1995 Review and Extension Conference
of the Parties to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons

Final Document

Part III

Summary and Verbatim Records

New York, 1996
NOTE

The Final Document of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons consists of three parts:

I. Organization of Work of the Conference (NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I))

II. Documents issued at the Conference (NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part II))

III. Summary and Verbatim Records (NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part III))
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1995 REVIEW AND EXTENSION CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

SUMMARY RECORDS OF THE 1ST TO 14TH PLENARY MEETINGS
VERBATIM RECORDS OF THE 15TH TO 19TH PLENARY MEETINGS

Held at Headquarters, New York,
from 17 April to 12 May 1995

PRESIDENT: Mr. DHANAPALA
OPENING OF THE CONFERENCE BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE FOURTH SESSION OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE (agenda item 1)

1. The ACTING PRESIDENT declared open the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), convened pursuant to article VIII, paragraph 3, and article X, paragraph 2, of the Treaty, and General Assembly resolution 47/52 A.

2. The Conference was charged with the dual task of reviewing the Treaty's operation and deciding on its extension. Both tasks were of great significance to the strengthening of international peace and security. With regard to the latter task, the Conference had a responsibility not only towards the current generation but towards generations to come.

3. Following the practice of past review conferences on the Treaty, he formally introduced the final report of the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.1995/1), adopted on 27 January 1995. The Committee had held four sessions during the period from May 1993 to January 1995, and 154 States parties to the Treaty had participated in the work of one or more sessions. That represented an increase of 48 States parties as compared to the number that had taken part in the preparatory phase of the Fourth Review Conference.

4. In order to finalize the draft rules of procedure for the Conference, it had been agreed that the Chairman of the informal working group on the rules of procedure would hold further informal consultations. Agreement had been reached in the consultations to increase the number of Vice-Presidents of the Conference from 26 to 34, on the understanding that that did not constitute a precedent. Accordingly, rules 5 and 8 of the provisional rules of procedure had to be revised. With regard to rule 28.3, the one rule on which consensus had not yet been reached, the informal working group had been able to clarify a number of issues; however, a few issues required further consultation before the rule could be finalized. He believed that there was general agreement that the Conference should decide to apply the rules of procedure provisionally, pending their formal adoption, and that the President of the Conference should be asked to continue to search for consensus on the one outstanding point in rule 28.3 (f) and report back to the Conference no later than 10 a.m. on Wednesday, 26 April.

ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE (agenda item 2)

5. The ACTING PRESIDENT said that, at its second session in January 1994, the Preparatory Committee had decided to recommend to the 1995 Review and Extension Conference the election of Mr. Jayantha Dhanapala (Sri Lanka) as President.

6. Mr. Dhanapala (Sri Lanka) was elected President of the Conference by acclamation.

7. Mr. Dhanapala (Sri Lanka) took the Chair.
8. The President read out a message from the President of Sri Lanka and paid tribute to all those who, within and outside the Governments of States parties, had worked over the past 25 years to strengthen the Treaty in various ways and enlarge the number of its adherents to 178; that was almost 96 percent of all the States Members of the United Nations. He welcomed the new parties to the Treaty, in particular South Africa, and acknowledged the invaluable support of the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

9. With the end of the cold war, the world had hoped for an era of collective security and the genuine fulfilment of the objectives and the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. It had seen instead the outbreak of the Gulf War, fighting in the Balkans and the continuation of fratricidal conflict in different parts of the world.

10. The maintenance of peace and security had become more complex than ever before. Military threats were linked to non-military aspects of security. Subnational and transnational groups, and even individuals, had acquired the power to destabilize the world. Destabilization of global peace and national and international security had assumed many unconventional forms that emanated from diverse sources.

11. The threat of weapons of mass destruction remained the paramount danger to the existence of humankind. While nuclear weapons, the use of which had brought unprecedented death and destruction at the end of the Second World War, remained at large, their horizontal proliferation had been held in check by the legal norm established by the non-proliferation Treaty. The Conference provided an opportunity to consolidate that norm and extend it; that would be a statement against the possession and use of nuclear weapons for all States for all time. The declaration of four nuclear-weapon States in the Conference on Disarmament on 6 April 1995, together with China's known policy, could provide a basis on which to work.

12. In recent years, there had been substantial progress in nuclear disarmament. For the first time in history, the capping of the nuclear arms race had been followed by the actual dismantling of nuclear missiles. The Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty), the Treaty between those countries on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START-I) and the Treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction of Strategic Offensive Arms (START-II) were important milestones on a journey that must end with total nuclear disarmament. The comprehensive test ban treaty and a treaty to halt the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes would be negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Security Council resolution 984 (1995) was a step forward in providing security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

13. As the world entered the twenty-first century, the focus on halting the spread of nuclear weapons that lay at the heart of the Treaty must extend logically to cover the future of nuclear weapons. Fresh challenges, including nuclear smuggling and the breakup of nuclear-weapon States must also be faced. It was essential to be absolutely clear about the objective of nuclear disarmament, and that clarity of purpose must pervade the Conference's deliberations so that its decision to extend the Treaty was seen in its true perspective - as a consolidation of the gains on the road to the outlawing of the most horrendous weapon so far invented by humankind.

14. Mr. Christopher (United States of America) welcomed the participants in the Conference on behalf of the host country. Few agreements had better embodied the principles that had guided the United Nations since its creation. The collective force of the Treaty had been a shining example of what nations could do to maintain international peace and security.
15. The non-proliferation Treaty was truly one of the most important
treaties of all time. While many of its achievements - the weapons not built,
the nuclear materials not diverted and the wars not started - could not be
quantified, the results were none the less impressive. Since its entry into
force, the Treaty had kept the number of nuclear Powers far lower than had
initially been predicted. It had given the parties confidence in the nuclear
intentions of other nations and had reduced the risk of nuclear conflict. It
had advanced nuclear disarmament, bolstered regional security, promoted the
safe and peaceful use of nuclear energy and underpinned the international
community’s efforts to halt the spread of all weapons of mass destruction.

16. By its purpose and its strength, the Treaty had earned the widest
adherence of any international arms control agreement in history. It had
protected the security of both nuclear and non-nuclear States. The
international community had taken important steps to diminish the nuclear
threat, and the number of nuclear-weapon-free zones was growing. The nuclear
 arsenals of the two former cold-war adversaries were being reduced by almost
two thirds, and negotiations were advancing on a comprehensive test ban treaty
and the cut-off of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

17. The purpose of the Treaty was to preserve the security of all, not the
nuclear weapons monopoly of a few. The nuclear-weapon States had committed
themselves to pursue negotiations towards the ultimate goal of nuclear
disarmament. The Treaty was the basis for assurances to non-nuclear treaty
partners that their security interests continued to be served by the wise and
far-sighted choice that they had made to become parties to the Treaty.

18. The security that the Treaty helped to provide must be constantly
reinforced. While the prospect of global nuclear war was receding, the
prospect of the spread of nuclear weapons remained. Together, the members of
the international community shared the responsibility to meet that common
threat.

19. Mr. IBRAHIM (Indonesia), speaking on behalf of the members of the
Movement of Non-Aligned Countries that were parties to the Treaty, said that
the non-aligned countries attached great importance to the Conference, which
presented a unique opportunity to assess the performance of the Treaty during
the past 25 years and to strengthen the regime in all its aspects with a view
to achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons, promoting peaceful uses
of nuclear energy and ensuring universal adherence to the Treaty. In that
regard, the Conference would decide on the extension of the Treaty based on
the careful examination and realistic assessment of the obligations and
responsibilities undertaken by all the parties to that instrument. The non­
aligned countries participating in the Conference would spare no effort in
cooperating with the President and with all delegations with a view to
ensuring the success of the Conference.

20. Mr. GORITA (Romania), speaking on behalf of the Eastern European Group
of States Parties to the Treaty, said that the attention of the entire
international community was focused on the Conference, and its outcome would
be of particular relevance for international stability, peace and security.
He paid tribute to all those who had played a key role in the positive outcome
of the preparatory process, especially the Chairmen of the Preparatory
Committee at its four sessions. The Eastern European Group shared the
optimism of the Secretary of State of the United States and hoped that his
hopes for the success of the Conference would be realized.

21. Sir Michael WESTON (United Kingdom), speaking on behalf of the Western
European Group of States, congratulated the President on his election and
thanked all those who had contributed to the success of the preparatory
process, in particular the Chairmen of the Preparatory Committee at its four
sessions. He also thanked the Secretary of State of the United States for his
words of welcome and opening remarks.

22. Mr. LI (China), said he was gratified that the President of the
Conference was a representative of a non-aligned country and he hoped that the
proceedings of the Conference would take place in a spirit of cooperation, mutual trust and respect.

ADDRESS BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS (agenda item 4)

23. Mr. Boutros-Ghali (Secretary-General of the United Nations) said that the outcome of the Conference could support a vision of international relations that extended beyond disarmament to improved cooperation among States on issues ranging from development to international security. It was significant that the holding of the Conference coincided with the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations. By forging a joint strategy on non-proliferation, the States parties would help to define the future of international cooperation.

24. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, it was possible to look back on a record of remarkable achievement. The world had become a safer place, with the creation of machinery to support nuclear controls and safeguards, to carry out the destruction of nuclear weapons, and to ban nuclear testing. There were more States parties to the Treaty than to any other arms control and disarmament agreement; universality was within reach.

25. In some ways, however, the international situation was increasingly dangerous. Some States, despite having ratified the Treaty, were seeking to obtain materials and technology for the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. It would be tragic if the end of nuclear deterrence were to be followed by a proliferation of the nuclear threat.

26. Another terrible risk which was currently recognized was the possession of weapons of mass destruction by non-State terrorist groups. The smuggling of nuclear material had become a frightening reality. Weapons-grade material could emerge in the hands of those who believed themselves beyond the reach of national and international authority.

27. It was clear that all elements of the non-proliferation regime were interconnected: the Treaty, the ban on chemical weapons, the ban on biological and toxins weapons, and efforts to curtail conventional weapons. It was essential to enhance security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States through cooperative security arrangements; to seek to advance nuclear disarmament; and to address concerns regarding access to uses of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

28. The question of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States had not yet been resolved. In that connection, however, he noted the recent adoption of Security Council resolution 984 (1995).

29. In disarmament, there had been major accomplishments; thousands of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles had been eliminated and an entire class of weapons systems had been taken out of commission. Thousands more tactical nuclear arms had been withdrawn and dismantled. In the two START Treaties, agreement had been reached to remove more than 17,000 nuclear weapons from missiles and bombers. Solutions had also been found to the problems of the nuclear weapons on the territories of the successor States to the former Soviet Union. Progress was being made at the Conference on Disarmament towards a comprehensive test ban treaty and he urged the negotiating parties to take into account the desire of the international community for an early conclusion of the treaty. An Ad Hoc Committee had been established by the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate an end to the production of fissile material for weapons purposes; that would be a major step forward in the implementation of article VI of the Treaty.

30. With regard to the transfer of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, he said that technology transfer continued to arouse concerns among suppliers and clients. IAEA was working directly with Member States to improve the physical protection of nuclear materials and to improve State systems of accounting and control. It was continuing its critical effort to develop a radiation safety
infrastructure, as well as a database on illicit trafficking. He himself had established a Working Group within the Secretariat to monitor developments and to maintain liaison between the United Nations and IAEA.

31. The non-proliferation Treaty was the only multilateral legal instrument that committed States to negotiations for an early end to the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament. It was the only instrument that recognized the right of parties to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and provided safeguards to make the peaceful use of nuclear energy a reality.

32. During the forthcoming deliberations, national security issues would clearly be of concern. It should be borne in mind that the decisions made at the Conference could affect the structure of international peace and security. He saluted the pioneering declarations of the Organization of African Unity, of the Non-Aligned Movement, and of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty had fully proved its beneficial influence. Decisive progress was being made on the drafting of an African nuclear weapon-free-zone treaty, and he hoped that the peace process in the Middle East would lead to the establishment of a similar zone, to free the entire region from weapons of mass destruction.

33. At its tenth special session, the General Assembly had called for an end to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their ultimate elimination. Since then many Member States had adopted policies in support of that great objective. Decisions made at the current Conference would be crucial to the maintenance of that momentum. The safest, surest and swiftest way to deal with the threat of nuclear arms was to do away with them. Reduction and destruction of all nuclear weapons and of the means to make them should be humanity's great common cause.

34. The Conference could mark the beginning of a new phase in arms limitation and disarmament and represent a major stride towards a world free from nuclear weapons. It could pave the way for the redirection of the vast sums of money currently spent on armaments towards the development that could ensure lasting peace. By acting with courage and determination to assure the security of generations to come, the international community could rise to the challenges of a new era and testify to its faith in the future.

ADDRESS BY THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (agenda item 5)

35. Mr. BLIX (Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency) said that IAEA had been given an important role in the implementation of the non-proliferation Treaty. Acceptance of the Agency's safeguards by non-nuclear weapon States parties to the Treaty was required because the parties needed credible assurance that nuclear material and installations were used exclusively for peaceful purposes. To provide such assurance safeguards must be effective.

36. The number of States having safeguards agreements with IAEA had increased from 64 in 1975 to 118 in 1994. By late 1994, 170 power reactors, 158 research reactors and critical assemblies, 196 other facilities and 334 locations outside facilities were under safeguards. The quantity of nuclear material under safeguards, particularly plutonium and highly enriched uranium, was also increasing rapidly.

37. Reviewing the events of recent years regarding the nuclear programmes of Iraq, South Africa and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, he said that, under the cease-fire agreement at the end of the Gulf War, Iraq had been compelled to accept a far-reaching inspection regime. As a result of the lessons learnt in that case, proposals were now before IAEA which, if accepted by States, would give the Agency greater access to information and to sites, significantly increasing the level of assurance regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear activities. Also, since 1990, a much closer interaction had been established between IAEA and the Security Council of the United Nations.
38. In the case of South Africa, he said that that State was the first to have rolled back from a nuclear-weapon status. In that connection, he noted that transparency regarding all nuclear-related activities was important in order to build confidence in the completeness and correctness of a State's declaration of nuclear material and installations. However, even with the fullest cooperation from States, in no case could the Agency positively affirm that a declaration presented was correct and complete.

39. The case of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had shown, inter alia, that some of the measures to strengthen safeguards put in place following the case of Iraq had been effective, for instance, the use of advanced techniques which had shown that there was more plutonium in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea than that State had declared. While the Agency had never asserted that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had diverted nuclear material to a clandestine nuclear weapons programme, it had reason to believe that that could have happened and to state that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was in non-compliance with its safeguards agreement. Conclusions had subsequently been drawn regarding several technical matters relating to detection and verification. It was also clear, however, that it was for the Security Council to determine its response on the basis of the merits of each case.

40. Current efforts to strengthen safeguards were intended to provide more credible assurance regarding the correctness and completeness of States' declarations of items subject to safeguards and thus regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear activities. They were also aimed at making the implementation of safeguards more cost-efficient. Many of the measures identified in the new programme had been extensively tested with the help of Member States.

41. Increased Agency access to nuclear and nuclear-related sites, sometimes on a short-notice or "no-notice" basis, would be requested. That should not, however, be difficult to accept if safeguards were seen by States as an opportunity to demonstrate non-proliferation bona fides. It should also be possible to arrange for the issuance of multiple-entry visas for designated inspectors, as in the case of the Convention on Chemical Weapons.

42. With regard to the problem of illegal trafficking in nuclear materials, measures taken by the Agency to assist States included the establishment of a data bank and the provision of advice on State systems of nuclear material accountancy and control.

43. Other IAEA activities which were not related to non-proliferation Treaty safeguards included assistance in connection with negotiations on a number of regional non-proliferation treaties and nuclear-weapon-free zones. He noted that IAEA safeguards were directly relevant to the implementation of some agreements, such as the disarmament agreements that had been reached between the United States of America and the Russian Federation. The Agency was ready to provide verification for material which any nuclear-weapon state might place under safeguards.

44. A non-discriminatory ban on the production of fissile material - a so-called "cut-off" agreement - was another measure which might well be subject to IAEA verification. The Agency's capabilities could be tailored to the needs of different arms-control and disarmament agreements.

45. Negotiations were continuing regarding a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Such a treaty would involve several types of verification different from those of which the Agency had experience. There would, however, be considerable overlap between obligations under such a ban and those under the non-proliferation Treaty. It would not appear to be necessary or practical to create a new international organization for each arms-control and disarmament agreement; it would seem more practical to place "clusters" of agreements under different organizations.
46. With regard to cooperation to further the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, he said that the Agency had been the principal instrument for promoting such cooperation and the transfer of peaceful nuclear technology to developing countries. A precondition for such transfer was the existence in the recipient countries of adequate rules and structures for radiation protection. Building up such structures was a priority activity for IAEA.

47. The Agency also promoted peaceful nuclear activities through a very wide information exchange. Scientists, engineers and policy makers from developing countries participated in hundreds of meetings organized by IAEA every year. Developing countries could also benefit from the Agency's computerized bibliographical database.

48. When planning technical cooperation activities, IAEA emphasized nuclear technology which could lead to improvements in food production and preservation, health care, industrial output and the supply of fresh water. IAEA was also reviewing various options, including the use of nuclear reactors for sea-water desalinization, and, together with several other international organizations, would participate in the assessment of the benefits and problems of different power options for the future, including nuclear energy.

49. Cooperation activities undertaken by IAEA were financed through the Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund. Unfortunately, however, pledges and payments to that fund had declined since 1984. IAEA needed adequate resources and strengthened and streamlined safeguards in order to carry out its functions and verify that non-proliferation pledges were respected, thereby instilling confidence among the States parties. The Agency's verification capacity could be employed in the implementation of nuclear disarmament agreements reached in pursuance of article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty. Moreover, it could serve as a principal intergovernmental channel for the transfer of peaceful nuclear technology among States parties to the Treaty and for assistance to developing countries. He urged the Conference to ensure that there was no interruption in the services provided by IAEA under the Treaty.

ADOPTION OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE (agenda item 7)

50. The President said that the draft rules of procedure, contained in annex III to the final report of the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.1995/1), had been submitted to the Conference by the Chairman of the fourth session of the Preparatory Committee. While the latter had indicated that progress had been made on rule 28.3, regarding the extension of the Treaty, there continued to be divergent views on one aspect of that rule. He therefore proposed that the Conference should decide to apply provisionally the rules of procedure as proposed by the Preparatory Committee and as revised, in the case of rules 5 and 8, to reflect the agreement to increase the number of Vice-Presidents from 26 to 34.

51. It was so decided.

52. The President, referring to rule 44.1 of the rules of procedure, said that the Secretariat had received requests for observer status at the Conference from the following States not parties to the Treaty: Brazil, Chile, Djibouti, Israel, Oman, Pakistan, United Arab Emirates and Vanuatu. The Secretariat had also received a request from the Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine asking that Palestine be granted observer status at the Conference.

53. If he heard no objection, he would take it that the Conference wished to accede to those requests.

54. It was so decided.

55. The President, referring to rule 44.3 of the rules of procedure, said that requests for observer status had been received from the following organizations: the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin
America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), the South Pacific Forum, the European Community, the League of Arab States, the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the North Atlantic Assembly.

56. If he heard no objection, he would take it that the Conference wished to accede to those requests.

57. It was so decided.

ELECTION OF CHAIRMEN AND VICE-CHAIRMEN OF THE MAIN COMMITTEES, THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE AND THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE (agenda item 8)

58. The President said that, at its fourth session, the Preparatory Committee had agreed to recommend the following as Chairmen of the three Main Committees and the Drafting Committee: Mr. Ayewah (Nigeria), Main Committee I; Mr. Erdős (Hungary), Main Committee II; Mr. Ramaker (Netherlands), Main Committee III and Mr. Strulak (Poland), the Drafting Committee. The Preparatory Committee had also agreed to recommend a representative of the Group of Non-Aligned and Other States as Chairman of the Credentials Committee and had subsequently nominated Mr. Garcia (Colombia).

59. Mr. Ayewah (Nigeria), Mr. Erdős (Hungary), Mr. Ramaker (Netherlands), Mr. Strulak (Poland) and Mr. Garcia (Colombia) were elected Chairmen of Main Committee I, Main Committee II, Main Committee III, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee respectively.

60. The President said that, in accordance with rule 5 of the rules of procedure, the Conference would elect two Vice-Chairmen for each of the three Main Committees, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee. The following nominations had been received: Mr. Starr (Australia) and Mr. Zlenko (Ukraine), Main Committee I; Mr. de la Torre (Argentina) and a representative from the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries whose name had not yet been received, Main Committee II; Mr. Yanev (Bulgaria) and a representative from the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries whose name had not been received, Main Committee III; Mr. Patokallio (Finland) and a representative from the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries whose name had not yet been received, the Drafting Committee and Mr. Sychou (Belarus) and Mrs. Hoinkes (United States of America), the Credentials Committee.

61. Mr. Starr (Australia) and Mr. Zlenko (Ukraine) were elected Vice-Chairmen of Main Committee I; Mr. de la Torre (Argentina) was elected Vice-Chairman of Main Committee II; Mr. Yanev (Bulgaria) was elected Vice-Chairman of Main Committee III; Mr. Patokallio (Finland) was elected Vice-Chairman of the Drafting Committee; and Mr. Sychou (Belarus) and Mrs. Hoinkes (United States of America) were elected Vice-Chairmen of the Credentials Committee.

62. The President said that consultations on the outstanding nominations for Vice-Chairmen of the Committees were still continuing and that he would inform the Conference of those nominations at an appropriate time.

ELECTION OF VICE-PRESIDENTS (agenda item 9)

63. The President said that consideration of the election of Vice-Presidents of the Conference would be deferred until all nominations had been received.

CREDENTIALS OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE CONFERENCE (agenda item 10)

(a) APPOINTMENT OF THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE

64. The President, referring to rule 3 of the rules of procedure, which provided that six members of the Credentials Committee were to be appointed on the proposal of the President of the Conference, said that consultations were continuing on nominations to the Credentials Committee and that he would convey to the Conference the outcome of those consultations at the appropriate time.
CONFIRMATION OF THE NOMINATION OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (agenda item 11)

65. The PRESIDENT said that, at its first session, the Preparatory Committee had decided to invite the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in consultation with the members of the Preparatory Committee, to nominate an official to act as provisional Secretary-General of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. At its second session, the Secretary-General had nominated Mr. Prvoslav Davinic, Director of the Centre for Disarmament Affairs, as provisional Secretary-General of the Conference.

66. Mr. Davinic was confirmed as Secretary-General of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA (agenda item 12)

67. The PRESIDENT said that, if he heard no objection, he would take it that the Conference wished to adopt the agenda as contained in annex IV of the final report of the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.1995/1), including the recommendation of the Preparatory Committee in annex V regarding the allocation of items to the three Main Committees.

68. The agenda was adopted.

The meeting rose at 5.10 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 2nd MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 18 April 1995, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. DHANAPALA (Sri Lanka)

The meeting was called to order at 10.10 a.m.

GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 15)

1. Mr. JUPPE (France), speaking on behalf of the European Union and Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the Slovak Republic, said that, although the countries of Europe differed in their level of economic development, recent political history and choices with regard to the use of nuclear energy, they all held in common the values of democracy and freedom. They were also united by their common commitment to the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). That commitment was based on the conviction that the proliferation of nuclear weapons was a threat to peace and international security, and that the NPT served the fundamental interests of the international community.

2. Concerning non-proliferation, the predictions made 20 years earlier that there would be 20 to 30 nuclear-weapon States by the end of the century had not materialized; in fact, South Africa's decision to renounce its weapons signalled an opposite trend. The draft treaty on the denuclearization of Africa had the support of all the European countries, who welcomed it as an undertaking for the peace and stability of that continent. Brazil, Argentina and Chile had given up their intention to acquire nuclear weapons, and Cuba's recent signing of the Treaty of Tlatelolco should allow the conclusion of a legal instrument to prevent the emergence of nuclear weapons in the Latin American region. The discovery during the Gulf War of a secret nuclear programme in Iraq had led to a rethinking of the spirit in which International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards were carried out. They were currently based not only on trust among signatory countries, but also on improved capability to detect possible clandestine activities, which was indispensable for maintaining their credibility. As in the case of North Korea, the Agency must be able to verify effectively that States were complying with their obligations.

3. As the review would confirm, the Treaty made it possible for many countries to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, because of the confidence generated by compliance with its obligations. Export controls, far from being an obstacle to the development of trade in nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, were an essential component of the international system of non-proliferation.

4. During the 1990s, détente and peace had led to unprecedented disarmament accords between the two main adversaries of the cold war, and a return to the situation that had prevailed just ten years earlier was almost inconceivable. The arms race had ended: the nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia would be reduced by nearly two thirds, and the two European nuclear powers had begun unilateral arms reduction efforts.

5. For the first time in history, the international community had decided to begin negotiations on a complete nuclear test ban treaty that would be universal and verifiable. The European Union welcomed the forthcoming opening of negotiations at the Disarmament Conference to draft a convention banning
the production of fissile materials for explosive purposes. It also welcomed the efforts by the five nuclear-weapon States to respond to the expectations of the non-nuclear signatories of the NPT regarding security assurances. Security Council resolution 984 (1995) provided a collective, global and concrete response to that problem.

6. The European Union solemnly reaffirmed its commitment, in accordance with article VI of NPT, to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament. The world was still going through a phase of change and instability, and the nature of the balances on which the next century would be founded was still unknown. Although there were an ever-growing number of accessions to the NPT, stronger international safeguards, more diversified means of verification and greater international solidarity, new regional ambitions were surfacing where the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction could be particularly dangerous. In order to reduce the risks of uncertainty and instability, increase confidence among States and strengthen the international legal status of the NPT, the Treaty must be made permanent. What united the parties to the NPT was more important than what divided them. The international community expected from the participants in the Conference the consolidation of the system of non-proliferation and confirmation of the disarmament process, and the indefinite extension of the Treaty was the only solution compatible with those objectives.

7. Mr. SPRING (Ireland) said that the international community was faced with the double task of removing any uncertainty about the future of the non-proliferation regime and ensuring that the regime was strengthened to respond to the changing circumstances and risks of the twenty-first century. Ireland’s objectives for the Conference and other forums on nuclear disarmament were to see the complete abolition of nuclear weapons, to ensure that those who possessed nuclear weapons and technology did not pass it on to non-nuclear-weapon States, to end the testing of nuclear weapons everywhere, for all time, to end the production and stockpiling of materials for use in the manufacture of nuclear weapons, to strengthen further the detection, safeguard and verification systems, and to see the environmental, health and safety issues associated with the nuclear industry effectively addressed. Some argued that the only way to achieve those objectives was a series of short, conditional extensions of the Treaty, but in his view, any action that placed a question mark over the long-term future of the NPT would be a step backward.

8. Ireland had been very closely associated with the NPT from the days of its genesis in the United Nations General Assembly nearly 40 years earlier, and had been the first country to ratify the Treaty. The NPT was the most widely supported disarmament measure in history, and for the first time, all five declared nuclear-weapon States were participating in the Conference. Nuclear non-proliferation had become a global norm, and that achievement must be secured. For the Treaty to be fully effective, it should be universal, and the parties must continue to challenge those States holding out against membership to explain their reasons.

9. Like other non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, Ireland had forgone, as a matter of principle, the option of developing nuclear weapons capability. It believed that the only acceptable level of nuclear weapons was zero. Twenty-five years after entry into force of the Treaty, there was no justification for the existing stocks of nuclear weapons and fissile materials. The obvious first step in moving to zero nuclear weapons was to stop their development and to end nuclear testing. The achievement of a comprehensive test ban treaty would realize a major unfulfilled aspiration of the NPT. Pending the conclusion of such a treaty, the moratoria on nuclear testing introduced by the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom and France would continue. He called on China to introduce a similar ban.

10. The commitments undertaken by States to forgo, control and eliminate nuclear weapons would mean little if they were not accompanied by stringent verification arrangements. The serious challenges to the system of IAEA safeguards, notably in Iraq and North Korea, although rigorously addressed,
none the less made it clear that confidence in the adequacy of the system must be strengthened. Some had asserted that the safeguards system must be based on trust, but it was, rather, an effective safeguards system that could create an atmosphere of confidence and trust. A more intrusive inspection system than the one currently existing would be a small price to pay for increased confidence and security.

11. An issue of particular concern to Ireland was the treatment of fissile material in the nuclear-weapon States. The Review Conference must emphasize the need for such material to be placed under IAEA safeguards and for non-nuclear-weapon States to avoid stockpiling plutonium in excess of normal operational requirements for peaceful nuclear programmes. Knowledge of the risks associated with the nuclear industry was far greater than it had been when the NPT had been negotiated: the Chernobyl disaster had opened a new era of awareness. The IAEA had a key function as the universal forum for the promotion of internationally acceptable safety levels in the nuclear industry. Of particular concern to Ireland was the environmental impact of the nuclear power installations across the Irish Sea at Sellafield.

12. The non-proliferation regime depended on the confidence of each State in the present and future behaviour of others. The international community could not yet be confident either of preventing the diversion of nuclear energy for peaceful uses to nuclear weapons programmes or of handling civilian nuclear materials safely, much less of managing the abundance of weapons-grade material in the world. Although the NPT could not itself generate adequate responses to these challenges, without credible guarantees that the Treaty would endure, the elements of the international non-proliferation regime would risk entering into decline. A series of short extensions would punctuate the future of the Treaty with question marks which would inevitably detract from its credibility.

13. It had been argued that those who were calling for the indefinite extension of the Treaty were tacitly consenting to the retention of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States. Yet, it was in the NPT alone that all five nuclear-weapon States had undertaken a legal obligation to pursue nuclear disarmament in good faith. The indefinite extension of the NPT was not incompatible with determined action on nuclear disarmament. It was a central part of the process of persuading those who possessed nuclear weapons to give them up and convincing others not to acquire them. The broad constituency of States legally committed to non-proliferation and to nuclear disarmament through the NPT gave it its strength and held out a real hope for a world in which nuclear weapons no longer had a place.

14. An uncertain or weakened NPT, subject to the vagaries of negotiations at regular intervals or to progress in other forums, would seriously undermine confidence and put at risk all that had been achieved over the past 25 years. The message that should go out from the Conference was that the nuclear non-proliferation regime was permanent and that its contribution to the prevention of nuclear war remained vital not only to the current generation, but to succeeding generations as well.

15. Mr. EVANS (Australia) said that all nations - the nuclear-weapon States, the non-nuclear-weapon States, and even States which had not joined the NPT - had major interests at stake in its continued success. The growth in the Treaty's membership to its current level of 178 States reflected its success in preventing the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons. Australia itself had been seen as one of the countries with the capability and possible intention to develop nuclear weapons, but as a direct consequence of the NPT, had chosen not to pursue that option.

16. The threat of global nuclear war had clearly receded, but regional conflicts of the kind seen in recent years risked provoking wider tensions, and the possibility that they would engage the interests of States possessing nuclear weapons capability could not be ruled out. Cases of non-compliance with the non-proliferation regime itself, new concerns about nuclear smuggling, and the presence of facilities without safeguards in India,
Pakistan and Israel were issues that must be faced. There were no grounds for complacency about the ability of the non-proliferation regime to continue to provide the current level of security.

17. The objectives of the Conference must be to establish non-proliferation irrevocably as the future standard for international behaviour, to continue and accelerate progress towards nuclear disarmament, to achieve universal membership in the Treaty, and to strengthen cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

18. The NPT was, with the Charter of the United Nations, fundamental to the maintenance of international security. Australia very strongly supported indefinite extension of the Treaty. A world which did not have a treaty regime in place for the containment of nuclear proliferation and the elimination of existing nuclear weapons was unthinkable. The NPT was the only treaty of global reach that bound its members to those objectives. A decision of indefinite extension, therefore, was the only possible position of principle to take for those resolutely committed to achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. Indefinite extension would also be most effective in pressing the declared nuclear-weapon States to continue the process of nuclear disarmament and in containing the nuclear aspirations of the so-called threshold States.

19. Indefinite extension of the Treaty offered the best encouragement for continuing the process of nuclear arms reduction which had finally begun. In Australia’s view, to allow the decision on extension to be influenced by a desire to punish one group of States or another for their past performance would be as misguided as it would be dangerous for the Member States’ wider interests in the Treaty. The end of the cold war made progress in nuclear disarmament possible for the first time since the beginning of the nuclear age. The United States and Russia were each destroying about 2,000 weapons a year under the provisions of the START I and START II agreements, and the process had been extended to Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus under the Lisbon Protocol. All five nuclear-weapon States had come to support the negotiation of a convention to ban the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, and had also agreed on improved security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.

20. The NPT had played a vital role in creating the conditions of confidence about non-proliferation which had allowed nuclear disarmament to proceed. A qualified decision to extend the Treaty could not possibly help the disarmament process. Indefinite extension of the NPT was the only way to reassure the nuclear-weapon States that further nuclear disarmament could be achieved without unacceptable security risks.

21. The argument that indefinite expansion would somehow legitimize the status of the nuclear-weapon States was quite unfounded; the NPT had been the single most important factor in establishing the international norm against nuclear weapons, and it remained the only international nuclear disarmament agreement which had been signed by all five nuclear-weapon States. It was therefore necessary to press ahead towards the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons, and to continue and accelerate the process of deep reductions agreed between the United States and Russia; the three smaller nuclear-weapon States should join that process at the earliest appropriate opportunity. Australia also desired a permanent and comprehensive end to nuclear weapons testing through the rapid conclusion of negotiations on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), one to which it intended to be an original signatory, and it also looked forward to the opening of negotiations on a convention banning the production of fissile material for weapons purposes.

22. The existence of threshold or "twilight zone" States, remaining outside the Treaty and strongly suspected of possessing nuclear weapons capability, was sometimes used as a criticism of the Treaty. However, if such States were not prepared to join the 178 other States in forswearing nuclear weapons forever, they and not the Treaty were responsible. Indefinite extension of the Treaty was the only way to eventually convince such States to renounce
nuclear weapons. "Regional tensions and rivalries fuelled regional arms races that posed disturbing dangers for international security, but the NPT offered the assurance, through international inspection, that States were adhering to their undertakings not to acquire nuclear weapons. Only by indefinite renewal could the NPT continue to offer threshold States the security assurances they needed to break out of the cycle of nuclear escalation, or could the parties to the Treaty exert increased pressure on the threshold States to renounce nuclear weapons. South Africa's recent decision to join the NPT was influenced by the attraction of enhanced security and by the international pressures against possession of nuclear weapons brought to bear by a strong NPT, and thus illustrated the vital necessity of indefinite extension of the Treaty.

23. Indefinite extension was also vital for those wishing to engage in peaceful nuclear cooperation under the provisions of the NPT, as such cooperation required an assured environment of long-term security and stability. The significance of long-term non-proliferation assurances was magnified by the fact that planning, constructing and operating nuclear plants often required several decades, as well as heavy investments of financial and other resources. Indefinite extension would provide the basis for the long-term assurance essential to both suppliers and recipients of nuclear technology that their cooperation was for exclusively peaceful purposes and did not risk proliferation.

24. By ensuring that nuclear material, equipment and technology were provided to non-nuclear-weapon States only where subject to full-scope IAEA safeguards, export licensing or other export controls reinforced the Treaty's essential non-proliferation objective, and also helped to establish the environment of long-term assurance and stability necessary for effective cooperation. Moreover, such export controls could not be portrayed as a cartel or conspiracy exceeding the legitimate terms of the Treaty.

25. An aspect of those controls of particular interest to Australia was the central role of full-scope IAEA safeguards as a condition of nuclear supply to non-nuclear-weapon States, a principle which had become the accepted international standard for such transactions and had also been incorporated into the supply guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Australia hoped that members would endorse that principle by consensus in reviewing the operations of the Treaty.

26. The proliferation dangers which had led to the Treaty's creation 25 years previously had been held in check, but in the face of new challenges presented by technological advances and illicit transfers of nuclear material, the NPT and the norm of behaviour it entailed were more important than ever. The argument for indefinite extension of the Treaty could be summarized in a few words: Any decision to qualify or limit renewal of the Treaty could only weaken it, and an outcome that damaged the Treaty could not be risked. Only a decision to extend the Treaty indefinitely could guarantee that its objectives would be met and that the interests of all its members would be protected.

27. Mr. Kovács (Hungary) said that for the previous 25 years, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had been an outstanding example of States' ability to find mutually acceptable solutions to even the most complex problems; in the case of the Treaty, the stake at risk continued to be the very survival of mankind. Over an arduous negotiation process, the States had arrived at the historic agreement that the proliferation of nuclear weapons must be prevented. Twenty-five years later, the States similarly agreed that they needed a durable and dependable Treaty that could serve as a basis for their security and for that of the entire world.

28. Hungary was convinced that the real interests of the States called for the indefinite extension of the Treaty, and fully shared the position expressed by the representative of the European Union. While it rejected the idea of linking the extension of the Treaty to certain achievements in other negotiations, it in no way wished to deny the necessity of conducting those negotiations with the greatest resolve. Hungary wished to stress the urgent
need to conclude further treaties on nuclear arms control and disarmament, and noted with satisfaction the strong commitment of the two Powers parties to START I and START II to implement those treaties and to explore further drastic cuts in their nuclear arsenals. It also wholeheartedly welcomed Security Council resolution 984 (1995), which it viewed as a major contribution towards providing additional security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. Such measures would constitute important contributions to fulfilling Member States’ common obligations under article VI of the Treaty. In actuality, the indefinite extension of the NPT was a vital requirement for maintaining the conditions and atmosphere necessary to ensure progress in those negotiations.

29. Hungary commended the IAEA for providing non-proliferation assurances through its safeguards system, and called for universal application of those safeguards. It also encouraged all nuclear-weapon States to submit their peaceful nuclear installations to those safeguards under the voluntary offer agreements. It continued to support the Agency’s efforts to improve and strengthen existing safeguards, and joined those who were calling for an improved IAEA safeguards system capable of providing credible assurances regarding not only declared nuclear activities but also the absence of undeclared nuclear activities.

30. Hungary had been a committed advocate of various efforts to further strengthen elements of the non-proliferation regime. The principle of full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply for any significant new nuclear export had been incorporated into its export licensing regulations and practice. The implementation and continuous updating of the agreed common policy of supplier States facilitated cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by enhancing confidence that nuclear exports would not contribute to unsafeguarded fuel cycles or any weapons-related activities.

31. The new phenomenon of the illicit transfer and smuggling of nuclear materials posed challenges to the nuclear non-proliferation regime; in order to eliminate that threat, an increased physical protection system of nuclear materials needed to be introduced in all countries, along with a higher level of international cooperation.

32. In Hungary, nuclear power generation provided about one half of total electricity production, and advanced nuclear-related scientific activities had been developed. A significant part of Hungary’s achievements in the nuclear field had been accomplished through international cooperation. The Treaty had greatly promoted bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Hungary remained committed to the broadest cooperation in that respect with all those countries that respected the objectives of nuclear non-proliferation.

33. As Chairman-in-Office for 1995 of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, he wished to draw attention to document NPT/CONF.1995/13 containing an excerpt from the Budapest Summit Declaration adopted in December 1994 by the Heads of State and Government of the States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. It reflected the strong belief of those 52 States that the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, and missiles to deliver them, posed a threat to international peace, security and stability and that the non-proliferation Treaty should be indefinitely and unconditionally extended.

34. Mr. KINKEL (Germany) said that the Conference was not a routine diplomatic event; the decision to be taken was of crucial importance for peace and security in the twenty-first century. At stake was the future of mankind. The threat arising from the most dangerous of all weapons of mass destruction must be averted. Although the nuclear genie could not be forced back into the bottle, everything must be done to tame it. Many strategies to that end had failed. The non-proliferation Treaty was a realistic and successful response to the nuclear challenge, based on the recognition that a continually increasing number of nuclear-weapon States was bound to lead to incalculable risks for the survival of mankind.
35. At a time of mistrust between East and West and disagreement between North and South, the Treaty had been the first evidence of a new global thinking. Forced upon the signatory States by a common survival instinct, a historic compromise had been founded which took account of their common interests. In spite of its deficiencies, the Treaty had lived up to all expectations over the past 25 years. Dangerous developments in the direction of the proliferation of nuclear weapons had been halted or reversed. The number of signatory States had risen to 178. All the successor States of the Soviet Union had acceded. Africa had become a nuclear-weapon-free zone. If the Treaty was extended indefinitely, it would be easier to persuade the other countries to join. The Treaty was the guarantor of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under the control of IAEA; IAEA was making a valuable contribution through its technical assistance programmes. Now that the confrontation between East and West was over, the Treaty was needed more than ever. In a multipolar world full of nuclear players, there could no longer be a balance of terror, only an omnipresent threat. Nuclear proliferation was no longer a danger for States alone: nuclear civil wars and atomic weapons in the hands of terrorists had become conceivable.

36. Germany had long ago renounced all types of weapons of mass destruction, and had proved that renunciation of nuclear weapons was in no way a disadvantage. That decision was wholeheartedly supported by all democratic parties in the German Bundestag. Germany was fully committed to all the obligations arising from the Treaty. It appreciated the concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States and would continue to urge further energetic steps towards disarmament. However, it rejected the idea of making the Treaty's extension conditional, since that would only play into the hands of those who sought a pretext to justify their own nuclear ambitions. For Germany, the durability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime had absolute priority over all other considerations. More States were committed to the Treaty than to any other international agreement except the Charter. There was now an unprecedented opportunity to make the ban on the proliferation of nuclear weapons a universal norm of international law, provided that agreement was reached on an indefinite, unconditional extension of the Treaty. The United Nations was needed as the guardian of non-proliferation. The Security Council should play an active role in that respect.

37. In recent years, the nuclear disarmament obligation in article VI had been fulfilled to an extent no one could have imagined. That process must be vigorously continued; the five nuclear Powers must fulfil that obligation since it had been the very reason for the accession to the Treaty of the great majority of the community of nations.

38. In order to make the nuclear disarmament process irreversible, no more fissible material must be produced for weapons purposes, and weapons-grade fissible material from dismantled weaponry must not be used to build new weapons and must not fall into the hands of nuclear smugglers. Hundreds of tonnes of spare plutonium must be reliably monitored. Germany reiterated its proposal for an international plutonium regime.

39. There was an urgent need for a comprehensive test-ban treaty. If the 1995 deadline could not be met, it must be signed in 1996.

40. The expansion of the Conference on Disarmament was long overdue. The article VI obligation applied to all signatory States, whether they were nuclear-weapon States or not. Therefore, the sole multilateral negotiating forum for global disarmament and arms control should be open to all those who wished to participate.

41. In the light of events in Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the instruments available to IAEA must be further strengthened. The right to conduct special inspections in non-declared sites must be exercised and enforced.

42. Germany welcomed the merging and harmonization of the declarations by the nuclear-weapon States on security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon
States. Security Council resolution 984 (1995) was an important step in that direction.

43. Everyone knew that the real problems facing mankind on the threshold of the twenty-first century, including mass migration and terrorism, environmental disasters, poverty and overpopulation, could not be solved through the possession of nuclear weapons. However, stopping proliferation for all time and a permanent disarmament pledge by the nuclear-weapon States were major preconditions for solving those problems.

44. Germany therefore called for the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty.

45. Mrs. AGNELLI (Italy) paid tribute to the two French peacekeepers who had lost their lives in Sarajevo over the past weekend.

46. The substantial achievements of the non-proliferation Treaty were clear: the proliferation of nuclear weapons had been effectively contained, and the security of all States dramatically enhanced. Her delegation fully endorsed the statement made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of France on behalf of the European Union and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Italy firmly believed that the Treaty must acquire a permanent character, thereby further contributing to peace and stability in the world.

47. Italy had ratified the Treaty after an extensive and difficult internal debate, during which serious concerns had been raised. During the negotiations on the Treaty, Italy had strongly promoted the arrangements for periodic reviews of its implementation and had been in favour of limiting its validity to an initial 25-year period. In the midst of the cold war, the East-West confrontation had posed a threat to its security and to its very survival. Italy's decision to forgo the nuclear option had been a gesture of responsibility and trust in international agreements and obligations. At that time the arms race, particularly in the nuclear field, had been in full acceleration. The renunciation of nuclear weapons had been particularly significant for countries like Italy that were politically and geographically most exposed to the East-West confrontation and that had the technological and industrial capability to become nuclear powers.

48. The international situation had profoundly changed. The danger to mankind was no longer the nuclear arms race - "vertical" proliferation - but "horizontal" proliferation, including the possibility of terrorist organizations arming themselves with weapons of mass destruction.

49. The process of negotiating nuclear disarmament in accordance with the commitments of article VI of the Treaty was well under way. Nuclear disarmament, starting with the two major nuclear Powers, had become irreversible. It would be a mistake to ignore the new realities and respond to the problem of nuclear proliferation with the logic of the cold war. Although some countries continued to feel that the Treaty perpetuated differences in status, Italy felt that that view was out of step with the times, when the role of the United Nations as an instrument to maintain peace and security was being strengthened. Italy appealed to those countries which still had doubts about the wisdom of indefinitely extending the Treaty to recognize the new political and security realities and draw the appropriate conclusions, bearing in mind the global interests of the international community.

50. Italy understood the concerns expressed about the slow pace in the negotiation or implementation of important agreements in the field of nuclear disarmament. However, it must be recognized that significant results had been achieved, even if they were not yet conclusive. A comprehensive test-ban treaty was likely to be concluded shortly. In the meantime, a moratorium on nuclear testing had already been decided on and implemented by most nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on prohibiting the production of fissile material for military purposes were expected to begin soon. Italy, as a member of the Security Council, was promoting a global system of adequate security
assurances by nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty which effectively complied with their obligations. Security Council resolution 984 (1995) testified to major progress in that direction.

51. Italy recognized the importance of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and understood the legitimate expectations of those countries that wished to acquire nuclear capability for the purpose. As a member of the European Union, it was contributing to several assistance projects, especially in the area of nuclear safety, involving the transfer of technology for economic development. Strict safeguards were needed to prevent possible diversions of nuclear material for military purposes. Safeguards should also be applied to nuclear installations, especially those of an older generation, to ensure that a satisfactory level of safety was maintained.

52. In Europe, the Treaty had become an integral part of the political and strategic environment and was ensuring stability. The decision made by the Heads of State and Government of the 15 countries of the European Union to undertake common action to promote the indefinite extension of the Treaty was clear evidence of their commitment to non-proliferation.

53. As a Mediterranean country, Italy welcomed the recent accession of Algeria to the Treaty and was following with interest the progress already made towards making the African continent a nuclear-weapon-free zone. South Africa's decision to renounce the nuclear option confirmed that the possession of nuclear weapons was reversible, and was a highly significant precedent. Italy attached great importance to the efforts under way to establish an area free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. The principle of universality which inspired the Treaty obviously applied to that area too. Italy appealed to all countries in the Middle East to accept the indefinite extension of the Treaty.

54. Italy was convinced that the indefinite extension of the Treaty, far from being an obstacle to the ongoing and future negotiations on disarmament, would facilitate their success. The development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy would also greatly benefit. The work programmes of the relevant international forums, in particular the Conference on Disarmament, confirmed that the process of arms reduction, particularly of nuclear weapons, was irreversible. Moreover, there would be no impediment to the supply of equipment and technology to countries with a genuine interest in using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only.

55. Mr. DURÃO BARROSO (Portugal) said that in recent years the international community had shown a common interest in the search for a solution to the continuing spread of weapons of mass destruction. The end of the cold war had brought the revival of some ancient questions which had in the past led to world-wide suffering and destruction. There was an escalation of ethnic intolerance, and growing nationalism and regional conflicts, sometimes involving a relentless quest for the possession of weapons of mass destruction. The proliferation of such weapons was one of the greatest dangers to international peace and stability. The recognition of the need to halt their proliferation was evidenced by the increasing number of adherents to the Treaty.

56. The Treaty was unique; it was the pillar of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential guarantor of the development of international cooperation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Portugal believed that further improvements in the international non-proliferation regime could be achieved. IAEA had done much to ensure the compliance of States parties with the Treaty's provisions, relying on the willingness of States to cooperate and fulfil the agreements signed. A renewed system of safeguards should enable IAEA to verify in an effective and transparent manner the enforcement of the obligations undertaken by the States parties through their full-scope safeguards agreements and the Treaty provisions. Portugal was firmly convinced of the need to strengthen the existing safeguards system through the use of new technologies.
57. The Treaty had been the major political and legal barrier against the spread of nuclear weapons. It was the only global non-proliferation instrument and it had created an international norm that isolated States outside the regime which persisted in their efforts to develop or acquire nuclear weapons. At the same time it reflected the commitment of States parties to collective security because it was the only international agreement that obliged its parties to pursue measures for global disarmament.

58. Portugal fully supported the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty and endorsed the statement by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs in that respect. Without a durable non-proliferation Treaty, it was doubtful whether its achievements, as well as the current disarmament process and the consolidation of the non-proliferation regime, could be maintained. An indefinite extension would also provide a major reason for those States which insisted in staying out of the regime to join it or, at least, to adopt measures compatible with the existing non-proliferation norms; otherwise, they would risk becoming even more isolated. Any decision other than indefinite extension could undermine the whole non-proliferation system built upon the Treaty, thereby damaging its credibility and creating a feeling of instability within the international community.

59. The current international political momentum was favourable to that decision. Over the past few years there had been an unprecedented movement towards effective reduction of nuclear arsenals all over the world. The START treaties, along with the Lisbon Protocol and further unilateral decisions, would significantly reduce the number of nuclear weapons belonging to or in the control of the existing nuclear Powers.

60. Portugal also supported the ongoing negotiations of the Conference on Disarmament for a comprehensive test-ban treaty and looked forward to its early conclusion as well as the conclusion of a convention to prohibit the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. It welcomed the adoption of Security Council resolution 984 (1995).

61. The indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty would better serve the interests of all States and thus preserve international peace and stability.

62. Mr. GURRIA (Mexico) said that the main problem in evaluating the application of the Treaty stemmed from the fact that it had been originally intended to perpetuate a situation that favoured nuclear-weapon States over non-nuclear-weapon States. That was why it had been deemed necessary to include certain conditions that the non-nuclear countries felt should be met in order to justify their decisions to abandon their rights to acquire nuclear weapons. However, as a result of changes in the international climate, especially the end of the cold war, the prospects for achieving progress in negotiations on a treaty prohibiting nuclear testing were very bright. In that connection, his delegation was encouraged by the steps already taken by the Russian Federation and the United States under the START I and II Treaties.

63. Mexico had provided irrefutable proof of its commitment to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and wished to stress the need to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race. In that regard, nuclear-weapon States should firmly commit themselves to the elimination of nuclear weapons from the face of the earth starting with the complete ban on nuclear testing. The Treaty of Tlatelolco, a legally binding instrument which banned the use of nuclear weapons or the threat of the use of such weapons in the Latin American and Caribbean region, should serve as an example to the whole world.

64. The international community should avoid polarization and make use of the unique opportunity offered by the Conference to achieve a consensus on the best means of consolidating the Treaty and ensuring its universal application in the twenty-first century. While his delegation understood the concern of those delegations which considered that limiting the effectiveness of the Treaty might endanger an instrument that continued to be the basis of the non-
proliferation system, it nevertheless shared the opinion that States parties must continue to fight for nuclear disarmament. The extension of the Treaty was not an end in itself. Accordingly, any decision arising out of the Conference should consider several interrelated elements, namely: extending the Treaty with modalities emerging from a balance among all States parties; approving a treaty prohibiting nuclear testing within a year; starting negotiations on an agreement for the prohibition of fissile materials for military purposes as soon as possible; establishing binding negative security non-particles for non-nuclear countries; strengthening the current safeguards regime of IAEA; and approving a reinforced review mechanism guaranteeing a periodic evaluation of the Treaty.

65. His delegation was prepared to participate in good faith in negotiations to find a suitable formula that enjoyed the support of the vast majority of the States parties and that took into account the universal concern about nuclear issues, not only the non-proliferation aspect thereof but also the need to make progress towards genuine and effective disarmament.

66. Mr. IKIMI (Nigeria) said that the considerable increase in the number of signatory States since the Fourth Review Conference reflected the desire of the majority of Member States for general and complete disarmament. As an early signatory, Nigeria had faithfully carried out its obligations under the Treaty; it had also concluded a Safeguards Agreement with IAEA. Nigeria’s adherence to the Treaty stemmed from its conviction that enduring security could not be built on the possession of nuclear weapons. It therefore remained committed to the goal of nuclear disarmament. It continued to be active in all disarmament matters and collaborated with other countries in the effort to ensure a speedy negotiation of agreements that would strengthen the non-proliferation regime. As a result of their collective faith in the usefulness of the Treaty, many States had remained faithful to its provisions in spite of the inequities of the rights and obligations embedded therein.

67. The Treaty had been extremely successful in preventing the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons since there were only five acknowledged nuclear-weapon States. Other positive developments attributable to the Treaty were the growing number of nuclear-weapon-free zones, including the imminent treaty on an African nuclear-weapon-free zone. Over the previous five years there had also been commendable developments in bilateral nuclear disarmament between the Russian Federation and the United States, while South Africa, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine had given up their nuclear weapons. Those States had demonstrated that it was possible to do so without loss of status or diminished security.

68. However, his delegation was deeply concerned that, while the Treaty had succeeded in preventing the emergence of nuclear-weapon States, very little had been achieved in curbing the qualitative and quantitative improvement of nuclear weapons. Despite the intention of the Russian Federation and the United States to reduce their strategic nuclear arsenals under the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II), they were yet to take concrete steps towards the elimination of nuclear weapons altogether. Indeed, when fully implemented, START II would still leave the two major nuclear-weapon States with more than enough warheads to wipe out human civilization. Nigeria was therefore calling for deeper cuts and urging the other nuclear-weapon States to undertake similar efforts. It also expected that all States parties would pursue the negotiations in good faith on measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the elimination of nuclear weapons in accordance with their obligations under the Treaty.

69. Nigeria was worried about the extent of the commitments of the nuclear-weapon States parties not to transfer nuclear weapons or other explosive devices and related technology to other States and about selective compliance, which had enabled non-parties to acquire a nuclear-weapons capability. There was no doubt that such actions had led to the emergence of nuclear-threshold States and to the diversion of nuclear materials to weapons programmes. That
situation could not but erode the confidence of many non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty and undermine its future viability.

70. Indeed, 25 years after the coming into force of the Treaty, none of the concrete disarmament measures envisaged therein had been accomplished and even the relative progress recorded at the Conference on Disarmament on a comprehensive test-ban treaty was tentative and not irreversible. In that connection, Security Council resolution 984 (1995) had fallen short of the desire of many non-nuclear-weapon States for a multilaterally negotiated and legally binding treaty prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. In that regard, the previous Review Conference had considered Nigeria's draft agreement on the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. It was designed to allay the anxieties of non-nuclear-weapon States over their vulnerability to nuclear intimidation as a result of their permanent military disadvantage.

71. The International Atomic Energy Agency must be assisted with adequate resources to perform its dual mandate. It was disappointing that despite faithful African adherence to the Treaty and the conclusion of safeguards agreements with IAEA, access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and enabling facilities had not been forthcoming. Although verification of compliance was a vital element in any disarmament agreement, the existing safeguards mechanism of NPT had proved to be inadequate for the monitoring of compliance with treaty obligations. The time had come for comprehensive and non-discriminatory verification provisions applicable to all States parties.

72. Glossing over the failures of the Treaty and extending it indefinitely would be an invitation to a nuclear disorder. The decision on extension must adequately address the concerns of all States parties and must meet the international security challenges of the present and future generations. Nigeria supported extension of the Treaty for a fixed period to be determined by the Conference with the proviso that it must not lapse at the end of that period. The spirit of give and take that had facilitated the conclusion of negotiations on the Treaty should equally prevail in the Conference deliberations in order to develop a programme of nuclear disarmament aimed at achieving a nuclear-free world in the twenty-first century.

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 3rd MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York,
on Tuesday, 18 April 1995, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. DHANAPALA (Sri Lanka)

The meeting was called to order at 3.15 p.m.

REQUEST BY CUBA FOR OBSERVER STATUS

1. The President announced that Cuba had requested observer status at the Conference. If he heard no objection, he would take it that the Conference acceded to that request.

2. It was so decided.

GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 15) (continued)

3. Mr. SYANKO (Belarus) said that the Conference was an historic event of great importance to strategic stability and international security. The dramatic changes in East-West relations and the conclusion of disarmament agreements had laid the groundwork for totally new, non-conflictual relations in the world. Preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems and ultimately eliminating them was a key to building a new world order.

4. Belarus believed that indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was the basis for speedy progress in that direction. That position was a logical extension of the line of conduct that Belarus had set for itself in the area of nuclear disarmament in 1991 when, as a newly independent State, it had faced the various problems posed by its succession to the nuclear status and the nuclear arsenals of the former Soviet Union. Belarus had been the first of the former Soviet republics to declare that any agreement on the nuclear treaty legacy should fall within the scope of multilateral negotiations and be screened by the respective parliaments. It had also written its non-nuclear status into its declaration of sovereignty and its Constitution.

5. Translating its intentions into action, Belarus had undertaken sweeping nuclear disarmament measures in its territory as early as April 1992. It had also ratified the START I Treaty and acceded to the non-proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State, becoming the first State to willingly renounce the possession of nuclear weapons. To complete those measures, it had in recent days signed a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

6. It was easy to imagine the problems that the Soviet nuclear legacy would have caused had there been no non-proliferation Treaty when the Soviet Union broke up. In its political decisions, Belarus had frequently drawn inspiration from the moral and legal principles on which the Treaty was based. The possibility that similar situations might arise in the future should be duly considered.

7. Belarus was aware that the Treaty was not perfect and that, in many ways, it reflected the balance of interests that had existed at the time of its signing. His country nevertheless believed that the Treaty represented the only possible basis for achieving comprehensive nuclear disarmament and that its indefinite extension was therefore essential and would, moreover,
provide the framework for more stringent nuclear arms proliferation deterrents.

8. Turning to international efforts that might ensure a successful Conference and a viable non-proliferation Treaty, he mentioned, first of all, the adoption of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. His country was concerned that the draft treaty had acquired numerous terms and conditions that threatened its universality and that the Conference on Disarmament, of which Belarus was not a member, seemed to be in no hurry to resolve the deadlock on enlarging its membership. He believed that the latter issue had a direct bearing on the universality of the future comprehensive test-ban treaty.

9. In the same connection, Belarus welcomed the creation by the Conference on Disarmament of a special committee on the cessation of the production of fissionable materials.

10. Turning to the question of security guarantees, he recalled that, as a result of their accession to the non-proliferation Treaty, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus had received security guarantees from the nuclear-weapon States. Belarus assumed from that development that the nuclear Powers were prepared to intensify their efforts to put in place a new safeguards regime. It welcomed the adoption of Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and statements by the nuclear Powers granting security guarantees to non-nuclear States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty, and looked forward to follow-up action in that direction. Existing and emerging nuclear-weapon-free zones had an important contribution to make to consolidating the non-proliferation regime. As early as 1990, Belarus had proposed the creation of such a zone in Central Europe. With Ukraine's recent decision to become a non-nuclear-weapon State, the prerequisites for implementing that proposal could be said to exist. Belarus was somewhat concerned, however, about the possible risk of more and more European territory being used for nuclear weapons deployment if NATO were to be expanded geographically.

11. Belarus believed that the entry into force of the START I Treaty had lifted all barriers to ratification of the START II Treaty by the Russian Federation and the United States of America and hoped that a speedy solution would be found to that problem. It attached considerable importance to keeping the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty alive as a cornerstone of strategic stability and was involved in the negotiations on its future.

12. Realizing the importance of eliminating such inhumane weapons of mass destruction as chemical weapons, Belarus had signed and ratified in February 1995 the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction.

13. Belarus greatly appreciated the safeguards regime of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as the basis for the nuclear non-proliferation regime and believed that the Agency should be strengthened. The delayed disclosure of "clandestine" nuclear programmes in some States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty testified to the need for better control mechanisms to prevent any diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful to military purposes.

14. A mechanism was therefore needed for detecting unreported nuclear activity. Such a mechanism might include free access to reported facilities, along with the possibility of inspecting any other facilities. IAEA was known to be subject to financial constraints because of the increase in the volume of nuclear materials and the number of power plants subject to safeguards. Belarus believed that nuclear States could increase their contribution to financing the safeguards system. In the final analysis, the costs involved were minimal compared with the benefits that States would enjoy in terms of greater international security.

15. Because 70 per cent of the radioactive waste released by the Chernobyl disaster had fallen on its territory, Belarus had learnt the bitter lesson of
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the fatal consequences of radioactive contamination. Since those consequences were similar to the consequences of a nuclear attack, it wished to issue a warning to those States that might be envisaging the use of nuclear weapons. The consequences of such an action were too horrible for anyone to seek to possess such weapons. Belarus knew from experience that, once confronted with the consequences of a nuclear holocaust, a State could not count on receiving effective outside assistance. That was why it was insisting on the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime and the indefinite extension of the non-proliferation Treaty.

16. Mr. van NIELLO (Netherlands) expressed satisfaction that, since 1990, some 30 States, including two nuclear-weapon States, had acceded to the Treaty, which, with 175 States parties, had become nearly universal. There was no doubt that the Treaty had turned out to be the most successful global security treaty since the world had entered the nuclear age. The question facing the Conference was therefore whether the Treaty, which had served well in the relatively stable world of the cold war, would continue to serve well in a less predictable future. His country's answer to that question was yes, for it saw the Treaty as providing the necessary framework for nuclear disarmament, durable disarmament and international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Netherlands therefore favoured the unconditional extension of the Treaty for an indefinite period, since that course of action would best serve those purposes.

17. The non-proliferation Treaty was unique in many respects. First, its duration had not been unlimited from the outset. Second, it intentionally created inequality between the nuclear haves and have-nots. And lastly, it provided for a linkage between nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful cooperation.

18. The only global legal instrument aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the Treaty had been highly successful in preventing additional States beyond the five declared nuclear Powers at the time of its conclusion from acquiring nuclear weapons. The fears that existed when the Treaty had been concluded had not come to pass and, at least, the number of nuclear States was the same as in 1968.

19. The very welcome increase in the number of parties to the Treaty should not give rise to complacency; the ultimate goal was universal adherence to the Treaty. The Conference could contribute to the achievement of that goal by sending a strong signal to States which had not yet acceded to the Treaty or even accepted its norms. Making the Treaty permanent would be just such a signal.

20. Out of their overriding concern to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons, the signatories to the Treaty had accepted a temporary inequality between the nuclear haves and have-nots. That unusual provision had been agreed to because all the parties had realized that, whatever their status, it was in their common interest and that their determination to reduce nuclear weapons and proceed to disarmament would ultimately do away with that inequality.

21. After reviewing the considerable progress made in recent years in the area of disarmament, he pointed out that, under the START I and START II Treaties, the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Russian Federation would soon be reduced by two thirds.

22. In the current favourable climate, the five nuclear-weapon States should actively engage in further arms control and disarmament negotiations. Security Council resolution 984 (1995), adopted on 11 April 1995, provided the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty with security assurances and solemnly reaffirmed the obligation of the nuclear-weapon States to pursue negotiations in good faith leading to nuclear disarmament. The progressive implementation of article VI of the Treaty, dealing with nuclear disarmament, had become more feasible than ever and the
world could look forward to a day when a complete nuclear disarmament would be a reality.

23. The Netherlands fully supported the negotiations under way in Geneva on a comprehensive test-ban treaty and noted with satisfaction that the talks begun in January 1994 had made significant progress. However, there were still intricate political and technical issues to be solved. The current negotiations should be concluded quickly so that the world would finally see an end to all nuclear testing. The start of negotiations on a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other explosive purposes was another positive development. Progress on those two fronts would further strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

24. Turning to the question of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, he said that efforts to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons should not keep the non-nuclear-weapon States from benefiting from civilian nuclear technology, which could play an important role in improving the quality of life. The experience with civilian nuclear cooperation had perhaps been disappointing to some States. The overriding reason for that was growing scepticism about the possibility of benefiting from nuclear energy in an ecologically and economically sound and sustainable manner. Such scepticism was felt in the industrialized and the developing world alike. His country was for its part, reappraising the role of nuclear energy in its national industry. That did not mean that the beneficial impact of nuclear technology on people's everyday lives should be forgotten, but it was important to note the limitations to the use of the atom.

25. The challenge embodied in the non-proliferation Treaty was to make sure that no nuclear technology or material, once transferred for peaceful purposes, was diverted for military applications. In that connection, he wholeheartedly supported the statement by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency the preceding day and fully supported the efforts being made in Vienna to strengthen the existing safeguards regime through "Programme 93 + 2".

26. A strengthened safeguards regime and the extension of the non-proliferation Treaty for an indefinite period would not hamper peaceful nuclear cooperation between States. On the contrary, it would create a climate of confidence in which such cooperation would be able to flourish.

27. That was precisely why his delegation urged the Conference to accept the principle of the application of full-scope safeguards on all peaceful nuclear activities, in nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States alike. That measure should become the cornerstone of the future nuclear non-proliferation regime under the non-proliferation Treaty. The discussions at the Conference would, no doubt, be intense, perhaps sometimes acrimonious, but at last it seemed that it was possible not only to establish a stable non-proliferation regime but also to further the Treaty's other objectives, especially in the sphere of disarmament. His delegation did not believe that there was a conflict of interest between North and South, or between rich and poor countries, all of which had a common destiny and the same basic security interests. Extending the Treaty for an unlimited period would not only make life difficult for potential proliferators, but would also create the necessary conditions for further nuclear disarmament. The other side of the coin was that any uncertainty over the future of the Treaty could dampen the willingness of the nuclear-weapon States to further reduce their nuclear arsenals. The parties would in fact be the ones to suffer from such a situation.

28. The nuclear disarmament process that had started in the past decade must, obviously, go on. The inequality between nuclear haves and nuclear have-nots that was inherent in the Treaty was a source of tension and could not last in the long run. In that connection, the Treaty placed a heavy moral responsibility on the nuclear-weapon States.
29. Mr. HURD (United Kingdom) said that, although the cold war was now over, the risks posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction had not faded. The non-proliferation Treaty lay at the heart of efforts to deal with those risks, and it should be placed on solid, permanent foundations. Needless to say, the Treaty had its imperfections, but none of them was a fatal flaw. The best way to rid the world of the fear of nuclear war was to extend the Treaty unconditionally and indefinitely. Although the circumstances in which the Treaty had been devised had changed, the Treaty had preserved its relevance. Mere exhortation of the States parties was no use; there was a need to look at the Treaty’s imperfections, whether real or perceived. His delegation did not believe that they were major obstacles.

30. The Treaty recognized the existence of only five nuclear-weapon States. That might seem discriminatory, but it had to be borne in mind that, 25 years earlier, the Treaty had had to recognize the real position if it was to prevent further nuclear proliferation. At that time proliferation had appeared unstoppable. Well over 20 States had been thought eager to acquire nuclear weapons and it was largely because the Treaty had drawn a firm distinction between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States that nuclear proliferation had been contained.

31. As for the criticisms of nuclear disarmament, the continued existence of nuclear weapons should not obscure the fact that considerable progress had been achieved. The Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty and the two START Treaties had consigned thousands of nuclear warheads to elimination. Unilateral decisions had also been taken to reduce stockpiles. The United Kingdom was not lagging behind, but had steadily proceeded with its own reductions. Its nuclear forces would soon be limited to a single system deployed on submarines. At the end of the current decade, the total number of British warheads would be 21 per cent less than in the 1970s and their explosive power 59 per cent lower, which represented a reduction of three fifths. If the world had seen cuts of that order in other types of weapons, it would be a safer and more stable place.

32. The United Kingdom nevertheless understood the fears of some countries. In order to allay them, it had, together with other nuclear-weapon States, offered strengthened security assurances. It was committed to negotiating measures which would impose severe constraints on nuclear weapons and hoped that an effective and verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty would soon be concluded. To that end, it had accepted that there should be no exemption for tests in exceptional circumstances or safety tests. It also hoped that there would be an early start to the negotiations on an agreement to cut off the production of fissile materials for military purposes. In order to remove any doubts that there might be, he announced that the United Kingdom had ceased the production of fissile material for explosive purposes.

33. The United Kingdom programme for the reduction of nuclear forces which he had outlined meant that, when the START II Treaty was implemented, British nuclear forces would be considerably less than 10 per cent of the total United States and Russian nuclear forces. There was, however, no doubt that, in a world in which those forces were counted in hundreds rather than the current thousands, the United Kingdom would respond to the challenge of multilateral talks on the global reduction of nuclear arms.

34. The nuclear disarmament he had described could only have taken place in the framework of stability and predictability which the Treaty had helped to establish. In order to build further on the momentum created by recent successes and by the negotiations in progress or in prospect, it was important to ensure that the framework provided by the Treaty was made permanent.

35. Turning to the question of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, he noted that some deplored the fact that those uses had not developed as rapidly as they had expected. Nuclear power had, however, spread widely around the world and nuclear energy had found various applications in fields of particular interest to developing countries, such as medicine and agriculture. All that would not have been possible without the non-proliferation Treaty and the IAEA
safeguards. It would take several decades to secure a return on investment in major civilian nuclear projects. A predictable and certain non-proliferation Treaty was therefore essential if international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was to be increased.

36. Some were concerned about export controls. However, the fact that certain items were subject to controls did not mean that their export was prohibited. The controls in question affected only countries such as Iran, about whose ultimate intentions there were widespread doubts. Suppliers must be careful; they would be rightly criticized if they were not.

37. The United Kingdom constantly urged all States which were not parties to the Treaty to allay suspicions about their nuclear activities and accede to the Treaty at the earliest opportunity. Progress had been made. He welcomed the fact that Algeria, Argentina, South Africa and all the successor States to the Soviet Union had become parties to the Treaty.

38. It was not impossible that Israel, India and Pakistan might one day accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States. Some States which had once condemned the Treaty were, indeed, now parties to it. Unrelenting pressure and persuasion could perhaps achieve the same result with others. Such efforts would not succeed, however, if the decisions taken at the Conference displayed a lack of commitment to the Treaty.

39. It was also important to ensure that States which had acceded to the Treaty complied with its provisions. In that connection, the scale of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear-weapons programme had been a salutary shock for all. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had presented a problem and many were anxious about Iran. Those dangers were all the more reason to strengthen, rather than despair of, the control system established under the Treaty. The United Nations Special Commission and IAEA were dealing with the Iraqi problem and the Agreed Framework signed in October 1994 offered a way of resolving the problem of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea within the framework of the Treaty.

40. The international community had also recognized the need to strengthen the safeguards system of IAEA and to provide the latter with all the support it needed through the Security Council. His delegation welcomed the Agency’s latest proposals for strengthening safeguards and looked forward to early agreement on their implementation. The statement made by the President of the Security Council at the summit meeting of the Council held in January 1992, to the effect that the members of the Security Council would take appropriate measures in the case of any violations of safeguards agreements, also considerably reinforced confidence in the Treaty.

41. To sum up, it was important to look beyond the technicalities and recognize the benefits of the non-proliferation Treaty. Despite the threats to peace and stability in the world, the Treaty had made it possible to avert the threat of a nuclear war and the risk of uncontrolled nuclear proliferation. It was important to preserve what had been achieved and make the Treaty a permanent feature of international life.

42. The indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty was the right decision because it would reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation with its destabilizing consequences, reinforce the momentum towards nuclear disarmament, provide the continuing framework essential to international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and send a clear signal to those few countries which had not yet acceded to the Treaty that the international community expected them to do so. Lastly, a decision to that effect would demonstrate to all – including those tempted to follow the route of proliferation – that the world community remained determined to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and the horrors inherent therein. The non-proliferation Treaty deserved the biggest vote of confidence, which it would well repay.
Mr. SOLANA (Spain) noted that the current international context was substantially - and happily - different from what it had been in 1970, when the Treaty had been born. The threat of nuclear war had disappeared, nuclear arsenals had been considerably reduced and international cooperation encouraged the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Serious dangers had, however, also emerged, such as the first cases of illicit trafficking in fissile materials and violations of the international system established to guarantee compliance with the Treaty. The French delegation had expressed the common point of view of the European Union on the matter. His delegation wished to discuss some points in greater detail.

Although since the previous Review Conference in 1990 more than 30 States had become parties to the Treaty, the refusal of some countries to accede to it gave rise to considerable regional imbalances and situations of clear inequality on a global scale. Given the incalculable risk which the proliferation of nuclear weapons represented for mankind as a whole, only universality could make the Treaty an effective instrument in the fight against that terrible danger. Spain therefore earnestly hoped that the international situation would soon be such that it would allow the accession of all States without exception.

With regard to safeguards, Spain believed that the Treaty also required a system to monitor compliance. Through its system of inspections, IAEA had proved to be the best guarantor of international security. It was essential to recognize, however, that that system was not infallible, as had been demonstrated by the discovery of the nuclear programmes in Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which should be a clear warning for the future.

Spain was therefore convinced that it was necessary to strengthen the safeguards system and to support the efforts being made by the Director General of IAEA to ensure that inspections without prior notice and access to strategic areas during routine inspections were allowed. It also hoped that new types of safeguards agreements would be concluded which would reinforce the Agency's responsibilities and go beyond the legal prejudices and outdated concepts of sovereignty. If the Treaty was to be effective, it must be provided with a system to control the export of nuclear material and technology that would allow commercial and technological exchanges under the necessary security guarantees. Spain, which was a member of the Zangger Committee and had recently presided over the Nuclear Suppliers Group, considered that the latter was not a closed group of States bent on obstructing legitimate international trade. On the contrary, it advocated the gradual and cautious enlargement of that Group so that States which were suppliers of nuclear equipment, material and technology and subscribed to the Group's fundamental principles would assume the same obligations as its other members. That had been the case with Argentina, New Zealand and South Africa.

The existence of export controls was not incompatible with cooperation for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Spain had always sought to promote economic development throughout the world, and it felt that nuclear energy should not be the exclusive privilege of a small group of States. It had recently signed 12 such cooperation agreements, thus contributing to the legitimate right of the least developed countries to have access to advanced technology. It had also financed, wholly or in part, 60 international projects through IAEA and, between 1989 and 1994, had dispatched 300 experts to Latin American and East European countries, where they were collaborating in the development of nuclear energy.

Turning to disarmament, he recalled the progress made in the post-cold-war period - the agreements on the reduction of nuclear arsenals, ratification of the START I Treaty, the accession by Ukraine to the non-proliferation Treaty - and called for prompt ratification of the START II Treaty noting that it would be a further step towards the ambitious objective set forth in article VI of the Treaty, namely, the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control. He also called for the establishment of further nuclear-weapon-free zones. The Treaty of
Tlatelolco and the Treaty of Rarotonga were magnificent examples of what could be done to combat proliferation when States of varying dimensions combined their efforts to build a safer world. Spain supported the ongoing efforts to establish the African continent and the Middle East as zones free of weapons of mass destruction.

49. Spain had learned with deep concern of the recent cases of illicit trafficking in nuclear material. That was a serious problem which affected the entire international community and it was essential that the process of dismantling nuclear weapons, which was one of the outstanding results of the new disarmament agreements, should be subject to strict control. In the multilateral area, the International Atomic Energy Agency was the most suitable forum for designing a strategy to combat such illicit trafficking; such a strategy was not incompatible with the efforts being made in other regional organizations.

50. Spain welcomed the willingness shown by the nuclear Powers to conclude a treaty banning all nuclear tests and to accompany it with an effective verification system. That must continue to be the highest priority of the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva. Spain for its part was an active observer of that Conference and it was already participating in the vast network of nuclear tests detection systems known as GSETT-III. It also wished to cooperate in the conclusion of a treaty for the cut-off of fissile material production.

51. Regarding assurances, Spain noted that, for years, a large number of signatory States to the Treaty had quite rightly, been demanding greater commitment from the nuclear Powers on the question of positive and negative security assurances. Security Council resolution 984 (1995), which had been adopted unanimously on 11 April, marked a qualitative step forward in that respect since, for the first time in history, the five nuclear Powers had jointly given positive and negative security assurances to the States that were parties to the Treaty.

52. Finally, he said that the efforts to combat the proliferation of nuclear weapons could not be limited in time and that the international community could not afford the luxury of periodically reviewing the essence of the Treaty. Spain was therefore convinced that the Treaty must be indefinitely and unconditionally extended. It had been argued that that would deprive some States of an important means of persuasion in the efforts to promote disarmament. To that Spain replied that the best way of achieving general and complete disarmament was precisely to ensure that the provision set forth in article VI of the Treaty remained in effect indefinitely. Likewise, only by extending article IV would it be possible to continue the cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

53. Mr. OUELLET (Canada) said that the discussions at the Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, one of the most successful international treaties ever, would take place against the backdrop of a growing world consensus in favour of halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons on the one hand, and denuclearization on the other hand. By signing the Treaty, 176 countries had already affirmed their commitment to the universal norms and principles on which it was based. There was no doubt that the international community must work to achieve the ultimate goal of universalization. Canada, for its part, hoped that the commitment would become a permanent reality and that the non-proliferation Treaty would be indefinitely and unconditionally extended.

54. The attitude of the Canadian Government to the Conference was shaped by a number of realities: first, Canada had taken a political decision, very early on, not to use either its skills or its technical capacities to produce nuclear weapons. Secondly, Canada was one of the leading proponents of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Finally, true to its long-standing commitment to multilateralism, Canada wished to strengthen the United Nations and international norms and principles in order to build a comprehensive and universal security framework for the twenty-first century. That presupposed
universal adhesion to the key instruments on non-proliferation, namely, the
Treaty under consideration and also the chemical weapons Convention, the
biological and toxin weapons Convention and the Convention on certain
conventional weapons, which regulated the use of land mines. In addition, it
would be necessary to strengthen respect for legality by establishing a
framework of international treaties on non-proliferation and disarmament. Any
allegations based erroneously on possible limitations of sovereignty must be
refuted by noting the tangible progress accomplished in the area of security.

55. Canada appreciated the opportunity that presented itself every five
years to review the operation of the Treaty and considered that that
opportunity should be further enhanced. The aim should be not only to
facilitate consideration of the implementation of provisions of the Treaty but
also to strengthen the achievement of its objectives.

56. Reviewing what had been achieved in the 25 years since the Treaty came
into force, he recalled that one of the first objectives was, and remained, to
prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to countries other than the five nuclear
Powers of the post-war era. It could be said that the Treaty had achieved
that goal. Indeed, at the time the Treaty came into effect, it had been
faced that there might be some 25 countries with a nuclear arsenal by the
time the Treaty came up for review in 1995. In fact that had not happened.
Of course, the threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons had not disappeared:
it was just as real as it had been in 1970.

57. Non-proliferation was not the Treaty’s sole objective; it also
established fundamental, lasting norms and principles governing the conduct of
those in possession of nuclear material and authorized the utilization of
nuclear energy for purposes of economic development. Under article III
signatories were required to conclude safeguard agreements for the purpose of
verifying that nuclear material was not diverted from peaceful uses to other
purposes. In that connection, Canada strongly encouraged the States parties
to the Treaty to support the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Programme
"93+2", which helped to improve the transparency and to strengthen the
assurance of the peaceful use of nuclear energy by providing for mechanisms to
detect clandestine weapons activities. Article III also provided for the
establishment of supplementary mechanisms such as export controls. The
safeguards and export controls were mutually reinforcing and together provided
assurance that nations were not secretly preparing nuclear-weapons programmes.
Thus all States, even the non-signatories, benefited from the resulting
security.

58. Under article IV all parties were entitled to benefit from the peaceful
applications of nuclear energy and nuclear technology. On that score, the
results were conclusive, for a growing number of States parties to NPT were
using nuclear energy to strengthen their economies.

59. Article VII dealt with the legal right to establish nuclear-free zones.
Those agreements did much to strengthen the security of signatory States and
Canada saw that as another positive element of regional and international
security.

60. The Treaty provided for a dynamic process of negotiations to halt the
nuclear-arms race and to undertake nuclear disarmament. More than that, it
established a radical agenda which would result in a treaty on "general and
complete disarmament under strict and effective control". In assessing the
Treaty’s effectiveness with regard to article VI, it was first necessary to
recognize and to welcome the fact that among the States which were parties to
the Treaty, the nuclear arms race had virtually ended. Russia and the United
States continued to make bold steps to reduce their nuclear arsenals. The
arms race had given way to a joint bilateral undertaking for nuclear
disarmament. Other nuclear-weapon States had made unilateral cuts in their
nuclear arsenals.

61. That had all been done against the backdrop of security calculations
which had begun with the Treaty. Canada was convinced that it was the
framework of stability, security and predictability provided by the Treaty that had made progress on nuclear-arms control and disarmament possible. For that reason those in favour of radical disarmament should be the strongest proponents of the indefinite extension of the Treaty.

62. Under the broad security guarantees provided for in the Treaty, certain initiatives of vital importance had been taken. First, negotiations were under way for a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Canada was encouraged by the work to date and believed that such a treaty would in time become a reality. It hoped that the nuclear-weapon States would refrain from testing during the negotiations.

63. Second, building on the momentum of those negotiations and reflecting States’ political will to make progress in disarmament, the Conference on Disarmament had on 23 March 1995 adopted the important decision to begin negotiations on a convention to prohibit the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons.

64. Third, the nuclear-weapon States had taken significant steps with their recent declarations on security assurances. Such assurances, like the further extension of nuclear-weapon-free zones, were important confidence-building measures which were in every State’s security interest.

65. Further, the leading nuclear-weapon States had recommitted themselves to their obligations under article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty, an initiative that sent a powerful message in behalf of future disarmament.

66. Canada believed that the non-proliferation Treaty offered security guarantees that were essential for nuclear disarmament, and it was important to perpetuate the Treaty indefinitely. Future review conferences would provide States parties with the opportunity every five years to strengthen compliance with article VI and the other provisions of the Treaty. There was simply no substitute for the non-proliferation Treaty, whose benefits for non-nuclear-weapon States were invaluable.

67. Canada believed that the only way to ensure that the Treaty remained in force was to extend it indefinitely. That meant enshrining, permanently, the legal commitment of States to dismantle all nuclear arsenals. The Treaty was the only multilateral legal instrument to contain such an injunction. Without it, the international community would have nothing, even if some claimed that countries could not be forced into following timetables and meeting goals that they had had no role in developing.

68. In conclusion, he said that the states parties to the Treaty had the political responsibility to take a decision that responded to present realities and positioned them to meet future challenges. The Treaty, with its flexibility, was the States parties’ instrument for promoting and achieving nuclear disarmament. Canada and the other States parties were committed to both elements of the Treaty – non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament – which called for a firm political decision in favour of indefinite and unconditional extension.

69. Mr. IBRAHIM (Indonesia) said that any decision on the extension of the Treaty should reflect the results of the review of its implementation. It would therefore be useful to assess the functioning of the Treaty.

70. In 1975, at the First Review Conference, the depositary States and their allies had categorically rejected several basic demands of the non-nuclear countries. They included a comprehensive test ban, an end to the increase of strategic arsenals, efforts to prevent both horizontal and vertical proliferation, a timetable for nuclear-arms control and assurances of non-use of nuclear weapons – all intended to redress the imbalances in the Treaty.

71. The non-nuclear-weapon States had argued that the nuclear Powers had not lived up to their commitments, since the pace of the nuclear-arms race had actually accelerated. Hence, they had called for a thorough examination of
the operation of the Treaty to determine whether all its provisions were being implemented and to remedy any inadequacies in that regard. They had also pointed out that non-parties to the Treaty had benefited considerably more from the transfer of nuclear technology and equipment than parties to the Treaty. They had therefore sought increased assistance in the use of such technology, but the depositary States had ignored their grievances. With great foresight, they had also called for a suspension of all nuclear tests for a period of 10 years and a reduction of nuclear arsenals by 50 per cent.

72. At the Second Review Conference, in 1980, the question of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy had emerged as the overriding issue. With the establishment in 1977 of the extra-Treaty mechanism - the Nuclear Suppliers Group - the implementation of articles III and IV of the Treaty had rested effectively with the suppliers or had been governed by bilateral agreements. The non-nuclear-weapon States had declared that there should be no threats to impose more stringent restrictions or safeguards. They had also opposed the imposition of unilateral conditions on nuclear exports beyond the safeguards required by IAEA. But none of the requests made by the non-nuclear-weapon States for negotiations concerning storage, use and management of fissionable material had materialized.

73. In 1985, during the Third Review Conference, the depositary States had contended that the resumption of the Geneva negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear weapons had been in itself evidence of their "good faith". In reality, the level of weapons of mass destruction had greatly risen and the arms race had been extended into outer space. Thus, prospects for genuine reductions had receded. The Fourth Review Conference had been convened in 1990 against the background of a profoundly changed international political situation. It had achieved consensus on a wide range of recommendations concerning the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation, safeguards, establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It had not, however, succeeded in arriving at a consensus on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race, while the responsibility of adopting an instrument on a complete cessation of nuclear testing had been left to the two super-Powers.

74. Thus, it was evident that, during the 25 years of its existence, the Treaty had not functioned as originally intended and had not met the expectations of the majority of the states parties. Furthermore, the inequalities between the nuclear-weapon States and the others had been accentuated, with the former preserving their rights and privileges while relegating the non-nuclear-weapon States to the position of sole bearers of obligations under the Treaty.

75. While advances had undoubtedly been made in nuclear-arms limitations, they had not gone far enough. The two nuclear super-Powers should negotiate an agreement on a timetable for a drastic cut in nuclear weapons far below the level of that provided for under the START II Treaty. A strengthened non-proliferation Treaty would involve a comprehensive nuclear-test ban, prohibition of the production of weapons-grade fissionable materials and the elimination of nuclear arsenals.

76. In the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, cooperation should be fostered on an assured and predictable basis. States parties to the Treaty must be given preferential access to nuclear technology. Export-control regimes should be replaced by multilateral agreements that were more responsive to the development needs of the non-nuclear countries.

