NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Subsequent to the preparation of the present Yearbook, the documents and summary records of the meetings of the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament (A/AC.187/. . .) were issued—in accordance with a decision taken by the Committee at its fifth session—as Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 1 (A/S-10/1), vols. II to VII.

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EDITORIAL NOTE

The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook contains a review of the main developments and negotiations in the field of disarmament for each year, starting with 1976, together with a brief history of the major aspects of the question.

It makes no claim to present fully the views of all the States Members of the United Nations or even of the Powers directly concerned; for further information on the official positions of States the reader should consult the official records of the General Assembly and other sources.

For a more detailed account of the work of the Organization in previous years, the reader may consult The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970 (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1) and The United Nations and Disarmament: 1970-1975 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.76.IX.1).

ABBREVIATIONS

ABM  anti-ballistic missile
CCD  Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
ENDC Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament
FAO  Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
IAEA  International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM  intercontinental ballistic missile
ICRC  International Committee of the Red Cross
MIRV  multiple independently-targeted re-entry vehicle
SALT  Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SLBM  submarine-launched ballistic missile
UNEP  United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO  United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
WMO  World Meteorological Organization
INTRODUCTION


¹ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-first Session, Supplement No. 36 (A/31/36), chap. II.
³ See, for example, The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970 (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1); and The United Nations and Disarmament: 1970-1975 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.76.IX.1).
subjects, which are included in the appropriate chapters, the Secretary-General addressed the basic problems of disarmament in his message to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, and in his annual report on the work of the Organization. (For the texts, see appendices I and II, respectively, to the present volume.)

While the United Nations Secretariat has prepared most of the contributions included in the present edition, chapter XI has been provided by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the World Meteorological Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization have also contributed comments on their activities related to disarmament (see appendices III, IV and V, respectively).

In connexion with the subjects treated in the present issue, it may be noted that the main features of the 1976 edition have been followed, with some changes made in the light of the experience gained in preparing the first volume and of developments and events which occurred during 1977.

Thus, in part one, the first chapter of the Yearbook deals with the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

In part two a new chapter V is added, to take into account a number of nuclear arms limitation and disarmament questions not considered in other chapters. The title of chapter IX emphasizes the two basic elements of the discussion relating to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, although its contents are similar to chapter IX of the 1976 issue. Chapter XI, on IAEA safeguards, includes more information on the activities of the Agency in that connexion than chapter X of the previous edition, which was mainly concerned with the implementation by IAEA of the Final Declaration of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which had taken place the year before. In view of these changes, the order of the chapters in part two has been re-arranged to maintain a logical sequence.

The order of the first two chapters of part four, dealing with questions of regional disarmament, has been reversed in view of the action taken on that subject by the General Assembly in 1977, so that the general consideration of the problem could precede the discussion of aspects relating to a particular region.

In part four the title of chapter XIX, on international transfers of conventional arms, has been changed because this chapter covers ground which differs somewhat from that covered in the corresponding chapter in the 1976 edition. That part also contains two additional chapters. Chapter XIX deals with the report on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and of military expenditures, submitted to the General Assembly in 1977, while chapter XXI covers

4 United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.1.

2

Among the recommended contents of the *Disarmament Yearbook*, the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Review of the Role of the United Nations in Disarmament referred in its agreed proposals to a report on the status of existing disarmament agreements. A publication on the status of multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements is being issued as a separate annex to the present volume. The *Ad Hoc* Committee further recommended that the *Disarmament Yearbook* should contain factual information, communicated by Governments or appearing in their official publications, on such topics as military expenditures, armed forces and armaments, military production, arms trade and foreign aid in the military field, with full citation of the sources. Such information would be included in the *Yearbook* once appropriate and generally applicable criteria for the measurement, reporting and evaluation of relevant internationally comparable data were developed and agreed upon by the United Nations. As those criteria have not yet been developed or agreed upon, the pertinent information is not available, and therefore it cannot be given in the present volume. In connexion with other elements that the Secretariat hoped to include in the *Disarmament Yearbook*, it may be noted that a short chronology of events in the field of disarmament is now being published in the periodical entitled “Disarmament”, and that other subjects have been dealt with in the context of the background and working papers prepared by the Secretariat at the request of the Preparatory Committee for the special session.\(^5\)

PART ONE

Comprehensive approaches to disarmament
CHAPTER I

Special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament

Introduction

The idea of convening either a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament or a world disarmament conference under the auspices of the United Nations was initially discussed at the First Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Belgrade in 1961, and a proposal to that effect was formally included in the Declaration adopted by the Conference. Thereafter it was regularly reiterated in the final documents adopted at subsequent Summit Conferences (Cairo, 1964; Lusaka, 1970; Algiers, 1973), ministerial meetings (New York, 1971; Georgetown, 1972; Lima, 1975) and other conferences of the non-aligned countries, the underlying motive behind the initiative being the urgent need of setting in motion a process of general disarmament.

The question was again considered at the Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Colombo in 1976. In the Political Declaration adopted at the Conference it was recommended that, pending the convening of a world disarmament conference, the members of the non-aligned movement should request the holding of a special session of the General Assembly not later than 1978.

Following that decision, at the initiative of the non-aligned countries, a draft resolution on the convening of the special session, sponsored by 72 States from various political and geographical groups, was submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session. It was adopted without a vote on 21 December 1976 as resolution 31/189 B. By that resolution, it was decided to convene a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in New York in May/June 1978, to establish a Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, composed of 54 Member States appointed by the President of the Assembly on the basis of

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1 For an extract from the Declaration, see A/AC.187/30 and Corr.1.
2 See A/31/197.
equitable geographical distribution, and to invite all Member States to communicate to the Secretary-General their views on the agenda and all other relevant questions relating to the special session.

After consultations with the Chairmen of the various regional groups, the President of the General Assembly, in a communication to the Secretary-General dated 7 February 1977, stated that he had appointed the following 54 members of the Preparatory Committee: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Brazil, Burundi, Canada, Colombia, Cuba, Cyprus, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Guyana, Hungary, India, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire and Zambia.

Work of the Preparatory Committee, 1977

During the year 1977 the Preparatory Committee held three sessions, one organizational (28-30 March) and two substantive (9-20 May and 31 August-9 September). Its report on the work of those three sessions was submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session.

The first meeting of the Committee was opened by the Secretary-General. In his statement, the Secretary-General said that disarmament was a vital aspect of the primary function of the Organization—the maintenance of international peace and security. Pointing out that the special session would, in all probability, be the largest, most representative gathering ever convened to consider the question of disarmament in all its aspects, he expressed the hope that its holding might be an important element in the search for a more just and equitable world order. He noted, however, that the positive results of that search were constantly threatened by the continuing arms race. In an international environment dominated by the arms race, military and strategic considerations tended to shape the over-all relationship between States, affecting all other relations and transactions as well. Unless the arms race was brought to an end and unless a vigorous process of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, was initiated, there could be no guarantee that relations among States would, in fact, be based on the principles of national independence and sovereignty, non-interfer-

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3 See A/31/475.
5 The full text of the Secretary-General’s statement was circulated as document A/AC.187/62.
ence in the domestic affairs of other States, full equality of rights, non-
resort to force or the threat of force, and the right of every people to
decide its own destiny. The Secretary-General also said that for a num-
ber of years, world military expenditure had been around 300 billion
dollars per year, which was equivalent to about two thirds of the aggre-
gate gross national product of the countries which together comprised
the poorest half of the world’s population. He further remarked that
the diversion of resources in the field of scientific and technological
capability was most massive of all and that 25 per cent of the world’s
scientific manpower was engaged in military-related pursuits and that
40 per cent of all research and development spending in the world was
devoted to military purposes. In contrast, disarmament efforts since the
Second World War had produced only modest results. They had been
in the nature of arms limitation rather than disarmament. The emphasis
was on regulating competition in armaments and proscribing certain
developments deemed to be particularly destabilizing, costly or other-
wise unacceptable, rather than on attempting substantially to reduce
important weapons systems. What was needed, therefore, was a com-
prehensive approach aimed at real disarmament and one that was
realistic concerning both the possibilities of disarmament and the dan-
gers of a continued lack of decisive progress. The need for that new
approach had led the General Assembly to call for a special session
devoted to disarmament which would, it was hoped, prove to be a
turning-point in the search for disarmament and thus move the United
Nations closer to attaining the broad objectives for which it had been
created. Referring to the on-going arms race, the Secretary-General
noted that although stocks of nuclear weapons in the possession of the
nuclear Powers had for many years been sufficient to destroy the world
many times over, still the number of nuclear warheads had increased
fivefold in the past eight years. Furthermore, those weapons were con-
stantly being diversified and their performance characteristics im-
proved. It was his firm belief that only by halting the production of
nuclear weapons and liquidating the existing stocks could the danger
of their further horizontal proliferation be ultimately eliminated and a
nuclear holocaust averted. In that situation there was only one road
available to lead the world towards a peaceful and prosperous future
and that road was towards disarmament. He also stated that disarma-
ment must be a vital part of the attempts to restructure the world order
politically, economically and socially. The need was today greater than
ever. The Secretary-General concluded his statement by emphasizing
that, under the circumstances, it was essential to give the United
Nations an enhanced role in the field of disarmament.

The Preparatory Committee devoted its first session to organiza-
tional and other matters pertaining to its own work. Among other
things, it agreed to a recommendation of its Chairman concerning the
procedure to be followed for the adoption of decisions. In submitting
his recommendation at the first meeting, the Chairman said that the
Committee would be governed by the relevant parts of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly. Notwithstanding that fact, it had been generally agreed during prior consultations that every effort should be made to ensure that, as far as possible, decisions on matters of substance were adopted by consensus. He assured the Committee that, whenever it proved necessary, he would make every effort as Chairman to secure such a consensus. He would do so not only to respond to the wishes of the Committee but also because he felt that, in matters as important as those relating to disarmament, decisions adopted by consensus were much more likely to be implemented. Nevertheless, in order to avoid any misunderstanding, he stated that should his efforts to secure a consensus fail, he would duly inform the Committee so that decisions could then be adopted in accordance with the rules of procedure. He trusted that that procedure would not be questioned and pointed out that strict adherence to it would be beneficial to all.

The Committee also discussed the question of the participation in its work of non-members of the Committee. In order to make the preparation of the special session as successful as possible, it decided that States non-members of the Committee could fully participate in its work, without the right to vote.⁶

There was also a discussion of the role which various non-governmental organizations concerned with disarmament could play in the preparation of the special session. On that subject, the Committee agreed to a proposal submitted by its officers at the 4th meeting, which read as follows:

1. A well-informed public opinion, be it at national or international levels, can bring significant contributions towards progress in the field of disarmament.

The non-governmental organizations, whose dedication and interest in this field is well known and highly appreciated by the members of this Committee, could play a stimulating and constructive role in channelling the public concerns in this matter.

2. The officers of this Committee are pleased to realize the NGOs' interest in closely following the development of its work and hope that this association will be further strengthened by the continued presence of its representatives in the usual places in this room.

3. Notwithstanding the frequent and useful contacts or exchanges that take place between the NGOs and individual delegations, and in order to facilitate the knowledge of non-governmental contributions, the Secretariat will provide lists of general circulation of the communications received from the NGOs and institutions known to be conducting research in the field of disarmament. The lists will indicate where the communications and any annexed documentations will be available to delegations.

The Committee also decided to invite specialized agencies concerned with disarmament and the International Atomic Energy Agency

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⁶ Pursuant to this decision the following States attended the Committee's meetings: Bulgaria, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Honduras, Ireland, Israel, Lebanon, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal and Syrian Arab Republic.
(IAEA) to take part in the work of the Committee with observer status.\(^7\)

The two substantive sessions of the Preparatory Committee (second and third sessions) were devoted to the consideration of the various issues pertaining to the organization of the work of the special session and the future work of the Committee itself.

With regard to the special session, the subjects to which the Committee devoted special attention were the provisional agenda of the special session and the rules of procedure. The discussions concerning the agenda were greatly facilitated by the replies of Member States to the note verbale addressed to them by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 3 of resolution 31/189 B.\(^8\) From those replies two basic approaches to the agenda issue could be identified. One group of States considered that the agenda should be conceived in broad terms and confined to a few fundamental issues. In their opinion, that would provide a framework which would still be flexible enough to permit consideration of the many specific problems and questions. That approach was supported by a number of States, including Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Cyprus, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iran, Mexico, the Netherlands, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and Yugoslavia. Although not always using the same wording for the specific items, most of the replies of those countries suggested the following four main items for the agenda: (a) general debate, including a review of the current international situation; (b) declaration of principles of disarmament; (c) programme of action in the field of disarmament; and (d) review of disarmament machinery, including the role of the United Nations.

Another group of States, while not opposed in principle to that approach, considered that it would facilitate the deliberations of the special session if specific areas of concern were indicated in the agenda. In elaborating that view, Finland, India, Italy and Malaysia emphasized in particular that the highest priority should be accorded to the problem of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, including such specific questions as the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, the transfer of nuclear technology and the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Other States in this group, among them Colombia, Egypt, Indonesia, Japan, Kuwait, Portugal and Surinam, in addition to measures concerning nuclear weapons, mentioned the questions of the transfer of conventional weapons, chemical weapons, incendiary weapons, reduction of armed forces, security of non-nuclear-weapon States, zones of peace, disarmament and development and economic and social consequences of disarmament.

\(^7\) Pursuant to this decision representatives of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the International Atomic Energy Agency attended the meetings of the Committee.

In addition, several States in their replies addressed the issue of the agenda in general terms. The United States, for example, considered that the primary focus of the session's work should be the examination of major substantive issues in the disarmament field and the search for practicable approaches to their resolution. In the view of the Soviet Union, the agenda of the special session should provide for a broad exchange of views on the problem of disarmament, with regard to the fundamental approaches to the question at the present time and also to the basic directions of the priority efforts of States in the disarmament field, with a view to attaining the main goal of all efforts, namely, general and complete disarmament. In its opinion, attention could also be devoted at the session to partial measures directed towards limiting and halting the arms race and bringing about disarmament, and to measures taken on a regional basis. Bulgaria and Venezuela felt that the agenda of the special session should provide for the consideration of the question of convening a world disarmament conference. A similar view was also expressed by Mongolia. The German Democratic Republic considered that the special session should devote maximum attention to the memorandum of the Soviet Union on questions of ending the arms race, and disarmament, of 28 September 1976, which in its opinion constituted an important reference document since it not only covered all essential problems of disarmament in their interrelationship but also pointed out ways of solving them.

In the course of the work of the Preparatory Committee and following initial consultations with members of other regional groups, Sri Lanka, on behalf of the non-aligned group in the Committee, submitted on 10 May a working paper containing a draft provisional agenda for the special session. After additional informal consultations which resulted in several amendments to the four-item draft, at the 12th meeting of the Committee on 20 May, Sri Lanka stated that a consensus had been reached on a final wording.

The substantive part of the provisional agenda of the special session as adopted by the Preparatory Committee and recommended by it in its report to the General Assembly, together with an additional item entitled “General debate” inserted at a later stage of its work, reads as follows:

8. General debate
9. Review and appraisal of the present international situation in the light of the pressing need to achieve substantial progress in the field of disarmament, the continuation of the arms race and the close interrelationship between disarmament, international peace and security and economic development
10. Adoption of a declaration on disarmament

10 A/AC.187/43.
11. Adoption of a programme of action on disarmament
12. Review of the role of the United Nations in disarmament and of the international machinery for negotiations on disarmament, including, in particular, the question of convening a world disarmament conference.

With regard to the provisional agenda, it should also be noted that the Committee recommended in its report that the General Assembly, at its thirty-second session, should request the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) and the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference to submit special reports to the Assembly at its special session, the former on the state of the various questions under its consideration and the latter on the state of its work and deliberations.

The second question of particular importance which the Committee discussed was that of the rules of procedure of the special session. In view of the decision of the Committee to be governed in its own work by the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, many members of the Committee considered that it followed logically that the same principle should apply with regard to the special session. However, in the course of the initial discussions during the organizational session, as well as the discussions during the later stage of the work of the Committee, in particular at its informal meetings, a number of States expressed the view that, with regard to the decision-making process, the rule of consensus was a more appropriate method of work. That view was supported by the German Democratic Republic, Turkey, the United States, the USSR and the United Kingdom (on behalf also of the other members of the European Economic Community). The United States, for instance, stressed that disarmament was a highly sensitive issue and that, if the special session was to lend new impetus to the disarmament process, the decisions of the special session must enjoy widespread support, particularly that of the major Powers. The views of both groups of States were appropriately reflected in the recommendations of the Committee, as contained in its report. The relevant part of the report reads:

The rules of procedure of the General Assembly should apply in the special session without amendments, on the understanding that, regarding the adoption of decisions by the Assembly at the special session, every effort should be made to ensure that, in so far as possible, decisions on matters of substance will be adopted by consensus.

The report of the Committee contains a number of other recommendations pertaining to the organization of the work of the special session agreed upon after thorough exchanges of views. The Committee also recommended that the special session should be held in New York between 23 May and 28 June 1978.

The Committee considered that, following the practice of previous special sessions, the Assembly might wish to elect as President of the special session the President of the thirty-second regular session. The
Committee also considered that the Vice-Presidents should be the same as those of the thirty-second session, on the understanding that regional groups might make substitutions of Vice-Presidents allocated to each group. The Preparatory Committee also recommended that the special session should establish a committee of the whole, with as many open-ended groups or subsidiary organs as might be necessary. The chairman of the committee of the whole should be elected by the Assembly at its special session. The other recommendations concerned the election of the Credentials Committee and the General Committee, the level of representation, which should be at the highest possible level, public information activities, and the role of non-governmental organizations, which it was decided should be accorded the same facilities at the special session as they had had in the Preparatory Committee.

With regard to the organization of the future work of the Preparatory Committee itself, a consensus was reached on the recommendation that the Committee should hold two additional sessions in 1978, one from 24 January to 24 February (fourth session) and the other from 10 to 21 April (fifth session). Both sessions would be devoted to working out the draft principal document—or documents—of the special session.

The question of the principal documents was initially touched upon in the replies of Member States to the Secretary-General, from which there emerged a large measure of agreement between States on the type of documents that the special session should produce. Most of those which referred to the matter, while agreeing to defer for the time being the question whether there would be one or more principal documents, were of the opinion that the special session should adopt at least two basic texts. Argentina, Brazil, Greece, Ireland, Malaysia, Norway, Peru, the Philippines and Sweden called the two texts “general principles on disarmament” and “programme of action”, while Canada, Finland, Mexico, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia used the terms “political declaration” and “programme of action”. Romania also included in the proposal a suggestion for a text on the negotiating machinery. On the other hand, Japan, Liberia, Mongolia, the Ukrainian SSR and the USSR referred only to a “political declaration”. For its part the German Democratic Republic proposed the adoption of a “joint declaration of intent”, while Italy suggested the adoption of a “general policy statement”. Further exchanges of views helped the Committee to reach consensus, in principle, that the main sections of the principal document or documents of the special session should be: (a) introduction or preamble; (b) declaration on disarmament; (c) programme of action; and (d) machinery for disarmament negotiations. The Committee also noted in its report that there was a trend in favour of one final document, but that the question should be decided at a later stage.

11 See foot-note 8.
In the course of the work of the Committee a number of Member States submitted various working papers further elaborating ideas and elements which, in their opinion, should find a place in the documents of the special session. The working papers submitted by the non-aligned members of the Preparatory Committee and Romania covered all three areas of concern—declaration on disarmament, programme of action and machinery for disarmament negotiations. The two working papers of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the USSR dealt with the declaration on disarmament and the programme of action. Finally, in their respective working papers Mexico and Mauritius referred to the declaration.

The Preparatory Committee did not deal with the substance of the proposals, not only because it had primarily organizational matters on its agenda, but also because it was expected that at the fourth session of the Committee in 1978 other individual States or groups of States would submit additional working papers, which would then reflect more fully the spectrum of views of the membership of the Committee on the substantive issues. The papers already submitted are based on different approaches to disarmament. Concerning the declaration, the main differences appeared with regard to such issues as the assessment of the current situation and of the disarmament results achieved so far and the causes and the effects of the arms race. Differences were also reflected in the proposed programmes of action, mainly with regard to disarmament areas or particular measures which should be given priority treatment. Some States considered that nuclear disarmament required the most urgent attention, while others attached an equal importance to the regulation of conventional weapons. A third group of States placed particular emphasis on various partial measures. Irrespective of those differences, there was a growing tendency in the Committee to favour a programme of action which, while covering in a comprehensive manner all possible measures that might facilitate the realization of the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament, would concentrate on and specify in greater detail those measures which could be worked out within a shorter period of time and reviewed periodically. According to that view, it would be more appropriate to elaborate a long-term programme of action only once the machinery for disarmament had been well defined and agreed upon. The working papers dealing with the disarmament machinery emphasized in particular the need for strengthening the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. General exchanges of views on the issue in the Committee ranged from suggestions for substantial changes in the machinery both within and outside the scope of the United Nations, based on the notion that the present machinery was not quite adequate, to the view that minor improvements in existing machinery were suffi-

A list of these working papers is given in the report of the Preparatory Committee.
cient, since results in disarmament negotiations depended primarily on the political will of the participants, rather than on modifications of the available mechanisms. In considering the issue of machinery, many non-aligned States held that all nuclear-weapon States should be able to participate fully in disarmament efforts.

The ideas and proposals advanced in the course of the preliminary exchanges of views in the Preparatory Committee on the contents of the final document or documents of the special session suggest that the Committee will have a solid basis for its work at subsequent sessions, but at the same time that intensive and even protracted negotiations will be required before an agreed text can be worked out.

Finally, it should be mentioned that under the heading “Other recommendations”, the report of the Committee deals with the proposal, submitted by Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, for a United Nations study on disarmament and development. Having heard the explanations of the sponsors, the Committee decided to recommend to the General Assembly that it should initiate the proposed study, the terms of reference and other aspects of the study to be determined by the Assembly itself. The Committee further recommended that decisions in that respect should be taken at the special session.

The report of the Preparatory Committee to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session was unanimously adopted at the 20th meeting of the Committee, on 9 September 1977.

Consideration by the CCD, 1977

In the course of the 1977 session of the CCD, a number of delegations made reference in their statements to the special session of the General Assembly. Romania, stressing the vital interest of disarmament to all States, pointed out that the decision to hold a special session was proof of the determination of small and medium-sized countries to put an end to the arms race. Similarly, Yugoslavia held that the convening of the special session was the result of the growing awareness in the international community of the tremendous dangers of the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race, and that it reflected the need for resolute and immediate action to work out a programme of measures aimed at and ensuring concrete disarmament, as well as the need for all Members of the United Nations to be engaged in such efforts on an equal basis. Several delegations, notably Mexico, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United States and Yugoslavia, stressed the importance of making significant progress in the CCD in 1977 as a contribution to the success of the special session. Hungary, while sharing a sense of urgency with

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13 See A/AC.187/80.
regard to achieving progress before the session, held that that date should not be considered as an absolute deadline for solving all disarmament problems. Bulgaria hoped that the CCD would be in a position to report new achievements to the Assembly at the special session. It stressed, however, that the special session could not be a substitute for existing disarmament negotiating bodies, such as the CCD, and that the future of the Committee could not depend on the views of the session. For its part, Mexico held that the CCD should not only achieve tangible results with regard to genuine disarmament before the special session, but also changes in its structure. Similarly, Egypt hoped that the special session would consider new forms for the negotiating process. The United Kingdom, for its part, considered that the objective of the special session should be to reach agreement on the general principles for effective disarmament, which would also indicate the priorities for negotiation. Italy favoured the adoption of a declaration of basic principles, with broad support, as a useful guideline for all endeavours in the disarmament field. Poland hoped that the special session would address many important and urgent problems, thereby contributing to the adoption of a programme of action on disarmament reflecting the Committee's efforts with respect to the elaboration of a comprehensive negotiating programme. Finally, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary held that the special session should be a stage in the preparation of a world disarmament conference.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1977

The question of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament received a great deal of attention from Member States at the thirty-second session, both during the general debate, in the Assembly, and in the First Committee. Almost all States which referred to the issue in their statements expressed satisfaction with the timely decision to convene the special session and pledged themselves to contribute to its successful work. In doing so, some of them, including Indonesia, Iran, Kuwait, Portugal and Sri Lanka, recalled that one of the main reasons for holding the special session was a certain disappointment with the results achieved so far, which they described as rather meagre, and in particular about the fact that the arms race, especially in the nuclear sphere, continued unabated. It was pointed out by other delegations, including the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Sao Tome and Principe and Thailand, that the arms race had resulted in an enormous waste of material and human resources used to create means of man's destruction, instead of being deployed for peaceful development projects for the benefit of all people.

15 See Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-second Session, First Committee, 7th to 38th, 40th and 44th meetings; and ibid., First Committee, Sessional Fascicle, corrigendum.
Some States, notably Cyprus, Jordan, Kenya and Kuwait, dealt with the close interrelationship between disarmament and the maintenance of international peace and security, emphasizing that the continued arms race had adverse effects both on security and on development, since in their view, peace and prosperity were indivisible. In that regard, Yugoslavia also stated that the holding of the special session was an expression of an awareness that international peace and security in the present-day world could not be permanently maintained on a balance of force, military might and division into blocs.

Against that background, many Member States referred to their expectations concerning the special session. A great many of them hoped that it would become an important milestone, landmark or turning-point in the search for genuine disarmament (Belgium, Ireland, Liberia, Mauritius, Netherlands, Romania, Sweden and Tunisia), acting as a catalyst to continued disarmament negotiations (Denmark and Italy), and that as such it would lend new momentum to and generate fresh enthusiasm for disarmament efforts (Federal Republic of Germany, Guinea, Hungary, Indonesia, Netherlands and Nigeria). It was also pointed out that the special session would provide a valuable opportunity to review and reflect on the entire range of urgent disarmament problems, to make a broad reassessment of the problems and their possibilities, and to examine the interrelationship between disarmament, international peace and security and economic development (Afghanistan, Australia, Canada, Cyprus and Ethiopia). Many States remarked that the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament should be strengthened (Afghanistan, Honduras, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Romania, the United Kingdom and Yugoslavia) and that the United Nations should, in fact, remain the supreme body for the settlement of questions relating to disarmament (Algeria).

Many States from various geographical and political groups felt that the special session could be successful only on the basis of the concerted efforts of all States. In their opinion, the ever growing arms race threatened the survival of the whole of mankind and therefore it was important that the interest of all States, small and large, should be fully taken into consideration at the special session. At the same time, it was pointed out that the participation of the major military Powers, particularly all nuclear-weapon States, was essential (Belgium and German Democratic Republic) in view of the special responsibilities of those States for halting the arms race (Mauritius, Morocco, Norway, Sweden, Tunisia, Yugoslavia and Zaire). Some States felt that the work of the special session would be greatly facilitated if some agreements on outstanding issues could be reached before it commenced. Specific references were made with regard to SALT (Austria), a comprehensive test ban (Austria, Bangladesh and Norway) and chemical weapons (Mongolia and Norway).

As far as the general objectives of the special session are concerned, a number of views were expressed by Member States. It was
felt, for example, that the special session should establish new guidelines and priorities for further negotiations (Argentina), point out the direction which the international community should follow to achieve significant measures of disarmament (Australia), determine a common and fundamental approach to disarmament (Bulgaria), lay down the necessary guidelines and give incentives for genuine progress in the disarmament negotiations (Norway), and identify the main areas where States should concentrate their priority efforts in the field of disarmament (USSR). While agreeing with those general objectives, many States, including Australia, Austria, Argentina, Ethiopia, India, the Netherlands, Sweden and Yugoslavia, emphasized that since nuclear weapons, or the threat of nuclear conflict, currently posed the most serious danger, nuclear disarmament should be given the highest priority at the special session. Several other States felt that within the general field of nuclear disarmament particular attention should be devoted to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace (Kuwait, Mauritania and Pakistan) as well as to the formulation of credible security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States (Pakistan).

Finally, in discussing the special session several States, including Botswana, Bulgaria, the Congo, Czechoslovakia, Cuba, the German Democratic Republic, Greece, Hungary, Indonesia, Mozambique and the Ukrainian SSR, referred also to the question of convening a world disarmament conference. Those States expressed the hope that the special session would make a decisive contribution to an improvement in conditions for the convening of a world disarmament conference, i.e., that the special session would be an intermediate stage leading to a world disarmament conference.

In the course of the consideration of the agenda item, particular attention was devoted to the report of the Preparatory Committee and the various recommendations it contained with regard to the organization of the special session and the future work of the Preparatory Committee. The report was introduced in the First Committee by the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee, Ambassador Carlos Ortiz de Rozas of Argentina, who emphasized that the work of the Committee had been characterized by the spirit of co-operation of all participants, who had both contributed ideas and made constructive suggestions during the general debate, as well as in the process of consultations and negotiations which had led to the adoption by consensus of the recommendations contained in the report.

During the consideration of the report virtually all Member States expressed support for the recommendations contained therein. Some States expressed, in particular, their approval of and support for the recommended provisional agenda of the special session (Argentina, German Democratic Republic, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Morocco, Ro-
mania and Turkey). Numerous references were also made to the principal document or documents to be adopted at the special session. Most of the States which spoke on the issue, notably Australia, Austria, Ecuador, Finland, Greece, Italy, Mexico, Norway, Pakistan, Romania, Sweden and Yugoslavia, expressed their general agreement with the proposed sections—introduction or preamble, declaration on disarmament, programme of action, and machinery for disarmament negotiations—some of them emphasising in particular the importance of the programme of action (Austria, Ecuador and Finland). Several other States, while supporting the general trend concerning the main sections, offered also specific suggestions concerning the various points which in their opinion should find their place or be particularly emphasized in the appropriate parts of the document or documents.

Bulgaria felt that the introduction should offer a well-balanced account of what had been achieved and what remained to be achieved, and should show the consistency and continuity of the current and future efforts in the field. Concerning a declaration on disarmament, Bulgaria attached particular importance to the reaffirmation of such concepts as the link between political and military détente, the obligation not to use force in international relations or to impair the security of any Member States, and renunciation of the policy of obtaining unilateral advantages and of the use of the achievements of science and technology for the qualitative perfectioning of weapons.

The Byelorussian SSR considered that a great deal had been achieved in resolving the problems of disarmament so far and therefore was of the opinion that that should be properly reflected in the documents of the special session. It attached particular importance to the need for all Member States to become parties to the important existing agreements in the field of disarmament. It also expressed the view that the attainment of the goal of general and complete disarmament would be greatly facilitated if the Assembly at its special session would pay due attention to partial measures to limit and halt the arms race and would encourage bilateral, regional and multilateral measures. In its view, the special session should give a fresh powerful momentum to the business of concluding work on the proposals which had already been submitted in the United Nations. Concerning the question of machinery, the Byelorussian SSR expressed the view that the existing organs and channels for disarmament talks had proved their worth and had yielded considerable positive results. In view of that it hoped that the decisions of the special session would facilitate their successful functioning in the future.

Hungary felt that the introduction should mention, in a brief analysis of the current international situation, both the dangers of the unresolved issues and the positive results that would have been achieved by the time of the special session. In its opinion, the declaration, while reaffirming general and complete disarmament as a standing objective,
should recognize the importance of partial measures seeking to limit the armaments race. It should also include a renunciation of efforts to obtain unilateral advantages, and confirm the importance of the universality of disarmament agreements and measures, as well as of the principle of non-use of force in international relations. The programme of action, in defining the areas that call for international agreements, should place particular emphasis on nuclear disarmament and on the need for States to limit or reduce other weapons and armaments. With regard to machinery, Hungary felt that the slow progress in disarmament was not due to imperfect machinery but rather to the lack of adequate political will. The existing system of negotiations, in its opinion, was capable of handling the existing problems—bilateral, regional and multilateral—and therefore the main task of the special session should not be the modification of the existing machinery.

Italy was of the view that the adoption of a comprehensive and balanced programme of action specifying the priorities and key steps of a gradual disarmament process was essential for furthering the cause of disarmament. Its implementation should be in successive stages, but without rigid time-limits, and the programme would have to embody the following principles: (a) a degree of flexibility in following the established time-table; (b) a balance between the measures to be taken in the different sectors of disarmament; and (c) appropriate co-ordination of global and regional disarmament. Concerning the specifics of the programme, Italy considered that the following questions should be dealt with as a matter of priority in this order: first, nuclear disarmament; secondly, the prohibition of chemical weapons and other weapons of mass destruction; thirdly, the reduction of conventional weapons. Among the measures of nuclear disarmament, Italy mentioned in particular the complete cessation of all nuclear weapon tests and the strengthening of the system of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons with adequate provisions for the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. As regards the question of machinery for disarmament negotiations, it felt that the discussion of the issue ultimately concealed a lack of political will and a persistence of serious ideological divergencies regarding substantial disarmament matters, rather than inadequacy of the disarmament mechanism as such.

Mexico, for its part, considered that the results of the work of the special session should be concentrated in a single final document containing a small number of sections. The introduction should be designed to give a synoptic view of the current situation of the arms race and disarmament and, within this context, should give particular emphasis to the incalculable destructive power of accumulated nuclear arsenals, the tremendous squandering of resources entailed by the arms race and the hazardous effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons. It should also explain with suitable conciseness the content and purposes of the other three sections of the final document. With regard to the declara-
tion, Mexico recalled that it had suggested in a working paper submitted to the Preparatory Committee a series of 25 fundamental principles and norms. Concerning the programme of action, Mexico believed that it should include only measures which could be carried out in the three years following the special session, so as to avoid the discouraging effect of failure to implement innumerable proposals. However, the programme would have to be complemented with three provisions which would ensure its implementation and the preparation of a comprehensive disarmament programme. The first of those provisions would be designed to bring about the inclusion in the agenda of the three subsequent regular sessions of the General Assembly of an item permitting examination of the extent to which the programme of action was being carried out. The second would embody a decision to convene a second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in May/June 1981. The third would entrust either to a subsidiary ad hoc body or the CCD, provided that the necessary changes were made to permit the participation of China and France, the task of preparing a comprehensive disarmament programme which would be complete and exhaustive. With respect to machinery, Mexico was of the view that the institution of the co-chairmanship of the CCD should be replaced by a system which would have the most chance of being acceptable to all five nuclear-weapon Powers, such as the monthly rotation of the chairmanship among all States members of the CCD not possessing nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Union recalled that the working papers submitted by the Eastern European States to the Preparatory Committee with regard to the declaration on disarmament and the programme of action were based on the premise that disarmament was a matter of priority for all mankind. It also recalled that those countries included among the fundamental ideas which should serve as guidelines when elaborating agreements on disarmament matters the need to supplement political détente by military détente, the universal confirmation of the principle of non-use of force in international relations, the principle of the non-violation of State security, the use of scientific and technological achievements exclusively for peaceful purposes and the largest possible participation in disarmament negotiations and the acceptance of disarmament agreements. Concerning the programme of action, those countries were of the view that it should include provisions on the halting of the arms race in both nuclear and conventional weapons, prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, consolidation of the system of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the prohibition of chemical weapons and new forms and systems of weapons of mass destruction, the creation of non-nuclear zones and zones of peace and the reduction of military budgets.

Finally, while favouring the drafting of a single document, Yugoslavia said that it had an open mind concerning other possible

16 A/AC.187/56.
proposals. It believed that the introduction of the final document should, *inter alia*, point out the harmful consequences of the arms race for international peace and security and the social and economic development of the world. The declaration on disarmament, in Yugoslavia's view, should embody clearly formulated principles of long-term value, among them that the measures for the limitation, reduction and elimination of armaments, until the attainment of the objective of general and complete disarmament, should be implemented in a balanced manner, that there should be a balance of mutually acceptable rights and obligations between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States, that all types of weapons and systems of mass destruction should be given the highest priority among all disarmament measures, that a definitive solution with regard to the limitation and reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces could be found only within the framework of general and complete disarmament, that all States should have access to scientific achievements and technology for the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and that the responsibilities of the United Nations in the field of disarmament should be further strengthened. As regards the programme of action, Yugoslavia believed that it should be drafted in such a way that its dynamics and priorities could be implemented in determined phases that would not be rigidly fixed in terms of time. Concerning the machinery for disarmament negotiations, Yugoslavia stressed the importance of strengthening the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. In this context it suggested that the United Nations could play an important role in elaborating negotiating principles, drawing up a programme of measures and actions, intensifying its own activity by having, *inter alia*, the First Committee of the General Assembly become a body dealing exclusively with problems of disarmament and international security, and by reviewing the progress achieved, as well as providing the necessary impetus for further negotiations. These measures could be undertaken without hampering the disarmament efforts taking place within the existing bodies, such as the CCD, which should be further improved to become more efficient and representative.

In the course of the disarmament debate of a number of States also made specific references to the recommendation of the Preparatory Committee concerning a United Nations study on the relationship between disarmament and development. Sweden, as one of the initiators of the proposal, recalled that several studies had been undertaken by the United Nations in this field, but that work had not so far led to any tangible results. It was of the opinion that a further in-depth analysis of this relationship was necessary, in order to develop a basis for decisions on specific reallocation measures. For their part, both Denmark and Norway pointed out that particular attention should in this connexion be focused on means and methods of reallocating resources released through disarmament for the alleviation of the condition of the world's poor and suffering. Finland also pointed out that
disarmament and development should be viewed in closer relationship with each other than hitherto. Many non-aligned and Western States, including Bangladesh, Cyprus, Fiji, Ireland, Liberia, Malaysia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Spain, the Sudan, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States expressed support for this proposal, which had been initiated by the Nordic countries. In doing so, the United Kingdom emphasized, however, that it could not be taken for granted that the redeployment of military resources to civilian purposes would be achieved without a measure of economic disruption and industrial restructuring. It agreed, though, that the study could throw more light on those problems and might be considered an appropriate follow-up to the question of the reduction of military budgets. Similarly, the United States held that it was hard to make a concrete link between disarmament savings by major Powers and development. Still, it agreed that the time had come to focus new creative efforts on that question. In its view, the interdependence of nations and of human enterprises — food, energy, development, technology, security — which was becoming more pervasive every year, would create ever more pressing questions about interdependence of economic well-being and development, on the one hand, and security and expenditures for armaments, on the other. Therefore, it concluded, the proposed study offered a welcome stimulus for international discussions about the nature of the problem posed by the choice between arms and development.

Under the agenda item concerning the special session, the First Committee also had before it a draft resolution (A/C.1/32/L.16), submitted on 10 November and introduced by Norway on 11 November. The draft, sponsored by 39 States from the various geographical and political groups, dealt with the study on the relationship between disarmament and development recommended by the Preparatory Committee in its report. It was adopted by the Committee by consensus on 15 November.

In connexion with the other recommendations contained in the report of the Preparatory Committee, the First Committee had before it a draft resolution (A/C.1/32/L.11) submitted on 7 November. The draft sponsored by 53 States belonging to the various geographical and political groups, was introduced by Sri Lanka on 10 November. The Committee adopted it by consensus on 18 November.

On both occasions China stated that it dissociated itself from the consensus.

Both draft resolutions were adopted by the General Assembly on 12 December by consensus, as resolutions 32/88 A and 32/88 B. Prior to the voting in the General Assembly on disarmament matters, Albania stated that it would not participate in the vote on those draft resolutions.

The resolutions read as follows:
A

The General Assembly,

Gravely concerned that vast human and material resources are spent on armaments,

Reaffirming the need to allocate greater resources to economic and social progress, particularly having in mind the needs of the developing countries,

Firmly believing that a curtailment of expenditures on armaments in keeping with the objectives of the Disarmament Decade would facilitate the availability of greater resources for economic and social development, particularly to the developing countries,

Recalling its previous resolutions on the aforementioned matters and the specific studies carried out at its request,

Noting the declaration made by the Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Colombo from 16 to 19 August 1976, on this matter,

Noting also the proposal for a United Nations study presented to the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament,

Sharing the view that decisions on concrete action would be facilitated through an in-depth analysis on the relationship between disarmament efforts and measures to achieve economic and social progress,

1. Endorses the recommendation by the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament that the General Assembly should initiate a study on the relationship between disarmament and development, the terms of reference of the study to be determined by the Assembly itself at its special session;

2. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint, at the earliest possible date, an ad hoc group of governmental experts with the task of elaborating a possible framework and terms of reference for the above-mentioned study;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to make available to the Ad Hoc Group on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development all the relevant materials, including proposals made by Member States, as well as previous and current United Nations studies on the subject;

4. Requests the Ad Hoc Group to report on its work not later than 1 April 1978;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit the report of the Ad Hoc Group to Member States not later than a month before the opening, on 23 May 1978, of the special session.

B

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 31/189 B of 21 December 1976, in which it decided to convene a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament,

Having considered the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament,

1. Endorses the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament and the recommendation contained therein for the special session to be held between 23 May and 28 June 1978 in the General Assembly Hall;

2. Requests the Preparatory Committee to continue its work in order to prepare a draft final document or documents for consideration and adoption by the General Assembly at its special session and to submit to the Assembly its final report;
3. Expresses its appreciation to the members of the Preparatory Committee for their constructive contribution to its work;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to Member States the records of the thirty-second session of the General Assembly relating to the special session;

5. Further requests the Secretary-General to render the Preparatory Committee all necessary assistance as may be required for the completion of its work.

Conclusion

Although at this time the preparations for the special session are still proceeding, it is already possible to draw certain conclusions regarding both the work of the Preparatory Committee and the significance of the special session.

The sessions of the Committee so far have been held in a business-like atmosphere and in a spirit of constructive co-operation which enabled it to adopt all its recommendations by consensus. This provides grounds for hope that the same approach will prevail in the decisive phase of its work when the Committee deals with the substantive matter, the actual drafting of the principal document or documents of the special session.

The special session of the General Assembly will be the first meeting convened to discuss, in a universal forum and at the highest possible political level, all aspects of disarmament since the establishment of the United Nations. In fact, no international gathering on disarmament has attracted such wide attention from Member States and non-governmental organizations as the special session. The thorough preparations under way, which by the time the session starts will have taken more than a year, reflect the importance that Member States attach to the special session and the need for careful and detailed consideration of all the questions to be discussed at the session.

With respect to the work that the Assembly is expected to undertake at the special session, the preparations point to a comprehensive approach to the question of disarmament, which has been stressed by all Member States participating in the work of the Preparatory Committee. The provisional agenda, adopted by the General Assembly by consensus, follows the same approach. For the first time, the most authoritative body of the United Nations will consider in depth the complex problem of disarmament in all its aspects, including a declaration, a programme of action and machinery.

A comprehensive approach is seen by Member States as a step forward in the disarmament process. In addition, it is also recognized that dealing with all the questions involved in disarmament is a difficult task which would require a major effort on the part of all delegations. However, it is generally felt that, if this endeavour succeeds, the special session may well start a new phase in disarmament.
CHAPTER II

Consideration of general and complete disarmament

Introduction

Following a number of early efforts to deal with the question of disarmament on a comprehensive basis, the General Assembly, on 20 November 1959, adopted resolution 1378 (XIV) in which, for the first time, it expressly stated its hope for the early achievement of the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The goal formulated in that resolution has ever since been considered as the ultimate disarmament objective of the United Nations.

In the early 1960s several consequential initiatives were introduced which attempted to deal with disarmament as a whole. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America in fact agreed, in a joint statement issued on 20 September 1961, on a set of eight principles as the basis for future disarmament negotiations aimed towards the ultimate objective and, in its resolution 1722 (XVI), the General Assembly agreed on the composition of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC), the negotiating body which would work towards agreement on general and complete disarmament with those principles in view. Initiatives put forward during the period called for disarmament to be achieved in defined stages under strict and effective international control, sometimes within a specific number of years. Separate draft treaties covering the process were submitted by the Soviet Union \(^1\) and in outline by the United States.\(^2\) They took into account such requirements as stable relative security among States and adequate measures to ensure international control throughout the whole disarmament process and outlined a final status of armed forces and armaments, including their peace-keeping role in a disarmed world. Procedures for implementation of actual measures in the first stage of

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such a process, however, could not be agreed upon and gradually the concept of achievement of disarmament through an all-inclusive instrument was combined with efforts to deal first with partial measures which offered greater promise of near-term results. Among problems which received attention were those of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the cessation of all nuclear-weapon testing; later, the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons became a major concern.

In recent years, the trend has been towards dealing separately with important but partial areas of arms limitation and disarmament, and the number of separate disarmament items on the agenda of the General Assembly has accordingly increased. The ultimate goal has remained unaltered, however, and has been referred to repeatedly in the various bodies and conferences dealing with disarmament. In consequence, an item entitled “General and complete disarmament” has appeared on the agenda of the General Assembly each year and has continued to be an important aspect of the deliberations of the Assembly.

Numerous proposals have been submitted under the item, which, while not containing specific plans leading to the ultimate goal, seek to encourage progress towards it by various means. They have included initiatives concerning principles and priorities for negotiations, improvements in the machinery and other ideas intended to co-ordinate or otherwise enhance the effectiveness of efforts devoted to disarmament. Thus, the declaration by the General Assembly, in resolution 2602 E (XXIV), of the 1970s as a Disarmament Decade was the result of a proposal debated under the general agenda item. Similarly, the question of the review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament was debated under the general item prior to becoming a separate question. The general item has also enabled the General Assembly to cover certain questions which, for one reason or another, could not be placed on the agenda as separate items. In that sense, it has embraced such questions as the encouragement of greater progress in the bilateral Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the Soviet Union and the United States, one-time calls for review conferences pertaining to the operation of certain international treaties, and the consideration of the reports of the CCD and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

In addition to its function in providing considerable flexibility to the deliberations of the General Assembly on disarmament questions, the item “General and complete disarmament” has exerted a significant influence on its debates. It has restated the basic goal which has usually been linked with the consideration of specific measures and, furthermore, has been an essential element for the evaluation of the results achieved in ongoing negotiations. General and complete disarmament has thus become both a widely recognized objective and an ever-present concept in disarmament efforts.
Consideration by the CCD, 1977

As in previous years, the delegations of the States represented in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament continued to recognize general and complete disarmament under effective international control as the ultimate goal of all disarmament efforts. Several referred to the matter directly, while others referred to it either in connexion with the question of a comprehensive programme of disarmament in the discussions on the Disarmament Decade, or in expressing views on such questions as disarmament and development or the economic and social consequences of the arms race, the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament or the possibility of the convening of a world disarmament conference.

The Soviet Union made some of the more direct comments on the question and circulated as a CCD document the memorandum on questions of ending the arms race and achieving disarmament which it had submitted in 1976 to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session. In the memorandum, the USSR identified and discussed what it considered to be the main areas for co-ordinated action, as follows: (a) cessation of the nuclear arms race and reduction and subsequent elimination of nuclear weapons; (b) prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests; (c) consolidation of the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; (d) prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons; (e) prohibition of the development of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction; (f) reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments; (g) zones of peace in the Indian Ocean and other regions; and (h) reduction of military budgets; finally, in considering (i) negotiating forums, the USSR reiterated its support of a world disarmament conference. The Soviet representative called attention to the willingness of his Government to proceed on a step-by-step basis, and therefore felt that the memorandum could serve as one of the documents to be taken into account in the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

The United States called attention to its continued resolve to press for arms-control goals, while maintaining a stable balance at every stage in the process, and emphasized that all arms agreements should enhance the security of the United States and other countries and include adequate verification arrangements. A message from President Carter was read in which he pledged his efforts to halt the nuclear arms race and to place practical limitations on conventional arms. He added that the

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5 Ibid., paras. 256-277.
6 Ibid., para. 278.
7 Ibid., paras. 279-285.
8 Ibid., annex II, document CCD/522 (previously circulated as document A/31/232).
United States would work tirelessly to contribute to the success of the CCD.

The concept of achieving the ultimate goal through agreed priorities and steps was voiced by the delegations of several States members of the Committee. The German Democratic Republic, for instance, called attention to the Soviet Union's memorandum, and noted that that initiative as well as others had focused, as a first priority, on nuclear disarmament, leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons but without losing sight of the strategic aim of general and complete disarmament. India also stressed the need for efforts to achieve general and complete disarmament on a step-by-step basis, starting with disarmament in the areas of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, and working within the framework of the ultimate goal. It added that the process must be based on the premise of arms limitation, rather than arms control, since the latter would merely maintain a balance of terror. Italy reaffirmed its dedication to general and complete disarmament despite the obvious difficulties involved and stressed the need for a systematic programme of disarmament with both short- and long-term objectives. Late in the session, the delegation expressed satisfaction that an item concerning such a programme had been placed on the provisional agenda for the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

A number of members of the Committee expressed concern over the continuing arms race and the lack of progress in achieving real disarmament. Yugoslavia, in particular, outlined what it viewed as the requirements for real progress towards disarmament: (a) acceleration of negotiations and conclusion of agreements on questions that had been discussed in the Committee for several years; (b) undertaking of urgent measures to halt the arms race at its source; and (c) full implementation of all provisions of disarmament agreements, not only those selected by individual preference. If achievements in those areas were not simultaneous, the delegation held that technological progress would soon cause existing treaties to lose their validity.

The representatives of Bulgaria and Mongolia stressed that recent improvements in the international political climate should encourage States to take concerted action in the field of disarmament. The Swedish representative expressed the feeling that disarmament might be an idea whose time had come, and referred to the particular responsibility of the CCD to make that idea reality.

A brief resumé of the aspects of the general question which are dealt with in other chapters will serve, at this point, to illustrate the connexion between general and complete disarmament and other questions.

The delegation of Egypt made mention in the Committee of the connexion between the goals of general and complete disarmament and the establishment of a new economic order, while those of Italy, Romania and the Soviet Union referred specifically to the economic and social aspects of the arms race, dealt with in chapter XIX below.
Most members of the Committee spoke on the question of a comprehensive programme dealing with all aspects of disarmament, pursuant to resolution 31/68 concerning the Disarmament Decade. In that resolution, the Assembly had urged the CCD to adopt such a programme in 1977. The views of specific members are contained in chapter III below.

Considerable reference was made in the Committee to the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament: comments included expressions of hope that the session would establish new guidelines for disarmament and focus international public attention on disarmament in all its aspects. Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary expressed the view that the special session should facilitate the convening of a world disarmament conference. The various views are covered in chapters I and IV of the present Yearbook.

The question of a review of the Committee's organization and procedures with a view to improving its effectiveness was the subject of four informal meetings held early in the session. Several suggestions, including proposals for both structural and procedural changes, were made, primarily by Mexico and other non-aligned members of the Committee. On the other hand, arguments were put forward, particularly by the Western and Eastern European members, which drew attention to the great flexibility that had been established in the Committee over the years with regard to both organization and procedures. On 24 March, 12 of the non-aligned members—Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Egypt, Iran, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Peru, Sweden, Yugoslavia and Zaire—submitted a working paper which would establish a permanent sub-committee and make permanent some innovations which had been introduced in 1976. At the same time, the USSR and the United States submitted an alternative working paper which recommended the continued use of ad hoc working groups, but otherwise was substantively the same as the non-aligned paper. By the compromise solution which was accepted without objection, the Committee decided (a) that it would continue to use ad hoc groups for specific negotiating and drafting purposes in a flexible manner, depending on needs as they arose; (b) that the drafting of its reports to the General Assembly would be effected by the Secretariat of the United Nations; (c) that verbatim records of plenary meetings and documents of the CCD would be distributed to the delegations of all States Members of the United Nations in New York as soon as they became available; and (d) that the communiqués of plenary meetings would adequately reflect the substance of the proceedings of those meetings.

9 Ibid., paras. 286-313.
10 Ibid., annex II, document CCD/530 and Add.1.
11 Ibid., document CCD/532.
Consideration by the General Assembly, 1977

Many delegations made reference to general and complete disarmament at the thirty-second session of the General Assembly during the general debate, both in the plenary meetings and in the First Committee. As in recent years, emphasis was placed on the increasing dangers and cost of the arms race, on the urgent need for halting and reversing it and on the priority to be given the curbing of nuclear armaments. General and complete disarmament was often envisaged mainly as an ultimate goal—the ideal culmination of all disarmament efforts which it was important to keep in view. States from all political groupings spoke in terms of setting priorities and implementing concrete measures which would be achievable in the short term and which, they held, would lead towards that goal. As in the CCD, many of the references to general and complete disarmament were made in connexion with other issues, including the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Disarmament Decade, the convening of a world disarmament conference and the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament.

Among the more direct references to the over-all question were those included in the general statements made by four of the five nuclear-weapon Powers. President Carter of the United States, in addressing the Assembly, said that the security of the global community could not rest forever on the balance of terror. He stated that the United States was prepared, on a reciprocal basis, to reduce nuclear weapons by 10, 20 or even 50 per cent to prepare the way for total nuclear disarmament. He also called for immediate action with respect to the conventional arms race, in particular the ever-growing trade in conventional arms. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Andrei Gromyko, in addressing the Assembly, referred to the Soviet proposals contained in its memorandum on ending the arms race and indicated disappointment that, in realistic terms, very little had been done so far. He added that physical disarmament and the elimination of the material means of warfare had not even been started yet and that the armies of States had not been reduced by a single aircraft or a single tank, as called for in United Nations resolutions. Nevertheless, he noted that significant limitations had been placed on the arms race in a number of areas in recent years and reiterated, with respect to the problem of nuclear disarmament, that the USSR remained ready to enter negotiations with all other nuclear Powers at any time to seek a practical solution. The Chinese representative said that his Government was in favour of genuine disarmament and against sham disarmament. He urged the prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons and reiterated the

\[12\] See Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-second Session, First Committee, 7th to 38th, 40th and 44th meetings; and ibid., First Committee, Sessional Fascicle, corrigendum.

\[13\] See foot-note 8.
Chinese position that, as first steps, all the nuclear-weapon States should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons in any circumstances, to dismantle all their nuclear bases on the territories of other States, and to withdraw their nuclear armed forces and weapons to their own territories. The representative of France called for all the major powers to participate in efforts towards genuine quantitative and qualitative reductions in arsenals. He held that disarmament should be general and complete in the sense of covering all States, geographical areas and types of weapons.

Most of the Eastern European States emphasized the importance of the question of reversal of the arms race through the achievement of concrete steps along the lines of the measures that had been proposed by the Soviet Union. A number of Western States affirmed their commitment to general and complete disarmament through both nuclear and conventional measures which would be amenable to adequate verification and would not reduce security at any stage. A large number of developing countries regarded the arms race as endangering security as well as hindering development, and called with great urgency for it to be reversed, starting with concrete action by the major nuclear powers, particularly in the area of nuclear disarmament.

It is also noteworthy that a great many States, either in the General Assembly or in their replies to the letter of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 3 of resolution 31/189 B requesting the views of Member States on all relevant questions relating to the forthcoming special session, linked that session closely with renewed hope for progress towards general and complete disarmament. Their comments included, in broad terms, hopes that the special session would contribute to a necessary atmosphere of confidence, rouse world public opinion, facilitate the convening of a world disarmament conference, or lead towards specific agreements on a variety of questions. Among the matters frequently mentioned and which were on the provisional agenda of the special session were the elaboration of a declaration on disarmament and of a programme of action on disarmament. With regard to the contents of such a programme, such issues as a comprehensive nuclear test ban and a ban on chemical weapons were mentioned, as well as other measures, including security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States, regulation of international transfers of conventional armaments, and suggestions concerning the international machinery for disarmament negotiations. A large number of States of all geographical regions and political groupings, among them Australia, Austria, Belgium, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Colombia, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Kuwait, Italy, Mexico, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Romania, Sri Lanka, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, expressed the hope that the special session would facilitate progress in a number of such areas,

particularly in connexion with a programme of action leading to the objective of general and complete disarmament.

During the debate on the 17 specific agenda items on disarmament which the Assembly allocated to the First Committee, seven separate draft resolutions were submitted under the item “General and complete disarmament”, and all were adopted by the Committee and the General Assembly (resolutions 32/87 A to 32/87 G).

The first draft resolution concerned the final report of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, and is dealt with in chapter XXI below. The second, on the strengthening of security of non-nuclear-weapon States, and the third, on the relationship of international peace and security to disarmament, are discussed in the present chapter. The fourth submission under the item, dealing with regional aspects of disarmament, is covered separately in chapter XVI below. The fifth, concerning publication of a disarmament periodical, is dealt with in the present chapter. The sixth draft resolution concerned the question of nuclear safeguards in the context of peaceful applications of nuclear energy under the control of IAEA and is described in chapter IX below. Finally, the draft resolution on SALT is discussed in chapter VI below.

The draft resolution on strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States was introduced by Pakistan at the 28th meeting of the First Committee and also sponsored by Morocco. Pakistan, which had sponsored a similar resolution (31/189 C) adopted in 1976, said, in introducing the draft, that despite various proposals through the years, the major nuclear-weapon Powers, with the exception of China, far from meeting the long-standing security concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States, had remained indifferent or had opposed even “negative guarantees”, i.e. guarantees not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against those States. It held that the guarantees under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear-Weapons (resolution 2373 (XXII), annex) and Security Council resolution 255 (1968) were restrictive and unreliable and lacking in credibility because of the provision for a veto. Moreover, the nuclear Powers had not lived up to their commitment to make progress towards genuine disarmament; on the contrary, they had ominously increased their arsenals. By the draft resolution, the Assembly would reaffirm resolution 31/189 C and urge the nuclear-weapon Powers to make expeditious efforts to strengthen the security of non-nuclear-weapon States and give them binding and credible security assurances. The draft was adopted in the First Committee by a recorded vote of 86 to none, with 36 abstentions; those abstaining included France, India, Sweden, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States. China voted in favour.

15 So-called “positive guarantees” are those which would guarantee assistance to States victims of a nuclear threat or attack.
In explaining its abstention, France held that its nuclear force was solely for deterrence and self-defence and did not threaten any State, particularly the non-nuclear-weapon States. Sweden said that it supported negative guarantees for States that were parties to the non-proliferation Treaty and not members of military alliances possessing nuclear weapons. The United States explained that the draft, as formulated, did not meet its concerns regarding the maintenance of existing security arrangements. The United Kingdom felt that the greatest security for all States lay in widest possible adherence to the non-proliferation Treaty. The Netherlands, which voted in favour, stated that it nonetheless would have preferred a resolution leaving the question open for discussion and imposing some constraints on the non-nuclear-weapon States. The draft resolution was adopted by the Assembly on 12 December 1977 by a vote of 95 to none, with 38 abstentions (resolution 32/87 B). There were no explanations of vote. The resolution reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 31/189 C of 21 December 1976, in which it requested the nuclear-weapon States, as a first step towards a complete ban on the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, to consider undertaking, without prejudice to their obligations arising from treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the nuclear security arrangements of some nuclear-weapon Powers,

Deeply concerned at the continuation of the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, and the threat to mankind due to the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons,

Considering that, until nuclear disarmament is achieved on a universal basis, it is imperative for the international community to devise effective measures to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from any quarter,

Noting that the non-nuclear-weapon States have called for assurances from nuclear-weapon Powers that they will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them,

Considering that the existence of credible and binding restraints against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States would contribute towards strengthening the international non-proliferation regime and creating a suitable climate for disarmament,

Recalling its resolution 3261 G (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, in which it recommended that Member States should consider in all appropriate forums, without loss of time, the question of strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States,

1. Reaffirms the provisions of its resolution 31/189 C;
2. Urges the nuclear-weapon Powers to give serious consideration to extending the undertaking proposed by the General Assembly in its resolution 31/189 C and to take expeditious action in all relevant forums to strengthen the security of non-nuclear-weapon States;
3. Recommends that all possible efforts be made at its special session devoted to disarmament, to be held in May and June 1978, to evolve binding and credible security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States, taking into account resolution 31/189 C.
The proposal to initiate studies on the relationship of international peace and security to disarmament was sponsored by 11 countries: Bangladesh, Colombia, Cyprus, Egypt, Ghana, Mexico, Nigeria, Panama, Philippines, Venezuela and Yugoslavia. In introducing the draft resolution on the item at the 31st meeting of the First Committee, the representative of Cyprus referred to the report of the Secretary-General entitled *Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures* which, he said, had forged a link between the new international economic order which had been the subject of the seventh special session of the General Assembly held in 1975 and the new disarmament order which was expected to ensue from the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. But first, he stressed, there had to be a halt to the arms race, and that was impossible as long as the arms race was inextricably linked with the concept of the balance of power and the consequent balance of weapons which had placed the world in a vicious circle, trying to achieve disarmament while it could not halt the arms race. Accordingly, to break that vicious circle, it was necessary to initiate a study on the relationship between international peace and security on the one hand and disarmament on the other, which should run parallel to and complement studies on the link between development and disarmament. In that way, the means for a halt to the arms race might be provided, and the benefits implicit in that link would become possible. The draft resolution requested the Secretary-General to initiate such a study and submit a progress report to the Assembly at the special session. The request for a progress report was incorporated particularly because of the limited time available, but also because it would allow the Assembly at the special session to consider further steps for the continuation of the study.

The draft resolution was adopted by the First Committee by consensus. In commenting on the vote, Belgium noted that care should be taken to ensure that the study should be objective and balanced.

The draft was adopted, also by consensus, by the General Assembly on 12 December 1977 as resolution 32/87 C, which reads as follows:

*The General Assembly,*

_Mindful_ that, according to Article 1, paragraph 1, of the Charter, the primary purpose of the United Nations is to maintain international peace and security,

_Convinced_ that the relationship of international peace and security to disarmament is a close one and that a determination of this relationship can promote peace, security and disarmament,

_Considering_ that for the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, to be held in May and June 1978, the Preparatory Committee proposed that one agenda item be a review and appraisal of the close interrelationship between disarmament, international peace and security and economic development,

_Considering further_ that it has examined at the current session a proposal

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18 United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.1.
for a study of experts on the interrelationship between disarmament and development.

Bearing in mind the need for a parallel study of the interrelationship between disarmament and international security,

1. Requests the Secretary-General to initiate a study on the interrelationship between disarmament and international security;

2. Further requests the Secretary-General to submit a progress report thereon to the General Assembly at its special session devoted to disarmament.

The draft resolution entitled "Publication of a disarmament periodical" was introduced by Sweden and also sponsored by Austria, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Jordan, Norway, Romania, Tunisia and Venezuela. In introducing it at the 32nd meeting of the First Committee, the representative of Sweden held that the disarmament efforts of the United Nations and its Member States would be more fully supported by public opinion if it were better informed. He also drew attention to the need of Governments to be kept informed of developments in the disarmament field and observed that information activities had in the past been rather neglected. Calling attention to the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Review of the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament, he noted that those recommendations had been adopted by consensus and included a recommendation that the General Assembly should consider publication of a disarmament periodical after publication of the United Nations Disarmament Yearbook had been implemented. With regard to the material and information to be presented, operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution repeated what the Ad Hoc Committee had recommended in its 1976 report to the Assembly, namely, the presentation of a selection of current facts and developments and summaries of publications in the field of disarmament in highly readable form in all the working languages of the United Nations.

During the debate, Saudi Arabia submitted an amendment to the draft resolution by which the General Assembly would also consider the preparation of a United Nations film portraying the devastation and miseries brought about by wars. The proposal was motivated by the view that, while the publication would be of value, a film could be made available to a much wider and more general audience than the periodical, and thus have a more vivid impact. Saudi Arabia later withdrew the amendment at the request of the sponsors of the original draft, mainly on the grounds that the new element was beyond the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee and should be given thorough consideration before the Assembly committed itself to the idea. It was also understood that the implications of producing the film would be studied and reported upon by the Secretary-General to the Assembly at its next regular session.

17 A/32/276.
The original draft resolution was adopted by the First Committee by consensus, and by the Assembly on 12 December 1977 as resolution 32/87 E, also by consensus. It reads as follows:

_The General Assembly,_

_Recalling_ its resolution 31/90 of 14 December 1976, in which it endorsed the agreed proposals made by the _Ad Hoc_ Committee on the Review of the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament,

_Having considered_ the report on the measures taken by the Secretary-General as recommended by the _Ad Hoc_ Committee,

_Noting_ that the Secretary-General has carried out the request in resolution 31/90 to implement as soon as possible the measures recommended by the _Ad Hoc_ Committee falling within his area of responsibilities,

_Noting with satisfaction_ the publication of the first volume of the _United Nations Disarmament Yearbook,_

_Recognizing_ the vital interest of all Governments and world public opinion to be kept properly informed on all efforts in the field of disarmament,

_Recalling_ the recommendation of the _Ad Hoc_ Committee to the effect that the General Assembly, on the basis of the report of the Secretary-General, should consider publication of a disarmament periodical,

1. _Emphasizes_ the need for a disarmament periodical presenting in highly readable form current facts and developments in the field of disarmament, such as summaries of new proposals, of important relevant statements and communiqués and of in-depth studies undertaken by the United Nations or the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, annotated bibliographies and brief summaries of important books and articles on disarmament questions and related matters;

2. _Requests_ the Secretary-General to initiate the publication of a disarmament periodical in all the working languages of the General Assembly.

Some other items not otherwise mentioned were also placed before the Assembly under the item "General and complete disarmament". They included, in accordance with established practice, the annual report of the International Atomic Energy Agency,¹⁹ some aspects of which are discussed in chapter XI below.

The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya transmitted the text of the final communiqué of the Eighth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers²⁰ held at Tripoli from 16 to 22 May 1977, which included references to a number of disarmament and related questions; and the resolutions of the Conference,²¹ including resolutions on nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa, the Middle East and south Asia, the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, similar in content to resolution 32/87 B, discussed above, and on the remnants of war, particularly mines.

Finally, the United States transmitted, by note verbale, the final communiqué of the Organizing Conference of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation which took place in Washington from 19 to 21 October 1977 (see chapter IX below).

¹⁹ A/32/158 and Add.1.
²⁰ A/32/133.
²¹ A/32/235.
Conclusion

General and complete disarmament is widely accepted as being the ultimate and necessary objective of all disarmament efforts; at the same time it is looked upon as an objective to work towards, in the expectation that one achievement may follow upon another in accordance with certain logical priorities and thus enable the goal eventually to be reached. It is hoped that a comprehensive programme, to be considered by the CCD and by the General Assembly at the special session, will go some distance towards specifying, at least for the early stages, what these achievements should be. In contrast to the original concept, general and complete disarmament is no longer generally regarded as a goal to be achieved through a single and comprehensive instrument which would embody various timetables for nuclear and conventional disarmament, a definition of the final status for the remaining armed forces and armaments and a number of provisions dealing with peace-keeping in a disarmed world.

The main difference between the debates on the item in 1977 and those of recent years was the increasing tone of urgency expressed in the appeals to halt and reverse the arms race and reduce expenditures on armaments in general, as well as in specific problem areas such as nuclear disarmament, embracing such concerns as technological advances in nuclear weaponry, deployment of new weapons systems and the continuation of nuclear-weapon testing. As in recent years, the need for political will, confidence-building measures and proper planning to ensure the complementary nature of various approaches to disarmament was widely recognized.

Despite the tone of urgency, the recognized seriousness of the problem and the difficulties experienced so far, there was also an expression of considerable hope, especially in respect of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament which, it was frequently suggested, might become a turning-point and thus promote concrete measures of actual disarmament in areas of central concern. In this context, it is expected that the special session will give renewed attention to the goal of general and complete disarmament.
Disarmament Decade

Introduction

The concept of a Disarmament Decade gained attention during the 1969 session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, when Romania suggested that consideration be given to the proclamation of such a decade. In the same year, in the introduction to his annual report on the work of the Organization,¹ the Secretary-General, after deploring the continuing arms race, proposed that the decade of the 1970s be designated as a Disarmament Decade. The Secretary-General's proposal was widely welcomed in the General Assembly which, in a resolution concerning the celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations (resolution 2499 (XXIV)), endorsed the call for the proclamation of a Disarmament Decade. Also at its twenty-fourth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2602 E (XXIV) of 16 December 1969, by which it declared the decade of the 1970s a Disarmament Decade; called upon Governments and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to intensify their efforts towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament; and requested the CCD, while continuing negotiations with a view to reaching agreement on collateral measures, to work out at the same time a comprehensive programme, dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control, which would provide the Committee with a guideline to chart the course of its work and negotiations. The resolution further recommended that consideration be given to channelling a substantial part of the resources freed by measures in the field of disarmament to promote the economic development of developing countries and, in particular, their scientific and technological progress.

The following multilateral agreements have been achieved thus far during the Disarmament Decade: the Treaty for the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (resolution 2660 (XXV), annex), which entered into force on 18 May

1972; the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex), which entered into force on 26 March 1975; and the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (resolution 31/72, annex), which was concluded in 1976 and is not yet in force. A number of bilateral agreements were also concluded in the context of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the Soviet Union and the United States (see chapter VI below).

In 1974, on the initiative of Nigeria, the General Assembly adopted resolution 3261 A (XXIX) in which, inter alia, it reaffirmed the purposes and objectives of the Disarmament Decade and requested the Secretary-General and Governments to report to the Assembly at its thirtieth session on the action and steps they had taken to publicize the Disarmament Decade, as well as on the measures and policies Member States had adopted to achieve those purposes and objectives.

The report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session contained the text of communications received from 28 States, as well as information concerning actions taken by the Secretariat to publicize the Disarmament Decade.

In resolution 3470 (XXX) the General Assembly reiterated the central interest of the United Nations in all disarmament negotiations; called upon Member States and the Secretary-General to intensify their efforts in support of the link between disarmament and development; and invited the CCD to review the work done in the implementation of the purposes and objectives of the Disarmament Decade and in that light to reappraise its tasks and duties, as necessary, in order to accelerate the pace of its efforts to negotiate truly effective disarmament and arms-limitation agreements. Several countries, including Australia, Denmark, France, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States expressed reservations about the direct link between disarmament and development, as envisaged by the resolution, which they considered as two separate issues, to be dealt with independently.

During 1976, the CCD discussed the mid-term review of the Disarmament Decade. Nigeria reiterated its concern over the lack of progress in the Committee and stated that the CCD should adopt a comprehensive programme of specific negotiations on disarmament measures. In this connexion, Nigeria submitted a working paper on conclusions of the mid-term review of the Disarmament Decade. In the working paper, it was stated, inter alia, that the CCD, while acknowledging that during the review period some progress had been made in

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2 A/10294 and Add.1.
reaching agreements on collateral measures of disarmament, was concerned at the meagre achievements of the Disarmament Decade in terms of truly effective disarmament and arms-limitation agreements under strict and effective international control. It was also suggested that the first task of the Committee was the negotiation of agreements on a comprehensive test ban and chemical weapons.

On 2 September 1976, taking into account the recommendation made by Nigeria in its working paper, the CCD decided to consider, during its 1977 session, the question of a comprehensive programme dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2602 E (XXIV) proclaiming the Disarmament Decade.

The question of the link between disarmament and development was also discussed by a number of delegations. India, Mexico, Nigeria, Romania, Sweden and Yugoslavia noted the ever increasing military expenditures and stressed the need to channel such expenditures to development.

At the thirty-first session of the General Assembly, most speakers recalled what they considered as the meagre disarmament achievements during the first half of the Disarmament Decade, and the detrimental effects of the continuing arms race. At the end of the debates, the General Assembly adopted without a vote resolution 31/68 in which it, inter alia, reaffirmed the purposes and objectives of the Decade and urged the CCD to adopt, during its 1977 session, a comprehensive programme dealing with all aspects of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. In the same resolution, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to ensure a proper co-ordination of disarmament and development activities within the United Nations system and to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session.

Consideration by the CCD, 1977

During its 1977 meetings, the CCD considered the question of the implementation of the purposes and objectives of the Disarmament Decade with specific reference to the elaboration of a disarmament programme. A series of six informal meetings were also held on the subject. Several suggestions were made in connexion with the basic documents which might be useful for the preparation of that programme.

While urging the Committee to adopt during 1977 a comprehensive programme dealing with all aspects of the arms race and general and complete disarmament, Mexico maintained that the "Comprehen-

sive Programme of Disarmament” contained in document A/8191\(^6\) of 1 December 1970 should be used as a point of departure.

That document had been submitted by Ireland, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Sweden and Yugoslavia to the General Assembly which, by its resolution 2661 C (XXV), recommended to the CCD that it take the proposal into account in its further work and its negotiations, together with other disarmament suggestions presented or to be presented in the future. The document contained an introduction and six sections. The introduction stated that the programme should include effective procedures in order to ensure that the General Assembly be kept informed of all negotiations on disarmament. The first section dealt with the objective of the comprehensive programme: general and complete disarmament under effective international control in a world in which international peace and security prevailed, and economic and social progress were attained. The other sections were devoted to principles, elements and phases of the programme, peace-keeping and security and procedure.

The delegation of Romania also urged the adoption during 1977 of a detailed programme of negotiations, as the Committee had decided in 1976 at the initiative of Nigeria, and asked the Secretariat of the CCD to prepare a compilation of all the proposals made and views expressed in the Committee concerning the disarmament programme.

The delegation of Iran held that a comprehensive programme would help guide the Committee’s discussions and shared the view that the questions of a comprehensive test ban and a chemical weapons ban should receive priority attention, as suggested in the working paper submitted by Nigeria in 1976.

The delegation of Egypt, stressing the importance of responding to the General Assembly’s request to adopt a comprehensive programme during the 1977 session, supported the working paper (CCD/313\(^7\)) submitted to the Committee in 1970 by Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia containing a draft for such a programme. It should be noted that that document was the basis for the preparation by the delegations concerned of document A/8191, the main provisions of which were outlined above.

The delegation of India noted that during negotiations which had preceded the establishment of the Committee in 1961, all the main elements of a comprehensive programme had been identified and established in the 1961 joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations\(^8\) by the Soviet Union and the United States, and that the General Assembly, by its resolution 1722 (XVI), had endorsed

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all those main elements. Recalling India's suggestion to develop and elaborate the joint statement into a comprehensive programme, the delegation held that there could be no other agreed basis on which the CCD could work for developing such a programme.

The joint statement recommended a number of principles as the basis for future disarmament negotiations. The goal of negotiations was to achieve agreement on a programme which would ensure general and complete disarmament, accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. Other principles provided for the implementation of the programme by stages, the adoption of balanced disarmament measures, so that no State or group of States could gain military advantage, and their implementation under strict and effective international control.

The delegation of the Soviet Union said that there was so far no common view either on the content of the proposed programme or on the approach towards its elaboration. It believed that that was understandable since the implementation of a comprehensive disarmament programme should involve in the process of disarmament all States, each of which had its specific interests that had to be carefully taken into account in elaborating any documents of a comprehensive nature, including a disarmament programme. The Soviet delegation noted, in that respect, that the complexity of that problem had not decreased. It added that the question of the document or documents which should constitute the basis for the establishment of a comprehensive programme had occupied no small place in the discussion. After recalling that a number of members of the Committee had expressed themselves in favour of document A/8191, the Soviet Union said that, in that connexion, a discussion had arisen on the question whether it was possible to take as a basis a document which had not been approved by the General Assembly and which reflected the views of some States only. On the other hand, the Soviet delegation held, it had been suggested that the joint principles for negotiations on disarmament agreed between the United States and the USSR, which had been approved by the General Assembly in 1961, should be taken as the starting-point for further work. Noting that the considerations expressed in the Committee deserved careful examination in the search for a mutually acceptable solution, the delegation expressed the view that the Soviet Union's memorandum on questions of ending the arms race and disarmament might be taken as the basic document, or as one of the basic documents, for the elaboration of a concrete comprehensive disarmament programme. It stressed that the memorandum was an extensive and comprehensive document containing a programme of disarmament measures

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which were most urgent at present and in the immediately foreseeable period.

It may be recalled that the memorandum contained proposals which were considered by the Soviet Union to be the main areas for co-ordinated action: (a) cessation of the nuclear arms race and reduction and subsequent elimination of nuclear weapons; (b) prohibition of nuclear weapon tests; (c) consolidation of the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; (d) prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons; (e) prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction; (f) reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments; (g) zones of peace in the Indian Ocean and other regions; (h) reduction of military budgets; and (i) negotiations on halting the arms race and on disarmament.

Other comments were made on the approach to be followed in the preparation of a comprehensive programme. The delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom held that rigid guidelines and time-tables should be avoided and, in that context, the latter supported the flexible approach reflected in document A/8191, and agreed with Mexico that that document would be a suitable basis for discussion of a new negotiating programme.

Stressing Italy's long-standing interest in a comprehensive disarmament programme as demonstrated by its 1970 suggestions on the subject (working paper CCD/309\textsuperscript{10}), the delegation of Italy welcomed the fact that the matter had been included as a separate item in the agenda of the special session of the General Assembly on disarmament. It further held that a global disarmament programme should be based on the following principles: (a) that disarmament negotiations were essential to world peace; (b) that the majority of States favoured the pursuit of disarmament along the parallel paths of general and complete disarmament and the negotiation of specific measures; (c) that the United Nations and the CCD had made some progress in the field, either by achieving specific agreements or by adopting principles, such as the joint principles of 1961; (d) that the disarmament process must avoid the creation of imbalance and privilege by including measures of collective security and the strictest possible verification measures; and (e) that any disarmament programme should be coherent, global and carefully designed to provide clear guidelines leading logically from urgent initial steps to the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Italy added that such a programme should be achieved by successive steps without any rigid deadlines, that it should include a balance of nuclear and conventional disarmament and the greatest possible measure of co-ordination between global and regional disarmament and that it should give priority to nuclear disarmament, including a nuclear-
weapon-test ban, to the prohibition of chemical weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and to the reduction of conventional arms.

Referring to General Assembly resolution 31/68 urging the CCD to adopt during its 1977 session a comprehensive programme of disarmament, the delegation of Mexico recalled its proposal at the spring session that the Committee take as a basis for its discussion document A/8191, which it held should be revised in the light of developments since its submission to the General Assembly in 1970. Noting that it now appeared that the Committee would begin consideration of the question of such a programme at the outset of its 1978 session, the Mexican delegation introduced, as a contribution to that task, a preliminary draft comprehensive programme which, it said, largely reproduced the contents of document A/8191, with certain changes, including one serving to draw attention to the degree of responsibility to be borne by the principal nuclear-weapon States in implementing various measures.

As consideration of the question continued, Nigeria urged the CCD to address itself sufficiently to duties incumbent upon it under General Assembly resolution 31/68. Appealing in particular to the nuclear-weapon States members of the Committee, Nigeria maintained that the fact that the Committee had not been able to tackle substantial issues of disarmament in a systematic and comprehensive manner called for a review of the method of approach to the complex problem. Nigeria therefore proposed the setting-up of an informal working group to prepare a draft programme for the Committee's consideration and adoption by consensus not later than the 1978 CCD spring session and definitely before the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany, referring to the Nigerian proposal to set up an informal working group to examine all available proposals on a comprehensive negotiating programme, suggested a possible middle way which it believed would lead the CCD to the 1978 spring session with a firm plan of action in that respect. To that end, the delegation submitted the text of a draft decision to the effect that such a working group should be established at the beginning of the next session of the CCD. It also noted that, before the group began its work, it would be necessary for the Committee to define its mandate. The delegations of Italy, United Kingdom and the United States supported the proposal to establish the working group.

On 25 August 1977, the CCD took note of the consensus reached among the States members of the Committee that, at the beginning of the spring session of 1978, an ad hoc working group would be established, in accordance with the procedural decision adopted at the 746th meeting of the Committee on 21 April 1977, to discuss and elaborate a draft

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comprehensive programme of disarmament to be submitted to the CCD for consideration.

At the closing meeting of the 1977 session, the delegation of the United States welcomed the decision of the CCD to establish a working group on a comprehensive negotiating programme and stressed the opportunity thus provided for the Committee to update its agenda and look to its future work programme.

