Thirty-fifth session  
Agenda item 48 (c)  

GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT  

Study on all the aspects of regional disarmament  

Report of the Secretary-General  

1. By resolution 33/91 E of 16 December 1978, the General Assembly decided to undertake a systematic study of all the aspects of regional disarmament and requested the Secretary-General to carry out the study with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts, appointed by him on a balanced geographical basis, and to submit it to the Assembly at its thirty-fifth session.

2. Pursuant to resolution 33/91 E, the Secretary-General appointed the Group of Governmental Experts on Regional Disarmament, which met from 18 to 22 June and from 6 to 12 October 1979 in Geneva, from 14 to 25 April 1980 in New York, and from 28 July to 8 August 1980 in Geneva. By a letter dated 8 August 1980, the Chairman of the Group of Experts transmitted to the Secretary-General the study which is hereby submitted to the General Assembly.
ANNEX

Study prepared by the Group of Governmental Experts on Regional Disarmament

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FOREWORD

The attached study has been prepared by the Group of Governmental Experts on Regional Disarmament appointed by the Secretary-General to assist him in carrying out a systematic study of all the aspects of regional disarmament, as requested in paragraph 3 of resolution 33/91 E adopted by the General Assembly on 16 December 1978.

The Secretary-General notes that, whereas certain important regional measures have already been adopted and other measures are currently under negotiation, the study indicates that there is considerable room for further efforts in this direction. The study further indicates that disarmament efforts in a regional context, while not being a substitute for efforts at the global level, could greatly facilitate the achievement of global disarmament measures.

The experts point to the possibility of outlining a programme for a broad-based effort in each region, to be undertaken on the initiative of the region concerned and in the light of the conditions prevailing there, which could give the necessary thrust and continuity to such efforts. The experts’ conclusions stress the value of further studies addressed to the problems of various individual regions; they also recognize the need to involve institutions of learning and public opinion generally in such a diversified effort. Further, the experts stress various ways in which the United Nations system might give assistance to regions engaged in such efforts, if they should so request.

The Secretary-General wishes to thank the experts for their unanimously-approved report, which he hereby submits to the General Assembly for its consideration.
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

8 August

Sir,

I have the honour to submit herewith the study prepared by the Group of Governmental Experts on Regional Disarmament which was appointed by you in pursuance of paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 33/91 E of 16 December 1978.

The experts appointed by you were the following:

Mr. Olu Adeniji
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the United Nations Office at Geneva

Mr. Antonio González de León
Ambassador
Principal Director for Multilateral Affairs
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His Excellency
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Mr. Mohamed Ibrahim Shaker
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Mr. Furdo S. Suwondo
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(from 14 April 1980)

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The study was prepared between June 1979 and August 1980, during which period the Group held four sessions, from 18 to 22 June and from 8 to 12 October 1979 in Geneva, from 14 to 25 April 1980 in New York, and from 26 July to 8 August 1980 in Geneva.

The members of the Group of Governmental Experts wish to express their appreciation for the assistance which they received from members of the Secretariat of the United Nations. They wish, in particular, to convey their thanks to Mr. Anders Boserup of the University of Copenhagen, who served as consultant to the Secretariat and to Mr. Prvoslav Davinić of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament, who served as secretary of the Group.

I have been requested by the Group of Governmental Experts, as its Chairman, to submit to you on its behalf this study which was unanimously endorsed.

(Signed) Albert WILLOT
Chairman of the
Group of Governmental Experts
on Regional Disarmament
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1. By its resolution 32/87 D of 12 December 1977, the General Assembly invited all States to inform the Secretary-General of their views and suggestions concerning the regional aspects of disarmament, including measures designed to increase confidence and stability as well as means of promoting disarmament on a regional basis.

2. Pursuant to that resolution communications were received from 28 Governments. They were transmitted by the Secretary-General as official documents to the Assembly at its tenth special session, devoted to disarmament, held from 23 May to 30 June 1978 (A/8-10/8, A/8-10/8/Add.1 and 2).

3. The General Assembly, by its resolution 33/91 E of 16 December 1978, decided to undertake a systematic study of all the aspects of regional disarmament and requested the Secretary-General to carry out the study with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts appointed by him.

4. The terms of reference for the study were set out in the resolution, which reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Concerned about the armaments race and the continued increase in expenditures on armaments,

Recognizing the importance of pursuing every effort which might contribute to progress towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Mindful of the importance of the regional measures already adopted, of studies already carried out, notably in the field of nuclear-weapon-free zones, and of regional efforts undertaken at the nuclear and conventional levels, both in the field of measures designed to increase confidence and in that of disarmament and arms control,

Recalling its resolution 32/87 D of 12 December 1977, on the regional aspects of disarmament,

Taking note of national contributions made in accordance with the aforementioned resolution,

Taking fully into account the decisions and recommendations contained in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and the views expressed by Member States at its thirty-third session,
1. Decides to undertake a systematic study of all the aspects of regional disarmament;

2. Specifies in that connexion that the study shall cover, _inter alia_, the following subjects:

(a) Basic conditions governing the regional approach, particularly from the standpoint of security requirements;

(b) Definition of measures which, on the initiative of the States concerned, may lend themselves to a regional approach;

(c) The link between regional measures and the process of general and complete disarmament;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to carry out the study with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts, appointed by him on a balanced geographical basis, and to submit it to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session a progress report on the work of the Group of Governmental Experts on Regional Disarmament.

5. Chapters III and IV of the present study cover the subjects specified in paragraph 2 of the above resolution and constitute the main part of the study. However, in order to provide a comprehensive and self-contained treatment of the subject of regional disarmament, this main part has been preceded by a survey of past and present regional disarmament efforts (chapter II). These experiences have been presented in some detail in order to give substance to the more theoretical and general considerations of subsequent chapters and because it is felt that they contain lessons which may prove pertinent for future endeavours.

6. Chapter III is a general examination of the regional approach to disarmament. Its first part outlines the concept of regional disarmament and examines the link between regional disarmament measures and general and complete disarmament. The second part of the chapter discusses the basic conditions and guidelines governing the regional approach to disarmament considering, _inter alia_, the security requirements of States, generally accepted principles relating to disarmament efforts and the link between regional and global measures.

7. Chapter IV is a survey of conceivable disarmament measures which may, depending on circumstances, lend themselves to a regional approach. The survey is meant to provide as wide a range as possible of measures which could be envisaged by States wishing to promote disarmament in their region.
CHAPTER II

PAST EXPERIENCES AND PRESENT ENDEAVOURS

8. Numerous initiatives and proposals for measures of disarmament relating to particular regions have been made in the period since the Second World War. Initially, most proposals were concerned with the region of Europe because this was the most heavily armed area, and it was felt that war in that region, if it broke out, would assume, once again, world-wide proportions. In Europe many questions relating to a post-war settlement were still outstanding, the political situation was particularly tense, military alliances were confronting each other, and an arms race of unprecedented magnitude was developing. Proposals were concerned at first with the limitation of conventional weapons and armed forces, but, by the mid-1950s, the spread of nuclear weapons in Europe had become a predominant concern, and a variety of suggestions were made to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in different parts of the continent or to freeze the level of nuclear forces pending actual reductions.

9. By the early 1970s, in conjunction with a stabilization of the territorial status quo in Europe and a measure of normalization of political relations, there were renewed attempts to address the military situation there, this time in a more comprehensive manner, involving negotiations on mutual reductions of forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe and a further improvement of the international political situation by the settlement of outstanding political issues and by the implementation of measures to promote security and co-operation throughout Europe, including confidence-building measures pertaining to military activities.

10. In other regions too the prospect that local arms races might intensify or that they may become increasingly involved in the global arms race led to efforts at regional disarmament. In particular, the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons became an over-riding concern of countries in those regions. As fears were mounting that some regional powers might acquire nuclear weapons or admit their stationing or testing on their territories, efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones spread, in the 1960s, to Africa, Latin America, the Middle East and South Asia. In each case these efforts were prompted by specific regional developments and shaped by the specific conditions of each region. In Antarctica it was possible to agree on complete demilitarization. In other regions again, including the region of the Indian Ocean, the region of South-East Asia and the Mediterranean region, the attempt has been to approach regional disarmament in terms of the broader concept of a zone of peace.

11. As a practical endeavour, therefore, the regional approach to disarmament is by no means new. Several important agreements and initiatives since the Second World War have been regional in scope and, in assessing the possibilities of further practical implementation and broadening of the concept, there is considerable experience on which to draw. Moreover, the difficulties encountered in negotiations on general and complete disarmament gave increased prominence to a more pragmatic approach, of which regional disarmament is one aspect.
12. Several factors came together in the late 1970s to suggest that regional disarmament efforts might have an important role as one among several components in a step-by-step approach to general and complete disarmament. First of all, the disappointing results of decades of disarmament efforts which had been unable to check the ever-expanding arms race called for every possible avenue to be explored. Indeed, the tenth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament was convened for that very reason. In the preceding years, the regional approach had proven that it could yield results in such important fields as nuclear non-proliferation (particularly the nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America) and the process of détente in Europe. At the same time, these examples themselves demonstrated that regional measures had to be considered in a global context if lasting results were to be achieved. It was clearly recognized that the viability of regional measures to prevent nuclear proliferation or regional measures to strengthen détente would be greatly enhanced if they were related to measures of a global scope. Finally, the tenth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament had raised anew the problem of disarmament in the field of conventional weapons and armed forces as part and parcel of the total programme towards the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament. As had been widely recognized for some time, the problems of disarmament in this field would be particularly difficult unless approached from an angle which allows regional specificities to be taken fully into account. In this case also it might be that disarmament questions could be handled more easily in a regional framework than by attempting to apply from the start broad concepts and approaches to widely differing situations.

13. The major regional initiatives of recent years are reviewed below. Beyond the intrinsic value of such a survey it also provides a background for the consideration of the regional approach to disarmament, of the possibilities it offers and of the principles which could and should guide it. The initiatives are discussed beginning with those measures which have been agreed upon, following on to those which are currently under negotiation or which have been officially proposed.

1. **Antarctic Treaty**

14. The Antarctic Treaty, 1/ which entered into force on 23 June 1961, represents the only post-war international agreement so far for the complete demilitarization of a sizeable geographical region. The Treaty was negotiated in 1959 by the 12 countries which had participated in 1958 in the International Geophysical Year in Antarctica. It was prompted by the desire to ensure the use of Antarctica exclusively for peaceful purposes, to ensure the continued freedom of scientific investigation and to promote scientific co-operation in the study of this region. The original contracting parties were the following: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Union of South Africa, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America. The Treaty has since been acceded to by Brazil, 

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Czechoslovakia, Denmark, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Netherlands, Poland and Romania.

15. The Antarctic Treaty also provides that disputes in that area be solved by peaceful means. In fact, the Antarctic continent was and is the subject of conflicting claims of sovereignty and territorial rights, and the Treaty is expressly designed to avert disputes on these questions by freezing the political status quo for the duration of the Treaty. It provides that nothing contained in the Treaty, nor any acts or activities taking place while the Treaty is in force, shall in any way be interpreted as constituting a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica.

16. The provisions of the Treaty apply to the area south of 60° south latitude, including all ice shelves, but, as explicitly stated, this shall not prejudice or in any way affect the rights, or the exercise of the rights, of any State under international law with regard to the high seas within that area.

17. The Treaty provides that Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only and prohibits, inter alia, any measure of a military nature, such as the establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military manoeuvres, as well as the testing of any type of weapons. The Treaty does not prevent the use of military personnel or equipment for scientific research or for any other peaceful purpose.

18. The Treaty expressly prohibits any nuclear explosions. It also prohibits the disposal of radioactive waste material in Antarctica, but it does not rule out other types of nuclear activity for peaceful purposes. It is moreover provided that future international agreements concerning the use of nuclear energy, including nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive waste material, shall apply to Antarctica, provided that all the original contracting parties and those parties which subsequently accede to it and which demonstrate their interest in the continent by conducting substantial scientific research activity there, are also parties to such agreement or agreements.

19. The Treaty provides for the right of aerial observation at any time over any or all areas of Antarctica by any of the contracting parties and for inspection by observers designated among their nationals by the contracting parties, the observers being granted complete freedom of access at any time to any area or installation and to all ships and aeroplanes at points of discharging or embarking on the continent.

20. The Treaty provides for representatives of the contracting parties to meet at suitable intervals to exchange information, to consult together on matters of common interest pertaining to Antarctica, and to formulate, consider and recommend measures in furtherance of the principles and objectives of the Treaty.

2. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Tlatelolco)

21. The 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America
(Treaty of Tlatelolco) is the first, and, so far, the only treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in an inhabited region. It is also the first agreement to establish a system of international control under a permanent supervisory organ (the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, OPAHAN) together with a system of inspection to deal with suspected cases of violation of the Treaty and measures to be taken in the event of violation. This system includes full application of safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

22. The purposes of the Treaty were both regional and global. On the one hand, the Treaty was designed to strengthen peace and security in the region, to avert the possibility of a regional nuclear weapons race, and to protect the parties against possible nuclear attacks. At the same time, it was conceived as a significant contribution towards preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and as an important factor for general and complete disarmament.

23. In article 1 of the Treaty the parties undertake to use exclusively for peaceful purposes the nuclear material and facilities which are under their jurisdiction and to prohibit and prevent in their respective territories the testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means whatsoever of any nuclear weapons, by the parties themselves, directly or indirectly, on behalf of anyone else, or in any other way; and the receipt, storage, installation, deployment and any form of possession of any nuclear weapons, directly or indirectly, by the parties themselves, by anyone on their behalf, or in any other way. They further undertake to refrain from engaging in, encouraging, or authorizing, directly or indirectly, or in any way participating in the testing, use, manufacture, production, possession or control of any nuclear weapon.

24. The term "territory" in the above undertakings is defined as including the territorial sea, air space and any other space over which the State exercises sovereignty in accordance with its own legislation. At present the zone of application of the Treaty is the sum of the territories of the countries for which the Treaty is in force.

25. Annexed to the Treaty are two additional protocols which, together with the Treaty itself, establish a system of mutual rights and obligations engaging three categories of States: the States of the region, extra-regional States having responsibility for territories within the region, and the nuclear-weapon States, present and future. It is foreseen in the Treaty that upon the accession of all these States to the Treaty and protocols as appropriate, its zone of application shall extend to include a precisely defined maritime area surrounding South and Central America as well as the Caribbean.

26. The weapons prohibited are defined in the Treaty as any device which is capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner and which has a set of characteristics that are appropriate for use for warlike purposes. An instrument that may be used for the transport or propulsion of the device is not included in this definition if it is separable from the device and not an indivisible part thereof.

/...

27. The Treaty reaffirms the right of the contracting parties to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in particular for their economic development and social progress. The Treaty also affirms the right of the parties to benefit, under IAEA observation and OPANAL supervision, from nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, including explosions which involve devices similar to those used in nuclear weapons, or collaborate with third parties for the same purpose, provided that specified conditions, including notification and control and the safeguard of any other party or parties are complied with.

28. Additional Protocol I provides for the extension of the nuclear-weapon-free status to territories lying in the zone of application of the Treaty, which de jure or de facto, are under the jurisdiction of States outside the zone, namely, of France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States. This protocol has been ratified by the Netherlands and the United Kingdom and signed but not yet ratified by France and the United States.