77. Concurrently, IAEA should become an efficacious instrument for building a broader framework for international cooperation by extending technical assistance without restraints and based on regionally agreed priorities. Safeguards should be functional, objective, universal and non-discriminatory.

78. The question of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States had been one of the central issues in the negotiations leading to the non-proliferation Treaty. The recent declarations issued by the nuclear Powers had failed to
assuage the apprehensions of non-nuclear-weapon States, which had long
demanded legally binding commitments. Unilateral pledges of that type did not
contain adequate guarantees, since they left ample room for subjective
interpretation and, since they were made unilaterally, they could also be
unilaterally withdrawn in the event of hostilities. States which had
renounced the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons had the inherent
right to receive unconditional and legally binding assurances.

79. Indonesia had always attached great importance to article VII of the
Treaty, which affirmed the right of all States to conclude regional treaties
to ensure their security. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones,
freely arrived at by the States of the region, would foster peace, stability
and security. Furthermore, such zones would also contribute to the objectives
of the Treaty by curbing the spread of nuclear weapons. The endeavours to
establish South-East Asia as a nuclear-weapon-free zone were encouraging.

80. With regard to the extension of the Treaty, he recalled that article X,
paragraph 2, required parties to choose among three options. In his
delgation's view, indefinite extension of the Treaty would legitimize nuclear
weapons and permit the five nuclear Powers to keep their arsenals while
denying others the right to acquire them. That would ratify inequality in
international relations once and for all, and relegate the non-nuclear
countries to second-class status. The second option would mean the eventual
expiry of the Treaty, which was not desirable.

81. The third option, providing for extension for successive periods, would
be conducive to the advancement of the disarmament objectives set forth in the
preamble and in article VI. The nuclear-weapon States would be obligated to
conclude specific agreements leading to the complete elimination of nuclear
weapons. Those measures would form an integral part of the decision to extend
the Treaty, or would be the subject of separate binding agreements whose
fulfilment or non-fulfilment would be reviewed by the States parties on a
regular basis. Such an approach would have the advantage of linking the
successive extensions of the Treaty to its application. Moreover, that option
constituted a reasonable compromise between indefinite extension and extension
for a single period, and would be in the interests of all States Parties to
the Treaty.

82. The attainment of the Treaty's objectives would be largely dependent on
the way in which the nuclear-weapon States lived up to their commitments. The
Treaty was not an end in itself, but a means to the objective of nuclear
disarmament. For the majority of States, it was the only instrument for
stemming proliferation, promoting international cooperation in the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy and eliminating all nuclear weapons from the face of
the earth.

83. Mr. ALEXANDROV (Bulgaria) said that encouraging progress had been made
in curbing the nuclear-arms race, as was apparent from the various treaties he
listed. In his view, it was the Treaty under discussion which was responsible
for that favourable climate.

84. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had for 25 years
been preventing the spread of nuclear weapons: thus more than 30 States had
become parties to it, including two nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear
countries such as Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine.

85. The Treaty was also the core of an effective system of safeguards and
controls. International cooperation in the field of the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy would hardly have been possible without a legally binding
commitment to non-proliferation. The IAEA safeguards ensured that nuclear
materials were not diverted for military purposes. His Government highly
appreciated the efforts made by the Agency to promote international
cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy and in combating
proliferation.
86. With regard to the extension of the Treaty, Bulgaria's position had been set forth in the statement made by its Minister for Foreign Affairs on 14 April 1985: it was in favour of indefinite and unconditional extension. His delegation therefore fully associated itself with the statement made by the French delegation on behalf of the European Union and the associated States. Bulgaria was sincerely committed to the efforts of the international community to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and eliminate them. There were no nuclear, chemical or biological weapons in its territory. The non-proliferation Treaty should, in its view, become a permanent factor in international relations. It was a guarantee of the irreversibility of nuclear disarmament and provided a framework for continuing the efforts to bring about a world free from nuclear weapons.

87. That said, his delegation believed that the international community should seek rapid progress on a number of other issues. First, a nuclear-test-ban treaty and an agreement to halt the production of fissile material for military purposes should be speedily elaborated by the Conference on Disarmament. Next, the nuclear Powers should commit themselves firmly to refraining from the threat or use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. In that context, Bulgaria welcomed the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 984 (1995), which afforded an appropriate point of departure for negotiating a future legally binding international instrument on the provision of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. Lastly, the IAEA safeguards system should be strengthened, inter alia, by on-site and random inspections to prevent diversion of nuclear materials, equipment and technology for military purposes. Further steps should also be taken in relation to export controls, protection, accounting and control of fissile materials, and prevention of environmental degradation.

88. Mr. KONO (Japan) said that the decision to be taken by the Conference regarding the extension of the Treaty would have a decisive impact on the nature of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and far-reaching implications for the peace and stability of the international community. For that reason, the decision must be taken not only from the national standpoint but also from the perspective of the future of humankind and the entire planet.

89. Japan had ratified the Treaty in 1976, despite vigorous arguments against doing so by those who cited its discriminatory nature. The progress made since then had convinced it that it had made the right choice, for without the Treaty, the number of nuclear-weapons States would certainly be much greater. The nuclear non-proliferation functions of the Treaty had not been without problems, however: some countries had refused to accept the IAEA safeguards regime, some had attempted to acquire further nuclear weapons, and others, which were not parties to the Treaty, were suspected of developing nuclear weapons; lastly, nuclear material had been reported to have been smuggled into Europe in 1994. Nevertheless, the Treaty had become substantially closer to universality since the previous review conference, and he took pleasure in enumerating the new States parties.

90. With regard to the aspects to the treaty relating to disarmament, an objective embodied in article VI, the ending of the cold war had made the situation more promising. The United States of America and the Russian Federation had concluded the START I Treaty and were dismantling their arsenals, and they would, it was hoped, enable the START II Treaty to enter into force soon. Progress had been made in the negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Japan was working to facilitate the conclusion of those negotiations, by, for example, making its seismological knowledge available to the international community. In that context, he asked China to join the nuclear test moratorium. Lastly, the countries concerned, among them Japan, were making efforts to launch negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty.

91. The Treaty also served the purpose of ensuring compatibility between non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Japan, for its part, was promoting nuclear fuel recycling, which entailed shipping material overseas for recycling so as to ensure more efficient use of uranium, a
precious and limited resource. In so doing, it complied fully with the standards and guidelines established by the International Maritime Organization and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

92. Commenting at some length on the role of the Agency, he said that Japan accepted the whole of its safeguards regime, as was indicated by the fact that it had been the first country to publish information on the plutonium in its possession. International cooperation among the States parties to the Treaty in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy could be strengthened in accordance with the Treaty, and on the multilateral level, through IAEA. Japan participated in that cooperation by providing personnel and financing for activities under regional agreements covering Asia and the Pacific, and intended to maintain its assistance so as to advance the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The IAEA safeguards had played a crucial role at the point of interface between the peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation. While the Treaty did not require them to do so, Japan believed that the nuclear-weapon States should consider voluntarily applying the IAEA safeguards to all their peaceful-use nuclear facilities.

93. Turning next to the issue of the extension of the Treaty, he noted that the ending of the cold war had not freed the world from all uncertainty. Japan therefore concluded that the Treaty should be extended indefinitely. A decision to extend it for fixed periods meant the possibility of its being terminated, and every effort should be made to avoid that eventuality. The nuclear-weapon States, which had reaffirmed their position on security assurances and enabled the Security Council to adopt a resolution on the subject, would undoubtedly participate in the efforts directed towards an indefinite extension.

94. Those States should none the less promote progress in nuclear disarmament. The extension of the Treaty would establish a framework to facilitate such progress. They should bear in mind their obligations under article VI of the Treaty and honour the confidence shown in them by non-nuclear-weapon States, which were in the majority and which had renounced the option of nuclear armament in order to contribute to world peace and stability. Japan had consistently stressed the importance of promoting realistic and steady nuclear disarmament measures, as was proved by the resolution which it had sponsored at the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly, entitled "Nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons", and which had been adopted.

95. In conclusion, the Japanese delegation wished once again to appeal to the States that were not parties to the Treaty to accede to it at the earliest possible date; it also appealed to the nuclear-weapon States to pursue their efforts for disarmament and it appealed to all States to honour their commitments in the field of disarmament and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Japan had renounced war as a means of settling international disputes and had consistently worked to promote disarmament, and particularly nuclear disarmament. Having experienced the devastating horror of atomic weapons, it had totally rejected the option of nuclear armament and strictly observed the three nuclear principles of not possessing nuclear weapons, not producing them, and not permitting their introduction into Japanese territory. Japan’s support for the indefinite extension of the Treaty was an outgrowth of that position.

96. Mr. Qian Qichen (China) said that the year 1995, which marked the fiftieth anniversary of the victory of the anti-Fascist forces and the founding of the United Nations afforded an opportunity to review the past. In fact, nuclear weapons had made their first appearance 50 years earlier and had been used twice. The ensuing cold war, which had been accompanied by the escalating arms race had caused all the world’s people to live with the threat of nuclear war and had adversely affected the socio-economic development of the planet. The cold war had come to an end but huge nuclear arsenals remained. One began to wonder whether mankind, which had been able to invent and manufacture nuclear weapons, was incapable of destroying them completely.
97. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had become the most universal treaty in the field of arms control and had played a positive role in limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Chinese delegation supported the three main objectives of the Treaty, namely, the promotion of nuclear disarmament, the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation and the enhancement of international cooperation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It considered that, in the light of the new international situation, it was in the interest of all States parties to reaffirm their commitment to those three objectives, for that could only contribute to the maintenance of peace, security and international stability. However, it realized that the Treaty had its limitations and defects and was in some respects unbalanced, as it set out different rights and obligations for different States parties. However, such inadequacies could be gradually remedied through continued progress in nuclear disarmament and enhanced international cooperation in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

98. China supported the extension of the Treaty. It believed that the option of extension for one fixed period was not desirable. However, if the option for indefinite extension was chosen, China believed that it must be made clear that such an extension should in no way be interpreted as perpetuating the prerogatives of the nuclear-weapon States. Should the option for fixed periods be chosen, each fixed period should be no less than 25 years. Whichever option was chosen, the implementation of the Treaty would have to be subject to regular reviews.

99. The Chinese delegation felt that there were more agreements than differences between the States parties to the Treaty. They should therefore be able, through constructive collaboration and by holding intensive consultations, to agree on the extension of the Treaty by consensus. In the meantime, his delegation pointed out that the nuclear-weapon States had the obligation to provide negative and positive security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States, as an essential prerequisite to the extension of the Treaty.

100. The prevention of nuclear-weapon proliferation was not an end in itself but an intermediate step that should lead to the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. In that connection, China’s position had not varied and could be summed up in the following manner.

101. First, the primary objective should be a complete prohibition of nuclear weapons. A convention on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons under effective international supervision should be concluded, as had been done in the case of the conventions banning biological and chemical weapons.

102. Second, pending the conclusion of that convention, measures should be taken to prevent the threat of nuclear weapons. Nuclear-weapon States should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against other States which also possessed nuclear weapons and should unconditionally undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones. Those commitments should be undertaken as soon as possible and, for the sake of greater efficacy, they should be embodied in treaties or international legal instruments.

103. Lastly, a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty should be concluded through negotiations as soon as possible, and not later than 1996. A convention banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear-weapon purposes should also be concluded through negotiations. Those intermediate steps would facilitate the realization of the ultimate goals of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.

104. China had never shirked its obligations in the matter of nuclear disarmament. It was the only nuclear-weapon State to have assumed certain unilateral obligations, namely, not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against other nuclear-weapon States and not to use or threaten to use those weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones.
105. China did not endorse the policy of nuclear deterrence, and the nuclear weapons it had developed were solely for self-defence. It had never had any intention of using them to oppose or threaten any country. It had always advocated the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, and had never joined in the nuclear-arms race.

106. China had, from the very beginning, exercised restraint in nuclear testing and had conducted fewer nuclear tests than other nuclear-weapon States. Furthermore, it called for the conclusion of a treaty on no-first-use of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States. It had proposed a draft treaty on those lines to the other four nuclear-weapon States. Lastly, China and Russia had issued a joint statement undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other and to detarget their respective nuclear weapons away from each other.

107. China welcomed the adoption, on 11 April, of resolution 984 (1995) of the Security Council on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States and it hoped that unconditional security assurances would be provided to all non-nuclear-weapon States at an early date in the form of an international legal instrument. On 5 April 1995 it had issued a statement reaffirming its unconditional negative security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States and undertaking to provide positive security assurances to those States. The Chinese Government had also issued statements concerning the provision of security assurances to Ukraine and Khazakstan, at their request.

108. China supported the efforts made by the countries and regions concerned to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones or zones free of weapons of mass destruction through voluntary consultations. Under the Additional Protocols to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Treaty of Rarotonga, which it had signed respectively in 1973 and 1987, it had undertaken specific commitments to the nuclear-weapon-free zones of Latin America, the Caribbean and the South Pacific. It accordingly welcomed the efforts made by the African countries to conclude a treaty on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa. Lastly, China was making positive efforts to facilitate the early conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and supported the negotiation and conclusion of a convention banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear-weapon purposes.

109. In order to realize the objective of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, it was necessary for the international community to prevent the proliferation of weapons of that kind. China supported the principle of the universality of the Treaty and hoped that the safeguards system of IAEA would be more rational and effective. It had consistently pursued a policy of not endorsing or encouraging nuclear-weapon proliferation. It had always refrained from engaging in activities that would promote such proliferation and it had never helped other countries to manufacture nuclear weapons. With regard to nuclear exports, it adhered to three principles. First, exports should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes; second, exports should be subject to IAEA safeguards; thirdly, exports should not be retransferred to a third country without China’s consent. All Chinese nuclear exports were subject to IAEA safeguards.

110. China believed that the promotion of international cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy was important in fulfilling Treaty obligations and that it deserved the same attention as other provisions of the Treaty. The prevention of nuclear-weapon proliferation should facilitate the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by the developing countries and should help them to exercise their legitimate rights in that respect. In preventing nuclear-weapon proliferation or utilizing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, it was inadmissible to apply a double standard.

111. China, a developing country with some nuclear industry capabilities, conducted a policy of international cooperation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It had engaged in cooperation and fruitful exchanges with IAEA and had signed bilateral cooperation agreements with 14 countries.
112. With the advent of the twenty-first century it was to be hoped that mankind could finally rid itself of the nuclear threat and that nuclear energy could be harnessed for the benefit of all. His country was ready to work towards that objective.

113. Mr. UDOVENKO (Ukraine) said that the results of the Conference would have a lasting effect on nuclear geopolitics and would influence the evolution of military-political strategy and the national legislation of the States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty.

114. With reference to the "Ukrainian nuclear question", he said that the issue had attracted too many political speculations and that too many unjust accusations had been levelled at Ukraine, whose position was obviously misunderstood and whose legitimate concerns and balanced and constructive proposals had not been taken into account. Ukraine found itself in a unique situation: it had inherited the world's third largest nuclear potential and at the same time was the first State to declare voluntarily, even before the break-up of the former USSR, its desire to become a non-nuclear State. That was a historic step, which retained its importance even after Ukraine had ratified the START I Treaty and acceded to the non-proliferation Treaty, a step which should contribute to the success of the Conference.

115. While the discovery of the secrets of the atom and nuclear applications had been the triumph of science, the tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki demonstrated the terror of nuclear catastrophe and clearly pointed to the need for a global non-proliferation regime for nuclear weapons. Ukraine had been deeply traumatized by the Chernobyl disaster and was particularly interested in cooperating closely with the international community to prevent further tragedies of the kind. The establishment of IAEA, the institution of the system of safeguards, the conclusion of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, and the entry into force of the non-proliferation Treaty had become the first important international steps in that direction.

116. From the outset, the non-proliferation Treaty had received the support of the majority of States. Although it was one of the cold-war treaties and not ideal, it was nevertheless an important starting-point for nuclear disarmament. Therefore, in determining its future, it was important to keep in mind that in international practice there neither was nor could be an absolute or perfect solution. Since the existing international non-proliferation regime had in principle proved its usefulness, the aim should no doubt be to improve the norms incorporated in that regime and to develop new mechanisms for their implementation.

117. The end of the cold war had significantly altered the geopolitical map of the world and was opening up new prospects for the peaceful settlement of conflicts. The non-proliferation Treaty was the key instrument in the field of arms control and disarmament because, by regulating the problems of nuclear security, it allowed countries to develop future policies in the sphere of nuclear disarmament and enabled non-nuclear States to conduct an equal and effective dialogue with nuclear States on measures aimed at strengthening the existing non-proliferation regime and on specific steps in the direction of general and complete disarmament. In order to ensure the effective halting of the nuclear-arms race and the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the Conference must concentrate on the development of additional prevention mechanisms. That would involve an in-depth analysis of the underlying causes of those phenomena. At the same time, it was important to develop international incentives to promote nuclear disarmament.

118. That said, Ukraine, although in favour of an indefinite extension of the Treaty, was prepared to consider all possible ways of solving the remaining disagreements, making the Treaty more effective and improving the existing non-proliferation regime. At the same time, it stressed the instability of a situation created by the existence, on the one hand, of States which based their security on the possession of nuclear weapons and, on the other, of threshold States and countries which had either never possessed nuclear
weapons or had voluntarily relinquished them. It was obvious to everyone that the use of nuclear weapons would be fatal for human civilization. Moreover, the end of the cold war and the resulting new political realities had forced States to develop more sophisticated military doctrines. The very concept of security was changing, and whatever was necessary should be done to ensure that the principles of indivisible and collective security which were being incorporated into the foundation of the external policy of States should find practical applications. In that regard, Ukraine would welcome the confirmation of the obligations undertaken by all nuclear-weapon States parties under article VI of the Treaty. The international community had a right to expect the parties to ratify the START II Treaty promptly. The willingness of the United Kingdom, France and China to take part in the negotiations on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons could be more definitely reflected in the final act of the Conference.

119. Ukraine had proved to the whole world that its policy with respect to nuclear disarmament was consistent. It had, for example, participated in the implementation of the INF Treaty and the START I Treaty, and in spite of considerable social and economic difficulties, it had consistently fulfilled its obligations, because it was aware of the decisive importance of disarmament questions. Other States, both nuclear and non-nuclear, would significantly contribute to those efforts by providing more substantial support to Ukraine.

120. The question of complete security assurances being granted by the nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty remained one of the most pressing problems in the context of the Treaty’s implementation. Security Council resolution 984 (1995) on security assurances, which had been adopted unanimously on 11 April, demonstrated that the dialogue between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States was progressing and should be regarded as a further step towards a universal international legal document. The experience of countries which had signed the Memorandum on Security Assurances in connection with Ukraine’s Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons indicated that there was a real opportunity to prepare an instrument which would reflect all aspects of the current world. It was known that the elaboration of the Memorandum had played a key role in Ukraine’s accession to the Treaty. Although it concerned the situation of Ukraine, the Memorandum contained a number of ideas that could be helpful to the international community and thereby foster the existing non-proliferation regime.

121. The majority of States parties recognized the Treaty’s importance. Unfortunately, the positive shifts which had occurred at the Geneva negotiations were not sufficient, as the remaining differences on substantive issues attested. If the negotiations were really to move forward, all the nuclear-weapon States must declare a moratorium on nuclear tests.

122. His delegation welcomed the progress achieved at the beginning of 1995 during the negotiations on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for military purposes. However, the outcome of the negotiations was still far in the future, given that the task was not a simple one.

123. Among the efforts to strengthen the global non-proliferation regime, improvement of the IAEA safeguards regime deserved a special mention. Safeguards agreements were implemented jointly by national bodies and the relevant segments of the Agency, and the results depended on the efficiency and coordination of the various actions. More than once, additional "unconventional" measures had brought positive results. In that regard, his delegation welcomed the agreement concluded between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the United States of America.

124. With regard to the problems connected with the implementation of article IV of the Treaty, this country proceeded from the premise that improvements in the global non-proliferation regime should be inseparably linked to the broadening of international cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It favoured the establishment of equal partnership
relations in that field on both a bilateral and a multilateral basis within the existing international export control regimes. Special attention should be paid to the situation in the developing countries and it should be easier for them to become members of the international organizations responsible for control of transfers of nuclear materials and sensitive technologies. That approach would meet the interests of each State and help to strengthen the global security system. In that context, consultations between the Nuclear Suppliers Group and nuclear recipient countries could considerably improve the climate of trust between the parties.

125. Referring to regional measures to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, he emphasized that the creation of new nuclear-free zones was very important for the implementation of article VII of the Treaty and could, as previous cases had shown, lead to very substantial progress. Ukraine supported the efforts of States to create nuclear-free zones in the Middle East and in Africa, because that would help to solve certain difficult international problems. It also felt that ratification by all nuclear-weapon States of the protocols to the existing treaties on nuclear-free zones and fulfilment of their treaty obligations by all parties would provide compelling proof of their adherence to the cause of non-proliferation.

126. Mr. DERYCKE (Belgium) said his delegation fully supported the statement by the representative of France on behalf of the European Union and the associated countries of central and eastern Europe.

127. The non-proliferation Treaty, which had come into force a quarter of a century previously, was designed to promote the peaceful use of atomic energy without risking the spread of nuclear weapons. His country had subscribed to the Treaty in that context and hoped it would be extended indefinitely and unconditionally.

128. The Treaty must become universal if it was to achieve its objectives. Notable progress had been made in that direction with the recent accession of new States. However, the Treaty did not cover all nuclear proliferation issues. The speedy conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and the opening of negotiations on a convention banning the production of fissile materials for the production of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices constituted an essential step towards complete nuclear disarmament.

129. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, the results seemed somewhat mixed. With some exceptions, the international community could congratulate itself on the results of horizontal non-proliferation. Since 1970, few States had sought to acquire nuclear weapons and some, such as Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which had perhaps wished to do so, had not been successful, partly as a result of the treaty control mechanism. On the other hand, in the 1970s and 1980s the nuclear payloads and delivery systems in the arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States had multiplied unchecked and become increasingly sophisticated. The Treaty had been inoperative because of a political and strategic context making all nuclear disarmament unlikely. The end of the cold war had enabled States to embark on the course traced by article VI by reducing their arsenals, an enterprise which Belgium hoped would be vigorously pursued.

130. However, the persistence of exacerbated nationalism and regional tensions, the accessibility of technology and terrorist designs called for an intensified struggle against military nuclear proliferation. The difficulties of transition in the former communist countries, where a high level of nuclear know-how co-existed with major economic and administrative difficulties, were a source of concern. The nuclear assistance those countries were already receiving should be reinforced in the interest of protecting the common environment.

131. In accordance with its obligations, Belgium had always opened all its nuclear installations to control by IAEA and EURATOM because it considered the rules of the guarantee systems indispensable to the security of international commerce for peaceful applications of nuclear energy. It wanted controls
applied to fissile materials deriving from the dismantling of arsenals as well as to all civilian nuclear activities of the nuclear-weapon States. It should be recalled that all non-nuclear-weapon States parties were under an obligation to submit all of their nuclear installations and materials to IAEA control and could not evade that obligation even temporarily, as Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had done. Better-oriented human and financial resources should permit more efficient detection of clandestine nuclear activities. To that end, Belgium supported the ongoing reform of the IAEA control system and would like it to be universally applied.

132. The indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty was also necessary for the security of the development of the civilian nuclear industry and for international cooperation. Belgium had long encouraged international exchanges in the field of the peaceful application of nuclear energy. It had concluded agreements on scientific, industrial and technological cooperation with more than 20 States, as well as specific agreements on nuclear cooperation. Such cooperation involved sending experts to developing countries, training technicians, studying installations and supplying equipment or operational assistance. Belgium had also welcomed several hundred interns from developing countries in its research centres, medical centres and nuclear industries. It had contributed to numerous IAEA expertise and assistance missions. In the non-energy sector, it had helped to promote radio-isotopes for medical and industrial use and for the conservation of food products. It was likewise participating in the tsetse fly eradication project. Lastly, it had made its expertise in radiological protection of the population and the environment available to those countries which had requested it. It wished to pursue and develop that international cooperation and would favour all measures that would promote it without risk of proliferation.

133. Mr. MARSCHIT (Austria) recalled that as early as 1955 his country had renounced the possession of nuclear weapons in a legally binding instrument. In 1968, it had been one of the first countries to sign and ratify the non-proliferation Treaty. Since then, it had consistently advocated the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

134. Austria realized that that goal could not be reached in the immediate future, but considered that efforts must be made to halt the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. It was essential to prevent an increase in the number of nuclear-weapon States and to persuade the existing nuclear States to reduce their arsenals and refrain from developing new types of weapons. During the past 25 years, the Treaty had been the best available instrument for channelling such international endeavours.

135. The Treaty had become almost universal with regard to horizontal non-proliferation. More than 170 States had become parties to it. Austria particularly welcomed the decisions of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, which had nuclear weapons in their territories, to become non-nuclear-weapon States, as well as the decision of South Africa to abandon its nuclear capability. The Treaty had been less successful with regard to vertical non-proliferation. It could not be denied that the arsenals of the five nuclear Powers had become substantially larger since the Treaty had come into force. However, a number of disarmament measures had been taken in recent years.START I and START II, which were designed to reduce and limit offensive strategic weapons during the forthcoming decade, the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, and the nuclear-test-ban moratoria. Austria therefore believed that the Treaty had stemmed the proliferation of nuclear weapons and should be extended indefinitely. That did not mean that Austria disregarded the arguments of those who pleaded in favour of a series of limited extensions; such a procedure would make it possible to exert additional pressure on the nuclear Powers to hasten nuclear disarmament. However, that procedure would keep open the question of whether the Treaty would be a definite and permanent instrument, or merely an arrangement that could be changed or discontinued altogether after a period of time. That situation would encourage hesitant States to keep their nuclear options open, discourage the efforts of nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals and
dissuade them from taking measures to ban nuclear testing. Austria was convinced that a definite and clear decision should be taken and would therefore support a decision by the Conference to extend the Treaty indefinitely and unconditionally.

136. The nuclear-weapon States should pursue their efforts in the field of nuclear disarmament. The START treaties should be implemented speedily and the three other nuclear Powers should seriously consider reducing their arsenals. Substantial progress should be made towards the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, if possible in 1995 or 1996. Austria appealed to the nuclear Powers to declare or maintain a voluntary moratorium on nuclear-weapon tests. It looked forward to the start of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. It took note with satisfaction of the recent declaration by France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States reaffirming their commitment to pursue negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament and placing high priority on the complete prohibition of nuclear testing.

137. Austria welcomed the work done by IAEA in the implementation of Treaty safeguards and supported ongoing efforts to strengthen the safeguards system. It would like IAEA to be given additional responsibilities in the context of future agreements and in regard to verification of nuclear materials, including fissile materials derived from nuclear disarmament.

138. In conclusion, he called on the international community to unite to lay the foundation for a future free from the threat of nuclear war, a future of peace and cooperation among all nations.

139. Mr. MONGBE (Benin) noted that 25 years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a number of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States were failing to honour the commitments they had entered into. The nuclear Powers displayed little eagerness to honour their fundamental commitments under articles IV and VI of the Treaty; certain non-nuclear-weapon States parties seemed tempted to renege on their commitments; others had not signed a safeguards agreement with IAEA committing them, inter alia, to inform the Agency of the amount of source materials available to them for various peaceful purposes. Nevertheless it should be recognized that the Treaty, notwithstanding its deficiencies, had helped to curtail the proliferation of nuclear weapons. A growing number of States had ratified the Treaty, and States which had the capability to acquire or which had acquired nuclear weapons had recently renounced such ambitions and had acceded to the Treaty. The universality of the Treaty had continued to increase since its entry into force.

140. The non-proliferation Treaty had been born in an international context of global rivalry in which it had been more or less feasible to control nuclear proliferation. One of the salient features of the new international context since the end of the cold war was that forces tending to promote fragmentation, for long contained by the policy of blocs, were reasserting themselves. That new development carried with it a serious risk of proliferation of all kinds of weapons, including weapons of mass destruction and nuclear weapons. In the circumstances and pending concerted specific measures, such as those relating to chemical weapons, for the complete elimination of a capability by States to carry out acts of aggression, it was important to maintain the non-proliferation Treaty, which, notwithstanding its defects, had helped to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Treaty being the standard applied by the international community in its condemnation of nuclear weapons, every effort should be made to avoid any development that would fail to strengthen its universality and which would substantiate the argument of those few States that refused to accede to it. Benin had thus determined to support unlimited extension of the Treaty.

141. Benin welcomed the unanimous adoption by the Security Council, on 11 April 1995, of its resolution 984 (1995) concerning security assurances against the use of nuclear weapons, but took the view that the resolution did
not go far enough to dispel the legitimate fears of the non-nuclear-weapon States, particularly the weaker States. Other measures were necessary to reassure those States and guarantee their security. The States parties must thus seize the opportunity offered by the Conference to advance nuclear disarmament, promote the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, negotiate an international treaty confirming security assurances, encourage IAEA to continue to strengthen implementation of the system of safeguards in accordance with article III of the Treaty, and, lastly, accelerate the establishment of denuclearized and nuclear-weapon-free zones.

142. Since the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity in 1964, progress had been made in that domain. Benin welcomed such progress, but supported the idea of the formulation of a binding international legal instrument, similar to those existing in other parts of the world, to strengthen the nuclear security of Africa.

143. Given the stakes for the future of the planet, Benin trusted that the Treaty would make an effective contribution to nuclear disarmament and that it would establish a foundation for more fruitful international cooperation in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

144. Mr. CHINETOV (Kyrgyzstan) said that the eyes of all mankind were fixed on the Conference, which would decide an issue of supreme importance for international peace and security, namely, the extension of the non-proliferation Treaty. Respect by the nuclear Powers for their commitments under the Treaty had enabled a nuclear holocaust to be avoided. Yet the world remained exposed to the threat of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, the manufacture of which absorbed enormous human and material resources. For that reason the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty was a political act of absolute necessity at the current juncture.

145. The peaceful foreign policy of the Kyrgyz Government was intended to strengthen peace and security throughout the world and to safeguard that most precious of all things, human life. The Kyrgyz people had always been imbued with ideals of peace and friendship and good-neighbourliness towards peoples of other States. Moreover the consequences of the nuclear tests which were an integral part of the issue under consideration inspired fears in the Kyrgyz people that were fully justified.

146. For that reason, heeding the voice of good sense; aware, in common with the international community as a whole, of the problems that remained in terms of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and control of conventional weapons; stressing the importance of peaceful coexistence in a context in which local armed conflicts were likely to escalate into world confrontation; and considering that the future stability and safety of the planet could be guaranteed by respect for the non-proliferation Treaty in conjunction with a treaty imposing a complete ban on nuclear tests and the conclusion of agreements on the use of nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes, the Government of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan was firmly in favour of unconditional and indefinite extension of the non-proliferation Treaty, and invited other States to support that position.

147. Mr. CASSAR (Malta) said that the Review and Extension Conference had been envisaged during the cold war and was taking place at a time when the international community and the United Nations were on the threshold of a new era. Yet the disappearance of confrontation between blocs had in no way diminished the need to address issues relating to non-proliferation. The Treaty had gained quasi-universal acceptance and the concept of non-proliferation had become central to the concerns of the majority of Member States, indicating that that critical sector was not the sole domain of the nuclear-weapon States.

148. Malta was party to the non-proliferation Treaty, having deposited its instrument of ratification in 1970, only two years after it had been opened for signature. The Maltese Government had also signed a safeguards agreement
with the International Atomic Energy Agency and was considering joining IAEA as a full member.

149. The threat of a nuclear holocaust had overshadowed the international community since the invention of nuclear weapons and had been aggravated by the arms race between the nuclear super-Powers which had led them to stockpile nuclear weapons to an extent too terrible even to imagine.

150. The non-proliferation Treaty had succeeded in halting that race towards global destruction and in limiting the number of nuclear-weapon States. Perhaps by a historical coincidence the proliferation in the Member States making up the international community had occurred during the era of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Yet those new States, including Malta, barely free of colonial rule, wishing to exist in a secure international environment, had immediately acceded to the Treaty.

151. The past 25 years had also demonstrated that the ambitions of some States could not easily be ignored. That was why most smaller States wished for an unconditional and indefinite extension, a choice dictated by pragmatism as much as by the ideal of a world free from the nuclear threat. Indefinite extension would nip in the bud any ambitions to undertake a programme to develop a nuclear capability which, on the expiry of a definite period of extension, would lead to the possession of an arsenal. Only a universal Treaty could dispel the fears instilled over past decades in the minds of generations that had lived under the threat of nuclear destruction. Universality and indefinite extension were all the more necessary in that the threat of nuclear weapons was no longer employed only by States, but also by groups engaged in international terrorism.

152. The Treaty and the basic principles on which it was built (nuclear disarmament, security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States and access to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes) were not the only mechanism available to the international community to ensure the success of the Conference. Bilateral and parallel track negotiations on non-proliferation had also proved successful. Negotiations in other fields relating to disarmament, such as those on a comprehensive test-ban treaty and on implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, would also have Malta's full support. Indefinite extension of the non-proliferation Treaty would have a positive impact on other fields relating to disarmament.

153. The non-proliferation Treaty need not be viewed as a treaty for ever freezing States into two groups. It imposed a number of responsibilities on nuclear-weapon States, particularly regarding security assurances vis-à-vis non-nuclear-weapon States. Security Council resolution 984 (1995), adopted on 11 April, should make a useful contribution to the strengthening of such security assurances.

154. The non-proliferation Treaty had been the only beacon of hope in the dark period of the cold war. It would be illogical if, in an environment that was more propitious to international peace and security, the Conference failed to better the commitments undertaken 25 years earlier. Universal acceptance of an indefinite extension was the minimum result that States should envisage if they wished to bequeath the heritage of global peace and security to future generations.

155. Mr. CRVENKOVSKI (The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) said that it was a great honour for him to participate in the Conference as a representative of the Republic of Macedonia which, on 30 March 1995, had become the 178th State party to the non-proliferation Treaty. Ukraine and South Africa's accession to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States was also an important step which demonstrated that it was possible to denuclearize national defence without jeopardizing national security.
156. As a non-nuclear-weapon State, the Republic of Macedonia was in favour of the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty. The Security Council's recent adoption of resolution 984 (1995) on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States that were parties to the Treaty represented, in his delegation's view, an important step towards strengthening the regime of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and should contribute to the successful outcome of the Conference. At the same time, the nuclear-weapon States must pursue their negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament, in particular a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control as provided in article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty.

157. The non-proliferation Treaty was the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation system, in that it enshrined all its principles; however, it must be implemented. The dramatic changes in the global situation had helped diminish any interest in nuclear weapons acquisition. Nevertheless, for the universalization of the non-proliferation regime, several conditions must be met. Comprehensive nuclear disarmament, which was on the agenda of the relevant international bodies, had not yet been accomplished. International verification was being strengthened, but the process of strengthening safeguards had not yet been completed.

158. While the prospects for the universalization of the non-proliferation regime seemed good, an improvement in the regional political climate was needed and the regional bodies should work to that end.

159. The credibility of international arms control and disarmament efforts depended to a large extent on the ability of the international community to mobilize all the States Members of the United Nations, 96 per cent of which had already acceded to the non-proliferation Treaty.

160. While small States did not feel the immediate threat of a global nuclear war, they were very much concerned about the threat that would be posed to their security by negative developments in their immediate vicinity. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia therefore attached the greatest importance to the development of good-neighbourly relations and regarded them as the most important factor for peace, security, cooperation and efforts towards disarmament in the Balkan region.

161. At its forty-eighth session, the General Assembly had adopted without a vote resolution 48/84 B on the development of good-neighbourly relations among Balkan States. Affirming its determination that all nations should live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, the General Assembly had emphasized the urgency of the consolidation of the Balkans as a region of peace, security, stability and good-neighbourliness, thus contributing to the maintenance of international peace and security. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia sincerely hoped that would be a significant step towards establishing a lower level of armaments and a higher level of confidence-building measures in the region.

162. No other multilateral arms control treaty in existence could match the security benefits provided by the non-proliferation Treaty under its system of accountancy and control of nuclear weapons which facilitated both verification and nuclear commerce.

163. IAEA should continue to ensure that the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy were made more widely available to all the States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty.

164. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia agreed that a number of improvements were needed in the IAEA safeguards system because the current system had been designed three decades previously and, since then, States had become more accustomed to confidence-building measures in the form of international inspections. However, it was important to recognize that the creation and maintenance of political and security conditions which were
conducive to non-proliferation were the most crucial elements in preventing proliferation.

165. Since there was so much at stake for current and future generations, for nuclear-weapon States and for non-nuclear-weapon States, his delegation hoped to work with all the delegations of States which were parties to the Treaty in order to achieve its indefinite and unconditional extension.

166. Mr. MORADI (Islamic Republic of Iran), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that he deplored the unjustified and unsubstantiated remarks made by the representative of the United Kingdom about the Islamic Republic of Iran. It was regrettable that, since the beginning of the general debate of such an important Conference, which should help harmonize points of view, certain States were making comments which spread discord.

167. His Government’s position on the export control regime was very clear. Recent events demonstrated that disagreements regarding the regime had been accentuated when a small group of supplier States, referring to "gaps" in the IAEA safeguards system, had decided unilaterally to establish regimes which did not fall within the purview of the Treaty. Taking advantage of their privileged position as supplier States and ignoring the suspicions of the majority of States parties, they were taking secret decisions after closed debates and, curiously, were making no distinction between non-nuclear-weapon States parties and non-nuclear-weapon States which were not parties to the Treaty, thereby disregarding the inalienable right of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to have access to the peaceful applications of nuclear technology. In recent years, certain countries which controlled exports, such as the United Kingdom, which, moreover, had essentially helped create nuclear capacity in some countries, had tried to justify the discriminatory nature of the export control regime. It was time to review those erroneous principles in order to strengthen the implementation of the Treaty. The States parties to the Treaty which fulfilled their obligations should be able to exercise their inalienable right as stipulated in article IV of the Treaty and have free access to the peaceful applications of nuclear energy. Certain powers considered themselves to be above the law and were claiming the right to judge the intentions of others, which was in absolute contradiction with the spirit of the Treaty.

168. The PRESIDENT said that the Organization of African Unity had requested observer status at the Conference. He suggested that the request should be approved.

169. It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 7.10 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 4th MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 19 April 1995, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. DHANAPALA (Sri Lanka)

The meeting was called to order at 10.10 a.m.

GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 15) (continued)

1. Mr. NZO (South Africa) said that South Africa had played an active part in the work of the Preparatory Committee and, in response to General Assembly resolution 49/75 F, had provided a legal analysis of the extension options contained in article X, paragraph 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It was committed to a policy of non-proliferation and arms control covering all weapons of mass destruction and extending to conventional weapons. That policy was integral to its commitment to democracy, human rights, sustainable development, social justice and environmental protection.

2. The dramatic changes brought about by the end of the cold war had created the global environment in which it had been possible for the number of nuclear weapons to be reduced. The international community now had a unique opportunity to achieve the basic objectives of the Treaty. It was South Africa’s fundamental belief that the Treaty should not be placed in jeopardy, and that the review and extension process should strengthen, not weaken, the non-proliferation regime. South Africa firmly believed that the security of individual countries, and of the international community as a whole, would be severely damaged if the Treaty were weakened.

3. South Africa had taken the decision to destroy its nuclear weapons and become a State party to the Treaty because it felt that its security would be guaranteed by the Treaty’s provisions. Since the entry into force of the Treaty, the number of threshold States had diminished, and several countries, including South Africa, had drawn back from the nuclear-weapon option and become a part of a nuclear non-proliferation regime. Furthermore, the Treaty was the only international instrument on nuclear disarmament to which all five nuclear-weapon States were bound. Its continued existence would ensure that that commitment by nuclear-weapon States remained.

4. South Africa believed that the inequalities inherent in the Treaty, as well as the criticism of some of its provisions, should not be dealt with in such a way that they threatened the security that the Treaty provided. South Africa therefore supported the view that the Treaty should be extended indefinitely. The termination of the Treaty, whether by placing conditions on its future existence or extending it only for a fixed period, was not an acceptable option. The linkage of the Treaty to certain conditions raised the question, inter alia, of what would happen if the conditions were not met. However, there was concern that proper checks and balances should be put in place to ensure that the objectives of the Treaty were translated into reality.

5. The decision on extension should be taken only after every effort had been made to achieve the broadest possible support. Any decision taken by a simple majority would weaken the Treaty and undermine the commitment of those left on the outside. While a consensus decision would be ideal, the decision must be taken by a significant majority, which would need to include key countries from across group boundaries.
6. A mechanism must be found to address the concerns expressed about the implementation of the Treaty. The review process provided for in article VIII should be strengthened. That could be done by adopting a set of principles for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament which would set out the general obligations and goals which States parties would strive for, taking into account the prevailing international environment. The principles would not constitute an amendment to the Treaty; commitment to them would be renewed at every review to ensure that they were dynamic and corresponded to changing international circumstances. They would not be conditions which could lead to the termination of the Treaty, but a yardstick by which all States parties could measure their achievement.

7. The following broad issues should be taken into account when formulating the principles: restatement of the commitment to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; strengthening of and full adherence to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguard agreements; access to nuclear material and technology for peaceful purposes; progress in the negotiations on a treaty on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, the reduction of nuclear arsenals and negotiations for the establishment of a comprehensive test-ban treaty; commitment to the establishment of regional nuclear-weapon-free zones, and the enforcement of binding security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.

8. South Africa proposed that a committee should be established - either open-ended or consisting of a representative group of countries - which would be responsible for studying the review process and making concrete recommendations on how to improve and strengthen the review conference mechanism. The report on its recommendations should be submitted for the consideration of all States parties, possibly at an additional Preparatory Committee session prior to the review conference in the year 2000. The Preparatory Committee should then be responsible for including those improvements in the agenda and programme of work of the next review conference.

9. South Africa had a number of initial suggestions which could be considered by such a committee. It believed that the basic structure of the review conferences should be retained, but that subcommittees of the three main committees should be established in order to take up specific issues falling within the ambit of the Treaty provisions which were being considered by the parent main committee. It proposed the adoption of a set of principles for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and the establishment of an open-ended committee which would meet at fixed intervals during the period between review conferences and consider specific ways of strengthening all aspects of the Treaty and the non-proliferation regime.

10. South Africa agreed that the disarmament provisions contained in article VI were essential for the effective implementation of the Treaty. It welcomed the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I) and the Treaty on the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II) and believed that steps should be taken to accelerate the pace of nuclear disarmament and achieve the earliest possible conclusion of a START III agreement. Consideration should also be given to including the arsenals of the other nuclear-weapon States in the process. South Africa welcomed the security assurances embodied in Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and in the statements made in the Security Council by the five nuclear-weapon States. However, it remained convinced that the most effective way to address the issue was the negotiation, by all the States parties, of an international agreement prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties. South Africa believed that nuclear-weapon-free zones gave an added dimension to the security provided by the Treaty. It was an active supporter of an African nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty and would be hosting the next meeting of the Group of Experts preparing the text for such a treaty.

11. With regard to article III, South Africa supported the principle of strengthened safeguards as well as the work that was being done by IAEA. It
had been participating in field trials and in principle supported the idea of including environmental monitoring as an integral part of the safeguards system, but needed time to obtain an opinion on the legal implications of such a system, as well as more information on the cost implications. It urged greater transparency on the part of the nuclear-weapon States; that would help allay concerns and suspicions regarding the manner in which they were meeting their responsibilities under the Treaty.

12. With regard to article IV, South Africa was participating in the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme and was strongly in favour of the exchange of technology for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy between the developed and developing world, based on the concept of sustainable development. South Africa was currently a host country for the training of scientists and technicians from Africa. It had supported the establishment by IAEA of a Standing Advisory Group on Technical Assistance and Cooperation (SAGTAC), and believed that SAGTAC should convene a meeting of all interested parties, particularly the developing countries, to discuss specific problem areas in the field of nuclear technology transfer. South Africa, with its extensive nuclear infrastructure and competencies, was also participating actively in many projects in Africa under the African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology; it would strongly support greater levels of involvement on the part of the developed world in the transfer of peaceful nuclear technologies to the developing world, and especially to Africa.

13. Democratic South Africa saw international and regional security being achieved by complete nuclear disarmament. The South African experience — that security was provided by nuclear disarmament rather than by nuclear proliferation — was significant, not only for the threshold States, but also for the acknowledged nuclear-weapon States. South Africa believed that, with the necessary political will, it was possible to create a world free of nuclear weapons.

14. Ms. HALONEN (Finland) said that the Conference had a momentous decision to take which would have a lasting impact on international peace and security. The Conference should once and for all remove any uncertainty about the permanence of the Treaty. Finland had joined the Treaty because it saw it as contributing to its national security and economic development. It had no regrets.

15. The Treaty had stood the test of time; it had become a global norm, upheld by the vast majority of the States. Even those States which might harbour nuclear-weapon ambitions were not willing to say so publicly. When non-compliance had been established beyond the shadow of a doubt, as in the case of Iraq, the international community had upheld the Treaty with determination. When compliance had been and was in doubt, as in the case of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the international community needed to insist that the doubts be removed to its satisfaction.

16. Important work had been initiated by IAEA to strengthen its role in verifying the non-existence of undeclared nuclear activities. Finland was a strong supporter of "Programme 93+2", and believed that the Conference should support the measures called for in that programme. Finland had accepted IAEA safeguards on all its nuclear activities, both current and future. It also required acceptance of full-scope safeguards by any non-nuclear-weapon recipient of nuclear transfers from its territory. The Conference should urge those few suppliers which did not yet do so to require such a condition without delay. That condition derived from the general obligation under the Treaty not to assist in any way in the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

17. The non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty had a legitimate right to assurances against nuclear aggression. Finland therefore welcomed the unanimous adoption of Security Council resolution 984 (1995). For Finland, as a non-nuclear-weapon State, the ultimate goal remained the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Indefinite extension of the Treaty would provide the necessary framework for renewed efforts towards nuclear
disarmament. Article VI would become a permanent obligation. Indefinite extension would also send a clear message to those few States that still remained outside the Treaty that the Treaty was permanent and that to remain outside was to remain in the cold. The Treaty was there also to help if a non-State party decided to change its mind. South Africa had shown that it could be done. Finland hoped that India, Israel and Pakistan would also become States parties. Finland welcomed the recent steps towards the consolidation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, as well as the progress made towards the denuclearization of Africa.

18. The nuclear-arms race was over; the threat of a global nuclear war had receded beyond the horizon. The Conference should recognize that historic change. The number of nuclear weapons was rapidly decreasing. Finland urged rapid withdrawal from operational use of all the remaining tactical nuclear weapons and their subsequent elimination. A comprehensive and verifiable nuclear-test-ban treaty would complement other efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. That treaty must ban all nuclear explosions. The technological hopes of the 1960s that nuclear explosions could be used for peaceful purposes had turned out to be misguided; there was no justification for conducting such explosions. The Conference should note that article V was in fact a dead letter; that would benefit the negotiations on a comprehensive test ban. There was also an urgent need for a multilateral ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear explosive purposes so as to cap the bomb-making ability not only of the five nuclear-weapon States but also of those which still remained outside the Treaty.

19. Mr. GORE (United States of America) said that, like those who had gathered 50 years earlier to create the United Nations, the international community was assembled at a moment of unusual opportunity and great risk. The confrontation between the United States and the former Soviet Union had ended, and their Governments had put behind them a relationship based on a nuclear balance of terror, profoundly diminishing but not eliminating the risk of nuclear war.

20. The struggle to block the proliferation of nuclear weapons had entered a critical phase. The knowledge and capacity to build nuclear weapons was increasingly available, and although most countries had recognized that the acquisition of nuclear weapons would bring greater insecurity and danger, the few seeking them had an increasing possibility of succeeding. The diminishing risk that nuclear war would be caused by one rivalry was offset by an increasing risk that it would be caused by others.

21. At the time of its creation, the Treaty had represented a delicate balance between competing and seemingly irreconcilable interests. After a quarter century of experience, it must be determined whether the cause of peace was best served by continuing the Treaty under temporary arrangements, or by using the one-time option to give it a permanent basis by supporting its indefinite extension without conditions.

22. The case for indefinite extension could be stated succinctly. The Treaty created a more secure world for all its members, nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States alike. By providing an internationally recognized, verifiable means for States to forswear nuclear weapons forever, the Treaty helped to prevent regional rivalries from evolving into arms races. By making it possible for the vast majority of the world's nations to remain non-nuclear without jeopardizing their security, the Treaty reinforced the global stability that was a necessary foundation for progress in arms control and disarmament.

23. The principal arguments directed against indefinite extension were that the Treaty was inherently discriminatory, that the nuclear-weapon States had failed to live up to their commitments under article VI, that indefinite extension would free the nuclear-weapon States from further pressure to disarm, that the Treaty exposed non-nuclear States to intimidation by nuclear-weapon States and States not party to the Treaty, and that it would destroy the capacity of the agreement to be adapted to future circumstances.
24. The Treaty had recognized an initial division of States between those possessing nuclear weapons and those pledged not to acquire them, but it did not create a permanent class of nuclear-weapon States. Rather, those States had a binding legal obligation under article VI to pursue negotiations in good faith on arms control and disarmament. Indefinite extension would ensure the permanence of that obligation and create the conditions for its ultimate achievement. Some also argued that the nuclear-weapon States had failed to live up to their commitments under article VI, but the evidence strongly supported the case that they were moving in the direction prescribed by their obligations under the Treaty. The United States and Russia, under the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) had eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. The combined results of the START I and START II Treaties would be a two-thirds reduction in the nuclear arsenals of those two countries. They had also agreed not to target their remaining nuclear missiles. In addition, the United States had stopped producing fissile materials for nuclear explosives, and had launched a new global effort to halt their production anywhere in the world. In 1994, the United States had for the first time submitted weapons material from its stockpile to IAEA safeguards. To propel further the effort to negotiate a comprehensive test ban treaty, the United States had extended its moratorium on nuclear tests, and a previous proposal for a ten-year withdrawal provision had been withdrawn. If the Conference on Disarmament was successful, it was possible that the United States had already conducted its last nuclear test. He paid tribute to Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, which had become parties to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States, as had South Africa, which had rid itself of its nuclear weapons in order to join the Treaty.

25. Rather than indefinite extension, some argued that the best way to ensure that the nuclear-weapon States moved towards disarmament was to subject it to periodic live-or-die votes, or by extending it with conditions. Yet there were serious flaws in that argument. It was worth noting that even a review period of 25 years was well within the service lifetime of a major nuclear weapons system. In practical effect, rolling periods of review could have the same consequences as an immediate decision to terminate the Treaty. Making the Treaty subject to periodic risk would encourage States which aspired to nuclear weapons to hold their options in reserve, rather than to accept the permanence of their obligations under the Treaty.

26. Nuclear-weapon States clearly understood that damaging the NPT also damaged their own security, and thus had strong motives to refrain from nuclear threats and instead to provide credible assurances designed to allay the concerns of others. In fact, the United States and the other four nuclear-weapon States had just provided positive and negative security assurances to the international community. In addition, the success of the NPT built a barrier against nuclear threats by establishing a global norm of non-proliferation. In response to the argument that indefinite extension would destroy its ability to meet changing circumstances, radical changes had taken place in the world in recent years which the Treaty had handled without difficulty. Furthermore, reserves of flexibility were built into the procedures for review and amendment, and would not be altered by a decision to extend it indefinitely and without conditions.

27. In an era in which super-Power confrontation had been replaced by cooperation to eliminate nuclear arms, but in which the dangers of nuclear proliferation were increasingly apparent, the Treaty remained central to the cause of peace. He called for support of the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty, because it was deeply in the security interests of all.

28. Legislative bodies throughout the world, in ratifying the Treaty, had accepted that they would be bound by a decision made by the majority of the parties. Any suggestion that the decision might be made through a secret ballot undermined the confidence placed in those legislative bodies. Nations which called for accountability must accept its burdens. The United States strongly rejected any notion that the decisions of the Conference could not
stand the light of day, and called on all countries to take responsibility for their actions.

29. The international community had learned what those who were present at the creation of the atomic age could only hope: that proliferation could be halted, and that nations could work together to protect their mutual security. There could be no rest until those goals, and the Treaty, became enduring realities.

30. Mr. KABARITI (Jordan) said that, in reflecting on the achievements and future goals of the NPT after 25 years, the Treaty had succeeded in preventing an increase in the number of declared nuclear-weapon States, although certain States had been able to escape the controls of the international non-proliferation regime and produce nuclear weapons. It had also succeeded in promoting the renunciation of the production and development of nuclear weapons and in portraying any State which sought to acquire such weapons as an international outlaw. The Treaty had linked the question of proliferation with increased danger of nuclear war, and had drawn attention to the dangers of a regional arms race. It had provided the IAEA safeguards system with the legal authority to carry out its tasks, as well.

31. The impossibility of achieving complete nuclear disarmament, as it appeared at the end of the 1960s, had not discouraged the international community from seeking to achieve that goal. The horizontal non-proliferation of nuclear weapons had been considered a temporary solution to that dilemma, but the ultimate aim of the Treaty was complete nuclear disarmament. The reasons why complete nuclear disarmament, and even the less ambitious goal of a comprehensive nuclear test ban, had not been achieved, should be explored.

32. The obligations imposed on nuclear States by article VI were clear. The first, i.e. the cessation of the nuclear arms race, had been achieved between the two super-Powers following the end of the cold war, but not at the regional level. The emergence of so-called threshold States had aggravated the problem because such States presented a strong incentive to neighbouring States to acquire nuclear weapons. Fulfilment of the second obligation under article VI, i.e. overall nuclear disarmament, was still distant despite progress achieved bilaterally between the two super-Powers; more distant still was general and complete disarmament, the third obligation under article VI. While Jordan viewed with satisfaction the moratorium on nuclear tests by four of the five nuclear powers, it considered that neither the nuclear-test moratorium nor a binding treaty, if achieved, would fulfil the obligation of the nuclear powers under the Treaty to undertake general and complete nuclear disarmament. Accordingly, Jordan hoped for the early finalization of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, to be followed by other steps towards that ultimate goal.

33. Jordan noted with deep appreciation the services offered by the IAEA in the area of provision of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes to non-nuclear States. It called upon those States that possessed nuclear technology to enable the Agency to overcome existing obstacles to providing nuclear energy to developing countries for peaceful uses and to the efficient and effective implementation of the safeguards system.

34. The refusal of some States possessing nuclear capabilities to accede to the Treaty reduced its efficacy as well as the commitment of States parties to fully implement its provisions. For example, Israel had consistently refused to accede to the Treaty for the past quarter century, despite other recent successes in the Middle East peace process. Israel's accession to the Treaty and placement of all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards would help achieve such positive results as preventing the occurrence of potentially disastrous nuclear accidents, accelerating negotiations within the framework of the Arms Control and Regional Security Group, enhancing the progress of and building confidence in other parts of the peace process in general, mitigating the regional arms race to foster economic and social development in the region, and bolstering the universality of the Treaty by encouraging other States not parties to accede to it. Jordan believed it would be very
difficult to convince the peoples in the region of Israel's credibility, seriousness and desire for a just, durable and comprehensive peace in the Middle East if Israel continued its intransigence and refusal to accede to the Treaty or place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.

35. Israel's accession to the Treaty would also pave the way towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the region, in accordance with the numerous General Assembly resolutions to that effect adopted over the previous two decades. However, those resolutions had yet to be implemented, and the nuclear powers had a major responsibility for establishing such zones both in the Middle East and in the world at large. To date, only the Treaties of Tlatelolco and Rarotonga had been concluded to establish such zones in inhabited areas, although a treaty to establish such a zone in Africa was about to be opened for signature.

36. The security assurances given to the non-nuclear-weapon States in compensation for their renunciation of the nuclear option did not provide those States with sufficient security. Rather, what were required were comprehensive, legally binding and unconditional security assurances, both positive and negative, along the lines of the non-use and non-first use of nuclear weapons. The role of the Security Council in that regard extended to monitoring of the implementation of Treaty provisions and the even-handed prevention of further nuclear-weapons proliferation. However, the Treaty lacked implementation machinery or sanctions regimes, relying for those functions on the IAEA and the Charter of the United Nations respectively. It was therefore imperative that the Conference should concentrate on finding solutions to those shortcomings in the Treaty before considering the question of extending it. While reaffirming the utmost importance of the Treaty's continuing to play its vital role, Jordan also reaffirmed the need for the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their obligations under the Treaty by:

(1) Intensifying their efforts to achieve a general and complete nuclear disarmament, by concluding a Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty and a treaty banning the production of fissile material;

(2) Making additional efforts to provide nuclear technology for peaceful purposes to non-nuclear States;

(3) Working to provide comprehensive, legally binding and effective security assurances, both positive and negative, to non-nuclear-weapon States, and working towards a treaty committing the nuclear powers to the non-use and non-first use of nuclear weapons;

(4) Securing the universality of the Treaty by exercising pressure on States with nuclear capability like Israel that remained outside the Treaty framework and ending regional nuclear-arms races;

(5) Enhancing the role of the Security Council in observing the Treaty implementation and even-handedly promoting its universality;

(6) Supporting the effectiveness of the International Atomic Energy Agency by enhancing its system of guarantees and increasing its human and financial resources; and

(7) Encouraging the establishment of nuclear-weapons-free zones throughout the world, with priority for the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East in order to avoid the dangers to the peace process posed by the presence there of nuclear weapons.

37. Jordan was motivated by its commitment to achieving peace and consolidating stability and security in the Middle East and the world at large. As the main pillar of the international non-proliferation regime, the Treaty required review and constructive criticism from time to time in order to strengthen it and ensure its universality.
38. Mr. MWAMBULUKUTU (United Republic of Tanzania) said that Tanzania had always regarded the Treaty as an important instrument for arms control, and was aware of the significant role it had played in discouraging horizontal proliferation. However, the nuclear-weapon States had failed to fully meet their obligations under article VI in the area of progress towards total nuclear disarmament. Tanzania welcomed the call of the United Nations Secretary-General for the reduction and destruction of all nuclear weapons and the means to make them. The past 25 years had witnessed an unprecedented nuclear arms race, with the majority of those weapons having been deployed after the Treaty came into force in 1970. Other risks remained as well, such as those of weapons-grade material falling into the wrong hands, as well as of nuclear accidents. The international community was responsible for ensuring that such leakages did not lead to unbridled proliferation.

39. The Treaty itself had fundamental shortcomings which compromised its effective functioning, as for example its failure to address the imbalance between the nuclear States, with their stockpiled arsenals, and the non-nuclear States, which had voluntarily given up any ambition to acquire nuclear capability. Non-nuclear States had further expressed their commitment to nuclear disarmament in their decisions to voluntarily establish nuclear-weapons-free zones in various regions of the world.

40. Another area of great concern to the majority of States parties was the imbalance between nuclear and non-nuclear States in the application of the safeguards regime provided for under article III; such safeguards should also not be used as a pretext for denying States parties access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

41. Tanzania paid tribute to the vital role of the IAEA in implementing the Treaty, and called for its resources to be increased so that it could fulfil its responsibilities in channelling the transfer of peaceful nuclear technology and for assistance to developing countries. Tanzania was indebted to the IAEA for its technical assistance and promotion of regional cooperation ventures through the African Regional Cooperative Agreement (AFRA).

42. To date, efforts to provide security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States had fallen short of the legally binding instrument those States required, in which nuclear-weapon States would reaffirm the non-use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. However, Tanzania looked forward to the conclusion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and continued to view that Treaty as a cornerstone for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

43. Tanzania was strongly of the view that continuing with the Treaty in its present form was to perpetuate the inequalities inherent in it, and to legitimize the existence of deadly weapons in the hands of the few. Unconditional and indefinite extension of the Treaty was surely not a viable option if the past was to determine the future; any decision on extension of the Treaty should reflect the interests of the powerful and less-powerful alike.

44. Mr. AL-SHARA’ (Syrian Arab Republic) said that the Treaty was not an end in itself, but rather a step towards limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons and towards their total eradication. However, in the first 25 years of its operation, the Treaty had not succeeded in ridding the world of nuclear weapons; nor had the nuclear States parties lived up to their commitments to eradicate nuclear weapons, prevent their proliferation, or even to assist non-nuclear States parties in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Some of the nuclear-weapon States parties had even obstructed the transfer of peaceful nuclear technology to non-nuclear-weapon States parties, which had abided by its provisions, while channelling sophisticated technology to Israel, which had steadfastly refused to sign the Treaty. That in turn had paved the way for Israel’s acquisition of military nuclear capabilities, in contravention of the letter and spirit of the Treaty.

45. Syria believed that the international community had a unique opportunity to undertake a comprehensive review of the Treaty, to set up machinery that
would guarantee the eradication of nuclear weapons and their manufacture, and destroy stockpiles of such weapons throughout the world. His country believed that the Treaty would remain unable to achieve its objectives as long as all the States of the world without exception did not accede to it and abide by its provisions. Adherence to the Treaty was even more crucial at the regional level. In that regard, it was unreasonable to require the Arab States of the Middle East region, who had proved their commitment to the Treaty for over a quarter of a century, to extend it unconditionally and indefinitely while Israel, which was known to have a military nuclear programme, refused to accede to it. Moreover, Israel not only categorically sidestepped the requirements of a comprehensive peace with its immediate neighbours, but consistently thwarted any efforts to achieve such a peace and strenuously objected to the legitimate right of any State in the region to develop a peaceful nuclear programme under international inspection and control.

46. In a resolution adopted unanimously by the Council of the League of Arab States, Syria and all the Arab States had expressed their deep concern at that critical situation in the region. The resolution had stressed inter alia that the entrenchment of the status quo whereby all the States of the Middle East with the exception of Israel were committed to the non-proliferation system constituted a dangerous and unacceptable balance that threatened the region's security and stability.

47. Syria had remained faithful to its obligations under the Treaty and on different occasions had made positive contributions to the promotion of stability and security in the region. At the Paris Conference on Chemical Weapons in 1989 it had put forward an initiative to rid the Middle East region of all nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction under the auspices of the United Nations. Proceeding from its concern for the security and stability of the region, Syria could not agree to the extension of the Treaty unless Israel acceded to it and subjected its nuclear installations to international inspection. That position did not emanate from a wish or intention to set aside the objectives of the Treaty but rather from Syria’s categorical rejection of the presence of nuclear weapons in the Middle East without any genuine international efforts being made to eliminate such weapons. Furthermore, had the Conference suspended its activities for a reasonable period of time to try to make all possible efforts to arrive at an international consensus which would help to remove the loopholes in the Treaty and ensure both its effectiveness and universality by obtaining the accession of all the States of the world to it without exception, Syria would not have objected to its extension.

48. Syria nevertheless remained committed to the achievement of a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East region as well as to the universality of the non-proliferation Treaty.

49. Mr. GODAL (Norway) said that the threat of nuclear war no longer derived from super-Power rivalry in a bipolar world but from the spread of nuclear weapons and associated technologies, material and expertise to areas of political tension and internal unrest. In the view of the Norwegian Government, the non-proliferation Treaty was the most important instrument at the international community’s disposal in the efforts to counter that threat. While no other multilateral arms control agreement had obtained the support of so many countries, he none the less believed that the most serious drawback of the Treaty, as the only legally binding instrument of global application in the field of nuclear arms control and disarmament, was that it did not have a permanent status.

50. In his Government’s view, the Treaty should be extended indefinitely and be granted unlimited duration for a number of important reasons. It served as a barrier against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and held out the promise of a world free of nuclear weapons. It was an instrument for assessing and influencing the disarmament efforts undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States in accordance with their obligations under article VI of the Treaty. The review mechanism would continue to be an integral and vital part of the Treaty once a decision on extension had been taken. Uncertainty as to
the future of the Treaty could easily weaken the effect of those systematic reviews. Uncertainty concerning the duration of the Treaty could also have a negative effect on the will of the nuclear-weapon States to implement further disarmament measures. Indefinite extension of the Treaty would reinforce the global non-nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-proliferation norm. Extending it for a short fixed period would send a signal to would-be proliferators that the international community was no longer seeking the indefinite prevention of nuclear proliferation, but some lesser goal.

51. While a non-proliferation treaty of indefinite duration was not sufficient to ensure total nuclear disarmament, giving the Treaty permanent legal status provided the best possible framework for a continuation of efforts towards a world free from the threat of nuclear weapons. In that regard, rapid progress was needed on a number of interrelated issues which included the need for all nuclear Powers to reconfirm their commitment to the aim of a nuclear-free world and a firm commitment on the part of such Powers to abstain from the threat of use or the use of nuclear weapons against States which did not possess such weapons. A comprehensive ban on all nuclear testing had been a priority arms control issue for the Norwegian Government for many years and negotiations in that regard should be speeded up. In his opinion, the notion of nuclear explosions for so-called peaceful purposes should be rejected. Norway also believed that concrete steps must be taken to establish a regime that would include declarations of stockpiles of all weapons-grade materials accompanied by other appropriate transparency measures, while more effective measures should be agreed upon for registering, managing and monitoring existing stocks of plutonium in order to address the growing international concern about the illegal transfer and smuggling of nuclear material of weapons-grade quality. The safe and secure storage and handling of fissile material was also a matter of urgency if further environmental degradation was to be prevented from following in the wake of a comprehensive disarmament process. Norway welcomed the efforts under the auspices of IAEA to draw up an international convention on the safety of radioactive waste management.

52. The end of the cold war had uncovered large-scale military related environmental damage of an inherently cross-border character, affecting entire regions and spanning several countries. The question of how to allocate sufficient resources to deal with those challenges was a matter of urgency.

53. The current downgrading of the role of nuclear weapons in international affairs was of paramount importance. His Government therefore welcomed the political will in the United States and the Russian Federation to seek an agreement on further reductions and limitations of strategic forces beyond the stipulations of the START II Treaty and the will on the part of the British and French authorities to implement further reductions. The fact that non-nuclear-weapon States de-emphasized the importance of a nuclear deterrent to national security not only reduced the role of nuclear weapons as such but should also influence the thinking of other States on that issue.

54. Preventing proliferation was a matter of political will to which the non-proliferation regime as a whole contributed. The first and most important barrier to proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction was an international political order which made those weapons meaningless. International cooperation to resolve regional and local conflicts was indispensable and should therefore be seen in the context of non-proliferation. Confidence-building measures could help to improve relations between States by replacing distrust, tension and uncertainty with confidence, stability and cooperation.

ELECTION OF CHAIRMEN AND VICE-CHAIRMEN OF THE MAIN COMMITTEES, THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE AND THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE (continued)

55. The President said that Mr. Rajab Sukayri (Jordan) had been nominated for the post of Vice-Chairman of Main Committee II, Mr. Gustavo Alvarez Goyoaga (Uruguay) for the post of Vice-Chairman of Main Committee III and Mr. Nabil Fahmy (Egypt) for the post of Vice-Chairman of the
Drafting Committee. If there was no objection, he would take it that the Conference wished to approve the nominations.

56. It was so decided.

ELECTION OF VICE-PRESIDENTS (agenda item 9) (continued)

57. The President announced the following nominations for the posts of Vice-President: for the Group of Eastern European and Other States: Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic and Ukraine; for the Group of Western European and Other States: Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, France, Japan, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States of America; for the Group of Non-Aligned and Other States: Algeria, Bangladesh, Cameroon, the People's Republic of China, the Congo, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Peru, South Africa, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania and Venezuela. If there was no objection, he would take it that the Conference wished to approve the nominations.

58. It was so decided.

CREDENTIALS OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE CONFERENCE (agenda item 10) (continued) (a) APPOINTMENT OF THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE

59. The President proposed Armenia, Germany, Italy, Lesotho, Lithuania and Myanmar as members of the Credentials Committee. If he heard no objection, he would take it that the Conference agreed with the proposal.

60. It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 5th MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 19 April 1995, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. ZLENKO (Ukraine) (Vice-President)

later: Mr. DHANAPALA (Sri Lanka) (President)

In the absence of Mr. Dhanapala (Sri Lanka), Mr. Zlenko (Ukraine), Vice-President, took the Chair.

The meeting was called to order at 3.25 p.m.

GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 15) (continued)

1. Mr. ZACHARAKIS (Greece) said that he fully supported the statement made by the representative of France on behalf of the European Union. For his part, he would confine himself to emphasizing the importance which his country attached to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and addressing some issues which were of particular interest to Greece.

2. The non-proliferation Treaty was the most important agreement in the history of nuclear disarmament. It had not only prevented the spread of nuclear weapons and promoted technical cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, but had also provided a frame of reference for nuclear disarmament efforts.

3. The steps taken since the previous Review Conference to strengthen nuclear export controls and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards had contributed to global confidence and security, as evidenced by the significant increase in the number of parties to the Treaty, which now numbered almost 180, including the five nuclear Powers. In order to fulfill the expectations thus raised, it was essential to extend the Treaty indefinitely. Any other solution would create uncertainty about the future of the Treaty, deprive it of its credibility and very quickly have a destabilizing effect.

4. In the absence of the non-proliferation Treaty, a number of achievements, including the IAEA safeguards, could fall apart. In that connection, Greece fully subscribed to the position adopted by the European Union at the Corfu summit meeting that the Treaty should be extended indefinitely. European unanimity was all the more remarkable in that the Union was comprised of both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. It should also be noted that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe supported the European Union’s initiative. Reviewing the arguments of those who were opposed to the indefinite extension of the Treaty, he said that, whatever the modalities agreed upon, such a solution would deprive non-nuclear-weapon States of the possibility of exerting pressure on the nuclear Powers to honour their commitments under article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty. Indeed, it had been under the pressure exerted within the Review Conferences convened periodically in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3, that a reduction in nuclear arsenals had recently been undertaken. The opportunity to exert such pressure would be lost if the Treaty were to expire. Moreover, the nuclear Powers would then be freed of the obligation to disarm which they had undertaken in accordance with article VI. That would have even worse consequences.
5. To extend the non-proliferation Treaty for a limited period would be tantamount to programming its expiration, unless an amendment was envisaged. That would be an extremely complex procedure which, in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 2, would have to be supported by the majority of parties to the Treaty (including all the nuclear-weapon States) or by all the parties to the Treaty which were members of the Board of Governors of IAEA. That cumbersome procedure would be very time-consuming.

6. It should also be pointed out that, in such a situation, it would be difficult for IAEA to plan and finance its safeguards activities, which must be based on long-term projections.

7. Greece was also opposed to the solution whereby the non-proliferation Treaty would be extended for several additional periods, since that would also create uncertainty about the future of the Treaty.

8. Whatever the Treaty’s shortcomings, its unconditional and indefinite extension was the only way to ensure that the commitments undertaken with regard to non-proliferation would remain valid. That solution would also ensure the continuation of a forum for debate on issues related to non-proliferation, cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the reduction of nuclear weapons and disarmament. The significant increase in the number of parties to the Treaty also argued in favour of a universal Treaty extended for an indefinite period.

9. With the end of the cold war and the conclusion of treaties calling for drastic reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Russian Federation, it was at last possible to envisage the attainment of the objectives set out in the non-proliferation Treaty of stemming both vertical and horizontal proliferation. In that connection, Greece supported the various efforts being made at the international level in the field of disarmament: the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, which should soon be achieved; the strengthening of the non-proliferation region and of the safeguards activities of IAEA; the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones, particularly in the Middle East; and the establishment by the Conference on Disarmament of an ad hoc committee to negotiate a universal and effectively verifiable treaty on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for weapon purposes. It also welcomed the adoption by consensus of Security Council resolution 984 (1995) on security assurances and the historic declarations made on that subject by the five nuclear Powers.

10. Whatever its shortcomings, a permanent non-proliferation Treaty would guarantee all parties thereto access to nuclear materials and technology. Greece had contributed towards that goal by providing substantial assistance to various countries and by making voluntary contributions to the Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund of IAEA.

11. In conclusion, he said that his country, which had been one of the first to sign the Treaty, believed that it should remain a vital framework for the efforts being made in the field of security, arms reduction and disarmament and that its unconditional and indefinite extension would promote economic and social development throughout the world.

12. Mr. WYZNER (Poland), referring to the political transformations which had taken place in his country and in Europe since the previous Review Conference, welcomed the fact that they had been accompanied by a renewal of the commitments undertaken in the cause of non-proliferation. In particular, he welcomed the fact that Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania had acceded to the non-proliferation Treaty and that, like Poland and the 52 States members of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, they were in favour of the unconditional and indefinite extension of the Treaty. In that connection, Poland shared the views expressed by the representative of France, speaking on behalf of the European Union and the associated States of Central and Eastern Europe.
13. On other continents, the non-proliferation regime was also being strengthened. In Latin America, initiatives had been taken by Argentina, Brazil and Chile, and the Treaty of Tlatelolco had recently been signed by Cuba. In Africa, with South Africa’s accession to the non-proliferation Treaty, there was now a prospect of the continent becoming denuclearized. Those successes and the fact that the Treaty had now become an almost universal instrument should not obscure the fact that a number of important States still remained outside it. Poland would be prepared to join with others in exploring ways of encouraging them to accede to the Treaty.

14. From that perspective, he reviewed the merits of the Treaty and emphasized that they included not only the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, but also nuclear disarmament.

15. In that connection, he welcomed the important advances made in nuclear disarmament and noted that article VI was being implemented. Following the accession of Ukraine to the non-proliferation Treaty, the START I Treaty had entered into force, paving the way for the early ratification and implementation of the START II Treaty. That would open up prospects for further reductions in the strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Russian Federation and, perhaps, of other nuclear Powers, too. The multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty were also going well and testified to the resolve of the five nuclear Powers to stand by the commitments they had made under article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty. It was to be hoped that, before the 1995 session was over, the Conference on Disarmament would have been able to elaborate a draft treaty that was acceptable to all parties to the negotiations. The draft must be not only comprehensive but specific, and it must prohibit all nuclear tests, everywhere and for all time, and leave no loopholes whatsoever. It was imperative that it should be adopted for an indefinite duration.

16. The elaboration of a treaty on the prohibition of the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapon purposes and other explosive devices was also going well. There were therefore many reasons to welcome the progress achieved in the implementation of article VI and to emphasize that the indefinite extension of the non-proliferation Treaty would lead to further advances in disarmament.

17. That solution would also open up broad prospects for trade cooperation and assistance in all areas of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, in particular the nuclear power industry. Suppliers must be confident that nuclear trade and cooperation would continue to take place within the framework of the safeguards provisions of the non-proliferation Treaty. When those prerequisites were met, the recipient States parties, in other words the nuclear have-nots, should be assured of their right of access to peaceful nuclear technology in accordance with article IV of the Treaty. Poland, which was also at the receiving end of technical cooperation and assistance in the civilian nuclear field and, to the extent of its possibilities, rendered assistance to others, was vitally interested in enhancing such cooperation. It greatly appreciated the role played by IAEA in that connection, and hoped that it would be strengthened.

18. Turning to the question of the safeguard provisions contained in article III of the non-proliferation Treaty he said that in view of recent instances of non-compliance with the Treaty, the need to assure sustained credibility and effectiveness of the IAEA safeguards had become evident. Accordingly, Poland was in favour of prompt implementation of the measures considered by IAEA in the context of the "programme 93 + 2" and it was ready to participate in the necessary work.

19. While speaking about IAEA safeguards he wished to commend the Agency on the considerable work it had accomplished since the last review conference: numerous inspections (including Iraq and in South Africa), verification of the quadripartite agreement on the implementation of safeguards in Argentina and Brazil, negotiation of safeguards agreements with the newly independent States
of the former Soviet Union and provision of assistance with a view to giving
effect to those agreements.

20. The Agency also deserved to be congratulated for its perseverance in
endeavouring to ensure full implementation of the safeguards agreement with
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. He noted with satisfaction that
IAEA was reporting cases of non-compliance to the Security Council as required
by the IAEA statute and that the Council was taking vigorous action in the
known cases of non-compliance with a Treaty.

21. It had been decided at the 1990 Review Conference that, in order to be
able to receive nuclear supplies, non-nuclear-weapon States would have to
agree to full-scope safeguards. That decision had been followed by a
consensus decision of the States of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group. As a
result, in order to be able to receive nuclear supplies, a non-nuclear-weapon
State must either be a party to the Treaty or have concluded full-scope
safeguards agreements with IAEA.

22. Unlike many other States, Poland believed that export control measures
whether agreed upon within the Zangger Committee or the Nuclear Suppliers'
Group, including those concerning dual-use nuclear items, were motivated by
principles of non-discrimination and that they served international trade and
cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

23. Turning to the issue of security assurances which it was legitimate to
give to non-nuclear-weapon States, he welcomed the adoption on 11 April 1995
of Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and the statements made on the
subject by each of the nuclear Powers.

24. He was convinced that the Treaty would be extended indefinitely and
unconditionally, and expressed the hope that the review mechanism it provided
for would be fully used in future to provide for continuous scrutiny and
enhancement of the Treaty's implementation.

25. Mr. CONSTANTINESCU (Romania) said that, as a country associated to the
European Union, Romania fully endorsed the positions outlined by the
presidency of the Union. All nations, both those which had nuclear weapons
and those that did not, would stand to benefit from a permanent non-
proliferation Treaty. It would be a sign of confidence in the international
non-proliferation regime centred around the Treaty. The latter was the
foundation for most other arms control agreements and it allowed mankind to
enjoy the many benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

26. The main objective of the Treaty, namely, to prevent the spread of
nuclear weapons, to foster cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy
and to work for an end of the nuclear arms race and encourage arms control and
disarmament, were being met. The Treaty was the only multilateral arms
control agreement that required its parties to negotiate nuclear disarmament
measures. The fact that in all regions of the world, rival States were
renouncing acquiring nuclear weapons presented very obvious security benefits.
South Africa's adherence to the Treaty had enhanced the security of all
African States. The same was true in Europe, where all States, including the
newly independent States of the former Soviet Union, were now parties to the
Treaty.

27. Implementation of IAEA safeguards was further evidence of the way in
which the Treaty strengthened international security. Safeguards did not, in
themselves, prevent or stop non-proliferation, but because of the confidence which
effective verification provided, they helped reduce the concerns that
potential adversaries might have regarding their own security. It was,
therefore, necessary to enhance the system of safeguards, starting with the
strengthening of the international inspection procedures carried out by IAEA.
The safeguards agreements with IAEA were important security assurances for all
countries. It was therefore essential for the Conference to reaffirm that
such agreements, which were mandated by the Treaty, were vital prerequisites
for the supply of any nuclear material or technology to non-nuclear-weapon
States for peaceful purposes. Multilateral coordinating groups, such as the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers' Group or the Missile Technology Control regime, supplemented the efforts of international organizations, which had difficulty tracking the many commercial business deals that sometimes opened the way to dangerous diversions of dual-use nuclear equipment. Participation in those groups should be strengthened and their effectiveness enhanced.

28. With regard to the future of the nuclear disarmament process, the Conference should take into account and reaffirm the importance of four main tracks: Firstly, there was a need to continue and accelerate the process of nuclear disarmament of the nuclear-weapon States. Secondly, a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty should be concluded; that might be possible in the near future. Thirdly, the multilateral negotiations on a future convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear explosive devices recently launched at the Conference on disarmament must be pursued. Finally, further enhancement of the nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime would be best served by the elaboration of international arrangements to strengthen the security of non-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and the individual statements on the subject made by the five nuclear-weapon States constituted an important step towards a suitable solution.

29. Romania urged all countries which had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty; all Parties should do their utmost to ensure that it was extended unconditionally and indefinitely. To do otherwise would be to undermine the very foundation of the thus-far successful world-wide efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons while making the benefits of peaceful uses of nuclear energy available to mankind. It would endanger the climate of trust prevailing among parties to the Treaty and would weaken their security and their hopes for enhanced nuclear cooperation. Participants in the Conference had a historic opportunity to create a more secure world. It must not be allowed to slip away.

30. **Mr. DHANAPALA (Sri Lanka) took the Chair.**

31. **Mr. AGAM (Malaysia) said that his delegation could not help but note the gap that existed between the commitments undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States under the Treaty and their actions.** The non-nuclear-weapon States, for their part, had fulfilled their commitments, in the hope that the nuclear-weapon States would do likewise. Unfortunately, the latter's nuclear programmes had expanded almost without restraint over the past few decades. The Treaty was neither fair nor just but, in fact, discriminatory: it accorded privileged status to the nuclear-weapon States and prohibited the non-nuclear-weapon States from developing or acquiring such weapons.

32. Malaysia acknowledged the important breakthroughs that had been made in the various disarmament negotiations among all or some of the nuclear-weapon States, which had led to major nuclear disarmament agreements. It was encouraged by the ongoing efforts to reduce nuclear weapons, but regretted that those breakthroughs were limited in scope and disappointing. The conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty was an essential prerequisite to halting the nuclear arms race, for it would contribute effectively to ending the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons. Pending the conclusion of such a treaty, the nuclear-weapon States which had instituted a moratorium on testing should maintain it and resist the temptation of resuming testing. Malaysia urged the nuclear-weapon State which did not as yet observe the moratorium to join in the voluntary restraint so as to create an atmosphere conducive to successful negotiations of that instrument.

33. Cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes was an equally important nuclear non-proliferation measure. His delegation was encouraged by the readiness of the nuclear-weapon States to do so. It hoped that they would spearhead the efforts to draw up a convention banning the production and stockpiling of fissile materials for nuclear weapons.
34. In a global security system premised on nuclear deterrence, it was only natural that the non-nuclear-weapon States should harbour feelings of insecurity. The latest effort by the nuclear-weapon States to remedy the situation, which had taken the form of Security Council resolution 984 (1995), together with individual statements on negative security assurances, were too little and too late. It was an obvious attempt by those States to provide a "sweetener" conducive to an indefinite extension of the Treaty rather than a real move to allay the fears of the non-nuclear-weapon States. The nuclear-weapon States parties should set a time-frame for the elimination of all nuclear weapons, provide greater security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States, and recognize and respect the binding nature of nuclear-weapon-free zones. The States outside the Treaty should become State parties as soon as possible to ensure its universality. However, the Treaty should not be perceived as a system that perpetuated the status quo.

35. One of the more positive developments under the Treaty was the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, as established by the Treaties of Tlatelolco and Rarotonga. Thanks to the efforts of ASEAN, south-east Asia also should soon have a nuclear-weapon-free zone. It was to be hoped that the treaty being drafted for that purpose would encourage similar trends in other parts of Asia, particularly in the Middle East, and in Africa and Europe.

36. A further positive aspect of the Treaty was the contribution it had made in the area of applications of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Unfortunately, the recently reinstated export control requirements were an impediment to the international exchange of nuclear materials and equipment for peaceful purposes under the Treaty.

37. Malaysia supported the strengthening of the IAEA safeguards regime; however, the legal implications of those measures would need to be studied in greater detail. It should be noted also that the resources for the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes through the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund were in a downward trend. That decline, together with the practice of not giving preferential treatment to States parties over non-parties, meant that only a part of article IV was being implemented. Positive discrimination in favour of States parties would encourage non-parties to accede. Malaysia also expected the monitoring and verification of nuclear materials and activities to be equally applicable to nuclear-weapon States. It therefore welcomed the offer by some nuclear-weapon States to open their peaceful nuclear facilities to IAEA inspection.

38. Despite certain misgivings in connection with the operational aspects of the Treaty, Malaysia was strongly supportive of its extension. It feared, however, that such an extension might permanently divide the world into nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States. It would also tend to confer legality on the possession and use or threat of use of nuclear weapons of mass destruction. Lastly, it would remove for ever the opportunity to utilize the Treaty as a legitimate means of once and for all eliminating nuclear weapons from the face of the earth.

39. For the reasons given, Malaysia found it difficult to support an indefinite extension of the Treaty. Nuclear weapons were immoral and should be declared illegal. Extension of the Treaty should be limited to a fixed period or periods pegged to a schedule of disarmament measures which the nuclear-weapon States must take, leading ultimately to a nuclear-free world. That was not an ideal but rather a specific initiative which could take shape if all the provisions of the Treaty were implemented. Extending the Treaty indefinitely and unconditionally would be a bar to changing the status quo and would mean rejecting once and for all the doctrine of nuclear deterrence.

40. Mr. Taylhardat (Venezuela) said that, from the very beginning of the nuclear era, the need to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons had been overriding. Although the risk of a nuclear holocaust had practically disappeared, the danger of nuclear-weapons proliferation was always present and had even increased. The possibility that some countries might try to acquire nuclear weapons currently added to the danger that unscrupulous
elements might traffic in nuclear products without concern for the destabilizing effects on international security. It was therefore of the most critical importance to strengthen further the international non-proliferation system. Accordingly, Venezuela supported without reservation the Treaty and the global non-proliferation system, of which the Treaty of Tlatelolco, establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean, was an essential piece.

41. The non-proliferation Treaty was probably one of the most paradoxical international instruments. After the Charter, it was the multilateral instrument which had garnered the support of the largest number of States. It had slowed the spread of nuclear weapons and promoted cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. However, the Treaty was also the source of deep resentment, because of both the inequalities it perpetuated and the lack of balance with which it was applied. The non-nuclear-weapon States had faithfully fulfilled their obligations. The nuclear Powers, on the other hand, had not fully honoured their commitments to end all nuclear testing, to pursue good-faith disarmament negotiations to halt the nuclear arms race, to stop production of nuclear weapons, to reduce existing arsenals, to dismantle nuclear warheads and their delivery systems and, lastly, to conclude a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

42. It was true that substantial progress had been made in recent years in the context of bilateral agreements between the United States and the Russian Federation: the arms race had virtually ceased and large quantities of nuclear warheads and missiles had been destroyed. Collateral measures had also been taken to slow vertical proliferation. However, it should be noted that those achievements did not result directly from the obligations embodied in the Treaty but were a fortunate effect of the end of the cold war and the trust which had developed between the two nuclear super-Powers. It should not be forgotten, either, that the world currently contained more nuclear weapons than it had in 1970.

43. Venezuela did not underestimate the importance of Security Council resolution 984 (1995) on negative and positive security assurances or the accompanying unilateral statements of the nuclear Powers. But, in order not to look like a last-ditch effort, those steps should have been taken earlier. Venezuela shared the Secretary-General's opinion that Council resolution 984 (1995) should go hand in hand with specific measures and be transformed into a legally binding instrument.