At the same meeting, the delegation of the Soviet Union, after emphasizing the priority of solving the important problems of ending the arms race and of disarmament, also drew attention to the need to work on a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1977

As had been the case at previous sessions of the General Assembly, at the thirty-second session, both during the general debate and in the First Committee, many delegations, mainly of non-aligned countries, expressed regret that there had been no tangible results in the area of disarmament measures, even though the Disarmament Decade had passed its half-way mark. Most speakers from every group of States addressing the subject noted the continuing arms race and referred to the link between disarmament and development, pointing to the need of freeing resources by disarmament for their use to promote economic and social development, particularly in the developing countries.

With regard to the question of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, delegations discussed the various aspects of the matter. The delegation of Bangladesh called for comprehensive measures aimed at a phased programme for the substantive reduction and elimination of arms and the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament under collective international control. The delegation also said that such measures must provide reliable mechanisms for verification and for compliance with disarmament agreements, lay down adequate procedures and means to settle disputes among nations peacefully, and strengthen the peace-keeping and peace-making ability of the international community through the collective policing of sanctions and permanent peace-keeping forces.

The Byelorussian SSR declared that a comprehensive programme of disarmament measures that were most urgent at the present time was contained in the Soviet Union's memorandum on questions of halting the arms race and disarmament submitted at the thirty-first session of the General Assembly. Those measures were also to be found in the

13 See Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-second Session, First Committee, 7th to 38th, 40th and 44th meetings; and ibid., First Committee, Sessional Fascicle, corrigendum.

14 See foot-note 10.
working paper submitted by the seven Eastern European countries to the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament. Similar views were expressed by the Ukrainian SSR.

Mexico referred to the preliminary draft comprehensive programme of disarmament which it had submitted to the CCD in August 1977. It stated that 80 per cent of that preliminary draft was a reproduction of the contents of document A/8191 of 1970, while 20 per cent was made up almost entirely of an account of the most important of the relevant events which had occurred since the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly. Mexico explained that the most important change in the preliminary draft as compared with document A/8191 was undoubtedly that of the further break-down of disarmament measures into subsections, namely: (a) measures for whose implementation the political will of the two principal nuclear-weapon States was essential; and (b) measures for which the political will of the States directly concerned might be sufficient. The delegation of Mexico added that the structure and scope of the comprehensive programme of disarmament to be adopted by the CCD were almost certain to be different from the programme of action to be adopted at the special session of the General Assembly. In the view of the Mexican delegation, the comprehensive programme of disarmament should be general; on the other hand, the programme of action should be the result of a very careful selection and should contain only those measures which, apart from their extreme urgency and particular importance, might justifiably be expected to be followed up either immediately or at an early date.

The delegation of Peru mentioned a number of subjects which ought to be included in a comprehensive disarmament programme, namely the elimination of nuclear weapons; the prohibition of chemical, incendiary and other specific weapons; the gradual limitation of conventional weapons and armed forces; and the channelling of resources towards the priority goals of development and well-being for mankind.

Romania referred to a comprehensive programme which was submitted in 1975 by its delegation (A/C.1/1066) and which contained concrete measures. The suggested measures included the freezing and gradual reduction of military budgets; the banning, gradual reduction and liquidation of nuclear weapons; the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones of peace and co-operation; the adoption of partial and regional measures of disarmament and military disengagement; the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament; and an enhanced role to be given to the United Nations and the General Assembly in the field of disarmament.

While noting the initiative and efforts of the non-aligned members of the CCD in their drive to elaborate a comprehensive programme of

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15 A/AC.187/82.
16 See foot-note 12.
disarmament, Poland believed that a large, if not the decisive, part of the comprehensive programme of disarmament would have to be implemented through that Committee.

Noting that the CCD had decided in the last days of its 1977 session to set up at the beginning of its 1978 session an ad hoc working group to elaborate a comprehensive programme of disarmament, the delegation of Nigeria believed that the General Assembly should request the CCD to submit such a comprehensive programme to it at its special session devoted to disarmament.

A draft resolution, sponsored by Bangladesh, Finland, India, the Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Morocco, Nigeria, Romania, Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoslavia, was submitted on 8 November (A/C.1/32/L.14). In introducing the draft resolution in the First Committee, Nigeria said that the CCD, by deciding to set up an ad hoc working group on a comprehensive programme for disarmament, had taken only the first tentative steps to comply with the assignment given it under General Assembly resolution 31/68, by which the Assembly called on the Committee to adopt that programme. Therefore, the purpose of the draft resolution was to request the CCD to continue its work on the question and to submit a progress report to the General Assembly at its special session devoted to disarmament in 1978. Nigeria also distinguished between the programme of action to be adopted at the special session, which would be limited, and the comprehensive programme for disarmament to be adopted by the CCD, which should be all-embracing and general, leading progressively to the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament.

Following the introduction of the draft resolution by Nigeria, the Niger submitted amendments (A/C.1/32/L.22) dealing with the insertion of three preambular and one operative paragraph in the draft resolution emphasizing that human and material resources should be allocated to development instead of being used for the manufacture of armaments, and that modern technology should be devoted to fight poverty, ignorance, disease and hunger throughout the world. For their part, the sponsors of the draft resolution made the point that its purpose was to urge the CCD to continue a process that it had started towards the end of its 1977 summer session when it decided to set up, at its 1978 spring session, an ad hoc working group to begin work on a comprehensive programme for disarmament. Although they shared the concern of the Niger, they believed that elements of the amendments were already part of their draft resolution (paragraph 4) and two other draft resolutions which had been adopted by the First Committee.17

At the end of the discussions, the First Committee voted first on the amendments and then later on the draft resolution as amended. The amendments were adopted by a recorded vote of 96 to none, with 22

17 Subsequently adopted by the General Assembly as resolutions 32/75 and 32/88 A.
abstentions, thus becoming the fifth, sixth and seventh preambular paragraphs and operative paragraph 5. Subsequently, the First Committee adopted the draft resolution as amended by 121 votes to none. Finally, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 130 to none, with 1 abstention (Sierra Leone).

The resolution (32/80) which the General Assembly adopted reads as follows:

_The General Assembly,_*

_Recalling_ its resolution 2602 E (XXIV) of 16 December 1969, in which it declared the decade of the 1970s the Disarmament Decade and envisaged a link between the Disarmament Decade and the Second United Nations Development Decade,

_Also recalling_ its resolution 31/68 of 10 December 1976, in which it reaffirmed the purposes and objectives of the Disarmament Decade, and its resolution 31/189 B of 21 December 1976, in which it decided to convene a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament,

_Deploring_ that these purposes and objectives have not been fulfilled in terms of effective disarmament agreements and that the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race, continues unabated,

_Deeply concerned_ at the continued wastage of resources on armaments and the consequent detrimental effect on international security and the achievement of the objectives of the new international economic order,

_Reaffirming_ the incompatibility between the unbridled arms race and the will of the international community, proclaimed and repeatedly reaffirmed, to promote healthy economic co-operation among all States,

_Convinced_ that the peaceful use of the human and material resources allocated every year to the manufacture of armaments of all kinds will have very positive effects for the future of mankind,

_Believing_ that the aid made available to developing countries, in all its forms, will serve its purpose only in a healthy, peaceful atmosphere characterized by mutual respect,

_Affirming_ the urgent need for the promotion of negotiations on effective measures for the cessation of the arms race, especially in the nuclear field, for the reduction of military expenditures and for general and complete disarmament,

_Having considered_ the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament,

1. _Takes note_ of the decision of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to set up an _ad hoc_ working group to elaborate a comprehensive programme for disarmament;

2. _Requests_ the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to continue its work on this subject and to submit a progress report to the General Assembly at its special session devoted to disarmament, to be held in May and June 1978;

3. _Requests_ the Secretary-General to transmit to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament all documents relating to the consideration of this item by the General Assembly at its thirty-second session;

4. _Calls upon_ Member States and the Secretary-General to intensify their efforts in support of the link between disarmament and development, envisaged in General Assembly resolution 2602 E (XXIV) on the Disarmament Decade, so as to promote disarmament negotiations and to ensure that the human and material resources freed by disarmament are used to promote economic and social development, particularly in the developing countries;

5. _Urges_ that the unparalleled technical possibilities now available to man-
kind should be exploited for the purposes of combating poverty, ignorance, disease and hunger throughout the world;

6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-third session the item entitled "Effective measures to implement the purposes and objectives of the Disarmament Decade"

The delegation of Belgium, on behalf of the nine members of the European Economic Community, explained the positions of those countries after the voting in the First Committee. As in the previous year, they referred to the link between disarmament and development which was mentioned in paragraph 4 of the draft resolution. They expressed the belief that effective disarmament measures would make it possible to release vast human, technological, economic and financial resources, and that a part of such resources could be used to satisfy other needs, more particularly in the developing countries. The EEC countries could accept a link between disarmament and development, but could not subscribe to an automatic link between the two concepts, since they held that both had their own separate characteristics. They could not therefore accept the conclusion according to which a lack of progress on disarmament would prevent countries from contributing to development, as they were bound to do in any case.

The delegation of Romania, also on behalf of India, Nigeria and Yugoslavia, explained the votes of those delegations after the voting in the First Committee on the amendments submitted by the Niger. They maintained that elements of the amendments were already included in the draft resolution and that its purpose was to urge the CCD to continue its work on a comprehensive programme for disarmament. They further pointed out that their votes should not be interpreted in any way as implying fundamental opposition to the substance of the ideas contained in the amendments submitted by the delegation of the Niger, ideas which their delegations fully supported and which they had done their best to incorporate in the draft resolution they had submitted.

Conclusion

The debates on the Disarmament Decade during 1977 centred on the content of the comprehensive programme for disarmament and the approach to its elaboration. Members of the non-aligned group regretted that no comprehensive negotiating programme had as yet been worked out. Some Western countries cautioned that the approach to disarmament should be flexible and not forced into rigid and static guidelines. The Eastern European States recognized the need to work on a comprehensive programme for disarmament, but emphasized the priority of solving the important problems of ending the arms race and of disarmament. With reference to the basis for the elaboration of a disarmament programme, divergent views were expressed as to which of the docu-
ments or working papers submitted thus far should be used as a point of departure.

In connexion with the link between the comprehensive programme for disarmament to be adopted by the CCD and the programme of action to be adopted at the special session of the General Assembly, a trend seemed to emerge among delegations on the structure and scope of the two programmes. While it was felt that the comprehensive disarmament programme should be general, leading progressively to the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament, the programme of action should be the result of a very careful selection of measures which could possibly be implemented in the near future.

One of the steps taken in the implementation of resolution 31/68 was the establishment of an *ad hoc* working group of the CCD to elaborate a comprehensive programme for disarmament. The next step, in accordance with resolution 32/80, is for the CCD to submit a progress report to the General Assembly at its special session devoted to disarmament.
CHAPTER IV

World Disarmament Conference

Introduction

The initiative of convening a World Disarmament Conference was taken at the First Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Belgrade in 1961. The Declaration adopted by the Conference\(^1\) recommended, *inter alia*, that the General Assembly should take a decision with respect to convening either a special session devoted to disarmament or a world disarmament conference under the auspices of the United Nations with a view to setting in motion the process of general disarmament.

At subsequent Summit Conferences—Cairo 1964, Lusaka 1970, Algiers 1973 and Colombo 1976—the non-aligned countries reiterated their view that the convening of a world disarmament conference at an appropriate time, with the participation of all States, would be useful.

Within the United Nations, the idea of a world disarmament conference generated great interest. The item was, for the first time, inscribed on the agenda of the General Assembly at its twentieth session, when the Assembly adopted resolution 2030 (XX) endorsing the proposal for the convening of a world disarmament conference. The proposal did not materialize, however, and there were no further major developments until 1971 when, at the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly, the USSR revived the idea.

While France and the United Kingdom took a positive attitude with certain qualifications, the United States was sceptical with respect to what such a conference might accomplish. China, for its part, held that the proposal had neither set out a clear aim nor put forward practical steps for its attainment.

On 16 December 1971, the Assembly adopted by acclamation resolution 2833 (XXVI), in which it expressed the conviction that it was most desirable to take immediate steps in order that careful consideration be given to the convening, following adequate preparation, of a world disarmament conference open to all States.

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\(^1\) For an extract from the Declaration, see A/AC.187/30 and Corr.1.
The item remained on the General Assembly's agenda in subsequent years and has also been considered at meetings of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament since 1972.

At its twenty-seventh session, in 1972, the General Assembly, in its resolution 2930 (XXVII), set up a Special Committee which held an informal exchange of views on the question of convening a world disarmament conference. As reported to the Assembly by the unofficial Chairman, areas of agreement and disagreement were identified and the participants favoured the convening of the conference with the participation of all States and after adequate preparation. He also reported that a number of countries had stated that the participation, or at least the co-operation, of all nuclear-weapon States was essential if the Committee was to fulfil its duties.

At its twenty-eighth session, in 1973, the General Assembly adopted resolution 3183 (XXVIII) by which, inter alia, it established an Ad Hoc Committee to examine all the views and suggestions expressed by Governments on the convening of a world disarmament conference, including conditions for the realization of such a conference, and to submit on the basis of consensus a report to the General Assembly in 1974. The Assembly also invited the nuclear-weapon States to co-operate or maintain contact with the Ad Hoc Committee.

In the reports it submitted to the General Assembly in 1974 and 1975, the Ad Hoc Committee, while stating the problems preventing further progress towards the convening of a world disarmament conference, generally held that there was a widespread view that such a conference would be a useful forum for disarmament efforts. In accordance with the mandate given by the General Assembly, the Ad Hoc Committee reached the following basic conclusions:

(a) Various objectives were proposed for a world disarmament conference, which would assign different functions to it and thus affect its scope;

(b) Some States proposed an objective of actual measures of disarmament, while others regarded the world disarmament conference as a forum that would be able to review progress in the field, propose guidelines, and review the negotiating machinery;

(c) It noted that the conditions that might apply to a conference aiming at actual measures of disarmament might not be the same as those applied to a conference with less extensive objectives, and one approach was that there could be no world disarmament conference or any preparatory work unless certain pre-conditions were fulfilled;

(d) The overwhelming majority of States believed, irrespective of the task assigned to a world disarmament conference, that it must be

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3 Ibid., Thirtieth Session, Supplement No. 28 (A/10028).
universal and adequately prepared and that the participation of all nuclear-weapon and militarily significant States was essential;

(e) The position of the nuclear-weapon States—with which the Ad Hoc Committee maintained contact under its mandate—on all aspects of a world disarmament conference remained unchanged.

The report of the Ad Hoc Committee to the thirty-first session of the General Assembly\(^4\) contained an analytical study of the conclusions contained in the Committee's report to the previous Assembly, as well as a set of observations and recommendations.

In presenting its analysis of the conclusions, the Committee noted, inter alia, that whereas the concept of a world disarmament conference enjoyed wide support, many Governments considered its realization to require universal participation as well as adequate preparation. The report further pointed out that the basic divergence of opinion, which had emerged among the nuclear-weapon States concerning the timing and conditions for the convening of such a conference, had continued to persist.

When considering the objectives envisaged for a world disarmament conference, the Committee noted that they ranged between two specific conference models. namely: (a) a conference aimed at arriving, during its course, at agreements on concrete measures of disarmament in both the nuclear and conventional fields; or (b) a conference that would undertake the task of streamlining the machinery, proposing guidelines and providing impetus to disarmament negotiations. The report acknowledged that the scope and nature of the conference would vary according to the function that would be assigned to it and that the political conditions that might be applicable to a conference aiming at actual measures of disarmament might not necessarily be essential for the convening of a conference with more limited goals.

In presenting its observations, the Committee recommended that since no consensus on the question of holding a world disarmament conference had been reached among the nuclear-weapon States, efforts towards the creation of appropriate conditions for the convening of a world disarmament conference should continue and opportunities conducive to the achievement of progress in disarmament should be fully explored.

At the same session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 31/190, in which it requested the Committee to maintain close contact with the representatives of the States possessing nuclear weapons in order to remain currently informed of their respective attitudes, to consider any relevant comments and observations which might be made to the Committee and, for that purpose, to meet briefly and submit a report to the Assembly, at its thirty-second session, in accordance with established procedure.

\(^4\) Ibid., Thirty-first Session, Supplement No. 28 (A/31/28).
Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries

In its final communique, the Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries, which met at New Delhi at the Foreign Ministers' level from 7 to 11 April 1977, recommended that the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament should, *inter alia*, consider the question of convening a world disarmament conference.

*Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference, 1977*

Pursuant to the mandate entrusted to it by General Assembly resolution 31/190, the *Ad Hoc* Committee held the first meeting of its 1977 session on 4 April and after a general debate and an exchange of views decided, *inter alia*, that the remainder of the session should be held in September of that year. The Committee also agreed that the Working Group, which had been established in 1974, should undertake the task of preparing a draft report for the *Ad Hoc* Committee's consideration.

The *Ad Hoc* Committee resumed its work on 12 September and, at its final meeting on 16 September, unanimously adopted its report to the General Assembly which had been drafted by the Working Group in the course of a number of formal and informal meetings held between 13 and 16 September.

The fourth report of the Committee noted that, in compliance with its mandate, the Committee maintained, through its Chairman, close contact with the representatives of States possessing nuclear weapons, in order to remain currently informed of their respective attitudes towards the convening of a world disarmament conference. Information regarding these contacts which in the opinion of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, in the prevailing circumstances of its work, are a unique feature of the Committee, was included in the Committee's report. Based on the results of those contacts, it was evident that, in essential aspects, the positions of the five nuclear Powers concerning the holding of a world disarmament conference remained unaltered.

In this respect, China said that there had been no change in its position, according to which a world disarmament conference could only be convened if certain prerequisites for the creation of conditions conducive to genuine disarmament were met. The convening of a world disarmament conference, or preparation for such a conference, could only be acceptable if all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular the two nuclear-weapon Powers, would undertake an obligation: (*a*) not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, particularly against the non-

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5 See A/32/74, annex I.
nuclear-weapon States; and (b) to end all forms of military presence on the territory of other countries by those concerned. If such preconditions were met, a world disarmament conference could be convened with a clear aim, namely, to consider the question of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all nuclear weapons.

France noted that the holding of a special session on disarmament, the main objectives of which would be to define the general principles applicable in the matter of disarmament, to determine the main foci of efforts in that regard and to enhance the effectiveness of the existing negotiating machinery, did not in any way lessen the interest of France in the convening of a world disarmament conference. It hoped that the necessary prerequisites for such a gathering—in particular, endorsement by all the nuclear Powers—could be met in the near future.

The Soviet Union stated that it attached exceptional importance to the question of convening a world disarmament conference, at which all countries of the world, without exception, and on an equal basis, could state and compare their views on the whole range of disarmament problems. If properly organized and with working bodies available to ensure a thorough preparation and practical agreement in taking appropriate decisions with due regard for the interests of all States, a world disarmament conference could work out specific, effective measures aimed at curbing the arms race and thus achieving a breakthrough in solving the problem of disarmament. The Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference could recommend to the General Assembly that the latter entrust it to prepare a report for the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament on the item of convocation of the World Disarmament Conference in order to implement resolution 31/190.

The United Kingdom said there was no change in the position it had expressed on many occasions in the past. In its view, the participation of all militarily significant States, including all nuclear-weapon States, remained an essential element in convening a world disarmament conference.

The United States pointed out that its position had not changed. According to that position, the General Assembly could note by consensus that a world disarmament conference could play a role in the disarmament process at an appropriate time. However, under the circumstances, it was not the lack of a suitable forum, but the lack of political agreement that constituted the principal obstacle to progress in disarmament. A world disarmament conference would be unlikely to overcome that lack of agreement and thus would more probably hinder, rather than assist, efforts to reach concrete arms control agreements. It would, therefore, be premature at this time to convene, to set a date for or to start preparations for a world disarmament conference.

In conclusion, the report stated that in considering the advisability of the continuation of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World
Disarmament Conference under an appropriate mandate, in the light of the contents of the current as well as previous reports, the General Assembly might wish to bear in mind the recommendation made to it by the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament. The recommendation referred to was contained in paragraph 18 of the Preparatory Committee's report to the thirty-second session of the General Assembly, to the effect that the General Assembly request the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference to submit a special report to the special session on the state of its work and deliberations.7

**Consideration by the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament**

The proposal for holding a world disarmament conference also received attention in the context of preparations for the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

In that respect, the Eastern European States generally expressed the view that the special session and a world disarmament conference were forums that were not mutually exclusive but organically interrelated and that, accordingly, the special session should constitute an important step in the process leading to a world disarmament conference. The Soviet Union, for instance, stated that effective solutions to disarmament problems could only be worked out in a universal forum with the necessary machinery for adopting practical viable decisions that took the interests of all States into account. In its opinion, that could be accomplished within the framework of a world disarmament conference. Hence, one of the main tasks of the special session was to decide on measures for preparing and holding such a conference, which should be the next decisive stage in the solution of disarmament problems.8

On the basis of such an approach, the Eastern European countries affirmed their support for the proposal made by the non-aligned countries at their 1976 summit conference in Colombo that the question of a world disarmament conference should be placed on the agenda of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Thus, the delegation of Hungary emphasized that a world disarmament conference would be a new approach in international disarmament negotiations, and underlined the importance of ensuring that the special session would devote due attention to that subject and include it as a separate item on its agenda.

Among States subscribing to the view that the special session could contribute to the attainment of the goal of a world disarmament con-
ference was Finland, which noted that the General Assembly had, for more than six years, striven to pave the way for the convening of such a conference. Nepal and Tunisia also supported the holding of a world disarmament conference, the latter pointing out that in view of the difficulty of adopting concrete and realistic measures, the possibility of a second special session should not be ruled out, and noting that most States supported the convening of a world disarmament conference.

With respect to consideration, at the special session, of the question of a world disarmament conference, the non-aligned countries, in a working paper entitled "Draft agenda for the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament", 9 which they submitted to the Preparatory Committee on 10 May 1977, proposed the inclusion of an item dealing with the convening of a world disarmament conference on the agenda of the special session. This proposal was reiterated in a subsequent working paper entitled "Some preliminary ideas concerning preparations for the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament", 10 which the non-aligned countries submitted to the Preparatory Committee on 18 May 1977.

The Preparatory Committee’s report to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session 11 contained the Committee’s recommendation concerning item 12 of the provisional agenda for the special session on the review of the role of the United Nations in disarmament and of the international machinery for negotiations on disarmament, including, in particular, the question of convening a world disarmament conference.

Several other working papers which were submitted to the Preparatory Committee also referred to the possibility of holding a world disarmament conference. Mexico, in its working paper of 24 May 1977, 12 set forth some fundamental principles and norms for possible inclusion in the declaration on disarmament envisaged in the provisional agenda of the special session approved by the Preparatory Committee, and stated that the deliberative machinery of the United Nations should be reinforced through the institutionalization of a world disarmament conference on terms acceptable to all Member States. On 13 June 1977, Mauritius submitted a working paper 13 containing some views on the content of the declaration on disarmament, in which it noted that the feasibility of convening, in due time and after appropriate preparatory work, a world disarmament conference of all States should be thoroughly studied. In a working paper entitled "Negotiating machinery for disarmament problems", 14 Romania stated that within the framework of disarmament negotiations described in the paper, a decision could also be adopted concerning the convening of a world

9 A/AC.187/43.
10 A/AC.187/55.
11 See foot-note 7.
12 A/AC.187/56.
13 See A/AC.187/60, annex.
14 A/AC.187/79.
disarmament conference with the participation of all States and all nuclear-weapon Powers. Finally, the question of convening a world disarmament conference was also raised in two working papers submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the USSR. The first paper, entitled "Basic provisions of the declaration on disarmament", noted that a world disarmament conference must be used as an important forum for working out specific, effective measures to solve the problem of disarmament. The second paper entitled "Basic provisions of the programme of action on disarmament" noted, in the section on machinery for disarmament negotiations, that if properly organized and with working bodies available to ensure a thorough preparation and practical agreement in taking appropriate decisions with due regard for the interests of all States, a world disarmament conference could work out specific, effective measures aimed at curbing the arms race and achieving disarmament.

Consideration by the CCD, 1977

At the 1977 session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament there was no extensive discussion on the question of convening a world disarmament conference; several delegations, nevertheless, referred to the subject.

At the outset of the session, the USSR submitted to the CCD its memorandum on disarmament which it had circulated earlier at the thirty-first session of the General Assembly. In that document, the Soviet Union, noting that the achievement of radical changes in dealing with the problem of disarmament required consideration of it in the broadest and most authoritative possible international forum, reiterated its conviction that the necessary prerequisites would be met by convening a world disarmament conference. While pointing out that a special session of the General Assembly could also constitute an appropriate forum for taking up disarmament questions, the Soviet Union maintained that it conceived of the convening of such a session as an interim stage, which should, by its decisions, prepare the way for a broad and far-reaching review of the problem of disarmament at a world conference.

The Soviet position that the special session represented an intermediate stage on the way to the convening of a world disarmament

15 A/AC.187/81.
16 A/AC.187/82.
18 Ibid., annex II, document CCD/522 (previously circulated as document A/31/232).
conference was supported also by the other Eastern European countries, including Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The latter noted that the special session, by creating favourable conditions and an appropriate atmosphere among the participating countries, could promote the preparation and holding of a world disarmament conference.

Among delegations referring to the question of a world disarmament conference was that of Iran, which stated that the lack of progress registered by the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference was a reflection of the difficulties inherent in a process that involved the seeking of a consensus. It also noted that the Committee's unique feature had been its ability to establish contacts with all five nuclear-weapon States.

**Consideration by the General Assembly, 1977**

In its consideration of the question of a world disarmament conference at the thirty-second session of the General Assembly,\(^\text{19}\) the First Committee had before it the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee\(^\text{20}\) which was introduced by the representative of Iran in his capacity as Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee.

During the debate in the First Committee, the question of convening a world disarmament conference was brought up most frequently in the context of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. While most countries considered the latter event as affording the international community a singular opportunity for making further progress in the field of disarmament, a large number of States, including Afghanistan, the Congo, Jamaica, Morocco, Mozambique and Qatar, upheld at the same time the viability of the concept of a future world disarmament conference. Indonesia, for example, voiced its continued support for a world disarmament conference as a forum which would offer an opportunity for all countries to participate in negotiations and to take concrete disarmament measures acceptable to all States. On the same subject, Spain characterized a world disarmament conference as part of the dynamic process leading to general and complete disarmament. It held that the convening of such a conference should be considered not as an isolated event but rather as part of the over-all process of disarmament, in which another important step was the special session on disarmament. Italy, while recalling its open-mindedness regarding the proposal to convene a world disarmament conference, emphasized that such a conference should be pre-

\(^{19}\) See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-second Session, First Committee, 7th to 38th, 40th and 44th meetings; and ibid., First Committee, Sessional Fascicle, corrigendum.

\(^{20}\) See foot-note 6.
ceded by an equally adequate preparation benefiting from the outcome of the special session.

The most persistent support for the concept of a world disarmament conference, however, came from the Eastern European States. While those countries acknowledged the significance of the forthcoming special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, they reiterated their position that the special session would only constitute an intermediate stage leading to the convening of a world disarmament conference. For example, Bulgaria held that the idea of holding a special session on disarmament had come up logically as an intermediate solution due to the impossibility of convening a world disarmament conference at present and added that the special session must, therefore, become a landmark on the road to the practical preparation of that conference. Among other countries who envisaged the special session as being a step towards an eventual world disarmament conference were the Congo, Jamaica and Morocco, which stated that the special session should represent a fundamental stage for convening a world disarmament conference based on equality and the participation of all nuclear-weapon States.

Furthermore, the Eastern European States maintained that only a world disarmament conference invested with broad and full powers would provide a sufficiently large and authoritative forum for the coordination, elaboration and adoption of effective measures in the field of disarmament. Thus, the Soviet Union held that the task of implementing the decisions to be adopted at the special session on disarmament could best be carried out through a world disarmament conference. Therefore, in its opinion, the conference should be the type of forum that would make it possible to proceed from the general declarations and appeals that are normally adopted at General Assembly sessions, to practical work on agreed disarmament measures.

On that same point, Syria also emphasized that its support for a world disarmament conference was based on the fact that the convening of a special session of the General Assembly could not possibly take the place of an international conference, which could be transformed into a body that would hold periodic meetings in order to review the progress achieved towards disarmament.

On the other hand, referring to the question of a link between the special session and a world disarmament conference, the delegation of China, at the 10th meeting, asked whether it was not clear "that in advocating the turning of the special United Nations session on disarmament next year into an 'interim' or 'intermediate phase' for the 'world disarmament conference', the purpose of the Soviet Union is to bring this special session into its own orbit and make this session a part of its fraud of sham détente and sham disarmament?"

With respect to the future mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference, the Eastern European States
pointed out that the Committee had done useful work and had succeeded in maintaining contact with the five States possessing nuclear weapons and that, therefore, it would be desirable for it to continue its work and present its regular report to the General Assembly at its thirty-third session.

On 11 November, Burundi, Iran, Peru, Poland and Spain submitted a draft resolution, which was subsequently also sponsored by Cuba, Jordan and Mongolia. The draft resolution was adopted by the First Committee on 18 November without a vote, and by the General Assembly without a vote as resolution 32/89. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2833 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, 2930 (XXVII) of 29 November 1972, 3183 (XXVIII) of 18 December 1973, 3260 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3469 (XXX) of 11 December 1975 and 31/190 of 21 December 1976,

Reiterating its conviction that all peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations and that all States should be in a position to contribute to the adoption of measures for the achievement of this goal,

Stressing anew its belief that a world disarmament conference, adequately prepared and convened at an appropriate time, could promote the realization of such an aim and that the co-operation of all nuclear-weapon Powers would considerably facilitate its attainment,

Taking into account the provisional agenda of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, to be held in May and June 1978, and the recommendations proposed in the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, endorsed by the Assembly in its resolution 32/88 A and B of 12 December 1977,

1. Requests the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference to submit to the General Assembly at its special session devoted to disarmament a special report on the state of its work and deliberations;

2. Requests the Ad Hoc Committee to maintain close contact with the representatives of the States possessing nuclear weapons in order to remain currently informed of their respective attitudes, as well as to consider any relevant comments and observations which might be made to the Committee and to submit a report to the General Assembly at its thirty-third session;

3. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-third session the item entitled "World Disarmament Conference".

In the only explanation of vote following the adoption of the draft resolution in the First Committee Belgium, speaking on behalf of the nine members of the European Economic Community, observed that any decision to convene a world disarmament conference could not properly be examined until after the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Furthermore, a world disarmament conference could achieve significant results and have the expected impact on world public opinion only if the conference were carefully prepared and if the participation of all the major military Powers, particularly those possessing nuclear weapons, were assured.
Conclusion

The developments related to the question of a world disarmament conference during 1977 once more brought to the fore the difficulty of obtaining a coincidence of views on the part of the nuclear-weapon Powers regarding the convening of such a conference. The divergent views consistently expressed on the matter by those Powers, virtually since the inception of the proposal, continued to exist.

The subject will undoubtedly receive attention at the forthcoming special session on disarmament. In this respect, it should be noted that the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference has been requested by the General Assembly to submit a special report to the special session on the state of the Committee's work and deliberations. The question will be further considered at the thirty-third session of the General Assembly, to which the Ad Hoc Committee will submit its regular report.

In the meantime, many States continued to subscribe to the view that any future world disarmament conference is predicated on ensuring adequate preparation as well as the participation of all nuclear-weapon and other militarily significant States.
PART TWO

Nuclear disarmament
CHAPTER V

Nuclear arms limitation and disarmament

Introduction

Nuclear disarmament has been a constant preoccupation of the international community ever since the emergence of nuclear weapons. It may be recalled that by its very first resolution the General Assembly, in its resolution 1 (I), established an Atomic Energy Commission with the urgent task of making specific proposals for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction.

The following chapters examine various approaches and measures in respect to specific aspects of nuclear arms limitation and disarmament that have been adopted or are under consideration. This chapter is designed to provide an overview of the question, including a survey of initiatives which are not covered in other chapters of this Yearbook, and which have been discussed from time to time, singly, in various combinations, or as part of comprehensive proposals aimed at general and complete disarmament.¹

Over the years, it has come to be recognized that nuclear war constitutes the greatest single peril to the survival of mankind and that, consequently, nuclear disarmament is the most important and pressing item on the disarmament agenda. A number of agreements have been reached, within and outside the framework of the United Nations, to diminish that danger. Nevertheless, as has been repeatedly pointed out, the quantitative and qualitative nuclear arms race has continued apace: there has been a staggering growth in the number of nuclear weapons and a steady stream of technological innovations leading to the development and deployment of ever more complex and destructive weapons systems.

In this context, many States have criticized the tendency to direct international efforts to peripheral issues rather than to nuclear disarmament—a tendency which in their eyes is particularly notable in the

¹ A detailed account of these initiatives may be found in The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970 (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1) and its supplement The United Nations and Disarmament: 1970-1975 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.76.IX.1).
work of the CCD. In addition, it has been generally emphasized that the nuclear-weapon States have the primary responsibility to take the steps needed for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. For their part, the Soviet Union and the United States have time and again affirmed their commitment to those objectives, as evidenced by their persistent efforts in the context of the SALT negotiations.

Prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons

A. Unconditional prohibition or non-use

Various proposals have been advanced for the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, also known as "non-use". Such proposals have been discussed at different times and in different contexts. In 1946, the Soviet Union proposed the unconditional prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons in a draft convention submitted to the Atomic Energy Commission, and it has continued to take initiatives on the subject. In 1972, for instance, it made a proposal concerning the non-use of force in international relations and the permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, which led to the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2936 (XXVII). Initiatives calling for the unconditional prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons have also been made by Romania in 1975 and at the Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Colombo in 1976. This concept has also been considered in connexion with the questions of nuclear-weapon-free zones and of security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States. For instance, Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) provides for the unconditional prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons against the contracting parties. Such a prohibition was also contemplated in a draft additional protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, proposed by Bolivia, Ecuador, Ghana, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Romania, Senegal, Sudan, Yugoslavia and Zaire at the Review Conference of the Parties to the non-proliferation Treaty in 1975. In this approach, the Depositary Governments would solemnly undertake never and under no circumstances to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty whose territories were completely free from nuclear weapons. Similarly, a number of General Assembly resolutions concerning nuclear-weapon-

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3 See A/C.1/1066.
4 See A/31/197.
6 See NPT/CONF/35/I, annex II.
free zones and security guarantees envisage unconditional prohibitions of the use of nuclear weapons.

B. Non-first-use

Proposals have also been made prohibiting the first use of nuclear weapons. For instance, pursuant to the above-mentioned proposal for a draft additional protocol to the non-proliferation Treaty, the Depositary Governments of the Treaty would undertake to refrain from the first use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty whose territories were not completely free from nuclear weapons. Another example is the proposal, made in November 1976, by the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty to the States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, by which the participants would undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons one against the other either on land, on sea, in the air or in outer space. A principle along these lines has further been advocated by China, which has repeatedly called on the nuclear-weapon States to undertake the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, particularly against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones.

C. Conditional prohibition

An alternative, which has been favoured by Western countries, is the conditional prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Such a prohibition was contemplated in a joint proposal made by France and the United Kingdom in the framework of the Disarmament Commission in 1954, under which States would regard themselves as prohibited in accordance with the terms of the Charter of the United Nations from the use of nuclear weapons except in defence against aggression.

Cessation of production and reduction of stocks

In addition, a wide range of measures have been put forward aiming at the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and involving, in one form or another, limitations, reductions and/or the

8 See, for instance, Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-first Session, First Committee, 25th meeting; and ibid., First Committee, Sessional Fascicle, corrigendum.
elimination of nuclear weapons. Several of these proposals have also included the question of delivery vehicles. The bilateral Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in which the Soviet Union and the United States have been involved since 1969 may also be mentioned in this context.

Among the measures proposed has been the cut-off of the further production of fissionable material for weapons purposes and the transfer of stocks of such material to peaceful uses, the destruction of stockpiles of nuclear material and nuclear weapons, and the reduction of such stocks as a step on the way to a complete liquidation. In this area, proposals have been made both by the Soviet Union and by the United States. In 1964, the latter made a proposal for the cut-off of the production of fissionable nuclear material (plutonium and enriched uranium) for weapons purposes, and the transfer of stocks of such material to peaceful uses. In 1966, the Soviet Union proposed the destruction, under appropriate international control, of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the prohibition of their manufacture.

Other countries have also taken initiatives in this area. At the Colombo Conference, a resolution on disarmament was adopted, *inter alia*, calling for the urgent banning of the production and stockpiling of nuclear weapons.

In 1975, Romania submitted in the General Assembly a memorandum on the problems of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, and establishment of lasting world peace. In that document, it held that it was necessary to adopt measures to ensure, among other things, the cessation of the development, testing and production of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery; the cessation of the production of fissionable material for military purposes; the use of existing material for peaceful purposes and the transfer of a quota to be used, by all States, within the context of broad international cooperation; the reduction and complete liquidation of all existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and means of their delivery; and the total banning of nuclear weapons.

**Other measures**

The question of limiting, reducing or eliminating delivery vehicles is connected with that of the reduction and elimination of stockpiles of such material. The Soviet Union and the United States have also taken initiatives in this context. For instance, in 1964, both of them proposed

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12 See A/31/197, annex IV A.
13 A/C.1/1066.
the destruction of bomber aircraft. In that same year, as a collateral to its proposal for a cut-off of the production of fissionable material, the United States advanced the suggestion of a verified freeze on the number and characteristics of offensive and defensive strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.

There have, further, been proposals for restrictions or prohibitions on the deployment of nuclear weapons in the territory of other States. Measures to this effect have been advocated as indicated above by Romania and at the Colombo Conference.

Measures to avert or reduce the danger of nuclear war have been the subject of discussions in bilateral negotiations and a number of agreements have been reached, such as the “hot line” agreements and the agreement, of 30 September 1971, on measures to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war between the Soviet Union and the United States; the agreement on the prevention of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, concluded by France and the Soviet Union on 16 July 1976; and the agreement between the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom on the prevention of the accidental outbreak of nuclear war, concluded on 10 October 1977.

The framework for discussions

In addition to substantive measures relating to nuclear weapons, the topic of a suitable framework for discussions on nuclear disarmament has merited attention. The evolution of the negotiating machinery, particularly in the 1950s, has reflected the special role that the major military powers play in this area. Thus, it may be recalled that the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament (the predecessor of ENDC and the CCD) was established by a decision of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States in 1959. In recent years, there has been renewed interest in the idea of negotiations among all the nuclear-weapon States to deal with the problem of nuclear disarmament. A proposal to this effect was advanced by the Soviet Union in 1971. Rejecting that proposal, China stated that all countries in the world, big or small, should be equal and that matters affecting various countries in the world should be jointly

15 See foot-note 10.
16 The original “hot line” agreement, officially known as Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and the USSR Regarding the Establishment of a Direct Communications Link, was signed on 20 June 1963. An additional agreement was signed on 30 September 1971 and amended by an exchange of letters on 29 April 1975.
discussed and settled by all of them and permit of no monopoly by a few big Powers.\textsuperscript{18}

France, which supported the Soviet proposal for a conference of the five nuclear-weapon States,\textsuperscript{19} has repeatedly held that the successful pursuit of nuclear disarmament requires the participation and active co-operation of all the nuclear Powers and that this, in turn, requires the establishment of new mechanisms.

It is generally acknowledged that the nuclear-weapon States bear a special responsibility for finding solutions to the problem of nuclear disarmament. At the same time, there is recognition that the international community as a whole is also vitally affected and, hence, has a legitimate interest in this search, as evidenced by the General Assembly resolutions adopted on the subject of the SALT negotiations.

**Consideration by the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament**

Proposals made in 1977 in the context of preparations for the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament have variously underlined the paramount importance of nuclear disarmament.

The working paper presented by the Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries,\textsuperscript{20} which contained preliminary ideas concerning preparations for that session, placed nuclear weapons as first in the order of priorities that should govern disarmament negotiations. Mexico, in its working paper on the fundamental principles and norms that might be included in the declaration on disarmament,\textsuperscript{21} proposed, *inter alia*, to assign the highest priority to the progressive reduction of nuclear weapons until their total elimination was achieved. Similarly, Romania's working paper on the declaration on disarmament\textsuperscript{22} attached absolute priority to measures of nuclear disarmament. Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the Soviet Union, in their working paper on the basic provisions of the programme of action on disarmament,\textsuperscript{23} included the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament as one of the principal areas in which it was essential to seek appropriate international agreements.

Finally, the working paper containing a draft declaration on disarmament,\textsuperscript{24} submitted by Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway,

\textsuperscript{18} See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-sixth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1971*, document S/10397.

\textsuperscript{19} See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 1942nd meeting, para. 55.

\textsuperscript{20} A/AC.187/55.

\textsuperscript{21} A/AC.187/56.

\textsuperscript{22} A/AC.187/77.

\textsuperscript{23} A/AC.187/82.

\textsuperscript{24} A/AC.187/87.
Turkey and the United Kingdom, provided that the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons in the context of general and complete disarmament was the most important challenge of our time, since the dangers of nuclear warfare remained a grave threat to the survival of mankind.

These proposals also outlined various measures that should be implemented to achieve a cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, besides those discussed in subsequent chapters. The following proposals may be mentioned among those aiming at the limitation, reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. The working paper of the non-aligned countries included, among the measures that should be urgently implemented, the cessation of research and development of new types of nuclear weapons and weapon systems, the cessation of production of fissionable material for military purposes and a freeze on the deployment of all types of nuclear weapons. Among other measures that should also be implemented as concrete steps within the framework of the programme of action on disarmament, the working paper listed the gradual reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. Romania included the measures it proposed in 1975, as outlined above, in its working paper on the programme of measures and action. In their working paper, the Eastern European States considered it essential to halt the nuclear arms race, i.e. to stop manufacturing nuclear weapons, equipping the armed forces of States with them, and developing and constructing new models and types of such weapons; to begin reducing the stockpiles of nuclear weapons and subsequently to proceed with their complete elimination.

Proposals were also made concerning the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. The non-aligned countries, in their working paper, put forward for consideration, in the context of collateral measures, particularly those concerned with the strengthening of international peace and security and the relaxation of tensions, the renunciation or prohibition of the use, or the threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. Romania's working paper on the programme of measures and action also called for an unconditional prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

Concerning the danger of nuclear war, the Eastern European countries suggested that bilateral or multilateral measures should be taken in the interest of achieving disarmament and providing reliable safeguards for the future of all mankind.

**Consideration by the CCD, 1977**

As in previous years, a number of member States spoke on the subject of nuclear disarmament in the context of general statements relating to

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25 A/AC.187/78.
the nuclear arms race, although the matter was not among those under negotiation in the CCD. The question was also discussed in connexion with the SALT negotiations and with a comprehensive ban of nuclear-weapon tests (see chapters VI and VII below).

The United States recalled President Carter’s commitment to the control and reduction of armaments, including the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons, and reviewed the steps that the Government of the United States had taken to give fresh impetus to arms control and disarmament negotiations, including new proposals for the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons. For its part, the Soviet Union reiterated its determination to strive for the adoption of measures to halt the accelerating arms race and to reduce existing stockpiles with a view to achieving disarmament.

Other statements also highlighted the priority generally attached to nuclear disarmament. India, for instance, recalled that the General Assembly had repeatedly declared that the highest priority in the field of disarmament should be given to the elimination of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. Pakistan considered that the basic tasks in the field of disarmament were preventing the further development and sophistication of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, immediate lowering of the existing level of armaments, especially nuclear armaments, and initiating moves towards their eventual destruction and complete elimination, and held that the drive towards those goals must stem firstly from the two super-Powers which already enjoyed a preponderant position in military arms and therefore did not need to continue extending their arsenals either quantitatively or qualitatively. In the opinion of Romania, negotiations should concentrate, as the highest priority, on problems of nuclear disarmament because, indisputably, nuclear weapons had proved to be the most destructive devices at present to be found in the arsenals of States; by their very nature they constituted a threat to all mankind, and not only to those who possessed them; and their existence and continual refinement sustained the arms psychosis in the world.

Some countries pointed to the connexion between vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. For instance, the Netherlands expressed the conviction that horizontal proliferation could not be stopped in the long run if the present nuclear-weapon States did not enter into real nuclear disarmament.

Mexico, welcoming the views expressed by President Carter, both before and on the occasion of his inauguration as President of the United States, with regard to nuclear disarmament, called attention to

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27 The term “vertical proliferation” denotes the increase in the quantity and the quality of the nuclear arsenal of the nuclear-weapon States. “Horizontal proliferation” means the increase in the number of States having a nuclear-weapon capability.
the explicit recognition of the fact that the elimination of nuclear weapons must be the principal objective of the discussions and negotiations on disarmament. In addition, noting with satisfaction that Leonid Brezhnev, President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, had made parallel statements very similar in substance, it expressed the hope that the results that could be expected to flow from such promising intentions in the context of the SALT negotiations would have a significance that would correspond to the repeated exhortations that the General Assembly had addressed year after year to the two Powers.

Besides comments of a general nature, there were also references to specific partial measures. Japan, in the context of a statement on nuclear proliferation, in which it held that the very existence of nuclear weapons was the core of the problem, suggested as one concrete step towards nuclear disarmament that the nuclear-weapon States halt the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes so as to devote the natural and enriched uranium thus saved to peaceful purposes. Yugoslavia recalled the recommendations and conclusions of the Colombo Conference regarding nuclear disarmament. Romania reminded the Committee of the proposals it had submitted in the past to various forums as measures to be negotiated in the context of genuine efforts for nuclear disarmament.

The Soviet Union and various other Eastern European countries brought to the attention of the Committee the proposal made in November 1976 by the Warsaw Treaty States to the other States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, concerning the non-first-use of nuclear weapons.

Japan, noting that, with the increase in the number of nuclear warheads, consisting of thousands of strategic and tens of thousands of tactical nuclear warheads, the chances of accidental warfare obviously multiplied unless an absolutely effective system of control was established, thought it necessary that both the United States and the Soviet Union, which were overwhelmingly dominant in the number of nuclear weapons in their arsenals, consolidate each of their control systems for nuclear weapons and develop them into an international arrangement. It welcomed the conclusion of the United States-USSR accidental warfare prevention Treaty and the United States-USSR "hot line" agreement as an effort to avert such a danger, and proposed that they further stipulate the obligation to notify each other in the event of such potentially dangerous activities as missile launching tests and military exercises.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1977

The absolute priority and utmost urgency of effective measures to halt the nuclear arms race and begin the process of nuclear disarmament
was again emphasized at the thirty-second session of the General Assembly, both during the general debate and in the First Committee.\textsuperscript{28} Japan, for instance, expressed the belief that unquestionably the highest priority in the field of disarmament must be given to the question of nuclear disarmament and noted that in spite of the continuous efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament at the United Nations and in other international forums on disarmament, nuclear disarmament was still far from attainment, while the nuclear arms race continued to increase in terms of both quality and quantity. India considered that the twin dangers facing the world today were the awesome arsenals of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and the enunciation and acceptance of politico-military doctrines which endeavoured to establish the indispensability of the existence of such weapons for the maintenance of international peace and security. India had been consistently opposed to the proliferation of those weapons, vertical as well as horizontal. Equally, it could not and did not accept the thesis underlying the doctrine of strategic deterrence, namely, that nuclear weapons in the possession of the existing nuclear-weapon States were essential to preserve peace. Pointing out that it was an historical fact that nuclear weapons had been used in the past on grounds of military necessity, it held that only the total dismantling of the entire armoury of all the nuclear weapons could guarantee peace in the world.

Various countries, such as Iran, Malaysia and Peru, deplored the continuation of the nuclear arms race, dwelt on its qualitative aspect and special dangers.

Both the Soviet Union and the United States made statements that reflected their awareness of the threat posed by the nuclear arms race and of the consequent need for nuclear disarmament. President Carter and Foreign Minister Gromyko, in their addresses to the General Assembly, indicated their willingness to work for the elimination of nuclear weapons. The latter reiterated the Soviet Union's readiness to sit down at any time, together with all the other nuclear-weapon States, at the negotiating table to examine the problem of nuclear disarmament in its entirety and jointly to work out concrete ways for its practical solution.

The Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries referred to the proposal put forward on 7 November 1977 by Leonid Brezhnev, which called for an agreement on a simultaneous halt in the production of nuclear weapons by all States, encompassing all such weapons—whether atomic, hydrogen or neutron bombs or missiles. At the same time the nuclear Powers could undertake to start the gradual reduction of existing stockpiles of such weapons and move towards their complete and total elimination.

\textsuperscript{28} See \textit{Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-second Session, First Committee, 7th to 38th, 40th and 44th meetings;} and \textit{ibid., First Committee, Sessional Fascicle, corrigendum.}
The United States noted in positive terms the suggestion made by Japan in the CCD that the question of a cut-off in the production of fissionable materials for weapons use be considered anew. In addition, the Soviet Union submitted, but did not press to a vote, a draft resolution on the prevention of the danger of nuclear war, under the item entitled "Deepening and consolidation of international détente and prevention of the danger of nuclear war", which had been included in the agenda of the Assembly's thirty-second session at its request. The draft resolution specified a variety of measures to be taken by all States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, for the purpose of reducing, as far as possible, the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war. Thus, the Soviet proposal urged that those nuclear-weapon States which had not yet done so, conclude agreements with other nuclear-weapon States concerning measures to diminish and avert the danger of nuclear war and to prevent the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, and that those nuclear-weapon States which had concluded such agreements with each other should improve and develop such measures. It also called for negotiations among the nuclear-weapon States with a view to reaching agreement on the withdrawal of ships carrying nuclear weapons from certain areas of the world's oceans and on other possible measures to limit the nuclear arms race in those areas.

Concerning the question of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, which was also considered in the context of nuclear-weapon-free zones and of security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States, it may be noted here that President Carter, reiterating United States policy on the matter, namely, its willingness to accept a conditional prohibition, solemnly declared that the United States would not use nuclear weapons except in self-defence, that is, in circumstances of an actual nuclear or conventional attack on the United States, its territories or armed forces, or such an attack on its allies.

A number of countries directed attention to the question of the non-first-use of nuclear weapons. China, reaffirming its long-held position, maintained that, as a first step towards the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, all nuclear-weapon States, especially the Soviet Union and the United States, should undertake the obligation not to be the first to use such weapons at any time and in any circumstances, and particularly not to use them against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones. The Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries referred to the proposal made by the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty to the other participants in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, which contemplated the conclusion of a treaty whereby they would undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against one another.

Conclusion

For many years, the attention of the international community has been focused on the danger posed by nuclear weapons to the very survival of mankind and the consequent need to adopt effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.

Over the years, a broad range of measures has been advanced both by nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States covering the whole field of nuclear disarmament and arms limitations. Concrete discussions and negotiations have concentrated on certain specific questions which are examined in various chapters of the present Yearbook, such as the limitation of strategic nuclear weapons, a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons testing, the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons, nuclear-weapon-free zones and security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. But, as this chapter indicates, a wide variety of other questions concerning the limitation, reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons and the non-use of such weapons have, at one time or another, been the subject of proposals in different forums, within and outside the United Nations.

Most of the proposals referred to in the present chapter have been reiterated from time to time, but it has not been possible to reach agreement on their implementation and, consequently, they have not gone beyond the phase of general discussion. Nevertheless, their consideration in future negotiations could be envisaged in the context of the final document that the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament is expected to adopt.
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

Introduction

The Soviet Union and the United States have been engaged in bilateral Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) since late 1969. The first phase of the negotiations (SALT I) ended with the signing in Moscow on 26 May 1972 of two agreements: the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, with a Protocol attached.¹ Both agreements entered into force on 3 October 1972.

The ABM Treaty, of unlimited duration, permitted each side to have only two ABM deployment sites, one to protect its capital and another to protect one intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launch site. Subsequently, the Treaty was amended by a Protocol of 3 July 1974,² limiting each side to one ABM deployment area only, with no more than 100 interceptor missiles. In addition to the quantitative limitations, both parties agreed by the Treaty to restrict qualitative improvements of their ABM systems, including further improvements of the characteristics of ABM radars.

The Interim Agreement, concluded for a period of five years, established quantitative limitations for the two sides' strategic offensive forces. They undertook to freeze the number of fixed land-based ICBM launchers—1,054 for the United States and 1,618 for the USSR—³ and to limit submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines to an agreed level for each side—710 SLBM launchers on 44 submarines for the United States and 950 SLBM launchers on 62 submarines for the USSR.

The second phase of the negotiations (SALT II), which formally began in November 1972, is still under way. By the end of 1974 the two sides had reached understandings as to the scope of the eventual

¹ See A/C.1/1026.
² See A/9698.
agreement and the principles upon which it should be based. At the Washington summit meeting in June 1973 an Agreement on Basic Principles of Negotiations on the Further Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms⁴ was signed, by which the two sides agreed that the limitations placed on strategic offensive weapons would apply to both quantitative aspects and qualitative improvements, and also that the limitations must be subject to adequate verification by national technical means. The second understanding, of July 1974, signed in Moscow,⁵ reflected the decision of the two Governments to seek an agreement covering the period up to 1985, rather than a permanent one as envisaged in the 1973 Agreement on Basic Principles. Finally, a joint statement of 24 November 1974, issued after the Vladivostok summit meeting, further specified that the negotiations, and the SALT agreement which was their ultimate goal, would be based on the following provisions:

1. The new agreement will incorporate the relevant provisions of the Interim Agreement of 26 May 1972, which will remain in force until October 1977.

2. The new agreement will cover the period from October 1977 through December 31, 1985.

3. Based on the principle of equality and equal security, the new agreement will include the following limitations:
   A. Both sides will be entitled to have a certain agreed aggregate number of strategic delivery vehicles;
   B. Both sides will be entitled to have a certain agreed aggregate number of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with multiple independently-targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs).

4. The new agreement will include a provision for further negotiations beginning no later than 1980-1981 on the question of further limitations and possible reductions of strategic arms in the period after 1985.

5. Negotiations between the delegations of the United States and the USSR to work out the new agreement incorporating the foregoing points will resume at Geneva in January 1975.

According to a subsequent announcement made by the United States,⁶ the aggregate numbers referred to in paragraphs 3 A. and B. would place a ceiling of 2,400 on strategic delivery vehicles for each side, of which only 1,320 could be armed with MIRVs. The total number would be composed of a combination of land-based missile launchers, submarine missile launchers, intercontinental bombers and certain other categories of weapons that would have the characteristics of strategic weapons. Each side could, however, decide on the composition of its forces within the given total, provided that the number of

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⁴ See A/9293.
fixed land-based missiles, particularly heavy missiles, would not exceed the total determined in the SALT I agreement. The statement also confirmed previously set restrictions concerning further increases in ICBM silo dimensions, which were not permitted to exceed 10 to 15 per cent of the then existing silos. According to the same announcement, no restraints concerning throw-weight or other qualitative improvements were envisaged.

During the negotiations to translate the Vladivostok guidelines into a specific agreement, which commenced in January 1975, differences arose with regard to substantive issues, such as the scope of the eventual agreement. The question was whether certain new weapons should or should not be counted against the numerical ceiling for strategic delivery vehicles agreed upon by the two sides. Specifically, the controversy concerned a new supersonic Soviet bomber and the American cruise missile.

By mid-1976 that issue was still unresolved. Mr. Kissinger, at a press conference held in Washington on 10 July 1976, stated that his Government therefore proposed the conclusion of an agreement covering only those matters which had already been settled, leaving all other issues for the next phase of the negotiations. The Soviet Union reportedly did not agree with this approach and no agreement was reached. The negotiations were recessed in the autumn of 1976 in view of the change of the United States Administration.

Although bilateral in nature, the SALT negotiations have attracted wide attention, both in the General Assembly and the CCD. A number of Member States have made numerous references to the importance of these negotiations. In addition, at each of its regular sessions since 1972, when it adopted resolution 2932 B (XXVII), the General Assembly has adopted resolutions on the subject in which it expressed concern about the continuing nuclear arms race, stressed the urgency of reaching agreement on quantitative reductions and on restricting qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons and requested the two sides to keep it informed of the progress of their negotiations. While maintaining the view that the negotiations were not within the purview of the General Assembly and should therefore proceed along the lines set by the States concerned, both parties have themselves made regular references in the Assembly to their talks and the results achieved so far.

Bilateral negotiations, 1977

The negotiations were resumed in March 1977 when the United States Secretary of State visited the Soviet Union. On that occasion the American side put forward two alternative proposals.  

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7 Resolutions 3184 A (XXVIII), 3261 C (XXIX), 3484 C (XXX) and 31/189 A.
One of them, called a “deferral option”, in fact repeated the proposal of the previous Administration whereby the two sides would immediately conclude an agreement on the basis of the Vladivostok ceilings, not counting against the total either the cruise missile or the supersonic bomber, the two weapons to be dealt with in negotiations subsequent to the conclusion of the agreement (SALT III).

The other proposal, called a “comprehensive option”, provided for a substantial lowering of the Vladivostok ceilings and for certain qualitative limitations. The measures proposed were specified as follows:

(a) the total number of strategic delivery vehicles permitted for each side would be cut down from 2,400 to 1,800-2,000 units, and the sublimit of vehicles armed with MIRVs from 1,320 to 1,100-1,200 units;

(b) with regard to land-based intercontinental ballistic missile launchers:

(i) the number of “heavy” ICBM launchers would be reduced by half,

(ii) the number of fixed land-based ICBM launchers armed with MIRVs would be frozen at the present level (about 550 for each side),

(iii) the deployment of mobile land-based ICBM launchers would be banned (the Soviet Union would be requested to provide some assured mechanism by which it would be possible to distinguish between its intercontinental missile known as the SS-16 and the limited range mobile missile known as the SS-20);

(c) with regard to the cruise missile:

(i) the development, testing and deployment of land-based cruise missiles (LBCM) of intercontinental range would be banned;

(ii) the development, testing and deployment of all other cruise missiles, that is, sea-launched (SLCM) and air-launched missiles (ALCM) would be banned beyond the range of 1,500 miles (approx. 2,500 km);

(d) with regard to the Soviet supersonic bomber known as “Backfire” there would be a “strict limit” on its deployment;

(e) with regard to further improvements of weapons, the number of test firings of missiles of intercontinental range would be limited to six per year;

(f) with regard to new weapon systems, there would be a strict ban on their development and deployment.

The Soviet Union considered both proposals unacceptable. The “deferral option” was objected to on the grounds that such an agreement would substantially depart from the Vladivostok guidelines which were carefully worked out to provide for an over-all balance between the two sides. In its opinion, that balance would be jeopardized if the
cruise missile were not to be counted against the total number of strategic delivery vehicles agreed upon. The Soviet Union maintained that the guidelines also referred to the cruise missile and that it was therefore subject to the limitations. Commenting on the matter, the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs remarked, at a press conference on 31 March 1977: ⁹ "At Vladivostok the question was posed differently, no green light was given there to the cruise missile. The question was posed thus—to work for such an agreement that would shut off all channels of the strategic arms race and reduce the threat of nuclear war." At the same time he reiterated that the Soviet supersonic bomber in question was in fact a medium-range bomber and that consequently there was no justifiable reason for counting it as a strategic weapon. He added that the necessary clarification on this issue had been presented to the American side. That basic position was subsequently reiterated in a Pravda editorial of 14 April 1977: ¹⁰ "The Soviet Union has categorically rejected and rejects any attempts to introduce the question of 'Backfire' and other Soviet weapons systems incapable of reaching United States territory within the range of questions of strategic arms limitations discussed at Soviet-American talks."

The "comprehensive option" was rejected for two basic reasons. First, in the Soviet view any substantial reductions in the numbers agreed upon in Vladivostok would have to be based on due considerations of the security needs of both parties and their allies, and also take into account the different strategic options available to each side. If the drastic reductions in strategic delivery vehicles were limited to the two sides' forces only, the Soviet Union would remain without adequate defence, while the United States would still have additional options. Referring to the proposed reductions, it was stated in the same editorial: "The result would be that after such an operation, which would have deprived the USSR of means of delivery to the territory of the United States, there would still remain, in the immediate proximity of the Soviet Union, United States forward-based nuclear systems (about 800 carrier aircraft and ground missiles); American aircraft carriers with planes capable of delivering offensive nuclear weapons would still be operating (more than 500 planes) and there would remain the American allies, some of whom have their own strategic weapons". In that light, the editorial concluded that proposals for substantial cuts of earlier agreed ceilings would have to take into consideration a number of factors prejudicial to the security of the USSR, including such factors as the American forward-based nuclear systems in Europe and Asia, the United States carrier-borne aircraft and the possession of nuclear weapons by the United States allies.

According to the Soviet view, the proposal would also cut by half

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⁹ See press release No. 67 of 1 April 1977, issued by the Permanent Mission of the USSR to the United Nations.

the number of Soviet ICBM launchers for "heavy" missiles and freeze the land-based ICBM launchers armed with MIRVs, but would not affect the United States "Trident" submarine armed with SLBMs, which was being built with priority over the land-based ICBMs, and would be equipped with missiles of a range and effectiveness as great as those of intercontinental ballistic missiles. In addition, it was pointed out that the proposal would ban only those cruise missiles with a range of more than 1,500 miles (approx. 2,500 km), which was not considered sufficient since the remaining missiles "are a strategic weapon because, when emplaced on submarines, vessels, bombers, or on the territories of United States allies, they would, of course, be quite capable of hitting targets on the USSR territory."\textsuperscript{11} The acceptance of that formula would, in Soviet opinion, trigger off a new round of the arms race: "Unless an agreement to block that new dangerous channel of the strategic arms race is reached now, when the cruise missiles are not yet being manufactured, it would be far more difficult after their manufacture is launched. This is borne out convincingly by the whole experience of disarmament talks. Needless to say, the Soviet Union would in that case be free to have any cruise missiles in any numbers, and it has every opportunity for that. However, it is in principle opposed to the opening of that new channel of the strategic arms race and the colossal expenditure involved."\textsuperscript{12}

The Soviet Union, nevertheless, reiterated its readiness to continue the negotiations, but only on the basis of such proposals which would take into consideration more adequately its security needs and interests. Consequently, it repeated its earlier proposal for the immediate conclusion of an agreement which would, in its view, strictly observe the Vladivostok agreement, i.e., to count the cruise missile against the agreed ceiling. A specific suggestion was advanced in that respect, as follows: (a) each bomber carrying air-launched cruise missiles with a range over 360 miles (approx. 600 km) would be considered as a strategic delivery vehicle armed with MIRVs, and as such counted against the sublimit of 1,320—the number which had already been agreed upon by the two sides in the course of the 1975-1976 negotiations, and (b) land-based cruise missiles and sea-launched cruise missiles with a range over 360 miles (approx. 600 km) would be totally banned because of their obvious strategic capacity.

On the controversial issue of the cruise missile, President Carter, at a White House press conference on 30 March 1977, held that the United States had never agreed to forgo the deployment of cruise missiles. Speaking to the Southern Legislative Conference on 21 July, he further added: "The Soviets are worried about our cruise missiles. We are concerned about the security of our deterrent. Our cruise missiles are aimed at compensating for the growing threat to our deterrent capa-

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid.
bility represented by the build-up of Soviet strategic offensive weapons forces. If these threats can be controlled, we are prepared to limit our own strategic programmes." In this connexion, it was pointed out that the United States was concerned with what it considered an increasing Soviet reliance on very large missiles with multiple warheads. The United States also felt that, by concentrating on the land-based ICBMs that were armed with MIRVs, its comprehensive proposal would take into account the greatest sources of insecurity on both sides. It held that, under that proposal, it was prepared to freeze its Minuteman III deployment—the MIRVed ICBM—at the current level of 550 and would forgo further improvements in all its ICBMs, as well as any plans for any other ICBMs. Furthermore, the United States said that it had proposed that the Soviet Union freeze its strategic MIRVed ICBMs at a number not in excess of 550, although they were below that number, on the understanding that not more than 150 of them would be the most modern Soviet large ballistic missiles. It added that the latter figure would provide for a reduction from the present total. That would be, in its view, an important element of stability because a large number of such missiles would introduce the destabilizing potential inherent in large throw-weight and many warheads. The United States also noted that pending the outcome of the SALT negotiations, it had since January slowed down the development of its own mobile land-based ICBM known as MX (missile experimental), designed as a substitute to more vulnerable fixed land-based ICBMs. It further noted that while maintaining the basic approach on the SALT negotiations, reflecting the intention to bring about reductions in the strategic forces of the two sides, it would be willing to accommodate its position on specific details if warranted by the Soviet arguments.

The whole issue was taken up again at the meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the two sides which took place at Geneva in May and during the visit of the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs to Washington in September 1977. After those meetings, the latter stated, at a press conference on 3 October 1977, "It may be said that the positions of the two sides were brought somewhat closer together as a result of the talks held in Washington the other day, and the situation in this respect is better today than it was yesterday. It may be said that the two Powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, have now stepped on the road which leads to agreement" Similarly, in his address to the General Assembly (18th meeting, 4 October 1977), President Carter declared: "In Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, we and the Soviets are within sight of a significant agreement in limiting the total numbers of weapons and in restricting certain categories of weapons of special concern to

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each of us. We can also start the crucial process of curbing the relentless
march of technological development which makes nuclear weapons ever
more difficult to control.” Intensive bilateral negotiations continued
thereafter at Geneva. They were recessed on 16 December, to be con­
tinued on 9 January 1978.

The 1977 round of the SALT negotiations was particularly impor­
tant in view of the fact that the provisions of the Interim Agreement of
1972 stipulated that it would expire after five years on 3 October 1977,
if not replaced with a new one. In spite of some progress made in the
negotiations, there still remained issues which could not be worked out
within the given deadline. Subsequently, the two sides issued a separate
declaration pledging to observe the provisions of the Interim Agreement
while the negotiations on a new agreement were in progress, if recipro­
cated by the other side. The American declaration, made by the Secre­
tary of State on 23 September,\(^\text{16}\) reads: “In order to maintain the status
quo while SALT II negotiations are being completed, the United States
declares its intention not to take any action inconsistent with the provi­
sions of the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures With Respect to
the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms which expires 3 October
1977, and with the goals of these ongoing negotiations, provided that
the Soviet Union exercises similar restraint.” The Soviet Union issued an
identical declaration on 25 September, published in Pravda.

During the Washington meeting in September, another important
issue was also considered by the two parties—the status of the Treaty on
the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of 1972, which provides
for a five-year review of its operation. In the Joint Statement issued on
24 September 1977 the two sides, inter alia, stated the following:

The United States and the Soviet Union agree that the Treaty on the Limita­
tion of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, signed in Moscow in 1972 and amended
in 1974, serves the security interests of both countries. They share the view that
this Treaty decreases the risk of nuclear war and facilitates progress in the fur­
ther limitation and reduction of strategic offensive arms. Both sides also agree
that the ABM Treaty has operated effectively, thus demonstrating the mutual
commitment of the USSR and the United States to the goal of nuclear arms
limitations and to the principle of equal security,

Accordingly, in connexion with the five-year review of the ABM Treaty,
the two sides reaffirm their commitment to the Treaty. It is agreed that this
review will be conducted in the Standing Consultative Committee after its regu­
lar fall meeting.\(^\text{17}\)

**Consideration by the CCD, 1977**

Although outside the scope of the negotiations taking place in the CCD,
a number of member States, as in previous years, made specific refer­

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\(^{16}\) See *The Department of State Bulletin*, vol. LXXVII, No. 2002 (7 Novem­

ences to the SALT negotiations in the context of the debate on measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race.\textsuperscript{18}

At the opening meeting of the CCD, both nuclear-weapon Powers engaged in the negotiations drew attention to certain statements of their respective leaders which had been made at the beginning of the year with regard to the nuclear arms race. At the 728th meeting, the Soviet Union recalled that the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, in his speech at Tula on 17 January, had declared: “Not a course towards superiority in weapons but a course towards reducing them, towards lessening military confrontation—such is our policy.” At the same meeting, the United States, for its part, recalled that in his inaugural address of 20 January the new President had stated the following: “The world is still engaged in a massive arms race designed to insure continuing equivalent strength among potential adversaries. We pledge perseverance and wisdom in our efforts to limit the world’s armaments to those necessary for each nation’s own domestic safety. And we will move this year a step toward our ultimate goal: the elimination of all nuclear weapons from this earth. We urge all other people to join us, for success can mean life instead of death.”

Referring to those statements, the representative of Mexico welcomed the new promising intentions which they reflected, and expressed the hope that they would be soon followed by further achievements in the negotiations. That hope was also shared by Iran. While noting the existence of the new spirit, which they both welcomed, Sweden and the Netherlands at the same time reiterated their concern about the lack of more substantial results in the SALT negotiations. Sweden felt that the pace of the negotiations was far too slow to offset new weapon development programmes. It noted that while the talks went on, the qualitative arms race, which had a complex relationship to the talks and which was facilitated by nuclear-weapon testing, threatened to undermine their very basis. The Netherlands expressed, in particular, concern that the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament might adversely affect the current efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The delegations of both the United Kingdom and Pakistan, in their references to the SALT negotiations, recalled the obligation assumed by the nuclear Powers under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to work towards nuclear disarmament. The United Kingdom also noted that continued progress in SALT could have an important and beneficial impact on the non-proliferation régime and on other arms control negotiations. Significant reductions in the level of nuclear arms would be a major step towards what must be the ultimate goal for all: the abolition of nuclear weapons as part of a comprehensive and multilateral disarmament programme. Pakistan held that the major Powers already enjoyed a preponderant position in military arms and

therefore did not need to continue extending their armaments either quantitatively or qualitatively. While recognizing the results achieved so far in the negotiations, Pakistan urged the United States and the Soviet Union to focus attention in the further negotiations on the more basic issues, such as preventing the further development and sophistication of nuclear weapons and delivery systems and immediate lowering of the existing level of armaments, so as to create a climate of confidence in which the other nuclear States could be persuaded to join in the efforts to promote global disarmament.

For its part, Italy also pointed out that the success in the SALT negotiations would make progress towards the final and over-all goal of the complete cessation of the nuclear arms race, while Czechoslovakia welcomed all the partial steps achieved by the Soviet Union and by the United States in the field of strategic weapons.

Following resumption of the SALT negotiations in March, and the differences which arose between the two sides in connexion with the proposals put forward at that time, Mexico again referred to the issue of strategic arms limitation. Pointing out that the two nuclear Powers played a decisive role in matters pertaining to the acceleration or slowing down of the arms race based on the theory of the so-called balance of terror, Mexico expressed regret at the discouraging outcome of the talks, but at the same time maintained the hope that the two sides would be able, on the basis of reciprocal concessions, to accomplish what the General Assembly of the United Nations had been calling for years—important qualitative limitations and substantial reductions of strategic nuclear-weapon systems.

Finally, at the summer session of the CCD, in a special statement to the Committee (754th meeting), the delegation of the United States outlined at length its Government's policy with regard to the cessation of the nuclear arms race, and also reported on the developments concerning the SALT negotiations. Speaking about the considerations upon which its arms control and disarmament policies are based, the United States, inter alia, emphasized its conviction that the current world-wide level of arms and the burdens they entailed could be reduced without in any way reducing the security of any nation. It also stated that measures to control proliferation of nuclear capabilities must be balanced by obligations to control the growth and sophistication of current nuclear arsenals. It noted that those considerations were reflected in its proposal put forward during the SALT negotiations which, it maintained, sought substantial reductions in strategic armaments combined with a series of measures which would stabilize the strategic balance, particularly by reducing any possibility that either side might gain from a first strike. The United States also confirmed that the exchanges of views with the Soviet Union had led to an agreed framework for a SALT II agreement, but added that while it had agreed on an approach to SALT II, a number of differences remained to be worked out; its negotiations with
the Soviet Union were continuing and were making slow but steady progress on the many technical issues that must be resolved.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1977

As in previous years, the SALT negotiations received particular attention at the thirty-second session of the General Assembly both during the general debate and in the First Committee. This time, however, the consideration of the issue was markedly influenced by the results of the bilateral consultations held concurrently with the beginning of the session and also the unilateral declarations made by both parties to the effect that they would continue to observe the provisions of the SALT I agreement after it expired (see pages 130 and 131 above). In addition, statements were made by the two sides during the general debate indicating their readiness to seek an agreement on further limitations of nuclear weapons which would go beyond the existing SALT agreement. In his address to the General Assembly at its 18th plenary meeting, President Carter declared: "We must look beyond the present, and work to prevent the critical threats and instabilities of the future... The United States is willing to go as far as possible, consistent with our security interests, in limiting and reducing our nuclear weapons. On a reciprocal basis we are willing now to reduce them by 10 per cent, 20 per cent or even 50 per cent. Then we will work for further reductions with a view to a world truly free of nuclear weapons" For his part, the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs stated at the 8th plenary meeting: "The USSR has invariably sought to achieve an agreement on the limitation of strategic arms and has done and is doing everything in its power to that end. We are prepared to go even further and to proceed to negotiations on the reduction of existing stockpiled arsenals of strategic weapons." While the Assembly was in session, it was reported that, in his address to the Joint Session of the Supreme Soviet and Central Committee of the Communist Party, the President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union stated the following: "Today we are proposing a radical step: that agreement be reached on a simultaneous halt in the production of nuclear weapons by all States. All such weapons—whether atomic, hydrogen or neutron bombs or missiles. At the same time the nuclear Powers could undertake to start the gradual reduction of existing stockpiles of such weapons and move towards their complete, total destruction".

In view of these developments, the prevailing opinion in the statements of Member States, made in the plenary meetings or in the First Committee, 7th to 38th, 40th and 44th meetings; and ibid., First Committee, Sessional Fascicle, corrigendum.

Committee, was one of satisfaction and hope. Statements to this effect were made in particular by Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Bulgaria, Ecuador, Hungary, Indonesia, Ireland, Liberia, Mongolia, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Qatar, Somalia, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and Venezuela. Bulgaria, for instance, referring to the statements of the two parties, noted that they had conveyed a feeling of justified optimism, substantiated by constructive efforts. Ireland similarly felt that the debate was taking place in a time of genuine encouragement and rising expectations, while the United Kingdom stated that it strongly supported the efforts of the United States and the Soviet Union to reach agreement on the limitation of strategic arms and welcomed the statements by both sides that they were within sight of such an agreement. In addition, Canada, Greece, Iran, Italy, Japan and Thailand noted with satisfaction the unilateral declarations of the two parties to continue to abide, on the basis of reciprocity, by the provisions of the SALT I treaty.

While welcoming these encouraging developments, a number of States reiterated, at the same time, their concern over the slow pace of the negotiations. Brazil, Burma, Kuwait, Madagascar, Morocco, Pakistan and Sierra Leone pointed out that the results achieved so far were meagre and that, in fact, the nuclear arms race was continuing.

For its part, China, at the 10th meeting of the First Committee, held that "the so-called Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between the Soviet Union and the United States are but a synonym for 'stimulating' and 'promoting' the strategic arms race between them. Each agreement reached in such talks marks the beginning of a new round of the strategic arms race. The conclusion of the so-called Vladivostok Agreement was followed immediately by the successive emergence of a great variety of new generations of strategic weapons, such as the 'Backfire' aircraft, MIRV mobile missiles and more accurate guidance systems, Hunter satellites, cruise missiles, etc. It was then followed by clamours for a new round of talks for further 'limitation'"

In their comments on the subject, other Member States pointed out that the successful outcome of the negotiations would promote peace and progress in other disarmament efforts. The Federal Republic of Germany therefore considered that SALT was one of the most important political means of ensuring stability and peace throughout the world. Finland noted that progress in the limitation of strategic arms was essential to efforts to prevent a further spread of nuclear explosives and their manufacturing capability, while Hungary expressed its conviction that the agreement between the two parties would facilitate the progress of negotiations at Vienna on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. The Netherlands observed that the behaviour of the two parties determined in many ways the political climate in the world with respect to the role of nuclear weapons in international relations and considered it essential to de-emphasize the reliance on nuclear weapons to ensure peace. Similarly, Sweden expressed its firm belief
that collective security could be reached at successively lower levels of armaments. Finally, Canada reiterated its view that the two sides should, as their ultimate objective, seek to curb the technological arms race, as well as to limit and reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons. It also noted that it would be appropriate for the Assembly to leave the two negotiating Powers in no doubt about the profound hope of the international community that the talks would soon result in the conclusion of SALT II, and permit progress to SALT III, which should lead to further and substantial reductions in strategic weapons.

On 14 November, four States—Argentina, Mexico, Nigeria and Sweden—submitted a draft resolution in the First Committee in which they expressed their concern for the successful outcome of the negotiations. The language of the draft was, however, somewhat different from the text of the resolutions on the same item adopted at previous sessions of the General Assembly. While stressing once again the necessity and urgency of achieving qualitative limitations and quantitative reductions of nuclear-weapon systems, the proposal also highlighted a broadly felt satisfaction in connexion with the declared determination of the two parties to seek more substantial agreements on the reduction of strategic arms. The first two operative paragraphs noted with satisfaction the statements made by the heads of State of the two parties in connexion with the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons, and the third paragraph invited the Soviet Union and the United States to strive to implement them as soon as possible. The fourth paragraph, as indicated above, stressed the necessity and urgency of limiting and reducing the two Powers' strategic nuclear-weapon systems, both qualitatively and quantitatively. Finally, the fifth paragraph reiterated with special emphasis the long-standing invitation to both Governments to keep the General Assembly informed in good time of the progress and results of their negotiations and, in view of the forthcoming special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, expressed the trust that the two parties would submit to the session a special report in that regard.

Introducing the draft resolution, Mexico expressed its conviction that it reflected what might be described as the most ardent aspirations of all peoples. In order to underline what it defined as the abnormal situation in which the world lives because of the arms race, Mexico drew attention to the conclusions contained in the report of the Secretary-General entitled Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures. It also indicated that the sponsors' definite preference was that the draft be adopted by consensus and, if that was not possible, that at least, as in previous instances, it be adopted by an overwhelming majority. Following intensive consultations between the sponsors and other States, in particular the two sides involved in

22 United Nations publication, Sales No. E.72.IX.16.
the negotiations, a revised draft resolution (A/C.1/32/L.28/Rev.1) was submitted on 21 November with five additional sponsors: Ghana, Jordan, Morocco, New Zealand and Pakistan.

The revised draft resolution combined operative paragraphs 3 and 4 of the original text into a single paragraph, the special reference to important qualitative limitations and substantial reductions being replaced by a new formulation concerning the adoption by the two sides, without delay, of all relevant measures to achieve the implementation of the statements of the heads of State of the Soviet Union and the United States. The references made in operative paragraph 5 of the original text with regard to the information to be provided to the General Assembly were also revised. The two sides were invited to keep the Assembly informed of the results of their negotiations and to transmit appropriate information in that regard to the General Assembly at the special session.

While introducing the amendments, Mexico, at the 44th meeting, pointed out in particular that the rewording of operative paragraphs 3 and 4 did not imply any change in the position of the sponsors as regards substance. It stated that, in the opinion of the sponsors, the objective referred to in operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution went beyond any appeals made by the General Assembly in past resolutions on the subject, since both President Carter and the President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, Leonid Brezhnev, had committed themselves not only to reductions but, as President Carter said, they would work towards further reductions so as to arrive at a world truly free of nuclear weapons and, as Mr. Brezhnev said, to move towards the complete, total destruction of existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons.

In explaining its vote, the United States, at the same meeting, said that, as stated by President Carter, its Government hoped that current and future rounds of the SALT talks would permit the United States and the Soviet Union to reach agreement on substantial reductions in the arsenals of both States. It also stated that it intended to inform the special session on disarmament of the results achieved in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.