29. During the drafting of the Treaty a clear commitment by the nuclear-weapon States to respect the nuclear-weapon-free status of the zone was considered to be of the greatest importance for the effectiveness of the zone. Contacts between the Preparatory Commission of the Treaty, which functioned from early 1965 to 14 February 1967, and the nuclear-weapon States led to the elaboration of Additional Protocol II. In it, nuclear-weapon States undertake to respect the statute of denuclearization of Latin America in respect of warlike purposes as defined, delimited and set forth in the Treaty, and not to contribute in any way to the performance of acts involving a violation of the obligations of article 1 of the Treaty in the territories to which the Treaty applies, nor to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the parties to the Treaty. All the five nuclear-weapon States have adhered to this protocol. 3/

30. The Treaty enters into force for those States which have ratified it, subject to requirements set out in article 28, paragraph 1, namely, that all the States included in the zone have acceded to the Treaty, that all the States to which they are opened have acceded to the additional protocols, and that safeguards agreements have been concluded with the IAEA. However, since these requirements might have considerably delayed the coming into being of the zone, paragraph 2 of the same article allows the signatory States to waive these requirements, wholly or in part. At present the Treaty is in force for those 22 Latin American States which have ratified it and which have waived all the said requirements. These States are: Bahamas, Barbados, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. Of the remaining States in the region, Brazil and Chile have ratified the Treaty but

have not waived the requirements, Argentina has signed the Treaty and has recently announced its intention to ratify it, and Cuba, Dominica, Grenadine, Guyana, Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent have not signed it.

3. Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe

31. The 1975 Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) stands out in the long history of efforts and proposals dealing with various aspects of security in Europe since the Second World War. The idea of holding a European conference to deal with questions of security and co-operation had been discussed since the beginning of the 1950s. Since then, the convening of such a conference has been a persistent aim of a number of countries. It was not, however, until the late sixties and early seventies that the CSCE idea gained sufficient support all around to materialize, though differences subsisted on the approach to be adopted.

32. Following consultations and multilateral preparatory talks in 1972-1973, the Conference convened on 3 July 1973, in Helsinki, at the level of foreign ministers. A second stage took place in Geneva from September 1973 to July 1975, and a third, final meeting on the highest political level was held in Helsinki from 30 July to 1 August 1975. The Conference was attended by all European States (with the exception of Albania), as well as Canada and the United States. During the second stage of the Conference, contributions were received, and statements heard, from the following non-participating Mediterranean States: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Syrian Arab Republic and Tunisia. At the final meeting the participating states adopted by consensus the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation (circulated to all Member States under cover of a note verbale dated 24 September 1975).

33. The Final Act is divided into the following sections: questions relating to security in Europe; co-operation in the field of economics, of science and technology and of the environment; questions relating to security and co-operation in the Mediterranean; co-operation in humanitarian and other fields; and follow-up to the conference.

34. The section devoted to questions relating to security in Europe contains the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States and the Document on Confidence-building Measures and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament.

35. The principles contained in the Declaration are the following: sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty; refraining from the threat or use of force; inviolability of frontiers; territorial integrity of States; peaceful settlement of disputes; non-intervention in internal affairs; respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief; equal rights and self-determination of peoples; co-operation among States; and fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law.

36. The inclusion of confidence-building measures in the Final Act derives from the
recognition by the parties of the need to contribute to reducing the dangers of armed conflict and of misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities which could give rise to apprehension. The measures considered in the document fall under the following headings: prior notification of major military manoeuvres; prior notification of other military manoeuvres; exchange of observers; prior notification of major military movements; and other confidence-building measures.

37. It was explicitly stated in the Document that implementation of these measures would be voluntary. However, there was a more precise commitment by signatories as regards one of these measures – the prior notification of major military manoeuvres. It was stated that the signatories "will notify" such manoeuvres (defined as exceeding a total of 25,000 troops) 21 days or more in advance, and that they will provide information on the purpose, size, composition, area and time of the manoeuvre. As regards the territorial application of this measure, special provisions were made for Turkey and the Soviet Union whose territories extend beyond Europe. For the other measures - whose importance and usefulness the document recognized - the degree of commitment and the extent of the obligation were less precise. The signatory States, it was stated, "may" give prior notification of other military manoeuvres and of major military movements. Similarly they "will" exchange observers at military manoeuvres, voluntarily and on a bilateral basis, and promote exchanges of military personnel, including visits by military delegations. They will also duly take into account and respect their common objective of confidence-building when conducting their military activities.

38. These measures are modest and cautious, but the inclusion of such commitments in a multilaterally agreed document was in itself a new departure. Their adoption constituted an important first step to help reduce the incentives for competition and over-reaction which may derive from uncertainty in interpreting the military activities of other countries. All of these measures sought to alleviate possible fears by means of increased openness and mutual understanding. The last-mentioned measure, the commitment to take duly into account the common objective of confidence-building when conducting military activities, does not rule out any specific activities but implies self-restraint as regards the objectives which such activities may serve. As the Document itself recognized, these several measures could be developed and enlarged on the basis of the experience gained.

39. As regards the actual implementation of the provisions of the Document there is every indication that the commitment to notify major military manoeuvres has been respected. For lesser manoeuvres, where notification is primarily intended for participating States near the area concerned, the practice of States has varied considerably, and also for the other measures envisaged, including the question of inviting and accepting military observers, some countries have made more extensive use of the opportunities offered by the provisions of the Document than have others. It is, however, of the nature of confidence-building measures, particularly voluntary ones, that it takes time for them to show their full potential and for all parties to recognize their mutually beneficial character.

40. The CSCE also took into account considerations relevant to efforts aimed at promoting disarmament. As stated in the Final Act, the participating States
recognized the interest of all of them in efforts aimed at lessening military confrontation and promoting disarmament which are designed to complement political détente in Europe and to strengthen their security. Furthermore, the participating states expressed their conviction of the necessity to take effective measures in these fields which by their scope and by their nature constitute steps towards the ultimate achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, and which should result in strengthening peace and security throughout the world.

41. The Final Act of CSCE contains provisions for the follow-up of the Conference. The first meeting of the representatives of the participating States took place in Belgrade in 1977-1978. Its purpose was to proceed to an exchange of views on the implementation of the provisions of the Final Act in its entirety and of the tasks defined by the Conference. The meeting was also called to consider future efforts to deepen mutual relations and to develop the process of détente and to improve security, including the military aspects of security in Europe. The participating States at the Belgrade meeting agreed to hold further meetings among their representatives and to continue the multilateral process initiated by the Conference. Since the Belgrade meeting, several experts' meetings have been held to consider more specific topics. The next follow-up meeting of the representatives of the participating States is scheduled for 11 November 1980 in Madrid.

42. There have been lately numerous proposals for developing and enlarging the military aspects of security in Europe and first of all confidence-building measures. This would be done possibly at a specially convened conference, the mandate of which would be discussed and decided in Madrid. The proposals are as follows:

(a) The proposal for a conference on disarmament in Europe, presented by France at the tenth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, is being introduced for consideration in the CSCE context (see para. 131). In a communiqué dated 20 November 1979, the Nine have announced their endorsement of the French proposals in view of the Madrid meeting.

(b) The Warsaw Treaty States made proposals in May and December 1979, which were subsequently elaborated upon in May 1980, to hold a conference on disarmament and military détente in Europe, including the initiative of Poland to convene such a conference in Warsaw (see para. 132).

(c) Ministerial communiqués from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) of May and December 1979 and June 1980 have dealt with the possible treatment of military aspects of security in Europe in the framework of CSCE.

(d) The proposal about a disarmament programme for Europe, presented by Finland at the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly, in October 1979 (see para. 133), has also been brought forth for consideration in the context of CSCE.

(e) Sweden has offered Stockholm as the site for a conference on
disarmament in Europe to be held as soon as, inter alia, marked progress would have been reached in Madrid and Vienna (see sect. 4 below).

43. The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe also considered questions relating to security and co-operation in the Mediterranean. An experts' meeting relating to economic, scientific and cultural co-operation took place in Valetta in February 1979.

4. Mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe

44. The continued negotiations on the mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe, dealing as they do with actual reductions, constitute an example of a regional disarmament effort of exceptional importance: they involve a region where the military situation is particularly complex, where the force levels are exceptionally high, where military postures rest more directly than anywhere else in the world on an intricate combination of conventional forces, short-range and medium-range nuclear weapons as well as intercontinental strategic nuclear weapons, and where the primary security interests of four nuclear-weapon Powers are directly involved.

45. Suggestions for separate negotiations to deal with the limitation of forces and armaments in Europe were first made in the mid-1950s. During the 1950s and the early 1960s, a number of proposals on this matter were put forward. At first the concern of the Western States had been focused more on the solution of the German problem, which they saw as a primary cause of tension in Europe, but by the mid-1960s Western States began to place more emphasis on such measures of arms limitation and disengagement in Europe as might be susceptible to solution prior to, and independently of, political problems.

46. Following preparatory consultations between the two sides held in Vienna in the first half of 1973, formal negotiations opened in Vienna on 30 October 1973. The area contemplated for reductions and limitations comprises the territories of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Poland. In addition to these countries, four other States which maintain forces in the area, Canada, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States are direct participants in the negotiations. Eight other States take part in the negotiations with special status: Bulgaria, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Norway, Romania and Turkey. Western participants have maintained a reservation as to the ultimate status of Hungary which in their view should become a participant to certain measures; Hungary has stated that it could consider to take part in certain measures only if Italy also took part.

47. The goal, as stated jointly by participating States in a communiqué dated 28 June 1973, is to contribute to a more stable relationship and to the strengthening of peace and security in Europe while maintaining undiminished security for each party. However, the positions of the two sides as to practical ways of reaching this goal have differed in important respects.
48. Western participants have maintained that there is a considerable disparity of forces in terms of manpower and equipment which, together with geography, favours the Eastern side. Any agreement on reduction and limitation of forces designed to achieve a more stable relationship should therefore, in their view, provide for the elimination of the existing imbalance by adequate reductions which should not necessarily be the same for both sides.

49. In contrast, Eastern participants have maintained that there is an approximately equal relationship of forces between the two sides and that, consequently, reductions of armed forces, along with their combat equipment, by equal percentages or reductions in numbers on the basis of an equitable mutually agreed solution, would be the most appropriate way of preserving the existing equilibrium but at a lower level of forces. The importance of reduction in armaments and nuclear weapons within the area has been stressed by Eastern participants. As regards the geographical factor, Eastern participants have felt that it is a part of the over-all equilibrium.

50. The initial positions of the two sides were reflected in the proposals put forward at the very beginning of the talks.

51. The proposals submitted on 8 November 1973 by the four Eastern direct participants, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Poland and the Soviet Union, in the form of a draft agreement, envisaged three stages to be carried out in 1975, 1976 and 1977 respectively. In the first stage, troops in the area of reduction would be reduced over-all on each side by 20,000 men and by a corresponding quantity of armaments and military equipment. On each side, the reductions would be carried out by each country in proportion to the total number of troops it had in the area. In the second stage, there would be a further reduction by 5 per cent, and in the third stage by an additional 10 per cent. Reductions would be carried out in military units, together with their equipment. A special protocol would list the units subject to reduction. Both land and air forces, as well as units or sub-units equipped with nuclear weapons, would be comprised in the reductions. The foreign units to be reduced would be withdrawn while the corresponding units of the countries in the reduction area would be disbanded.

52. The proposal submitted on 22 November 1973 by the seven Western direct participants – Belgium, Canada, Germany, Federal Republic of, Luxembourg, Netherlands, United Kingdom and United States – was based on NATO's assessment of the manpower possessed by each side in the area concerned, and was limited to ground forces only. According to the data presented with the Western proposal, ground forces present at the time in the Western part of the area of reductions were said to total over 150,000 men less than on the Eastern side and the East was said to have more than two times as many tanks in active units as the West. The Western proposal called for the establishment of approximate parity in ground forces by means of a common collective ceiling on the over-all ground force manpower of each side – 700,000 was mentioned as an illustrative figure – and of a diminution of the tank disparity. This would be achieved through phased reductions. In the first phase, there would be a reduction of 29,000 United States soldiers and of one Soviet tank army, including 68,000 men and 1,700 tanks. Withdrawn United States and Soviet Union
forces would be repatriated. In the second phase, there would be a further reduction of ground force manpower leading to the common collective ceiling. During this phase, the reduction on the Western side would focus on the forces of direct participants other than the United States.

53. The Eastern participants denied the disparities cited by the Western participants and claimed that both sides were in approximate over-all parity. In June 1976, the Eastern participants, pursuant to a general understanding between the two sides on the definition of forces to be counted, tabled figures on their ground and air military personnel in the area of reductions as of 1 January 1976. The West tabled its figures on its own forces as of the same date, in December 1976. The two sets of figures showed an approximate parity. Subsequently, in early 1978, they were broken down by countries to the level of personnel in major formations and outside these formations. The West produced official estimates of its own on the Eastern forces meant to show the disparity it claimed to exist. The discussions on data and definitions concerning military personnel in the area for the purposes of a reduction agreement continue (see para. 66 below).

54. During 1974 and 1975 the Western participants continued to insist on an asymmetrical reduction of forces and armaments limited to ground forces alone, while the Eastern participants maintained that notwithstanding differences of structure and composition of armed forces, there was an approximate equilibrium and that, therefore, ground as well as air forces along with their armaments should be reduced on an equal basis, percentage-wise or otherwise, involving the contribution of all direct participants. In the course of the negotiations, the Eastern participants supplemented and modified their initial proposal on several occasions while maintaining the basic concept of symmetrical reductions. The Western participants mainly strengthened the link between their proposed two phases, inter alia, by means of a non-increase proposal for ground manpower and for air manpower between the phases and a declaration of readiness on the part of the Western direct participants other than the United States to take a substantial part in the phase II reductions.

55. In order to overcome the differences in approach, both sides revised further their respective proposals. The Western participants submitted new proposals on 16 December 1975 and the Eastern participants submitted in response new proposals on 19 February 1976.

56. The most important changes brought in 1975 by the West to its initial proposal was that it accepted to extend the ceiling on ground force manpower to air force manpower as well, and to reduce United States nuclear warheads and some types of United States nuclear delivery means. The proposal retained a two-phase approach, specifying the respective commitments as explained below.

57. In phase I, the Soviet Union would withdraw five divisions including 60,000 soldiers and 1,700 tanks, while the United States would withdraw 29,000 soldiers, 1,000 nuclear warheads, 54 nuclear-capable F-4 aircraft and 36 Pershing I ballistic missile launchers. Both sides would agree on the establishment of the common collective manpower ceilings to be reached by the end of phase II and on the
reductions necessary to meet these ceilings. The West suggested that the ceilings might be set on each side at about 700,000 for ground forces and 900,000 for air and ground forces combined.

58. The 1976 Eastern proposal also contained a number of new elements, particularly with regard to the time schedule concerning withdrawal of United States and Soviet Union forces. It accepted that, in the first phase, the reductions would apply only to American and Soviet forces and armaments, including on both sides a certain portion of nuclear warheads and delivery means. At the same time the other direct participants would undertake obligations regarding the scope and timing of their own reductions in the second phase. For this second phase, the proposal still called for an equal percentage reduction of all forces and armaments by all direct participants.