44. That was the climate of controversy in which the international community must take action of critical importance in determining the framework for the conduct of future international relations and the future shape of world security. All countries were aware of the dangers of the spread of nuclear weapons and wanted the Treaty to continue to shield them from the monstrous instrument of destruction which nuclear weapons represented. That was why the greatest care must be taken with the elements on which the decision to extend the Treaty would be based.

45. According to his delegation, those elements were: first, the decision must strengthen the Treaty and facilitate the attainment of its objectives; secondly, it must be the result of a consensus, since if adopted by a small majority or without the support of major and representative countries of the third world, the Treaty, like the non-proliferation system as a whole, would be unavoidably weakened; thirdly, it must be faithful to the spirit and letter of article X, paragraph 2, which stipulated as a prerequisite for extension the fulfilment of the obligations assumed by all the States parties; fourthly, it must maintain the verification machinery consisting of review conferences every five years; fifthly, it must ensure the maintenance of transfers of technology for peaceful purposes provided for in article IV; and, lastly, it must preserve the link between the renewal of the Treaty and the fulfilment of the obligations assumed by the nuclear Powers. The States parties must be able to call the Treaty into question; otherwise, its discriminatory character would be further accentuated.
46. Venezuela intended to submit to the Conference a formal proposal embodying the aforementioned conditions. The proposal would have the effect of extending the Treaty on the same terms and conditions as those on which it had been based originally: it could be extended for further periods of 25 years, it would be the subject of review conferences every five years, and every 25 years a conference of States parties would be convened to decide on its extension. Accordingly, the States parties could, if satisfied with the results obtained in the area of nuclear disarmament, decide to extend the Treaty for an indefinite period. On the other hand, they could opt for one of the formulas provided for in article X, paragraph 2.

47. Venezuela’s proposal would not entail any amendment of the Treaty, since it did not alter the current text at all, and it in no way excluded the possibility of convening another extension conference. The decision to extend the Treaty should be accompanied by a firm and solemn commitment on the part of the nuclear Powers to intensify their efforts to fulfil all the obligations they had assumed and to work effectively towards complete disarmament. Such a commitment would help to reduce the discriminatory nature of the Treaty and would have to be embodied in the documents recording the results of the review of the implementation of the Treaty. That valuable instrument could therefore provide a means of pressuring the nuclear Powers to honour fully their commitments and thereby to contribute to the complete elimination of nuclear arsenals.

48. Mr. Park (Republic of Korea) said it was extremely satisfying to note that the number of States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty continued to increase; he once again urged those countries which had not yet signed the Treaty to do so at the earliest possible date. His country had acceded to the treaty in 1975, had signed a full-scope safeguards agreement with IAEA in the same year and was fully committed to non-proliferation, as could be seen from the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, in which it had pledged not only to forego the development, possession and deployment of nuclear weapons, but also to give up reprocessing and enrichment facilities. His country, which was situated in close proximity to two nuclear-weapon States, a State having a very advanced civilian nuclear programme and North Korea, which had yet to ensure nuclear transparency, was in a uniquely precarious location, especially in the light of the recent serious threat of nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula. That had not prevented his country from faithfully implementing the provisions of the Treaty and remaining fully committed to preserving its integrity.

49. It was necessary to bolster confidence in the Treaty, which was the only viable and practical means of curbing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and to rectify the Treaty’s shortcomings, especially those relating to fairness and equity in its implementation. It would be unrealistic to ignore the protests concerning the different treatment accorded to States according to whether or not they possessed nuclear weapons. Only when the legitimate concerns raised by those disparities had been addressed would it be possible to attain fully the objectives of the Treaty with regard to nuclear disarmament, enhance the security of all States parties and foster cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

50. The objectives of the Treaty were interlinked and mutually complementary, and all must be treated with equal weight if the integrity of the Treaty was to be preserved. That had rarely been the case, for although an overwhelming number of non-nuclear-weapon States had cooperated fully in preventing nuclear proliferation, there had been exponential increases in the nuclear arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States since the Treaty had come into effect and it was only recently that progress towards nuclear disarmament had begun with the conclusion of the Intermediate nuclear forces Treaty and the START I and START II treaties. His delegation hoped that those treaties would encourage other States to follow suit and would be implemented promptly and effectively. It urged the nuclear-weapon States to exert further efforts to make major reductions in their nuclear arsenals.
51. It welcomed the adoption of Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and fully supported the ongoing negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. It also welcomed the moratorium on nuclear testing maintained by the United States, Russia, France and the United Kingdom and hoped that China would join the moratorium soon.

52. It likewise hoped that the negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons would begin soon in Geneva.

53. The best way of addressing the concerns expressed about the transfer of know-how and technology for peaceful uses of nuclear energy would be to make distinctions among States according to their behaviour. For example, preferential treatment should be given to States which had a solid history of honouring the provisions of the non-proliferation Treaty, while strict sanctions should be imposed on those States which had not respected their obligations under that treaty.

54. The IAEA safeguards measures were integral components of the Treaty, whose effectiveness would be enhanced by a strengthening of the IAEA inspection system. His delegation supported the 93 + 2 programme put forward by IAEA, which would strengthen the inspection regime and enhance the transparency of national nuclear policies. His country attached great importance to the role of the State system of accounting and control of nuclear materials and in April 1994 had even established a technology centre for nuclear control to enhance nuclear transparency. It was convinced that the establishment of similar national inspection systems by other countries could contribute effectively to the work of IAEA and looked to the latter for support in such efforts.

55. With regard to the crisis created recently by North Korea's refusal to comply with its obligations under the Treaty, he said that North Korea's nuclear activities threatened peace and security not only in the Korean peninsula but also in north-east Asia and could have serious implications for the implementation of the IAEA safeguards agreement. His delegation believed that the Agreed Framework concluded on 21 October 1994 in Geneva between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea could solve that problem and invited North Korea to implement faithfully all the provisions of that instrument, to ensure the total transparency of its nuclear programme under the safeguards agreement it had concluded with IAEA, and to comply fully with the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

56. Lastly, his country believed that the Treaty, which was the only global and nuclear non-proliferation treaty and was a basic norm-setting instrument in the field of nuclear non-proliferation, and which had also served as the model for all the major international arms control agreements, was essential to the enhancement of international peace and security and should therefore be extended indefinitely.

57. Mr. SHENK (Slovakia) said he was convinced that the Conference would further the use of nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes. His delegation fully associated itself with the statement made by the representative of France on behalf of the European Union and the associated countries of Central and Eastern Europe; his country was ready to cooperate actively in the elimination of the most destructive type of weapons of mass destruction.

58. Although Slovakia firmly rejected the use of nuclear weapons, it had a large civilian nuclear programme, of which nuclear power generation was one of the main components; nuclear power plants accounted for about half of the country's total generation of electricity.

59. His country considered that IAEA, with which it enjoyed productive cooperation, made a pivotal contribution to the promotion of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy and played an irreplaceable role in the implementation of the non-proliferation Treaty, using its
safeguards system to prevent fissile materials from being converted for military purposes. That system was a generally recognized international mechanism whose importance was growing with the increasing number of nuclear installations and had recently proved its usefulness. It could be greatly strengthened by applying it to fissile materials. Furthermore, the progress made in the reduction of nuclear military potential since the most recent Review and Extension Conference promised well for the future.

60. Slovakia adhered strictly to the obligations arising from the application of safeguards to nuclear materials and installations situated in its territory. It supported all measures designed to strengthen the safeguards system and increase its effectiveness. In particular, it endorsed the implementation of advanced methods going beyond currently applied practices (environmental monitoring, expanded right of access to information, "no-notice" inspections, etc.).

61. His country viewed the Treaty as an exceptionally important global mechanism that could play a dominant role in the prevention of nuclear proliferation, reduce the risk of nuclear conflict and promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. An issue inseparable from the nuclear disarmament problem was that of a ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and the drafting of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. That treaty, which had rightly been the main focus of the discussions at the 1994 Conference on Disarmament and should be again in 1995, should lead to the establishment of an efficient international monitoring system that would make it possible to identify and measure effects related to nuclear explosions. His delegation supported the early drafting, conclusion and entry into force of a treaty ending all nuclear explosions once and for all, without any exception, and considered observance of the nuclear test-ban moratorium to be an important element in the preparation of that text. It welcomed the fact that the Conference on Disarmament had established an ad hoc committee to negotiate a ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

62. Slovakia, which did not possess any nuclear weapons and felt threatened by their existence, supported all initiatives in favour of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament and had greatly appreciated the coordinated declarations of 6 April 1995 in which the nuclear-weapon States had pledged not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States which were parties to the non-proliferation Treaty and to give immediate assistance to any non-nuclear-weapon State that was the victim of a nuclear attack. Those declarations, like resolution 984 (1995) adopted recently by the Security Council, represented an important element of the security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.

63. His country supported the indefinite and unconditional extension of the non-proliferation Treaty, which it viewed as an important means of guaranteeing international security and strengthening confidence and stability. It welcomed the growing number of accessions to the Treaty, including those of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and South Africa, and the destruction of South Africa's military nuclear potential.

64. Mr. WOLZFELD (Luxembourg) said he endorsed the statement made by the representative of France on behalf of the European Union and the six associated central and eastern European countries and was pleased to note that a very large number of countries had acceded to the Treaty and, in particular, that 173 of the 178 States signatories to the Treaty had renounced the possession of atomic weapons. He also noted that since the entry into force of the Treaty, whose importance and decisive influence was undisputed among the States Parties, the number of nuclear-weapon States had remained practically the same, apart from a few "threshold" countries which had the capacity to manufacture atomic weapons. It was hard to imagine what the current state of the world would be without the Treaty.

65. He recognized that the situation was far from perfect, and particularly regretted the fact that some 10 countries had not yet decided to accede to the
that some of them presented a serious problem for the international community because of their ambiguous position regarding nuclear non-proliferation and that several States Parties to the Treaty had not honoured the commitments they had undertaken and had tried to develop nuclear weapons. On the other hand, he noted that the vast majority of countries scrupulously respected the arrangements entered into under the Treaty.

66. Recalling that that Treaty also contained provisions that should facilitate the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, he said that his country had decided against installing the capacity for producing nuclear energy in its territory but none the less benefited from a number of peaceful applications of such energy. Luxembourg, which had acceded to the Treaty 20 years earlier, had always pursued a strict policy of nuclear non-proliferation and, being anxious to prevent sensitive nuclear materials from being used for terrorist activities or nuclear programmes of a non-peaceful nature, had established a solid infrastructure to combat the illicit traffic in such materials, whose transfer it permitted only if it was sure that they could not be used for military purposes.

67. He also recalled that although all States Parties to the Treaty agreed on the need to maintain the Treaty in force, they had not yet decided whether it should be extended for one or more fixed-term periods or for an indefinite period. His country was in favour of an indefinite extension of the Treaty, which it considered to be the only acceptable solution and the only means of achieving the objectives set in the area of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. Indeed, the other options could result in the lapse of the Treaty, sooner or later, and confront the international community with a legal vacuum in the matter of nuclear non-proliferation. That risk was particularly unacceptable as the renegotiation of the Treaty in current circumstances, or periodic reviews of the Treaty, accompanied at the end of each term by a vote on its continuation or cessation, the outcome of which would depend on the results achieved in nuclear disarmament, would be dangerous because it could create a climate of uncertainty and distrust and produce effects quite different from those anticipated, delaying nuclear disarmament and promoting the resumption of the arms race.

68. Referring to the efforts made to achieve complete nuclear disarmament, he said that the recent adoption by the Security Council of a resolution on the provision of "negative" and "positive" security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty was an important step forward. It would have been better, however, if the nuclear-weapon States waited for more substantial results in the field of nuclear disarmament, even if some real progress had already been made in that field. He also regretted the fact that those Powers had not reached agreement on the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and final cessation of nuclear tests, accompanied by a verification system.

69. Luxembourg was in favour of strengthening the IAEA safeguards, of prohibiting the production of fissile materials for the manufacture of explosives and of placing all non-military plutonium under the control of IAEA. Those initiatives which, thus far, had mainly been no more than projects and statements of intention, should be carried out and based on the non-proliferation Treaty which, in spite of its imperfections, was the only universal instrument in the field of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, constituted one of the basic legal foundations of the IAEA controls and ensured the strategic and political stability that would permit accelerated nuclear disarmament.

70. Mr. DE SILVA (Sri Lanka) said that the non-proliferation Treaty had never been considered an end in itself but was more in the nature of a road-map for evolving a security order in which nuclear weapons were never meant to be a permanent feature. It was not the task of the Conference simply to choose between an indefinite or limited extension of the Treaty. The Treaty must be able to respond to the continually evolving challenges of peace and security. The length of the extension should not be viewed in terms of mutually exclusive options. While the political atmosphere surrounding the
Conference was propitious, much remained to be done in the matter of nuclear disarmament, and it was particularly necessary to eliminate national arsenals, the doctrine of nuclear deterrence and the diffusion of nuclear weapons.

71. The review of articles I and II of the Treaty would indicate that the general norm of nuclear non-proliferation had remained intact. The serious compliance problems which had emerged during the period under review showed that the Treaty needed strengthening as experience was gained through treaty practice. One important lacuna in the treaty verification regime derived from the fact that, under article III, the IAEA safeguards applied only to declared facilities. Yet several of the compliance concerns arose from activities related to undeclared facilities. The review conferences were the only forums accessible to all States Parties in which those questions could be addressed on an equal footing. Consideration might be given to the possibility of creating a verification mechanism based on the treaty regimes of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention. A body of that nature would not require any amendment to the Treaty.

72. While a good consensus needed to be reached on the safeguards regime, it was also necessary to make an honest appraisal of the mounting problem of plutonium stocks and the related question of latent proliferation. Less than a third of plutonium stocks and an even smaller quantity of enriched uranium were under international safeguards. The security and environmental threats were considerable, and commercial or political interests should not be allowed to mask the gravity of that problem or the problem of the smuggling of nuclear material.

73. The strengthening of conventional safeguards must be supplemented by an international treaty regime governing fissile material. Such a treaty could enable the "threshold" States also to join an international non-proliferation regime on a non-discriminatory basis. Hence the importance of addressing the issue of stocks existing at a certain point in time. The offer of voluntary and limited application of safeguards by nuclear-weapon States would not be sufficient to generate confidence among States Parties to the non-proliferation Treaty which were situated in a geopolitical environment of unrestrained nuclear activity.

74. The application of articles III and IV of the Treaty, on the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and material, deserved close attention. The complex problems of dual-use technology, the gaps in the safeguards regime and the suspicions against certain States Parties were questions that would continue to present formidable challenges to the Treaty regime. States Parties should look at contemporary methods and technologies of verifying compliance without hindering the satisfaction of the legitimate development needs of the safeguard-abiding States Parties. Article IV, paragraph 2, designed to promote solidarity and cooperation among States Parties remained an underutilized provision. The fuller utilization of that provision could elevate the Treaty regime to a broader framework for security and cooperation.

75. Article VI represented one of the core issues before the Conference. The nuclear-weapon States could not overlook the fact that article VI was a commitment yet to be fulfilled. It could not be interpreted as an encumbrance which would militate against the long-term viability of the Treaty. The delegation was confident that the Conference would take a positive and firm decision concerning the long-term extension of the Treaty. Commitments under article VI would provide the necessary political platform for a stronger decision. That decision should be underpinned by a consensus or by an overwhelming majority, otherwise there would be an avalanche of doubts.

76. Nuclear non-proliferation could not be isolated from nuclear disarmament. As was shown by the Chemical Weapons Convention concluded in 1992, a non-proliferation regime could only endure if it was conceived in an overall disarmament perspective. That was the essence of article VI, and the time had come to at least begin to rethink the existing security policies.
77. An unambiguous commitment to nuclear disarmament should be one of the principal results of the Conference. It was important to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty as early as possible. A comprehensive convention on fissile material could encourage the threshold States to gravitate towards global non-proliferation arrangements. Clear and unconditional security assurances in a legally binding form should be given to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. It was those States which, through their scrupulous compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, had established the near universal norm of nuclear non-proliferation. The least that the nuclear-weapon States could do was to give them legally binding assurances.

78. With respect to the regional aspects of non-proliferation, he was happy to note that the idea of a nuclear-weapon-free zone continued to gain ground in Africa. Unfortunately, that was not the case in the Middle East. In Sri Lanka's own region, South Asia, militarily significant countries had yet to conclude bilateral or multilateral treaties on nuclear non-proliferation. Disturbing concepts were currently being advanced in the region whereby current policies of nuclear ambiguity were giving rise to new heresies, such as the concept of "non-weaponized deterrence". Such new doctrinal developments could neither advance regional security nor promote global stability and understanding. They were matters of particular concern to States Parties in the region which scrupulously complied with their Treaty obligations. His delegation therefore urged the nuclear-weapon States to be more forthcoming in advancing measures, such as the adoption of a treaty regulating fissile material and a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Such measures would encourage the threshold States to join in non-discriminatory non-proliferation arrangements within the framework of an internationally supervised verification regime.

79. His delegation would work assiduously to promote a consensus on the long-term extension of the Treaty in its entirety. It believed that such an approach would enhance the confidence of the current States Parties, allay the security concerns of at least some of the States which remained outside the Treaty, and promote universality.

80. Mr. SALLAL (Kuwait) said that the non-proliferation Treaty had had a positive impact on the maintenance of international peace and security and on efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament. He therefore urged all States to accede to it. His country had been among the first to sign the Treaty as well as among the first to sign the partial test-ban Treaty and all the Protocols related to weapons of mass destruction, including bacteriological and chemical weapons.

81. The experience of Kuwait and the countries of the Gulf region in recent years did not support the view that accession to the Treaty was, in itself, a guarantee of international good conduct. Effective compliance with, and voluntary implementation, in good faith of, the spirit and letter of the Treaty were the only true criteria. The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, the liberation war which had followed and the various resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council, especially resolution 687 (1991) and the various stages of its implementation, had revealed the existence of a vast clandestine nuclear-weapons programme. Those activities were in flagrant violation of the safeguards agreement concluded with IAEA and an infringement of the commitments entered into by Iraq under the Treaty, especially those pertaining to articles II and III thereof. Furthermore, the critical information obtained by the international inspection teams had shown that there were significant gaps in the international effort aimed at the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, and that the Iraqi regime had shamelessly exploited those gaps. For those reasons and out of a concern about the need to strengthen and improve the system of assurances and its implementation by all States, Kuwait unreservedly endorsed the proposals calling for an increase in the efficiency of the system, to which all nuclear facilities, whether declared or undeclared, should be subject. It also supported the proposal that States parties should be required to subject all exchanges of fissile materials and related devices and
equipment to the system of assurances, even if such exchanges took place with States which had not acceded to the Treaty.

82. Recalling that the non-proliferation Treaty had contributed to the realization of significant achievements and, in particular, to the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in certain parts of the world, in accordance with article VII, he said that his country shared the deep concern of the other Arab States over Israel’s refusal to accede to the Treaty, an attitude which was an obstacle to the establishment in the Middle East of a region free of weapons of mass destruction. In that connection, the League of Arab States had recently issued a statement in which it had stressed the universality of the Treaty and urged all States to accede to it; reaffirmed the support of the Arab States for the Treaty and its objectives and for the realization of its universality; and emphasized that securing peace and stability in the Middle East required the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction and that Israel’s refusal to accede to the Treaty and to subject its nuclear facilities to the system of assurances constituted a threat to regional security and damaged the Treaty’s credibility.

83. His delegation welcomed the bilateral Treaties concluded between the United States and the Russian Federation on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms (START I and START II), which should contribute to the reduction of nuclear arsenals. It hoped that the other nuclear-weapon States would take similar steps, in accordance with the provisions of those Treaties.

84. His delegation had followed closely the work of the Conference on Disarmament and welcomed the positive results achieved. In particular, it noted with satisfaction that progress had been made in the negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, which should lead to the conclusion of a full agreement before the end of 1995 or early in 1996. It also welcomed the establishment of an ad hoc committee to prepare a treaty prohibiting the production of fissile materials for the manufacture of nuclear weapons, since that would make it possible to tackle the issue of the stockpile of fissile materials and thereby facilitate the establishment of an efficient control system which would increase the transparency and effectiveness of the non-proliferation system. It also believed that Security Council resolution 984 (1995) was very constructive and hoped that multilateral negotiations would soon begin with the aim of reinforcing the assurances offered by the nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States within the framework of a binding international treaty prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

85. Kuwait was all the more committed to the strict implementation of the non-proliferation Treaty, since the ordeal which it had endured during the Iraqi occupation had demonstrated the importance of international cooperation to the maintenance of peace and security, as well as the danger of the random stockpiling and export of weapons, particularly weapons of mass destruction.

86. Mr. NOBILAR (Croatia) said that the unstable and challenging times that had followed the end of the cold war required the reinforcement of the non-proliferation regime.

87. Croatia had become a party to the Treaty shortly after attaining independence, in June 1992. It had demonstrated its commitment to the objectives of non-proliferation by concluding a comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA in June 1994. It had also acceded to the International Convention on Nuclear Safety, which it regarded as an instrument for improving the safety of nuclear power plants. For that reason, it believed that the indefinite extension of the Treaty was the best way to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and to develop research into and the production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in conformity with article IV. It was also strongly committed to strengthening the safeguards system, especially with respect to the detection of undeclared activities.
88. While it was committed to the indefinite and unconditional extension of the non-proliferation Treaty, however, Croatia was fully aware of its inherent inequalities and of the shortcomings in its implementation. It was therefore most important to ensure strict compliance with all the provisions of the Treaty if a more secure international environment was to be created at the threshold of the twenty-first century.

89. The Review and Extension Conference offered a unique opportunity for the nuclear-weapon States to reconfirm, in the strongest possible terms, their obligation under article VI to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control".

90. Although some progress had been made, particularly in the Conference on Disarmament, Croatia believed that further progress was essential. It hoped that the ad hoc committee responsible for negotiating a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices would be established soon and that the negotiations would begin. The same applied to the multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The conclusion of legally binding instruments on those topics would help to make the disarmament process irreversible. Croatia therefore urged the nuclear Powers to submit to IAEA safeguards any nuclear installations that were transferred from military to civilian use and all excess fissile material in their possession. Croatia commended the Zangger Committee for having strengthened export control, thus making it possible to combat more efficiently illicit trafficking in or smuggling of nuclear material. Non-proliferation was especially important to Croatia in view of the threat to peace and security posed by Serbia's aggression against its neighbours Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Possession of nuclear weapons by one of the sides in that tragic conflict would have disastrous consequences. He therefore once again urged the Belgrade Government to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty, as the other successor States of the former Yugoslavia had already done.

91. The international community must deter aggression wherever it occurred, for otherwise the credibility of international instruments would be undermined and the temptation for certain countries to acquire nuclear weapons increased. The international community could not run that risk and must agree on an indefinite extension of the Treaty, complete nuclear transparency and the strengthening of cooperation in the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

92. Mr. BILOA TANG (Cameroon) said that, 25 years after its entry into force, the non-proliferation Treaty, to which 178 of the 185 States Members of the Organization had acceded, was still of the utmost importance. Everyone hoped to see the world freed of the nuclear threat, but that necessarily entailed respect for all provisions of the Treaty. The balance of terror that had reigned during the cold war had led to an accumulation of nuclear arsenals. Furthermore, for obvious reasons of geopolitical strategy, military cooperation had been established between the nuclear Powers and some non-nuclear-weapon countries. That had led to horizontal proliferation and transfers of technology for military purposes, whereas cooperation for peaceful purposes, provided for in articles IV and V, had not yet produced the expected results, for some countries still had no access to technology.

93. Those shortcomings must be remedied if the Treaty was to become a truly global instrument, capable of promoting technological cooperation.

94. Since relations between States had always been based on force, including military force, permanent renunciation of nuclear weapons should be considered a sacrifice and a risk accepted by the 173 States Parties to the Treaty. That renunciation should therefore be accompanied by guarantees which should not be reduced to simple declarations of intent. Security Council resolution 984 (1995) would have been valuable if it had provided for implementation of the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter to countries which used nuclear
weapons against a country that had renounced such weapons in accordance with the Treaty.

95. Cameroon considered that the security safeguards should be strengthened through an internationally negotiated and binding legal instrument.

96. The progress made in the Conference on Disarmament was welcome. His country welcomed the establishment of committees to negotiate, respectively, an international test-ban treaty and a treaty banning production of fissile materials for military purposes. It would, of course, have been preferable for those two instruments, which must be binding and verifiable, to have been concluded before the current Conference.

97. It was regrettable that the detente resulting from the end of the cold war had not been accompanied by a reduction of the nuclear threat. The nuclear smuggling that was going on around the world was pernicious, for it could undermine the international efforts to eliminate proliferation. The international community should therefore take action and adopt forceful measures against those who failed to comply with international law. It should also strengthen the non-proliferation regime by encouraging the creation of nuclear-weapons-free zones in all regions of the world. In that connection, Cameroon welcomed the progress made towards the conclusion of a treaty on the denuclearization of Africa.

98. It was in the interest of the international community to pursue with determination its efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament by strengthening the non-proliferation regime. Cameroon therefore considered that the continued existence of the non-proliferation Treaty was essential in order to attain the goal of general and complete disarmament, due account being taken of the legitimate concerns of all parties.

99. Mr. KIM (Democratic People's Republic of Korea), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the South Korean authorities were not qualified to speak about the nuclear question in the Korean peninsula. It was those authorities which had allowed foreign forces to introduce nuclear weapons into the peninsula, exposing the entire nation to the risks of a nuclear holocaust. It was totally incongruous for them to express concern about a nuclear threat from the North while saying nothing about the foreign nuclear weapons aimed at their compatriots in the North or about the nuclear programmes they were conducting in secret. If there was a nuclear threat it came from the south of the Korean peninsula and not the north. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States had demonstrated responsibility in implementing the "Agreed Framework". The problem was that the South Korean authorities were seeking to oppose that agreement by arguing that they should play a central role in its implementation, although they had no right to participate. In fact, they were motivated only by the sinister aim of seeking to make up for the failure of their past efforts to interfere in the talks between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States. It was essential to ensure that the efforts of the South Korean authorities to prevent the full implementation of the Agreed Framework did not succeed. If those authorities achieved their aims, the situation in the Korean peninsula would deteriorate seriously, against his country's will and to the great detriment of the peoples of the region.

100. Mr. LEE (Republic of Korea), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the accusations made by the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were groundless. The Director-General of IAEA had told the Conference that IAEA had had grounds for indicating in its report to the Security Council that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was not respecting its safeguards agreement, that nuclear materials might have been diverted and that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had rejected a special inspection request from IAEA. In the interest of general respect for the guarantees and obligations deriving from the non-proliferation Treaty, it was to be hoped that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would submit a new statement of nuclear materials and authorize IAEA to inspect its installations as soon as possible. The statement by the Director-General of
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IAEA was bound to create doubts about the credibility of North Korea's allegations concerning a South Korean nuclear programme. The Republic of Korea had unilaterally renounced any possibility of developing nuclear weapons, as announced in December 1991 in a presidential declaration on a denuclearized Korean peninsula. Since the signing of a safeguards agreement with IAEA in November 1975, all nuclear installations in the Republic of Korea had been subjected to IAEA inspection. There was total transparency in that regard. If the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had doubts about those inspections, immediate verification could be undertaken by agreement between that country and the Republic of Korea. The Republic of Korea once again invited the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to open bilateral talks with it and to begin by applying the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula signed in 1992.

101. **Mr. KIM** (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) said it had been the consistent policy of his Government to make the Korean peninsula a nuclear-weapons-free zone. The Joint Declaration represented great progress with regard to peace and security in the peninsula. It was, however, currently ineffective because the South Korean authorities were not supposed to involve themselves in questions relating to nuclear weapons. It was pointless at the current stage to refer to talks between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea or to the Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Peninsula. It was necessary, first of all, to resolve the nuclear issue between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Only when that issue had been settled in the way envisaged in the Agreed Framework could North and South Korea begin to implement the Declaration. His delegation therefore urged the South Korean authorities not to impede the implementation of the Agreed Framework. If there were nuclear weapons in South Korea, there had never been such weapons in the North, not even a single atomic bomb. The nuclear threat obviously came from the South. However, the South Korean authorities would never have a role to play in the resolution of the nuclear issue in the Korean peninsula because they had no say in the matter.

102. **Mr. LEE** (Republic of Korea) said he regretted the further unreasonable statement just made by the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and felt that no representative present would have faith in the efforts of the North Korean delegation to denigrate the Republic of Korea, in the light of what North Korea had said and done on the international scene. The international community clearly understood that those accusations against the Republic of Korea were erroneous and unfounded.

*The meeting rose at 6.30 p.m.*
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 6th MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Thursday, 20 April 1995, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. DHANAPALA (Sri Lanka)

The meeting was called to order at 10.25 a.m.

EXPRESSION OF SYMPATHY IN CONNECTION WITH THE BOMB ATTACK AT OKLAHOMA CITY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

1. The PRESIDENT expressed sympathy to the Government of the United States of America in connection with the bomb attack on the previous day at Oklahoma City.

GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 15) (continued)

2. Mr. ERDENECHULUUN (Mongolia) said that the decisions of the Conference would have a direct bearing on the international security environment well into the twenty-first century and would largely shape the multilateral disarmament agenda. The ultimate success of the Conference depended on a balanced and thorough assessment of what had been achieved under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, agreement on specific objectives to be attained with a view to promoting the implementation of the Treaty and strengthening the non-proliferation regime, and the extension of the Treaty by a consensus decision that would recognize the legitimate concerns of all States parties.

3. By and large, the Treaty had been successful, and had played an indispensable role in preventing the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons and promoting international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The near universal adherence to the Treaty, including the adherence of all five declared nuclear-weapon States, was clear testimony to that role. Hence there was little doubt that the Treaty must go on serving the vital security interests of the international community.

4. The non-proliferation Treaty had never been an end in itself, but a means to an end. It was for that reason that conferences were held to review its operation. Everyone seemed to agree that the Treaty had been of great importance in preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons. However, some important nuclear threshold States still chose to stay outside the Treaty; Mongolia endorsed the appeal that those countries which had not yet done so should accede to the Treaty as soon as possible. Universal adherence was essential to creating conditions favourable to general and complete disarmament - the ultimate goal of the Treaty.

5. Bold steps had been taken by the Russian Federation and the United States of America to reduce their nuclear arsenals. Some nuclear-weapon States had taken specific confidence-building measures, and the moratorium on nuclear testing had been in effect for some time for all but one nuclear-weapon State. Mongolia was encouraged by progress towards the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and a convention on the prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. A new global security environment had made the doctrine of nuclear deterrence obsolete and opened up new prospects for the further substantial reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. However, other nuclear-weapon States had yet to be brought into the strategic arms reduction process.

6. The non-nuclear-weapon States must be adequately assured against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Security Council resolution 984 (1995)
and the unilateral statements of nuclear-weapon States were welcome developments; however, an internationally negotiated legally binding document was needed containing unconditional and unlimited assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. That was particularly important for States which had also undertaken obligations with regard to nuclear-weapon-free zones. There was a precedent in that all five declared nuclear-weapon States had signed Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. It was to be hoped that similar arrangements could be worked out for other nuclear-weapon-free zones. In 1992, Mongolia had declared its territory a nuclear-weapon-free zone. As a "nuclear-locked" country it welcomed the joint statement by China and the Russian Federation undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other and to detarget their nuclear weapons from each other, and also China’s proposal to conclude a treaty on the non-first use of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States.

7. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) played a pivotal role in the efficient functioning of the non-proliferation regime; its efforts must be supported in every way possible. The recent experience of non-compliance with safeguards-related obligations highlighted the need for improved and enhanced verification systems. Newly emerging risks associated with illegal trafficking in nuclear materials required urgent and effective measures at national, regional and international levels. The so-called "export control" regimes constituted another major ingredient of the non-proliferation regime; the application of those regimes should, however, be non-discriminatory and uniform.

8. With all its shortcomings, the Treaty was essential to strengthening international security and promoting peaceful nuclear cooperation. Mongolia believed that it would better serve the common interest to have the Treaty extended indefinitely. Whatever option the Conference chose, however, it was important to be guided by the rule of consensus in the interests of strengthening the Treaty.

9. Mr. MOUSSA (Egypt) said that Egypt, which had supported the non-proliferation regime and had become a signatory to the Treaty believed that it must become not only truly universal and credible but that it must maintain a balance through the commitment of all countries to honour their obligations thereunder. Unless that was achieved, the non-proliferation regime would merely benefit some countries at the expense of others and might exclude a third group of countries. Such a situation was unacceptable.

10. Egypt shared the view that, on the whole, progress in the implementation of the Treaty had not lived up to the expectations of its original architects. The much bigger stockpiles of nuclear weapons contradicted the objective of the Treaty. A comprehensive test-ban treaty and an agreement on prohibiting the production or stockpiling of fissionable materials for military purposes were yet to be concluded.

11. However, the most serious criticism levelled at the Treaty was the continuing disparity between the commitments of its parties. Such disparity was inconsistent with the new concept in international relations which called for justice, equality and collective security in a climate devoid of nuclear weapons. Nuclear-weapon States should establish a framework in which they would reduce and ultimately eliminate their nuclear arsenals within a specific time-frame. On the other hand, the continuing absence of legal and effective security assurances to protect the States which had voluntarily renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons 25 years previously was a great disappointment since it defeated the very purpose of non-proliferation and could never lead to world security and universal peace.

12. Turning to the unilateral declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States contained in Security Council resolution 984 (1995), he said that, with the exception of the one issued by China, they were fraught with conditions and reservations. Unfortunately, the resolution still fell short of providing the required security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States from the threat of nuclear weapons as it focused on assistance in the case of nuclear aggression.
to the detriment of other crucial elements such as deterrence, protection and effectiveness.

13. Noting that there was a serious imbalance in international cooperation with respect to the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and the transfer of such technology to non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty and the discriminatory treatment and double standards applied by export control groups, he called for a thorough review of the work of such groups which, he suggested, could be transformed into an international regime which included all parties to the Treaty and would subject all the nuclear activities of specific States to the IAEA full-scope safeguards regime as a prior condition for the supply of nuclear technology or nuclear materials to the States in question. That international norm should apply to all States including non-States parties.

14. Egypt believed that the universality of the Treaty was a sine qua non for the achievement of its purposes. Its extension would merely reaffirm the legal norm upon which the non-proliferation regime had been established. Even States that were not parties should abide by that norm; otherwise, efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation regime would be undermined by according a special status to those States which had chosen to remain outside. In his delegation's opinion, such a situation would be both unfair and illogical.

15. For decades, Egypt had maintained consistent and clear-cut positions at both the regional and international levels with respect to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In that connection, it had worked tirelessly to spare Africa and the Middle East from the nuclear peril, including the efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa and the Middle East and the multilateral track on Arms Control and Regional Security.

16. Turning to the situation in the Middle East he noted that the issue of nuclear armament continued to be a source of concern and a threat to the security of the whole region. His country considered as extremely dangerous the existence on its eastern borders of a nuclear programme outside the scope of the IAEA full-scope safeguards. It had conducted extensive consultations with all its regional partners as well as with influential national parties with a view to reaching specific international or regional arrangements that would protect the region from the dangers of nuclear weapons and affirm the determination of all parties, including Israel, to adhere to the international covenants and the non-proliferation Treaty, in particular, and to place Israel's nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards. Egypt had proposed that an official process of negotiations should be initiated on the provisions related to the establishment of a zone free from all weapons of mass destruction; all States in the region should undertake to accede to international legal instruments relating to all weapons of mass destruction; such accession should coincide with the conclusion of peace agreements between Israel and the parties involved in the Middle East peace process; and discussions should be held on the possibility of conducting mutual verification of nuclear facilities.

17. Those proposals had been aimed at enhancing security for all in the Middle East and further reinforcing the credibility and stability of the Treaty. In that context, Israel's continued failure to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty was not conducive to progress; indeed, it would be irresponsible to urge States of the region to agree to an indefinite extension of the Treaty even as one State within the region was benefiting from an exemption that allowed it to maintain a nuclear programme outside the boundaries of international legitimacy. Stability in the region could not prevail in the face of security imbalances or military supremacy that would benefit no one; nor would it serve regional peace or international peace and security. Despite all Egypt's efforts, Israel had rejected all the proposals, even though it had always joined in the consensus on the General Assembly's resolutions calling for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and for all the States of that region to join the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty. Egypt was therefore calling upon Israel to reconsider its position and to enter into the same commitments as its neighbours in the
region. His delegation also urged all States parties to consistently endeavor to ensure the strict adherence of all States in the region to policies consistent with the principles and provisions of the Treaty.

18. He recalled that Egypt had signed and ratified the Treaty on the assumption that it would encourage Israel to take similar steps. Israel had failed to do so despite assurances from several countries to that effect. The entrenchment of the de facto status quo by the indefinite application of the Treaty to all the Middle East countries, with the exception of Israel, constituted a serious imbalance threatening not only the region's security but its stability as well. The League of Arab States had recently declared that such a situation was unacceptable. The Middle East was going through a period of extreme sensitivity and significance where the foundations of future peaceful relations in the region were being laid. That could not be accomplished if there were double standards or privileged status was granted to one party at the expense of the other.

19. Although Egypt supported the Treaty despite its imperfections, it could not endorse the indefinite extension thereof, because the regional situation remained volatile and unsatisfactory. That notwithstanding, Egypt would participate actively in the work of the Conference. The extension decision should be linked to specific steps aimed at achieving the objectives of non-proliferation and the universality of the Treaty; enhancing its effectiveness towards striking a balance between the responsibilities of all its parties; concluding two conventions on a comprehensive nuclear test ban and on the prohibition of the production and stockpiling of fissionable materials for military purposes respectively; providing legally binding security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States and ensuring the right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to all States parties.

20. Mr. LAMAMBA (Algeria) said that Algeria was participating for the first time in a conference of the parties to the non-proliferation Treaty, to which it had formally acceded on 13 January 1995. It had already voluntarily subjected its two radioisotope reactors to IAEA safeguards. Since 1991, Algeria had also acceded to other multilateral disarmament instruments and was preparing to ratify the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and Their Destruction.

21. Despite the intrinsic imbalances of the Treaty, it was a cornerstone of collective security and must remain so. With the end of the bipolar division of the world, there should be unprecedented momentum for its implementation. The agreements concluded between the United States of America and the Russian Federation were encouraging; however, further reductions must be carried out, and the other nuclear-weapon States must undertake comparable actions with a view to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The delays in the implementation of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly were well known, as were the limitations placed on multilateral negotiations within the Conference on Disarmament and the impediments to the access of developing countries to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including the alarming reduction of resources made available to IAEA. Even the security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States had been adversely affected by the selective and restrictive approaches embodied in Security Council resolutions 255 (1968) and 984 (1995).

22. Efforts must be intensified to achieve decisive progress in the full implementation of the commitments embodied in the Treaty. A comprehensive test-ban treaty must be concluded as soon as possible and immediately take effect. Negotiations must be undertaken for the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, which, to be truly verifiable and universally applicable, must ensure that existing stockpiles were placed under effective international control. A satisfactory formula must be found to guarantee non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of such weapons, beyond Security Council resolution 984 (1995) which had only revived resolution 255 (1968) with all its imperfections. Security assurances must have sufficient deterrent force to be credible. Pending the elimination of all nuclear
weapons, which constituted the only real guarantee of security, non-nuclear-weapon States were entitled, on an unconditional basis, to credible and effective security assurances which were not subject to interpretation or veto. They should be codified in a binding legal instrument drawn up within the Conference on Disarmament as the only forum for multilateral disarmament negotiations. The legitimate right of developing States to have access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, in line with the IAEA safeguards system, also needed to be established.

23. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones needed to be promoted through concrete action. Nuclear-weapon States must encourage such zones, particularly in Africa and the Middle East, and must accede to additional protocols to guarantee respect for the status of such zones and provide security assurances to Member States. Algeria, which had always supported the Declaration by the Organization of African Unity on the denuclearization of Africa, was actively participating in drawing up a treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the African continent and neighbouring islands. It was confident that once that Treaty was concluded, the nuclear Powers would make the commitments to Africa they had accepted under Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

24. The aspirations of Arab countries to the establishment of a zone free from nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East had already been forcefully reaffirmed. In the new political atmosphere, the Middle East region could no longer be subjected to damaging selectivity with regard to the universality of the Treaty and the objective of non-proliferation. The legitimacy of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East was also formally acknowledged in Security Council resolution 667 (1991), adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter with binding force for all Member States.

25. The Conference had a historic responsibility to strengthen the political and moral authority of the Treaty and ensure progression towards universality. The conclusions of the Conference should prepare the way for the development of a new nuclear disarmament instrument similar to the Chemical Weapons Convention, which was an example of what could be achieved with the necessary political will. Efforts must be made to reach consensus on the extension of the Treaty. The forthcoming ministerial meeting of the coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement would be able to make a valuable contribution to those efforts.

26. Mr. YASSIN (Sudan) said that the review, analysis and assessment of the non-proliferation Treaty must be objective, taking into account both its achievements and its deficiencies. Undeniably, it had made a contribution to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and such agreements as START I and II, which fell within its framework, had led to a reduction in medium and short-range missiles. It had made possible the voluntary renunciation of nuclear weapons by Belarus, Kazakhstan, South Africa and Ukraine. Yet, despite those accomplishments, the Treaty had not fully met the aspirations of its parties.

27. As a product of the cold war era, the non-proliferation Treaty had deepened the gap between nuclear "haves" and "have nots". As a discriminatory treaty, it had approved the possession of nuclear capability by certain States, while closing the door to others. It also lacked a mechanism for enforcing the obligations of the nuclear-weapon States, whose arsenals had continued to grow despite the binding effect of article VI. Those States had also failed to honour their obligations under article I not to transfer nuclear materials or assist any non-nuclear-weapon State in manufacturing such weapons, thus defeating one of the Treaty’s main objectives of universality. The persistent refusal of Israel to heed the call to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty, to renounce its nuclear weapons and to place its nuclear installations under IAEA safeguards had jeopardized efforts towards the establishment of nuclear-free zones in the Middle East, Africa and Asia. The Sudan strongly supported the acceleration of efforts to finalize a
comprehensive test-ban treaty as a step towards complete nuclear disarmament within a specific time-frame.

28. With respect to IAEA safeguards under article III, double standards and selectivity had been applied. A legally binding mechanism for universal verification, for non-nuclear-weapon and nuclear-weapon States alike, was needed. Moreover, the Director-General of IAEA had discussed the Agency's fragile financial situation, which seemed incompatible with the huge expenditures of nuclear-weapon States on their military nuclear programmes. It would appear that those States were not serious about strengthening the Agency and providing it with the resources required to carry out its mandate.

29. Effective verification would only be feasible if an agreement could be reached between nuclear and non-nuclear States banning the production, stockpiling, export and import of fissionable materials for non-peaceful uses. The Conference on Disarmament must intensify its efforts towards the conclusion of such an agreement. Efforts to prevent some States from acquiring nuclear technology for peaceful uses was a clear contravention of articles IV and V, however.

30. With regard to negative and positive security assurances, Security Council resolution 984 (1995) had not broken any new ground. The Sudan called upon the nuclear-weapon States to give clear, direct and binding security assurances through an agreement complementary to the non-proliferation Treaty binding on all which would meet the concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States that they would not fall victim to nuclear aggression by acceding to the non-proliferation Treaty.

31. His delegation did not see any interest in the indefinite and unconditional extension of the non-proliferation Treaty when no effort would be made to attain universality and satisfactory security assurances.

32. Mr. BOUEZ (Lebanon) said that his country did not see the Treaty as an end in itself, but as a means to achieve the objective of ridding the world ultimately and comprehensively of the dangers of nuclear weapons. The universality of the Treaty was fundamental if it was to remain credible, useful and effective. Another primary objective was the speedy conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Review of the Treaty must also include a provision for the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States. In that regard, Security Council resolution 984 (1995) was not satisfactory.

33. Because of Israel's failure to sign the Treaty, the Middle East was imperiled by their nuclear armament at a time of complex relations and violent conflict. The Governments and the peoples of the Middle East would not accept the consecration of Israeli domination in the region by allowing it to maintain its nuclear arsenal. The realization of peace in the Middle East required a reduction in the level of armament, in order to avoid an escalating regional arms race. Thus, Israel's adherence to the Treaty was an urgent necessity, if it was serious about creating favourable conditions for peace.

34. Commitment to the letter and spirit of the Treaty alone could guarantee some balance between nuclear-weapon States and those who had undertaken not to acquire nuclear arms. Lebanon did not believe that indefinite and unconditional extension was the best way to guarantee the non-proliferation regime. It was vital to maintain the practice of adopting resolutions by consensus on an issue of such great importance for the future of international relations. Periodic review would provide the necessary flexibility to respond to new and changing circumstances. Every review would shed light on the "absentees" and prompt renewed efforts to make the Treaty truly universal.

35. The Security Council, as the body entrusted with the maintenance of international peace and security, must enforce Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter without double standards if was to be relied on as a just political arbiter.
36. Mr. TURNQUEST (Bahamas) said that a common feature of previous Treaty review conferences had been the dissatisfaction expressed by the non-nuclear States parties regarding the failure of the nuclear States parties to implement the nuclear disarmament pledges contained in article VI. However, since some progress had been made towards halting the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, it could be concluded that the Treaty had performed satisfactorily on the whole.

37. Some important issues and concerns remained to be resolved before the Treaty could gain the universal support and confidence of the international community. An atmosphere of mistrust persisted with regard to the true nature of the nuclear programmes of both non-nuclear and nuclear-weapon States; moreover, regional and global efforts were required to obtain the accession of the several States remaining outside the Treaty. Nuclear-weapon States had further to commit to a complete cessation of fissionable material production for weapons purposes, and to clarify their positions on nuclear weapons testing. Although they welcomed the adoption of Security Council resolution 984 (1995) on security assurances by the nuclear-weapon States, the non-nuclear-weapon States also required a more legally binding commitment from them with regard to such assurances.

38. While not viewing the successful conclusion of a Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty to be essential for the success of the present Conference, the Bahamas called for all efforts to be undertaken in the Conference on Disarmament to conclude a verifiable test-ban Treaty that would be universally supported and subject to periodic review.

39. Deliberations at the present Conference must therefore be inclusive of all States parties regardless of their nuclear status, and must establish whether nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States had fulfilled their obligations under articles II, III and VI. Whatever the outcome, the decision on the Treaty's future ought to be definitive.

40. Despite the shortcomings of the Treaty, the Bahamas was of the view that an indefinite extension of the Treaty would continue to provide greater assurances for preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons, both horizontally and vertically.

41. Mr. IBÁÑEZ (Peru) said that the Treaty was the sole effective guarantee of the international non-proliferation regime, and that the significant growth in its membership unequivocally reflected its success. Peru firmly supported the indefinite extension of the Treaty as the sole available means of continuing the process of nuclear disarmament and of making peaceful nuclear cooperation possible. Review conferences should continue to be held at five-year intervals, and some consideration should also be given to establishing monitoring mechanisms. However, in view of the fact that a divergence of views existed among the States parties with regard to central aspects of the Treaty, the decision on extending it should respond to the will of the broad majority of those States.

42. Peru believed that it was imperative to prohibit all nuclear tests as well as the production and storage of fissionable material; to establish adequate and legally binding security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States; to strengthen the existing multilateral mechanisms for safeguards, detection and verification; and to ensure, improve and increase nuclear cooperation for peaceful purposes.

43. With the Treaty of Tlatelolco, Latin America had made a commitment to nuclear non-proliferation throughout the region. At the XIVth General Conference of the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL), Peru had suggested harmonizing and linking the southern hemisphere nuclear-weapon-free zones already established through the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga and the Antarctic, and those to be established in Africa and in the South Atlantic.
44. Mr. ABDUL MOMIN (Brunei Darussalam) said that the Treaty was an expression of the international community's desire to rid itself of nuclear weapons, and called for the signing and implementation of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). His delegation shared the concern of many others about the increased number of countries possessing weapons of mass destruction, as well as the continuing modernization of those weapons. It was their belief that the Treaty should be demonstrably strengthened, and that a strong review mechanism and safeguard system should be put in place. Parties to the Treaty should explicitly define their commitments as stated in article VI, and activities between signatories and non-signatories in contravention of the Treaty should be ended.

45. Brunei Darussalam was concerned at the Treaty's continuing lack of regular and effective review mechanisms, but was prepared to support indefinite extension of the Treaty if, following a thorough process of review, the majority of Conference members favoured such a decision.

The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 7th MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York,
on Thursday, 20 April 1995, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. DHANAPALA (Sri Lanka)
later: Mr. FOSTERVOLL (Vice-President) (Norway)
later: Mr. DHANAPALA (Sri Lanka)

The meeting was called to order at 3.15 p.m.

EXPRESSION OF SYMPATHY IN CONNECTION WITH THE BOMB ATTACK AT OKLAHOMA CITY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

1. The PRESIDENT expressed to the people and Government of the United States the sympathy of the delegations of States participating in the Conference, in connection with the terrorist attack on the previous day at Oklahoma City.

2. Mrs. ALBRIGHT (United States of America) thanked the delegations of States participating in the Conference for their expressions of sympathy and their offers of assistance.

GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 15) (continued)

3. Mr. GRAHAM (New Zealand) said that the non-proliferation Treaty had achieved its main objective since it had helped to prevent the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. He commended the wisdom of such States as Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan and South Africa which had abandoned an existing nuclear capability and acceded to the Treaty, which currently had 178 States Parties.

4. That success, however, should not obscure the fact that, until very recently, progress in disarmament had been much more disappointing and the arms race had been allowed to accelerate for some 20 years. There was no doubt that if the decision on the future of the Treaty had had to be taken in 1990, it would have been difficult to decide in favour of an indefinite extension.

5. However, during the past five years, the armaments race had stopped, agreements on the reduction of nuclear arsenals by two thirds had been concluded and negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty had progressed. The Conference was therefore opening in a propitious climate and the Parties should take the opportunity to ensure that there was no turning back from the present course of disarmament.

6. Clearly, the declared nuclear-weapon States had a particular responsibility. New Zealand expected them to accelerate the negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, which it hoped could be completed before the end of 1995, which marked the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the United Nations.

7. However, New Zealand noted with concern that one nuclear-weapon State was continuing to conduct tests and another was contemplating the resumption of testing. While welcoming the active participation of China and France in negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, he hoped that they would do nothing to jeopardize the early conclusion of those negotiations.
8. Progress had also been made in the area of the production of fissile materials for the manufacture of nuclear weapons with the establishment by the Disarmament Conference of an ad hoc committee to deal with that question. The negotiations would certainly be lengthy and difficult, but an agreement would be an important step towards a situation in which the total elimination of nuclear weapons could be negotiated. The Conference of the Parties to the Treaty should commit themselves to the negotiations, as they contributed to the fulfilment of the obligations undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States under article VI of the Treaty.

9. With regard to the Treaty of Rarotonga, under which a nuclear-weapon-free zone had been established in the South Pacific in 1986, his delegation appealed to the signatories strongly to endorse the objectives of that Treaty, and it urged all nuclear-weapon States to accept the obligations set out in the Protocols to the Treaty. Russia and China had already signed Protocols II and III, and it was to be hoped that the United States, the United Kingdom and France would soon be in a position to accept them too, as well as the Protocol relating to the stationing of nuclear weapons in territories of the South Pacific for which they were responsible.

10. Turning to the question of security assurances, he welcomed the announcements made recently by the five nuclear-weapon States and the decisions taken by the Security Council. The time had come to negotiate an instrument setting out the assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States pending the elimination of those weapons. New Zealand urged the rapid re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on negative security assurances, which would provide a forum for negotiations.

11. Much of the progress made in nuclear disarmament in the past few years had been the result of bilateral negotiations. New Zealand had warmly welcomed the START I and START II agreements, but it would also hope that all five nuclear-weapon States would indicate how they intended to continue the process of nuclear disarmament. It would not be enough to adopt a convention banning the military production of fissile materials. Efforts should also be made to negotiate a verifiable agreement banning the production of nuclear weapons and putting an end to vertical proliferation. The United States and Russia had stated that their bilateral arms race had ended, and therefore the situation seemed favourable for further progress.

12. Concluding his remarks on article VI, he expressed the hope that the final document adopted by the Conference would reflect the importance of the issues he had mentioned. That document should provide for the strengthening of other fields of activity covered by the Treaty, such as trade and cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the safeguards system. It should thus endorse the work undertaken by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) since 1990 to strengthen its safeguards system, particularly under Programme 93 + 2; reiterate the principle, adopted by the Parties in 1990, that the non-nuclear-weapon States should not receive nuclear supplies unless they agreed to make all their nuclear operations subject to IAEA safeguards, and provide guidance in respect of the management of fissile materials resulting from the dismantling of nuclear weapons.

13. On that point, New Zealand welcomed the United States decision to put excess fissile material under IAEA safeguards and the efforts made by the States of the former Soviet Union to deal with nuclear materials in their territory. On the other hand his country was very concerned at reports of trafficking in nuclear materials. Effective national systems of control and accountancy were needed and, at the international level, there should be cooperation enabling that problem to be solved. Greater transparency was also needed in all matters relating to the management of plutonium and highly enriched uranium.

14. He felt that the Treaty would be considerably strengthened in the fields he had mentioned if the Conference reached agreement on each of those issues and on the progress to be made under article VI. In conclusion, he recalled that when the General Assembly had adopted the Treaty in 1968, his country had
made it clear that the Treaty should not be regarded as an isolated measure. That position remained unchanged and, while hoping that the Treaty would soon become universal, New Zealand looked forward to the day when a world without nuclear weapons became a reality.

15. **Mr. PeterSEN** (Denmark) endorsed the statement made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of France on behalf of the European Union and the six Eastern European States associated with the Union, and said that he was in favour of an indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty.

16. Denmark believed that the amount of disarmament undertaken should not obscure the fact that the risks of proliferation had increased and that international control was needed more than ever before. Although imperfect, the Treaty had none the less scored many successes, since 178 States had become signatories, the number of nuclear-weapon States had not grown and the fact that the Treaty was now close to universality was increasing the pressure on States that not yet become Parties to it.

17. Referring to the delicate balance between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States established by the Treaty, he said that, at the Conference which they had held in 1990 in the shadow of the cold war, the parties had been unable to reach a consensus. Since then, considerable progress had taken place in disarmament and the 1995 Conference was meeting under much more favourable auspices.

18. The commitment made by the United States with regard to the banning of nuclear-weapon tests, which Denmark itself had long urged, was particularly laudable. His delegation hoped that the ongoing negotiations would soon be concluded. It also awaited with impatience the fulfilment of the promises that further reductions would be made in the nuclear arsenals following the START Treaties, and the elaboration of a treaty to cut off the production of fissile materials. It would follow closely the work of the Conference on Disarmament on those questions, in particular regarding verification measures in connection with the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and the elaboration of a convention to cut off the production of fissile materials.

19. On the question of the international safeguards system, he said that the obligation of States parties, under article III of the Treaty, to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA could allow of no exception. He therefore urged all non-nuclear-weapon States which had not yet done so to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. Various States parties to safeguards agreements had failed to meet their commitments in recent years, thereby posing challenges to the safeguards system. Such challenges were unacceptable and the Conference must react by endorsing new measures to strengthen the safeguards system.

20. Similarly, the maintenance of effective export control measures was essential and the guidelines established by the Nuclear Suppliers Group constituted an important element in the international non-proliferation regime. Denmark encouraged all States to apply them. Illicit transfers of nuclear material had recently emerged as a threat to the effectiveness of the safeguards system. Such transfers placed demands on the producing States to impose stricter export controls. In that connection, Denmark welcomed the United States decision to place its excess fissile material under safeguards. Other producers should be encouraged to do the same.

21. It was important to be ambitious. Denmark's ambition was to help to create a consensus in favour of the indefinite extension of the non-proliferation Treaty. If a vote were to be taken, it should be an open vote, in accordance with the democratic principles of political accountability. The decision on extension must in no way be held hostage to the review process. A good and thorough review, however, would undoubtedly work in favour of indefinite extension.

22. **Mr. Ravelomanantsoa-Ratsimihalaza** (Madagascar) said that, since it had regained its independence, Madagascar had paid the greatest attention to all
matters relating to world peace and international security. It had, for
instance, been among the first 62 States to sign the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which it had ratified on 10 August 1970.

23. The Treaty, which should be universal and to which more than 170 States
had already acceded, was an important achievement for the whole international
community and it must be carefully preserved. It was, in effect, the only
international instrument which entailed disarmament commitments on the part of
the nuclear Powers. It also provided a framework for exchanges in the field
of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

24. On the basis of that achievement, many countries, in particular
developing countries, would be able to receive increased assistance from IAEA
in various fields which were important to the enhancement of the well-being of
their people, including medicine, agriculture and the environment.

25. As a result of the considerable progress achieved in the field of arms
control and disarmament since the end of the cold war, the Conference was
being held under favourable auspices. Madagascar hoped that those
developments would lead to the early adoption of a treaty establishing a
nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa.

26. With regard to security assurances, the initiatives taken in that
connection - in particular the adoption on 11 April of Security Council
resolution 984 (1995) - showed that the nuclear Powers were prepared to take
into account the legitimate concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

27. The progress which had been achieved should not, however, obscure the
fact that the threats of proliferation had not disappeared: the alarming
existence of stockpiles of fissile materials opened the way for an evolution
which was all the more dangerous in that the world was witnessing a resurgence
of regional ambitions and terrorism; the control and verification system of
IAEA had shown its limitations; the non-nuclear-weapon States remained without
sufficient security assurances; and the transfer of civilian nuclear
technology had not kept pace with the expectations of the developing world.
In the face of those challenges, the provisions of the Treaty must be
strengthened. That would be in the common interest of all States, both
nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon.

28. The continuity of the Treaty, the adoption of practical measures to
ensure the implementation of its provisions, the attainment of its objectives
and the balance of contracted obligations were elements which would give it
renewed vigour and make nuclear disarmament more dynamic. The commitment of
the parties, in particular with regard to article VI, would strengthen the
conviction that the Treaty would serve the interests of collective security.
In order to give greater force to the Treaty, it was essential to adopt a
comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty in the near future, and to elaborate a
legally binding instrument which would provide security assurances for
non-nuclear-weapon States and would be binding also on States which were not
parties to the Treaty. It was also important to establish a schedule for the
elaboration of an agreement prohibiting the production or stockpiling of
fissile materials for the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

29. With regard to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, cooperation must be
strengthened through the regulation of transfers of technology within the
framework of the IAEA safeguards system, the effectiveness of which Madagascar
hoped would be enhanced. An appropriate financial contribution should support
the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes to the developing
countries which were parties to the non-proliferation Treaty.

30. The non-proliferation Treaty had admittedly not yet attained the desired
level of perfection, but, since the nuclear Powers had made a commitment to
pursue negotiations in good faith with a view to nuclear disarmament and had
adopted Security Council resolution 984 (1995), States should take advantage
of the exceptionally favourable international context to give the Treaty the
permanent status which would promote progress towards its universality.
31. **Mr. Mayor** (Switzerland) welcomed the fact that the non-proliferation Treaty was almost universal and that, since the Fourth Review Conference in 1990, some 30 additional States, including two nuclear powers, two countries which had had military nuclear programmes and three countries which were successors to a nuclear Power, had acceded to it.

32. In assessing the situation with regard to the Treaty, several aspects should be considered. As far as horizontal non-proliferation was concerned, the success achieved was relative. The alarmist predictions that there would be some 20 nuclear States by the end of the century had not come true, but India, Pakistan and Israel had since acquired a military nuclear capacity. In Africa and Latin America, there had been favourable developments, since those two continents should soon become nuclear-weapon-free zones. In the Middle East, the situation was less encouraging, but it was to be hoped that, within the framework of the peace process which had been going on for some time, the Egyptian and Israeli proposals regarding the establishment of a denuclearized zone in the region could be implemented.

33. With regard to vertical non-proliferation and disarmament, the results obtained were clearly less conclusive. The two nuclear super-powers had admittedly agreed to make substantial reductions in their arsenals, but the number of warheads was almost the same as 25 years earlier and their effectiveness was much greater.

34. The Conference would provide an appropriate opportunity for States to reaffirm their commitment to eliminate weapons of mass destruction within a specific time-frame. In the absence of further progress in that field, the delicate compromise reached between the nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States during the negotiation of the Treaty would be imperilled. It was in the interests of all countries that the START II Treaty should be speedily ratified and put into force. It was also necessary that nuclear weapons should be dismantled in a safe manner and that the resulting fissile material should be placed under international control. It was important to ensure that such material could never again be used for weapons production.

35. The cut-off in the production of fissile material for explosive devices would be a valuable supplement to the dismantling of existing weapons. In that regard, Switzerland welcomed the establishment by the Conference on Disarmament of an ad hoc committee with the mandate to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. It hoped, however, that that mandate had not been adopted merely to pacify States with an eye to the current Conference, but testified to the desire to obtain speedy results.

36. The negative security assurances were another field in which the non-nuclear-weapon States remained dissatisfied. The nuclear powers should undertake, unconditionally and unambiguously, and in the context of a multilateral treaty, never to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against States which had renounced them. The absence of such assurances provided arguments to those who viewed the non-proliferation Treaty as inequitable.

37. It was encouraging that negotiations for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty had begun in 1994 in the context of the Conference on Disarmament. However, Switzerland was disheartened by the lack of progress achieved to date and considered that the idea of providing for exceptions to the general prohibition was incompatible with the spirit of article VI. Whatever the motives and arrangements for such exceptions, it would leave lingering doubts over the will to ensure that nuclear tests would never again take place.

38. The example of Iraq having demonstrated the need to strengthen the system of safeguards, Switzerland welcomed the fact that IAEA had taken specific measures promptly and that it was no longer satisfied with simple, regular inspection of declared installations.
39. Switzerland had never doubted the need to establish a sound and reliable non-proliferation regime. That was why it had immediately ruled out the option of extending the Treaty for a single additional period. The choice between the other two options (indefinite extension and several renewable additional periods) had been a difficult one, since each of the two formulas presented undeniable advantages and would in principle be acceptable. The option of unconditional extension for an indefinite period seemed, in current circumstances, to be the most suitable means of gathering the support needed for a strong non-proliferation regime. It was essential that the decision to extend the Treaty should be taken speedily and with a sizeable majority, since a weak majority would not augur well for the future of the Treaty.

40. Switzerland's vote would, however, be accompanied by the earnest hope that the nuclear Powers would fully honour their pledges and would give tangible signs without delay of their will to eliminate nuclear weapons. Switzerland hoped that, before the review conference in the year 2000, treaties on the complete prohibition of nuclear tests and on a cut-off in the production of fissile material for explosive devices would be in force. Furthermore, the five nuclear Powers would need to have reached agreement on a timetable for progressive and substantial reductions in their arsenals.

446. Mr. WIN MRA (Myanmar) said that the Treaty had undoubtedly curbed nuclear proliferation. Without it, the number of nuclear-weapon States would have been much greater. Those achievements had been somewhat undermined, however, by the size of nuclear arsenals. Yet nuclear non-proliferation was not an end in itself; it was but one step towards complete cessation of the nuclear-arms race and, ultimately, general and complete disarmament. The obligations of the nuclear-weapon States in that regard were clearly stipulated. It was encouraging that the two major nuclear Powers had started to dismantle their installations and destroy their nuclear warheads, but the current Conference should provide an opportunity for them to commit themselves anew to the elimination of nuclear weapons within a reasonable time-frame.

42. With regard to horizontal non-proliferation, the Treaty was a resounding success: the non-nuclear-weapon States parties had faithfully fulfilled their obligations by renouncing their sovereign right to possess nuclear weapons. That sacrifice should not, however, deprive them of their inalienable right to develop the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, provided that their nuclear activities were subjected to the IAEA safeguards system.

43. Although there were now over 170 States parties to the Treaty, it was not yet truly universal. In his delegation's view, scrupulous observance by the nuclear-weapon States of their Treaty obligations would strengthen the credibility of the Treaty and would encourage those States which had not yet done so to accede to it.

44. The security of non-nuclear-weapon States was no less important than that of a nuclear-weapon State. Until nuclear weapons were eliminated, the former were entitled to effective security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. To be effective, those security assurances must be in the form of a legally binding international instrument. The basis for such an instrument could be the draft protocol to the Treaty on security assurances submitted by some 12 States, including Myanmar, at the Conference on Disarmament. Security Council resolution 984 (1995) did not obviate the need to conclude an international and legally binding instrument.

45. Nuclear-weapon States and some other States had recommended an indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty. Many non-nuclear-weapon States, including Myanmar, did not share that view. They felt that the third option of rolling fixed periods of credible length with a strong review mechanism was the most appropriate option. It would be constructive to work out a modified version of that option by building into it an appropriate decision-making mechanism to move from one fixed period to another. His delegation would pursue that matter further during the Conference in order to work out, together with like-minded countries, an appropriate modality for that option.
46. However, a decision on the extension of the Treaty should be preceded by an extensive review of the Treaty and progress in crucial areas such as nuclear disarmament, a nuclear-test ban, security assurances, a ban on the production of fissile material and access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

47. Myanmar, which had acceded to the Treaty in 1992, had just signed the IAEA safeguards agreement. It attached great importance to the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, and considered that the decision to be taken by the Conference concerning the extension of the Treaty must be acceptable to all States parties.

48. Mr. Fostervoll (Norway), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

49. Mr. JOKONYA (Zimbabwe) said that non-nuclear-weapon States, in acceding to the non-proliferation Treaty, had done so in the sincere belief that the nuclear-weapon States would scrupulously honour their obligations. Yet over the 25 years of the Treaty’s existence nuclear arsenals had continued to grow, without the non-nuclear-weapon States having had either any mechanism or leverage with which to bring pressure to bear on the nuclear-weapon States.

50. The current Conference was the only chance the non-nuclear-weapon States had to evaluate the progress made, to strengthen the provisions of the Treaty and to prevent the legitimization and institutionalization of the dichotomy between nuclear “haves” and “have-nots”.

51. Some States parties had conducted a relentless campaign for an indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty. It was premature to take such a decision, which might lead to a perpetuation of current imbalances and would erode the voice of non-nuclear-weapon States in nuclear disarmament matters.

52. In common with many others, his delegation supported an extension of the Treaty, but only after it had been transformed into an action-oriented instrument. To that end the review process should identify specific objectives for future years, in particular an immediate cessation of the nuclear arms race, the conclusion and implementation of a nuclear-test-ban treaty, a legally binding commitment on security assurances, and the conclusion of a non-discriminatory and universally applicable treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

53. Promises were not guarantees, and it was hard to see how the non-nuclear-weapon States could be reassured by mere statements of intent, since the nuclear-weapon States had very reluctantly adopted a watered-down Security Council resolution on security assurances. Nuclear-weapon States had an obligation, within the framework of a binding legal instrument, to provide unconditional security assurances on the non-use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against States which had renounced such weapons. They should also respect the international accords that had given birth to nuclear-weapon-free zones and should fully support denuclearization initiatives.

54. With regard to the extension of the Treaty, Zimbabwe questioned the intentions of nuclear-weapon States and other developed countries that made constant reference to indefinite and unconditional extension, whereas the Treaty referred only to indefinite extension.

55. The fact that 178 States were parties to the Treaty was by no means an indication that the Treaty in its present form should be made permanent. It demonstrated, rather, that the international community was firmly convinced of the need for nuclear disarmament and in due course total and general disarmament.

56. Restricted measures outside IAEA safeguards should not be used as tools to impede the peaceful use in some countries of nuclear technology for civilian purposes. It was vital for all States parties to the Treaty that had
signed the IAEA safeguards agreement to have unobstructed access to nuclear technology.

57. Zimbabwe, like others, was fully persuaded that there should be no hurry to immortalize an inadequate treaty. Rather, the opportunity presented by the Conference should be used to strengthen the provisions of the Treaty and make good its deficiencies. He trusted that the conclusion of their deliberations would ensure that each and every State, large or small, nuclear or non-nuclear, had a decisive say in the deliberations on the prospects for nuclear disarmament.

58. Mrs. RODRIGUES (Mozambique) said that the end of the cold war offered an opportunity to reaffirm the support of the international community for a treaty which for more than 25 years had been an important instrument in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. For its part, Mozambique, since its accession to independence, had fought for a world free of nuclear weapons where peace would reign. From the outset Mozambique had incorporated in its Constitution the principle that Africa should be a nuclear-weapons-free zone and the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. The Treaty had become quasi-universal, which meant that most countries in the world were committed to the ideal of non-proliferation, and that non-nuclear-weapon States were voluntarily refraining from acquiring nuclear weapons.

59. For that reason Mozambique supported an indefinite extension of a treaty which had proved its value and effectiveness. The discussion on the duration of the Treaty did not, however, address the heart of the matter. The main concern was, rather, the inequalities and imbalances reflected in the Treaty. For it to become a credible and effective instrument for peace and disarmament it would be necessary, in the view of Mozambique and most other non-nuclear-weapon States, for a number of conditions to be met, namely, the attainment of complete and general nuclear disarmament, the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, the adoption of positive and negative security assurances in a legally binding instrument, and respect for the international legal instruments creating nuclear-weapons-free zones.

60. The nuclear non-proliferation regime was not an end in itself. Article VI of the Treaty, which called for negotiations in good faith leading to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and the conclusion of a comprehensive disarmament treaty, had remained largely unimplemented. Similarly, a comprehensive test ban remained elusive despite the fact that its importance was universally recognized and even if the ongoing negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament were encouraging.

61. As far as security assurances were concerned, Mozambique welcomed adoption by the Security Council of its resolution 984 (1995), which, together with Security Council resolution 255 (1968), constituted a welcome initiative on the part of the nuclear-weapon States. Nevertheless the resolution fell short of providing the assurances demanded by the non-nuclear-weapon States, in particular those in the non-aligned movement.

62. Regarding the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency, she expressed the support of her country for an institution which had proved to be the best instrument to promote international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Her delegation urged the nuclear-weapon States to take specific steps in that domain, in compliance with articles IV and V of the Treaty. In that regard she congratulated the Republic of South Africa, a neighbouring country, for having given up its nuclear-weapon capability and thereby enhanced not only the stability of southern Africa but also confidence throughout the continent.

63. The foundations of the non-proliferation Treaty lay in the symmetric obligations imposed on both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States parties. That was why Mozambique supported extension of the Treaty and maintenance of the mechanisms provided for in article VIII, paragraph 3.
Mr. ELIASSON (Sweden) said that the main responsibility of the States participating in the Conference was to reaffirm that all nuclear weapons must be eliminated from the face of the earth, in the spirit of the preamble to the non-proliferation Treaty. The limitless destructive character of nuclear weapons made nuclear disarmament a moral imperative.

The Treaty contained the only contractual commitment by nuclear-weapon States to negotiate in good faith on nuclear disarmament. It embodied the pledges by almost all other nations to forgo nuclear weapons. Sweden had renounced the nuclear-weapon option in 1969, having concluded that its own security would be strengthened, and not weakened, if it refrained from acquiring nuclear weapons. That commitment to the goals of the Treaty was supported by the nation as a whole, which welcomed the quasi-universality of the Treaty, which was thus raised to the level of general international law.

There had been encouraging developments since the 1960s, when the Treaty had been negotiated. First, the feared emergence of at least 20 nuclear-weapon States had not occurred. Secondly, since 1990, more than 30 States had acceded to the Treaty, and with the accession of China and France in 1992, all the declared nuclear-weapon States were parties. Thirdly, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, which had Soviet nuclear weapons in their territories, had acceded to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States. Lastly, threshold States had given up the nuclear option. South Africa had set an historic example.

The non-proliferation regime had three main objectives. The first was to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. The NPT had an excellent record in that respect. Even States which were suspected of having nuclear ambitions were not encouraging speculation that they possessed clandestine nuclear weapons. Instead, they were claiming that they would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons, or that their nuclear programmes were peaceful. Those States should follow the example of South Africa. In connection with the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, Sweden welcomed recent positive developments regarding the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the question of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa.

The second objective of the Treaty was international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The third was, of course, nuclear disarmament. In other words, the NPT was a key to both nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. The three objectives were mutually reinforcing and should be actively pursued together.

Turning to the question of nuclear disarmament, he said that progress had been distressingly absent for a long time in that area. However, START I had been concluded and START II should soon enter into force. That would provide a basis for further disarmament involving all nuclear-weapon States. There had also been recent security assurances given by the five nuclear-weapon States, and a resolution had been adopted on that subject by the Security Council. Those unilateral declarations could form a basis for a multilateral treaty on negative security assurances, and could be further developed into declarations of no first use of nuclear weapons.

Sweden also saw encouraging signs in the negotiations at the ongoing Geneva Conference on Disarmament regarding a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. It was of vital importance for all the States involved in the negotiations to reach agreement before the end of 1995. Sweden appreciated the nuclear-test moratorium being observed by all but one of the nuclear-weapon States. It expected the moratorium to continue until it could be replaced by a treaty banning nuclear tests for ever. The Conference on Disarmament had decided to start negotiations on a treaty on the cut-off of production of fissile weapons materials. Existing stockpiles should also be the subject of those negotiations. Despite all those positive developments, it was still necessary for the delicate balance between commitments to nuclear non-proliferation and to disarmament within the NPT to become a reality.

The report entitled "Our Global Neighbourhood" (A/50/79), presented by the Commission on Global Governance, stated: "The international community
should reaffirm its commitment to progressively eliminate nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction from all nations, and should initiate a ten to fifteen year programme to achieve this goal." There was no reason to accept the existence of nuclear bombs, when the international community had agreed to ban the others weapons of mass destruction - the chemical and biological weapons. It was reasonable to demand a specific time schedule for nuclear disarmament, along the lines of the START Treaties.

72. With respect to the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Sweden urged all States to ensure that the Agency was provided with the resources needed to fulfil its verification task in accordance with the NPT. It endorsed the new measures proposed to strengthen IAEA safeguards. It called for urgent progress towards the separation of military and non-military nuclear activities and facilities in all non-nuclear-weapon States.

73. On the question of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, Sweden recognized the Treaty's contribution to the elimination of the technological gaps between the developed and the developing countries. Preferential treatment should be given to non-nuclear States that were parties to full-scope safeguards agreements with IAEA. Nuclear suppliers had agreed on criteria for technology transfers based on the principle that recipient States should have safeguards agreements with IAEA. Such arrangements did not prevent such States from acquiring and developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. It was of fundamental importance to strengthen nuclear safety and radiological protection. Since the 1990 Review Conference, initiatives had been taken to improve the safety of power reactors in Eastern and Central Europe and in the former Soviet Union. Since that should be a priority task, Sweden urged all States to ratify the IAEA Nuclear Safety Convention. It was gratified by progress made in the preparation of a convention on the management of radioactive waste.

74. The final part of his statement would be devoted to the question of the extension of the Treaty. To reach a fair and just decision on that question, the international community should compare commitments with actual achievements. In accordance with article VI of the Treaty, all nuclear-weapon States had undertaken to pursue negotiations in good faith on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race, nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament. In 1995, all declared nuclear-weapon States were parties to the Treaty, and substantial progress had been made in the field of disarmament. The States concerned should establish a specific time schedule for the implementation of disarmament measures. The NPT provided for review conferences every five years. They would serve as future checkpoints to ensure that the commitments of States parties were honoured.

75. There was a question as to what would happen if the Conference failed to extend the Treaty indefinitely. According to the Commission on Global Governance, all nations, whether they possessed nuclear weapons or not, stood to gain from indefinite extension. Failure to extend the NPT indefinitely could seriously compromise the credibility of the non-proliferation regime itself. It could also lead to rapid and uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear weapons. Lastly, it could cause nuclear Powers to undertake unilateral action to prevent proliferation.

76. The international community must not let the Treaty run the risk of expiring. It was of fundamental importance that the commitments to disarmament should be embodied in an international Treaty to which most States had acceded, and that substantial further results should be registered. Uncertainty about the future of the Treaty would not facilitate nuclear disarmament, but might well endanger results that were within reach. Elimination of nuclear weapons was not a technical matter for experts, but a matter of values. After thorough consideration, Sweden had come to the conclusion that the NPT should be extended indefinitely.

77. Ms. MENON (Singapore) said that even though the cold war had ended, the spectre of nuclear proliferation continued to hang over the international
community. It was therefore timely that States should come together to review the Treaty aimed at preventing proliferation, and to decide on its future.

78. Singapore supported an indefinite extension of the NPT. It was the only international treaty aimed at containing nuclear proliferation, a goal that was one of the cornerstones of global security. The Treaty was too important to be put under the risk of termination. It provided the best available framework for cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Despite its shortcomings in some areas, it had been successful in containing the spread of nuclear weapons.

79. Singapore agreed that the Treaty should be strengthened. It was not convinced, however, that giving it a limited life-span was the best way to do so. On the contrary, the uncertainty surrounding a limited extension could jeopardize the progress that had already been made in the field of disarmament. It was essential to build up a comprehensive and effective disarmament regime that would ensure a secure and stable environment. At the same time, there was an urgent need for greater efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to meet the objectives of the NPT and to demonstrate unequivocally their resolve.

80. Those States were obligated, under article VI, "to pursue negotiations in good faith" with a view to disarmament. They must make a clear commitment to pursue that goal and redouble their efforts to work towards the early conclusion of disarmament treaties and conventions that would complement the NPT regime, such as a comprehensive test-ban treaty and an agreement on the cessation of production of military fissile materials, and to make declarations providing security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. In that connection, his delegation was encouraged by the adoption, on 11 April 1995, of Security Council resolution 984 (1995) concerning security assurances. It had also noted with satisfaction the individual declarations on security assurances made earlier that month by the five nuclear Powers.

81. With regard to article III, his delegation supported all measures to enhance the effectiveness of the IAEA safeguards system. The Conference should look at ways to strengthen the verification of compliance with the Treaty and to promote confidence-building. His delegation would also like to see the establishment of a strong periodic review mechanism to ensure that all parties met their obligations under the Treaty.

82. Mr. Dhanapala (Sri Lanka) resumed the Chair.

83. Mr. VONDRA (Czech Republic) said that, for a quarter of a century, the non-proliferation Treaty had played an irreplaceable role as a barrier against further proliferation of nuclear weapons. When the Treaty had been negotiated in 1968, nuclear weapons had already been added to the arsenals of certain countries and, throughout the cold war era, vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons had continued unabated, posing a serious threat to international security. Nevertheless, the Treaty had proved its effectiveness and viability and had helped to check proliferation. The number of States parties was growing and, in the preceding five years, 39 States, including two nuclear-weapon States and a number of technologically advanced countries, had acceded to the Treaty.

84. His delegation strongly believed that the international community should continue to support the Treaty and that the best way to do that was to make it permanent. There was a need for a permanent guarantee against nuclear proliferation, even if the risk of a global nuclear holocaust had been reduced. Some countries, especially those in areas of tension, might be tempted to acquire nuclear weapons.

85. Major changes had occurred in the world in recent years. The two super-Powers, which had previously confined themselves to mere arms control measures, had begun to make significant reductions in their nuclear arsenals. France and the United Kingdom had scaled down their nuclear-weapon programmes.
Four of the five nuclear Powers had been observing a moratorium on nuclear testing for some time.

86. The experience had been that nuclear cooperation had not been unduly hampered by the Treaty; if anything, such cooperation had developed too liberally, affording some States the opportunity to develop their own nuclear-weapon programmes. He underlined the importance of the control activities of IAEA, especially its safeguards, which played a crucial role in the implementation of the non-proliferation Treaty. The discovery of clandestine nuclear-weapon programmes in certain countries highlighted the importance of improving and strengthening safeguards.

87. His country, which had a long tradition of peaceful use of nuclear materials, which offered technical assistance and training to a number of countries in the field of nuclear physics and chemistry and which generated 30 per cent of its electricity at nuclear power plants, was convinced that reliable safeguards did not interfere with the peaceful use of nuclear energy but, on the contrary, created conditions for its wider and safer use. His delegation would like the verification activities of IAEA to be more stringent and nuclear exporters to take additional measures in that regard. His country was prepared to cooperate with IAEA in developing and implementing effective measures to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear materials.

88. His delegation firmly supported the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty. Even so, it recognized the desirability of additional nuclear-arms control measures, namely, the early achievement of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and a ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. His delegation welcomed the efforts of the Conference on Disarmament. Although it participated in the Conference only as an observer, it contributed to the work of its group of governmental experts and had offered to make available a highly sensitive seismic station for verifying compliance with the future comprehensive test ban.

89. On the subject of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States, his country had voted in favour of resolution 984 (1995), adopted unanimously by the Security Council on that matter. He also noted with satisfaction that important measures had been taken in the field of nuclear disarmament, especially in recent years. The START I Treaty, when fully implemented, would lead to a significant reduction of American and Russian nuclear arsenals; it was to be hoped that the START II Treaty would be ratified soon and that further measures of nuclear disarmament would be agreed upon. Another encouraging development was the fact that for the first time in history serious negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty had been initiated in Geneva with the participation of all the nuclear-weapon States. Far from hindering efforts to work out such a treaty, the extension of the non-proliferation Treaty would create a climate more conducive to the conclusion of a test-ban treaty and the adoption of further nuclear disarmament measures.

90. As to progress at the regional level, he welcomed the decision taken by the Government of South Africa to forgo its military nuclear potential and to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty. It was also encouraging that Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan had decided to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States. He noted with satisfaction Cuba's decision to accede to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, thereby helping to strengthen the nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the solemn commitments given by Argentina and Brazil to renounce any intention of acquiring nuclear weapons.

91. His delegation associated itself fully with the statement made by France on behalf of the European Union and, in particular, the conclusion that what was expected of the States parties was the consolidation of the non-proliferation regime and the confirmation of the disarmament process. His country therefore favoured extending the non-proliferation Treaty indefinitely and unconditionally.
92. Mr. GERVERAS (Côte d'Ivoire) said that the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should serve to consolidate the important progress made over the preceding 25 years and to reinforce the achievements made in the area of nuclear disarmament. The primary task was to confirm the new spirit of peace that had emerged in a world which for decades had lived under the threat of thermonuclear war. It was also a matter of adopting a hopeful measure reflecting the aspirations of the entire international community for a new culture of peace.

93. The current international political situation offered a unique opportunity to put an end to the nuclear-arms race. Africa, for its part, on which a heavy toll had already been taken by history, was participating fully in efforts under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations to promote the signing of a treaty to make the African continent a nuclear-weapon-free zone. His country had made peace one of its guiding principles and supported that objective without reservation. It intended to sign the treaty in question which should reinforce the non-proliferation Treaty through a solemn step inspired by article VI.

94. His country believed that the only way to dispel the threat of a nuclear holocaust was for States to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty, as 178 had already done, and to strengthen the provisions of the Treaty which dealt with cooperation, in particular those in article V concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In addition, it saw a need to extend the Treaty indefinitely and considered that the declarations on security assurances recently made in the Security Council by certain nuclear-weapon States were useful commitments which should be reinforced in the context of a Treaty whose permanence was ensured.

The meeting rose at 5.45 p.m.
1. **Mr. HURST** (Antigua and Barbuda) said that at the time when the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had been readied for signature, Antigua and Barbuda had still been a colony. All but six of the States which had achieved independence since 1970 had understood the dangers of nuclear weapons and nuclear war and had become signatories to the Treaty.

2. The primary benefit of the Treaty was its containment of the spread of nuclear weapons to additional States, thereby reducing the risk of nuclear war and nuclear accidents. However, the Treaty had failed to limit the number of nuclear weapons, so that the nuclear-weapon States now had more nuclear weapons than in 1970. Despite the nuclear disarmament measures taken by the nuclear-weapon States, and the security assurances in Security Council resolution 984 (1995), a great deal more remained to be done.

3. The terms of the Treaty and related agreements needed to be made sufficiently attractive to achieve universal acceptance. That would be difficult to achieve, however, since the interests of many States were diametrically opposed. Several States wanted their perceived advantages to be made permanent, while others wished to end their evident disadvantage and elicit greater security assurances from the powerful. Yet, if the remaining 13 sovereign States did not accede to the Treaty, the future which awaited mankind would be even more uncertain and dangerous than in the past.

4. His delegation was greatly concerned about the vulnerability of small island States to nuclear-weapons testing. Threatened by global warming and rising sea levels, such States could not successfully deal with nuclear fallout from nuclear testing; the islands would have to be abandoned, effectively ending those countries' very existence. Every unilateral moratorium on weapons testing must become legally binding and permanent. The Treaty of Tlatelolco protected the small island States of the Caribbean; the Treaty of Rarotonga could do the same for the small island States of the South Pacific if the nuclear-weapon States signed that Treaty and its protocols. It defied reason for large and powerful democratic States to refrain from giving legally binding assurances to small island States which could not possibly threaten them or do them harm.

5. Antigua and Barbuda supported an indefinite extension of the Treaty on the understanding that the nuclear-weapon States would continue to accelerate their efforts towards complete nuclear disarmament.

6. **Mr. GOLOB** (Slovenia) said that the Treaty had been the first multilateral treaty to which the Republic of Slovenia had succeeded; it had done so in the hope that the Treaty would be a step towards the total and final prohibition of testing and of nuclear weapons. The Treaty had served the world well and had survived the end of the cold war; Slovenia hoped that it would be indefinitely extended. In the post-cold-war era, there were strong grounds for extending the Treaty. There was a marked trend towards individualization of the national policies of many countries, even those that
were members of integrations or defence organizations; that trend was not altogether negative, but it would be unacceptable if it went beyond the limits defined by the Treaty.

7. A number of occurrences in recent years had shown that there was only a thin line separating the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and attempts at developing nuclear weapons. International crime syndicates and others that might exploit lax safeguards posed another threat. The role of the Treaty therefore remained vital. Slovenia believed that it provided a sound basis for attaining the goal of eliminating the nuclear threat by creating a nuclear-free world. Lack of progress towards disarmament was not a reflection of the quality of the Treaty but a result of lack of will by States parties.