The USSR, in turn, explained that it had constantly striven to achieve agreement on the limitation of strategic arms and was doing everything in its power to bring this about, in the firm conviction that a mutually acceptable agreement at these talks on the basis of strict observance of the principles of the equality and equal security of States was fully attainable.

On 25 November, the First Committee adopted the revised draft resolution by 91 votes (including France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States) in favour and 2 against (Albania and China). China explained that it had cast a negative vote because the revised draft resolution "makes an assessment of the recent statements of the two super-Powers which is not acceptable to us"
The draft resolution was adopted by the General Assembly on 12 December as resolution 32/87 G by a recorded vote of 134 votes to 2 (Albania and China).

The resolution reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2602 A (XXIV) of 16 December 1969 relating to the initiation of bilateral negotiations between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the limitation of offensive and defensive strategic nuclear-weapon systems,

Recalling also its resolutions 2932 B (XXVII) of 28 November 1972, 3184 A and C (XXVIII) of 18 December 1973, 3261 C (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3484 C (XXX) of 12 December 1975 and 31/189 A of 21 December 1976,

Regretting the absence of definitive results during the last three years of those bilateral negotiations,

1. Notes with satisfaction that, in his address to the General Assembly on 4 October 1977, the President of the United States of America stated, inter alia, the following:

   "The United States is willing to go as far as possible, consistent with our security interests, in limiting and reducing our nuclear weapons. On a reciprocal basis we are willing now to reduce them by 10 per cent, 20 per cent or even 50 per cent. Then we will work for further reductions with a view to a world truly free of nuclear weapons."

2. Notes with identical satisfaction that, in his address to the Joint Session of the Supreme Soviet and Central Committee of the Communist Party on 2 November 1977, the President of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated the following:

   "Today we are proposing a radical step: that agreement be reached on a simultaneous halt in the production of nuclear weapons by all States. This would apply to all such weapons—whether atomic, hydrogen or neutron bombs or missiles. At the same time, the nuclear Powers could undertake to start the gradual reduction of existing stockpiles of such weapons and move towards their complete, total destruction."

3. Stresses the necessity and urgency that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America strive to implement as soon as possible the foregoing declarations of their respective heads of State and invites the Governments of both countries to adopt without delay all relevant measures to achieve that objective;

4. Reiterates with special emphasis its invitation to both Governments to keep the General Assembly informed in good time of the results of their negotiations and trusts to be able to receive from them appropriate information in this regard during the special session of the Assembly devoted to disarmament, to be held in May and June 1978.

Conclusion

Although so far there has been no new agreement resulting from the SALT negotiations from the substantive point of view, some new important developments have taken place during 1977. In the first place, the two parties involved in the negotiations strongly reiterated their determination to complete this phase of SALT as soon as possible, giving some indication that, in spite of the remaining differences in their
positions, they were closer to reaching an agreement than previously. It appears that with regard to the next phase of the negotiations, SALT III, both sides made it clear that their objective should be to achieve substantial reductions of their strategic nuclear-weapon systems. They also made unquestionably clear their awareness of the danger of the continuation of the nuclear arms race and, in view of this, of the importance of nuclear disarmament for world peace and security. Finally, there were significant developments in the context of the consideration of the question by the United Nations. For years this subject has regularly been discussed by the General Assembly and a number of resolutions were passed signifying support and interest of the world community in the negotiations, as well as its concern for the achievement of more substantial results. It was for the first time at this session of the General Assembly that both nuclear powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, joined an overwhelming majority of other Member States in the adoption of a resolution concerning SALT negotiations. This fact not only enhances the importance of that resolution but gives added emphasis to the recognition by the parties of the interest of the international community, as represented in the General Assembly, in those questions on which the peace and security of the whole world most directly depends. From that point of view, the support given by the two parties to a resolution requesting them to submit appropriate information on the results of their negotiations to the General Assembly at the special session devoted to disarmament appears very significant, particularly in connexion with the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament.
CHAPTER VII

Cessation of nuclear-weapon tests

Introduction

The question of the complete prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests has been continuously and actively discussed in the United Nations since the mid-1950s under various titles. In 1963, agreement was reached on a Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water known as the partial test-ban Treaty, but since that time many nuclear tests have been carried out underground, while the two nuclear Powers not parties to the partial test-ban Treaty (China and France) continued to carry out nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere. In 1974, France announced that it would continue its programme of underground testing, and that it had already taken steps to do so as early as 1975.

Moreover, despite many United Nations resolutions condemning all nuclear-weapon tests and despite the commitment in the partial test-ban Treaty, as well as in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to the continuation of negotiations for the discontinuance of all nuclear-weapon tests, no agreement to prohibit all underground testing has as yet been achieved. In 1974, however, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, which was supplemented in 1976 by the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, similarly limiting the size of such explosions.

From the beginning, the principal obstacle to a comprehensive solution of the problem has been the divergence of opinion as to what would constitute satisfactory verification of compliance with a complete ban. The Soviet Union and other Eastern European States have maintained that any suspected violation could be adequately verified by so-called "national means", as compared with "on-site" inspections at the presumed locale of a suspected violation, combined with certain inter-
national measures such as the exchange of data on seismic events collected by various countries. Most non-aligned countries and some Western States, notably Canada, the Netherlands and Sweden, have taken the view that seismic identification techniques are now so effective that they could identify most nuclear-weapon tests. The United States and many other Western countries have, on the other hand, maintained that, despite considerable progress in identifying seismic events, on-site inspections continued to be essential to identify the nature of events of a relatively low magnitude that could still have considerable military importance. At the same time, those countries have vigorously supported all efforts to improve seismic identification capabilities and the system of international data exchange. The Soviet Union, for its part, revealed a more flexible attitude on the verification question in the discussion at the General Assembly in 1976, by indicating its readiness to seek a compromise for conducting on-site verification in certain cases, with the voluntary consent of the country suspected of conducting a test and by reflecting that position in an amendment to a draft treaty on the subject that it had submitted in 1975 (see page 99 below).

The second major obstacle to agreement on a comprehensive nuclear-weapon-test ban has been the question of whether it was necessary for all nuclear Powers to participate in such an agreement to make it effective, as maintained by the Soviet Union, or whether the two major nuclear Powers could agree to a cessation of nuclear-weapon tests on a bilateral basis, at least for a certain period of time, without undue risk to their security, as maintained by a number of States, including Australia, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Iran, Ireland, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Pakistan, Sweden and Yugoslavia. By the end of 1976, the position of the United States also appeared to favour some type of suspension, or moratorium, on all nuclear explosions by the two major Powers. Reflecting its position on the question of participation, the Soviet Union, in 1975, submitted to the General Assembly a draft treaty on the complete and general prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests, to be negotiated by all nuclear-weapon States, in addition to 25 to 30 non-nuclear-weapon States. Although the General Assembly called for such negotiations in its resolution 3478 (XXX), they have not taken place because other nuclear-weapon States have not agreed to participate in them.

The issue most recently raised in connexion with a nuclear-weapon-test ban has been the insistence of the United States that nuclear-weapon tests and peaceful nuclear explosions were indistinguishable and that it should be acknowledged that both questions should be covered under a comprehensive ban. The Soviet Union and other Eastern European States, supported by Egypt, India and Yugoslavia, have held that the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions should be solved outside a nuclear-weapon-test-ban treaty and should not delay agreement on such a ban. India has also held that the question of peaceful nuclear explosions was outside the scope of disarmament problems. Another group of
countries, including Canada, Denmark, Iran, Nepal, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand and Norway, have either seriously questioned the value of peaceful nuclear explosions in the light of the risks of the nuclear-weapon proliferation involved, or supported a moratorium on such tests, while Sweden has suggested that peaceful nuclear explosions be abandoned entirely in order to make an early weapon test ban possible. On the other hand, the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries stressed the wide possibilities for the peaceful use of the energy from nuclear explosions for the benefit of all States, in conformity with the objective of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The 1975 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirmed the view that a comprehensive test ban was one of the most important measures to bring a halt to the nuclear arms race and urged the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to take the lead in achieving early agreement in the matter. The Review Conference also noted the desire of many States parties to the Treaty for a halt to all nuclear tests for peaceful purposes.

In late 1976, the General Assembly, at its thirty-first session, adopted two resolutions on the subject, one on the item regularly included in the agenda of the General Assembly and another on the item concerned with the Soviet initiative for special negotiations among all nuclear-weapon States. In its resolution 31/66, on the traditional test-ban item, inter alia, (a) the Assembly again condemned all nuclear-weapon tests; (b) re-emphasized the urgency of concluding a comprehensive agreement in the matter; (c) called again on all nuclear-weapon States to suspend the testing of nuclear weapons by agreement, subject to review after a specified period, as an interim step towards the conclusion of a formal and comprehensive test-ban agreement; (d) emphasized in that regard the particular responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States parties to international agreements in which they had declared their intention to achieve an early cessation of the nuclear arms race; (e) called on all States not yet parties to the partial test-ban Treaty to adhere to it forthwith; and (f) urged the CCD to continue to give highest priority to the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban agreement and to report to the Assembly at its thirty-second session on the progress achieved. In resolution 31/89, on the latter item, the Assembly again called on all nuclear-weapon States to proceed as soon as possible with negotiations on the conclusion of a complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests with the participation of non-nuclear-weapon States and decided to include the same item in the agenda of the thirty-second session.

Consideration by the CCD, 1977, and accompanying developments

The report of the CCD for the year 1977 indicates that the subject of a nuclear-weapon-test ban was discussed at length during the 1977
session of the Committee, beginning on 15 February and ending on 30 August 1977. In that discussion, the urgent need for a general ban on all nuclear-weapon tests continued to be stressed by virtually all delegations, including those of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. Many Committee members, in particular Mexico and Sweden, attached the highest priority to the achievement of such a ban as an essential first step to halting the arms race and as a measure to strengthen the non-proliferation régime. Most members stressed the need for the conclusion of an agreement before the convening of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in May 1978.

The general discussions in the Committee continued to centre on the same three principal obstacles to agreement in the matter: (a) the question of verification of compliance with the ban; (b) the question of whether the participation of all nuclear-weapon Powers in the ban, or in its negotiation, should be required; and (c) the question of peaceful nuclear explosions.

In general, the majority in the Committee, including the Eastern European States and most non-aligned States, continued to maintain that national means of identification, supplemented by some international measures, would be adequate for verification of compliance, while most Western countries continued to hold that some obligatory on-site inspection would be required. With regard to the participation of all nuclear-weapon States, the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries reiterated that participation by all such States was essential, while many of the non-aligned and Western States held that an agreement could be reached by the two major nuclear-weapon Powers, in which other nuclear-weapon Powers could be persuaded to join at a later date. On the question of peaceful nuclear explosions, the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries repeatedly stressed that the problem should not delay the conclusion of a treaty but should be solved at a later date in accordance with Article V of the non-proliferation Treaty. The United States and most Western countries, on the other hand, continued to maintain that any agreement to ban nuclear-weapon tests must also include a solution of the question of peaceful nuclear explosions, while several countries, notably the Netherlands and Sweden, urged even more strongly than before that such explosions be temporarily banned if a final solution of the problem threatened to delay the achievement of a weapon test ban. Sweden also held that should it generally be considered necessary to allow for the possibility of future peaceful nuclear explosions, they should be conducted by all countries, whether nuclear or non-nuclear-weapon States, under strict international supervision and control, in accordance with procedures previously agreed upon.

Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands and Sweden urged that, if a comprehensive ban could not be achieved in the near future, agreement on the suspension of all nuclear tests for a limited period should be reached.

Despite its position with regard to the need for participation of all nuclear-weapon States, the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries held that the Committee could play a useful role in negotiating a treaty, inasmuch as the initiation of negotiations among all nuclear-weapon States was still being delayed. The Soviet Union tabled the draft treaty it had submitted to the General Assembly in 1975 as the basis for such negotiations, with the amendment to the text submitted to the Assembly in 1976, providing for on-site inspections under certain conditions on the voluntary invitation of the State being inspected. In this connexion, the Soviet Union maintained that the amendment opened the way for a generally acceptable understanding on the verification problem and for a rapid conclusion of a treaty banning all nuclear-weapon tests.

Sweden also introduced a new draft treaty designed to be comprehensive in principle, but with possible transitional arrangements to permit the two major nuclear-weapon Powers to phase out their testing over a limited period of time, as well as special arrangements for the carrying out, under international supervision, of peaceful nuclear explosions if of overriding national or international importance, the details of which would be worked out in a separate protocol but which would be applicable equally to all parties, whether nuclear or non-nuclear. Verification of compliance would be based primarily on verification by challenge, or by invitation of the country suspected of conducting a nuclear test, a procedure similar to the one in the amended Soviet draft. However, the Swedish draft also provided for the establishment of a consultative committee of parties to the treaty, one of the main purposes of which would be to clarify all events pertaining to the subject-matter of the treaty. The exact mandate of that committee would also be worked out in a separate protocol. On the question of participation of nuclear Powers in the agreement, the Swedish draft, while providing for the entry into force of the treaty upon the final cessation of tests by the United States and the Soviet Union, also provided for withdrawal of any party from the treaty if all nuclear-weapon Powers had not adhered to it within a specific period. Sweden urged that a working group be set up at an early date to negotiate a concrete agreement in the matter.

While most Committee members welcomed the fact that the Soviet Union had submitted its draft treaty to the Committee for its consideration, and in particular its more flexible position on the verification issue, most direct comment in the Committee was directed towards the Swedish draft, with particularly extensive observations by Iran, Japan

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6 Ibid., annex II, document CCD/523.
7 Ibid., document CCD/526.
and the Netherlands, largely in a favourable vein and suggesting a number of improvements. In response to such suggestions, Sweden made several minor revisions in the draft, stressed its intention to hold extensive consultations with regard to the exact mandate of the proposed consultative committee and said that the draft was only one of several contributions towards solving the problem and was accordingly subject to modification. The text of the draft treaty is contained in appendix VI below.

Early in the summer, the Soviet Union and the United States informed the Committee that they had held useful bilateral consultations on the subject of a test ban in June and that they would be joined, in early July, by the United Kingdom to begin negotiations which they hoped would result in agreement among them. The United States stressed that, if such agreement was reached, the Committee could then begin to play an important role in the elaboration of an appropriate international treaty. The United States added the view that, while it would be easier to reach a broad agreement after the nuclear-weapon Powers had first succeeded in bridging their differences on the subject, informal discussions in the Committee could be useful in the meantime. Several Eastern European countries also stressed that the Committee could play a useful part in preparing the final text of an agreement. Mexico and Sweden urged early decision on the part of the nuclear-weapon Powers to prevent the possible undermining of the non-proliferation Treaty, the acceleration of horizontal nuclear proliferation and the continuation of the massive arms race. In late July, the nuclear-weapon Powers informed the Committee that the first round of trilateral consultations had been completed and that negotiations would be resumed in early October.

Many members expressed dissatisfaction with the lack of progress on the question at the Committee's 1977 session. Most recognized, however, that the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, established the previous year, had made encouraging progress in three series of meetings held throughout the Committee's 1977 session. In that connexion, the hope was expressed that the work of that group would contribute to the achievement of a generally acceptable monitoring system for a comprehensive test ban. It should be noted that, in 1977, the Ad Hoc Group continued its deliberations on the various aspects of the specification for an international system for the detection and identification of seismic events, including the composition of a network of stations, and made substantial progress towards the completion of its final report to the CCD.

Many delegations, including those of Bulgaria, Canada, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Iran, Italy and Nigeria, stressed the significance of the trilateral talks for the achievement of a comprehensive test ban. Canada, Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia, nevertheless,
urged the Committee to start multilateral negotiations on the question soon. Mexico and Sweden specifically suggested the establishment of a working group for that purpose. In this context, the need for agreement prior to the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament was emphasized by some delegations.

At its closing meeting on 30 August, the Committee decided to convene its next regular session on 31 January 1978, or, if the need arose, to resume its work at an earlier date in order to conduct negotiations on the priority items on its agenda, among which a comprehensive test ban was considered by virtually all members of the Committee as deserving the highest priority.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1977

At the thirty-second session of the General Assembly, the question of the cessation of nuclear tests appeared for the third consecutive year under two separate agenda items: item 40, entitled “Urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban”, which was concerned with the traditional item of a comprehensive test ban, and item 49, entitled “Conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests”, which concerned the negotiation of an agreement on the matter by a special negotiating group and had been included on the agenda in 1975 as a result of a Soviet initiative.

Both during the general debate and in the First Committee, comments were general in nature, covering both approaches to the problem. As in previous years, most delegations stressed the importance and top priority of an early cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests as a necessary first step towards nuclear disarmament and towards fulfilling the commitments of the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom contained in the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963, as well as in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Many of those speaking on the subject expressed the belief that a comprehensive ban of nuclear-weapon tests would provide an impetus for further progress in other disarmament negotiations, particularly in the bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States on the limitation of strategic nuclear arms (SALT). Many also hoped that a nuclear test ban could be negotiated before the beginning of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, scheduled to convene in May 1978. Several expressed the view that the Assembly at its special session should give the matter top priority consideration.

The Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries continued to support the draft treaty on the complete and general pro-

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8 See Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-second Session, First Committee, 7th to 38th, 40th and 44th meetings; and ibid., First Committee, Sessional Fascicle, corrigendum.
hibition of nuclear-weapon tests\(^9\) that had been submitted in the General Assembly in 1975, revised in 1976 to reflect the Soviet proposal concerning on-site inspection on a voluntary basis to verify compliance with the treaty, and tabled in 1977 in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. They regretted that the special negotiations envisaged under the Soviet initiative and endorsed by the General Assembly had not yet been realized because of the failure of the other nuclear-weapon Powers to participate in them and urged those Powers to reconsider their positions.

Early in the general debate in the Assembly, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Andrei Gromyko, noting the progress being made in the trilateral negotiations with the United States and the United Kingdom on a comprehensive test ban and referring to the Soviet willingness to take part in a mutually acceptable agreement on the verification issue, announced that the Soviet Union was now taking still another step, namely, that under an arrangement with the two negotiating partners, it had consented to suspend underground nuclear-weapon tests for a period of time, even before other nuclear-weapon Powers acceded to the future treaty. A number of other Eastern European States, as well as Canada and Japan, welcomed that action on the part of the Soviet Union as an additional step towards the conclusion of the treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. The Ukrainian SSR stated that, under the arrangement, the treaty would be signed initially by the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States and that, having signed the treaty, those three nuclear Powers should refrain from carrying out underground tests of nuclear weapons during a certain period of time, while the remaining nuclear Powers should prove in deeds the sincerity of their intention to start moving towards the prohibition of nuclear weapons. The German Democratic Republic suggested that the General Assembly should call upon all nations to co-operate in achieving a moratorium on nuclear tests, following which the nuclear-weapon States could proceed to a complete and general ban.

President Carter of the United States, addressing the Assembly at its 18th plenary meeting, referred to the trilateral negotiations currently underway and described the aim of the United States therein as a fair and verifiable agreement to end all explosions of nuclear devices, whether for military or peaceful purposes. He added the view that such an agreement would close one more avenue of nuclear competition, thereby demonstrating that the major nuclear Powers took their obligations to reduce the threat of nuclear catastrophe seriously.

The United Kingdom expressed satisfaction that active trilateral negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty were underway and said that such a ban would have a profound effect in limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Later in the debate, the United King-

\(^9\) See foot-note 6.
dom noted, with reference to the trilateral talks, that a serious and encouraging discussion of the main issues involved had taken place, and that the aim of the United Kingdom was a multilateral comprehensive agreement of unlimited duration, banning all nuclear explosions and providing for effective verification. It added the view that, once the three Powers had reached agreement, the CCD should deal with the details of a multilateral agreement.

Most of the other countries speaking on the subject welcomed the trilateral talks, and several expressed the view that an agreement between the two major nuclear-weapon Powers on the subject was an essential first step towards the cessation of tests by all countries. Many countries, including Canada, Ethiopia, India, Ireland, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, Poland, Sweden, Turkey and Yugoslavia, took the general position that the trilateral talks should result in an early agreement, which would then be referred to the CCD for negotiation of a broadly acceptable multilateral agreement and submitted to the General Assembly at its special session for consideration. In that connexion, the Soviet Union and Mexico noted that the question of the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests was an important part of the proposals for the programme of action established by their delegations in the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session.

With regard to the three principal obstacles to the achievement of agreement on a test-ban treaty, two of them—the questions of verification of the treaty and of the need for participation of all nuclear-weapon Powers in it—received markedly less attention than at previous sessions. With particular respect to verification, the Soviet Union and other supporters of the Soviet draft treaty continued to maintain that the new position adopted by the Soviet Union, as now reflected in the draft treaty, removed any further obstacle to agreement, while the Western countries laid little or no specific emphasis on the need for on-site inspection. New Zealand commented that it was not acceptable to wait for technology to solve all the political problems confronting a test ban. In connexion with the question of verifying a test-ban agreement, several countries at the same time specifically supported the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts set up under the CCD to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events. Canada, for example, stated that it expected an easing of the problem as a result of the Group's work, while the Federal Republic of Germany expressed similar views and New Zealand hoped the group would make a definitive report on the verification question, with recommendations. Japan and New Zealand expressed the belief that the establishment of a consultative committee of parties to a test-ban agreement, as proposed in the Swedish draft treaty, offered a solution to the problem.

With respect to the third main obstacle to agreement, that of the treatment to be given to peaceful nuclear explosions under a test-ban
agreement, there were still significant differences of opinion, as indi­
cated in the statements of the United States and the United Kingdom
noted above. The view of these two States that any agreement banning
all nuclear tests must also ban peaceful nuclear explosions by individual
nations was specifically supported by Canada, the Federal Republic of
Germany, the Netherlands and New Zealand. The Netherlands stressed,
in addition, that all restraints with regard to peaceful explosions should
be assumed equally by the nuclear and the non-nuclear-weapon States.
The Eastern European countries, on the other hand, supported by
others, including Austria, Cuba, Finland and Nigeria, continued to hold
that the question of peaceful nuclear explosions should be solved sepa­
rately from a test-ban agreement and in accordance with the relevant
provisions of the non-proliferation Treaty. Another group of countries,
including Afghanistan, Argentina, India and Nepal took the position
that a test-ban agreement should not include any measures discriminating against non-nuclear-weapon States with respect to the peaceful uses
of nuclear energy.

On 2 November, Leonid Brezhnev, President of the Presidium of
the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, made a statement in Moscow to the
effect that the USSR was prepared to accept a suspension of all under­
ground nuclear tests for a definite period of time. That statement was
welcomed on the same date by officials of the United States as an indi­
cation of Soviet willingness to accept a moratorium on peaceful nuclear
explosions, which, the United States said, went in the direction of its
own position of including a ban on such explosions in a comprehensive
nuclear test ban. On 3 November, the Secretary-General of the United
Nations also warmly welcomed the proposal as an important step
towards the comprehensive test ban that had been at the centre of
United Nations preoccupations for a considerable time, and expressed
the hope that negotiating efforts to that end would be intensified and
lead to an early and successful conclusion. A number of countries,
including Australia, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Ecuador, Ethiopia,
Fiji, Liberia, Mongolia, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, the Sudan and
the United Kingdom specifically welcomed Mr. Brezhnev’s statement.

Those and other comments after the statement had been made
indicated a rising optimism with regard to the early conclusion of an
agreement to ban all nuclear tests. For example, Mongolia believed an
agreement could be reached to prohibit all nuclear explosions for a
definite period of time; Pakistan and Spain indicated that they expected
a moratorium on nuclear tests soon; Cyprus commented that a stage
had now been reached where a comprehensive ban, or at least a mora­
torium on testing, could be achieved; Somalia believed it was now pos­
sible to conclude a comprehensive ban speedily; and Malaysia wel­
comed the progress towards a comprehensive ban being achieved in
the trilateral talks. The Observer for the Holy See also noted the
increasing hopes of achieving progress towards a comprehensive ban.

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The Soviet Union, in its first statement on the subject in the General Assembly after Mr. Brezhnev's announcement, continued to stress the importance of a total ban on nuclear tests, noting, at the same time, the new Soviet position in favour of a compromise on verification, its recent initiative to solve the question of participation in the agreement by proposing a trilateral agreement on nuclear-weapon tests for a certain period and, most recently, its readiness to agree that, together with a ban for a specified period on all nuclear-weapon tests, a moratorium should be called on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The Soviet Union hoped that its two partners in the trilateral negotiations would appreciate those efforts and that an agreement would be speedily concluded when the talks were resumed in the near future.

On 11 November 1977, six countries, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia and Poland, submitted a draft resolution\(^{10}\) in the First Committee under the item originally placed on the agenda on the initiative of the Soviet Union, by which the General Assembly would, \textit{inter alia}, (a) reaffirm the need for an early conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests; (b) note with satisfaction the beginning of the trilateral negotiations and express the hope that they would soon lead to an international agreement on the subject; (c) call upon other nuclear-weapon States to join in the efforts aimed at achieving the desired goal; (d) note that non-nuclear States, within the framework of the CCD and elsewhere, might make a substantial contribution towards solving the problem; and (e) decide to include an item with the same title in the agenda of the thirty-third session of the General Assembly.

On the same date, 16 States (Australia, Austria, Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Ireland, Japan, Mexico, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Sweden and Venezuela) submitted a draft resolution\(^{11}\) under the traditional item on the cessation of tests. By that draft resolution, the General Assembly would, \textit{inter alia}, (a) reiterate its grave concern that, in spite of its repeated resolutions on the subject, adopted by very large majorities, nuclear-weapon tests had continued unabated during the past year; (b) note with satisfaction that the trilateral negotiations had begun; (c) declare that the conclusion of a test ban and its opening for signature would be the best possible augury for the success of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament; (d) urge the three Powers engaged in negotiations to expedite a positive conclusion and to use their best endeavours to transmit the results for full consideration by the CCD no later than the beginning of its spring session; and (e) request that Committee to take up the question with the utmost urgency, with a


\(^{11}\) \textit{Ibid}., agenda item 40, document A/32/371, para. 7.
view to the completion of a draft treaty for consideration and action by the Assembly at its special session.

After consultations on the subject, however, the sponsors of the two draft resolutions agreed, on 18 November, to withdraw both drafts and to replace them by a new draft resolution jointly submitted by all 22 of them under both items. The new draft differed from the draft originally submitted by the 16 Powers principally in its specific request to the CCD to take up the agreed text resulting from the trilateral negotiations with a view to the submission of a draft treaty to the Assembly at the special session. In introducing the joint draft resolution, the representative of New Zealand noted that it would be supported by the three nuclear-weapon States participating in the trilateral negotiations on the subject.

In a statement made before the vote, China reiterated its established position that it was compelled to conduct limited nuclear tests and develop nuclear weapons entirely for the purposes of self-defence and that it would be ready to halt such tests only when the two major nuclear-weapon Powers and all nuclear countries completely prohibited and thoroughly destroyed their nuclear weapons. Accordingly, China would vote against the resolution on the subject, as it had in previous years.

The draft resolution was adopted by the First Committee by a recorded vote of 89 to 1 (China), with 1 abstention (France). In explaining its abstention after the vote, France reiterated its position of previous years that the action proposed in the resolution was not an effective disarmament measure because it would not lead to any reduction in the volume of existing nuclear weapons or even interrupt the development of current and future arms programmes.

The General Assembly adopted the draft resolution as resolution 32/78 by a recorded vote of 126 to 2 (Albania and China), with 1 abstention (France). It reads as follows:

_The General Assembly,

Reaffirming its conviction that the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all States would be in the supreme interest of mankind, both as a major step towards controlling the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons and to relieve the deep apprehension concerning the harmful consequences of radioactive contamination for the health of present and future generations,

Recalling the determination of the parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons expressed in those treaties to continue negotiations to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time,

Recalling its previous resolutions on the subject,

Taking note of that part of the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament relating to the question of a comprehensive test-ban treaty,

1. Reiterates its grave concern that in spite of the repeated resolutions of the General Assembly related to nuclear-weapon testing in all environments, adopted by very large majorities, such testing has continued unabated during the past year;
2. Notes with satisfaction that negotiations have begun among three nuclear-weapon States with a view to the drafting of an agreement on the subject of the present resolution;

3. Declares that the conclusion of such an agreement and its opening for signature would be the best possible augury for the success of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, to be held in May and June 1978;

4. Urges the three nuclear-weapon States to expedite their negotiations with a view to bringing them to a positive conclusion as soon as possible and to use their best endeavours to transmit the results for full consideration by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament by the beginning of its spring session in 1978;

5. Requests the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to take up the agreed text resulting from the negotiations referred to in paragraph 4 above with the utmost urgency, with a view to the submission of a draft treaty to the General Assembly at its special session devoted to disarmament;

6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-third session an item relating to the implementation of the present resolution.

In addition, in a draft resolution submitted by Finland under the item entitled "General and complete disarmament" and adopted by the General Assembly as resolution 32/87 F, the General Assembly urgently called for determined efforts by all nuclear-weapon States to find an early solution to the remaining problems in reaching agreement to discontinue all test explosions of nuclear weapons. This resolution is discussed in chapter IX below.

Conclusion

At the end of 1977, there were indications of substantial progress in efforts to achieve a comprehensive test ban agreement.

While the negotiations among three nuclear-weapon States with a view to drafting such an agreement were proceeding, their differences on the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, which had long been an obstacle to the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban, had narrowed. This major development followed another step forward taken late in 1976, when the Soviet Union revised its draft treaty to facilitate a compromise on the question of on-site inspection.

Differences still existed on the participation of nuclear-weapon States in the proposed agreement. However, the fact that negotiations were being conducted on a trilateral basis suggests that a compromise might be worked out between the view that all such States should become parties to the agreement and the concept that this should not be a condition for the entry into force of a comprehensive test ban.

Contrary to 1975 and 1976, at the thirty-second session of the General Assembly, the sponsors of two draft resolutions were able to agree on a common text, thus making the adoption of a single resolution on the two items relating to a test ban possible. As compared with
the voting pattern in the two previous years, the wide support given by the membership of the Assembly to the resolution was also significant. The fact that the three parties to the negotiations supported the resolution was another positive development in the search for an agreement in this important question.
CHAPTER VIII

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Introduction

From its very beginning, the United Nations, whose foundation coincided with the emergence of atomic weapons, was concerned with the problem of ensuring that the power of the atom would be directed exclusively to peaceful uses for the welfare of mankind. The earliest efforts in this area had as one aim the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons. Later, in the mid-1950s, the development of international co-operation in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy—marked by the Geneva Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in 1955, and the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1957—lent urgency to the problem of preventing the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, and proposals specifically addressed to that problem were put forward in the General Assembly of the United Nations. In 1958, Ireland introduced, but did not press to a vote, a draft resolution aimed at curbing the spread of nuclear weapons. The following year, again at the initiative of Ireland, the General Assembly adopted resolution 1380 (XIV), in which it suggested, inter alia, that the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee (the predecessor of ENDC and the CCD) should consider means whereby the danger of an increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons could be averted, including the feasibility of an international agreement subject to inspection and control. In 1961, the General Assembly, acting once again on an Irish proposal, adopted resolution 1665 (XVI), by which it called upon all States, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, to use their best endeavours to secure the conclusion of an international agreement under which, on one hand, nuclear-weapon States would undertake not to relinquish control of nuclear weapons to States that did not have them and not to transmit to such States the information needed for their manufacture and, on the other hand, the latter would commit themselves not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control of nuclear weapons.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (resolution 2373 (XXII), annex) was opened for signature and ratification in 1968, following years of discussion and negotiation in ENDC and
in the General Assembly, and it entered into force on 5 March 1970. In 1977, Switzerland and Panama became parties to the Treaty, bringing the total to 103 States, of which three are nuclear-weapon States—the United Kingdom, the USSR and the United States. France stated in 1968 that, while it would not sign the non-proliferation Treaty, it would behave in the future in that field exactly as did the States adhering to the Treaty.\(^1\) For its part, China stated in 1973 that it had been compelled to develop a few nuclear weapons for the purpose of self-defence and for breaking the nuclear monopoly and blackmail of the super-Powers. It added that it was firmly against using the non-proliferation Treaty to deprive non-nuclear countries or countries with few nuclear weapons of their sovereignty and to damage the interest of the people of various countries.\(^2\) The non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty include several of those most advanced in nuclear technology. On the other hand, a number of non-nuclear-weapon States with significant programmes in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy have not ratified or acceded to the Treaty.

The first Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty was held at Geneva from 5 to 30 May 1975, in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty, which provided for such a conference five years after its entry into force to review the operation of the Treaty, with a view to ensuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty were being realized. The Final Declaration of the Review Conference included a statement confirming that articles I and II, relating specifically to the objective of averting the further proliferation of nuclear weapons, had been faithfully observed by all parties to the Treaty.

Since the conclusion of the non-proliferation Treaty, there have been repeated affirmations of support for the Treaty on the part of States parties, particularly the nuclear-weapon States and other Eastern European and Western countries, which consider it the pillar of the international régime for the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons and also an important means for promoting international co-operation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. From this perspective, the task of the international community is to strengthen the Treaty by achieving universal adherence to it and improving the effectiveness of the safeguards system.

At the same time, the implementation of several provisions of the Treaty has given rise to criticism among a large number of non-nuclear-weapon States. Questions of concern to non-nuclear-weapon States have arisen in three areas: nuclear disarmament, security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the threat or use of nuclear weapons and peaceful uses of atomic energy. Indeed, the ongoing debate revolves around the same matters that came to the fore in the course of the negotiations on

\(^1\) *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Plenary Meetings, 1672nd meeting.*

\(^2\) *Ibid., Twenty-eighth Session, First Committee, 1969th meeting.*
the non-proliferation Treaty, when a number of non-nuclear-weapon States insisted that unless the Treaty represented an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers and constituted a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament—more particularly, nuclear disarmament—they might, by renouncing the possession of nuclear weapons, prejudice their security and political and economic well-being.

One of the most important aspects of the demand of the non-nuclear-weapon States for a balance of obligations under the non-proliferation Treaty concerned the adoption of measures of nuclear disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States. By article VI of the Treaty those States undertook to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. References to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament were also included in the Treaty's preamble. On numerous occasions, including the Review Conference, many non-nuclear-weapon States have noted that since the adoption of the Treaty the nuclear arms race has continued unabated. Some of them have reminded the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty that vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons must be seen as interrelated processes and that the failure of nuclear-weapon States to keep their part of the bargain could not but undermine the credibility and viability of the international community's effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

For their part, the Soviet Union and the United States have, on various occasions, pointed to the importance of the measures agreed upon in the context of the SALT negotiations and have reiterated their commitment to halting the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament, as evidenced by the constant efforts made with a view to the limitation and reduction of strategic nuclear-weapon delivery systems. In addition, there have been repeated expressions of satisfaction on the part of other States, particularly Eastern European and Western countries, at the agreements that have been reached in the bilateral strategic arms limitation talks and the determined efforts of the two parties to check the nuclear arms race and begin the process of nuclear disarmament. The SALT negotiations are dealt with in chapter VI of the present Yearbook.

Another important preoccupation of non-nuclear-weapon States during the negotiations on the non-proliferation Treaty was to obtain reliable guarantees against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The question was not however dealt with in the Treaty, but in Security Council resolution 255 (1968), of 19 June 1968, at the initiative of the United Kingdom, the USSR and the United States. By that resolution, the Council welcomed the intention expressed by the three nuclear-weapon States that they would provide or support immediate assistance,
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, to any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the non-proliferation Treaty that was a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons were used. In the view of many non-nuclear-weapon States, the Security Council resolution and associated declarations fall short of the credible and effective guarantees that they feel are necessary, pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament, to induce confidence in States that renounce the acquisition of nuclear weapons. In recent years, various proposals have been made to fill this need, at the Review Conference and in other forums, such as the General Assembly and the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers. In one form or another all these proposals would involve a commitment on the part of the nuclear-weapon States not to resort to the threat or use of nuclear weapons against States not possessing such weapons—the so-called "negative guarantees".

In the area of peaceful uses of atomic energy, the non-nuclear-weapon States sought to ensure that notwithstanding the built-in distinction between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, the Treaty would not deprive them of the benefits that could be derived from the use of nuclear technology and materials for the production of nuclear power and from the wide variety of other existing or future industrial and medical applications of nuclear energy. For the developing countries, in particular, it was most important that the Treaty should not contribute to widening the technological and economic gap between them and the more developed countries, especially the nuclear-weapon States. To ensure that all States will be able to share equally in the benefits of nuclear energy, article IV recognizes the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. Under the same article, all parties undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and parties in a position to do so are to co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world. At the Review Conference many non-nuclear-weapon States made it clear that in their view the rights and obligations provided for in article IV had not been duly implemented. Concern had also been expressed lately with respect to the constraints adopted by suppliers in connexion with their nuclear exports, particularly those involving restrictions on access to "sensitive" technology, equipment and materials which are considered to contravene article IV of the Treaty.

With regard to peaceful nuclear explosions, at the Review Conference many non-nuclear-weapon States regretted the lack of progress
towards the implementation of article V and a formal proposal was submitted by Ghana, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, the Philippines, Romania, Syria and Yugoslavia, urging the United Kingdom, the USSR and the United States, as the Depositaries of the Treaty, to initiate consultations immediately with other States parties with a view to beginning the process of formulating the special international agreement envisaged in article V so that non-nuclear-weapon States might be able to obtain the benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions. The three nuclear-weapon States and other Eastern European and Western countries disagreed with this proposal and the Conference in its Final Declaration urged IAEA to commence consideration of the structure and content of such an agreement, as well as to expedite its work on identifying and examining the legal issues involved therein.

On 11 June 1975, the IAEA Board of Governors established an Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, which in 1977 submitted a report wherein it set forth: (a) the results of its examination of various aspects of peaceful nuclear explosions—procedural, legal, safety and economic aspects; (b) the factors involved in the establishment and operation of an international service for peaceful nuclear explosions; (c) some principles or matters to be considered in formulating the agreements contemplated in article V of the non-proliferation Treaty; and (d) the main alternative international arrangements for providing peaceful nuclear explosions services in accordance with the Treaty. The report also contains an analysis and appraisal of various proposed and actual applications of peaceful nuclear explosions, which are divided into two main categories: contained applications and excavation applications. In the case of the first type of applications, the report covers, inter alia, the use of contained nuclear explosions for purposes of gas and oil stimulation; sealing of runaway gas and oil wells; storage of gas, oil or nuclear wastes; copper ore leaching and oil production from shale. Among the excavation applications considered in the report are: cratering nuclear explosions for the construction of canals, harbours, dams, road and railway cuts, the creation of water reservoirs and the removal of navigation hazards. The analysis of each application includes such matters as safety, health and environmental implications and economic aspects, including comparisons with non-nuclear alternatives. In addition, the Advisory Group sets forth the consensus it reached on the state of the art of the various peaceful nuclear explosions applications. The Group did not, however, attempt to sub-divide the applications it considered into proven, possible and speculative categories, because it felt that this would involve difficult value judgements which might become obsolete as the technology developed. Its appraisals aim at giving a balanced view of the current and future potential of particular applications in a form helpful to engineers, managers and administrators who are considering the applicability of peaceful nuclear explosions in particular geographic and economic circumstances.
On 23 September 1977, the IAEA Board of Governors took note with satisfaction of the report and decided to keep the matter of peaceful nuclear explosions under review and to seek the services of the Advisory Group as required. The Board also requested the Director-General to send the report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the information of Member States. The report has been circulated to all members of IAEA and the Secretary-General of the United Nations has transmitted it to all Members of the Organization.

Consideration by the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament

In 1977, the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament constituted another forum for the presentation of views and proposals on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. A number of States—Eastern European and Western countries for the most part—drew attention to the importance of the problem and called for the adoption of measures at the special session to strengthen the international regime to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, including the non-proliferation Treaty. Various aspects of the question were addressed and lines of action were suggested.\(^3\)

In the view of Venezuela, the Assembly at its special session should consider, as a matter of high priority, among other measures, an appeal to countries that had not yet adhered to the Treaty and to other treaties in the field of disarmament, to do so.

Several countries highlighted the link between the spread of nuclear weapons and the continuation of the nuclear arms race. Austria held that the future credibility of measures to prevent the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons hinged upon the willingness of the powers possessing nuclear weapons, especially the two leading nuclear-weapon States, to agree on effective measures of nuclear disarmament. It believed that the fragile basis of the non-proliferation régime, as demonstrated by the Review Conference, could not be overlooked and that national and international actions prior to the second Review Conference would be a determining factor for the future of non-proliferation treaties. Japan, while convinced that universal adherence to the Treaty was essential for its effective implementation, considered that no effort should be spared to rectify the inequality inherent in the fact that the Treaty granted a special status to nuclear-weapon States. Japan suggested that the special session would be an appropriate time for the nuclear-weapon States to acknowledge their grave responsibility for nuclear disarmament and to adopt measures aimed at halting the nuclear arms race and reducing nuclear stockpiles; otherwise, in its view, the

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régime of the non-proliferation Treaty could not be maintained per-
manently.

Canada suggested that in its final document, the special session
should: (a) recognize that the danger of nuclear warfare remained
a grave threat to the survival of mankind, requiring thoroughgoing,
balanced and effective measures to curb and reverse the nuclear arms
race, and (b) note the importance of the linkage between efforts to
deal with nuclear weapons proliferation in the vertical dimension and in
the horizontal dimension and affirm the need for balanced progress
in both areas in order to enhance international security on an equitable
basis. Australia expressed the hope that before the special session con-
vened efforts to curb the nuclear arms race would have gained sufficient
impetus for at least equal attention to be given to the need for parallel
advances in the quest for a strengthened régime against the spread of
nuclear weapons to additional countries and suggested that the special
session should seek to promote the view that horizontal non-prolifera-
tion was an objective to which all States should subscribe and that all
had obligations and responsibilities in furthering that objective.

Mexico, in its working paper on the principles and norms that
might be included in the declaration on disarmament, suggested, inter
alia: (a) that it is necessary to have an acceptable balance of mutual
responsibilities and obligations for nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon
States, and (b) that the proliferation of nuclear weapons could endanger
the security of all States and would make it even more difficult to
achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international
control.

The strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States
also received attention in this context, although it may be noted that
some States raised the matter in connexion with the question of nuclear-
weapon-free zones. In the opinion of Pakistan, the special session
should examine the problem of ensuring the security of non-nuclear-
weapon States against nuclear attack or the threat of such attack. While
the ultimate aim, in Pakistan's view, should be the establishment of a
system of positive guarantees, in other words, the system of collective
security envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations, it considered
that the special session could make progress on that issue on the basis
of an undertaking by the nuclear-weapon Powers to refrain from the
use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States, as
envisaged in General Assembly resolution 31/189 C. Sweden also called
for such a commitment vis-à-vis non-nuclear-weapon States parties to
the Treaty. Australia and the Netherlands believed that an effective
régime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should include ade-
quate security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States—the Nether-
lands expressly supporting the granting of negative security guarantees
by nuclear-weapon States, subject to certain conditions.

4 A/AC.187/56.
5 See A/AC.187/SR.10, para. 35.
The peaceful uses of nuclear energy was another matter that was raised in the context of discussions of measures that should be adopted at the special session to strengthen the régime against the proliferation of nuclear weapons (see also chapter IX below). Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the USSR, in their working paper on the basic provisions of the programme of action to be adopted by the special session, included among such provisions the consolidation in every possible way of the régime of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. This would involve, in addition to making the Treaty more effective and truly universal, strengthening the IAEA system of safeguards and not permitting broad international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which was recognized by them as playing an important role in the development of the national economies of States, to become a channel for the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. Sweden considered that the special session should promote non-proliferation efforts by adopting recommendations concerning nuclear disarmament and, in addition, should call for: (a) strict international supervision and control of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, covering the entire fuel cycle; (b) a strengthening of the resources of IAEA in the fields of physical protection of nuclear materials in use, storage and transit; and (c) support for other activities of IAEA relevant to the problem of nuclear weapons proliferation. Austria also believed that while the question of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons could only be dealt with in connexion with the general problem of nuclear disarmament, the special session would have to address itself to the problem posed by the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and in particular by the peaceful uses of nuclear explosive devices. In its opinion, the programme of action should contain recommendations regarding effective international supervision of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and should provide for the strengthening of the resources of IAEA. New Zealand held that further ratifications of the non-proliferation Treaty, especially by potential nuclear-weapon States, and more effective controls on the supply of nuclear materials and technology that could be used to produce nuclear weapons, were urgently required. It would actively support proposals designed to secure those objectives while continuing to permit access to materials and technology required for the production of electric power through nuclear fission.

Some States pointed to the need to ensure that non-nuclear-weapon States would derive the same benefits from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy as nuclear-weapon States. For instance, Italy believed that the non-proliferation Treaty remained the corner-stone of the system and was, therefore, the main point of reference for defining the duties of
the nuclear-weapon States, as well as their rights. In its opinion, the possibility of utilizing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes must be guaranteed to all States. Australia felt that the special session, in considering the basis upon which an effective non-proliferation régime could be built, should bear in mind, in addition to the clear need for strengthened safeguards and controls on nuclear materials, equipment and technology, that such a régime should hold out incentives for co-operation and ensure that self-denial of a weapon option would not inhibit a country's wish to develop nuclear power for peaceful purposes. In its working paper Mexico, for its part, included among the fundamental principles and norms that might be adopted in the declaration on disarmament the following: (a) access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes constitutes an inalienable right of all States which is subject only to the limitations derived from the relevant provisions incorporated in multilateral instruments designed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons; and (b) conditions should be established for the utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes which contribute to the elimination of the gap separating the developed from the developing countries.

Consideration by the CCD, 1977

During the deliberations of the CCD in 1977, the importance of the non-proliferation Treaty and universal adherence thereto was emphasized by many countries, especially the Eastern European and Western countries parties to the Treaty, including Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Japan, Mongolia, Poland, the United Kingdom, the USSR and the United States. In the CCD, the Soviet Union held that the Treaty occupied an important place among measures aimed at putting an end to the nuclear arms race. Its operation was not only contributing to progress in that direction but also to the development of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Soviet Union, and other members also, considered that the further strengthening of the Treaty was becoming more and more urgent owing to the fact that nuclear power development throughout the world was assuming an increasingly prominent role as an alternative source of energy. Various members, such as Czechoslovakia, Mongolia, Poland, the United Kingdom, the USSR and the United States, noted with satisfaction the accession of Switzerland to the Treaty, which was considered highly significant in the light of the advanced stage reached by that country's nuclear industry, and it was hoped that it would serve as an example to other countries that had not yet adhered to the Treaty.

Various countries dwelt on the significance of questions related to nuclear disarmament, security guarantees and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The link between vertical and horizontal proliferation and the special responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States for nuclear disarmament were stressed by several countries in the CCD. Iran believed that the failure of the nuclear Powers to honour their commitments under the non-proliferation Treaty did not bode well for its ultimate success and noted that there was a widespread feeling of disenchantment. At the same time, it recognized that efforts were being made to further negotiations aimed at stopping the nuclear arms race and hoped for some concrete results. In the opinion of India, horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons were two aspects of the same problem and had to be tackled simultaneously if a satisfactory and effective solution was to be found; it could not be solved by unequal treaties or cartel-type arrangements. India also held that the heart of the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was a complete stoppage of the production of nuclear weapons combined with a simultaneous cut-off in the production of fissionable materials for weapon purposes. All nuclear factories would then become peaceful and the same system of verification could be applied to the flow of fissionable materials in all States without exception. Stating its views on the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, Japan emphasized that the Treaty constituted the most important international legal framework for preventing the spread of such weapons. It noted, however, that non-nuclear-weapon States had acceded to the Treaty in the belief that it was a realistic step towards nuclear disarmament, and reiterated its view that the inequality between the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States should neither be consolidated nor perpetuated and should be rectified by the abolishment of all nuclear weapons on the part of the former. The very existence of nuclear weapons was the core of the nuclear-weapons proliferation problem and efforts aimed at solving that problem should, consequently, be reinforced above all by the substantial furtherance of nuclear disarmament. In Japan's opinion, only after concrete steps towards substantial reduction of nuclear weapons were initiated would international co-operation for horizontal nuclear non-proliferation gain powerful momentum. According to Pakistan, the only durable solution to the problem of horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons lay in building an international climate of trust and confidence in which nations would not feel the need to acquire such weapons. Towards that end, attention should focus on the more basic tasks of preventing the further development and sophistication of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, the immediate lowering of existing levels of armaments, especially nuclear armaments, and initiating moves towards their eventual destruction and complete elimination. In the view of Pakistan, the drive towards these goals should come in the first place from the two major Powers which already enjoyed a pre-
ponderant position in military arms and, therefore, did not need to continue extending their arsenals either quantitatively or qualitatively. The Netherlands pointed to the close interrelationship between the problems of horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons and held that technical means, such as strong safeguards, would not suffice to combat the danger of horizontal proliferation if the nuclear arms race between the great Powers was not brought under control. While recognizing that attention could not focus exclusively on the question of vertical proliferation while thousands of kilograms of plutonium were being accumulated all over the world, the Netherlands was firmly convinced that the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons could not be stopped in the long run if the existing nuclear-weapon States did not enter into real nuclear disarmament. The United Kingdom noted that under article VI of the Treaty three of the nuclear Powers had assumed the obligation to work towards nuclear disarmament, and expressed the view that if the international community was to control the spread of nuclear weapons it had to remove the incentives to the acquisition of nuclear weapons and foster an international climate hostile to the proliferation of such weapons. At the same time, the United Kingdom believed that the Treaty remained the centre-piece of the international régime to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The United States, for its part, recognized that the obligations undertaken by all States in arms control must be balanced and equitable. Stating that that was one of the considerations on which United States arms control and disarmament policies were based, it mentioned as an example the need to balance measures to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons with obligations to control the growth and sophistication of existing nuclear arsenals. In this respect, the United States recalled President Carter's commitment to the control and reduction of armaments, including the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons, and reviewed the steps that the United States Government had taken to give fresh impetus to arms control and disarmament negotiations, including new proposals for the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons. For its part, the Soviet Union reiterated its determination to strive for the adoption of measures to halt the accelerating arms race and to reduce existing stockpiles with a view to achieving disarmament. Its representative introduced for examination by the Committee the memorandum of the Soviet Union on questions of ending the arms race and disarmament initially submitted at the thirty-first session of the General Assembly, in which were set forth its views regarding the most practical way of solving or initiating the solution of the most important disarmament problems, *inter alia*, the cessation of the nuclear arms race; reduction and subsequent elimination of nuclear weapons; prohibition

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of nuclear-weapon tests; and consolidation of the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The provision of adequate security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States continued to be viewed by a number of countries as a critical element of an effective international régime to curb the spread of nuclear weapons in that such guarantees would serve to allay the apprehensions of non-nuclear-weapon States about the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and thus promote an international climate more propitious to the success of anti-proliferation efforts. The matter was raised during the 1977 session of the CCD, and some delegations once again called on the nuclear-weapon States to undertake the obligation not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against States not possessing such weapons. Iran recalled that it had taken a strong stand on this issue at the Review Conference of the parties to the Treaty, had repeatedly stressed its importance since that date and had co-sponsored the resolution on security guarantees introduced by the delegation of Pakistan at the thirty-first session of the General Assembly (resolution 31/189 C). Romania reminded the Committee of the proposals it had submitted in the past in various forums for measures to be negotiated in the context of genuine efforts for nuclear disarmament, which included, *inter alia*, a solemn pledge by States possessing nuclear weapons not to use them or threaten to use them against States not possessing such weapons. In the view of Pakistan, one of the leading proponents of "negative" guarantees, an essential step towards the creation of a suitable international climate was to reassure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by extending to them credible and binding guarantees. Pakistan had sought to promote a consensus on the subject in the belief that the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States was important not only to such States but also to the international community as a whole in its effort to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and achieve general and complete disarmament. Unfortunately, the attitude of the nuclear-weapon States, with the exception of China, had been one of indifference.

The matter of peaceful uses of nuclear energy by non-nuclear-weapon States assumed greater prominence in discussions in the CCD, nuclear export policies being the theme that dominated the discussions (see also chapter IX below). Some Eastern European and Western countries welcomed the measures adopted by supplier countries to tighten safeguards and related controls associated with nuclear exports, feeling that such measures were necessary to consolidate the Treaty in view of the rapid growth of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy and the fact that some nations having relatively advanced nuclear industries were not yet parties to the Treaty. Poland said that it attached the greatest importance to the agreements concluded by the major exporters of nuclear materials and installations, which constituted legitimate ancillary efforts to consolidate the Treaty.
Hungary expressed support for the efforts being made to establish increasingly effective control and to ensure more complete respect for the provisions of the Treaty and for the efforts of IAEA in connexion with the export of fissionable products and nuclear technology. The United Kingdom held that the central dilemma was how best to reconcile the equally important commitments contained in the Treaty to curb the spread of nuclear weapons and to promote the further development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. A major feature of the non-proliferation strategy should be to place the most stringent controls on access to the technology and fissile materials necessary to produce nuclear weapons and the international safeguards system should be made as watertight as possible. The United Kingdom indicated that for the past two years it had advocated the general application of full fuel cycle safeguards and noted that a model agreement had been drawn up by IAEA to enable nations that were not parties to the Treaty to accept full fuel cycle safeguards. The United States, referring to the steps it had taken to give impetus to arms control and disarmament negotiations, mentioned the development and articulation of new approaches to reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation. It sought through international co-operation to meet growing energy needs while guarding against the spread of nuclear explosive materials. Italy, while agreeing that measures could be adopted to strengthen the system of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, felt that such measures should not prejudice the right of all States to develop, acquire and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, a right that should be safeguarded in the most effective way.

Several non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty opposed the application of restrictions to the peaceful nuclear programmes of parties to the Treaty. Japan pointed out that by acceding to the Treaty, non-nuclear-weapon States had been assured the inalienable right to develop peaceful uses of atomic energy without discrimination. That right, together with the obligation of nuclear-weapon States under article VI, constituted the very fabric of the Treaty régime and had to be substantiated to counterbalance the obligations they had undertaken to forgo nuclear weapons. Otherwise, the credibility of the Treaty would be jeopardized and the goal of universality more difficult to achieve. Japan noted that there had been recurring instances of nuclear co-operation in which countries that were not parties to the Treaty enjoyed the same benefits as States parties without undertaking the same obligation, a trend that might well weaken the credibility of the Treaty, especially in view of the fact that new and additional restrictions were being contemplated or discussed with regard to the development of the civil nuclear programmes of non-nuclear-weapon States parties. What was called for was the implementation of a set of measures within and outside the framework of the Treaty to make the existing nuclear non-proliferation system effective and further the establishment of an international control system for the peaceful uses of atomic energy, based
on a general consensus with the widest possible participation of interested countries. Japan emphasized that measures concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be implemented with due consideration to the economic and other relevant situations of those countries that already met the legal requirements of the Treaty. The measures it proposed included the following: materialization of the rights of non-nuclear-weapon States to use nuclear energy for peaceful uses; strict safeguards requirements with respect to States not parties to the Treaty; application of safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities in the nuclear-weapon States and strengthening of the functions of IAEA; prevention of accidental uses of nuclear weapons; early conclusion of a comprehensive test ban Treaty; cut-off of the production of nuclear fissionable materials for military purposes; and strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. In the same vein, Romania criticized the application of measures that interfered with the peaceful use of nuclear energy by countries which, having acceded to the non-proliferation Treaty, had renounced the acquisition of such weapons. In its view, any limitation or restriction of the right of States to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, particularly in a situation where the arms race was going ahead unchecked, made for disruption of the already precarious balance of rights and obligations on which the Treaty was based.

With regard to the implementation of article V, concerning the establishment of an international arrangement under which non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty would be able to obtain the benefit of peaceful nuclear explosions, it may be noted that consideration in the CCD of the question of peaceful nuclear explosions during the 1977 session took place mainly in the context of discussions on a comprehensive nuclear weapon test ban (see chapter VII above).

There were, however, some references to the Treaty. The German Democratic Republic, raising the question of peaceful nuclear explosions in the course of a discussion of a prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, pointed out that studies by IAEA and a number of experiments showed that peaceful nuclear explosions were of potentially great significance in the solution of immense economic and technical tasks and that, for that reason, many States had repeatedly demanded in various forums a guarantee that benefits from such explosions would be made available to all interested non-nuclear-weapon States in accordance with article V of the Treaty. Similar views were held by Bulgaria and Mongolia.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1977

At the thirty-second session of the General Assembly, both during the general debate and in the First Committee, many States parties to the

10 See Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-second Session, First Committee, 7th to 38th, 40th and 44th meetings; and ibid., First Committee, Sessional Fascicle, corrigendum.
non-proliferation Treaty, notably the Soviet Union and the United States and other Eastern European and Western countries, continued to stress the importance of the Treaty as the corner-stone of the international régime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the consequent need to achieve universal adherence to it. Australia, for instance, held that such universal adherence was essential to the interests of the international community and that the greater the number of adherents to the Treaty the more cogently it could be urged that the nuclear-weapon States must abide by their part of the bargain—to cease their arms race and to co-operate in development of nuclear energy. Australia pointed out that it rated adherence to the Treaty as the most convincing demonstration of a commitment by a State to disavow the option of acquiring nuclear weapons. Many countries, expressing anxiety over reports about South Africa's plans to conduct a nuclear explosion, pointed out that such a development highlighted the gravity of the danger and the urgency of securing universal adherence to the Treaty in order to strengthen the régime to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries.

As in previous years, a large number of countries voiced criticism regarding the way the provisions of the Treaty had been implemented, the main argument being that the obligations of non-nuclear-weapon States had been stressed while their rights and the obligations of nuclear-weapon States had been neglected.

With respect to article VI of the Treaty, many non-nuclear-weapon States, with varying emphasis, pointed to the interrelationship between the problems of horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons and held that an effective and credible régime to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons depended on the fulfilment of the commitments of the nuclear-weapon States in the area of nuclear disarmament. Sri Lanka recalled that when the Treaty was originally discussed the point had been made by several countries that, while the Treaty obviously sought to prevent the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, the possibility of vertical proliferation was not adequately dealt with; and said that in the intervening period it had been shown only too clearly that the misgivings expressed were entirely justified since a notable measure of success had been achieved in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to additional States, while those that had already been established as nuclear-weapon Powers had engaged in a vertical proliferation through the further sophistication of nuclear weapons and an astounding rate of increase of their nuclear arsenals. In its view, it had to be recognized that there was increasingly a danger that a horizontal proliferation would become unavoidable and that to a large extent the great Powers would be responsible for such proliferation taking place in the future. Similarly, the Netherlands expressed the conviction that the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons could not be stopped in the long run if the existing nuclear-weapon States
did not enter into real nuclear disarmament. Austria, noting that nuclear technology had become widely accessible, stressed that ultimately the political will not to acquire nuclear weapons counted more than technical barriers to nuclear proliferation. Hence, a non-proliferation strategy could no longer rely on regulation of the technical and commercial aspects of the transfer of nuclear technology and should focus on ways and means of reducing the incentives to and strengthening the deterrents against States' acquiring nuclear weapons. What Austria therefore expected from the nuclear-weapon States was that they adopt the disarmament measures that were politically necessary in order to diminish any motivation for an independent development of new nuclear arms potential. Believing that the Treaty could provide the framework for the kind of action required, Austria pointed out that it rested on the mutual rights and obligations of all parties and concluded that if and when the nuclear Powers recognized the existing direct and specific link between the obligations of non-nuclear-weapon States and their own commitment to effective nuclear disarmament then, and only then, would the non-proliferation Treaty have a chance for further survival, and only then could States that thus far had preferred to remain aloof be convinced to adhere to the Treaty. Sweden maintained that nuclear disarmament should be seen as a key in the critical battle against proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional States and that if today, nine years after its conclusion, the best available instrument of non-proliferation—the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons—was still not universally adhered to and its viability was called into question, it was to a considerable extent owing to the fact that the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty were still reluctant to accept what the non-nuclear-weapon States saw as the full consequences of their accession to it. In its view, those nuclear-weapon States had to give concrete evidence that they took seriously their treaty obligations and solemn pledges to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures of disarmament to be taken at an early date. Otherwise, there would be no balance in the fulfilment of the obligations undertaken in the Treaty by nuclear-weapon States, on the one hand, and non-nuclear-weapon States, on the other.

For their part, the Soviet Union and the United States re-affirmed their determination to limit and reduce nuclear weapons and pointed to the efforts being made in pursuit of that objective. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, in his statement to the General Assembly (8th meeting, 27 September 1977) said, in connexion with the SALT talks, that the USSR had invariably sought to achieve an agreement on the limitation of strategic arms and had done and was doing everything in its power to that end. It was prepared to go even further and proceed to negotiations on the reduction of existing stockpiled arsenals of strategic weapons. While noting that as a result of recent meetings in Washington some progress had been achieved in bringing closer together the positions of the two sides, he pointed out
that certain issues remained to be agreed upon and reiterated that the Soviet Union was doing everything possible to ensure the successful completion of the talks in the firm belief that a mutually acceptable SALT agreement was quite feasible on the basis, of course, of strict observance of the principle of the equality and equal security of the two sides. Subsequently, in the course of the disarmament debate, reference was made to the proposal made by Leonid Brezhnev, President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, in a speech delivered in Moscow on 2 November 1977, which called for an agreement on a simultaneous halt in the production of nuclear weapons by all States, encompassing all such weapons—whether atomic, hydrogen or neutron bombs or missiles. At the same time the nuclear Powers could undertake to start the gradual reduction of existing stockpiles of such weapons and move towards their complete, total elimination.

President Carter of the United States, in his address to the General Assembly (18th meeting, 4 October 1977), said that the USSR and the United States were within sight of a significant agreement in limiting the total numbers of weapons and in restricting certain categories of weapons of special concern to each of them and added that they could also start the crucial process of curbing the relentless march of technological development which made nuclear weapons ever more difficult to control. He also pointed out that the United States was willing to go as far as possible, consistent with its security interests, in limiting and reducing its nuclear weapons. On a reciprocal basis it was willing now to reduce them by 10 per cent, 20 per cent or even 50 per cent. Then it would work for further reductions to a world truly free of nuclear weapons.

In the First Committee, the United States representative commented that as a result of the recent meetings in Washington between Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and President Carter and Secretary of State Vance, a SALT II agreement was taking shape and that if such an agreement was concluded it would lower the level of strategic arms on both sides, impose certain qualitative constraints on potentially destabilizing weapon developments and set the stage for even more substantial limitations in SALT III. He stressed that what was being sought was not agreements that merely channelled competition in convenient directions, but significant disarmament. He pointed out, moreover, that already steps towards real disarmament had been achieved in SALT: the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, of May 1972, required dismantling of actual weapon systems then being deployed and there was little doubt that a new SALT II agreement would involve cutbacks in existing, as well as planned, weapon programmes.

Various other States, mainly Eastern and Western European, welcomed the continued efforts of the USSR and the United States to limit strategic nuclear weapons and noted with satisfaction indications of progress in the SALT negotiations. Bulgaria and the German Demo-
ocratic Republic, for instance, attached great significance to the strengthening of the régime to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons for the achievement of nuclear disarmament.

A number of States called attention to the need for effective measures to protect the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the threat of use of nuclear weapons. Bangladesh was convinced that a major incentive for adherence to the Treaty would be created if the security of non-nuclear countries against nuclear intimidation or attack were safeguarded through effective commitments incorporated into the Treaty and held that those commitments had to ensure not only active intervention in the event of threatened or actual aggression, but also a forthright assurance that the nuclear Powers themselves would not use such weapons against non-nuclear countries. Sweden reiterated its view that Security Council resolution 255 (1968) could not be regarded as a realistic answer to requests for security guarantees and called for a general pledge by the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty not to use nuclear weapons and not to threaten to use them against non-nuclear-weapon States that were parties to that Treaty and not members of a military alliance possessing nuclear weapons. Turkey held that if nuclear proliferation was to be controlled, the incentives to acquire nuclear weapons should be removed and underlined, in that connexion, the importance of appropriate arrangements with a view to providing adequate security guarantees to the non-nuclear States. Austria and the Netherlands also attached importance to the adoption of measures to strengthen the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.

Pakistan submitted a draft resolution on the question, which was adopted by the General Assembly as part of its resolution on general and complete disarmament—resolution 32/87 B (see chapter II above).

It may also be noted that the General Assembly, in operative paragraph 3 of resolution 32/87 F, relating to the report of IAEA, underlined the importance of determined efforts, especially by the nuclear-weapon States, to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States (see chapter IX below).

In the General Assembly, the discussion regarding the question of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy developed along the same lines as in the CCD and other bodies (see also chapter IX below).

Some States, particularly the Eastern European and Western countries, continued to reiterate that the Treaty provided an appropriate

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11 Chapter IX is devoted to an examination of questions related to international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. To minimize overlapping, the present chapter is limited to presentation of statements of particular relevance in the context of the non-proliferation Treaty. It should be noted that General Assembly resolution 32/87 F, concerning the report of IAEA, which is also considered in chapter IX, contains various references to the Treaty as well as to other measures to reduce the risks to international peace and security that might arise from a widening use of nuclear energy.
basis for the development and expansion of international co-operation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to lay emphasis on the strengthening of its safeguards system. The Soviet Union, for instance, said that the Treaty was a solid foundation for the development of international co-operation in the nuclear field and served the interests of economic development of States. Therefore, in its view, the countries that sincerely desired to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes had no grounds whatsoever to refuse to accede to the Treaty. The United Kingdom believed that the international safeguards system constituted a major part of the answer to the problem of reconciling the commitment in the Treaty to curb the spread of nuclear weapons with the equally important commitment under its article IV to promote the further development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Hence, it should be made as watertight and non-discriminatory as possible, and that was why for the past two years the United Kingdom Government had advocated the general application of full fuel cycle safeguards. Similarly, Bulgaria expressed support for measures aimed at strengthening the IAEA system of safeguards established under the terms of the Treaty and considered that it was essential for all non-nuclear-weapon States, including those that were not parties to the Treaty, to place under IAEA control all their peaceful nuclear activities. It pointed out that its experience showed that the IAEA system of guarantees under the Treaty did not create any impediments to such activities.

Other States, developed as well as developing, focused attention on the question of access to nuclear technology, equipment and materials by non-nuclear-weapon States, variously stressing that the promise held out by the Treaty that such States would be able to derive from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy the same benefits as nuclear-weapon States had yet to be realized. Italy, for instance, held that the Treaty régime—supplemented by full and universal application of IAEA safeguards—offered precise terms of reference for the rights as well as the obligations of nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States, not only from the standpoint of disarmament, but also from the standpoint of international co-operation in the development of nuclear energy for peaceful uses. Consequently, while reaffirming the necessity to render the non-proliferation régime effective, it emphasized that it was essential to the viability of the Treaty that the nuclear-weapon States take positive steps to ensure to non-nuclear-weapon States the effective exercise of their inalienable right to develop, without restriction or discrimination, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in its manifold applications and to benefit from international co-operation in that field. In Belgium's opinion, all current and future civilian nuclear technology and all necessary equipment and fuel had to be available equally to every one, without discrimination between those that possessed nuclear weapons and those that not only did not yet possess them but had voluntarily renounced their use in accordance with the non-proliferation Treaty. That Treaty had imposed an infinitely greater sacrifice of sovereignty on those
parties that had no nuclear weapons than on their partners that did possess them. If, as seemed to be the case, it was now necessary to go beyond the Treaty to protect mankind from the dangers of nuclear proliferation, it was for the nuclear States this time to set an example of sacrifice by committing themselves to equal access for all to nuclear technology, equipment and fuels. Nepal noted that the pledge by the nuclear Powers to promote the development of peaceful nuclear energy in non-nuclear countries had not been given proper attention and that it had been hoped that those Powers would cooperate with those anxious to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Iran, criticizing the policies of some supplier nations as hindering the flow of nuclear technology and services, pointed out that States parties to the Treaty were as much affected as those that had not acceded to the Treaty. It reiterated its commitment to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and expressed the belief that the objectives of the Treaty could not be served by erecting obstacles to the much-needed transfer of technologies and services required for the implementation of nuclear energy programmes.

Regarding the question of peaceful nuclear explosions, which was also discussed in the context of a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapon testing, some States, including Bangladesh and Nepal, called for the adoption of measures to implement article V of the Treaty.

The report of the IAEA's Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes was also the subject of comment. For instance, Czechoslovakia said that the report was a good starting point for the successful continuation of work in the field of peaceful nuclear explosions, which should involve, in the first place, the elaboration of the structure and content of international agreements making accessible to non-nuclear-weapon States the potential advantages derived from nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes as envisaged in article V of the Treaty. India noted that the Advisory Group had identified major practical applications, both existing and potential, of peaceful nuclear explosions and expressed the belief that the assessment contained in the report provided a useful programme on the current status and potentialities of the technologies of peaceful nuclear explosions. It added that the participation of a large number of States members of IAEA in the work of the Advisory Group was in itself an indication of growing interest in the applications of peaceful nuclear explosions and held that it was unfortunate that the potential benefits of that technology were sometimes ignored.

The General Assembly, in its resolution 32/49 concerning the report of IAEA, adopted by consensus on 8 December 1977, noted with appreciation the decision of the Agency's Board of Governors to keep the matter of peaceful nuclear explosions under review, seeking the services of the Advisory Group as required.
Conclusion

The discussions on the non-proliferation Treaty during 1977 reveal continued and broad support for the Treaty as the central element of an effective international régime to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Many States stressed the need of consolidating the régime by promoting universal adherence to the Treaty. In this context, the importance of measures aimed at strengthening the safeguards established under the Treaty was emphasized by a number of those countries. Several States also held that the Treaty provided the appropriate framework for the development of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

On the other hand, from the perspective of numerous non-nuclear-weapon States, the way the Treaty has been carried out so far tends to upset, to their detriment, the balance of mutual rights and obligations originally envisaged. In their view, the continuation of the nuclear arms race is incompatible with the commitment undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to pursue negotiations relating to its cessation and to nuclear disarmament. In addition, the demand of many non-nuclear-weapon States for what they would consider reliable guarantees against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons has so far remained unanswered. Additional cause for misgiving has arisen in the area of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, where a considerable number of non-nuclear-weapon States have observed that, while nuclear weapons are increasing, various constraints are being placed on their peaceful nuclear activities. In this respect, it should be noted that a conference with the participation of suppliers and recipients of nuclear technology, equipment and materials was convened in Washington in October 1977 for the purpose of organizing an International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, in an effort to promote a solution to the problem of reconciling the objective of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons with the right of all States to enjoy, without discrimination, the benefits of the peaceful applications of nuclear energy (see chapter IX below).

The three questions outlined above—cessation of the nuclear arms race, "negative" security assurances and international co-operation in peaceful uses—have emerged as the main issues in the current discussions relating to the international régime for the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. They will, no doubt, be considered further at the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in connexion with the strengthening of that régime.

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International co-operation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the question of the proliferation of nuclear weapons

Introduction

In recent years, the development of nuclear power has assumed a key role in many energy programmes and consequently there has been an expansion and diversification of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. An increasing number of States are involved in co-operation agreements in this field, as suppliers or as recipients, and the range of items covered by such agreements has broadened to include—in addition to nuclear fuel material and power reactors—facilities for the fabrication of nuclear fuels and for the treatment of those fuels after irradiation in power reactors.

These developments have given rise to a debate that has been growing in intensity. Essentially, two perspectives can be discerned in the debate, one focusing on prospective dangers, the other on expected benefits.

From the former perspective, the weapons proliferation risks posed by the widening use of nuclear energy tend to be the predominant concern. This concern relates in particular to the spread of the capability to produce weapons-grade fissionable material—plutonium 239 and uranium highly enriched in the isotope 235. The fear of nuclear-weapon proliferation, in turn, lends greater urgency to the adoption of measures to avert or minimize the perceived danger, such as universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII)) or, failing that, the application of full nuclear fuel cycle safeguards in non-nuclear-weapon States, and the improvement of the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards. In addition, the search for ways and means of reducing nuclear-weapon proliferation risks has centred on nuclear export policies, the underlying thought being that nuclear suppliers should harmonize their policies so as to free them from the pressures of commercial competition and thus ensure that such policies reflect the overriding importance of non-proliferation considerations. Essentially, common guidelines are being sought concerning the nature and extent of the safeguards and

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assurances to be associated with the transfer of nuclear technology, equipment and materials. At the same time, questions have been raised, notably by the United States, about the efficacy of existing methods to safeguard “sensitive” stages of the nuclear fuel cycle, such as reprocessing and uranium enrichment. Hence the thought that in these areas the emphasis should be on restricting access, and thereby ensuring prevention of diversion to military purposes, rather than on detection of such diversion through safeguards. The steps taken by nuclear suppliers are discussed in more detail below.

Viewed from the other perspective, the trends on the suppliers' side are causing concern, as evidenced by the criticism of several actual or potential recipient nations. In view of the fact that science and technology are increasingly important in furthering national independence and economic progress, and that the significance of nuclear power for the solution of energy problems—and consequently the significance of reliable and secure nuclear fuel supplies—is growing, there is concern, particularly on the part of developing countries, that for the sake of non-proliferation, non-nuclear-weapon States could be condemned to a position of dependence. From this point of view, the peaceful applications of nuclear power should be encouraged and all countries should have access, without discrimination, to peaceful nuclear technologies. This attitude is reinforced by the argument that it would be futile at the current stage to prevent the spread of nuclear technology by restricting access. In addition, there is a conviction that the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament are integral elements of an equitable and effective non-proliferation régime.

In 1977, the international discussion was characterized by the continuation of efforts by nuclear suppliers to work out export policies that, in their view, would lessen perceived nuclear-weapon proliferation risks, and the reaction of those who feel that those policies would affect their efforts to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. At the same time, there began a search for a consensus, reflecting awareness that effective solutions require the understanding and co-operation of all concerned. On the initiative of the United States, a dialogue between suppliers and recipients of nuclear technology was opened in the framework of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), with the aim of exploring alternative programmes and related institutional arrangements that would promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and further international collaboration in this field (see page 143 below).

1 The nuclear fuel cycle may be defined as the series of processes that certain minerals suitable for nuclear use undergo from the moment they are exploited as raw materials to the moment they are disposed of or recycled for further use—this includes ore processing, conversion, enrichment (unless natural uranium is to be used in the reactor), fabrication, use in reactor, reprocessing, disposal of part of the reprocessed material and reconversion, enrichment and refabrication of part of the reprocessed material.
Since 1975, a group of nuclear supplier States has been meeting in London with a view to the adoption of common standards concerning safeguards and related controls associated with nuclear exports.

When these nuclear suppliers first met, there was already an understanding, reached in 1974, regarding common safeguards requirements to be applied to the transfer of certain nuclear materials and equipment to non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the non-proliferation Treaty, aimed at preventing diversion of safeguarded nuclear material from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The materials and equipment concerned are those which are, in the terms of article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty, especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material. They are defined in what is known as the "Trigger List" and include reactors and related equipment (pressure tubes, zirconium tubes and primary coolant pumps), non-nuclear materials for reactors (deuterium, heavy water and nuclear-grade graphite), plants and equipment for the reprocessing of irradiated fuel elements, plants for the fabrication of fuel elements, and equipment (other than analytical instruments) especially designed or prepared for the separation of isotopes of uranium. A Government wishing to supply "Trigger List" items for peaceful purposes to a non-nuclear-weapon State not party to the Treaty should: (a) specify to the recipient State, as a condition of supply, that the source or special fissionable material produced, processed or used in the facility for which the item is supplied shall not be diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; (b) satisfy itself that safeguards to that end, under an agreement with IAEA and in accordance with its safeguards system, will be applied to the source or special fissionable material in question. In addition, satisfactory assurances are required that the items will not be re-exported to non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the non-proliferation Treaty, unless arrangements corresponding to those referred to above are made for the acceptance of safeguards by the State receiving such re-exported items.

The meetings in London aimed at developing further the common export requirements outlined above. Fifteen countries are now participating in those suppliers meetings: Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, USSR, United Kingdom and United States. As agreed at a meeting in September 1977, the export policy guidelines adopted by these countries have been communicated to the Director General of IAEA, with a request that they be circulated to all members of the Agency as a demonstration of support [by the Governments concerned] for the Agency's non-proliferation objectives and safeguard activities.

2 See INFCIRC/254, appendix (IAEA document).
Some of the basic features of the common nuclear export principles and guidelines are set out below.

The list of items triggering the application of IAEA safeguards has been expanded to include certain additional facilities. The duration and coverage provisions of safeguards agreements are to be governed by the guidelines recommended by the IAEA Director General in 1973 and approved by the Board of Governors in 1974. Those guidelines, which are reflected in the safeguards agreements concluded since that time, set out the following two concepts: (a) the duration of the agreement should be related to the period of actual use of the items in the recipient State; (b) the provisions for terminating the agreement should be formulated in such a way that the rights and obligations of the parties continue to apply in connexion with supplied nuclear material and with special fissionable material produced, processed or used or in connexion with supplied nuclear material, equipment, facilities or non-nuclear material, until such time as the Agency has terminated the application of safeguards thereto, in accordance with its safeguards system. In addition, the transfer of items on the list would be authorized only upon a formal assurance from the recipient Government explicitly excluding uses that would result in any nuclear explosive device.

The guidelines also contain requirements concerning the adoption of physical protection measures by the importing country to prevent unauthorized use and handling of the material or facilities supplied. The suppliers have determined certain “sensitive” areas—namely, plutonium reprocessing, uranium enrichment and heavy water production—and have agreed to exercise restraint in the transfer of sensitive facilities, technology and weapons-usable materials. IAEA safeguards would apply to sensitive facilities utilizing technology directly transferred by the supplier or derived from transferred facilities, or major critical components thereof. In addition, the transfer of sensitive facilities, critical components thereof, or related technology would trigger the application of IAEA safeguards to any facility of the same type (i.e., if the design, construction or operating processes are based on the same or similar physical or chemical processes as defined in the list) constructed during an agreed period in the recipient country. This is understood to refer to facilities, or major critical components thereof, whose first operation begins within a period of at least 20 years from the date of the first operation of a transferred facility or of a facility built after the transfer of technology. It is further understood that during that period there would be a conclusive presumption that any facility of the same type utilized transferred technology.

3 For the decision of the Board, see GOV/DEC/79 (XVII).
4 Basically, the principles outlined here are reflected in safeguards agreements concluded in the last two years: IAEA, Brazil and the Federal Republic of Germany (see INFCIRC/237); IAEA, France and Pakistan (see INFCIRC/239); IAEA, Canada and Spain (see INFCIRC/247); IAEA, France and South Africa (see INFCIRC/244); and two agreements between IAEA and Argentina (see INFCIRC/250 and INFCIRC/251).
The guidelines include common criteria for technology transfers, namely, a definition of "technology" and of "major critical components" and an enumeration and description of the facilities that should be deemed to be "facilities of the same type" for the purpose of implementing the relevant guidelines. The suppliers have also agreed on certain control measures in addition to safeguards, including restrictions on re-exports, the supplier's consent being required for the re-export of heavy water or weapons-usable material and of "sensitive" facilities, major critical components or technology, and for the export of facilities or major critical components derived from those items, and limitations with respect to uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing.

It has been agreed that in the event that one or more suppliers believe that there has been a violation of supplier-recipient understandings resulting from the agreed guidelines, particularly in the case of an explosion of a nuclear device, or illegal termination or violation of IAEA safeguards by a recipient, suppliers should consult promptly through diplomatic channels in order to determine and assess the reality and extent of the alleged violation. Pending the early outcome of such consultations, suppliers have agreed not to act in a manner that could prejudice any measures that might be adopted by other suppliers concerning their current contacts with that recipient. Upon the findings of such consultations the suppliers, bearing in mind article XII of the statute of IAEA, should agree on an appropriate response and possible action which could include the termination of nuclear transfers to that recipient. The suppliers should also consult, as each deems it appropriate, with other Governments concerned, on specific sensitive cases, to ensure that any transfer does not contribute to risks of conflict or instability.