59. On 19 April 1978, on condition that an understanding would be reached in due time on data, the West agreed that in a phase I agreement direct participants other than the United States and the Soviet Union would undertake to take a substantial part in the phase II reductions needed to reach the common collective ceilings, and that these reductions would take place at the latest three years after entry into force of the phase I agreement, even if there were no agreement yet in the phase II negotiations. There was also agreement for the United States to take about two thirds of its phase I reductions in units and sub-units.

60. On 8 June 1978, the Eastern participants stated that, given the agreement of the Western countries to the principles of an equal percentage reduction and to the approximate equality in the numerical strength of the armed forces, the sides could during three to four years reduce their armed forces by an approximated equal percentage. The Eastern participants accepted in principle the concept of combined common collective levels, including sub-ceilings for ground forces, and agreed that the reductions of armaments and combat equipment envisaged for phase I could be limited to selected types as initially proposed by the West, i.e. USSR tanks and combat infantry vehicles and US nuclear warheads and delivery means. The Eastern participants proposed manpower reductions of 30,000 USSR and 14,000 US troops in phase I and subsequent reductions in phase II of ground force personnel of other direct participants as well as of the United States and of the Soviet Union, proportionately to the strength of their armed forces in the area.


62. In October 1979, it was indicated by the Soviet Union that important reductions would be carried out on a unilateral basis in the form of repatriation from the German Democratic Republic of 20,000 Soviet troops, 1,000 Soviet tanks and other military equipment. In December 1979, the NATO ministerial meeting announced the withdrawal from Europe of 1,000 United States nuclear warheads.

63. Also in December 1979, the West put forward a simplified phase I proposal and tabled detailed proposals on "associated measures" to be applied in both phases to...
all participants, some of which are intended to be implemented beyond the reduction area. The Eastern participants stated that the newest Western proposal reverted the discussion in the Vienna negotiations back to the matters of principle, including that of the definition of the area of reductions and limitations.

64. On 10 July 1980 the Eastern direct participants tabled a proposal according to which the talks should focus on working out a phase I agreement. Accordingly, the Eastern participants proposed that in phase I the United States would withdraw 13,000 soldiers and the Soviet Union 20,000 soldiers over and above the 20,000 Soviet soldiers mentioned in paragraph 62. The Eastern participants also proposed a new rule for the operation of the future collective levels on military manpower of the respective sides in the area of reductions. As a first reaction the Western participants promised to study all aspects of the Eastern proposal.

65. Since November 1974, the East advocates a non-increase commitment for the duration of the negotiations on the military manpower of all direct participants in the reduction area. In November 1978, the East declared its readiness to have this "freeze" applied collectively on both sides. Western participants have refused to undertake the proposed commitment, considering that it would prejudice the data issue since it would imply some recognition for the official figures produced by either side concerning its own forces. For their part, the Eastern participants have repeatedly stressed that the non-increase arrangement would constitute progress in the talks and would be a measure of confidence-building.

66. At present the discussion on data, i.e. on the discrepancy between official data submitted by the Eastern direct participants on their own military personnel in the area and NATO's figures on this Eastern military personnel, appears to be a major obstacle to further nearing of positions. Pursuant to an Eastern proposal put forward in early 1980, both sides exchanged in June 1980 new data, updated as of 1 January 1980. These new data were not decisively divergent from the previous ones.

67. While considerable difficulties remain, and while some questions such as associated measures have hardly been discussed yet, there is now substantial rapprochement as to the result to be expected by manpower reductions and on the phasing of those reductions.

5. **Zones of peace**

68. The establishment of zones of peace has been considered in several regions, such as the Indian Ocean, South-East Asia, the Mediterranean, the Balkans and the Baltic. The last two are discussed in section 6 below.

(a) **Indian Ocean**

69. The question of the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean region has been a recurrent theme at the United Nations and among the non-aligned countries throughout the 1970s. Efforts to implement such a concept were prompted in large
measure by the prospect of increasing great-Power involvement and military presence in the Indian Ocean. Indeed, there has been in the course of the 1970s a renewed expansion in the naval forces and facilities of extra-regional powers. Apprehensions about the growing military, including naval, capabilities of some of the littoral States added to the fears that short of early preventive measures, the region of the Indian Ocean could become a zone of confrontation with grave implications for the security of the countries in the region and for world peace.

70. While the idea of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean region can be traced further back, it first gained prominence and momentum when the Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, at their Third Conference in Lusaka in September 1970, endorsed the idea and called upon the United Nations to declare the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace from which great Power rivalries, military bases and nuclear weapons would be excluded.

71. As a direct result of this initiative the General Assembly, on 16 December 1971, adopted resolution 2832 (XXVI) in which it solemnly declared that the Indian Ocean, within limits to be determined together with the air space above and the ocean floor subjacent thereto, was designated for all time as a zone of peace. It also called upon the great Powers, in conformity with the Declaration, to enter into consultations with the littoral States of the Indian Ocean, with a view to halting the further expansion of their military presence in the Indian Ocean and eliminating from the area all bases, military installations, nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and any manifestation of great Power rivalry, and called upon the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, the Permanent Members of the Security Council and other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean to enter into consultations, with a view to implementing the Declaration and ensuring that: (a) warships and military aircraft would not use the Indian Ocean for any threat or use of force against any of its littoral and hinterland States; (b) subject to the foregoing and to the norms and principles of international law, the right to free and unimpeded use of the zone by all nations would be unaffected; and (c) arrangements would be made to give effect to any international agreement ultimately reached on the question.

72. Efforts to implement the objectives of this resolution have been many, but progress has been slow, and over the decade of the 1970s has succeeded mainly in establishing different fora to examine the questions involved.

73. In 1972, the General Assembly established a 15-member Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean (increased to 18 members in 1974 and to 23 members in 1977) to study the implications of the proposal with specific reference to the practical measures that might be taken in furtherance of the objective of resolution 2832 (XXVI), having due regard to the security interests of the littoral and hinterland States and to the interests of any other State consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. Since 1973, consideration in the General Assembly has generally centred on the report of the Ad Hoc Committee.

74. Concurrently, the Conferences of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, in Algiers in 1973, in Colombo in 1976 and in Havana in 1979, have...
consistently reaffirmed support for the concept of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace and have actively searched for ways to promote its effective implementation. Consideration of the question at each of these conferences has contributed momentum to discussions and decisions in the United Nations.

75. Bilateral Soviet-American talks were initiated in 1977 to pursue possible limitations on military activities in the Indian Ocean. 4/ Three rounds of talks were held in 1977 and one again in 1978. The talks were suspended in February of that year. In an agreed statement submitted to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on 1 March 1978, the United States and the Soviet Union stated that there had been to date a certain measure of agreement on a number of questions, including the desirability of a staged approach, beginning with an agreement not to increase current military presence, then moving on promptly to negotiations on reductions. Talks have not been resumed until now.

76. The question of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace was given considerable attention in the course of the preparation for the tenth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, as well as at this special session itself. Various proposals on the subject were submitted, raising such issues as the need for prompt measures to implement the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace; the bilateral talks between the Soviet Union and the United States; the necessity, within the zonal peace concept, for mutual restraint on the part of the littoral and hinterland States as well as the maintenance of a reasonable military balance among themselves; and the need for an early convening of a conference on the Indian Ocean. 5/

77. At the special session itself much time and effort was devoted in both formal and informal discussions in the Ad Hoc Committee and in the drafting groups. Still, most of the outstanding issues concerning the Indian Ocean zone of peace remained unresolved, and the Final Document confined itself in its programme of action to the following:

"4/. The establishment of zones of peace in various regions of the world under appropriate conditions, to be clearly defined and determined freely by the States concerned in the zone, taking into account the characteristics of the zone and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and in conformity

4/ Announcement at the conclusion of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's visit to Moscow, The Department of State Bulletin, vol. LXXVI, No. 1974 (25 April 1977), p. 401. See also note of 14 September 1978 to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee by the Deputy Permanent Representative of the Soviet Union; and note of 22 September 1978 to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee from the Permanent Mission of the United States.

with international law, can contribute to strengthening the security of States within such zones and to international peace and security as a whole. In this regard, the General Assembly notes the proposals for the establishment of zones of peace, inter alia, in:

(a) South-East Asia where States in the region have expressed interest in the establishment of such a zone, in conformity with the views /see paras. 81-83/;

(b) The Indian Ocean, taking into account the deliberations of the General Assembly and its relevant resolutions and the need to ensure the maintenance of peace and security in the region."

78. At the final meeting of the special session a number of delegations of non-aligned countries deplored that the outcome had been so meagre and that the question had been dealt with in such casual and summary manner (A/S-10/PV.27).

79. Already in 1974, the Ad Hoc Committee began consultations with a view to convening a conference on the Indian Ocean. In 1979, a Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States, including other members of the Ad Hoc Committee as well as the great Powers and major maritime users of the Indian Ocean, was held in New York. In its Final Document, 6/ the Meeting recommended the holding of the conference on the Indian Ocean, proposed that the Ad Hoc Committee undertake the preparatory work for the conference, including consideration of appropriate arrangements for any international agreement that may ultimately be reached. Following an invitation of the General Assembly in its resolution 34/80 B, the permanent members of the Security Council and a number of major maritime users of the Indian Ocean, that had not yet done so, have accepted to serve on the Ad Hoc Committee. Pursuant to that same resolution, the Ad Hoc Committee was further expanded with the addition of new members who were appointed by the President of the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the Committee, bringing the total membership to forty-five. The conference is expected to take place during 1981 at Colombo, Sri Lanka.

80. The Final Document of the Meeting also called upon all States concerned, especially the littoral and hinterland States, to explore actively regional arrangements for the realization of the principles and objectives of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, in particular parts of the Indian Ocean area, taking into account the characteristics of the zone and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and in conformity with international law.

(b) South-East Asia

81. Active exploration of regional arrangements has also been in progress in the South-East Asian region since 1971. On 27 November of that year, the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), consisting of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, issued the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the establishment of South-East Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, free from any manner of interference by outside Powers. 7/ The member States of ASEAN have also affirmed


7/ 10 Years, ASEAN, Jakarta 1978, pp. 240-241.
their support for the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean region as reflected in the General Assembly resolutions. In 1976 they reaffirmed through the Declaration of ASEAN Concord 8/ their support and determination to work for the early establishment of a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in South-East Asia, as a contribution to international peace and security, through maintaining stability by strengthening national and ASEAN resilience.

82. The aims and purposes of such a zone are generally the same as those of the zone of peace in the Indian Ocean region. Nevertheless, there is in the declarations relating to the former a much greater emphasis on the positive role to be ascribed to economic, social and cultural and other forms of co-operation, and greater prominence is also given to the question of peaceful settlement of disputes among the countries of the region. Provisions to promote pacific settlement of disputes are contained in the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in South-East Asia, 9/ signed by the same five countries in 1976. This Treaty is left open for accession by other States in South-East Asia.

83. Support for the establishment of a zone of peace in South-East Asia has been steadily growing since 1971. At their meeting in 1972 in Georgetown, Guyana, the foreign ministers of the non-aligned countries welcomed the Kuala Lumpur Declaration as a positive development and called upon all States to respect its objectives. Additional support was obtained the following year when the Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries meeting in Algiers endorsed the Declaration. The efforts of the ASEAN countries in this respect also received support by the People's Republic of China at the thirty-first session of the General Assembly and by India in 1978. In July of 1979, Vietnam expressed interest in entering into consultations with South-East Asian countries with a view to establishing South-East Asia as a zone of peace, independence, neutrality, stability and prosperity.

(c) The Mediterranean

84. Consideration has also been given to the question of transforming the Mediterranean into a zone of peace and co-operation. In its resolution 34/100 the General Assembly commended the decision to this effect taken at the 1979 Havana Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries (A/34/542, annex, Sect. I., para. 193) and urged all States to co-operate in applying this decision on the basis of the principles of respect for each State's sovereignty and territorial integrity, the right of peoples to make their own decisions, non-intervention and non-interference in internal affairs and equal rights. Likewise, resolution 34/100 endorsed the recommendation made at Havana for a meeting of the Mediterranean non-aligned countries and other Mediterranean countries participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe for the purpose of launching joint projects of co-operation and for the preparation of the Madrid follow-up meeting.


9/ Ibid., pp. 118-123; Statement of Treaties and International Agreements (ST/LEG/SER.A/356, p. 579), Reg. No. 15063.
6. Nuclear-weapon-free zone projects

85. The idea of nuclear-weapon-free zones antedates by many years the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. From the outset the establishment of such zones was conceived in the context of worldwide non-proliferation efforts. At the same time, the zones would contribute to regional stability and security and diminish the prospect of nuclear weapons being used against countries of the zone. Active consideration of specific areas has been prompted in many cases by particular regional developments, such as the prospect of introduction of nuclear weapons in some regions, inter alia, in Europe, or the apprehensions caused by the nuclear programmes of some regional Powers.

86. Among the many proposals put forward over the years, one has been implemented in Latin America and is described in section 2 above, others are under active consideration by the United Nations General Assembly or have been considered in other contexts. These proposals and endeavours are reviewed in this section.

87. In 1959, at the fourteenth session of the General Assembly, Ireland, in addition to a draft resolution on global prevention of dissemination of nuclear weapons adopted as resolution 1380 (XIV), also made a proposal for a regional approach to nuclear non-proliferation. While supporting the idea of the creation of denuclearized zones in the world in general and Central Europe in particular, the Irish proposal envisaged that the non-nuclear-weapon States in a given area would undertake, first, not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction, and would subject themselves to United Nations inspection. In return, the nuclear-weapon States and all other members of the United Nations would undertake in advance to assist members of the area in case of attack, by means of a standing United Nations force. 10/

88. Further proposals towards a general approach to nuclear non-proliferation were submitted by Sweden in 1961. According to this proposal, often referred to as the Undén Plan for a non-nuclear club, an inquiry was to be made by the Secretary-General among Member States to determine the conditions under which countries not possessing nuclear weapons might be willing to enter into specific undertakings not to manufacture or otherwise acquire such weapons and not to receive them on their territories on behalf of any other country. If the results of the inquiry were favourable, a conference should be convened to work out arrangements acceptable to all countries. By its resolution 1664 (XVI) the General Assembly adopted the Swedish proposal.

89. Replies to the inquiry conducted by the Secretary-General pursuant to that resolution were received from 62 Member States. 11/ Most replies stressed


reciprocity as a condition for assuming the obligations envisaged. Several States specified adherence by other States or all States within the region as a pre-condition for their own adherence. Other States viewed the question in the context of measures affecting the nuclear-weapon States as well or in the context of general and complete disarmament.

90. In resolution 3261 F (XXIX), the General Assembly decided to undertake a comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects. The study was carried out by an ad hoc group of governmental experts under the auspices of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and was completed in 1975. In its report the group elaborated the general principles applicable to the creation of such zones.\(^{12}\)

91. The tenth special session of the General Assembly, devoted to disarmament, endorsed the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones, recognizing that their establishment on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned constitutes an important disarmament measure and should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons. With respect to such zones it called upon the nuclear-weapon States to give undertakings, the modalities of which are to be negotiated with the competent authority of each zone, to respect strictly their status, and to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of the zone (see resolution S-10/2, paras. 60-62).