8. The threshold States, mostly developing countries that were spending enormous amounts on nuclearization on the grounds that it would enhance their security, should follow the positive examples of Argentina and Brazil, and of South Africa. In all those cases denuclearization had been helped by mutual trust.

9. It was, first and foremost, the permanence of the Treaty which could help improve the atmosphere. In addition, it was crucial for nuclear-weapon States to take specific measures for complete nuclear disarmament and to enhance their security assurances. The recent assurances made by the nuclear-weapon States, and Security Council resolution 984 (1995), were an initial step. Security assurances would play a very significant role for quite a time until complete nuclear disarmament was attained; they would need to be included in a multilaterally binding instrument.

10. Slovenia hoped that a comprehensive test-ban treaty would be concluded by 1996, and that efforts to achieve a ban on the production of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons would be further intensified. The export control regime of nuclear substances must be enhanced in order to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. That step should not impede nuclear technology tests for peaceful purposes.

11. The progress achieved in Africa, Latin America and the South Pacific in establishing nuclear-free zones was encouraging. Slovenia welcomed the expanding circle of Contracting Parties to the Treaty, particularly those States which had given up nuclear weapons and joined the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States.

12. Slovenia believed that indefinite extension of the Treaty would promote confidence-building and mutual trust and enhance the disarmament process. However, confidence created in that way would soon fade away if not underpinned by true progress in nuclear disarmament. It was vital that the Conference should determine that all the essential issues had been thoroughly reviewed and that further progress in the disarmament process was viable.

13. Mr. VELAYATI (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that in a new global milieu and in a much more representative international community, the Conference was a significant opportunity to strengthen the Treaty and the non-proliferation regime in all aspects, thereby enhancing international peace and security. With the end of the cold war era and bloc rivalries, the need to build a solid foundation for global security was all the greater. The Treaty had paved the way for the achievement of the ultimate objective of nuclear disarmament, but that objective had yet to be accomplished because of the imbalances between the obligations and responsibilities of nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States parties. That situation, together with the non-fulfilment of obligations by nuclear-weapon States parties, were the weaknesses of the Treaty. Those elements merited a thorough and objective review by the Conference with a view to securing a genuine, truly universal and non-discriminatory nuclear non-proliferation regime.

14. A review of the implementation of article I underscored an ever-widening gap between promises and reality. Certain nuclear-weapon States had provided
direct and indirect assistance for the development of nuclear-weapon capabilities. It was no secret that some countries which had remained outside the Treaty had gained access to nuclear weapons. Certain nuclear-weapon States which were ostensibly the most active advocates of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons had not only generously provided materials and know-how to Israel to enable it to develop nuclear weapons but also turned a blind eye to Israel's production and stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction, tacitly exempting it from the Treaty, despite its record of reckless expansionism. Furthermore, the apartheid and Israeli regimes had acquired nuclear-weapon capabilities at a time when they had been under international scrutiny, condemnation and sanctions; that would not have been possible without the assistance or, at least, the acquiescence of the nuclear-weapon States and other nuclear-advanced countries.

15. That approach had destabilized the Middle East region and generated spiralling crises. Moreover, the threat posed by Israel's possession of nuclear weapons and its refusal to accept the non-proliferation Treaty and IAEA safeguards had led a number of States in the region to decide not to accede to international instruments prohibiting weapons of mass destruction, most notably the Chemical Weapons Convention. That trend had been devastating for the security of those States as well as to the credibility of the Treaty itself. It also constituted a major impediment towards the universality of the Treaty and the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, which Iran had first proposed in 1974, and ran counter to the objectives of article VII.

16. The failure of nuclear supplier countries to provide complying States parties with material for peaceful purposes was yet another area of non-implementation of commitments. The Treaty unequivocally recognized the peaceful uses of nuclear energy as the legitimate and inalienable right of States parties. For States parties which had faithfully fulfilled their obligations, any discriminatory approach or imposition of restrictive control regimes was totally unjustifiable. Efforts to regulate the transfer of nuclear technology must be transparent and must take place only within the framework of the Treaty.

17. Non-realization of the objectives of article VI was another shortcoming. The nuclear-weapon States had failed to take substantive measures towards complete nuclear disarmament and, instead, had developed and upgraded their nuclear arsenals in an unbridled fashion. That approach had helped intensify the apprehension of the international community.

18. The Islamic Republic of Iran believed that the Treaty's future should be meticulously intertwined with the periodic examination of progress achieved towards the implementation of a number of measures. First and foremost, a programme of action should be adopted for the significant reduction and total elimination of nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles within a specific time-frame; the Conference on Disarmament must be fully utilized to begin serious negotiations in that regard. A comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty must be concluded at an early date and a comprehensive, verifiable and legally binding treaty on the prohibition, production and stockpiling of nuclear-weapons-grade fissionable materials should be concluded. Technology and materials for peaceful nuclear activities should be transferred without any discrimination; as it was essential for nuclear supplier countries to undertake not to prevent access of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, cooperation among the parties must be facilitated and expanded. His delegation also believed that secretive groupings with restricted membership that undermined the Treaty should be phased out; on the other hand, agreement must be sought to establish a body representing all the parties, including developing countries; it must conduct its work in a transparent manner. Nuclear-weapon States must provide negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States through an international legally binding instrument; in that regard, the recent positive security assurances provided by the Security Council constituted a step in the right direction. Nuclear-weapon States must abide by and adhere to the instruments establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones and must support initiatives taken by
the States parties in the regions concerned, with a view to establishing such zones, particularly in the Middle East. As an essential, mutually reinforcing element, all nuclear facilities and installations must be placed under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguard systems. Universality of the Treaty must be achieved. In that connection, the reported possession by Israel of nuclear weapons and that country's stubborn refusal to accept international control had a serious destabilizing effect on the Middle East. The resolution of that problem by the international community was an essential requisite to reducing the nuclear threat in the region and paving the way for the achievement of a truly universal Treaty.

19. He believed that the Treaty should be extended indefinitely only after all the obligations set forth thereunder had been fully complied with. In the meantime, the only viable option was a form of extension that was consistent with article X.2, was compatible with the Treaty's objectives and ensured an early realization of the Treaty's purposes and provisions. Indeed, the crucial issue was to arrive at a consensus extension agreement in an atmosphere of mutual trust and cooperation free from any political and economic pressures that were aimed at imposing a specific extension option on States parties. Anything less would lack the moral authority and collective will of States parties.

20. Since IAEA had been established to ensure the full implementation of the Treaty in good faith, it must be strengthened. More credence should be given to its reports and findings, while at the same time effective measures should be adopted to ensure that outlaw regimes like Israel, which stubbornly rejected the Treaty, or States which violated it, were not immune from international accountability and reprisal. Failure to achieve universality of the Treaty and to ensure the full implementation of its provisions could jeopardize the aspirations of future generations to live in a world free from weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons.

21. His delegation would fully support the extension of the Treaty, which it viewed as a legal instrument of paramount importance for the maintenance of international peace and security.

22. Mr. MARTINEZ BLANCO (Honduras) said that the Conference provided the opportunity to enter into serious commitments that might help to avert the threat of nuclear war and to give some thought to the grave danger involved in the proliferation of nuclear weapons and fissionable materials. Fully aware of the danger represented by nuclear weapons and their proliferation, the Latin American and the Caribbean countries, including Honduras, had entered into the Treaty of Tlatelolco as their contribution to the noble cause of denuclearization and economic development because it permitted the utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Moreover, it established the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in a large inhabited region of the planet. The countries of the region therefore hoped that the Treaty of Tlatelolco would stand as an example for the whole world. Also noteworthy in that regard was the Treaty of Rarotonga which established another denuclearized zone in the South Pacific. His delegation hoped that treaties for a nuclear-free zone in Africa and the Middle East would be concluded in the not too distant future.

23. The Government of Honduras viewed as positive the statements that had been made by the nuclear-weapon States members of the Security Council on new security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. Those statements contributed to strengthening the non-proliferation regime and to allaying the fears raised by ambiguous nuclear policies. For those reasons, his delegation had voted in favour of Security Council resolution 984 (1995).

24. Expressing concern about the recent cases of illicit trafficking in nuclear materials, he expressed the view that a system of export controls over such materials and technologies was necessary as a security guarantee.

25. Honduras had welcomed the ratification of START I and believed that a prompt ratification of START II would be a positive contribution by the United States of America and the Russian Federation towards nuclear disarmament.
Since Honduras believed that the elimination of the production, use and threat of use of weapons of mass destruction would contribute to global security, it supported an indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty. It would therefore devote its efforts towards the achievement of that goal and hoped that in the near future the Treaty would become a universal instrument.

26. Mr. CLARE (Jamaica) said that, while the Treaty represented the most important regulatory instrument in the nuclear-arms-control regime, progress in nuclear disarmament over the past 25 years had been slow and there were doubts about how effectively the parties had attempted to reach the objectives of the Treaty. He called on the Conference to undertake a careful assessment of the Treaty’s goals to determine to what extent the parties had fulfilled their obligations and facilitated progress towards nuclear and general disarmament.

27. Compliance in all the areas covered by the Treaty had been inadequate and disappointing. Despite encouraging steps recently taken by some of the nuclear-weapon States to halt the nuclear-arms race, the Treaty’s goal of restricting the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons remained unrealized. Likewise, while there had been some success in stemming horizontal proliferation, the Treaty’s provisions for nuclear technology transfer had not been faithfully honoured. Non-parties were known to have acquired nuclear capability; in addition to effective safeguards, there was a real need for entrenchment of the international consensus against proliferation. In such a context, the cessation of the nuclear-arms race would remain elusive without an explicit and firm commitment on the part of the nuclear-weapon States to conclude the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty.

28. The Jamaican Government believed that, before being extended, the Treaty and expectations for its future performance had to be thoroughly assessed in view of existing international realities. The entire international community needed to declare and reaffirm its commitment to achieving the Treaty’s objectives by pursuing such complementary arrangements as the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty and a convention against the production of fissionable material.

29. Moreover, the non-nuclear-weapon States needed security assurances from the nuclear-weapon States. Security Council resolution 984 (1995), reaffirming the responsibilities of nuclear-weapon States to respond to the security concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States, was a step in the right direction. Jamaica also supported the call for greater commitment on the part of the nuclear-weapon States to facilitate access by Treaty parties to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes under article IV. It urged the Conference to issue a declaration expressing the commitment of the nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States to pursue that objective as well as the other stated objectives of the Treaty.

30. Mr. TESHABAEV (Republic of Uzbekistan) said that the indefinite extension of the Treaty was one of the most reliable means of achieving a secure world. Uzbekistan’s decision to support the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty was a logical extension of its nuclear disarmament policy. It called for stricter implementation of all articles of the Treaty, and stressed the necessity of creating nuclear-weapon-free zones, and reiterated its resolute opposition to all weapons of mass destruction. As a member of IAEA, Uzbekistan had assumed responsibilities for implementing and strengthening safeguards and controls on the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and pledged to continue to fulfill those responsibilities in the future.

31. Mr. BULL (Liberia) said that, as a developing country without the technology or inclination to develop nuclear capability, Liberia had realized that becoming party to the Treaty offered the best safeguards as well as possibilities of future access to atomic energy for peaceful uses. It was particularly heartening that 178 States had joined the Treaty, affirming the widespread commitment to the goal of general and complete disarmament. He called on the few remaining States to accede to the Treaty in order to achieve its universality before the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations.
32. Among the achievements of the Treaty had been the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in several regions of the world. Liberia commended the Republic of South Africa for its accession to the Treaty and for its unilateral decision to dismantle its existing nuclear-weapons programme, which had enabled African countries to finalize a treaty declaring the entire African continent a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Important strides had been made in the nuclear disarmament field, but if the Treaty was to be further strengthened, a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty must be concluded.

33. Liberia welcomed Security Council resolution 984 (1995), by which the nuclear-weapon States reaffirmed the security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. That important undertaking might be strengthened, however, by the conclusion of a mandatory legal instrument. It was important that IAEA should be strengthened and verification arrangements and safeguards unconditionally enforced.

34. There was nearly universal agreement that the Treaty was vital to the continued survival of mankind, and therefore, should remain in force. Its unencumbered extension would strengthen the Treaty rather than weaken it. The provision for periodic review should allow effective monitoring to ensure full implementation. Liberia, therefore, favoured indefinite extension. Its experience of the devastation caused by its civil war had made it acutely aware of the effects which the availability of weapons could have in prolonging unnecessary suffering.

35. Mr. SNOUSSI (Morocco) said that, in the new strategic environment created by the end of the cold war, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction had become one of the primary concerns of the international community. Its dangers were even more apparent in the light of new and unfamiliar threats to international security. The many bilateral and multilateral agreements concluded in the area of nuclear disarmament over the past 25 years represented important steps towards the complete denuclearization of the planet.

36. The non-nuclear-weapon States, however, still felt a measure of insecurity in a world where some Powers continued to possess nuclear weapons. A comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty remained one of the primary objectives of those States in enhancing their security. Morocco supported the unilateral moratoriums observed by most of the nuclear Powers, along with the negotiations towards an agreement prohibiting the production of fissionable materials.

37. The Treaty remained an effective and vital security regime, which had provided the first line of defence against nuclear proliferation during its 25 years of existence. Morocco believed that the Treaty was essential as the cornerstone of the broader non-proliferation regime between nuclear and non-nuclear States. That regime could be strengthened by the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones throughout the world. The requirements of transfer of technology for development purposes should not be neglected, however.

38. Although recent developments in the Middle East peace process were encouraging, more progress could be achieved if all the States of the region were to take concrete measures to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. Ridding that region of nuclear weapons would benefit not only international peace and security, but the economic and social development of the region. Morocco urged all the States of the region which were not yet party to the Treaty, particularly those with nuclear capability, to accede to it and to place their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards.

39. The future of the Treaty, whether its extension would be indefinite or of a limited duration, was the concern of all the parties, for neither legal rulings or majority vote could replace an agreement taking into consideration their legitimate interests. Morocco would cooperate closely with all delegations in a productive analysis of the Treaty that would meet the concerns of all the parties.
ELECTION OF VICE-PRESIDENTS (agenda item 9) (continued)

40. The PRESIDENT said that the Group of Non-Aligned and Other States had nominated Trinidad and Tobago to fill the remaining post of Vice-President.

41. Trinidad and Tobago was elected Vice-President by acclamation.

REQUEST BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS FOR OBSERVER STATUS

42. The PRESIDENT said that the Credentials Committee had recommended that the request of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) for observer status to the Conference should be approved.

43. It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 12.05 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 9th MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Friday, 21 April 1995, at 3 p.m.

Mr. DHANAPALA (President) (Sri Lanka)
Mr. TAYLHARDAT (Vice-President) (Venezuela)
Mr. DHANAPALA (President) (Sri Lanka)

The meeting was called to order at 3.20 p.m.

GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 15) (continued)

1. Mr. GYLYS (Lithuania) said that his country had become a party to the Treaty shortly after regaining independence, and it encouraged States that had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty to avoid weakening the non-proliferation regime and jeopardizing the security interests of all.

2. Being concerned about its regional security, Lithuania had noted with great satisfaction the accession of Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus to the non-proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States. It felt, however, that the end of the cold war had created a security vacuum in central and eastern Europe which could not be ignored, because it affected disarmament questions.

3. Because it believed that any uncertainty about the future of the Treaty or regarding security assurances would harm the security interests of all, Lithuania supported the indefinite and unconditional extension of the non-proliferation Treaty and universal accession to the Treaty, which could thus become a pillar of global security in the twenty-first century. In that connection he supported the statement made by the French delegation on behalf of the European Union.

4. However, the Treaty had its weaknesses and, in particular, the legitimate security concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States needed to be addressed. New security assurances were necessary to ensure a balanced non-proliferation regime. Lithuania welcomed the offer, made for the first time by the five nuclear-weapon States in Security Council resolution 984 (1995), to extend both negative and positive security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

5. It endorsed measures to foster regional security, as provided in article VII of the Treaty. It attributed great importance to the efforts being made to establish an area free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East and appreciated South Africa's decision to dismantle its military nuclear weapons programme, thus, giving reason to hope that Africa might soon become a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

6. Lithuania was also encouraged by the progress made in the negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty and an agreement on cessation of the production of fissile materials for purposes of weapons production since, in any case, the non-proliferation Treaty needed to be supplemented by other legally binding instruments.
7. With regard to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system, it should be strengthened by random inspections to prevent the diversion of fissile material and of sensitive technology. Lithuania had accepted IAEA safeguards for its nuclear activities and supported the ongoing efforts to strengthen the system. Recent cases of illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and radioactive substances gave cause for concern, and the safe storage of fissile material and the protection of the environment must be ensured during the disarmament process. More effective physical protection, accounting and border controls were needed to counter that problem. International assistance and cooperation should therefore be encouraged where the system of protection and control was inadequate. Being dependent on nuclear energy and having one of the biggest power plants in the world, Lithuania appreciated the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and welcomed assistance in the area of nuclear safety, among others.

8. In conclusion, he said that the process of nuclear disarmament gave reason to hope that the goal of a world free from nuclear weapons could be achieved. However, while the nuclear-weapon States had taken steps in the right direction, bigger steps were needed in the future.

9. Mr. AL-ASHTAL (Yemen) said that the 1995 Review and Extension Conference was of paramount importance and offered a historic opportunity to take stock of the 25 years of existence of the Treaty in order to see how far States Parties had discharged their obligations and responsibilities under the Treaty, to study the difficulties encountered and to agree on a common approach to ensure the continuation and universality of the Treaty after 1995. Although the Treaty pursued a wide range of goals, it still had certain deficiencies, the major deficiency being the inequity existing between the responsibilities and obligations of non-nuclear-weapon States and those of the nuclear-weapon States, to which the Treaty accorded privileges. In fact, as the four previous review conferences had clearly shown, the most difficult problem in the implementation of the Treaty was the failure of nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their obligations and commitments under article VI of the Treaty, in which each Party undertook to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Moreover, the nuclear-weapon States had disregarded the four objectives stated in the preamble to the Treaty, namely to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, to facilitate the cessation of the production and manufacture of nuclear weapons and ensure the liquidation of all existing stockpiles and, lastly, to ensure the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament. Those States had not provided any adequate negative or positive security assurances and had not even agreed not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

10. His delegation recognized, however, that the end of the cold war had enabled substantial progress to be made in disarmament and it welcomed the important and constructive initiatives taken by Russia and the United States in the matter of bilateral disarmament. It was also pleased to note that Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan had unilaterally decided to abandon their nuclear programme, thus showing that a country could renounce the possession of nuclear weapons without losing in stature or security.

11. Since the fourth review conference in 1990, more than 30 States, including two nuclear-weapon States, France and China, as well as Algeria and several other countries, had acceded to the Treaty, so that there were now very few States that had not yet signed it. His delegation thought that, in deciding to accede to the Treaty and dismantle its stock of nuclear weapons, South Africa had taken a courageous, constructive and crucial decision that should be imitated by Israel, which had so far expressed no intention of acceding to the Treaty and was even refusing to recognize the existence of nuclear weapons in its territory. That attitude was particularly disturbing as, for some years, positive developments had been noted with regard to nuclear-weapon-free zones in Latin America, the Caribbean and the Pacific. Moreover, at the next Conference of Heads of State and Government of the
Organization of African Unity, the African States were expected to proclaim the denuclearization of Africa.

12. Efforts to establish the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace and, in particular, alternative solutions and new means and methods advocated, continued to give rise to differences of opinion and certain reservations. His delegation hoped that measures would be taken to enable those efforts to succeed, and thought that the two States that were permanent members of the Security Council, and whose fleets maintained the largest presence in the waters of the Indian Ocean, should participate in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean.

13. On the other hand, the plan to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East was still making no headway. In fact, despite the changes that had occurred on the international scene and the peace process that was going on in the Middle East, the many efforts made to establish such a zone had met with a major obstacle, namely the Israeli nuclear-weapons programme. His delegation therefore called on the international community to take practical and effective measures to ensure the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States in the region and to press Israel to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty and agree to open its installations to inspection by the IAEA. There should also be a complete ban on nuclear weapons in the Middle East, all States without exception should be obliged to comply with the provisions of the Treaty and no State whatsoever should be allowed to stand apart and deliberately remain outside the nuclear non-proliferation regime. On that point, Yemen felt that the right to security assurances was a legitimate right of the non-nuclear-weapon States and that it should not be subject to any conditions or restrictions. Furthermore, his country agreed with the countries of the Non-Aligned Movement that such assurances should be embodied in a binding international treaty, whose content and provisions could be the subject of negotiations, and which should include complete safety guarantees and clear and explicit commitments taking due account of the security concerns of the developing countries, in view of the serious imbalance which still existed between the rights and obligations of States which, like Israel, were engaged in clandestine nuclear activities and refusing to accede to the Treaty, and those accorded to other countries, such as the Arab countries, which had voluntarily renounced the nuclear option.

14. Although it contained a number of positive aspects, Security Council resolution 984 (1995) of 11 April 1995 did not give the non-nuclear-weapon States the assurances to which they should be entitled under a binding multilateral international treaty. To begin with it did not recognize that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons constituted a grave threat to international peace and security. Furthermore, the Security Council did not undertake either to take effective collective measures to remove the threats to the peace or to take retaliatory measures against the perpetrators of aggression or those who jeopardized the peace.

15. Development and strengthening of international cooperation in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was one of the Treaty’s main objectives. It was important to give IAEA, which thus far had been unable to play a full role in that area, the means it needed in order to help the developing countries develop peaceful applications of nuclear energy.

16. Maintenance and continuity of the Treaty were two essential conditions for solving the fundamental problems which had prompted adoption of the Treaty 25 years earlier. States parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, must have the political will to fulfil all the commitments and obligations they had contracted under article VI. Those States were legally and morally bound to strengthen the Treaty and the regime stemming therefrom in order to achieve complete disarmament. Adoption by agreement of a reasonable and balanced solution would satisfy the vast majority of States parties, strengthen the non-proliferation regime, improve international relations, contribute to the maintenance of peace and security and promote coexistence among States. In order to do so the best thing would be to adopt a formula that would provide for an extension and guarantee, in the near
future, implementation of the provisions and conditions of the Treaty and its universality, elicit the support of all, take into account the legitimate rights and concerns of the States parties and be consistent with the spirit of article X, paragraph 2, of the Treaty.

17. Finally his delegation resolutely supported the positions and viewpoints expressed by the countries of the Non-Aligned Movement regarding disarmament and the achievement of the goals and objectives of the Treaty, and it hoped that the Conference would be in a position to adopt a final document that would make the Treaty an effective instrument in the service of peace and security.

18. Mr. KENDALL (Marshall Islands) said that his country was a young State and had acceded to the Treaty only on 30 January 1995. Between 1946 and 1958, the United States had tested 66 atomic weapons in the Marshall Islands. The results of that massive nuclear testing had been devastating to the health of the inhabitants; of all the countries in the Pacific Ocean the Marshall Islands remained the most severely affected by radioactive contamination.

19. As a matter of principle, the Marshall Islands were in favour of general disarmament, both conventional and nuclear, and the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. It welcomed the existing moratorium and the statement made by the representative of China in support of such a test ban. The Treaty was an integral building block of the whole regime of nuclear disarmament and international security. While recognizing the need for an indefinite extension of the Treaty, the Marshall Islands could understand the concerns expressed by some countries in regard to the strengthening of certain conditions.

20. The Marshall Islands unreservedly supported the statement made at the conclusion of the meeting of the Security Council, held at the level of Heads of State and Government on 31 January 1992, to the effect that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction constituted a threat to international peace and security. However, the permanent members of the Council had a special responsibility, particularly from a financial point of view, for tackling that problem. They must also reduce their nuclear arsenals in a safe, controlled and verifiable manner. His delegation believed, as did the delegation of the Netherlands, that the Treaty placed a heavy moral responsibility on the nuclear-weapon States, one which they were duty-bound to fulfil.

21. His delegation agreed with the German delegation that the production of weapons-grade fissile material must be stopped. The German proposal for an international plutonium regime was most interesting. He also welcomed the United Kingdom’s announcement that it would unilaterally cease production of such material, and hoped that that effort would be supported by all the members of the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group.

22. His delegation also agreed that the safeguards regime of IAEA needed to be further strengthened, and it paid tribute to the Agency and to its Director General for their excellent work.

23. Like many other delegations, his delegation was very concerned at the potential for so-called "horizontal" proliferation. It appealed, on the one hand, to the countries which were on the threshold of becoming nuclear-weapon States, to follow the example set by South Africa and, on the other hand, to the States which had not signed the Treaty, to adhere to the Treaty and to the safeguards currently provided and to work for a comprehensive improvement in the regime, particularly article VI.

24. His Government’s main concern was the lack of safe radioactive waste disposal sites anywhere in the world and the fact that so little attention was given to disposal of the waste resulting from the dismantling of civilian reactors and military weapons, let alone the nuclear decontamination of the islands in the Pacific. The present Conference should review article IV, paragraph 2, with a view to finding a way to help clean up radioactive
contamination around the globe. The exchange of scientific and technological information provided for in the Treaty did not, strictly speaking, include decontamination efforts. As his delegation had suggested at the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly, the international community should mobilize resources in order to study the feasibility of setting up an international waste disposal site. Such a step would be in keeping with the goals of the Treaty.

25. His delegation therefore fully supported the indefinite extension of the Treaty, but it would like to see more work done in the following areas: strengthening of the IAEA safeguards regime; preparation of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty; cessation of the production of fissionable nuclear materials and enhanced disarmament measures to be undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States with further assurances to be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States.

26. Mr. RAHMAN (Bangladesh) said that his country unequivocally supported the continuance, consolidation and progressive development of the Treaty. Bangladesh was constitutionally committed to working for renunciation of the use of force and general and complete disarmament, and considered the Treaty the most effective existing mechanism to that end.

27. The Treaty provided two critical balances. First of all, review and extension of the Treaty were inextricably linked. They could not be dealt with separately. Inasmuch as all speakers had underscored the unequal and imperfect nature of the Treaty, it was essential to strengthen the review process.

28. The second balance was the linkage between non-proliferation and disarmament. In that connection, the Conference offered a historic opportunity. The Treaty was not an end in itself but a means of moving towards averting the dangers of nuclear war and safeguarding the security of all people. The fact that it was the most widely adhered to arms control treaty and that States continued to accede to it up to the present attested to its credibility and continued relevance.

29. The fact that the non-proliferation Treaty had in the first instance been adopted for a limited duration had not been the result of a North-South conflict. Notwithstanding the security of the nuclear umbrella, some important States of the North had had reservations about renouncing nuclear weapons for all time and a trial period of 25 years had been established to enable States parties to take an informed decision about the future of the Treaty. In that connection, he said he believed that the Conference had met not to decide whether to extend the Treaty but to decide on the best means of extending it in accordance with article X, paragraph 2.

30. The major success of the Treaty had been to arrest horizontal proliferation; as in 1970, there were still only five declared nuclear-weapon States. The Treaty had established a moral norm, as evidenced by South Africa's voluntary renunciation of the nuclear option and its accession to the Treaty, together with Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus, all as non-nuclear-weapon States.

31. The results achieved in vertical non-proliferation were much more disappointing. The objective of the Treaty had not been to codify or legitimize inequality. His delegation agreed with many others that article VI of the Treaty and the preambular paragraphs relating thereto obligated the nuclear-weapon States to pursue negotiations in good faith with a view to the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, a cut-off convention prohibiting the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, and an instrument prohibiting the first use of nuclear weapons. Those steps should lead to further negotiations on deep reductions in nuclear weapons, with the ultimate aim of eliminating them from national arsenals.

32. The progress in disarmament achieved in recent years was welcome, but it should be borne in mind that, according to reliable estimates, even after the
START II Treaty had been implemented, the nuclear forces of the nuclear Powers would still exceed the level they had been in 1970 when the non-proliferation Treaty had entered into force. Bangladesh believed, however, that, with the end of the cold war, the doctrine of nuclear deterrence should be disavowed and it found disconcerting reports that some countries were allocating to their nuclear-weapons programmes, and in particular to research in that field, funds which were far in excess of those which they were allocating to the dismantling of their arsenals. While long and complex negotiations might well be required to draw up a schedule for nuclear disarmament, the nuclear Powers could, at the present stage, reassure the non-nuclear-weapon States parties by reaffirming that nuclear disarmament was their ultimate goal.

33. Bangladesh welcomed the progress made by the Conference on Disarmament with regard to the elaboration of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and it hoped that agreement would soon be reached on a universal and effectively verifiable instrument. It also hoped that techniques which were not directly covered by such a treaty would not be used for the development of nuclear weapon systems. It was also pleased to note that the Conference on Disarmament was working on the preparation of a cut-off convention to prohibit the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes and, in that connection, it believed that the issue of existing stockpiles should also be addressed.

34. With regard to nuclear-weapon-free zones, he welcomed the Treaties of Tlatelolco and of Rarotonga and the progress made towards the denuclearization of Africa. Bangladesh, which believed that nuclear-weapon-free zones promoted non-proliferation and strengthened confidence, regularly sponsored General Assembly resolutions calling for the establishment of such a zone in South Asia.

35. The question of security assurances did not fall strictly within the purview of the non-proliferation Treaty. Such assurances were, however, essential to the effectiveness of the Treaty and should ideally have been incorporated into it. Resolution 984 (1995), which had been adopted unanimously by the Security Council on the eve of the Conference, had, however, marked some progress, particularly with regard to negative security assurances. Nevertheless, it still fell short of a legally binding international instrument enjoying the same status as the non-proliferation Treaty which would offer cast-iron guarantees in the event of an attack or threat of an attack by nuclear weapons.

36. With reference to article IV, he said that the non-aligned countries called for all States parties to have access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, without discrimination. That was all the more important in that some States which were not parties to the non-proliferation Treaty appeared to have benefited more from international trade in nuclear material and equipment than other non-nuclear-weapon States which were parties to the Treaty. In that connection, it was his country’s expectation that the Nuclear Suppliers Group would operate in a transparent manner and that arbitrary and discriminatory restraints would not be imposed on peaceful nuclear trade.

37. With regard to the safeguards system, the Gulf War had demonstrated the weakness of the system, namely that it was applied only to declared nuclear installations. IAEA had no independent sources of information and it was therefore difficult for it to detect undeclared materials or installations. The non-aligned countries had urged that all nuclear activities and installations should be placed under comprehensive and strengthened IAEA safeguards. In that connection, it would be helpful if IAEA were to be given greater access to information and sites of interest to it.

38. The non-proliferation Treaty was not a perfect instrument, but it had served an admirable purpose during times of great tension. If the procedure for its amendment were not so complex, it would be tempting to adjust it for a transitional period of 25 years. Since that was not a feasible option, the Conference must endeavour to strengthen confidence in the Treaty and promote its objectives.
39. Very cogent arguments had been advanced in favour of both indefinite extension and extension for additional fixed periods. The debate focused on ways of promoting the universality of the Treaty, disarmament, confidence and predictability. Some also wondered whether there might be a viable alternative to the Treaty, which remained the only multilateral legal instrument binding States to conduct negotiations with a view to nuclear disarmament. Some non-nuclear-weapon States parties were afraid of forfeiting their leverage to promote nuclear disarmament if the Treaty were to be extended indefinitely and unconditionally. In conclusion, he emphasized that, in view of the vital importance of the Treaty for all States parties, the Conference should make every effort to reach a decision by consensus.

40. Mr. Taylhardat (Venezuela), Vice-President, took the Chair.

41. Mr. SAMANA (Papua New Guinea) said that his delegation fully subscribed to the remarks made recently by the representative of Indonesia, to the effect that the unconditional and indefinite extension of the non-proliferation Treaty would be tantamount to the legitimization of the possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States. That was contrary to the objective of the Treaty, which was to achieve total nuclear disarmament.

42. A realistic analysis of the way in which the Treaty had been implemented showed that the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty had failed to meet the obligations they had undertaken under article VI of the Treaty, namely to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. That was why the Treaty had been unable to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons - it had only been able to control horizontal proliferation - and had instead facilitated the centralization of the control, possession and qualitative development of nuclear weapons by a very small number of nuclear-weapon States. Papua New Guinea also believed that the bilateral efforts made by the United States and the former Soviet Union - now the Russian Federation - to reduce their nuclear arsenals were the result of detente between the two countries rather than of the vigorous implementation of the Treaty by all nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. It therefore called for the immediate implementation of the following measures: the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty; the conclusion of a treaty prohibiting the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes; further reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Russian Federation, and the inclusion of China, France and the United Kingdom as parties to the START treaty to which such reductions would give rise; the standardization of nuclear export policies and the incorporation in the Treaty of provisions providing for sanctions in the event of violations of the established standards; the conclusion of a treaty containing positive security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States; and the concerted efforts to strengthen security safeguards, which meant the strengthening of the resources available to IAEA and transparency in its operations.

43. Extending the Treaty for a series of fixed periods would provide a dynamic environment within which clear and verifiable targets could be negotiated for the reduction of nuclear weapons, and would facilitate gradual achievement of all the objectives of the Treaty. That would not in any way undermine the permanence or the continuity of the Treaty. While Papua New Guinea supported the NPT as the only existing instrument for non-proliferation, it believed that the Treaty must reflect the goal of establishing global norms that were binding on all States parties. Unilateral decisions of nuclear-weapon States in the absence of a legally binding international treaty afforded no guarantee for the security of other States, big or small. Papua New Guinea also believed that the goal of the NPT should be not only non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, but also the total eradication of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction. That was why it had taken an active part in sponsoring and voting for the World Health Organization (WHO) resolution requesting the International Court of Justice to consider the possibility of declaring any threat or use of nuclear weapons illegal. Papua New Guinea took the view that the Treaty in its current form legalized the possession of nuclear weapons by a small number of States - thus
polarizing States into nuclear "haves" and "have nots" - a condition which might continue to fuel proliferation and the qualitative development of nuclear weapons. The major nuclear-weapon States had not denounced their policies of nuclear deterrence, and continued to impede progress towards non-proliferation, inhibiting the desire of the international community to establish lasting global peace and security.

44. The Pacific countries continued to suffer from atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons and the dumping of nuclear wastes. It was well known that the health problems and environmental degradation caused by such activities had resulted in the uprooting of some of the Pacific communities. The Pacific countries believed that the continuous nuclear testing in their waters directly contravened their most fundamental rights, and therefore called on the international community to guarantee their environmental security without delay, realistically and resolutely, within an internationally and legally binding treaty with the necessary safeguards and assurances.

45. The Pacific Island region had been a pioneer in establishing a nuclear-free zone, demonstrating its commitment to meet the obligations of the Treaty. The Pacific countries were encouraged by other regional initiatives, such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and by initiatives to establish nuclear-free zones in Africa, South-East Asia and the Middle East. It was disheartening, however, that certain nuclear-weapon States which had a direct influence in the South Pacific region had failed to sign the Protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga, and were not making every effort to conclude a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. In that respect, the Pacific countries fully appreciated the positive decision by China and Russia to sign the Treaty of Rarotonga and accede to the relevant Protocols. They hoped that others would follow suit immediately.

46. While his delegation would very much welcome a strengthening of the NPT regime to meet the immediate objectives of nuclear non-proliferation, the lack of security guarantees for the non-nuclear-weapon States, particularly for the protection of their environment, made it extremely difficult for it to vote for an indefinite extension.

47. Mr. CHEIKH SYLLA (Senegal) said that the NPT had had somewhat mixed results. The determination of the parties, referred to in the eleventh preambular paragraph, to discontinue all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time had not led to specific commitments or, more important, binding commitments. While it was true that most of the nuclear Powers had voluntarily suspended testing, a comprehensive test-ban treaty remained elusive, despite constant appeals by Senegal and other countries. Likewise, with regard to the intention, stated in the preamble, to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all existing stockpiles, and the elimination of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery, the disappearance of the old bipolar system had encouraged significant progress. But it had to be admitted that that threefold objective was far from being achieved.

48. Another area where much had been expected concerned the promotion of access by the non-nuclear-weapon States to the technology and applications of nuclear energy for economic and social progress. The opportunities offered by the use of nuclear energy in agriculture, medicine and industry, for example, made that aspect of the NPT regime second to none, especially as far as the developing countries were concerned. Yet, despite the generous provisions of articles IV and V of the Treaty, the measures taken were inadequate for the most part. No doubt commendable efforts were being made by the International Atomic Energy Agency with regard to the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, but the initiatives in that area, as in others, had been largely inadequate. For example, for over 10 years there had been regular reductions in the resources of the technical cooperation fund on which the Agency's activities related to the transfer of nuclear energy were based, because of the shortage of donor contributions. The allocation of a tiny portion of the peace dividend to that cooperation fund would go a long way
towards redressing the situation and would enhance the credibility of the non-proliferation regime.

49. Senegal attached great importance to the establishment of nuclear-free zones. They should be established with the express collaboration of the nuclear Powers, for it was their role to guarantee respect for the status of such zones and to provide the participating States with the required security guarantees. The African countries were working on a draft treaty to make Africa a nuclear-free zone; they would very much like the nuclear Powers to undertake commitments in that regard when the drafting was completed.

50. Demands for negative security guarantees had been made over and over again but had not yet been met. Though the question had been under lengthy discussion since the Treaty had been negotiated, it was not really so complicated. There was nothing more natural than for States that had voluntarily renounced the option of possessing nuclear weapons to request firm assurances against the threat or use of such weapons. To date, however, no satisfactory solution had been found. Security Council resolution 984 (1995) undoubtedly represented progress towards a solution, but much more was needed: precise and binding legal commitments were called for. Negative security guarantees were indispensable if an equitable and properly balanced non-proliferation regime was to be promoted.

51. It was clear therefore that there were gaps, inadequacies and imbalances both in the conception and the implementation of the Treaty. The Conference should not therefore restrict itself to the question of the extension of the Treaty; it should also provide an opportunity of reaffirming the objectives of nuclear disarmament, of consolidating the achievements in that field and of filling the gaps that might prejudice the maintenance of the Treaty's authority. Indeed, in spite of its gaps, inadequacies and imbalances, the Treaty was a basic contribution to the maintenance of peace and security throughout the world. In proscribing dissemination of nuclear weapons on a large scale, the Treaty was a key to the security of all countries. That contribution was more significant than all the inadequacies that could be found in the Treaty's structure and in the implementation of its provisions. For that reason, Senegal, which had always called for general, complete and verifiable disarmament and which had begun for several years to work alongside the African countries in preparing a treaty which would banish nuclear weapons from Africa, supported the option of an unlimited extension of the Treaty.

52. Mr. VELLISTE (Estonia) said that his country associated itself with the statement made by the representative of France on behalf of the European Union and the Eastern and Central European States associated with the Union. In the post-cold war world, it was clear that the ability to carry out nuclear war was no longer an acceptable measure of a nation's political, economic or security strength. Only through global stability brought about by disarmament would peace and sustainable human development be possible.

53. Estonia supported the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Non-use of nuclear weapons was a starting-point. All countries must agree that real efforts aimed at reduction of nuclear weapons would lessen the chances of nuclear accidents, blackmail and war. The Conference provided an unprecedented opportunity to support and continue the diverse efforts that had already been started in the field of disarmament. Estonia would like to see the acceptance of a comprehensive test-ban treaty before the end of the year and an eventual ban on the production of fissionable material for military purposes. It was hard to imagine that multilateral, regional, bilateral or unilateral disarmament activities would effectively continue unless the Treaty was unconditionally accepted.

54. Estonia supported the review process already embodied in the Treaty. Safeguard mechanisms such as nuclear-free zones and the verification work begun by IAEA were of particular importance for the implementation of the Treaty. Estonia would like to see the continuation of a dynamic NPT that would not have to be renegotiated at any particular time in the future and
would be comprehensive enough to include means through which new circumstances could be addressed.

55. In Security Council resolution 984 (1995) the permanent members recognized the concerns of non-nuclear States. The resolution was an important step forward in ensuring acceptance of the NPT provisions by all Member States because it provided a framework for more concrete and binding security assurances. It was important for Estonia that the Security Council had affirmed a collective role for the United Nations that emphasized confidence-building through security assurances, transparency and cooperation in areas of disarmament, and conflict resolution.

56. In pursuit of global disarmament and regional security, Estonia would continue seeking to cooperate with various existing and international organizations and alliances that had shown a commitment to stability and the responsible management of nuclear materials.

57. Estonia attached importance to the dismantling and transport, as well as the short-term and permanent storage procedures, used in regard to nuclear weapons and nuclear materials. The issue of smuggling nuclear materials through Estonia was being addressed. The environmental concerns related to the peacetime uses of nuclear energy at nearby plants and the conversion of military facilities that contained nuclear weapons to peacetime uses were of particular importance.

58. Estonia supported detailed accounting for fissionable materials and export controls.

59. Universal accession to the Treaty would reduce the threat of a nuclear catastrophe. The rule of law must prevail over a lawless situation based on the threat of total annihilation.

60. There was no doubt that international peace and security would be enhanced through discussions that led to disarmament and to the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. Estonia thanked and congratulated all the States that had taken part in article VI negotiations. Estonia believed that the Conference could genuinely contribute to world peace through creating confidence, stability and victory for common sense.

61. Mr. Dhanapala (Sri Lanka) took the Chair.

62. Mrs. des ILES (Trinidad and Tobago) said that her country was a firm supporter of nuclear non-proliferation. It had signed the non-proliferation Treaty. The attainment of universal adherence would undoubtedly further strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and contribute to enhanced regional and international security and stability. She therefore expressed the hope that States which had not yet acceded to the Treaty would soon do so.

63. Her delegation was encouraged by the recently held negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament on a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The completion of such a treaty by 1996 would demonstrate the degree of commitment of the nuclear-weapon States to the fulfilment of their obligations under article VI. Agreement on a universal treaty which was internationally and effectively verifiable and which would ban testing in all environments would constitute a key step forward in the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

64. Trinidad and Tobago shared the concerns expressed by the Non-Aligned States for legally binding positive and negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties and for the conclusion of a treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissionable material for nuclear weapons that was non-discriminatory. Recent efforts to enhance security assurances through statements made by the nuclear-power States and the unanimous adoption of Security Council resolution 984 (1995) were timely.
Trinidad and Tobago, as a party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, supported the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones, which underlined the importance that regional organizations and arrangements could play in promoting and maintaining international peace and security. The fact that all the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean had not become parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco demonstrated their commitment to a nuclear-weapon-free world. Her delegation also welcomed the proposal which had been put forward for the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in South Asia and the Middle East and the finalization of the draft treaty for an African nuclear-weapon-free zone.

She was of the view that the objective of general and complete disarmament should be supported by a permanent legal instrument. Trinidad and Tobago therefore supported the indefinite extension of the Treaty.

The process of nuclear disarmament was not devoid of challenges, with the increasing need to store the components of nuclear weapons securely, especially enriched uranium and plutonium which required numerous logistic, administrative, legislative, technical and safety arrangements that must be urgently addressed. The smuggling of radioactive material also posed serious potential threats to the international community.

Trinidad and Tobago, together with other developing countries, placed importance on the link between disarmament and development, and had always believed that a reduction in arms expenditure should liberate funds for economic and social development. The recent World Summit for Social Development had again brought to the fore the importance of the security of the individual for international peace and security and the urgency with which the international community must address developmental needs.

As Chairman of the Alliance of Small Island States, she wished to state, on behalf of the members of the Alliance which were States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty, that they considered it legitimate and opportune to use the current Conference to express their concerns regarding the potentially catastrophic effects of the marine transport of irradiated nuclear fuel, plutonium and highly radioactive wastes. The Global Conference on the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States had identified pollution prevention and the transboundary movement of hazardous materials as critical issues for such States. It would be impossible for them to respond effectively to possible accidents, which had a long-lasting impact on people’s health and the economy. That was why the members of the Alliance which were parties to the Treaty called upon shipment countries to respect the wishes of the Governments and peoples of small island developing States, which had called for an end to shipments of irradiated fuel, plutonium and other radioactive wastes through their archipelagic and territorial waters as well as their exclusive economic zones. They also believed that there was an urgent need for a comprehensive environmental impact assessment regarding the marine transport of such materials, and for improvement of the international safety regime governing such shipments. Members of the Alliance which were parties to the Treaty were also of the view that any future transport of those materials through the oceans should be based on the strict liability of shipment countries for full compensation for the recovery of lost consignments and for any resulting damage.

Mr. BOISSON (Monaco) said that his country, a small State which had no nuclear weapons and no army, attached great importance to the undertakings given by the large States and the nuclear Powers, and particularly to resolution 984 (1995) recently adopted by the Security Council. It considered that all those undertakings were reassuring both for the present and for the future. It also considered encouraging the conclusion of the START I and II Treaties, as well as the efforts made by the major nuclear Powers to reduce their arsenals, emphasizing that the process could be described as irreversible.

He noted that the 178 States which had acceded so far to the Treaty were clear proof of their confidence in the safeguards offered by the Treaty and in the results already achieved during the past 25 years. Accordingly, by his
recent decision to ratify the Treaty, his Highness the Prince of Monaco had also wanted to demonstrate his confidence and to associate himself with the struggle against the nuclear scourge.

72. His delegation had given much consideration to the statements of preceding speakers concerning the technical or political aspects of the question, but wished to emphasize the philosophy and the humanist aspirations which had inspired the drafters of the Treaty. No one could remain indifferent to the issue of nuclear disarmament, since nuclear weapons recognized neither the frontiers nor the size of States. The Principality of Monaco, which had neither arms nor army, had devoted its modest resources to its economic, social and cultural development, and he noted that the vast majority of States Members of the United Nations had also chosen not to possess or transfer nuclear weapons or to facilitate an expansion of the nuclear threat. In that regard, his delegation welcomed the conclusion of regional agreements banning the use of nuclear weapons, and warmly welcomed the new South Africa and Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, which had decided to renounce their nuclear weapons or to reduce them considerably.

73. His delegation had noted with great interest the reports prepared by IAEA concerning its activities pursuant to the Treaty, and had listened with satisfaction to the statement by the Director General of the Agency and welcomed his conclusions. His delegation also welcomed the rigorous action taken by IAEA in the context of its responsibilities under the Treaty, and described the Agency as an instrument that could undoubtedly be improved but was none the less irreplaceable. Furthermore, it commended the very high level of competence of the IAEA laboratory for marine radioactivity in Monaco and considered that the Agency provided a guarantee of scientific competence and political neutrality which could not but encourage States to ensure the perpetuity of the Treaty.

74. In conclusion, he said that the unconditional and indefinite extension of the Treaty, under conditions of transparency and openness which would leave no doubts as to the genuine intentions of the greatest number of States, seemed the most equitable solution and above all the one most in keeping with his country's conception of the spirit and letter of the Treaty, and he invited all States to choose that option. He also stressed that Monaco fully endorsed the statement made by the representative of France on behalf of the European Union and the words of the representative of Côte d'Ivoire, who had so eloquently appealed to nations to foster a universal culture of peace.

75. Mr. KIM (Democratic People's Republic of Korea), speaking in exercise of the right of reply to delegations other than the delegation of the Republic of Korea which had cast aspersions on his country during the general debate, emphasized that the nuclear question in the Korean peninsula was a glaring example of the shortcomings of the non-proliferation Treaty. The most serious problem lay in the implementation of the Treaty. The influential States parties took advantage of its discriminatory nature to divide States at their whim into "friendly" States and "enemy" or "evil" States, which amounted to applying double standards in the implementation of the Treaty. Moreover, the nuclear question in the Korean peninsula had originated from the introduction by the United States of nuclear weapons into South Korean territory. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea was a small, non-aligned country without nuclear weapons which, having concluded a cease-fire and not a definitive peace agreement, lived under the constant threat of such weapons. That was why, in the desire to guard against such a threat, it had acceded to the Treaty in the belief that that instrument could protect it. However, that had not been the case at all, and the threat against it persisted. Its numerous appeals to the international community calling attention to its plight had fallen on deaf ears. In addition, feeling that it was useless to remain bound by a Treaty which was of no benefit to it, it had decided to withdraw from the Treaty, a measure which it had subsequently suspended in the light of the ''Agreed Framework'' it had concluded with the United States. In that regard, he pointed out that those who were currently denigrating his country had never asked the question whether it was threatened by a nuclear attack and whether that was a violation of the Treaty. Such indifference was the fruit of biased
minds which had sought from the outset to categorize the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as an enemy State and to portray it as an evil country.

76. He emphasized that the Korean nuclear question was a political and military issue which must be settled by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States; the solution must not be entrusted to IAEA, which was a technical organization manipulated by certain influential States. He pointed out that, having already had the aide-mémoire of his country's Atomic Energy Commission circulated to the participants in the Conference, his delegation would not respond in detail to the statement by the Director General of IAEA. But it was ridiculous for the Director General to have called for special inspections of two military bases which he had already inspected himself. He also wished to point out that the States members of IAEA had already rejected the idea of utilizing satellite-imaging techniques, fearing that such procedures might infringe their sovereignty. All that scheming stemmed from a desire to use the Treaty and IAEA as a means of isolating and strangling the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the political, military and economic fields. The 25 years of operation of the Treaty created the impression that a number of influential States had taken over the non-proliferation Treaty, fashioning it and IAEA into instruments which they sought to use for controlling and dominating most non-nuclear-weapon States. So long as the States parties were divided into friendly and enemy or evil States, and so long as some of them were the subject of discriminatory treatment, the non-proliferation regime could never be strengthened, even if extended for an indefinite period.

The meeting rose at 5.35 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 10th MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 24 April 1995, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. DHANAPALA (Sri Lanka)

later: Mr. WHEELER (Vice-President) (South Africa)

The meeting was called to order at 10.25 a.m.

GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 15) (continued)

1. Mr. ZAKI (Maldives) said that he wished to touch briefly upon the various aspects involved in the review of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, namely, the objectives of the Treaty; what had been achieved; the obligations of States under the Treaty; the role played by the Treaty in arms control, disarmament and the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty; and, above all, what remained to be done. His country, like the 177 other States parties, attached the utmost importance to the Treaty, since it was the only instrument which effectively supported non-proliferation and provided a foundation for global peace and security.

2. The Treaty was, however, not an end in itself. It contained provisions for periodic review and should in time lead to a nuclear-weapon-free world. In addition, it enshrined the right of countries to conduct peaceful nuclear programmes within a specific framework. The basic concept on which the Treaty was based was almost as old as the United Nations itself.

3. The characteristic features of the Treaty were that it played a considerable role with respect to the practical and legal implications of national and regional security; that it provided a clearly discernible programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons through negotiations in good faith and the adoption of measures in that area; that it provided for peaceful national nuclear programmes under safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); that it set out the principles governing the transfer of nuclear technology for the benefit of all parties; and that it supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones throughout the world (two such zones were already in existence, and others were being considered).

4. The Treaty did not deal solely with the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, but it also dealt with disarmament and international peace and security. The international community should therefore give the Treaty its full support if it wished, in the words of the Charter of the United Nations, "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war". The Treaty was the foundation of the non-proliferation regime and was closely linked to IAEA safeguards. Since the Treaty was a major factor in preventing nuclear war and in arms control and limitation efforts, it was not surprising that the review and extension of the Treaty should arouse such interest and anxiety. It was, on the other hand, sad and disconcerting to note that suspicion and envy were also playing a role.

5. His delegation welcomed the reassuring statements made recently by the five nuclear Powers and the adoption of Security Council resolution 984 (1995). The extension of the Treaty for a fixed period or series of fixed periods would ensure the continuation of the Treaty, but it would create uncertainty about the future. Criticism of the Treaty as discriminatory had been equally valid at the time of its adoption in 1968 and its entry into
force in 1970. It was not so much the cold war but rather the possession by
some States of a weapon of mass destruction which had prompted the adoption of
the Treaty. It was therefore imperative to extend the Treaty in order to
guarantee a safe future for the world and his country supported an indefinite
extension without conditions. It commended the peoples and Governments of
South Africa, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine for having convincingly
demonstrated to the international community their great confidence in the
Treaty.

6. Mr. ABDULAI (Ghana) said that 50 years ago, the horrors of nuclear war
had been demonstrated in Hiroshima and the international community had decided
that the future of mankind would be better guaranteed "without the bomb". The
fears of the international community had been reflected shortly thereafter in
the establishment of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, the
precursor of the International Atomic Energy Agency, whose mandate was to work
for the elimination of nuclear weapons and promote the use of nuclear energy
for peaceful purposes under international control. In 1961, the General
Assembly had called for measures to prevent an increase in the number of
nuclear-weapon States and, in 1968, it had adopted the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

7. Having become a Member of the United Nations after attaining its
independence in 1957, Ghana had taken part in the negotiations culminating in
the adoption of the Treaty. In the 1960s, it had organized conferences on a
"World without the Bomb" to protest against nuclear tests in the Sahara. It
was therefore logical that it had been one of the first States to sign the
Treaty in 1968 and to ratify it in 1970.

8. His delegation saw the non-proliferation regime not as an end in itself
but rather as a means towards nuclear disarmament. The Treaty was intended to
prevent the proliferation and wider dissemination of nuclear weapons and the
arms race and to achieve general and complete disarmament. The Treaty also
sought to encourage international cooperation in the use of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes and recognized the inalienable right of all States,
in particular the developing countries, to use nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes on a non-discriminatory basis.

9. Under the Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States committed themselves not to
transfer nuclear weapons or technology to any recipient whatsoever, whether
directly or indirectly. For their part, the non-nuclear-weapon States
undertook not to receive or seek to develop nuclear weapons or technology for
making such weapons and to submit their peaceful nuclear facilities and
materials to IAEA safeguards. Safeguards were not to hamper economic or
technological development of the parties. The Treaty was not perfect.
Although it had succeeded in limiting the number of nuclear-weapon States, it
had not had an impact on the number and quality of nuclear weapons and had not
achieved its objectives with regard to disarmament. Such progress in
disarmament as had been achieved had come about in the context of other
treaties (START I and II).

10. Ghana welcomed the assistance it received from IAEA and friendly
countries, which enabled it to apply nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in
the fields of health, agriculture and industry, but believed that much more
could be achieved under the Treaty. His delegation also wished to draw
attention to certain points of the non-proliferation Treaty which were a cause
of concern for the non-aligned countries, including his own: States parties
should reaffirm their commitment to the complete elimination of nuclear
weapons according to a specific timetable; they should agree to a target date
for the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and a treaty
banning the production and stockpiling of fissile materials for nuclear
weapons; they should commit themselves to respect nuclear-weapon-free zones
and reaffirm the inalienable rights of the parties to full access to nuclear
technology for peaceful purposes. In addition, the nuclear-weapon States
should commit themselves to pursuing negotiations on legally binding negative
and positive security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States.
11. His delegation believed that, with a sincere commitment by all the parties to the disarmament objectives of the non-proliferation Treaty, the negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty could be concluded more quickly, and it hoped that such a treaty could be concluded in the next few months, with the cooperation of all parties concerned. His delegation appreciated the efforts made by the nuclear-weapon States which were permanent members of the Security Council to provide the non-nuclear-weapon States with assurances before the Conference, but hoped that the security assurances would be legally binding.

12. Following the abandonment by South Africa of its nuclear-weapons programme, the African continent was engaged in the preparation of a treaty for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone and his delegation hoped that the proposed instrument would receive the support of all. The international community should also vigorously pursue efforts to end tensions in the Middle East and South Asia so that nuclear-weapon-free zones could be established in those regions.

13. His country was prepared to participate in negotiations on the future of the Treaty and hoped that they would lead to a stronger non-proliferation regime and nuclear disarmament and would promote peace. The best solution for all States was truly a “world without the bomb”.

14. Mr. BIRKAVS (Latvia) said that, as an occupied State in 1968, his country had been unable to participate in the conference at which the non-proliferation Treaty had been drafted. It paid tribute to the drafters of the Treaty and noted that, by relinquishing a part of their sovereignty, States parties had collectively reduced the risk of Armageddon. The end of the cold war, in halting the nuclear-arms race, had reduced that risk even further. Latvia supported indefinite, unconditional extension of the Treaty.

15. Twenty-five years after the adoption of the Treaty, one of the main purposes of which was to prevent an increase in the number of nuclear-weapon States, horizontal proliferation among non-nuclear-weapon States could, on the whole, be seen to have been kept in check. However, his country was alarmed that some States were seeking or had sought a nuclear-weapons capacity. While there had been relative success in curbing horizontal proliferation, halting vertical proliferation had proved an elusive goal during the cold war. Latvia was gratified that the arms race had at long last been reversed and that the various disarmament agreements between the United States of America and the Soviet Union, as well as unilateral measures by all the nuclear Powers, had profoundly changed the world. That progress could be attributed to the new international climate and to the good faith shown by the nuclear-weapon States pursuant to their commitments under the non-proliferation Treaty. The Treaty regime provided a framework of stability, security and predictability which had permitted concerted implementation of a disarmament agenda.

16. Much remained to be done, however, and Latvia hoped that present and future nuclear disarmament agreements and commitments would be fully and rapidly implemented. A comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty was within reach and until such an agreement was reached, Latvia urged all States to continue the current moratorium on nuclear-weapons testing. It awaited the commencement of negotiations on a convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices. Such a convention, which must be non-discriminatory, multilateral and effectively verifiable, would immeasurably increase confidence among all States. Negative and positive security assurances were an additional confidence-building measure. Latvia urged further negotiations on the expansion of such measures, including the conclusion of legally binding security assurances.

17. The relative success of the non-proliferation Treaty in curbing horizontal proliferation was due to the large number of States that were parties to it, who had put their trust in the non-proliferation regime knowing that most of their neighbours were also parties. However, in view of the gravity of the threat of proliferation, Latvia urged all States that were not
parties, in particular the threshold States, to accede to it so that the
Treaty might become universal by the end of the century.

18. Latvia had concluded a safeguards agreement with IAEA and urged all
States which had not fulfilled that obligation to do so as soon as possible.
International cooperation and an effective system of verification were
essential to collective security. States should have the assurance that
information yielded by IAEA inspections was accurate and complete.

19. He recalled that during the general debate at the forty-ninth session of
the General Assembly, Latvia had called not only for a coalition for democracy
but also for a fight against organized crime and the trafficking of nuclear
materials and narcotics. Such coalitions were particularly relevant with
regard to nuclear non-proliferation, since not only States but also
individuals might have access to weapons of mass destruction. Urgent
measures, including the development of regional arrangements, must be taken in
order to strengthen borders and thus prevent uncontrolled movements of nuclear
materials, and the financial resources needed to implement IAEA safeguards
must be mobilized.

20. The non-proliferation Treaty was the only near-universal disarmament
instrument. Its indefinite extension would make permanent the legal
commitments contained therein. Any other decision would weaken the Treaty and
the IAEA regime. The Treaty had helped to keep regional conflicts and
tensions away from the nuclear arena, but that could change if the future of
the Treaty was called into question.

21. It was important to acknowledge the significant disarmament steps taken
by the nuclear-weapon States in implementing article VI of the Treaty.
Indefinite extension of the Treaty would provide the stability and
predictability that were necessary for further disarmament measures and for
ensuring a world free of nuclear arms, would discourage the non-nuclear-weapon
States from hedging against the possible expiration of the Treaty and, lastly,
would help to create a framework in which the threshold States could be
prodded into acceding to the Treaty.

22. Mr. SAMASSEKOU (Mali) said that his country had acceded to the
non-proliferation Treaty because it believed that no security could be
achieved through reliance on the possession of nuclear weapons. Mali had
always encouraged all States to abide by their commitments under the Treaty
which, despite its imperfections, particularly the imbalance between the
rights and obligations of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States, was
the only instrument designed to halt the spread of the deadliest weapon ever
known to man. As soon as it had become independent, Mali had called for an
end to all nuclear tests, particularly in the Sahara.

23. The Treaty had achieved some remarkable successes, including the
prevention of horizontal proliferation and the creation of nuclear-weapon-free
zones, but there were several defects in its functioning because some of its
obligations had been breached; for instance, the nuclear Powers had been slow
to honour their commitments under articles IV and VI of the Treaty and some
non-nuclear-weapon States were seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. Despite
the glimmer of hope kindled by the unilateral and bilateral measures taken by
the two major nuclear Powers, it was a source of concern that many
"intermediate nuclear Powers" had emerged onto an international scene that had
become more difficult to control.

24. With regard to the three alternatives proposed for paragraph 2 of
article X of the Treaty, his delegation believed that in the absence of a
comprehensive agreement on the destruction of all nuclear weapons, limited
extension of the Treaty for a period of between 15 and 20 years might be one
of the better proposals, on the understanding that any decision on the
Treaty's future would have to be taken by consensus. The proposed period
should be used to offer greater security guarantees, particularly for
denuclearized regions such as Africa.
25. Speaking in his capacity as Chairman of the Group of African States and on behalf of the 50 African States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty, he wished to comment on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa. After retracing the history of that issue, which dated back to the first nuclear tests in the Sahara, and recalling General Assembly resolution 1652 (XVI), which considered Africa a demilitarized zone, and a resolution and solemn declaration of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), he said that Africa and OAU had set themselves the goals of keeping the African continent outside all spheres of rivalry and making it a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Since the establishment of a democratic regime in South Africa, that country had not only acceded to the non-proliferation Treaty but also renounced all its nuclear programmes. Africa's determination to become a nuclear-weapon-free zone was also evident in the OAU commitment since the 1990 declaration on the political and socio-economic situation of Africa, which sought to establish a climate of security conducive to economic development.

26. In order to promote the development of Africa, OAU had taken steps to halt internal conflicts on the continent. For example, it had established machinery for the prevention, management and settlement of conflicts. The creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone would help to strengthen those efforts by eliminating the risk of nuclear-weapons proliferation and the use of those weapons against African States. Africa was working for the universal application of the non-proliferation Treaty and urged the nuclear-weapon States to accelerate negotiations on the destruction of those weapons.

27. He mentioned the work of the Group of Experts responsible for drafting a treaty or convention on the denuclearization of Africa, the purpose of which was to prohibit nuclear weapons and promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. He listed the various points covered in the draft, and particularly the problem of nuclear waste, and recalled that the Bamako Convention prohibited all dumping and storing of toxic waste on the continent. The instrument that was being drafted also dealt with the acquisition of nuclear technology for economic and social development purposes, the strengthening of regional and subregional cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the right of the African States to seek and obtain the necessary assistance and cooperation from the developed countries and the IAEA. A full-scope safeguards agreement, including a system of effective verification, should be concluded and administered with the IAEA.

28. Africa would only be viable as a nuclear-weapon-free zone if it received full and unconditional support from the international community. It called for positive and negative security assurances, to be embodied in a binding international legal instrument, in the form of a protocol annexed to the Treaty, to which the African States themselves would be parties. Africa's willingness to renounce the possession of nuclear weapons deserved to be matched by the offer of credible security assurances. In that connection, Africa welcomed the adoption by the Security Council of resolutions 255 (1968) and 984 (1995), but nevertheless considered that the current assurances should be strengthened and that strategic considerations should not prevent the rapid elimination of nuclear weapons.

29. Africa fervently hoped that nuclear energy would in future be used on the planet exclusively for peaceful purposes. A terrible threat was hanging over mankind. If it came from the South it would have been warded off, but it basically came from another direction. He urged the international community, with the approach of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations, to show political will and join in building a new and peaceful world, free from fear of the apocalypse.

30. Mr. Wheeler (South Africa), Vice-President, took the Chair.

31. Mr. AL-ZAHAWI (Iraq) said that although previous speakers had mentioned Iraq as the example of a country seeking to acquire a nuclear capability, they had not mentioned it as an example in any other context because they were seeking to promote their policies in the region. What Iraq had had to endure since 1981 other States might have to endure in the future. The lesson from
that experience was that a certain entity, while refusing to accede to the Treaty, had managed, by secret and illicit means, to acquire nuclear weapons, not only with the knowledge of certain nuclear-weapon States but also with their assistance. Subsequently that entity had decided to take the law into its own hands and launched an armed attack against installations which, as they belonged to a State party to the Treaty, were covered by safeguards. That had not protected that State from the attack nor from a repetition of such attacks, repeatedly threatened by the aggressor. The Security Council and IAEA had stated that that attack constituted a serious threat for the entire IAEA safeguards system, on which the non-proliferation Treaty was based, and they had adopted resolutions asking the aggressor to place its nuclear installations under IAEA safeguards and to refrain in future from committing acts of that kind or threatening to commit them. Several years had elapsed but the resolutions had remained a dead letter because the Council and the international community had done nothing to ensure their implementation.

The reason was that the authorities of one of the nuclear-weapon States considered that the aggressor in question was entitled to acquire a nuclear capability and to act as it pleased because, as they put it, it behaved in a rational and responsible manner. They pretended to forget that that entity had threatened to bring out the nuclear bomb that it kept "hidden in the basement", not to defend its existence but to hold on to the territories it had occupied, settled and annexed by force. In that entity there was a powerful opposition party which was expected to win the forthcoming elections and which was urging that not a single inch of the occupied territories should be surrendered, and was ready, in its fanaticism, to go to any lengths, whatever the cost. It was not hard to see what that party would do with its nuclear bomb. Nevertheless, the nuclear-weapon State in question was not changing its policy towards the entity, on which it was lavishing financial resources, weapons and nuclear cooperation.

32. There was also another State, which was not a party to the Treaty and which had succeeded in acquiring certain nuclear capabilities without having to steal material or equipment or any other components or contravene the laws of the great Power in question or of any other State, unlike the other entity. However, the great Power was imposing a blockade on that State and an arms embargo, although it had already paid for its weapons. It was hard to see the justice in such biased policies and one wondered how independent States, large or small, could ensure their safety, exercise their rights and put their trust in ambiguous and illusory safeguards that failed to protect them against murderous acts of aggression.

33. Iraq, in keeping with Security Council resolution 687 (1991), had for four years submitted to strict nuclear controls and was fully cooperating in that sphere, as had been acknowledged by the IAEA. In paragraph 14 of the above-mentioned resolution, the Council noted that the actions to be taken by Iraq represented steps towards the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery. Not only had nothing been done in that area but the only State in the region which had not signed the Treaty and which possessed nuclear weapons was still refusing to accede to it. As for the great Power which was protecting that State, and which was behind the above-mentioned resolution, it was neither applying the provisions of that paragraph of the resolution nor reacting to the intransigence of its protege, although it was trying to make other States of the region apply the provisions of the Treaty when they would thereby renounce the exercise of their legitimate rights to equality and to ensure their security.

34. Iraq considered that the Conference should take those facts into consideration in order to avoid any discrimination. Otherwise, by exempting one State from applying the provisions of the Treaty while expecting others to respect it forever, there would inevitably be attempts to restore a certain balance. That meant an arms race, whether secret or public. It would therefore be unwise for the Conference to ignore that reality or to close its eyes to the consequences.
35. The objective was to safeguard the interests of all parties without granting privileges to a minority and depriving the majority of its right to equality, and even endangering its security and its future. Efforts must therefore be made either to establish equity and equilibrium or - preferably - to attain the ultimate goal sought by all mankind, namely the complete and permanent elimination of the nuclear threat.

36. If there had been any equilibrium at the beginning, the world would not have experienced the atrocities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Without the balance subsequently achieved in the world, the cold war would not have remained cold. One might thus consider the case of the war waged by the United States against Viet Nam as an example of the role played by nuclear weapons as an instrument of deterrence. Kissinger had stated that the Kennedy team wrongly thought there was nuclear parity between the United States and the Soviet Union, which made a general war unthinkable. McNamara had said that Eisenhower, under the Johnson presidency in 1965, had advised the United States Government to threaten the Chinese and Soviets with the atomic bomb if they themselves threatened to intervene in Viet Nam.

37. If Eisenhower, who was considered to have been one of the great presidents of the United States, had advised the use of nuclear weapons, one shudders at the thought of what might have happened if the United States had not considered that there was parity with the Soviet Union. In spite of that conviction, United States generals, such as General Curtis LeMay, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, had threatened to drop the atomic bomb on North Viet Nam.

38. Apparently, the military and civilian leaders of the United States were very attached to the idea of atomic bombing designed to destroy a city or an entire country, since their experience of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The wife of President Reagan had stated that General Alexander Haig, Secretary of State, had requested the United States Security Council to have Cuba turned into a parking lot. General Michael Dugan, another Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force, had stated in the Washington Post of 16 September 1990 that the United States was planning to conduct a massive bombardment of the centre of Baghdad and to eliminate the President and his family. General Dugan had also requested experts to tell him what Iraqis considered to be the most sacred Muslim site in Iraq so as to bomb it. At the beginning of 1991, the Secretary of State, James Baker, threatened to bomb Iraq back to the pre-industrial era. The United States Air Force had complied by unleashing more than 120,000 tons of bombs on Iraq, a total force representing more than the atomic bombs launched against Hiroshima and Nagasaki. As a result, the United Nations representative, Mr. Maarti Ahtissari, had stated in his report to the Secretary-General, that Iraq had indeed been bombed back to the pre-industrial era. What annoyed certain people was that Iraq, thanks to the determination of the Iraqis and the resolution of their leaders, had been able to reconstruct the country and defy the plans of the United States. It was clear from all the statements and descriptions that those were not isolated cases but were constantly recurring in the thoughts and behaviour of the United States.

39. It was unlikely that Mr. McNamara felt guilty about the murderous attack on Viet Nam and its neighbours for he had planned to list the Vietnamese killed so as to prove the success of United States policy. In fact, the cause of his guilt was the deaths of 58,000 United States soldiers brought about as a result of that policy.

40. It might be wondered whether Viet Nam could have saved its 3 million victims if it had been able to make the United States hesitate before it launched its attack.

41. McNamara had stated that he had written his book in order to avoid wars against nationalists whose emotional power could not be reduced to silence by United States bombs.
42. At present that stage was over and the moment had come to achieve the fundamental aim of the Treaty and to work seriously in favour of the elimination of all nuclear weapons from the earth and to ensure the future of coming generations.

43. Meanwhile, the most urgent task was to define a precise timetable for the reduction in the number of nuclear weapons and their elimination, the universal implementation of the Treaty, the establishment of a non-discriminatory regime regarding the transfer of nuclear technology to countries that were not parties to the treaty.

44. Finally, he reaffirmed the Arab position set forth in the resolution adopted in March 1995 by the Council of the Arab League, namely, that the endorsement of the status quo, which compelled all the States of the Middle East except Israel to respect the Treaty, was a serious mistake which threatened peace and stability in the region and was therefore unacceptable.

45. Mr. HOROI (Solomon Islands) said it was against a backdrop of profound change in political and security relations that the Conference was now considering the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It was therefore an historic occasion on which to decide the future of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. The Conference should therefore concentrate on the substantive issues of the Treaty's implementation, particularly on nuclear disarmament under article VI. The Conference must focus not only on the record but also on concrete ways to improve it. It must be improved drastically and quickly. Nuclear danger was a global problem and it required a global solution. The decisions to be made during the next few weeks would affect the very future of the earth. Even a small developing nation like Solomon Islands had a view about the world and relied on a healthy environment for its survival. It was therefore acutely aware of the need to protect its natural resources from nuclear contamination.

46. Solomon Islands was concerned about French testing in the Pacific and the possibility of nuclear wars or explosions anywhere in the world. Nothing short of the total and final elimination of all nuclear weapons for all time would convince his country that such a nightmare would not one day happen. The experience of the last 25 years did not yet give it confidence of the commitment of the world's nations and especially the nuclear-weapons States to that end.

47. If the world kept going in the present direction without a committed, global effort to delegitimize and to ban under international inspection the possession of nuclear weapons by anyone - as chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction were now banned - it was likely to experience within coming decades not only threats but actual explosions of Hiroshima-size bombs in regional wars or terrorist acts. And that prospect threatened the Solomon Islands along with every other nation in the world.

48. Solomon Islands had experienced first-hand the devastation and suffering of war. In addition, it had been affected throughout the cold war by nuclear weapons testing and other related activities. Those experiences had had a profound influence on its efforts to promote peace and nuclear disarmament internationally and on its deep commitment to the goal of world peace and security. Solomon Islands played an active role in the South Pacific Forum, other regional organizations and the United Nations and its major agencies. Its commitment to regional and international cooperation and peace was reflected in the adoption of the following measures.

49. Solomon Islands, together with other members of the South Pacific Forum, had agreed to adopt the South Pacific Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty in 1985 (Treaty of Rarotonga). It considered that Treaty to be the region's central contribution to the strengthening of global security and the international non-proliferation regime. It was with deep regret that Solomon Islands noted that, among the nuclear-weapon States, Russia and China had ratified the protocols of that Treaty but France, the United Kingdom and the United States had not. The Solomon Islands considered that the establishment of nuclear
weapon-free zones in all regions of the world was an important objective in the world quest for total nuclear disarmament. The Treaty of Tlatelolco had shown the way, followed by the Treaty of Rarotonga; the members of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) were ready to finalize a draft treaty creating a nuclear-free zone in South East Asia; the countries of Africa were also ready to create such a zone. The Solomon Islands hoped that those moves would encourage similar initiatives in other parts of Asia, the Middle East and Europe.

50. In 1993, its concern over the health and environmental effects of the use of nuclear weapons had led Solomon Islands, together with other members of the World Health Organization (WHO) to vote in favour of a request for an Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the use of nuclear weapons in armed conflict. In 1994, it had joined 77 other nations in supporting General Assembly resolution 49/75 K, urgently requesting the Court for a second and more comprehensive Advisory Opinion, on the legality of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances. Solomon Islands would continue to participate actively in those proceedings and hoped that they would spur on the efforts of the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their obligations under the Treaty and to eliminate nuclear weapons completely.

51. While his country welcomed the efforts of the United States and Russia to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons, it must be noted that the joint level of 7,000 strategic warheads to be achieved by the year 2003 if the START II Agreement was implemented, that would involve almost exactly the same number that the United States and Russia had deployed in 1970 when the Treaty entered into force 25 years ago. Unless his delegation heard commitments that START III negotiations would aim at further deep reductions below the 1970 level and that the other nuclear States were ready to join in disarmament negotiations at last, it would have little choice but to conclude that the nuclear-weapon States did not take seriously their article VI commitment to pursue the elimination of nuclear weapons. That would have profound consequences for the future of international relations and of the Treaty itself. Likewise, the failure of the nuclear-weapon States to agree even on a draft of a comprehensive test-ban treaty by the opening of the present Conference was deeply disturbing. It had given rise to concern that after the Conference adjourned they might turn their backs on their obligation to ban all nuclear explosions for all time. Instead, they might agree to a low-yield threshold treaty, allowing sizeable explosions which would permit further development of nuclear weapons and would spur rather than inhibit proliferation.

52. The success of the Conference would be judged not only by a decision to extend the Treaty but also on the demonstrated political will of the parties to implement the Treaty, including article VI, and to reform and strengthen the global nuclear non-proliferation regime.

53. While the Treaty had proved an invaluable tool in stemming the proliferation of nuclear weapons, it was not sufficient to extend it indefinitely without wholehearted support by a broad consensus. Both the Treaty itself and the commitments towards disarmament required to achieve its goals merited the affirmation of the Conference by overwhelming votes, freely given. The security of the international community demanded no less.

54. The Solomon Islands wished to stress the vital need for the parties to the Conference to commit themselves to taking additional concrete steps to strengthen the global non-proliferation regime. Without such steps, the Treaty could not attain its dual objectives of ending nuclear-weapons proliferation and bringing about the progressive elimination of nuclear weapons. The current regime gave nuclear-weapon States too much latitude, allowing them to retain large nuclear arsenals. Global political consensus was needed in order to implement the measures that would strengthen and reform the non-proliferation regime, but unless the nuclear Powers committed themselves once more to their nuclear disarmament obligations under article VI of the Treaty and took immediate and concrete steps to carry them out, that
consensus would not be sustained. The current pace of progress towards the abolition of nuclear weapons was insufficient and deeply troubling, particularly in light of the historic opportunities that had emerged with the end of the cold war. Non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament were inextricably linked. It would soon be all or nothing, abolition or proliferation. Either all nations would forgo the right to possess and threaten the use of nuclear weapons, or every nation would claim that right, and many nations and groups would act on it. In order to strengthen the non-proliferation regime and give effect to article VI, the nuclear-weapon States should immediately set a date for the start of negotiations on a convention to eliminate nuclear weapons - in which negotiations the undeclared nuclear-weapon States and threshold States should participate. There should also be a target date for the completion of those negotiations by the year 2000.

55. The Review and Extension Conference itself should be a forum in which the parties affirmed their political commitment to strengthening the non-proliferation regime. Those commitments should be included in the Conference's final document or in a statement of comparable importance. Progress or lack of progress in implementing those mutual obligations should be measured and assessed in a far more rigorous way than was currently the case with the five-year NPT Review Conferences. The Solomon Islands urged all parties to the Treaty to affirm, in a strongly worded final Conference document, their commitment to implementing the following measures: (1) elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles, particularly by the five nuclear Powers, and commitment by those Powers to negotiate a nuclear-weapons convention by the year 2000; (2) adoption of a multilateral and truly comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty that would ban all nuclear explosions for all time, leaving no loopholes; (3) establishment of safeguards on fissile materials from dismantled weapons and verification of the destruction of all warheads, and extension of bilateral or international safeguards; (4) banning of the production of fissile materials; (5) negative security assurances and binding commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons; and (6) improvement of non-proliferation safeguards by rigorous assessment of how States parties carried out their obligations.

56. If those commitments were made during the Conference there would be overwhelming and wholehearted support for indefinite extension of the Treaty, and the Solomon Islands would enthusiastically join that consensus.

57. Mr. GıYEN (Turkey) pointed out that, with the end of the cold war, the arms control process had entered a new phase. The new environment had made it possible to conclude agreements on disarmament dealing, inter alia, with conventional armed forces in Europe and chemical weapons. In the nuclear field, 1994 had marked two important steps forward, with the negotiation of the comprehensive test-ban treaty and the consultations on a treaty that would ban the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. However, despite all those encouraging new developments, the risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was far from over.

58. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was the main building block of the international non-proliferation regime and the most widely supported multilateral arms control agreement. It had proved its value in safeguarding international peace, strengthening the security of States and promoting international cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Turkey believed that strict adherence to its provisions was of crucial importance. Nuclear power plants were but one of several ways to produce energy, and nuclear installations should be operated at all times in strict conformity with IAEA safeguards and the principles of the Treaty.

59. The success of the non-proliferation regime depended not only on the adoption of treaties but also on compliance with their provisions. In the case of the non-proliferation Treaty, the safeguards contained in article III were designed for the exclusive purpose of verifying the fulfilment of obligations assumed under the Treaty with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Strengthening such safeguards was an important element of
nuclear arms control and of non-proliferation. His delegation strongly supported the approach taken and the recommendations contained in the recent report of the IAEA Director General on strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system, which was the outcome of the "Programme 93 + 2".

60. The Treaty also set out an agenda for nuclear disarmament and the parties had undertaken to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament. It was worth recalling the obligations relating to non-proliferation stemming from the relevant preambular paragraphs and article VI. He noted with satisfaction that the nuclear Powers had recently reaffirmed their commitment to nuclear disarmament, and that significant and concrete progress had been made in that area since the end of the cold war. However much still remained to be done and in that connection he drew attention to the negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, consultations on a treaty which would ban the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons, and positive and negative security assurances.

61. Some progress had been accomplished in the past on the subject of limiting the environments within which nuclear tests could be undertaken or limiting their yield; however that was not enough to attain the non-proliferation goals. The conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty which would be truly comprehensive and verifiable would therefore be a vital step in that direction. Another important step would be the early conclusion of a treaty providing for a cut-off in the production of fissile materials. Turkey expressed its satisfaction at the fact that the Conference on Disarmament had finally decided to establish an hoc committee to start negotiations on that issue. It hoped that the remaining differences of opinion would soon be ironed out.

62. In the meantime, Turkey shared the security concerns expressed by non-nuclear-weapon States and it welcomed the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 984 (1995) noting that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the five permanent members of the Security Council had given the non-nuclear-weapon States which were parties to the Treaty security assurances against the use of such weapons.

63. Turkey supported the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty, since it believed that the main objectives of the Treaty - strengthening of the non-proliferation regime and nuclear disarmament - could only be achieved through a treaty that was universally adhered to and indefinitely extended. Such an instrument could only strengthen international peace and security.

The meeting rose at 12.25 p.m.
President: Mr. DHANAPALA (Sri Lanka)

later:

Mr. HASMY (Vice-President) (Malaysia)

The meeting was called to order at 3.25 p.m.

GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 15) (continued)

1. Mr. ARCILLA (Philippines) said that the Conference had a historic mandate; it would determine whether or not future generations would live under the threat of nuclear annihilation. It should decide the future of the non-proliferation Treaty on the basis of a comprehensive review of the events of the past 25 years, and should be guided by the objectives of non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament, and promoting development through the application of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

2. The international community realized that peace and development were two sides of the same coin. That duality was embodied in the Treaty through the principles that nuclear weapons were a danger to international peace and security, and that peaceful applications of nuclear energy should be made universally available, subject to non-proliferation commitments. The Philippines, for its part, pursued a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory.

3. Despite the considerable number of States parties, their attachment to the Treaty could be rendered useless if one or a few States refused to be part of the non-proliferation regime; above all, the Conference should call for universal accession.

4. The non-nuclear-weapon States were fulfilling their non-proliferation obligations, either voluntarily or compelled by verification and inspection. However, the existence of a small number of de facto nuclear-weapon States was of the utmost concern. Moreover, many non-nuclear-weapon States parties had yet to comply with their obligations to conclude and implement comprehensive safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). They should be urged to rectify that situation. In that regard, the Philippines supported the strengthening of the international nuclear safeguards system.

5. The Conference should commend the various initiatives for the creation of regional nuclear-weapon-free zones. All States parties, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, should be urged to support such initiatives, and the nuclear-weapon States should respect the zones, especially a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South-East Asia.

6. After 25 years, nuclear disarmament - the crux of the non-proliferation regime - had not been fully realized. Consequently, the campaign of the nuclear-weapon States for indefinite extension had been interpreted as an attempt to perpetuate an unjust status quo. The Philippines urged immediate negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-disarmament treaty, in which all nuclear-weapon States, whether declared or de facto, would take part; that treaty should spell out the steps to be taken towards full nuclear disarmament, as well as the time-frame for its accomplishment.
7. The nuclear-weapon States should also be asked to declare to the Conference that they renounced nuclear weapons as instruments of war; that they would conclude forthwith a comprehensive test-ban treaty; and that they would pursue interim steps towards, inter alia, a cut-off convention banning production of all weapon-useable fissile materials, a treaty against first use of nuclear weapons, and a treaty containing positive and negative security assurances.

8. The Philippines also supported the establishment in the United Nations of a register of nuclear arsenals to serve as a benchmark in the disarmament process.

9. The issue of peaceful uses of nuclear energy presented a challenge in terms of peace and prosperity, necessitating an integrated approach to disarmament, collective security and economic and scientific cooperation. The Conference should call for such an approach, which should include a strengthened commitment for transfer of technology and technical cooperation to assist developing countries.

10. He agreed with the Secretary-General of the United Nations that there should be no diplomatic brinkmanship with respect to the non-proliferation Treaty. Non-proliferation and disarmament should not be a matter for bargaining. Prompt action should be taken to put the obligations under article VI into effect. Negotiations towards stopping further development of nuclear weapons and towards eliminating them should be pursued in good faith. Only the indefinite extension of the Treaty could provide the needed stability. It was the paradox of the Treaty that, in order to make the nuclear non-proliferation regime unnecessary, through nuclear disarmament, the Treaty must continue in force indefinitely. Once the international community attained the goal of the irreversible total abolition of nuclear weapons, the question of the Treaty remaining in force would be irrelevant, except with regard to the sharing of benefits from the peaceful applications of nuclear technology.

11. Mr. KOZYREV (Russian Federation) said that the outcome of the Conference would determine whether the future was stable and predictable or fraught with the danger of a new nuclear confrontation. The non-proliferation Treaty was a document which, on the basis of compromise, had brought together the most varied States - large and small, nuclear and non-nuclear. It served the common interest of ensuring stability, averting the nuclear threat and promoting disarmament and, for a disarmament agreement, had attracted a record number of States parties, which needed the Treaty as a guarantee of both national and universal interests.

12. It was said that the Treaty was ineffective. However, it had unquestionably limited the spread of nuclear weapons; there were still only five nuclear Powers and the provisions of the Treaty had become inalienable norms of international law and civilized behaviour. It was significant that South Africa had voluntarily dismantled its nuclear weapons and had acceded as a non-nuclear-weapon State. It was largely because of the existence of the Treaty that, in the turmoil of the breakup of the USSR, an increase in the number of nuclear-weapon States had been avoided and Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan had acceded to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States. The Russian Federation applauded the wisdom of its friends and partners in the Commonwealth of Independent States; their accession had strengthened the Treaty and the reliability of non-proliferation.

13. The Treaty had become an appreciable factor in the strengthening of regional stability; one could imagine what might have happened in the areas of local conflicts in the absence of the Treaty. The non-proliferation norm underlying the Treaty had also become a starting point for establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones. The recent adoption of Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and the harmonized statements of the nuclear Powers on the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty constituted a further contribution to the strengthening of international stability and security and had become possible because of the Treaty.
14. To the doubts and questions raised about the obligations in the Treaty to halt the nuclear-arms race and achieve nuclear disarmament, the Russian Federation, along with other States, had an unequivocal answer: the nuclear-arms race had been halted and reversed. That was indisputable. By mid-1991, an entire class of nuclear weapons of the Russian Federation and the United States had been eliminated. Under the START I Treaty, the two largest nuclear arsenals had been reduced almost by half; with the ratification of the START II Treaty, the Russian Federation and the United States would reduce their strategic offensive arms to one third, and they had also agreed to start deactivating all the strategic carriers that were subject to reduction.

15. The leaders of both countries recognized the need for further reductions and limitations in the remaining nuclear forces and had instructed their experts to accelerate work on possible reductions after the ratification of START II. The Russian Federation's agreements with the United States, China and the United Kingdom on the detargeting of their strategic nuclear forces were an important means of strengthening strategic stability and trust. The Russian Federation's strategic nuclear forces were no longer targeted against anyone.