It may be noted that Canada, in its communication to the Director General of IAEA setting forth the common guidelines to be followed in the export of nuclear material, equipment and technology, stated that it might apply additional control and safeguards requirements. For their part, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Poland and the Soviet Union noted that they supported the principle that "Trigger List" items should only be exported if all nuclear activities in the recipient non-nuclear-weapon country, and not only the exported item itself, were under IAEA safeguards. Belgium, Japan and Switzerland stated that they were not currently able to implement fully the principles for technology transfers because of the lack of appropriate national laws and regulations. However, they expressed their intention to implement those principles fully when such legislation had been enacted.

In the past two years, several nuclear suppliers have announced the adoption of certain principles or guidelines to govern their exports of nuclear equipment, material or technology. Generally, the statements on nuclear export policies reflect the understandings reached at the London meetings with respect to the application of IAEA safeguards, limitations in the use of exports for the manufacture of explosive
devices, restrictions on re-exports and measures of physical protection. In addition, some suppliers, such as Canada and Sweden, have announced that their transfers of nuclear materials, equipment or technology are restricted to States that are parties to the non-proliferation Treaty or accept the application of IAEA safeguards to all their peaceful nuclear activities. Others have stated that they no longer authorize the export of reprocessing plants and technology. The French Government so stated on 16 December 1976. Subsequently, at the International Conference on Nuclear Power and Its Fuel Cycle, held at Salzburg from 2 to 13 May 1977, a member of the French delegation pointed out that, this policy notwithstanding, France was not prepared to exercise pressure in the nuclear, economic or political field to prevent a country from acquiring or exporting sensitive technologies through its own resources. The Federal Republic of Germany announced a similar embargo on 17 June 1977 but at the same time stated that existing agreements and their implementation would not be affected by the decision. It also stated that its position was based on the conviction that agreements concluded in the past concerning the delivery of fuels and other materials needed for peaceful nuclear uses could be adhered to without adversely affecting the continuation of talks on nuclear energy and non-proliferation which were initiated at the summit meeting of Heads of State or Government, held in London on 7 and 8 May 1977 (see page 218 below). For its part, the United States, on 28 October 1976, had called for a three-year moratorium on the transfer of reprocessing and uranium enrichment technology and facilities.

In the United States, the review of nuclear energy policy begun under the administration of President Ford continued under that of President Carter who, on 7 April 1977, announced a number of decisions, among them the following:

(a) The United States would defer indefinitely the commercial reprocessing and recycling of the plutonium produced in United States nuclear power programmes, having concluded from experience that a viable and economic nuclear power programme could be sustained without such reprocessing and recycling;

(b) The United States would restructure its breeder reactor programme to give greater priority to alternative designs of the breeder, and defer the date when breeder reactors would be put into commercial use;

(c) The United States would redirect funding of its nuclear research and development programmes to accelerate research into alternative nuclear fuel cycles that do not involve direct access to materials usable in nuclear weapons;

(d) The United States would increase its production capacity for

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enriched uranium to provide adequate and timely supply of nuclear fuels for domestic and foreign needs;

(e) The United States would continue to embargo the export of equipment or technology that would permit uranium enrichment and chemical reprocessing;

(f) the United States would continue discussions, with supplier and recipient countries alike, on a wide range of international approaches and frameworks that would permit all nations to achieve their energy objectives while reducing the spread of nuclear explosive capability, among them the establishment of an international nuclear fuel cycle evaluation programme aimed at developing alternative fuel cycles and a variety of international and United States measures to assure access to nuclear fuel supplies and spent fuel storage for nations sharing common non-proliferation objectives.

In addition, on 27 April 1977, President Carter submitted a bill to the United States Congress, entitled Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1977, which was later amended. Among its key features are the following:

(a) The bill defines the immediate nuclear export conditions that the United States can reasonably expect other nations to meet pending the negotiation of stricter agreements for co-operation. These conditions include:

(i) A requirement for IAEA safeguards on all exported items and on any other plutonium or enriched uranium that might be used in the export facility or produced through its use;

(ii) A requirement that no United States export be used for research or production of any nuclear explosive device;

(iii) A requirement that no United States export be retransferred by a recipient nation to any other nation without the prior approval of the United States;

(iv) A requirement that no fuel exported from the United States be reprocessed without the prior approval of the United States;

(b) The bill defines additional nuclear export conditions that will be required in new agreements for co-operation. They include:

(i) A requirement, in the case of non-nuclear weapon States, that IAEA safeguards cover all nuclear materials and equipment regardless of whether these have been supplied by the United States. Fulfilment of this requirement will be a condition of continuing nuclear supply from the United States;

(ii) The stipulation that United States co-operation under the

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agreement shall cease if the recipient detonates a nuclear device or materially violates IAEA safeguards or any guarantee it has given under the agreement;

(iii) A requirement for IAEA safeguards on all United States supplied material and equipment for indefinite duration, whether or not the agreement for co-operation remains in force;

(iv) The United States right of approval on retransfers extended to all special nuclear material produced through the use of United States equipment;

(v) The United States right of approval on reprocessing extended to all special nuclear material produced through use of United States equipment.

It will be noted that these requirements correspond largely with the guidelines adopted by the London suppliers' group, except for the first one, which goes beyond this and is very similar to the position taken by the USSR and other Eastern European supplier nations.

(c) For the near future, the bill proposes to tighten the conditions for United States nuclear co-operation through the renegotiation of existing agreements to meet the same standards as those that will be required for new agreements, as specified above.

(d) The bill creates sanctions against the violation of nuclear agreements by providing that no nuclear export shall be granted to any non-nuclear-weapon State that, after enactment of the legislation:

(i) Detonates a nuclear explosive device;

(ii) Terminates or abrogates IAEA safeguards;

(iii) Is found by the President to have materially violated an IAEA agreement or any other guarantee it has given under an agreement for co-operation with the United States;

unless the President determines that such a cut-off would hinder the achievement of United States non-proliferation objectives, or would jeopardize the common defence and security.

On 22 June 1977, the President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Leonid Brezhnev, and the President of the French Republic, Valéry Giscard D'Estaing, upon the conclusion of their three-day talks at Rambouillet signed, among other instruments, a Franco-Soviet Declaration on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons^7 which, in part, reads as follows:

The French Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, conscious of the responsibility they bear as nuclear Powers and desirous of avoiding the dangers arising from the spread of nuclear weapons, reaffirm their common will to spare no effort in seeking to prevent the proliferation of such weapons.

To that end, they believe that broad international co-operation is necessary,

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particularly within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, whose system of inspection, to supervise the effective observance of the commitments assumed in the field of non-proliferation, is an important and effectual means of achieving that aim. They are prepared to contribute to the improvement of these controls.

France and the USSR recognize that access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is an important factor in the economic development of a growing number of countries. For their part, they will make sure, each insofar as it is concerned, that their co-operation with third countries in the field of nuclear industry affords all the necessary safeguards to prevent proliferation. With that in view, they recall that they have declared themselves in favour of limiting the transfer of nuclear materials suitable for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and of equipment and technology capable of producing those materials.

The two parties, in applying their policy of exporting nuclear materials, equipment and technology, will abide by their international commitments in this field and be guided by the aims of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. They are prepared, each insofar as it is concerned, to strengthen the appropriate provisions and guarantees relating to equipment, materials and technology. They will continue to contribute actively to the co-ordination of the general principles relating to nuclear exports.

On 25 August 1977, the Prime Minister of Australia, in a statement to Parliament announcing the Australian Government's decision to proceed with the further development and export of the country's uranium resources, said that the decision had been based, *inter alia*, on such fundamental considerations as the need to reduce the risk of nuclear-weapon proliferation and the need to supply essential sources of energy to an energy-deficient world. In view of the fact that Australia possessed 20 per cent of the Western world's known reserves of low-cost uranium, the Government realized that Australia was in a special position to influence, and had a corresponding moral responsibility to maximize, protection against nuclear-weapon proliferation by responding to the needs of many countries for adequate assurances of uranium supplies. By taking the decision to export uranium, the Australian Government believed it could slow down the movement towards the use of plutonium as a nuclear fuel and lessen the attendant increased risks of nuclear-weapon proliferation. In addition, it would work vigorously at the international level for a régime providing the best solutions to the risk of such proliferation. A comprehensive and stringent policy regarding the safeguards that should be applied to further exports of Australian uranium had been elaborated, which was based on four essential elements:

(a) the non-proliferation Treaty, which in the Australian view was the most important international non-proliferation instrument and the one on which any safeguards policy must be based; (b) supplementary bilateral agreements between Australia and uranium-importing countries to ensure the application of safeguards under the non-proliferation Treaty to Australian-supplied material under all circumstances; (c) the central role of IAEA in the implementation of safeguards; and (d)
Australian participation in multilateral efforts to strengthen safeguards and the non-proliferation régime. Australia had carefully considered a number of international efforts in which it might participate, exert its influence or lend its support—among them the international fuel cycle evaluation, preparation of a draft convention on physical security, development of a common approach to sanctions and achievement of the widest possible consensus amongst both nuclear supplier countries and nuclear importing countries on the controls to apply to the world nuclear industry—and had concluded that its ability to influence those developments would depend to a great extent on whether or not it was a major supplier and producer of uranium, for only in that role could it have a voice in the achievement of improved international safeguards and control.®

Consideration by the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament

The importance assumed by questions related to the spread of nuclear technology may be gauged by the number of States which, during the 1977 sessions of the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, identified the peaceful uses of nuclear energy as an area deserving particular attention at the special session (see chapter VIII above).

A number of delegations stressed the need for effective measures against nuclear-weapon proliferation. For instance, the Soviet Union (14th meeting) considered that an important task was the strengthening of the system for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Towards that end, it was important, in its view, to reinforce the IAEA system of safeguards and essential to ensure that international co-operation in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes did not become a channel for the proliferation of nuclear weapons. A provision along those lines was included in the working paper on the programme of action on disarmament® that the Soviet Union, together with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia and Poland, presented to the Preparatory Committee.

Canada suggested® that the special session:

(a) Should recognize that effective international safeguards and controls are essential in order to ensure that the peaceful application of nuclear energy will not lead to further proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

® The Australian Government has meanwhile advised IAEA that it will be applying export criteria which satisfy the guidelines for nuclear transfers adopted at the London meetings and have certain additional requirements (see INFCIRC/254/Add.1).

9 A/AC.187/82.
10 See A/AC.187/26.
(b) Should stress the importance of strengthening international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy through the collaboration of States receiving and supplying nuclear technology, facilities, equipment and fuel;

(c) Should assess the achievements to date in IAEA and among supplier States in strengthening the régime to ensure that international co-operation in the uses of nuclear energy is employed only for peaceful purposes;

(d) Should call for creation of new mechanisms for consultation and co-operation among both supplier and receiver States to seek agreement on collective measures to avoid the dangers for international security inherent in the development of an international "plutonium economy"

Other States, including Austria, New Zealand and Sweden, also pointed to the need to strengthen the international régime against the spread of nuclear weapons in this area (see also chapter VIII above). The matter of access to peaceful nuclear technology was emphasized, particularly by developing countries which voiced concern about recent trends in the area of nuclear exports.

Romania submitted working papers concerning the declaration on disarmament and the programme of measures and action,\(^{11}\) in which it affirmed the need for the removal of restrictions to widespread access, particularly by developing countries, to modern science and technology, and the rights of all States to make peaceful use of nuclear energy on an equal basis. Views along similar lines were expressed by Argentina and Brazil.\(^{12}\) The Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries submitted a working paper containing preliminary ideas concerning preparations for the special session,\(^{13}\) in which it stated that the declaration of principles to be adopted at that session should not be construed in such a way as to curtail the endeavours of the non-aligned and other developing countries, particularly their rights to share, on an equal basis, in the access to modern nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

The Bureau proposed a series of general principles, among them that given adequate safeguards, access to technology for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should not be subjected to discriminatory restrictions, whether between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States or among non-nuclear-weapon States themselves.

Consideration by the CCD and IAEA, 1977

During 1977, both in meetings of the CCD\(^ {14}\) and at the twenty-first session of the General Conference of IAEA, held from 26 to 30

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\(^{11}\) A/AC.187/77 and A/AC.187/78.

\(^{12}\) See A/AC.187/48 and A/AC.187/49, respectively.

\(^{13}\) A/AC.187/55.

September 1977, considerable attention was given to matters related to the transfer of nuclear technology, equipment and materials, and in particular to the steps being taken by nuclear suppliers individually and jointly.

Many developing countries, among them India, Indonesia, Pakistan and the Philippines, dwelt on the important role that the transfer of nuclear science and technology played in the development process and strongly criticized the controls and restrictions imposed by nuclear suppliers on various grounds—for instance, that they hampered the efforts of developing countries to improve their economic and social conditions, were discriminatory, contravened the principle of sovereign equality and did not address the question of nuclear disarmament which lay at the heart of the nuclear-weapon proliferation problem. In addition, developing countries pointed out that the denial of technologies deemed to be “sensitive”—plutonium reprocessing, for instance—would not solve nuclear-weapon proliferation problems since such technologies were already widely disseminated. It may be noted that the Director General of IAEA, in his statement to the IAEA General Conference, pointed out that because even the strictest international safeguards verification did not prevent the accumulation of weapons-grade nuclear material within the peaceful fuel cycle, there was a tendency to try to prevent proliferation by limiting the expansion of the peaceful nuclear fuel cycle, and indicated that such measures might be counter-productive by encouraging research and development activities in a sensitive area. He mentioned isotope separation as a prime example: it had always been classified by the nuclear-weapon States, which only seemed to have stimulated a great deal of work in several countries on new separation methods, a fact that had become clear at the Salzburg International Conference on Nuclear Power and Its Fuel Cycle.

Various Eastern European and Western countries viewed the efforts of suppliers to strengthen controls over peaceful nuclear exports as a positive development. In addition, some countries, notably the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, countered various criticisms directed to the suppliers group, saying that its purpose was to ensure that nuclear exports did not contribute to the risk of nuclear-weapon proliferation and that the participants in no way sought to obtain economic advantages. At the same time, they held that without a dialogue between suppliers and recipients of nuclear technology it would not be possible to achieve broad agreement on the control measures needed in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

**International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation**

In 1977, the United States, concerned about the consequences of a further spread of nuclear weapons or explosive capabilities and believ-
ing that those risks would be vastly increased by the further spread of sensitive technologies that entail direct access to plutonium, highly enriched uranium or other weapons-grade material, initiated a search for an international consensus on a less proliferation-prone nuclear fuel cycle that would serve economic needs and also satisfy exporters' requirements.

As indicated above, the United States has decided to defer indefinitely the commercial reprocessing and recycling of plutonium and the commercial use of breeder reactors. At the international level it has emphasized the prospective dangers of plutonium reprocessing and recycling and of breeder reactors, which produce more plutonium than they consume, and the need to think about the next generation of nuclear technology with a view to exploring the possibility of developing nuclear fuel cycles that present fewer proliferation risks before moving further towards a "plutonium economy". Other nations naturally view the matter of the nuclear fuel cycle from the perspective of their own needs and energy options, given their resource endowment, geography, economy, ecology and other relevant factors. As may be seen from the discussions at the Salzburg International Conference on Nuclear Power and Its Fuel Cycle and in other forums, several countries feel that they cannot renounce the use of plutonium as fuel if they are to satisfy future energy needs, and are therefore continuing or initiating programmes which include the use of breeder reactors utilizing plutonium, thereby closing the fuel cycle.

These questions, including the United States idea of a study of less proliferation-prone nuclear fuel cycles, were pursued at the summit meeting of Heads of State of Government, held in London on 7 and 8 May 1977, in which seven countries participated: Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom and United States. In their final communiqué the participants stated that they: (a) agreed on the need to increase nuclear energy to help meet the world's energy requirements; (b) committed themselves to do this while reducing the risks of nuclear proliferation; and (c) were launching an urgent study to determine how best to fulfil these purposes. The appendix to the communiqué contained the following two paragraphs on the subject:

Increasing reliance will have to be placed on nuclear energy to satisfy growing energy requirements and to help diversify sources of energy. This should be done with the utmost precaution with respect to the generation and dissemination of material that can be used for nuclear weapons. Our objective is to meet the world's energy needs and to make peaceful use of nuclear energy widely available, while avoiding the danger of the spread of nuclear weapons.

We are also agreed that, in order to be effective, non-proliferation policies should as far as possible be acceptable to both industrialized and developing countries alike. To this end, we are undertaking a preliminary analysis, to be completed within two months, of the best means of advancing these objectives, including the study of terms of reference for international fuel cycle evaluation.
Throughout the summer of 1977, experts of the seven participating countries held meetings in Paris to consider the idea of an international nuclear fuel cycle evaluation study and some Governments, including France and the Federal Republic of Germany, publicly stated their views on various aspects, notably participation in the proposed study and its effect on on-going national programmes in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The United States also held informal discussions with a number of countries, following which it decided to convene a three-day organizing conference in Washington in October 1977.

The Organizing Conference of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation was held from 19 to 21 October with the participation of 40 countries, both nuclear suppliers and recipients, developed and developing: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, the Federal Republic of, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, USSR, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela and Yugoslavia.

The Organizing Conference was also attended by representatives of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Commission of the European Communities, the International Energy Agency and the Nuclear Energy Agency.

It may be noted that in the course of the Organizing Conference, the United States took two initiatives. One was a proposal for the creation of an international fuel bank so that there might be a reservoir of nuclear fuel to be supplied in case of a temporary break-down in the bilateral supply of such fuel. In making this proposal at the inaugural meeting, President Carter indicated that the United States would contribute its technical capability and its own portion of enriched uranium supplies. The other initiative concerned the storage and disposal of spent nuclear fuel. To help solve that problem the United States offered to assume the responsibility for the storage and ultimate disposal of spent nuclear fuel from foreign as well as domestic reactors. At the same time, the United States urged other nations to enlarge their own storage capacity and pledged active support for the study of regional or international storage sites. As far as foreign spent nuclear fuel is concerned, the United States would be willing to accept limited quantities when this would contribute to fulfilling non-proliferation objectives. It is expected that such a policy would improve the ability of the United States to negotiate with other nations more effective non-proliferation measures and to avoid a premature entry into the "plutonium economy". The storage agreements with foreign operators would be similar to those concluded with domestic operators, subject to appropriate limitations to be established in the future.

16 For the final communiqué of the Conference, see appendix VII below.
Consideration by the CCD and IAEA, 1977

In the course of 1977, the United States initiative was the subject of comments in the CCD\(^{17}\) and other international bodies, notably IAEA.\(^{18}\) Several countries pointed to the need for an international evaluation of the nuclear fuel cycle, particularly at a time when commercial reprocessing and recycling and breeder reactors were being planned and developed in an increasing number of countries.

A few days before President Carter launched the idea of a study of alternative nuclear fuel cycles, the Netherlands spoke in the CCD (741st meeting) about the problems of developing a safe nuclear fuel cycle, meaning one that contained no significant quantities of dangerous materials, and attached great importance to the initiation of international discussions at the government level of various possible ways of dealing with the problem.

The study proposed by the United States was generally welcomed and there were specific comments on its nature and purpose. It was explained that the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation had been launched because of international interest in the contribution that nuclear power could make to meet growing energy requirements and in the use of nuclear power in ways that would minimize the danger of nuclear-weapon proliferation. It was not envisaged that INFCE would lead to specific commitments from participants or would entail substantive negotiations among them, its purpose being limited to an objective analysis of all relevant aspects of nuclear-power technology with a view to the evaluation of alternative approaches, particularly in the light of non-proliferation requirements. Hence, it should be understood that INFCE should in no way affect current nuclear programmes, including industrial enrichment and reprocessing activities and the development of fast breeder reactors, nor the implementation of existing agreements relating to the transfer of technology, equipment or materials. It was also pointed out that if the aim of INFCE was to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, then it was the motives for such proliferation that should be eliminated.

Japan stated that it was ready to support the proposed nuclear fuel cycle evaluation provided that its own nuclear development programme was not hampered and added that even while such an evaluation was under way the reprocessing and plutonium utilization programme of such non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty as urgently required the reprocessing of spent fuel to meet their growing energy demand should not be hindered.

\(^{17}\) See foot-note 14.

\(^{18}\) See foot-note 15.
MULTILATERAL OR REGIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE CENTRES AND INTERNATIONAL STORAGE RÉGIME OF SPENT REACTOR FUEL

In recent years, arrangements have been considered with a view to limiting the spread of nationally owned facilities or technologies that would provide direct access to weapons-grade nuclear materials, particularly plutonium. Among such arrangements are multinational or regional nuclear fuel cycle centres and an international storage régime for spent reactor fuel under IAEA control.

(A) Multinational or regional nuclear fuel cycle centres

The concept of regional nuclear fuel cycle centres responds to concern about the reprocessing of spent fuel from nuclear power plants and the separated plutonium recovered from this fuel. It envisages a multinational approach to the planning, establishment and operation of facilities necessary to service what is often referred to as the "back-end" of the nuclear fuel cycle—meaning the steps through which spent fuel goes from the time it leaves the nuclear power reactor until recycled fuel is ready for use in a reactor.

In April 1977, IAEA completed a study of regional nuclear fuel cycle centres, which was presented at the International Conference on Nuclear Power and Its Fuel Cycle at Salzburg. The results of this study might enable any group of interested member States to examine and work out alternative strategies pertinent to their present and projected nuclear fuel cycle needs, as well as evolve institutional, legal and other appropriate frameworks or agreements for the establishment of fuel cycle centres on a multinational co-operative basis.

Currently, some additional effort is under way to expand some areas of the study, in particular those dealing with considerations of extended storage or ultimate disposal of spent fuel elements.

(B) International storage régime of spent reactor fuel

In the spring of 1976, the United States made a proposal to IAEA for the establishment of an international régime to provide for the storage of plutonium and spent reactor fuel under IAEA auspices. President Ford, in his statement on United States nuclear policy of 28 October 1976, said that once a broadly representative IAEA storage régime was in operation, the United States would be prepared to place its own excess civil plutonium and spent reactor fuel under such a régime. Moreover, the United States would consider providing a site for international storage, also under IAEA auspices. As indicated earlier, the United States, in offering at the Organizing Conference of INFCE to assume responsibility for the storage and disposal of spent

fuel from foreign as well as domestic nuclear reactors, also pledged active support for the study of regional or international storage sites.

Currently, IAEA is examining the matter as part of its study on plutonium management.

Consideration by the CCD and other bodies, 1977

In the CCD and the General Conference of IAEA a number of countries—including Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Poland and Switzerland—referred with interest to the idea of establishing regional nuclear fuel cycle centres and creating an international storage régime of spent reactor fuel, and also welcomed the work undertaken by IAEA in those areas.

ConsiDeration by the General Assembly, 1977

Consideration of the various matters touched upon in the preceding sections was resumed at the thirty-second session of the General Assembly, both during the general debate and in the First Committee. The views expressed, although greater in number and varying substance and emphasis with respect to specific issues, reflected the two trends of thought that had dominated previous discussions.

Among the States stressing the need for effective measures to prevent the widening use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes from contributing to the danger of the spread of nuclear weapons, a number of Eastern and Western European countries expressed support for the steps being taken by nuclear exporters to ensure that transferred technology, equipment and materials were not misused to manufacture nuclear weapons or other explosive devices. It was pointed out that supplier countries had a special responsibility to see to it that nuclear exports did not increase nuclear-weapon proliferation risks, that the measures adopted by the group of nuclear suppliers in London were not discriminatory and did not hinder the development of co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, that the purpose of the group's discussions had been to ensure that the safeguards and non-proliferation aspects of sales of nuclear materials, equipment and technology took precedence over commercial considerations, and that the agreed nuclear export guidelines would be communicated to the Director General of IAEA. Some Western European countries, including participants in the meetings in London, recognized that effective non-proliferation policies with regard to the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes had to be based on a broad consensus and there-

20 See Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-second Session, First Committee, 7th to 38th, 40th and 44th meetings; and ibid., First Committee, Sessional Fascicle, corrigendum.
fore required the participation of all concerned in its formulation. The United Kingdom, for instance, said it would be useful to open the nuclear suppliers group to a wider membership.

The States seeking full access to peaceful nuclear technology, equipment and materials, particularly the developing countries, continued to express concern regarding the measures adopted by supplier countries. In their view, instead of taking steps to promote the scientific, technological and energy development of developing countries, supplier States were imposing, in the name of non-proliferation, constraints and restrictions that contributed to perpetuate the privileged position of a few advanced countries.

Related to this subject was the discussion on IAEA safeguards. A number of countries, mainly Eastern European and Western countries, continued to lay emphasis on the improvement of their technical effectiveness. Attention was drawn to the new demands that a “plutonium economy” would place on IAEA safeguards. For instance, the Netherlands commented that until recently the international community had been convinced that, with adequate IAEA safeguards, an effective barrier could be constructed against the misuse of nuclear materials for the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices, but added that the best possible IAEA safeguards could never prevent weapons-usable materials from becoming available to a greater number of countries. It pointed out that most reactor types currently used only natural uranium or slightly enriched uranium, nuclear materials that could not be immediately misused for nuclear explosive devices. Moreover, commercial reprocessing was still in its infancy and was restricted to a few countries. With large-scale development of the nuclear industry in all its stages around the world, however, that situation was bound to change, and with it the security situation in all countries. The Netherlands noted, in particular, that the world was moving towards the large-scale use of plutonium. Under the circumstances, the international community was, in its opinion, confronted with the question of whether the expansion and further spread of nuclear industry should continue without any restraints as to the technologies involved, or whether it was not necessary, first, to investigate alternatives that were more proliferation-resistant. The Netherlands further believed that it was necessary, inter alia, to explore how safeguards could be made more effective and the extent to which there was a need for self-restraint in the acquisition or transfer of sensitive technologies until they could be adequately safeguarded.

Apart from supporting the technical improvement of IAEA safeguards, Eastern European and Western countries continued to advocate the application of such safeguards to all the peaceful nuclear activities of non-nuclear-weapon States. President Carter, in his address to the General Assembly (18th meeting, 4 October 1977), held that it was not enough to safeguard some facilities or materials and that full scope comprehensive safeguards were necessary. The Soviet Union, referring
in the First Committee (26th meeting) to the control measures over nuclear exports adopted by supplier countries, said that an important step in the direction of strengthening the non-proliferation régime could be the expansion of controls over all the nuclear activities of importing countries having no nuclear weapons of their own.

For their part, developing countries, while recognizing the importance of IAEA safeguards, continued to focus their concern on the need to rectify the imbalance that in their view existed between the efforts being devoted to accelerating the contribution of nuclear energy to economic progress and those being devoted to regulatory activities. Among those countries were Nigeria, which, although agreeing that there was a need to strengthen the resources of the Agency in the area of safeguards, held that regulatory activities should not squeeze out promotional efforts, and Pakistan, which commented that while, according to its statute, the promotional objective of IAEA was first in order of precedence, in recent years the regulatory objective had tended to preempt the time and funds of the Agency.

The International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation generally received favourable comments from the countries that referred to the United States initiative. The fact that INFCE was open to wider participation was invariably viewed as a positive development in the light of the need to associate all the countries concerned—developed and developing, suppliers and recipients of nuclear technology—in the search for broadly acceptable solutions to the complex problems involved in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Beyond that, different countries highlighted the significance of different aspects of the programme.

Some countries—for instance, Canada, the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom—attached particular importance to the study of alternative nuclear fuel cycles that minimized nuclear-weapon-proliferation risks. Other countries, mainly developing countries, pointed out that the programme was carried out in recognition of the need to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Pakistan, for instance, said that the 40 countries that had participated in the Organizing Conference of INFCE were convinced that effective measures could be taken to minimize the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons without undermining the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. India noted that the Conference had recognized that special consideration should be given to the specific needs of and conditions in developing countries. Japan and Pakistan further pointed out that INFCE would not affect national nuclear fuel cycle policies.

The concepts of regional or multinational fuel cycle centres and of an international régime for plutonium storage continued to be matters of interest at the thirty-second session. The Director General of IAEA, in his statement to the General Assembly (58th meeting), referred to the Agency’s study on regional fuel cycle centres, which had been presented to the Salzburg Conference on Nuclear Power and Its Fuel Cycle.
In his opinion, almost every aspect of the concept had been exhaustively examined and it was now up to Member States to take initiatives for setting up such centres. He pointed out that IAEA was ready to provide any assistance it could and added that there had been some informal contacts but that so far no concrete project had emerged. He also indicated that the Agency would shortly complete its study on plutonium management and said that, once again, it would be up to States to evaluate the concept and to take political initiatives if they should consider it worth pursuing. Finally, he observed that both those concepts, as well as many others intended to strengthen the non-proliferation régime, would be studied in the framework of INFCE.

In its resolution 32/49, on the report of IAEA, the General Assembly noted with appreciation the study on regional nuclear fuel cycle centres and the intention of the Agency to continue its research in that field, especially with regard to economic and non-proliferation implications.

The two other resolutions adopted by the General Assembly reflected the two main trends that have emerged in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The first originated in an initiative by Finland, which on 19 October submitted a draft resolution in the First Committee, under the item entitled "General and complete disarmament" (A/C.1/32/L.3). It was sponsored, in revised form (A/C.1/32/L.3/Rev.1), by Australia, the Bahamas, Canada, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Japan, Nepal, Norway, Poland, Tunisia and Zaire.

Explaining the proposal, Finland said that it had been motivated, on the one hand, by awareness of the importance of nuclear energy to the world's energy needs and of the particular needs of the developing countries and, on the other hand, by the belief that the proliferation of nuclear weapons was a risk that threatened the security of all nations. In its view, the basic reason for the lack of consensus that had been hampering international nuclear co-operation was not the restraints being exercised, but rather the fear of proliferation of nuclear weapons. To dispel that fear, the non-proliferation Treaty should be made universal or, failing that, other reasonable assurances against proliferation should be adopted, such as the application of complete nuclear fuel cycle safeguards.

As outlined by Finland the substance of the draft resolution consisted of three main elements: first, it "clearly spelled out" the obligation of the nuclear-weapon States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty to take measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the need to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States; secondly, it recognized the right of States accepting effective non-proliferation restraints to enjoy fully the benefits of nuclear energy; and, thirdly, it clarified the notion of "effective non-proliferation restraints," urging States at present outside the non-proliferation Treaty to accede thereto, or at least accept
other arrangements involving the application of safeguards to their complete nuclear fuel cycles (paragraph 6). In addition, Member States would, by adopting the draft resolution, affirm the principle that States should not convert civil nuclear materials or facilities to the production of nuclear weapons.

Commenting on the Finnish proposal, Pakistan criticized various provisions of the draft resolution and remarked, in conclusion, that it ignored the reality of the immediate danger of nuclear proliferation and gave insufficient attention to the security interests of the non-nuclear-weapon States. Most important, in its view, its adoption would give international sanction to the coercive and restrictive approach unilaterally adopted by some of the supplier countries. In addition, it would undermine the work launched at the Organizing Conference of INFCE. Pakistan believed that at that juncture the General Assembly should set out certain broad principles that could help the suppliers and recipients of peaceful nuclear technology to find a common ground for international co-operation and for the acceleration of the contribution of nuclear energy to economic and social development. It was desirable that the General Assembly should affirm that nuclear energy was of vital importance for the economic and social development of all countries, particularly the developing countries; that all States had the right to develop, acquire, transfer and use without hindrance nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and to determine their peaceful nuclear programmes in accordance with their policies, needs and interests; and that access to nuclear technology should be available to all States without discrimination under international safeguards.

Pakistan submitted amendments (A/C.1/32/L.38) to the draft resolution, which had been further revised by its sponsors (A/C.1/32/L.3/Rev.2). Those amendments would have: (a) replaced the words “effective and non-discriminatory restraints” by the words “universally applied and non-discriminatory safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency” in paragraphs 4 and 8; (b) urged the nuclear-weapon States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty to respond positively to the proposals and preoccupations of the non-nuclear-weapon States in order to make it possible for all of them to adhere to the Treaty and urged them, in the interim, to accept the application of universal and non-discriminatory safeguards of IAEA; and (c) added, at the end of paragraph 7 concerning the study of arrangements for adequate supply of nuclear fuels and other materials, the words “without jeopardizing their respective fuel cycle policies or international co-operation agreements and contracts for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy”.

Before the First Committee proceeded to vote on the draft resolution, Finland, on behalf of the sponsors, orally revised it for a third time (A/C.1/32/L.3/Rev.3). A new preambular paragraph was added underlining the importance of the nuclear-weapon States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty responding positively, by participating in the
The fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy as provided in article IV of the Treaty, to the proposals and preoccupation of the non-nuclear-weapon States in order to facilitate the adherence of all non-nuclear-weapon States to the Treaty. In paragraphs 4 and 8 the word “safeguard” was substituted for “restraints”. Finally, Pakistan’s amendment to paragraph 7 was incorporated in the text, but in modified form, the words “provided that agreed safeguards are applied” having been added at the end. In view of the efforts made by the sponsors to accommodate its position, Pakistan withdrew its amendments. The draft resolution, as revised, was adopted by the First Committee by 89 votes to 1, with 16 abstentions. In the General Assembly, it was adopted on 12 December as resolution 32/87 F, by 111 votes to 2 (Albania and China), with 16 abstentions (including France, among the nuclear-weapon States, and Algeria, Israel, Pakistan, Peru and Spain). It should be noted that Argentina, Brazil and India did not participate in the vote.

The resolution reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recognizing that the danger of nuclear warfare remains a grave threat to the survival of mankind,

Convinced that the prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, especially in those areas of the world where the maintenance of international peace and security is endangered, remains an important element in the efforts to avert nuclear warfare,

Recalling resolution 31/189 D of 21 December 1976, in which the General Assembly requested the International Atomic Energy Agency to give special attention to its programme of work in the non-proliferation area and to give careful consideration to all relevant suggestions aimed at strengthening the safeguards régime that have been presented to the Agency, including the communication from the Government of Finland, and to report on the progress of its work on this question to the Assembly at its thirty-second session,

Noting the annual report for 1976 of the International Atomic Energy Agency,

Recalling also its resolution 31/75 of 10 December 1976 on the implementation of the conclusions of the first Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the recommendations, proposals and statements made at the Conference,

Recalling its resolution 2373 (XXII) of 12 June 1968, in which it commended the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and expressed the hope for the widest possible adherence to that Treaty,

Noting that more than one hundred States are now parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Underlining the importance of the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons responding positively, by participating in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as provided in article IV of the Treaty, to the proposals and preoccupation of the non-nuclear-weapon States in order to facilitate the adherence of all non-nuclear-weapon States to the Treaty,

Noting also the importance of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world as a possible means of contributing to the preven-
tion of the proliferation of nuclear weapons as recognized by the General Assembly in its resolution 31/70 of 10 December 1976 on the comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects,

Recognizing the need to ensure, on a non-discriminatory basis in accordance with article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and in keeping with the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, a supply of nuclear technology, materials and facilities to meet the world's energy needs,

Noting the deliberations of the International Conference on Nuclear Power and Its Fuel Cycle, held at Salzburg, Austria, from 2 to 13 May 1977 under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the Conference on the Transfer of Nuclear Technology, held at Persepolis, Iran, from 10 to 14 April 1977, which confirmed the important and growing contribution that nuclear energy will make to meeting the energy needs of all countries, including the developing countries,

Noting also that the Organizing Conference of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, held in Washington, D.C. from 19 to 21 October 1977, recognized that nuclear energy should be made widely available for peaceful purposes, that effective measures could and should be taken at the national level and through international agreements to minimize the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and that the evaluation would not jeopardize the respective fuel cycle policies or international co-operation agreements and contracts for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, provided that agreed safeguard measures were applied,

Anxious that the accelerated spread and development of nuclear technology should not increase the danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and convinced that these two objectives are not contradictory,

Underlining again the important role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in promoting the contribution of nuclear energy to economic progress, bearing in mind the special needs of developing countries, and in implementing safeguards in the interest of non-proliferation,

Noting that the International Atomic Energy Agency has made further progress in its safeguards activities by increasing its preparedness to reach with States which are not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, if they so desire, universal and non-discriminatory safeguards agreements no less effective than those concluded by the International Atomic Energy Agency with States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, by keeping under scrutiny the strengthening of its safeguards, by completing this year a study on the establishment of regional fuel cycle centres and by presenting a draft convention for physical protection of nuclear materials,

Determined that similar progress could be made in exploring possibilities of increased assistance to the developing areas of the world,

1. Urgently calls for determined efforts by all nuclear-weapon States:
   (a) To bring about the cessation of the nuclear arms race;
   (b) To undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament;
   (c) To find an early solution to the remaining problems in reaching agreement to discontinue all test explosions of nuclear weapons as a step towards the realization of these objectives;

2. Emphasizes in this connexion the particular responsibility of those nuclear-weapon States that have already accepted international obligations, namely in article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, with respect to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests and notes as encouraging the recent efforts under way towards these ends:
3. **Underlines** the importance of determined efforts, especially by the nuclear-weapon States, to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States;

4. **Reaffirms** that all States have the right, as provided for, *inter alia*, in article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to acquire and develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under effective and non-discriminatory safeguards against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and underlines the importance of increased efforts in this field, particularly for the needs of the developing countries and areas;

5. **Recognizes** the importance of the technical assistance provided by the International Atomic Energy Agency to the developing countries and areas of the world within an effective and comprehensive safeguards system, and emphasizes the urgent need of common efforts towards an essential increase of this assistance;

6. **Urges** States that as yet have not adhered to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in the first instance, to do so at an early date or, at a minimum, to accept other arrangements involving the application of safeguards to their complete nuclear fuel cycle that would provide satisfactory assurances to the international community against the dangers of proliferation while guaranteeing to the States concerned unhindered and non-discriminatory access to the peaceful benefits of nuclear energy;

7. **Emphasizes** the importance of common efforts to study satisfactory arrangements for an adequate supply of nuclear fuels and other materials and facilities necessary to the efficient implementation and operation of national nuclear power programmes without jeopardizing the respective fuel cycle policies or international cooperation agreements and contracts for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, provided that agreed safeguard measures are applied;

8. **Solemnly affirms** the following principles:
   
   (a) States should not convert civil nuclear materials or facilities to the production of nuclear weapons;
   
   (b) All States have the right, in accordance with the principle of sovereign equality, to develop their programmes for the peaceful use of nuclear technology for economic and social development in conformity with their priorities, interests and needs and should have, without discrimination, access to, and be free to acquire, technology and materials for the peaceful use of nuclear energy under effective and non-discriminatory safeguards against the proliferation of nuclear weapons;

9. **Expresses its strong support** for the efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency to increase the effectiveness of its safeguards system in order to ensure that the peaceful uses of nuclear energy will not lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

10. **Recognizes** the need adequately to ensure the physical protection of nuclear materials, facilities and transport;

11. **Requests** the International Atomic Energy Agency to continue the consideration of reaching an international agreement for such protection;

12. **Expresses its support** for the continuation of the studies by the International Atomic Energy Agency on the question of multinational fuel cycle centres and an international régime for plutonium management as possible means of promoting the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and the interests of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

13. **Requests** the International Atomic Energy Agency to report on the progress of its work on these questions to the General Assembly at its thirty-third session.

Some countries, including Argentina and the Netherlands, questioned whether it was wise for the General Assembly to pronounce
itself on such a controversial subject at that time, bearing in mind the need for a consensus. Objections were raised regarding various points of substance. India criticized paragraph 4 for establishing a link between the non-proliferation Treaty and the right of States to acquire and develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, a right that it stated did not derive from the Treaty but was inherent in the sovereignty of all States. Yugoslavia held that the call addressed in paragraph 6 to non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the Treaty was not conducive to finding a satisfactory solution to the problem of their possible adherence to the Treaty and that the application of safeguards to the complete nuclear fuel cycle was a relatively new concept that had to be properly defined and negotiated. Sweden said that the principles for international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as formulated in paragraph 8, lacked precision and thus lent themselves to opposing interpretations. Argentina and India also objected to the provisions concerning nuclear disarmament and the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States for not duly emphasizing the responsibility of nuclear-weapon States in those areas.

The second approach, emphasizing the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was reflected in a draft resolution (A/32/L.15) submitted by a group of developing countries (Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru and Yugoslavia) entitled “Peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development”.

Introducing the developing countries’ draft resolution in the General Assembly (58th meeting), Nigeria expressed concern that the role of nuclear energy in development was being increasingly called into question through the activities of various citizen groups, mainly in developed countries, and partly through what it considered as a cartel of countries exporting nuclear technology. It pointed out that, as the Director General of IAEA had indicated, for developing countries without any reserve of fossil fuel reliance on nuclear-generated power was likely to be progressively significant to their development process. It held that the Agency ought now to start preparing itself for a more intensive use of nuclear power by developing countries. Consideration ought to be given to the elaboration by IAEA of a special programme for the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in developing countries, which could be submitted to a conference on international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In addition, the conference could also adopt certain principles and guidelines in that field. In conclusion, Nigeria said that, believing that the draft resolution should be adopted by consensus, its sponsors were open to suggestions and were ready to consult with other delegations.

Following such consultations, a revised draft resolution (A/32/L.15/Rev.1) was submitted. As explained by Nigeria, many of the changes in the text had been introduced to allay fears that the pro-
liferation of nuclear weapons might be caused by increased dissemination of nuclear technology.

The revised text, which, in the words of Nigeria, was the product of a "real dialogue", was adopted by consensus on 8 December, as resolution 32/50. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Having considered the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the General Assembly for the year 1976,

Recognizing the need to strengthen the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the promotion of the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and to augment its resources for technical assistance to the developing countries in this field,

Bearing in mind the need to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons,

Having in mind the significance of nuclear energy for economic development and, in particular, its important role in accelerating the development of developing countries,

Convinced that the transfer of technology for the peaceful use of nuclear energy for development can greatly contribute to progress in general,

Taking into consideration the legitimate right of States to develop or acquire technology for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in order to accelerate their economic development,

Affirming the responsibility of States that are advanced in the nuclear field to promote the legitimate nuclear energy needs of the developing countries by participating in the fullest possible transfer of nuclear equipment, materials and technology under agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied through the International Atomic Energy Agency on a non-discriminatory basis in order to prevent effectively proliferation of nuclear weapons,

Recalling the obligation assumed under international agreements and contracts by a number of such States to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy,

Convinced that the objectives of the full utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons can be promoted by the establishment of universally acceptable principles for international co-operation in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,

1. Declares that:

   (a) The use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is of great importance for the economic and social development of many countries;

   (b) All States have the right, in accordance with the principle of sovereign equality, to develop their programme for the peaceful use of nuclear technology for economic and social development, in conformity with their priorities, interests and needs;

   (c) All States, without discrimination, should have access to and should be free to acquire technology, equipment and materials for the peaceful use of nuclear energy;

   (d) International co-operation in the field covered by the present resolution should be under agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied through the International Atomic Energy Agency on a non-discriminatory basis in order to prevent effectively proliferation of nuclear weapons;

2. Invites all States as well as the international organizations concerned to respect and observe the principles set forth in the present resolution;
3. Requests States to strengthen the existing programmes of the International Atomic Energy Agency for the development of the peaceful use of nuclear energy in the developing countries, the acquisition of installations, equipment and nuclear materials and information, as well as the training of personnel in the peaceful use of nuclear energy;

4. Invites all States to consider convening, at an appropriate stage, an international conference or conferences, under the auspices of the United Nations system, aimed at promoting international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in accordance with the objectives of the present resolution;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to invite all States to communicate to him their views, observations and suggestions on such a conference and requests him to submit a report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-third session.

A number of countries made statements to explain their positions. Generally, their statements highlighted the need for the continuation of the co-operative approach that had permitted the adoption of the resolution by consensus in the on-going search for acceptable international solutions to problems arising in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It may be noted, however, that the Netherlands reiterated the view it had expressed in connexion with the Finnish draft resolution to the effect that it was unwise for the General Assembly to take decisions that would prejudge the outcome of current discussions on the subject.

Views were also expressed on various aspects of the resolution. Some countries stressed the nuclear-weapon proliferation risks attendant on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Among them were Australia, which held that the non-proliferation Treaty was the major vehicle for minimizing that risk; Canada, which said that the rights of States concerning access to technology, equipment and materials for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy had to be balanced by a recognition of their responsibility to avoid risks of proliferation of nuclear explosive capabilities and that the resolution would have been improved if it had emphasized that responsibility more than it did; and the United States, which also would have preferred a resolution more balanced in that regard.

Various countries commented on the resolution’s provisions concerning safeguards. For instance, Australia said that the resolution did not give sufficient weight to the need for a political commitment to non-proliferation objectives and for increasing the effectiveness of international safeguards. The Netherlands, apart from noting that the language used was rather restrictive, wondered whether such safeguards were the only proviso to be attached to the freedom of access to nuclear technology, equipment and materials. In its view, there should at least be open for further discussion the question whether the international community should not envisage restraints going beyond existing safeguards arrangements in order to answer the present and future needs of an effective non-proliferation policy. Sweden held that any principles for co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy
should flow directly from the non-proliferation Treaty; thus, effective and comprehensive IAEA safeguards applied on a non-discriminatory basis were a fundamental element to be strongly emphasized. In its opinion, however, the resolution was not sufficiently clear and balanced. Argentina interpreted the relevant paragraphs as providing, in the application of the IAEA safeguards system currently in force, a method of effectively preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Pakistan believed that the agreed language that had been arrived at on the concept and application of international safeguards on a non-discriminatory basis made it incumbent on all States to ensure that no unilateral measures would be imposed or applied against recipient countries in the name of safeguards and that, in order effectively to prevent proliferation, international safeguards should be applied on a non-discriminatory basis—in other words, to all non-nuclear States that were recipients of nuclear technology.

Conclusion

Questions related to the dissemination of nuclear technology have undoubtedly become a major topic of discussion within and outside the United Nations; they are likely to figure prominently in deliberations and decisions at the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and beyond. While variations in substance and emphasis can be discerned in the views of the different States interested in such questions, two main currents of opinion shape the debate, one emphasizing the nuclear-weapon proliferation risks of indiscriminate access to nuclear technology, equipment and materials, and the other stressing the need for unlimited international co-operation in the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, particularly for the benefit of developing countries.

In 1977, the suppliers' consultations resulted in a consensus on a set of principles. At the same time, individual suppliers have indicated that they will have additional requirements with regard to their nuclear exports.

The year was one of controversy, as well as dialogue, and there appears to be a growing awareness that the solutions to the problems emerging from differing approaches in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, to be widely acceptable and thus effective, must take due account of the interests and needs of all concerned. The attempt to develop a broad international consensus is illustrated by the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, whose stated purpose is to minimize the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons without jeopardizing energy supplies or the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. How this can be done is now being explored at a technical level. The exercise is expected to take two years and it would
therefore be premature at this juncture to try to assess its probable impact on States' choices and decisions with regard to their respective nuclear energy policies and on international discussions concerning nuclear energy co-operation and related controls and safeguards.
CHAPTER X

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

Introduction

The concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones was developed in the course of disarmament negotiations at the United Nations and other international fora with a dual purpose. It was felt that those zones could contribute significantly to the general purpose of preventing the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and, at the same time, would ensure the complete absence of such weapons from those areas of the world where States in the region would undertake a commitment to establish such zones. Important questions have been raised with regard to that concept, such as the perception of their own security by individual States, conditions in a particular region that might ensure the viability of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, concern about the threat of nuclear attack, the voluntary participation in the zone of the States located in the region and the danger of becoming involved in a nuclear conflict. There has also been widespread recognition that nuclear-weapon-free zones might contribute to the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, particularly nuclear disarmament.

Several proposals have been made in connexion with the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions. In connexion with Central Europe, the Soviet Union suggested, in 1956, a ban on the stationing of nuclear weapons,¹ and in 1957 Poland specifically proposed the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The Polish proposal was subsequently revised in 1958 and 1962.² A number of initiatives were taken with respect to the Balkans by Romania, first in 1957 and later on several occasions, as well as by the Soviet Union in 1959, also including the Adriatic. In the late 1950s, China suggested the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Asia and the Pacific. In 1963, the Soviet Union proposed a zone free of nuclear missile weapons in the Mediterranean. Also in 1963 and subsequently from 1971 to 1973, Finland suggested the creation of a nuclear-weapon-

² See ENDC/C.1/1.
free zone among the Nordic countries. Suggestions concerning the general approach to be followed with respect to nuclear-weapon-free zones were advanced by Ireland in 1959, which proposed an area-by-area approach for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and by Sweden in 1961, which suggested that the Secretary-General should conduct an inquiry among Member States as to the conditions under which non-nuclear-weapon States would be willing to enter into undertakings for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. The Swedish proposal was adopted by resolution 1664 (XVI). Sixty-two Member States replied to the inquiry. None of those suggestions, however, developed into concrete negotiations for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone.3

The following international agreements have been concluded to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to some areas and environments: the Antarctic Treaty,4 the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,5 the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof6 and the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco),7 the latter being the only instrument concluded so far creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone in a densely populated area.

The General Assembly first took action in connexion with the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America by the adoption of resolution 1911 (XVIII), in which it noted with satisfaction a joint declaration issued by the Presidents of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Mexico, announcing their Governments' readiness to sign a multilateral agreement whereby countries in the Latin American region would undertake not to manufacture, receive, store or test nuclear weapons or nuclear launching devices.

Negotiations among Latin American countries led to the signing at Mexico City (Borough of Tlatelolco), on 14 February 1967, of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) which consisted of a preamble, 31 articles, one transitional article and two additional protocols. The Treaty set out the obligations of the Parties, and contained provisions for defining the term "nuclear weapon"; the establishment of an international Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America to ensure compliance with the Treaty; agreements on safeguards to be negotiated

3 For a discussion of early initiatives, see Comprehensive Study of the Question of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in All Its Aspects (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.76.I.7).
5 General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI), annex.
6 General Assembly resolution 2660 (XXV), annex.
with IAEA; the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy; the zone of application of the Treaty; relations with other international organizations; measures in the event of violation of the Treaty; settlement of disputes; entry into force; and amendments and denunciation. Additional Protocol I dealt with the application of the Treaty to territories in the zone for which other States had de jure or de facto responsibility. Additional Protocol II provided that the nuclear-weapon Powers would fully respect the status of the zone and would undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the parties to the Treaty.

Since the Treaty of Tlatelolco was opened for signature in 1967, the General Assembly has devoted increasing attention to initiatives dealing with nuclear-weapon-free zones, mainly those relating to that Treaty, the denuclearization of Africa, which had meanwhile already been discussed in the Assembly, and new proposals for the establishment of such zones in the Middle East, South Asia and the South Pacific.

By its resolution 2286 (XXII), adopted in 1967, the General Assembly welcomed the Treaty of Tlatelolco and invited States which might become signatories of the agreement, as well as those contemplated in Additional Protocols I and II, to sign and ratify those instruments. Since then, the Assembly has adopted a number of resolutions appealing to the States which might become parties to both Protocols to sign and ratify them as soon as possible. Additional Protocol I has been ratified by the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, while France, China, the United Kingdom and the United States are the nuclear-weapon States party to Additional Protocol II.

The question of the denuclearization of Africa was first discussed in 1961. By resolution 1652 (XVI), the General Assembly called upon Member States to refrain from nuclear-weapon testing in Africa in any form and to consider and respect the continent as a denuclearized zone. In 1964, the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) adopted the "Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa", in which they solemnly declared their readiness to undertake, through an international agreement to be concluded under United Nations auspices, not to manufacture or control atomic weapons. The Declaration was endorsed by the General Assembly in 1965, by resolution 2033 (XX). There were no significant developments until 1974, when the Assembly began to consider annually the implementation of the Declaration and adopted a number of resolutions for that purpose. It should be noted that in resolution 31/69, adopted without a vote in 1976, the General Assembly went further and appealed to all States not to deliver to South Africa or
place at its disposal any equipment or fissionable material or technology that would enable it to acquire a nuclear-weapon capability.

In 1974, at the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly, Iran and Egypt requested the inclusion in the agenda of an item dealing with the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Iran explained the request by drawing attention to the danger of nuclear-weapon proliferation. In a letter to the Secretary General,\(^\text{10}\) the Shah of Iran expressed the same concern in the context of the political situation in the Middle East. By resolution 3263 (XXIX), adopted by 128 votes to none, with 2 abstentions (Israel and Burma), the General Assembly called on all parties concerned in the area to proclaim immediately their intention to refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons and accede to the non-proliferation Treaty, and requested the Secretary-General to ascertain the views of the parties concerned with respect to the implementation of the resolution and to report to the Security Council, and to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session. Thereafter the Assembly has discussed the question regularly.\(^\text{11}\) It should be noted that in resolution 31/71, adopted by a vote of 130 to none, with 1 abstention (Israel) the Assembly further recommended that the parties directly concerned agree to place all their nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards.

The item on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia was first included, at the request of Pakistan, in the agenda of the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly. During consideration of the item, the General Assembly adopted resolutions 3265 A (XXIX) and 3265 B (XXIX). By resolution 3265 A (XXIX), proposed by India, the Assembly expressed the view that the initiative for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the appropriate region of Asia should come from the States of the region concerned, taking into account its special features and geographical extent. By resolution 3265 B (XXIX), submitted by Pakistan, the Assembly endorsed in principle the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia; invited the States of the South Asian region and such other neighbouring non-nuclear-weapon States as might be interested to initiate, without delay, necessary consultations with a view to establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone and urged them in the interim to refrain from any action contrary to the achievement of those objectives. The resolution also requested the Secretary-General to convene a meeting for the purpose of the consultations envisaged above. In that connexion, the Secretary-General reported on 31 October 1975\(^\text{12}\) that he had not convened that meeting because of the existing differences in the approach to the question. At its thirtieth session, the General Assembly

\(^{10}\) A/9693/Add.3.


\(^{12}\) See A/10325.
again adopted two resolutions on the subject. By resolution 3476 A (XXX), initiated by India, the Assembly decided to give due consideration to any proposal for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in an appropriate region of Asia, after it had been developed and matured among the interested States within the region concerned. Resolution 3476 B (XXX), proposed by Pakistan, urged the States of South Asia to continue their efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region and further urged them to refrain from any action contrary to the objective of establishing such a zone. In 1976, the General Assembly adopted resolution 31/73, submitted by Pakistan, by 91 votes (including China) to 2 (Bhutan and India) with 43 abstentions (including France, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States). By that resolution, the Assembly reaffirmed its endorsement in principle of the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia; urged once again the States of the region and such other neighbouring non-nuclear-weapon States as might be interested to continue to make all possible efforts to establish that zone and to refrain, in the meantime, from any action contrary to that objective; and requested the Secretary-General to render such assistance as might be required to promote those efforts and to report on the subject to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session. India explained its negative vote on the grounds that the region was not suitable for a nuclear-weapon-free zone and that the concept had not developed and matured among the States concerned. It reaffirmed its intention to refrain from manufacturing nuclear weapons. It held, however, that consultations on the basis of the Pakistani draft and similar resolutions were not possible, as such concepts should not be given international endorsement prior to discussions within the region concerned.

With respect to the South Pacific, the General Assembly adopted, at its thirtieth session, resolution 3477 (XXX), by which it endorsed the idea of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the area and invited the countries concerned to carry forward consultations for realizing that objective.

The question of nuclear-weapon-free zones has also been considered in ENDC and the CCD, mainly with reference to both the concept itself and the above-mentioned initiatives. There has also been general recognition in those bodies that, nuclear-weapon-free zones being a matter of primarily regional concern, actual negotiations on their establishment were outside the terms of reference of the Committee.

In 1974, on the initiative of Finland, the General Assembly adopted by consensus resolution 3261 F (XXIX), by which it decided to undertake a comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects and requested that the study be carried out by an ad hoc group of qualified governmental experts under the auspices of the CCD. Pursuant to that resolution, the CCD decided to invite 21 Governments to designate experts, including 16 from States members of the CCD (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, India, Iran, Japan, Mexico,
Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Sweden, USSR, United Kingdom, United States and Zaire) and five from other States (Australia, Belgium, Ecuador, Finland and Ghana). The study was submitted to the CCD on 18 August 1975 and transmitted by the Committee to the General Assembly in a special report.\textsuperscript{13}

The experts reached consensus on certain principles governing the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones, wherever appropriate conditions existed, namely: (a) obligations to that effect might be assumed by groups of States and even individual countries; (b) arrangements should ensure that the zone would be effectively free of all nuclear weapons; (c) the initiative for the creation of a zone should come from States within the region and participation should be voluntary; (d) the participation of all militarily significant States and preferably all States in the region would enhance the effectiveness of the zone; (e) arrangements should include an effective system of verification; (f) economic, scientific and technological development of Member States should be promoted through international co-operation on all peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and (g) the treaty establishing the zone should be of unlimited duration. As to the question of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the experts acknowledged the inalienable right of States parties to a nuclear-weapon-free zone to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and felt that IAEA should have an essential role in promoting and safeguarding peaceful uses of nuclear energy in such zones.

However, there were some other areas on which the experts could not reach agreement, such as the distinction between nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices, as well as the relationship between a nuclear-weapon-free zone and international law, including those principles relating to the high seas, to straits used for international navigation and to international air space. Nor could the experts agree on the question of adjacent safety areas, in particular the question of the emplacement of nuclear weapons geographically close to the zone which might be assigned to targets within the zone. Other questions of contention were the transit of nuclear weapons through the zone, with reference to the air space and territorial waters of the States concerned, the freedom of navigation through straits used for international navigation and the right of innocent passage through territorial seas. One further issue was the question of security assurances to be given by nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use such weapons against any member of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. While some experts held that those assurances were essential for the effectiveness of a zone, others felt that such undertaking should be considered in each particular case.

Following discussion in the CCD, the comprehensive study was transmitted to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session. Resolution

3472 A (XXX) was adopted by 126 votes to none, with 2 abstentions and resolution 3472 B (XXX) by 82 votes (including China) to 10 (including France, the United Kingdom and the United States) with 36 abstentions (including the Soviet Union). The former resolution invited all Governments, IAEA and other international organizations concerned to transmit to the Secretary-General before 30 June 1976 such views, observations and suggestions on the study as they might deem appropriate, request the Secretary-General to prepare a report based on information received, and decide to include the item in the agenda of the thirty-first session. In the other resolution, the General Assembly adopted a declaration on the definition of the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, under which a nuclear-weapon-free zone should, as a general rule, be deemed to be any zone recognized as such by the General Assembly, which any group of States, in the free exercise of their sovereignty, had established by virtue of a treaty or convention. The resolution also contained a definition of the principal obligations of the nuclear-weapon States towards nuclear-weapon-free zones and towards the States included therein, whereby in every case of a nuclear-weapon-free zone recognized as such by the Assembly, all nuclear-weapon States should undertake or reaffirm in a solemn international instrument to respect the statute of total absence of nuclear weapons defined in the treaty or convention which served as the constitutive instrument of the zone; to refrain from contributing in any way to the performance in the territories forming part of that zone of acts which involved a violation of the aforesaid treaty or convention; and to refrain from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against the States included in the zone.

At its thirty-first session and pursuant to resolution 3472 A (XXX), the General Assembly had before it the report of the Secretary-General containing the replies received from 36 Member States, as well as IAEA and the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. By resolution 31/70, submitted by Finland and adopted by 132 votes to none, the Assembly, inter alia, took note of the report of the Secretary-General, and conveyed the comprehensive study and the report to the Governments concerned, to interested international organizations and to the CCD for their further consideration and in order that they may take such measures as they may deem appropriate within their respective fields of competence.

Consideration by the CCD, 1977

The question of nuclear-weapon-free zones was considered by the CCD in the context of its discussion of further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear

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14 A/31/189 and Add.1 and 2.
Disarmament. As in previous years, no negotiations were held within the CCD on any proposal to establish such zones, but a number of members commented on the question with particular reference to the various resolutions adopted on the subject by the General Assembly at its thirty-first session.

The delegation of Romania noted General Assembly resolution 31/70 on the subject of nuclear-weapon-free zones and favoured maintaining the question on the agenda of the Committee as a means of encouraging the creation of such zones. In that connexion, the delegation reaffirmed its interest in establishing new co-operative relations among Balkan countries so that the area might be transformed into a zone of peace. The representatives of Poland and Czechoslovakia hoped that the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof would stimulate new interest in the establishment of other nuclear-weapon-free zones. The delegation of India stressed the importance of the voluntary participation of the concerned regional States in such zones, which could only be developed and maintained from within the region concerned. Also with reference to nuclear-weapon-free zones and the Indian Ocean as a proposed peace zone, the representative of Japan indicated that a concrete and realistic way to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States of their security was to explore a solution based upon the prevailing political and military conditions in each region.

With respect to the Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone, the delegation of Mexico submitted a document concerning the tenth anniversary of the opening for signature of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and referred to the scope and significance of the Treaty. The delegation expressed the hope that the occasion would serve as a stimulus to all nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States to take steps in order to strengthen the instrument and increase its effectiveness and that of its two Additional Protocols.

The representative of the United States called attention to a presidential statement made on 14 April to the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States that the United States would sign and seek ratification of Additional Protocol I, providing for an undertaking by the extra-continental Powers (France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States) to apply the statute of denuclearization in those territories for which de jure or de facto they were internationally responsible and which were located within the geographical zone established in the Treaty. He also stressed the desire of the United States to contribute towards bringing the Latin American nuclear-

16 Ibid., annex II, document CCD/525.
17 See foot-note 7.

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weapon-free zone fully into effect throughout the region and to averting the dangers of nuclear proliferation. While welcoming that announce-
ment, the delegation of Mexico called on France, the only country concerned by Additional Protocol I that had not acceded to it, to make the Protocol complete. At the same time, the delegation urged the Soviet Union to accede to Additional Protocol II, by which the nuclear-
weapon States would undertake fully to respect the statute of denu-
clearization of Latin America and also would undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the parties to the Treaty. After the signature by the President of the United States on 26 May 1977 of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty, the representative of Mexico emphasized the importance of the event and expressed the hope that it would have a positive effect on the attitude of the two States which had not signed the Additional Protocols.

With regard to the proposal for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, the delegation of Iran again stressed the need to establish that zone, in order to avoid the dangerous introduction of nuclear weapons into the area.

Referring to the proposal for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, the representative of Pakistan reiterated the belief that the establish-
ment of that zone would be in the interest of all the countries of the region and that the international community should continue to en-
courage all regional initiatives to create such zones. The representative of India held that South Asia was a subregion of Asia and the Pacific and could not be treated in isolation, and that the security environment of the region as a whole must be considered. He believed that a genu-
ine nuclear-weapon-free zone could only follow from the total absence of nuclear weapons in that region. The delegation of Pakistan noted later that the General Assembly had responded to the wishes of a majority of States in various regions by adopting resolutions urging the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, notably in South Asia, the Middle East and Africa. It also held that non-nuclear-weapon States must take initiatives towards regional security against the nuclear threat from within or without their regions by establishing such zones and that, instead of retarding progress by setting preconditions, the nuclear-
weapon States should take an active part in their establishment.

**Consideration by the General Assembly, 1977**

During consideration of the question both during the general debate in the General Assembly, and in the First Committee, many delegations belonging to the various political and geographical groups, including

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18 *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-second Session, First Committee, 7th to 38th, 40th and 44th meetings; and ibid., First Committee, Sessional Fascicle, corrigendum.*
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Burundi, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, Indonesia, Iran, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Jamaica, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mauritania, Mongolia, Nepal, Peru, Qatar, Spain, the Syrian Arab Republic, Venezuela and Zaire, expressed their support for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Some of those delegations made specific comments in connexion with either existing proposals or the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. China said that it firmly supported the demands of the countries and peoples in the regions of the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, and in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, South Asia and South-East Asia for the establishment of peace zones, security zones or nuclear-weapon-free zones. It also maintained that the super-Powers should undertake unequivocal obligations to that end and put them into effect. In Italy's view, certain fundamental requirements should be observed in the establishment of any nuclear-weapon-free zone. First, any initiative should originate with the States of the area directly concerned, in consultation amongst themselves and on a voluntary basis. Secondly, the participation of all militarily significant countries in the area should be assured. Finally, any action in that direction should preserve the existing balance of security and avoid destabilizing effects. Poland recalled that it had formulated the first plan for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone and said that it continued to support the establishment of such zones and zones of peace on the basis of agreement among the States concerned and in conformity with universally recognized norms of international law. The Soviet Union referred to the establishment of zones of peace completely free from nuclear weapons as one of the steps that could be taken to curb the arms race, and suggested that they could include both individual countries or groups of States and vast geographical regions or even entire continents. The United Kingdom stated that it would view with sympathy attempts to establish any further zones in clearly defined land areas that met the following basic criteria: a voluntary decision to participate by the States in the region, an enhancement of security for all participants, the inclusion of all militarily significant States—preferably all States—within the region, and adequate arrangements for impartial international verification. For its part, Yugoslavia said that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace in various parts of the world could be a useful means of preventing further proliferation of nuclear weapons and prohibiting their use. It also believed that two preconditions had to be fulfilled: the consent of all countries of a given region and the obligation of military nuclear powers to respect strictly the status of those zones.

In addition to the general discussion on nuclear-weapon-free zones, the General Assembly also considered, as in previous years, a number of initiatives relating to specific areas of the world which are reviewed in the sections below.
A. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America

The agenda of the General Assembly included two items relating to the implementation of previous resolutions of the Assembly concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocols I and II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

During the debate, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Mexico said that his country, as depositary of the Treaty, appreciated the full value of the gesture made by the President of the United States, when he personally signed Additional Protocol I of that instrument, whereby the countries of the region brought about the establishment of the first nuclear-weapon-free zone encompassing heavily populated areas. He also felt that, as a matter of priority, Latin America should bring the Treaty into full force as soon as possible. The United States, for its part, stated that what it defined as the “pathbreaking project initiated by Mexican statesmen” to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone throughout Latin America had advanced closer to realization in 1977. It added that the signature of Additional Protocol I by the United States was a move which it hoped would inspire other nations to take those remaining actions necessary to bring the Treaty into full force. The delegations of Ecuador, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and Venezuela welcomed the signature of that Protocol by the United States. It was also noted by some of those delegations that France had not signed Additional Protocol I and that the Soviet Union remained the only nuclear-weapon State which had not signed Additional Protocol II. The United Kingdom stated that it strongly supported the aims of the Treaty, but added that it was concerned that the Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone was not yet in force for a large part of that continent and that one of the nuclear-weapon States had not yet endorsed the Treaty.

Two draft resolutions were introduced in connexion with Additional Protocols I and II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

On 10 November, 22 members of the Latin American group submitted the draft resolution concerning Additional Protocol I. While introducing the text, the representative of Mexico recalled that the signature of that Protocol had been considered by the President of the United States as “an historic event” He said that the sponsors of the draft deplored the fact that France, to which he referred as the only Latin country to which the Protocol was open, was also the only State that had not taken any step to become a party to it. He welcomed the positive stand taken by France in connexion with the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and expressed the hope that one of the first acts confirming that stand would be to heed the appeal addressed to France to sign and ratify the Protocol.

The draft resolution was adopted by the First Committee by 100 votes to none with 16 abstentions, and by the General Assembly as
resolution 32/76 by 113 votes to none, with 14 abstentions. Those abstaining included Argentina, Cuba, France, Guyana, the Soviet Union and the other Eastern European countries. The resolution reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2286 (XXII) of 5 December 1967, 3262 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974 and 3473 (XXX) of 11 December 1975 concerning the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and its Additional Protocol I,

Taking into account that certain territories lying within the zone of application of that Treaty which are not sovereign political entities are nevertheless in a position to receive the benefits deriving from the Treaty through its Additional Protocol I, to which the States that de jure or de facto are internationally responsible for those territories may become parties,

Recalling with satisfaction that the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Kingdom of the Netherlands became parties to Additional Protocol I in 1969 and 1971, respectively,

1. Notes with satisfaction that Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) was signed on 26 May 1977 by the President of the United States of America and that the Government of that country has decided to take the necessary steps for its ratification;

2. Again urges France to sign and ratify additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) as soon as possible, in order that the peoples of the territories in question may receive the benefits which derive from the Treaty and which consist mainly in removing the danger of nuclear attack and sparing the squandering of resources on the production of nuclear weapons;

3. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-third session an item entitled “Implementation of General Assembly resolution 32/76 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)”

The second draft resolution, relating to Additional Protocol II, was also submitted by 22 members of the Latin American group on 10 November. While introducing the draft, Mexico stated that, so far as the sponsors were concerned, the refusal of the Soviet Union to heed the repeated appeals of the Assembly was incomprehensible in view of the fact that, among the five States to which the Protocol was constantly open, it was precisely that power which had most frequently advocated its own unreserved support of the idea of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones. It concluded by saying that the sponsors, therefore, had reason to hope that the imminence of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament would provide an additional incentive to the Soviet Union finally to heed to those appeals and to sign and ratify the Protocol.

The draft resolution was adopted by the First Committee by 105 votes to none, with 12 abstentions. The General Assembly also adopted it as resolution 32/79 by 118 votes to none, with 13 abstentions (Cuba,
The General Assembly,


Reiterating its firm conviction that, for the maximum effectiveness of any treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone, the co-operation of the nuclear-weapon States is necessary and that such co-operation should take the form of commitments likewise undertaken in a formal international instrument which is legally binding, such as a treaty, convention or protocol,

Recalling with particular satisfaction that the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, France and the People's Republic of China are already parties to Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco),

Noting that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session a draft resolution, in which it is "solemnly urged" that:

"All non-nuclear-weapon States should establish nuclear-weapon-free zones, which may cover entire continents or large geographic areas, as well as groups of States or individual States, and nuclear States. should respect the status of such nuclear-free zones;",

1. Again urges the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to sign and ratify Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco);

2. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-third session an item entitled “Implementation of General Assembly resolution 32/79 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)”

A number of delegations explained their votes on the two resolutions. Cuba said that, although welcoming the crowning of the noble purposes of the Latin American countries in general, and the work of Mexico in particular to attain the genuine denuclearization of the region, it would abstain on the drafts for it believed that they did not reflect the fact that the only State possessing nuclear weapons in Latin America did not respect the status of the zone. It added that they did not call upon the only nuclear power in the Latin American continent to dismantle its military bases, including nuclear bases, which were imposed and maintained against the will of the Governments and peoples of the region. Guyana stated that, while remaining committed to the purposes of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, it would abstain on both drafts in view of the provisions of article 25, paragraph 2, of the instrument, which, in its opinion, would prevent Guyana from becoming a party to the Treaty. The Soviet Union abstained in the vote of the two drafts explaining that, although it had repeatedly stated its support for efforts aimed at the
establishment of zones completely free from nuclear weapons, it had also repeatedly noted in the General Assembly and other bodies that, in its opinion, the Treaty of Tlatelolco suffered from serious drawbacks which substantially reduced its effectiveness. It also said that the Treaty lacked any clear-cut ban on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes by States parties or a ban on the transit of nuclear weapons through their territories. It further held that the sphere of application of the Treaty covered the wide space of the open sea, which was not in keeping with the generally recognized norms of international law.

B. Denuclearization of Africa

The item entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa" was included in the agenda of the thirty-second session of the General Assembly pursuant to General Assembly resolution 31/69. The debate centred this time on the situation in southern Africa in the light of reports from France, the Soviet Union and the United States that South Africa might conduct a nuclear test in the Kalahari Desert. Many States belonging to the various political and geographical groups and particularly those in the region called attention to the danger of nuclear proliferation emerging in the area. Concern was expressed at that development, which was also viewed as a threat to international peace and security, as well as an attempt to intimidate the countries of the region. In that connexion, a large number of delegations called for action by the United Nations to prevent South Africa from acquiring nuclear weapon capability. Repeated appeals were also made to all States to cease forthwith supplying South Africa with nuclear materials, equipment, technology or assistance which might enable it to develop nuclear weapons. It was further emphasized that the new situation created by those reports gave particular significance to the urgent implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa.

Mozambique warned that the introduction of nuclear weapons to the African continent would create a highly dangerous situation, escalating tensions and making difficult any attempt to find a peaceful settlement in southern Africa. Ghana said that the obvious intention of the South African nuclear programme was to use nuclear weaponry as a bargaining instrument for the socio-economic system known as apartheid, which the rest of the world had condemned. For Zambia, a South Africa armed with nuclear weapons was a threat not only to the security and independence of neighbouring African countries, but also to international peace and security. The Soviet Union called on the United Nations to take appropriate measures to prevent South Africa from acquiring nuclear weapons. It also stated that such a dangerous development would create a very direct threat to the security of the African States, lead to a steep escalation of instability and tension in southern Africa, undermine the efforts of the African States to create a nuclear-
weapon-free zone and increase the nuclear threat for all mankind. Similar views were expressed by Bulgaria. The United Kingdom strongly believed that South Africa should allay international fears by adhering as soon as possible to the non-proliferation Treaty and by accepting international safeguards on its nuclear facilities. Finland felt that the developments in southern Africa had added momentum to the efforts to exclude nuclear weapons on a regional basis, and hoped that proposals in that direction could draw on the comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects. Suggesting that, without the intervention of the Soviet Union and the United States, South Africa would have conducted its first nuclear test on the continent of Africa, Nigeria proposed that the initiative of the two Powers should be formalized by the General Assembly, which should call on the Security Council to exercise surveillance and to take effective measures to prevent South Africa from acquiring nuclear weapon capability. It also indicated that the General Assembly should urge all States to suspend forthwith any co-operation with South Africa in the nuclear field until that country had placed its entire nuclear programme under international safeguards and become a party to the non-proliferation Treaty. After recalling the actions taken by France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States in formally requesting South Africa to clarify its intentions, Mauritius urged the General Assembly to take a firm stand to put an end to South African nuclear weapon ambitions. Venezuela also urged the General Assembly to adopt decisive measures to put an end to the nuclear danger represented by South Africa.

On 2 November, 23 African States submitted a draft resolution which was revised on 10 November and subsequently also sponsored by 16 other African countries. The revised text included a new paragraph by which the General Assembly would take note of Security Council resolution 418 (1977) of 4 November. By that resolution the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, expressed, *inter alia*, its grave concern that South Africa was on the threshold of producing nuclear weapons, and decided that all States should refrain from any co-operation with South Africa in the manufacture and development of nuclear weapons.

While introducing the revised draft resolution in the First Committee, Nigeria stated that there was no need to recall the great threat to the peace and security of Africa that the South African nuclear ambition posed if not checked early enough, for the South African nuclear programme might soon represent an intractable problem if action was not taken to prevent it at that stage.

During the brief debate on the revised draft resolution held in the First Committee, the United States said it strongly supported the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa as in other regions of the world. It also pointed to its concern in view of the reports that nuclear test preparations might be under way in the Kalahari Desert in South Africa and noted that consultations with South Africa in that respect
had resulted in assurances that there would be no nuclear explosive testing of any kind in that country. The United States added that it would regard with the utmost gravity any indication that those assurances would not be honoured. While urging South Africa to become a party to the non-proliferation Treaty and to place all its nuclear facilities under full scope international safeguards, it considered it unwise and impractical to cut off peaceful, safeguarded nuclear co-operation with South Africa and, therefore, would not be able to support proposals that the Security Council take such steps under the existing circumstances.

France said that its recognition of Africa as a denuclearized zone should be seen in the light of France's position concerning nuclear-weapon-free zones. In its view, a denuclearization régime established by a treaty could not affect the status of territories under the sovereignty of France which might be geographically located within a zone. Nor could the French Government accept injunctions from other States with a view to compelling it to agree to a denuclearization status for all or part of the territories under its sovereignty.

The revised draft resolution was adopted by the First Committee by 118 votes to none and by the General Assembly by 131 votes to none, as resolution 32/81. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 31/70 of 10 December 1976, in which it reiterated its conviction that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones could make a great contribution to the security of States in such zones and to the prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons,

Bearing in mind the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its first ordinary session, held at Cairo from 17 to 21 July 1964,

Recalling its resolutions 1652 (XVI) of 24 November 1961, 2033 (XX) of 3 December 1965, 3261 E (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3471 (XXX) of 11 December 1975 and 31/69 of 10 December 1976, in which it called upon all States to consider and respect the continent of Africa, including the continental African States, Madagascar and other islands surrounding Africa, as a nuclear-weapon-free zone,

Also recalling that, in its resolution 31/69, it drew attention to the development of the nuclear-weapon potential of South Africa,

Taking note of Security Council resolution 418 (1977) of 4 November 1977,

Gravely concerned that South Africa may detonate a nuclear explosion and acquire a nuclear-weapon capability,

Convinced that such a development would constitute a grave danger to international peace and security and would frustrate efforts to establish Africa as a nuclear-weapon-free zone,

Reaffirming that the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa would contribute to the security of all African States and to the maintenance of international peace and security,

1. Strongly reiterates its call upon all States to consider and respect the continent of Africa, including the continental African States, Madagascar and other islands surrounding Africa, as a nuclear-weapon-free zone;
2. **Condemns** any attempt by South Africa to introduce nuclear weapons into the continent of Africa;

3. **Demands** that South Africa refrain forthwith from conducting any nuclear explosion on the continent of Africa or elsewhere;

4. **Urgently requests** the Security Council to take appropriate effective steps to prevent South Africa from developing and acquiring nuclear weapons, thereby endangering international peace and security;

5. **Appeals** to all States to refrain from such co-operation with South Africa in the nuclear field as will enable the racist régime to acquire nuclear weapons, and to dissuade corporations, institutions and individuals within their jurisdiction from any such co-operation;

6. **Requests** the Secretary-General to render all necessary assistance to the Organization of African Unity towards the realization of its solemn Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa;

7. **Decides** to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-third session the item entitled “Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa”.

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**C. Proposed nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East**

The item entitled “Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East” was included in the agenda of the thirty-second session of the General Assembly pursuant to its resolution 31/71.

During the debate on the item a number of delegations, including Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Niger, Qatar, Somalia, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen and Zaire, expressed their support for the creation of that zone.

Egypt indicated that together with Iran it had taken the initiative in establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, which had been supported by the international community. The conditions in the region made it one of the most worthy of consideration and concern; principles had therefore been laid down to ensure its safety from the danger of nuclear proliferation by calling upon countries concerned to pledge not to acquire or possess nuclear weapons, to adhere to the non-proliferation Treaty and to place all activities under the control of IAEA. Israel was the only country that had opposed the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. It reiterated its view that a nuclear threat from any source would jeopardize the prospects of peace in the Middle East, and that if Israel obtained nuclear weapons, Egypt could not be expected to stand idly by in the face of that development. It also stated that Israel should adhere to the non-proliferation Treaty, for it was inconceivable that it remained the only country in the Middle East not acceding to that Treaty, which had already been signed by Egypt.

On 14 November Bahrain, Egypt, Iran and Kuwait submitted a draft resolution which was subsequently also sponsored by Qatar and Yemen. By that draft resolution, the General Assembly would, *inter
alia, urge all parties concerned to adhere to the non-proliferation Treaty; reiterate its recommendation that, pending the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, those States should: (a) proclaim solemnly and immediately their intention to refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from possessing in any way nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices, and from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons in the territory under their control by any third part, (b) refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from any action detrimental to the objective of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region under an effective system of safeguards, and (c) agree to place all their nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards; it would also reaffirm its recommendation to the nuclear-weapon States to refrain from any action contrary to the objective of establishing the zone and to co-operate with the States of the region in the promotion of that objective, and renew its invitation to the Secretary-General to continue to explore possibilities of making progress towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

Introducing the draft resolution, Iran said that the purpose of the proposal was to ensure a complete absence of nuclear weapons in that sensitive area of the world and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In the current political setting, the area could ill afford any complication in the form of the introduction of nuclear weapons. Although the text contained the same elements incorporated in previous resolutions of the General Assembly, it also reflected the growing international desire for establishing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East and global apprehension over possible proliferation of nuclear weapons, particularly in that sensitive region. Iran believed that the draft resolution would contribute significantly to the goals of the non-proliferation Treaty and would help to break the cycle of mistrust and lack of faith which had frustrated efforts to bring about peace in the area.