(a) Africa

92. The question of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa was first raised in 1960 following French nuclear test explosions in the continent. A draft resolution submitted to the General Assembly in that year, inviting all States to regard and respect the continent as a nuclear-weapon-free zone, was not put to a vote, but at the following session, in 1961, the General Assembly, in resolution 1652 (XVI), called upon Member States to refrain from nuclear weapon testing in Africa in any form and to consider and respect the continent as a demilitarized zone.

93. The interest of African States in the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone was reaffirmed in 1964 when the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), meeting in Cairo, adopted the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa in which they solemnly declared their readiness to undertake, through an international agreement to be concluded under United Nations auspices, not to manufacture or control atomic weapons. The Declaration was endorsed by the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held in Cairo in 1964 and, subsequently, in 1965, also by the General Assembly in resolution 2033 (XX). The resolution, in addition, expressed the hope that the African States would initiate studies to implement the Declaration and take the necessary measures through OAU to achieve that end, and called upon all States to refrain from testing, manufacturing, using or deploying nuclear weapons on the continent of Africa, as well as from transferring such weapons, scientific data or

\(^{12}\) A/10027/Add.1: Comprehensive Study of the Question of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in all its Aspects (United Nations, Sales No. E.76.I).
technological assistance in any form which might be used to assist in the manufacture or use of nuclear weapons in Africa.

94. Concern over nuclear developments in South Africa gave renewed urgency to the question, and from 1974 on, the General Assembly began to consider annually the implementation of the Declaration, adopting a number of resolutions for that purpose. In resolution 31/69, adopted without a vote in 1976, the General Assembly went a step further and appealed to all States not to deliver to South Africa or place at its disposal any equipment or fissionable material or technology that would enable it to acquire a nuclear-weapons capability. Many African States expressed apprehension for their security. They believed that the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa would contribute to the strengthening of the security of the countries of the region and to international peace and security. They denounced the technological and military assistance accorded by certain Powers to help South Africa develop its nuclear capability, appealed to the Governments concerned to stop their assistance to South Africa, and called on the international community and the United Nations, including the Security Council, to take adequate and effective measures to put an end to the imminent danger posed by the possible acquisition of a nuclear weapon capability by South Africa.

95. The progressive consideration by OAU of the modalities for implementing the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa has in the past three years been jeopardized by reports on a South African nuclear weapons programme. At the tenth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the reported preparations by South Africa in the summer of 1977 to test a nuclear weapon were given serious consideration, both in its regional aspect as a danger to the African continent and in its global aspect as an imminent proliferation of nuclear weapons and a severe threat to the nuclear non-proliferation regime as it existed. The special session, therefore, adopted the following relevant decision in paragraph 63(c) of its Final Document:

"In Africa, where the Organization of African Unity has affirmed a decision for the denuclearization of the region, the Security Council of the United Nations shall take appropriate effective steps whenever necessary to prevent the frustration of this objective".

96. At its thirty-fourth session in 1979, the General Assembly, in its resolution 34/76 A, adopted by 128 votes to none, with 11 abstentions, strongly reiterated its call upon all States to consider and respect the continent of Africa as a nuclear-weapon-free zone and, in vigorously condemning the reported explosion of a nuclear device by South Africa, requested the Security Council to institute effective enforcement action against South Africa so as to prevent it from further endangering international peace and security through its acquisition of nuclear weapons. By resolution 34/76 B, adopted without a vote, it further requested the Secretary-General to prepare a comprehensive report on South Africa's plan and capability in the nuclear field, to be submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session in 1980.

(b) The Middle East

97. The initiative for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region
of the Middle East first came from Egypt and Iran which, at the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly in 1974, submitted a draft resolution, subsequently adopted by 128 votes to none with two abstentions (Burma and Israel), calling on all Parties concerned in the area to proclaim immediately their intention to refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons and to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

98. The resolution also requested the Secretary-General to ascertain the views of the Parties concerned with respect to the implementation of the resolution. The report of the Secretary-General contains the replies of States in the area to his inquiry (A/10221 and Add.1 and 2). The replies supported the concept of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and agreed with the terms of the resolution. The role that the non-proliferation treaty could play in the promotion of the establishment of a zone was generally acknowledged. In its reply, Israel stressed that the countries concerned must have direct preparatory negotiations among themselves.

99. The question of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East has been thereafter under regular review by the General Assembly. Resolutions have been adopted urging the Parties concerned to take steps for the implementation of the proposal. In 1978, however, in its resolution 33/64, the General Assembly went a step further and invited the Parties concerned to declare, pending the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and during the process of its establishment, their support for the establishment of such a zone in the region and to deposit these declarations with the Security Council. This request was reiterated in resolution 34/17 of 11 December 1979, which was introduced by Egypt and adopted by 136 votes to none with one abstention (Israel). In this connexion, Israel, reaffirming its support in principle for the zone, stated that it did not believe in unilateral depositions of declaratory statements.

100. At its thirty-fourth session, the General Assembly also adopted, by 97 votes to 10 with 38 abstentions, resolution 34/89 on Israeli nuclear armament. The resolution expressed the conviction that the development of nuclear capability by Israel would further aggravate the already dangerous situation in the region and further threaten international peace and security and requested the Secretary-General to prepare, with the assistance of qualified experts, a study on the Israeli nuclear armament and to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth and thirty-sixth sessions.

(c) South Asia

101. The initiative for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia first came from Pakistan, which has introduced resolutions on this subject at each session of the General Assembly since 1974. These resolutions have all been adopted, in some cases unanimously, in other cases with a large majority, with a few negative votes (including India's, see para. 105 below) and with a substantial number of abstentions. These differences reflect changes of substance and emphasis in the resolutions.
102. By these resolutions the General Assembly has endorsed in principle the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, has invited the States of the South Asian region and such other neighbouring non-nuclear-weapon States as might be interested to initiate consultations with a view to establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone and has urged them in the interim to refrain from any action contrary to the achievement of those objectives.

103. As envisaged in these resolutions, the Secretary-General has continued to follow developments in this regard although none of the States of the region has so far requested assistance from him in promoting the establishment of such a zone (see A/34/527).

104. The positions of both India and Pakistan have been stated repeatedly during the annual debates on this item. Pakistan has pointed out that there is no difference between a peaceful nuclear explosion as conducted by India, and one conducted to develop a nuclear weapon. In the opinion of Pakistan the regional approach is for the present the best and most effective means of preventing proliferation in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia, because the non-proliferation régime, as represented by the non-proliferation treaty, has certain inherent shortcomings and does not enjoy universal support. Pakistan believes that all the necessary conditions for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone exist in South Asia. In its opinion the region of South Asia is a well recognized region consisting of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka whose security interests are interrelated and who have shared common political experience. Furthermore, the countries of the region have unilaterally renounced the acquisition and development of nuclear weapons, and all that Pakistan is proposing is to give binding multilateral form to those declarations. Furthermore, the majority of the regional States support the creation of such a zone in South Asia and there is a common desire on the part of all the States in the region to extend the arrangements for denuclearization to as many neighbouring non-nuclear-weapon States as might be interested. Finally, Pakistan noted, all five nuclear-weapon States are favourably inclined to undertake the obligations entailed by the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia. While agreeing with India that consultations among States of the region are a prerequisite for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, Pakistan holds that the General Assembly can do no less than to encourage the South Asian States to continue their efforts towards the achievement of the proposed denuclearized zone.

105. In India's opinion a proposal for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in an appropriate region, taking into account the special features and geographical extent of that region, should be initiated by the States of that region. Their participation should be voluntary and based on arrangements freely arrived at by them. In South Asia, therefore, the States of the region should agree among themselves on the basic conditions for a nuclear-weapon-free zone before bringing the matter to the General Assembly. India has stated on many occasions its intention not to develop nuclear weapons and to use nuclear energy and technology exclusively for peaceful purposes. But that does not mean that it would either join a nuclear-weapon-free zone or accept full-scope safeguards. It does not regard the region of South Asia as either appropriate or adequate for setting up a nuclear-weapon-free zone. South Asia cannot be considered a distinct zone as it is an integral
part of the Asian and Pacific region which is surrounded by nuclear-weapon States or countries belonging to their alliances. In India's view, it is, therefore, incorrect to equate South Asia with Latin America, Africa or the Middle East, as the circumstances prevailing in those regions and the situations of the countries within them are different.

106. As regards the nuclear-weapon States, their statements in the General Assembly over the years indicate that they would be favourable in principle to a South Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone and would support its creation on the basis of agreement among the States of the region.

(d) Central Europe

107. Proposals for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Europe have been put forward on numerous occasions since 1957 when the first such plan, the Rapacki Plan, was submitted. At that time the NATO States were actively discussing the need to offset what they considered to be a Warsaw Treaty superiority in conventional forces by means of "tactical" nuclear weapons stationed in Western Europe. The formal decision to this effect was taken at the North Atlantic Council meeting on 19 December 1957. This decision by which the use of "tactical" nuclear weapons in Europe became part of NATO defence planning, as well as the conviction that the proposed zones would give unilateral military advantage to the Warsaw Treaty, remained all along the decisive factor in the reticence of the NATO States towards the establishment of denuclearized zones in any part of Europe.

108. The first version of the Rapacki Plan was the offer made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland on 2 October 1957 before the General Assembly of the United Nations that if the two German States agreed to impose a ban on the production and stockpiling of atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons on their territories, the Polish People's Republic was prepared simultaneously to impose a similar ban on its own territory. 13/ The proposal was endorsed by the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia announced its willingness to accede to the Plan. The Soviet Union on several occasions also expressed its support for the proposal.

109. The Plan was submitted again on 14 February 1958 in more elaborated form as a memorandum to the Governments of France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America as well as to the Governments of other countries concerned. 14/ It provided for a nuclear-free zone covering Poland, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany. In this area there would


14/ Polish Viewpoint, op. cit., p. 4.
be no manufacture or stockpiling of nuclear weapons or corresponding installations; the use of nuclear weapons against this area would be forbidden; the four nuclear-weapon States would undertake to respect the status of the zone; to guarantee the observance of the commitments, an appropriate system of ground and air control would be set up, with inspection posts; the supervisory machinery would consist of representatives of NATO, Warsaw Treaty and non-aligned States; and, in order to avoid complications that might be involved in the conclusion of a formal treaty, unilateral declarations by the Governments concerned would be sufficient. The proposal was, however, not found acceptable to the NATO States for the reasons already cited.

110. In an effort to meet some of the objections of the Western Powers, Poland submitted a new version of the Plan on 4 November 1958, which incorporated a number of changes, including implementation in two stages. 15/ The first stage would provide only for a ban on production and acquisition of nuclear weapons by the countries included in the zone, and for the freezing of nuclear armaments existing in the territory of the zone. Complete denuclearization would be accomplished in the second stage. The implementation of this stage would be preceded by talks on appropriate reductions of conventional forces. Such reductions would be effected simultaneously with the denuclearization of the zone and carried out under appropriate control.

111. In the context of a growing interest in certain parts of Europe and worldwide in the creation of denuclearized zones (see paras. 86 to 89) and of renewed efforts to ban nuclear-weapon tests and to prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons, Poland submitted this new version of its Plan in a memorandum dated 28 March 1962 to the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC/C.1/1). In its main features, the Plan was similar to the two-stage proposal of 4 November 1958 but it was more detailed and it was envisaged that in addition to the countries originally to be included, the proposed zone would be open to any European State wishing to accede. The reactions of the NATO States remained unchanged. They still maintained that the plan would result in serious military imbalance, inter alia, because the measures envisaged did not address themselves to the nuclear weapons located in certain parts of the territory of the Soviet Union. This stand led Poland once more to adjust its proposal.

112. Without withdrawing the Rapacki Plan for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, Poland, on 24 February 1964, submitted a new plan, the Gomułka Plan, 16/ which did not seek an immediate reduction of nuclear weapons already within the zone but envisaged merely a freeze at existing levels. The freeze was to apply to the same geographical area as in previous plans and was to be accompanied by controls to be established in nuclear plants in the area and at points of access by road, rail, sea and air. The control would be exercised by

15/ Polish Viewpoint, op. cit., p. 7.
16/ Polish Viewpoint, op. cit., p. 23.
commissions composed of representatives of NATO and Warsaw Treaty States on the basis of parity, or they could be enlarged to include non-aligned countries as well.

113. Since then, Poland has on several occasions reiterated its proposal of 1957, as elaborated upon in subsequent years, and that of 1964. It has had the support of the Soviet Union and of the other Warsaw Treaty countries, but the position of the NATO countries has not changed. In the 1970s, however, new approaches to confidence-building and arms limitation measures in Europe have been explored, as described in sections 3 and 4 above.

(e) The Balkans, Adriatic and Mediterranean

114. The creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Balkans, Adriatic and Mediterranean has been suggested on various occasions, but unlike the proposals concerning Central Europe, they were never elaborated into specific plans.

115. In September 1957 Romania had suggested that a conference be convened with the aim of converting the Balkans into a zone of peace. 17/ The Soviet Union supported the proposal and referred to it in its aide mémoire of 13 May 1959, addressed to the Government of Greece. In it the Soviet Government expressed the hope that Greece would not allow the establishment of NATO nuclear bases on its territory and the conviction that "the Balkan peninsula can and must become a zone of peace and friendly co-operation among the Balkan States." This suggestion was taken up again by the Soviet leaders during their visit to Albania from 25 May to 4 June 1959 when they proposed creating a zone "free from missiles and atomic weapons" covering the Balkans and the region of the Adriatic. On 25 June the proposal was formally conveyed by the Soviet Union in notes to France, Greece, Italy, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. 18/

116. The Soviet proposal was worded in general terms. Questions regarding the control system or guarantee mechanism were left to be solved through negotiations. The proposal was endorsed by the respective Warsaw Treaty countries. Yugoslavia, for its part, held that the zone should, in principle, include Italy, Greece and the whole of the Balkan region.

117. In 1963, the Soviet Union revived the idea, this time including also the Mediterranean in the zone. The proposal was submitted on 20 May to the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and respective Mediterranean countries. 19/ In January of that year an announcement had been made that the United States missile bases in Italy and Turkey would be replaced by missile-carrying submarines in the Mediterranean. In its reply to the proposal, the United States, referring to the Soviet Union's deployment of missiles aimed at countries in the area, expressed the view that the proposal seemed "to be designed..."

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17/ Scinteia, 17 September 1957.


precisely and solely to change the existing military balance at the expense of the United States and its Allies". 20/ A number of Arab countries, on the other hand, particularly Algeria and the United Arab Republic, welcomed the suggestion. Some of the countries concerned, mostly Arab States, have on various occasions reiterated their interest in the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the area and the abolition of foreign military bases, but there has been no specific actions in this regard.

(f) The Nordic countries and the Baltic

118. Within the framework of its activities for the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in different parts of Europe, the Soviet Union announced on 11 June 1959 its readiness to support a rocket and atom-free zone in the Scandinavian peninsula and the Baltic area. 21/. Shortly thereafter, the proposal was reiterated with the suggestion that the three proposed zones -- Scandinavian-Baltic, Central European and Balkan-Adriatic -- could be connected into one nuclear-weapon-free zone. 22/

119. In the late 1950s and early 1960s several suggestions were made regarding the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Nordic and Baltic area. These proposals were related in part to proposals put forward in the same years for nuclear-weapon-free zones in Central Europe and in the Balkan-Adriatic region and in part to the consideration in the United Nations of the Undén Plan for a non-nuclear club and of the replies of various Governments to the inquiry conducted by the Secretary-General on the basis of General Assembly resolution 1664 (XVI) (see paras. 88 and 89 above).