16. The Russian Federation was committed to the final goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. It proposed that all the nuclear-weapon States should proceed towards that goal, taking into account the specific nature of their nuclear potential, and possibly with a certain asymmetry of commitments. That objective could be achieved under the treaty on nuclear security and strategic stability proposed by the President of the Russian Federation at the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly (A/49/PV.5). The Russian Federation was gratified that, just before the Conference, the United States, the United Kingdom and France had joined it in making a statement solemnly reaffirming their commitment to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament (NPT/CONF.1995/20).

17. Among the major landmarks on the road to nuclear disarmament were the prohibition of nuclear tests for all time. An indefinite, universal treaty, subject to effective international control, was within reach. The Russian Federation was in favour of signing it in 1995. It was continuing to adhere to its moratorium on nuclear tests, which had been repeatedly extended. A comprehensive test-ban treaty and subsequent renunciation of the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons would further strengthen the non-proliferation regime but would be possible only if the non-proliferation Treaty was in effect.

18. Another pressing issue was the ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. In the Russian Federation a programme was under way to shut down the remaining facilities which had previously produced plutonium for weapons purposes; moreover, the plutonium already produced was not being used for those purposes. The production of weapon-grade uranium had been stopped several years previously. The Russian Federation would strive to ensure that the ad hoc committee of the Conference on Disarmament began work as soon as possible on that issue.

19. The Russian Federation favoured a progressive and irreversible process of nuclear disarmament. Yet it remained realistic. The implementation of disarmament programmes showed that it was impossible to get rid of nuclear weapons overnight. The elimination of inherited nuclear arsenals was a costly process which involved solving major technical and financial problems.

20. The Russian Federation had consistently supported the IAEA safeguards as an effective verification instrument fostering confidence that all States parties were abiding by the Treaty and that unauthorized activity would be detected and terminated. The IAEA safeguards constituted a verification mechanism for non-proliferation and at the same time a powerful confidence-building measure. The Russian Federation was participating in upgrading the safeguards system.
21. The non-proliferation Treaty had created a favourable climate for continuously broadening international cooperation in the peaceful uses of the atom for decades to come; the Russian Federation was prepared to develop such cooperation further, including cooperation with developing countries, whether through IAEA or on a bilateral basis. However, there must be an assurance that the Treaty would continue in effect.

22. The Russian Federation firmly favoured the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty; it would be inexcusable to miss the historic opportunity to achieve such an extension, thereby demolishing the foundations of international stability; in a world where the "logic" of the nuclear-arms race had only recently been defeated, that would be an inadmissible retreat. The indefinite extension of the Treaty would ensure that all its positive achievements were preserved and enhanced; it would not be a mandate for the nuclear Powers to retain their nuclear arsenals indefinitely, but would offer the prospect of progressive movement towards a world free from nuclear weapons.

23. The Russian Federation believed that the decision on the Treaty should be an open and clear expression of the will of the States parties. If it was not possible to take the decision on the basis of consensus, an open vote must be held. The States parties had the right to know each other's position with regard to the future of the Treaty; it was only on that basis that broad mutual trust, which had become one of the most important gains of the Treaty, could continue. It was the duty of each Government to state openly and unequivocally its position in its vote.

24. The Russian Federation welcomed all the new parties to the Treaty and expressed satisfaction that, with the accession of China and France, all the nuclear-weapon States had become parties. It hoped that the few countries which still remained outside the Treaty would soon find it possible to join. It called upon all States parties to make every effort to ensure that the Conference helped strengthen the Treaty through its indefinite and unconditional extension. The Treaty must remain one of the key pillars of the security system in the modern world.

25. Mr. DI TELLA (Argentina) said that the presence of his delegation carried special significance, since his Government had formally signed the instrument of accession in February 1995. Argentina was committed to the preservation of international peace and security, and remained convinced that the total elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction was a crucial condition for achieving that goal.

26. He recalled that the non-proliferation Treaty implied a commitment on the part of the nuclear-weapon States to progress towards the total elimination of such weapons. In the absence of such progress, the imbalance between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States would result in distrust and disillusionment among the latter.

27. It was in the regional context that nuclear proliferation took on its most destabilizing dimension; such senseless competition among neighbours fed on itself, resulting in a weakening of global peace. It was for that reason that Argentina and Brazil had decided to move towards closer ties in their respective nuclear policies. Their gradual coming together had led them to coordinate their efforts with Chile, and to endorse the Treaty of Tlatelolco. He welcomed the current strengthening and extension of that Treaty, including its recent endorsement by Cuba, which was an important step towards the consolidation of a nuclear-free zone in Latin America.

28. The current near-universal endorsement of the non-proliferation Treaty was an overwhelming response to the question of its validity and significance. Argentina believed that the Treaty should be extended indefinitely and unconditionally. That extension was necessary to ensure both the maintenance of international peace and security, and the promotion of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Were the international community to question the extension of the Treaty, much could be lost. Also, its partial or
qualified extension would set the world on a slippery slope. The principle of unquestioned, near-universal endorsement would be challenged, favouring the position of those who sought to obtain nuclear weaponry by illegitimate means. In 1992, in a historic statement, the Security Council had recognized that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction posed a threat to international peace and security; it would be ironic if that statement were to be followed by a weakening of the Treaty. The latter situation would also be in contradiction with strong, binding regional agreements such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco. For all those reasons, he hoped that an overwhelming majority of parties to the Treaty would reaffirm its validity.

29. The Conference should also focus on the need to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system, in order to deal with situations such as those that had arisen since 1990. Situations in which parties were able to commit violations of the Treaty should no longer be allowed to occur.

30. Argentina, which had a highly developed nuclear industry, was a responsible importer and exporter of nuclear technology. It was essential to implement a strict and effective system of international safeguards as a necessary condition for nuclear cooperation and technology transfer. Furthermore, promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy would be facilitated to the extent that the safeguards system adapted to new realities. The non-proliferation Treaty was not a strait-jacket; it was the guarantee Argentina needed to develop fully the capacities of its peaceful nuclear industry.

31. The Conference should be fully aware of the importance of strengthening and promoting international legislation on the physical protection of nuclear materials; the transportation of radioactive waste, as well as materials such as plutonium or highly enriched uranium, was a cause for great concern in terms of contamination. It was desirable to improve the effectiveness of the relevant instruments, which would be very important in the event of an environmental emergency.

32. He expressed his Government's satisfaction at the ending of the nuclear-arms race and the progressive reduction of arsenals. Such progress pointed the way for the future. Special efforts should be made to finalize the comprehensive test-ban treaty in 1995.

33. Argentina considered that the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 984 (1995) reflected the willingness of the five permanent members to review the legitimate claims of non-nuclear-weapon States to obtain assurances against their use or the threat thereof. The non-proliferation Treaty upheld the principle that the international community was responsible for preventing the horrors of nuclear war. All States had the duty to do whatever was necessary to ensure that the twenty-first century would begin with firmly established arrangements for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Argentina was firmly committed to that goal.

34. Mr. KURDI (Saudi Arabia) congratulated the States which had recently acceded to the non-proliferation Treaty, bringing it closer to universality. He urged all States which had not yet become parties to do so as soon as possible.

35. The goal of international peace and security was in the forefront of the aims of the United Nations, as were the principles of the peaceful resolution of disputes and of refraining from the threat or use of force in international relations. It was noteworthy that the first resolution of the General Assembly, in 1946, had called for the elimination, not only of nuclear weapons, but of all weapons of mass destruction.

36. One of the key opportunities of the post-cold-war era was the ability of States to refrain from the use of force in settling disputes. Experience had shown that security was not achieved through the stockpiling of weapons, and that possessing weapons of mass destruction did not protect States or
guarantee international peace and security. The possibility of a third world war in the nuclear age represented a plausible threat to humanity.

37. The non-proliferation Treaty was of particular concern to the Arab States. The League of Arab States, at its latest session, had reiterated its support for the objectives of the Treaty and for the goal of universality. The effectiveness of the Treaty should be enhanced through the IAEA safeguards system. Saudi Arabia was committed to refraining from the possession, development or use of nuclear weapons, and continued to pursue the objective of making the Middle East a region free of all weapons of mass destruction. It had supported all international initiatives to that end and called upon all States in the region to cooperate seriously in achieving such a noble objective.

38. In view of the threat to regional peace presented by the Israeli refusal to join the Treaty, he called upon the Conference to endorse making the Middle East a region free of all weapons of mass destruction, and also called upon Israel to accede to the Treaty and subject its nuclear installations to IAEA safeguards.

39. Although the Treaty had been instrumental in limiting nuclear proliferation, it had not completely succeeded in limiting their horizontal and vertical spread. The absence of effective international supervision constituted a dangerous loophole in the Treaty, one that could be remedied by establishing continuous supervision of nuclear facilities, as well as by means of satellite monitoring or by random surprise inspections.

40. The strengthening of IAEA safeguards and Security Council guarantees of a universal application of the Treaty would enhance its effectiveness. However, the non-nuclear-weapon States parties also required guarantees that the Security Council would take immediate action in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations in the event that one of them was subjected to aggression or the threat of aggression involving nuclear weapons. Security Council resolution 984 (1995) was an important step to that end, but further steps were required. Other basic requirements for achieving the objectives of the Treaty were the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and a treaty prohibiting the production or stockpiling of fissile materials for nuclear weapons, as well as additional steps by the nuclear Powers to achieve nuclear disarmament. His delegation earnestly looked forward to the fulfilment of Security Council commitments to prevent the spread of technology related to weapons of mass destruction, implement IAEA safeguards and export controls, and guarantee the universal application of Treaty provisions for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

41. Mr. INSANALLY (Guyana) said that his delegation welcomed the recent increase in the number of States acceding to the Treaty, but the implementation of the Treaty could be improved. The nuclear-weapon States could strengthen the Treaty by introducing more decisive disarmament measures, and could enhance the welfare of those States which had voluntarily renounced the nuclear option by agreeing to a legally binding international instrument against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Beyond simply debating the extension of the Treaty, therefore, the Conference should also examine the actions required to satisfy more fully the Treaty's objectives; his Government was of the view that additional political impetus must be given to the operation of the Treaty.

42. The parties to the Treaty must curb the manufacture and deployment of nuclear weapons, and also accept IAEA safeguards against the illegal diversion of fissionable material. Given the apparent compulsion of nations to test and improve the nuclear weapons in their possession, however, nothing short of complete nuclear disarmament would secure the world from the potential catastrophe of nuclear war. Nuclear energy should be devoted only to peaceful purposes, but the major nuclear-weapon States had yet to undertake the appropriate transfer of peaceful nuclear technology to non-nuclear-weapon States on a non-discriminatory basis and at low financial cost. The non-nuclear-weapon States should not be expected to conform to the Treaty on terms
laid down by the nuclear Powers in the absence of firm guarantees that the interests of the non-nuclear-weapon States would not be harmed. In the unequal conditions characterizing the Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States had a greater obligation to bring about complete denuclearization.

43. Because it was persuaded that nuclear non-proliferation was in the best interests of the international community, Guyana would continue to uphold the Treaty as a necessary instrument for the reduction and ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons throughout the world. In principle, Guyana did not oppose the indefinite extension of the Treaty, but an indefinite extension without conditions would remove all incentive to fully honour its obligations. Periodic review of implementation as called for under article VIII must therefore be strengthened as a guarantee of compliance by all parties. Indefinite extension had been made more acceptable by the commitment of the major nuclear-weapon States under Security Council resolution 984 (1995), as well as their unilateral declarations of readiness to provide appropriate guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States. Such guarantees should, however, be incorporated in treaty form.

44. In conclusion, Guyana called for the reconciliation of the positions of both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States in determining the future of the Treaty. Such a reconciliation could only be achieved if all parties demonstrated full respect for its provisions and placed them above narrow concerns.

45. Mr. AZWAI (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) called upon the Conference to remedy the many shortcomings of the Treaty and renew the participants’ commitment to making it truly universal. Nuclear arsenals had greatly increased during the past 25 years, and the world had failed so far to agree on a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing and on banning the stockpiling of fissionable materials for military purposes. Moreover, there was a glaring discrepancy in that non-nuclear-weapon States parties were subject to IAEA safeguards while the nuclear-weapon States were not. The latter had not helped the non-nuclear-weapon States gain access to peaceful nuclear technology, but had ironically been involved in transferring nuclear technology to countries that were not parties to the Treaty. He called upon the Conference to address those negative aspects of the Treaty in the interests of collective security.

46. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya appreciated the decision by South Africa to dismantle its nuclear weapons, and joined the countries of the Middle East in seeking to make the region free of all weapons of mass destruction. However, Israel’s possession of a nuclear arsenal and its refusal to accede to the Treaty or to subject its nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards constituted a threat to the security and stability of the region, as well as a provocation of all the Arab peoples.

47. His country supported the aims of the Treaty, but called upon the nuclear-weapon States to apply its provisions even-handedly and to set target dates for getting rid of their nuclear stockpiles. It further called for universal accession to the Treaty, as well as the nuclear disarmament of Israel and the destruction of its nuclear stockpiles. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya insisted that Israel should not remain outside the framework of the Treaty, with its nuclear facilities exempt from the IAEA safeguards regime, and would agree to an extension of the Treaty only if Israel were compelled to dismantle all the nuclear weapons in its possession.

48. Mr. PEERTHUM (Mauritius) said that the changing international circumstances had made it even more imperative to attain the objective of a nuclear-weapon-free world. Unfortunately, the realization of that objective remained but a dream because of the emotional approach that had characterized the debate thus far.

49. From the very outset, the developing countries, speaking through the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, had called and continued to call for a comprehensive test ban, cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, a freeze on and the gradual reduction of nuclear weapons
and delivery systems, a ban on the use of nuclear weapons, and assurances of security for non-nuclear-weapon States, as tangible steps towards the reduction and ultimate elimination of existing stocks of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. Had the international community been able to summon the collective political will to genuinely address the aspirations of the Non-Aligned Movement, the world would have been closer to achieving that ideal. Regrettably, the four preparatory sessions had failed to solve even procedural - let alone substantive - questions. Indeed, it was difficult to understand the reasons for the international community's failure to have a thorough review of the Treaty and to take stock of its implementation thus far with a view to strengthening it. After 25 years of a so-called non-proliferation regime, little progress had been made towards eliminating nuclear weapons, and States parties appeared to be more engrossed in whether to extend the Treaty indefinitely, a move which, paradoxically, would legitimize the possession of nuclear weapons by the five nuclear Powers.

50. Clearly, the letter and spirit of the Treaty had not been observed and several of its articles had been ignored, resulting in the spread of nuclear arsenals beyond the original five nuclear-weapon States. Little progress had been made towards the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty or a treaty on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. It should be recalled, however, that the Treaty was the outcome of the fears and hopes generated by the cold war. Things had changed since then, and it was therefore timely that the review should take into consideration current realities.

51. His delegation considered that it was essential to have the Treaty as long as nuclear weapons continued to exist. Nevertheless, the ultimate objective should be to eliminate nuclear weapons and not to have a Treaty which legitimized their existence. The Treaty needed to be strengthened; a mere extension, whether for fixed periods or indefinitely, would not eliminate its weaknesses, particularly the loopholes which had enabled certain States either to acquire or be on the point of acquiring nuclear weapons while being parties to the Treaty.

52. Non-nuclear-weapon States needed assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. While Security Council resolution 984 (1995) addressed the issue, it did not go far enough. In that connection, the non-nuclear-weapon States welcomed China's strong call for the early conclusion of an international convention on the non-first use of nuclear weapons and an international legal instrument assuring non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

53. His delegation would also welcome the further strengthening of IAEA safeguards to bring them up to date with technological advancements. It was a matter of concern that, in addition to the current difficulties of applying those safeguards to the traditional ways of diverting weapon-grade materials, new challenges to the safeguards regime were emerging from the latest technologies entering civilian use, such as the laser-enrichment technology which enabled quick and economic production of enriched uranium.

54. The current focus on the question of whether to approve an indefinite extension of the Treaty defeated the purpose of the Conference, which should review the implementation of the Treaty before considering its extension. Indeed, the current number of non-nuclear-weapon States could not be stated with accuracy. If the Treaty was to be the cornerstone of non-proliferation, the international community should encourage universal accession to it by addressing its shortcomings. There was no reason why the Treaty could not be amended, where necessary, in pursuit of the objective of a nuclear-weapon-free world. The Conference would thereby demonstrate that it was willing to work towards a conclusion that was satisfactory to all States parties.

55. PRINCE SISOWATH Sirirath (Cambodia) said that, although the Treaty prevented the spread of nuclear weapons, the international community remained deeply concerned about their continued existence. Many believed that the Treaty was weak and unreliable, especially in the light of recent discoveries
concerning the clandestine nuclear programme of certain States parties. His
delegation therefore urged all States parties to cooperate fully with IAEA,
which, in turn, should strengthen its safeguards system in order to detect
clandestine nuclear activities.

56. Despite the planned two-thirds reduction of nuclear weapons, some of the
non-nuclear-weapon States were concerned that nuclear-weapon States continued
to upgrade their nuclear-armament technology and other States parties acquired
the technical know-how to produce their own weapons, with the knowledge and
help of the nuclear-weapon States. Cambodia, a non-nuclear-weapon State,
wished to reiterate its pledge not to acquire nuclear weapons. However,
nuclear-weapon States must address the mounting concern of those who believed
that the Treaty had benefited only the industrialized countries and their
allies by applying a double standard.

57. Every sovereign nation had a legal right to acquire nuclear reactors for
peaceful purposes, provided that it agreed to inspections and cooperated fully
with IAEA. Failure to acknowledge that right would reduce the incentive of
States parties to the Treaty which already possessed nuclear reactors to work
within international structures for nuclear cooperation.

58. Some even talked of withdrawing from the Treaty in order to force the
nuclear-weapon States to disarm. Such action, however, might have the
opposite effect. Tremendous progress had been made towards disarmament, even
though much remained to be done. His delegation noted with satisfaction that the
comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty negotiations were well engaged, and
that agreement had been reached on negotiating a mandate for the Conference on
Disarmament to cut off the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.
It was also encouraging to note that IAEA was strengthening its application of
the safeguards regime.

59. His delegation welcomed the accession of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine
and South Africa to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States. For its part,
the United States had recently provided answers to the fundamental questions
which had long preoccupied the non-nuclear-weapon States; it had matched its
words with deeds. Moreover, Security Council resolution 984 (1995) went a
long way towards providing security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States
which were parties to the Treaty.

60. For all those reasons, his delegation supported the indefinite and
unconditional extension of the Treaty. The international community should,
however, go even further and begin to work towards the complete elimination of
nuclear weapons. It hoped that the Conference would support the extension of
the Treaty, preferably by consensus, in order to strengthen its
implementation.

61. Mr. TOKAEV (Kazakhstan) said that, since the invention of nuclear
weapons, the threat of the annihilation of civilization had become tangible.
It had taken the world community a long time to realize that the
interdependency of States meant that conflicts, if not neutralized in time,
could endanger global stability. The non-proliferation Treaty had been a
fairly reliable instrument for preventing an increase in the number of
nuclear-weapon States, and a correspondingly increased threat of the
escalation of conflicts into nuclear war. The changes brought about by the
end of the cold war highlighted the urgent need to resolve the issue of
nuclear arsenals in a responsible manner.

62. Kazakhstan had had to face the complex task of mastering the specifics
of global nuclear politics and determining its status and position on the
various issues of nuclear disarmament. From the very first days of
independence, President Nazarbaev had followed a course of freeing Kazakhstan
from nuclear weapons. That had been a natural choice for a State that had
suffered so much from nuclear tests: 459 nuclear explosions (113 of them in
the atmosphere) had been carried out in Kazakhstan. Those tests had seriously
affected the life and health of the population and the ecological balance of
the vast territory. Over 500,000 Kazakhs had been subjected to radiation
during the 43 years of operation of the Semipalatinsk nuclear-testing ground. In December 1993, Kazakhstan had ratified the non-proliferation Treaty, thereby taking an important step in implementing its foreign policy of peace and adherence to the universally recognized norms of conduct in international security issues.

63. Over the quarter century of the operation of the Treaty, there had been both successes and failures in the nuclear non-proliferation policy. In spite of control by IAEA, nuclear-weapon States and the United Nations, a number of States had managed to come very close to creating nuclear weapons. Clearly, participation in the Treaty was not a guarantee that States were not creating nuclear weapons. However, the general trend in international relations was towards a non-nuclear world, and with the implementation of the START I Treaty, nuclear disarmament had been intensified.

64. Kazakhstan favoured the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty. That would make it possible to strengthen the non-proliferation regime and continue efforts to reduce nuclear weapons and promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Any formulations that left doubts about the future of the Treaty would undermine confidence in it and threaten the non-proliferation regime. The States which were fulfilling their commitments would be the first to suffer if the disarmament process were reversed. Kazakhstan was also in favour of the early completion of nuclear-test-ban negotiations. By closing the Semipalatinsk nuclear-testing grounds forever, Kazakhstan had made a significant contribution to that goal. It was obviously very important that four out of the five nuclear Powers were maintaining the moratorium on nuclear tests; however, the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty must be signed as soon as possible.

65. Non-nuclear-weapon States had a right to receive firm and legally binding security assurances, both negative and positive. Although Kazakhstan had welcomed the adoption of Security Council resolution 984 (1995), it fully supported the proposal that the security assurances should have the legally binding nature of an international instrument, which could be a protocol on security assurances forming an integral part of the Treaty. The memorandum on security assurances to Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine, signed by the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States in December 1994, established a collective commitment to ensure the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kazakhstan and safeguard it from economic blackmail. Kazakhstan had received similar assurances from China.

66. Negotiations must begin on the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons, and all States possessing such materials, especially the nuclear Powers, must be invited to take part. Kazakhstan also favoured an early start of nuclear-disarmament negotiations among all five nuclear-weapon States in line with their commitments under article VI of the Treaty. The issues of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation had become interdependent, and international security could be achieved only through joint efforts of both the nuclear-weapon and the non-nuclear-weapon States.

67. Kazakhstan respected the efforts of a number of States to establish regional security mechanisms to enhance the non-proliferation regime. It was actively working to implement President Nazarbaev’s initiative to convene a conference on cooperation and confidence-building measures in Asia which could become an important factor in progress towards a nuclear-free world.

68. Kazakhstan appealed to all participants in the Conference to support the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty as a guarantee of the effectiveness of the existing non-proliferation regime and of strengthening security and stability throughout the world.

69. Mr. Hasmy (Malaysia), Vice-President, took the Chair.

70. Monsignor Mamberti (Observer for the Holy See) said that, by acceding to the non-proliferation Treaty, the Holy See had sought to manifest its support
for the efforts of the international community to control the future of mankind, which was still threatened by the discovery of nuclear power and the military and civilian uses to which it had been put. History showed that mankind needed a sense of responsibility in order to live with what it had invented. Once let out, no human discovery can be "put back into the bottle" and it was therefore necessary for the international community to be aware of the risks which nuclear power presented and to establish rules of conduct applicable to all of its members.

71. It was well known that the objective of the Treaty was not merely to prevent nuclear proliferation but also to create a framework for nuclear disarmament and to facilitate access by all States to nuclear power, while preventing the risk of its improper use. The question to be asked, however, was whether the Treaty had been fully implemented and what kind of political commitment was required from each State party for its full implementation. Moreover, the principle of nuclear non-proliferation was not of itself sufficient to provide security. Non-proliferation should be part of a system of security under which the more powerful States of a region were required to commit themselves to dialogue with and respect for the weaker States by reconciling their national interests with the interests of the community of nations as a whole.

72. It was also evident that the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons must be accompanied by general and complete disarmament. Indeed, the Conference should manifest a clear political intention to achieve disarmament in order to create a favourable environment for the effective implementation of the Treaty. The aim of the Conference was not to redraft the Treaty or to include new provisions, but rather to create conditions for the more effective implementation of the Treaty by building confidence among all the parties thereto.

73. It would probably be dangerous to leave a legal vacuum on the question of non-proliferation, since that would open the door to nuclear conflicts and accidents. The Holy See was of the view that the Treaty should be maintained and strengthened. Indefinite extension, however, was not an end in itself and must be accompanied by a willingness by all concerned to ensure its implementation.

74. The Treaty was a major component of the structure of international instruments concerning weapons of mass destruction and should be seen as part of the international community's efforts to minimize the risk of a conflagration. The extension of the Treaty was justified by those objectives and could therefore be seen not as a mere ratification of the status quo but rather as a dynamic instrument in the service of peace. The risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons, as of other types of weapons, would probably never be eliminated and that was why international legal instruments governing them were so important. The history of mankind showed that peace and security, like justice, were never definitively won but had to be fought for continuously and with each new generation.

75. Nuclear disarmament must be accompanied by the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction as well as by the limitation of conventional weapons. Nuclear-weapon States must therefore assume their special responsibilities in that regard while non-nuclear-weapon States must renew or enter into a commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons. States which did not acquire nuclear weapons must receive legal guarantees that nuclear weapons would not be used against them and that they would be protected against their use. Moreover, any international agreement on global security required universal accession to the Treaty and the strengthening of its verification mechanisms and of disarmament measures. The Conference offered an opportunity to improve the current international situation and should not be turned into an adversarial debate on the extension of the Treaty.

76. In order to be effective, the Treaty must be complemented by a series of bilateral, multilateral and regional agreements on disarmament, the banning of nuclear tests, and the monitoring of progress in reducing nuclear weapons.
Furthermore, the use of nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes must be carefully reviewed by the international community in order to guarantee more effectively the security of peoples and the preservation of all life. The risks inherent in the peaceful uses of atomic energy were now better known and the international community should therefore consider the need for international control and management of nuclear power. Since the peaceful uses of nuclear power also had applications in the fields of agriculture and medicine, nuclear power should be considered as a part of the common heritage of mankind.

77. The system of verification of the transfer of technologies must be improved, strengthened and expanded. In that connection, IAEA should seek to embody more effectively the international community’s sense of responsibility in the nuclear field.

78. It was for those reasons that the Holy See appealed to the sense of responsibility of all concerned to support a new consensus on the principles and purposes of the Treaty.

79. Mr. CAMACHO OMISTE (Bolivia) noted that the Conference’s historic responsibility vis-à-vis the Treaty coincided with the collective renewal of confidence in the purposes and principles of the Charter on the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations. His delegation would do everything possible to contribute to the search for decisions which would win majority support and make it possible to achieve consensus. His Government’s position would reflect its traditional peaceful policy. Bolivia believed that the basic objective of eliminating the nuclear threat was still valid and should be strengthened.

80. The parties to the Treaty must pursue negotiations taking into account the obligations of all countries, so as to avoid an imbalance among rights and duties; there was no question of ensuring advantages for some countries; instead, collective solutions must be found to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and promote global disarmament. A basic element of relations among States was the principle of fulfilment of international obligations in good faith. International stability and legality were assured through the fulfilment of obligations deriving from treaties and other sources of international law. The termination or suspension of a treaty was often the result of a serious breach. International justice and the implementation of treaties were the basis for interchange among the peoples and peaceful coexistence.

81. Language was a significant aspect of treaties. His delegation would prefer not to use the term "unconditional" for commitments in which all aspects were equally important, since otherwise there could be an imbalance between rights and duties. A climate of trust would help to promote progress. States must avoid becoming entangled in positions which, while reflecting legitimate individual and sovereign concerns, made it difficult to achieve the higher common interest. Efforts must be resumed to achieve universality of the Treaty. No State could refuse to participate in solving issues of general interest which affected mankind. It was only with full support of the regime by all countries that the survival of the world could be ensured.

82. The subject of non-proliferation and the elimination of nuclear weapons must be approached in a balanced and comprehensive manner, along with other aspects linked to the Treaty. There must be a complete nuclear-test ban, a legal strengthening of the regime of security assurances, a strengthening of safeguards mechanisms and effective promotion of nuclear cooperation for peaceful purposes so as to promote long-term economic and social development. The use of nuclear weapons or threat of their use would be a total negation of international law and civilized coexistence among nations. Bolivia therefore favoured the indefinite extension of the Treaty as a means of achieving the objectives embodied therein.

The meeting rose at 6.15 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 12th MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 25 April 1995, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. DHANAPALA (Sri Lanka)
later: Mrs. KUROKOCCHI (Vice-President) (Japan)

The meeting was called to order at 10.25 a.m.

GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 15) (continued)

1. Mr. PALSSON (Iceland) said that although the end of the arms race had released new resources in the service of peace and solidarity of peoples, the international community had yet to break with the legacy of the cold war. Huge quantities of nuclear weapons still remained in the arsenals of rich countries and poor countries alike. There were tens of thousands of nuclear warheads and over a dozen states possessed ballistic missiles.

2. The non-proliferation Treaty was the key to efforts to remedy that situation. The Treaty was unlike any other arms control treaty; it was the only legally binding instrument of global application prohibiting the spread of nuclear arms. To throw its future into doubt would be to risk unravelling the non-proliferation regime and system of safeguards and would weaken the incentives for nuclear powers to undertake further disarmament measures. Iceland therefore believed that the Treaty should be extended indefinitely and without conditions. Only thus would it be possible to prevent further proliferation and give substance to the commitment undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States, when signing the Treaty, to pursue negotiations in good faith relating to nuclear disarmament.

3. Extending the Treaty for an unlimited period would not be sufficient. It would also be necessary to adopt a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and an instrument prohibiting the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. Non-proliferation also required a continuous multilateral effort which must extend to the technology and materials necessary for the production of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. In that connection, Iceland attached great importance to the objectives and guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime.

4. The lessons of the Chernobyl accident must also be borne in mind. Iceland welcomed the efforts being made by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to ensure the safety of radioactive waste and the growing role it was playing in general in the area of nuclear safety and radiological protection. His delegation remained concerned, however, at the discharge into the sea of radioactive waste, which was then carried by ocean currents into the territorial waters of other States.

5. He concluded by pointing out that there was much more at stake than the technical and legal aspects of the review and extension of the Treaty. If the Conference was a failure, the international community would be condemned, like Sisyphus, to toil forever to roll the stone to the top of the hill, only to see it roll down again.

6. Mr. POPOV (Republic of Moldova) said that the Conference, which coincided with the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations was destined to play a major role, as evidenced by the breadth of its preparatory process and
by the fact that its topics had occupied a central place in the discussions of the First Committee of the General Assembly during the latter's forty-ninth session and during the deliberations of the Conference on Disarmament. The proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction was one of the main factors likely to increase security fears, and it was imperative to put a stop to it. The Treaty, because of its many merits, would best serve the fundamental interests - economic as well as security - of all States. That was why the Republic of Moldova had acceded to that important instrument as a non-nuclear-weapon State. Accordingly, it had undertaken not only to forego the use of nuclear weapons but also to conclude a safeguards agreement with IAEA.

7. He also pointed out that his country's new constitution contained provisions affirming its neutrality and prohibiting the presence, on its territory of foreign military forces, and bases that could be equipped with weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. The Republic of Moldova considered that only indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty could effectively halt nuclear proliferation and assure the conditions necessary for progressive disarmament.

8. Reviewing other arguments in favour of indefinite extension, he said that, since there were now 178 States parties to the Treaty and all the continents were covered, the Treaty was almost universal in nature. He also welcomed the recent adoption by the Security Council of resolution 984 (1995) and the individual statements made by the five nuclear Powers concerning security assurances. Those Powers had given both negative and positive security assurances, bringing the decision to extend the Treaty indefinitely one step closer.

9. Continued reduction of arsenals leading eventually to the total elimination of atomic weapons and the conclusion, in the near future, of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and an instrument prohibiting the production of fissile material would also contribute greatly to the strengthening of a permanent, legally binding non-proliferation regime.

10. Pointing out that it would be very difficult to strengthen such a regime without effective and transparent monitoring and control, he said that the measures envisaged in the international system must also cover illicit trafficking in nuclear materials, a phenomenon that had acquired singular importance, particularly in the area corresponding to the territory of the former Soviet Union. In order to put an end to it, States must establish effective border inspections; those were currently lacking. The relevant international organizations could play a decisive role in that regard.

11. Mr. VALENCIA RODRIGUEZ (Ecuador) said that at the time the Treaty was negotiated, the world had been going through one of the most critical periods of the cold war. Since its aim was to achieve a balance of nuclear terror it had not aspired to perfection. And yet, it was in part thanks to the Treaty that the world had become a safer place. For example, there had been a considerable reduction in nuclear arsenals - although they were still too large - and appreciable progress had been made in the field of disarmament thanks, in particular, to the SALT I and SALT II Treaties and to the fact that the nuclear Powers had declared a moratorium on nuclear tests.

12. And yet much still remained to be done. It was imperative to move quickly to conclude a universal, multilateral and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Progress made in that matter in the Conference on Disarmament inspired him to believe that that could be achieved in the relatively near future; in the meantime, the nuclear-weapon States should extend their moratorium on testing.

13. It was also necessary to conclude a treaty prohibiting the production, possession and marketing of fissile material; it should be non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally verifiable and effective. It was also necessary to put an end to illicit trafficking in radioactive material, the consequences of which could not be predicted.
14. With regard to the essential issue of positive and negative security assurances which the nuclear-weapon States could offer the non-nuclear-weapon States, Security Council resolution 984 (1995) was a positive step in the right direction; however, the security assurances it mentioned should be included in an instrument binding on all those States.

15. As some States, particularly those States with the capacity to develop nuclear energy for military purposes, had not yet acceded to the Treaty, efforts must be made to promote its universality. That was particularly important since the technical knowledge and means needed in order to produce nuclear weapons were becoming increasingly accessible.

16. It was fundamental to strengthen nuclear-weapon-free zones. In particular, the prompt entry into force of a demilitarized zone in Africa was indispensable.

17. In accordance with the provisions of the non-proliferation Treaty, true international cooperation should result in the non-discriminatory transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

18. Although considerable progress had been made since the conclusion of the non-proliferation Treaty, the IAEA safeguards regime should be respected and strengthened. The Conference should address that issue.

19. Lastly, measures should be taken to protect and preserve the environment, especially from activities related to the elimination of nuclear arsenals.

20. More generally, his Government did not believe that the Treaty was an end in itself, nor that it should seek to perpetuate the possession of nuclear weapons by a small number of States, but that its purpose was to promote and guarantee international peace and security through nuclear disarmament, as a fundamental step towards achieving general and complete disarmament. A climate of mutual trust and authentic international cooperation must be established. Accordingly, nuclear-weapon States should feel bound by a permanent commitment to pursue their nuclear disarmament, while non-nuclear-weapon States should not feel fearful for their security. It was also indispensable to continue the practice of convening five-year review conferences to verify fulfilment of the obligations deriving from the Treaty, particularly those under article VI.

21. In the light of all those factors, Ecuador favoured indefinite extension of the Treaty and hoped that the States parties would adopt a decision to that effect by consensus or by a broad majority.

22. Ms. KUROKOCHI (Japan), Vice-President, took the Chair.

23. Mr. SENILOLI (Fiji) said that while the non-proliferation Treaty had received broad support, it must become universal if the spread of nuclear weapons was to be prevented.

24. The task of creating a climate of confidence rested with the nuclear-weapon States since is was they that bore primary responsibility for disarmament and, in particular, for denunciation. At a time when there was relative peace and a reduction in international tension, the pace of disarmament negotiations must be accelerated. Reduction or destruction of obsolete and excess nuclear-weapons capacity was not enough. There must be deeper and more meaningful cuts which demonstrated a clear commitment to substantial denunciation. Voluntary and permanent cessation of all nuclear tests would be an important step in that direction. In that regard, while Fiji noted the progress being made towards the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, it was deeply disturbed at reports that the current three-year moratorium on testing was likely to be discontinued by some States.
25. The provisions of the Treaty concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear technology were equally important. In that connection, articles IV and V must be fully and properly implemented. Those articles provided an incentive against the development and possession of nuclear technology that might be open to use for non-peaceful purposes.

26. Article VII of the Treaty deserved special attention, in that it provided for the possibility of concluding regional agreements on the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Fiji was a party to the Rarotonga Treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific. The protocols to that Treaty required the nuclear-weapon States to give certain undertakings. The States parties were gratified that China and the Russian Federation had signed Protocols 2 and 3. However, they very much regretted that the remaining three nuclear Powers had not as yet signed any of the protocols, and they urged them to do so. Nuclear-weapon-free zones were an effective means of curbing the spread of nuclear weapons and contributed significantly to the security of the States that belonged to them. All those who supported and championed the cause of the non-proliferation Treaty should ensure that the treaties that had given rise to such zones were respected.

27. Turning to the object of the present Conference, the issue was not whether the non-proliferation Treaty had made the world a safer place and whether it should be extended and for how long, but whether all aspects of the Treaty had been faithfully implemented and, more particularly, whether the nuclear-weapon States had discharged their duties and obligations under the Treaty in a manner that enabled the non-nuclear-weapon States to feel confident about their fulfilment in the future.

28. With that in mind and given the tangible and concrete contribution that the Treaty had made to preventing the large-scale spread of nuclear weapons, Fiji supported indefinite extension of the Treaty and hoped that the Conference would reach an agreement to that effect by consensus.

29. Mr. OWADE (Kenya) said that his country had been among the first to sign, and subsequently, ratify, the non-proliferation Treaty and had fulfilled its obligations as a State party faithfully. The Treaty was sui generis in several respects. Among other things, it had a limited lifespan and it created unequal rights and obligations for nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. Nevertheless, it was the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation regime, having the largest number of states parties of any arms control treaty. The expectation of the majority of States parties had been that it would lead to comprehensive nuclear disarmament.

30. Kenya believed that before taking a decision on the question of extending the Treaty, the Conference must take serious stock of the Treaty's successes, failures and weaknesses. To agitate for indefinite extension without first making that objective assessment would be putting the cart before the horse. Such a decision must, of course, be linked to an evaluation of the specific progress made towards the goals set forth in article VI of the Treaty.

31. Many delegations were concerned that while significant progress had been made in certain areas, none of the targets set in the preamble to the Treaty had been fully met. His delegation was particularly disappointed that the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament had produced little evidence of progress towards the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. It had been argued that the progress in those talks could be characterized as a partial success or a partial failure, depending on which perspective one took. However, the truth was that a delay of a quarter of a century could hardly be considered the "early date" stipulated in the Treaty for the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and the cessation of the nuclear-arms race.

32. Turning to security assurances, his delegation wished to recall that the General Assembly had consistently maintained that there was an urgent need to reach early agreement on effective international arrangements to safeguard non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of nuclear weapons. The
best approach would be to work towards early agreement on a common formula that could be included in a legally binding international instrument, as called for in General Assembly resolution 49/73. Disagreement over that issue had been one of the reasons for the failure of the 1980 and 1990 review conferences to adopt final declarations.

33. On the eve of the present Conference, the nuclear-weapon States had made a belated attempt to fulfil their obligations by initiating Security Council resolution 984 (1995), on positive security assurances, and by making individual declarations on negative assurances. Those initiatives were to be welcomed, but the fact remained that Security Council resolution 984 (1995) did not add much to previous resolutions and did not explicitly address the question of negative assurances. In Kenya’s opinion, the only definite assurance against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was their total elimination. Pending that, such assurances should take the form of a legally binding instrument.

34. For the Treaty to achieve full universality, it was imperative that States which possessed nuclear weapons should all be parties to it and be subject to the IAEA regime. States which had opted not to accede to the Treaty should not benefit from any transfer of technology for peaceful nuclear uses which, under the Treaty, was intended only for States parties.

35. With regard to compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, his delegation would like the capacity of the IAEA to be strengthened to enable it to cope with its responsibilities, and in particular those relating to the transfer of technology. All States parties should have access, on an assured and predictable basis, to the peaceful applications of nuclear technology. The IAEA should be enabled to extend technical assistance without any constraints.

36. His delegation wished to put on record its commitment to regional initiatives. It awaited the conclusion of the treaty making Africa a nuclear-weapon-free zone, which was currently being finalized. It also welcomed the Treaty of Tlatelolco and looked forward to an acceleration of the peace process in the Middle East that would facilitate the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region. It likewise welcomed the exemplary gesture made by South Africa in deciding to destroy its nuclear weapons and become a party to the Treaty. But in the African region, it was light weapons that were killing hundreds of thousands of people. His delegation therefore appealed to the international community to support the Secretary-General’s efforts in what he had described as "micro-disarmament" in his supplement to an Agenda for Peace (A/50/60-S/1995/1).

37. The Conference must avoid the temptation to over-simplify the issues before it. The non-proliferation Treaty had not been intended to be a permanent treaty. Contrary to the view that had been expressed by several delegations, to fulfil the wishes of millions of human beings it was not enough to extend the Treaty indefinitely; it was necessary to ensure that its objectives were being achieved. In particular, the periodic review mechanism must be maintained and strengthened. Moreover, the question of extension was so important that any decision on it should be reached by consensus, so that the Treaty could move into the future with the full confidence of all States parties.

38. His delegation would work with other delegations with a view to reaching a consensus which could take the form of a long-term "rolled-over" non-proliferation Treaty on the lines originally intended. Any contrary decision would undermine the confidence which the international community so sorely needed as it faced the next century.

39. Mr. LEGWAILA (Botswana) said that the non-proliferation Treaty was the only multilateral treaty in its field which enjoyed nearly universal adherence, and that was due to the extreme gravity of the nuclear threat. The motive for Botswana’s accession to the non-proliferation Treaty, and no doubt
that of other States parties, was the inhuman and indiscriminate mass
destruction which could be visited upon mankind by the use of nuclear weapons.

40. As was clear from article IV of the Treaty, the renunciation of
acquisition or possession of nuclear weapons and the technology to develop
such weapons by the non-nuclear-weapon States was not a renunciation of access
to nuclear technology for purposes other than military. In that connection,
those States parties were not at all satisfied with the current level of
nuclear technology transfers for peaceful uses. Without advocating the
elimination of all conditions governing access to such technology they
believed that, where a party had agreed to put in place a mechanism such as
the IAEA safeguards, the benefits envisaged and recognized under article IV
should accrue to such a party without prejudice.

41. The sterling efforts made by the non-nuclear-weapon States would not rid
the world of the scourge of nuclear weapons without a corresponding commitment
on the part of nuclear-weapon States to honour their part of the bargain.
Major strides would have to be made in various areas of nuclear disarmament if
the Treaty was to continue to engender confidence among non-nuclear-weapon
States. Those States had made a significant contribution to the application
of the Treaty. Not only had they chosen to forego acquisition of nuclear
weapons but their almost religious adherence to the spirit and the letter of
the Treaty had strengthened world security, and they had honoured their
commitments without fail.

42. Since the entry into force of the Treaty, one of the major concerns of
the non-nuclear-weapon States had been to obtain security assurances from the
nuclear-weapon States. By renouncing possession of nuclear weapons, the
non-nuclear-weapon States had foregone a sovereign right. They had foregone
the right to self-defence. They had, in fact, renounced the possibility of
responding in kind in the event of a nuclear attack. Their right to
protection against those weapons must therefore be recognized.

43. Botswana appreciated that Security Council resolution 984 (1995) was a
step in the right direction, but its preference would have been for a legally
binding international instrument committing the nuclear-weapon States not to
use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. The
reluctance of the nuclear-weapon States to work towards the adoption of such
an instrument would remain a source of suspicion as to their real intentions.

44. To be genuinely engaged in a process of nuclear disarmament, certain key
areas in the nuclear weapon industry had to be targeted. There should be a
total ban on all forms of nuclear-weapon testing. The self-imposed
moratoriums were a welcome development, but a final solution was not yet in
sight. The best solution would be to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty
at an early date. His delegation noted that negotiations had begun in the
Conference on Disarmament but the process was painfully slow, and one wondered
if the nuclear-weapon States were really committed to their success. There
was an equally urgent need to conclude a treaty banning the production of
weapons-grade fissile material. Most of the previous speakers had alluded to
the dangers posed by the continued production of such material. It not only
added to the dangers of the proliferation of nuclear weapons but it also
encouraged the illegal trade in fissile material, even by individuals or
dissident groups.

45. The most important step to be taken to enhance nuclear disarmament was
the implementation of article VI of the Treaty. The very existence of nuclear
weapons made humankind captive to its own creation. Because of their
devastating effects they should never be used. The non-proliferation Treaty
offered humankind a chance of freedom from that bondage. States parties need
only honour the commitments and obligations they had undertaken and the threat
would ultimately become a thing of the past. However, it was mainly the task
of the nuclear-weapon States to earnestly engage in the process of nuclear
disarmament. Botswana hoped that the concern of the non-nuclear-weapon States
vis-à-vis the Treaty would be considered with due seriousness and that their
genuine desire for protection against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be fully met.

46. His country was in favour of the indefinite extension of the Treaty. The concerns it had expressed were a reaffirmation of the commitment of the parties to the Treaty and did not in any way constitute conditionalities.

The meeting rose at 11.35 p.m.
GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 15) (continued)

1. Mr. PIBULSONGGRAM (Thailand) said it was gratifying that, in the course of the general debate, consensus had emerged on a number of points. Everyone recognized the historic importance of the Conference and agreed that the non-proliferation Treaty was the best available mechanism to help eliminate the nuclear threat, that it should be strengthened and made as effective as possible, and that for the foreseeable future, there was no alternative to extending it.

2. Thailand, which had no nuclear aspirations and saw no place for nuclear weaponry on the planet, had always viewed the Treaty as a means towards the elimination of all nuclear weapons. It therefore attached the highest importance to the implementation of article VI of the Treaty. The nuclear-weapon States therefore had a special responsibility to ensure that the article was implemented and that the goals of full nuclear disarmament were achieved. Thailand believed that, while efforts by the major nuclear Powers to implement existing disarmament agreements could help strengthen article VI, the speedy conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty would demonstrate their sincere commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and the elimination of nuclear weapons.

3. The effectiveness of the Treaty also called for a balance between the rights and obligations of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States parties. Articles I and II should therefore be regarded as a code of conduct. The principle of non-proliferation should be universally applicable and not limited to current States parties; all countries should therefore be encouraged to accede to the Treaty.

4. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system was a fundamental component of the Treaty which must be supported through the strengthening of article III. In particular, States parties which had not concluded and implemented comprehensive safeguards agreements with IAEA should do so as soon as possible. Supplementary measures to help prevent diversion of nuclear energy to military uses should also be promoted. The early conclusion of a non-discriminatory and verifiable convention banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for weapons purposes would be an additional contribution.

5. Thailand fully supported the right of States parties to exchange and acquire peaceful nuclear technology without discrimination, in the spirit of articles IV and V of the Treaty.

6. Treaties on nuclear-weapon-free zones would be effective only when guaranteed by the nuclear-weapon States; the commitments of regional States alone would not ensure safety in the regions concerned. Thailand therefore considered the protocols to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Treaty of Rarotonga as essential for all such treaties.

8. Thailand hoped that the decision on the future of the Treaty would be arrived at by consensus. It favoured extending the Treaty for fixed periods, as the best approach for achieving full nuclear disarmament. There had been far too much violence and destruction in the twentieth century; posterity must not be condemned to repeat the mistakes of history.

9. Mr. KULLA (Albania) said that, over the past 25 years, the international community had witnessed undeniable results in the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament and security assurances, which were all attributable to the non-proliferation Treaty. The high level of accession to the Treaty demonstrated the importance the world community attached to the Treaty and the success achieved in the efforts of sovereign States to implement its provisions.

10. Albania welcomed the efforts undertaken to negotiate a comprehensive test-ban treaty, which must be universal and fully verifiable. A prompt opening of negotiations on a convention to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons would further strengthen the non-proliferation system and promote disarmament. The security assurances in Security Council resolution 984 (1995) were a collective response to a delicate matter. The nuclear-arms race had been ended through the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and the Treaty on the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I and START II treaties); strategic nuclear weapons must now be dismantled and deactivated. Albania acknowledged the efforts of IAEA to identify cases where safeguards agreements had not been complied with. Without the non-proliferation Treaty, international cooperation for verifying the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and arrangements for safeguards on nuclear materials would be very difficult to achieve.

11. Albania fully supported the statement made on behalf of the European Union and six associated States from eastern and central Europe. His Government was fully convinced that the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty would benefit all countries, whether nuclear or non-nuclear, and would be a victory for non-proliferation, disarmament, control and verification, thereby offering the prospect of a safe world. If the future of the Treaty was endangered, prospects for the further control of nuclear weapons would fade. If that future was secure, steps towards the reduction of the nuclear arsenal could continue with the final objective of full nuclear disarmament.

12. Mr. NGO QUANG XUAN (Viet Nam) said that the importance of the non-proliferation Treaty was unquestionable. Despite its flaws, the Treaty had been widely recognized as the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime and an important instrument for disarmament, world peace, and international and regional security and cooperation. The decision made by the Conference would be extremely important for the future of the Treaty and for the security, stability and development of every region and nation of the world. Viet Nam shared the view that the review and extension of the Treaty were interlinked and that the issue of extension could not be dealt with in isolation.

13. It was encouraging that, despite the emergence of a number of "threshold" States, the Treaty had in the main succeeded in limiting the number of nuclear-weapon States. The treaties and commitments by the nuclear-weapon States were important achievements in the area of nuclear disarmament, and the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones was also a positive aspect.

14. Viet Nam was concerned, however, that, while the number of nuclear-weapon States remained the same, there were more nuclear weapons in the world.
than when the Treaty had come into force and that, even if the nuclear­
disarmament treaties were fully implemented, the remaining nuclear warheads
would be more than enough to destroy civilization. Moreover, there was no
legally binding mechanism to stop the further development of nuclear weapons
and ensure security for non-nuclear-weapon States. A comprehensive test-ban
treaty remained a hope rather than a reality. The unilateral security
assurances provided by the nuclear-weapon States were not legally binding.
Viet Nam also shared the concern of many delegations about the limited access
developing countries to nuclear technology because of export controls
imposed by suppliers.

15. Viet Nam supported the steps advocated by the Group of Non-Aligned
Countries to strengthen the Treaty.

16. In the aftermath of long, destructive wars, Viet Nam had acceded to a
number of multilateral disarmament treaties, including the non-proliferation
Treaty in 1982, and had always fulfilled its obligations as a State party to
the Treaty. In 1990, it had signed a full safeguards agreement with IAEA with
regard to its experimental reactor, followed up by numerous IAEA inspections
with his Government’s cooperation. A decree on radiation safety would soon be
submitted for approval by the National Assembly. From the outset, Viet Nam
had supported efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South-East
Asia. In the field of nuclear energy for development, a number of small-scale
projects had been carried out with the assistance of IAEA and regional
countries. Viet Nam was studying the possibility of developing nuclear energy
and hoped that when it took a decision in the matter, it would enjoy further
cooperation of IAEA and countries in the spirit of article IV of the Treaty.

17. The Conference needed to find a modality for the extension of the Treaty
which would serve the best interests of the Treaty and of international peace,
security, stability and development. That task demanded a high sense of
responsibility and a willingness to compromise on the part of every
delegation.

18. Mr. KASHITA (Zambia) said that Zambia had acceded to the non­
proliferation Treaty because of its firm belief that it was the cornerstone of
international peace and security. The Conference had a historic role to play;
a sober assessment of the effectiveness of the Treaty should be followed by a
reasoned decision as to the way in which the serious concerns would be
addressed. It was an opportune time to strengthen the Treaty regime.

19. The issue was not whether to extend the Treaty or not; it was a question
of safeguards, commitment and good faith. His Government had serious concerns
about the attitude of the nuclear-weapon States in respect of a number of
issues, including that of general and complete disarmament under strict and
effective international control. It was for that reason that Zambia could not
associate itself with the unconditional aspect of the extension of the Treaty,
because there was still much ground to be covered in the implementation of the
Treaty itself. The world had lost out on the much-vaunted "peace dividend",
and the international community needed to discuss how the lost ground was to
be recovered.

20. His delegation was concerned that if the Treaty were to be
unconditionally extended, its lack of effectiveness would be
institutionalized, and there would be no incentive for the nuclear-weapon
States to negotiate in good faith. The latter had so far been lacking,
nuclear arsenals had undergone little effective reduction since 1970, and the
nuclear-weapon States, apart from the United States and the Russian
Federation, had not effected any meaningful reductions at all.

21. The use of the word "unconditional" in the context of the Conference was
misleading. Either it was due to misunderstanding of the desire of the
ordinary people of the world for the removal of nuclear weapons, or it had to
be attributed to mischief-making; he knew of no country wishing to return to
the period before the non-proliferation Treaty. Even those who had spoken in
favour of indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty had expressed
concerns and had advocated conditions or issues on which action should be taken to strengthen the Treaty. There was in fact no disagreement as to the destination; it was a matter of deciding at what speed to travel, to ensure that the provisions of the Treaty would be realized.

22. The issue of unconditional extension was an unnecessary diversion. There was every reason to predicate the indefinite extension of the Treaty on meaningful progress in a number of areas, some of which had been on the agenda since the Treaty had come into being. Paramount among them was the question of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, to which his delegation attached the utmost importance; it was the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime, and would be a milestone in the race to achieve complete disarmament.

23. There should also be a treaty banning the production of fissile material for explosive devices, and a treaty on negative security assurances for all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty, coupled with an agreement on the non-first use of nuclear weapons.

24. It was important to realize that the "conditions" or concerns being expressed by many States parties were intended to enhance the effectiveness of the Treaty. Furthermore, Zambia believed that the Treaty would serve the international community better by the provision of adequate technical assistance to all non-nuclear-weapon States. It was regrettable that article IV of the Treaty had not been made a major area of responsibility of IAEA. If the vast amounts spent on nuclear-weapons research and development could be made available to a strengthened and independent IAEA, the whole world community would benefit immensely. The Treaty would also be greatly strengthened if the Agency could play a role in verifying the extent to which States were honouring the nuclear-weapon-free zones.

25. His delegation wished to compliment South Africa, whose bold decision to destroy its nuclear arsenal had made a major contribution to the cause of disarmament and to world peace. That example should be followed by other States.

26. In the post-cold-war era, there was no reason for continuing distrust. All nuclear Powers should move towards total commitment to a nuclear-weapons-free world in which future generations could live in peace and freedom from fear.

27. Mr. FERNANDEZ ESTIGARRIBIA (Paraguay) said that the Conference was exceptionally important for the future of humanity, and the fact that it was taking place in the same year as the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations was highly symbolic. The non-proliferation Treaty was as important to the preservation of international peace and security as the Charter of the United Nations itself.

28. Despite the numerous issues remaining to be settled, his delegation would support the indefinite extension of the Treaty, in the conviction that its beneficial effects were such that it should remain in force. A small, peace-loving country such as Paraguay considered the Treaty as an assurance of its own security and that of all humanity. His delegation's conviction of the need to eradicate nuclear weapons were all the stronger as a result of the terrorist attacks which had taken place recently in many parts of the world.

29. He welcomed the progress made during the lifetime of the Treaty, firstly to end the nuclear-arms race, and then to begin eliminating those arms. Although there remained much to be done to free humanity from the fear of nuclear war, the improvement already achieved was encouraging.

30. In the light of recent events, continued efforts should be made to increase the effectiveness of the safeguards system. Improved control of the production of nuclear material was due in part to that system, and also to the existence of a better political and security climate.
31. His Government was most gratified that a number of States had decided to renounce the development of nuclear weapons and accede to the Treaty. He hoped that others would soon follow their example, and that nuclear energy, rather than an instrument of death, could contribute to a better life for all humanity. The duty to help those in need was universally recognized; developing countries such as Paraguay should be enabled to benefit fully from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in agriculture, industry and medicine.

32. The great achievements of humanity were built upon small victories. The degree of non-proliferation achieved so far should be seen as a step towards the goal of total nuclear disarmament, and it was possible to look forward, in the near future, to a comprehensive test-ban treaty and a treaty prohibiting the production of fissile material. It was also to be hoped that the principles contained in Security Council resolution 984 (1995) would soon be incorporated in a multilateral agreement.

33. His delegation hoped that the extremely important decisions to be taken by the Conference could be adopted by consensus, as befitted a Treaty which aspired to universality, and would thus bequeath to future generations a world free from the fear of nuclear war.

34. Mr. SHAH (Nepal) commended those States parties which had dismantled their nuclear-weapons programmes; it was an act of courage and statesmanship of the highest order. The non-proliferation Treaty, signed amid an intensifying nuclear-arms race, had proved its relevance in stemming the rapid proliferation of nuclear arms. The post-cold-war climate currently offered unprecedented opportunities for a renewed commitment to international peace and security, and the Conference was one such opportunity.

35. He noted that there was growing optimism among the delegations attending the Conference, reflecting an overwhelming consensus in favour of strengthening the Treaty regime. The decision of the Conference would have a far-reaching influence on global peace, stability and development for decades to come. That peace and stability necessitated the elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and the Treaty was a means to that end.

36. A non-proliferation regime could be sustained only in the overall context of disarmament, nuclear or otherwise. The commitment under article VI to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and to nuclear disarmament had remained largely unfulfilled; however, the situation had recently undergone a qualitative change.

37. A world free of nuclear weapons was Nepal's overriding concern; his Government believed that the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons, a comprehensive test-ban treaty and a verifiable treaty banning the production of weapons-grade fissile material were achievable. Negotiations should take place swiftly.

38. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones should be encouraged. Nepal would support all regional initiatives of that type, and they should be fully respected by the nuclear-weapon States. Security assurances should be credible and should in no way detract from the commitment of the permanent members of the Security Council. Negative assurances would go a long way in that regard.

39. Universality of the non-proliferation Treaty in both scope and application was the prime concern; any uncertainty about its life-span would weaken the Treaty regime.

40. The international community should not lose sight of the issue of conventional weaponry. In the interests of international peace and security, efforts should be made to minimize the diversion for armaments, both nuclear and conventional, of the world's resources; it would be better to channel the latter towards development activities in developing countries.
41. Mr. KAYUMOV (Tajikistan) said that, with the end of the cold war, new conflicts had erupted which could develop into large-scale wars and pose a threat to international peace and security. The crisis in and around Tajikistan was a grave danger for peace and stability in the region; the leaders of Tajikistan believed that the conflict did not have any military solution and were searching for political means of achieving national reconciliation. The President of Tajikistan had called on the world community to continue to promote the progress and successful completion of the inter-Tajik talks that were under way.

42. The uncontrolled and unauthorized arms trade in areas of heightened instability gave rise to deep concern. Massive arming of whole regions was taking place. It was extremely difficult to confiscate illegal weapons from the population. On the basis of its own bitter experience, Tajikistan stressed the danger of that trend. The attempts of some countries to obtain nuclear weapons or the technology to produce them added a new dimension to the problem.

43. Tajikistan, which had the technology for the production and primary refining of uranium, firmly supported the non-proliferation Treaty. On attaining its independence, it had announced its firm commitment to the three principles of nuclear disarmament — not to develop, not to obtain and not to deploy weapons of mass destruction. The purpose of the Treaty was to prevent both horizontal and vertical proliferation and, eventually, the elimination of nuclear weapons. The Treaty had worked well for the international community; the objective of making the Treaty universal had become real and achievable.

44. Tajikistan supported the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty as a key element of achieving a more stable and safe world. The effectiveness of the Treaty depended on the full implementation of both the spirit and letter of all its articles.

45. The treaties concluded between the Russian Federation and the United States and the measures taken by the United Kingdom and France for the reduction of nuclear weapons were encouraging. Tajikistan welcomed the readiness of the nuclear-weapon States to continue talks on nuclear disarmament, in accordance with article VI of the Treaty, as clearly indicated at the Conference by the Vice-President of the United States. His Government was gratified by the collective security assurances provided for the first time by all five nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty; Security Council resolution 984 (1995) provided new incentives for universal accession to the Treaty and for its indefinite and unconditional extension.

46. The prevention of nuclear war and nuclear proliferation must continue to be the priorities of the international community in maintaining world peace and security. The future comprehensive test-ban treaty must be universal and must therefore encompass all States that had nuclear weapons, including such States as India, Israel and Pakistan.

47. Civil wars, armed tension along frontiers, power struggles, and the long-term absence of political settlement could lead to the acquisition of nuclear weapons; numerous armed groups, or simply armed bands of robbers, could well seek to acquire modern weapons. It was therefore more important than ever to make efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. All peace-loving States must support such efforts. The non-proliferation Treaty was of enormous significance in that respect; cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons would be an important means of strengthening the non-proliferation regime.

48. Through joint efforts, especially on the part of the nuclear-weapon States, it would be possible to reduce the significance of nuclear weapons as an instrument of modern politics, in particular by strengthening political stability and reassessing the role of nuclear weapons in international politics; creating the political and security conditions for the renunciation of nuclear weapons; establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones; enhancing the IAEA safeguards; and adopting measures for the non-proliferation of military and
dual-use nuclear technologies and the detection of secret nuclear-weapon programmes.

49. Ms. FLORES (Uruguay) reiterated Uruguay's consistent commitment to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Her delegation called for the results of the Conference to be put in the form of a consensus document, as had been done at previous Treaty review conferences. Moreover, it was of the utmost importance that the Conference should obtain results that were satisfactory to those delegations expressing reservations about aspects of the Treaty.

50. Multilateral declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States as well as the adoption of Security Council resolution 984 (1995) had been important steps towards providing security guarantees to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. Nevertheless, her delegation continued to believe that such guarantees should be contained in a binding document in the context of a direct link between the Treaty and the continuing nuclear disarmament process. To ensure compliance with the Treaty, any agreement on extension reached at the Conference had to consider the establishment of a periodic review system.

51. With regard to the work of the main committees, her delegation called for careful consideration of the ways in which nuclear-weapon States cooperated with each other and with non-nuclear-weapon States, controls over the possible deployment of nuclear weapons in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States, an analysis of export activities leading to the development of nuclear capabilities, a commitment to providing legally binding negative safeguards, and support for the establishment of denuclearized zones. Uruguay also called for strengthening IAEA operations and safeguard mechanisms, and reiterated its special concern regarding safeguards governing the transport of plutonium and other radioactive materials passing close to its coast.

52. Her delegation expressed interest in the proposal to establish a mechanism of an inter-sessional nature to facilitate agreements on specific issues, which in its view would strengthen the review process.

53. With regard to extension of the Treaty, her delegation was of the view that some of the proposals made at the Conference deserved to be carefully considered before definitive positions were adopted. Uruguay's support for indefinite extension of the Treaty was consistent with its traditional principles in the area of nuclear disarmament and its security concerns as a non-nuclear-weapon State. Any extension, however, had to be accompanied by a reliable system of periodic review.

54. Mr. LONGCHAMP (Haiti) said that, despite its importance as the legal foundation for nuclear non-proliferation as well as the basis for the peaceful utilization of atomic energy, the Treaty had not fully accomplished its main objectives. It allowed nuclear-weapon States to keep their nuclear weapons while preventing non-nuclear-weapon States from acquiring them, and the provisions of the IAEA safeguards regime had not been even-handedly applied. It had not reduced the overall number of nuclear weapons in existence, and its provisions for the exchange of peaceful nuclear technology had not prevented States from acquiring the capability to assemble their own nuclear bombs. Nor had those provisions enabled many developing countries to resolve their lack of energy resources. Furthermore, the nuclear-weapon States had not respected their commitments under article VI to pursue nuclear disarmament in good faith, and the non-nuclear-weapon States still felt that the security assurances contained in Security Council resolution 984 (1995) had to be strengthened by a binding international treaty.

55. Haiti unequivocally supported nuclear non-proliferation and total nuclear disarmament, and was aware of the progress in disarmament in recent years. The nuclear menace persisted, however, in the stockpiles of the nuclear Powers and perhaps of other States suspected of possessing nuclear weapons. A new danger had also arisen in the form of illicit trade in fissionable materials and in the risk of such materials falling into the hands of criminals and terrorists.
56. To be truly effective, the non-proliferation regime needed to be strengthened in order to correct its shortcomings. Nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States should engage in the fundamental application of the Treaty, and those States which had yet to accede to it should do so as quickly as possible in order to ensure its universality. Above all, a treaty completely banning nuclear testing and a convention halting the production of fissile material should be concluded at the earliest possible date.

57. Mr. KAMUNANWIRE (Uganda) said that Uganda attached great importance to the non-proliferation Treaty and considered its extension to be a necessity. Such extension, however, should only be considered after the Conference had addressed the concerns raised about how the Treaty had operated during the 25 years of its existence. In the light of the changed international circumstances, in recent years the international community’s perception of security, defence and the entire nuclear strategy should evolve accordingly.

58. The Conference was not about the extension of the Treaty as an ultimate goal; it was about the future of mankind and its vision of the twenty-first century. The ultimate aim was the achievement of general and complete disarmament. Emphasis must therefore be placed on charting a clear course towards that objective.

59. Uganda was of the view that a number of significant issues needed to be clarified. Extension of the Treaty should proceed only after a thorough review of the fulfilment of their obligations by States parties, particularly the nuclear-weapon States. The Treaty should also address the concerns of those who believed that it would confer the possession of deadly weapons upon certain States in perpetuity. Uganda believed that extension should be explicitly linked to progress in nuclear disarmament. Despite some progress in bilateral reductions in the context of the START I and START II treaties, there was need for a more concrete commitment to disarmament in a phased and predictable manner.

60. Recalling that the extension of the Treaty had been explicitly linked to progress towards the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, he called for the urgent conclusion of that treaty as a short-term goal. At the same time, non-nuclear-weapon States should be given legally binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In that regard, Security Council resolutions 255 (1968) and 984 (1995) did not provide adequate assurances.

61. There was also a need for assistance on a non-discriminatory basis to non-nuclear-weapon States in the field of peaceful nuclear technology and its applications. The record in that area was uneven, since little assistance had been provided to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, while, paradoxically, a number of States not parties to the Treaty had been beneficiaries. Moreover, IAEA should take steps to strengthen the safeguard provisions of the Treaty.

62. Uganda fully shared Africa’s aspiration to make the continent a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Efforts to that end must be actively supported by the nuclear-weapon States. Ultimately, the whole world should be free of nuclear weapons.

63. Unconditional extension of the Treaty was not among the options for extension provided for in article X. It was thus clear that the drafters had recognized the need for progress in implementation as a key determinant of whether or not to extend the Treaty. Indeed, no effort should be spared to strive towards a strengthened, balanced and widely supported non-proliferation regime which could ultimately enjoy universal membership. Those objectives could be best achieved through the indefinite extension of the Treaty.

64. Mr. ILLUECA (Panama) said that Panama had been an early signatory to the non-proliferation Treaty. Moreover, it had long advocated that Latin America and the Caribbean should be converted into a nuclear-weapon-free zone. That aspiration had become reality with the conclusion of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.
His delegation was convinced of the international community’s desire for a better world and hoped, therefore, that wisdom and moderation would prevail during the current Conference.

65. The mission of maintaining international peace and security had been a very challenging one for the United Nations, particularly in view of the existence of weapons of mass destruction which could lead to the extinction of human life on Earth. The recent improvement, however, in the international situation gave rise to the hope that, individually and collectively, mankind had learned that well-being, peace, security and justice could not be achieved through an arms race, whether nuclear or conventional. Because of the experiences of the past, the Conference should guard against any attitudes that could jeopardize certain difficult but necessary balances. His delegation therefore hoped that the difficult debate ahead would be characterized by generosity, an intelligent acknowledgement of current realities and an awareness of the role which the Treaty was called upon to play.

66. At the time of its entry into force, a small number of countries had possessed nuclear weapons while the majority had not. That imbalance should have been corrected using the mechanisms provided for in the Treaty. Some of those mechanisms were about to be put in place and others had functioned but with evident shortcomings.

67. The safeguards system established under article III appeared to be undermined by the difficulties encountered by IAEA in performing its tasks. IAEA should therefore be strengthened in order to enable it to fulfil its verification responsibilities. With regard to article IV, no consistent effort had been made to apply in the developing countries, such as Panama, the fruits of science and technology in the field of nuclear energy. That failure was very evident in the health, industrial and agricultural sectors.

68. It should be recalled that during the 1990 Review Conference, the majority of States parties had renewed their calls for guarantees. His delegation therefore welcomed resolution 984 (1995) recently adopted by the Security Council. That resolution should, however, be accompanied by a recognition of the need for a non-proliferation regime that was equitable, and for assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States.

69. The Treaty as a whole, in the light of article VI, should be taken in conjunction with its preamble, which was linked to the adoption of measures aimed at achieving nuclear disarmament, such as, inter alia, the elimination of fissionable material, the cessation of all nuclear-weapon-test explosions and the elimination of all nuclear weapons and their delivery systems from national arsenals.

70. Because of its geographical location and of the Canal which linked the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, Panama had displayed a universalist vocation throughout the various stages of its history. It therefore hoped that the last few years of the century would witness a redressing of the imbalances in the world and progress towards greater solidarity among nations. In order to preserve civilization, it was necessary to halt the production of nuclear weapons, put an end to nuclear tests and ensure that the Treaty achieved universality in terms of both participation and compliance. The position of Panama was that the Treaty should be extended indefinitely and, since it went hand in hand with nuclear deterrence, that all parties should give firm and transparent commitments to periodic reviews of its provisions.

71. Mr. BUALLAY (Bahrain) said that the Conference was being held at a time when the international situation was different from that which prevailed during the preparation of the Treaty. The number of nuclear-weapon States had increased and nuclear weapons in the hands of certain States posed an intolerable threat to non-nuclear-weapon States, which lived in constant fear. Because of the immense destructive power of nuclear weapons, there was need to review the Treaty in all its aspects in order to evaluate both the positive
and negative effects of its application. A review should also be undertaken with a view to the establishment of regional military balances, which was another objective of the Treaty.

72. The Arab countries continued to support the Treaty and, at the previous meeting of the Council of the League of Arab States, had reaffirmed their support for its goals and had called for the Middle East region to be a nuclear-weapon-free zone, free of all weapons of mass destruction. However, the continued refusal by Israel to accede to the Treaty and to place its nuclear facilities under the IAEA safeguards system created an exceptional situation which could threaten regional peace and security. Bahrain therefore called upon all countries in the region, including Israel, to accede to the Treaty and to place all their nuclear facilities under the international safeguards system in order to avoid the horrors of a nuclear-arms race.

73. Bahrain and its sister States members of the Gulf Cooperation Council wished to see the Gulf region remain free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in order to establish peace and security in the region and to concentrate on raising the living standards of the peoples and at providing prosperity for future generations.

74. The Conference afforded an opportunity to improve the Treaty by creating the necessary legal framework to bridge the gaps in the Treaty so that it could more effectively respond to new international realities. That framework should include, but not be limited to, the provision of effective guarantees for the protection of non-nuclear-weapon States faced with the use or threat of nuclear weapons. It should also provide for the transfer of nuclear technology to non-nuclear-weapon States for peaceful purposes and for assurances by the nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons, in accordance with a schedule to be agreed upon. Bahrain believed that such a framework, together with the achievement of the universality of the Treaty, would provide an appropriate climate for its indefinite extension.

75. The PRESIDENT announced that the general debate had been concluded, but that he would continue to hold consultations with a view to reaching a consensus on rule 28, paragraph 3 (f), of the draft rules of procedure.

The meeting rose at 5.50 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 14th MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York,
on Friday, 5 May 1995, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. Dhanapala (Sri Lanka)

The meeting was called to order at 3.20 p.m.

REPORTS OF THE MAIN COMMITTEES (agenda item 18)

1. The President said that he would suspend the meeting in order to allow
Main Committee II to adopt its report.

The meeting was suspended at 3.25 p.m. and resumed at 4.40 p.m.

2. The President said that Main Committee I would need to hold an
additional meeting in order to adopt its report and would submit its final
report on Monday, 8 May 1995. He took it that the Conference agreed with that
request.

3. It was so decided.

4. The President invited the Chairman of Main Committee II to introduce his
report.

5. Mr. Erdös (Hungary) said that Main Committee II had completed its work
on all the relevant issues that had been entrusted to it by the Conference
except for export controls; the latter would be further discussed in a
drafting group, which would report its results directly to the Drafting
Committee.

6. The Committee had reached agreement on the agenda items concerning the
review of article III and its relation to articles I, II, IV and VII of the
Treaty, with the exception of a few sentences that remained in brackets in the
report. On the issue of safeguards, the Committee had reached a consensus on
the text and language except for the paragraphs relating to Iraq and the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which had been referred to the Drafting
Committee for finalization.

7. The Committee had agreed that safeguards were an important part of the
international non-proliferation regime and that they played an indispensable
role in ensuring the implementation of the Treaty. It had also agreed on the
importance of both the safeguards system and the legitimate right of States
parties, especially the developing countries, to the benefits of the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy. The Committee had welcomed the continued efforts of
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to improve the effectiveness and
efficiency of safeguards and called upon all States parties to the Treaty to
continue their political, technical and financial support for the IAEA
safeguards system. The Committee had also called for the wider application of
safeguards to peaceful nuclear facilities in the nuclear-weapon States and
underscored the importance of State and regional systems of accounting and
control and their contribution to the effective and efficient implementation
of safeguards. It had noted the need for greater transparency in matters
relating to the management of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for civil
purposes and had stressed the importance of the effective physical protection
of nuclear material, especially nuclear material usable for military purposes.
The Committee had also expressed concern at instances of illicit trafficking
in nuclear material.
8. The Committee had reached agreement on the texts submitted on nuclear-weapon-free zones, except for those calling for the establishment of such zones in the Middle East and Central Europe. It had also expressed its support for the need for nuclear-weapon-free zones and agreed that such zones contributed to the enhancement of regional peace and security and strengthened further the barrier to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

9. The PRESIDENT took it that the Conference wished to take note of the report of Main Committee II.

10. It was so decided.

11. The PRESIDENT invited the Chairman of Main Committee III to present his report.

12. Mr. RAMAKER (Netherlands) said that an advance copy of the report had been made available to delegations as document NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/1. The Committee had worked intensively to arrive at generally acceptable formulations for the Final Declaration on article IV regarding peaceful uses of nuclear energy, article V on peaceful nuclear explosions, and article IX concerning wider adherence to the Convention.

13. Because of the spirit of good will that had prevailed in the Committee’s deliberations, all the paragraphs save one in the substantive part of the document had been agreed. The language of the formulations was significant in that it indicated the considerable amount of cooperation that actually existed in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. He wished to commend the ideas contained in the agreed part of the text to the Conference for inclusion in the Final Declaration.

14. The paragraph left in brackets expressed concerns over full access to nuclear technology, a question which was of keen interest to the Conference. It was the understanding of Main Committee III that the paragraph would be taken up for consideration by the Drafting Committee.

15. The PRESIDENT took it that the Conference wished to take note of the report of Main Committee III.

16. It was so decided.

OTHER MATTERS

17. The PRESIDENT invited the Chairman of the Credentials Committee to present his interim report.

18. Mr. GARCIA (Colombia) said that delegations would find the report in document NPT/CONF.1995/CC/L.1. The Credentials Committee established by the Conference had met twice to examine the credentials of representatives participating in the Conference. The interim report contained information on the status of credentials received as of 27 April. Additional credentials had been received since that date, and the Committee had held a third meeting on 4 May.

19. Based on information received from the Secretary-General of the Conference, the Committee had decided to accept the credentials of 168 States participating in the Conference, on the understanding that those delegations which had not presented their credentials in the form required by rule 2 of the rules of procedure would do so as soon as possible. The Credentials Committee intended to keep the situation under review.

20. The PRESIDENT, reporting on his consultations on one outstanding aspect of rule 28.3 (f), said that a consensus seemed to be emerging that would allow the Conference to adopt the rules of procedure formally, but that further discussion was still required.
21. Mr. WESTDAL (Canada), on behalf of the 103 sponsors, namely, Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malta, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Monaco, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Republic of Palau, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Uzbekistan, introduced the following draft decision: “The Conference of States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, held in accordance with article X.2 of the Treaty, decides that the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely”.

22. Mr. TARMIDZI (Indonesia), speaking on behalf of some members of the Non-Aligned Movement and supported by a number of other countries, suggested that the decision on extending the Treaty should reflect both the spirit and the letter of article X, paragraph 2, of that Treaty and should be characterized by consensus, recognition of the legitimate concerns and interests of all States parties, compatibility with the Treaty’s stated objectives, the implementation of a review procedure, and the establishment of a decision-making mechanism on the Treaty’s roll-over extension from one period to another.

23. The option of an indefinite extension of the Treaty did not meet those requirements since it would basically perpetuate the status quo, and in addition it was flawed by the lack of a strong and effective review procedure and an appropriate decision-making mechanism.

24. The aforementioned requirements would be met by extending the Treaty for rolling fixed periods of 25 years; the Treaty would be automatically renewable unless a majority of the States parties decided otherwise, and it would be supplemented by a strong and effective review mechanism. Furthermore, 25 years was also long enough to facilitate the planning and implementation of the transfer of technology for peaceful uses of nuclear energy as envisaged by article IV of the Treaty.

25. Mr. BAEL (Philippines) said that his delegation wished to join the sponsors of the draft decision introduced by Canada. It did so in order to make a point, namely that there should be no bargaining in nuclear non-proliferation or nuclear disarmament. That common vision could only be achieved through negotiations in good faith as mandated by article VI of the Treaty. The review process, even if strengthened with principles, did not constitute negotiations in good faith. The distinction between negotiations in good faith and review every five years was made absolutely explicit in the Treaty. The review process had never resulted in binding commitments; it had merely led to wrangling over whose interpretation of compliance should be included in the resulting declaration.

26. In the light of the new geopolitical situation following the end of the cold war, States parties should fulfill their obligations under article VI and embark on negotiations in good faith. The best way to achieve that goal would be to convene an international conference that would eventually prescribe binding commitments.

27. Mr. GONZALEZ GALVEZ (Mexico) said that while his delegation found the arguments in favour of indefinite extension convincing, there were a number of other matters that needed to be dealt with first; they could only be addressed
through an adequate review mechanism. Accordingly, the Conference should adopt a compromise formula which his delegation would submit in due course.

The meeting rose at 5.30 p.m.
VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 15TH MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York,
on Monday, 8 May 1995, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. DHANAPALA (Sri Lanka)

The meeting was called to order at 10.25 a.m.

Introduction of the report of Main Committee I

The President: At the last plenary meeting we had agreed that Main Committee I would submit its final report to the plenary this morning. Accordingly, I should like to invite the Chairman of Main Committee I, Ambassador Isaac E. Ayewah, to present the Committee's report.

Mr. Ayewah (Nigeria), Chairman of Main Committee I: I appreciate the opportunity to present the report of Main Committee I to this historic Conference.

The report is both long and complex, owing to the fact that the subject-matter remitted to the Committee was difficult and controversial. It is also indicative of the importance that the States Parties attribute to the review process. The stakes were high in relation to the performance of the Treaty and the value that the Parties attach to it for the maintenance of international peace and security.

The atmosphere in the Committee was friendly, for the most part, even though the discussion in many areas was polarized and politically driven.

Again, the report is complex. There was no agreement on many of the key issues before the Committee, owing in part to the time available to the Committee to deal with them. Indeed, I will be supplementing this report with a note to the Chairman of the Drafting Committee wherein I will try to advise that Committee on some of the nuances in the report, particularly with respect to section I.

Members have before them an advance copy of the English version of the report. I have been assured that the report will be available to the Conference in all languages later this week. The mandate of the Committee was clear, as is the way the Committee has organized its work.

I want to thank the two Vice-Chairmen for their invaluable assistance in this regard. In particular, I should like to thank Ambassador Richard Starr of Australia, who chaired the Working Group on Security Assurances and cooperated with Main Committee II in the joint open-ended Working Group that considered the topic of nuclear-weapon-free zones. I also want to thank the many delegations and groups of delegations that contributed working papers and conference room papers to the Committee. As can be seen, a total of 10 working papers and 27 conference room papers were presented in the Committee. This is testimony to the interest delegations attributed to its work.

I do not intend to review the report in detail; I shall refer only to the key issues. In my opinion, those issues were also the problem issues. They were: first, the definition of the degree to which all Parties to the Treaty had met or not met their obligations under articles I and II; second, the question of how to deal with certain States non-Parties to the Treaty; third, the determination of whether the nuclear arms race had ceased or was continuing in a new form; fourth, whether the reductions in nuclear arms that had occurred in the past few years should be attributed to the implementation
of the Treaty and its article VI or to other factors; fifth, the extent to
which a treaty on a comprehensive test-ban and the cessation of the production
of fissile material for weapons purposes would contribute to the Treaty, and
the scope and timing of actions to that end; sixth, the security assurances
that should be accorded to non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty,
and their nature and status under international law; seventh, the amount of
progress towards general and complete disarmament, particularly in the area of
conventional arms; and, eighth, agreement on a timetable, if possible, for the
foregoing.

This report indicates areas in which work must be done if we are to move
forward, strengthen the Treaty and the non-proliferation regime and evolve a
universally accepted norm.

The task before the Drafting Committee is by no means easy. I am none
the less optimistic that, with additional flexibility and a ready disposition
to compromise, all of the remaining brackets can be removed. I remain
available to the Chairman of the Drafting Committee to assist in any way I
can, particularly in facilitating his review of the Main Committee report to
which I have just referred.

Despite its many difficulties, the Committee was united about the final
paragraph of section II of the report, wherein it calls for the universality
of the Treaty by urging all States not Parties to the Treaty to accede to it
at the earliest possible date.

In conclusion, let me express my profound gratitude to the Conference
for having provided me the opportunity to serve in this capacity at this
historic Review and Extension Conference of the non-proliferation Treaty.

The President: May I take it that the Conference wishes to take note of
the report of the Main Committee I which is now before us?

It was so decided.

Organization of work

The President: I should now like to report on the decision on the
extension of the Treaty, in accordance with paragraph 2 of article X of the
Treaty.

As participants may recall, at the last plenary meeting Canada, on
behalf of 104 States parties, submitted a draft decision on the extension that
is contained in document NPT/CONF.1995/L.2. Indonesia, on behalf of 11 States
parties, has submitted a draft decision on the extension that is contained in
document NPT/CONF.1995/L.3. Mexico submitted its revised draft resolution in
document NPT/CONF.1995/L.1/Rev.1. The deadline for submission of proposals was
6 p.m. last Friday and there has been no further proposal.

It is my understanding that at this point there is no agreement among
delgations for a consensus decision on any of these three proposals. In light
of this, I propose that we defer a decision on the extension for 48 hours, and
during this period of deferment I shall make every effort to facilitate the
achievement of general agreement, with the cooperation of all delegations. It
is my intention, therefore, to report to the Conference on my efforts in this
regard at the next plenary meeting, on Wednesday, 10 May, when I intend to
have the decision on the extension taken, as appropriate.

May I take it that the Conference agrees with that proposal?

It was so decided.

The President: At the last plenary meeting, I suggested that I report to
the Conference on the outcome of consultations on the one outstanding aspect
in rule 28.3 (f).
Although good progress has been made, a final agreement has not yet been reached on this issue and further consultations are needed. I therefore propose to report to the Conference on the final outcome of the consultations at the next plenary meeting, on Wednesday, 10 May.

The meeting rose at 10.40 a.m.
President: Mr. DHANAPALA (Sri Lanka)

The meeting was called to order at 5.40 p.m.

The President: I should like to apologize for keeping delegations waiting but in extenuation of the delay I must say that I was engaged in urgent consultations which are vital to the progress of our work, and I am sure that representatives will not begrudge me that time.

Request by the Organization of the Islamic Conference for observer status

The President: The Secretariat has received a request from the Organization of the Islamic Conference to be granted Observer status at the Conference. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Conference wishes to approve the request.

It was so decided.

Adoption of the rules of procedure (agenda item 7) (continued) (NPT/CONF.1995/28)

The President: As representatives may recall, at the first plenary meeting of the Conference, on 17 April, the Conference decided, upon the proposal of the Preparatory Committee, to apply the rules of procedure provisionally, pending their formal adoption, and I was entrusted with continuing consultations on the one outstanding aspect in rule 28.3 (f), with a view to reaching agreement by consensus. I am pleased to report that agreement has been reached on that one outstanding point. In accordance with agenda item 7, I now submit to you for formal adoption the rules of procedure of the Conference (NPT/CONF.1995/28). These rules of procedure include the agreed text of rule 28.3, that is, the extension. They also reflect the agreement we reached at the beginning of the Conference on increasing the number of vice-presidents from 26 to 34, and accordingly rules 5 and 8 have been revised.

I should also like to draw attention to appendix 1 of document NPT/CONF.1995/28, the schedule for the division of costs. This schedule only reflects participation in the four sessions of the Preparatory Committee. The final schedule for the division of costs is reflected in a separate document, which I shall take up in a moment.

I now call on the Secretary-General of the Conference for an explanation.

Mr. Davinić (Secretary-General of the Conference): I refer to document NPT/CONF.1995/28, appendix 2, "Voting Procedure A" and "Voting Procedure B". It has been brought to my attention that in the fifth paragraph of Voting Procedure A several words were inadvertently omitted from the agreed formulation. After the words "Non-Aligned Movement delegations" the following phrase should be inserted "and other developing States delegations". The same correction should be made to Voting Procedure B. In the fourth paragraph, after the words "Non-Aligned Movement delegations", add the words "and other developing States delegations".
The President: That correction by the Secretary-General of the Conference is noted.

If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Conference wishes to adopt the rules of procedure contained in document NPT/CONF.1995/28, as amended.

It was so decided.

Adoption of arrangements for meeting the costs of the Conference (agenda item 14)

The President: Under agenda item 14 I would like to draw the attention of representatives to document NPT/CONF.1995/29, which gives the schedule for the division of costs based on actual participation of States Parties in the Conference. The document should be read in conjunction with rule 12 and appendix 1 of the rules of procedure, which we have just adopted. May I take it that the Conference wishes to adopt the Schedule for the division of costs as contained in document NPT/CONF.1995/29? If I hear no objection, it will be so decided.

It was so decided.

Credentials of representatives to the Conference (agenda item 10)

(a) Report of the Credentials Committee (NPT/CONF.1995/CC/1)

The President: To present the report of the Credentials Committee (NPT/CONF.1995/CC/1), submitted under agenda item 10 (b), I have pleasure in calling on the Chairman of the Credentials Committee.