Separate votes were requested in the First Committee on operative paragraphs 1 and 2. Paragraph 1, dealing with accession to the non-proliferation Treaty, was adopted by 98 votes to none, with 14 abstentions (Algeria, Argentina, Bhutan, Brazil, Burma, Cuba, France, Guyana, India, Israel, Portugal, Spain, Uganda and United Republic of Tanzania). Paragraph 2, reiterating previous recommendations of the General Assembly, was adopted by 103 votes to none, with 12 abstentions (Argentina, Bhutan, Brazil, Burma, Cuba, France, Guyana, India, Israel, Spain, Uganda and United Republic of Tanzania). The draft resolution was adopted by the Committee by 117 votes to none, with 1 abstention (Israel). Explaining its vote in the First Committee, Israel reiterated its support in principle for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, but considered that nuclear-weapon-free zones should be established through negotiations between the States concerned. It had called on its Arab neighbours to join it in direct negotiations with a view to establishing such a zone by the conclusion of a formal, contractual and multilateral convention between all States in the region, but no response had yet been made to that particular offer.

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Furthermore, the proposal regarding the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East did not call for the consultations which were considered the only way to create it. Israel expressed the hope that a text would be presented to the General Assembly in 1978 which would be fully consonant with the concept of negotiation and thus would be acceptable to all States in the region. France stated that, while it supported the draft resolution as a whole, it had abstained in the two separate votes on operative paragraphs 1 and 2 because it could not waive its basic options concerning, *inter alia*, the non-proliferation Treaty, in regard to which it maintained reservations. The same considerations applied with regard to the commitment requesting all countries to place all their nuclear activities under international control. The United States indicated that it had voted in favour of the draft, because it strongly supported the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones under conditions that would assure the effectiveness of such zones. However, the United States continued to believe that the actual provisions set forth in the resolution should be negotiated and agreed among the potential participants in the zone in question before States could be expected to undertake commitments regarding it. China said that it supported the draft resolution but stated that it did not participate in the separate vote on operative paragraph 1 because of its consistent position on the non-proliferation Treaty.

The General Assembly adopted the text recommended by the First Committee as resolution 32/82 by 131 votes to none, with one abstention (Israel). It reads as follows:

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolution 3263 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, in which it overwhelmingly commended the idea of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

*Recalling also* its resolution 3474 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, in which it recognized that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East enjoys wide support in the region,

*Further recalling* its resolution 31/71 of 10 December 1976, in which it expressed the conviction that progress towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would greatly enhance the cause of peace both in the region and in the world,

*Mindful* of the growing international desire for establishing a just and lasting peace in the region of the Middle East,

*Conscious* of the global apprehension over possible proliferation of nuclear weapons, in particular in the sensitive region of the Middle East,

*Fully convinced* that the possible development of nuclear capability would further complicate the situation and immensely damage the efforts to create an atmosphere of confidence in the Middle East,

*Reiterating anew* the particular nature of the problems involved and the complexities inherent in the situation in the Middle East, and the urgency of keeping the region free from involvement in a ruinous nuclear-arms race,

*Recognizing*, as a consequence, the need to create momentum towards the goal of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East,
1. Urges anew all parties directly concerned to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a means of promoting this objective;

2. Reiterates its recommendation that the Member States referred to in paragraph 1 above, pending the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone under an effective system of safeguards, should:

   (a) Proclaim solemnly and immediately their intention to refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices and from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons in their territory or the territory under their control by any third party;

   (b) Refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from any other action that would facilitate the acquisition, testing or use of such weapons, or would be in any other way detrimental to the objective of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region under an effective system of safeguards;

   (c) Agree to place all their nuclear activities under the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;

3. Reaffirms its recommendation to the nuclear-weapon States to refrain from any action contrary to the purpose of the present resolution and the objective of establishing, in the region of the Middle East, a nuclear-weapon-free zone under an effective system of safeguards and to extend their co-operation to the States of the region in their efforts to promote this objective;

4. Renews its invitation to the Secretary-General to continue to explore the possibilities of making progress towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East;

5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-third session the item entitled “Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East”

D. Proposal for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia

The item entitled “Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia: report of the Secretary-General” was included in the agenda of the thirty-second session of the General Assembly in accordance with resolution 31/73 which, inter alia, requested the Secretary-General to render such assistance as might be required to promote efforts for the establishment of that zone and to report on the subject to the General Assembly at its thirty-third session.

On 24 October, the Secretary-General reported\(^\text{19}\) that he had been in contact with the States of the South Asian region and that he wished to inform the General Assembly that there had been no request, on behalf of the States concerned, for his assistance in connexion with the subject. The Secretary-General also noted that, in the course of those contacts, a view had been expressed that he would continue to be available for that purpose.

During the debate a number of delegations, including China, Jordan, Madagascar, Mauritania, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, expressed support for the promotion of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia.

On 2 November, Pakistan submitted a draft resolution which was

\(^{19}\) See A/32/298.
introduced by its representative on 11 November. Introducing the draft resolution, Pakistan indicated that its proposal was based on the premise that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones contributed to the security of the members of the zones and to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It also said that in South Asia all necessary conditions existed to develop a viable arrangement for its denuclearization, as all the States in that region had declared their intention not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons. Furthermore, Pakistan had confirmed that intention by accepting the application of IAEA safeguards. Other States in the region were committed to the objective of non-proliferation. India, too, had repeatedly affirmed that it would not manufacture nuclear weapons. Most of the provisions of the draft resolution were similar to those of previous resolutions. The draft sought to reaffirm the General Assembly's endorsement, in principle, of the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and, in that connexion, it was Pakistan's hope that all States of the region would agree to join in consultations regarding the arrangements that could be made for the denuclearization of the region. Efforts to establish the zone could have been facilitated if an appropriate forum for consultations existed in South Asia. Therefore, unless the regional States could evolve the modalities for such consultations, the Secretary-General might be able to play a part in assisting the efforts being made by one or more of the regional States, and the proposal provided for such assistance. Pakistan felt that the forthcoming special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament presented an opportunity to make progress on proposals for the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones. For that reason the draft resolution requested the Secretary-General to report progress on the subject to both the special session and to the thirty-third session of the Assembly.

The First Committee adopted the draft resolution by 71 votes to none, with 28 abstentions. The General Assembly adopted the recommendation of the Committee as resolution 32/83 by 105 votes to none, with 28 abstentions. Those abstaining were Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bhutan, Bulgaria, Burma, the Byelorussian SSR, the Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, the German Democratic Republic, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Norway, Poland, Singapore, Sweden, the Ukrainian SSR, the USSR and Yugoslavia.

The resolution reads as follows:

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolutions 3265 B (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3476 B (XXX) of 11 December 1975 and 31/73 of 10 December 1976 concerning the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia,

*Reiterating* its conviction that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world is one of the measures which can contribute most effectively to the objectives of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and general and complete disarmament,
Believing that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, as in other regions, will strengthen the security of the States of the region against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Noting the recent declarations issued at the highest level by Governments of South Asian States reaffirming their undertaking not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons and to devote their nuclear programmes exclusively to the economic and social advancement of their peoples,

Recalling that in the above-mentioned resolutions the General Assembly called upon the States of the South Asian region and such other neighbouring non-nuclear-weapon States as might be interested to make all possible efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and to refrain, in the meantime, from any action contrary to this objective,

Further recalling that, in its resolutions 3265 B (XXIX) and 31/73, it requested the Secretary-General to convene a meeting for the purpose of the consultations mentioned therein and to render such assistance as might be required to promote the efforts for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia,

1. Reaffirms its endorsement, in principle, of the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia;

2. Urges once again the States of South Asia and such other neighbouring non-nuclear-weapon States as may be interested to continue to make all possible efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and to refrain, in the meantime, from any action contrary to this objective;

3. Calls upon those nuclear-weapon States which have not done so to respond positively to this proposal and to extend the necessary co-operation in the efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to render such assistance as may be required to promote the efforts for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and to report on the subject to the General Assembly at its special session devoted to disarmament, to be held in May and June 1978, and at its thirty-third regular session;

5. Decides to consider this item at its special session devoted to disarmament and at its thirty-third regular session.

Explaining its vote in favour of the draft, the United States reiterated its support for the concept of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones as a means to enhance the security of the parties and to reinforce non-proliferation on a regional basis. The United States believed that the actual provisions governing the establishment of the zone in South Asia should be negotiated and agreed on among the parties concerned before States could be expected to undertake commitments in that regard.

India reiterated that it was opposed to nuclear weapons and had no intention of exercising the nuclear-weapon option. It was interested in nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and would not allow that limited interest to be impeded in any way. Furthermore, India remained opposed to the non-proliferation Treaty and similar agreements that were discriminatory. It was India’s view that the whole world should be free of nuclear weapons. Subregionalization would not only be in-
consistent with the global approach to the question but would also change it from a universal to a subregional or regional concept. India felt that regional nuclear-weapon-free zones would not help to combat the nuclear threat to the world at large but would provide an advantage to nuclear-weapon States, since nuclear weapons and their delivery systems were intercontinental in nature. The Indian position in regard to the draft was also embodied in resolutions 3265 A (XXIX) and 3476 A (XXX), by which the General Assembly accepted the proposition that the initiative for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in any appropriate zone of Asia should come from the States of that zone, taking into account its special features and geographical extent. India remained opposed, as in the past, to a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, and could not agree to co-operate in the implementation of Pakistan's proposal. However, since other countries in the region might have different views, India had decided to abstain in the voting.

The United Kingdom, which had abstained in the voting on Pakistan's draft resolution in the First Committee, but had changed to an affirmative vote in the General Assembly, explained why it had found it possible to reconsider its position. The delegation indicated that nuclear-weapon-free zones could make a positive contribution to national and regional security, to the cause of non-proliferation and to the reduction of the risk of nuclear war. For the same reasons, the United Kingdom favoured the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia. The decision to establish a zone should be made by the States of the region. In that connexion, the resolution called for efforts to establish a South Asian zone but did not seek to impose one. The resolution left those decisions for consideration by the States concerned. While a South Asian zone would be a very positive development, the United Kingdom would not seek to impose that view on any State, nor should the General Assembly do so. It hoped, however, that all the States of the region would take into account the views of the United Kingdom and the other States that had voted in favour of the resolution, and that in due course a general agreement would evolve in the region on that subject.

After the vote in the First Committee, Pakistan recalled that the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia had been endorsed in principle by the General Assembly since 1974. With respect to the point emphasized by some delegations concerning the need for voluntary co-operation among the States of the region for the establishment of the proposed zone, it had held consultations on a bilateral basis with some of those States, and would be happy if consultations could be held on a collective basis among all States of the region. In connexion with the argument that South Asia was an artificially restricted area for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, it stressed that it had no objection to the inclusion of such other neighbouring non-nuclear-weapon States as may be interested in forming part of the zone.
Conclusion

Discussions in 1977 on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones reflected again general support for that concept among Member States, including the five nuclear-weapon Powers, as a means of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and of enhancing the security of the States concerned by the complete absence of those weapons from various areas of the world. However, differences continued to exist with respect to the application of that concept in some specific regions, as shown during the debates in the General Assembly.

During 1977, the Treaty of Tlatelolco moved a step closer towards its full implementation, with the signature by the United States of Additional Protocol I. The denuclearization of Africa continued to enjoy the unanimous support of the General Assembly, at a time when developments in southern Africa appeared to endanger that concept. Hope was expressed that new developments in the Middle East might contribute to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons in that region and the proposed nuclear-weapon-free zone in the area was again supported by virtually all Member States. It should also be noted that, for the first time, two nuclear-weapon States—the United Kingdom and the United States—voted in favour of the proposal for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, which had already been supported in previous years by China. Instead of casting a negative vote, as in the case of previous resolutions, India abstained, expressing strong reservations with respect to the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia.

The adoption by the General Assembly of five resolutions dealing with the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones indicates the significance of this concept in the current discussion of disarmament issues. In that connexion, it can be expected that during the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones will again be considered as an essential element of any comprehensive approach to the task of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.
IAEA safeguards

Introduction

The present chapter has been contributed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and deals with the safeguards being applied by the Agency at the time of preparation of the 1977 issue of The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook.

Although the chapter describes the situation concerning safeguards at the end of that year, it should be noted that they have been evolving practically since the establishment of the Agency in 1956. Therefore it has been necessary in some cases to refer to events which took place in previous years, in order to provide background information useful for an understanding of the safeguards régime as it exists today.

Scope of IAEA safeguards

International safeguards are one of the important aspects of the activities of IAEA. The IAEA safeguards are designed to ensure that any diversion of nuclear material for prohibited activities, in particular the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or for unknown purposes, is promptly detected.

As a result of safeguards agreements concluded with States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII)), and with States not parties to that Treaty, the Agency's safeguards coverage today is very extensive. According to the best information officially available to the Agency, there are at present only five non-nuclear-weapon States with significant nuclear activities that are not covered by Agency safeguards. It is therefore apparent that the Agency applies safeguards to most significant nuclear activities in non-nuclear-weapon States. The number and type of nuclear facilities subject to safeguards and those not safeguarded as at 31 December 1977 are given in appendix VIII below. Nevertheless, any State that is not a party to the non-proliferation Treaty or the
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) is free, in the absence of other obligations, to build or otherwise acquire unsafeguarded nuclear plants. Furthermore, there are significant differences in the scope of application of safeguards agreements concluded under the non-proliferation Treaty and others; agreements under the Treaty cover all peaceful nuclear activities in the State, which in practice means all nuclear activities, while other agreements thus far cover only particular plants or supply agreements but do not extend legally to the complete nuclear programme of the State concerned.

**Safeguards agreements not concluded under the non-proliferation Treaty**

The basic provision related to the Agency safeguards is contained in article III A.5 of the statute of IAEA, under which the Agency is authorized to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy. The Agency's rights and responsibilities related to safeguards application are laid down in article XII.

Safeguards first developed on a bilateral basis. Nations advanced in nuclear science used to attach safeguards to their exports of nuclear material and plants to other countries in order to verify that the material supplied served only peaceful purposes. Early in the 1960s the United States started to transfer the administration of those bilateral safeguards to IAEA. Other supplier countries followed suit. At the same time some member States unilaterally submitted nuclear installations to IAEA safeguards. In accordance with its statute, IAEA commenced also to apply safeguards to material and facilities provided by it under "Agency projects".

Thus three categories of agreements were created under which international safeguards were applied by the Agency:

(a) Agency project agreements;

(b) Trilateral, so-called transfer agreements, under which IAEA assumed from the two States parties to an initial bilateral agreement for co-operation the responsibility to apply its safeguards. Later most of the nuclear co-operation agreements between States provided for immediate application of Agency safeguards rather than going through the stage of bilateral safeguards;
(c) Unilateral submission agreements. These agreements may cover imports or indigenous activities in the State concerned.

All three categories of agreements have a basic element in common: they essentially address the application of safeguards in respect of individual or otherwise limited supplies and to some extent also the fruits of such supplies, in the form of produced special fissionable material or facilities making use of supplied items.

The scope of safeguards, i.e. the items to be subject to the Agency safeguards, is defined in each specific case in the safeguards agreement covering the case. Items to be safeguarded are included in a list referred to as "inventory". These safeguards agreements constitute the legal basis for the application of safeguards, they specify the rights and obligations of the parties and the conditions under which Agency safeguards shall be applied as well as the technical procedures for such safeguards. The Safeguards Document (The Agency's Safeguards System, 1965, as provisionally extended in 1966 and 1968) serves as general guidance when drawing up the agreements. This has resulted in a standardization of the technical content of the non-Treaty safeguards agreements.

In an attempt to introduce standardization in respect to the duration of the agreements, the IAEA Board of Governors decided in February 1974 that application of safeguards and therefore the duration of the agreements should continue until the Agency had terminated the application of safeguards, according to the provisions of the agreement, to supplied nuclear material and to special fissionable material produced, processed or used in or in connexion with supplied nuclear material, equipment, facilities or non-nuclear material.

The Agency statute provides that Agency safeguards are designed to ensure that items subject to safeguards do not serve any military purpose. The Agency interprets the military purpose concept to include the use of special fissionable and other nuclear material for the development or manufacture of any nuclear explosive device. All recent safeguards agreements contain an express provision to this effect.

The Agency applies safeguards in the following 12 States that are not parties to the non-proliferation Treaty: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, India, Indonesia, Israel, Pakistan, South Africa, Spain and Turkey. In eight of these States all significant nuclear activities in the State are under safeguards, while in India, Israel, South Africa and Spain some of those activities are covered by safeguards and others are not. The only non-nuclear-weapon State which has a significant nuclear activity and where safeguards are not applied by the Agency is Egypt which, however, has signed the Treaty.

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1 INF CIRC/66/Rev.2.
Safeguards agreements concluded under the non-proliferation Treaty

In 1968 the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was opened for signature. It entered into force on 5 March 1970. Under article III, paragraphs 1 and 4, of the Treaty, the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty undertook to conclude with IAEA agreements whereby they submitted all their peaceful nuclear activities to the Agency’s safeguards. A Safeguards Committee was set up in IAEA to advise the Board of Governors of the Agency’s responsibilities in relation to safeguards in connexion with the Treaty, in particular about the content of the agreements which would be required in connexion with that Treaty. The Committee, in which 48 member States participated, completed its work on 10 March 1971. It produced a set of recommendations for the content of the relevant safeguards agreements in the form of a draft agreement designed to enable the Agency to apply safeguards pursuant to the Treaty, particularly meeting the requirement that safeguards in non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty should be applied to all peaceful nuclear activities as distinct from safeguards agreements not concluded under the Treaty. These recommendations form the substance of all safeguards agreements under the Treaty, which are all, therefore, practically identical.\(^2\)

About half of the States having such safeguards agreements in force do not have nuclear material in quantities which, according to the agreement, require the application of safeguards. For such States the agreement is held in abeyance until the State acquires such quantities and a protocol to that effect is concluded with the State concerned.\(^3\)

Since all safeguards work is based on agreements concluded between the Government of a State and IAEA, it was felt necessary to lay down the essential points for co-operation between the States and the Agency. As a result, the safeguards agreement under the non-proliferation Treaty requires that the State establish and maintain a State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC) and lays down the types of measures to be provided by the SSAC. In this way, the SSAC becomes an essential link between the operator of a nuclear facility and the Agency. In some States the national verification of the operator’s nuclear material accountancy at the plant is carried out in a way similar to that of the Agency. For these cases, a special protocol has been attached to the safeguards agreements regulating the co-ordination of both verification activities, those of the States and those of the Agency. Such are the cases of the safeguards agreements with EURATOM and Japan.\(^4\)

A list of States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty having safeguards agreements under the Treaty is given in appendix IX below.

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\(^2\) For the structure and content of such agreements, see INFCIRC/153.

\(^3\) See, for example, the agreement between Cyprus and IAEA (INFCIRC/189).

\(^4\) See INFCIRC/193 and INFCIRC/255, respectively.
There are 43 States parties that have not yet concluded the required safeguards agreement in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty. However, those among them having significant nuclear activities are under safeguards as a consequence of other agreements. Of the three nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, the United Kingdom and the United States have negotiated agreements pursuant to voluntary offers made by them. These agreements will enable IAEA to apply safeguards to all nuclear installations except those related to national security. France has negotiated a similar agreement. These three agreements have been approved by the Board of Governors but have not yet entered into force. At present safeguards are also applied in the United Kingdom and the United States under trilateral agreements, such as agreements to cover reprocessing of irradiated fuel shipped from other States. Similarly, if material subject to safeguards is transferred to France, safeguards will also apply.

**Safeguards agreements concluded under the Treaty of Tlatelolco**

According to article 13 of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) each State for which the Treaty is in force is required to conclude a safeguards agreement with the Agency covering its nuclear activities. Nineteen safeguards agreements have been concluded or are being negotiated. All of these agreements relate to both the non-proliferation Treaty and the Treaty of Tlatelolco and, therefore, they apply to all nuclear activities of the States concerned.\(^5\)

**Recent developments in the application of safeguards**

Article III, paragraph 2, of the non-proliferation Treaty stipulates that nuclear supplies to any non-nuclear-weapon State from a State party to the Treaty should be subject to Agency safeguards.

To reach a general agreement on the implementation of this provision a group of exporting countries deliberated for several years and in 1974 they informed the Director General of IAEA that they would require as a pre-condition for the export of source or special fissionable material to any non-nuclear-weapon State that such material should not be diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. IAEA safeguards to that end would have to be applied to the nuclear supply. They also informed the Agency that when making such exports they would require assurances that the material would not be re-exported to a non-nuclear-weapon State not party to the Treaty unless arrange-

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\(^5\) See, for example, the agreement between Ecuador and IAEA (INFCIRC/231).
ments for Agency safeguards were made by the State receiving such re-exported material. Furthermore the group drew up a list designating the categories of equipment and other material, such as heavy water, the export of which would necessitate the application of safeguards to the nuclear material produced, processed or used in the facility for which these items were to be supplied\(^6\) (see also chapter IX above).

At the Review Conference of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, held at Geneva in May 1975, several States stressed their view that the extension of the application of safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities in importing States, even if not parties to the Treaty, should be a pre-condition for any nuclear imports into those States. The Board of Governors of IAEA adopted a draft resolution, submitted jointly by Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, the USSR, the United Kingdom, the United States and Venezuela, in which it requested the Director General to prepare a document setting out the possible content of an agreement for application of Agency safeguards to all nuclear activities in the State party to the agreement. The Agency's secretariat has prepared a draft for such a “full scope agreement” but so far no State has communicated the wish to conclude such an agreement.

In this context, when the guidelines for nuclear transfers established during meetings of nuclear suppliers in London were communicated to the Agency on 11 January 1978, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Poland and the USSR declared in separate letters their determination that their nuclear exports would go to a non-nuclear-weapon State only in case the whole nuclear activity of that State was subject to Agency safeguards.\(^7\)

The Agency’s Safeguards System does not provide specific procedures for safeguards connected with the transfer of technological information and until a few years ago this matter had not been covered in any safeguards agreement to which the Agency is a party. However, in the trilateral agreements concluded between IAEA and the Republic of Korea and France; Brazil and the Federal Republic of Germany; Pakistan and France; South Africa and France; and Spain and Canada,\(^8\) and in two agreements with Argentina\(^9\) covering a fuel fabrication plant supplied in connexion with a co-operation agreement between Argentina and Canada, provision is made for the application of safeguards in connexion with the supply of technological information. Any facility, equipment or material benefiting from the transfer of such information will be subject to safeguards. These agreements further provide that any nuclear facility or specified equipment will be deemed to derive from the transferred information if the chemical or physical process which

\(^7\) See INFCIRC/254.
\(^8\) See INFCIRC/233, INFCIRC/237, INFCIRC/239, INFCIRC/244 and INFCIRC/247, respectively.
\(^9\) See INFCIRC/250 and INFCIRC/251, respectively.
characterizes the operation of the nuclear facility or equipment is the same or essentially the same as the one to which the information relates.

**IAEA safeguards in practice**

When applying safeguards IAEA makes use of material accountancy with containment and surveillance as important complementary measures. The plant operator is required to determine the quantities and composition of nuclear material kept in the plant and changes in these amounts. The operator must keep records of these determinations and report them to IAEA through the national authority. By balancing nuclear material on hand and recorded data it can be ascertained that no material has escaped the operator's control.

Containment and surveillance techniques are being increasingly employed by the Agency. Photographic equipment is one of these and for some years now cameras have been successfully employed in some countries to provide confirmation that no undeclared fuel movements have taken place. Seals also have been used, and adequate seals capable of being checked in the field are under development. Optical surveillance is currently being boosted powerfully by the introduction of closed circuit television recorders in place of the present film system.

Material accountancy is applied to provide information which is to be verified in the course of IAEA inspections. IAEA inspectors check the operator's records against reports sent to IAEA, verify that seals have not been tampered with and analyse films or video tapes in surveillance equipment. And, most important, the inspectors verify quantity, composition and location of nuclear material by making independent measurements and taking samples of material which are analysed in IAEA laboratories. All checks and analyses done, IAEA can conclude whether all nuclear material under safeguards is satisfactorily accounted for or not.

The conclusions of the reports based on inspection results are now being summarized and presented each year to the Board of Governors as a Special Safeguards Implementation Report. The principal conclusion in the report which was submitted in 1977 and which covers the year 1976 was that in none of the 41 States in which the Agency carried out inspections during that year was there any diversion of a significant quantity of safeguarded nuclear material, and the Secretariat was also confident that there was no diversion at all of such material in these States. The report for 1977 will contain a similar conclusion.
PART THREE

Prohibition of other weapons
Chemical weapons

Introduction

The question of banning chemical warfare has been discussed in the framework of the United Nations for the past 20 years. Initially, the subject was dealt with mainly in conjunction with that of prohibiting biological weapons. From 1971 onward, however, after agreement was reached on the conclusion of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex), the question of a ban on chemical weapons has been discussed as a separate issue. In the preamble of that Convention, which entered into force on 26 March 1975, the States parties recognize that an agreement on the prohibition of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons represented a first possible step towards the achievement of agreement on effective measures also for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and express their determination to continue negotiations to that end. In article IX, moreover, each State party affirms the recognized objective of effective prohibition of chemical weapons and, to this end, undertakes to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling and for their destruction, and on appropriate measures concerning equipment and means of delivery specifically designed for the production or use of chemical agents for weapons purposes.

The discussions that have taken place since 1971 in the CCD and in the General Assembly on a ban on chemical weapons have involved a number of highly complex and closely interrelated issues. Briefly, the principal questions are the scope of a prohibition, i.e., whether it should be of a comprehensive or a gradual nature; the activities that should be banned and the agents that would be subject to a prohibition; and the way in which compliance with the convention should be verified.

In respect of the scope of a prohibition, the proposals for a com-


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prehensive approach imply that a convention should, from the moment of its conclusion, extend to all chemical means of warfare from the stage of their development up to their use. Furthermore, in the comprehensive approach, not only chemical weapons themselves would be banned, but also the chemical agents they make use of and their means of delivery. In the gradual approach, the ban would initially be limited, for instance, to those lethal chemical agents that can be identified on the basis of specific agreed criteria. The coverage of the ban would subsequently be extended, by a series of carefully defined steps, so as to achieve eventually a comprehensive prohibition. Generally speaking, the Eastern European States and the non-aligned countries have called for a comprehensive way of dealing with the subject, while the gradual approach has been advocated by the Western States, which have tended to see the scope of a prohibition in the light of the means available to verify compliance.

The second main issue is the question of the activities which should be banned, i.e. whether the scope of the ban should extend to development, production and stockpiling or only to one or another of those activities. It has also involved the question of whether one or more of those activities should be banned with respect only to the weapons themselves or also with respect to the chemical warfare agents used in them. There has been considerable discussion concerning the technical criteria that would be used to determine whether or not a chemical substance should be considered to be a chemical warfare agent.

The determination of the activities and the substances subject to the prohibition is obviously essential in setting the exact scope of an agreement. A major problem is posed by the fact that chemical substances, as well as the facilities in which they are produced, may serve more than one purpose. In this context, it is highly important to agree on criteria that would determine which activities and substances should come under the scope of a prohibition. One such criterion is that of purpose or intention, meaning that a lethal chemical agent that has no peaceful use should be banned. Another possible criterion is that of quantity, by which substances produced in amounts having no justification for peaceful purposes should come under the prohibition. Other proposals made in the discussions refer to certain properties which would make chemical substances warfare agents; these include their toxic effect, degree of toxicity, suitability for use in a weapon and chemical structure. A further consideration in the discussions concerning the scope of a convention is whether or not the chemical agent can be verified. This question is raised in particular by those who hold that a prohibition in respect of a given activity or substance can serve a useful purpose only if compliance with that prohibition can be adequately verified.

2 Chemical agents are usually classified in two categories. Single-purpose agents have no large-scale uses except in chemical warfare. Dual-purpose agents are commonly used for civilian purposes, but may also be used as chemical warfare agents.
The third main subject of discussion is the question of the assurance of compliance with a prohibition of chemical weapons. Various modes of verification have been proposed, in particular the use of national means, combined with international monitoring measures of various degrees of intensity, including on-site inspection. Verification problems necessarily differ depending on the substances and activities involved, and the related technical and political aspects further complicate the discussion.

In the course of the discussions in the CCD over the past six years, members have submitted a number of proposals and working papers. Several of these merit specific mention because of their particular importance in subsequent debates.

In 1972, the Eastern European members of the CCD submitted a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. The provisions of this draft followed the lines of the Convention on biological weapons and incorporated a comprehensive approach to the problem, by applying the purpose criterion to the scope of the prohibition. The proposed ban would include all chemical agents of types and in quantities having no justification for peaceful purposes. Provisions for both national and international forms of control were included.

In 1973, 10 non-aligned States members of the CCD submitted a working paper calling for a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons, and including a proposal for a combination of national and international means of verification. The national means would involve consultation and co-operation among the States parties and the international verification would be carried out by an independent international control organ.

In 1974, Japan submitted a draft convention which provided for a comprehensive ban on all chemical warfare agents, with a supplementary document that would temporarily limit that ban to the development and production of super-toxic chemical agents, while effective verification measures appropriate in regard to less toxic agents and applicable to all chemical weapons stockpiles were being worked out. In embracing the principle of a comprehensive ban, the draft used the “purpose criterion” (as had the 1972 draft of the Eastern European members of the CCD), but provided at the same time for a phased approach both by including currently verifiable agents and by using further objective criteria, such as toxicity and chemical structure, permitting preparation of a list of agents to be banned. In 1976, Japan elaborated its 1974 draft in a working paper which contained proposals

5 Ibid., Twenty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/9621), annex II, document CCD/420.
6 Ibid., Thirty-first Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/31/27), annex III, document CCD/515.
for delimiting chemical warfare agents to be prohibited on the basis of their toxicity. This would become the primary criterion.

In a joint communique issued on 3 July 1974, the Soviet Union and the United States announced that they had agreed in principle to consider a joint initiative with respect to the conclusion, as a first step, of an international convention, dealing with the most dangerous lethal means of chemical warfare. Since then, bilateral consultations have been held between the two powers for the purpose of agreeing on the text of that initiative for its submission to the CCD. Subsequently, in 1976, the Soviet delegation reiterated its support of a complete and general prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, as laid down in the draft convention of 1972, but expressed its readiness to promote the earliest possible attainment of the goal of prohibiting chemical weapons by accepting a step-by-step approach with, as a first step, prohibition of the most dangerous and lethal means of chemical warfare. The other Eastern European countries expressed similar views.

In 1976 also, the United Kingdom submitted a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. As explained by that delegation, the draft was an attempt to combine the constructive elements of previous drafts with some new ideas. It included suggestions made in the 1972 draft tabled by the Eastern European delegations, in the Japanese draft convention and the Canadian proposal of 1974 for a phased approach in which the first stage might involve a ban on the production of all lethal chemical weapons and the destruction of stocks of such weapons over a specified period.

Consideration by the CCD, 1977

In 1977, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament continued its efforts towards a prohibition of chemical weapons in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 31/65. It devoted the major part of its substantive consideration of the subject to the three issues of the scope of a ban, the definition of agents to be included and the question of verification.

Several working papers were submitted during the session. At the outset of the 1977 session, in response to a request made by the Committee at its 1976 session, the Secretariat submitted a compilation of material from working papers and statements on the question presented to the Committee in recent years.

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7 Ibid., Twenty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/9627), annex II, document CCD/431.
8 Ibid., Thirty-first Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/31/27), annex III, document CCD/512.
10 Ibid., annex II, documents CCD/529, CCD/531, CCD/533, CCD/537 and Rev.1, CCD/538, CCD/539, CCD/541 and CCD/544.
11 Distributed to the members of the CCD as an informal document.
In March and August 1977, two series of informal meetings were also held with the participation of technical experts. Those meetings were generally regarded as useful for achieving a broader understanding of the practical approaches to deal with the problem.

With regard to the scope of a possible agreement, the Soviet Union and other Eastern European States, as indicated in their draft convention, held that any prohibition of chemical means of warfare should be comprehensive in scope, banning the development, production and stockpiling of all such weapons, even though the comprehensive goal might be achieved in phased stages. Romania said that a partial approach might actually be more complicated to achieve than a comprehensive one.

Hungary stated that while the majority of States continued to favour a comprehensive prohibition, the deliberations in the Committee had shown that the final aim could be achieved only through successive steps or phases; it stressed, however, that it conceived those steps as an organic part of the negotiating process leading to the ultimate goal. The delegation also noted that the view was widely shared in the Committee that, in addition to the general purpose criterion, some other specific characteristics should be used for the definition of chemical agents to be covered by a partial prohibition. It held, however, that, while offering some advantages, the suggested lists of chemical agents to be included in the prohibition had serious shortcomings, and that the method according to which chemical structures or formulas could be used was possible only with identical groups of agents.

Poland held that since 1972, when the Socialist countries, supported by 10 non-aligned members of the Committee, had proposed a total elimination of chemical weapons in their draft convention, there had been a slow evolution of the prevailing view of the Committee in that direction.

Egypt supported the approach recommended in the working paper of the 10 non-aligned members of the Committee because it was comprehensive in scope and, while favouring use of the general purpose criterion for defining the scope of the prohibition, it also envisaged the elaboration of more detailed prohibitions in appropriate annexes to an agreement. Yugoslavia also believed that a comprehensive ban would be the only lasting solution, but did not oppose a phased approach if each step in the process towards the desired goal was strictly defined and linked to a time limit.

A number of Western delegations also commented on the question of the scope of a prohibition. The Netherlands maintained that the reservations made by many countries with regard to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare signed at Geneva in 1925 (see foot-note 4).

12 See foot-note 4.
1925, concerning the right of retaliatory use of chemical weapons, would have to be abandoned if the goal of strengthening the Protocol by a full prohibition of chemical weapons was to be achieved.

Japan maintained that the prevailing view was that a chemical weapon ban should cover not only super-toxic compounds but also other lethal agents, and that the ban should be based on the general purpose criterion supplemented by a toxicity criterion, such as the LD spectrum suggested by Japan in 1976.

The Federal Republic of Germany, maintaining that the scope of a chemical weapons ban appeared to be the least problematical aspect, held that the view that a convention should from the outset embrace not only super-toxic but also other lethal and highly toxic chemicals, as well as incapacitants and binary weapons, had gained general support. It stated that, over and above the general purpose criterion, the objective criterion of toxicity was now generally accepted for the definition. Additional criteria should make the distinction between warfare agents and substances not suitable for military purposes as clear as possible.

The United States recalled its suggestion that a convention on the subject could usefully prohibit training and related programmes for the use of chemical weapons and hoped that those and other confidence-building measures would contribute to an effective ban. It also stressed that any convention on the subject should not weaken the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use of chemical weapons, but supplement it.

As the discussion in the Committee proceeded, a trend could be noted towards acceptance of a comprehensive approach to the question of the scope of a chemical weapons ban, both with regard to the agents and to the activities to be prohibited.

On the question of verification of compliance with a prohibition of chemical weapons, the Eastern European and many non-aligned members reiterated their view that national means of verification, supplemented by international measures, were sufficient for verification and that on-site inspection was not necessary. On the other hand, the Western members generally maintained that on-site inspections were essential to control effectively both destruction of stockpiles and production.

The Soviet Union continued to stress that, in applying verification, it was necessary to maintain conditions in which that activity would not infringe the sovereign rights of States parties to the convention and would not lead to the disclosure of State or military secrets. Those requirements would be satisfied by control based on national means of verification combined with some international procedures. At the same

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14 An LD spectrum is a toxicity list for chemical substances in the order of the numerical value of their lethal doses.
15 Binary weapons contain chemical agents which, although by themselves are not highly toxic, generate an extremely toxic substance when combined in flight or on impact.
time, the Soviet Union stated, in an endeavour to ensure that agreement was reached as quickly as possible, it had expressed its readiness to examine the possibility of using additional supervision procedures and, in particular, to discuss methods of verifying the destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons which are to be excluded from the arsenals of States.

In this connexion, the Soviet Union submitted two working papers entitled "Some methods of monitoring compliance with an agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons" and "Verification of the destruction of declared stocks of chemical weapons". The flexibility indicated by the Soviet Union with regard to the verification of the destruction of stockpiles was welcomed by the delegations of Bulgaria, Iran, Italy, Japan, Mongolia, the Netherlands, Poland, the United Kingdom and the United States. Iran, Italy, and the United Kingdom, as well as Sweden, stressed, however, the importance of further elaboration of the Soviet position.

In commenting also on the question of verification, the German Democratic Republic objected to the establishment of international control organs with excessive power as a legitimization of interference in the internal affairs of a State. Mongolia held that a chemical weapons ban could be effectively monitored by national means, combined with certain procedures of an international nature. Western delegations held different views on that question. The United States continued to express reservations with regard to reliance on national measures for verification of a chemical weapons ban, and suggested that technical exchange might facilitate work in the area. Japan held that the prevailing view was that international verification, including on-site inspection, was necessary, and that such inspections could supplement national means without unjustifiable intrusion. The Netherlands also maintained that a certain amount of international verification was necessary and that an effective verification system could be based on various mutually reinforcing measures. It also considered a declaration by all parties of their stocks of chemical weapons to be an important confidence-building measure, suggesting that all States should be obliged to declare all stocks on becoming a party to the convention, but that they might make a unilateral declaration, or several declarations in stages, which should contain as much information as possible. The delegation held that verification of production was just as important and while such verification with regard to single-purpose agents appeared possible in principle, the verification of dual-purpose agents was a difficult problem; however, since the highly toxic, single-purpose agents constituted a considerably greater military threat than most of the dual-purpose agents, international verification measures might be concentrated on nerve agents and comparable chemicals, including the precursors for binary weapons, 

with less stringent attention being given to other agents. While it con­
sidered that the Committee must try to develop verification methods that
were as non-intrusive as possible, the Netherlands believed that national
means of verification alone would not be sufficient and that, without
international verification measures, such as those agreed upon in the
non-proliferation Treaty, the relevant provisions of a ban on chemical
weapons would amount to mere self-control.

The Federal Republic of Germany, for its part, said that verifica­
tion of a chemical weapons ban would not be sufficiently effective with­
out international on-site inspection. It was convinced that a system
could be developed that would insure the protection of commercial and
military secrets, at least to the extent that they were legitimate within the
meaning of the convention. Inspections on challenge, which would have
to be based on suspicion, should only play a supplementary role.

Other delegations also expressed views on the problem of verifica­
tion of a chemical weapons ban. Yugoslavia considered that a unified
system of national and international control measures could be one of
the possible ways of organizing the verification process, with particular
emphasis on the prevention of proliferation. It held that countries not
possessing chemical weapons should have no particular difficulty in
accepting on-site inspection in certain cases, provided all States parties
were equally liable to such inspection.

Sweden believed that the idea of a consultative committee, as pro­
vided for under the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any
Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (resolu­
tion 31/72, annex), was gaining support, but noted that a chemical
weapons ban was more complex than most others and that the tasks
and procedures of such a committee would not be the same for every
disarmament convention.

In addition to having a general discussion on the various issues
involved in a chemical weapons ban, the Committee considered in detail
the draft convention submitted by the United Kingdom in late 1976.17
The draft was welcomed or favourably noted by Canada, the Federal
Republic of Germany, Iran, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the
United States and Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia held that it was a positive
contribution towards a generally acceptable solution of the problem;
Canada and Italy believed the draft could serve as a basis for the Com­
nittee’s further deliberations. Views were expressed by delegations on
the approach followed in the proposal, as well as on those provisions
dealing with the scope of the ban, verification and international co­
operation in the peaceful uses of chemical agents.

Concerning the phased approach proposed in the draft convention,
Sweden, noting that it called, first, for the submission of information by
all signatories on their chemical weapons potential and for the adoption

17 See foot-note 8.
of a moratorium on production before entry into force of the convention and, secondly, for the destruction or conversion of all production facilities and weapon stockpiles, questioned whether countries possessing chemical weapons would accept far-reaching obligations before the entry into force of an agreement. Iran expressed similar views. Canada favoured such a phased but comprehensive approach, holding that it should lead, in agreed and verified stages, to an eventual total ban on all lethal chemical agents and munitions that could be used for hostile purposes. It also recalled its 1974 suggestion that the phasing should not be on the basis of excluded agents but of excluded activities. The Federal Republic of Germany also favoured the proposed introduction of a ban on production, followed by the destruction of stockpiles.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union, supported by other Eastern European States, rejected the proposed idea of accepting obligations before an agreement had even entered into force, and held that the prohibition of production while stocks were preserved would put States not possessing them in an unacceptable position.

Referring to article II of the draft concerning the submission of information by signatories on their chemical weapon capabilities, prior to the entry into force of the convention, the United States, while supporting such confidence-building measures, suggested that agreements to take certain action before the convention entered into force should be included in a document separate from, but linked to, the convention.

The United Kingdom, stressing the many years required for the safe destruction of stockpiles, held that an immediate ban on production was essential in order to prevent replenishment of stocks in parallel with their destruction. Accordingly, the United Kingdom explained, its draft proposed a phased approach in recognition of the realities of the present situation; it would freeze from the outset the existing situation where some countries had stocks and some did not and, in the long term, it would lead positively to a situation of real equality following the destruction of stocks.

With particular regard to article I of the proposed convention, which outlines the general scope of the ban, Sweden held that such words as “lethal”, “long-term”, “harm” and “physiological” must be clearly defined and that toxins should also be included in the ban, even though already covered by the Convention prohibiting biological weapons. Noting that the draft did not mention agents causing harm to plants or animals either, Sweden suggested consideration be given to the banning of those agents that caused damage to the environment and might lead to harm or destruction of human beings, as set forth in the Soviet draft convention on the prohibition of new weapons of mass destruction. The delegation of Czechoslovakia also held that defoliants and herbicides should be covered in the ban.

Japan, considering the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, as amended by the 1972 Protocol, useful as a model for defining the scope of the ban, suggested listing banned agents in three annexed lists rather than attempting to ban a category of weapons. The first list would cover single-purpose super-toxic agents, the second dual-purpose agents and the third other chemical substances which had the dangerous characteristics of chemical weapon agents or were precursors of binary weapons. Parties to the agreement should give notification of their activities with regard to the substances on the third list but, if it was felt necessary to control them strictly, they could be transferred either to the first or the second list, following a periodic review.

The Federal Republic of Germany suggested that the military suitability of a given agent should also be considered as a criterion for including it in the ban.

Canada stated that, in view of the difficulty of accurately defining chemical weapon agents, it favoured, as an interim solution, a ban based on the general purpose criterion, together with negotiations to define the precise agents to be banned based on further study.

The United States suggested elimination of the proposed ban on the use of chemical agents, since the 1925 Geneva Protocol already included a ban on their use. Similar views were expressed by Mongolia. On the other hand, the United States proposed a ban on all training in the use of chemical munitions, except for the use of small quantities for protective purposes, and believed that such a ban should also include incapacitating agents as well as lethal weapons. It also suggested consideration of practical methods for deciding which agents were being produced in types and in quantities that have no justification for protective or other peaceful purposes. With regard to paragraph (b) of article I, while supporting the proposed text and understanding that the term “munitions” was intended to cover binary and other possible multicomponent weapons, the United States held that the article did not deal adequately with the precursors of the prohibited agents, which could also be banned.

Suggestions were made by Japan and Yugoslavia in connexion with the formulation of article I, in order fully to cover the problem of binary weapons. In the view of the German Democratic Republic, the draft convention did not provide a solution for the prohibition of binary agents.

The United States proposal to include incapacitating agents in a chemical weapon ban was welcomed by a number of members. Sweden, while appreciating the proposal, requested further elaboration regarding a delimitation between incapacitating agents and riot control weapons. It held that the need for use of the latter agents in peacetime was undis-
puted and that it should also be recognized that some uses of tear gases must be assured even in wartime. Rather than adopt a delimitation based on the persistence of the effects of the agent, Sweden suggested possible exemptions from a comprehensive prohibition, to be spelled out in a protocol.

In replying to various comments, the United Kingdom stated that, while the ban on chemical weapons should be as broad as possible, it was clear that the overlap with chemicals produced for peaceful purposes became increasingly greater, and the prohibition less absolute, as the scope was broadened. Accordingly, draft article I referred to agents which caused long-term physiological harm to man. A supplementary protocol to the convention giving detailed definitions would show a clear dividing line between riot control agents, which had effects hardly lasting longer than the period of exposure, and incapacitants, which had much longer-lasting effects. Binary weapons were covered by the proposed ban. That point could also be emphasized in a protocol and the detailed definitions might be expanded to cover the chemical precursors of binary munitions.

With particular regard to the provision of information on production facilities under draft article II, the United States considered it sufficient to report only on facilities producing or designed to produce single-purpose agents or their precursors and those capable of producing toxic agents; if facilities producing less toxic agents were to be included, they should be tied to a list of specific chemicals. Yugoslavia thought that the obligations contained in draft article II, as well as in articles III, V, VII and IX, should be more precisely defined for those countries that might not possess the banned weapons but might have them on their territory; draft articles II, III and VII should specifically contain not only the term “possession” but also the term “located on its territory”.

With regard to draft article III, providing for the closing down or conversion to peaceful purposes of chemical production plants, the United States thought it might be better to require the closing down or dismantling of all such plants, since verification of such action would be simpler than verifying a conversion to peaceful uses. Italy, while supporting the article as a confidence-building measure, stressed the need for unambiguous clarification of the closing-down of facilities producing munitions, equipment or delivery systems.

Comments were also made on draft article IV, concerning the setting of a time-limit for the entry into force of the convention, after which the undertakings accepted by signatories would cease to apply. Sweden thought such a provision might complicate verification of the prohibition, while Iran believed that it might jeopardize the convention unnecessarily, since ratification by some States might be delayed for legitimate reasons.
The United States supported draft article VI, concerning the prohibition of assistance to a third country in acquiring banned items. In that regard, it stated that preventing the spread of chemical weapons capabilities was essential to ensure that the objectives of the convention were achieved.

With regard to draft article VII, concerning the destruction of stockpiles, Japan held that all single-purpose super-toxic agents, to be included in the suggested first list, should be destroyed within five years, for example, with on-site verification, and that dual-purpose agents, to be included in the second list, should also be controlled to ascertain that their amounts did not exceed a State party's requirements for peaceful purposes. The Federal Republic of Germany favoured the destruction of absolute quantities of stocks, rather than percentages of total stocks.

With specific regard to draft article VIII, pertaining to the establishment and functions of a consultative committee of parties, the United States believed that, in addition to outlining that committee's functions in the agreement, it would be necessary to specify its composition, decision-making procedures and methods. It hoped, however, that the creation of an elaborate international mechanism for the implementation of the convention could be avoided. Romania indicated support for the proposal that the control system should include an institutional framework that would give the less advanced countries a chance for direct participation.

With regard to draft article IX, concerning verification of the proposed agreement, Sweden expressed general support for the proposed control system, but noted the need to solve questions concerning the mandate and procedures of the proposed consultative committee. It also stressed the need to monitor military training activities, as well as chemical production plants. It further suggested that a system of verification by challenge might be used instead of the on-site inspection proposed in draft article IX.

Canada welcomed both draft articles VIII and IX and agreed that, as provided in article VIII, the effective operation of a treaty should be the responsibility of the parties to it rather than being delegated to a separate international body. Reiterating the view that some international verification would be necessary to implement the first phase of a phased agreement, Canada specifically supported the procedures for on-site inspection by persons appointed by the consultative committee, although it thought it might be desirable to specify in an annex that committee's composition, procedures and terms of reference. The United States believed that detailed arrangements for on-site inspection would have to be elaborated in an annex to the convention. The Federal Republic of Germany, for its part, maintained that on-site inspection would be necessary for more than the destruction of stocks.
The Soviet Union held that the proposed measures of control were mainly international in nature and disagreed with that concept on the grounds that it was tantamount to the legalization of interference in the internal affairs of States and would lead inevitably to the disclosure of military, industrial and commercial secrets. The Soviet delegation also held that it was hardly justifiable to grant supranational powers to an international control organ.

On draft article X, concerning consultation and co-operation prior to a decision to implement an on-site inspection, the United States suggested that the proposed consultative committee be given more responsibility for solving complaints of violation, while Italy endorsed the principle involved in the article.

In commenting on the various questions raised with regard to the proposed verification provisions, the United Kingdom stated that it considered the fears expressed to be unjustified; while the possible disclosure of commercial secrets through inspections was an understandable concern, similar fears had been expressed with regard to the inspection of nuclear power plants under the safeguards system of IAEA, but those fears had not proved justified, even with extensive application of such safeguards. Because of the difficulty of monitoring the many chemical plants in industrialized countries, however, it might be better, as suggested by the Netherlands, to confine reporting and inspections in such countries to factories producing chemicals closely analogous to the most toxic nerve agents, with only random checks of those producing less toxic chemicals. With regard to possible verification of the agreement by the use of space satellites, it had concluded that, while technically feasible, such verification would not be adequate and would be too costly even for those few States to which satellites were available. National control committees, set up to monitor statistics on chemical production for peaceful purposes, could play their part, the delegation held, but would not by themselves be sufficient to ensure compliance.

Hungary, on the other hand, continued to believe that, apart from the destruction of stocks, national means of verification combined with international procedures would provide adequate assurance of compliance with treaty obligations.

In the only comment on other draft articles, Yugoslavia expressed its support for article XII, concerning international co-operation in the peaceful uses of chemical agents.

During the session, the Soviet Union and the United States kept the Committee informed of the bilateral talks they were holding with a view to preparing the text of a joint initiative on chemical weapons for the consideration of the Committee. At the end of the session, it was clear that progress had been made towards an agreement between the two sides.
Consideration by the General Assembly, 1977

In the course of the debate in the General Assembly and in the First Committee, many non-aligned, Western and Eastern European States emphasized that the prohibition of chemical weapons was one of the pressing issues related to curbing the arms race and disarmament, and urged for an early agreement on a chemical weapons ban.

As in the CCD, the discussion centred on the main issues relating to the prohibition of those weapons, in particular the questions of the scope of a ban and verification.

With regard to the scope, the Soviet Union and a number of Eastern European States expressed the view that the comprehensive approach followed by the 1972 draft convention\(^\text{21}\) remained the most acceptable basis for future work. They stated, however, that in case some States did not agree to an extensive ban of chemical weapons, they were ready to seek, as a first step, agreement on the prohibition and destruction of the most dangerous and lethal types of such weapons.

A large number of non-aligned States, including Argentina, Cyprus, India, Morocco, Sri Lanka, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yugoslavia, also pointed to the need for a comprehensive ban.

The United States stressed that an international convention banning chemical weapons would be a genuine disarmament measure requiring the destruction of all existing stocks and prohibiting any further production of those weapons. The Federal Republic of Germany, in assessing the discussions held in the CCD during 1977, noted that there had been a marked convergence of views as regards the scope of the prohibition.

In connexion with the question of verification, the Soviet Union, with the support of the other Eastern European States, continued to maintain that verification measures should not infringe upon the sovereign rights of participating States and should not result in a disclosure of commercial secrets, among others. Therefore, verification should be based on national means of verification in combination with some additional international procedures. The Ukrainian SSR stated that national means could include satellite observation, and that destruction of stocks should be closely monitored. Bulgaria held that technological developments assured adequate control by national means and noted with interest the suggestion to use satellites for verification and control.

Several Western States, including the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, held that clarification of verification issues was crucial for real progress towards a chemical weapons agreement. The Federal Republic of Germany, observing that the differences over the question of verification were still considerable,

\(^{20}\) Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-second Session, First Committee, 7th to 38th, 40th and 44th meetings; and ibid., First Committee, Sessional Fascicle, corrigendum.

\(^{21}\) See foot-note 3.
stressed the need to guarantee observance of the obligations agreed upon, and suggested that an efficient international verification system should provide for routine on-site inspections in order to ensure that available warfare agents were destroyed and no new ones produced. It also believed that a system of that kind could be designed so as not to prejudice economic interests.

References were made during the debate to the bilateral talks between the Soviet Union and the United States. The Soviet Union noted that the exchange of views on all aspects of a possible joint initiative had been useful. It stated that the two sides had a fuller understanding of the possible scope of the prohibition to be included in the convention and also of procedural aspects of implementation, including the question of verification. The United States said that the bilateral negotiations were proceeding in a serious and detailed way and that measurable progress was being made towards the formulation of a joint initiative to be presented to the CCD.

A number of States, including Bulgaria, Canada, Finland, Liberia, Somalia, Turkey, the Ukrainian SSR and the United Arab Emirates, noted that the continuing bilateral talks between the Soviet Union and the United States were important for the further progress of negotiations on the question at the CCD, and looked forward to their early conclusion. Italy stated that direct dialogue between the two Powers could not solve all problems and that, in its opinion, there was still an important role for the CCD to play in the matter.

A number of delegations, including Austria, Ethiopia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nigeria and Sweden, suggested that the CCD should submit an agreed draft to the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The United Kingdom, while appreciating the USSR-United States talks, held that it was equally important that there should be a role for the CCD and the rest of the international community to play in order to assure universal acceptance of a ban.

The draft resolution on the item, submitted on 2 November, was sponsored by 28 Member States from all regional groups: Afghanistan, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, Nigeria, Poland, Sweden, Ukrainian SSR, United Kingdom and Yugoslavia. The draft was subsequently also sponsored by Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, Ghana, Ireland and the Ivory Coast.

The draft resolution was introduced by Canada, which pointed to the consensus of the international community that a high priority should be accorded to early agreement on effective measures for the complete prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction, and stressed that no one could dispute the desirability of achieving such an agreement as soon as pos-
sible to supplement the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Canada noted that the sponsors had sought to develop a draft resolution that would take into account recent developments and rally a consensus in support of a call for early elaboration of an agreement on chemical weapons. While holding that negotiations of such a complex treaty could not be accomplished overnight, the sponsors believed it important to exhort the CCD to press on and undertake the elaboration of a convention and to report on the results of the negotiations to the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Speaking on behalf of the nine member States of the European Economic Community, Belgium expressed support for the draft resolution and stated that the question of banning chemical weapons was a very complex field, but that there existed the prospect of a multilateral agreement in the not too distant future. The nine members of the European Economic Community were of the opinion that a comprehensive ban could be achieved, comprehensive with respect both to the agents and to the activities to be prohibited. Although they noted that large differences of opinion still existed with respect to verification, the nine countries felt that there had been some progress on that point in recent years. They also held that national means of verification were not sufficient. France noted that its approval of the draft would not affect its position towards the CCD, its methods or procedures. China announced that it dissociated itself from the consensus on the draft.

The draft resolution was adopted by consensus by the General Assembly on 12 December 1977 as resolution 32/77.

The resolution reads as follows:

The General Assembly,


Convinced that the continuing arms race calls for urgent disarmament measures and that the process of international détente is conducive to the achievement of progress towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Reaffirming the necessity of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,

Convinced that the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction constitutes an important step towards early agreement on the effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their elimination from arsenals of all States,

Recalling in that connexion the undertaking contained in article IX of the Convention to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and for their destruction,
Stressing the importance of early agreement on the complete prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction, which would contribute to general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Noting the risk of continued development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons in the absence of such agreement,

Having considered the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament,

Noting that drafts of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction, as well as other working documents, proposals and suggestions, have been submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and constitute valuable contributions to reaching appropriate agreement,

Taking into account the comments made on this item and relevant documents submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session,

Stressing the need for early submission of the joint initiative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in order to assist it in achieving early agreement on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction,

Noting that sustained and intensive efforts in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament have led to increased understanding in identifying practical approaches towards the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and towards their destruction,

Recognizing the importance of developing methods for providing adequate assurance of compliance with effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons, including methods of verifying the destruction of stockpiles of such weapons,

Having in mind that agreement on the complete prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction should not impede the utilization of science and technology for the economic development of States,

Desiring to contribute to an early and successful conclusion of the negotiations and, as a matter of high priority, to undertake the elaboration of an agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and for their destruction,

1. Urges all States to reach early agreement on the effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction;

2. Requests the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to continue negotiations and, as a matter of high priority, to undertake the elaboration of an agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and for their destruction, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives submitted for its consideration;

3. Invites all States that have not yet done so to accede to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, as well as to accede to or ratify the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and calls again for strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of those instruments;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament all documents of the thirty-second session of the
General Assembly relating to chemical weapons and to chemical means of warfare;

5. Requests the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to report on the results of its negotiations to the General Assembly at its special session devoted to disarmament, to be held in May and June 1978, and at its thirty-third session.

Conclusion

During 1977 substantive progress was made in the discussion of a chemical weapons ban. In-depth discussions at the political and technical levels of the basic problems relating to the prohibition of those weapons, namely the scope of the ban and verification, have given a new impetus to the search for an agreement on a question which has been given high priority by the General Assembly.

For the first time since the conclusion of the Convention on the prohibition of biological weapons in 1971, a consensus seems to be emerging with regard to the scope of a ban on chemical weapons. The debates in the CCD and the General Assembly, as well as the views expressed by the two sides in connexion with the continuing bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States, point to a general acceptance of the comprehensive approach in connexion with both the chemical agents and the activities to be prohibited in a multilateral convention.

Differences still persist, however, with respect to the question of verification, in particular on the international measures required to give assurances to the parties to an agreement that its provisions are being observed. While the Eastern European countries continued to hold that a verification system should be based on national means combined with some international procedures, the Western States continued to maintain that international verification was necessary and that, in that respect, on-site inspection should be one of the measures contemplated in an agreement.

In accordance with General Assembly resolution 32/77, the CCD has been requested to report on the results of its negotiations on a chemical weapons ban to the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. As noted in the resolution, the early submission of a joint initiative by the Soviet Union and the United States would assist the CCD in achieving an agreement on that question. It can, therefore, be expected that renewed efforts will be made to maintain the momentum achieved in the negotiations.
CHAPTER XIII

New weapons of mass destruction

Introduction

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY has long been aware that military research may result in new devices whose destructive effect is comparable to that of nuclear weapons. As early as 1948, when atomic weapons had been in existence for only a few years, the Commission for Conventional Armaments of the Security Council adopted a resolution which reflected the realization that in the future weapons might be developed with characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, and lethal biological and chemical weapons.1

The General Assembly took up the discussion of the question of new weapons of mass destruction in 1969 on the initiative of Malta. It did so by adopting resolutions 2602 C (XXIV) and 2602 D (XXIV), relating respectively to radiological methods of warfare and military applications of laser technology. In the following year, the subject was briefly discussed in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament which, however, did not deal with it in depth.

The question of the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons was first included in the agenda of the General Assembly at its thirtieth session, in 1975, following the transmission by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Andrei Gromyko, of a letter to the Secretary-General,2 to which a draft international agreement on the question was attached. That agreement did not contain a definition of the new types of weapons or the new systems to be included in the prohibition, but indicated in article I that they would be specified through negotiations. Article I also provided that new areas of development emerging after the entry into force of the agreement would be the subject of negotiations to extend the prohibition. The General Assembly

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2 A/10243.
subsequently adopted resolution 3479 (XXX), in which it asked the CCD to proceed on the matter.

In 1976, the CCD accordingly considered the question and held two series of informal meetings on it, in April and August of that year. In the discussion, the USSR and the other Eastern European countries advanced the view that it was essential to adopt a general prohibition of the development of new types and systems of mass destruction immediately, since it was more difficult to eliminate weapons once they were deployed than to ban their development and manufacture while they were still at the stage of research or experiment. A number of Western States, on the other hand, expressed the opinion that new scientific developments should be dealt with as they arose and that some potential new weapons of mass destruction fell within categories of weapons that already existed and should be covered in the context of such weapons. The difference in approach was thus basically one of definition.

This was also the case during the consideration by the General Assembly at its thirty-first session in 1976. During that session, Western States again sought clarification in respect of the question of the definition of the weapons to be covered in the draft treaty submitted by the USSR. The Eastern European States and a number of non-aligned States stressed the importance of banning new weapons of mass destruction in general and called for negotiations on a treaty to this end. The Soviet Union stated that it was ready to propose an approach that would include among new types of weapons of mass destruction any types of weapons based on qualitatively new principles of action, according to the method of use, the target to be attacked, and the nature of their impact.

The Assembly once more adopted a resolution on the subject, resolution 31/74, in which it called upon the CCD to continue negotiations, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, with a view to working out the text of an agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.

Consideration by the CCD, 1977

During the 1977 session, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament gave considerable attention to the subject. Its discussions centred at first on the draft convention submitted to it by the Soviet Union the year before and subsequently on the revised version of the draft, which its sponsor presented on 9 August 1977 (see appendix X below). An

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important point in the discussions was that of the priority to be given to the matter. Most of the delegations supporting the Soviet draft stressed the need for early agreement. Several other delegations, however, expressed the view that the negotiation of such an agreement should not divert the attention of the Committee from its task of adopting measures relating to already existing weapons, particularly nuclear ones. That point was made by the delegations of Egypt, Italy, the Netherlands, Romania and others.

As in the previous discussions, salient issues were the scope of a convention on the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction and the definition of such weapons, the verification aspect of such a convention and the question of how to avoid hampering technological and scientific research for peaceful purposes.

Generally, in the first phase of the debate in the CCD, the Soviet Union and other Eastern European States renewed their call for early agreement on a general prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, and the Western States, while supporting efforts to ban particular weapons of mass destruction, objected to the conclusion of a comprehensive convention banning any future, unspecified, new weapons of this kind.

Those delegations supporting the Soviet proposal, including Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary and India, thus continued to support the idea of concluding an agreement of broad scope. The Soviet Union added to its earlier proposal to prohibit any types of weapons of mass destruction that were based on qualitatively new principles the principle that a ban should also cover those types of weapons that were based on scientific principles already in use, but whose characteristics could be made even more dangerous through the introduction of new technical elements. The Soviet delegation shared the view expressed by several States, that the proposed agreement should not cover weapons of mass destruction already banned by other agreements, particularly by the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (General Assembly resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex). However, the delegation thought it might be useful to examine the possibility of including new types and systems of chemical weapons, particularly since the exact scope of a prohibition of such weapons had not yet been decided. It recognized that the first step in the negotiating process must be to reach an understanding on the scope of the prohibition, but suggested that the Committee focus, at the present stage, on the identification of possible directions for the development of new types and systems of weapons.

In supporting that approach with regard to the scope of an agreement, India disagreed with the criticism that it was amorphous, and that new weapons of mass destruction were difficult to define. It noted that
disarmament agreements already in existence did not contain precise definitions of the prohibited weapons. In that context, the Indian delegation referred to the question of verification and said that the problem was a perennial one in all agreements. Hungary also referred to the scope of the proposed convention, noting that there was fairly general agreement that it should not deal with weapons already prohibited by existing agreements or soon to be prohibited. It stated that of the four possibilities which existed for defining the scope of the convention, i.e., a precise definition, a less precise definition supplemented by illustrative examples, a definition indicating the objective and orientation of the agreement, but which would not be precise from the technical and legal standpoints and a definition by the enumeration of examples, it preferred the third one as a practical approach and because difficulties in elaborating a definition must not hinder further constructive negotiations. Egypt also believed that the Committee should not be rigid in trying to maintain the 1948 United Nations definition of weapons of mass destruction. Mongolia considered the definition in the Soviet working paper (CCD/514) entirely acceptable and the German Democratic Republic also supported the general proposals for defining the weapons to be banned, as well as a proposal Pakistan had made for listing specific banned weapons and keeping that list up to date. That delegation stated that the informal meetings held by the CCD with the participation of experts had identified the fields in which new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction might come into existence in the foreseeable future.

In the discussion of the scope of a ban on new weapons of mass destruction, several Western States said, on the other hand, that the resolution adopted in 1948 by the Commission for Conventional Arms, established by the Security Council, should be kept in mind in considering the problem of the prohibition of new weapons of mass destruction. That view was expressed in particular by Italy and by the United States. The delegation of the United Kingdom believed that a single treaty banning the development of new weapons of mass destruction would have to be so general in scope and so vague in its definitions that it would not be effective. It proposed that the General Assembly should adopt a resolution firmly condemning the development of such weapons, together with a request to the Committee to keep the matter under review. The CCD might then decide to negotiate specific agreements from time to time to preclude the development of particular new types of weapons of mass destruction which were based on new applications of scientific principles.

Canada, Italy, Sweden and the United States made statements supporting that suggestion. The Canadian delegation said, inter alia, that the discussion of the Soviet proposal had failed to show that weapons based on applications of new principles of science threatened to appear in the foreseeable future. Canada held that an "umbrella" agreement would not be of practical value, since each type of weapon had its own
characteristics and problems, and it supported the "common-sense approach" of the United Kingdom.

A number of delegations raised the point that a ban on new weapons of mass destruction should not hamper technological and scientific research for peaceful purposes. That was discussed, inter alia, by the German Democratic Republic, which stated that scientific research was assured under the Soviet draft convention, and by Hungary and Romania. The latter delegation added that the coverage of the convention should be subject to periodic review in the light of advances in science and technology.

The informal meetings, held with the participation of experts, earned favourable comment. It was noted by Hungary that the meetings of that type which had been held in 1976 had helped clarify the general approach to the problem, had provided the CCD with useful scientific information on new weapons and had more clearly defined the distinction between the convention proposed by the USSR and existing agreements on arms limitations. Iran, Italy and the Netherlands expressed the hope that the 1977 meetings would yield further clarification. The German Democratic Republic voiced regret that Western experts had not submitted helpful proposals, and both the Soviet Union and the United States said that the meetings had improved understanding of the problems.

The submission by the Soviet Union, on 9 August 1977, of a revised version of its draft treaty initiated the second phase of the debate. The new draft contained a number of changes relating to the scope of the proposed agreement and the delegation of the USSR pointed out that in making them, it had taken into account comments and proposals made by the representatives of Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary, India, Italy, Pakistan, Poland, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. In its statement, the Soviet Union explained that the new draft, in deference to the wishes of a number of members of the CCD, was using the 1948 formulation of the Commission for Conventional Armaments as the basis for the definition in article I, stating it in greater detail in the light of present requirements and tasks in the field of disarmament. That was necessary because the definition in the 1948 formulation did not, in the view of the delegation, make the necessary distinction between known types of weapons of mass destruction, including those that had been modernized, and new types of weapons which might be developed. The new draft article also took account of the possibility that weapons would be developed which were even more effective than existing ones, not only from the point of view of destruction, but from that of their damaging effect on human beings.

The revised draft agreement also included a clause providing that, parallel to a general agreement on the prohibition of the development
of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, special agreements could be concluded on the prohibition of particular types of weapons of mass destruction. The draft further foresaw that a specific list of types and systems of weapons of mass destruction to be prohibited would be annexed to the agreement and that that list could be supplemented if new areas of development and manufacture of such weapons emerged after the agreement had entered into force. The list annexed to the draft included the following types and systems of weapons: (a) radiological means of the non-explosive type acting with the aid of radioactive materials; (b) technical means of inflicting radiation injury based on the use of charged or neutral particles to affect biological targets; (c) infrasonic means using acoustic radiation to affect biological targets; and (d) means using electromagnetic radiation to affect biological targets.

The Soviet delegation stated that in the opinion of specialists, there existed a sufficient material basis for the application in practice of the scientific and technological principles that could be useful in the development of the new types of weapons of mass destruction included in that annex. In the view of the delegation, its proposals represented a composite approach to the solution of the question of scope, taking account of proposals both by those in favour of a general prohibition and by those who preferred to conclude specific agreements on various new types of weapons of mass destruction.

A number of delegations made statements supporting the Soviet proposals. Bulgaria stated that the conclusion of an agreement banning all new types of weapons of mass destruction was essential and that renouncing the conclusion of such an agreement in favour of possible specific agreements when a given new type of weapon of mass destruction could be better identified, as suggested by some delegations, would amount to ignoring the will of the General Assembly, compromise the solution of the problem as a whole, and open the possibility of the appearance of one or another new type of weapon in the future. The delegation did not oppose the conclusion of specific agreements, but held that it should not be envisaged as an alternative solution to a general prohibition.

The German Democratic Republic also supported the new initiative of the USSR and opposed the suggestion of achieving the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction only through specific agreements. The delegation of Mongolia, supporting the USSR draft, noted in particular the more detailed and specific definition included in it and the suggested specific list of types to be prohibited as well as the provision for supplementing that list in the future. The delegation pointed to those proposals as reflecting a trend towards minimizing the differences in the positions of the participants in the negotiations. Mongolia, too, maintained that the conclusion of a specific agreement on particular new types of weapons of mass destruct-
tion should not hamper the conclusion of a general agreement on the matter.

Poland, among other delegations, found the series of informal meetings with experts, which had been held from 9 to 12 August, beneficial. It also welcomed the revised Soviet text, particularly its flexible combination of the principle of a total ban with a realistic provision for special agreements as meaningful complementary steps. The Polish delegation suggested that the 1948 definition of weapons of mass destruction might well be outdated and that a more suitable definition should be found for inclusion in an agreement on the subject, as contained in the revised Soviet draft.

A different point of view was held by the United States, which considered that the best way to prevent the development and deployment of new types of weapons of mass destruction would be to keep the question under review, developing specific agreements dealing with particular new types of such weapons when they had been clearly identified. That would permit the formulation of verification measures specifically tailored to the weapons in question. The United States delegation doubted that attempts to reach such specific agreements would be helped by linking them to an over-all treaty dealing with technological fields not clearly understood or with areas of scientific development on whose military potential there was no general agreement. The delegation shared the objective of curbing weapons of mass destruction, but considered the 1948 definition adequate and saw no justification for amending it on grounds of new technological developments, since no such developments existed.

Sweden welcomed the Soviet initiative to try to put a definite obstacle in the path of potentially disastrous new arms developments, but concluded that it was unfortunately not possible to achieve a comprehensive agreement to ban new weapons once and for all. In Sweden's view, the CCD should review the pertinent areas to detect future dangerous signs and if such signs were detected, it should rapidly conclude agreements on the particular new types of weapons involved. Sweden therefore supported the United Kingdom proposal for a firm general condemnation, coupled with a request to the CCD to keep the matter under review.

At the closing meeting of the 1977 session, the United States delegation reported on the results of United States/USSR consultations on radiological weapons and other new weapons of mass destruction and stated that considerable progress had been made on a joint initiative dealing with the former (see Chapter XIV below). At that meeting, the Soviet Union also noted with satisfaction the manner in which its new draft had been received by many delegations. At the same time, it noted the absence of well-conceived arguments on the part of those opposed to a comprehensive agreement. The delegation expressed, inter alia, the hope that after careful study of the proposals, those delegations
would also show a constructive approach and make their contribution to the attainment of an understanding.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1977

The discussion at the thirty-second session of the General Assembly, where the question of the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons figured as item 46 on the agenda, reflected the same trends and centred around the same main issues as in the CCD.

Both during the general debate and in the First Committee, the Eastern European States and a number of non-aligned countries stressed the urgent need to conclude a treaty on the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction and called for renewed efforts of the CCD towards the achievement of an international agreement in this field. Most of these States expressed support for the proposal of the Soviet Union. The Western States generally adhered to their view that it was not possible to deal in advance with new weapons of mass destruction in a single global convention before each such weapon had been precisely defined. While continuing, therefore, to express reservations on the approach set out in the revised Soviet draft, and advocating consideration of specific agreements prohibiting certain categories of new weapons of mass destruction as soon as such weapons could be identified, those States, on the other hand, generally expressed the view that the CCD should keep the subject under close review.

Emphasizing the urgency and importance of the issue, the USSR called upon the United Nations to demand resolutely that plans for production of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, including the so-called neutron bomb, should be discontinued. Noting the positive results in the study of the substantive aspects of the problem by the CCD during the last year, the Soviet Union reaffirmed its belief in the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement as the most effective way of eliminating the danger of developing new types of weapons of mass destruction and called on the General Assembly to urge the reactivation of the talks on the subject.

Bulgaria stressed the urgent necessity of an agreement in the light of the fact that, in the circumstances of an arms race, the temptation to use new scientific and technological discoveries for military purposes was becoming stronger. The Bulgarian delegation also expressed its concern at and firm opposition to the policy of producing the neutron bomb.

6 See Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-second Session, First Committee, 7th to 38th, 40th and 44th meetings; and ibid., First Committee, Sessional Fascicle, corrigendum.
Poland said that the submission by the Soviet Union of a revised draft agreement had greatly facilitated the negotiations and the examination of that question by the CCD. It particularly welcomed the flexible combination of the ultimate objective of a comprehensive ban on the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction with the possibility of concluding special agreements on specific types of such weapons.

The Indian delegation stressed that it would continue to support in the future all initiatives aimed at preventing the development and production of new weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, and expressed its support for the revised Soviet draft convention.

Statements supporting the Soviet proposal were further made by the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia and the Ukrainian SSR. Hungary stressed that the revised draft treaty proposed by the USSR would not exclude the possibility of establishing separate treaties covering specified types of weapons of mass destruction, and was among those States condemning the deployment of the neutron bomb.

Supporting the intention behind the proposal of the Soviet Union, the Netherlands, however, expressed its doubts about the methodology, namely, the conclusion of a single “umbrella” agreement covering quite different types of weapons, some of them completely unknown.

Considering the question of the proposed convention to be a very complex issue, the Italian delegation reaffirmed its appreciation for the idea underlying the draft treaty proposed by the USSR and suggested that the CCD should be invited to keep this subject under constant and close study.

Canada found that some elements of obscurity in the original Soviet draft had been somewhat diminished. It nevertheless held that there were serious practical difficulties in the way of making the Soviet proposal effective as an arms control treaty. A similar statement was also made by the Federal Republic of Germany. Among other Western States that expressed views on the matter were Belgium, Japan, Portugal and the United States. Japan registered a strong reservation on starting negotiations on a disarmament question which it qualified as peripheral, unclear with regard to the scope of the prohibition and presenting difficulties of verification that were easy to foresee. The last point was also stressed by the United States, which said that the method of verifying compliance with an agreement to ban weapons of mass destruction would depend on the nature of the threat posed by the weapon and its characteristics, which might determine the means for its control.

The United Kingdom noted that the discussion of this subject in the CCD had led it and many others to the conclusion that there was no immediate danger that any new weapons of mass destruction based on any identified new scientific principle would emerge in the near future.
It did agree, however, that it was necessary to ensure that no new scientific discovery would be used for the creation of weapons of mass destruction coming under the fourth category of the 1948 definition, i.e. "weapons which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above". The United Kingdom had studied with great care and sympathy the Soviet Union's proposal to achieve that objective in a single all-embracing treaty, but it still remained convinced that such a treaty would inevitably be so vague and so general in its provisions as to be ineffective. Further, given this imprecision of definition, it would be impossible to devise workable means of verifying compliance with the treaty. There would also be the danger that a general treaty might appear to overlap, and hence call into question, the area covered by existing treaties banning already identified weapons of mass destruction. It was also the view of the United Kingdom that the conclusion of a general treaty would not help obtain agreement on prohibitions within other categories now under negotiation: nuclear, chemical and radiological. The United Kingdom, therefore, again presented its view that the matter could best be approached by means of a firm statement by the world community against the abuse of science for the purpose of creating new threats to mankind, coupled with a request to the CCD to keep the matter under constant review and negotiate instruments to preclude the development and production of particular weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles in good time.

On 28 October 1977, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary and the Soviet Union submitted a draft resolution (A/C.1/32/L.4) which was subsequently also sponsored by the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia and Mongolia and introduced by the German Democratic Republic at the 28th meeting of the First Committee on 9 November. By that draft resolution the General Assembly would, inter alia, request the CCD to continue negotiations, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, with a view to working out the text of an agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, and, when necessary, specific agreements on this subject; it would also request the CCD to submit a report on the results achieved to the General Assembly for consideration at its thirty-third session. While introducing the draft resolution, the representative of the German Democratic Republic stressed that it reflected the aim effectively to oppose the spreading of the arms race to new areas through the development of weapons of mass destruction. That goal would best be achieved by means of a comprehensive all-embracing agreement and not through a resolution of the General Assembly alone, which merely called upon States not to develop and manufacture new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. The German Democratic Republic saw the topicality and urgency of that demand as obvious in view of the development of new weapons such as the neutron bomb. It
also expressed its regret that a number of States disposing of significant economic, scientific and technological potential rejected the possibility of a comprehensive all-embracing prohibition as proposed by the Soviet Union and other countries. It stressed that those countries did not deny the possibility of concluding specific agreements when necessary and expressed the belief that the Soviet-American negotiations on the question of prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction, particularly of radiological weapons, could be regarded as a step forward.

On the same day, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom submitted a draft resolution (A/C.1/32/L.5), which was subsequently also sponsored by the Ivory Coast and introduced it at the 28th meeting of the First Committee on 9 November. By that draft resolution the General Assembly would, inter alia, urge States to refrain from developing new weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles; call upon States to apply scientific discovery for the benefit of mankind and reaffirm the definition of weapons of mass destruction contained in the resolution of the Commission for Conventional Armaments of 12 August 1948; request the CCD, while taking into account its existing priorities, to keep under review the question of the development of new weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and to consider the desirability of formulating agreements on the prohibition of any specific new weapons which may be identified; and to report on its review to the General Assembly at its thirty-third session.

In introducing the draft resolution, the representative of the United Kingdom once more stated that he did not believe that a general "umbrella" agreement would be effective in preventing the use of new scientific principles for military purposes. He called for a statement by the world community to that effect, in the form of a resolution of the General Assembly, which should be adopted by consensus.

Considerable effort was made by the two groups sponsoring the different resolutions to find a common formula on the subject. Appeals were made from both sides to obtain a single text bridging the two major approaches. Austria, in particular, said it could see only limited value in proposing draft resolutions which would be disapproved by one or more of those countries to which they were mainly addressed. It deplored that it had not been possible to achieve that goal in spite of the declared preparedness of the respective sponsors to make sincere efforts to reach an agreement.

On 15 November, the First Committee adopted draft resolution A/C.1/32/L.4 by a recorded vote of 87 to none with 28 abstentions (draft resolution A).

The General Assembly adopted it as resolution 32/84 by 110 votes to 1 (Albania), with 25 abstentions (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece,
Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Luxembourg, Mauritania, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States). China did not participate in the vote.

The resolution reads as follows:

_The General Assembly,_

_Recalling_ its resolutions 3479 (XXX) of 11 December 1975 and 31/74 of 10 December 1976, in which it requested the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to work out an agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons,

_Recognizing_ that modern science and technology have reached a level where a serious danger arises of the development of new, still more destructive types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons,

_Conscious_ that the development and manufacture of such weapons are fraught with the most serious consequences for the peace and security of nations,

_Convinced_ of the importance of concluding an agreement or agreements to prevent the use of scientific and technological progress for the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons,

_Not ing_ the negotiations now under way between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the question of the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction and in this context on the prohibition of radiological weapons,

_Taking note_ of the discussion at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament of the question of the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons,

_Taking into account_ the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament with regard to this question,

1. _Requests_ the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to continue negotiations, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, aimed at working out the text of an agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, and, when necessary, specific agreements on this subject;

2. _Requests_ the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to submit a report on the results achieved to the General Assembly for consideration at its thirty-third session;

3. _Urges_ all States to refrain from any action which would impede international talks aimed at working out an agreement or agreements to prevent the use of scientific and technological progress for the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons;

4. _Requests_ the Secretary-General to transmit to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament all documents relating to the discussion of this item by the General Assembly at its thirty-second session;

5. _Decides_ to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-third session the item entitled “Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament”

On 15 November, the First Committee adopted draft resolution A/C.1/32/L.5 by a recorded vote of 80 to none, with 35 abstentions (draft resolution B).
The General Assembly adopted it as resolution 32/84 B by 102 votes to 1 (Albania), with 28 abstentions (Austria, Barbados, Benin, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guyana, Hungary, Jamaica, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Nigeria, Poland, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Republic of Tanzania and Upper Volta). China did not participate in the vote.