120. The idea of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Northern Europe has, however, been advocated primarily by Finland. On 28 May 1963, the President of Finland suggested that the Nordic countries should establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone. He noted that despite the differences in their security policy, none of the Nordic countries had sought to acquire nuclear weapons or wished to have nuclear weapons belonging to other States on their territories. Accordingly, a Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone would only confirm, through mutual undertakings in the manner envisaged in the Undén Plan, the existing de facto situation of absence of nuclear weapons, without impairing the security of the Nordic countries or upsetting the relationship of forces in the world. By declaring themselves a nuclear-weapon-free zone, the Nordic countries would, in his opinion, remove themselves "from the sphere of speculation caused by the development of nuclear strategy".

121. Finland has subsequently reiterated this idea on several occasions in the General Assembly and at the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. In the Finnish view, the idea of a Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone would be worth

21/ Pravda, 12 June 1959.
22/ Pravda, 18 July 1959.
discussing on a new basis even after the Non-Proliferation Treaty had, in fact, already established a 'non-nuclear club'.

122. The idea has not been supported as such by the other Nordic countries. Since the Nordic countries constitute de facto a region free from nuclear weapons, and since the question of independent nuclear weapons development does not arise, all countries being parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the transformation of this de facto non-nuclear status into a de jure nuclear-weapon-free zone would mean that Denmark and Norway would have to commit themselves formally not to accept the deployment of nuclear weapons of their allies in their territories. It is felt in these countries that the Nordic region cannot be regarded as strategically self-contained. Accordingly, a formalized nuclear-weapon-free status for the Nordic countries would be possible only as part of a wider European arrangement. Pending this, their long-standing declared policy not to accept the stationing of nuclear weapons under present circumstances is believed to promote peace, stability and military restraint in the region more effectively than would a treaty commitment. The Swedish Government, for its part, has declared its willingness in principle to participate in serious discussions on a Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone provided that the other countries concerned are ready to do so. The Swedish Government has expressed the opinion that the zone should include inter alia the Baltic, and has further emphasized that tactical nuclear weapons aimed at the Nordic region should be taken into account in an agreement, supplementing the zone with a surrounding or adjacent security belt.

123. In May 1978, the President of Finland, developing the idea further, suggested the elaboration of a Nordic arms control arrangement, the main purpose of which would be to isolate the Nordic countries as completely as possible from the effects of nuclear strategy in general, and new nuclear weapons technology in particular. In this connexion, he emphasized that the initiative for negotiations must come from the States in the region, that they must themselves conduct the negotiations in good faith without coercion or pressure, that they alone were qualified to interpret their respective security needs, and that in Finland's view, the necessary arrangements could be made within the framework of the existing security policy solutions. Because a security arrangement concerning the Nordic countries would in one way or another affect the security interests of the leading nuclear-weapon States, it would be most natural and necessary that they should participate in the negotiations at an early stage, and also the countries in the region would have to receive assurances against the use or threat of use against them of the weapons they would commit themselves not to acquire or station in their territories.

124. After 1978, conversations have been held by Finland with the proposed participants in negotiations on a Nordic arms regulation arrangement. Basic positions on the issues have been maintained.
7. Further efforts pertaining to conventional disarmament

(a) Latin America

125. Possibilities for arms limitation agreements in Latin America have been considered for many years, and there has been in the past a number of initiatives for bilateral arrangements among pairs of Latin American countries and for multilateral arrangements among the Central American Republics. Ceilings on personnel and weapons, limits on military budgets and renunciation of certain types of conventional weapons for the whole continent have been considered at one time or another in the past decades.

126. These efforts gained new momentum with the Declaration of Ayacucho (Peru), signed on 9 December 1974 by eight Latin American States: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru and Venezuela (A/10044, annex). In the Declaration the signatories undertook to create conditions which will make possible the effective limitation of armaments and an end to their acquisition for offensive purposes, so that all possible resources may be devoted to the economic and social development of every country in Latin America. The principles of this Declaration were reaffirmed in 1978 in a joint communiqué, issued by the foreign ministers of those same countries, in which they expressed their countries' willingness to explore, together with the other Latin American countries, possibilities for reaching an agreement on limiting conventional weapons in the region (A/S-10/AC.1/34, annex).

127. At a meeting in Mexico City in August 1978, representatives from 20 Latin American and Caribbean countries agreed to propose for the consideration of their Governments the establishment of a regional consultation mechanism relating to disarmament matters in the field of conventional weapons in general and called upon all countries of the region to participate in these endeavours. The meeting also considered consultations on limitations specifically addressed to conventional weapons considered to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects with a view to recommending measures for restricting trade with Latin America and between countries of the region in such weapons and for restricting or prohibiting their use. These proposals are currently under consideration by the Governments concerned.

(b) South Asia

128. In a statement at the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly in 1973, Pakistan declared its readiness to discuss with India, at an appropriate time, in the context of their joint agreement to work for durable peace in the subcontinent, a substantial reduction of their military budgets (A/PV.2147, p. 52).

129. In 1979, at the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly, Pakistan declared its readiness to explore with other States in the region the possibility of mutual reduction of forces and of confidence-building measures (A/34/PV.15, pp. 44 and 45 and A/C.1/34/PV.20, p. 23).
130. Up to now, no specific negotiations on either issue have been reported.

(c) Europe

131. At the tenth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, France proposed the holding of a conference on disarmament in Europe. According to the French proposal, this conference should be attended by all the European countries, as well as Canada and the United States; its procedural rules, including the consensus principle, should be similar to those of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe; and it should consider the problems of conventional disarmament in Europe as a whole, from the Atlantic to the Urals. The priority aims of such a conference would be to promote confidence and to reduce those conventional armaments which are most destabilizing. Accordingly, in a first phase, the conference would seek agreement on the implementation of a number of confidence-building measures relating to information about military activities, prior notification, constraints on military activities and verification. The first-phase agreement would contain a firm commitment to the second stage. In addition to their inherent value, those first-phase measures would pave the way for the second phase which should lead to reductions of those types of conventional equipment which are suited for offensive purposes, according to formulae intended to establish a balance of forces among participants (A/8-10/PV.3, pp. 23-25).

8. Other proposals relating to disarmament in Europe

132. In May 1980, following initiatives of 1978-1979, Warsaw Treaty States submitted a number of proposals for halting the arms race and achieving disarmament, including regional steps (A/35/237). In particular, it was proposed that, as a measure of goodwill, the signatory States of the Final Act of CSCE should undertake a commitment to freeze the levels of their forces in Europe; that the preparations for the conference on military détente and disarmament in Europe should be sped up and that this Conference could devote its first stage to confidence-building measures; and that the signatory States of the Final Act might conclude an agreement on the non-first use of nuclear as well as conventional weapons. It was also suggested that an agreement could be reached on security guarantees to those European States, regardless of their participation in alliances, which do not possess nuclear weapons and do not permit deployment of nuclear weapons in their territories.

133. An initiative aimed at examining whether a special disarmament programme for Europe should be outlined was presented by Finland in a statement in the General Assembly in October 1979 (A/C.1/34/PV.9, pp. 143-50). On the basis of existing and anticipated processes and proposals on disarmament concerning Europe or parts of Europe and through appropriate consultations, it should be possible, according to this initiative, to reach an understanding on such a programme. It was proposed that the States concerned should agree on the framework for the negotiations dealing with disarmament and arms regulation and should determine the principles...
that would guide the negotiations. Subsequently, Finland submitted to the
Governments concerned a working paper in which the initiative was further
elaborated. On the basis of the working paper, the Government of Finland has
initiated a series of consultations in order to define the possible role of such
a comprehensive approach in European disarmament talks keeping in mind the
forthcoming meeting in Madrid of the States having participated in CSCE.

134. Both proposals in paragraphs 132 and 133 above, as well as France's proposal
in paragraph 131, were mentioned in paragraph 42 together with other proposals
put forward in the CSCE framework.

135. The Soviet Union clearly placed in a regional European context its proposals
of October 1979 and July 1980 to open talks with the United States on
"medium-range" nuclear weapons; it also proposed to hold such negotiations in the
framework of SALT III (Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms). For
their part, the NATO States, at their ministerial meeting of December 1979, made a
proposal for negotiations between the United States and the USSR on their "long-
range theatre nuclear forces", starting with ground-launched ballistic missiles,
in a world-wide, SALT III perspective. Recent statements seem to indicate some
flexibility in the positions of both sides.
III. REGIONAL APPROACH TO DISARMAMENT

1. The concept of regional disarmament

   (a) Objectives and importance

136. For the great majority of States, the perceived threats to their security and the need for military preparedness is primarily connected with conditions in their own region. Some of the problems which stand in the way of progress in disarmament are therefore regional in nature. The importance of a regional approach to disarmament derives mainly from this.

137. At the same time there is a link between the conditions of security in a region and those in other regions and at the global level. Consequently, disarmament efforts in one region should be conceived in their interrelation with disarmament efforts in other regions, and with efforts to stop and reverse the over-all arms race, especially the arms race involving the leading nuclear powers.

138. However, conditions differ so widely between regions that while efforts in different regions and at the global level should be in some general way in harmony, there is considerable scope for independent initiatives and practical action in each region. The particular merit of the regional approach to disarmament is a consequence of this, for it implies that the specific aspirations in a region and the historical opportunities peculiar to it can impart considerable momentum to the global disarmament effort. In addition, regional measures can be adapted to the specific needs and requirements of the participating States, thus making it possible to reach agreement on measures more far-reaching than those which could be implemented under the prevailing circumstances on a world-wide basis.

139. According to its concept, therefore, regional disarmament aims at achieving several objectives at once, namely, to promote regional security, and to contribute to the promotion of a relaxation of tension, enhanced security and disarmament at the global level.

140. Undoubtedly, the immediate motivations and predominant concerns of countries engaged in regional disarmament efforts are mostly reducing tension, promoting peace, security and stability in the region and preventing unnecessary competition in armaments or keeping the region aloof from extra-regional confrontations. The predominant importance of regional conditions emerges very clearly from the cases examined in chapter II. The various measures considered were based, each in its own way, on regional considerations, aspirations and concerns which served to focus the efforts of the States of the region. Even so, however, the wider, global aims were never absent.

141. With the growth of regional co-operation in other fields, co-operation also in the field of disarmament could commend itself increasingly to countries in various regions. As countries place greater emphasis on regional political, economic, social and other forms of co-operation, the impediment to such
co-operation inherent in regional arms races and the diversion of resources to wasteful competition which they entail, should become increasingly clear.

142. Development towards greater emphasis on a regional approach to disarmament, far from being inconsistent with global goals, enhances them. The cases examined in chapter II bring this out. Whereas the approaches adopted in different regions have been different, their aims and their effects, or prospective effects, were to a large extent similar: to diminish the regional impact of the global arms race and to enhance security, regionally and globally, and, with it, to improve the prospects for further steps in disarmament. For instance, the nuclear-weapon-free zone established in Latin America by the Treaty of Tlatelolco is generally recognized as a case of an initiative taken in one region which could be an example for other regions. Indeed, the comprehensive study commissioned by the United Nations General Assembly in resolution 3261 F (XXIX) of 9 December 1974 on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects was a recognition of the important contributions which a regional measure can make to the global goal of nuclear non-proliferation, while bearing in mind that differing security situations in different regions will to a great extent influence the specific nature of the agreements concluded (A/10027/Add.1). The Final Act of the 1975 CSCE is another instance of efforts at the regional level.

143. Thus the regional disarmament concept must constantly be seen in its right perspective. Though in no way a substitute for general and complete disarmament, it can be an effective complement to global measures and an important constituent in the step-by-step approach to global disarmament. In particular it can facilitate negotiations on some of the areas identified for universal action, and contribute initiatives on other possible disarmament steps promoting stability, mutual confidence and co-operation within the region.

144. Efforts towards general and complete disarmament cannot simply be broken down into regional components, with each region deciding on what is or is not feasible, since such a break-up could distort global disarmament efforts. It is moreover evident that disarmament in one region cannot proceed in total disregard of development and conditions in other regions and globally, if it is to serve its immediate purpose of enhancing regional security. This requirement implies, among other things, that regional disarmament measures must not only ensure undiminished security for the States of the region, but they must also take into account, where appropriate, the security concerns of extra-regional States. The wider implications of this are discussed in a later section.

145. Disarmament in the present study is to be understood in a wide sense including not only reduction and limitation agreements on armaments and armed forces, but also confidence-building measures and collateral measures in general. In each of these areas regional disarmament agreements can contribute in important ways to the global process of disarmament.

146. First, regional measures can contribute to the negotiations on specific weapons, viz., nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, other weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons and armed forces. For instance, regional arrangements in
the field of nuclear non-proliferation can be vital to the universal non-proliferation efforts. Similarly, regional restraint in the production, acquisition and accumulation of conventional weapons can contribute to world-wide disarmament in the conventional field.

147. Second, an important element for the successful conclusion of disarmament agreements is confidence among States. Collateral and confidence-building measures among the countries of a region can enhance the security of States in the region. This can improve the prospects for further progress in disarmament, both in that region itself and on the global level.

148. Third, there are in certain regions of the world situations which are peculiar to those regions, and which must necessarily be taken into account in disarmament negotiations. The countries within each region, being most acquainted with these peculiarities, are naturally in the best position to find solutions to these particular situations in a manner which avoids globalizing the difficulties in question.

149. Fourth, regional organizations and other regional arrangements as envisaged in Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations have been created to deal with security problems. Similar mechanisms could be adopted with respect to disarmament. Also the various regions can improve the prospects of the global disarmament negotiations by undertaking, where appropriate, measures of a regional nature aimed at maintaining peace, political stability, regional security and economic co-operation and development. Resources for such economic co-operation and development can in part emanate from savings resulting from regional disarmament measures such as limitation in the production or acquisition of armaments, and the reduction of military expenditure.

150. Among the conditions conducive to progress in regional disarmament, particular stress must be laid on the importance of strict adherence to the basic principles contained in the Charter of the United Nations and reaffirmed and elaborated in numerous resolutions and declarations of the General Assembly, including the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security and the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. All States have a role to play in this respect, but the largest military powers, including, above all, the leading nuclear-weapon States, assume special responsibilities to promote disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, among themselves; to take steps to diminish tension and to enhance international security; to allow the United Nations institutions responsible for promoting and maintaining international peace and security, in particular the Security Council, to assume their responsibilities; and to implement faithfully the decisions of those organs, so as to remove obstacles to regional stability and regional peace and security. Strict respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all States, for the right of self-determination and for the principles of non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States are particularly important in this context. Otherwise, countries in a region which feel themselves the victims or potential victims of outside interference, overt or covert, might find it difficult, in spite of their aspirations, to agree on regional disarmament measures.
151. Conversely, the more effectively the countries in a region can reduce tension among themselves, strengthen intra-regional co-operation and eliminate mutual military competition, the better will they be able to keep the region free from external interference, and to prevent it from becoming a zone of confrontation and rivalry for outside powers. Resolute efforts to resolve regional conflicts and settle disputes by peaceful means, and steps to promote regional co-operation in various fields, can go a long way towards diminishing the scope for external interference and the occasions for confrontation at the global level, thus paving the way for appropriate regional and global disarmament measures.