Mr. Garcia (Colombia) (interpretation from Spanish), Chairman of the Credentials Committee; I have the honour to present to the Conference at its plenary meeting this afternoon the final report of the Credentials Committee. Delegations will find an advance copy of the report in document NPT/CONF.1995/CC/1.

The Credentials Committee, which was established under rule 3 of the rules of procedure, adopted today, met four times to examine the credentials of representatives participating in the Conference.

As will be recalled, last Friday, 5 May, I presented, on behalf of the Committee, an interim report on the status of the credentials submitted to the Committee up to that date. Since that report was issued the Committee has met twice more to review the situation. The Secretary-General of the Conference, Mr. Davinić, has kept the Committee informed about the status of the credentials submitted and I should like to express the appreciation of the Committee to the Secretary-General of the Conference and to the members of the Secretariat for the timely and ongoing submission of that information.

The Committee expressed its great satisfaction with respect to the submission of the credentials of representatives of the 175 States Parties participating in the Conference. Allow me to point out that in paragraph 7 of its report the Committee has taken note that as at 11 a.m. today, formal credentials had been received from 136 States Parties in accordance with rule 2 of the rules of procedure; credentials in the form of telefax copies had been received from 35 States Parties; and the designation of representatives of 4 States Parties had been received from the Permanent Missions in New York.

The Credentials Committee decided to accept the credentials of those States Parties which presented them formally, either in the original or in telefax form, from Heads of State or Government or from Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the latter on the understanding that the originals in the form established by rule 2 of the rules of procedure would be forwarded to the Secretary-General of the Conference as soon as possible.
Since 11 o'clock this morning, the Secretariat has received formal credentials from the Azerbaijani Republic and Turkmenistan. Furthermore, I have been informed by the representatives of Burundi, Honduras, Tuvalu and the United Republic of Tanzania that their credentials have been submitted in the required form. They have requested that their names be included on the list that is contained in this document, and this will be done.

The President: May I take it that the Conference wishes to take note of the report of the Credentials Committee contained in document NPT/CONF.1995/CC/1?

It was so decided.

Organization of work (continued)

The President: As representatives will recall, at its 15th plenary meeting, on Monday, 8 May, the Conference decided to defer the decision on the extension of the Treaty for 48 hours, until today, and requested that I make every effort to facilitate the achievement of general agreement.

In carrying out this mandate, I have conducted intensive consultations, the results of which are before representatives in a draft decision proposed by the President on strengthening the review process for the Treaty (NPT/CONF.1995/L.4), in a draft decision proposed by the President on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament (NPT/CONF.1995/L.5), and in a draft decision proposed by the President on the extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.1995/L.6).

It is my understanding that there seems to be a great measure of support among delegations for adopting these draft decisions without a vote. However, I have been informed by many delegations that they would need more time to consult with their Governments and to receive instructions.

Furthermore, a draft resolution has been submitted by 14 States Parties on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. This draft resolution is contained in document NPT/CONF.1995/L.7. Its sponsors have expressed the wish that it be taken up immediately following action on the decisions that I have just outlined. It is my understanding that delegations also need more time for consultations before action is taken on this proposal.

In the circumstances, I propose, with the agreement of the General Committee, to defer any action on the draft decisions and on the proposal until 10 a.m. tomorrow, Thursday, 11 May, when the Conference will hold its next plenary meeting. I would like to propose that at that time the Conference take action, without any further postponement.

May I take it that the Conference agrees with my proposal?

It was so decided.

The President: In connection with the action that the Conference will take tomorrow, it is my understanding that delegations wish to be given an opportunity to set forth their positions on the action that will be taken tomorrow. I propose that, as agreed in the General Committee, which met this afternoon, these interventions not exceed seven minutes.

May I take it that the Conference agrees with this proposal?

It was so decided.

The President: Allow me to take up another issue – the establishment of a deadline for the submission of proposals, as provided in rule 24 of the rules of procedure. The General Committee discussed this matter and decided to suggest to the Conference that the deadline for submission of proposals be 8 o’clock tonight.
May I take it that the Conference agrees with this suggestion?

It was so decided.

The President: As everyone knows, we shall conclude our work on Friday, 12 May. Delegations have already expressed their wish to make closing remarks at that time. In accordance with discussions held in the General Committee, I recommend to the Conference that those statements not exceed seven minutes.

May I take it that the Conference agrees with this recommendation?

It was so decided.

The President: I urge delegations to continue to demonstrate the necessary flexibility and cooperation. I hope that the Drafting Committee will be able to report to the Conference tomorrow morning.

I call now on representatives wishing to make statements at this stage.

Mr. Hoey (Ireland): My delegation, Sir, will be very happy to accept the procedural proposal you made, that we should defer action on the extension decision and on accompanying decisions until tomorrow morning. We understand that, as you rightly said, this proposal was made to allow delegations, not all of which have been involved closely in the negotiations you have conducted, to study the draft decisions. We certainly share your hope that this will facilitate the objective which, I think, we all share, which is to enable the Conference to adopt these decisions without a vote.

I very much hope that all the States Parties that are attending the Conference — no less than 175 as we have heard from the Chairman of the Credentials Committee — will, by their presence here tomorrow, contribute very much to this historic occasion.

Ms. Forsyth (New Zealand): I should like to second the comments just made by the delegation of Ireland. My delegation believes that the States Parties to the non-proliferation Treaty have already shown, by their record attendance at this Conference, how much importance they attach to the decision we are to take tomorrow. After the effort that has gone into our work over the past few weeks, we are confident that all the participants will want to be present for a decision that is of historic significance.

The meeting rose at 6.05 p.m.
The meeting was called to order at 12.10 p.m.

The President: I apologize to all delegations for the delay in convening this meeting, but I assure them that it was for very good reasons. Consultations were taking place amongst delegations to ensure that our work should progress smoothly. We also commence a little after high noon to intensify the drama of the occasion.

Consideration of and action on proposals before the Conference

The President: In connection with agenda item 19 — Decision on the extension of the Treaty as provided for in article X, paragraph 2 — article X, paragraph 2, of the Treaty states as follows:

"Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty."

Representatives will recall that, at the 14th plenary meeting, it was decided that the deadline for the submission of proposals on the extension should be 5 May 1995 at 6 p.m. Three proposals were presented to the secretariat before the expiration of the deadline. These proposals are contained in documents NPT/CONF.1995/L.1/Rev.1, submitted by Mexico; NPT/CONF.1995/L.2, submitted by Canada on behalf of 103 States Parties and subsequently sponsored by 8 additional States Parties; and NPT/CONF.1995/L.3, submitted by Indonesia and 10 States Parties and subsequently sponsored by 3 additional States Parties.

All delegations have had time to consider these draft resolutions fully and I thank the sponsors for their initiatives. Meanwhile, the Conference has also been working on three other documents. These are: a draft decision on strengthening the review process for the Treaty, as contained in document NPT/CONF.1995/L.4; a draft decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, as contained in document NPT/CONF.1995/L.5; and a draft decision on the extension of the Treaty, as contained in document NPT/CONF.1995/L.6.

These three documents are the end result of considerable discussion over long hours. Those discussions drew on the substance of draft resolution NPT/CONF.1995/L.1 and draft decision L.2 and L.3. I personally presided over those consultations, and I should like to thank sincerely all the delegations that contributed to them. Given the large number of delegations — 175, to be exact — participating in this Conference, it may not have been possible for every one of the delegations to be present at the consultations. However, representatives of the main political groups or the coordinators did attend them, and I have been assured that they have kept their respective memberships informed of the progress of work in the consultations.

Throughout the consultations, I enjoyed the fullest possible cooperation of all delegations, which displayed a constructive attitude towards seeking common ground on extremely complex issues. The atmosphere that prevailed has
been excellent, and this has contributed to strengthening the spirit of the Treaty.

In conducting the consultations, I benefited also from the statements made by delegations during the general debate and from the individual meetings I had the pleasure of having with a large number of delegations. These views have been reflected in the documents. All this has contributed in ample measure to the three draft decisions before us which, I believe, together represent a fair and equitable balance of interests on the issues before us.

A word of explanation about the final paragraph of draft decision NPT/CONF.1995/L.5: it refers to the Final Declaration of the Conference. This will, of course, depend on what documents are eventually adopted as the final product of this Conference.

The documents before representatives provide, in my humble opinion, an excellent basis for an understanding on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, the strengthening of the review process for the Treaty and for the extension of our Treaty. It is also clear that a majority exists in terms of article X, paragraph 2, relating to the extension. This leads me to conclude that it will not be necessary to resort to a vote on the three draft decisions before us – contained in documents NPT/CONF.1995/L.4, L.5 and L.6, as they command the general support of the Conference.

Accordingly, if I hear no objection, I will take it that the draft decisions may be adopted without a vote.


As agreed during my consultations, it is my understanding that the sponsors of draft resolution NPT/CONF.1995/L.1/Rev.1 and draft decisions NPT/CONF.1995/L.2 and NPT/CONF.1995/L.3 will not pursue any action with regard to their proposals.

I should like to inform representatives that, in accordance with rule 24 of the rules of procedure, another draft resolution was submitted yesterday to the Conference. It is contained in document NPT/CONF.1995/L.8 and is sponsored by the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America. This draft resolution was made available in English to delegations this morning. The text in other languages will be distributed in the course of this meeting.

In light of my consultations, may I, under rule 24 – which allows for the possibility — propose to the Conference that it act on this draft resolution now, waiving the 24-hours requirement?

_It was so decided._

_The President:_ With the consent of the sponsors of the draft resolution, I should like to introduce a change in operative paragraph 1 of draft resolution NPT/CONF.1995/L.8. The amended paragraph will now read as follows:

"Endorses the aims and objectives of the Middle East peace process and recognizes that efforts in this regard, as well as other efforts, contribute to, _inter alia_, a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction;"

It is my understanding that there is general agreement on draft resolution NPT/CONF.1995/L.8, as orally amended. I should like therefore to propose that we adopt this draft resolution without a vote.
Draft resolution NPT/CONF.1995/L.8, as orally amended, was adopted.

The President: I should now like to call on those representatives who have inscribed their names on the list of speakers for an explanation of their positions. I should like to remind delegations of the recommendation that those statements should not exceed seven minutes.

Mr. Hussamy (Syrian Arab Republic) (interpretation from Arabic): Kindly allow me to express my country's position on the documents adopted by the Conference. We should like our position to be set forth in the formal record of this meeting.

First, concerning decisions NPT/CONF.1995/L.4, L.5 and L.6, the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) means that the loopholes and shortcomings recognized by most States Parties to the Treaty shall henceforth be remedied entirely through the good faith of nuclear States Parties in the fulfilment of the obligations incumbent upon them under the provisions of the Treaty. However, regardless of the real reasons that prompted the majority of States to take the decision to extend the Treaty in this manner, unanimity or near-unanimity has clearly crystallized in the course of the deliberations within the Conference and its committees, as well as within the different regional groups, as regards the achievement of the universality of this Treaty needed to give it the credibility it requires in order to attain its objectives.

Accordingly, the Syrian Arab Republic believes that the clear failure to obtain the universality of the Treaty is a matter that cannot be merely accepted or left to be remedied by the good will of the States Parties. That would mean leaving nuclear weapons and programmes out of the international non-proliferation system and international control, particularly in the Middle East region, the security and stability of which are considered an essential component of international peace and security.

This Conference provided a unique historic opportunity — an opportunity not heeded by Israel — to accede to the Treaty and to participate with the other States of the region in transforming the Middle East into a region free of nuclear weapons and all weapons of mass destruction. The Syrian Arab Republic cannot therefore agree to the extension of the Treaty unless Israel accedes to the Treaty and agrees to subject its nuclear installations to the safeguards and inspection system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The Syrian Arab Republic, which has underlined its concern for the security and stability of the region, was one of the first States to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty, and has remained faithful to the commitments proceeding from the provisions of that Treaty for the past 25 years. The Syrian Arab Republic cannot accept Israel's remaining outside this Treaty, particularly when everyone knows that Israel does have an arsenal of nuclear weapons, that it continues to occupy large areas of its neighbours' territories, that it defies the resolutions of the United Nations, and that it behaves as if it were above international law.

This position on the part of Syria does not stem from our desire or intention to set aside the objectives of this Treaty. Rather, it stems from our absolute rejection of the existence of nuclear weapons in Israel's hands, which may threaten security and stability in the region and the world. This should be rejected by the international community also.

As for the decision on the draft resolution contained in document NPT/CONF.1995/L.8, despite the clear commitment of the Syrian Arab Republic to the peace process, despite its serious endeavours through bilateral talks to reach a just and comprehensive peace in the region, despite its call and long-standing proposal to transform the Middle East into a region free from all weapons of mass destruction, and particularly nuclear weapons, the Syrian Arab Republic cannot agree to this draft until and unless Israel accedes to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and until Israel places its
nuclear installations under the safeguards system of the IAEA. In the absence of such action, the resolution will remain devoid of any meaning.

**Mr. Abu Odeh (Jordan) (interpretation from Arabic):** I should like to explain the position of my delegation as regards the resolution that has been adopted.

First of all, Jordan was one of the first signatories of the non-proliferation Treaty, and Jordan has always been concerned that the Treaty should continue to play its important role in the maintenance of the regime of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the attainment of the lofty objectives of complete nuclear disarmament so that we may be able to achieve a world that is completely rid of such weapons.

Secondly, as regards the Middle East, Jordan believes that it would be difficult to achieve a global, just and lasting peace if Israeli nuclear installations remained and if they continued to be unsafeguarded. It is for this reason that, in accordance with what has been achieved with regard to peace, Jordan asks that Israel accede to the Treaty and that it place all of its nuclear installations under the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Thirdly, as I have stated, the danger that flows from the presence of Israeli nuclear installations that are not subjected to Agency control affects Jordan's life in two ways - regional security and the pursuit of the peace process, on the one hand, and the security of the inhabitants of Jordan, which is linked to the existence of Israeli nuclear installations found close to places where Jordanians live, on the other.

Fourthly, Jordan’s decision to participate in the adoption of draft resolution NPT/CONF.1995/L.3 is the expression of our concern that the Treaty continue to exist and reflects our desire for universality and the attainment of the noble objectives underlying the Treaty with a view to achieving a world completely free of nuclear weapons.

Fifthly, as regards draft resolution NPT/CONF.1995/L.8 on the Middle East, my delegation supported the draft resolution despite its lacunae and shortcomings, although Jordan would have liked it to contain a clear and unambiguous statement calling upon Israel to accede to the Treaty and to subject all its nuclear installations to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

However, this objective could not be realized during the negotiations and, in order to ensure peace in the region and the universality of the Treaty, we once again call upon Israel to participate in stopping nuclear weapons.

On behalf of my delegation, I call upon Israel seriously to work to facilitate the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in order to strengthen peace in the region and in the world and to attain a world without nuclear weapons.

Sixthly, Jordan’s decision does not mean that we are giving up our conviction that the best solution is to be found in draft decision L.3, but we have deferred to the wishes of the majority and have also recognized the positive elements contained in the President’s package.

**Mr. Agam (Malaysia):** Let me at the outset, state categorically that the decision on the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons does not have the consensus of the Conference. We would have preferred that a vote had been taken by secret ballot to enable States Parties to decide with their conscience. We believe that the outcome would have been different. Our position as comprehensively stated on 18 April 1995 remains.

Malaysia has consistently supported all actions and efforts towards complete and general disarmament. In this regard, we have always maintained
the need to strengthen the non-proliferation regime to prevent horizontal and vertical proliferation, as well as undertake on an urgent basis tangible measures towards nuclear disarmament for all times. Like all peace-loving nations, we too desire the outlawing of nuclear weapons — the most horrendous weapons of mass destruction invented by humankind to date. It remains our determination and resolve that nuclear weapons be outlawed in the same way that chemical weapons and biological weapons have been outlawed. The outlawing of these weapons of mass destruction would be a major contribution towards international peace and security.

Even as we speak today, 25 years after the signing of the NPT, stockpiles of nuclear weapons are far greater than when the NPT was originally signed. Two of the major nuclear-weapon States have a total of 40,000 warheads today, compared with 38,700 in 1970. The combined stockpiles of the other nuclear-weapon States have grown from 400 total warheads in 1970 to almost 1,200 today. The explosive power of two tons of TNT for every person on earth remains in the arsenals to haunt us, even as 1 billion people live in abject poverty and as the vast majority of humankind clamour for a development agenda. More than 1,200 tons of fissile material, the most dangerous substance on earth, remain stockpiled in nuclear-weapon States. With the cold war over, who are these warheads targeted at? What is their purpose and relevance today?

My delegation and other like-minded delegations have worked assiduously to ensure that the decisions that the Conference has today adopted provide a firm basis for monitoring and evaluating the performance of the nuclear-weapon States' compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, in particular, that of article VI. We and other like-minded countries had introduced, for inclusion in the draft final declaration and in the decision to principles and objectives, language that would firmly commit the nuclear-weapon States to taking specific nuclear disarmament measures. Regrettably, our efforts met with strong and determined resistance from the nuclear-weapon States and their supporters. Seemingly confident of numbers, the nuclear-weapon States rebuffed the publicly-shared need and desire for setting specific and time-bound objectives regarding such issues as the comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT), fissile material cut-off, elimination of nuclear weapons and effective review mechanism. We cannot in all conscience agree that our deliberations and this decision have advanced humanity's desire for an immediate end to nuclear proliferation and armaments and their ultimate elimination.

Numbers have been bandied about to cow those committed to non-proliferation and disarmament. Although the NPT itself provides options regarding extension, advocates of indefinite extension would have nothing else and would let nothing stand in their way. In reality, indefinite extension provides a carte blanche to the nuclear-weapon States and does not serve as an incentive towards universality. Indefinite extension justifies nuclear weapons and might be interpreted as legalizing nuclear-weapon States for eternity. Indefinite extension fundamentally weakens all efforts towards the elimination of nuclear weapons.

My delegation continues to believe that global peace and security will be best served not by an indefinite extension of the Treaty but by extension for fixed periods. In this context, we, together with a number of other countries, had introduced a draft decision for a 25-year rolling period. This would have in effect provided indefinite extension, and yet given the States Parties a legal basis to continue to review the performance of all parties, including the compliance of the nuclear-weapon States in particular with article VI. Any other decision would be tantamount to abandoning a historic moment to free ourselves from the nuclear-weapon blackmail and safeguard the interests of current and future generations.

Notwithstanding our disappointment, Malaysia remains committed to the NPT, to which we attach vital importance as an instrument to check nuclear proliferation in all its forms. We will work to ensure that the nuclear-weapon States Parties fully discharge their Treaty obligations and are accountable to all States Parties to the Treaty; indeed, to humanity itself.
Mr. Sha Zhukang (China) (interpretation from Chinese): The Conference has just adopted three important decisions. We have decided, without a vote, to extend the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons indefinitely, and we have adopted decisions on the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and on strengthening the review process for the Treaty. These positive results will have an important and far-reaching bearing on the future. We commend the untiring efforts and the spirit of compromise on the part of all States Parties. In this regard, the delegation of China would like to express its gratitude to the President of the Conference, Ambassador Dhanapala, who, with his outstanding talent and rich diplomatic experience, has fulfilled the important mission entrusted to him with distinction and has made a vital contribution to the agreement reached by the Conference. I should also like to thank the Chairmen of the various committees and the other members of the Bureau for their efforts towards the success of the Conference.

From the very beginning of the whole process, China has worked resolutely for the smooth extension of the Treaty and has strongly called for the adoption of the extension decision by consensus. China has made energetic efforts towards this end. It has been our firm belief that we, as States Parties, share the same objective of strengthening the Treaty and that there are more agreements than differences among us. The differences we have can be resolved through constructive cooperation. This has provided the basis for the agreement we have reached and has been true for the extension of the Treaty, as it will be for our future strengthening of the review and implementation of the Treaty. We hope that all States Parties will continue to be guided by the same spirit and that we can complete our work on the final declaration of the Conference.

The indefinite extension of the Treaty reaffirms its role in the new international situation. It also reaffirms the three objectives of the Treaty, namely, promotion of nuclear disarmament, prevention of nuclear-weapon proliferation and enhancement of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The other two decisions adopted by the Conference, for their part, manifest the fact that the strengthened and full implementation of the Treaty is conducive to the maintenance of international peace and security and represents the common demand and interest of all States Parties.

The NPT was concluded 25 years ago under the historical conditions then prevailing, and it has its limitations and defects. It is unbalanced in certain aspects. The results of the review and the decisions adopted by the Conference show that such limitations and defects can be redressed and rectified through continued progress in nuclear disarmament and enhanced cooperation between countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In the course of the Conference various delegations put forward many suggestions on how to realize the objectives of the Treaty, and they will be a sound basis for an enhanced and comprehensive implementation of the Treaty. China stands ready to join all other States Parties in seeking effective ways to achieve the full implementation of the objectives of the Treaty and will make its own positive contribution to that end.

The prevention of nuclear-weapon proliferation is not an end in itself but an intermediate step towards the ultimate objective of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. In our view, the unanimous decision on the indefinite extension of the Treaty reaffirms the Treaty's objective of nuclear disarmament and should in no way be interpreted as perpetuating the prerogative of the nuclear-weapon States to possess nuclear weapons. The nuclear-weapon States should fulfill their Treaty obligations for nuclear disarmament in good faith. A convention on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons should be concluded, in the same way as were the Conventions banning all biological and chemical weapons, under which nuclear weapons will be completely prohibited and thoroughly destroyed under effective international supervision. This should be the primary objective of nuclear disarmament. In the meantime, we should conclude as soon as possible a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, a convention prohibiting the production of fissile materials for nuclear-weapon purposes, a treaty on
the non-first-use of nuclear weapons and an international and legally binding instrument unconditionally assuring non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. All these are essential to the strengthening of the effectiveness and functioning of the Treaty.

In order to realize the objective of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, it is necessary for the international community to make further efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this regard, China's policies have been clear-cut and consistent. China does not endorse, encourage or engage in nuclear-weapon proliferation. Nor does it assist any other country in developing nuclear weapons. In the field of nuclear exports, we adhere to the following three principles: first, such exports should be exclusively for peaceful purposes; secondly, the exports should be subject to the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards; thirdly, such exports should not be retransferred to a third country without China's prior consent. At the same time, we believe that the prevention of nuclear-weapon proliferation should facilitate, rather than impede, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and should contribute to safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the developing countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In preventing nuclear-weapon proliferation and utilizing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, it is inadmissible to apply double standards.

China believes that the promotion of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as one of the three objectives of the Treaty, should constitute an important element in fulfilling NPT obligations. It deserves the same attention as other provisions of the Treaty. We hope that the indefinite extension of the Treaty will further enhance exchanges and cooperation among countries in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy to benefit mankind as a whole.

Four weeks ago we came here with an important historic mission. Today, with the concerted efforts of each and every delegation, we have reaffirmed the validity and authority of the NPT. Furthermore, we have decided upon the principles, objectives and mechanism for strengthening the implementation and review of the Treaty. The indefinite extension of the NPT marks a new beginning. It is a call for redoubled efforts to realize the objectives of the NPT in all its aspects, with the goal of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. Faced with the present historic opportunity, China stands ready to work unremittingly with all other States Parties for the early realization of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

Mr. Gambari (Nigeria): Once more, I have asked to speak to explain my delegation's position on document NPT/CONF.1995/L.6 on extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. We respect fully the sovereign right of each State Party to take a position on the extension options contained in article X.2 of the NPT. Therefore, Nigeria cannot stand in the way of the majority of the States Parties that opted for indefinite extension of the Treaty, but we hope sincerely that those States Parties will also be able to respect my delegation's dissenting opinion, based purely on principle.

Nigeria would like to place on record its inability to support the indefinite extension of the Treaty. We remain convinced and strongly believe that in their heart of hearts, and in a free and fair vote, several other States Parties will agree with our position that the best option is the 25-year rolling periods of extension with clearly defined objectives and a programme of action that would keep in focus the accountability of all Parties, nuclear as well as non-nuclear, in relation to the full implementation of their respective obligations under the Treaty.

My delegation believes that any decision on the extension of the NPT must be geared towards strengthening, not weakening, the Treaty, in the interests of international peace and security. In that regard, Nigeria is of the view that the decision to extend the NPT indefinitely without applying to that decision a time-bound programme of nuclear disarmament measures poses
grave security risks for present and future generations. First, it removes the urge speedily to pursue negotiations to achieve nuclear disarmament. Secondly, it could very well undermine the goal of universality. Thirdly, it banishes to a remote future the goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

Furthermore, my delegation is deeply concerned that, as the deliberations of this Conference during the past four weeks have shown, nuclear-weapon States are reluctant to abandon their nuclear doctrines even in an international environment that is now less antagonistic to their security interests and, therefore, ill-suited to such doctrines.

Nigeria was the second signatory of the NPT but we are second to none in scrupulously and faithfully carrying out our obligations under the Treaty. Demonstrating our firm belief in the Treaty, we have also concluded a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

At the regional level, my country and the other members of the Organization of African Unity have intensified efforts for the establishment of an African nuclear-weapon-free zone: an objective that is now within sight. Our actions stem from our country’s conviction that an enduring structure of international security cannot be built on the possession of nuclear weapons.

Finally, in spite of our stated inability to support the option of indefinite extension, I wish to reaffirm my country’s commitment to the objectives of the NPT and our belief in its viability as the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime. Nigeria will continue to cooperate fully with other States Parties in the effort to achieve the goals of the Treaty and a world that is completely free of nuclear weapons.

Mr. Nasseri (Islamic Republic of Iran): Ever since its inception, the non-proliferation Treaty has contributed to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to the process of nuclear disarmament. Its operation has not, however, always been on a par with its objectives, and there have been persistent, major shortcomings that have stubbornly hampered the realization of the purposes of the preamble to and the provisions of the Treaty.

A large number of States Parties, therefore, were hesitant and sceptical when they came to this Conference and were deeply apprehensive about the decision on the manner in which the Treaty was to be extended. It is a known fact that a substantial – indeed, a major – diplomatic effort was therefore required by the nuclear States Parties and their principal allies to solicit support for the indefinite extension of the Treaty by any means possible. It is true that a majority was eventually achieved through that process, but nevertheless it left many principal quarters unconvinced. Even when support was expressed, reservations or conditions were often attached. That must have raised an alarm and given a signal that, without a firm commitment to the full implementation of the Treaty, its fate would be put at tremendous risk. As a result, the negotiations here followed a more serious course and led to the formulation of the package that has been presented today by the President and adopted at this plenary meeting without a vote.

The declaration on principles and objectives and the decision on the strengthening of the review process have been instrumental in avoiding a vote on the extension. They are part and parcel of the extension decision and have made possible – to use the appropriate term – the conditional indefinite extension of the non-proliferation Treaty. Those who had perceived permanency as vital to their security concerns, national interests and political requirements now have the further obligation fully to respect those concerns, interests and requirements in the case of all others.

The basic ground rule in the negotiations was to concentrate on what unites us and not on what divides us. The declaration on principles and objectives was derived directly from the preamble to and the provisions of the Treaty, taking into account today’s developments. All States Parties, therefore, are expected to be fully committed to the Treaty’s implementation without any reservations. The Treaty’s indefinite extension is closely linked
to the accountability of nuclear-weapon States in particular, in respect of this set of principles.

With regard to the major themes of the declaration, we wish to reiterate these points: The fundamental objective of the Treaty will be seriously undermined unless universal adherence is achieved. In the Middle East, the Israeli nuclear threat must be checked. We therefore stress the commitment in the declaration to pursue that issue, as well as the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, as a matter of priority. On the basis of this agreement, a demand must be made upon Israel to place all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive safeguard agreements.

Every effort should be made to implement the Treaty in all its aspects to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Of course, that should not hamper in any way the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The declaration recognizes that with the end of the cold war international tension has eased and trust between States has been strengthened. Nuclear disarmament, on the basis of the text of the Treaty, is now substantially facilitated. The related undertaking should therefore be fulfilled with determination. In that context, the comprehensive test-ban treaty should be completed by next year; negotiations on the cut-off treaty should be pursued without delay; and complete elimination of nuclear weapons should become reality through the envisaged programme of action.

The agreement on security assurances is expected to lead quickly to the commencement of negotiations on an internationally, legally-binding instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The exercise of the inalienable right to develop, carry out research on, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes should be assured for all parties without exception.

Undertakings to facilitate participation in all exchanges related to peaceful use should be fully implemented. Non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty should receive preferential treatment on nuclear-related peaceful activities. Export controls should no longer be the exclusive domain of a limited group. All interested States Parties should be able to participate in the formulation of export controls, and those controls should become transparent.

The competent authority responsible for ensuring compliance with safeguards agreements is the International Atomic Energy Agency. The concerns of States Parties regarding non-compliance should be directed, along with supporting evidence, to the IAEA for consideration, investigation, conclusion and decisions on necessary actions. States' own perceptions about non-compliance, therefore, are not merited unless verified by the IAEA.

Those are the commitments that have been made here, and we take it that they have been made in good faith. They will be made subject to rigorous assessment and evaluation in our review process, which will be reinitiated at the meetings of the 1997 Preparatory Committee, as has been decided.

Before I conclude, let me state that while we fully support the general thrust of the amended draft resolution NPT/CONF.1995/L.8 — as, indeed, Israel should be compelled to accede to the NPT and to place its unsafeguarded nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards in order that a Middle East nuclear-free-zone can be realized — we express, in accordance with our principled positions in this regard, our reservations about references in the draft resolution to the Middle East peace process.

At this stage, I wish to join others who have spoken before me, Mr. President, in the firm acknowledgement of your immense contribution to the successful outcome of this exercise. Your diplomatic skill and vast knowledge and experience, along with your total dedication, played a major role in guiding us to an agreement. This, I am certain, is appreciated by everyone here. Our heartfelt appreciation is also extended to the Secretary-General of
the Conference and his very able staff, who worked around the clock to ensure efficiency.

Mr. Lamamra (Algeria) (interpretation from French): Allow me first of all, Mr. President, to express the Algerian delegation’s admiration for the outstanding human and professional qualities you have demonstrated in the conduct of the complex tasks of this Conference.

By depositing its instruments of accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons a few months ago, Algeria wanted to show its commitment to the collective work of nuclear disarmament and thereby contribute to the process of universalizing the Treaty. Through that act of faith, which took place at a crucial time, when the validity of the NPT was nearing expiration, Algeria wished to lend its support to responsible collective action aimed at making the NPT an effective nuclear-disarmament instrument and promoting the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

This shows the great hopes that my country, like many others, placed in this Conference, whose objective was, above and beyond the temporary issue of the Treaty’s validity and extension, to proceed to an objective and exhaustive evaluation of the Treaty’s 25 years of operation. Though it may not have fully lived up to all our expectations, the Conference has nevertheless furnished an opportunity for intensive and rich debate on all disarmament-related issues and nuclear non-proliferation. It has enabled us to reaffirm the validity of the Treaty’s objectives and renew the commitments taken on under its provisions, in particular those concerning general and complete disarmament, the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones. The arrangements made for the strengthening and improvement of the Treaty’s review mechanism are a promising result, in that they will henceforth provide the States Parties with an opportunity to evaluate more regularly and more closely the progress achieved in the implementation of commitments undertaken under the provisions taken on under the Treaty.

In the especially important area of security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States, the Conference has taken a welcome step forward by clearly opening up the prospect of concluding a binding international legal instrument on this subject, as the countries of the Non-Aligned Movement have consistently called for.

These results — modest, but not inconsiderable — take on more significance in the light of the commitments made here and at the highest level by the main nuclear Powers, which have solemnly affirmed that the permanence of the Treaty in no way means perpetuation of the atomic-weapon monopoly, but that it constitutes, rather, a pledge of diligent implementation of a nuclear-disarmament process with a view to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

Algeria takes note of these commitments. The perpetuity bestowed upon the Treaty today makes it possible to guarantee from now on the legal permanence and stability necessary for renewed action and, on the basis of the results achieved, for the promotion of a new dynamic ensuring that all the potential contained in this unique legal instrument will be fulfilled.

The responsibility of the nuclear Powers in the implementation of the results of our meetings on this subject is of primary importance, particularly for the purpose of banishing for ever any resort to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. They have a similar responsibility with regard to the realization of the ultimate objective of the NPT, which remains the definitive elimination of nuclear weapons in the framework of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Lastly, they have a responsibility in bringing about the conditions necessary for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, particularly in Africa and the Middle East.
In this regard, the Conference's call for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, a region of tension, and the enshrinement of the achievement of the NPT's universality as an urgent priority for the future action of all States Parties are important, in that they address, with a heightened sense of responsibility, the concern and legitimate interests expressed by all the Arab States.

In that context, the Conference has added a fourth pillar to the results of its work by adopting a specific resolution on the entire problem of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament in the Middle East, which is designated the favoured geopolitical area for an urgent and decisive breakthrough towards implementing the principle of the NPT's universality. The unequivocal statement of concern by all States Parties to the NPT, including the nuclear-weapon States, over the existence of Israeli nuclear facilities not under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and the call for all States in the Middle East to accede to the NPT make it everyone's pressing obligation to get Israel to participate in non-proliferation and nuclear-disarmament endeavours.

In this spirit, and in the hope that an NPT strengthened politically by this Conference will become a universal and effective instrument for disarmament and for qualitative and quantitative non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as a powerful vehicle for promoting the uses of nuclear technology for development, Algeria, which has resolutely worked in favour of a consensus outcome that would rally our differing positions around a common commitment to the Treaty, would like to see that all states Parties redouble their efforts to ensure that the four agreements this Conference has reached will become historic milestones on the path towards a world forever free of nuclear weapons.

Mr. Errera (France) (interpretation from French): On behalf of the European Union and its associated countries — Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia, I welcome the decision we have taken.

And why should we applaud this decision? Because, in the weeks just past, we have seen a sense of solidarity over the Treaty grow with each passing day. The high level of participation, the impressive number of countries that have chosen to accord the Treaty the permanence it used to lack and our common will to expand further what might have been merely a simple majority all show how committed we are to our common asset, the NPT.

We have always been sure that the future of the Treaty should override our differences and even our divisions. However, success was not guaranteed. We are happy that success has been achieved. We are happy that each and every one of us has shown a keen sense of responsibility, thus enabling us to arrive at the important decision we have just taken.

And what will this decision mean in practice? We have not only ensured that the Treaty will be permanent; we have also strengthened the international non-proliferation norm. We have thus helped increase the confidence between States without which there could be no development of the peaceful uses of nuclear technology nor any further progress towards disarmament. The decisions we took on strengthening the review process for the Treaty and on the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament will help us ensure better implementation of the Treaty.

In so doing, we have just assured the future of the non-proliferation regime. This is also our best opportunity to get the accessions we need to make the Treaty universal.

And to what can we attribute our success? Firstly, to the active participation of all delegations and also to their readiness to take into account the constraints and the imperatives that obtain for each delegation, and also their aspirations, in order to arrive at compromise solutions, including solutions to issues on which positions used to be very far apart. The European Union, for which the extension of the NPT was a priority
objective, unreservedly committed itself to this, and it is pleased to have contributed to our common endeavour, in particular by carrying out the specific responsibilities that were entrusted to some of its members under the Treaty review process.

We welcome the initiative by the delegation of the Republic of South Africa and applaud the role it has played not only within the context of the policies we have defined but also in the spirit of dialogue that has characterized our work.

However, our success is attributable primarily to you, Mr. President: you showed us the way and guided us. Under your authority we managed to overcome our differences. It was your exceptional talent that enabled us gradually to bring together the various elements of the decisions we have taken. And it was the moral authority you exerted throughout this Conference that created the confidence that made it possible to bring together such diverse countries. We thank you from the bottom of our hearts.

The task we have just completed was entrusted to us 25 years ago by men and women who were unaware of the context in which this decision would be taken, but who counted on the wisdom of our assembly. I believe that we have proved worthy of the trust they placed in us.

Mr. Jele (South Africa): At the very outset, my delegation would sincerely like to pay a warm and well-deserved tribute to you, Mr. President, for the momentous decisions we have just adopted. Your commitment and sense of purpose provided the inspiration and direction we needed for our work. Your sensitive and skilful handling of the serious matters before this Conference has also ensured the smooth progress and final success which we are all now able to celebrate.

This remarkable achievement was made possibly only through the deep commitment, flexibility and genuine spirit of conciliation and compromise of each delegation at this Conference. That is why it has been possible, through constructive dialogue and negotiations, to formulate and agree to the decisions just adopted. They reflect the collective desire of all States Parties to promote nuclear disarmament, and emphasize the urgent need to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world. Our decisions provide us with an interlinked and realistic framework to enable us all faithfully to discharge our obligations and reach the goals enshrined in the Treaty as soon as possible.

We earnestly hope that all States Parties — and particularly the nuclear-weapon States — will dedicate themselves to the central task of fulfilling the aspirations of their peoples — and humanity as a whole — to rid the world of the threat of mass destruction. If the commitment of our decisions is followed by concrete action, it will encourage those States that have so far not done so to accede to our Treaty.

On 10 May 1994 the people of South Africa and millions of people the world over rejoiced at the successful transition to a democratic order and the inauguration of our Government of National Unity under President Nelson Mandela. This democratic transformation constitutes, for our people, the firm foundation for peace for which they have yearned for generations.

On 25 May 1994 the United Nations Security Council met to lift the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa, which was imposed in 1977 under the terms of the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations because the prevailing system of government in our country and the actions carried out by that Government constituted, demonstrably, a threat to international peace and security. In that solemn meeting our Deputy President, Thabo Mbeki, firmly committed our country, as a Member of the United Nations and as a responsible citizen of the world, to living up to its obligations. He also said that democratic South Africa was determined to discharge its responsibilities in an effort to secure peace for ourselves and the peoples of the world.
As our Foreign Minister indicated at the beginning of this Conference, we see the fundamental objective of promoting peace and security as constituting an integral part of our commitment to democracy, human rights, sustainable development, social justice and environmental protection. It is in this context that we are evolving our policy on non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament with a view to achieving the total elimination of all nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

South Africa believes that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should not be placed in jeopardy and that the review and extension process should strengthen — not weaken — the non-proliferation regime. As our Foreign Minister made clear, we hold the view that the security of individual countries, like our own, and of the international community as a whole would be severely jeopardized if the NPT were weakened. We also place importance on the fact that the NPT is the only international instrument on nuclear disarmament to which all five nuclear-weapon States are bound.

This is why South Africa took the decision to support, in principle, the indefinite extension of the Treaty. We were, however, concerned that proper checks and balances should be put in place to ensure that the objectives of the Treaty are translated into reality, because we share the belief that the inequality inherent in the Treaty, as well as the criticism of provisions regarding disarmament, peaceful uses and other aspects of the Treaty, should and must be addressed.

South Africa believes that the decisions we have just adopted entitled "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" and "Strengthening the review process for the Treaty" are a means whereby these expectations and criticisms can be addressed. We believe that they can fulfil the role outlined by our Minister, and South Africa therefore feels able to support the indefinite extension of the NPT.

We now have a stronger Treaty and a yardstick by which we can measure the non-proliferation and disarmament achievements of all States Parties. South Africa sees the decisions as representing the beginning — and not the end — of a new journey towards the achievement of all the goals and obligations of the NPT.

We hope that all States will faithfully implement our joint decisions and act without any reservation, qualification or conditionality, so that we can transform our vision of a nuclear-weapon-free world into an early reality. If the positive and constructive political will demonstrated in the corridors and meeting rooms of the United Nations over the last four weeks is reproduced in the capitals of the world we shall have the necessary firm basis for success.

We believe that the Conference has fulfilled the expectations of the international community. We have not failed. But it is now up to individual Governments, which over the next five years will determine whether we enter the next century with the real prospect of creating a world free of nuclear weapons. They must not fail us.

Mr. Elaraby (Egypt) (interpretation from Arabic): I should like at the outset to extend to you, Mr. President, the sincere thanks and appreciation of the delegation of Egypt for your skilful leadership and your valuable contributions, which have helped to ensure the results that have been achieved today.

Now that the Conference has demonstrated majority support for, and has adopted, its four decisions — those on the extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; on the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament; on strengthening of the review process; and on the Middle East — my delegation would like, on the instructions of its Government, to put clearly on record the position of Egypt.
First, Egypt, while supporting the non-proliferation Treaty, being committed to its provisions and seeking to promote the objectives of the Treaty as a main pillar of stability and international peace and security, believes that the method used to achieve its indefinite extension was neither the best nor the most successful and that it may have negative consequences. In that regard, Egypt believes that the four decisions adopted today, considered as a package, reflect the interests and priorities of the parties to the NPT. We should like to reaffirm the importance of the Treaty’s continued validity, of commitment to its principles and of the speedy realization of its objectives, as well as the need to give special priority to the Middle East to ensure accession to the Treaty by all States of the region and the declaration of the Middle East as a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

Secondly, Egypt’s support for the aims and objectives of the Treaty stems from a firm belief in the need to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, with a view to the total elimination of those most destructive devices, as well as from a firm conviction that the possession of nuclear weapons by any State in the Middle East constitutes a threat to the security of all States of the region and could have serious regional and international consequences - to say nothing of the imbalance in regional and international affairs due to lack of even-handedness in their treatment.

Thirdly, concerned about promoting the principles of the Treaty, and in support of the implementation of its provisions and objectives, we as Parties should face up to the weaknesses and deficiencies in the implementation process. Here, I should like to begin by mentioning that the Treaty does not yet enjoy universality. There has been much delay in the implementation of the nuclear disarmament process under article VI of the Treaty. There is no provision in the Treaty for any security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States nor is there any provision in Security Council resolutions 255 (1968) and 984 (1995) for any safeguards or assurances which provide protection to non-nuclear-weapon States. It is also important to increase the efficiency and enhance the inspection regime of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

In addition, there are imbalances between the rights and obligations of nuclear States and those of non-nuclear States despite the fact that the Treaty has been in force for 25 years. There is no doubt that all States Parties to the Treaty, and nuclear States in particular, are required to seek a remedy for the deficiencies and weaknesses of the Treaty in order that, through the strict implementation of its provisions and the principles adopted in our decisions today, its objective of universality can be fully realized.

In the absence of the universality of the Treaty the dangers posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons will persist and will increase as time goes on. The Middle East region at present bears witness to a situation that perpetuates those dangers because of Israel’s unclear nuclear capabilities, which are not subject to international supervision. That imbalance is not acceptable. Serious regional and international attempts must be made to correct it as soon as possible.

Consequently, as is known, Egypt presented its proposal for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East region based on its clear vision of what is needed and required to establish peace and security in that sensitive region. President Mubarak’s 1990 initiative outlined the need to establish a zone free of weapons of mass destruction, and the Middle East has taken into account recent developments at both the regional and the international level. In this regard I should like to state that the decision on the Middle East adopted by the Conference recently, which was sponsored by the three depository States of the Treaty as a clear indication of its importance, is based essentially on the achievement of the universality of the Treaty. It calls on all parties in the Middle East, but first and foremost on Israel as the only State possessing nuclear facilities not subject to IAEA safeguards, to achieve the main objective and it stresses the importance of taking the necessary steps speedily to free the Middle East of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. This decision is a step in
The right direction but requires the adoption of the necessary measures for its implementation.

The continued suspicion of the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East threatens to bring on a regional arms race, with all that that entails, including the negative message that it sends to the Parties to the Treaty — namely that their accession to the Treaty has not helped to establish their peace and security against the nuclear threat — and it would therefore rouse suspicion about the nuclear capabilities of Israel. That is how we in the region feel.

We therefore call upon the Security Council to shoulder its obligations and to declare the Middle East region a nuclear-weapon-free zone in accordance with the provisions of the Charter and within the context of the statements made at the summit meeting of the Security Council held in 1992 and its resolutions in that regard.

We will also work, in the committee on arms limitation in the Middle East, to intensify efforts and take tangible steps in that area, which is of primary interest for the security of the region and the world as a whole.

The option of the indefinite extension of the Treaty before the realization of its universality ignores the important fact that it represents a request to States, in particular those in the Middle East region, to fulfil indefinite obligations in respect of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, without similar obligations being placed on Israel. That perpetuates a structural imbalance in rights and duties and endangers national, regional and international peace.

From our understanding of the history of the region it is clear that the indefinite extension of the Treaty does not accord with our view of how a new Middle East, free from tension and weapons of mass destruction, could be established, nor does it accord with our view of a proper relationship between peoples and States of the region. Therefore Egypt cannot support the indefinite extension of the Treaty in those circumstances and has opted for a definite extension of the Treaty. For the Treaty to be indefinite, it should be universal and without discrimination between the Parties.

Mrs. Kurokochi (Japan): Before presenting the views of Japan on the decisions that have just been taken, I should like, on behalf of my delegation, to express my sincere appreciation for the skilful and efficient manner in which you, Sir, have been guiding this 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The accomplishments of this Conference, particularly the three important decisions that have been taken, should be a source of great encouragement to all of us gathered here. I thank you, Mr. President, for your leadership in the realization of our shared objectives.

As was reiterated by Mr. Yohei Kono, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, in the statement which he delivered at the outset of this Conference, Japan has consistently stressed the importance of promoting steady and realistic disarmament measures with the goal of ultimately eliminating nuclear weapons. Moreover, he emphasized that the basic framework of nuclear non-proliferation must be consolidated and that, towards that end, the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should be decided according to the general will of the States Parties.

Japan thus heartily welcomes the decision taken without a vote to extend the NPT indefinitely. This will enhance the stability and credibility of the Treaty and, in so doing, make a genuine contribution to the peace and prosperity of the world.

My delegation is also gratified by the concurrent decisions on strengthening the review process for the Treaty and on the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, as a means of
ensuring nuclear non-proliferation, promoting nuclear disarmament, and promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The Japanese delegation heartily welcomes these decisions. It considers that the following positions of the Government of Japan are reflected in the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

First, all States not party to the NPT should seriously consider the decision of the States Parties to extend the Treaty indefinitely, and should themselves accede to it at the earliest date.

Second, all nuclear-weapon States should make serious efforts to reduce their arsenals with the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. Japan attaches great importance to the nuclear disarmament section of the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, which includes a call for the systematic and determined efforts of the nuclear-weapon States to reduce nuclear weapons with the ultimate aim of eliminating them.

Third, no States should conduct nuclear testing, as such tests would undermine the significance of the decision to extend the NPT indefinitely.

The NPT has been extended indefinitely. The principles and objectives, which provide guidance for the implementation of the Treaty, have been formulated. The mechanism to enhance and strengthen the review process has been established. Japan sincerely hopes that in the years ahead this very significant achievement will serve as a foundation for ongoing efforts and steady progress toward the realization of our ultimate objectives.

Mr. Westdal (Canada): What have we done? What does it mean? What difference will it make? Why did it happen? What now? It is my honour briefly to answer for Canada.

Mr. President, under your leadership, we have exceeded expectations (most of our own included), confounded sceptics and — listen up — given a world aching for it some very good news.

We together, all 175 States Parties of us, have achieved a goal Canada has long sought: permanence with accountability, without division, without a vote, as one.

With our extension decision, we have given our Treaty’s norms and obligations a powerful, new dimension: permanence. Make no mistake. We have thus enshrined new values, a perceptible step forward. The world is a safer place today. And we are a finer bunch.

With our decision on reviews, we have made ourselves — all of us, not alone the weapon States — more deeply accountable for the custody of our Treaty’s values and the fulfilment of its obligations. We will have to keep all these promises we have made. We will visit the dentist four years out of every five. We will focus more sharply on the hard, specific issues of Treaty fulfilment and practical implementation.

With our decision on principles, we made a template. We will have much new. We now have a programme of action toward the eventual complete elimination of nuclear weapons. We are to pursue it systematically, progressively. We will have a complete test ban by next year. We will soon be hard at work to cut off fissile material production for weapons. And we will have stronger safeguards — eventually for all States Parties, treated equally. We will have new hope for legally binding security assurances, more transparency in export controls, wider peaceful uses, and, if our best efforts are good enough, human and financial resources for the IAEA to do its growing, vital work.

With all this, we have made non-States Parties very lonely. And we have made the weapon States and the world begin to think hard anew about the future of nuclear weapons, to think hard about how to get rid of them. Permanent
values - not temporary, uncertain provisions - have today joined the forces of nuclear disarmament. Now, the real, enduring pressure begins.

All this good happened today, at last, because we built trust, the only foundation for security. And because our diverse paths converged, in time, because we found common ground and made common goods. And won big for all the people of the world.

We are for ever in your debt, Mr. President. We got you within reach; you grasped the prize for us all. Thank you. Your work here will grace fair records of our age. And, on this day of harvest, we thank many others: the Bureau and the Secretariat, who helped all this happen, day and night; the non-governmental organizations, who tried to keep us honest, and may now be as surprised as they are deeply rewarded by their success. We thank those distinguished practitioners of our field - they know who they are - who have long kept the faith and deepened ours. And we thank the co-sponsors of the permanence we all came to value. They stuck together and built momentum. And their ranks include many who came when the coming was not easy.

I thank those States Parties who later joined Canada and our co-sponsors, linking their cause to ours, adding flesh to the bare bones we drafted, giving life to the agreement we all together achieved. I single out South Africa, whose principles, skill and dedication made all the difference, made all this possible. I will not cite others but I pay tribute to the courage of many. Some who joined in our unity had real, fair reservations. Some face regional problems not yet solved. Some have found our process and our products awkward. But all have been welcomed. All are essential partners in our achievement. Those who made our unity possible in the final, decisive stage have bridged the larger gaps. They have made the longer leaps of faith. We thank them all and must redeem their pledge.

What now, beyond some sleep, and home, and families? Now, the completion of our review, to which we return this afternoon. Now, the vigilance and hard work of implementation. Now the work with fresh hope to build the global values we know we need to reach our goal: compassion, restraint, the honour of compromise in the peaceful resolution of disputes. Now, life with new values and more, just pride.

Let it be said of us all, Mr. President, and of you first. In New York this long month now passed, we seized our chance. We shared here a great, common victory for the better angels of our nature. We should let it set them free.

The meeting rose at 1:50 p.m.
VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 18th MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Thursday, 11 May 1995, at 3.30 p.m.

President: Mr. DHANAPALA (Sri Lanka)

The meeting was called to order at 3.55 p.m.

Consideration of and action on proposals before the Conference (continued)

The President: I shall now call on those remaining representatives who wish to explain their positions.

Mr. Moubarak (Lebanon): Lebanon was among the first countries to sign the non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). We believed in the vital importance of this Treaty as a fundamental component of international peace and security as long as it would have been effectively universal.

Our Conference would have been a unique opportunity to enhance the NPT by investing the momentum created by the commitments of the States Parties to achieve its universality and to include concrete commitments by the nuclear States in the fields of security, safety and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

We believe that this Conference ended with minimal effects on the implementation of the objectives and provisions of the NPT. On this occasion, we would like to reaffirm that Lebanon fully supports the peace process in the Middle East aimed at a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the area and is committed to fulfill the terms of the Madrid peace conference based on Security Council resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973) and 425 (1978). The realization of peace in the Middle East remains our primary objective.

This Conference did not seriously address the Israeli nuclear programme. This programme remains outside the circle of the non-proliferation regime, and Israel’s refusal to adhere to the NPT and to submit its nuclear facilities to the full-scope safeguards regime constitutes a grave threat to regional and international security. It also undermines the Treaty’s credibility and universality.

Maintaining the Israeli fait accompli represents a grave imbalance that seriously threatens peace and stability in the region. The exclusion provision by which Israel is excused from adhering to the NPT is based on an unacceptable political consideration. We believe that document NPT/CONF/1995/L.8 does not suit the purpose, because Israel is not a party to the NPT and refuses to allow the appropriate international inspection of its nuclear facilities to take place.

My delegation cannot back this document as long as Israel does not accede to the non-proliferation Treaty and allow the appropriate international inspection of its nuclear facilities. We shall not accept the consecration of Israeli domination in our region by allowing it to maintain its nuclear arsenal.

Moreover, we do not accept the use of double standards in the treatment of Israel. Our insistence that Israel join the NPT and the efforts to create a nuclear-free-zone in the Middle East stems primarily from our concern over the future of the region. In addition, we do not have any guarantee of the safety of Israeli nuclear installations.
For all these reasons, Lebanon proclaims its reservation regarding the decision on the extension of the NPT as long as Israel does not accede to the NPT and does not allow the appropriate international inspection of its nuclear facilities. The extension sends the wrong signal to the nuclear States non-parties to the Treaty that they can extend the ambiguity surrounding their nuclear programmes indefinitely, regardless of the consequences.

Mr. Mwakawago (United Republic of Tanzania): My delegation joined with understandable reluctance the compromise in the just-adopted decision to extend the non-proliferation Treaty indefinitely. When we addressed this Conference during the general debate, my delegation stated, inter alia, that it was strongly of the view that to continue with the Treaty in its current form was to perpetuate the inequalities inherent in the Treaty and legitimize the existence of nuclear weapons in the hands of the few. We continue to stand by this position. The indefinite extension still does not fully meet our expectations if the past is to determine the future.

At the time of joining the NPT in 1991, Tanzania stated categorically that our accession to the Treaty did not change our long-standing position with regard to the major imbalances inherent in the Treaty. We took a long time to accede to the Treaty, not because we had any ambition of becoming a nuclear State, but because we were against the Treaty’s discriminatory nature and the failure of the nuclear-weapon States to live up to their obligations under the Treaty.

During the 25 years of the existence of the NPT, the world has witnessed the continued development of nuclear weapons, both qualitative and quantitative. This forum had the opportunity to evaluate the progress made and to address the gaps that exist between the obligations undertaken under the Treaty by the nuclear-weapon States in particular and the current realities. While the non-nuclear-weapon States have lived up to their side of the bargain, the nuclear-weapon States have not fully carried out their obligations.

This Conference has offered us a unique opportunity to review the implementation of the Treaty in its entirety. It is regrettable that more emphasis was placed on the extension aspect than on the review process. This has left the Treaty with its inherent imbalances intact, thus allowing the provisions of the Treaty to be implemented selectively and on an indefinite basis.

The indefinite extension of the Treaty has permanently shattered our genuine hopes and aspirations to see a qualitative regime committed to halting the nuclear build-up, eliminating the current stock and bringing about the eventual banning of their production. The role of the Non-Aligned Movement, in particular the like-minded and others, in highlighting at this Conference these many concerns, must be fully recognized. It is in this regard that my delegation associates itself with the group endeavours in stating our long-standing position with regard to the operation of the Treaty.

Nuclear disarmament is too important a matter to be the permanent prerogative of only a few, however powerful. Tanzania has always believed that multilateral bodies are the best forums in which to address arms control and disarmament issues.

We need not overemphasize the fact that the NPT in its broader perspective is the cornerstone of world efforts aimed at the eventual cessation of the arms race and the elimination of nuclear weapons. We sincerely hope and expect that all commitments which constitute the integral part of the Treaty will be fully respected and implemented. Let the nuclear-weapon States for once allay our fears by enhancing the credibility of the non-proliferation regime with a binding commitment to eliminate all their nuclear arsenals within an agreed time frame.

Finally, our commitment to the NPT is a firm one. We still have a vision for a stable, secure, safer world, free of all weapons of mass destruction.
Mr. Laing (Belize): Mr. President, reference has been correctly made today to your sense of humour. In that connection, I hazard a guess that you will appreciate and excuse the following brief deviation from my prepared remarks.

This delegation happily accepts the gracious explanation by the secretariat of the innocent reasons why the order of speakers was not adhered to this morning. If the reasons had not been entirely innocent, the implications for the cooperative nature of the international system would have given rise to grave concern, especially on an occasion such as this.

To return to my prepared remarks, this delegation has indicated its full support for indefinite extension of the Treaty. Not being a technologically or militarily advanced country, we must confess that much of this debate has been beyond our normal preoccupation. However, since the consequences of the explosion of any nuclear device, in peace or in war, are too awful to contemplate, Belize's decision in this matter has been made on the basis of faith, which, for us, is the safest and wisest fuel. We have therefore chosen to accept the formal assurances of the nuclear States, as incomplete as they have been. More importantly, we have decided for the foreseeable future to continue to rely on those of our allies in possession of nuclear weapons which have assured us of their absolute fealty in terms of the confidence we have all reposed in them.

It has been said that the extension of the Treaty is unconditional. That is so, but in some senses only rhetorically. Since circumstances have vouchsafed to the possessors of nuclear arms what amounts to a solid legal trusteeship of global security, we, the grantors and beneficiaries of that trust, have the right to revoke the trust if the trustees fail to keep its terms. That would happen in the most unlikely event that any of the trustees would use nuclear weapons in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations or the imperatives of our very civilization.

Furthermore, this delegation believes that if an authorized organ of the international community makes a binding determination regarding the illegitimacy or illegality of these frightening weapons, it may have a significant impact on the continuing validity of this trust.

I now refer to the decision in document NPT/CONF.1995/L.5 and state that failure on the part of any of the trustees to meet the separate commitments in that decision to nuclear sanity which they, and all of us, are solemnly making might also disengage this trust.

We are certain that the trust will be kept.

The trust concept underscores the inextricable interconnectedness of the phenomena of international life. Thus, this delegation perceives the existence of close connections between nuclear security and global financial security. In other words, we believe that those States that are vested with this crucial trusteeship have now also assumed a significant share of the mantle of global financial responsibility.

Another question arises. The institution of permanent membership of the Security Council was devised in an era when there was a wartime fear of "the crushing burden of armaments", to use the expression of the 1941 Atlantic Charter. At that time, there were no nuclear armaments.

If, with the indefinite extension of this Treaty, the nuclear Powers have become the indefinite and ultimate trustees of global security, has the collateral notion of permanent membership, under the Charter of the United Nations, lost much of its rationale? Or, does the composition of the permanent membership of the Council require radical restructuring?

Finally, the nature of many of the concepts of which I have spoken, including the changes occurring in the international system, is such as to suggest that, logically, universality is a sine qua non for global security
and nuclear sanity. My delegation therefore suggests that all non-parties might consider acceding to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The President: I am grateful to the representative of Belize for his magnanimous understanding of our organizational problems.

Mr. Wisnumurti (Indonesia): The Conference has adopted without vote, three decisions of far-reaching significance, namely, the decision on strengthening the review process for the Treaty, the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and the decision on extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. These three decisions are of equal importance and constitute a package.

We continue to believe that the 25-year rolling periods along with the 5-year strengthened review process constitute the most appropriate and viable option for extending the Treaty. Such an extension, in our view, will ensure the full implementation of all the provisions of the NPT, including article VI, while maintaining its durability, continuity, stability and effectiveness. At the same time, we take note of the fact that the majority of States parties to the NPT have sought and obtained an indefinite extension of the Treaty. The positive impact of the decision to extend the Treaty indefinitely depends, however, on the full implementation of the decision on strengthening the review process for the Treaty and the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

The delegation of Indonesia wishes to stress the importance of the commitments contained in the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Of transcendental importance in this regard is the pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the objective of eliminating those deadly weapons of mass destruction. Equally, the nuclear-weapon States have agreed to complete negotiations on a comprehensive test ban no later than 1996 and, pending its entry into force, the nuclear-weapon States should exercise utmost restraint. We would also like to emphasize the decision by the Conference in furthering the steps that should be taken in order to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In this context, the conclusion of a legally-binding international instrument, an option recognized by the Conference, should be pursued in all earnest.

Furthermore, the decision also foresees the possibility of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones by the time the next Review Conference is convened, in the year 2000. As regards access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, we have noted the reaffirmation of the inalienable right of all of the Parties to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis, and in this connection my delegation welcomes the provision for transparency dialogue and cooperation in nuclear-related export controls as well as the prohibition of attacks or threat of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted exclusively to civilian purposes.

At the same time, my delegation has not been oblivious to the shortcomings in the decisions that the Conference has chosen to adopt. From the outset, Indonesia's participation has been imbued and motivated by a genuine desire to strengthen and enhance the effectiveness of the NPT primarily through the full and expeditious implementation of its purposes and objectives. It was therefore justifiable for my delegation to expect that all States Parties would not only reaffirm their commitment but also comply fully with their obligations as stipulated in the Treaty. Despite the vastly improved international political climate since the last Review Conference of 1990, a climate that has become more conducive to the attainment of those objectives, we are dismayed at the policies and positions of some nuclear-weapon States with regard to the fulfilment of their obligations. It would seem that the maintenance of their unilateral and strategic postures as well as their status as nuclear-weapon States took precedence over the fulfilment of those obligations.
Issues long identified as critical components of the non-proliferation regime have been marginalized in the decisions that have been adopted. These are conspicuous by the lack of specific commitments concerning, in particular, the qualitative aspects of nuclear armaments, nuclear disarmament under multilateral auspices and within a time-bound framework, and the right of non-nuclear States Parties to the NPT to credible, unconditional and legally-binding security assurances. As many Member States would agree, the qualitative aspect is, together with its quantitative aspects, a matter of central and urgent concern. For Indonesia, any non-proliferation regime to be effective and credible, nuclear disarmament must have a clear perspective. Unilateral security assurances lack credibility as they have not been multilaterally negotiated and are internationally unverifiable. Hence the call for more far-reaching action in the form of an international convention.

Export controls and other unilaterally-enforced restrictive measures, other than IAEO safeguards, may hamper the promotion of international cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Furthermore, such extra-NPT mechanisms erode the right of access of developing States to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, which they require in order to meet their critical development needs. Those serious shortcomings have not been objectively reviewed, as is reflected in the document on principles and objectives, which we consider to be ambiguous and falls short of our legitimate expectations. Finally, the decision on extension, which prolongs the Treaty indefinitely, will remove the sense of urgency from the obligations under article VI of the Treaty and will have the effect of perpetuating and legitimizing the possession of nuclear weapons. Such an adverse effect could be minimized only by the full and effective implementation of the decisions on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and on the strengthening of the review process under the Treaty. In this regard, my delegation wishes to emphasize the fact that the Conference agreed that review conferences should look forward as well as back. They should assess the implementation of the undertakings of the States Parties under the Treaty during the period under review and identify the areas in which, and the means through which, further progress should be sought in the future. Review conferences should also consider what specifically could be done to strengthen the implementation of the Treaty and to achieve its universality.

Indonesia remains committed to the realization of the purposes and objectives of the NPT, and will continue to strive for the full and faithful implementation of all its provisions. Only history will judge the merits of the decisions taken by this Conference.

Mr. Al-Zahawi (Iraq): Allow me first, Mr. President, to commend your earnest attempts to lead this Conference to a satisfactory conclusion: no easy task, in view of the unprecedented pressure tactics used by some delegations, which we have all witnessed during the past four weeks. We do not believe that the procedure adopted to arrive at the decision on the extension of the Treaty conforms to the letter and spirit of article X.2 of the Treaty.

In the past two decades, the western group of countries, especially the United States of America, has complained about the manner in which the non-aligned countries have managed to get their resolutions adopted in the United Nations: they called it the mechanical majority. What we had this morning was not only a mechanical majority, but a demonstration of the tyranny of the majority par excellence. The decision was taken without even resorting to proper voting procedures.

It is also worth noting that the so-called mechanical majority resolutions sponsored by the non-aligned countries in the United Nations were primarily concerned with the observance of the principles of the Charter and of international law on such problems as Palestine, the rights of the Palestinian people, apartheid in South Africa, Namibia and the invasions of Lebanon, Panama and so on. The United States and its collaborators dismissed those resolutions as "shrill, anti-western rhetoric".
Be that as it may, had the question of the extension of the NPT been put to the vote this morning, my delegation would have voted against the indefinite extension of the Treaty, because such an extension procedure is unprecedented in the annals of international law. It does not serve the purposes of the Treaty, nor does it ensure its universality, its impartiality or its effectiveness in achieving nuclear disarmament.

Last but not least, the indefinite extension of the Treaty lays the ground for Israel's indefinite refusal to accede to the NPT and to subject its nuclear installations to the safeguards regime, and it enables Israel to continue to obstruct the establishment of a nuclear-free-zone in the Middle East.

The NPT has, in the past, failed to meet the aspirations, the legitimate concerns and grievances of a number of signatory, non-nuclear States. In the Middle East, only Israel, a non-signatory to the Treaty, has achieved a nuclear capability and it has done so illegally and clandestinely. It now publicly refuses to adhere to the Treaty despite the fact that it is the one member of the United Nations that has been called upon by the Security Council to subject its nuclear installations to the safeguards regime: I refer to Security Council resolution 487 (1981).

During this Conference, we have been subjected to the spectacle of one nuclear power – the United States – protecting the interests of Israel – a non-signatory – at the expense of the interests and security of other States in the region which are party to the NPT. The United States has prevented any specific reference to Israel in the decision contained in document NPT/CONF.1995/L.8 unless Djibouti, Oman and the United Arab Emirates are also mentioned. To equate those three States with Israel and its nuclear arsenal is, to say the least, utterly bizarre and risible.

We also see no reason why the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East should be tied to the so-called peace process. The establishment of such a zone, for which the United Nations has been calling in the past two decades, is now made contingent upon efforts in a process that Israel itself continually violates. Neither is it within the purview of this Conference to comment on a process on which it has no say whatsoever, to say nothing of the fact that it is a highly controversial matter.

I should like to end my remarks by quoting the considered opinion of an outstanding American investigative reporter. In the very last paragraph of his book "The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy", Seymour M. Hersch wrote in September 1992:

"The nuclear threshold States – and there are as many 40 other nations that could go nuclear in the next generation – are watching America's treatment of Israel with interest. If there is no significant effort in the coming years to resolve the nuclear issue in the Middle East, Washington will have seriously diminished its ability to limit the emergence of independent nuclear powers. The result will be a post-cold war peace populated by an ever growing number of nations anxiously arming themselves with nuclear weapons as they grimly take the measure of one another."

Mr. González Gálvez (Mexico): First, the Mexican delegation would like to put on record its appreciation of the efforts made by you, Mr. President, to arrive at an agreement incorporating the different currents of opinion of this Conference on the subject under consideration.

The Mexican delegation's satisfaction is even greater since the decisions that we have just taken incorporate elements of draft resolution NPT/CONF.1995/L.1/Rev.1 presented by Mexico.

That is why we welcome your appeal, Mr. President, not to insist on voting on the various proposals, including our own. We take this opportunity...
to reiterate our determination to continue working on this subject, as we have done since 1962 — when Mexico became a member of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva — with a view to achieving general and complete disarmament under effective international control. This, without a doubt, is one of the highest-priority issues on the international community’s agenda, together with the challenge of achieving world economic development on a just basis.

Ernesto Zedillo, President of Mexico, said on 26 June last year, during his electoral campaign, that the scant effect that the end of the cold war has had on the universal aspiration to general and complete disarmament is discouraging, and that today the world is experiencing tension because of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in areas where there were none before. Similarly, in his speech at this Conference on 18 April, my country’s Secretary of Foreign Relations indicated our support for extending the Treaty, which we view not as an end in itself but as a means of facilitating the adoption of effective measures for genuine nuclear disarmament as well as of maintaining or re-establishing, as the case may be, an acceptable balance of responsibilities and mutual obligations between the nuclear and the non-nuclear States.

In deciding to extend the Treaty’s validity indefinitely, we have not perpetuated the dichotomy between States with nuclear weapons and States without since this Conference has reaffirmed that in this context the Treaty’s ultimate objective is the total elimination of all nuclear weapons. For this reason, we wish to stress the importance of the commitment that the States Parties undertook this morning to redouble their efforts to reach that goal — the total elimination of nuclear weapons — through systematic and progressive reductions and of their formal agreement to conclude negotiations on a treaty for a complete ban in 1996, with no exceptions whatsoever, on nuclear tests. In this regard, Mexico respectfully but firmly urges all nuclear Powers to refrain, as of now, from conducting nuclear tests, with a view to bringing that agreement into force.

We note also that the idea of a programme of action in the field of nuclear disarmament has been accepted, an idea that Mexico has fought for in Geneva for many years. The abolition of nuclear weapons should from now on be one of the main raisons d’être of our meetings. The five-year review mechanism that we approved today, which Mexico proposed on 21 April on the basis of an idea from Canada, will provide an opportunity for the nuclear Powers to report to the international community on their compliance with the solemn commitments undertaken today.

For decades now, Mexico has been advocating nuclear disarmament. There is no doubt that this Conference has helped us make progress in that direction. None the less, the road to a world free of nuclear weapons will be a long one. That is why Mexico will continue to contribute actively and vigorously to the attainment of our common goal. We have led by example: Mexico unilaterally renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons and later, together with other countries, proposed the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Mexico has fought for over three decades to put an end to nuclear tests and this has included making proposals to amend the 1963 Treaty. We have worked through the so-called Group of Six and other international and regional bodies, while also submitting and negotiating a number of initiatives in conventional-arms control. Our actions are proof of our conviction.

In conclusion, I should like to reaffirm Mexico’s determination to continue to formulate proposals aimed at accelerating the nuclear-disarmament process with a view to abolishing these weapons of mass destruction as a matter of urgency.

Mr. Rahman (Bangladesh): Bangladesh welcomes the decision for an indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Several factors have contributed to firming up our own position in support.
Firstly — an obvious point — there is our constitutional commitment to strive for the renunciation of the use of force in international relations and for general and complete disarmament. We remain convinced that the NPT remains the most viable multilateral instrument towards this end.

Secondly, we firmly believe that maintaining the validity of the NPT not only best serves our own national security interests but is also essential for enhancing international peace and security.

Thirdly, from the outset we have held that continuance of the Treaty was never at stake, nor were its provisions or objectives under challenge. At issue was the question of compliance and effective implementation by all Parties. The Treaty was not an end in itself, but a means towards an end, as many States have underscored.

Fourthly, it was recognized that the Treaty was the negotiated product of finely tuned compromises, an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States. At the core of the issue of indefinite extension was the degree to which the accountability of all Parties could be measured, monitored, encouraged and strengthened to advance the goals of the NPT through specific objectives, time-frames and a defined programme of intensified negotiations and verifiable action. A reinforced review process was a sine qua non entailed in the Treaty. We believe that considerable progress has been made in underpinning this process, though some limitations are still palpable.

Fifthly, perhaps the most telling argument influencing our decision is that an indefinite extension of the Treaty also means an indefinite extension of the legal obligations contained therein. In short, it constitutes a permanent gage of accountability. Much has been made of the factor of leverage in promoting the accountability and compliance of all parties. This should not be lightly discounted: the fact remains that the Treaty can be diminished if even a very few countries feel that it has failed to live up to its purpose. The strength of the Treaty lies in its universality and in the common will to move forward together — or not at all.

Finally, uncertainty to even a minimal degree about the durability of the Treaty will inevitably weaken its credibility and harden the stance of those outside the Treaty to justify their non-accession. Our goal must remain that of urging and encouraging universal adherence.

My delegation is deeply appreciative of the concerted efforts made by you, Mr. President, and by a great variety of member States, individually and collectively, to reach an agreed outcome without a vote. Key to this process was the establishment of linkages between the principles of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, a strengthened review process and the issue of extension, all of which constituted an integral whole. It is this combined, concerted and continuous push on all fronts that can make this Treaty credible and durable. By its decision, Bangladesh has endorsed its faith in this process.

Mr. Aswai (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (interpretation from Arabic): The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya wishes to announce that it is completely and absolutely opposed to the extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for one or more periods, let alone an indefinite extension. The first reason is that the purpose and objectives of this Treaty have not been fulfilled even though the Treaty has been in existence for twenty-five years. In particular, the principle of universality has not been respected. Second, the nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty have not fulfilled their commitments. They operate according to double standards in so far as they help certain States to build up their nuclear arsenals but object to the construction of a small pharmaceutical plant elsewhere.

Third, Israel has not acceded to the Treaty. As everybody here is aware, Israel has a nuclear arsenal and delivery systems capable of hitting Arab capitals from the Atlantic Ocean to the Persian Gulf. Because of this situation, the establishment of a Middle East free of weapons of mass
destruction, the goal of all the countries of this region, with the exception of Israel, is being impeded, as are attempts to reach a comprehensive and just peace. In fact, some nuclear-weapon States have helped the Israelis to build up their nuclear arsenal. These States are exerting extraordinary pressure on many countries of the region, in an attempt to force them to accept a fait accompli and agree to peace under the threat of Israeli nuclear arms. We would like the whole world to know that this situation is not acceptable to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. We therefore reject any extension of the NPT as long as the situation I have just described continues, as long as Israel fails to accede to the Treaty and open its nuclear installations to the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency and as long as there is no practical plan to destroy this nuclear arsenal which threatens peace and security in the Middle East and throughout the world.

The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya opposes resolution NPT/CONF.1995/L.8 because it does not explicitly call upon Israel to accede to the Treaty. As we have said before, Israel is the only nuclear-weapon State in the Middle East. We also object to this resolution's reference to the ongoing peace process, which my country does not believe will lead to a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East owing to the intransigence of Israel, whose independent nuclear arsenal may be targeted directly at any Arab country. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya believes that a just, comprehensive and genuine peace in the region can be achieved only through the establishment of a democratic, non-racist and non-nuclear Palestinian State in which Palestinians and Jews live side by side in the framework of a solution mirroring that found in the Republic of South Africa.

The position of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya does not mean that we do not uphold the noble objectives of the NPT and I hope that this will be reflected in the records of this Conference.

Mr. Kittikhoun (Lao People's Democratic Republic) (interpretation from French): After much work and effort, the moment of truth has finally arrived. In our view, the adoption without a vote, and I emphasize, without a vote, of this package of three decisions - the first on the indefinite extension of the NPT, the second on strengthening the review process and the third and last on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, all equally valuable and significant - is a major historic event. The delegation of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, which has unswervingly tried to promote international understanding on this delicate issue can but applaud this event.

The three decisions we have just adopted, which are part of a package, deserve our full support because they provide a suitable platform which can further implementation by all States Parties to the NPT, and I mean, all States Parties without exception. In our view, given the Treaty's vital importance for the world, it should not be put to a vote. Wisdom and reason have prevailed and with the adoption of these three decisions without a vote, the international community is thus joining together to work towards a world free of nuclear weapons. The road is long and arduous, but, if we work together and are united and sincere, we believe we can reach the ultimate goal as set out in the Treaty.

Mr. Diaz Paniagua (Costa Rica) (interpretation from Spanish): I should like, in accordance with the instructions of my Government, to ask that my statement be faithfully incorporated in the final document that sets out the decisions that have been adopted.

Costa Rica is pleased to associate itself with the consensus relating to those decisions. However, its Government considers that, since the use or the threat of the use of nuclear weapons represents a violation of international law — and in particular of the jus cogens human rights norms — none of the provisions or recommendations in the decisions just adopted, nor the extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or continuing to be Parties to the Treaty should be interpreted as recognizing, directly or
indirectly, the legality of the use, the threat of the use, or the possession of weapons of this type.

These decisions and provisions do not imply in any way whatever a renunciation of our sovereign right to insist on the development of stricter rules to prohibit the use, the threat of the use, the possession and the development of nuclear weapons. Costa Rica's position on these principles is immutable.

Mr. Owade (Kenya): I wish to take this opportunity to congratulate you, Mr. President, on your tremendous and untiring efforts to enable this Conference to reach the very important decision we have made today. This occasion will no doubt mark a significant epoch in the history of mankind in pursuit of peace. That you, Sir, have been able to steer the Conference to reach a decision on such a delicate issue without resort to a vote is indeed a demonstration of your skills as a negotiator and your devotion to nuclear disarmament. We applaud you for this noble achievement.

Kenya is committed to the principles of nuclear disarmament as enshrined in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. As a State Party, we have fulfilled our obligations under the Treaty and have always been convinced that the NPT forms the very cornerstone of disarmament. We therefore took the position that the decision regarding extension should be taken by consensus. Accordingly, we are delighted that a decision has been made without a vote - thanks to your efforts, Mr. President.

My delegation did not sign any of the draft resolutions that were submitted to the Conference last Friday. We took this course in the hope that the Conference would be able to reach consensus, thereby avoiding the acrimonious end to this vital event that would have been inevitable had we resorted to a vote.

We are convinced that an indefinite extension, taken together with the other two decisions - those regarding the strengthening of the review process and the principles and objectives addressing, inter alia, such issues as universality, nuclear disarmament, security assurances and safeguards - is the best way forward. Had this Conference been approached from the perspective of a package along the lines taken today, Kenya would not have had any hesitation in cosponsoring the indefinite-extension draft resolution.

We want to take this opportunity to put on record our conviction that the NPT is a central Treaty for the cause of international peace and security. With its indefinite extension, we can now face the future with confidence and courage, reassured that the international community is committed to the cause of nuclear disarmament.

My delegation had hoped that it would be possible to reach consensus on a 25-year rolled-over Treaty. The majority of States Parties, however, joined the momentum for indefinite extension. We join that decision in the hope and belief that the international community - in particular, the nuclear-weapon States - will leave this Conference with a clear message: that indefinite extension is supposed to augment international confidence towards disarmament and total nuclear elimination. Any contrary interpretation cannot stand. This message must not be lost. The nuclear-weapon States must now take concrete steps towards fulfilment of the principles and objectives of disarmament and total nuclear non-proliferation.

We owe it to our children and to our children's children to leave this world a better place than we found it. We should bequeath to them a nuclear-free world. We therefore call upon all States to implement faithfully, without any reservations, the four resolutions that were adopted this morning so that we may realize a nuclear-free world at the earliest opportunity.

We also hope that the principle of universality will soon be achieved.
Finally, I wish to reassure the Conference that Kenya will work assiduously with the rest of the international community for the early realization of a nuclear-free world. Once again, we hope that indefinite extension of the Treaty will not lead to any complacency on the part of the nuclear-weapon States. We have heard many voices and many concerns. We cannot and must not let them down.

Mr. Arcilla (Philippines): The Philippine delegation congratulates you warmly, Mr. President, on your success, after long and difficult consultations, in forging the three documents that have been adopted relating to the question of extension — namely, draft decisions NPT/CONF.1995/L.4, NPT/CONF.1995/L.5 and NPT/CONF.1995/L.6. We are as conscious as many others of the fact that draft decision NPT/CONF.1995/L.4 and NPT/CONF.1995/L.5 were sugar-coating mechanisms to make draft decision NPT/CONF.1995/L.6 more palatable for adoption without a vote.

My delegation has from the start made very clear its position that an indefinite extension of the Treaty is the best option — but not at any price. In our view, the price that we have just paid for indefinite extension is a bit high. We therefore wish to take this opportunity to register our lament, in the manner of a poet who once wrote that of all the sad words the world can say, the saddest are "It could have been."

Yes, the Conference could have been more specific in stating how, when and under what implementation framework the undertakings in article VI are to be put into effect. The Conference could have been a little more forward-looking than merely stating that these undertakings should be fulfilled with determination and that the nuclear-weapon States reaffirmed their commitment to pursue the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. The Conference could have been a better forum for generating among us more trust in each other so that we could agree on more concrete steps to move the world closer to freedom from nuclear weapons.

Our greatest fear, contrary to the perception of others who spoke before me, is that, because of the less-than-universal acceptance of the decisions we have just taken, the end result will be our failure to encourage those who have not yet adhered to the Treaty to do so soon, if at all. That would, in effect, be a serious blow to the very purpose of the Treaty, which is non-proliferation.

None the less, I end this brief intervention by expressing the hope that, the next time we meet, the States Parties to the Treaty, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, can and will do better in realizing our common vision.

The meeting rose at 5.05 p.m.
The meeting was called to order at 9.05 p.m.

The meeting was suspended at 9.10 p.m. and resumed at 10.30 p.m.

Adoption of the report of the Drafting Committee and of the Final Document

The President: I now call on the Chairman of the Drafting Committee.

Mr. Strulak (Poland), Chairman of the Drafting Committee: I should like to introduce the report of the Drafting Committee, which the Committee has just adopted, as well as the draft Final Document of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: organization and work of the Conference, which the Drafting Committee also adopted. I present it to you for adoption by the Conference.

The President: Delegations will understand that in view of the lateness of the hour it was not feasible for the secretariat to produce the report in all languages. The report is therefore only available in English and the other languages will follow as soon as possible. May I take it that the Conference wishes to take note of the report of the Drafting Committee as introduced by the Chairman of that Committee? If I hear no objection it will be so decided.

It was so decided.

The President: I should like to express my gratitude to Ambassador Tadeusz Strulak, Chairman of the Drafting Committee for his strenuous efforts to conclude the work of that Committee.

I turn now to agenda item 20 "Consideration and adoption of Final Document(s)". The Conference has before it a draft Final Document, document NPT/CONF.1995/DC/L.1/Add.1 as amended, which was by unanimous decision of the Drafting Committee transmitted to the Conference. It is my understanding that...
there is general agreement on this document. If I hear no objection I shall take it that the Conference wishes to adopt the Final Document?

*It was so decided.*

**Conclusion of the Conference**

_The President:_ I now turn to the final business of the Conference, the concluding statements by delegations. The first speaker is the representative of Ukraine.

_Mr. Hryshchenko_ (Ukraine): Yesterday, by taking the decision to extend the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) indefinitely, we inscribed the names of our countries in the book of history.

This decision, taken without objection, underscores months and years of scrupulous routine work by thousands of statesmen, politicians, diplomats and experts and definitely can be considered as a triumph of common sense over transient, short-lived political considerations.

The Conference reconfirmed that today nuclear weapons are more a relic of the past than the ultimate symbol of national pride, as many believed only a few years ago.

The recent accession to the NPT of Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan and South Africa, which have voluntarily renounced nuclear weapons, significantly changed the dynamics of nuclear geopolitics and opened the way for new, far-reaching endeavours in the field of nuclear disarmament. But, by giving up nuclear weapons and joining the Treaty, Ukraine did not give its blessing to the eternal continuation of the existing right of official nuclear-weapon States to possess their nuclear arsenals. Moreover, we urge the nuclear-weapon States to follow our example and move towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons in the shortest possible time.

Dragging out the process of nuclear disarmament for whatever reason would constitute a serious breach of the now strengthened and reinvigorated Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

We also hope that the strengthening of the non-proliferation Treaty and the continuing process of nuclear disarmament will provide new incentives for the non-participating countries, which apparently have not yet abandoned nuclear ambitions, speedily to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States.

By taking practical steps, Ukraine has clearly demonstrated to the whole world the consistent character of its policy in the field of nuclear disarmament. We are proud that our contribution to the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime has been highly commended by the international community. We shall continue to fulfil — on an equal footing with the United States, Belarus, Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation — our common obligations under the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I) and, _inter alia_, continue the removal of all the nuclear warheads on our territory, inherited from the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to the Russian Federation for elimination under our control.

At the same time, we expect the United States, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom — our partners in the trilateral statement of 14 January 1994 and in the 5 December 1994 Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine’s Accession to the NPT — to comply fully with their relevant obligations and commitments under these documents.

Having eliminated the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world, Ukraine expects all the nuclear-weapon States that have not yet done so to join at the earliest possible time the multilateral negotiations on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons. We hope that this process will be
We are convinced that dedicated efforts aimed at balancing the rights and obligations of all the Parties to the NPT — both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States — must follow the decision on the indefinite extension of the Treaty, since only the harmony of the fundamental interests of the Parties to the Treaty could guarantee its long-term durability and effectiveness.

From this perspective we view the decision to indefinitely extend the Treaty as an expression of confidence by the non-nuclear-weapon States in the nuclear-weapon States, which the latter should justify in the near future.

In this context, the full implementation by nuclear-weapon States of the provisions of the principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, adopted without a vote by the Conference, will be of the utmost importance.

One important element in balancing the interests of the nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States would be the achievement in the shortest possible time of an agreement on an international legal instrument on security assurances. Providing such assurances would erase the feeling of mistrust between the Parties to the Treaty and provide a new impetus to the negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

In this regard, I should like to recall the words of President John F. Kennedy, who said in his inaugural speech:

"Let us never negotiate out of fear, but let us never fear to negotiate."

The delegation of Ukraine urges all the Parties to the non-proliferation Treaty to follow this wise advice, and, building on the success of our Conference, to move steadily towards the goal of global security and stability based on universal adherence to the non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament principles we all reconfirmed yesterday and today.

Mr. Quiros (Peru) (interpretation from Spanish): The Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Peru, Ambassador Ponce Vivanco, has asked me to read out the statement he had intended to deliver tonight, Mr. President. It is as follows:

"The unflagging diplomatic skills you have shown throughout the proceedings ending today have made it possible to extend indefinitely the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, despite valid differences of opinion on specific issues, an important result Peru has sought determinedly since 1993.

"However, Peru believes that if this outstanding effort to establish and strengthen international law is to have genuine significance, the international community must, above all, continue to instil a real commitment to the idea that treaties and arbitral awards are to be respected and that the legal order and peace and security of peoples will be secured only when the principle pacta sunt servanda is the sole inspiration for the international conduct of all States, given that each month brings new surprising kinds of conflict and different forms of violence and disorder at the present stage of history.

"We welcome the fact that the ultimate objective of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament has prevailed as a standard for relations between States. If we want to consolidate this reality once and for all, we now have to face up to our legal and moral obligation fully to implement the Treaty. This is an urgent and priority task and needs a firm commitment on the part of all States Parties to the Treaty,
above all the nuclear Powers, in accordance with the letter and the
spirit of the Treaty.

"With a renewed feeling of trust and solidarity we have adopted
two important documents on principles and objectives and a further
document on strengthening the review process for the Treaty. These will
be of fundamental importance in the new phase opened up by this
Conference. Peru is already looking forward expectantly to the Review
Conference due to be held in the year 2000 and to the preparatory
process scheduled to begin scarcely two years from now, in 1997. We
firmly hope that by then, there will be full compliance with the
agreements contained in the declaration of principles and objectives. We
will work actively to that end in Geneva, New York and in any other
competent forum.

"It is also essential that we ensure, without delay, that all
countries fully participate in the Treaty: the continued existence of
nuclear capacity which does not come under the safeguards system of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is a nagging threat. We are
convinced that the agreements reached at this Conference will help us to
reach this goal.