The resolution reads as follows:

*The General Assembly,*

*Guided by the interests of strengthening international peace and security and desiring to promote confidence among nations and the further improvement of the international situation,*

*Restating its conviction that scientific discovery should be used for the benefit of mankind,*

*Recognizing that new weapons might be evolved on the basis of scientific principles other than those used in the weapons named in the 1948 definition of weapons of mass destruction,*

*Bearing in mind that recent years have seen the conclusion of a number of important agreements on the limitation of the arms race and disarmament, including some relating to the prohibition and limitation of identified weapons of mass destruction, and that negotiations for further agreements are continuing,*

*Noting the discussion at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on the question of the prohibition of the development of new weapons of mass destruction,*

1. *Urges States to refrain from developing new weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles;*

2. *Calls upon States to apply scientific discovery for the benefit of mankind;*

3. *Reaffirms the definition of weapons of mass destruction contained in the resolution of the Commission for Conventional Armaments of 12 August 1948, which defined weapons of mass destruction as atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons and any weapons developed in the future which might have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above;*

4. *Welcomes the active continuation of negotiations relating to the prohibition and limitation of identified weapons of mass destruction;*

5. *Requests the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, while taking into account its existing priorities, to keep under review the question of the development of new weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and to consider the desirability of formulating agreements on the prohibition of any specific new weapons which may be identified;*

6. *Requests the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to report on its review to the General Assembly at its thirty-third session.*

**Conclusion**

The question of the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons evoked even more interest in the course of 1977 than in the previous year. There would seem to be general agreement regarding the need for
some action by the international community in regard to new weapons of mass destruction.

During 1977, the two basic approaches to the question have become clearer. On the one hand, there is the continuing call, particularly by the Soviet Union and the other Eastern European States, and by a number of non-aligned countries, to conclude as soon as possible a global prohibition of such weapons, in the form of an all-encompassing agreement. On the other hand, Western States in particular oppose such a general agreement and advocate the conclusion of conventions regarding specific weapons as and when these emerge.

The two approaches have been greatly clarified, and the discussion contains some new elements. One such element is the United Kingdom proposal for a condemnation by the world community of the development of new weapons of mass destruction, albeit in the form of a United Nations resolution rather than an agreement. Another is the acceptance by the Soviet Union of the possibility of concluding special agreements prohibiting individual specific new types of weapons of mass destruction.

Nevertheless, serious differences still persist. Consideration of the question of a prohibition of new weapons of mass destruction will doubtless continue, and the attempts to achieve a decisive measure of consensus in this matter will require much additional time and effort.
CHAPTER XIV

Radiological weapons

Introduction

The question of controlling the use of radiological weapons has been considered by the General Assembly at various times since 1969. In that year, the Assembly, acting on the initiative of Malta, adopted resolution 2602 C (XXIV) concerning radiological warfare, in which it not only recommended that the CCD consider the need for effective methods of control of nuclear weapons that maximize radioactive effects, but invited that Committee to consider effective methods of control against the use of radiological methods of warfare conducted independently of nuclear explosions.

The weapons in question make use of radioactive substances produced in nuclear reactors, which are dispersed at the target area for the purpose of causing injury to humans. A major distinction between radiological methods of warfare conducted independently of nuclear explosions and the use of nuclear weapons proper is that the former rely on radiation effects caused by radioactive material contained in the weapon, while the latter depend for their effect on heat, blast and radiation caused by the nuclear process occurring at the time of explosion.

The report of the CCD on its deliberations in 1970 made a brief mention of the subject. It referred, inter alia, to a working paper submitted by the Netherlands, which concluded on the basis of available information that possibilities of radiological warfare existed theoretically, but would not seem to be of much, or even of any, practical significance. It was therefore, according to that paper, difficult to see the practical usefulness of discussing measures related to radiological warfare.

The question of radiological weapons as such was not discussed anew in the General Assembly until the thirty-first session, in 1976. Then it was raised by the United States, which pointed to the potential use in radiological weapons of radioactive materials accumulated as a result of operation of nuclear reactors. The United States representative

proposed that an agreement should be concluded prohibiting the use of radioactive materials for that purpose. Discussion in the General Assembly on the subject was limited and no draft resolution was submitted.

Meanwhile, however, the question of a ban on the prohibition of radiological weapons had begun to form the subject of bilateral negotiations. A working group on the subject was among the eight groups established during the meeting which took place from 28 to 30 March 1977 between Leonid Brezhnev, President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs, Andrei Gromyko and the United States Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance.2

**Consideration by the CCD, 1977**

As in the previous year, the question of a prohibition of radiological weapons was considered in the CCD in 1977 in the more general context of the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and of new systems of such weapons.3 Several references were made to the bilateral talks between the Soviet Union and the United States on an agreement on the prohibition of radiological weapons and some delegations referred to such an agreement as an example of possible specific agreements on particular new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction.

The Soviet Union informed the Committee that bilateral discussions had taken place at Geneva in 1976 and in early May 1977, particularly with regard to radiological weapons, and that the two participants had agreed to continue their work in the near future. In discussing the revised version4 of its draft agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, submitted in 1976,5 the Soviet delegation mentioned "radiological means of the non-explosive type acting with the aid of radioactive materials", among the types of weapons listed in an annex to the draft agreement, which, in the new version, provided that special agreements could be concluded on the prohibition of particular types of weapons of mass destruction.

The United Kingdom referred to the discussions on radiological weapons going on between the Soviet Union and the United States, which it believed might lead to the need for the CCD to negotiate a specific agreement to preclude the development of that particular new

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5 See *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. I: 1976 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.77.IX.2), chap. XVI; and appendix X.
type of weapon of mass destruction. The United States delegation also stated that it felt that radioactive material weapons should be subject to an appropriate agreement. At the closing meeting of the 1977 session of the CCD, that delegation reported on the results of United States-Soviet Union consultations on radiological weapons and other new weapons of mass destruction. On that occasion, it stated that considerable progress had been made on a joint initiative dealing with radiological weapons.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1977

At the thirty-second session of the General Assembly, the question of radiological weapons was again principally dealt with either in statements generally dealing with progress in various areas of disarmament and arms limitation (during the general debate) or in the framework of discussions on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons (agenda item 46). In discussions under item 46, Czechoslovakia referred to the work of the CCD that had followed the Soviet proposals, particularly in regard to the so-called radiological weapons of a non-explosive character, among other devices using new techniques of mass destruction. The United Kingdom, referring to its proposals in respect of weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles, also mentioned radioactive material weapons, in terms of the definition of weapons of mass destruction adopted in August 1948.7

The German Democratic Republic recalled the Soviet-American negotiations on such a prohibition and in particular on a prohibition of radiological weapons, which it said could be regarded as a step forward.

The delegation of the United States expressed its belief that the negotiation of a convention banning radiological weapons would be an action consistent with the definition given by the United Nations in 1948, and a further step in implementing the action called for by the decision of that year. It added that it had demonstrated that it was prepared to negotiate such a convention.

Mongolia, in stressing the need for the prohibition of new weapons of mass destruction, said that the idea of creating radiological weapons was not new, and that therefore the timely adoption of measures designed to serve as a reliable barrier against the emergence of new types of systems of weapons of mass destruction was a matter of acute
urgency. The delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany, on the other hand, spoke against dealing *a priori* with the complex of so-called new weapons of mass destruction in a single global convention; before the effect of a weapon would be fully covered by an agreement, the technical possibilities of its further development had to be clearly discernible. As soon as that was the case, the delegation held, it would appear appropriate to draft a special agreement relating to the particular weapon and taking into account its specific properties. Such an agreement should not only clearly define what was to be prohibited but also be adequately verifiable. Under the circumstances, that delegation felt it would be appropriate to prohibit radiological weapons.

The delegation of Venezuela mentioned the expectations aroused in the international community about, *inter alia*, the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on various subjects; it referred in that context specifically to the question of the prohibition of radiological weapons. Yugoslavia also expressed the expectation that the current negotiations between the two Powers would soon make it possible, *inter alia*, to draw up an international treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons.

**Conclusion**

Although the subject of the prohibition of radiological weapons has not been in the forefront of the discussions either in the General Assembly or in the CCD, numerous States feel that the conclusion of a convention on that subject would be useful. While there are different approaches to the question of the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction, a convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons could either be accommodated within the approach inherent in the Soviet draft agreement, or constitute a special agreement, as proposed, in particular, by a group of Western nations. Both the Soviet Union and the United States have demonstrated the wish to conclude a convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons and the reports on the progress in their talks on this subject would seem to indicate the possibility of concrete results.
CHAPTER XV

Napalm and certain other specific conventional weapons

Introduction

The question of prohibiting the use of napalm and other specific conventional weapons for humanitarian reasons has been considered in the General Assembly and in other forums for many years, but no specific agreement has as yet been reached with regard to such weapons.

In 1971 the General Assembly, in its resolution 2852 (XXVI), requested the Secretary-General to prepare a report on the subject, with the assistance of governmental experts. The report, entitled Napalm and Other Incendiary Weapons and All Aspects of Their Possible Use, was issued in 1972. The report noted that incendiary weapons caused widespread and largely uncontrollable conflagrations. The indiscriminate effects of fire on military and civilian targets were also discussed, as well as the particularly cruel effects of incendiary weapons on human beings, and in the report the experts reached the general conclusion that there was a need for measures prohibiting their use, production, development and stockpiling. By resolution 2932 A (XXVII), the General Assembly welcomed the report and deplored the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons in all armed conflicts.

Furthermore, a study prepared in 1973 by experts from 20 countries convened under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) concluded that all incendiary weapons, as well as a number of other specific conventional weapons, tended to cause excessive suffering or to have indiscriminate effects and should, therefore, be prohibited. The question of a ban on the use of these weapons was subsequently considered in detail at three sessions of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, held from 1974 to 1976, by an Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons established for that purpose by the Conference. The question was also extensively studied at the expert level, under the auspices of ICRC, at two sessions of the

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1 United Nations publication, Sales No. E.73.I.13.
2 Weapons That May Cause Unnecessary Suffering or Have Indiscriminate Effects (International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, 1973).
Conference of Government Experts on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons convened in Lucerne and Lugano, Switzerland, in 1974 and 1976 respectively, but without concrete results or specific recommendations, despite extensive support for prohibitions or significant restrictions on the use of many of the weapons in question, particularly the incendiaries.\(^3\)

The work of these forums was kept under review by the General Assembly in its First and Sixth Committees, for consideration of its disarmament and legal aspects, respectively. As regards the former, in 1973, by resolution 3076 (XXVIII), the General Assembly, aware that the first session of the Diplomatic Conference was to be held early in 1974, invited the Conference to consider, in addition to the question of napalm and other incendiary weapons, other specific conventional weapons which might be deemed to cause unnecessary suffering or to have indiscriminate effects, and to seek agreement on rules prohibiting or restricting the use of such weapons. In resolutions 3255 A (XXIX) and 3464 (XXX) the General Assembly again considered these questions, inviting the Diplomatic Conference to continue its discussions on the matter.

In addition to napalm and other incendiaries, the principal general categories of weapons considered for prohibition or restriction for humanitarian reasons by the various bodies included (a) blast and fragmentation weapons, (b) delayed action and treacherous weapons (namely, mines and booby traps) and (c) high-velocity small-calibre projectiles.

The principal obstacle to agreement on any of the weapons under consideration, as revealed in the discussions in various forums, was the position of many of the militarily advanced countries, among them the United States, that insufficient evidence had been advanced to show that the weapons in question were unduly inhumane against military personnel or indiscriminate in their effects when properly used and that, accordingly, any restrictions applied to them should pertain only to their use against civilian populations. Some countries, including the Soviet Union and France, stressed the view that the question of specific bans or restrictions on weapons was a disarmament matter which should be discussed in appropriate disarmament bodies. Detailed consideration of the problem appeared to have resulted principally in emphasis on its broad scope and complexity and the difficulties involved in reaching any significant specific agreements.

At its thirty-first session, the General Assembly adopted by consensus resolution 31/64, in which it stressed the urgency of the problem and the wish to attain concrete results at the fourth, and final, session of the Diplomatic Conference in early 1977 and again called

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on the Secretary-General to report on the aspects of the work of that Conference relevant to the resolution.

Consideration at the final session of the Diplomatic Conference, 1977

At its final session, held from 17 March to 10 June 1977 at Geneva, the Diplomatic Conference, as reported by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly, made some progress towards agreement on restricting the use of certain specific conventional weapons, notably landmines and the use of weapons that injure by fragments undetectable by X-ray. The Conference took no final decisions, however, with regard to any weapons. With particular regard to napalm and other incendiary weapons, which many countries were primarily interested in banning, little or no progress was made towards agreement because of the opposition of most of the militarily advanced countries to prohibiting the use of such weapons against military targets, including personnel.

As a result, those countries favouring the early prohibition or severe reduction of use of incendiaries and a number of other specific weapons, led by Mexico and Sweden, pressed for a decision to create an international body to follow the problem closely and to convene an international conference to consider the matter, when it deemed such a conference necessary. Failing in that effort by a close vote, the countries favouring such an initiative joined those opposing it, including most of the militarily advanced States, in formulating and adopting by consensus a compromise resolution (22 (IV)) recommending that a conference should be convened not later than 1979 with a view to reaching agreement on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain specific conventional weapons for humanitarian reasons, as well as on a mechanism for the review of agreements reached and for the consideration of further agreements. The resolution further requested Governments and the Secretary-General of the United Nations to give early consideration to the relevant proposals and discussions of the Diplomatic Conference; urged the holding of consultations among Governments prior to consideration of the question at the thirty-second session of the General Assembly and specifically recommended that a consultative meeting of all interested Governments be convened for that purpose in September or October 1977; recommended that States participating in such consultations should consider the establishment of a preparatory committee to seek the best possible basis for the achievement of agreements at the Conference; and invited the General Assembly, in the light of the results of such consultations, to take any further action that might be necessary for the holding of the Conference.

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4 See A/32/124.
5 Ibid., annex II.
Consideration by the General Assembly, 1977

The consultative meeting of Governments referred to in resolution 22 (IV) of the Diplomatic Conference was held at United Nations Headquarters in New York on 11 October 1977, on the initiative of Austria, Mexico and Sweden, with the participation of some 60 interested Governments. At that meeting, as well as at informal consultations on the subject, general views were exchanged on matters relating to the holding of the proposed conference on the subject in 1979 and on its preparation, as recommended in the resolution.

In the relatively limited debate on the matter in the plenary meetings of the General Assembly and in the First Committee, Sweden continued to take the lead in advocating a conference in 1979, receiving strong support from Austria. Mexico stated that, together with Sweden and Yugoslavia, it had initiated action with a view to the early adoption of conventions limiting or prohibiting certain conventional weapons having cruel or indiscriminate effects. Egypt, New Zealand, Spain and Venezuela were also prominent among the several additional delegations speaking in favour of convening a conference on the subject. A number of those delegations held that, with regard to such weapons, the humanitarian aspect should override other considerations, and that action was necessary to ban them.

The United Kingdom, noting that it had sponsored resolution 22 (IV), hoped that the conference recommended by that resolution would adopt proposals by consensus and that agreement could be reached on a number of proposals put forward in the Diplomatic Conference by the United Kingdom and other countries.

The Ukrainian SSR did not favour holding a special conference on the subject and suggested that the problem be resolved in the context of disarmament and in appropriate disarmament forums.

In a related and parallel discussion in the Sixth Committee under agenda item 115 on human rights in armed conflicts, Algeria, Austria, Bangladesh, Cyprus, Egypt, Finland, Honduras, India, Iran, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Sweden, Togo and Yugoslavia, as well as Switzerland, speaking in the capacity of observer, strongly supported resolution 22 (IV) of the Diplomatic Conference. The Federal Republic of Germany also observed that it had supported resolution 22 (IV) and was ready to participate in the preparatory work for the proposed conference, while Italy stressed that it had participated in the recent informal consultations on the subject and intended to co-operate in any steps that might be taken on the basis of general agreement. The Soviet Union, however, supported by the Byelorussian SSR, Mongolia and the Ukrainian SSR, reaffirmed its position.

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6 See Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-second Session, First Committee, 7th to 38th, 40th and 44th meetings; and ibid., First Committee, Sessional Fascicle, corrigendum.
of principle that any measures on the subject of curbing the use of weapons should be considered in the broader context of disarmament, while Hungary also expressed reservations concerning the implementation of resolution 22 (IV). With particular regard to the suggestion that the matter be considered in appropriate disarmament forums, Mexico held that the programme of the CCD was already full; it also noted that China and France, whose contribution to a solution of the problems Mexico considered essential, were not represented in the CCD; it concluded that referral of the matter to a disarmament body would result only in a lengthy postponement of the solution of the problem. Bangladesh also held that it was unnecessary to adopt a global view of disarmament, provided that there was some hope of achieving a universally recognized ban on certain specific weapons in the not too distant future.

Resolution 32/44, adopted by the Sixth Committee and the General Assembly under the item entitled "Respect for human rights in armed conflicts: report of the Secretary-General", while primarily designed to endorse the work of the Diplomatic Conference not directly concerned with the subject of curbing the use of specific conventional weapons, also contained a paragraph welcoming the recommendation of that Conference that a special conference be called on the subject.

On 14 November, Austria, Finland, Jordan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Tunisia submitted to the First Committee a draft resolution, which was subsequently also sponsored by Bangladesh, in which the General Assembly would express the belief that work on the question of prohibiting or restricting the use of specific conventional weapons for humanitarian reasons should be continued and would decide to include an item on the subject in the agenda of its next session.

In introducing the draft resolution, the delegation of Sweden pointed out that the Diplomatic Conference had made some limited progress towards banning the use of some specific weapons, notably the use of land-mines and booby traps against civilian populations. Noting that less progress had been made towards banning incendiaries, however, Sweden urged new efforts towards a solution of that problem, holding that most uses of incendiaries, including napalm, could be phased out without upsetting any existing military balance. With regard to small-calibre projectiles, on which no agreement had been reached, Sweden observed that both military alliances seemed to be preparing to supply their armed forces with new rifles of smaller calibre and stressed the need to avoid the use of weapons which might cause superfluous injury. With particular regard to the draft resolution, Sweden held that, since the Diplomatic Conference had concluded its work, the question of curbs on specific conventional weapons had

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reverted to the United Nations, where continued negotiations would have to take place. Although maintaining that consultations on the question had shown unanimity with regard to holding a conference on the subject in 1979, Sweden conceded that it had not yet been possible to achieve agreement on the language of the text for the setting up of a preparatory committee for the conference. In that connexion, Sweden recognized the need for a careful balance in such matters between humanitarian concerns and military and security concerns and stated that, without prejudging the decision of the preparatory committee with regard to its own procedures, it believed the committee must ensure that, for all practical purposes and based on previous experience in the field, decisions on substantive matters should always be the result of the broadest possible agreement. Sweden also maintained that the proposed conference would not adopt agreements that were binding on the participants without subsequent governmental ratification of an appropriate agreement. Lastly, Sweden urged new efforts towards agreement on a revised version of the draft resolution that would include a decision to hold a conference in 1979 and to make appropriate arrangements for its preparation.

On 17 November, after further consultations, Austria, Egypt, Finland, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Sweden, Tunisia, Venezuela and Yugoslavia submitted a revised draft resolution, subsequently also sponsored by Bangladesh, Jordan, New Zealand and Senegal, by which the General Assembly would decide to convene a United Nations conference in 1979, with a view to reaching agreement on: (a) prohibitions or restrictions on the use of specific conventional weapons, including those which might be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, taking into account humanitarian and military considerations, and (b) on the question of a system for periodic review of the matter and for consideration of further proposals. In addition, the Assembly would decide to convene a United Nations preparatory conference and request the Secretary-General to transmit invitations to all States and parties invited to attend the Diplomatic Conference; recommend that the preparatory conference meet in 1978 for organizational purposes and, subsequently, with the task of establishing the best possible substantive basis for the achievement at the conference of agreements as envisaged in the resolution and of considering organizational matters relating to the conference; and request the Secretary-General to assist the preparatory conference in its work.

In introducing the revised draft resolution, Sweden stressed that it now contained two new elements—decisions to hold a conference on the subject in 1979 and to convene a preparatory conference. With regard to the decision-making process of the preparatory conference, Sweden reiterated that a careful balance must be maintained between the humanitarian and security aspects of the problem and that decisions of substance would, for all practical purposes, always be the result of
the broadest possible agreement. The sponsors of the new draft hoped that it could be adopted by consensus and that certain difficulties raised by some countries with respect to various minor points of the text and with respect to an understanding about the decision-making process, both at the preparatory conference and at the conference itself, could be dealt with in the explanations accompanying the vote.

The revised draft resolution was adopted in the First Committee by a recorded vote of 84 to none, with 21 abstentions (including France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States). China did not participate in the vote.

A number of delegations explained their abstentions. The United States stated that, while it was prepared to continue to support further work of the type already carried out with a view to curbing the use of specific weapons, regarding which a reasonable prospect of agreement existed, progress could be made only under generally acceptable procedures, particularly the rule of consensus in reaching decisions. It held that neither the text of the draft resolution nor the statements of its sponsors had offered sufficient assurance on that point. The United States also noted that the language of the draft resolution concerning invitations to participants differed from that of resolution 22 (IV) of the Diplomatic Conference, which called only for meetings of Governments in the matter. The Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, stressing that they had participated in the consensus on resolution 22 (IV) and were prepared to consider further steps in the matter, also noted that they did not believe the draft resolution reflected the consensus reached on resolution 22 (IV) that future decisions on the question should be based on the broadest possible agreement, which they believed should be consensus, since such a decision would be binding under international law. The Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom further expressed the belief that it would be premature to consider any rigid review system of the matter before progress had been made towards actual agreements that might require such review. They also believed that the proposed conference should be based on the common ground already identified at the Diplomatic Conference and seek to elaborate proposals for which there was sufficiently broad agreement. In addition, the United Kingdom objected to the language of the draft resolution with regard to invitations as going beyond that of resolution 22 (IV) of the Diplomatic Conference. Australia, although it had voted in favour, and Turkey also regretted that no agreement had been reached to the effect that decisions would be taken by consensus and noted that any convention concluded without the support of the militarily significant States would be of little value.

The Soviet Union reiterated its long-standing view that the question involved was a disarmament question that should be considered in appropriate international disarmament forums. In that connexion, it stressed that military and security considerations must figure in any
solution of the problem and held that satisfactory results could not be achieved by ignoring the experience of those forums. It added that, despite changes made as a result of consultations regarding the draft resolution, it still could not agree with all its provisions, believing in particular that the General Assembly should not try to determine what the conference would deal with and that decisions concerning the security of States should be taken by consensus.

On 19 December, the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the First Committee, adopted the revised draft resolution by a vote of 115 to none, with 21 abstentions, as resolution 32/152. It reads as follows:

*The General Assembly,*

*Convinced* that the suffering of civilian populations and combatants could be significantly reduced if general agreement can be attained on the prohibition or restriction for humanitarian reasons of the use of specific conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects,

*Mindful* that positive results as regards the non-use or restriction of use for humanitarian reasons of specific conventional weapons would serve, in addition, as encouragement in the broader field of disarmament and might facilitate subsequent agreement on the elimination of such weapons which were completely banned for use,

*Recalling* that the issue of prohibitions or restrictions for humanitarian reasons of the use of specific conventional weapons has been the subject of substantive discussion for a number of years, notably at the sessions of the Conference of Government Experts on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons held, under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross, at Lucerne from 24 September to 18 October 1974 and at Lugano from 28 January to 26 February 1976, and at four sessions of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts and in the General Assembly since 1971,

*Taking note* of the reports of the Secretary-General on the work of the Diplomatic Conference relevant to the present resolution,

*Having concluded* from these reports that discussions have taken place primarily on the questions of prohibiting the use of conventional weapons, the primary effect of which is to injure by fragments not detectable by X-ray, of restrictions in the use of land-mines and booby traps, and of prohibitions or restrictions of use of incendiary weapons, including napalm, and that consideration was also given to other conventional weapons, such as small-calibre projectiles and certain blast and fragmentation weapons, and to the possibility of prohibiting or restricting the use of such weapons.

*Noting* resolution 22 (IV) on follow-up regarding prohibitions or restrictions of use of certain conventional weapons adopted by the Diplomatic Conference on 7 June 1977, in which the Conference recommends, *inter alia,* that a conference of Governments on such weapons should be convened not later than 1979,

1. *Believes* that the work on such weapons should both build upon the areas of common ground thus far identified and include the search for further areas of common ground and should in each case seek the broadest possible agreement;

2. *Decides* to convene in 1979 a United Nations Conference with a view to reaching agreements on prohibitions or restrictions of the use of specific conventional weapons, including those which may be deemed to be excessively

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injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, taking into account humanitarian and military considerations, and on the question of a system of periodic review of this matter and for consideration of further proposals;

3. **Decides** to convene a United Nations preparatory conference for the conference referred to in paragraph 2 above and requests the Secretary-General to transmit invitations to all States and parties invited to attend the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts;

4. **Recommends** that the Preparatory Conference for the United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects should meet once in 1978 for organizational purposes and, subsequently, with the task of establishing the best possible substantive basis for the achievement at the United Nations Conference of agreements as envisaged in the present resolution and of considering organizational matters relating to the holding of the United Nations Conference;

5. **Requests** the Secretary-General to assist the Preparatory Conference in its work;

6. **Decides** to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-third session an item entitled "United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects: report of the Preparatory Conference"

**Conclusion**

Despite the detailed and extensive consideration given at the Diplomatic Conference and at the two sessions of the Conference of Government Experts to the question of prohibiting or restricting the use of incendiary and other specific conventional weapons, no agreement on such prohibitions or restrictions was achieved in those forums. However, discussions have resulted in the identification of a number of technical and legal aspects which, while increasing the understanding of the issues involved, has also revealed the need for further consideration of the various problems confronting the negotiations, such as the scope of possible agreements, weapons to be included and other complex matters. In this respect, differences have also emerged on the choice of the appropriate forum for future efforts as well as on the question of decision making.

At its thirty-second session, the General Assembly developed a new mechanism for negotiations on those weapons. As the Diplomatic Conference concluded its work in 1977, many States considered it essential to convene a new conference, which would benefit from the thorough discussion held so far. The Diplomatic Conference was closely followed by the General Assembly, which had before it periodic reports of the Secretary-General on the deliberations of the Conference. A United Nations delegation also attended its sessions. Resolution 32/152 has introduced a new negotiating body by the convening of a conference which will be held within the framework of the Organiza-
tion. Therefore the preparatory conference, as well as the 1979 conference convened to deal with substantive questions, will involve the United Nations, more than before, in the efforts to reach agreements on prohibition or restrictions of use of certain conventional weapons.
PART FOUR

Other approaches to disarmament and arms limitation
CHAPTER XVI

The regional approach

Introduction

The possibility of taking a regional co-operative approach towards the realization of the goal of general and complete disarmament was raised in a number of forums in 1977. The realization of regional arms limitation was not viewed as a final goal, but rather as an aspect of the step-by-step approach to the eventual achievement of general and complete disarmament on a global basis. Moreover, in the light of the complex nature of the disarmament problem and the varying security considerations and arrangements in different regions, it appeared that in some cases questions of arms limitation and disarmament might be handled more easily within a regional framework than by attempting to apply broad concepts and approaches to widely differing situations. For instance, the primary disarmament concern in one region might be nuclear while in another it might be conventional. Among examples of regional initiatives treated in the present Yearbook are the questions of nuclear-weapon-free zones (see chapter X above) and the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace (see chapter XVII below) as well as a number of suggestions concerning international transfers of conventional arms (see chapter XVIII below).

At the thirtieth session of the General Assembly in 1975, Ghana\(^1\) suggested that conventional disarmament could best be achieved on a regional basis and proposed the establishment of regional conventional disarmament committees. The reports of such committees could, in Ghana's view, become part of the annual report of the CCD to the General Assembly.

The question of a regional approach to conventional disarmament was also raised during 1976 in the CCD,\(^2\) where Germany, Federal Republic of, the United Kingdom and the United States commented on various aspects of that approach and drew the attention of the Committee to the potential value of regional disarmament measures. Nigeria, on the other hand, said that it could not agree to shift the

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\(^1\) See Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirtieth Session, First Committee, 2089th meeting.

emphasis from the over-all problem of halting the nuclear arms race and of achieving general and complete disarmament to other questions, such as controlling the international traffic in conventional armaments.

At the thirty-first session of the General Assembly, Belgium circulated an aide-mémoire\(^3\) containing its views on regional disarmament. The aide-mémoire suggested that the Assembly could undertake a comprehensive study of disarmament matters lending themselves to a regional approach, covering all its aspects, i.e., not only disarmament and non-armament measures, but also any measure taken in the military field liable to increase stability or confidence among States. In addition to Belgium, other delegations, among them Pakistan, Singapore, Trinidad and Tobago and the United Kingdom, supported phased or regional approaches to arms limitation and disarmament. However, no resolution was tabled on the subject.

**Consideration by the CCD, 1977**

Although several States stressed the need for co-operation in efforts to achieve arms limitation and disarmament, there was little specific reference in the 1977 discussions of the CCD to the concept of a regional approach to realize that aim.\(^4\) Romania urged the Committee to devote special attention to Europe if it wished to make a genuine and lasting contribution to the cause of disarmament. The Romanian representative, who reiterated his country's support for the establishment of a zone of peace in the Balkans, stressed that the urgency of adopting practical disarmament and nuclear disengagement measures was increasingly being felt in Europe where, more than in any other part of the world, there was an unprecedented concentration of armed forces and modern weapons, including nuclear arms, and where two major military blocs were confronting each other.

Pakistan, while noting that the primary responsibility for disarmament lay with the nuclear-weapon States, held that the non-nuclear-weapon States, particularly those of the third world, must lend strong impetus to the disarmament process by their own collective and regional initiatives. India, on the other hand, stressed that the real danger of diversion of disarmament efforts rested with the proposals for controlling conventional armaments without any meaningful curbs on the nuclear arms race, and with the adoption of an imposed or artificial regional disarmament approach instead of a truly world-wide one. India held, furthermore, that the developing countries needed conventional weapons to preserve their independence from various threats, including new threats of destabilization.

\(^3\) A/ C.1/31/10.

Consideration by the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament

The subject of promoting arms limitation and disarmament on a regional basis was discussed in the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament and was also raised in the comments and suggestions communicated by a number of States to the Secretary-General concerning the special session. The States which referred to the topic generally expressed the view that regional measures taken on the initiative of the States concerned could contribute significantly to arms limitation and disarmament, especially in the field of conventional arms, and they urged the consideration of the question at the special session.

In its comments sent to the Secretary-General regarding the special session, Belgium referred to the aide-mémoire it had circulated at the thirty-first session of the General Assembly and emphasized its belief that, particularly in the sphere of conventional weapons, the United Nations should make an over-all review of the possibilities for negotiations and for measures of arms control and disarmament available to the regions of the world.

Furthermore, a number of countries included the question of regional arms limitation and disarmament in the working papers which they submitted to the Preparatory Committee containing their suggestions for the declaration on disarmament and the programme of action envisaged for adoption at the special session.

On behalf of the Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries, Sri Lanka suggested, as one of the elements of the programme, the convening of regional conferences on the initiative of the States of the region for the reduction of armaments and armed forces. Among the principles to be embodied in the declaration, it was also stated that the ultimate elimination of conventional armaments could be achieved only within the framework of general and complete disarmament. In connexion with the proposed Declaration, Romania held that, while absolute priority should be given to measures of nuclear disarmament, there should be parallel negotiations aimed at universal objectives having a regional or bilateral nature. In suggesting basic provisions of the programme of action, the Soviet Union and other Eastern European States referred to regional measures for military détente and disarmament, such as mutual reductions of armed forces.

6 A list of these working papers is given in the report of the Preparatory Committee (Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-second Session, Supplement No. 41 (A/32/41)).
Regional aspects of arms control and disarmament received considerable attention at the thirty-second session of the General Assembly, both during the general debate and in the First Committee. In addition to the established question of nuclear-weapon-free zones, there were references to the general concept of regional arms limitation and disarmament, conventional arms regulation within a regional framework, mutual force reductions and détente in Europe and questions of regional security and co-operation in other areas, including the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

With regional peace, security and co-operation being regarded as vital components of regional arms control and disarmament, several representatives, including those of both Eastern European and Western countries, stressed the importance of the Vienna talks on mutual force reductions in Central Europe and the Final Act of the 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and urged the expansion and further consolidation of the process of détente in that continent.

In that connexion, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary and the Ukrainian SSR recalled the proposal of the Eastern European States, addressed to all participants in the Helsinki Conference, to conclude a treaty whereby they would undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. A number of States, including Czechoslovakia, Ghana, Senegal, Sierra Leone and the United Kingdom, while noting the positive impact of détente in Europe, also called for its extension to other regions.

Several delegations, including those of Albania, Greece, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Spain and Yugoslavia emphasized the need to rid the Mediterranean region of war and conflict and to transform it into an area of peace and stability. To that end, Albania and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya called for the elimination of foreign military and naval bases and the withdrawal of all foreign naval fleets from the area. The Byelorussian SSR, for its part, attached great importance to the withdrawal from the Mediterranean area of vessels and submarines carrying nuclear weapons.

With regard to the Middle East, Israel said that it had decided to reduce its military budget by 3 to 4 per cent and indicated its readiness to discuss an agreement on arms limitation with all States in the region. Egypt held that there were a number of elements for the achievement of peace in the Middle East and mentioned among them, in addition to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, the need to regulate con-

\[\textit{\textsuperscript{7}}\text{See Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-second Session, First Committee, 7th to 38th, 40th and 44th meetings; and ibid., First Committee, Sessional Fascicle, corrigendum.}\]
ventional armaments, since in its view a race in that field was likely to increase tensions.

Many States referred to regional arms control and disarmament within the context of curbing the international traffic in conventional weapons. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Portugal, Singapore, the United Kingdom and the United States, among others, supported such an approach, regarding it mainly as a step towards a wider and more comprehensive global scheme, which would involve arms suppliers, to limit the flow and accumulation of such weapons (see also chapter XVIII below).

Belgium stressed that its support for the regional approach was neither to undermine the global approach nor to define an order of priorities. Rather, Belgium considered both approaches as necessary and as mutually complementary. Moreover, in its view, certain measures could only be conceived of on a global basis, such as those relating to weapons of mass destruction, while others could be applied immediately at the regional level, whether they be measures of arms reduction, control, stabilization or prevention, or measures designed to increase confidence.

On 11 November, Belgium submitted to the First Committee a draft resolution under the agenda item entitled “General and complete disarmament”, aimed at promoting the regional approach to arms control and disarmament. In commending the draft resolution to the Committee for its approval, Belgium, inter alia, referred to regional initiatives already undertaken, such as the successful realization of a Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone agreement and proposals for the creation of similar zones in other regions, as well as the comprehensive United Nations study on the subject. The Vienna talks on mutual force reductions in Central Europe and the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference were also mentioned as regional efforts offering opportunities leading to general and complete disarmament. Belgium pointed out that it was now even more convinced than in 1976— when it had first proposed the issue in the General Assembly—that the United Nations should devote systematic attention to the numerous arms control and disarmament possibilities offered by the regional approach, as well as to appropriate measures to increase confidence and stability among States. It also stressed that the initiative for regional measures should be left to the States of the regions concerned as it was up to those States to assess, independently, the necessary conditions for their security.

Contending that the regional approach offered great flexibility of application, Belgium explained that the approach envisaged in its draft resolution could be applied in both the nuclear and conventional weapon fields, and that prospects for agreement varied from one region to another, depending on political and military factors, in particular on the existence of conflict situations.

Finally, Belgium emphasized that by its draft resolution, the role
of the United Nations would be limited to the production of a reference
document setting forth the various regional possibilities. The United
Nations, Belgium further held, could not and should not replace States
either in assessing the advisability of measures to be contemplated or
in defining ways and means of implementing those measures.

A number of comments were made on the Belgian draft resolution.
Israel, Romania and Spain expressed their support for the draft, while
Jordan, which abstained in the vote, said it shared the position of
other non-aligned countries which considered the Belgian initiative
unsuitable at the moment, when world attention should be concentrated
on nuclear disarmament and on the elimination of weapons of mass
destruction and when, in its view, countries facing aggression needed
continually to defend themselves.

Israel explained that it regarded the Belgian draft resolution as a
step in the right direction and shared the view expressed in the draft
that measures designed to increase confidence and stability could play
an important part in the process of regional disarmament, while Spain
considered that the regional approach, in all its aspects, opened up
important disarmament possibilities.

Romania emphasized its view that the attainment of the final goal
of general and complete disarmament required not only world-wide but
also regional and even unilateral measures. The heavily armed coun-
tries, for instance, could stimulate the whole process of military disen-
gagement and disarmament by proceeding, unilaterally, to reduce their
troops and armaments. It held further that the achievements of the
regional approach to nuclear disarmament represented by the establish-
ment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and by the pro-
posals for similar zones in a number of other regions justified further
steps aimed at strengthening mutual confidence and stability and reduc-
ing armed forces and armaments at regional levels, especially in Europe.

The regional approach, Romania contended, presented several
advantages, among which were: (a) that the negotiation and adoption
of disarmament measures took place under comparatively homogeneous
geopolitical conditions; (b) that the security interests of the States con-
cerned were, in general, similar or even common; (c) that the number
of States participating in negotiations and likely to become parties to
any future agreement was relatively small; and (d) that the States
involved knew each other well and were linked not only geopolitically
but also by a common history.

Finally, Romania asserted that General Assembly support of meas-
ures taken by States towards regional military disengagement and dis-
armament would represent an important contribution towards the realiz-
ation of the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament.

The Belgian draft resolution was adopted by the First Committee
on 18 November by 71 votes in favour (including France, the United
Kingdom, the United States and the USSR) to none against, with 41
abstentions, most of them non-aligned countries. China did not participate in the vote. The draft was subsequently adopted by the General Assembly on 12 December 1977 by 91 votes to none, with 40 abstentions, as resolution 32/87 D. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Concerned at the fact that the armaments race is accelerating and that the world figure for expenditures on armaments continues to increase,

Convinced of the need to intensify and diversify the efforts to promote general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Reaffirming the right of each State, in the exercise of its sovereignty, to determine the appropriate conditions, and to take all the necessary measures, for ensuring its security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations,

Mindful of the importance which new regional measures taken on the initiative of the States concerned may have,

Convinced of the usefulness for the international community of a study on all regional aspects of disarmament,

1. Invites all States to inform the Secretary-General, not later than 15 April 1978, of their views and suggestions concerning the regional aspects of disarmament, including measures designed to increase confidence and stability as well as means of promoting disarmament on a regional basis:

2. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit the communications received by him from Governments as official documents to the General Assembly at its special session devoted to disarmament, to be held in May and June 1978;

3. Decides to consider at its thirty-third session the desirability of requesting the Secretary-General to prepare, with the collaboration of a special group of qualified governmental experts, a comprehensive study of all the regional aspects of disarmament, bearing in mind, inter alia, the decisions and recommendations that may be adopted by the General Assembly at its special session.

Conclusion

During the discussions held in 1977, it was generally felt that any initiative for regional arms limitation and disarmament, if it is to be effective, should involve the countries of the region in the negotiating process. As those discussions demonstrate, the regional approach has found significant applications in the case of nuclear-weapon-free zones (see chapter X above) and the United Nations has made a continuing contribution in the development of the concept. In comparison with the questions relating to those zones, the regional approach to conventional disarmament has so far received less attention.

However, the regional approach found significant support in 1977, particularly among members of the Western group, as well as some Eastern European countries, which felt that regional measures in the field of nuclear and conventional arms, where appropriate conditions existed, could be complementary to a global approach to disarmament. On the other hand, some States—mainly non-aligned—have expressed reservations. Many among them regard nuclear disarmament as the
problem commanding the highest priority and, therefore, concern has been expressed that a regional approach to conventional arms might distract attention from that urgent question.

In the case of the regional approach to conventional disarmament as with questions relating to nuclear-weapon-free zones, two different levels of international activity can be identified: one focusing on negotiations and the other dealing with information and study. The latter may lead to a better understanding of the complex problems involved in the regional approach to conventional disarmament. Further elaboration of the concept, under United Nations auspices, might assist both in the identification of basic problems and in finding appropriate answers to them.

The General Assembly will discuss the question at its special session in considering the views and suggestions of Governments as requested in paragraph 1 of resolution 32/87 D. The decisions and recommendations made at the special session will then be among the basic considerations that the General Assembly, at its thirty-third session, will keep in mind in deciding whether to request the Secretary-General to prepare a comprehensive study of all the regional aspects of disarmament, in accordance with paragraph 3 of the same resolution.
CHAPTER XVII

Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace

Introduction

In 1971, at the request of Sri Lanka, later joined by the United Republic of Tanzania, an item entitled “Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace” was included in the agenda of the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly. The General Assembly, at that session, adopted resolution 2832 (XXVI) in which it solemnly declared that the Indian Ocean, within limits to be determined, together with the airspace above and the ocean floor subjacent thereto, was designated for all time as a zone of peace. It also called upon the great Powers, in conformity with the Declaration, to enter into consultations with the littoral States of the Indian Ocean, with a view to halting the further expansion of their military presence in the Indian Ocean and eliminating from the area all bases, military installations, nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and any manifestation of great power rivalry, and called upon the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, the permanent members of the Security Council and other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean to enter into consultations, with a view to implementing the Declaration and ensuring that: (a) warships and military aircraft would not use the Indian Ocean for any threat or use of force against any of its littoral or hinterland States; (b) subject to the foregoing and to the norms and principles of international law, the right to free and unimpeded use of the zone by all nations would be unaffected; and (c) arrangements would be made to give effect to any international agreement ultimately reached on the question.

A year later, at its twenty-seventh session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2992 (XXVII) by which it decided to establish a 15-member Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, consisting of Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen and Zambia. The Ad Hoc Committee was to study the implications of the proposal to establish an Indian Ocean peace zone, with specific reference to the practical measures that might be taken in furtherance of the objectives of resolution 2832 (XXVI), having due regard to the security interests of the littoral and hinterland States of
the Indian Ocean and the interests of any other State consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

In 1973, the General Assembly adopted resolution 3080 (XXVIII), by which it, *inter alia*, requested the Secretary-General to prepare, with the assistance of qualified experts and competent bodies selected by him, a factual statement of the great Powers' military presence in the Indian Ocean, in all its aspects, with special reference to their naval deployments, conceived in the context of great Power rivalry. The statement was completed in 1974 and annexed to the *Ad Hoc* Committee's report to the General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session.¹

At its twenty-ninth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 3259 A (XXIX), by which it, *inter alia*, called upon the great Powers to refrain from increasing their military presence in the region of the Indian Ocean; requested the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean to enter into consultations with a view to convening a conference on the Indian Ocean and invited all States, especially the great Powers, to co-operate with the *Ad Hoc* Committee in the discharge of its functions. By resolution 3259 B (XXIX), the *Ad Hoc* Committee was enlarged by the addition of three new members: Bangladesh, Kenya and Somalia.

In its report to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session,² the *Ad Hoc* Committee unanimously recommended to the Assembly for adoption a draft resolution, in which, among other things, the Assembly noted than an agreement in principle on the convening of a conference on the Indian Ocean had emerged among the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean and requested them to continue their consultations to that end, with particular attention to the purposes of the conference, its date and duration, its venue, the provisional agenda, participation and level of participation. The draft resolution was adopted by the General Assembly as resolution 3468 (XXX).

At its thirty-first session, by its resolution 31/88, the General Assembly took note of the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean,³ in particular section two thereof concerning the consultations entered into by the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean in pursuance of resolution 3468 (XXX), and invited once again all States, in particular the great Powers and the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean, to co-operate in a practical manner with the *Ad Hoc* Committee in the discharge of its functions.

Besides the consideration given to it by the United Nations, the proposal to establish an Indian Ocean peace zone has also, for a number of years, appeared as an item on the agenda of other international conferences, particularly those of the non-aligned and Islamic States, which

have consistently expressed support for the implementation of the peace zone concept.

Consideration by the *Ad Hoc* Committee, 1977

Pursuant to resolution 31/88, the *Ad Hoc* Committee continued its work and held 13 formal and a number of informal meetings between April and October 1977, ending with the adoption of the Committee's report to the General Assembly.4

The *Ad Hoc* Committee reconvened on 18 April 1977 against the backdrop of certain new and significant developments. On 9 March President Carter, in reply to a press conference question about the general state of negotiations with the Soviet Union, noted that the United States had proposed that the Indian Ocean be completely demilitarized.5 Subsequently, on 17 March, in his address to the United Nations, the President stated that the United States would "seek to establish Soviet willingness to reach agreement with us on mutual military restraint in the Indian Ocean".6 This was followed by the announcement on 30 March, at the conclusion of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's visit to Moscow, that a working group would be set up to pursue possible military limitations in the Indian Ocean.7 Within the framework of the agreements reached during that visit, three rounds of talks were held in 1977: in Moscow, from 22 to 27 June; in Washington, from 26 to 30 September; and at Bern, from 6 to 12 December.

Mindful of these developments, several delegations,8 while voicing disappointment at the outset of the session over the continued lack of co-operation on the part of certain great Powers and major maritime users of the Indian Ocean, nevertheless expressed satisfaction concerning the recent events which had demonstrated that the great Powers were prepared, at least in principle, to study the possibility of controlling their arms race in the Indian Ocean. Iran recalled that the Soviet Union, in the memorandum on disarmament which it had submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session,9 had made it clear that it would be prepared to study the question of its attitude concerning the convening of a conference on the Indian Ocean. Iran further referred to the statements made by the President and the Secretary of State of the United States regarding the possibilities and options concerning the

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8 See, for example, the statement of Sri Lanka at the 39th meeting (A/AC.159 SR.39, para. 5).
Indian Ocean and suggested that on the basis of those statements and the Soviet memorandum, the Ad Hoc Committee should approach the Soviet Union and the United States with a view to obtaining their co-operation and that to facilitate that task it should authorize its Chairman to undertake personal consultations with the two Powers. The Ad Hoc Committee endorsed that proposal and decided to entrust its Chairman with the task of entering into consultations with those Powers in order to discuss with them the co-operation they would give that body in the discharge of its functions, and to seek further clarification of the statements made by their respective leaders relating to the Indian Ocean.

In pursuance of the above decision, a series of consultations was undertaken by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, the results of which were reflected in its report to the General Assembly, which included a draft resolution that was unanimously recommended for adoption by the Assembly at its thirty-second session.

The Ad Hoc Committee noted in its report that the initial meeting of the delegations of the United States and the USSR had taken place in Moscow between 22 and 27 June 1977, within the general framework of the arms reduction negotiations between them, and that during those talks, possible steps towards arms limitation by both States in the Indian Ocean area had been considered. As seen from the report, there were divergent views among the members of the Committee as to the significance of the bilateral consultations. Several countries welcomed the initiation, by the Committee, of contacts with the two Powers as a positive development towards the realization of the concept of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace and expressed the hope that they would be continued. Other members, however, voiced a degree of scepticism regarding the usefulness of those consultations and one member held that the Soviet Union and the United States should make an unequivocal commitment to eliminate any manifestation of their military presence in the Indian Ocean region, and scrupulously respect the independence and sovereignty of the countries of that region.

The second round of Soviet-American talks was held in Washington from 26 to 30 September 1977. In his consultations with the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee had been informed that during the negotiations both sides had expressed their interest in achieving practical results in the talks, which, it was felt, would be conducive to the strengthening of peace in the Indian Ocean area and contribute to the relaxation of international tension. It had also been pointed out that the talks had entered an advanced and practical stage and the possibility of a step-by-step implementation of appropriate measures had been considered. Furthermore, the two sides had concurred in the view that those initial steps

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10See A/AC.159/SR.39, para. 7. See also, for example, the statements of India and Australia at the same meeting.
should contribute effectively to preventing the build-up of an arms race in the Indian Ocean area and had expressed their intention to move promptly, in the period of implementation of such initial steps, to further talks on reductions.

The Ad Hoc Committee also informed the General Assembly about the results of its consultations concerning the convening of a conference on the Indian Ocean, pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 of resolution 31/88. The great Powers and major maritime users of the Indian Ocean were invited by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, in a letter dated 14 April 1977, to participate in consultations looking forward to the convening of a conference on the Indian Ocean. Of the Governments which responded, only two—Greece and Panama—accepted the invitation. On the question of a programme of action leading to the convening of a conference on the Indian Ocean, all Governments which submitted their views and suggestions on that subject supported the establishment of a zone of peace which would ensure peace and security in the Indian Ocean and recognized the need to convene a conference on the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.

The Ad Hoc Committee noted that in the course of its deliberations, one member had suggested that it would be useful to hold a preliminary meeting of the States in the Indian Ocean region with a view to arriving at a common position on various issues before a wider conference, with the participation of the great Powers and major maritime users of the Indian Ocean, was convened. While there had been no objection on the part of the littoral and hinterland States to the proposed conference, no agreement had emerged regarding a suitable date and venue.

Finally, the report referred to the question of expansion of the Ad Hoc Committee, as well as to a letter received by the Chairman from the representative of Israel expressing Israel's interest and its willingness, in principle, to participate in the meetings of the littoral and hinterland States or any other relevant bodies.

Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries

The Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries, which met at New Delhi at the Foreign Ministers' level from 7 to 11 April 1977, reiterated, in its final communique, the firm and unanimous commitment of non-aligned countries to the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2832 (XXVI).

11 For the replies, see annex I to the report of the Ad Hoc Committee. Liberia responded affirmatively to a similar invitation sent out in 1976.
12 See annex I to the report of the Ad Hoc Committee.
13 See annex III to the report of the Ad Hoc Committee.
14 See A/32/74, annex I, paras. 47 and 48.
It condemned the establishment, maintenance and expansion of foreign military bases such as Diego Garcia contrary to the express wishes of the littoral and hinterland States and of the international community and called for the elimination of great Power military rivalry and tension from the Indian Ocean. The Bureau also recalled, in that context, the Colombo Declaration\(^\text{15}\) which had called for the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean and its natural extensions. It further urged the littoral and hinterland States to desist from membership in military alliances or pacts conceived in the context of great Power rivalry. The Bureau noted the consultations under way for convening a conference on the Indian Ocean with a view to implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. It expressed the hope that the great Powers and the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean would co-operate with the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean and, in that context, took note of recent statements by great Powers relevant to the establishment of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.

### Eighth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers

The question of creating an Indian Ocean peace zone was also considered at the Eighth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, which was held at Tripoli from 16 to 22 May 1977.

The Conference, by its resolution 12/8-P,\(^\text{16}\) *inter alia*, requested Islamic States to concert their positions to ensure the early establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean, free of military bases and nuclear weapons and called upon the nuclear powers to honour their obligations with regard to the denuclearization of Africa, the Middle East and South Asia and the establishment of an area of peace in the Indian Ocean. Furthermore, in a final communiqué, the Conference called for the transformation of the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace, free of military bases and nuclear weapons.\(^\text{17}\)

### Consideration by the CCD, 1977

The question of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace received only limited consideration during the 1977 session of the CCD.\(^\text{18}\) At the start of the session, the Soviet Union submitted to the Committee its memorandum on disarmament, which it had submitted to the General Assem-

\(^{15}\) Political Declaration adopted by the Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Colombo from 16 to 19 August 1976 (A/31/197, annex I).

\(^{16}\) See A/32/235, annex I.

\(^{17}\) See A/32/133, annex, para. 29.

bly at its thirty-first session.\textsuperscript{10} In that document the Soviet Union indicated that it regarded the Indian Ocean peace zone proposal with understanding. It stressed, in that regard, that the key issue was the elimination of foreign military bases from the area and stated that it never had had, and did not now intend to build, military bases in the Indian Ocean region. The Soviet Union also indicated in its memorandum that it was prepared to join with other Powers in seeking ways to reduce, on a reciprocal basis, the military activities of non-coastal States in the Indian Ocean and in the regions directly adjacent to it. It added, however, that such measures must not interfere with the freedom of navigation on the high seas as well as with research and the need for commercial stops at ports of coastal States. The Soviet Union further indicated that it was prepared to consider the question of convening an Indian Ocean conference in the light of the views set out in its memorandum.

The delegation of Iran, referring to the Ad Hoc Committee's report to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session,\textsuperscript{20} noted the Ad Hoc Committee's inability to move towards the convening of a conference of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean. It expressed the hope that an action programme leading to the convening of such a conference could be formulated and that all the countries concerned would participate in the relevant consultations.

While addressing the question of security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States, Japan stated that the proposed peace zone in the Indian Ocean could also contribute to the security of the countries in the region concerned, provided that the establishment of such a zone: (a) gained the consensus of the States concerned, including nuclear-weapon States; (b) did not undermine the peace and security of the region or the entire world; (c) was furnished with an effective safeguards system embracing inspection and verification; and (d) was consistent with the principles of international law, including the principle of freedom of navigation on the high seas.

\textbf{Consideration by the General Assembly, 1977}

In its consideration of the question of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace,\textsuperscript{21} the General Assembly had before it the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean,\textsuperscript{22} the resolution on the question

\textsuperscript{10} See foot-note 8.
\textsuperscript{21} See Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-second Session, First Committee, 7th to 38th, 40th and 44th meetings; and ibid., First Committee, Sessional Fascicle, corrigendum.
adopted by the Islamic Conference and the relevant part of that Conference's final communiqué.

The report of the Ad Hoc Committee was introduced (at the 35th meeting of the First Committee) by its Chairman, the representative of Sri Lanka, who submitted two oral amendments to paragraphs 3 and 5 of the draft resolution recommended by the Ad Hoc Committee. The first amendment specified New York as the venue of the proposed meeting of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, the date being left open for further consultations; the second amendment proposed to increase the membership of the Ad Hoc Committee by the addition of Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, Greece, Mozambique and Oman. In his statement, the Chairman gave a brief history of the item under consideration since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2832 (XXVI), in which the Assembly declared the Indian Ocean a zone of peace, and noted that the most impressive development was the fact that the Soviet Union and the United States had provided information on their consultations. He also expressed the hope that both powers would continue the practice that they had initiated of keeping the Ad Hoc Committee informed, through the Chairman, of the progress of their talks.

By the revised draft resolution recommended by the Ad Hoc Committee in its report, the General Assembly would, inter alia, renew its invitation to the great Powers and the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean to co-operate with the Ad Hoc Committee; decide that as the next step towards the convening of a conference on the Indian Ocean a meeting of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean be convened in New York at a suitable date; request the Ad Hoc Committee to make the necessary preparations for such a meeting; decide to enlarge the composition of the Ad Hoc Committee by the addition of five States; and renew the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee and request it to submit a full report on its work to the Assembly at its thirty-third session.

During the course of the debate, a large number of delegations reaffirmed the validity of the objective of transforming the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace and urged all States to co-operate in taking effective action towards the realization of that goal. At the same time, several delegations, including Indonesia, Iraq, Kenya and Zambia, expressed dissatisfaction with the lack of any significant progress in the efforts towards implementing the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, and a number of them attributed the prevailing situation to failure on the part of the major Powers to accord greater co-operation to the Ad Hoc Committee. Iraq, for example, pointed out that the results obtained to date were limited, essentially owing to the fact that most of the major Powers had not co-operated, and Zambia deplored the negative attitude of the great Powers and urged them to co-operate fully with the Ad Hoc Committee in its efforts to seek implementation of the Declaration.
Elaborating further on the difficulties which had prevented the realization of the goals embodied in the Declaration, a number of States, particularly Democratic Yemen, Iraq, Madagascar, Mozambique, Seychelles and Tanzania, emphasized that the maintenance of military bases in the region, and the ensuing escalation of military rivalry, constituted the major obstacles preventing the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean. In that connexion, Democratic Yemen and Madagascar criticized, specifically, the presence of military bases on the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia. China maintained that all foreign military presence in the Indian Ocean and its littoral areas, including all overt and covert military bases, must be completely and thoroughly eliminated.

The delegation of the Soviet Union stressed that, in its opinion, the fundamental condition for creating a genuine peace zone in the Indian Ocean, was the elimination from the area of foreign military bases and the prevention of the creation of new ones. The delegation further declared that it was authorized to state that the Soviet Union had no military bases whatsoever in the Indian Ocean and had no intention of establishing any.

With respect to the initiation of bilateral consultations between the United States and the Soviet Union, the delegation of the United States noted that there had been positive movement on the question of reducing tensions in the Indian Ocean with the beginning of those discussions, which aimed at stabilizing the level of military activity in the Indian Ocean area. The delegation said that the two parties were seeking to achieve practical results in the talks which would promote the strengthening of peace in the Indian Ocean area and contribute to the lessening of international tension and that, moreover, both sides regarded with understanding and respect the desire of the littoral States of the Indian Ocean area to bring about the strengthening of security and the development of co-operation in the area.

Australia, Japan and the United Kingdom were among those delegations which welcomed the bilateral talks as a positive development. Other delegations were more guarded in their optimism regarding the outcome of the discussions, and some expressed a degree of scepticism concerning their usefulness.

In that context, Sri Lanka stated that so far as the bilateral talks were conducive to a reduction of great Power military rivalry in the Indian Ocean, they could have a beneficial influence. The delegation, however, expressed misgivings about the purpose of the discussions, which might be to achieve no more than a balance of power among the great Powers in the Indian Ocean; that could only turn out to be provisional and precarious and could not be reconciled with the fundamental purposes of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. Madagascar, referring to the meetings between the two major Powers, noted that no valid result concerning the Indian Ocean could be ob-
tained without the participation of the coastal States, for exclusivism on
the part of the super-Powers could engender only mistrust and lack of
understanding. In a similar vein, Madagascar stated that it could hardly
approve of talks which were held outside the interested countries,
namely, the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean. Further­
more, the delegation maintained that it could not consider the limitation
of arms as synonymous with demilitarization and denuclearization and
stressed its refusal to agree to what it considered as the distortion of the
true meaning of the concept of a zone of peace. Pakistan, too, empha­
sized the need fully to consult the littoral and hinterland States of the
Indian Ocean prior to any decisions being taken concerning the peace
and security of those States, and pointed out that an equilibrium between
the two Powers in the region would not necessarily meet the interests
of the littoral and hinterland States or conform to the objectives of the
proposed zone of peace. China characterized the bilateral discussions as
an attempt to divert people's attention and deceive world opinion.
Noting that the talks were aimed only at stabilizing the military strength
of the two super-Powers, the Chinese delegation asked whether it was
not an obvious attempt to legalize their continued rivalry in the Indian
Ocean, as well as a clear manifestation of their refusal to leave the
region.

The proposal contained in the draft resolution for holding a meet­
ing of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean received a
wide degree of support. Among the many countries which welcomed
and endorsed the proposal were Bangladesh, Democratic Yemen, Iraq,
Madagascar, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Zambia. Pakistan further stated
that such a meeting should address itself to the measures required to
ensure conditions of security within the region, such as the commit­
ment of regional States to the principles of peaceful coexistence, the settle­
ment of outstanding disputes, the renunciation of nuclear weapons and
the maintenance of a reasonable military balance among the littoral and
hinterland States.

Japan, while endorsing the proposal for the meeting, underlined
the necessity for adequate preparations. In addition, it felt that the
planning of such a meeting should be co-ordinated with the US-USSR
bilateral consultations, whose outcome could have a significant effect on
the maintenance of international peace and security in the region of the
Indian Ocean.

Another aspect of the proposed meeting of the littoral and hinter­
land States, the question of participation (see para. 3 of the draft reso­
lution), also generated comments on the part of certain delegations,
specifically with respect to the letter submitted by Israel,23 in which it
had expressed its interest and willingness to participate in the meetings
of the littoral and hinterland States or any other relevant bodies.

23 See foot-note 13.
In that respect, Iraq declared that its delegation had participated in the drafting of the resolution in the Ad Hoc Committee on the understanding that no decision had been taken with regard to the "Zionist representative's letter." Furthermore, it believed that paragraph 3 of the draft resolution was integrally linked to paragraph 4, in which the Ad Hoc Committee was requested to undertake the necessary preparations for such a meeting. Finally, citing as a precedent the case of South Africa, Iraq emphasized that Israel should also be similarly excluded from the work of the Ad Hoc Committee and from participation in any meeting aimed at implementing the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. The delegations of China, Democratic Yemen, Pakistan and Yemen associated themselves with the remarks made on the subject by Iraq. Exercising its right of reply, the Israeli delegation stated that Israel had a geographical dimension which was an indisputable fact and that therefore it would find its natural expression also in its participation in the relevant activities and bodies of the United Nations.

Some delegations from the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, such as Bangladesh, Democratic Yemen, Iran and Pakistan touched upon various aspects of the question of security within a regional context. Thus, Bangladesh noted that it had repeatedly expressed its support for the proposal to declare the Indian Ocean a zone of peace with the dual objective of excluding great Power rivalry and competition and strengthening regional co-operation and security. In its view, the disappearance of great Power presence or rivalry would not automatically ensure peace and tranquillity in that area for, while it would aid the process of achieving that peace and tranquillity, it could not substitute for the obligations to be contracted by the countries of the region themselves to ensure their security. Iran, reiterating its advocacy of co-operation between the countries in the Indian Ocean area, once again called for the establishment of regional mechanisms for co-operation, along with the development of stronger economic and cultural ties among the countries of the region. Alluding also to the significance of regional co-operation, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee said, at the 35th meeting of the First Committee, "Our desire is not confined to preventing the region from becoming an arena for military competition on the part of outside Powers. We are no less concerned with preventing military competition within the region on the part of the Powers of the region itself."

The Ad Hoc Committee's draft resolution as amended was adopted in the First Committee on 18 November by 95 votes to none, with 13 abstentions, among them the United States and other Western countries. In explanations of vote before the vote, China and the Soviet Union stated that they would vote in favour of the draft resolution.

The Soviet Union expressed support for the peace zone proposal on the grounds that it would genuinely facilitate the strengthening of the peace and security of States and the strengthening and deepening of
détente in international relations, and its extension to new parts of the world. At the same time, it drew attention to the fact that, in the fifth preambular paragraph of the draft resolution, mention was made of the military presence and military rivalry of the great Powers in the Indian Ocean. In that regard, the Soviet Union emphasized that it bore no responsibility for the tension in the area. Furthermore, it was of the opinion that in implementing the idea of converting the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace no obstacle should be created to freedom of navigation and scientific research in that part of the world. If such an approach were duly taken into account, the Soviet Union could take part in consultations relating to preparations for convening an international conference on the Indian Ocean.

The United States explained that, although it shared the goal of the supporters of the draft resolution of promoting peace and stability in the region, it would have to abstain and that its reasons for doing so remained the same as in the past. In its opinion, the original Declaration could be interpreted as giving littoral States of the region the right to establish a legal regime for the seas in the region. The United States could not accept such an understanding. Nor could it agree that the convening of a multilateral conference would be the best way of achieving the goal of promoting peace and stability for all concerned. The United States was hopeful that its bilateral talks with the USSR would lead to an agreement preventing an arms race in the region. Such an agreement would be to the benefit not only of the United States and the Soviet Union, but of all States of the region.

Other delegations explained their abstentions after the vote in the First Committee. The United Kingdom welcomed the talks between the Soviet Union and the United States and said that the call in the draft resolution for a conference of all the littoral States was a step in the right direction to achieve a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean. However, it stated that the definition of the limits of the zone and the activities which should be excluded from it should precede rather than follow the declaration of any peace zone and that therefore the United Kingdom felt bound to maintain its abstention. While also considering as a positive step the call for the convening of a conference of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, the Federal Republic of Germany held that it could not vote in favour of the draft resolution because of its concern that the proposed designation of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace might adversely affect the principle of the freedom of the seas embodied in international law. Italy, for its part, stated that it shared the views expressed by the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany.

The draft resolution was adopted by the General Assembly on 12 December by a recorded vote of 123 in favour to none against, with 13 abstentions, including the United States and other Western countries, as resolution 32/86. It reads as follows:
The General Assembly,

Recalling the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, contained in its resolution 2832 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, and recalling also its resolutions 2992 (XXVII) of 15 December 1972, 3080 (XXVIII) of 6 December 1973, 3259 A (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3468 (XXX) of 11 December 1975 and 31/88 of 14 December 1976,

Reaffirming its conviction that concrete action in furtherance of the objectives of the Declaration would be a substantial contribution to the strengthening of international peace and security,

Encouraged by the support extended to the concept of zones of peace by non-aligned countries at the Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Colombo from 16 to 19 August 1976,

Recalling its resolution 3259 A (XXIX), in which it requested the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean to enter, as soon as possible, into consultations with a view to convening a conference on the Indian Ocean,

Considering that the continued military presence of the great Powers in the Indian Ocean, conceived in the context of great Power rivalry, with the danger of a competitive escalation of such a military presence, makes the achievement of the objectives of the Declaration an even more imperative necessity,

Considering also that the creation of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean requires co-operation among the regional States to ensure conditions of peace and security within the region, as envisaged in the Declaration, and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the littoral and hinterland States,

Noting that talks between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America regarding their military presence in the Indian Ocean have been initiated and that the two countries have established contacts with the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean through its Chairman,

Expressing the hope that those talks between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America will contribute to the attainment of the objectives of the Declaration and lead to practical and effective co-operation on their part with the Ad Hoc Committee and the littoral and hinterland States,

Noting the reactions of certain great Powers and other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean to the invitation extended to them by the Ad Hoc Committee, in pursuance of paragraphs 2 and 3 of resolution 31/88 by which the General Assembly requested the Committee and the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean to continue their consultations with a view to formulating a programme of action leading to the convening of a conference on the Indian Ocean,

1. Renews its invitation to the great Powers and other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean that have not so far seen their way to co-operating effectively with the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean and the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean to enter with the least possible delay into negotiations with the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean in pursuance of paragraphs 3 and 4 of General Assembly resolution 3468 (XXX);

2. Takes note of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee and in particular the stage reached in the Committee's deliberations in regard to the convening of a conference on the Indian Ocean;

3. Decides that, as the next step towards the convening of a conference on the Indian Ocean, a meeting of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean be convened in New York at a suitable date, which other States not falling within this category, but which have participated or have expressed their willingness to participate in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee, could attend;

4. Requests the Ad Hoc Committee to make the necessary preparations for the meeting referred to in paragraph 3 above;

5. Decides to enlarge the composition of the Ad Hoc Committee by the addition of Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, Greece, Mozambique and Oman;
6. **Renews** the general mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Committee as defined in the relevant resolutions;

7. **Requests** the *Ad Hoc* Committee to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-third session a full report on its work;

8. **Requests** the Secretary-General to make the necessary provision for the meeting referred to in paragraph 3 above and to continue to render all necessary assistance to the *Ad Hoc* Committee, including the preparation of summary records.

### Conclusion

During 1977, there continued to be several differences on the question of the implementation of the objectives embodied in the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. As in previous years, a number of major military powers and maritime users of the Indian Ocean expressed their reservations with respect to the contents of the Declaration and its conformity with certain principles of international law. There were, however, a number of significant developments which may start a process leading to its ultimate realization.

The bilateral talks initiated between the Soviet Union and the United States concerning their presence in the Indian Ocean, while perceived by some of the States directly concerned as not going far enough, are, however, considered to be a step in the right direction.

From the *Ad Hoc* Committee's point of view, the decision of the two Powers to initiate the practice of informing it, through its Chairman, of the progress of those talks is welcomed as a step forward. There were expressions of hope in the *Ad Hoc* Committee that such contacts would prove to be an indication of increasing co-operation on the part of the two major Powers with the work of the Committee.

Concerning the pattern of voting on the relevant resolution, the most perceptible difference with respect to previous years was the support of the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries, which for the first time voted in favour of a resolution dealing with the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace since the item appeared in the General Assembly's agenda.

As regards the voting, it was also discernible that, over the years, more States are expressing support for the proposal of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. This general pattern was evident once more during the Assembly's thirty-second session.

Finally, the expansion of the *Ad Hoc* Committee by the addition of five new members, namely, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, Greece, Mozambique and Oman, was seen as a sign of growing interest in the concept of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.
International transfers of conventional arms

Introduction

A significant number of States continued to exhibit, during 1977, great concern over the problem of international transfers of conventional weapons. That concern reflected the view that world peace and security as well as economic progress, especially of the developing countries, could be jeopardized and existing sensitive situations exacerbated by the spiralling traffic in conventional arms.

The question was discussed for the first time by the General Assembly at its twentieth session in 1965, when Malta submitted a draft resolution\(^1\) which would invite the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to consider the question of arms transfers and submit to the Assembly proposals for establishing a system to give publicity to such transfers. The Maltese draft was rejected in the First Committee by 18 votes to 19, with 39 abstentions.

The question was again raised at the twenty-third session of the General Assembly in 1968. At that session, a draft resolution\(^2\) was submitted by Denmark, Iceland, Malta and Norway, and was also supported by Canada and the United States, as well as by other, particularly Western, countries. By the draft resolution, the General Assembly would request the Secretary-General to ascertain the position of Governments on undertaking an obligation to register with the Secretary-General all trade in arms. The draft was not pressed to a vote, in part because of opposition from some non-aligned and Eastern European States, on the understanding that the question was covered by resolution 2454 B (XXIII) on general and complete disarmament.

The arms trade issue was also considered at a number of sessions of the CCD. In August 1970, the United States submitted in the Committee a working paper on conventional arms limitation,\(^3\) in which it, after reconfirming the six principles which it had elaborated in

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\(^2\) Ibid., Twenty-third Session, Annexes, agenda items 27, 28, 29, 94 and 96, document A/7441, para. 5(d).
ENDC in 1966, suggested three new guidelines which emphasized the regional aspects of possible agreements regulating the arms trade. Most recently, in 1976, Nigeria, the United Kingdom and the United States addressed the question of conventional arms limitation in the CCD. The United Kingdom and the United States urged restraint by exporters and importers in the arms trade, while Nigeria held that the suppliers were primarily responsible for the arms trade and that it could not accept attempts to shift emphasis in the CCD from nuclear and general and complete disarmament to such questions as the arms trade.

At the thirty-first session of the General Assembly, Japan introduced a draft resolution in which it was proposed that the Secretary-General should ascertain the views of Member States on the question of the international transfer of conventional weapons and conduct a factual study on the problem, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts. The General Assembly did not act on the Japanese proposal, in the light of a procedural motion for adjournment of the debate adopted by the First Committee by 51 votes (including the Soviet Union) to 32 (including the United Kingdom and the United States) with 33 abstentions (including France). China did not participate in the vote.

Consideration by the CCD, 1977

During the 1977 meetings of the CCD, a number of delegations, in particular Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States, addressed themselves to the issue of conventional arms limitation. The United States again pledged its dedication to efforts to realize practical limitations on international transfers of conventional arms and in that respect pointed out that its Government was undertaking a comprehensive review of the United States policies on conventional arms transfers. It added that, once that review was completed, it intended to consult with other arms suppliers as well as with arms importers, to encourage co-operation in achieving reductions in the world-wide arms trade.

The United Kingdom noted the Japanese proposal which had been submitted at the thirty-first session of the General Assembly and held that arms control and disarmament must concern itself not only with weapons of mass destruction but also with conventional arms. It also stated its intention to continue to urge international discussions of

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4 257th meeting.
7 The results of the United States review were announced by President Carter in a policy statement of 19 May 1977 (see appendix XI below).
possible arrangements for multilateral restraint in conventional arms transfers and expressed the hope that the proposals of the United States to reach broader agreements between supplier and recipient nations, as well as to encourage regional arms limitation agreements among the latter, would lead to constructive results.

Italy expressed its increasing concern over escalating expenditures on conventional weapons and their uncontrolled transfer, and held that efforts towards the reduction of such weapons and armed forces should be initiated parallel with nuclear disarmament efforts. In that connexion, it suggested that the adoption of the following measures might be envisaged:

(a) Pilot studies, to be carried out by a group of States on a voluntary and reciprocal basis, for the purpose of devising and testing jointly an effective system of international statements of military expenditure, with the object of reducing military budgets;

(b) Preparatory studies on the conversion of the armament industries of the principal developed countries, the aim being to provide alternative lines of production while maintaining the employment rate at a constant level;

(c) The periodical publication by the United Nations of data on the production and transfer of weapons and the development of an effective system for processing such data;

(d) The establishment, on the basis of Article 29 of the Charter of the United Nations, of a commission, divided into regional sub-commissions, in which the principal arms suppliers in each region would participate, the function of the commission being to maintain conventional armaments at the lowest possible level.

Italy explained further that to facilitate the establishment of those regional subsidiary organs with the consent of the parties concerned, it might be advisable to consider establishing committees or separate parallel groups in which the purchasing countries would participate. As a result of those activities, an agreement for the gradual elimination of conventional weapons might be concluded and the first disarmament measures adopted.

Consideration by the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament

At the meetings of the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, and in the views and suggestions communicated by several States to the Secretary-General regarding that session, the problem of international transfers of conventional arms was also raised by a number of countries, includ-

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ing Austria, Belgium, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Portugal, Surinam, Sweden and Venezuela, which suggested that it should be considered at the special session with a view to seeking effective solutions to it. Furthermore, Mexico specifically called for the limitation and regulation of the international transfer of conventional weapons, among its suggestions for the proposed declaration on disarmament.9

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1977

At the thirty-second session, the General Assembly's consideration of the question of transfers of conventional arms was more intensive than at previous sessions. Both during the general debate and in the First Committee,10 a large number of countries, developed as well as developing, referred specifically to the question of conventional arms limitation as a separate subject rather than within the broader context of general and complete disarmament. As in previous years when the question was considered in the General Assembly, those States which referred to it largely reaffirmed their view that the increasing international traffic in conventional arms and the accompanying accumulation of weapons contributed to or exacerbated conflict situations and was a wasteful diversion of resources from vital social and economic development efforts.

Although many speakers maintained the view that nuclear disarmament should remain the first priority concern of disarmament efforts, a number of them, including Colombia, Denmark, Greece, Italy, Japan, Nepal, Singapore, Sweden and the United Republic of Tanzania, stated that such priority should not distract attention from the conventional arms race. Greece emphasized that the problems of nuclear and conventional armaments should be examined simultaneously because, in its view, each constituted an equal threat to international peace and security. Colombia, after expressing the view that the international conventional arms build-up and transfers through trade produced destabilizing effects on the peace and security as well as on the economic development of the developing countries, suggested that the problem be given the highest priority among the concerns of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament. Denmark, Japan, Portugal, Singapore and Sweden noted further that about 80 per cent of total world military expenditures—variously estimated at between 300 and 400 billion dollars annually—was devoted to conventional forces. Japan, Singapore, Sweden and the United Republic of Tanzania, among others, also expressed their concern over the continuing technological sophistication of conventional weapons.

9 See A/AC.187/56.
10 See Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-second Session, First Committee, 7th to 38th, 40th and 44th meetings; and ibid., First Committee, Sessional Fascicle, corrigendum.

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Japan and Singapore also held that such improvements tended to blur the difference between conventional and nuclear arms. Nepal and the United Republic of Tanzania, among others, pointed out that no nuclear weapon had been used in war since the end of the Second World War, while millions of people had suffered as casualties of conventional warfare over the same period.

India, on the other hand, re-emphasizing its position that nuclear and conventional weapons could not be weighed equally, indicated that it would view with concern and misgiving any proposal which would, intentionally or otherwise, detract from the overriding question of nuclear disarmament. Pointing out that it attached the highest priority to nuclear disarmament, India added that that did not mean that conventional disarmament was not important or essential. The question of conventional weapons, India believed, must take a lower priority because such weapons did not threaten mankind's total annihilation and because they were the only weapons available to the developing countries for their defence and to national liberation movements, as in southern Africa, for their emancipation. Mali expressed a similar view, saying that efforts against the supply of conventional weapons, which developing countries needed for their security, were only a diversion in the face of the proliferation and technological perfection of the major Powers' weapons of mass destruction.

In addition, a large number of States specifically called upon the major Powers, in particular the Western powers, not to supply weapons to the racist minority régimes in southern Africa.11

Among the major military powers which addressed themselves to the problem of the conventional arms race at the thirty-second session were Germany, Federal Republic of, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States.

In his address to the General Assembly (18th meeting, 4 October 1977), President Carter of the United States called for curbing the conventional arms race and the accompanying international trade in such weapons. The President noted that world-wide military expenditures were now around 300 billion dollars annually with the rate of growth in military spending rising faster in the developing countries than in the industrialized States, and that the world, in 1976, spent over 60 times as much equipping each soldier as was spent educating

11 By its resolution 418 (1977) of 4 November 1977, the Security Council determined that acquisition of arms and related matériel by South Africa constituted a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security, and decided that all States should cease forthwith any provision to South Africa of arms and related matériel of all types, as well as grants of licensing arrangements for the manufacture or maintenance of such items. It went on to call upon States to review such arrangements with a view to terminating them, and decided that all States should refrain from any co-operation with South Africa in respect of the manufacture and development of nuclear weapons. It called upon all States to act in accordance with the resolution, requested the Secretary-General to report on its implementation and decided to retain the item on its agenda.
each child. He asserted that the conventional arms race both caused and fed on the threat of larger and more deadly wars and levied an enormous burden on an already troubled world economy. He also indicated that the United States, for its part, had begun unilaterally to reduce its arms exports, both quantitatively and qualitatively, but could not go very far without the co-operation of other supplier nations. The United States, therefore, hoped to work with other suppliers to reduce arms transfers and the spread of advanced weapon technologies and also hoped that purchaser countries would limit their arms imports, either individually or through regional arrangements. The United States was ready to provide to some nations the necessary means for what he called "legitimate self-defence" but it was also eager to work with any nation or region in order to decrease the need for more numerous, deadlier and ever more expensive weapons.

The United Kingdom stressed the need to find means of reducing the world-wide conventional arms build-up without prejudicing the security of States, particularly that of the arms importers. Pointing out that it always took account of all the factors involved in arms sales, the United Kingdom indicated its intention to continue urging international discussion of possible arrangements for restraints, involving both suppliers and purchasers, in conventional arms transfers. It noted the recent United States policy on transfers of conventional arms and stressed that the United Kingdom was convinced of the necessity of agreed measures of multilateral restraint to check the conventional arms race. It further believed that the regional approach could offer the best hope for progress in that field.

The Federal Republic of Germany stated that, notwithstanding the importance that was attached to checking the nuclear arms race, it should not be forgotten that another arms race, which annually consumed valuable economic resources, was occurring in the conventional field. The Federal Republic of Germany also indicated that it exercised the greatest restraint on arms exports and pointed out that its proportion of weapons exports to countries outside the Atlantic Alliance was negligible compared with the total volume of German exports. Noting that it had taken up with great interest the United States proposal for tighter controls on world-wide conventional arms transfers, the Federal Republic of Germany indicated its support for efforts to find an international solution to the problem and expressed its feeling that a regional approach could provide the answer.

France, which held that a genuine reduction of weapons arsenals was a prerequisite for disarmament, called upon the major powers to undertake a common effort towards a genuine reduction, quantitatively as well as qualitatively, of both nuclear and conventional arms.