(b) The "region" in a disarmament context

152. In relation to regional disarmament, a flexible approach to the concept of a "region" must be adopted. It is not possible to define in advance and in general what might constitute a suitable "region", as this will depend both on the initiative of the States concerned, and, in many cases, on the type of measure envisaged. Thus, two or more neighbouring States can constitute a "region" for disarmament purposes. So can, in fact, contiguous parts of the territories of States, as in the case of a demilitarized border zone. In other cases an entire continent or other known geographical entity may be the most appropriate framework for regional disarmament measures. It is clear, however, that in all cases the area of application of the measure must be precisely defined, including, where appropriate, definition of the maritime and air spaces covered.

153. In fact, the area of application of a regional disarmament measure need not be fixed once and for all. Also in this respect a flexible approach is sometimes preferable. In some cases, for example, it may be desirable or necessary to aim from the outset for a wide coverage, such as an entire continent or sub-continent. Even so, it may be that the only practicable approach is for some States of the region to adopt and implement the measure in question, in the expectation that the remaining States of the region will eventually accede to it as well. In other cases one could envisage a process in which a disarmament measure is first negotiated among a nucleus of States where the need for relaxation of tension, reduction of force levels or pre-emption of further military expansion is particularly great. From that nucleus the "region" may then be gradually extended by the accession of neighbouring States to the measure in question, without it being necessary to define from the outset the exact boundaries of the region to which the measure in question will ultimately apply.

154. The most important criterion for defining the region for some particular disarmament measure will normally be that of its coherence in terms of the military conditions and of the security perceptions and concerns of the States in question, but this too may assume a different meaning depending on the measures contemplated and on the political and security situation in the region. Moreover, security perceptions can change with developments in technology and in political relations, again pointing to the need for flexibility in defining the "region". For example, conditions are likely to be different in cases where the States of the region are already heavily armed and confront each other, or feel threatened by each other, and in cases where the level of armaments is lower, where there are no clear-cut
and persistent political and military divisions within the region, and where, on the contrary, the primary concern of the countries of the region may be to preserve the region from involvement in the confrontations of outside Powers. In the former case, measures to avert or to regulate competitive arms acquisition, for confidence-building and for effective verification are likely to assume particular importance, and military-strategic conditions, including the role of outside Powers, are likely to be paramount considerations in determining the region to which the measures should apply. In the latter case, regional co-operation in the maintenance of peace and security, and mutual agreements to prevent military involvement by outside States and to forego acquisition of certain types of weapons may constitute more relevant approaches.

155. Strictly geographical and security considerations will not always suffice to determine what might be a suitable "region". In many cases regional disarmament might be promoted by taking into account such additional factors as the prior existence of cultural, economic, ideological and/or political links. In particular, the existence of regional intergovernmental organizations reflecting a certain homogeneity of outlook and a certain political coherence can in many cases provide an effective and natural setting for discussing and agreeing upon regional disarmament measures.

156. To ensure the effectiveness of a regional disarmament measure it may sometimes be desirable, or even necessary, to define the region to which the measure applies in such a way that it comprises parts of the high seas or other areas not under the national jurisdiction of the States of the region, or areas where outside States have certain established rights. In such cases, and when the measure in question would infringe upon the established rights of third parties under general international law or under other existing legal arrangements, its full implementation requires the positive co-operation of those parties. The complex problems arising, in this as in other cases, from the interaction between the rights and aspirations of the States of the region and the rights and legitimate interests of extra-regional States are considered more fully in paragraphs 174 to 176 of section (b) below.

2. Basic conditions and guidelines

(a) Principles regarding disarmament in general

157. Bearing in mind that regional disarmament should take place in the perspective of ultimately achieving general and complete disarmament under effective international control, the principles governing negotiations in the field of disarmament generally should form the foundation on which regional disarmament should be based. These general principles include in particular those embodied in the United Nations Charter and other generally accepted rules of international law, the principles elaborated in the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and the principles affirmed in other relevant resolutions of the General Assembly.

158. The United Nations Charter deals with disarmament in the context of the fundamental purpose of maintaining international peace and security. Article 11
of the Charter invests the General Assembly with the power to consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments and to make recommendations with regard to such principles to the members or to the Security Council or to both.

159. Article 26 of the Charter links the promotion of the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the regulation of armaments. According to this Article, the former goal should be pursued with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources. According to the Charter, the Security Council is responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee, plans for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments. Although this mechanism has failed to materialize, Article 26 clearly constitutes a basic principle for the pursuit of international peace and security.

160. Article 2 lays down the principles for the pursuit of the purposes of the United Nations, among them the maintenance of international peace and security. In the light of Articles 11 and 26, these principles are implicitly valid, where applicable, for disarmament measures. Of the principles enumerated in Article 2, the following may be considered particularly relevant to disarmament measures:

(i) The principle of sovereign equality of States;

(ii) The obligation to settle international disputes by peaceful means;

(iii) The obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force in international relations;

(iv) The obligation to assist the United Nations in any preventive or enforcement action taken in accordance with the Charter;

(v) Respect for the territorial integrity and political independence of any State;

(vi) The obligation for the United Nations not to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State.

161. Article 52 of the Charter specifically envisaged the possibility of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action. Indeed, the Security Council is obligated under the Charter to encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or agencies. Bearing in mind the close link established in the Charter between the maintenance of international peace and security on the one hand, and disarmament and the regulation of armaments on the other, regional disarmament efforts can be seen to be not only consistent with, but to have a clear basis in the provisions of the Charter.
162. The preservation and strengthening of international peace and security is the primary objective of the United Nations as set forth in its Charter, in the preamble, in the purposes and principles laid down in Articles 1 and 2, and in the functions, powers and responsibilities entrusted to the Security Council and the General Assembly. All of the activities of the Organization, whatever their immediate purpose and whatever their other merits, contribute, each in its own way, to this objective. In so doing, they help create conditions conducive to disarmament efforts in general and regional disarmament efforts in particular. In the context of this study, a special importance is to be attached to United Nations efforts with a predominantly regional impact, including action relative to specific conflicts, action to uphold the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of others and of the right of peoples to self-determination, action in support of the efforts of regional organizations to promote peace and security in their regions, action to combat colonialism, racism and apartheid, etc.

163. The United Nations can also promote conditions conducive to progress in regional disarmament by encouraging extra-regional powers whose co-operation is required for the implementation of regional measures to assume the appropriate obligations.

164. In the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Member States reaffirm the principles inherent in the Charter and stress the central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament ( paras. 26 and 27). The Document reaffirms, as have a long series of resolutions of the General Assembly, that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control. It then proceeds to specify the fundamental principles and criteria which must govern disarmament efforts as follows:

All the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations. Consequently, all States have the duty to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament. All States have the right to participate in disarmament negotiations. They have the right to participate on an equal footing in those multilateral disarmament negotiations which have a direct bearing on their national security. While disarmament is the responsibility of all States, the nuclear-weapon States have the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and, together with other militarily significant States, for halting and reversing the arms race. It is therefore important to secure their active participation.

The adoption of disarmament measures should take place in such an equitable and balanced manner as to ensure the right of each State to security and to ensure that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage. At each stage the objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces.

An acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations for nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States should be strictly observed.
Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all parties.

165. The Final Document also stresses the close relationship between expenditure on armaments and economic and social development, urging that resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures should be used in a manner which will help to promote the well-being of all peoples and to improve the economic conditions of the developing countries.

(b) Principles and guidelines specific to the regional approach

166. Principles applicable to disarmament negotiations in general have been discussed above. There are also principles which have been adopted by the States in particular regions as a basis for disarmament negotiations among themselves and which might be helpful in negotiations on regional disarmament in other regions as well. In addition, there are principles and guidelines which can be derived from the connexion between regional and global considerations, and which apply specifically to the regional approach to disarmament.

167. As indicated, one of the aims of regional disarmament is to promote the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament by means of partial, geographically limited measures. This goal of general and complete disarmament must therefore be borne in mind in seeking to identify specific guidelines intrinsic to the regional approach to disarmament. This means as a minimum that regional measures must not include any obligations that would be in contradiction with the world-wide goal or put obstacles in the way of its ultimate realization. Likewise, the measures concerned must conform to international law in general and should take into account other legal obligations previously assumed by the participating States, as discussed below.

168. Moreover, the elaboration of disarmament measures for, and their application to, a given region, rather than the entire world, raises ipso facto the question of the modalities of the particular relationship thus established between the region in question and the rest of the world.

169. Among the principles relating to the regional approach to disarmament the sovereignty of the States of the region under consideration must be emphasized first of all: it is for those States to determine the modalities of their regional approach to disarmament. A disarmament measure can emanate only from the express will of each State to whose territory and/or armed forces it applies.

170. It is also clear that in many cases the States of a given region would be in a position to envisage taking a given regional disarmament measure, and at the same time being sure to maintain their own security, only if they obtained the co-operation of certain third States whose actions have a significant influence on the security situation in the region. States taking steps aimed at regional disarmament must be able to secure for themselves the co-operation of such third
States in order to obtain the assurances, commitments or readjustments of previous agreements, which they need.

171. A further aspect is the interaction between the region and the rest of the world which implies duties for the regional States as well as for extra-regional States.

172. A regional disarmament measure would not be in keeping with the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament if, although guaranteeing undiminished security for the States parties to the agreement, it did not at the same time take into account the security concerns of third States involved and of the international community as a whole. It follows that the States of the region have an obligation vis-à-vis other States to take into consideration the implications for their security of the measures envisaged. In the same perspective, the United Nations should be appropriately informed of regional disarmament efforts.

173. Conversely, and no less important, third States should co-operate in implementing any disarmament measure agreed upon by the States of a region in the context of gradual advance towards general and complete disarmament. This co-operation means, as a minimum, respect for the new status established by the States in question for their own region, but it may also take the form of active assistance - if requested by the States of the region - in elaborating the measure under consideration and/or in implementing it.

174. Also, while the initiative must remain with the States of the region, it should be possible to obtain, upon request, the assistance of the United Nations, or of a regional organization that may exist, for the study, negotiation and/or implementation of any regional disarmament measure.

175. It may happen that questions arise as to whether disarmament measures adopted on a regional basis conform to certain elements of public international law or are compatible with prior legal commitments. The most important case is that already referred to in paragraph 156, in which the region under consideration comprises, or consists of, geographical areas which are not under national jurisdiction of any State and in which the régime envisaged would restrict the rights of third States in that region under international law. What is involved in this case is a combination of two elements: a regional disarmament measure in the proper sense, and a multilateral measure of disarmament or disengagement as the case may be, whose field of application is regional.

176. Antarctica provides one illustration of this situation. The approach adopted in that case has been dealt with above (see chap. II, paras. 14 to 20).

177. The other important case concerns international waters. One example is the Treaty of Tlatelolco which provides that when it has fully entered into force, demilitarized status will apply also to a maritime security area surrounding the region and extending beyond the national jurisdiction of coastal States. Association of all nuclear-weapon States with the Treaty through their accession to Additional Protocol II was devised, inter alia, as a means to achieve this aim.
178. Another example concerns the concept of zones of peace as applied to the Indian Ocean, the Baltic, the Mediterranean or other maritime expanses. In these cases, there are different possible approaches. For instance, two or more extra-regional States may decide among themselves to forego on a reciprocal basis some or all forms of naval deployment, activity and/or transit in that particular region of the high seas. Alternatively, a special legal régime might be instituted for some precisely defined maritime expanse which prohibits or otherwise limits some or all military uses. There is, of course, nothing to preclude that measures of this latter kind be adopted, but they would have to be negotiated internationally and gain the acceptance of the international community to have binding force. As a possible solution the negotiations may produce a formula which is explicitly designed for disarmament purposes only.

179. Applying to these several cases the principles developed above, it seems possible to conclude that if States parties to a regional disarmament agreement succeed in defining a restrictive régime for maritime expanses in their region, a régime whose implementation no other State could regard as detrimental to its security and which does not interfere with the peaceful pursuits of third parties in that region in accordance with the principles of international law, then maritime users should co-operate in establishing and respecting that régime.
IV. SURVEY OF CONCEIVABLE MEASURES

180. The considerations discussed above under the heading of guidelines specific to the regional approach (see chap. III, 2 (b), paras. 166-179) concerning a given region to determine the modalities of their approach to regional disarmament imply that this study should not seek to establish the nature of the most appropriate disarmament measures at the regional level. Such an assessment is the prerogative of the States of the region under consideration.

181. All the same, it seems useful to list what has been done, proposed or thought of so far, in order to make available to States wishing to promote disarmament in their region as wide a range as possible of measures whose implementation could be considered at a regional level.

182. It is in this sense that the Group of Governmental Experts has interpreted the directive contained in General Assembly resolution 33/91 E, which requires it to determine, inter alia, the "definition of measures which, on the initiative of the States concerned, may lend themselves to a regional approach".

183. The same considerations imply that such a list of possible measures should be extensive rather than restrictive. To exclude measures as unsuited for regional action, simply because they have not yet been envisaged except at the global level, would seem to prejudice in a negative sense the choices of the States of the region.

184. It follows, in particular, that none of the measures contained in the Programme of Action of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, can be excluded a priori from a regional approach. The Group of Governmental Experts has consequently drawn up its survey of disarmament measures that may lend themselves to a regional approach, taking into account that Programme of Action and, with this in view, has followed the list of measures which the Disarmament Commission, at its spring 1979 session, included in its report under the title "elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament." 23/

185. No matter how extensive it might be, a list of disarmament measures that may lend themselves to a regional approach cannot be considered exhaustive. There is always the possibility that new ideas may come up and that new developments, or specific regional conditions, may point to approaches which had been overlooked or could not be foreseen. Moreover, the Committee on Disarmament is currently engaged in negotiating a comprehensive programme of disarmament which, upon its adoption in 1982 by the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, may provide additional ideas for regional action.

186. The sequence in which the measures are mentioned below is that followed by the Disarmament Commission in its elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, "it being understood that nothing should preclude States from conducting negotiations

on all priority items concurrently". Likewise, nothing should preclude States in a given region from negotiating and agreeing upon any measures in the order of their choice. It also follows from what has been said of the prerogatives of the States of the region that they may decide which measures to consider and in which order, on the basis of the conditions prevailing in their region.

1. Disarmament measures

(a) Nuclear weapons

187. The efforts of the international community to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race are reflected in multilateral treaties and in resolutions and programmes adopted within the United Nations framework. Other measures have been adopted bilaterally by the United States and the Soviet Union in the agreements on strategic arms limitation. Further efforts are needed in order to continue the SALT process and in order to bring about agreements on such measures as limitation and reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time; cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems; and cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. In this connexion, speedy results in the efforts by nuclear-weapon States in pursuance of their obligations under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons would be most important. An essential step in this direction is the complete cessation of nuclear-weapons testing.

188. Cessation of the nuclear arms race in all its aspects, and nuclear disarmament with a view to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons at the earliest possible time, are primarily the responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the largest nuclear arsenals. All the same, some of the measures which are pertinent in this respect may lend themselves to partial approaches on a regional basis, either as a means of facilitating the subsequent adoption of similar global measures, or as measures in their own right serving to diminish the impact of the global arms race on the region in question. It was noted in chapter II, for example, that the question of the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests was the direct occasion, initially, for the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa.