"I should now like to refer to the case of Latin America and the
Caribbean. As we all know, we have been able to create the first densely
populated nuclear-weapon-free zone on the planet, equipped with
necessary safeguards as set forth in a legally binding document signed
by the five nuclear Powers. The region also possesses the political will
to move forward towards the establishment of a zone free of all weapons
of mass destruction and linked, in so far as possible, with existing
nuclear-weapon-free zones in order to make the entire southern
hemisphere into such a zone.

"However, Latin America still faces the problem of conventional
weapons and the establishment of machinery to control and reduce
military expenditure in cases where it exceeds the legitimate needs of
national defence. For these reasons Peru considers that non-
proliferation in Latin America and the Caribbean should also be extended
without delay to include conventional weapons.

"Because of its destabilizing effects, the illegal arms traffic
must be halted and international machinery to ensure transparency in
international arms transfers must be strengthened. For that reason we
have firmly supported the extension of the United Nations Register of
Conventional Arms to include national stockpiles and local arms
production as well as universal participation. This will build trust,
which is the basis of friendship and dialogue among States."

Mr. Wisnumurti (Indonesia): I am profoundly honoured and privileged to
speak on behalf of the non-aligned countries at the concluding session of this
historic Conference. It was 25 years ago that the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons came into force. In the intervening time, its
effectiveness in stemming proliferation and its role in creating an
international norm in achieving that objective has been universally acclaimed.
Beyond doubt, the Treaty has codified the interests of a vast majority of
States, indicating an abiding commitment to its validity.

As the single most important piece of legislation to have come out of
disarmament negotiations, it has given legitimacy to the non-proliferation
regime. For the great majority of States it is the only instrument to stem
proliferation. For these reasons, the NPT has made a major contribution to
nuclear-arms limitation. However, the non-aligned countries are also acutely
aware of its shortcomings. It is undeniable that the Treaty has imposed
asymmetrical obligations. There has been a growing concern that intensified
efforts are needed to remove the very real danger of the proliferation of
these weapons, both vertical and horizontal. The question of unhindered access
to civilian uses of nuclear energy has also assumed increasing prominence.
It is against this backdrop that the non-aligned countries welcomed the convening of the Review and Extension Conference of the NPT. It afforded an unparalleled opportunity to engage in the assessment and appraisal of the workings and functioning of the Treaty.

For the past three weeks we have deliberated and vigorously addressed all aspects of the NPT, whose ramifications for the critical interests of all States Parties are all too self-evident. In that process we have also thoroughly examined our options and assiduously sought a common position on the manner of review, on effective measures to promote the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty and on its extension so that it advances rather than congeals the disarmament agenda.

The NPT has today reached an important stage in the onward march of our efforts to achieve the objectives contained therein. In these endeavours the non-aligned countries have made significant contributions to the work of the Conference which have led to the adoption without a vote of three important decisions. These three decisions — namely, decisions on the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, on strengthening the review process for the Treaty and on the extension of the Treaty — are of equal importance and constitute a package.

It is regrettable, however, that the Conference has failed to adopt a final declaration, one of the important expected results of the Conference. The divergence of views, especially in assessing and reviewing the implementation of the Treaty, are too substantial for the reaching of a common ground. It is our sincere hope that this unfortunate development will not constitute a preview of what will happen in the Preparatory Committee meetings and the Review Conferences which we all are agreed to strengthen.

It is, however, the fervent hope of the non-aligned countries that as a result of the decisions taken by this Conference the inequalities inherent in the Treaty concerning disarmament, peaceful uses of nuclear energy and other aspects will be forthrightly addressed.

Our priorities now include further reductions in nuclear weapons, arresting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, ensuring peaceful applications, detecting non-compliance wherever and whenever it occurs and thereby maintaining the regained momentum of support for the NPT generated by the Conference.

Assuring the orderly flow of badly needed technology for the developing countries without leading to weapons proliferation is an issue of great importance to the non-aligned countries. What is needed is a formula for cooperation involving greater willingness by the developed nations to meet the needs of developing countries for science and technology for peaceful purposes.

We cannot allow our determination to waver. Let us renew that determination in fulfilling the solemn commitments that we have undertaken. Let this Conference give new impetus to our combined efforts for a world without nuclear arms, for global peace and security, for greater and generalized prosperity. We all know that the stakes are high and much depends on the efficacy and outcome of our efforts and our will to accommodate and compromise in order to arrive at a common ground. It is the unanimous view of the non-aligned countries that we have achieved all this and, indeed, much more.

These attainments were greatly facilitated by your patience, Mr. President, and by your perseverance, by your indefatigable energy, your skilful handling of the complex issues, your gentle prodding of the delegates towards flexibility and compromise and, above all, your deep and abiding commitment to the cause of disarmament. The confidence which we all reposed in you has been fully borne out by the successful conclusion of what is admittedly a difficult and complex task. We are for ever indebted to you.
Let me also avail myself of this opportunity to convey our sincere thanks to the secretariat and to all those with responsibility for the Conference for their dedication and their contribution.

Mr. Earle (United States of America): This Assembly has just completed the most important multilateral arms control conference in history. Its successful outcome, I should like to say at the outset, is due in large part to you, Sir, President Dhanapala, your well-tested patience, your diplomatic adroitness, your personal leadership and your unstinting devotion to build and then mobilize a consensus decision-making process. On behalf of the United States delegation and for my own part, I heartily and sincerely congratulate you. I also congratulate the tireless and professional members of the Secretariat and the able members of the Sri Lankan delegation who have assisted you and contributed so very much to the positive outcome of the Conference.

The decisions undertaken by the Conference reflect the exhaustive efforts and the collective will of the international community. No single group of States and no single set of interests prevailed. Historians who review our efforts will note that our diplomatic compromises have been skillful, our language carefully chosen, and our decisions not without controversy.

Nevertheless, those historians will also note that States Parties made these historic decisions because fundamentally the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons serves the interests of its Parties, but more important, of all mankind. Moreover, they will note that the Treaty's contribution to international peace and security grew in importance after our decisions were made.

Our foresight to make the Treaty permanent is in effect a "gift" to future generations and it will long overshadow the differences or the reservations that may have arisen during our deliberations in these past four weeks.

When Vice-President Gore spoke from this podium to the Conference in April, he stated that the indefinite extension of the NPT without conditions would reduce the uncertainty that often leads States to develop weapons or to preserve their options to do so. With the decisions of the Conference, we have greatly reduced the potential for that climate of uncertainty. The Conference has definitively endorsed the authority of the NPT, and it has underlined the intention of the international community to strengthen, make universal, and extend the principles and objectives of non-proliferation. What lies ahead now is not only to reduce uncertainty regarding proliferation but to commit ourselves to the certainty of a safer and more secure world. Having adopted these principles, we must, with the good faith and pragmatic idealism that we have shown here this week, move towards the full implementation of the lofty objectives we have set for ourselves and our successors.

The United States Government is resolutely committed to do its part to support the non-proliferation regime and the terms and obligations of all the articles of the Treaty. In the short run this will mean redoubling our efforts to achieve a comprehensive test-ban treaty and a fissile-material cut-off agreement. But at the same time we will be exploring ways to move beyond the significant reductions to which we are committing ourselves in the START I and START II Treaties. We will not — we cannot — walk away from this process.

The 1995 Review and Extension Conference decided to extend the NPT indefinitely, to adopt a set of Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation, and to create an enhanced Review Process.

These decisions give us a framework for our future efforts and guiding principles by which we can judge our success. We are committed to them and it is particularly satisfying that the impetus for two of these decisions — the Principles and the enhanced Review — came from a recent adherent to the NPT, South Africa.
While the Conference was unable to complete a final document, the review process was comprehensive, thorough and frank. As past reviews have demonstrated, there are a few issues on which we cannot reach easy accord and on some of these we have been unable to reconcile the differences.

On the other hand, the review revealed large areas of agreement as well. We have agreed to give Conference endorsement to the International Atomic Energy Agency’s "93+2" plan for strengthened and cost-effective safeguards. We have also endorsed the value of increased cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including particularly the safe and efficient utilization of nuclear energy. And we have agreed to pursue the creation of more nuclear-weapon-free zones, universal adherence to the NPT, and the early attainment of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

Finally, let me stress that the outcome of the Conference is in fact a significant victory for all the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. On 1 March 1995, President Clinton noted that the United States believes that nothing is more important to international security than the achievement of the indefinite extension, without conditions, of this Treaty. In that view we associated ourselves with an overwhelming majority of the Parties to the Treaty. We understand that every sovereign nation at this Conference rendered an historic judgement; we are hopeful that all States Parties will now work towards the Treaty’s ultimate goal: a world without nuclear weapons.

Mr. Rodrigo (Sri Lanka): The past four weeks have been critical ones, and you, Mr. President, have succeeded in presenting us with a package held together, if not with the bright ribbons of consensus, then certainly with the cords of realism that signify collective accession to the undeniable fact that the NPT must continue in force indefinitely as the fundamental international basis for non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

The documents adopted yesterday without a vote provide the political, legal and institutional framework for what could be an enduring system of security that could serve us far into the future. Sri Lanka’s statement in the general debate, which expressed cautious optimism that a consensual approach to the extension of the Treaty was both essential and possible, has now been vindicated. We owe you, Mr. President, a major debt of gratitude for what you have helped us all to achieve. That achievement is all the more remarkable considering the number of participants involved in the process and the complexity of differing, often conflicting, concerns that participating delegations to the Conference wished to reconcile.

All delegations share in the conclusions reached yesterday as you, Mr. President, observed dramatically around high noon. The celebrated Western film "High Noon" concluded with the victors quitting town, leaving the vanquished prone — dead in the dust.

Today, however, we are concluding a major international conference and we are not watching the end of a Western movie. The delicate balances that have been achieved in the Conference documents which you, Mr. President, will transmit to Heads of State should be a triumph in which all of us can share. What is important is a sense of identification by all in the conclusions reached. All delegations have indeed contributed to those conclusions.

At least three resolutions or decisions representing varying perceptions on the past record of the NPT and its future were before us. They were all advocated with conviction. They illustrate the complexity of the concerns the Conference had to confront. What is remarkable is that the delegations concerned did not insist on pushing their prime positions to a vote, choosing instead to submit patiently to a collective examination of the multiplicity of issues involved. That that choice was made is itself significant. Compromises had to be made in the process, and the costs of such compromises in terms of individual national interests for many delegations are probably quite heavy. These must be respected. They are as much a part of the final outcome as those points that prevailed.
The precise nature of the conclusions and their impact will continue to be discussed. The decisions on the extension of the Treaty affirm the need for full compliance with all its provisions. Whatever the assessment of the Treaty's performance has been over the last quarter century, we are now at the point, in a sense, of a fresh beginning. The world today is different to that which prevailed in the 1960s, and the prospects for genuine international cooperation are universally acknowledged as being far more favourable. The attainment of the goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons should thus be rightly an objective that is less distant and less difficult today. Simply put, the clear message that emerged yesterday was a firm "yes" to the indefinite extension of the Treaty, and an equally clear "no" to the indefinite extension of nuclear weapons into our lives.

The decisions we have taken to strengthen the review process of the Treaty are aimed not at casting doubts on the Treaty or weakening its thrust, but, rather, at providing a standing institutional framework to ensure that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized.

Some concerns articulated in the last few weeks have not found expression in the documents to the satisfaction of all delegations. However, the strengthened review mechanism we adopted offers a satisfactory framework within which to consider all issues that lie in the future implementation of the Treaty.

We must, however, express regret that it was not possible, largely due to time constraints tonight, to reach agreement on the draft declaration. We need to benefit from this experience by learning that the strengthened review process agreed on will need to be fully utilized to build confidence among States Parties.

The principles and objectives enunciated in document NPT/CONF.1995/L.5 provide the basis to explore these and other issues seriously, in a genuine climate of cooperation. These include issues such as those concerning the Treaty's lack of universality, one of its major shortcomings. The resolution contained in document NPT/CONF.1995/L.8 is important in this regard.

We have together taken a historic decision extending the NPT for an indefinite period. That this was possible without resort to a decisive vote should not breed complacency. Much remains to be done to ensure the verifiable implementation of the Treaty, to prepare the way for an eventual nuclear-weapon-free world in which all States can concur. Our work together has, in this sense, only just begun.

Mr. Sannikau (Belarus): The most important Conference of this year is nearing completion. A very intensive period of multilateral, regional and bilateral negotiations and consultations in preparation for the Review and Extension Conference, and at the Conference itself has yielded the results which my country has hoped for and worked for. Yesterday, by adopting three decisions of vital importance for the non-proliferation Treaty, States Parties created a new disarmament and security environment, thus establishing a solid basis for further common efforts aimed at strengthening international peace and security.

By adopting yesterday the decision on indefinite extension of the non-proliferation Treaty, together with the decisions on strengthening of the review process and principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, the Conference has consolidated the legal basis for non-proliferation, established a viable mechanism for implementing the spirit and the letter of the Treaty, and outlined areas of concerted actions of all States Parties.

Belarus has on many occasions stated its views on priorities in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and we were satisfied to see them reflected in the decisions of the Conference, although we cannot conceal our frustration.
over the failure of the Conference to adopt the final declaration, despite all the efforts exerted.

The target date set by the Conference for the completion of the negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT) is a very important factor for the work of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. In our view, this Conference has created the necessary conditions for concluding a solid Treaty, truly comprehensive in its scope and internationally verifiable.

There have been specific examples of actual disarmament in the period between the last Review Conferences. Under different circumstances and in different ways, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and South Africa have chosen to renounce nuclear weapons and acceded to the non-proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States.

From the very beginning of its movement towards independence, Belarus clearly stated its position on nuclear weapons and led the way in nuclear disarmament on the territory of the former Soviet Union. Together with Kazakhstan and Ukraine, Belarus has contributed to the process of the elimination of nuclear weapons. Having become a Party to START I, Belarus is scrupulously observing its obligations under this formerly bilateral Treaty. Nuclear disarmament of a non-nuclear-weapon State has turned out to be a difficult process, which creates political and economic problems, demands substantial financial and human resources and is not necessarily appreciated by all. Nevertheless, Belarus is firmly committed to nuclear disarmament, supports all the efforts in this regard and will do everything possible and necessary for further steps in this direction.

In this connection, it was encouraging to learn about the resolve of President Clinton and President Yeltsin to see START II ratified this year. We hope not only that this goal is attainable, but that the long-awaited talks on START III are within the reach of the two States.

The Conference decision on principles and objectives mentioned, inter alia, the possibility of developing a legal international document on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States Parties. In our opinion, it might be a necessary measure, provided that it is regarded as an interim step towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

Belarus has suffered severely from nuclear consequences, and unfortunately understands only too well the lethal danger of nuclear weapons or nuclear accidents. That is why we have a strong policy as regards non-proliferation and are trying to consolidate our own non-nuclear-weapon status, to prevent any attempts to use Belarus as a transit territory for fissile-material smuggling. That is one of the reasons for our proposal to consult on the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Europe.

In conclusion, the Conference has created a new international security reality that has to be accepted and safeguarded. The Conference has also created a momentum that has to be preserved and further developed.

Mr. Fostervoll (Norway): We should not permit our failure to adopt a final document to overshadow the remarkable results that were achieved. Yesterday we ensured the permanency of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and agreed on a set of principles and objectives for non-proliferation and disarmament. A structure has been established for an improved and strengthened review process that will enable us to focus more sharply on the specific issues of Treaty obligations and implementation. These decisions are of historic significance. They provide us with better tools with which to shape a safer world. They have the full support of my Government. We owe this success, Mr. President, to your efforts, skill and dedication.

We adopted yesterday a programme of action for nuclear disarmament, the draft of which was contained in the document on principles and objectives. We agree with the measures it contains and the priorities it indicates for the years ahead. In 1997 we shall meet again to review the progress made. By then
a comprehensive treaty banning all nuclear tests should have entered into
force, and an agreement to halt the production of fissile material for weapons
purposes should be near its conclusion. We look forward to new efforts to
strengthen security assurances to non-nuclear States, if possible in the form
of a legally binding instrument.

We welcome the renewed commitment by all nuclear-weapon States to the
determined pursuit of systematic and progressive efforts towards nuclear
disarmament, as reflected in the decision on principles and objectives for
nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. In the course of the continued and
comprehensive disarmament process in the years ahead, it will be a major
challenge to ensure secure and environmentally safe handling of huge amounts
of weapons-grade plutonium, highly enriched uranium and other toxic
substances. We must also ensure internationally accepted standards for the
safe management and handling of radioactive waste from civilian as well as
military-related activities and installations. The management of disarmament
is a new challenge affecting us all.

Permit me to draw attention to the interrelationship between nuclear and
other weapons of mass destruction. As my country currently holds the
chairmanship of the Commission preparing for the implementation of the
chemical weapons Convention, I would like to express concern at the slow pace
of ratification, and would urge all States that have not yet done so to
conclude their ratification process as soon as possible so that the Convention
may enter into force at the earliest possible date.

In conclusion, I believe we should acknowledge that no single legal
instrument or political agreement is sufficient to halt nuclear-weapons
proliferation. The most important barrier to the proliferation of nuclear
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction is the establishment of an
international political order that makes such weapons irrelevant.
International cooperation to resolve regional and local conflicts is
indispensable in this regard. Confidence, stability and cooperation should
replace distrust, tension and uncertainty in relations between States.

Mr. Gorita (Romania): Allow me, on behalf of the Eastern European group
of States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
to express our satisfaction that this historic Conference is coming to an end
with positive results. The decision on the indefinite extension of the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the decision on principles and
objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and the decision on
strengthening the review process for the Treaty, constitute a valuable outcome
and a solid foundation for future achievements in the field of arms control
and disarmament, and an important contribution to international peace and
security.

To a very large extent, Mr. President, this outcome of the Conference is
due to your exceptional qualities: leadership, competence, diplomatic skill,
patience and painstaking effort in guiding our work. We are deeply grateful to
you.

We would also like to express our appreciation and thanks to all those
who contributed to the success of the Conference: the Bureau; the secretariat,
under the able guidance of the Secretary-General of the Conference,
Mr. Prvoslav Davinić; the non-governmental organizations that have been so
actively following and supporting our efforts; and many others.

The States Parties to the NPT members of the Eastern European group
strongly believe that the 175 participants in the Conference have every reason
to be satisfied with the success of our common efforts, confident as they are
in the further pursuit of endeavours aimed at nuclear non-proliferation and
disarmament.

Mr. Park (Republic of Korea): I would like to join other delegations in
expressing deep appreciation to you, Mr. President, for having guided this
historic Conference to a fruitful conclusion. We pay tribute to your excellent
leadership, which provided the kind of sensitive and professional touch that was required for reaching a solution to the complex issues and challenges of the Conference. I have no doubt that this sentiment is shared by all my colleagues in this forum.

My delegation welcomes the decision on the indefinite extension of the Treaty, adopted at this Conference yesterday without a vote. That historic moment was an unmistakable expression of mankind’s desire to build a more stable world through the permanence of the Treaty.

While applauding the historic decision on the issue of extension, my delegation considers it unfortunate that we were unable to adopt a final declaration. It is our sincere hope that the pending issues that we have been so arduously working on will be satisfactorily resolved as soon as possible.

The set of decisions which we collectively took yesterday should be considered an initial step towards ensuring a world free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. In this sense, we are convinced that the objectives of the Treaty can truly be attained when the nuclear-weapon States remain committed to nuclear disarmament through the full implementation of article VI.

Notwithstanding the significant cuts which have been made in the nuclear arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States during the past 25 years, we urge these States to make systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons with the ultimate goal of their total elimination. At the same time, my delegation sincerely hopes that the other two decisions of the Conference — on the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and on strengthening the review process for the Treaty — will properly address the legitimate concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States regarding fairness and equity.

In order to secure the universality of the Treaty, we once again call upon those countries which have not yet acceded to the Treaty to join at an early date. The international community should exert every effort to achieve this objective as a top priority.

My delegation is encouraged to see that there is a strong desire further to strengthen efforts aimed at the enhanced effectiveness and efficiency of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system. I am confident that the momentum gained at this meeting will lead to the early realization of the "93+2" programme.

I would like to stress that the future shape of the NPT will greatly depend on the degree to which we are able to promote international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. With regard to the export control system, it is expected that reinforced transparency will lead to greater opportunities for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

We believe that preferential treatment should be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty and that, accordingly, the transfer of nuclear technology should be ensured for those non-nuclear-weapon States which faithfully comply with the IAEA safeguards agreement.

My delegation notes with regret that one delegation has decided not to participate in the adoption of the document of the Conference. Taking this opportunity, my delegation would like to reiterate its hope that the DPRK, as a responsible State Party to the NPT, will contribute to the achievement of the objectives of the NPT by fully complying with the IAEA-DPRK Safeguards Agreement under the Treaty.

In conclusion, the Republic of Korea would like to reiterate its full commitment to the aspirations and vision of the international community to build a nuclear-free world through the faithful implementation of the Treaty, which we agreed yesterday to extend in perpetuity.
Mr. Sha Zhukang (China) (interpretation from Chinese): Having worked intensively for more than 20 days, we are nearing the end of the Conference. This has been a Conference with achievements. We unanimously adopted the decision to extend the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, a decision on the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, a decision on strengthening the review process for the Treaty, and a resolution on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

It is regrettable that we have not agreed on a final declaration, but our efforts to draft such a declaration were not futile. Through consultations, we have enhanced mutual understanding and identified our differences, which has set a course and provided a basis for future reviews.

This is a Conference of historic significance. Nuclear weapons first appeared 50 years ago, ushering humanity into the nuclear age. The entry into force of the NPT 25 years ago marked the beginning of efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. Today, as we approach the turn of the century, we have achieved the seamless extension of the Treaty and solemnly reaffirmed its three objectives: nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The extension of the Treaty should give new momentum to efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation, a comprehensive ban on and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The Conference owes its success to the concerted efforts and cooperation of all the States Parties to the Treaty. Although our positions and points of views differ on some matters, we share the common objective of strengthening the Treaty. The Conference also owes its positive outcome to the unflagging efforts of its President, Mr. Dhanapala, who, with his outstanding talent and rich diplomatic experience, has fulfilled with distinction the important mission with which history has entrusted him and has made a vital contribution to the agreements reached at the Conference. The Chinese delegation offers him its particular thanks. We also wish to thank the Chairmen of all the Committees and the other members of the Bureau for their important contributions to the Conference. We express our gratitude to the staff of the Secretariat, including the translators and interpreters, under the leadership of the Secretary-General of the Conference, Mr. Davinić, who have provided reliable support services to the Conference.

Humanity is approaching the twenty-first century. While reviewing the past and looking to the future, we find ourselves still faced with the lofty mission of achieving the objectives of the Treaty in all its aspects, with the final goal of a comprehensive ban on and complete destruction of nuclear weapons. China is ready to contribute, along with all the other States Parties, its unremitting efforts for this purpose.

Mr. Kisliak (Russian Federation) (interpretation from Russian): The historic Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is coming to an end. In the view of the Russian delegation, difficult but extremely important and necessary work has been done by all delegations to achieve agreement in one of the pivotal areas of our time. They have seen to it that joint efforts will be pursued to ensure stability, to preserve civilized rules of behaviour in a nuclear century, and to establish the necessary conditions for the process of nuclear disarmament and broad cooperation in the area of nuclear energy as a whole and for its development.

The decision has been taken that the NPT, which has withstood the test of time and has established what are now almost universally recognized norms of international law designed to contain the threat of the spread of nuclear weapons, will remain in force indefinitely. In this connection, I should like to draw attention to the joint statement by the President of Russia, Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, and President Clinton of the United States published in Moscow on 10 May. Both Presidents appealed to our Conference to make the Treaty permanent and reaffirmed their countries' commitments under article VI of the Treaty to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures.
relating to nuclear disarmament, which continues to remain their ultimate goal.

The Presidents also stated their intention to cooperate closely to achieve the wider goals of non-proliferation, including improving implementation of their commitments to cooperate with other Parties to the Treaty on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy while at the same time carrying out their commitments to eliminate the threat of proliferation. We shall steadfastly abide by these decisions.

We include the decision on the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and the decision on strengthening the review process of the Treaty on the list of major achievements. Unfortunately, however, we note that it did not prove possible, for the Conference to agree to a text of a Final Declaration on the implementation of the Treaty during the period since the fourth Review Conference.

However, in our view, an enormous amount of work has been done in terms of meshing approaches to and harmonizing assessments of nearly all the key provisions of the Treaty. Russia was prepared to go on working on the Declaration but we all ran out of time before we could conclude it. Even so, a good basis has been established for further cooperation between States Parties towards the full implementation of the Treaty.

On behalf of the Russian delegation, I should like to thank you, Mr. President, for your great professionalism and your energetic leadership of our work, which, to a great extent, were responsible for making it possible to unite all delegations and take these historic decisions on 11 May without a vote, despite the many and well-known nuances in all our positions regarding them.

On behalf of the Russian Federation, I should like to express our gratitude to the delegation of Canada for its contribution in putting forward the idea and the corresponding draft for the decision on an indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty, which, from the very outset, the Russian Federation supported.

We also express our gratitude to all the other sponsors of our joint draft. We are grateful too to the sponsors of other drafts – different from the one originally proposed by Russia – for their willingness to seek agreed decisions, for their flexibility and realism and for the consensus that united us all in this most important decision to extend the Treaty indefinitely.

We should like also to express our gratitude to the secretariat and to our Secretary-General, without whom it would have been impossible for this forum to work effectively.

Mr. Butler (Australia): Mr. President, Australia is deeply grateful to you. Your leadership in the President’s consultations and your management of the proceedings of this Conference have been outstanding. We also thank the Secretariat for its great work for the Conference.

History was made in this Hall yesterday with the decision to give the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons an indefinite life. That decision, and the accompanying decisions to strengthen the review process and adopt a set of Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, was to the credit of all States Parties. It was crucial to the maintenance of international peace and security and, through its strengthening of the implementation of the Treaty, to the continuing pursuit of a world free of nuclear weapons.

We also warmly welcome the adoption of the Depositaries’ resolution on universal membership of the Treaty, focusing on the Middle East. The goal of universal membership has been an underlying theme for successive NPT review conferences and one for which Australia and many other States Parties have worked long and hard. In 1995, only a handful of countries remain outside the
Treaty, and this attests to the enormous importance accorded to the NPT by the international community. Of the 185 States Members of the United Nations, 178 are Parties to the NPT; and of these, 175 States participated in this Review and Extension Conference. There has never been a Conference of States of this size.

Decisions taken by such an overwhelming majority of the world’s nations send the clearest possible message to those small number of States — only 12, and shrinking in number — that remain outside the Treaty, particularly those that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in regions of tension. Such States cannot afford to, and should not, ignore the call from this Conference to become part of the non-proliferation regime, to accede to the NPT and to place their facilities under IAEA safeguards.

Australia shared the disappointment of many States that more progress towards nuclear disarmament was not possible during the long years of the cold war, particularly during the first 25 years of the Treaty’s life. But this trend has been reversed in recent years. It needs to be promoted. The decisions taken on 11 May make this clear: it is of the greatest importance that all Parties to the NPT reaffirm their commitment for all time to prevent nuclear proliferation and to work on a programme of action for nuclear disarmament, with the eventual goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.

Australia has never accepted that an indefinitely extended NPT would in some way legitimize the status of the nuclear-weapon States for ever. That would be not only unacceptable but simply wrong. It does not reflect what article VI of the Treaty states. With the Treaty extended indefinitely, the obligation on all States, but particularly the nuclear-weapon States, to pursue nuclear disarmament has now become one from which there is no escape. Thus it is not only our hope but our expectation that the Principles and Objectives adopted by this Conference will consolidate progress to date, promote accelerated progress in disarmament negotiations currently under way, and result in additional early steps, in particular a permanent end to nuclear testing by 1996.

This Conference has also undertaken a substantial review of the Treaty’s operations. We regret that it did not prove possible for the full measure of that review on this occasion to be reflected in the Final Documents of this Conference. Australia has always taken the NPT review process very seriously and strongly endorses the decision by this Conference to strengthen that process in the future.

The Conference has produced highly worthwhile outcomes in both the Principles and Objectives document and in the work of the Main Committees, and these include support for ongoing work to strengthen the Treaty’s verification mechanism; the IAEA safeguards system; endorsement once and for all that all new supply of nuclear material to non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty must be on the basis of their having accepted full-scope IAEA safeguards; promotion of measures to ensure a secure environment for trade and cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; endorsement of the vital role of the Security Council in ensuring compliance with non-proliferation obligations; and endorsement of the value of regional non-proliferation arrangements such as the South Pacific Nuclear-Free-Zone in our own region.

The Conference also dealt with the concerns of States Parties about nuclear safety, waste management and the transport of nuclear material, the latter being of particular concern to small island States.

My delegation is proud to have participated in this event, a defining moment in contemporary history. As partners in this Treaty, we share a collective responsibility to strengthen its operations, to prevent proliferation, to strive for disarmament and for universal membership. By extending the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons indefinitely and by making key changes that were necessary, strengthening its review mechanism and defining our common objectives for the future — by doing these things, we have discharged our common obligations in the best way we were able
to do at this time. We have answered those who question whether, with indefinite extension, nothing would change. It has and it will.

Mr. Mayor (Switzerland) (interpretation from French): At the culmination of a Conference which included exceptional participation by States, a Conference which provoked enormous interest and great hopes but also scepticism in our countries and in public opinion, we can leave with a feeling that our mission is accomplished.

To be sure, not all the problems were resolved. It would have been desirable this evening for us to have adopted a final document on consideration of the Treaty summing up the results of our detailed discussions, our conclusions on the operation of the Treaty and our recommendations on its future. But we have achieved together, through consensus and without adverse confrontation that would have threatened the credibility of the Treaty, an objective that we share, namely, maintaining a strong non-proliferation regime whose duration is ensured. We have consolidated international norms and we have finally renewed, if not spelled out, commitments whose implementation cannot be postponed indefinitely.

My delegation particularly welcomed the initiatives undertaken by South Africa and Mexico. Numerous elements of these initiatives correspond to the views of Switzerland which, from the outset, hoped that the decision for extension would be accompanied by brief and precise texts which recall and strengthen the principles, mechanisms and fundamental commitments of the parties to the Treaty.

The Declaration of Principles which, to a great extent, takes into account the concerns that my delegation voiced at the beginning of the Conference, opens up prospects and will serve to measure progress and to stimulate efforts to achieve all the goals of the Treaty. It is quite clear that the decision taken yesterday must not be the indefinite extension of the status quo, particularly as regards the prerogatives of the nuclear Powers.

Mr. President, if our Conference has been able to fulfil its objective, it is largely thanks to your commitment, your courage and your subtlety. Many other protagonists also deserve congratulations, but you clearly have pride of place.

May our efforts be crowned with success, not only today, but also tomorrow and beyond, when the need will arise for all parties to hold fast to the commitments they have renewed and to pass on to concrete action for rapid progress on the way leading to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

Sir Michael Weston (United Kingdom): Mr. President, on behalf of the Western Group, I should like to express our deep thanks and appreciation for the way in which you have conducted this Conference. You have made possible a remarkable achievement: agreement on extension of the Treaty with a renewed sense of purpose and commitment from all its Parties. The Treaty will continue in force indefinitely, thus permitting the full realization of all its aims: non-proliferation, disarmament and the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. I am certain that this achievement would not have been possible without your skilful leadership. Your determined sense of purpose and your patient efforts to identify those elements which unite us were an inspiration to us all. You had the courage to set yourself the highest possible goal and to keep to it. I am glad that we all had the courage to follow you. I am confident that no one could have done a better job and that history will give you credit.

While pleased that the Conference decided without a vote to extend the Treaty indefinitely, the Western Group regrets that time did not permit us to reach agreement on the review of the Treaty. For our part, we were ready to continue the search. We attach great importance to the review process. We contributed fully both to the debate and to the drafting exercise. We also attach importance to the agreement reached yesterday on strengthening the
review process for the Treaty. We fully support this and we will play our full part in the future, as we have in the past and on this occasion.

I should also like to express my Group's deep thanks and appreciation for the work of the team from the secretariat which has assisted the President throughout this Conference. Its members too have demonstrated enormous dedication and a great capacity for hard work and, even more remarkably, they have done so with great good humour. I should specifically like to mention Secretary-General Davinić, Ms. Hoppe, Mr. Fraser, Ms. Ikegaya and Ms. Ng. But I know that there were many others whose roles were equally important in ensuring the efficiency and effectiveness of the team.

Finally, and again on behalf of the Western Group, I should like to emphasize that we believe that the decision to extend the Treaty without a vote owes much to the spirit of cooperation among the various regional groups. It is this which has brought success to our efforts. Mr. President, hard-working members of the secretariat and distinguished colleagues, thank you.

Mr. Elaraby (Egypt) (interpretation from Arabic): The Conference has concluded its work on the review and extension of the non-proliferation Treaty. My delegation had hoped — indeed expected — that on this occasion the Conference would succeed in adopting a final declaration and would agree on a consolidated, uniform draft of the reports of the Committees so as to reflect the importance of this session. The final outcome was however very disappointing. The Conference failed to adopt a final declaration but did adopt the reports of the three main Committees. Despite the fact that this is not the first time that the Conference has failed to issue a final declaration, and although the Conference decided yesterday to strengthen the review mechanism, we had high hopes that we would begin its implementation today by adopting the final declaration of the Conference.

It seems that some people mistakenly believe that, because the Conference took a decision on the extension of the Treaty, it had achieved its objective. I hope that that mistaken notion does not apply to the success of the Conference in achieving its objectives regarding future efforts on disarmament in general.

In its opening statement at the beginning of the Conference, in an attempt to send out the right signals, Egypt called for a link between the review process on the one hand and the extension of the Treaty on the other. If the NPT is to continue to fulfil its role, the nuclear-weapon States, no less than the non-nuclear-weapon States, will be obliged to comply with the Treaty. The result of the Conference, and the fact that we have not agreed to such a review, raises serious concerns as to whether the nuclear-weapon States will fulfil their commitments, especially after the indefinite extension of the Treaty. This result emphasizes our stance, which is to oppose the indefinite extension of the Treaty, as we said in our statement to the Conference yesterday.

I should like to point out that this failure could have a negative impact regionally, which would strengthen the arms race in areas of tension. That would in turn lead to the escalation of regional problems. The Conference was interested in the regional aspect and yesterday called for all the countries of the Middle East to accede to the Treaty, for Israel's nuclear installations to be subjected to international supervision and for the Middle East to be a nuclear-weapon-free zone, a zone free of weapons of mass destruction.

Now that the Treaty has been extended and though the work of the Conference on the review process has been impeded, we hope that all Parties to the Treaty will consolidate their efforts to implement what we agreed on yesterday as soon as possible.

On behalf of Egypt, I call on all Parties to look to the future, to work together to strengthen the Treaty and to achieve universality so as to provide credibility and to save humanity from the scourge of nuclear weapons.
In conclusion, Mr. President, my delegation would like to extend to you our profound thanks for all your efforts to achieve consensus. You conducted the work of this Conference in admirable style. I should like also to thank the Secretary of the Conference and the members of the Secretariat for their remarkable efforts throughout the Conference.

Mr. Errera (France) (interpretation from French): Yesterday I had the opportunity, on behalf of the European Union and associated countries, to speak of our satisfaction at the major decision taken by the Conference and of the debt of gratitude that we owe you, Mr. President.

As the Conference draws to a close, allow me, again, speaking on behalf of the European Union and associated States, to express the thoughts that the culmination of our work has inspired. We regret that it did not prove possible to adopt a final declaration containing a shared assessment of our consideration of the Treaty. We regret it all the more as three of the Committees were chaired by members of the European Union or associated States, who spared no effort to achieve that end. This Conference was also a Review Conference and that role was carried out in a spirit of professionalism. It allowed for a general debate on all aspects of the Treaty.

In the course of our work, differences were highlighted, but they were also clarified and sometimes they were reduced. We were thus able to recognize that on many major points we have shared interests, our approaches are closely related to one another, and sometimes they converge. Those points of convergence allowed us to adopt a decision on the principles and objectives for non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. Those same points of convergence very quickly made possible an agreement on the need to strengthen the review process in the future.

It is true that we lacked the time to finalize all the documents relating to the review, but we should not draw negative conclusions. Perhaps we did not succeed in reaching full agreement on the assessment of the past, but we achieved basic agreement on the prospects for the future. We are united, individually and collectively, in implementing the Treaty in all of its aspects, including non-proliferation, the peaceful uses of atomic energy, and disarmament.

We wanted to provide ourselves with a means to achieve this, with clearly stated principles and objectives and a renewed and strengthened review process. If our decisions yesterday demonstrated that there was basic agreement on giving the Treaty the permanence it lacked, they also attested to our common will, equally strong, to continue to assure its implementation in a new world.

Every one of us here must be convinced of the determination of the European Union and the associated States to preserve the vitality of this shared asset, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The announcement this evening of Chile’s accession, which the European Union and associated States welcome, is yet another proof of this. That accession bears witness to the pursuit of progress towards the universality that each of us here so desires.

The President: This brings us to the end of the concluding statements, and also to the end of the work of the Conference.

Statement by the President

The President: The States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons have had a truly unique encounter with history. We have emerged from that tryst with our Treaty not merely extended indefinitely but greatly strengthened by the solidarity of its adherents participating in this Conference in their total commitment to the objectives of the Treaty, to the need for its universality and with a collective determination to achieve the goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. A historic Conference has therefore ended with a historic agreement.
We have concluded the work of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the NPT with some momentous decisions. That it was possible to arrive at these decisions without a vote is indeed a vote of confidence in the political and security regime underpinned by our Treaty, which is the only global security compact with near-universal membership. I do not wish to impose my interpretation in regard to the nature or the content of the agreement reached. It is nevertheless my duty as the President of the Conference to highlight the significance of our collective achievement and the need for all States Parties to consolidate and implement these important decisions.

It is also important for us all to remember always that there were no winners or losers in this Conference: it was the Treaty that won. No one delegation and no one group brought us within reach of that success. All delegations and all groups contributed to the success we all achieved for the Treaty and for ourselves. There is therefore no reason for smug complacency about the past performance of States Parties to the Treaty. There is still less room for any relaxation of our pursuit of the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the achievement of the complete elimination of those weapons through their prohibition and the promotion of cooperation in the field of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. It is less important to debate what is legally binding and what is politically binding. What is more important is that through delicate and painstaking negotiations the States Parties were able to craft a balanced and forward-looking agreement that they are committed to implementing in a systematic and progressive manner.

They will also periodically review and evaluate the implementation of the package of principles and objectives, together with the provisions of the Treaty. This review and evaluation process will be ongoing, regular and action-oriented. The institutional infrastructure required to operationalize this process has also been put in place. All these elements of the agreed package represent a framework to further the objectives of the Treaty regime, the endurance of which is essential for the future security order of the world.

The strengthened review process that we have established will now ensure a sharper focus on review conferences of the future and their preparatory committees. These forums of rigorous accountability will play a more crucial role in the operation of the Treaty than ever before. As States Parties to the Treaty, we have to ensure that we make maximum use of this mechanism of accountability in the fulfilment of the undertakings in the Treaty.

Our Treaty has been rendered permanent by our actions at this Conference. The permanence of the Treaty does not represent a permanence of unbalanced obligations, nor does it represent the permanence of nuclear apartheid between nuclear haves and have-nots. What it does represent is our collective dedication to the permanence of an international legal barrier against nuclear proliferation so that we can forge ahead in our tasks towards a nuclear-weapon-free world.

I want to highlight the unmistakable message emanating from this Conference: non-proliferation and disarmament can be pursued only jointly, not at each other’s expense. Delegations voiced their strong support for the Treaty as a legal basis for achieving non-proliferation and disarmament. The final output of our Conference encapsulates those sentiments and provides a political, legal and institutional framework for translating them into reality in a verifiable, progressive and systematic manner. As President of the Conference, I urge all States Parties now to proceed with dispatch to implement this important package.

In my opening statement, in accepting the honour of presiding over this historic Conference, I said that we had a historic opportunity of making a statement against the possession and use of nuclear weapons for all States for all time. That statement has been made, and it will be heard in the world and remembered for years to come. The final realization of the objective of nuclear disarmament will prove the wisdom of our Conference decisions.
In emphasizing the importance of the results achieved, let me not minimize the concerns and differences that we have had to take cognizance of. That would not be fair to those delegations that have made genuine compromises; nor would it be in the interests of the Treaty. However, the very fact that the delegations were willing and able to address frankly their fundamental security concerns and negotiate viable compromises within the context of the Treaty is a reaffirmation that the Treaty has indeed become a truly broad-based security framework.

Despite the absence of a final declaration because of lack of time and lack of agreement on certain parts of the reports of the Main Committees, especially Main Committee I, the three Main Committees were able to develop general agreement on several crucial questions dealing with disarmament, non-proliferation, safeguards, negative security assurances and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. These will provide invaluable inputs in the implementation of the decisions of this Conference, in particular in the strengthened review process.

Multilateralism and the consensual approach have prevailed over parochial and divisive politics. The painstaking process of enlarging the area of agreement through consultation and compromise was ultimately more fruitful than proselytization with pieces of paper. One month of hard work and complex negotiations has brought about a political package that points to an incremental way forward in non-proliferation and disarmament. The objectives and principles on non-proliferation and disarmament, together with the strengthened review process, which are intricately bound up with the decision on the extension of the Treaty, represent a pathfinder for a nuclear-weapon-free world.

Over the past 25 years non-governmental organizations have performed valuable services for the non-proliferation Treaty — in encouragement, ideas, public support and advocacy of further progress towards the goals of the Treaty. I should like to pay them a sincere tribute for their dedication.

The expertise and resources of non-governmental organizations are being increasingly integrated into various facets of human endeavours within and among States, including in the context of the United Nations. Arrangements for communication between non-governmental organizations and NPT parties should therefore be improved. For that purpose, consideration might be given to the possibility of having a presentation of one to two days to delegates by non-governmental organizations, in written and oral format, which would encourage maximum exchange of ideas between non-governmental organizations and delegates during the Preparatory Committee meetings and at Review Conferences. The Centre for Disarmament Affairs could take on the organization of these improved contacts.

Let me, before concluding, thank the Chairmen of the Main Committees, the Vice-Presidents and the other officials for the support and advice they gave me in the management tasks of this Conference. I should also like to thank the Secretary-General and his diligent staff for the splendid job they have done under difficult conditions. Let me also thank the conference services staff and interpreters and all the other Secretariat staff whose services were invisible but indispensable. Above all, I should like sincerely to thank all delegations who have given me unreserved support and encouragement for my efforts at seeking agreement. All of you inspired me in my convictions about the need for a consensus approach to decision-making. I should like, therefore, to express my deepest gratitude to all delegations for the support, flexibility and cooperation extended to me at all times.

Closure of the Conference

The President: I declare the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons closed.

The meeting rose at 12.25 a.m. on Saturday, 13 May 1995.
MAIN COMMITTEE I

SUMMARY RECORDS OF THE 1ST TO 12TH MEETINGS

Held at Headquarters, New York, from 17 April to 12 May 1995

CHAIRMAN: Mr. AYEWAH (Nigeria)
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 1st MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 19 April 1995, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. AYEWAH (Nigeria)

The meeting was called to order at 10.45 a.m.

PROGRAMME OF WORK (agenda item 13)

1. The CHAIRMAN expressed the hope that the Committee, as a group of technocrats, diplomats and experts, would be able to work in a constructive, dispassionate, objective and flexible manner and leave the discussion of political issues to the plenary meetings. It would be the purpose of the Committee to give consistency to the import of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to seek to strengthen it in anticipation of the new life which all hoped would be conferred on it. If the Treaty failed to take account of the legitimate security aspirations of both the nuclear-weapon and the non-nuclear-weapon States, it would be a defective instrument in promoting the global non-proliferation norm.

2. The Committee would endeavour to review the implementation of the Treaty in all candour and objectivity, and it would then try to relate it to the expectations of States parties and make recommendations on action to be taken in order to strengthen the Treaty and its regime, as it entered a new phase of its life. The issues, which might be complex and at times contentious, would relate, inter alia, to the lateral transfer or acquisition of nuclear weapons, nuclear materials and related technology for weapons purposes; qualitative improvements of such weapons and their vectors; efforts at nuclear disarmament, including relevant negotiations leading thereto; security assurances; and cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Committee should approach its work in a spirit of cooperative endeavour since its members shared a common interest in the survival of the Treaty.

3. He drew attention to the items allocated to the Committee for review, as provided for in article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty, which were set out in annex V to the final report of the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.1995/1). He noted that both Main Committee I and Main Committee II would be dealing with article VII; some coordination between the two would therefore be required. Main Committee I was asked to concentrate on the aspects of the article related to non-proliferation, disarmament and international security.

4. He suggested that the work of the Committee should be divided into three phases: first, a general exchange of views and the introduction of any proposals by delegations; second, a more in-depth review, taking the various provisions of the Treaty assigned to the Committee one by one; and third, consideration of the report to the Drafting Committee, which was to be submitted by Friday, 5 May. He further suggested that, to make the best use of the time available, a working group might be established to examine the issue of security assurances, as well as the aforementioned aspects of article VII. A provisional programme of work had been circulated. Lastly, he pointed out that summary records would be provided only for the formal open meetings of the Main Committee.

5. Sir Michael WESTON (United Kingdom) said that his delegation had some reservations regarding the advisability of having meetings open to non-governmental organizations and the press. That would not necessarily be conducive to the full and frank exchange that was desirable and it might lead
to polemical discussions which would be better avoided, given the limited time available for the Committee's work. He wondered what practice would be adopted in that respect by the other Main Committees and would welcome any clarification from the President of the Conference or from the Chairman.

6. **Mr. KAREM** (Egypt) requested additional clarification regarding the way in which the consideration of matters pertaining to article VII would be divided between Main Committee I and Main Committee II. His delegation was particularly interested in that subject, especially the question of regional arrangements regarding nuclear-free zones.

7. **The CHAIRMAN** said that, at the current stage of the Committee's work, it would be difficult to define the precise division of work between the two Main Committees with regard to article VII. He would, however, clarify the issue as soon as possible.

8. In reply to the question raised by the representative of the United Kingdom, he said that the issue was being considered by the President of the Conference, who would shortly produce specific recommendations.

9. **Mr. EFFENDI** (Indonesia) expressed support for the programme of work as set out by the Chairman.

10. **The CHAIRMAN** said he took it that the Committee wished to adopt the programme of work.

11. It was so decided.

**GENERAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS**

12. **Mr. HOFFMANN** (Germany) said that, despite laudable efforts, the need for further nuclear disarmament was undeniable. His delegation would continue to urge further energetic steps in that direction, since it attached great importance to maintaining the credibility of the goal of complete nuclear disarmament. In that connection, he welcomed the recent declaration by four of the nuclear-weapon States that they were prepared to live up to their commitments under article VI of the Treaty and he hoped that declaration would be reflected in the final document of the Conference.

13. Now that the cessation of the arms race had been achieved, the next task was to reduce the levels of nuclear forces as quickly, safely, securely and transparently as possible. His delegation welcomed the declarations by the nuclear-weapon States regarding security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States. In that connection, the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 984 (1995) represented an important step forward.

14. His Government favoured the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty. Germany had long since renounced all kinds of weapons of mass destruction and had demonstrated that it had not resulted in any disadvantage in competing with others in the international arena.

15. The issue of the extension of the Treaty should not be used as a lever to press for nuclear disarmament. There was no acceptable alternative to cooperative threat reduction based on universal treaty regimes such as the non-proliferation Treaty. In the absence of customary international law banning the acquisition of nuclear weapons, the Treaty gave non-nuclear-weapon States the assurance that their neighbours could not pursue nuclear-weapons ambitions. It would be unwise to gamble with the Treaty by adding conditions regarding its extension. His delegation was ready to join ranks with the non-nuclear-weapon States represented at the Conference to insist, with pragmatic perseverance, on the implementation of all contractual obligations.

16. **Mr. STARR** (Australia) said that it was important to recognize that all States derived major benefits from, and had major interests at stake in, the continued success of the non-proliferation Treaty. It should be the aim of the Conference to make decisions which would allow the Treaty to operate more
effectively so that it could continue to meet its objectives in the face of future challenges. The key objectives most relevant to the work of the Committee should be to reconfirm, and establish irrevocably for the future, nuclear non-proliferation as the standard for international behaviour; to continue and accelerate the progress which was being made towards eventual nuclear disarmament; and to achieve universal membership of the Treaty.

17. With regard to articles I and II and the first three preambular paragraphs of the Treaty, he said it was imperative that all States parties should comply scrupulously with their basic obligations. His delegation would welcome a reaffirmation by the nuclear-weapon States that their nuclear cooperation was, and would be at all times, consistent with article I. With reference to article II, recent instances of non-compliance by certain non-nuclear-weapon States had clearly underlined the need to strengthen the verification provisions of the Treaty. He would expect that to be a principle issue discussed in Main Committee II.

18. With regard to article VI and the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs of the Treaty, he said it was clear that the nuclear arms race had now been reversed, and that nuclear disarmament of historic proportions was under way. The United States and the Russian Federation were each destroying about 2,000 nuclear weapons a year; several States previously belonging to the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics had achieved non-nuclear-weapon status; and a number of nuclear-weapon States had taken unilateral decisions to dismantle considerable quantities of weapons.

19. A comprehensive test-ban treaty was now attainable. His Government intended to be an original signatory to that treaty which, by preventing the development and deployment of new generations of advanced nuclear weapons, would represent an important step towards global security. The negotiations for such a treaty had produced an advanced draft which reflected a new convergence on a number of key issues. The outstanding questions facing negotiators were well defined and, although there was still a considerable amount of work to be done, the conclusion of the new treaty was within reach.

20. With regard to security assurances, the recent adoption by consensus of Security Council resolution 984 (1995) represented a significant advance, establishing strengthened international expectations and norms against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in respect of non-nuclear-weapon States. It should also be recalled that security assurances could be pursued and entrenched by means of regional nuclear-weapon-free zones, such as those established under the South Pacific Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty or the Treaty of Tlatelolco. He also welcomed the fact that the Conference on Disarmament had agreed to establish a negotiating committee on the cessation of the production of fissile material for explosive purposes.

21. The non-proliferation Treaty had thus played a vital role in creating the conditions of confidence about non-proliferation that had allowed nuclear disarmament to proceed. Australia, however, shared the disappointment of many non-nuclear-weapon States that more progress had not been possible under article VI during the cold war.

22. It would like to see in the final document a strong endorsement of the objective of further progress in nuclear disarmament and a clear statement from the five nuclear-weapon States about the future of the nuclear disarmament process which would reaffirm the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament. In that context, the recent reaffirmation by the five nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to pursue negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament was welcome. The final document should also contain the firmest appeal to those few States which had so far not become parties to the Treaty to reconsider their position. In the view of his delegation, the act that would best convince those outside the Treaty that there were sound reasons for acceding to it would undoubtedly be the indefinite extension of the Treaty.
23. It was of the utmost importance that the United States and the Russian Federation should move towards a START III agreement, and that the three other nuclear-weapon States should join in the formal negotiating process for disarmament at an early opportunity. The best way to provide such an impetus was to ensure a climate in which there were strong assurances against proliferation. A world free of nuclear weapons was not conceivable in the absence of universal membership of the non-proliferation Treaty and complete and permanent assurances of non-proliferation.

24. Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) said that the decision on whether to extend the non-proliferation Treaty would flow naturally from the discussions to be held during the course of the Conference. In the view of his delegation, the Conference was already a success by the mere fact of its having been convened; an atmosphere had been created that would encourage intensified debate on a number of issues pertaining to nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in general. The world situation in 1995 was very different from the one prevailing in 1990, when the fourth review conference had been held. In Latin America and the Caribbean, for example, the atmosphere was now much more propitious for a total prohibition of nuclear weapons. Changes in the international scene, in particular the geopolitical and military situation resulting from the end of the cold war, had led to the START I and START II Treaties. It was to be hoped that further reductions in nuclear weapons would be made possible by a START III treaty.

25. The convening of the current Conference had had a beneficial effect on certain disarmament negotiations, such as the talks on a comprehensive test-ban treaty held recently in Geneva. It was encouraging to note the willingness of the five nuclear Powers to offer security assurances, as evidenced by the adoption of Security Council resolution 984 (1995). A move had also been made to establish a committee to conduct negotiations to prohibit the production of fissile material for military purposes.

26. The task now facing Main Committee I was to find a formula that would reflect a collective appreciation of the meaning of the provisions of the Treaty allocated to it for review, especially article VI and the preambular paragraphs relating to disarmament.

27. Sir Michael WESTON (United Kingdom) said that the United Kingdom took its non-proliferation obligations under article I of the Treaty very seriously and had fully complied with them. His Government had also advocated and supported a number of actions taken by the international community in order to ensure compliance with article II, including action in respect of Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

28. It welcomed the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the progress made towards nuclear disarmament, including the dramatic reductions in United States and Russian nuclear arsenals, most recently those agreed under the START I and START II Treaties. The United Kingdom had always maintained its nuclear forces at a minimum level and, in recent years, had adjusted its nuclear arsenal to reflect the improvements in the international security environment. As a result, by the end of the 1990s, the total number of warheads in the United Kingdom stockpile would be 21 per cent lower than it had been in the 1970s, and the total explosive power of those warheads would be 59 per cent lower than in the 1970s. The total number of operational warheads in the stockpile would be 30 per cent less than in the 1970s, and the total explosive power of those warheads would be 63 per cent lower than in the 1970s. The United Kingdom had therefore already contributed directly to reductions in nuclear forces and was continuing to do so. A world in which United States and Russian nuclear forces were numbered in the hundreds rather than the thousands would be one in which his Government would respond to the challenge of multilateral nuclear arms control talks.

29. The United Kingdom was strongly in favour of concluding a comprehensive test-ban treaty and was playing a full and active role in the negotiations which had begun in Geneva in January 1994. His Government had recently agreed
that there should be no exemption for "tests in exceptional circumstances", the so-called "safety tests".

30. His Government had welcomed the recent agreement, at the Conference on Disarmament, to establish an ad hoc committee to negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or for other nuclear explosive devices. As a demonstration of his Government's commitment to those negotiations, the Secretary of State of the United Kingdom had announced recently that the country had ceased the production of fissile material for explosive purposes.

31. The United Kingdom had played an active part in initiating and elaborating Security Council resolution 984 (1995) on security assurances. It had also supported many other measures which contributed to the goal of general and complete disarmament. It had taken the original initiative which had ultimately led to the conclusion of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction and fully supported recent efforts to strengthen it. It had also played an active part in the negotiations on the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. At the regional level, the United Kingdom had consistently sought verifiable reductions in conventional arms in Europe, and had played a full part in the negotiations which had led to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

32. The United Kingdom was thus fully committed to practical disarmament and non-proliferation measures, including negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament, which remained its ultimate goal. If the world community was to build further on the momentum created by recent disarmament successes, it must ensure that the essential framework of stability and predictability provided by the Treaty was made permanent.

33. Mr. FRIEDRICH (Switzerland) pointed out that questions concerning the implementation of the provisions of the non-proliferation Treaty relating to nuclear disarmament and security assurances were the main issues preventing the Governments of many countries, including his own, from readily endorsing the idea of an unconditional and indefinite extension of the Treaty. It was therefore of the utmost importance that the Committee should conduct a comprehensive analysis of the current situation and that its conclusions should be reflected clearly and in detail in its report, as well as in the final document of the Conference. In the view of his delegation, non-proliferation was not an end in itself; it should be accompanied by the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction.

34. His country attached very high priority to the reduction of existing arsenals to the lowest possible level. In accepting an indefinite extension of the Treaty, Switzerland was placing its trust in the nuclear-weapon States, assuming that they would move with determination, and without concern for their own national prestige, towards nuclear disarmament.

35. The provisions of article VI had not been met. The number of warheads in the possession of the nuclear-weapon States had increased considerably over the years, and it had not been until the end of the cold war that two of those States had finally agreed to substantial reductions in their arsenals. Even so, the number of warheads remained almost the same as 25 years earlier; moreover, the current warheads were more efficient. His delegation hoped that by the next review conference, in the year 2000, all five nuclear-weapon States would agree on a schedule for substantially reducing their arsenals. Moreover, at the present Conference, all the States parties to the Treaty should reaffirm their commitment to the total elimination, within a specific time-frame, of all weapons of mass destruction.

36. The dismantling of nuclear weapons should be carried out with due regard for the environment. The fissile materials thus obtained must be placed under international controls and must never be used to manufacture new weapons. The production of fissile material for nuclear explosive purposes must be stopped.
His delegation welcomed the establishment by the Conference on Disarmament of a committee to deal with that matter and hoped that its work would be successful. His Government had stated its position in favour of an indefinite extension of the Treaty in the strong hope that, by the next review conference, a treaty on the cessation of the production of fissile material for explosive purposes would be in force.

37. His delegation was pleased to note that negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty had finally begun in the Conference on Disarmament. His Government was disappointed that agreement had not been reached on the essential elements of such a treaty before the current Conference. The idea of providing for exceptions to the principle of a comprehensive test ban was incompatible with the spirit of article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty. Any exception would have a negative impact on the environment and would cast doubt on the determination to ensure a permanent halt to experimental nuclear explosions.

38. The issue of security assurances was another area in which the non-nuclear-weapon States still had some concerns. The nuclear-weapon States should undertake, in a legally binding multilateral treaty, never to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States which had renounced the use of nuclear weapons. Security Council resolution 984 (1995) represented a positive step in that direction.

39. Mr. SCHEINMAN (United States of America), referring to articles I and II and the first three preambular paragraphs of the Treaty, said that the Committee should bear in mind that the five nuclear-weapon States were now all parties to the non-proliferation Treaty; that the Treaty had proved its value in providing assurances to all States that their neighbours were not seeking to acquire nuclear weapons; and that there was near-universal support for the norm of non-proliferation. Efforts to secure universal accession to the Treaty should be encouraged, and States should be discouraged from pursuing nuclear weapons capabilities. Violations of the Treaty should be expressly condemned, and emphasis should be placed on the need for a strong international response to evidence of violations. The parties to the Treaty should express concern about the serious threat posed by nuclear proliferation, and about all States which remained outside the Treaty and not subject to comprehensive safeguards agreements.

40. With regard to article VI and the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs, he said that, with the end of the cold war, the climate for arms control and disarmament had never been better. The role of nuclear weapons in United States national security strategy had never been lower. The United States took its commitments under article VI very seriously. Not only had it compiled a strong record of accomplishments in that regard, but it had reaffirmed its commitment, as stated in article VI, to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament, which remained its ultimate goal.

41. The United States was dismantling up to 2,000 nuclear weapons per year. Since 1988, it had reduced defence expenditures for strategic nuclear weapons by almost two thirds, cut military personnel performing duties with strategic nuclear forces by a similar amount, and reduced its active strategic nuclear stockpile by nearly 60 per cent, and its non-strategic nuclear stockpile by 90 per cent. By the year 2003, with the implementation of the START II Treaty, the United States would have reduced its total nuclear forces by 80 per cent. The United States had not tested a nuclear weapon in almost three years. His Government was fully committed to the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and was determined to complete that treaty at the earliest possible time. In fact, it was prepared to conclude that it had already conducted its last nuclear test.

42. The United States had ceased the production of fissile material for nuclear explosive purposes and had already removed massive amounts of nuclear material from its military stockpile. It had recently committed itself to removing 200 metric tons of fissile material from its nuclear stockpile and
some material excess to weapons needs had been submitted to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. The United States actively supported negotiations on a fissile-material cut-off convention, and welcomed the establishment in the Conference on Disarmament of an ad hoc committee to conduct negotiations to that end.

43. The United States was not manufacturing new nuclear weapons and had halted research and development of third-generation weapons. Its nuclear weapons were not targeted against any country and United States bombers no longer stood on day-to-day alert. His Government had also reaffirmed long-standing policies on negative and positive security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States which were parties to the Treaty, as evidenced by Security Council resolution 984 (1995).

44. In short, there had been overwhelming success in satisfying the undertakings given under article VI. Progress had been achieved not only in nuclear disarmament, but also in bilateral and multilateral agreements on other weapons of mass destruction, most notably chemical weapons.

45. The foregoing list of accomplishments underscored the direction in which the United States was heading. Its commitment to complete the journey was unwavering. However, fulfilment of article VI was the responsibility of all parties, and all must do their part to achieve arms limits and other measures to ease regional tensions and arms competition. It was important that the Conference should acknowledge the contribution that the arms control efforts of the nuclear-weapon States had made to a strong non-proliferation regime, as well as the importance of a strong non-proliferation regime to further nuclear reductions.

46. On the question of security assurances, the United States had always recognized the importance of addressing the special needs of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty for assurances that would alleviate their legitimate security concerns. Substantial progress had been made and the Conference should welcome the recent unanimous adoption of Security Council resolution 984 (1995), which took note of the national declarations by the five nuclear-weapon States on security assurances.

47. In conclusion, he reiterated the importance of the non-proliferation Treaty and the need for its indefinite extension without conditions. The Treaty established the only international, legally-binding obligation on the nuclear-weapon States to work towards eventually laying down their arms and it provided the stable climate in which the nuclear-weapon States could continue that process. A world without a permanent non-proliferation Treaty would not provide a climate conducive to future progress.

The meeting rose at 12.10 p.m.
Chairman: Mr. AYEWAH (Nigeria)

The meeting was called to order at 3.30 p.m.

GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 15)

1. Mr. HAZLAN (Malaysia) said that the Conference offered a unique opportunity for States parties to the Treaty to advance the cause of global nuclear disarmament. It was important to ensure that the decision to be taken would be based on an objective evaluation of the Treaty and would best serve the interests of the States parties in their quest for global security. The notion of a world entirely free of nuclear weapons was an entirely practical proposition which the international community should strive to attain.

2. The nuclear-weapon States' fulfilment of their obligations under the preamble and article VI was far from satisfactory. Recent achievements in the area of disarmament were of limited scope and fell far short of expectations; the world was still a dangerous place.

3. His Government's decision on the extension of the Treaty would depend on the result of the work of the three Main Committees. Regarding Main Committee I, his delegation would press for the inclusion of positive language reflecting unfaltering commitments, particularly from the nuclear-weapon States, on the following issues: a programme of action by the nuclear-weapon States in respect of negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons; establishment of a comprehensive test-ban treaty; cessation of the further production of fissile materials for weapons purposes; internationally negotiated, legally binding security assurances; and adherence by the nuclear-weapon States to nuclear-free zones. The nuclear-weapon States should demonstrate greater commitment to disarmament through a programme of action to eliminate all nuclear weapons within a ten-year period beginning in 1996.

4. His delegation would also request a guarantee that States parties could exercise their right to withdraw from the Treaty, in accordance with article X. That right, together with the aforementioned programme of action, were prerequisites for his delegation's agreement to an extension of the Treaty.

5. A comprehensive test-ban treaty, which would end the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, was essential to the halting of the nuclear-arms race. His delegation would work for a commitment by the nuclear-weapon States to conclude a verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty by the end of 1996, and for the maintenance by the nuclear-weapon States of their moratorium on testing.

6. The cessation of the further production of fissile materials for weapons purposes was another vital link in non-proliferation measures. Encouraging progress was already being made. A non-discriminatory and verifiable convention should be drawn up at the earliest possible date, baning the production and stockpiling of such materials.

7. Recent efforts in the area of security assurances, while welcome, were clearly inadequate, failing to meet the call by the non-nuclear-weapon States for legally binding security assurances. The nuclear-weapon States should accept a binding international instrument on the subject. Referring to recent positive developments in the field of regional nuclear-weapon-free zones, he
said the nuclear-weapon States should also show a positive attitude to the creation of such zones and to the establishment of appropriate guarantees.

8. The full and fair implementation of the non-proliferation Treaty would lead the international community on the road to complete nuclear disarmament. The security of future generations would depend on whether the international community, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, had the courage to grasp that opportunity.

9. Mr. MERNIER (Belgium) said that the discouraging results of the early years of the Treaty had been considerably improved upon recently, since the trend towards escalation had been reversed, with a number of highly significant reductions, such as those achieved by the START agreements, in the world's nuclear arsenal, and the moratoriums on nuclear testing accepted by four of the nuclear-weapon Powers. He hoped that they would soon be joined by China.

10. Although the level of nuclear armaments was still too high, the international community was visibly on the right track, and the fact that the multiplication of nuclear-weapon States had been largely averted was another example of success which was of itself sufficient to justify the indefinite extension of the Treaty. Universality was an important goal, and those States which were not parties to the Treaty should be encouraged to accede to it.

11. Once extended, the Treaty would need to be strengthened and reinforced by other measures, such as the current moratoriums on nuclear testing, and efforts to ban the production of fissile material for weapons use. Steps of a more political nature were also needed, such as the security assurances desired by the non-nuclear-weapon States, and the establishment of additional nuclear-free zones.

12. The overall picture was positive, but there was still a long way to go, and the work remaining to be done in the interest of nuclear non-proliferation required a stable and permanent legal framework which the Treaty could provide.

13. Mr. ARAR (Turkey) said that the non-proliferation Treaty had reduced the risk of nuclear war, but dangers still existed. A huge majority of States currently agreed on the necessity of further reductions in nuclear weapons and maintained the goal of complete nuclear disarmament.

14. He welcomed the steps which had recently been made, particularly those concerning the States of the former Soviet Union. The comprehensive test-ban treaty, once concluded, would play a vital role. Another important step would be the conclusion of a treaty providing for a cut-off in the production of fissile material for weapons purposes and he welcomed the current efforts in that area at the Conference on Disarmament.

15. He also welcomed Security Council resolution 984 (1995) on positive and negative security assurances, sponsored by the nuclear-weapon States. Despite its weaknesses, the non-proliferation Treaty remained the sole assurance of nuclear non-proliferation and the only multilateral treaty providing commitment to nuclear disarmament. His delegation was of the view that only a permanent non-proliferation Treaty could ensure those two crucial elements of global security, which was why it supported the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty.

16. Mr. TYUTYUNNIK (Ukraine) stressed the need to promote efforts to bring about a nuclear-weapon-free world. In the past five years, nuclear arsenals had been significantly reduced and the number of the so-called "threshold" States with nuclear weapons in their territory had decreased. At the same time, the number of States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty had grown. Ukraine, which was the first State in history to renounce voluntarily nuclear weapons, was also proceeding, together with the Russian Federation, to destroy the third most powerful nuclear arsenal in the world.
17. His country had repeatedly expressed its support for the indefinite extension of the Treaty as a key instrument for weapons monitoring and disarmament. At the same time, the possibility of unconditional extension seemed very problematic. The main condition for strengthening the Treaty and for its indefinite extension was clear and conscientious compliance by all States parties with its provisions. In that regard, the principles concerning nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament put forward by the Government of South Africa should be given careful consideration. The granting of security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties was of particular importance among the overall measures to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. The absence of such assurances in the Treaty was its "Achilles heel". The adoption by the Security Council of resolution 984 (1995) had been an important step towards eliminating that shortcoming. Lastly, Ukraine supported the idea of elaborating a legally binding international instrument on security guarantees for the non-nuclear-weapon States parties.

18. Mr. PATOKALLIO (Finland) said that without the strict implementation of articles I and II, which contained the basic obligations of the Treaty, its objectives could not be fulfilled and it would lose every shred of credibility.

19. The obligations under article II had been challenged twice since the Fourth Review Conference. In the case of Iraq, non-compliance had been established beyond the shadow of a doubt. In the case of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, doubts still remained, and needed to be removed.

20. Prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons called for continuous effort. The current Conference should reaffirm that non-proliferation had become a global norm of behaviour. It should also welcome the accession since 1990 of a large number of States. The accession of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine as non-nuclear-weapon States was commendable. With the accession of South Africa, the Treaty counted among its parties the first State which had voluntarily rolled back its nuclear-weapon programme. The non-proliferation regime had been significantly strengthened, and the Treaty was approaching universality. Further efforts needed to be made to that end.

21. The ending of the nuclear-arms race was a historic step in the implementation of article VI. Thanks to the START treaties, the two biggest nuclear-weapon States were in the process of reducing their nuclear arsenals by two thirds. The Conference should stress that the implementation of those treaties in the fastest manner compatible with safety and security was of key importance. The United States and the Russian Federation had taken a number of other arms-reduction measures concerning both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. He looked forward to additional steps on the part of China, France and the United Kingdom.

22. The Conference should reaffirm that the ultimate goal of article VI was the elimination of all nuclear weapons; however, it should also be emphasized that disarmament, including conventional disarmament, was an obligation on all States parties. Positive developments had taken place, but more attention was needed, and conventional arms were used daily in conflicts around the world. Excessive accumulation of such weapons was a growing concern in many regions.

23. A comprehensive test-ban treaty was currently the single most important nuclear issue; the Conference on Disarmament should be urged to conclude its negotiations by the end of 1995. The treaty should be truly comprehensive, and effective verification was essential. Cutting off further production of fissile material for nuclear explosive purposes was also an important measure.

24. The non-nuclear-weapon States parties had the right to demand credible security assurances. They had no interest in providing a "free ride" to those States which had not accepted the same undertaking. Finland therefore welcomed the adoption of Security Council resolution 984 (1995).

25. Mr. KAREM (Egypt) said that, while Security Council resolution 984 (1995) addressed the issues of assistance and compensation to States which
were victims of a nuclear threat or attack in a fairly comprehensive manner, it offered no credible protection to non-nuclear-weapon States. Comprehensive and unqualified security assurances in the form of a legally binding instrument were a legitimate right of all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. Security assurances could be enhanced through complementary action to achieve regional nuclear-weapon-free zones. His delegation had been active in the area of regional disarmament and had proposed an initiative for the establishment of a zone free from all weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. To that end, it was vital that all States in the Middle East should accede to the Treaty as a first step towards establishing such a zone.

26. Contrary to the principles of non-proliferation, the Treaty had permitted the number of nuclear weapons to increase considerably during its 25-year life span. Despite the progress achieved in the past five years, his delegation, as many other non-nuclear-weapon States, regretted that greater achievements had not been possible under article VI of the Treaty. It was imperative that the final document of the current Conference should contain a clear commitment from the five nuclear-weapon States regarding the future of the nuclear-disarmament process with a view to attaining the ultimate goal of total nuclear disarmament. The failure to reach agreement on a final text for the comprehensive test-ban treaty constituted a serious loophole in the non-proliferation regime. While some States parties saw testing as a way to ensure the safety of nuclear weapons, others believed that a comprehensive test-ban treaty would put an end to the nuclear-arms race by preventing qualitative improvement and thus vertical proliferation. His delegation supported a comprehensive and verifiable test-ban treaty - as opposed to the Threshold Test-Ban Treaty - and favoured a non-discriminatory and universally applicable treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

27. Ms. LAOSE-AJAYI (Nigeria) said that existing cooperation between nuclear-weapon States in the area of nuclear-weapon research and development undermined article I of the Treaty. Now that the cold war had ended, there was no justification for such collaboration, which the Committee should address during its review.

28. While the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty had largely complied with article II, some parties, and also non-parties, to the Treaty had acquired weapons-grade materials from nuclear-weapon States. The Committee should also address that issue and discuss how Governments' export policies should be brought into line with their obligations under the Treaty.

29. The assurances provided for in Security Council resolution 984 (1995) required further clarification to strengthen their effectiveness. Since the non-nuclear-weapon States parties had renounced nuclear weapons, they deserved to be assured in treaty form that they would not be victims of the use or threat of use of such weapons. At the Fourth Review Conference in 1990, her delegation had submitted a draft proposal on negative security assurances, which could serve as the basis for the Committee to express, in its current report, a commitment to draw up a legally binding instrument on negative security assurances.

30. Despite significant progress towards disarmament in recent years, there continued to be a need for greater transparency in nuclear disarmament. A nuclear-weapons register of qualitative and quantitative measures for nuclear disarmament and a clear timetable for future disarmament were needed. Her delegation proposed that a programme for nuclear disarmament should include the conclusion and entry into force of an agreement on negative security assurances within one year, an irreversible ban on nuclear testing by 1996, the prohibition of weapons-grade fissile materials by the year 2000 and a commitment to begin negotiations for a total ban on the production and stockpiling of nuclear weapons by 2005.

31. Mr. BERDENNIKOV (Russian Federation) said that his delegation attached great importance to a comprehensive and objective review of the operation of the non-proliferation Treaty, which should lead to the conclusion that its
indefinite and unconditional extension was vital. The Treaty had withstood the test of time and confirmed its role as an important instrument to check the spread of nuclear weapons, thus providing stability in the nuclear field without which there could be no global or regional stability. It had laid the foundation for irreversible progress towards disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament, and guaranteed the development of broad international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. All countries, large and small, nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon, needed the Treaty.

32. The Russian Federation's commitment to the ultimate goal of complete nuclear disarmament had been reaffirmed in the declaration which it had recently made, jointly with three other nuclear-weapon States, at the Conference on Disarmament (NPT/CONF.1995/20). As evidence that the nuclear-arms race had ceased and been reversed, he referred to the signing within the past few years by the United States and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and subsequently the Russian Federation of the Treaty on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty), the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I Treaty) and the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II Treaty). Under the INF Treaty, a whole class of nuclear weapons had been eliminated from the arsenals of both Powers by the end of May 1991. Moreover, in total, approximately 40 per cent of the Russian and United States nuclear arsenals would be reduced within seven years under the START I Treaty, and further considerable reductions were provided for under the START II Treaty. At the same time, under unilateral disarmament measures, the Russian Federation had already transferred a large number of its tactical nuclear weapons to central facilities and storage areas for the purpose of eliminating them.

33. The Russian Federation and the United States had also mapped out new large-scale measures. In September 1994, the Presidents of the two countries had signed a joint statement on strategic stability and nuclear security issues, under which they had agreed to expedite the implementation of bilateral strategic-arms-reduction agreements, and they had instructed their experts to intensify discussion of ways to reduce and limit the remaining nuclear forces.

34. The time had now come for other nuclear Powers to join in the process. In that connection, the President of the Russian Federation had, at the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, suggested that the five nuclear Powers should develop a treaty on nuclear security and strategic stability, under which the proposed measures could be carried out on a step-by-step basis in view of the differing nuclear potentials of the countries concerned.

35. His delegation welcomed the establishment, within the Conference on Disarmament, of an ad hoc committee to negotiate a multilateral convention on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, which should provide for appropriate verification, and was pleased to note that a mandate for negotiations had been agreed upon. The Russian Federation had already ceased to produce weapons-grade uranium, and a national programme to discontinue the production of weapons-grade plutonium was under way. In fact, the fissile materials currently produced in the Russian Federation were not being used for nuclear-weapon purposes.

36. The Russian Federation was participating actively in the negotiations within the Conference on Disarmament regarding a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, which it was hoped would be concluded in the near future. The moratorium on nuclear tests, to which his country would continue to adhere, created an environment conducive to the negotiations.

37. The provision of more clearly defined security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States was important to the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime and to international stability. In that connection, he referred to the recent adoption of Security Council resolution 984 (1995), which provided for appropriate assistance by the Security Council in the event
of nuclear aggression or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the non-proliferation Treaty and took note of the statements by the nuclear-weapon States concerning negative assurances.

38. With regard to disarmament in the field of other types of weapons of mass destruction, the Russian Federation had been among the first to sign the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and was preparing legislation providing for the discharge of its obligations in that connection. It also supported efforts to strengthen the regime of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction and intended to work towards achieving agreement on a verification mechanism at the forthcoming multilateral negotiations.

39. Major steps had also been taken recently to limit conventional arms and armed forces in Europe.

40. The Russian Federation, like the former Soviet Union, had complied strictly with its obligations under article I of the non-proliferation Treaty. As for article II, the newly independent States which had previously belonged to the former Soviet Union had taken collective decisions aimed at preventing the proliferation of Soviet nuclear weapons, and an international legal mechanism had been created which provided for the removal of such weapons to the Russian Federation and for the elimination of most of them. The Russian Federation remained the only nuclear-weapon State in the territory of the former Soviet Union, while Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan had acceded to the non-proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States and had fulfilled their obligations thereunder.

41. With regard to article VII, he said that the Russian Federation continued to advocate the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East, Africa, South Asia and elsewhere, as a means of strengthening international peace and security, and that it was a party to the relevant protocols to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the South Pacific Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga). His delegation hoped that support for the creation of nuclear-free zones would be reflected in the report of the Committee.

42. Ms. FORSYTH (New Zealand) said that recent history had underlined the fact that the risk of the spread of nuclear weapons was greatest in those regions where instability, tension and lack of cooperation remained the norm. Therefore, the Conference should aim, above all, to strengthen the climate of security in which nuclear disarmament could occur and to reaffirm without reservation its commitment to the non-proliferation and disarmament norms embodied in the Treaty. The goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world could not be achieved as long as some States with advanced nuclear capabilities remained outside the Treaty and its safeguard system. The Conference should warmly welcome recent adherents to the Treaty and express a determination to secure its universal application. Full compliance with articles I and II was essential to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. The record of compliance with article II had been tarnished by the actions of two States parties to the Treaty, Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States should recommit themselves to strict and full observance of those articles.

43. The aim of the Committee, in reviewing the implementation of article VI, should be to reinforce the moves towards nuclear disarmament of the past five years and offer specific recommendations for the future. Such recommendations should include the conclusion without delay of negotiations for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. The commitment of all five nuclear-weapon States to the uninterrupted observance of testing moratoriums would be a welcome signal of seriousness in that regard. States parties should also urge the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiations for a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. Furthermore, States parties should discuss verifiable measures to bring a permanent end to vertical proliferation by stopping the qualitative improvement and development
of nuclear-weapon systems and the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. In addition, the Conference should encourage further reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the five nuclear-weapon States.

44. Non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty had long held that they were entitled to effective international arrangements to assure them against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons pending their elimination. While some had already received such assurances through the operation of regional nuclear-weapon-free zones, the Conference should consider what further measures could be pursued in a multilateral framework such as the Conference on Disarmament to strengthen security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States which had made firm non-proliferation commitments.

45. Mr. ERRERA (France) reviewed the many measures France had taken to reduce its nuclear forces and scale down its nuclear-weapons programmes adding that, to promote transparency, the President of France had given, in 1994, a full account of all French nuclear forces. In addition, France had just given the non-nuclear-weapon States positive and negative security assurances the wording of which had been harmonized with those of four of the five nuclear Powers.

46. Now that the nuclear-arms race was over, France hoped that the START I Treaty would be fully implemented. Negotiations on a complete ban on nuclear tests were progressing, and he hoped that a treaty would be included without delay. France welcomed the decision taken by the Conference on Disarmament regarding negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices and urged that negotiations should begin forthwith. France, together with the United States, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom had just solemnly reaffirmed its commitment to the pursuit of negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament.

47. As for other disarmament measures, France would seek to promote universal ratification of the chemical-weapons Convention, and to establish a verification regime for the biological-weapons Convention, strengthen the ban on anti-personnel mines and to help develop regional arms control.

48. Strengthening of the non-proliferation regime - in particular the indefinite extension of the non-proliferation Treaty - was a basic element for continuing the general disarmament process.

49. Mr. KIM (Republic of Korea) said that, while his delegation considered that the non-proliferation Treaty should be extended indefinitely, efforts to eliminate discrimination and address the shortcomings of the non-proliferation regime should continue. An international norm delegitimizing the development and possession of nuclear weapons under any circumstances should be further strengthened with a view to achieving complete non-proliferation. The Republic of Korea would continue to participate in the diplomatic campaign for nuclear non-proliferation at both the regional and global levels.

50. Over the past 25 years, the non-proliferation Treaty had provided a firm and dependable foundation for preventing nuclear proliferation and had served as the primary legal and political deterrent to the uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear weapons. In order to build on the positive global perception of the Treaty, to which more than 170 countries had become parties, it was important for both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States to make concerted efforts, on a non-discriminatory basis, to comply in good faith with their respective obligations under the Treaty.

51. The legitimate concerns about the discriminatory aspects of the Treaty expressed by the non-nuclear-weapon States could be resolved if and when the goal of comprehensive and complete nuclear disarmament was achieved with the full participation of all nuclear-weapon States. One of the most urgent tasks for the nuclear-weapon States was to take the lead by substantially
diminishing the political and military significance of nuclear weapons so that none of the non-nuclear weapon States would attempt to develop them.

52. Bilateral efforts between the United States and the Russian Federation to implement nuclear disarmament provided further evidence of the progress made towards nuclear disarmament. The early ratification of the START II Treaty would make it possible to achieve epoch-making progress by the year 2003. In addition to such bilateral efforts, multilateral efforts were needed towards comprehensive and complete nuclear disarmament. His delegation noted with satisfaction the tangible progress made recently in the ongoing negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, which might contribute to the successful extension of the non-proliferation Treaty. Negotiations on the test-ban treaty should be concluded at the earliest date and with the full participation of all States concerned.

53. The consensus adoption by the Conference on Disarmament of a mandate for the establishment of an ad hoc committee on the issue of fissile material for weapons purposes had marked real progress towards the further strengthening of the non-proliferation regime. His delegation looked forward to the early establishment and operation of that body.

54. The adoption of Security Council resolution 984 (1995) on security assurances had contributed to the indefinite extension of the Treaty. His delegation noted with satisfaction the collective initiative made by all nuclear-weapon States in dealing with comprehensive security assurances, both positive and negative. That was an important step towards achieving the extension of the Treaty and the further strengthening of the non-proliferation regime.

55. Mr. DUMOBE (Netherlands) stressed the need for the safe processing of fissile material resulting from the dismantling of nuclear warheads. That was time-consuming and costly, and should be carried out in an environmentally sound manner. The Government of the Netherlands had recently contributed $1 million for such a project in Ukraine.

56. He also stressed the significance of Security Council resolution 984 (1995), which represented an important step in the field of security assurances by including both negative and positive security assurances.

57. He welcomed the agreement reached by the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiations on a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other explosive purposes through the establishment of an ad hoc committee.

58. His delegation fully supported the current negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. At its 1994 session, the Conference had made important progress in drafting the nuclear-test-ban treaty. With regard to verification, much work had been done in preparation for an international monitoring system, which, by monitoring possible test explosions, should be the core of the verification system. In that regard, the agreement reached at the end of 1994 concerning monitoring techniques had been of great importance.

59. The negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty were building on those foundations, and further substantial work had been done on verification, particularly on-site inspection. A major breakthrough had been reached with regard to the scope of the treaty, and there was currently a much clearer prospect of what it would eventually prohibit. In addition, there seemed to be consensus that a comprehensive test-ban treaty should be of indefinite duration, an example which the 1995 Review and Extension Conference should follow.

60. Mr. WESTDAL (Canada) said that, although complete nuclear disarmament had not been achieved and although some States had still not signed the Treaty, and indeed some States parties had even violated the Treaty, nevertheless articles I, II and VI had served to protect the international
community. The Treaty had profoundly altered attitudes towards nuclear weapons, stigmatizing and delegitimizing them. At the time the Treaty had been drafted, some had feared that there could be as many as 20 or 30 nuclear-weapon States by the end of the century. Moreover, all five declared nuclear-weapon States were parties to the Treaty, had strengthened their security assurances and were trying to put an end to testing. All had agreed to negotiate the end of the production of fissile material for weapons. There were currently 178 States parties to the Treaty, an eloquent statistic which gave cause for hope.

61. The prerequisites for complete nuclear disarmament were beyond the world's current imagination and would be realized only with the establishment of political institutions and laws that were more effective than existing ones. It was certain, however, that the international community needed to instil global values of compassion, restraint and the honour of compromise in the peaceful resolution of disputes. In the meantime, the massive number of nuclear weapons must be reduced and those that remained must be tightly sheathed. In that regard, the first obvious step was to make the Treaty permanent and to keep the promises embodied in it. That implied a comprehensive nuclear test-ban, a cut-off in the production of fissile material for weapons, and treaties to supplement START I and II. It also meant more nuclear-weapon-free zones and universal accession.

62. While there continued to be horrors in the world, from Bosnia to Burundi and beyond, the international community must take advantage of the current situation in which there was no conflict or strife between major Powers. Canada advocated permanence with accountability: permanence, because there appeared to be no circumstances under which it would ever make sense to "lose" the Treaty; and accountability, because the profound promises inherent in the Treaty would not be kept without vigilance and hard work. Accordingly, the Governments of States parties must be held to account for their custody of the values of the Treaty and the fulfilment of its obligations.

63. Mr. NEAGU (Romania) stressed the obligations of both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States to comply with their undertaking to ensure non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, and to pursue nuclear disarmament. The Treaty had proved to be a strong barrier to nuclear proliferation, despite the long-lasting arms race. The final document of the current Conference should include a call for universal adherence to the Treaty. Building on the significant progress made in recent years, including the START I, START II and INF Treaties, the final document of the Conference should endorse the objective of further reductions of nuclear arms with the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament. Given the significant role of the non-proliferation Treaty, Romania strongly favoured its indefinite and unconditional extension.

64. To the extent of its possibilities, Romania had made its own contribution both to the development of a political environment favouring the dramatic achievements he had just mentioned, and to the process of disarmament. Romania had begun a process of democratization and integration into the democratic structure of Europe and the world. It had also contributed directly to the conclusion of the INF Treaty, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and other global agreements. His country was also contributing to the negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, a landmark process which should be reflected in and encouraged by the final document of the current Conference.

65. Another significant development was the agreement reached at the Conference on Disarmament to establish a negotiating committee on the cessation of production of fissile material for explosive purposes. That effort should also be encouraged in the final document of the current Conference.

66. Romania welcomed Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and the security assurances given by the five nuclear-weapon States. That resolution did not, however, fully meet the expectations of many non-nuclear-weapon States, and
the matter of assurances should be further pursued at the Conference on Disarmament. That objective should also be mentioned in the final document of the current Conference.

67. Mr. WHEELER (South Africa) drew attention to the statement recently made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of South Africa at the fourth plenary meeting of the Conference (NPT/CONF.1995/SR.4). Specifically, he wished to reiterate his Foreign Minister’s proposals regarding the adoption of a set of principles for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and the establishment of a committee to study the review process and make concrete recommendations on how to improve and strengthen the review conference mechanism. His Foreign Minister had also suggested some specific matters that might be taken up by the proposed committee (NPT/CONF.1995/SR.4, para. 9).