While maintaining that there should be a balance between nuclear and conventional disarmament, Italy reaffirmed its position that first priority should still be given to nuclear disarmament efforts. In that
connexion, it urged the initiation of parallel measures on the reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces and the promotion of co-operative efforts to halt the trade in such weapons, recalling the proposal that it had submitted earlier in the CCD.

While addressing the question of the arms race in the First Committee (7th meeting), the Soviet Union expressed its concern over the fact that some 350 billion dollars, which could be used for peaceful development purposes, went for military purposes in 1976. It urged multilateral co-operation to halt the arms race, proceed towards a genuine reduction of weapons stockpiles and begin disarmament. To that end, the Soviet Union reiterated its call for a world disarmament conference which could consider expertly and in the necessary depth the entire range of disarmament problems and take effective action thereon. Moreover, it had been reported earlier\(^\text{12}\) that the Soviet Union and the United States had established a joint group to study a way to initiate comprehensive arms limitation in conventional weapons and also the sale of weapons to third countries, particularly the developing nations of the world.

Other delegations expressed views specifically on international conventional arms transfers. Japan, which at the General Assembly's thirty-first session had commented extensively on the question, again considered it in detail. Pointing out that it constituted an exceptional case among advanced industrial States in that it exported practically no weapons, Japan re-emphasized its view that there could not be genuine disarmament without conventional arms control and reduction. It expressed concern over the danger, including the possible escalation of a serious conflict into a nuclear holocaust, posed by the continuing flow of large quantities of sophisticated weapons into areas of potential armed conflict. Japan also noted the recommendation contained in paragraph 183 of the report of the Secretary-General entitled *Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures*\(^\text{13}\) that the time might have come to study the build-up of conventional arms thoroughly and to seek feasible ways to formulate international agreements on the transfer of weapons. In the light of the suggestions made recently by many States, Japan believed that it was possible for the General Assembly to consider the question on a global basis, although it might also be useful to examine it within a regional framework, as had been suggested by Belgium in 1976.\(^\text{14}\) preferably if such regional initiatives came from the countries of the region concerned. Support for the consideration of the conventional arms problem within a regional context was also indicated by such countries as Austria, Denmark and Singapore.


\(^{13}\) United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.1.

Japan further recalled its suggestions at the thirty-first session for a factual study by the United Nations of the question of conventional arms transfers. A number of other countries, including Colombia, Denmark and New Zealand, supported the idea for such a study. Norway said that a practical instrument for the limitation of arms transfers would be a United Nations register recording all such transfers.

Finally, Japan expressed the hope that at the thirty-second session of the General Assembly or at the special session devoted to disarmament agreement would be reached on the procedures for a thorough examination of the question of regulating conventional armaments, without hindering progress on nuclear disarmament.

Some developing countries specifically called upon the exporting countries to take action towards curtailing conventional arms transfers. The Philippines urged the major suppliers, in advance of the convening of the special session, to reduce their arms sales. Singapore suggested a number of measures the exporters might take to help lessen the conventional arms race; they could: (a) subordinate the economic motivations for arms sales to their foreign policy, national security and arms control objectives; (b) try to work out a co-ordinated arms sales policy; (c) give their support to regional initiatives to control the arms trade; and (d) take certain unilateral measures to reduce the arms race. Those measures, Singapore explained, might be either qualitative or quantitative. An arms supplier could, for example, refuse to sell certain types of weapons, such as weapons exclusively or primarily designed to deliver nuclear warheads. It could also refuse to sell certain high-technology weapon systems which were not commensurate with the legitimate defence requirements of the requesting State and the transfer of which would upset the strategic balance in an area.

Despite the extensive attention given to the question of international transfers of conventional weapons during the session, no draft resolution was submitted on the subject to the General Assembly in 1977.

Conclusion

The international transfer of conventional weapons is a very complex subject, involving a wide range of economic, political and security considerations.

However, against a background of concern over rising military expenditures—the bulk of which is spent on conventional forces—and the recognition that the goal of general and complete disarmament has not only nuclear but also non-nuclear aspects, a number of Member States have recently shown increased interest, and are taking initiatives, in the field of conventional arms limitation and disarmament, both in and outside the United Nations.
It is in that context that the question of international arms transfers has become a matter of concern, in view of the potentially destabilizing effects of the introduction of weaponry in some regions, be they produced by new arms or by a substantial increase in the quantities of weapons already deployed. Other States, particularly non-aligned, believe that the problem of international transfers is linked with the production of conventional weaponry and should not therefore be treated separately. They also stress that nuclear disarmament should be given first priority in disarmament efforts.

States concerned about the consequences of such transfers feel that dealing with the question might require a combined approach, involving regional and global measures of co-operation. Since both exporters and importers are involved in international transfers, the problem tends to go beyond regional boundaries, although in the view of some of those States the regional framework might be appropriate to develop, with outside co-operation, limitations on the supply of conventional armaments. Those States which have taken an active role in the debates have suggested that the General Assembly should consider the question at its special session devoted to disarmament.

The consideration of these problems is now in its initial stages. Further discussion at the special session may help to clarify the issues outlined above, as well as the ways and means with which the international community might wish to deal with the question in the framework of the United Nations.
CHAPTER XIX

Economic and social consequences of the arms race

Introduction

Over the years the question of disarmament has been highlighted by the concern about the harmful consequences of the arms race for the development of all countries and for international peace and security. In 1970, at the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly, the item entitled "Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security" was placed on the agenda at the initiative of Romania. The Assembly adopted resolution 2667 (XXV) in which it, inter alia, requested the Secretary-General to prepare a report on the question with the assistance of qualified consultant experts. The report, entitled Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures¹ was submitted to the Assembly at its twenty-sixth session.

At the same session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2831 (XXVI), in which it welcomed with satisfaction the experts' report and requested the Secretary-General, Governments and international and non-governmental organizations to give the report the widest possible publicity. The Assembly also decided to keep the agenda item under constant review and to place it on the provisional agenda of its twenty-eighth session. At that session, the Assembly adopted without objection resolution 3075 (XXVIII), in which it expressed its appreciation of the Secretary-General's efforts to publicize the report, and endorsed the conclusion of the report that a substantial reduction in the military expenditures of all countries, particularly of those with the highest military budgets, should be brought about as soon as possible. The Assembly also called upon all States to renew efforts aimed at adopting effective measures for the cessation of the arms race, especially in the nuclear field, including the reduction of military budgets, particularly of the heavily armed countries, with a view to achieving progress towards general disarmament. The Secretary-General was requested to pursue the study of the consequences of the arms race in order to enable him to submit, upon request by the General Assembly, an up-to-date report on that matter.

¹ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.72.IX.16.
In 1975, at its thirtieth session, the General Assembly in its resolution 3462 (XXX) requested the Secretary-General to bring up to date, with the assistance of qualified consultant experts appointed by him, the report submitted at the twenty-sixth session, covering the basic topics of that report and taking into account any new developments which he would consider necessary, and to transmit it to the General Assembly in time to permit its consideration at the thirty-second session. Pursuant to that resolution, the Secretary-General appointed a group of 13 consultant experts.

The group elected as its Chairman Professor Gheorghe Dolgu of Romania and held three sessions, the first two in New York from 26 to 30 July 1976 and from 28 February to 11 March 1977, and the third session at Geneva from 4 to 8 July 1977. In a message read to the group of consultant experts at their opening meeting, the Secretary-General said that he regarded the question of armaments and the arms race as one of the most critical world problems. After describing the prevailing situation in the field of armaments, the Secretary-General further stated that a closer understanding of the mechanism, dynamics, characteristics and consequences, at both national and international levels, of the arms race must therefore be developed, for only then could the international community be successful in putting an end to it. The Secretary-General also stressed that the 1971 report contributed to a better understanding of the gravity of the arms race and the danger which its continued acceleration, especially the accumulation of nuclear-weapon stockpiles, posed for world peace and security and for the further economic and social development of all countries.

The group of consultant experts submitted to the Secretary-General a unanimous report. The Secretary-General commended the report to the attention of Governments, organizations of the United Nations system and world public opinion and transmitted it for consideration by the General Assembly.

Summary of the report on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and of military expenditures

The experts affirmed that the conclusions of the 1971 report retained their entire validity: the threat of ultimate self-destruction as a result of nuclear war was the greatest peril facing the world; effective security could not be achieved today by further armaments; the cost of the arms race was enormous; and the military forces of the largest powers and the immense destructiveness of the weapons with which they were equipped cast the greatest shadow over the world. The experts stressed the following features of the current arms race and its consequences:

Dynamics of the arms race

For a number of years now the world has been diverting annually about $350 billion in today's prices to military purposes. The leading six countries in terms of military expenditure account for three fourths of this total. Altogether

2 Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.1).
5 to 6 per cent of the world’s total output of goods and services are diverted to military ends. In individual countries the percentage diversion is mostly in the 2 to 8 per cent bracket, although the extremes range from less than 1 per cent to over 30 per cent.

The arms race is increasingly a world-wide phenomenon. The competition in armaments between the largest military Powers is by far the most important. It involves the greatest diversion of resources, the greatest inherent dangers and constitutes the principal driving force of the world-wide arms race.

The primary engine of this world-wide arms race is constituted by the qualitative arms race among the largest military Powers. This is due chiefly to the virtual monopoly of these Powers in the development of advanced military technology, to their overwhelmingly large share of world production and world exports of advanced weaponry, and to the global character of their interests, politically and militarily. The six main military spenders account for three fourths of world military spending, and for practically all military research and development (R and D) and exports of weapons and military equipment. All significant developments in armaments originate here and spread from here to the rest of the world. As these weapons are being assimilated in the countries at the periphery of the arms race, new generations are under development at the centre to supersede them, preparing the ground for a new round of transfer and emulation. Outside of this small number of producing countries, arms races or competitions are substantially and often wholly dependent on external supplies of arms, technicians and instructors.

Current stocks of nuclear weapons are sufficient to destroy the world many times over. The number of missile-deliverable warheads of the two major nuclear Powers increased from about 3,700 in 1970 to nearly 12,000 in 1976, a rise by more than a factor three. Their combined explosive power is believed to be equivalent to 1.3 million Hiroshima-size bombs. The number of so-called “tactical” nuclear weapons is believed to be about four times larger than the number of “strategic” nuclear warheads, but their combined explosive power is but a fraction of the latter. According to one source it is equivalent to about 700 million tons of TNT or to some 50,000 Hiroshima-type bombs.

The distinguishing characteristic of the present arms race is the continuous qualitative change in the weapons and equipment being produced and deployed. It is primarily this feature that gives the arms race its momentum and it immeasurably complicates efforts to stop or control it. Given the high proportion of military expenditure devoted to R and D, the fact that military expenditures for the world as a whole and for some important countries remained relatively stable in recent years in no way implies a relatively stable military situation.

The most important and spectacular aspect of the arms race in the 1960s was the development and the full-scale deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and of submarine-launched missiles (SLBMs), and the associated deployment of satellite surveillance and communication systems. By the end of that decade there was widespread concern that a new arms-race spiral may result from the development of anti-ballistic missile systems (ABMs) and from countermeasures in the form of increasing numbers of launchers and, more particularly, of increasing numbers of warheads per launcher to saturate ABM systems. The technical form for the latter development is multiple and independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). The first USSR-USA SALT agreements, signed in May 1972, intended, inter alia, to prevent this development, succeeded in halting the deployment of ABM systems. Vigorous R and D programmes on improved ABM systems have been maintained. The number of ICBM and SLBM deliverable nuclear warheads has been rising by about 1,000 every year, even though the number of ICBM and SLBM launchers has remained relatively constant since 1972. Thus, in recent years, the arms race in strategic nuclear weapons has increasingly taken a qualitative direction. A major post-
MIRV innovation is already at an advanced stage of development. This is a manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle (MARV) which could make defence against ballistic missile attack more difficult but, in particular if combined with developments now taking place in terminal guidance systems, it can provide MARVed missiles with pinpoint accuracies. Now, in addition to being a means of massive reprisals to serve as a basic deterrent, it becomes possible to think of using ballistic missiles in “counter-force” roles, or to use them to conduct supposedly “limited” nuclear war. The adoption of doctrines of this kind could greatly enhance the probability of nuclear war.

No less significant are the implications of the deployment of long-range cruise missiles. Current models have ranges of several thousand kilometres and accurate guidance systems, which readjust the trajectory at intervals by comparing terrain features with a map. The accuracy is therefore independent of the range. It will be impossible to determine from its geometry alone whether a cruise missile carries a nuclear or a conventional warhead and, within wide limits, what range it may have. Future agreements on strategic weapons may thus become very difficult to negotiate because they would be difficult to verify. The cost of the cruise missile will be, in the years to come, well within the financial means of the smaller nuclear powers and of many other countries as well. For some time the exorbitant cost of the latest types of nuclear weapons carriers (ICBMs and SLBMs) has helped maintain the two main military Powers in a class by themselves. In the foreseeable future the importance of this factor may greatly diminish.

Developments in nuclear weapons technology proper are equally ominous, particularly the development of small, low-yield nuclear weapons, of enhanced radiation weapons and of tactical concepts for their use in battle. Delivered with higher accuracy and causing less collateral damage per warhead, their use on the battlefield may seem more acceptable, so that the step from non-nuclear to nuclear war may be more readily taken. Once they are used on the battlefield, escalation towards full-scale nuclear war becomes a dangerous possibility.

The importance of the changes now underway in the field of nuclear armaments and their carriers is that essentially new types of missions are becoming possible. New technologies open the way for new doctrines which in turn give an appearance of rationality to the deployment of weaponry embodying these technologies. At the same time they increase the dangers of war and alter the terms of the disarmament equation, rendering it more complex and more intractable.

The only barriers to horizontal proliferation are now political: obligations assumed under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the good sense of Governments and the example to be set in the coming years by the nuclear weapons Powers in agreeing to reduce their own nuclear arsenals. It is, of course, the continuation of the nuclear arms race, not by itself the spread of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which endangers peace.

Conventional weapons systems underwent continual and rapid refinement. Unit costs for major weapons systems typically doubled in real terms during this period. For aircraft they doubled about twice as fast. New precision guided munitions, remotely piloted vehicles and other devices are using the latest developments in such fields as laser technology, micro-electronics, electromagnetic sensors in the radar, infrared and optical ranges and wide-band data links for a variety of remote or automatic guidance and/or homing devices. The new weapons together with developments in such areas as night vision devices, battlefield surveillance and communications, are likely to accelerate the pace of modern warfare and to place a still higher premium on standing military forces. With dramatic improvements in accuracy, the yield of the explosive charge becomes a less important parameter in performance and there have been suggestions that some of the missions now assigned to “tactical” nuclear weapons could be per-
formed by precision-delivered weapons with a conventional warhead, which in practice could well have the effect of blurring the distinction between the use of nuclear and non-nuclear weapons, thus enhancing the risk that an armed conflict develops into nuclear war.

This rapid technological change originates in a few countries, but it readily spreads to the rest of the world through the transfer of arms, whether in the form of grants or of trade. The rate of innovation and obsolescence in weaponry which is determined by the R and D efforts of the leading countries thus imposes itself on other countries, even though there may be time-lags, depending on the weapons and countries involved. This tendency for the rate of innovation of the leading countries to be transmitted to other countries and regions is already implied by the fact that it is overwhelmingly the technologically leading countries which are the big arms exporters. The six main military spenders, who together account for virtually all military R and D outlays, account for over 90 per cent of all military exports and for 95 per cent of the exports of major weapons to developing countries. The qualitative character of the arms race gives rise to various pressures in the main producing countries to raise exports, including the need to dispose of obsolete inventories, to achieve large-scale economies, and to lengthen production runs in order to lower unit costs and finance further research and development efforts.

The value of military goods and services transferred world-wide in 1975 is estimated at $13 billion. About one third of the total is traded among industrialized countries; another third, approximately, is made up of exports to oil-exporting developing countries, mainly in the Middle East, and the remaining third goes to all other developing countries together. The total value of arms transfers has been growing steadily over the years. The arms transfers are only one part of the over-all process of arms acquisition. Arms transfers account for 3 to 4 per cent of world military expenditures, or for somewhere between 10 and 15 per cent of the military equipment produced throughout the world. It follows that rapid expansion in armaments is, with a few notable exceptions, overwhelmingly concentrated in the main arms producing countries, in other words in arms exporting rather than in arms importing countries.

A qualitative arms race with its long lead time and its emphasis on future possibilities rather than current realities tends to move in one direction only: one country's advances in weaponry will be emulated by others, but its self-restraint need not be. Similarly an increase in international tension may accelerate the arms race, but an improvement of the international climate will not necessarily suffice to slow it down.

If effective progress towards disarmament is to be achieved it will be insufficient to regard the arms race merely as an action-reaction phenomenon, and disarmament as simply a question of political will at the highest decision-making levels. The arms race is becoming more dangerous, more complex and more firmly entrenched. It is sustained by a variety of forces acting together, and it must be expected that to remove one of them is not sufficient to reverse its course. In fact, it may be assumed that it is not one or a few single factors, but precisely their multiplicity which confers upon the arms race its great inertia and which has rendered it so intractable from the point of view of disarmament, any limited successes in one field tending to be offset very quickly by developments in other sectors of the arms race.

The arms race in terms of resources

The massive diversion of resources to military ends has continued unabated. What is fundamentally new in evaluating the situation in the perspective of the latter half of the 1970s is the changed frame of reference: there is today a much greater awareness that the world is facing a range of urgent problems of decisive importance for the progress of all States.

Every year military activities throughout the world absorb a volume of
resources equivalent to about two thirds of the aggregate gross national product of those countries which together comprise the poorest half of the world’s population. World military expenditure has been rising steadily. Over the past half century it has increased in real terms by a factor of 10, corresponding to an annual increase of nearly 5 per cent. Since the Second World War the direct costs of the arms race have exceeded $6,000 billion (in 1975 prices) or about as much as the aggregate GNP of the entire world in 1975.

It is in the field of scientific and technological capability that the diversion of resources to military ends is most massive. It is estimated that at the present time some 25 per cent of the world’s scientific manpower is engaged in military-related pursuits. It has been estimated that of total cumulative R and D spending since the Second World War some 40 per cent has been directed at achieving military ends. Together the six main military spenders are reported to account for 96 to 97 per cent of world military R and D. Military research and development in the world absorbs perhaps 10 times the entire scientific and technological capabilities available in developing countries. The civilian spin-offs from military research, if not in all cases negligible, have been trifling in comparison with the resources with which they were bought and with the results that could have been achieved if the efforts had been aimed directly at the civilian applications.

Manpower is another one of the very large drains on resources which the arms race entails. The armed forces around the world total approximately 22 million people. It is estimated that for the world as a whole, 60 million people are engaged in military-related occupations, uniformed or civilian, public or private. This corresponds to the entire labour force in manufacturing in Europe outside the USSR or to 70 per cent of total employment in the United States in all branches of activity.

The world’s armed forces are also major consumers of a wide range of non-renewable resources, both energy and raw-material reserves. World military consumption of liquid hydrocarbons (excluding petroleum products used in the production of weapons and equipment) has been estimated to be about 700 to 750 million barrels annually. This is twice the annual consumption for the whole of Africa and corresponds to approximately 3.5 per cent of world consumption.

Military expenditures in some developing countries have been rising fast. For this group as a whole they doubled in constant prices over five years, rising from $17.0 billion in 1970 to $33.8 billion in 1975. Also in proportion to GNP the rise has been fast. But caution is in order when interpreting such trends. Military forces are in most cases being built up from a very low level and, with a few notable exceptions, they are still very small. Average figures for the developing countries are heavily influenced by high levels of spending in a few conflict-ridden and war-prone areas. In the regions with the lowest per capita income, South Asia and mid-Africa, military expenditures are in the region of $5 per capita. This is only 1 to 2 per cent of what the highly industrialized countries spend per head of population. Even when such regions of intense militarization as the Middle East are included in the total, the developing countries with almost 50 per cent of the world’s population still account for only 12 to 13 per cent of its military expenditure. In the over-all context the developing countries are marginal. Evidently, the principal engine of the arms race is not located here, nor are the main problems of disarmament or of resource wastage. But however small in the global context, arms budgets of developing countries loom larger and larger in relation to their limited resources and in relation to their urgent social and economic needs.

The arms race and economic and social development

The high level of military spending in the world not only diverts resources that are urgently needed for dealing effectively with economic development and growth problems, but also helps to exacerbate these problems. Large military expenditures contribute to the depletion of natural resources, tend to aggravate
inflationary tendencies and add to existing balance-of-payments problems. In this way, they have contributed to economic disruption and political instability in some countries. Even so, the implications of an arms race and of military expenditures on the scale typical of the post-war period are much more pervasive than mere economic considerations would suggest. Being one of the main factors shaping the international context, the arms race exerts a profound influence on the politics, economy and society of many countries. In some cases an ever-present risk of interference by outside powers imposes narrow limits on foreign and domestic policies, limits that may run counter to national aspirations. In other cases the armed forces become a factor of decisive weight in internal politics. Military priorities may also exert considerable influence on the directions taken by the civilian economy.

So far, the high levels of military expenditure have not been noticeably affected by the economic recession which hit many countries after 1973. In some countries there is a marked contrast between a still buoyant military sector on the one hand, and a depressed civilian economy and tightening or downright austere government budgets on the other. In some limited aspects of the arms race, one can even register a new impetus directly related to features of the present economic crisis: some countries have been able to improve their balance-of-payments position by increased arms exports. In many industrialized and in a few developing countries the arms industry is now one of the fastest growing sectors of the economy. The international arms market has grown in recent years at a rate which contrasts sharply with otherwise sluggish trends in world markets.

If half the funds spent on armaments throughout the world in the period 1970-1975 had instead been invested in the civilian sector, annual output at the end of this period could have been perhaps $200 billion larger than it was. This sum is somewhat more than the aggregate GNP of Southern Asia and the mid-African region.

Whereas military expenditures create jobs in the industries supplying the armed forces, the growing high-technology component in military expenditures has eroded their direct and their over-all job-creating potential. Military technology is moving further and further away from any conceivable civilian use and is focusing on fields which are mostly irrelevant for the solution of the more important present and future problems of the world. It has often been pointed out that in some developing countries the military sector has contributed substantially to technological training and has helped to raise the level of technical skills, providing partial compensation for the resources spent on military activities. The programmes of industrial development, civilian community projects and the like, however, can achieve those results in a more direct, pertinent and cost-effective way.

The trade in arms has opposite effects on the economies of importing and exporting countries. What is involved is a highly unequal exchange, detrimental in particular to efforts to bridge the gap between poor and rich countries. For the importer of arms it is in economic terms a pure waste of surplus which could have been used productively. Even when weapons are provided as gifts there are maintenance, operation and infrastructure costs to be included on the debit side. In contrast to the import of civilian goods these outlays raise neither consumption nor production and generate no future output from which to pay for them. Not so for the exporting country. That part of its arms production which is destined for its own armed forces again figures to a first approximation simply as an economic loss. But its production of weapons for export is no different in economic terms from any other export production. In some cases it may be in fact more advantageous than other kinds of export because the advanced-technology component in arms exports is particularly high. These exports therefore tend to stimulate important sectors of the economy of the exporting country, such as mechanical engineering, electronics and the industries supplying these sectors. In a very real, although often marginal way, importing countries are thus helping
to perpetuate the lead in military technology of the main arms exporting countries and to sustain the rate of innovation and obsolescence in weaponry.

In the countries with a centrally planned economy, the negative consequences of military expenditures are in principle of the same character as in other economic systems, but they make themselves felt in a different socio-economic context.

The continuance of the arms race tends to draw all countries along with greater or lesser delays. In the process the limited strength of smaller countries and of countries with a limited industrial and technological base is undermined. An ongoing arms race with its inherent tendency to spread and intensify in geographical, technological and economic terms will constitute an ever greater obstacle to social and economic progress in all countries and to the urgent development tasks of developing countries in particular. No task is more urgent than to stop this technological spiral at the centre of the world arms race where it originates and, through substantial disarmament in the leading military powers, to pave the way for major reductions in arms expenditures throughout the world.

The military institution in the wide sense enjoys a unique position of strength in many societies due to a variety of factors: first, there is its sheer mass combined with a centralized organization. Second, there are the privileged relations which the armed forces may entertain with key sectors of industry, being at once a customer and a link to government. Third, there is a privileged relation to the State and many areas of government policy. Fourth, the military institution can, to a varying degree, protect its operations from public scrutiny, and conduct a variety of activities under the label of national security. Last, but not least, the armed forces enjoy a monopoly of physical force and a position of instrument of ultimate recourse, vis-à-vis other States and internally.

In most cases one may assume that the military institution and the armed forces have a double role. They are at once an ultimate recourse in external affairs and an ultimate arbiter in internal affairs. These roles are not always unrelated. In an environment of external confrontation the limits of tolerated dissension get narrowed down, and the real or supposed external threat could become an argument for increased repression. Conversely, when internal dissension transgresses these limits, and when means for satisfying basic needs and aspirations are scarce, there could be a temptation to seek temporary refuge in domestic repression or in the escalation of foreign confrontation.

There can be no doubt that the continuing arms race and the growth of violence in the world adds to the disaffection of many people, to their sense of utility and powerlessness, and turns them away from socially constructive ends. The arms race not only entails heavy economic sacrifices. It also threatens and perverts democratic processes, and weakens those processes of social evolution which provide the only real hope for the future of mankind.

International implications of the arms race

The most important feature of the arms race is that it undermines national, regional and international security. It involves the constant risk of war engaging the largest Powers, including nuclear war, and it is accompanied by an endless series of wars at lower levels. It raises an ever greater barrier against the development of an atmosphere in which the role of force in international relations may be downgraded. In addition, it impedes relations between countries, affecting the volume and direction of exchanges, diminishing the role of co-operation among States and obstructing efforts towards establishing a new international economic order on a more equitable basis.

The international consequences of the arms race may be grouped under three headings, even though in practice these effects are in many ways interrelated. First and foremost, there is the strictly military aspect: on the one hand, a long series of wars, some of them of extreme destructiveness, seldom caused in any strict sense by the arms race, but very often inflamed by it; on the other hand, an ever-present possibility of nuclear conflagration. The new feature here is the
growing awareness that the approaches adopted in the 1960s to deal with this threat will have to be set in a broader context and will have to be related to a wider programme of disarmament, one that ultimately aims at general and complete disarmament, if they are to restrain and reverse the arms race effectively.

Second, there are the economic effects (and, by implication, social effects) in the widest sense: the effects of the arms race and military expenditures on trade, aid, on technological and scientific co-operation and on other kinds of exchange between countries. By diverting vast resources away from production and growth, and by contributing to inflation and the economic crisis which have affected many countries, the arms race directly and indirectly impedes the full development of international exchanges. In addition, the flow of trade and aid is distorted, in some cases very markedly, by interference from political and strategic considerations, resulting in the misallocation of resources on a global scale. The arms race thereby contributes to maintaining and widening the gap between and within developed and developing countries and impedes co-operation between States, socio-economic progress generally and the promotion of a new international economic order.

Third, there is the impact of the arms race on international political conditions. In an environment characterized by high military preparedness on all sides, conflicts, even minor ones, tend to become salient in the policies of countries. This is an environment conducive to the creation of spheres of influence, in which local conflicts tend to become linked to regional or global confrontations and in which social and political developments are likely to be resisted if they seem to call existing alignments into question. The frictions arising from this rigidity at a time when the relative economic, political and military weight of countries changes more rapidly than ever are themselves possible sources of conflict.

The possibility of nuclear war remains the overriding danger of the arms race. Attempts to deal with the dangers of the arms race have not lacked. In the 1960s and continuing into the 1970s, these efforts were characterized by two main features: one was the priority given to partial measures aimed at preventing the arms race from moving into certain new directions; the other was the emphasis on détente, the assumption being that relieving suspicion and fear would not only diminish the risk of war, but would also remove one of the main factors fuelling the arms race. The past decade and a half has produced a considerable number of agreements on arms limitation. Although these treaties and conventions have contributed to some extent to a new climate of understanding, they have not proved equal to the task of slowing down the arms race or of significantly affecting the actual basis of armaments. Partial and collateral measures can play a role in the cessation and subsequent reversal of the arms race, but it is becoming increasingly clear that for this to be the case they must be conceived as part of a broader programme, inscribed in a whole set of measures aimed at substantial disarmament in areas of weaponry of central military significance. The partial measures achieved contributed to a climate of optimism, served to establish useful channels of communication, and demonstrated that agreements were possible, within limits at least. These measures thus undoubtedly contributed to promoting détente. Détente has had an important effect in relaxing the international climate, thereby diminishing the risk that conflicts in the periphery of the arms race or lesser conflicts involving the major Powers will escalate into nuclear war. Détente has improved the conditions for beneficial intercourse between States, for the development of economic ties, and for increased scientific, technological and cultural exchanges. These are major, even decisive achievements, of the last decade or so, which must be vigorously pursued and strengthened.

The fact that political détente has not been accompanied by corresponding measures of disarmament and military disengagement is its central weakness and a major cause of concern. Détente is being continuously assailed and undermined.
by the momentum of technological developments in armaments. If the arms race is not reversed, détente remains without a real basis, always in danger of sliding back into tension, suspicion, isolation and confrontation.

The arms race has not only diminished the priority given to aid in the policies of donor countries, it has also distorted the flow of bilateral assistance, in some cases to a marked degree. The relationship between aid provided and political considerations is in many cases very pronounced. The partial measures of arms limitation achieved so far has not led to arms reductions or to savings in military budgets of a kind to have measurable economic implications. Proposals for actual reductions in military budgets have been adopted by the General Assembly, but have not been implemented so far.

In an international environment dominated by an arms race on the scale of the last decades, military-strategic considerations tend to shape the over-all relations between States, affecting to a greater or lesser extent all other relations and transactions. The arms race tends to render the international political environment more rigid and more resistant to change. It fosters concerns for the political and social options chosen by other countries, in particular by those countries that are deemed to have strategic importance, and it promotes a pattern of alliances and alignments that may reinforce confrontation and, in some cases, domination. Under such conditions processes of social transformation or emancipation are likely in many cases to be resisted. They become painful processes, postponed for too long, and they may end in protracted and destructive conflict, as several of the longest and most painful wars of the recent past have shown.

Conclusions and recommendations

What emerges with particular force is the multiplicity of the consequences of the arms race, not only in the field of security proper, but in all aspects of civil life.

Discussion of the consequences of the arms race—social, economic and military-political—presupposes some conceptual view of the phenomenon itself. Likewise, effective progress towards disarmament presupposes some understanding of the forces and processes that drive the arms race along. Effective action to reverse the arms race would seem to presuppose some agreement as to where the problem lies and what it consists of.

The two most important goals of the international community, disarmament and development, are in fact intimately linked. Development at an acceptable rate would be hard if not impossible to reconcile with a continuation of the arms race. Substantial progress in the field of development is increasingly understood to be essential for the preservation of world peace and security. Genuine security cannot be assured by the accumulation of armament but only through disarmament, co-operation and the growth of exchange and interdependence in a world of diminishing inequalities.

Progress towards disarmament would release internal material, financial and human resources both in developed and in developing countries and would permit their redeployment to purposes of development. The relaxation of the climate of fear, hostility and confrontation which progress towards disarmament would bring about would remove some of the barriers now hampering international exchanges in general and the free circulation of raw materials and advanced technology in particular, and would greatly facilitate the free choice by each country of its particular path towards development. Disarmament should be so designed that this close connexion between disarmament and development gets full recognition.

The 1970s were proclaimed the Disarmament Decade, but through the first two thirds of that decade, progress has been meagre and fell far short of what the vast majority of members of the international community would genuinely prefer. A number of agreements, several of them of great importance in their own right, have been reached, but progress has been much too slow to constrain the momen-
turn of the arms race to any significant extent, let alone reverse it. This is due, *iuter alia*, to the lack of a comprehensive scheme in which partial measures would find their place and, supplementing each other, would add up to a coherent strategy. Effective progress towards disarmament presupposes the elaboration of an over-all plan, persuasive in concept and workable in application, a “Strategy for Disarmament” as it were. A framework is needed within which endeavours can be co-ordinated and against which progress can be measured. The determination of tasks and priorities must engage the participation of all States, even though specific measures may often be negotiated more effectively in regionally or otherwise limited forums.

To impart a new momentum to disarmament efforts, it seems necessary not only to engage all countries in these endeavours on a basis of equality, but also to involve the peoples of all countries more actively and in a more coherent and organized fashion than has been the case hitherto.

Given the character of the present arms race, effective disarmament will presuppose progress in two directions simultaneously: curtailment of the qualitative arms race, and reductions of military budgets. The first involves the erection of boundaries against further developments in weaponry. Responsibility for continued and more rapid progress in this respect overwhelmingly rests with the main military Powers and with the two largest Powers in particular. The second major task of immediate urgency is to bring about substantial reductions in the military budgets of all countries and particularly of those whose military budgets are the highest. All countries share responsibility for taking prompt steps in this direction. What is needed is the adoption of a specific time-schedule for gradual but substantial co-ordinated reduction of budgets, first of all of those of the largest and most heavily armed countries and of strategic rivals locked in confrontation, specifying criteria and proportions for these reductions and ensuring that they are irreversible and that the means saved are in fact allocated for peaceful purposes.

Nuclear disarmament must be given the highest priority both because of the intolerable threat posed by nuclear weapons, and because current and foreseeable developments in their means of delivery and in the doctrines governing their use and the prospect of their proliferation to new States will enhance this threat and could make disarmament vastly more difficult in the future.

**Consideration by the CCD, 1977**

Although the report of the Secretary-General was circulated only at the end of the 1977 session of the CCD, a number of delegations referred to the economic and social consequences of the arms race. The representative of the Soviet Union held that it was a matter of universal concern that resources that could be used for eradicating poverty, illiteracy, disease and hunger were being used by some for arms production and the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race. The delegation of Italy held that the trend towards the diversion of resources to military ends was threatening détente by depriving mankind of capital that should be devoted to the development of economic and social well-being. The representative of Mongolia, stressing the organic relationship between détente, disarmament and development, hoped the enormous

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resources being absorbed by the arms race would be diverted to peaceful uses. The delegation of Romania, referring to the meagre results of the Committee, stressed that the arms race had continued unchanged, proving an obstacle to the social progress and development of mankind and jeopardizing the possibilities of correcting the international structures and relations which for centuries had given rise to inequalities, suffering and disaster.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1977

At the thirty-second session of the General Assembly, the question of the consequences of the arms race was discussed by the overwhelming majority of delegations, both during the general debate and in the First Committee. Ghana stated that the stockpiling of arms, both nuclear and conventional, had become one of the most dangerous developments in international relations, and Mexico felt that the accumulative destructive power of the nuclear arsenals was such that their mere existence constituted a danger of universal suicide, a situation which Mauritania described as a terrifying and permanent reality.

The instability of peace, which is generated by the arms race, was emphasized by a number of countries. Libya, for instance, stated that humanity could not enjoy a durable peace so long as a terrible arms race continued both quantitatively and qualitatively, and Turkey emphasized that the arms race was incompatible with efforts to establish a new international economic order and was also in contradiction with the policy of détente. Norway noted that, in fact, expenditures on arms were still rising, apparently independently of political détente, and added that no country could in the long run achieve greater security by devoting more and more of its resources to armaments. The arms race had already resulted in the stockpiling of destructive power beyond any conceivable military purpose. The military build-up constituted an obvious danger to international peace and stability and the immediate aim of the international community should be improved security for all at the lower level of armaments.

Venezuela stressed that it was necessary to disclose openly the dangers inherent in a continued arms race and to dispel the illusion that peace and security could coexist with immense stockpiles of the means of destruction. The Byelorussian SSR emphasized that the conscience of mankind could not resign itself to the monstrous waste of effort and funds of so many nations on the production of ever newer deadly weapons. In that respect, stated the representative of Morocco, the awareness of peoples was clear. Protest against fearful weapons grew and small and medium-sized countries exercised a considerable influence in bringing about an end to the arms race.

4 Ibid., First Committee, 7th to 38th, 40th and 44th meetings; and ibid., First Committee, Sessional Fascicle, corrigendum.
A number of speakers stressed that military expenditures represented a heavy burden on the shoulders of all peoples, with extremely harmful effects on the efforts aimed at the development of, and the assistance to be provided to, developing countries. Almost without exception, those who referred to the subject emphasized the misuse of resources, the distorted priorities in the use of resources and the inconsistency of the waste on armaments with the need to build a new international economic order. Concern over the existing situation was expressed by countries such as France, Ireland and Portugal. That aspect was also particularly emphasized by developing States. Venezuela stated that there was a definite contrast between the economic and social restrictions imposed on peoples of the developing countries and the uncontrollable suicidal explosion of military expenditures and the arms race. Similar views were expressed in many statements, including those of Bahrain, the Central African Empire, Egypt, Jamaica, Madagascar, Qatar, Sierra Leone, Togo and Tunisia.

The interrelationship between disarmament and development was emphasized by a number of countries which recalled previous relevant resolutions by the General Assembly. Malaysia stated that progressive global disarmament would eventually release resources in both the developed and developing countries to supplement the efforts of the international community in realizing the establishment of a new international economic order. Bhutan, for its part, voiced the growing need to view closely the relationship between development and disarmament.

The discrepancy between military expenditures and international development assistance was repeatedly mentioned. The United Republic of Cameroon, for instance, stated that the sums swallowed up by the production of military arsenals came close to $350 billion whereas aid for development barely reached $15 billion. The stagnation and the regression of official development assistance were the direct consequences of the arms race. Poland recalled that global military spending was roughly equivalent to what at the current rate would have been spent on foreign aid to developing countries in the next 25 years. Nepal, while stressing the fact that the session was taking place in the Second United Nations Development Decade and also in the Disarmament Decade, stated that the current level of development assistance fell far short of the target. Luxembourg drew the attention of the Assembly to the incommensurable gaps which existed between military expenditure and expenditure for the development of those who lived in complete destitution.

Against that background, concern was expressed by many delegations at the lack of meaningful progress towards disarmament and it was also stressed that a quicker pace in the negotiations was therefore imperative.

The updated report of the Secretary-General was welcomed with

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5 See foot-note 2.

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satisfaction by delegations. Venezuela stated that it was one of the most enlightening United Nations reports and a fundamental contribution to be taken into account in disarmament negotiations. New Zealand commended it to all Members of the First Committee, and Guinea felt that it should be studied very carefully by all the developing countries, which in its view were affected by the arms race more than any others. Romania stated that the Secretary-General's report represented a warning, issued with the authority of the United Nations, about the consequences of the arms race and an explicit expression of the fact that the world did not contemplate placidly that harmful phenomenon. In its opinion, the preparation by the Secretary-General of the report and the acceptance by Member States, on the basis of consensus, of its assessments, conclusions and recommendations, especially those concerning priorities in the field of disarmament, already represented a way of assuming responsibilities as to the prevailing situation. A number of delegations felt that the General Assembly should ensure the widest dissemination of the report, with a view to keeping Governments and international public opinion informed, and as a contribution to a better understanding of the imperative need for disarmament. The view was also expressed that the report should be further updated.

On 7 November, a draft resolution was submitted in the First Committee by Colombia, India, Liberia, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Venezuela and Yugoslavia, which was subsequently also sponsored by Benin, the Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Madagascar, the Sudan, Sweden, the United Republic of Cameroon and Zaire. The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of Romania who stressed that the significance which all countries attached to the question of the economic and social consequences of the arms race and the fact that certain assessments and conclusions of the report had already been extensively quoted in the debate in the Committee demonstrated the large consensus which existed in the Committee on that important matter. He also expressed the hope that the draft resolution would be adopted by consensus. In explaining their vote in the First Committee, a number of delegations, including Bangladesh, the Niger and Peru, expressed strong support for the report prepared by the Secretary-General and congratulated the Secretary-General, the consultant experts, Governments and international agencies contributing to the report and its preparation. The hope was also expressed that the findings and conclusions of the report should be taken into account in future disarmament negotiations. Japan drew particular attention to the statement contained in the Secretary-General's report that the time had come to study thoroughly the build-up of conventional arms in many parts of the world and to seek feasible ways to formulate international agreements on the transfer of weapons. Speaking on behalf of the nine members of the European Community, Belgium said that while participating in the consensus on the draft resolution, it found it one-sided, in that one super-Power only was held up as an example of the
misuse of resources for military purposes, and also in that one group of economies was criticized for not increasing its development aid, while nothing was said about the performance of the other group. China stated that it dissociated itself from the draft resolution.

At its 30th meeting on 11 November, the First Committee adopted by consensus the draft resolution which, on 12 December, was adopted without a vote by the General Assembly (resolution 32/75). It reads as follows:

*The General Assembly,*

*Having considered* the item entitled “Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security”,

*Recalling* its resolutions 2667 (XXV) of 7 December 1970, 2831 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, 3075 (XXVIII) of 6 December 1973 and 3462 (XXX) of 11 December 1975,

*Deeply concerned* that, despite the repeated requests by the General Assembly for the implementation of effective measures aimed at its cessation, the arms race, particularly of nuclear armaments, has continued to increase at an alarming speed, absorbing enormous material and human resources from the economic and social development of all countries and constituting a grave danger for world peace and security,

*Considering* that the ever-spiralling arms race is not compatible with the efforts aimed at establishing a new international economic order, as defined in the Declaration and the Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, contained in General Assembly resolutions 3201 (S-VI) and 3202 (S-VI) of 1 May 1974, in the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, contained in Assembly resolution 3281 (XXIX) of 12 December 1974, and in other resolutions of the Assembly, and that these efforts imply more than ever the resolute action of all States to achieve the cessation of the arms race and the implementation of effective measures of disarmament, particularly in the nuclear field,

*Conscious* that disarmament is a matter of grave concern to all States and that consequently there is a pressing need for all Governments and peoples to be informed about and to understand the situation prevailing in the field of the arms race and disarmament,

*Recalling* that the Secretary-General was requested by the General Assembly, in resolution 3462 (XXX), to bring up to date, with the assistance of qualified consultant experts appointed by him, the 1971 report entitled *Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures*, covering the basic topics of that report and taking into account any new developments which he would consider necessary, and to transmit it to the Assembly in time to permit its consideration at the thirty-second session,

1. *Welcomes with satisfaction* the updated report of the Secretary-General on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and of military expenditures and expresses the hope that it will help to focus future disarmament negotiations on nuclear disarmament and on the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control;

2. *Expresses its appreciation* to the Secretary-General and to the consultant experts as well as to the Governments and international organizations that have rendered assistance in the updating of the report;

3. *Decides* to transmit the report to the General Assembly at its special session devoted to disarmament, to be held in New York between 23 May and 28 June 1978;
4. **Recommends** that the conclusions of the updated report on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and of military expenditures should be taken into account in future disarmament negotiations;

5. **Requests** the Secretary-General to arrange for the reproduction of the report as a United Nations publication and to give it the widest possible publicity in as many languages as is considered desirable and practicable;

6. **Recommends** to all Governments the widest possible distribution of the report, including its translation into the respective national languages;

7. **Invites** the specialized agencies as well as intergovernmental, national and non-governmental organizations to use their facilities to make the report widely known;

8. **Reaffirms** its decision to keep the item entitled "Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security" under constant review and decides to include it in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fifth session.

**Conclusion**

Many countries belonging to the various geographical and political groups took part in the debate on the item entitled "Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security". Figures and other relevant information contained in the report of the Secretary-General were widely quoted during the discussion. The need for urgent action in order to put an end to the arms race was stressed by all delegations. The debate also helped to bring about a better understanding of the causes and effects of the arms race, as well as of the need for disarmament.

The report of the Secretary-General has been transmitted to the General Assembly at its special session devoted to disarmament, in accordance with paragraph 3 of resolution 32/75. The Assembly recommended that the conclusions of the report should be taken into account in future disarmament negotiations. Therefore, it may be expected that the question of the economic and social consequences of the arms race will also be discussed at the special session, in the context of its review and appraisal of the current international situation.

Finally, it should be noted that paragraph 8 of resolution 32/75 reaffirms similar decisions taken previously by the General Assembly and indicates that the item will be constantly kept under review as an important aspect of the international efforts to achieve the cessation of the arms race and the adoption of effective measures of disarmament.
Reduction of military budgets

Introduction

The question of the reduction of military budgets as an approach to disarmament has been considered by the General Assembly on many occasions, mainly in the light of the global volume of resources devoted to military activities compared with those being assigned to economic and social problems. The reduction of military expenditures, and the utilization of the resources that would thus be freed to meet economic and social needs, particularly those of the developing countries, have been a matter of concern since 1950, when the General Assembly adopted resolution 380 (V), in which it called upon every State to agree to reduce to a minimum the diversion for armaments of human and economic resources and to strive towards the development of such resources for the general welfare, with due regard to the needs of the under-developed areas of the world.

Since then the General Assembly has taken an active interest in the subject. That interest has been reflected both in a number of resolutions and in the conclusions or recommendations of studies dealing with the need to reduce military expenditures through disarmament, as well as with the link between disarmament and development. The Assembly adopted resolutions 914 (X) of 16 December 1955; 1516 (XV) of 15 December 1960, in which it recommended the preparation of the report entitled Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament; 1 1837 (XVII) of 18 December 1962; 2387 (XXIII) of 19 November 1968; 2602 E (XXIV) of 16 December 1969; 2667 (XXV) of 7 December 1970, requesting the first report entitled Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures; 2 2685 (XXV) of 11 December 1970, which requested the report entitled Disarmament and Development; 3 2831 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971; 3075 (XXVIII) of 6 December 1973; 3462 (XXX) of 11 December 1975; relating to the second, updated report entitled Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military

1 United Nations publication, Sales No. E.62.IX.1.
2 United Nations publication, Sales No. E.72.IX.16.
3 United Nations publication, Sales No. E.73.IX.1.
Expenditures (see chapter XIX above); 3470 (XXX) of 11 December 1975 and 31/68 of 10 December 1976.

As consideration of the question of releasing resources to promote economic and social development proceeded, attention was drawn to the specific approach of reducing military budgets. It was also felt that its possible application to all factors contributing to military capability, from research and development to the actual deployment of armed forces, would provide a useful tool for disarmament negotiations.

At the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly in 1973, the Soviet Union proposed the inclusion in the agenda of an item entitled "Reduction of the military budgets of States permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and utilization of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries". During the debate on the item, most developing countries supported the proposal, because of its disarmament implications and the link established between disarmament and development. A similar position was taken by the Eastern European countries.

Although in the discussions the desirability of reducing military budgets was generally recognized, the other permanent members of the Security Council objected to the Soviet proposal. France, the United Kingdom and the United States noted, inter alia, the difficulties of measuring different military budgets, while China held that it was inappropriate to call for proportionally equal reductions in the military budgets of the five permanent members of the Council.

At that session, the General Assembly adopted resolutions 3093 A (XXVIII) and 3093 B (XXVIII) under the item. By the former, dealing with the Soviet initiative, it recommended that the permanent members of the Security Council should reduce their military budgets by 10 per cent from the 1973 level during the following financial year, and appealed to them to allot 10 per cent of the funds thus released for the provision of assistance to developing countries. A Special Committee on the Distribution of the Funds Released as a Result of the Reduction of Military Budgets was established under the resolution, but because China, France, the United Kingdom and the United States declined to participate in it that Committee was never convened. By the latter resolution, submitted originally by Mexico, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to prepare, with the assistance of qualified consultant experts, a report on the reduction of military budgets of the States permanent members of the Security Council, which should also cover other States with a major economic and military potential, and on the utilization of a part of the funds thus saved to provide international assistance to developing countries.

The report, entitled Reduction of the Military Budgets of States Permanent Members of the Security Council by 10 Per Cent and Utilization of the Funds Thus Saved to Provide Assistance to Developing

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4 United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.1.
Countries,\textsuperscript{5} was issued in 1974. It dealt with figures relating to military expenditures and development aid and, in connexion with the reduction of military budgets, noted that a prerequisite for negotiating such reductions was agreement on what should and should not be included in military budgets, i.e., the problem of defining their scope and content. The report also discussed the difficulties of developing a standardized system of measuring military expenditures and of verifying any agreement to reduce them, as well as the use of released resources for international development assistance.

By its resolution 3254 (XXIX) in 1974, the General Assembly, \textit{inter alia}, invited all States to communicate their views and suggestions on all those points they deemed pertinent with regard to the matters covered in the report of the group of experts. The Soviet Union abstained in the vote on the resolution explaining that, by proposing further studies, it departed somewhat from the question of military budget reductions by the permanent members of the Security Council. Among the other permanent members, the United Kingdom and the United States voted for the resolution, France abstained and China voted against it.

At its thirtieth session, in 1975, the General Assembly considered, pursuant to that resolution, the report of the Secretary-General containing the views and suggestions of a number of States.\textsuperscript{6} By resolution 3463 (XXX), initiated by Mexico and Sweden, the Assembly reaffirmed its conviction that part of the resources released by reductions in military budgets should be utilized for social and economic development, particularly of the developing countries; appealed to all States, in particular the States which were permanent members of the Security Council—namely, the five nuclear Powers—as well as any other State with comparable military expenditures, to strive to reach agreed reductions in their military budgets; urged the two States with the highest levels of military expenditure in absolute terms, the USSR and the United States, to carry out, pending such agreement, a reduction of their military budgets; and requested the Secretary-General, assisted by a group of qualified experts, to prepare another report to be submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session on several technical aspects of the question, including the definition and scope of the military sector and of military expenditures, the valuation of resources in the military sector, the deflation for price change in military production in different countries, and the international value comparison and exchange rates relevant to military production. The two States urged by the resolution to reduce their military budgets abstained in the vote. France and the United Kingdom also abstained, while China voted against the resolution.

At its thirty-first session, the General Assembly had before it the

\textsuperscript{5} United Nations publication, Sales No. E.75.I.10.

\textsuperscript{6} A/10165 and Add.1 and 2.
report entitled *Reduction of Military Budgets: Measurement and International Reporting of Military Expenditures*,\(^7\) prepared in pursuance of resolution 3463 (XXX) by the Group of Experts on the Reduction of Military Budgets. The report contained recommendations concerning a definition and scope of the military sector and of military expenditures and, on that basis, it formulated a reporting formula, or matrix, as an instrument for a standardized reporting system.

The suggested reporting form is comprehensive in character, calling for about 50 items of data under three major headings, namely, operating costs, procurement and construction costs, and research and development costs. These items in turn are to be broken down by types of forces: strategic, general purpose, central support, paramilitary, civil defence and military assistance. In their conclusions, the experts considered that, while their recommendations were not necessarily exhaustive, they were viable and constituted an analytical step forward towards the goal of expenditure limitations and reductions. The group suggested that the international reporting instrument, as elaborated by them, should be operationalized, tested and refined by an *ad hoc* panel of experienced practitioners in the field of military budgeting. After this process, the group felt that the international community should be ready for discussion of the other major technical issues of expenditure limitation and verification. At the appropriate time, further consideration should be given to the utilization of part of the resources released from the reduction of military expenditures for social and economic development, particularly that of the developing countries.

At the initiative of Mexico and Sweden, later joined by Ecuador, the General Assembly adopted resolution 31/87 by which it, *inter alia*, invited all States to communicate to the Secretary-General before 30 April 1977 their comments with regard to matters covered in the report and, in particular: (a) their views and suggestions on the proposed standardized reporting instrument contained in the report; (b) any information they might wish to convey on their military expenditure accounting practices, including a description of methods currently in use; (c) suggestions and recommendations concerning possible practical approaches for the further development and operation of a standardized reporting system. The Assembly also requested the Secretary-General to prepare, with the assistance of an intergovernmental group of budgetary experts appointed by him, a report containing an analysis of the comments provided by States in the light of the suggestions contained in his report, as well as any further conclusions and recommendations. Among the permanent members of the Security Council, France, the United Kingdom and the United States voted for the resolution, the Soviet Union abstained and China voted against it.

In pursuance of the resolution, the Secretary-General appointed the members of the group of experts which met in two sessions

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\(^7\) United Nations publication, Sales No. E.77.I.6.
(31 May-3 June and 8-19 August 1977) under the Chairmanship of Mr. Encinas del Pando of Peru, and submitted a report to the Secretary-General who transmitted it to the General Assembly.8

Summary of the report of the Intergovernmental Group of Budgetary Experts

The Intergovernmental Group of Budgetary Experts stated that their report8 was an attempt to formulate constructive approaches to the reduction of military expenditures and the promotion of economic and social progress. They affirmed that it related to on-going studies within the United Nations, and to the Disarmament Yearbook, which was intended to contain in a standardized format information appropriate for the measurement and evaluation of military expenditures. They further stated that the central purpose of the report was to analyse the comments provided by States on the 1976 report entitled Reduction of military budgets: measurement and international reporting of military expenditures, and to furnish further conclusions and recommendations.

In their report, the experts analysed the comments provided by 14 States, considered the further development of the reporting instrument, examined practical problems which would face budgetary experts in completing the recommended format and in trying to extract appropriate information from data delivered by States in the process of testing and refining that instrument, and submitted the following conclusions and recommendations:

It is important to keep in mind that the basic aim of the exercise begun pursuant to General Assembly resolutions 3093 A and 3093 B (XXVIII) of 7 December 1973 is to achieve agreement regarding the reduction of the military budgets of the States permanent members of the Security Council, as well as any other State with comparable military expenditures, and to ensure that part of the resources thus released be utilized for social and economic development, particularly of the developing countries.

An essential element for the achievement of that aim is the availability of a satisfactory instrument for the effective reporting of military expenditures by States. This instrument should be characterized by consistency and comprehensiveness, which add to the verifiability of compliance by participants.

Much progress has been made, in the course of the studies underlying the 1974 and 1976 reports, towards developing and refining a reporting instrument with the following characteristics:

(a) Acceptable definitions of the military sector and of military expenditures have been devised;

(b) An international reporting format has been constructed which balances the needs of detail and verifiability against the difficulty of reporting;

(c) This reporting format and the report of which it was a part have been submitted to States, and comments have been invited; an analysis of those replies has been undertaken in this report.

8 A/32/194 and Add.1.
The group of experts believes that the views of respondent States reaffirm the validity of the concepts of the reporting instrument contained in the 1976 report. None the less, it should be observed that some degrees of reservations, and suggestions for modifications, were offered by some States, and that the data on which this report is based are less than complete. However, the highly successful attempt of one State (Sweden) to complete the matrix and the indications from other States that it would be possible without excessive difficulty to supply the required military expenditure data, emphasize the practicability of the proposed reporting instrument.

The expert group considers it important to put before the General Assembly the choices which will be involved in completing the matrix. Where States are not presently in a position to provide the kind of detailed data required, choices lie between: (a) reducing the level of detail required; (b) allowing approximations for some of the cell entries; and (c) appropriately modifying their budgeting and accounting systems. Although some simplification of reporting procedures may be appropriate in the early stages, reaching effective agreements to reduce military expenditures will ultimately involve the modification of the budgeting and accounting systems of States.

The following recommendations are made, as they are related to the resolution of issues raised in the formal replies submitted by States:

(a) The definitions of the military sector and military expenditures are appropriate;
(b) The importance of including paramilitary forces and all military assistance in the military sector was emphasized;
(c) Reserve production facilities and civil defence are part of the military sector in principle, although practical problems of measuring expenditures on them remain to be addressed as the development of the reporting system proceeds;
(d) Whether United Nations peace-keeping forces should be included or not depends on how they are mobilized and demobilized;
(e) Where military or quasi-military organizations perform civilian activities, only the additional costs arising from those activities should be excluded from the military sector;
(f) It will be necessary during operational development to further examine national practice with respect to personnel compensation, rental policy, the division between investment and repair, etc., in order to avoid discrepancies between States;
(g) Ammunition going to stockpiles should not be distinguished from ammunition for training;
(h) Some slight modifications of the subdivision of the resource cost category “construction” are suggested;
(i) Where the proposed force group divisions do not exactly match a State’s military organization, some flexibility of division should be allowed;
(j) The distinction between imported and domestically produced procurement items is important but will require further attention as the development of the reporting system proceeds.

The testing and refinement during the phase of operational development of the proposed reporting instrument will involve, in part, the completion of the matrix by a number of States. For this purpose a body will be required to carry out the work, to assess its results, and to develop practical recommendations for larger-scale applications and further refinement of the reporting instrument. Consideration should therefore be given to the composition and functions of such a body. The group of experts, in accordance with the 1976 report, recommends that such tasks might be delegated to an ad hoc panel of experienced practitioners in the field of military budgeting, under the aegis of the United Nations. The group of experts further deems it advisable that, in establishing the initial calen-

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dar of work of that body, account should be taken of the decision of the General Assembly to hold a special session on disarmament in May/June 1978.

For the phase of operational development referred to above, the sample of countries would preferably be manageably small, although participation would be open to all States. In order to test and refine the reporting instrument as thoroughly as possible, it is the opinion of the expert group that the sample should reflect as varied a group as possible of different military budgeting and accounting systems as well as different mechanisms for establishing the relevant prices for the military sector.

The work set in motion by General Assembly resolutions 3093 A and 3093 B (XXVIII) of 7 December 1973 has reached a decisive stage. A satisfactory reporting instrument has been devised and reviewed. The time thus appears propitious to attempt to move a step further. Progress along these lines will require operational testing and refining of the reporting instrument, which is work of a character different from that undertaken by the expert groups of 1974, 1976 and 1977. Development of the instrument, although necessary, is not sufficient in itself. It must be recalled that without an accompanying process of cooperation among States with large military expenditures, as referred to in Assembly resolution 3093 (XXVIII), in reducing military expenditures it will not be possible to accomplish the ultimate objectives—the reduction of military expenditures and the freeing of significant resources for social and economic development, particularly of developing countries.

Consideration by the CCD, 1977

In the CCD, only a few delegations commented on the question of the reduction of military budgets. The USSR held that its unilateral budget reduction for 1977 was further evidence of its desire to make a breakthrough in halting the arms race and achieving disarmament. The United Kingdom hoped that the Intergovernmental Group of Budgetary Experts, meeting at that time at Geneva, would be able to provide an agreed basis for measuring and comparing the military expenditures of States, so that proposals for the reduction of such expenditures could be considered on the basis of dependable facts. The United Kingdom also pointed out that the reduction of military budgets must be universal if such action was to be an effective stimulant to the economic and social progress of all countries.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1977

At the thirty-second session of the General Assembly both during the general debate and in the First Committee, many Member States belonging to the various political and geographical groups expressed deep concern on the continuation of the arms race which, they stressed, absorbed a sizeable proportion of the world's material and human resources which
could be channelled towards the elimination of poverty, disease and hunger, thus raising living standards all over the world. At the same time, it was stated that the reduction in military expenditures could have a decisive influence upon disarmament. In this context, the Byelorussian SSR recalled that the Soviet Union had long been proposing that an agreement be reached on practical measures to reduce military budgets and that, at the same time, the Soviet Union had unilaterally reduced its own military expenditures, thus demonstrating and setting a worthy example for others to follow.

Several countries, including the Byelorussian SSR, Cuba and the United Arab Emirates, recalled General Assembly resolution 3093 A (XXVIII) on the reduction by 10 per cent of the military budgets of the States permanent members of the Security Council and asked for its implementation. Cuba said that the resolution had not yet been implemented for reasons alien to the spirit and purposes underlying its presentation and the Byelorussian SSR stated that the proposal had not been complied with because of the resistance of those States which had been stubbornly pursuing a policy of stepping up military appropriations.

The need and significance of reducing military expenditures and allocating part of the funds thus released to international development assistance was stressed particularly by the developing countries. Sri Lanka held that the General Assembly, at its special session devoted to disarmament, should be able to give adequate attention to matters relating to the question of reducing military budgets for the purpose of freeing resources for social and economic development, particularly of the developing countries. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya called for a time-table to be worked out for the reduction of military budgets and Nepal suggested a freezing of the level of military spending from which to proceed further, to the reduction of military budgets. Romania expressed the view that a part of the funds saved as a result of the reduction of military budgets should be placed at the disposal of a United Nations development fund for the support of the economically backward countries, priority being given to those with a national per capita income below $200.

A number of countries expressed views on the ways in which the reduction of military budgets could be achieved. Austria stated that general agreement on military expenditure concepts, including definition and measurement procedures, as well as a corresponding international reporting structure, seemed to be a prerequisite for the realization of a balanced reduction of military expenditures as a particularly useful approach to disarmament. The United Kingdom felt that the failure in the past to implement formal proposals for the limitation of military expenditures had been attributed to a general lack of trust between countries and their willingness to provide the kind of information necessary to maintain confidence in the observance of expenditure limits. Success depended, the United Kingdom further considered, upon find-
ing a satisfactory system of measurement and comparison of military expenditures. It also held that agreement in that area would be an important first step towards effective limitation. In Canada’s view, the question of the reduction of military budgets was an area where efforts could probably best be pursued in a broad multilateral forum, because such reductions should be implemented universally.

A number of countries, including Austria, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Nepal, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom welcomed the 1977 report on military budgets and commented on the reporting instrument developed by the group of experts. The Netherlands stated that the report was a further step towards a world-wide system of reporting and verifying military budgets which, when applied, would strengthen confidence between States and could form the basis for agreement on reductions of military budgets. It also reaffirmed its willingness to test such a system on its defence budget, in the expectation that a number of countries representing different political and social structures would indicate their willingness also to participate in a test run of the system, so as to acquire more experience with it. Canada considered that the viability of reductions in military budgets as a means of progress towards real disarmament on an assured basis rested upon the development of a satisfactory means of reporting and comparing military expenditures, and that that would require a much greater degree of openness on the part of States in making useful information available. The Federal Republic of Germany hoped that all countries would seriously consider the step proposed in the report towards greater comparability of military expenditures as a basis of trimming their military budgets, while the United Kingdom appealed to the countries of Eastern Europe to support an early start of the reporting procedure with a pilot study. Austria stated that it was prepared to consider taking part in the testing of the proposed reporting system and hoped that, after an adequate testing period, it would be possible to refine the reporting system and make it operational on a global scale.

On 11 November, Mexico and Sweden submitted a draft resolution (A/C.1/32/L.24) which was introduced by Mexico at the 35th meeting of the First Committee on 17 November. Mexico stated on that occasion that it was obvious that the General Assembly had already exhausted all possibilities of continuing to study the technical aspects of the question of the reduction of military budgets, as it finally had a satisfactory instrument by means of which States could report effectively on their military expenditures. The next step, Mexico felt, should be to set in motion the practical process for testing and refining the proposed reporting instrument. But first and foremost, Mexico held, there had to be a clear indication that the permanent members of the Security Council, as well as other States with comparable military expenditures, would give evidence that they were prepared to carry out reductions in their military budgets.
By the draft resolution, the General Assembly would: (a) express its appreciation to the Secretary-General and to the group of qualified experts which had assisted in the preparation of the report; (b) request the Secretary-General to prepare a background report on the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and transmit it to all Member States not later than 1 April 1978, compiling the proposals and recommendations put forward by the groups of experts appointed by the Secretary-General and under Assembly resolutions 3463 (XXX) and 31/87; and (c) decide to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-third session the item entitled “Reduction of military budgets”

Also on 17 November, Germany, Federal Republic of, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States submitted amendments (A/C.1/32/L.33) to the draft resolution, which were introduced by the United States at the 37th meeting on 18 November. The amendments provided for: (a) the insertion of a new preambular paragraph recognizing the value of the availability of a satisfactory instrument for standardized reporting on the military expenditures of Member States, particularly of the States permanent members of the Security Council, as well as any other State with comparable military expenditures; (b) the insertion, after operative paragraph 1, of a new paragraph requesting the Secretary-General to ascertain those States which would be prepared to participate in a pilot test of the reporting instrument and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its special session devoted to disarmament; and (c) the addition, at the end of operative paragraph 2, of a new clause, also requesting the Secretary-General to include in the background report information concerning the progress made in carrying out the task relating to the pilot test.

In introducing the proposed changes, the United States explained that the first amendment gave explicit recognition to the value of standardized reporting of military expenditures for achieving agreement on the reduction of those expenditures. It also held, in connexion with the other two amendments, that the question of military expenditures and the notion of a pilot test would be before the special session devoted to disarmament and that, therefore, deliberations at the special session would be much more meaningful if it was known who would be prepared to participate in a test programme.

Although the sponsors of the draft resolution agreed with the objectives pursued by the amendments, they could not accept them because, in their view, their adoption might result in a hardening of the negative attitude among many delegations regarding participation in a pilot test of the reporting instrument.

At its 37th meeting, the Committee voted on the amendments and on the draft resolution. The first amendment was adopted by a recorded vote of 103 (including France, the United Kingdom and the United States) to 1 (China), with 17 abstentions (the Soviet Union, other
Eastern European countries and some non-aligned States). The second and third amendments were adopted by a recorded vote of 40 (including France, the United Kingdom and the United States) to 4 (China, Mexico, Peru and Sweden), with 76 abstentions (the Soviet Union, other Eastern European States and many non-aligned countries).

The draft resolution, as amended, was adopted in the First Committee by a recorded vote of 109 (including France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the two sponsors of the original draft) to 2 (Albania and China), with 11 abstentions (the Soviet Union, other Eastern European States and Cuba).

At its 100th meeting, on 12 December 1977, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution recommended by the First Committee by a recorded vote of 120 to 2, with 13 abstentions, as resolution 32/85, the voting pattern being the same as in the First Committee. The resolution reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling that, in its resolution 31/87 of 14 December 1976, it requested the Secretary-General to prepare, with the assistance of an intergovernmental group of budgetary experts appointed by him, a report containing an analysis of the comments provided by States in the light of the suggestions set forth in the 1976 report of the Group of Experts on the Reduction of Military Budgets,

Noting with appreciation the report of the Secretary-General submitted to the General Assembly in response to the aforementioned resolution,

Recognizing the value of the availability of a satisfactory instrument for standardized reporting on the military expenditures of Member States, particularly of the States permanent members of the Security Council, as well as any other State with comparable military expenditures,

Recognizing that the work set in motion by the General Assembly on the reduction of military budgets has reached a decisive stage and that successive reports of groups of experts have moved the whole exercise to a position where practical steps for testing and refining the proposed reporting instrument could now be taken,

Noting that the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, to be held in May and June 1978, will provide an opportunity to consider the disarmament problem in a broad perspective,

Noting further that at the special session several matters related to the reduction of military expenditures will be considered,

Reaffirming its conviction that part of the resources thus released should be utilized for social and economic development, particularly that of the developing countries,

Reaffirming also its conviction of the urgent necessity that the States permanent members of the Security Council, as well as any other State with comparable military expenditures, carry out reductions in their military budgets,

Conscious that, without an accompanying process of co-operation among such States, it will not be possible to accomplish the ultimate objectives,

1. Expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General and to the Group of Budgetary Experts which assisted in the preparation of the report;

2. Requests the Secretary-General to ascertain those States which would be prepared to participate in a pilot test of the reporting instrument and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its special session devoted to disarmament;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to prepare a background report for the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and transmit it to all Member States not later than 1 April 1978, compiling the proposals and recommendations put forward by the groups of experts appointed by the Secretary-General and under Assembly resolutions 3463 (XXX) and 31/87, and containing information concerning the progress made in carrying out the task referred to in paragraph 2 above;

4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-third session the item entitled “Reduction of military budgets”

Conclusion

The three expert reports on the question of the reduction of military budgets brought about, in the view of a number of non-aligned and Western delegations, a more detailed understanding of the complex problems involved in that question. In accordance with resolution 32/85, the stage of theoretical study must now be followed by the first moves towards the implementation of a pilot test, designed to establish the adequacy of the reporting instrument as developed by the experts.

However, this new step has not led to a solution of the basic differences in approach to the problem of the reduction of military budgets, which have been obvious practically since that question was included for the first time in the agenda of the General Assembly. Several States, mainly members of the Eastern European group, continued to hold that a political decision, followed by substantive negotiations at the intergovernmental level, would facilitate a solution to the problem without the need for further studies. Other States, many of them members of the Western European group, have repeatedly emphasized the importance of first solving a number of complex technical issues, which would make an adequate comparison among the various budgetary systems possible. Still other countries, particularly non-aligned, believed that a continuing study of technical issues, while useful, should not further delay progress in the question of the reduction of military budgets, as a measure aimed at disarmament and development.

It could then be expected that, at the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, discussions will centre again not only on the question of conducting a pilot test of the reporting instrument, but also on those differences in approach to the question.
CHAPTER XXI

Review Conference of the Parties to the Sea-Bed Treaty

Introduction

The First Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (Sea-Bed Treaty) was held at Geneva, Switzerland, from 20 June to 1 July 1977, pursuant to article VII of the Treaty, which provided for such a Conference five years after the Treaty's entry into force with a view to assuring that the purposes and provisions of the Treaty were being realized.

The Sea-Bed Treaty

In the mid-1960s, the surge of interest in the economic potential of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof beyond the limits of national jurisdiction gave rise to awareness of the need to establish an international régime that would forestall rival national claims to the area and its resources and ensure that exploration and exploitation of that environment would be carried out for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all mankind. In 1967, the question was placed on the agenda of the twenty-second session of the General Assembly at the initiative of Malta. The discussion revealed widespread support for the principle of reserving the sea-bed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction exclusively for peaceful purposes, and the Assembly, by its resolution 2340 (XXII), established the Ad Hoc Committee to Study the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, which had as its main task to explore practical means of promoting international co-operation in the exploration, conservation and use of the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof.

The following year, the General Assembly transformed the Ad Hoc Committee into the permanent Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurs-
diction (resolution 2467 (XXIII)),\(^1\) within the framework of which work on the question was pursued.

Military uses of the sea-bed were however dealt with separately, in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and its successor, the CCD, and also in the General Assembly, because it was felt that since matters closely related to national and international security were at stake, the question should be considered in the context of disarmament negotiations.

At its twenty-fifth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2660 (XXV), in which it commended the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil thereof, the text of which was annexed to the resolution.

By article I of the Treaty, the States parties undertake not to emplant or emplace nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof beyond the outer limits of a sea-bed zone defined in article II. This formulation corresponds to that which appeared in the first joint draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Union and the United States to the CCD on 7 October 1969,\(^2\) although the Eastern European countries and many non-aligned countries would have preferred a treaty providing for the demilitarization of the area. Discussions both in the CCD and the General Assembly focused primarily on such questions as the implications of the Treaty for the rights or claims of States in connexion with law of the sea matters, verification procedures, the continuation of negotiations regarding further demilitarization of the sea-bed and review mechanism, and in the course of the discussions the first joint draft underwent several revisions.\(^3\)

For purposes of defining the geographic zone of the Treaty’s application, the first joint draft made specific reference to the “maximum contiguous zone” provided for in the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone,\(^4\) signed at Geneva on 29 April 1958. A number of States that had not accepted that Convention objected to that wording on the grounds that it prejudged their position on the question of the contiguous zone in general. To allay their apprehensions, in the revised joint draft of 23 April 1970,\(^5\) the phrase “outer limit of a sea-

\(^1\) This Committee subsequently carried out preparatory work for the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, and was dissolved by the Assembly as from the inauguration of the Conference (see resolution 3067 (XXVIII)).


\(^3\) For an account of the discussions on the draft treaty, see The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970 (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1), chap. VIII, and The United Nations and Disarmament: 1970-1975 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.76.IX.1), chap. VI. See also documents SBT/CONF.4 and A/AC.187/68.


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bed zone" was substituted for "maximum contiguous zone", and the area was defined in article II as being coterminous with the 12-mile outer limit of the zone specified in the 1958 Geneva Convention. In addition, the disclaimer clause, stating that the Treaty would in no way affect the rights or claims of States in relation to law of the sea matters, became a separate article (article IV).

The matter of verifying compliance with the Treaty received considerable attention throughout the discussions and a number of suggested changes in the procedures originally envisaged in the USSR-United States draft found their way into the final text of article III.

The limited scope of the Treaty lent great significance to the continuation of discussions concerning the demilitarization of the seabed. A number of delegations insisted on the addition of a separate article containing a commitment on the part of States parties to pursue negotiations on further measures for the prevention of an arms race in the sea-bed, and a new provision to that effect was included in the last revised draft\(^6\) (article V).

Similarly, the limited scope of the Treaty made it necessary, in the eyes of a great number of delegations, to include a provision contemplating the holding of periodic review conferences to examine the operation of the Treaty in the light of relevant technological developments; such a provision, which appeared in the second draft\(^7\) as article V, became article VII in the final text.

The Sea-Bed Treaty was opened for signature on 11 February 1971 and entered into force on 18 May 1972. In 1977 Cuba became a party to the Treaty, bringing the total number of States parties to 65. That number includes three nuclear-weapon States—the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States, whose Governments are the Depositaries of the Treaty—and some of the most significant maritime Powers.

### Developments since the conclusion of the Treaty

There were few developments in connexion with the Sea-Bed Treaty following its entry into force. Some references to it were made in the CCD and in the course of the work of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.

The only substantive issue raised in the CCD related to the implementation of article V, on continued negotiations on further measures for the prevention of an arms race in the sea-bed. During the period 1971-1975, several members of the CCD, including Czechoslovakia, Mexico, Poland, Sweden and the USSR, spoke at various times about the importance they attached to continuing negotiations in accordance

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with article V of the Treaty. At the 1974 session of the CCD, Mexico drew attention to that article and stated that, despite the fact that more than three years had passed since the conclusion of the Treaty, the contemplated negotiations had not taken place. In early 1975, Czechoslovakia, reminding the CCD that the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty would be meeting at Geneva in 1977, in accordance with article VII, maintained that the CCD might appropriately begin a discussion of the problem of demilitarization of the sea-bed. However, no such discussion was held either at the 1975 or 1976 session of the CCD.

At the fourth session of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, held in New York from 15 March to 7 May 1976, during the consideration of the item entitled "Peaceful uses of ocean space: zones of peace and security", a number of States, including Iran, Iraq, Madagascar, Malta, Pakistan, Peru and Romania, considered that the future convention on the law of the sea should develop further the concept of peaceful uses of ocean space and that the Conference should, therefore, address itself to all relevant issues, including disarmament related matters. Madagascar, for instance, held that the Conference should adopt a comprehensive approach to the question of peaceful uses of ocean space and its resources, both with regard to geographical extent and activities to be covered, since the new rules should apply equally throughout the marine environment. In its opinion, all categories of zones covered by the law of the sea convention should be subject to the rule of peaceful use, and the provisions of the Sea-Bed Treaty should be applied in the territorial sea. Furthermore, since activities carried out on the sea-bed could not be separated from those carried out in the water column or on the surface or even in the super-jacent air space, the proposed rule on peaceful uses should be uniformly applied. Recognizing that complete demilitarization was not a realistic proposition, it suggested a number of issues for negotiation, among them the possibility of restricting the right of passage or refusing port facilities to foreign warships, particularly those carrying nuclear, chemical or other weapons of mass-destruction, the possibility of banning all naval manoeuvres and all missile testing in the international zone, and the question of foreign military bases. According to Iraq, the law of the sea convention should provide for the establishment of zones of peace and security in which rockets, nuclear weapons and military installations with a nuclear capacity would be prohibited since those armaments were a threat to the security of peoples and impeded the course of free international navigation.

On the other hand, some States, notably Bulgaria, Cuba, the Soviet Union and the United States, were of the view that the Conference, in endeavouring to formulate a convention on the law of the sea, should

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not turn its attention to questions pertaining to the military uses or specific peace and security problems in ocean space. In their opinion, those problems, while relevant in a broad sense to the matters under discussion, were much more closely related to problems of international peace and security and disarmament and, therefore, their solution should be sought within the framework of other appropriate bodies. The Soviet Union, for instance, stated: "A complete and constructive solution of those issues would be possible only within the framework of the appropriate United Nations bodies or at other international conferences and forums dealing with the problems of disarmament, international security and world peace." Similarly, the United States held that any specific limitation on military activities would require the negotiation of a detailed arms control agreement and concluded that "the Conference was not charged with such a purpose and was not prepared for such negotiation. Any attempt to turn the Conference's attention to such a complex task could quickly bring to an end current efforts to negotiate a law of the sea convention."

**Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty**

At its thirtieth session, the General Assembly, in its resolution 3484 E (XXX), after noting the provisions of article VII of the Sea-Bed Treaty and the fact that the Treaty would have been in force for five years on 18 May 1977, stated that it expected that the review conference would take place soon after that date. In addition, the General Assembly noted that, after appropriate consultations, a preparatory meeting of parties to the Treaty would be arranged and requested the Secretary-General to render the necessary assistance for the review conference and its preparation.

Informal consultations among States parties were held during the thirty-first session of the General Assembly in 1976, in the course of which agreement was reached on various organizational matters, *inter alia*, that the membership of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference would be open to all States parties and that it would meet at Geneva from 7 to 11 February 1977.

The Preparatory Committee met at Geneva as scheduled and unanimously adopted its final report. It decided that the Review Conference would be held at Geneva from 20 June to 1 July 1977, and that it would be open to all States parties to the Treaty.

The Conference was convened on 20 June at Geneva, with the participation of 42 States parties: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Hungary, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, Nicaragua, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Kingdom, United States and Yugoslavia. In addition, three States which had signed but not ratified the Treaty participated without taking part in the decisions (Argentina, Brazil and Greece) and one State (Nigeria) participated as an observer. The United Nations and IAEA were also represented at the Conference.

After two weeks of deliberations, the Conference unanimously adopted its Final Document,\(^8\) which includes the text of the Final Declaration (part two) and the summary records of the plenary meetings (part three). The task of preparing the Declaration fell on the Drafting Committee, which worked on the basis of a text submitted by Bulgaria, Ghana, Hungary, India, Iran, Norway and the United Kingdom. It should be noted that the Conference itself, at the suggestion of the President, introduced two changes in the draft Final Declaration recommended by the Drafting Committee (11th meeting).

In its Final Declaration, the Conference assessed the operation of the Treaty article by article and made several recommendations with regard to the further implementation of the Treaty's provisions. (For the text, see appendix XII below.)

To a great extent, the Review Conference in its examination of the Treaty focused on the same issues that arose in the course of the discussions leading to the conclusion of the Treaty, such as the scope of the Treaty's prohibition, further negotiations, verification procedures, review mechanism and the relationship between the Treaty and law of the sea questions. Intertwined with those, however, two new questions emerged in the discussions: technological developments since the Treaty's entry into force and the collection, assessment and dissemination of information relevant to the Treaty's operation.

It was recognized that the Sea-Bed Treaty had been a timely and useful pre-emptive measure in the field of arms control and disarmament in that it had contributed to preventing the extension of the nuclear arms race to the vast area of the bottom of the seas and oceans, covering two-thirds of the surface of the globe. In its Final Declaration, the Conference confirmed that the obligations assumed under article I of the Treaty had been faithfully observed by the States parties and stated its conviction that the continued observance of that article remained essential to the objective which all States parties shared of avoiding an arms race in nuclear weapons or any other type of weapons of mass destruction on the sea bed. The Conference also stated that the five years that had elapsed since the date of entry into force of the Treaty had demonstrated its effectiveness. At the same time it noted with concern that the Treaty had not yet achieved universal acceptance and called upon the States that had not yet become parties, particularly those possessing nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass

\(^8\) SBT/CONF/25 (also circulated as documents A/C.1/32/4 and CCD/543).
destruction, to do so at the earliest possible date. In the view of the Conference, such adherence would be a significant contribution to international confidence.

In the course of the discussions, a number of delegations expressed concern about the limited scope of the Treaty and, in that connexion, pointed to the rapid pace of scientific and technological advances and the consequent need for further negotiations with a view to extending the reach of the Treaty's provisions.