189. Measures relative to the reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time, as well as measures relative to the cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems, are applicable in principle to regions where countries possess nuclear weapons and to regions where nuclear weapons are presently deployed. Quantative and qualitative limitations on nuclear weapons need not necessarily be addressed only in bilateral talks between the

24/ Ibid., para. 12.
two leading nuclear Powers and need not necessarily be confined to so-called strategic nuclear weapons. The success of negotiations on such questions in a regional context would, of course, depend on adequate consideration of regional security preoccupations. In certain cases this may involve adequate arrangements regarding the size and character of the conventional armed forces of the various States and groups of States concerned, and progress in limiting and reducing the strategic arsenals of nuclear Powers.

190. The goal of nuclear non-proliferation is on the one hand to prevent the emergence of any additional nuclear-weapon State, beside the existing five nuclear-weapon States, and on the other progressively to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons altogether. This involves obligations and responsibilities on the part of both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, the former undertaking to stop the nuclear arms race and to achieve disarmament, and non-nuclear-weapon States as well as nuclear-weapon States undertaking to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

191. Pending the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of these weapons would be a very important contribution to non-proliferation efforts. Such arrangements are currently under consideration in the Committee on Disarmament. Several approaches have been envisaged. Assurances in the form of an international convention might be extended by nuclear-weapon Powers to all non-nuclear-weapon States or, at least, to those which are not parties to the nuclear security arrangements of some nuclear Powers, or a more differentiated approach might be adopted through multilateral or other forms of action. For example, all the nuclear-weapon States, in acceding to Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, undertook not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the parties to that Treaty.

192. In connection with further steps to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons the need to ensure that such measures do not at the same time put obstacles in the way of the peaceful utilization of nuclear technology has been repeatedly affirmed, as has the need to strengthen international co-operation for the promotion of the transfer and utilization of nuclear technology for economic and social development under agreed and appropriate safeguards, on a non-discriminatory basis, and in conformity with the priorities, interests and needs of each country. Full implementation of article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by advanced nuclear countries would constitute an essential contribution in this respect. It could furthermore be envisaged to combine measures to promote regional co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology with systems for the inspection and control of peaceful nuclear activities on a regional basis, designed to supplement and/or facilitate international safeguards applied through the International Atomic Energy Agency. Articles 12 to 18 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco establish such a regional system of control and inspection together with the appropriate organs, and adapted to the particular nuclear-weapon-free status implied by the Treaty. In some cases, regional agencies for supply and/or reprocessing of nuclear fuels under agreed and appropriate international and regional safeguards could help to allay fears about nuclear-weapons proliferation while at the same time effectively promoting economic development and co-operation.
193. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is one domain in which the regional approach to disarmament has proved to be particularly attractive. Such a zone was established in Latin America by the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Proposals for similar zones in Africa, in the Middle East and in South Asia have gained wide support. Article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons explicitly recognized the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories. The general principles applicable to such zones were considered in the comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects, submitted to the General Assembly in 1975 (see chap. II, para. 90).

194. The advantages of superposing global and regional approaches are particularly clear in the case of nuclear non-proliferation. In some respects, the global approach makes more modest demands on the States but it has the advantage of wider application. On the other hand, where and when the necessary conditions are met, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones provides advantages which the global approach could not have achieved. In particular, it involves the complete absence of nuclear weapons, and therefore allows for the provision of more specific security guarantees by the nuclear-weapon States as well as for more developed arrangements regarding inspection and international transfers of nuclear materials and equipment.

195. In the present context reference may be made to the concept of zones of peace. In proposals put forward up to now this concept implies nuclear-weapon-free status, or, as a minimum, non-nuclear weapon status for the countries of the zone. Moreover, an important objective in all proposals to date on the subject has been to limit the deployment of forces, including nuclear forces, by extra-zonal powers in the region concerned. The case of a zone encompassing a part of the high seas raises difficult problems beyond those of naval and air presence in the narrow sense, notably the questions of transit and of the presence of nuclear-missile carrying submarines which, while not primarily related to the regional situation, may all the same be perceived as affecting it.

(b) Other weapons of mass destruction

196. The measures listed under this heading in the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament are: prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction; prevention of the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons specifically those based on new scientific principles; and prohibition of the development, production and use of radiological weapons. Global prohibitions relative to each of these types of weapons are presently under consideration in the Committee on Disarmament.

197. Some of these measures, for instance prohibition of chemical weapons, may nevertheless lend themselves to a regional approach involving the elimination of the weapons in question where they exist at present as well as the prohibition of any future development, possession, introduction or use of such weapons. Regional assignments combined with control procedures and with guarantees by extra-regional
States, if and as appropriate, could have merits for example where regional conditions render possible more far-reaching agreements than those which have been or can be achieved on a global basis.

(c) Conventional weapons and armed forces

198. Cessation of the conventional arms race is a domain in which the inclusion of a regional aspect in the approach to disarmament is particularly important. Due to the ubiquity of conventional weapons and armed forces and their technical and functional diversity, and due to the central role of conventional forces in the security perception of the countries in a region, the question of conventional disarmament is highly complex, and the possible approaches highly dependent on regional conditions. In many cases simple reduction of force levels or armaments may not suffice on its own, and one type of measure relating to conventional forces may need to be supplemented by other measures of conventional disarmament to satisfy the requirement of undiminished security of the parties. In some cases the presence or the role of nuclear weapons needs to be taken into account, or confidence-building measures and other measures to promote security, as well as the particular effective national or international verification measures that may be required. Conventional disarmament is a field in which the number of possible measures and the scope for regional initiatives is virtually unlimited.

199. Agreements on the limitation and reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces fall into several distinct, if related, categories.

200. One category of measures consists of the renunciation of certain types of weapons by the States in a region in which these weapons do not exist. Such agreements not to acquire certain types of weapons may typically concern new and technically advanced types of weapons or weapons which are particularly destructive or indiscriminate in their effects. They may be designed to avert future regional arms competition or to prevent the introduction of weapons which could render future disarmament agreements particularly difficult. Agreements of this type may, however, also concern weapons which are not fundamentally new or different from existing ones but whose performance exceeds certain agreed limits, for example, limits on mission capability, on range, load and speed of aircraft, on weight and armament of fighting vessels, or on range and launch and target characteristics of missiles. This kind of regional agreements implies renunciation of acquisition and production by regional States and, as appropriate, engagements by extra-regional States not to introduce or deploy such weapons in the region, and not to use them against countries of the region. In some cases such agreements may have to be linked with agreements imposing certain other restrictions on the armaments and armed forces in the region.

201. As regards armed forces, agreements can take the form of collective or national ceilings on armed forces in the region, of a freeze at existing levels, or of reduction and subsequent limitation to the levels thus reached. In the case of reductions, the agreement may either specify the levels to be reached after the reductions are completed, or it may specify instead the percentages or quotas by which existing forces are to be reduced. Reductions, ceilings and freezes may be confined to certain types of forces, such as ground, naval or air forces, or may be
concentrated on certain types of forces and/or armaments, equipment and installations (selective approach), or they can be applied to all forces and to all armaments at the same time. Limitations on armaments can be quantitative and/or qualitative. Again, reductions, ceilings and freezes can be linked to geographical restrictions on deployment, including the establishment of fully or partly demilitarized zones, or of equivalent arrangements regarding sea and air space. A freeze on performance characteristics for certain types of armaments can also be envisaged. Where the armed forces of other countries are present in the region, their withdrawal, total or partial, can be part of the agreement.

202. A variety of combinations of measures are possible, each with a different rationale in terms of means chosen to strengthen regional security. Thus, a combination of limits on quantity and performance could serve to balance the force levels of the different countries or groups of countries in the region; limits on weapons characteristics, for example of aircraft or of vessels, could aim at limiting the offensive capabilities of States in the region without undue impairment of their defensive capacity; and limitations on performance, combined with limitations on deployment could serve confidence-building purposes. Also, weapons to be subjected to such limitation could be selected not only on the basis of their military characteristics, but also on the basis of some other consideration, such as cost.

203. Agreements of the above types which limit possession of certain weapons or types of weapons may specify those limits in terms of the maximum stocks allowed or in terms of the new acquisitions which are permitted or forbidden, or in terms of both. The question of verification, for example, may determine which approach is adopted. Agreements relating to the levels of production and importation of certain types of weapons are therefore equivalent to those mentioned previously as regards the effects, even though they may in some cases be easier to implement. From the present point of view, that of measures which lend themselves to a regional approach on the initiative of the States concerned, limitations on the international transfer of conventional weapons are therefore possible components of regional agreements to limit possession of certain types or quantities of weapons in that region, rather than measures in their own right.

204. Prohibitions or restrictions of use of certain conventional weapons, including those which may cause unnecessary suffering or which may have indiscriminate effects, constitute a category of measures which have up to now always been discussed in terms of global prohibitions. To the extent that regional measures could be made more inclusive than global ones there might therefore seem to be merit in a regional approach to supplement global efforts. However, on a regional basis, agreements to renounce possession of such weapons could ensure non-use equally well. Moreover a multilateral convention, even if, initially, some countries do not accede to it, can become a universally binding prohibition through gradual increase in the number of parties, backed by an international opinion and a long practice of non-use by parties and non-parties alike.
(d)Military expenditures

205. The reduction of military expenditures would be an effective contribution to halting and reversing the arms race, also in a regional context. It is normally the most direct way of releasing resources which could be reallocated to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries, as envisaged in several resolutions of the United Nations. Reduction of military expenditures can also contribute significantly to confidence-building, especially when implemented in a regional context.

206. A basis for implementing such measures would have to be agreed upon by participating States. Acceptable ways and means would have to be found for their effective implementation, taking into account, inter alia, the problems involved in assessing the relative significance of reductions by different States. Therein lies one major difficulty of this approach, as has been recognized in several United Nations studies (A/9770/Rev.1 of 1975, and A/31/222/Rev.1 of 1977). In these studies the possibility of standardized reporting of military expenditures has been explored and a practical testing of the proposed reporting instrument on a voluntary basis is in progress, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 33/67.

207. Cases could be envisaged where reporting of military expenditures were designed to be not only a basis for possible future reductions, but also a confidence-building measure in its own right. The problems involved in regular accounting and reporting might in some cases be more manageable in a regional context. However, it must be stressed, for this as for other measures, that effective curbing of the arms race presupposes the participation of the militarily significant States.

(e)Verification

208. Verification methods and procedures in relation to specific disarmament measures to facilitate the conclusion and effective implementation of disarmament agreements and to create confidence among States are as important in a regional as in other contexts and might in some cases be more easily implemented in the regional context. The form and modalities would depend on the purposes, scope and nature of the disarmament measures in question, as well as on relevant regional particularities. Among measures specifically related to verification, States of a region could examine, in addition to the technical approaches relevant to specific disarmament measures, the general requirements of an institutional and procedural nature to ensure the implementation of regional disarmament agreements, including, where appropriate, establishment of regional consultation and verification mechanisms or agencies, and the role that the organs and organizations of the United Nations system can play in relation to regional verification arrangements.

209. Regional measures for verification can be combined with international mechanisms. One example of this is the control system established in the Tlatelolco Treaty for the militarily demilitarized zone in Latin America which combines the application of the IAEA safeguards system with additional measures of
verification which go beyond the IAEA safeguards, applied by the regional agency OPAEW, as described in chapter II. Another example is the control system established by the European Atomic Energy Community on the flow of fissionable materials within the European Community which complements the implementation of the IAEA safeguards in the Community pursuant to article III of the non-proliferation Treaty. There also exists an Arms Control Agency functioning under the authority of the West European Union established by the 1954 Paris protocols to the 1948 Brussels Treaty.

(f) Related measures (zones of peace)

210. The concept of zones of peace cannot be given a universally valid definition in terms of one or several specific measures (see also chap. II, paras. 68-84; chap. III, para. 178 and chap. IV, para. 195). In the proposals made up to now several elements can, however, be identified, which, together, may serve to characterize the concept.

211. One central element, maybe the defining one, in the proposals for zones of peace which have been put forward so far, is the idea of isolating the zone as far as possible from the interference of extra-zonal powers, from the impact of the wider confrontations of such powers, and of keeping the zone aloft from the global arms race. Another central concept is that of maintaining regional peace, security and stability by resolving disputes among the States of the region in a context of political co-operation and mutual military restraint. This implies avoiding arms competition among the States of the region while maintaining an acceptable force relationship between them. A third central concept is that of active promotion of intraregional co-operation in economic, social, political and other fields. The emphasis on each of these aspects tends to differ according to the region considered and according to the stage reached in the establishment of the zone.

212. As can be seen a zone of peace is best described, not as itself a measure in the narrow sense, but rather as a process, or an endevour, characterized by a certain conception of regional peace which it aims at promoting, and which may differ somewhat from one case to another. In order to promote it a variety of different measures can be envisaged, depending on the precise circumstances. Measures relating to disengagement by foreign military powers, such as dismantling of foreign military bases and installations, repatriation of foreign forces and withdrawal of foreign naval units, are inherent in the concept of zones of peace. In fact, virtually all of the other measures considered throughout this chapter could be relevant elements in the process of establishing a zone of peace.

213. In addition to the ability of zonal States to promote peace, security and progress in the zone and to promote peaceful co-operation with all extra-zonal States, an essential factor in ensuring success is the acceptance and respect of extra-zonal States for the concept and for the specific provisions of the zone of Peace in question. The agreements on which it is based must therefore seek to achieve an acceptable balance of rights and responsibilities between zonal and extra-zonal States with due regard to the legitimate interests of all States concerned.
2. Other measures

214. Under this heading the Disarmament Commission has included a variety of measures all designed to promote conditions conducive to progress in disarmament. From the point of view of specific measures, applicable in a regional context, some of these items cannot be separated without considerable arbitrariness. Thus, confidence-building, the relaxation of international tension, and the prevention of the use of force in international relations are aims so closely related that any measure which effectively promotes one of them is likely to promote the others as well. The two remaining items, the mobilization of public opinion in favour of disarmament, and disarmament studies under the auspices of the United Nations, are distinct as measures from the former, but still relate to the same general goal.

215. Within each of these categories of measures and actions many can be found which lend themselves to the implementation on a regional basis and also have a value in their own right. Some of them are even suitable, primarily in a regional context. It must, however, constantly be borne in mind that the prospect for disarmament in a region depends not only on the success of efforts to create, in that region, a climate of security, co-operation and mutual trust, but also on measures, implemented globally and in other regions, to create similar conditions throughout the world.

(a) Measures aimed at achieving relaxation of international tension and confidence-building measures

216. The causes of tension are different from region to region, and so must be the means for building confidence among States. In all cases it is important to address the real underlying causes of tension and friction, rather than adapting standard procedures and measures employed elsewhere. Some of these causes are regional in nature, others are global. Some causes relate to the military situation, others to political questions, others again to socio-economic conditions or to a variety of other factors. In general there is wide scope for regional measures to diminish tension and build confidence, designed on the basis of the specific conditions in each region.

217. To eliminate sources of mistrust and tension the fundamental steps include the peaceful settlement of conflicts and disputes, commitment in act to peaceful and friendly relations among States, and renunciation of any effort at domination or hegemony over other States, within or outside the region. These are considered more fully in section (b) below.

218. The promotion of regional co-operation in various fields among the States of the region on the basis of equality can also play an important role. Such co-operation can help create the material basis and the climate of opinion for regional peace and security, based not upon a balance of fear, but on growing mutual trust, interdependence and respect for the concerns and interests of other countries. Such co-operation can comprise political consultations, including the establishment of just and equitable economic relations among States; and
co-operation in cultural, social, educational and humanitarian fields, including freer movements and contacts among peoples, both on an individual and on a collective basis, and education specifically designed for promoting peace and disarmament.