Romania noted (3rd meeting) that since the conclusion of the Treaty, despite the insistence of many delegations on the need for further measures aimed at the demilitarization of the sea-bed, no specific problem relating to disarmament in ocean space had been the subject of discussions in the CCD. Furthermore, Romania was concerned that the extension of the arms race had reduced the marine and ocean area available for peaceful purposes, a trend that ran counter to the provisions of the Treaty's first preambular paragraph and the growing desire of the international community for the development of co-operation between States in the exploitation of marine resources. Romania considered that the Review Conference should, in particular, reach clear and precise conclusions concerning article V so that the negotiations envisaged therein could begin without delay, with a view to the adoption of measures for the complete prohibition of nuclear activities of a military nature on the sea-bed and for promoting the negotiation of agreements prohibiting the emplacement thereon of installations, new military bases, depots or structures forming part of conventional weapons, and the conclusion of treaties for the dismantling of existing naval bases. The Conference should also encourage measures designed to restore the sea-bed and ocean floor to peaceful uses and protect them from military use, including measures to strengthen confidence, such as notification of naval manoeuvres of a certain scale and the invitation of observers to military manoeuvres; the negotiation of agreements renouncing manoeuvres, particularly when they involved nuclear components and were to be conducted in maritime navigation zones, and the establishment of zones of peace in the seas and oceans.

Noting also that the scope of the Treaty was limited, Yugoslavia said (6th meeting) that the fact that no violation had been reported in the period under review did not mean that the situation was satisfactory. The increasing vulnerability of strategic weapons on the earth's surface and in the air had stimulated interest in sea warfare and, consequently, the sea-bed. The rapid increase of military interest in the sea was illustrated by activities such as the accelerated measurement and study of all its parameters, the improvement of systems for the precise determination of positions of objects under the sea's surface, the development of more versatile vessels and of oceanographic stations, and the general improvement of nuclear submarine performances. Yugoslavia also pointed out that no negotiations had taken place pursuant to article V
and held that negotiations on those matters should be part of the broader
efforts aimed at gradual reduction and withdrawal of fleets from sensitive
regions of the world.

Sweden commented (3rd meeting) that although the Treaty con­
stituted a very limited step towards arms control and disarmament, it
had acceded to it essentially because it contained provisions that held
out hopes of further measures. It raised the question of how far the
risks of an arms race on the sea-bed might have increased since the
Treaty had entered into force and recalled that, at the time of the
negotiations, it had been considered reasonable to suppose that new
military developments concerning the sea-bed might accentuate the
danger of an arms race.

Similarly, Finland, which considered that the ultimate goal of the
measures initiated by the Treaty was the complete exclusion of all
weapons from the sea-bed, dwelt on the significance of technological
developments (5th meeting). It pointed out that military technology,
and in particular surveillance by satellites, had rendered military instal­
lations not only on land but also on the surface of the sea increasingly
vulnerable. It also noted that the development of submarine technology
and communication techniques, as well as the increased range of mis­
siles, might result in the emplacement on the sea-bed of support equip­
ment which, without strictly speaking being designed for launching,
storing, testing or using nuclear weapons, could indirectly facilitate
their deployment. Furthermore, the sea-bed could also be used for the
deployment of controllable mines or mine torpedo systems which might
even be equipped with nuclear warheads. In its view, the development
of arms technology and various economic incentives often tended to
undermine arms control treaties and therefore it would be well, in order
to preserve the future credibility of the Treaty, to study ways and means
of strengthening it by measures aimed at counteracting an arms build­
up on the sea-bed.

The Soviet Union noted (2nd meeting) that it had consistently
advocated the complete demilitarization of the sea-bed and that, together
with other countries, it had repeatedly raised the question of continuing
negotiations within the CCD in conformity with article V of the Sea­
Bed Treaty. In its view and that of other Eastern European countries,
the Conference should give a fresh impetus to efforts aimed at imple­
menting article V. For its part, the Soviet Union was fully prepared to
enter into negotiations on additional international treaties or conven­
tions on the prohibition of the emplacement on the sea-bed and ocean
floor of military objects not covered by the existing Treaty and other
measures for the prevention or limitation of the arms race on the sea-bed
and ocean floor. The CCD would undoubtedly offer the most suitable
forum for such negotiations and the Conference might appeal to it to
proceed with the preparation of further measures aimed at the demili­
tarization of the sea-bed.
Several countries, such as Cyprus, India and Jordan, also favoured the initiation of negotiations on measures prohibiting the emplacement on the sea-bed and the ocean floor of weapons, installations and military facilities not currently covered by the Treaty.

Other countries, namely Australia, Canada and Denmark, were sceptical about the desirability of further negotiations at present either because they felt that the undertaking would be in vain, as it was during the elaboration of the Treaty, or because they attached greater priority to other disarmament issues.

The United States held (2nd meeting) that further work on multilateral arms control measures relating exclusively to the sea-bed was not justified at the present time, since there was little likelihood of an arms race there, and pointed out that, together with several other States parties, it continued to be engaged in disarmament negotiations that although not directly related to the sea-bed, might serve to prevent an arms race in that area by restraining the development or use of certain weapons or methods of warfare.

In its Final Declaration, the Conference requested the CCD to proceed promptly with the consideration of measures for the further demilitarization of the sea-bed, in consultation with the States parties and taking into account the proposals made at the Conference and relevant technological developments, and invited it to consider the establishment of an ad hoc group of experts to keep technological developments under review.

The verification procedures as defined in article III were a matter of considerable concern to many delegations, although it was recognized that, as stated in the Final Declaration, all States parties had faithfully respected the prohibition contained in article I. Specifically, it was felt that those procedures should be further elaborated by making provision for resort to international mechanisms other than the Security Council where, as stated in Article 27, paragraph 3, of the Charter of the United Nations, the concurring votes of the permanent members were required. Views along those lines were expressed by such countries as Iran, Japan, Sweden and Switzerland, Japan and Sweden drawing attention to the Consultative Committee of Experts provided for in the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (General Assembly resolution 31/72, annex). Japan submitted a formal proposal to the effect that the Conference should declare that it was desirable to establish an international machinery for verification, a consultative committee for instance, with a view to securing the effective operation of the Sea-Bed Treaty. In addition, Japan proposed (8th meeting) that, pending the establishment of such a machinery, the Conference should recommend that article III, paragraph 5, should be interpreted as including the extension of the good offices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for providing assistance to those States which, for example, did
not possess satisfactory verification means of their own and desired such assistance with regard to verification, and that a statement to that effect should be incorporated in the Final Document of the Conference. The fact that most countries did not have adequate means of verifying compliance was also stressed by other delegations, among them those of some Western European countries, such as the Netherlands and Sweden. On the other hand, some delegations, including those of the three Depositaries, considered that the relevant Treaty provisions were adequate and that, as noted in the Final Declaration, they were broad enough to permit States parties to resort to various international procedures, including ad hoc consultative groups of experts. The USSR expressly opposed the inclusion of an interpretative statement of article III, paragraph 5, as suggested by Japan.

The lack of information on relevant technological developments was another matter of concern to many delegations, which considered that in the absence of such information the Review Conference could not effectively discharge its mandate since, pursuant to article VII of the Treaty, the Conference was required to examine the operation of the Treaty taking into account relevant technological developments. For that reason, the Preparatory Committee had requested the Secretary-General of the United Nations to prepare compilations of: (a) official communications with regard to the implementation of the objectives and provisions of the Treaty that he and the Depositaries might have received, and (b) papers on technological developments—military as well as peaceful—relevant to the Treaty, which States parties might wish to provide or which were otherwise officially available to him from Governments. It may be noted that the three Depositaries, in their replies to the Secretary-General, stated that they had received no such communications or papers. In addition, the United States noted that it had not identified any technological developments relevant to the Treaty’s operation and effectiveness for consideration at the Review Conference.

Various delegations, among them the Netherlands and Yugoslavia, voiced scepticism about the statements to the effect that in the previous five years no relevant technological developments had been identified. Australia, for its part, hoped that when any technological developments which would affect the purposes or specific provisions of the Treaty occurred the information would be shared among the States parties.

According to Sweden (3rd meeting), important matters of principle were involved. In its opinion the operation of the Treaty was a common responsibility of all States parties and that common responsibility was closely connected with the right to obtain information, for the very nature of the Treaty and the verification procedures—as well as the Review Conference itself—implied that the parties should share information to some extent. Sweden considered that it would be difficult
to assess how far the objectives of the Treaty were being realized if it was impossible to take account of relevant technological developments and held that to ask countries that did not possess the necessary technology to prove that the military use of the sea-bed had increased would be unrealistic. To assert, on the other hand, that no relevant military or peaceful technological developments had taken place since 1971, without providing any basis for such a conclusion, could undermine the credibility of the Treaty. Sweden acknowledged the fact that military secrecy stood in the way of disclosure of many details of new technologies but hoped that a reasonable degree of secrecy would not prevent a meaningful assessment of new developments and their implications for the implementation of the Treaty and noted that parties possessing the most developed underwater technology and military resources bore a special responsibility in respect of the review of the functioning of the Treaty, and their contribution would probably be decisive. It then submitted a formal proposal by which the Conference would have, *inter alia*: (a) expressed the view that a previously established broad documentation would facilitate any common assessment of whether the risks of an arms race had increased and of which specific measures might be negotiated in order to prevent such risks; and (b) decided to submit to the attention of the CCD the desirability of instituting an expert committee on technological developments in the broader sense indicated above. The findings of such a committee would be submitted to the parties to the Treaty for further consideration, both with a view to the orderly preparation of the next review conference and, in a shorter perspective, to facilitate ulterior comprehensive assessments as to whether the risks of an arms race on the sea-bed had increased or not and what specific measures ought to be undertaken in negotiations in order to prevent such an arms race.

On this matter, the Conference stated in its Final Declaration:

The Conference takes note of the fact that no information has been presented to it indicating that major technological developments have taken place since 1972 which affect the operation of the Treaty. The Conference, nevertheless, recognizes the need to keep such developments under continuing review and invites the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, in consultation with the States parties to the Treaty, to consider establishing an *ad hoc* expert group under its auspices for this purpose. Such a group might facilitate the implementation of the purposes stated in the section dealing with article V. It might also contribute to the orderly preparation of the next Review Conference.

Romania considered that it was difficult to reach precise conclusions on the operation of the Treaty and that the difficulty resulted from the fact that the Treaty did not specify how information relating to technological progress made in sea and ocean research could be made available to all States. In view of this, Romania believed that the Review Conference should decide upon practical approaches likely to contribute towards achievement of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty, in particular, the establishment of a system for dissemination and
evaluation of information on technological progress so as to enable all States parties to make an informed judgement regarding respect of the provisions of the Treaty. Accordingly, it proposed that the Conference invite the United Nations to consider ways and means to facilitate collection, assessment and dissemination of information in connexion with the Treaty. In view of the opposition of some States, notably the three Depositaries, Romania, together with the Netherlands, presented a revised text inviting the Secretary-General to collect such information from officially available sources and publish it in the United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, which was included in the Final Declaration.

It should be noted that Yugoslavia, while participating in the consensus, expressed some reservations about the text of the Final Declaration. In its opinion, the Conference should have "regretted", as well as noted, the fact that no information had been presented to it. Secondly, it considered that the Final Declaration should have made provision for the appointment of a group of experts to assist the Secretary-General in the collection of relevant information and that the word "officially" should have been deleted in the phrase "officially available sources".

Several delegations raised in various forms the connexion between the Sea-Bed Treaty and developments relating to the law of the sea, in particular the work of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, which was holding its sixth session (23 May-15 July 1977) at the time of the Review Conference. Italy submitted a proposal concerning the reference to the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in article II of the Sea-Bed Treaty, according to which the Review Conference, while recognizing the great importance of the negotiations in progress at the Conference on the Law of the Sea, would have expressed the opinion that the new legal régime of the sea that might emerge as the result of such negotiations would not in any way affect the extent of the rights and obligations deriving from the Sea-Bed Treaty, or alter the delimitation of the portion of the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof to which the undertakings set forth in article I applied. Any modifications of the rights and obligations deriving from the Sea-Bed Treaty would be negotiated in the framework of the amendment procedure provided for in article VI.

On this point, the Conference stated in its Final Declaration that it agreed that the zone covered by the Treaty reflected the right balance between the need to prevent an arms race in nuclear weapons and any other types of weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the right of States to control verification activities close to their own coasts.

India proposed to include in the Final Declaration a paragraph stating that no country could, without the request or consent of a coastal State, take any measures in its continental shelf and the sea-bed of its exclusive economic zone for the implementation of article III of
the Treaty which might be prejudicial to the sovereign rights of a coastal State in its continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone. After informal consultations, the Conference reaffirmed, in the framework of articles III and IV, that nothing in the verification provisions of the Treaty should be interpreted as affecting or limiting the rights of States parties recognized under international law and consistent with their obligations under the Treaty, including the freedom of the high seas and the rights of coastal States, and noted with satisfaction that nothing in those provisions had been identified as affecting or limiting those rights. It also reaffirmed that States parties should exercise their rights under article III with due regard for the sovereign rights of coastal States as recognized under international law.

India also suggested that the Final Declaration should reflect the concept of the area of the sea-bed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof beyond the limits of national jurisdiction and its resources as the common heritage of mankind. Romania, which had also presented a proposal along those lines, supported that suggestion. As adopted by the Conference, the Final Declaration recognized in a preambular paragraph that the natural resources of the sea-bed and ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction would have an increasing role in assuring the economic progress of States, particularly of developing countries, and recalled in that connexion General Assembly resolution 2749 (XXV).

By article VII of the Sea-Bed Treaty, the Conference was required to decide whether and when an additional review conference was to be held. Basically, three approaches may be identified, although views on the question were generally flexible. Some States, including Morocco, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey, favoured a decision setting the date of the next review conference, while others, including Canada, Denmark, Germany, Federal Republic of, Japan and the Netherlands, favoured a decision along the lines of the Environmental Modification Convention, and still others, among them Australia, Hungary, Norway and the United States, considered that the question should be left open and the next review conference held when developments warranted.

Sweden submitted a proposal according to which the Conference would have noted that the instrument for review was of essential value

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10 Paragraphs 2 and 3 of article VIII of the Convention read as follows:

"2. At intervals of not less than five years thereafter, a majority of the States Parties to this Convention may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary, the convening of a conference with the same objectives.

"3. If no conference has been convened pursuant to paragraph 2 of this article within ten years following the conclusion of a previous conference, the Depositary shall solicit the views of all States Parties to this Convention concerning the convening of such a conference. If one third or ten of the States Parties, whichever number is less, respond affirmatively, the Depositary shall take immediate steps to convene the conference."
both in order to assure the proper functioning of the Treaty in its current form and to enable the parties to decide if and when the Treaty ought to be modified or complemented by additional agreements. Beyond that, it would have decided that a new review conference should be held in 1982, or earlier if a majority of the States parties submitted a proposal to that effect to the Depositary Governments.

For its part, the Federal Republic of Germany put forth a proposal based on the relevant provisions of the Environmental Modification Convention.

The compromise decision adopted by the Conference makes provision for the holding of another review conference in 1982, unless a majority of States parties wish such a conference to be postponed, in which case it is to be convened not later than 1984.

Consideration by the CCD, 1977

In the course of the summer session of the CCD, several delegations, including those of Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Italy, Mongolia, Poland, the USSR and the United Kingdom, noted with satisfaction the results of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Sea-Bed Treaty, which had confirmed that the Treaty had worked satisfactorily. The Eastern European countries drew attention to the Conference’s recommendations concerning negotiations on further measures for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed. The Soviet Union, for instance, recalling that it had always advocated complete demilitarization of the area and had repeatedly raised in the CCD the question of further negotiations with a view to achieving that end, pointed out that the Review Conference had requested the Committee to proceed promptly with the consideration of further measures which would completely exclude the sea-bed from the arms race. It added that the Committee, having worked out the Sea-Bed Treaty and possessing as it did a significant potential for reaching mutually acceptable agreements on the various problems of disarmament, should conduct negotiations on practical steps leading to that goal.

On the question of technological developments, the United Kingdom reiterated that, as stated at the Review Conference, it did not believe that there had been any such developments affecting the Treaty. However, it expressed the hope that at an appropriate time it would be possible to consider establishing an *ad hoc* expert group to keep technological developments under review to allay the fears of any State which believed that technological developments relevant to the operation of the Treaty might be taking place.

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At its 759th meeting on 4 August, the CCD, at the request of its Co-Chairmen, decided to circulate the Final Document of the Review Conference as a Committee document.\(^{12}\)

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1977

The President of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Sea-Bed Treaty, as requested by the Conference, transmitted the Conference's Final Document to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for distribution to all Member States at the thirty-second session of the General Assembly.\(^{12}\)

In the course of the debate on disarmament questions in the First Committee,\(^{13}\) a number of countries, among them Czechoslovakia, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Mongolia, Poland, Turkey, the USSR and the United Kingdom, drew attention to the results of the Review Conference. It was noted with satisfaction that the Conference had been held in a constructive and business-like atmosphere, that its decisions had been adopted by unanimity, that it had achieved its primary purposes and that it had reaffirmed that no violations of the Treaty had occurred during the period under review. The Eastern European countries also attached particular significance to the Conference's decision to request the CCD to begin consideration of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed.

On 3 November, Poland introduced a draft resolution on the subject under the item "General and complete disarmament", which was co-sponsored by Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, the German Democratic Republic, Ghana, India, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Togo, Tunisia, the USSR, the United Kingdom, the United States, Yemen and Zaire. Poland explained that the underlying notion of the draft resolution was to give the General Assembly's positive reaction to the findings and conclusions of the Review Conference and to assure the adoption of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor, regardless of its usefulness and effectiveness, the Sea-Bed Treaty was certainly not the last word on disarmament in that vital area of the earth. It further pointed out that, since the draft resolution was meant to be non-controversial, its text was in many instances based on the actual wording of the Final Declaration of the Review Conference which had been collectively elaborated and approved by all participants in the Conference. The sponsors believed, therefore, that it reconciled and reflected, to the greatest extent possible, the views of delegations in the Committee.

\(^{12}\) See foot-note 9.

\(^{13}\) See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-second Session, First Committee, 7th to 38th, 40th and 44th meetings; and ibid., First Committee, Sessional Fascicle, corrigendum.*

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The draft resolution was adopted by consensus in the First Committee. China dissociated itself from its adoption and Spain explained that it would have abstained had there been a vote because it was not a party to the Sea-Bed Treaty.

In the General Assembly, the draft was also adopted by consensus on 12 December 1977, as resolution 32/87 A. Albania previously announced that it would not participate in the vote. The resolution reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2660 (XXV) of 7 December 1970, in which it commended the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof,

Convinced that the Treaty constitutes a step towards the exclusion of the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof from the arms race,

Recalling that the States parties to the Treaty met at Geneva from 20 June to 1 July 1977 to review the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty were being realized,

Noting with satisfaction that the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof concluded that the obligations assumed under the Treaty had been faithfully observed by the States parties,

Noting that in its Final Declaration the Review Conference affirmed its belief that universal adherence to the Treaty would enhance international peace and security,

Noting furthermore that the States parties to the Treaty reaffirmed their strong support for and continued dedication to the principles and objectives of the Treaty, as well as their commitment to implement effectively its provisions,

Recognizing that in the Final Declaration the States parties to the Treaty reaffirmed the commitment undertaken in article V to continue negotiations in good faith concerning further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof,

Bearing in mind that, in this connexion, they have addressed specific requests to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament,

Having considered the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament,

Noting the comments with respect to further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, as well as relevant documents submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session,

1. Welcomes with satisfaction the positive assessment by the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof of the effectiveness of the Treaty since its entry into force;

2. Invites all States that have not yet done so, particularly those possessing nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass destruction, to ratify or accede to the Treaty as a significant contribution to international confidence;

3. Affirms its strong interest in avoiding an arms race in nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed, the ocean floor or the subsoil thereof;
4. Requests the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament—in consultation with the States parties to the Treaty and taking into account the proposals made during the Review Conference and any relevant technological developments—to proceed promptly with the consideration of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race in that environment;

5. Calls upon all States to refrain from any action which might lead to the extension of the arms race to the sea-bed and the ocean floor;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament all documents of the thirty-second session of the General Assembly relevant to further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof;

7. Requests the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to report on its negotiations to the General Assembly at its thirty-third session.

Conclusion

The Review Conference of the Parties to the Sea-Bed Treaty was the second conference convened to examine the operation of a multilateral agreement in the field of disarmament, the first having been the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which was held at Geneva from 5 to 30 May 1975.

In its Final Declaration, the Review Conference confirmed that the obligations assumed under article I of the Treaty had been faithfully observed by the parties and made a positive assessment of its effectiveness since its entry into force in 1972. At the same time, it recognized that the Treaty should be supplemented by additional measures, so as to exclude the sea-bed area from the arms race, and called on the CCD to undertake negotiations towards that end. The Conference also provided for clarification of some of the provisions of the Treaty, notably those concerning verification procedures, which are to be understood as permitting, inter alia, the establishment of consultative groups of experts.

In addition, the Conference, acknowledging that States parties should have data concerning the functioning of the Treaty, particularly information on technological developments, took steps aimed at providing mechanisms for filling that need. The Secretary-General of the United Nations was invited to collect relevant information from officially available sources and publish it in the United Nations Disarmament Yearbook. Information transmitted by States parties is reproduced in appendix XIII to the present volume. The CCD was also invited to consider the establishment of an ad hoc group of experts to keep under review technological developments affecting the Treaty's operation.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX I

Message conveyed by the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at its 1977 session*

The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament today begins its new year of activity. This provides an opportunity to review the work accomplished and to consider the tasks that are ahead. We are all aware of the fundamental role that disarmament must play in any systematic approach to international peace and security and to the construction of a new and more just world order. A relaxation of political tensions has diminished the danger of big Power confrontation, but this has not led to a slackening of the nuclear arms race. The hazards to international security of this continuing arms race are obvious. It is equally obvious that the release of resources through disarmament would benefit economic and social development. Recent changes in world conditions further emphasize this dual need for disarmament.

The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has been deeply engaged in difficult substantive work and has successfully negotiated three major agreements. I refer to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction. These are real achievements, and their importance should not be underestimated. Moreover, you have recently elaborated the text of a draft convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques, which the General Assembly decided to refer to all States for their consideration, signature and ratification. In this connexion, I note that this new Convention is the first disarmament agreement to designate the Secretary-General of the United Nations as Depositary and that, in addition, it provides that the Secretary-General should, in case of any problem relating to the application of the Convention's provisions and upon the request of any State party to the Convention, convene a consultative committee of experts appointed by interested States parties for the purpose of preparing a summary of findings concerning the problem. I take this as an indication of the intention of the world community to have the United Nations play a more central role in the field of disarmament.

I would also like to express the hope that this innovation with regard to the handling of possible violations of the provisions of the Convention by any party will be seen as a precedent for creative solutions of the ever recurring problem of verification of compliance, which has been considered by some to be the major obstacle to the conclusion of a number of important agreements.

* As read out by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General at the 728th meeting of the Committee, on 15 February 1977.
Your negotiations must reflect a sense of urgency commensurate with the threat to world peace and security. Despite the conclusion of a number of limited arms control agreements during the past decade, it is clear that no significant breakthrough to halt the ever accelerating growth of the world's arsenals, whether nuclear or conventional, has yet been achieved.

The result is an accumulation of arms far beyond the needs of legitimate defence which not only endangers world security, but now absorbs annually some $350 billion at a time when the struggle to alleviate the hunger, poverty and disease that plague many hundreds of millions of the world's people suffers from a lack of resources.

It is most unfortunate that the greatest increases in arms spending in recent years have been for conventional weapons in areas of the world where the arms race was as yet relatively unknown, and it is certainly most desirable and urgent that the suppliers of arms to these regions, together with the countries of the regions themselves, find some mutually satisfactory means of curbing this dangerous trend.

Looking to the future, there is general agreement that the most urgent attention in the disarmament effort should be directed towards an early halting of the nuclear arms race and the reduction and ultimate elimination of these awesome weapons of mass destruction.

Over the years, I have stressed repeatedly the vital importance of a general and complete test ban as a necessary first step towards halting the nuclear arms race, and I remain convinced that the risks of continuing such tests far outweigh the risks involved in any tests that might still conceivably go unverified. I am encouraged that the two major nuclear Powers have, in the course of the past year, signed agreements to limit the scope of such tests, including peaceful nuclear explosions. We also note with special interest that both the Soviet Union and the United States recently have indicated a willingness to overcome the impasse with regard to on-site inspections. There seems to be now a greater readiness to reach an accord in this area. Difficulties may remain, but I would express the hope that this Committee make a very determined effort towards achieving a comprehensive test ban, as urged by the General Assembly at its thirty-first session. I am confident that this would have a major positive impact on the international situation and help us to make real progress towards disarmament.

With regard to the growing threat of the spread of nuclear-weapons technology, the General Assembly has stressed the urgency of international co-operative efforts in appropriate forums to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices, while at the same time recognizing the right of all non-nuclear-weapon States to full access to the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under appropriate safeguards. The Assembly also renewed its call for the early creation of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones in different parts of the world. In this context I wish to direct attention to the efforts of the Latin American region. The tenth anniversary of the Treaty of Tlatelolco was celebrated yesterday in a special ceremony at Mexico City. This important event demonstrates that progress can be achieved if the political will exists to do so.

The General Assembly has also stressed the continuing importance of prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and called on this Committee to continue negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement. The situation now appears more encouraging than in the past in the light of fresh approaches—and new proposals on this subject. I, therefore, sincerely hope that substantial progress can be made at this session toward banning the most lethal of these weapons in the general framework of an agreement that all such weapons would be banned as soon as adequate compliance procedures could be worked out.

In the introduction to my last report to the General Assembly, I said that possibility of a sensible, equal and constructive dialogue on political and
economic matters among all States, developed and developing, now exists as never before. We must make sure that this dialogue includes disarmament.

In this connexion, I was impressed by the spirit of compromise which characterized the debate on many of the disarmament issues before the General Assembly last year. I am referring in particular to the consensus reached on the strengthening of the role of the United Nations in this field and on the convening of a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1978.

I have tried to review the most vital areas of work that will be taken up by the Committee at its 1977 session. Your deliberations on these and other important items on the agenda can contribute to setting the new and positive course in disarmament negotiations which we all seek. I wish the Committee every success in its endeavours.
APPENDIX II

Extract from the report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization*

I have frequently said that the United Nations cannot hope to function effectively on the basis of the Charter unless there is major progress in the field of disarmament. Without such progress world order based on collective responsibility and international confidence cannot come into being. The question of disarmament lies at the heart of the problem of international order, for, in an environment dominated by the international arms race, military and strategic considerations tend to shape the over-all relations between States, affecting all other relations and transactions and disturbing the economy. We have become used to living in a highly unnatural state of affairs where the shadow of nuclear weapons and of vast and increasing arrays of conventional armaments has virtually come to be accepted as the normal light of day. In this profoundly unhealthy situation there can be no guarantee that national independence and sovereignty, equality of rights, non-resort to force or to the threat of force, and the right of every people to decide its own destiny will in fact be honoured as the principles on which we have long agreed that the international order should be based. And yet it is all too obvious that the world is still ineffectively groping for the key to this problem of life and death.

Since the Second World War there have been some modest achievements, but they have been in the nature of arms limitation rather than disarmament, or regulating competition and proscribing certain particularly undesirable developments rather than on substantially reducing important weapons systems. It is now becoming increasingly clear that such an approach is wholly inadequate to stem the tide of an innovating arms race, where technological ingenuity tends constantly to outstrip the pace of negotiations. We cannot take for granted, as a permanent feature of life, that new military developments must and will always be controllable in a stable balance of mutual or multiple deterrence. If we continue to try only to regulate or to temporize with the arms race, treating the symptoms rather than the underlying causes, we run an increasing risk of temporizing ourselves into oblivion.

Nowhere is the problem of finding a workable balance between national fears and preoccupations and the long-term interests of the world community so acute as in the question of disarmament. The facts of the present situation are well known. Stocks of nuclear weapons have already for many years been sufficient to destroy the world many times over, and yet the number of nuclear warheads has increased five-fold in the past eight years. These weapons are constantly being diversified and their performance improved. The dividing line between the use of nuclear and conventional arms is being steadily eroded, while every year the danger of the further spread of nuclear weapons increases as the technology becomes more widely known. So-called conventional weapons

are also becoming increasingly sophisticated and deadly. Continuous study and assessment of nuclear-weapon problems, including non-proliferation, are clearly required if the international community is to be able to move forward. The International Atomic Energy Agency is one available instrument for limiting some of the dangers involved.

All this is happening in a world which has accepted the objective of a new international economic order and which urgently requires all its energy and resources to meet a series of urgent human problems. For several years annual world military expenditure has been about $300 billion. By contrast the World Health Organization has spent about $83 million over 10 years to eradicate smallpox in the world—a sum insufficient to buy one modern supersonic bomber. That organization's programme for eradicating malaria at an estimated cost of $450 million—half of what is spent daily for military purposes—is dragging for lack of funds. In a world where scientific and technological capability is one of the keys to the future, 25 per cent of the world's scientific manpower and 40 per cent of all research and development spending is engaged for military purposes.

These are but a few examples of the burden on the economic development of all States constituted by our failure to achieve substantial progress on disarmament. Disarmament must therefore be a vital part not only of our efforts to establish a better system of international peace and security, but also of our attempts to restructure the economic and social order of the world.

The relation between disarmament and development has, for some years, been the subject of international debate and there is, as a result, widespread concern to find practical and concrete ways to effect a reduction of military budgets and to transfer human and material resources to areas of development that sorely need them. It is evident that further comprehensive study is needed of this problem if we are to make more substantive progress.

It is now 10 years since a United Nations study was made of the most awesome of all weapons, nuclear arms. In this period we have seen a continued, not to say accelerated development in this field, bringing new concepts and applications into public focus. It would seem high time for the international community again to undertake a comprehensive study and assessment of nuclear-weapon problems in the light of the developments of recent years.

The special role and responsibilities of the great military Powers for peace and security are fully recognized. Progress towards nuclear disarmament must obviously originate in the first place with the major nuclear Powers. The strategic arms limitation talks are of crucial importance, and I wish here to express the hope that definitive and substantial progress can soon be made in reducing the vast numbers of nuclear weapons now existing, as well as in controlling the dangerous and destabilizing impact of the development of new weapons systems. The success of these talks is unquestionably also crucial to the creation of the atmosphere of international confidence in which alone further disarmament efforts can flourish. I also have in mind in this connexion the talks on the reduction of armaments and armed forces in Europe and efforts to create nuclear-weapon-free zones in certain areas.

The interest of the United Nations, and the international community as a whole, in these issues is not merely that of a passive spectator. In a period where a new form of world society, symbolized by the United Nations, is emerging, the majority of the medium and small Powers, the developing countries and the non-aligned—by whatever groupings we may wish to categorize them—must be involved, and actively so, in a problem which vitally affects them all. They can, and should, play an important part in a comprehensive approach to disarmament aimed at real disarmament in the context of world order, which is at the same time realistic as to practical possibilities, including the escalating dangers of a continued deadlock.
For all these reasons the General Assembly has decided to call for a special session on disarmament. But if this initiative is to be successful, careful preparation and the involvement of informed world public opinion will certainly be important prerequisites for any progress.

The task ahead is immensely difficult and complex, but the expectations of humanity are high. I hope that in the coming years the United Nations will be able to show its collective determination to fulfil them.
APPENDIX III

Activities of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization related to disarmament*

Introduction

Keeping in mind the hope expressed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations at the fourteenth session of the General Conference of UNESCO that that organization would effectively supplement the efforts of the United Nations to contain and reduce the dangers inherent in the new weapons of mass destruction brought out by progress in science and technology, UNESCO has been developing, over the last few years, a programme touching all its fields of competence aimed at making an effective contribution to efforts within the United Nations system towards general and complete disarmament.

Mandate for UNESCO disarmament activities in 1977

During the biennial period 1977-1978, UNESCO programmes relating to disarmament were determined by the decisions of the General Conference at its nineteenth session, held at Nairobi in November 1976. Of particular importance in this regard was the approval by the General Conference (resolution 100) of the medium-term plan for 1977-1982, which it considered as enabling UNESCO activities to be seen in an over-all context in relation to the most important problems of the modern world and thus [contributing] to the adjustment of the organization’s programmes to the real wishes and aspirations of the international community.

The medium-term plan sets out the objectives of the organization for the six-year period 1977-1982 according to 10 problem areas, the second of which is the “reinforcement of peace”. Within this problem area there are three objectives which involve, at least in part, disarmament issues:

Objective 2.1—Promotion of peace research, in particular on manifestations of violation of peace, causes preventing its realization, ways and means to eliminate them and proper measures to be taken in order to maintain and reinforce a just, lasting and constructive peace at the level of groups, societies and the world.

Objective 2.2—Promotion of the study of the role of international law and of international organizations in the establishment of a peaceful world order.

Objective 2.3—Development of school and out-of-school programmes as well as of information aimed at furthering peace and international understanding.

* Text contributed by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.
In the discussion at Nairobi, the Director-General made a special appeal to member States concerning disarmament. In his introduction to the medium-term plan, he stated:

"The arms race, which is the most obvious symptom of the present tensions throughout the world, devours vast resources, which, if they were used for other purposes, would be capable of substantially improving the lot of the most seriously disadvantaged peoples and giving a possibly decisive impetus to the development of the societies to which they belong."

Among the principles of action for objective 2.1 is the following:

(c) Increased emphasis should also be placed on studies which can be used to explain the origin of the tensions in the world and the factors determining the arms race, and which can be used to promote disarmament and eliminate obstacles to it.

The objective relating to international law and international organizations (objective 2.2) stresses the challenges to the international community of major world problems and the response of international law and international organizations to them. Disarmament appears as one of the major challenges in this regard.

Objective 2.3 concerns in particular the implementation of the Recommendation on International Understanding, Co-operation and Peace and Education relating to Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms adopted by the General Conference on 19 November 1974. This instrument sets out detailed recommendations for national educational policy to promote international understanding and co-operation, including the study of the major problems of mankind, such as disarmament.

During the nineteenth session of the General Conference at Nairobi, several resolutions made specific reference to the role of the organization in the field of disarmament. In its resolution 12.1, on the contribution of UNESCO to peace and its tasks with respect to the promotion of human rights and the elimination of colonialism, the General Conference urged member States actively to support any moves towards solving the problems of disarmament and invited the Director-General, under the short- and medium-term programmes, to promote studies and research on the contribution that could be made by UNESCO, in its fields of competence, to knowledge of the problems of disarmament, and to their solution, by employing all possible ways of making world opinion alive to these problems. In another resolution (resolution 13.1) the General Conference drew particular attention to the role of UNESCO in generating a climate of public opinion conducive to the halting of the arms race and the transition to disarmament.

Under the above-mentioned mandate UNESCO intensified its activities in the field of disarmament in 1977 with a view to contributing, within its spheres of competence, to preparations being made within the United Nations system for the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The activities described below are part either of the peace research programme of the organization, the efforts in the direction of public information or the work of National Commissions and non-governmental organizations.

During 1977, a seminar was prepared, to be held in early 1978, on the obstacles to disarmament and the ways of overcoming them. A number of studies were also commissioned.

Within its programme of the study of international organizations, the UNESCO secretariat has begun a series of publications on the role of govern-

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b See Medium-Term Plan (1977-1982), introduction by the Director-General, para. 29.

mental and non-governmental, regional and universal organizations in dealing with the major problems of the period since the Second World War. Among the first subjects to be covered in this series was the role of these organizations in reducing the arms race and in promoting disarmament, which was prepared in 1977 for publication, along with other themes, in 1978 and 1979.

In the same year, a selection was made of previously published scientific articles with a view to publishing a reader on disarmament. This will be published later. Two annotated bibliographies were also prepared, of which one, on the social and economic aspects of the arms race and disarmament, has been published together with a report on research trends, as number 39 in the series Reports and Papers in the Social Sciences. The other deals with the main trends emerging on the subject of dangers to man and his environment inherent in modern armaments and techniques of warfare.

Preparatory work has begun on a possible large-scale programme on disarmament education, as one area of competence where UNESCO may make a specific contribution to the follow-up to the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. With the help of several non-governmental organizations, a survey was conducted on where, how, by whom and with what orientation teaching programmes deal with disarmament. A study on the pedagogical implications of disarmament education was prepared in 1977 for UNESCO under the auspices of the Peace Education Commission of the International Peace Research Association.

**Dissemination of public information about disarmament**

Following a request made by the General Conference in 1976 (resolution 13.1), efforts were intensified in 1977 to alert public opinion to the urgency of the transition to disarmament and to provide information about the issues involved.

On 28 and 29 June 1977, a round-table was held at UNESCO headquarters in Paris, on the initiative of a non-governmental preparatory committee, on the subject "The challenge of the year 2000." At this meeting, which was attended by persons from the area of politics, the arts and the sciences, much attention was devoted to disarmament. A particularly important statement, among others, was made, by Lord Noel-Baker. He, together with two other Nobel Prize winners participating at the round-table, Alfred Kastler and Sean MacBride, issued an appeal to President Carter and to General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev to assure as soon as possible the application of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Several radio programmes were produced by UNESCO radio with participants at the round-table.

Another series of radio programmes was devoted entirely to disarmament. These programmes have been widely distributed to French language radio stations and plans were made to publish the text of the programmes as a brochure for general distribution.

In 1977, the bi-weekly UNESCO Features published the following articles related to disarmament:

- "UNESCO observes 'Day of Peace'" (No. 714), on the holding, at UNESCO Headquarters, on 11 January of a ceremony marking the tenth anniversary of the Day of Peace with representatives of Pope Paul VI.
- "Building peace in Northern Ireland from the bottom up" (No. 724), containing an interview with a co-founder of the movement of the peace people.
- "The continuing quest for disarmament" (No. 725), containing remarks on the subject made by Sean MacBride, Han Suyin, Michel Jobert and Alfred Kastler during the round-table of 28 and 29 June.

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"Hiroshima's unanswered questions", by Frank Barnaby (No. 726), an article written for UNESCO about the symposium on the damage and after-effects of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (see below).


Support to disarmament-related activities of National Commissions and non-governmental organizations

In December 1977, the Finnish National Commission for UNESCO organized an expert seminar on research and information on questions related to disarmament and international co-operation in this field, in which 30 experts from 10 European countries participated. The results of the seminar will be published in time for the special session of the General Assembly.

An international symposium on the damage and after-effects of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was held in July 1977 in those two cities, as well as in Tokyo, with the assistance of UNESCO. This symposium was sponsored inter alia, by 40 non-governmental organizations. An article about this symposium and several of the papers presented there will be published in several UNESCO periodicals, including UNESCO Features, Impact of Science on Society and the International Social Science Journal.

Representatives from 68 non-governmental organizations participated in the symposium entitled: "Disarmament, development and education for peace: how they interact", which was held at UNESCO headquarters in June 1977. Two working papers were presented, on disarmament and development and education for peace. A special session was devoted to the consideration of the interrelations between the two subjects and proposals for follow-up action. The final document of this symposium was adopted by the sixteenth Conference of non-governmental organizations in consultative relationship (categories A and B) with UNESCO, which was held in November 1977. The Conference adopted a resolution favouring the continuation of action by non-governmental organizations in the field of disarmament. It also decided to establish a working group to consider the follow-up to be given to the symposium.

In December 1977, a round-table on the future of the third world was held under the auspices of UNESCO in Mexico. The round-table, which considered the multiple aspects of the situation of the under-developed countries, stressed, inter alia, that the questions dealt with, including the establishment of the new international economic order, were inextricably linked to the question of general and complete disarmament. In the Joint Declaration adopted at the round-table, participants appealed to the United Nations General Assembly to consider the following three points at the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament:

(a) The immediate adoption of a convention outlawing the use of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, and condemning the use of such arms as a crime against humanity which should be punishable under international law;
(b) Adoption of measures aimed at a complete halt, once and for all, to research and projects concerned with the manufacture of nuclear weapons;
(c) The immediate start of negotiations with a view to drawing up a treaty on complete and universal disarmament based on the principles accepted in 1961. This treaty should provide for efficient measures to reduce armaments in addition to partial measures such as those for the control of armaments.

Further support to non-governmental organizations active in disarmament was given through the UNESCO Programme of Participation, in particular to the
International Peace Research Institute (PRIO) at Oslo for its quarterly *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*. The first two issues of 1977 of the Bulletin were specifically devoted to disarmament issues and contain a wealth of contributions in this area. These issues have been distributed internationally to various authorities dealing with the subject matter. Also under the Programme of Participation, a contribution was made by UNESCO to the International Peace Research Association to hold its seventh General Conference in December in Mexico. This conference dealt, *inter alia*, with various aspects of disarmament.

**Planning for the special session**

While pursuing the activities mentioned above UNESCO has followed closely developments in the United Nations, particularly the preparation for the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It has established useful relations with the Centre for Disarmament of the United Nations Secretariat and has sought to assure co-ordination of its disarmament activities through the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination, when the matter was on the agenda of that body.

In order to reinforce this co-operation and to draw the attention of the States participating in the Preparatory Committee for the special session, the representative of the Director-General attended part of the third session of that Committee and made a statement on 1 September 1977 (16th meeting).

Finally, the UNESCO secretariat has, during 1977, considered new activities in the field of disarmament which could be proposed, within the framework of the programme and budget for 1979-1980, to the member States at the twentieth session of the General Conference in November 1978. These proposals were drawn up with a view to facilitating the carrying out of any specific mandate that the special session might wish to give to UNESCO, particularly as regards education and information. Among the proposals is the holding in 1980 of a world congress on education for disarmament. Further action on these proposals will depend on the outcome of the special session of the General Assembly and on the decisions of the General Conference of UNESCO.
Activities of the World Meteorological Organization related to disarmament*

Introduction

The World Meteorological Organization is not directly involved in questions of disarmament. Some of the activities of the Organization have, however, some relevance to article III of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (General Assembly resolution 31/72) and the understandings of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament relating thereto. A brief review of such activities in 1977 is given in the present note. Before describing these activities, it may be mentioned, as a matter of general interest that the World Weather Watch, which is the basic programme of WMO, contains the following provision:

The World Weather Watch shall be used only for peaceful purposes, due account being taken of the national sovereignty and security of States, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the spirit and traditions of the World Meteorological Organization.

Weather modification

Seventh Congress (1975) of WMO approved a Weather Modification Programme, the most important element of which is a Precipitation Enhancement Project consisting of an internationally planned and executed and scientifically evaluated field experiment to obtain scientifically accepted information on the feasibility of precipitation enhancement under given conditions. Further progress was made in the development of the Project which is at present in the site-selection phase. It should, however, be mentioned that the tentative time-table for the Project, drawn up assuming favourable circumstances, provides for the experiment to take place during the period 1981-1986, following a final decision on the site to be used based on an intensive study of the relevant meteorological conditions at the site.

Seventh Congress (1975) of WMO authorized the Secretary-General to assist members, upon request, in conducting their own weather modification experiments, the costs involved being met by the country concerned. Assistance was given to one member country in investigating the feasibility of undertaking an experiment on rain enhancement in that country.

Seventh Congress (1975) of WMO decided that an inventory of activities within member countries related to weather modification should be maintained and distributed from time to time in order better to inform members of world-

* Text contributed by the World Meteorological Organization.

\* See The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, vol. 1: 1976 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.77.IX.2), appendix IX.
wide activities and advances in this field. In compliance with this decision, the Second Register of National Weather Modification Projects, which relates to the year 1976, was distributed.

Ozone research and monitoring

Action was continued in implementing the WMO Global Ozone Research and Monitoring Project, the objective of which is to enable WMO to provide advice to member countries and to the United Nations and other appropriate international organizations concerning various aspects of atmospheric ozone. The project is being carried out with support from the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).

The main activities related to the improvement of the global network of ground-based total-ozone measuring stations and organization of meetings of experts for discussion of specific problems relating to the Project.

WMO also participated in a meeting of experts designated by Governments, inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations which was convened by UNEP and held in Washington, D.C., in March 1977. The outcome of the meeting was an agreed World Plan of Action on the Ozone Layer with WMO acting as the agency to provide the lead in several activities in the field of atmospheric ozone.
Activities of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations related to disarmament*

The World Food Conference, which was held at Rome from 5 to 16 November 1974, considered the question of reducing military expenditures for the purpose of increasing food production. Most speakers pointed to the enormous disproportion between military expenditures and the current goals of agricultural development aid and called for the allocation of the sums so released to the financing of food production in developing countries and the establishment of emergency reserves. The Conference adopted resolution XIV, in which it called on the States participating in the Conference to take the necessary measures for the most rapid implementation of the resolutions of the General Assembly and other organs of the United Nations pertaining to the reduction of military expenditures for the purpose of development, and to allocate a growing proportion of the sums so released to the financing of food production in developing countries and the establishment of reserves to deal with emergency cases.

Following the Conference, there was an appreciable increase in development assistance to agriculture from bilateral and multilateral sources. The official commitments of external assistance to agriculture in its broad sense more than doubled between 1973 and 1975. However, in 1976 such commitments showed a decline in nominal terms, thus widening further the gap between the availability and requirements of external assistance for increasing food and agricultural production in developing countries to attain the target growth rate of 4 per cent. FAO estimated in 1974 for consideration by the World Food Conference, that official development assistance to agriculture needed to be stepped up to between 5 and 6 billion dollars annually during the second half of the Second United Nations Development Decade. These estimates would amount in 1976 prices to around 8.3 to 8.5 billion dollars, against which the actual commitment in 1976 was less than 3.6 billion. Notwithstanding the establishment of the International Fund for Agricultural Development at a level of over 1 billion dollars—a major achievement—its annual lending can only cover a small fraction of this gap. However, a reduction of just 2 per cent in the military expenditures currently running at a rate of at least 300 billion dollars and the provision of resources so released for stepping up food and agricultural production in countries of the third world would be enough to fill this gap in development assistance.

With support from the World Food Conference, the FAO governing bodies have adopted the International Undertaking on World Food Security, to which the majority of the States members of FAO have already subscribed. Successful achievement of the goals and objectives of the Undertaking would appear to be

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* Text contributed by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

See Report of the World Food Conference (United Nations publication, Sales No. 75.II.A.3).

b See E/CONF.65/4, paras. 444 and 445.
considerably facilitated if there was to be a more effective political security based on the limitation of the arms race. Establishment of an effective system of international co-ordination of nationally held stocks and provision of adequate and timely information on crop conditions and stock-holdings would thus have a more auspicious political climate if there was a global agreement on disarmament.

The 1972 report on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and of military expenditures draws attention in paragraphs 97 and 99 to the link between military considerations and agricultural protectionism. The views expressed in these paragraphs are even more valid today than they were in 1972.

The prospect of early establishment of the new international economic order depends to a considerable extent on the political and military stability in the world. Success in the difficult negotiations for the establishment of the new international economic order is likely to be facilitated by agreements to curb the growth of the arms race and the military expenditures of States.

*United Nations publication, Sales No. E.72.IX.16.*
Draft treaty banning nuclear weapon test explosions in all environments*

The States Parties to this Treaty,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures towards nuclear disarmament,

Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Each Party to this Treaty undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any explosion of other nuclear devices, in any environment.

2. Each Party to this Treaty undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, encouraging, assisting or in any way participating in the carrying-out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or of any explosion of other nuclear devices.

3. Each Party to this Treaty undertakes to take any measures it considers necessary in accordance with its constitutional process to prohibit and prevent any activity in violation of the provisions of the Treaty anywhere under its jurisdiction or control.

4. As regards the period ending on ............... the provisions of Protocol I annexed to this Treaty shall be applicable to the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.†

Article II

The provisions of Article I of this Treaty do not apply to those nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes which might be carried out under international supervision and control and which take place in conformity with Protocol II annexed to this Treaty.

Article III

1. Each Party to this Treaty undertakes to co-operate in good faith to ensure the full observance and implementation of this Treaty.

2. For the purpose set forth in this Article, the Parties to the Treaty shall engage the services of a consultative committee. The depositary shall either on


† Optional provision for a transitional arrangement, if needed; another alternative is found in article VII, para. 4.
his own initiative or within one month of the receipt of a request from any Party to convene the committee. Any Party may appoint a representative to this committee whose functions and rules of procedures are set out in Protocol III annexed to this Treaty.

**Article IV**

1. Each Party to this Treaty undertakes to co-operate in good faith in an effective international exchange of seismological data in order to facilitate the detection, identification and location of underground events. The arrangements for technical supervision of the compliance with this Treaty are laid down in Protocol IV annexed to this Treaty.

2. Each Party to this Treaty undertakes to consult one another and to co-operate in good faith for the clarification of all events pertaining to the subject matter of this Treaty. In accordance with this provision, each Party to the Treaty is entitled:

   (a) to make inquiries and to receive information as a result of such inquiries,

   (b) to invite inspection on its territory or territory under its jurisdiction, such inspection to be carried out in the manner prescribed by the inviting Party,

   (c) to make proposals, if it deems the information available or made available to it under all or any of the preceding provisions inadequate, as to suitable methods of clarification.

3. If after consultation and co-operation pursuant to this Article there remains a serious question concerning the fulfilment of the obligations assumed under this Treaty, a Party may, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, bring the matter to the attention of the Security Council and to other Parties to the Treaty.

**Article V**

The protocols annexed to this Treaty constitute an integral part of the Treaty.

**Article VI**

Any Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Amendments shall enter into force for each Party accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty and thereafter for each remaining Party on the date of acceptance by it.

**Article VII**

Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. The review conference shall determine in accordance with the views of a majority of those Parties attending whether and when additional review conferences shall be convened.

**Article VIII**

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by Signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall be the Depositary of this Treaty.
3. This Treaty shall enter into force upon the deposit with the Depositary of instruments of ratification by x Governments including the Governments of United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

[4. Pending the entry into force of this Treaty the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics undertake to apply the provisions of Protocol I as from the date on which this Treaty has been signed by these two Governments.]†

(Following subparagraphs would be renumbered accordingly if the above provision were to be inserted.)

4. For those States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited after the entry into force of this Treaty it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession and the date of the entry into force of this Treaty and of any amendments thereto, any notice of withdrawal, as well as of the receipt of other notices. He shall also inform the Security Council of the United Nations of any notice of withdrawal.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article IX

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty, if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject-matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to the Depositary three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Article X

If this Treaty has not been adhered to by all nuclear-weapon States x years after its entry into force, each Party shall by giving notice to the Depositary have the right to withdraw from the Treaty with immediate effect.

Article XI

This Treaty, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations who shall send certified copies thereof to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, duly authorized thereto, have signed this Treaty.

DONE at ....... ........ on .........

† Optional provision for a transitional arrangement, if needed; another alternative is found in article I, para. 4.
Final communiqué, dated 21 October 1977, of the Organizing Conference of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation*

The participants in the Organizing Conference of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation are conscious of the urgent need to meet the world's energy requirements and that nuclear energy for peaceful purposes should be made widely available to that end. They are also convinced that effective measures can and should be taken at the national level and through international agreements to minimize the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons without jeopardizing energy supplies or the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

The following countries which participated in the Organizing Conference have therefore agreed that an International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) will be conducted to explore the best means of advancing these objectives:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Germany, Federal Republic of</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Romania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>USSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Organizing Conference was also attended by representatives of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Commission of the European Communities, the International Energy Agency, and the Nuclear Energy Agency, who expressed their willingness to participate in INFCE.

The participants agreed that all interested States and relevant international bodies may participate in the future work of INFCE. It was also agreed that all participants will have an equal opportunity to contribute to that work.

They are aware of the vital importance of preventing proliferation and, moreover, of effective and urgent measures to stop and reverse the nuclear-arms race among the nuclear-weapons States.

* Transmitted to the Secretary-General by the representative of the United States in a note verbale dated 27 October 1977 (A/C.1/32/7).
The evaluation will be conducted along lines set out in the attached document entitled "International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation: Technical and Economic Scope and Methods of Work". The participants recognized that special consideration should also be given to the specific needs of and conditions in developing countries.

The participants agreed that INFCE was to be a technical and analytical study and not a negotiation. The results will be transmitted to Governments for their consideration in developing their nuclear energy policies and in international discussions concerning nuclear energy co-operation and related controls and safeguards. Participants would not be committed to INFCE's results.

The evaluation will be carried out in a spirit of objectivity, with mutual respect for each country's choices and decisions in this field, without jeopardizing their respective fuel cycle policies or international co-operation, agreements and contracts for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, provided that agreed safeguards measures are applied.

The participants welcomed the decision, in principle, of the International Atomic Energy Agency to support INFCE by providing appropriate technical and secretariat assistance. They expressed the hope that the extent and scope of such support will be considered by the appropriate bodies of IAEA. At the same time they also expressed their hope that IAEA will play an active role in the conduct of INFCE at all levels and particularly in the area of technical co-ordination. The participants acknowledge in this connexion the dual responsibility of IAEA in promoting and safeguarding nuclear activities.

The texts of the documents comprising the substantive work of the Evaluation will be made available to all Governments and international bodies which express an interest in them.
Nuclear facilities subject to IAEA safeguards in non-nuclear-weapon States

The table below shows the number of nuclear facilities in non-nuclear-weapon States subject to safeguards, and also gives an estimate of the number of facilities which are not safeguarded. Of the facilities currently under non-NPT (non-proliferation Treaty) safeguards, 12 facilities in Switzerland and one in Venezuela will come under NPT safeguards upon entry into force of safeguards agreements concluded pursuant to the Treaty.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facility Type</th>
<th>NPT safeguards</th>
<th>Non-NPT safeguards</th>
<th>Non-safeguarded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power reactors</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conversion fuel fabrication</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enrichment</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reprocessing</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot fuel fabrication</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot enrichment</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot reprocessing</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research reactors and critical facilities</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-critical facilities</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research and development facilities</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separate storage and other locations</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>486</strong></td>
<td><strong>73</strong></td>
<td><strong>12</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a Facilities covered by an NPT safeguards agreement which is now in force.
b According to the best information available to the Agency.
States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty having safeguards agreements in force under the Treaty

The following 55 States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons have concluded safeguards agreements—now in force—pursuant to the Treaty:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Holy See</td>
<td>Nepal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Romania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>Surinam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>Swaziland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany, Federal Republic</td>
<td>Maldives</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of</td>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>Zaire</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The non-proliferation Treaty requires each non-nuclear-weapon State party to it to conclude a safeguards agreement with IAEA covering all of the State's peaceful nuclear activities. Seven of the States listed above (Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) have concluded the safeguards agreement jointly with IAEA and the European Atomic Energy Community, in accordance with article III, paragraph 4, of the Treaty.

Although safeguards agreements, under the Treaty, with Switzerland and Venezuela are not yet in force, all nuclear activities in those States are already under safeguards as a result of the operation of other agreements. Negotiations are under way with most of the parties to the Treaty that have not yet concluded their safeguards agreements.

Except in the two cases mentioned, the safeguards agreements under the Treaty that have not yet entered into force are solely with States that do not yet have any significant nuclear activity, that is, an activity involving nuclear material in an amount that would call for the application of safeguards under the Treaty.

\(^a\) In 25 cases, the application of safeguards has been held in abeyance because the State concerned does not yet have any significant nuclear activities. Full application will begin as soon as the State concerned acquires nuclear material or plant requiring the application of safeguards.
Draft agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons*

The States Parties to this Agreement,

Guided by the interests of strengthening international peace and security,

Desiring to contribute to the cause of saving mankind from the danger of the use of new means of warfare, limiting the arms race and bringing about disarmament,

Recognizing that modern science and technology have reached a level where a serious danger arises of the development of new, still more destructive types of weapons of mass destruction and of new systems of such weapons,

Conscious that the development and manufacture of such weapons are fraught with the most serious consequences for the peace and security of nations,

Bearing in mind that recent years have seen the conclusion of a number of important agreements concerning limitation of the arms race and disarmament, including those relating to the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction,

Expressing the profound interest of States and peoples in the adoption of measures to prevent the use of the achievements of modern science and technology for the development and manufacture of the above-mentioned weapons of mass destruction,

Desiring to promote the strengthening of confidence among nations and the further improvement of the international situation,

Seeking to contribute to the realization of the lofty purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Having agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Each State Party to this Agreement undertakes not to develop or manufacture new types of weapons of mass destruction or new systems of such weapons.

For the purposes of this Agreement, the expression "new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction" includes weapons which may be developed in the future, either on the basis of scientific and technological principles that are known now but that have not yet been applied severally or jointly to the development of weapons of mass destruction or on the basis of scientific and technological principles that may be discovered in the future, and which will have properties similar to or more powerful than those of known types of weapons of mass destruction in destructive and/or injuring effect.

The list of types and systems of weapons of mass destruction to be prohibited by this Agreement is contained in the Annex to the Agreement.

2. In the event that new areas of development and manufacture of weapons of mass destruction and systems of such weapons not covered by this Agreement emerge after the entry into force of the Agreement, the Parties shall conduct negotiations with a view to extending the prohibition provided for by this Agreement to cover such potential new types and systems of weapons.

3. States Parties to the Agreement may, in cases where they deem it necessary, conclude special agreements on the prohibition of particular new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction.

4. Each State Party to this Agreement undertakes not to assist, encourage or induce any other State, group of States or international organization to engage in activities contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article.

Article II

Each State Party to this Agreement undertakes, in accordance with its constitutional procedures, to take the necessary measures to prohibit and prevent any activity contrary to the provisions of this Agreement within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere.

Article III

1. In the event that any State Party to this Agreement has any suspicions that another State Party has violated the provisions of this Agreement, the parties concerned undertake to consult one another and to co-operate in solving the problems which arise.

2. If the consultations referred to in paragraph 1 of this article fail to produce results mutually acceptable to the parties concerned, the State which has such suspicions may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such complaint shall include evidence confirming its validity and a request for its consideration by the Security Council.

3. Each State Party to this Agreement undertakes to co-operate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the complaint received by the Council. The Security Council shall inform the States Parties to the Agreement of the results of the investigation.

4. Each State Party to this Agreement undertakes to provide or support assistance in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to any State Party to the Agreement which so requests, if the Security Council decides that such State Party has been exposed to danger as a result of violation of the Agreement.

Article IV

1. Nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the States Parties to the Agreement to develop and use scientific research and discoveries exclusively for peaceful purposes without any discrimination.

2. The States Parties to this Agreement undertake to facilitate scientific and technological co-operation in the use of the latest achievements and discoveries of science and technology for peaceful purposes.

Article V

Each State Party to this Agreement undertakes to pursue in a spirit of good will negotiations on effective measures to limit the arms race in all its
forms and put an end to it, and also on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

**Article VI**

1. Any State Party may propose amendments to this Agreement. Each proposed amendment shall be submitted to the depositary Governments and circulated by them to all Parties to the Agreement, which shall inform the depositary Governments of the acceptance or rejection of the amendment as soon as possible after its receipt.

2. The amendment shall enter into force for each State Party accepting the amendment upon its acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the Agreement, including the depositary Governments, and thereafter for each remaining State Party on the date of its acceptance of the amendment.

**Article VII**

1. This Agreement shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Each State Party to this Agreement shall, in the exercise of its State sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from the Agreement if it decides that extraordinary circumstances related to the subject-matter of the Agreement have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties to the Agreement and to the Security Council of the United Nations three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary circumstances which it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

**Article VIII**

1. This Agreement shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Agreement before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Agreement shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and accession shall be deposited with the Governments of .........., which are hereby designated the depositary Governments.

3. This Agreement shall enter into force after the deposit of instruments of ratification by ...... Governments, including the Governments designated the Governments depositaries of the Agreement.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Agreement, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession and the date of the entry into force of this Agreement, and of the receipt of other notices.

6. This Agreement shall be registered by the depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

**Article IX**

This Agreement, the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of the Agreement shall be transmitted by the depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Agreement.

Done in .......... copies, at .......... on the ..... day of .........., .....
ANNEX TO THE AGREEMENT

An approximate list of types and systems of weapons of mass destruction covered by the Agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons

The following types and systems of weapons shall be prohibited by the Agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons:

1. Radiological means of the non-explosive type acting with the aid of radioactive materials.
2. Technical means of inflicting radiation injury based on the use of charged or neutral particles to affect biological targets.
3. Infrasonic means using acoustic radiation to affect biological targets.
4. Means using electromagnetic radiation to affect biological targets.

This list of types and systems of weapons to be prohibited may be supplemented as necessary.
Statement of 19 May 1977 by the President of the United States on conventional arms transfer policy*

The virtually unrestrained spread of conventional weaponry threatens stability in every region of the world. Total arms sales in recent years have risen to over $20 billion, and the United States accounts for more than one half of this amount. Each year, the weapons transferred are not only more numerous but also more sophisticated and deadly. Because of the threat to world peace embodied in this spiralling arms traffic and because of the special responsibilities we bear as the largest arms seller, I believe that the United States must take steps to restrain its arms transfers.

Therefore, shortly after my inauguration, I directed a comprehensive review of U.S. conventional arms transfer policy, including all military, political, and economic factors. After reviewing the results of this study and discussing those results with Members of Congress and foreign leaders, I have concluded that the United States will henceforth view arms transfers as an exceptional foreign policy implement, to be used only in instances where it can be clearly demonstrated that the transfer contributes to our national security interests. We will continue to utilize arms transfers to promote our security and the security of our close friends. But in the future the burden of persuasion will be on those who favor a particular arms sale, rather than those who oppose it.

To implement a policy of arms restraint, I am establishing the following set of controls, applicable to all transfers except those to countries with which we have major defense treaties (NATO, Japan, Australia and New Zealand). We will remain faithful to our treaty obligations and will honor our historic responsibilities to assure the security of the State of Israel. These controls will be binding unless extraordinary circumstances necessitate a Presidential exception, or where I determine that countries friendly to the United States must depend on advanced weaponry to offset quantitative and other disadvantages in order to maintain a regional balance.

1. The dollar volume (in constant fiscal year 1976 dollars) of new commitments under the Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance Programs for weapons and weapons-related items in fiscal year 1978 will be reduced from the fiscal year 1977 total. Transfers which can clearly be classified as services are not covered, nor are commercial sales, which the U.S. Government monitors through the issuance of export licenses. Commercial sales are already significantly restrained by existing legislation and executive branch policy.

2. The United States will not be the first supplier to introduce into a region newly developed, advanced weapons systems which would create a new or significantly higher combat capability. Also, any commitment for sale or coproduction of such weapons is prohibited until they are operationally deployed with

U.S. forces, thus removing the incentive to promote foreign sales in an effort to lower unit costs for Defense Department procurement.

3. Development or significant modification of advanced weapon systems solely for export will not be permitted.

4. Coproduction agreements for significant weapons, equipment, and major components (beyond assembly of subcomponents and the fabrication of high-turnover spare parts) are prohibited. A limited class of items will be considered for coproduction arrangements, but with restrictions on third-country exports, since these arrangements are intended primarily for the coproducers' possession requirements.

5. In addition to existing requirements of the law, the United States, as a condition of a sale for certain weapons, equipment or major components, may stipulate that we will not entertain any request for retransfers. By establishing at the outset that the United States will not entertain such requests, we can avoid unnecessary bilateral friction caused by later denials.

6. An amendment to the international traffic in arms regulations will be issued, requiring policy level authorization by the Department of State for actions by agents of the United States or private manufacturers which might promote the sale of arms abroad. In addition, embassies and military representatives abroad will not promote the sale of arms and the Secretary of Defense will continue his review of Government procedures, particularly procurement regulations which may provide incentives for foreign sales.

In formulating security assistance programs consistent with these controls, we will continue our efforts to promote and advance respect for human rights in recipient countries. Also, we will assess the economic impact of arms transfers to those less-developed countries receiving U.S. economic assistance.

I am initiating this policy of restraint in the full understanding that actual reductions in the worldwide traffic in arms will require multilateral cooperation. Because we dominate the world market to such a degree, I believe that the United States can and should take the first step. However, in the immediate future the United States will meet with other arms suppliers, including the Soviet Union, to begin discussions of possible measures for multilateral action. In addition, we will do whatever we can to encourage regional agreements among purchasers to limit arms imports.
Final Declaration of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof*

PREAMBLE

The States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof which met in Geneva in June 1977 in accordance with the provisions of Article VII to review the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized:

Recognizing the continuing importance of the Treaty and its objectives,

Affirming their belief that universal adherence to the Treaty would enhance international peace and security,

Recognizing that an arms race in nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed would present a grave threat to international security,

Recognizing also the importance of continuing negotiations concerning further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof,

Considering that the continuation of the trend towards a relaxation of tension in international relations provides a favourable climate in which more significant progress can be made towards the cessation of the arms race,

Reaffirming their conviction that the Treaty constitutes a step towards the exclusion of the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof from the arms race,

Emphasizing the common interest of mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor for peaceful purposes,

Recognizing that the natural resources of the sea-bed and ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction will have an increasing role in assuring the economic progress of States, particularly of developing countries, and recalling in this connexion General Assembly resolution 2749 (XXV),

Appealing to States to refrain from any action which might lead to the extension of the arms race to the sea-bed and ocean floor, and might impede the exploration and exploitation by States of the natural resources of the sea-bed and ocean floor for their economic development,

* SBT/CONF/25, part two.
Affirming that no measures which may be decided upon in the context of international negotiations on the Law of the Sea will affect the rights and obligations assumed by the States Parties under this Treaty,

Declare as follows

PURPOSES

The States Parties to the Treaty reaffirm their strong common interest in avoiding an arms race on the sea-bed in nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass destruction. They reaffirm their strong support for the Treaty, their continued dedication to its principles and objectives and their commitment to implement effectively its provisions.

Article I

The review undertaken by the Conference confirms that the obligations assumed under Article I of the Treaty have been faithfully observed by the States Parties. The Conference is convinced that the continued observance of this Article remains essential to the objective which all States Parties share of avoiding an arms race in nuclear weapons or any other type of weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed.

Article II

The Conference reaffirms its support for the provisions of Article II which define the zone covered by the Treaty.

Article III

The Conference notes with satisfaction that no State Party has found it necessary to invoke the provisions of Article III, paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5 dealing with international complaints and verification procedures. The Conference considers that the provisions for consultation and co-operation contained in paragraphs 2, 3 and 5 include the right of interested States Parties to agree to resort to various international consultative procedures, such as ad hoc consultative groups of experts and other procedures.

The Conference reaffirms in the framework of Article III and Article IV that nothing in the verification provisions of this Treaty should be interpreted as affecting or limiting, and notes with satisfaction that nothing in these provisions has been identified as affecting or limiting, the rights of States Parties recognized under international law and consistent with their obligations under the Treaty, including the freedom of the high seas and the rights of coastal States.

The Conference reaffirms that States Parties should exercise their rights under Article III with due regard for the sovereign rights of coastal States as recognized under international law.

Article IV

The Conference notes the importance of Article IV which provides that nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as supporting or prejudicing the position of any State Party with respect to existing international conventions, including the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, or with respect to rights or claims which such State Party may assert, or with respect to recognition or non-recognition of rights or claims asserted by any other State, related to waters off its coast, including, inter alia, territorial seas and contiguous zones, or to the sea-bed and the ocean floor, including continental shelves. The Conference also noted that obligations assumed by States Parties to the Treaty arising from other international instruments continue to apply. The Conference agrees that the zone covered by the Treaty reflects the right balance between the need to prevent an arms race in nuclear weapons and any other types of weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the right of States to control verification activities close to their own coasts.

Article V

The Conference affirms the commitment undertaken in Article V to continue negotiations in good faith concerning further measures in the field of disarma-
ment for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof. To this end, the Conference requests that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in consultation with the States Parties to the Treaty, taking into account the proposals made during this Conference and any relevant technological developments, proceed promptly with consideration of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the seabed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof.

**Article VI**

The Conference notes that over the five years of the operation of the Treaty no State Party proposed any amendments to this Treaty according to the procedure laid down in this Article.

**Article VII**

The Conference notes with satisfaction the spirit of co-operation in which the Review Conference was held.

The Conference takes note of the fact that no information has been presented to it indicating that major technological developments have taken place since 1972 which affect the operation of the Treaty. The Conference, nevertheless, recognizes the need to keep such developments under continuing review and invites the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, in consultation with the States Parties to the Treaty, to consider establishing an ad hoc expert group under its auspices for this purpose. Such a group might facilitate the implementation of the purposes stated in the section dealing with Article V. It might also contribute to the orderly preparation of the next Review Conference.

In order further to facilitate the dissemination of information relevant to the Treaty to States for their assessment, the Conference invites the Secretary-General of the United Nations to collect such information from officially available sources and publish it in the United Nations Yearbook on Disarmament.

The Conference, recognizing the importance of the review mechanism provided in Article VII, decides that a further review conference should be held in Geneva in 1982 unless a majority of the States Parties indicate to the Depositaries that they wish it to be postponed. In any case a further review conference shall be convened not later than 1984. The next conference shall determine in accordance with the views of a majority of those States Parties attending whether and when an additional review conference shall be convened.

**Article VIII**

The Conference notes with satisfaction that no State Party has exercised its rights to withdraw from the Treaty under Article VIII.

**Article IX**

The Conference reaffirms its conviction that nothing in the Treaty affects the obligations assumed by States Parties to the Treaty under international instruments establishing zones free from nuclear weapons.

**Article X**

The Conference stresses that the five years that have elapsed since the date of entry of the Treaty into force have demonstrated its effectiveness. At the same time the Conference notes with concern that the Treaty has not yet achieved universal acceptance. Therefore the Conference calls upon the States that have not yet become Parties particularly those possessing nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass destruction, to do so at the earliest possible date. Such adherence would be a significant contribution to international confidence.
Information received by the Secretary-General in connexion with the Final Declaration of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof

On 1 November 1977, the Secretary-General addressed the Depositary Governments of the Treaty and requested their assistance in making the necessary arrangements so that the Secretariat might receive information relevant to the Treaty from States Parties. The information below is extracted from letters received by the Secretary-General in time for inclusion in the present volume of the Disarmament Yearbook.

Czechoslovakia

The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic does not possess nor does it seek to possess any military equipment to be emplaced on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof. It fully supports the conclusions arrived at by the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof.

The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic is convinced of the necessity to continue, in keeping with the decisions of the above-mentioned Conference, deliberations on further measures in the field of disarmament with the view to preventing an arms race in the environment in question and to cover by a treaty also those types of military activities in this environment which as yet are not subject to prohibition.

In that context Czechoslovakia favours the continuation of the work of the group of experts within the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament entrusted with the consideration of these matters.

Dominican Republic

In its communication to the Secretary-General, the Government of the Dominican Republic states that it has observed its obligations under the Treaty.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

The Soviet Union considers that the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on
the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof continues to play a significant role in restraining the armaments race, principally in the area of nuclear weapons. One of the most important results of the conference to review the operation of the Treaty was the recognition of its effectiveness.

Furthermore the Treaty constitutes a first step towards the complete prohibition of the use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor for military purposes. Especially important, in this connexion, is the fulfilment of the obligation laid down in article V of the Treaty to continue negotiations in good faith concerning further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof. For its part, the Soviet Union is ready to conduct negotiations concerning the conclusion of an international agreement or agreements on the prohibition of the emplacement on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof, of weapons, equipment and other military objects not covered by the existing Treaty, and other measures to prevent or curb an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor. In this connexion, the Soviet side notes with satisfaction that both the conference to review the operation of the treaty and the General Assembly of the United Nations at its thirty-second session recommended that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should proceed promptly with the consideration of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof.

Another important task is the strengthening of the existing Treaty by increasing the number of parties to it, primarily among those nuclear Powers which have not acceded to the Treaty. In this connexion, the fact that two more States, Cuba and Ethiopia, recently submitted instruments of accession to the Treaty (on 3 June and 14 July 1977 respectively) to the Government of the USSR, as one of the Depositary Governments of the Treaty, is a matter for satisfaction.

With regard to information from other States parties concerning the Treaty, the Soviet Union, as a Depositary Government of the Treaty, has received no official communications in that connexion.

At the time of the signature or ratification of the Treaty by individual Governments, statements were made which have been transmitted in the appropriate fashion to the States parties in accordance with article X, paragraph 5, of the Treaty.

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Her Majesty's Government suggested to the Heads of Diplomatic Missions in London of all those Governments which have signed, ratified or acceded at London to the Treaty, that they should furnish information relevant to the Treaty by submitting it directly to the Secretary-General.

United States of America

The Secretary of State wishes to inform the Secretary-General that the United States Government has sent a circular note dated December 2, 1977 to the parties and signatories of the Treaty at Washington, citing the passage relating to article VII of the Treaty which is contained in the Final Declaration of the Review Conference, and suggesting that any State party wishing to furnish information relevant to the Treaty submit such information directly to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

For its own part the United States Government does not have any such information which it wishes to submit at this time.
Appendix XIV

List of resolutions on disarmament and related questions adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-second session, held from 20 September to 21 December 1977 (including voting)

Resolutions on disarmament questions

32/75 Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security

*Adopted without a vote*

32/76 Implementation of General Assembly resolution 3473 (XXX) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)

*Adopted by a recorded vote of 113 to none with 14 abstentions,* as follows:

*In favour:* Afghanistan, Algeria, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Canada, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Surinam, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab

*The delegations of Cyprus, Madagascar and Mauritius subsequently informed the Secretariat that they wished to have their votes recorded as having been in favour of the resolution.*

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Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

**Against:** None.

**Abstaining:** Argentina, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, France, German Democratic Republic, Greece, Guyana, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

**32/77 Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons**

*Adopted without a vote*

**32/78 Urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban; conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests**

*Adopted by a recorded vote of 126 to 2, with 1 abstention,* as follows:

**In favour:** Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Surinam, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

**Against:** Albania, China.

**Abstaining:** France.

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b The delegations of Burma, Madagascar and Mauritius subsequently informed the Secretariat that they wished to have their votes recorded as having been in favour of the resolution.
Implementation of General Assembly resolution 31/67 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)

Adopted by a recorded vote of 118 to none, with 13 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Canada, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Surinam, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Congo, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Guyana, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Effective measures to implement the purposes and objectives of the Disarmament Decade

Adopted by a recorded vote of 130 to none, with 1 abstention, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Dominican

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The delegations of Madagascar and Mauritius subsequently informed the Secretariat that they wished to have their votes recorded as having been in favour of the resolution.

The delegations of Mauritius, Madagascar and Sierra Leone subsequently informed the Secretariat that they wished to have their votes recorded as having been in favour of the resolution.
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Surinam, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Sierra Leone.

32/81 Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa

Adopted by a recorded vote of 131 to none,* as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Equador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Surinam, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab

*The delegations of Madagascar and Mauritius subsequently informed the Secretariat that they wished to have their votes recorded as having been in favour of the resolution.
Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: None.

32/82 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East

Adopted by a recorded vote of 131 to none, with 1 abstention, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Equador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Surinam, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, U.S. States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Israel.

32/83 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia

Adopted by a recorded vote of 105 to none, with 28 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burundi, Canada, Cape Verde, Central

The delegation of Madagascar subsequently informed the Secretariat that it wished to have its vote recorded as having been in favour of the resolution.

The delegation of Madagascar subsequently informed the Secretariat that it wished to have its vote recorded as having been in favour of the resolution.
African Empire, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Democratic Yemen, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Surinam, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bhutan, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, German Democratic Republic, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Norway, Poland, Singapore, Sweden, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia.

Resolution A
32/84 Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons

Adopted by a recorded vote of 110 to 1, with 25 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Empire, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland.

h The delegation of Madagascar subsequently informed the Secretariat that it wished to have its vote recorded as having been in favour of the resolution.
Reference in text

Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Surinam, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon. United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: Albania.

Abstaining: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Luxembourg, Mauritania, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Resolution B

Adopted by a recorded vote of 102 to 1, with 28 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bhutan, Bolivia, Burma, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Empire, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Surinam, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: Albania.

Abstaining: Austria, Barbados, Benin, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guyana, Hungary, Jamaica, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Nigeria, Poland, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta.

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4 The delegation of Madagascar subsequently informed the Secretariat that it wished to have its vote recorded as an abstention.
32/85 Reduction of military budgets

Adopted by a recorded vote of 120 to 2, with 13 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Empire, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Surinam, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: Albania, China.

Abstaining: Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mauritania, Mongolia, Poland, Swaziland, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

32/86 Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace

Adopted by a recorded vote of 123 to none, with 13 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Empire, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica,

j The delegation of Madagascar subsequently informed the Secretariat that it wished to have its vote recorded as having been in favour of the resolution.

k The delegation of Madagascar subsequently informed the Secretariat that it wished to have its vote recorded as having been in favour of the resolution.
Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Surinam, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

2/87 General and complete disarmament

Resolution A

Adopted without a vote

Resolution B

Adopted by a recorded vote of 95 to none, with 38 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central African Empire, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Democratic Yemen, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Surinam, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: None.

The delegation of Madagascar subsequently informed the Secretariat that it wished to have its vote recorded as having been in favour of the resolution. The delegation of New Zealand subsequently informed the Secretariat that it wished to have its vote recorded as an abstention.
Abstaining: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mongolia, Norway, Oman, Poland, Sierra Leone, Sweden, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Yugoslavia.

Resolution C
Adopted without a vote

Resolution D
Adopted by a recorded vote of 91 to none, with 40 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Central African Empire, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Surinam, Swaziland, Sweden, Togo, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Algeria, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Benin, Bhutan, Brazil, Cape Verde, Congo, Cuba, Democratic Yemen, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Nigeria, Oman, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Sao Tome and Principe, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Yemen, Yugoslavia.

Resolution E
Adopted without a vote

Resolution F

The delegation of Tunisia subsequently informed the Secretariat that it wished to have its vote recorded as having been in favour of the resolution. The delegations of Afghanistan and Madagascar subsequently informed the Secretariat that they wished to have their votes recorded as abstentions.
Adopted by a recorded vote of 111 to 2, with 16 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Empire, Chad, Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Surinam, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire.

Against: Albania, China.

Abstaining: Algeria, Benin, Bhutan, Burma, Colombia, France, Guyana, Israel, Kuwait, Mauritania, Pakistan, Peru, Spain, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia.

Resolution G

Adopted by a recorded vote of 134 to 2, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Empire, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

n The delegation of Madagascar subsequently informed the Secretariat that it wished to have its vote recorded as having been in favour of the resolution.

® The delegation of Madagascar subsequently informed the Secretariat that it wished to have its vote recorded as having been in favour of the resolution.
Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Surinam, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: Albania, China.

32/88 Special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament

Resolution A
Adopted without a vote

Resolution B
Adopted without a vote

32/89 World Disarmament Conference
Adopted without a vote

32/152 Incendiary and other specific conventional weapons which may be the subject of prohibitions or restrictions of use for humanitarian reasons

Adopted by a recorded vote of 115 to none, with 21 abstentions,* as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burundi, Central African Empire, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Surinam, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia,

*The delegation of Burma subsequently informed the Secretariat that it wished to have its vote recorded as having been in favour of the resolution.
Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire and Zambia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Belgium, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mongolia, Poland, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Resolutions on related questions

32/6 Effects of atomic radiation

Adopted without a vote

32/44 Respect for human rights in armed conflicts

Adopted by consensus

32/49 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency

Adopted without a vote

32/50 Peaceful use of nuclear energy for economic and social development

Adopted without a vote

32/150 Conclusion of a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations

Adopted by a recorded vote of 111 to 4, with 27 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Central African Empire, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon.
United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: Albania, China, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Abstaining: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chad, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mauritania, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey.

32/154 Implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security

Adopted by a recorded vote of 118 to 2, with 19 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Central African Empire, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Surinam, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: Israel, United States of America.

Abstaining: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

32/155 Declaration on the deepening and consolidation of international détente

Adopted by consensus *

* The Chinese delegation stated that it wished to disassociate itself from the consensus.
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