219. The term "confidence-building measures" has been used initially in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe to refer to certain measures of notification and observation of military activities. Over the years a great number of other measures of a similar kind have been proposed, and many have been implemented in one context or another. Some are primarily relevant in regions where there is intense military build-up, and where uncertainty about intentions, and misinterpretation of events can increase the risk of war and intensify competition in arms. Others could be applied in all regions, for example, the commitment embodied in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, to take into account and respect the objective of confidence-building when conducting military activities.

220. Some measures relate specifically to notification and observation of military activities, such as manoeuvres and movements which could cause apprehension in view of their size and location and of the types of forces involved. Measures of this kind are included in the provisions of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe which also recognizes that measures aimed at strengthening confidence could be developed and enlarged. There is no absolutely sharp boundary between measures of this kind and measures which begin to impose constraints on certain types of military activities, such as limitations on the scale, frequency or location of manoeuvres.

221. Other measures as well can be used to create greater openness in military matters with a view to mutual reassurances about intentions and capabilities, so as to enhance mutual trust. Such measures may consist in exchange of information, for example, on troops, on arms, on future programmes and on military expenditures. Another approach to the same question is to provide for mutual access to observation. This can take place through exchange of observers or military missions, or visits, or delegations, or by adapting means used or proposed for verification of disarmament measures, such as the installation, on a reciprocal basis, of stationary and/or mobile observation posts, joint or reciprocal air or satellite observation of given areas, or mutual undertakings not to impede the use of national technical means of observation, and not to interfere with the operation of such means. All of these measures could also be used in the context of verification of certain types of disarmament measures (see paras. 208 and 209 above).

222. Other measures again are those designed to deal with incidents and crises and to reduce the risk of war by accident, error, misunderstanding or miscalculation. They can include arrangements for immediate ad hoc consultations, and for temporary or standing consultative commissions, and for the installation of direct communication lines, so-called "hot lines". Measures of this kind have been implemented among certain States on a bilateral basis.
223. Other confidence-building measures which could find application in a regional context are those included in the Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas of 25 May 1972 between the United States and the Soviet Union, and in the Protocol to that agreement of 22 May 1973.

224. The application of any of the above measures in particular cases depends, of course, on their acceptability to all parties concerned, and they will not serve their purpose unless they respect the principle of undiminished security for all parties.

225. It is to be noted that a comprehensive study on confidence-building measures is being conducted by a group of qualified governmental experts pursuant to General Assembly resolution 34/87 B of 11 December 1979. The report of the group is to be submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session in 1981.

(b) Measures aimed at preventing the use of force

226. The basic, and in all cases the most important approach to preventing the use of force is for the States of a region to settle their disputes through peaceful procedures. The most direct and simple procedure consists of political consultations between the States concerned. Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations contemplates the possibility of resorting to regional arrangements or agencies to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes, and experience shows that a regional framework has often been effective in achieving settlements that are just and lasting. Such settlements can, moreover, contribute usefully to efforts to establish regional patterns of co-operation between the States concerned and enhance confidence between them.

227. Undertakings to settle disputes within the region through peaceful procedures such as negotiation, good offices, mediation, investigation and conciliation, judicial procedure and arbitration form part of several regional accords, including the Inter-American Treaty on the Pacific Settlement of Disputes which supplements the Charter of the Organization of American States, the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in South-East Asia, the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, and the Charter of the League of Arab States. In some of these cases permanent institutions to provide good offices, mediation, inquiry or conciliation have been established. The application of the procedures in question can be subject to prior agreement in each case of the parties to the dispute, or the parties can bind themselves in advance to accept the application, limited or unconditional, of certain procedures in future contentious cases, for example the verdict of third parties, as in the case of acceptance of the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice or of a similar judicial forum.

228. Another approach to preventing the use of force is through legal undertakings on a regional basis to strengthen the principle of the non-use of force in relations among States. This can take the form of treaties of non-aggression or of commitments among those States not to be the first to resort to the use of force.
Proposals for mutual renunciation of first-use of nuclear weapons have also been made, as have proposals to renounce the use of nuclear weapons altogether against the States of a region. The latter can be an integral part of nuclear-weapon-free zone arrangements, they can be part of efforts at preventing the outbreak of nuclear war, or they can stand in their own right as security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States.

229. Yet another approach is through regional systems of collective security in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, open to accession by all States of the region in question.

(c) Mobilization of public opinion in favour of disarmament

230. An aroused and enlightened public opinion can become an important factor contributing to the success of disarmament efforts. Dissemination of information about the armaments race and the efforts to halt and reverse it can contribute to this end, as can the promotion of education and study activities, meetings, seminars and publications of all types on this subject.

231. Constructive action by an informed public opinion can only result if there is a sound understanding of the issues involved and of the respective points of view. To this end, the facts of the arms race must be fully available and the public must be in a position to understand the fears, aspirations, policies and proposals of all sides. At the regional level this can be facilitated by exchanges of various kinds, such as exchanges of publications and radio and television programmes; harmonization of teaching materials, for example, on history and current affairs; and contacts at all levels: government, non-governmental organizations, and individuals in professional and private capacities.

232. Beyond exposing the dangers of the arms race and the benefits of disarmament, efforts to strengthen public support for disarmament must also aim more broadly at eliminating distrust and prejudice and promoting peace, mutual understanding and respect among countries. As noted previously, exchanges and co-operation on a regional basis can contribute to this broader aim.

(d) Studies on disarmament

233. One of the justifications for a regional approach to disarmament lies in the fact that security situations and disarmament possibilities are different in different regions. The present study has been conceived in general terms; it bears witness to the need for research and study on the possibilities for disarmament in specific regions, keeping in mind the global context in which regional disarmament measures must be inserted. Such regional studies can take the form of study reports by groups of experts from the region in question, appointed at the initiative of States in the region to explore possible approaches to disarmament within that region and to translate the emerging comprehensive programme of disarmament into regional initiatives, where appropriate. It can also take the form of independent research, whether promoted on a national basis, or by means of
exchanges of scholarships, or directly in a regional framework. Again, various levels of institutionalization on a regional basis can be envisaged. Regional study groups and seminars on security and disarmament in that region could also help to anticipate problems relative to security and to military developments in the region, and seek approaches which diminish as far as possible the incentives for regional arms competition.

3. Disarmament and development

234. Resolutions and reports of the United Nations have repeatedly stressed the close relationship between disarmament and development, the fact that progress in the former will be beneficial to the realization of the latter, and the need to release real resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development in the world, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries. Pursuant to paragraphs 94 and 95 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, a group of governmental experts has been appointed to study the relationship between disarmament and development, focusing on the utilization of resources for military purposes, the economic and social effects of the arms race and of the implementation of disarmament measures, and conversion and redeployment of resources from military use to development purposes.

235. The question of the relationship between disarmament and development deserves consideration also at the regional level. Possibilities inherent in combining regional disarmament measures with measures of intraregional co-operation in development have been noted in previous sections, for example, in relation to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The scope for other similar measures is undoubtedly great. In that it draws on research commissioned from all over the world, the above-mentioned expert study could prove particularly useful in a more detailed consideration of possible initiatives in each region.

4. Disarmament and international security

236. The close connexion between disarmament and international peace and security, and the fact that progress in one sphere promotes and complements progress in the other has been emphasized by the General Assembly on numerous occasions. Regional disarmament and regional peace and security are also intimately connected, and each is closely linked to developments in disarmament and in security at the global level. Where there is significant military build-up, it is in most cases related to security situations which are in greater or lesser measure regional in character. There is, therefore, reason to consider further the relationships between regional initiatives and global developments in each sphere, and the possible role of regional arrangements for the peaceful settlement of disputes, of regional systems of collective security, of regional approaches to security and co-operation, and of other measures, in promoting regional disarmament. Such consideration, whether conducted in a global context, or on a regional basis, will be able to build upon the results of the study of the interrelationship between disarmament and international security currently being conducted by a group of governmental experts pursuant to paragraph 97 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly.
V. CONCLUSIONS

237. It emerges clearly from the preceding chapters that, given the political will, there is a vast and, to a large extent, unexplored potential for progress in disarmament if the global approach is supplemented with determined and systematic efforts at the level of the different regions.

238. In such efforts the conditions elaborated in chapter III, as well as the lessons that can be derived from past and current endeavours, should be taken into account. It is clear, in addition, that progress in disarmament, both nuclear and conventional, particularly among the largest military powers, and avoidance of policies and actions leading to a deterioration of the political and security conditions at the global level would greatly facilitate agreement on effective measures in each region. Equally, progress in regional disarmament, the equitable solution of problems and the just settlement of disputes at the regional level, and measures to build confidence among the States of a region could create conditions that would promote disarmament and the relaxation of tension at the global level. It would also diminish the likelihood of those regions being drawn into or becoming the objects of wider, extra-regional confrontations. As indicated previously, there is such scope for independent action at the level of each region that a lack of progress at the global level should not impede efforts at the regional level.

239. The urgency of regional disarmament stems both from the importance of enhancing security in the different regions and from the impetus which the adoption of measures in one region can give to efforts in other regions or globally. It is evident that, whilst there is scope and the need for substantial progress in all regions, effective measures of disarmament are particularly urgent in those regions where there is a large accumulation of weapons and/or where situations persist which endanger world peace and security.

240. The threat posed by nuclear weapons, being a threat to the very survival of mankind, is of the utmost concern. The quantitative expansion and qualitative development of nuclear arsenals, as well as the possibility that more countries might acquire nuclear weapons, further heighten the danger. Halting and reversing the nuclear arms race, nuclear disarmament, as well as regional measures to this effect, for example the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, therefore assume particular importance.

241. There is also a need, however, to stress the necessity of conventional disarmament, although its importance derives from somewhat different considerations. Whereas the catastrophic consequences of nuclear war are common knowledge, the scale of destruction which would be brought about if the most advanced conventional armaments now available were used in war is not always sufficiently appreciated. Nor is there sufficient recognition of the fact that the conventional arms race provides impetus to the nuclear arms race and enhances its dangers: it can be an important factor contributing to the continuous refinement and expansion of existing nuclear arsenals and to the constant temptation to envisage new roles for new types of nuclear weapons as they are
developed. Thus, the continued conventional arms build-up can be a serious impediment to nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation efforts. Moreover, the social and economic burden associated with the arms race is predominantly - and for most countries exclusively - related to the conventional component of the global arms race. For these reasons conventional weapons should receive due emphasis in regional disarmament efforts.

242. The ultimate goals of disarmament are fundamentally the same for all countries, namely to attain genuine security, to avert the danger of war and to release social, economic and intellectual resources for peaceful ends. Nevertheless conditions differ between regions in such a way that those approaches which are held to be possible, useful and acceptable first steps towards these goals are not the same in all regions. Even the basic concepts and approaches or their particular combination may differ from region to region. Emphasis as to first steps may be in some cases on the peaceful resolution of specific regional disputes, in other cases on reduction of forces with a view to establishing or maintaining an equitable force relationship, in other cases again on non-involvement in confrontations between extra-regional powers or on avoiding external interference in the region, etc. As one particular merit of the regional approach to disarmament is precisely the possibility of taking advantage of such differences no single formula or generalization can be applied indiscriminately to all regions.

243. The general approach which has been adopted in this study therefore needs to be supplemented by analyses of possible disarmament steps, conducted region by region at different levels and in the light of the security situation and of the relevant geographical, historical and political conditions of each region. For the present group to engage in such more concrete analysis at the level of individual regions, let alone to advocate specific disarmament measures for implementation in a given region, would be neither feasible nor desirable. It must clearly be done in a regional framework and on the basis of regional initiatives. An important task at present is to stimulate a process of thinking, analysis and, as appropriate, concrete negotiation in each region.

244. To achieve real progress towards regional disarmament there should be a continuous process involving a multiplicity of efforts to set over-all goals, to determine the steps that might promote these goals and to identify and negotiate specific measures. Some general remarks can be made on the ways in which such a process could be set in motion and could be given the necessary momentum.

245. A potentially useful approach would be for the States of a region to seek agreement on over-all long-term objectives in the field of disarmament, even if, at first, such objectives and the approaches they imply may lack precision and may be more an identification of problems and aims than of solutions and means. In any case objectives and approaches as well as more specific programmes are, of course, always open to adjustment in the light of changing conditions and new experiences. Specific, practical steps can then be inserted in such a framework without risk of losing sight of the over-all goals; and the very fact that there are agreed objectives and approaches which go beyond the specific measures being
negotiated at some particular moment will promote reflection, discussion and proposals regarding further steps that might be taken.

246. Such steps may consist of measures applicable to the region as a whole, but they may also address themselves to particular situations existing in a subregion. The value of a contemplated measure need not be considered less because of the smallness of the subregion to which it would apply. If, at first, a measure applies only to a smaller area, it may as a result be more concrete and far-reaching than would otherwise be the case. Moreover, such a measure could contribute substantially to progress in a wider region, particularly if it is designed in the light of an over-all programme for that region.

247. To set in motion processes in each region to meet the above aims and in order to give to regional disarmament efforts the necessary thrust and continuity, there may be a need for strengthening or creating mechanisms, institutions or arrangements at the regional level which would allow initiatives to develop, concepts and approaches to be discussed and concrete steps to be negotiated. Experience shows that the existence of institutional frameworks has sometimes promoted initiatives and helped to sustain efforts, even when difficulties were encountered.

248. In order to ensure that a regional disarmament process gathers sufficient momentum over a period of time there is need for a plurality of sustained efforts in the various countries of the region. Regional conditions would no doubt be decisive in shaping the over-all programme at the stage of developing concepts and approaches in the negotiating phase and in the implementation. Consequently, to gain the necessary thrust, it is important that both governmental institutions and institutions of learning, and in fact public opinion more generally, be encouraged to contribute to this continuous effort. It is moreover important that efforts conducted from a national point of view be supplemented with efforts conducted in a wider regional perspective. For example, studies by groups of governmental experts from individual regions would be most useful in that such groups would be able to explore new ideas and approaches without losing touch with what is acceptable in terms of the policies of the respective Governments.

249. Given such a diversified effort a consensus on certain disarmament objectives and on means of achieving them is likely to emerge gradually in the region. If the possibilities inherent in the regional approach to disarmament are to be exploited fully an effort of the kind detailed here is necessary; nor can that effort be replaced by a centralized effort at the global level, however intense and dedicated it may be.

250. The various bodies of the United Nations system can provide valuable advice and assistance for the entire process of regional disarmament. In some previous cases where concrete support was given by the United Nations in the form of expert advice, information and documentation and technical assistance, it has proved to be of great importance. Guarantees of one kind or other, established through the United Nations, can in some cases be vital for the effectiveness of specific
regional measures. General Assembly resolutions on specific regional disarmament measures can be of great value in further promoting such measures and in securing the support and co-operation of the extra regional States concerned. The United Nations system can also play an important role in the promotion of an informed and engaged public opinion in favour of disarmament not only at the global level but also in its regional aspects. Once there is an initiative from a region, the countries and regional organizations concerned should be able, upon their request and in the manner they wish, to draw to the fullest extent on the resources and possibilities of the United Nations system.