68. South Africa believed that the disarmament provisions in article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty were essential for the implementation of the Treaty. Security assurances were also a key element of the Treaty; in that regard, his Government welcomed Security Council resolution 984 (1995). It remained convinced, however, that the most effective way to address the issue would be to negotiate an international agreement prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty.

69. During the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly, South Africa had expressed its support for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, which afforded an added dimension to the security provided by the Treaty. Complete nuclear disarmament was the key to international and regional security. South Africa now understood that the Treaty provided greater security than did the nuclear weapons which it had destroyed.

70. Mr. GARCIA (Colombia) said that his Government hoped that both the Committee and the Conference as a whole would be able to reach some basic agreements by consensus. His country strongly supported the elimination of nuclear weapons and all weapons of mass destruction, as attested to by the fact that it was a State party to the Treaty on Antarctica, the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the non-proliferation Treaty. Because of the fundamental role played by the latter in overall non-proliferation efforts, his delegation favoured extending it. The decision on extension must strengthen the Treaty and must provide the assurance that the purposes set forth in the preamble and the Treaty as a whole would be fully met.

71. His delegation considered that it was now reasonable to look forward to further reductions in nuclear weapons, and hoped that the nuclear-weapon States would be willing to work towards total elimination of such weapons. In absolute terms, however, and despite recent progress, more nuclear weapons were now in place than when the non-proliferation Treaty had been signed. The review must not be limited to an inventory of achievements or shortcomings; it must provide a basis for a plan of action, within a definite time-frame, for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

72. His delegation attached special importance to the following measures: immediate cessation of the arms race, with a view to general and complete disarmament under effective international control; conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty; the signing by the nuclear-weapon States of a legally binding instrument offering negative and positive security assurances; conclusion of a treaty prohibiting the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices; establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones and accession by the nuclear-weapon States to the instruments establishing such zones; universal application of the non-proliferation Treaty; guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States of non-selective access to peaceful uses of nuclear technology; and strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system in order to include the activities of all the States parties to the Treaty.

73. Mr. MORADI (Iran) said that in its discussions, the Committee needed to balance the retrospective and the prospective aspects of its work, with a view
to identifying specific measures to be taken to enhance the operation of the Treaty and ensuring that any extension provided for the realization of its purposes and provisions in the earliest time possible. All States parties must reaffirm their commitments under articles I and II and the first three preambular paragraphs of the Treaty. In the light of some reported cases of violations of articles I and II, the Committee should note with concern that ongoing collaboration in connection with materials and technology transfers between nuclear-weapon States, on the one hand, and between those States and States not parties to the Treaty, on the other hand, undermined the objectives of the Treaty.

74. Much remained to be done towards fulfilment of article VI, as nuclear arsenals far exceeded those of 1968, when the Treaty had been signed. The nuclear-weapon States should commit themselves to a programme of action for total elimination of nuclear weapons within a definite time-frame.

75. With regard to article VII, his delegation would like to see a reaffirmation by the Committee of the importance of nuclear-weapon-free zones and the expansion of the geographical scope of existing ones. The Committee should urge all nuclear-weapon States to adhere fully and unconditionally to all existing nuclear-free zones, and to commit themselves to refraining from any act that might endanger the status of such zones.

76. His delegation hoped that the Committee would underline the significance of the guarantees afforded by the Treaty and urged all States parties, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, to strengthen their commitment through a legally binding instrument, either in the form of a protocol to the Treaty or as a separate instrument.

77. Mr. EKWALL (Sweden) said that it was encouraging to note the new trend in arms control and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The significant progress made in the field of chemical and biological weapons and the steps taken to halt the arms race and reduce existing nuclear arsenals were all encouraging developments. Work on a comprehensive test-ban treaty was now well under way and an ad hoc committee had been set up to negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. The negative security assurances given by the nuclear-weapon States, complemented by the positive assurances provided for in Security Council resolution 984 (1995), were further steps in the right direction. In addition, with the number of States parties to the Treaty standing at 178, it was now approaching universality.

78. All those developments must be duly reflected in the final records of the current Conference. However, the goal must remain a nuclear-weapon-free world. Further steps must be taken. The nuclear-weapon States must reaffirm their commitment to the elimination of nuclear arsenals, in the spirit of the preamble to the Treaty. In accordance with its article VI, further negotiations must be conducted in good faith on measures for nuclear disarmament. The nuclear-weapon States should also establish a specific time schedule for the implementation of such measures.

79. In the shorter time perspective, it was to be hoped that the comprehensive test-ban treaty would be concluded by the end of 1995. His delegation also looked forward to a prompt start of negotiations on a "cut-off" treaty on fissile material. Not only future production but also existing stockpiles should be the subject of such negotiations. In addition, a multilateral, legally binding international treaty on security assurances should be concluded.

80. Propitious conditions must be maintained for further efforts towards a nuclear-weapon-free world; there must be no doubt regarding the future of the Treaty. His country therefore supported its indefinite extension. At the same time, however, it called for further steps to be taken to reduce the level of nuclear arsenals.
81. Mr. LAPTSENAK (Belarus) said that his country complied strictly with all its obligations under the non-proliferation Treaty. As a successor State of a nuclear Power, Belarus had unconditionally rejected the possibility of possessing nuclear weapons. It had become a party to the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State and had recently signed a safeguards agreement with IAEA. His country was also conscientiously carrying out its obligations under the 1987 INF Treaty, the 1991 START I Treaty and a number of documents of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Thus, Belarus was continuing its efforts to ensure compliance with article VI of the Treaty.

82. Aware of the serious danger of proliferation, his country underscored the need to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in central Europe. Belarus welcomed the assurances set forth in Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and the unilateral declarations concerning negative security assurances by the five nuclear Powers. The resolution, together with those declarations, represented an important step towards the elaboration of a legally binding international instrument and demonstrated the readiness of the nuclear Powers to conduct a single policy vis-à-vis the demands by non-nuclear-weapon countries for security assurances and assistance in case of nuclear aggression. The adoption of Security Council resolution 984 (1995) was a good step forward and should be followed by further efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation Treaty.

83. In view of the need for greater international stability, the Conference should seek the indefinite extension of the Treaty and its universality. Belarus welcomed further steps to eliminate nuclear weapons with the participation of all nuclear Powers and was prepared to work for the speedy conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and to participate actively in all areas of arms monitoring.

84. His delegation believed that the Conference would create a new moral climate in the world, in which any plans to acquire nuclear weapons would be considered contrary to the interests of the majority of States and, therefore, totally intolerable. That belief would be significantly strengthened by a firm pledge by the nuclear Powers to step up their efforts to comply with their obligations under the Treaty and to carry out further disarmament measures.

85. Mr. SHA Zukang (China) said that, ever since acceding to the non-proliferation Treaty in 1992, China had adhered strictly to its provisions. China had faithfully fulfilled its non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty and had maintained a policy of not endorsing, encouraging or engaging in the proliferation of nuclear weapons or assisting other countries in developing such weapons.

86. At the same time, the legitimate rights, interests and demands of States, in particular the developing countries, with respect to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy must be taken into account. It was absolutely inadmissible to adopt double standards or, under the pretext of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, to restrict or hamper the use of nuclear energy by developing countries for peaceful purposes.

87. Non-proliferation was not an end in itself but served only as an intermediate step towards the ultimate goal of the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons. The nuclear-weapon States should negotiate and conclude, at an early date, a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons, under which they would undertake to ban and destroy all their nuclear weapons under effective international supervision.

88. China had never shied away from its obligations with respect to nuclear disarmament and had undertaken a number of unilateral obligations not undertaken by any other nuclear-weapon State, namely, not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and, unconditionally, not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones.
89. China did not endorse the policy of nuclear deterrence, and the nuclear weapons that it had developed were solely for self-defence. China had always advocated the complete prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons and had never taken part in the nuclear-arms race. It had always exercised the utmost restraint with respect to the development of nuclear weapons and had kept its nuclear arsenal at a minimum level. China had also exercised restraint with regard to nuclear testing. It had conducted fewer nuclear tests than any other nuclear-weapon State. Moreover, China had never taken part in an arms race in outer space.

90. China had actively participated in the negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty at the Conference on Disarmament and would welcome the conclusion of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. In that regard, the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs and the United States Secretary of State had signed a joint statement to promote the conclusion of such an instrument. China welcomed the recent decision by the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee to that end.

91. For the purpose of initiating negotiations among the nuclear-weapon States on a treaty of mutual non-first-use of nuclear weapons, China had formally presented a draft treaty to the other four nuclear-weapon States, proposing that the five nuclear-weapon States should begin the first round of consultations in Beijing. In September 1994, the President of China and the President of the Russian Federation had issued a joint statement reaffirming the commitment of both countries to the mutual non-first-use of nuclear weapons and declaring that they would no longer aim their nuclear weapons at each other. His delegation hoped that that declaration would lead to a joint declaration by all five nuclear-weapon States on the mutual non-first-use of nuclear weapons.

92. China supported the establishment, on a voluntary basis and through consultations, of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones free of weapons of mass destruction. China had signed Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and Additional Protocols II and III to the Treaty of Rarotonga. China welcomed the efforts made by the African countries to establish an African nuclear-weapon-free zone. China also supported the Middle East countries in their efforts to establish a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone and a zone free of weapons of mass destruction.

93. At the request of Ukraine and Kazakhstan, China had issued statements, in December 1994 and February 1995, respectively, to provide them with security assurances. On 5 April 1995, China had issued a statement reaffirming negative security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States and also undertaking to provide positive security assurances to those States.

94. Mr. HERNANDEZ (Argentina) said that, as a country that developed and exported nuclear technology and material, Argentina, which had recently acceded to the non-proliferation Treaty, reaffirmed its commitment to comply with articles I and II of the Treaty and encouraged all other States parties to do likewise. Argentina firmly believed that the strengthening of the safeguards system and the full implementation of the export-control regimes would help ensure compliance with those provisions. Such controls constituted a necessary guarantee accompanying the development of nuclear capabilities with a view to promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and enabling countries to export nuclear material in a responsible, safe and transparent manner.

95. A number of important developments had taken place since the 1990 Review Conference. The United States and the Russian Federation had undertaken serious measures to end the nuclear-arms race and promote nuclear disarmament. The two countries had concluded two treaties on the reduction and limitation of their strategic offensive arms (START I and START II) and were currently destroying approximately 2,000 nuclear weapons a year. Such measures had encouraged the remaining nuclear Powers to begin to consider similar steps.
96. The current favourable international climate had made it possible to begin negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The drafting of the treaty was nearing completion, and his delegation welcomed the recent declaration by the five nuclear Powers of their intention to negotiate intensely with a view to concluding the treaty without delay.

97. Another important development had been the agreement to establish a negotiating committee on the cut-off of production of fissile material for explosive purposes. His delegation welcomed the decision of the United States Government to place under IAEA safeguards additional fissionable material produced by the United States or resulting from the disarmament process. His delegation also welcomed Security Council resolution 984 (1995), in which the five nuclear Powers endorsed positive and negative security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

98. His delegation believed that it was essential to extend the Treaty for an indefinite period. If that was done, the Treaty could become the basis for a new disarmament process and could strengthen international détente; that would reinforce the moral value of the decision of countries which, like Argentina, had the capacity to develop nuclear arms but had explicitly renounced that capacity.

99. Mr. TANAKA (Japan) said that, in the 25 years that the non-proliferation Treaty had been in effect, the progress in nuclear disarmament had not been as satisfactory as Japan had hoped. In fact, the arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States were significantly greater in 1995 than they had been in 1970. On the other hand, the conclusion of START I and START II between the United States and the former Soviet Union had been encouraging. Moreover, the President of the United States had announced that the United States would withdraw 200 tons of fissile material for nuclear weapons from its stockpile, and had referred to reductions beyond those envisaged in START II. His delegation hoped that the United States and the Russian Federation would ratify START II as soon as possible and would continue their efforts to reduce and eventually eliminate their nuclear arsenals, thereby setting an example for the other nuclear-weapon States.

100. His delegation welcomed the announcement by at least one other nuclear-weapon State regarding its readiness to reduce its nuclear weapons. The United States and the Russian Federation were continuing their disarmament efforts, and it was time for the other three nuclear-weapon States to take more serious steps towards the reduction of their nuclear arsenals.

101. The considerable progress made in the negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty at the Conference on Disarmament was also encouraging. The test-ban treaty should be concluded at the earliest possible date. Japan also appreciated the continued suspension of nuclear testing by four nuclear Powers and hoped that China would join that moratorium in the near future.

102. His delegation welcomed the decision taken at the Conference on Disarmament to establish the ad hoc committee to negotiate a fissile-material cut-off treaty and hoped that negotiations would begin as soon as possible. His delegation also appreciated the recent declaration at the Conference on Disarmament by France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States expressing their intention to implement the provisions of the non-proliferation Treaty, including article VI, and also Security Council resolution 984 (1995) on positive and negative security assurances.

103. With regard to article VII of the Treaty, his delegation attached great importance to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones to complement the non-proliferation Treaty, provided that such zones took account of local conditions. The validity of the nuclear-weapon-free zone established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco had been enhanced by the accession of Brazil, Argentina and Chile to the Treaty in 1994. His delegation also commended the efforts to draft a treaty on an African nuclear-weapon-free zone.
The international community's common goal of nuclear disarmament could best be achieved by extending the non-proliferation Treaty indefinitely. His delegation invited all States parties, in accordance with article VI of the Treaty, to redouble their efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament so that future generations could live in a secure, nuclear-weapon-free world.

Mr. FOUATHIA (Algeria) said that the consideration of the functioning of the non-proliferation Treaty over the past 25 years should permit a thorough and realistic evaluation of the accomplishments of the Treaty regime, with a view to prolonging that regime, improving its credibility, and ultimately, attaining the goal of universality. The regimes governing other types of weapons of mass destruction should be borne in mind, the final goal being to rid the world of all such weapons.

The fact that the goals contained in the Treaty had not been fully achieved should not prevent the international community from taking a positive approach to the future of the Treaty. Considerable cuts had taken place in the arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States; although those cuts were welcome, the remaining stockpiles were still too large, and those States should continue their efforts to reduce them further and ultimately to ban them altogether, as had been done in the case of chemical weapons.

It was to be hoped that the current negotiations for a comprehensive test-ban treaty would soon be successful, and an integrated approach to the issue of fissile materials had become a most urgent requirement. In addition, the security assurances required by the non-nuclear-weapon States should be embodied in a legally binding instrument, without any possibility of exceptions or differences of interpretation. The strengthening of the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones was vital for the security of all parts of the world; in that respect, it was to be hoped that particular attention would be given to the cases of Africa and the Middle East. The provisions of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) should apply not only to Iraq, but to the whole region.

His delegation hoped that the Treaty would be extended and strengthened; the Government of Algeria had always believed that the security of the world would be better ensured by nuclear disarmament than by the continued possession of such weapons.

Mr. THAN (Myanmar) said that his delegation would welcome a renewed commitment by the States parties to abide strictly by articles I and II of the Treaty. There was also an urgent need to strengthen its verification and safeguards provisions.

Despite a number of encouraging instances of bilateral and unilateral arms reductions, there was still a long way to go. Nuclear-weapon States should give to the international community a firm and solemn commitment to make further deep reductions in their arsenals, and to take measures leading to total nuclear disarmament. He concurred with the points made by previous speakers regarding nuclear-weapon-free zones and security assurances; the demands made by non-nuclear-weapon States in that respect were well justified. Security Council resolution 984 (1995) was a significant step, but it had fallen far short of the expectations and requirements of the non-nuclear-weapon States, having failed to create an international legal norm outlawing the use of nuclear weapons against such States; it could therefore only constitute an interim measure. At the Conference on Disarmament a number of States, including Myanmar, had recently submitted a draft protocol to the non-proliferation Treaty on the subject of security assurances. It could provide a useful basis for the elaboration of an international legal instrument.

The final document should contain firm and solemn commitments to the achievement of the aforementioned measures, and should reflect the importance of attaining the goal of universality. The use of nuclear weapons must be forever outlawed.
The meeting rose at 7.20 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 3rd MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Friday, 21 April 1995, at 10 a.m.

Chairman

Mr. AYEWAH (Nigeria)

The meeting was called to order at 10:55 a.m.

REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY AS PROVIDED FOR IN ITS ARTICLE VIII, PARAGRAPH 3 (agenda item 16)

(a) IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY RELATING TO NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

(i) ARTICLES I AND II AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 1 TO 3

1. The CHAIRMAN said that he trusted that the evaluation which the Committee was beginning of the implementation of articles I and II and of the first three preambular paragraphs of the Treaty would meet the expectations of States parties and of the entire international community.

2. Mr. AL-HAJAYA (Jordan) said that the commitments in respect of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, undertaken in accordance with the articles and paragraphs under consideration, had been fulfilled to a reasonable extent, although with a few exceptions where the responsibility was not only that of the States exporting nuclear technology and material but also those importing it. When reviewing articles I and II it should be remembered that the Treaty would not attain its objectives unless it was truly universal; it was not only certain States which violated the provisions of the Treaty that should be condemned but also those States which stubbornly refused to accede to it; steps should be taken to encourage States to accede to the Treaty, for example, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) could refuse to assist States which were not parties; in order to achieve the objective of the safeguards provided for in Security Council resolutions 255 (1968) and 984 (1995) and in the statements by the nuclear-weapon States it would be necessary to establish unconditional security assurances, both positive and negative; finally, given that the Treaty had no implementing mechanism, but depended for that on IAEA and the Security Council, those organs should be supported without using any double standard.

3. As for the commitments undertaken by States pursuant to article VI and the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs, the arms race had been brought to a halt at the level of the two super-Powers, but not at the regional level; nuclear disarmament had also progressed as far as the two super-Powers were concerned, but much still remained to be done before it was complete; although the consultations regarding a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty would be an important step forward towards nuclear disarmament, it should not be considered final since he hoped it would be followed by another treaty that would prohibit the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons.

4. Jordan considered that the Middle East was in a special position and that it should therefore be given priority during the consideration of the various issues. Only one State with nuclear capacity in the region continued to refuse to accede to the Treaty and to submit its installations to international inspection. That situation could not continue, particularly in view of the detente that had resulted from the peace process in the region.
5. Mrs. MULIMULA (United Republic of Tanzania) said that her country's decision to accede to the Treaty had been influenced by the positive developments in the field of nuclear disarmament following the end of the cold war; it had also been a gesture of goodwill following South Africa's decision to forgo its nuclear ambitions.

6. Articles I and II and the first to third preambular paragraphs were the salient features of the Treaty which had been more violated than they had been respected in the 25 years of the Treaty's existence. The international community had witnessed them being violated by those same countries which had signed the Treaty. The United Republic of Tanzania had fulfilled the obligations it had contracted under the Treaty and was participating actively in the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa. She hoped for an early conclusion of negotiations on a new treaty that would ban all nuclear tests and she expressed the hope that the Conference would come up with a programme of action and a definite timetable for the achievement of nuclear disarmament in the very near future.

7. The CHAIRMAN read out the text of article I of the Treaty and said that he would like to hear from the nuclear-weapon States regarding the implementation of the obligations contracted under that article.

8. Mr. SCHEINMAN (United States of America) said that the five nuclear-weapon States fully supported the principle and objectives of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Treaty had given all States the assurance that neighbouring States were not seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. It should be pointed out that article I had been literally implemented from the time the Treaty had come into force, and that the best way of ensuring that it continued to be implemented was to support the indefinite extension of the Treaty.

9. Mr. WANG Jun (China) said that, as was clear from the statements made by his delegation, both in plenary and in the Committee, and in the national report submitted to the Conference, China's commitment to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons dated not from 1972 when China acceded to the Treaty but from long before, from the very first day it had had such weapons. China had complied strictly with its obligations; it had not assisted, encouraged or induced other States to develop nuclear weapons and it had supported the ban on nuclear tests, the destruction of nuclear weapons and the prohibition and destruction of chemical and biological weapons. China had complied not only with its obligations under article I but also those under article VI.

10. Mr. BERDENNIKOV (Russian Federation) said that, as was pointed out in the documents submitted by his country and in the statement made to the Conference, both the former Soviet Union and the current Russian Federation had complied with article I of the Treaty. The Russian Federation trusted that the Conference would concur with that conclusion and that that would be reflected in the report. It also believed that it was necessary to strengthen the Treaty, particularly the provisions of articles I and II; in order to do so it would be best if the Conference were to decide on an indefinite extension of the Treaty.

11. Mr. BESANÇON (France) said that France had fully complied with the commitments stemming from article I of the Treaty.

12. Sir Michael WESTON (United Kingdom) said that the position of the United Kingdom was clear and had been set forth in detail in the document submitted by his country. The United Kingdom took its obligations under article I of the Treaty very seriously and it endeavoured to fulfil them fully at all times.

13. The CHAIRMAN asked whether any non-nuclear-weapon State wished to confirm what the previous speakers had said.
14. Mr. MARÍN BOSCH (Mexico) said he would like to clarify some matters relating to articles I and II of the Treaty, in particular the question of the transfer of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Mexico had no privileged information on the question, but rather depended on the information provided by institutions of various kinds, for instance the report of the non-governmental organization Greenpeace entitled "A special relationship: US/UK nuclear cooperation and the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty" of April 1995, which dealt with nuclear cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom and with the continuing failure to comply with the spirit and objectives of the Treaty. According to that report, over the past 36 years the United States had transferred to the United Kingdom copious quantities of technical information, materials and basic components for the United Kingdom nuclear weapons programme, thus contributing directly to the failure of that country to comply with article VI of the Treaty. The report also cited a statement by the Director of the Aldermaston Atomic Weapons Establishment concerning the nuclear assistance provided by the United States to the United Kingdom Trident programme.

15. He also referred to a document prepared by the Centre for European Security and Disarmament and the British American Security Information Council entitled "NATO and nuclear proliferation" in which it was stated that, although the number of nuclear weapons allocated to the allies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had been dramatically reduced since the end of the cold war, there were still a number of NATO countries which had nuclear units and held United States nuclear bombs for use in the event of war. The exact number of those weapons was not known, but it was probable that the weapons were a small part of the more than 300 B-61 bombs available to the United States Air Force Europe (USAFE) and that it appeared were being held at nuclear bases in Turkey, Greece, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany and the United Kingdom. The weapons were in the charge of USAFE, which maintained them in order to comply with the rule in the Treaty regarding the transfer of nuclear weapons or devices. However, when the time came to use them, United States nuclear weapons would be loaded onto NATO aircraft flown by allied pilots, so that, when the aircraft took off, the control of those weapons would be transferred to the other State. In view of all the foregoing, he would like clarification regarding the situations mentioned during the course of the debate in order to have a clearer idea of the meaning and scope of the Treaty.

16. Mr. KAREM (Egypt) said he thought that article I was clear in that it specified that nuclear weapons or devices could not be transferred to any recipient but that it was quite vague with regard to the concepts and principles which it embodied. Referring to the ideas expressed at previous Conferences concerning the undertakings given by the nuclear-weapon States, he said he wished to raise two questions: first, the deep concern over the nuclear-weapon programmes of some States which were not parties to the Treaty and, second, the specific case of Israel, which was a matter of concern for the whole Middle East region.

17. He pointed out that an appeal had already been made to all States to prohibit any transfer of nuclear facilities, resources or devices and to prohibit the transfer of material destined for the nuclear industry since that would only serve to strengthen the nuclear capacity of the country concerned and be detrimental to the main objective of the Treaty and to international peace and security.

18. Mr. SUKAYRI (Jordan) said that his country had complied with its obligations under article I as a non-nuclear-weapon State. For their part, the nuclear-weapon States had complied with their obligations in principle or in general. However, if those States had complied with the provisions of article I and all other States with a nuclear capability had complied with all their obligations, he wondered how those States which had contravened the provisions of the Treaty had managed to do so since two parties were involved in any transfer of nuclear material: a provider and a recipient. It was
therefore not clear where the recipient countries had obtained the nuclear material, technical know-how and technology.

19. **Mr. ELTINAI** (Sudan) agreed with the view expressed by Jordan concerning the transfer of nuclear weapons or devices and the declarations by the nuclear-weapon States in connection with article I. The States parties to the Treaty, both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States, had complied with their obligations under articles I and II. There were, however, also States which were not parties to the Treaty and had a nuclear capability. It appeared, therefore, that the States which had contravened the provisions of the Treaty were those which were not parties to it. The detention of spies in the Sudan had provided information on the way in which States non-parties to the Treaty had managed to transfer nuclear capacity to Israel. Lastly, he pointed out that China was following the same procedure as during the cold war with regard to the transfer of nuclear material; it therefore had some doubts about China's compliance with article I of the Treaty.

20. **Mrs. GUELLIL** (Germany), responding to the explicit allusion made by the representative of Mexico to the effect that Germany had received nuclear weapons, said that there was no foundation for such a statement. The NATO agreements complied strictly with the provisions of the Treaty. There had never been any transfer whatsoever of nuclear material or know-how for military purpose and at no Conference of the parties had there ever been any complaint that those agreements contravened articles I and II of the Treaty. With regard to the question raised by Jordan, she added that, while there might be reason to believe that nuclear material and know-how had been transferred for military purposes, such accusations must be backed by specific data.

21. **Mr. PAPADIMITROPOULOS** (Greece) supported the statement made by the representative of Germany and said he believed that the question raised had nothing to do with the Treaty, in particular article I, since it involved no transfer nor any contribution to the nuclear capacity of non-nuclear-weapon States which were parties to the Treaty. The NATO agreements were therefore compatible with the provisions of the Treaty.

22. **Mr. MERNIER** (Belgium) endorsed the statements made by the representatives of Germany and Greece. Belgium had never received any military nuclear technology nor had it contravened the provisions of the Treaty in that respect. With regard to article II, he dismissed the accusations made by Greenpeace, which he considered unfounded, since Belgium had never tried to acquire nuclear weapons or to transfer nuclear technology to other countries.

23. **Mrs. MULAMULA** (United Republic of Tanzania) supported the statements made by the representatives of Mexico, Egypt and Jordan. She also referred to the nuclear nightmare experienced by Africa for years because of the decision of the nuclear-weapon States not to comply with the Treaty. A situation had thus been created in which an African State had acquired a nuclear capability and the countries which had had the means and capacity to verify the relevant reports doubted the accusations of the African countries, which could not themselves verify the truth of the reports. Fortunately, international pressure had obliged that State to acknowledge publicly not only that it had acquired a nuclear capability but also that it had installed nuclear weapons. The nuclear-weapon States had assisted, encouraged and induced some countries to acquire nuclear weapons for one reason or another. Therefore, whatever they might say to the contrary, they had contravened the provisions of article I; it was not, however, up to the non-nuclear-weapon States to prove it.

24. She supported the statement by the representative of Egypt concerning the vagueness of article I, since the deployment of nuclear warheads in the territory of non-nuclear-weapon States would represent a violation of article I if it was interpreted as a transfer of nuclear weapons. Lastly, she proposed that a sanctions regime should be imposed on those States which contravened the aforementioned articles; to date the recipient countries had been punished, but the providers should also be penalized.
25. **Mr. ARCILLA** (Philippines) said that the Philippines had scrupulously complied with the provisions of article II. With regard to article I, the nuclear-weapon States stated that they had fully complied with its provisions; nevertheless, as the representative of Mexico had pointed out, to judge from a Greenpeace report, there had been transfers of nuclear devices from nuclear-weapon States. If that report was true, the Philippines urged the parties concerned to clarify the matter.

26. **Mr. SUKAYRI** (Jordan) said that a stop had recently been put to the suspected nuclear programme of a State that could not have made progress in that field without receiving transfers of nuclear technology and materials. Jordan would like those participating in such transfers to provide clarifications concerning their methods. The necessary materials or technology could only have come from some of the five nuclear-weapon States.

27. **Mr. FASEHUN** (Nigeria) said that the wording of article I was precise and unequivocal and not subject to flexible interpretations. The nuclear-weapon States denied that there had been any transfers. Nigeria wondered if any transfers of nuclear material or technology from those States had taken place. According to the Greenpeace report mentioned by Mexico, the transfers were an established fact. There was no denying the importance of those charges. The present Conference differed from earlier conferences because of the decisions that were to be adopted. If there had been any negligence or violations of the Treaty the States involved must admit the fact.

28. He thought that too much emphasis had been placed on horizontal proliferation, whereas vertical proliferation was an equally disturbing problem. Like other countries, Nigeria wondered how some States had acquired the technology and resources necessary to be practically in a position to develop nuclear weapons, and what effect the transfer of such resources and technology would have on the development of those States. It also wondered if it was true that a non-nuclear-weapon State allied with a nuclear-weapon State could, in case of war, have access to such weapons.

29. Lastly, he said that, as the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Nigeria had stated, Nigeria's policy in the matter of nuclear weapons had always been absolutely transparent. Nigeria was receiving no nuclear products or devices that were not subject to IAEA safeguards, and it did not permit the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Nigeria would like all States present to make a similar statement.

30. **Mr. KERVERS** (Netherlands) said that the Netherlands had fully observed the provisions of article II. With regard to the publication mentioned by the representative of Mexico on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and proliferation, like the representatives of Germany, Greece and Belgium, he wished to state that the Netherlands had never acquired control over nuclear weapons. NATO had always been governed by the provisions of the non-proliferation Treaty.

31. On the other hand, his delegation did not agree with the view that a violation of article II necessarily implied a violation of article I; the non-nuclear weapon States had their own responsibilities under article II and there could be a violation of that article without any participation by nuclear-weapon States.

32. **Mr. MAJID** (Bangladesh) said that article I referred only to nuclear-weapon States and did not prevent States that have no nuclear weapons but were technologically advanced from doing precisely what the article prohibited. Those States could not transfer nuclear weapons but they could assist, encourage or induce non-nuclear weapon States to manufacture or acquire them, especially if they were not parties to the Treaty. Bangladesh would like to have clarifications on that point.

33. **Mr. TALIANI** (Italy) said that it was possible that exports of nuclear material made in good faith and for peaceful purposes were being diverted to...
nuclear weapons programmes. There had been at least two cases of States parties violating the provisions of the Treaty in that way.

34. Mr. EFFENDI (Indonesia) said that his country was not in a position to verify compliance with the provisions of articles I and II. Like the representative of Mexico, he recalled Greenpeace reports to the effect that the provisions of articles I and II had been violated by nuclear-weapon States. If the Treaty was to be strengthened, every effort must be made to comply with its provisions. In that connection Indonesia would like it to be established whether the accusations of violations were true or false.

35. Mr. FOUATHIA (Algeria) said that his country was also incapable of verifying compliance with the provisions of the Treaty. Shortly after the first nuclear test on the African continent, which had taken place in Algeria, the majority of African countries had become aware of the need to declare Africa a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa had been approved by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1964. However, it had not been possible to put the Declaration into effect because of the nuclear ambitions harboured at that time by one State on the continent. The fears of the African countries had proved to be well founded when South Africa had confirmed that it had a nuclear programme. Fortunately those ambitions had been renounced and, at the fiftieth session of the General Assembly, the final text of a treaty on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa could be submitted.

36. With regard to the Middle East, it was stated that there had been no transfers of nuclear weapons or devices. But, once again, the reverse could be deduced from the fact that one State, which was not a party to the Treaty, had not placed its installations under IAEA safeguards and had not denied that it possessed nuclear weapons. Algeria felt that in that case, too, fears were not unfounded. It would like its concern to be reflected in the report of the Conference.

37. Sir Michael WESTON (United Kingdom) wished to refer to the comments made by the representative of Mexico concerning nuclear cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom, and particularly to the comment that the transfer of nuclear material and other information constituted a violation of the spirit of articles I and VI of the Treaty. The United States and the United Kingdom had made no transfers prohibited by article I. He also pointed out that the United Kingdom was strictly abiding by its obligations under article VI. As had been said in the general debate, the United Kingdom had made a considerable contribution to the reduction of nuclear forces and, by the end of the 1990s, it would have reduced its nuclear warheads by 21 per cent compared to the 1970s level, which showed its commitment to promoting the objectives stated in article VI.

38. Mr. SCHEINMAN (United States of America) said that the mutual defence agreements with the United Kingdom and the relevant NATO provisions were fully in accord with article I of the Treaty. Despite statements to the contrary, the United States had not transferred any nuclear weapons, nor had it encouraged or induced any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or acquire explosive nuclear devices. United States legislation explicitly prohibited such activities, both in the public and in the private sectors. Moreover, a comprehensive system for the control of nuclear technology and dual-use exports had been set up with a view to ensuring compliance with the provisions of article I of the Treaty.

39. With regard to article II, he wished to draw attention to the various reports prepared by the IAEA and the Special United Nations Commission on inspections in Iraq under Security Council resolutions 687 (1991) and 707 (1991). The obvious conclusion to be drawn from those documents was that Iraq had violated the provisions of article II of the Treaty. The United States felt that the same attention should be paid to article II as to article I.
40. The CHAIRMAN said that a question of sovereign political will was involved. If a State committed a deliberate violation and did not wish to explain the reasons for its action, the only possibility left was to seek information from another State. If confidence was placed in the abilities of the press or non-governmental organizations it was because, since they were not interested parties, they were assumed to provide, independently of the results of their inquiries, a reliable and unbiased view which had a certain credibility. On the other hand he expressed the hope that the recommendations resulting from the Committee's proceedings would serve to remedy the deficiencies noted in the application of the Treaty.

41. Mr. PAPADIMITRIOPOULOS (Greece) said that the measures taken to monitor the export of nuclear materials, in which his country was also participating, had been strengthened in recent years, and that showed the solidarity that existed between the exporting countries and contributed to the strengthening of the non-proliferation system by the nuclear-weapon States and helped to promote faith in the Treaty.

42. Mr. MORADI (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that he had the same questions as the representative of Mexico and other members of the Committee regarding violations of article I of the Treaty by nuclear-weapon States. In fact, those States had failed to provide any clear explanation of such violations, examples of which included the agreements between the United States of America and the United Kingdom on the sale of Polaris and Trident missiles for the development of nuclear weapons systems, the supply of radioactive nitric acid to the B205 facility at Sellafield, United Kingdom, and the promises made between nuclear-weapon States to transfer information and technology relating to nuclear test simulations.

43. Mr. JURSCHEWSKY (Canada), referring to article I, said that the presumed programmes for the manufacture of nuclear weapons in non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty had led some delegations to conclude that improper transfers of technology had taken place. His delegation did not share that view. Unfortunately, the manufacture of nuclear weapons was based on a highly developed technology the principles of which were widely known and not confined to the nuclear-weapon States. It was even possible to find information on the design of nuclear bombs through networks such as INTERNET. That depressing fact underscored the need to improve export controls on nuclear technology to ensure that it was used for peaceful purposes and the need to strengthen the implementation of the IAEA safeguards programme. With regard to article II, he noted that since the late 1940s Canada had renounced the manufacture of nuclear weapons and roundly affirmed that it had received no nuclear technology whatsoever, and would not accept it under any circumstances.

44. The CHAIRMAN read out article II of the Treaty and said that, by definition, the obligation set out in that article applied to non-nuclear-weapon States parties. He therefore hoped that those States would say whether they had respected the provisions of that article.

45. Mr. MERNIER (Belgium) agreed with the representative of Canada that a violation of the Treaty did not necessarily require two guilty parties; many of the States taking part in the debate had the capacity to develop nuclear weapons without resorting to the technology of nuclear-weapon States. Article II dealt with cases in which States manufactured nuclear weapons with their own resources. Belgium provided a broad range of cooperation in the sphere of civilian nuclear power. Given that the boundary between the military and civilian nuclear energy sectors was somewhat indistinct, the possibility that civilian nuclear material delivered to one State might be diverted to other uses that violated the Treaty could not be excluded.

46. The CHAIRMAN invited the nuclear-weapon States to express their views as to whether non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty had duly met their obligations under that instrument.
47. Mr. KERVERS (Netherlands) said that the responsibility for complying with article II lay with States that did not possess nuclear weapons and not on those that did. In his view, it was not up to the latter to determine whether the former had violated the provisions of the Treaty.

48. Mr. SCHEINMAN (United States of America) supported the remarks made by the representative of the Netherlands and said that, with regard to the failure to comply with the provisions of article II, statements had been issued not only by one nuclear-weapon State but by the Security Council itself, including those having to do with Iraq’s failure to comply with those provisions and Security Council resolution 815 (1993), which called upon the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to abide by the agreement concluded with IAEA under the Treaty.

49. Mr. LAPTSENAK (Belarus) said that although his country had not participated in the drafting of the non-proliferation Treaty, it had become a party to the Treaty without reservations and was fully complying with its provisions. Belarus was an example of the way in which a State party to the Treaty could fulfill its obligations, since on acceding to that instrument it had eliminated its tactical and strategic nuclear weapons, and its current Constitution expressly stated that the country was a non-nuclear-weapon State.

50. Mr. ELTINAI (Sudan) said that the violation covered in article II was not exactly the same as acquisition; the deployment of nuclear weapons was also a kind of violation. The responsibilities and obligations of recipient States included those arising from a country’s acceptance of the deployment of nuclear weapons on its territory.

51. Mr. PAPADIMITROPOULOS (Greece) and Ms. GUELLIL (Germany) said that their countries, which were non-nuclear-weapon States, were complying strictly with the provisions of article II.

52. Mr. ARCILLA (Philippines) said he thought it was quite logical that the Chairman should invite the nuclear-weapon States to make statements on other States’ compliance with the provisions of article II, and he wondered whether the representative of the Netherlands had spoken as a nuclear-weapon or a non-nuclear-weapon State. For its part, the Philippines was a non-nuclear-weapon State which complied with the provisions of article II.

53. Mr. TALJANI (Italy) said that while there were confirmed instances of failure to comply with the provisions of the Treaty, including the outright production of nuclear technology, in other cases, such as that of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, failure to comply had not been conclusively demonstrated. His delegation was not aware of any other violations of article II.

54. Mr. HASAN (Iraq) said that he would not go into detail regarding the false accusations that had been levelled against his country which were a cover-up for well-known political interests. He wished to stress, however, that the attitude of the Security Council vis-à-vis Iraq was discriminatory, not objective and did not serve to strengthen the Treaty. There were States other than the five nuclear Powers that had produced nuclear bombs and still others that were trying to learn more about manufacturing such weapons, producing enriched uranium and using plutonium radiation. In addition, some States that were not parties to the Treaty had transferred large amounts of uranium to other States that were also not parties. In that context, Iraq should be cleared of all such accusations, and his delegation intended to take the matter up more fully at a subsequent meeting of the Committee.

55. The CHAIRMAN said it seemed to be the view of the Committee that the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty had largely met their obligations under article II.

56. Mr. GAJDA (Hungary) said that the Committee’s review should lead to a serious report based on statements and facts. The Committee had a mandate to conduct a review but not to judge. The regime set up by Governments had a
mechanism for investigating complaints, a task which fell to IAEA and, subsequently, to the Security Council. The Committee must not seek to do the work of those two bodies, although every country had the right to state its position. The Government of Hungary was complying fully with the provisions of article II and had not been asked or forced to become a nuclear-weapon State.

57. The CHAIRMAN said that the Committee had concluded its debate on article II. If he heard no objection, he would take it that the Committee agreed with the content of the first three paragraphs of the preamble. He asked delegations to submit concrete proposals on articles I and II, which would be systematized by the Secretariat for subsequent consideration by the Committee. The draft document would be approved by the Committee prior to submission to the drafting committee.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 4th MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York,
on Tuesday, 25 April 1995, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. AYEWAH (Nigeria)

The meeting was called to order at 3.45 p.m.

REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY AS PROVIDED FOR IN ITS ARTICLE VIII,
PARAGRAPH 3 (agenda item 16) (continued)

(a) IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY RELATING TO
NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, DISARMAMENT AND
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

(i) ARTICLES I AND II AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 1 TO 3
(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/CRP.2, CRP.3, CRP.4, CRP.5 and CRP.6)

1. The CHAIRMAN said that review of the question of security assurances and
article VII had been entrusted to a working group, whereas the Committee
itself would focus on articles I and II of the Treaty and the first to third
preambular paragraphs on the basis of the working papers.

2. Mr. ALHAJIBRAHIM (Syrian Arab Republic) said that his country had been
one of the first to accede to the Treaty. For 25 years Syria had complied
with its commitments under the Treaty, had never attempted to acquire nuclear
weapons, and had played a positive role in strengthening security and
stability in the Middle East. The Conference offered a unique and historic
opportunity to eliminate nuclear weapons and the risk that their proliferation
represented for the world. The Conference would facilitate objective study of
the articles of the Treaty and the establishment of binding legal rules to
ensure that States fulfilled the obligations set forth in the preamble and
articles I and II of the Treaty.

3. The objective and general sense of the provisions of articles I and II
were quite clear. The possession of nuclear weapons, and of materials which
could be used to develop nuclear weapons by States, in particular States which
were not parties to the Treaty, would not have been possible without the
assistance of nuclear-weapon States which did not respect their obligations
under those articles.

4. The refusal of Israel, the only State in the sensitive region of the
Middle East to possess nuclear weapons, to accede to the Treaty deprived the
latter of universality. In acting as it did Israel enjoyed an unfair
advantage enabling it to strengthen its nuclear arsenal with which it
threatened peace and security in the Middle East and throughout the world. At
the same time there were demands for other States in the region, parties to
the Treaty, to conform to its provisions. By refusing to place its
installations under the system of safeguards, Israel left the door open for an
arms race in the region. Israel should follow the example of other nuclear-
weapon States which had renounced the nuclear option by acceding to the
Treaty, on which they were to be commended.

5. At the conference on chemical weapons, held in Paris in 1989, Syria had
made an appeal for the establishment in the Middle East, under United Nations
auspices, of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. However it was
impossible to establish such a zone if at the heart of the Middle East there
remained a nuclear arsenal not subject to international verification and
control.
6. The consolidation of the de facto situation, which seemed to consist in requiring all the Middle East States, with the exception of Israel, to conform to the non-proliferation regime, would perpetuate a serious imbalance that threatened the security and stability of the region, which was unacceptable. Accordingly Syria reaffirmed that all States, including Israel, must accede to the Treaty, which would thus become universal and would have attained its objectives on a non-discriminatory basis.

7. Mr. ELIASSEN (Denmark) welcomed the progress made since the 1990 Conference: the nuclear-arms race had been reversed and an impressive number of nuclear weapons were being destroyed every year under the START I and START II agreements and the Lisbon Protocol. In addition a number of nuclear-weapon States had unilaterally decided to dismantle large numbers of short- and intermediate-range nuclear weapons. It now seemed possible to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty that would prevent vertical and horizontal proliferation and the development of new generations of advanced nuclear weapons and that would greatly strengthen global security. Such a treaty should be followed by a convention to prohibit the production of fissile materials. Denmark welcomed the positive developments in that regard at the Conference on Disarmament and looked forward to the beginning of the work of the ad hoc committee on the question.

8. All the multilateral and bilateral agreements depended on the non-proliferation Treaty, which must be strengthened and made universal. Denmark favoured the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty. Non-proliferation must be considered a global norm of behaviour.

9. Articles I and II, dealt with by Main Committee I, contained the basic obligations of the Treaty. The nuclear Powers had reaffirmed their compliance with article I. Regarding article II, Denmark supported the efforts undertaken to strengthen the effectiveness of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) system of safeguards.

10. Mr. DUPREEZ (South Africa) welcomed the recent statements by the nuclear-weapon States regarding respect for the obligations arising under article I, as well as the statements by other, non-nuclear-weapon States concerning application of article II of the Treaty, as constituting a sound basis for the creation of an environment of global security. Respect for the Treaty and its universality were the best guarantees of non-proliferation. That was why South Africa had renounced its nuclear arsenal and decided to become party to the Treaty. Since the latter had entered into force, the number of potential nuclear States had decreased. A certain number of States, including South Africa, had renounced the nuclear option and had joined the non-proliferation regime. In the view of South Africa regional security must be based on comprehensive nuclear disarmament. The non-proliferation Treaty would give Africa greater security than nuclear arsenals such as that which South Africa had destroyed.

11. At the last meeting of the Committee several delegations had wondered how the non-nuclear-weapon States succeeded in acquiring nuclear weapons without transfers of the technology, materials and equipment needed for their production by the nuclear Powers or other States. South Africa's experience might provide an answer to that question: a State with significant fuel cycle activities and an advanced technological infrastructure could equip itself with a nuclear capability through domestic enrichment processes and very simple equipment. In that regard the export control regime could play only a very limited role.

12. Until very recently southern Africa had been in the throes of conflict and great instability; nuclear weapons had been seen as offering the best assurance of security. South Africa's example should show both potential nuclear States as well as acknowledged nuclear Powers that disarmament was the way forward. South Africa had abandoned its programme of nuclear deterrence once the international climate had improved. His Government was convinced that it was not enough to prevent the proliferation of nuclear technology through a system of export controls and safeguards, but that the security
concerns of States, particularly in a regional context, must be adequately addressed.

13. The CHAIRMAN recalled that it was the Committee's task to conduct a substantive review of articles I and II and the first to third preambular paragraphs. He urged delegations not to fall back on fixed positions but to demonstrate a spirit of conciliation so that the Committee could reach agreement on an acceptable document.

14. Mr. FRASER (Secretary of the Committee), introducing document CRP.2, said that the Secretariat had endeavoured to identify the key concepts in the statements made in the Committee and in the Conference itself, as well as in the documents submitted. Certain sections of the document used wording adopted by previous review conferences.

15. The CHAIRMAN said that he hoped that the Committee would seek to adopt a text that was as concise as possible. The Secretariat document was based on texts which had already been adopted, while reflecting discussion at the current Conference. It offered a useful working basis.

16. Mr. TAYLHARDIT (Venezuela), while recognizing the usefulness of the document, said it should be considered only as a significant contribution to the formulation of a text that would reflect the outcome of the Committee's work, and not as a working basis.

17. Mr. PATOKALLIO (Finland) said that it was regrettable that the document had been prepared by the Secretariat and not by the Chairman, and supported the representative of Venezuela: the Committee would have a genuine basis on which to proceed with its work only when it had a document incorporating all the proposals made by delegations. He asked whether the Committee would establish a drafting group at the conclusion of the general debate.

18. The CHAIRMAN said that it was the Secretariat which had submitted the document precisely because not all the proposals to be formulated by delegations were reflected. It should be remembered that the Committee would meet as a drafting group.

19. Mr. ERRERA (France) said he shared the Venezuelan representative's view that the document was merely one of the elements for discussion and not a working basis, since delegations could still make contributions, which would have to be included in the document before it could be considered such a basis. He would subsequently submit proposals on behalf of the European Union.

20. Mr. LAPTESEK (Belarus) thanked the Secretariat for preparing the document, thereby providing the Committee with an initial basis for its work. However, he shared the opinions expressed by previous speakers inasmuch as the document did not reflect all the positions which had emerged in the course of the discussions. In particular, it lacked a whole series of important ideas and information with respect to certain political changes and measures taken by countries which had greatly helped to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. Within both the plenary Conference and the main committees many delegations had repeatedly emphasized the important contributions to the strengthening of international security of three countries previously belonging to the former Soviet Union, namely, Byelorussia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, which had all three adopted drastic nuclear disarmament measures. Since the document did not reflect those facts, it could be used as a contribution but could not constitute a basic document.

21. The CHAIRMAN endorsed the comments made by delegations and deplored the paucity of written contributions received. He stressed the need to make the best use of the time and premises available to the Conference and reminded the Committee that the negotiations proper were due to begin the following day. Accordingly, unless previously announced, no new written contributions could be accepted. In his view, document CRP.2 reflected what had been said thus far. He invited delegations to submit specific proposals.
22. **Mr. Scheininman** (United States of America) said that documents CRP.3 and CRP.4 were really not so much working documents as information documents. He suggested that the Committee should hear the proposals and differing views and that the Secretariat should summarize them for the following day's discussion. He regarded document CRP.2 as interesting but too concise and thought that it needed to be rounded out with other proposals in order to provide a sound working basis.

23. **Mr. Errera** (France) introduced document CRP.6 on behalf of the 15 countries members of the European Union and outlined the most important points. First, it reaffirmed the importance to international peace and security of the full implementation of the provisions of the Treaty. Secondly, the Conference noted with satisfaction that the Treaty had become almost universal and that South Africa and a number of States previously belonging to the former Soviet Union had acceded as non-nuclear-weapon States. Thirdly, the Conference invited those States which had not yet acceded to the Treaty to do so without delay. Fourthly, the Conference reaffirmed the determination of all States parties to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and in that regard it stressed the importance of the statement made by the President of the Security Council, on behalf of the members of the Council, at the meeting held on 31 January 1992 at the level of heads of State or Government, namely that "the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction [constituted] a threat to international peace and security". Fifthly, the Conference welcomed positive developments in the international situation which had helped to lessen the danger of nuclear war. Sixthly, the Conference expressed concern about violations of the Treaty and underlined the need for all parties to the Treaty to comply scrupulously with their obligations. Such was the substance of the elements which the Committee's report should take into account.

24. **Mr. Karem** (Egypt), introducing document CRP.5, said that his delegation had already expressed its general position and that the document it was introducing was exclusively concerned with the question of Israel. The first paragraph reproduced the wording of the paragraph of the final document of the Third Review Conference, in 1985, which referred to South Africa and Israel and which it seemed essential to reproduce since Israel remained a problem. The terminology used in the second paragraph came from the resolutions adopted every year by the General Assembly on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East and the resolution adopted every year by consensus in TASA. The third paragraph dealt with the question of exports of nuclear equipment, material and information to Israel. He felt bound to add that, when document CRP.2 had been introduced, he had been disappointed and amazed to find that paragraph 6 of that document did not reflect Egypt's views. In view of the omission, it would not be superfluous for his delegation to highlight that question and provide some background.

25. The presence of a country which was implementing a non-peaceful nuclear programme only a few kilometres away from the frontiers of Egypt and other Arab countries that had renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons was very alarming, for Egypt was anxious to safeguard peace and security in the region, which had suffered so much from war. The case of South Africa was similar, with the presence of nuclear weapons representing a danger for the whole of southern Africa, and that country's courageous decision to renounce its nuclear programme, thereby placing the interests of the region as a whole above those of a single nation, was most commendable.

26. The Middle East was currently in need of a lasting peace whose cornerstone should be security, without which the economic development of the region would be hampered. That was the inner conviction which had impelled Egypt to sign the Treaty on 1 July 1968, although it had been unable to ratify the Treaty because Israel had refused to accede to it. In 1974, when the danger of a nuclear apocalypse had appeared imminent, Egypt had taken the initiative of including in the agenda of the General Assembly an item on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East in the belief that it was evident that all the countries of the region should renounce nuclear weapons and accede to the Treaty. An appeal to that effect
had been included in all the resolutions subsequently adopted on the subject.

27. Once the peace process had begun to gather momentum and Egypt had initiated the negotiations leading to the Camp David Accords, it had submitted to Israel a detailed document emphasizing the imperative need to apply the nuclear non-proliferation regime in the region and requesting it to accede to the Treaty. On 26 February 1991, Egypt had ratified the Treaty in the hope that its ratification would persuade Israel to accede, but that hope had not been realized.

28. In 1989, at the Conference on chemical weapons in Paris, Egypt had stated on 8 January that the question of chemical weapons should not be separated from the question of the proliferation of other weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons. It had held that it was illogical that certain countries of the Middle East should continue to possess nuclear weapons and to refuse to allow inspections, and that the success of a convention completely banning chemical weapons called for a symmetrical commitment of all the countries of the region.

29. In 1990, President Mubarak had submitted his proposal on the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and, in July 1991, the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs had sent a letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations listing numerous proposals on the subject of arms control and disarmament in the Middle East and emphasizing the need to create security in the region on the basis of equilibrium and equality and to establish a denuclearized zone.

30. In 1991, under the aegis of IAEA, Egypt had submitted to the Agency a new resolution on the need to apply a full-scope safeguards system, assigning a specific role to the Agency and its Director-General, who had visited the region and then reported on the subject to the Agency.

31. In July 1993, when it had been recognized that Egypt’s requests had not been satisfied, Egypt had expressed its regret at being unable to attend the ceremony for the signature of the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, stating that it envisaged the Convention as part of a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction that should be instituted in the Middle East, and it had again invited Israel to accede to the Treaty and to subject all its facilities to IAEA inspection.

32. The Middle East did not lack machinery for the purpose: the multilateral group on arms control and regional security had been established to enable all the countries of the region, including Israel, to meet and discuss relevant issues. The group had submitted a number of proposals on the need to establish a denuclearized zone in the Middle East. In the course of four years of arduous work, it had become apparent that Israel had not changed its position at all. Appeals to Israel, then, were nothing new, and the fact that past appeals had never been heeded needed to be emphasized in the Committee.

33. Mr. HASAN (Iraq) observed that a delegation had arranged for the circulation in document CRP.3 of Security Council resolution 707 (1991), which had been adopted four years previously, a fact which cast doubt on its relevance. The documents circulated should have a direct bearing on the work of the Committee, for otherwise it would be overburdened.

34. In order to ensure that the members of the Committee were aware that Iraq had implemented Security Council resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991) and 715 (1991), his delegation had requested distribution of the report of the Director-General of IAEA (S/1995/287), paragraphs 48 and 49 of which confirmed the continuous presence of IAEA inspectors in Iraq. Consequently, incriminating directly Iraq and Iraq alone would be outside the field of competence of the Conference and would even run counter to its spirit, for it would lead the Conference to take a political approach, although it was not supposed to do so.
35. The case of Iraq had been greatly exaggerated; Iraq had indeed postponed declaring its installations in order to prevent them from being destroyed as had occurred in 1981. There were numerous non-compliance cases and violations to the Treaty noted in the past few years. Iraq knew that there were such violations, but it could not provide detailed information about them because it did not have satellites or sophisticated information services, but it knew about them from the press and from communications issued by IAEA and Greenpeace. It would suffice to cite a number of examples: that of Luxembourg, for instance, which in 1985 had delivered uranium to Israel, or the Eastern European country which had withdrawn irradiated fuel without informing IAEA but had been congratulated on its declaration when IAEA had finally been informed. That showed clearly that two different standards were being applied. On 19 April 1995 Le Monde had published a Greenpeace report on countries which had violated the obligations they had accepted under the Treaty, in particular the United States and certain European countries: 500 nuclear warheads had been transferred to 16 bases in Europe. Furthermore, the head of the Belgian air force had stated on 20 April 1995 that his arsenal contained nuclear warheads. Greenpeace had also provided information on violations of the rules on export of nuclear materials (in that particular case, highly enriched plutonium) by the United States and another non-nuclear State which was a party to the Treaty. If there were weak links in the safeguards system, steps should be taken to eliminate them instead of transforming the problem as a whole into a political question.

36. The CHAIRMAN reminded the members of the Committee that statements should not exceed five minutes.

37. Mr. SUKAYRI (Jordan) said he fully shared the views expressed by Egypt in document CRP.5; Egypt’s position was identical to that of Jordan. Jordan’s views on Israel’s nuclear capability had been expressed in the General Assembly, in the First Committee, in the debate in the United Nations Disarmament Commission and recently in the statement by the Jordanian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the plenary Conference on Wednesday, 19 April. In that statement, the Minister had observed that the intransigence of Israel and its refusal to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty, as desired by the international community, would prevent the establishment of a climate of confidence in the region and would reinforce ideological barriers while impeding the international community’s peace efforts.

38. It would be impossible to convince the States of the region that Israel seriously wanted a lasting peace in the Middle East if it continued to refuse to accede to the Treaty and submit its installations to the IAEA safeguards system.

39. Mr. EFFENDI (Indonesia) said that, as delegations had been urged to submit written proposals, a contact group of the Non-Aligned Movement had just informed him that the next day or the day after that it would submit a document concerning article I, article II and the first, second and third preambular paragraphs of the Treaty, consideration of which had been referred to Main Committee I.

40. The CHAIRMAN said it would be desirable for the document to be submitted a little earlier. It was his understanding that other groups likewise wished to submit written proposals. That being so, he would extend the time-limit for the submission of proposals, which had initially been 25 April. He would also arrange for preparation of a new version of document CRP.2 in order to take into account the additional contributions submitted to him.

41. Mr. MERNIER (Belgium) said that the representative of Iraq had called in question Belgium’s observance of the Treaty. Belgium, which had never become a nuclear State, had signed within the context of the Atlantic Alliance agreements which had always been considered compatible with the Treaty. The allegations of Greenpeace, to which the representative of Iraq had referred, could in no way suffice to establish facts.

42. The CHAIRMAN suggested that the Committee should begin consideration of document CRP.6, submitted by the European Union.
43. Mr. SCHEINMAN (United States of America) said that his delegation wished to study in greater depth the document submitted by the European Union and document CRP.2; it would comment on those documents at the next meeting and circulate its comments as soon as possible. With regard to the Egyptian proposal (document CRP.5), he noted that the representative of Egypt had expressed a desire to reproduce the text adopted in 1985, but a comparison of the two versions showed that whereas the 1985 text said "The Conference noted the great and serious concerns expressed about the nuclear capability of South Africa and Israel", document CRP.5 read "The Conference calls on Israel to renounce possession of nuclear weapons and to accede to the NPT". The United States shared the concern about the fact that the Treaty was not universal and hoped that all peaceful uses of nuclear energy would be subjected to the safeguards system, but felt that instead of singling out one State which was not a party to the Treaty it would be preferable to call on all States which possessed nuclear installations and were not parties to the Treaty to accede to it.

44. The CHAIRMAN suggested that the Committee should take up article VI.

45. Mrs. BRONTE MOULES (Australia) observed that the plan had been to consider articles I and II only; it would be preferable not to change the agenda and to take up article VI at the next meeting, for some members of the Working Group on security assurances and article VII, which was holding a meeting at the same time as Main Committee I, would like to take part in the debate on article VI.

46. The CHAIRMAN said he wished to make the best possible use of the time allocated to the Conference, but article VI would be taken up at the next meeting so as not to put at a disadvantage the delegations taking part in the meeting of the Working Group.

47. Mr. MORADI (Islamic Republic of Iran) said he fully associated himself with the spirit and the letter of the proposal in document CRP.5. All States should support that proposal, for it made a real contribution to the Treaty and its operation.

48. Document CRP.2 submitted by the Secretariat was constructive, but as the representative of Venezuela had observed, it should be considered simply one contribution among others. His delegation agreed with the comments of the representative of Indonesia, the current head of the Non-Aligned Movement. It had sought to make a contribution to the document prepared by Indonesia with a view to its submission to the Committee on behalf of the Non-aligned Movement.

49. Mr. ELTINAI (Sudan) said that unlike the United States representative, he believed that nuclear arsenals were still being built up and that Israel had not renounced the stockpiling of nuclear weapons, a fact that the nuclear-weapon States could not deny. It was therefore necessary to use stricter terms than in 1985, when note had simply been taken of the fact, and it would also be appropriate, as proposed in paragraph 4 of document CRP.2, to congratulate South Africa, which had given up its nuclear-weapon programme. The reference in paragraph 4 to non-Parties should become the subject of a separate paragraph, in which those States would be requested to understand the spirit of the Treaty and the importance which the international community attached to that vital instrument. It would also be appropriate to congratulate the States of the former Soviet Union which had renounced nuclear weapons and to encourage other States to follow their example.

50. Mr. LAPTESENAK (Belarus) drew attention to the non-automatic character of disarmament measures, such as the very sensitive political decision which Belarus had managed to take concerning the elimination of all nuclear warheads located in its territory, or the contribution made by Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to attainment of the objectives of the Treaty, thus strengthening regional and international security. Those matters were admittedly referred to in the documents before the Committee, but in view of their importance they should be mentioned in the final document to be adopted by the Conference.
His delegation was sure that the Secretariat could prepare the necessary texts, but stood ready to provide assistance if necessary.

The meeting rose at 5.25 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 5th MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 26 April 1995, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. AYEWAH (Nigeria)

The meeting was called to order at 10.40 a.m.

REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY AS PROVIDED FOR IN ITS ARTICLE VIII, PARAGRAPH 3 (agenda item 16)

(a) IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY RELATING TO NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY:

(ii) ARTICLE VI AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 8 TO 12
(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.1, 2 and 3; NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/CRP.7)

1. Mr. DEMBINSKI (Poland) said that, in his view, article VI, together with articles I and II, constituted the very substance of the Treaty. Although not ideal, it had stood the test of time as a framework for the most determined pursuit of disarmament ever seen. Upholding the Treaty through its indefinite extension might not correct the elements that some perceived to be discriminatory, but, while the world might not become a fairer place as a result, at the least, it would become more secure. The record confirmed that the promise of the Treaty had indeed been pursued in good faith, with results deemed inconceivable at the previous review conference only five years earlier.

2. As the chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, he was firmly convinced that the promise set out in the Preamble to "seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions for all time and to continue negotiations to this end" had been pursued by the Conference on Disarmament with dedication, a sense of urgency and positive results. The negotiating process, which had begun only in March 1994, had recorded important progress. Agreement on a draft comprehensive test-ban treaty was imminent, and no effort would be spared to produce a final text before the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations. While such sensitive issues as entry into force remained to be resolved, flexibility on the part of the nuclear Powers and of many non-nuclear-weapon States had narrowed and sometimes eliminated divergences and controversies. Of crucial significance were the decision of the United States to drop the proposal for a 10-year special withdrawal provision and the recent agreement by the United Kingdom and France not to include a provision on "tests in exceptional circumstances". An early political decision to establish a four-technology international monitoring system that was complete and reliable was the essential next step.

3. Although some problems remained and the negotiations were complex, the comprehensive test-ban treaty was an indispensable step on the road to achieving the objectives of article VI. Without doubt, each new step would be easier than the previous one, as mutual trust and confidence were built up.

4. Mr. KAYSER (Luxembourg) said that, at the previous meeting, his country had been incorrectly criticized by the representative of Iraq for making an authorized shipment of depleted uranium to Israel. The shipment did not contain enriched uranium, as erroneously stated by Iraq. The difference between the two materials was enormous. Depleted uranium was used for a variety of conventional civilian applications, for example in the hulls of...
ships or aircraft to increase their stability, and as shielding, because of its high specific density. IAEA had verified that the substance in question had been put to conventional, non-nuclear use. Even the organization Greenpeace had certified that Luxembourg had pursued a policy of nuclear non-proliferation.

5. Mr. TYUTYUNNIK (Ukraine) said that Ukraine, which had voluntarily renounced the possession of its nuclear weapons, was in favour of the indefinite extension of the non-proliferation Treaty, since it was the only instrument that laid the international legal groundwork for a universal system to eliminate the nuclear threat.

6. In its efforts to implement the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF) and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT I), Ukraine had been consistent in its nuclear disarmament policy. All tactical nuclear weapons had been transferred from Ukraine to the Russian Federation for dismantling. The transfer and dismantling of strategic nuclear weapons were also proceeding according to schedule. On the whole, Ukraine was satisfied with the agreements reached between the Russian Federation, the United States and Ukraine on compensation to be provided to Ukraine for all the nuclear weapons that it had inherited from the former Soviet Union.

7. Consideration of article VI of the Treaty should be based on the positive trends that had been taking place in nuclear disarmament over the past few years. For the first time since the adoption of the Treaty, the nuclear arsenals of most nuclear-weapon States had been reduced. The number of "threshold" States had grown smaller, as had the number of countries in whose territories nuclear weapons had been deployed. Such trends should be strengthened politically and legally in order to ensure the irreversibility of the nuclear disarmament process.

8. All delegations should make every effort to ensure the indefinite extension of the Treaty and the adoption of the final document of the Conference. The final document should contain the reaffirmation by all nuclear-weapon States of their obligation under article VI of the Treaty to pursue negotiations on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear-arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. It should also take note of the willingness of all States parties to the Treaty to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty by the end of 1995, and of their commitment to making real progress towards the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

9. The CHAIRMAN said that article VI was the linchpin of the Treaty, and that the Committee must be determined to give it content and orientation within a projected framework of a strengthened Treaty. It was for the Committee to determine whether negotiations were being conducted in good faith, to consider the meaning of "at an early date", and what elements constituted nuclear disarmament.

10. Mr. STARR (Australia), focusing on the negotiations for a comprehensive test-ban treaty, said that the Polish representative's assessment of those negotiations coincided with that of his own delegation. The final declaration of the Conference should give expression to the consensus resolution calling for intensive negotiations and their prompt conclusion with a view to providing impetus to the process. To that end, his delegation would submit a paper encompassing language which welcomed the historic consensus adoption by the General Assembly of resolutions on the comprehensive test-ban treaty, as well as the recent establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban with a mandate to negotiate a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty. The significant progress so far achieved in the negotiations, which led him to anticipate their foreseeable conclusion, would also be welcomed. It was vital that the Committee should affirm support for the expeditious and intensive continuation of those
negotiations as the highest priority of the Conference on Disarmament, with a view to concluding the text in 1995, being the year of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations, so that it could be signed in 1996 at the latest. Also welcome was the reaffirmation by the nuclear-weapon States of their particular responsibility in those negotiations, as well as their commitment to continue intensively to negotiate the comprehensive test-ban treaty and their pledge of support for its conclusion. He looked forward to a draft which would provide the required impetus.

11. Mr. TAYLHARPAT (Venezuela) concluded that the provisions of article VI remained unfulfilled; the phrase "at an early date" could not possibly be construed to mean 25 years later. None the less, serious efforts aimed at compliance had occurred only very recently and were no more than bilateral. Fulfilment of the provisions of article VI therefore required a great deal more work. Such facts should be taken into account in the document which would contain the Committee's assessment concerning the implementation of article VI.

12. Mr. KAREM (Egypt) said that the comprehensive test-ban treaty should prohibit all nuclear tests without distinction as a step towards the full prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons. It should therefore ban all preparatory and other activities aimed at encouraging, assisting or providing a suitable environment for carrying out nuclear test explosions, as well as prevent the possible improvement or modernization of nuclear weapons. The ban on nuclear test explosions should include even those carried out under a peaceful guise with a view to ensuring that no military benefit was gained. The verification method should be universally applied on a non-discriminatory basis and should include international monitoring. It should also be technically effective and encompass all forms of verification, whether seismic or non-seismic, as well as on-site inspection. Moreover, an incremental approach should be pursued in order to improve monitoring that permitted maximum benefit to be derived from any technical advances achieved. It was therefore vital that negotiations on the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty should be pursued with renewed vigour and firm determination, with 1996 as the clear target date for conclusion.

13. Mr. ARCILLA (Philippines) affirmed that his delegation, in common with many others, regarded the conclusion of the comprehensive test-ban treaty as merely a first step towards the ultimate goal of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. According to his information, the size of detonations was an item of much debate in the treaty negotiations; a test ban, however, meant the total elimination of detonations. He shared the Australian view that the treaty should be concluded during the year of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations. He looked forward to considering the Australian proposal concerning the language relevant to the issue.

14. Mr. ONANGA (Gabon) said that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was part of a dynamic process and that positive developments in the negotiations on disarmament in general and nuclear disarmament in particular should be viewed judiciously. Although the post-cold-war climate favoured such developments, they were essentially the result of confidence-building measures implemented among the nuclear powers. He was pleased to note the Polish representative's remarks concerning the conclusion of the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. However, the demands of the non-nuclear-weapon States should be taken into account by the nuclear Powers with a view to ensuring that the treaty was fully credible. His delegation was open to all forms of negotiation which registered the positive results of nuclear disarmament and offered safeguards to non-nuclear-weapon States. The Committee's work was aimed at making the treaty universal. He therefore again stressed the importance of its credibility.

15. Mr. MORADI (Islamic Republic of Iran) reiterated the general assessment that article VI remained unfulfilled, since negotiations in good faith on one nuclear issue alone (i.e., a comprehensive test ban) had only just begun. None of the relevant multilateral bodies had registered any progress concerning implementation of the provisions of article VI, while nuclear-
States were unwilling to commit themselves to achieving the objectives contained in article VI and the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs. They also constantly refrained from supporting United Nations resolutions on the subject. Bilateral progress had also been very limited; nuclear-weapon States still needed to reduce their nuclear-weapon stockpiles, which were now larger than in 1968. Ways and means should therefore be found to ensure implementation of article VI and the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs, including the setting of an actual date for the cessation of the nuclear-arms race. Nuclear-weapon States should accordingly commit themselves to a programme of action for the total and effective elimination of nuclear weapons within a certain time framework, as well as to the pursuit of negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear-arms race as soon as possible.

16. Mr. ERRERA (France), speaking on behalf of Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom, said that he would be submitting a paper on the implementation of article VI of the Treaty. The paper would express satisfaction that the nuclear-arms race had come to an end and that the world was currently engaged in a process of drastically reducing nuclear arsenals; such was the case of the two major nuclear Powers, the United States and the Russian Federation, which had entered into commitments in the context of the START I and II agreements to dismantle the greater part of their nuclear forces. The United Kingdom and France had also made significant reductions in their nuclear programmes. Mention would also be made of the commitment to negotiate, in accordance with the General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus, a comprehensive test-ban treaty which would be universal and internationally and effectively verifiable.

17. Note would also be taken of the fact that for the first time an agreement had been reached to undertake, at the Conference on Disarmament, negotiations on a convention that would ban the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. Apart from aspects relating to nuclear disarmament, it was also important to take into account the progress achieved with respect to other weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons and to confidence-building measures, including measures within the regional framework.

18. The Conference should also focus on future prospects in the wake of recent developments which had opened new avenues for the continuation of the disarmament process as envisaged under article VI. That was why the countries on whose behalf he was speaking fervently hoped that in pursuance of the consensus resolutions adopted on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, the treaty could be signed and the ban could be implemented as soon as possible. They also hoped that the negotiations on the fissionable materials cut off would begin immediately. They would reaffirm their commitment to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament and expressed the hope that efforts would be pursued in other areas of disarmament concerning chemical, biological, anti-personnel mines and within the context of regional arms control processes. The countries on whose behalf he spoke wished to see those drafting proposals reflected in the report to be submitted by the Committee under article VI and the preambular paragraphs.

19. Mr. HASMY (Malaysia) said that negotiations had not been pursued in good faith at all. Indeed, for some 20 years after the coming into force of the non-proliferation Treaty, there has been a frenetic arms race which had slackened off only in the previous five years or so thanks largely to dramatic breakthroughs in the bilateral relations between the two major super-Powers. While the nuclear-weapon States, in particular the United States and the Russian Federation should be commended for their achievements in the area of nuclear arms reduction, it should be noted that the strictly bilateral agreements between them had not reduced nuclear arsenals to a satisfactory level nor did they involve the other three nuclear-weapon States which were yet to take steps to contribute to the process of overall disarmament.
20. Malaysia disagreed with those countries that had tended to take a more positive view of the implementation of article VI. It had taken many years for serious negotiations to get under way and even the current negotiations on reductions were too dependent on the maintenance of good relations between the two super-Powers. Indeed, Malaysia believed that the current situation was but a lull in the arms race. His delegation was pessimistic about the future as it did not know what would happen should the relationships between the two super-Powers deteriorate. It therefore endorsed the approach suggested by some non-aligned countries that the nuclear-weapon States must be made to commit themselves to a binding schedule of performance designed to reduce nuclear-weapons stockpiles and eventually to eliminate such weapons altogether. That should be one of the goals of the Conference, which should also call upon nuclear-weapon States to abandon once and for all the doctrine of nuclear deterrence which was out of place in the current world context.

21. Mr. OROBOLA (Nigeria) said that article VI was one of the pivotal articles of the non-proliferation Treaty. His delegation agreed with the delegation of Malaysia that, notwithstanding the efforts that had been made in the previous five years by some nuclear-weapon States towards the reduction in their stockpiles, good faith by and large had been lacking. While the efforts that had been made to reduce tactical and strategic nuclear weapons were welcome, much more needed to be done. Despite the efforts that were being made in the context of the Conference on Disarmament, it must be recognized that there were difficulties and that the Conference needed to move speedily in order to conclude and sign a comprehensive test-ban treaty in 1995 - the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations - or 1996 at the latest. With respect to the fissile cut-off, after prolonged discussions, an ad hoc committee had been established. However, there was a problem regarding the interpretation of the Committee's mandate. Moreover, it was unclear how long it would take to negotiate the fissile cut-off. Therefore, while recognizing the fact that problems existed, a way must be found to reflect the need to make rapid progress on all those issues.

22. While the pace of nuclear disarmament was too slow, there were other actions which could be taken by nuclear-weapon States to allay the fears of non-nuclear-weapon States. For instance, the withdrawal by nuclear-weapon States of nuclear weapons stationed on the territories of other countries would give more countries confidence and would demonstrate the further commitment of nuclear-weapon States to the reduction of the nuclear threat. Referring to the link that the Malaysian delegation had established between the state of international relations and nuclear disarmament and noting that the idea of the nuclear doctrine was still very much alive, he said that the Conference should re-examine the issue of whether the nuclear deterrent had a place in a post-cold-war world in search of a new world order.

23. Nigeria believed that the least that could be done was to inform States that were being asked to endorse the indefinite extension of the Treaty as to when nuclear weapons would be eliminated and when some progress on the ongoing negotiations would be achieved. Language should be found in the draft to reflect a time-bound programme of nuclear disarmament and complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The twenty-first century should be used to rein in the nuclear threat, stop the making of nuclear weapons and finally come up with a convention to ban the production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons.

24. Mr. IZQUIERDO (Ecuador) said that non-proliferation was an undeniable responsibility and that it was therefore vital to establish a climate of international trust in order to pursue negotiations in good faith. Ecuador believed that it was necessary to speedily conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty which was universal, multilateral and effectively verifiable. While negotiations on such a treaty were under way, the nuclear-weapon States should renew the moratorium on nuclear-weapon testing.

25. His delegation also deemed it vital for the Conference to promote the conclusion of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally verifiable treaty on the banning of the production, possession and marketing of fissionable materials. The illicit traffic in radioactive material should
also be stopped because unless timely measures were adopted, such traffic could have unpredictable consequences.

26. Lastly, the non-proliferation Treaty was not an end in and of itself; nor was it designed to perpetuate the possession of nuclear weapons by a small number of States. Rather, it was designed to promote and guarantee international peace and security through nuclear disarmament, a fundamental and essential step towards achieving comprehensive disarmament.

27. Ms. DUNCAN (New Zealand) said that the aim of pursuing negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race was to stop vertical proliferation. The negotiations on the comprehensive test-ban treaty were making an important contribution as they constituted not only a horizontal non-proliferation measure but also one which would contribute to nuclear disarmament. She agreed with the Australian delegation that it should be feasible, with a serious commitment to intensive negotiations by all participants, to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty during the current year. The document which emerged from the Committee's deliberations should reflect that goal. The commitment by all five nuclear-weapon States to the uninterrupted observance of testing moratoria would be consistent with that commitment and a welcome signal of their seriousness.

28. Mr. KIM (Republic of Korea) said that, as it had consistently done in the past, his Government supported the conclusion of negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty at the earliest possible date. He agreed with the representatives of Australia and Poland that the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations afforded a unique opportunity for signing the comprehensive test-ban treaty. His delegation hoped that in the not too distant future, the common goal of nuclear disarmament under the Treaty could be achieved as a result of substantial progress through wider participation in the negotiations relating to the comprehensive test-ban treaty. To achieve that goal, however, more intensive efforts were required to resolve the issue of the extension of the Conference on Disarmament at the earliest possible date. Those efforts would contribute greatly to the successful and indefinite extension of the Treaty.

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 6th MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Thursday, 27 April 1995, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. AYEWAH (Nigeria)

The meeting was called to order at 10.35 a.m.

REVIEW OF ARTICLE VI AND OF THE EIGHTH TO TWELFTH PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS (agenda item 16) (continued)

1. Mr. EKWALL (Sweden) said that the positive developments in the field of nuclear disarmament must be reflected in the Committee’s report. However, the goal must remain a nuclear-weapon-free world.

2. The statements made by his delegation in the general debate of the Conference and in the Committee contained various forward-looking elements pertaining to article VI and the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs which his delegation would like reflected in the Committee’s report.

3. The Conference should reaffirm that all nuclear weapons must be eliminated from the face of the earth. It should note that the non-proliferation Treaty contained the first and, so far, the only contractual commitments by the nuclear-weapon States to negotiate in good faith on nuclear disarmament and that it expected further disarmament negotiations to take place involving all the nuclear-weapon States. These States should also establish a specific time schedule for the implementation of their disarmament measures. The Conference should furthermore call for the necessary steps to be taken for the Treaty on the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II) to enter into force as soon as possible as a basis for further nuclear disarmament involving all nuclear-weapon States. The Conference should point out that the objectives of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament were mutually reinforcing and should be actively pursued together. It should urge those States which had not yet done so to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty.

4. The Conference should also point out that the unilateral declarations by the five nuclear-weapon States could form a basis for a negotiated multilateral treaty on negative security assurances and could be further developed into declarations on the non-first use of nuclear weapons. It should call for the moratoriums on nuclear testing to continue until they could be replaced by an international treaty banning nuclear tests for ever and stress the importance of reaching agreement on a comprehensive test ban treaty before the end of 1995. Negotiations on a treaty to ban the production of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons purposes should start straightaway, covering not only future production but also existing stockpiles.

5. Mr. BERNHARDSEN (Norway) said that his delegation welcomed the progress made in nuclear and conventional disarmament in the context of East-West relations over the past decade. There was an obvious strategic interrelationship between different categories of weapons, both nuclear and conventional, and other weapons of mass destruction; all those categories must be taken into account in assessing the progress made.

6. Regional disarmament reduced the risks of war; the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe had led to a massive reduction of
conventional weapons in Europe and represented the cornerstone of the emerging new European security system; it must be fully implemented.

7. Norway was concerned about the limited number of ratifications of the chemical weapons Convention and would welcome a political signal from the Conference urging member States to speed up their ratification process so that the Convention could enter into force at the earliest possible date.

8. The reversal and transformation of the nuclear arms race into a process of nuclear arms control and disarmament was of paramount importance. Norway welcomed the implementation of the START agreements and the political will of the Russian Federation and the United States of America to seek a further agreement.

9. The most urgent task was to reach agreement on a comprehensive test-ban treaty; Norway hoped for an early conclusion of that treaty, if possible in 1995.

10. Norway welcomed the recent agreement in the Conference on Disarmament on a mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons purposes.

11. A broad international effort would be needed to deal with the large-scale military-related environmental damage, affecting entire regions spanning several countries, that was a legacy of the cold war. The disarmament process required strict procedures for the safe handling and storage of nuclear weapons components and weapons-grade fissile material in order to prevent the material from falling into the wrong hands and protect the environment.

12. Mr. KANTOLA (Finland) said that his delegation felt that the negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty were the priority task for multilateral disarmament at the current stage, and was disappointed that the importance of the progress made so far in those negotiations had been questioned in the Committee. His delegation felt that the rolling text produced at the end of the first round of negotiations was a significant achievement, and provided a clear structure for the treaty. It hoped that the treaty would be concluded in 1995, if possible on the basis of that text.

13. The difficulties of the negotiations should not be underestimated; the treaty would be of historic importance in preventing the further development of nuclear weapons and that fundamental objective ran through the entire text. Another challenge was effective verification; the establishment of an international monitoring system was an unprecedented task, and it must be effective and cost-efficient. However, the negotiations were proceeding well, and all countries were participating in good faith.

14. Mr. LENARCIC (Slovenia) said that article VI was one of the crucial provisions of the Treaty. Recent progress, especially in respect of the comprehensive test-ban treaty and bilateral arrangements between the Russian Federation and the United States, should be adequately reflected in the Committee's report.

15. However, the implementation of article VI still remained only partial, at best. His delegation associated itself with the New Zealand position regarding vertical proliferation. It agreed that the negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty were the only negotiations which met the criteria of article VI. While the changed international climate had favourably influenced progress relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race, the achievements in the area of nuclear disarmament were less than modest. Specific pledges regarding the time-frame of negotiations, on fissile materials for example, would help strengthen confidence.

16. The indefinite extension of the Treaty, which Slovenia firmly supported, would not mean that the negotiations called for in article VI could continue indefinitely. The words "in good faith" implied that those negotiations must yield early results which would be the subject of close scrutiny.
17. Mr. RUSSELL (Ireland) said that in the general debate of the Conference, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ireland had outlined six objectives, three of which were directly relevant to the work of the Committee: the complete abolition of nuclear weapons, and concrete steps taken to that end; an end to the testing of nuclear weapons, everywhere, for all time; and a ban on the production and stockpiling of fissile materials for use in the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

18. The final document of the Conference should refer to the target of eliminating all nuclear weapons. It should also call for further concrete and quantifiable disarmament measures. The Conference should acknowledge that the completion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, if possible by the end of 1995, would realize a major unfulfilled ambition of the Treaty. The Conference should welcome the continuation in force of the moratoriums on nuclear testing by four of the nuclear-weapon States and call on the other nuclear-weapon States to introduce a similar ban.

19. Mr. HAJAYA (Jordan) said that article VI and the related preambular paragraphs established very clear obligations for nuclear-weapon States to end the arms race, achieve nuclear disarmament and conclude a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

20. The nuclear arms race had stopped because the cold war had ended, not because of the Treaty, as evidenced by the continuing proliferation of nuclear weapons at the regional level; the threshold countries posed a threat to other countries of the region, as in the case of the Middle East.

21. Despite the progress made at the bilateral level by the two super-Powers in achieving nuclear disarmament, the goal of general and complete disarmament was still a long way off; 25 years should have been long enough to eliminate the stockpiles of nuclear weapons in the world.

22. The conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty would promote nuclear disarmament but it was not the final objective; the means could not be confused with the end. The moratoriums by four nuclear-weapon States were not sufficient; other steps needed to be taken, including a ban on the production of fissile materials.

23. A balance of forces in all regions and between them would help stop the arms race at the regional level. The nuclear-weapon countries which remained outside the Treaty were a major obstacle to regional disarmament, especially in the Middle East. The Committee's report should stress that the threshold countries must accede to the Treaty and subject their nuclear installations to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) controls. No country could be exempt from its obligations.

24. The international community must take advantage of the post-cold-war period and ensure that future generations were not subjected to the nuclear threat. Nuclear-weapon-based strategies and policies must be abandoned. A timetable for the elimination of nuclear weapons must be established as a first step towards general and complete disarmament. A binding treaty on positive and negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States was needed.

25. The real enemies of mankind - such as desertification, environmental pollution and disease - could not be defeated by nuclear weapons. The economic resources used for such weapons needed to be devoted to development. The strategy of deterrence and the balance of force must be replaced by cooperation among States for the sake of a peaceful and secure world.

26. Mr. EFFENDI (Indonesia) said that the best way to strengthen the Treaty was for all States parties to abide by its terms. His delegation agreed that article VI had not been implemented since there was still an abundance of nuclear weapons in the world. It welcomed the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty and the START treaties; however, those treaties had not been concluded in implementation of article VI and they did not go far enough.
27. The Conference should approve and endorse specific steps as intermediate measures: a comprehensive test-ban treaty, a legally binding treaty to provide full security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States, a "cut-off" convention, and the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

28. Mr. SCHEINMAN (United States of America) said that his delegation supported document NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/CRP.10 and, wishing to supplement some of the points made, had introduced document NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/CRP.12.

29. His delegation was concerned about some of the comments made at the current and previous meetings which dismissed the achievements made in the area of disarmament or even questioned the intentions of the parties. The United States of America had negotiated in good faith in many forums for the entire 25 years of the Treaty's existence. It was pleased that everyone acknowledged the successes registered during the period under review. Many of those achievements had been preceded by years of intensive, laborious efforts to negotiate in good faith to fulfill the obligations under article VI. Given that record and the complexity of the negotiations, his delegation was concerned when unrealistic proposals were made, especially regarding time-bound disarmament. It was in the common interest to work towards a document which reflected concrete and positive advancement in matters of common concern.

30. Mr. ECHARIF (Algeria) said that it should not be surprising that, like many other non-nuclear-weapon States which did not belong to an alliance, Algeria's overall assessment of the fulfilment by nuclear-weapon States of their obligations under article VI was negative. To be frank, it doubted the sincerity of their commitments and their desire to implement them, based solely on an analysis of their actions since the entry into force of the Treaty. His delegation had listened with interest to the promises for the future, but could base its evaluation only on what had happened over the past 25 years. It must be recognized that, aside from bilateral measures taken by the United States and Russia, the nuclear-weapon States, as defined in article IX, had taken no action even to begin negotiations, much less "pursue" them. Unilateral withdrawal of certain weapons systems had been prompted mainly by budgetary considerations and by changes in doctrines on use of nuclear force, not by commitments under article VI.

31. Although the efforts within the Conference on Disarmament to conclude a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty were commendable, the new treaty would prohibit only the use of explosions to test nuclear weapons, and not their improvement or the development of new types of weapons not requiring such testing. It seemed that "good faith" was lacking in an approach designed to prevent new nuclear States from emerging, but did not prohibit current nuclear Powers from preserving and improving their nuclear capability. Good faith also seemed lacking in the approach of the nuclear-weapon States to the question of ceasing production of fissionable materials for military uses, due to their attempts to avoid the issue of transparency in the management of existing stocks. Under the proposed treaty, the production of nuclear-weapon States would not be subject to any real control because it could be represented as part of stocks existing at the entry into force of the treaty. Furthermore, illegal traffic in fissionable materials could continue and even escalate. In the current context, his country had few illusions about the ability of the Conference on Disarmament to achieve progress, when the representative of one nuclear State, a depositary of the Treaty, had stated that his country was not willing to discuss nuclear disarmament in the foreseeable future. From Algeria's point of view, prospects for international nuclear disarmament remained uncertain. It had hoped that, with the end of the cold war, the doctrine of nuclear deterrence would be abandoned, but those hopes had been dashed by the recent endorsement of that doctrine by a fourth nuclear Power. The United States and Russia, however, had shown a growing awareness of disarmament issues, which was a positive development.

32. Therefore, Algeria hoped that reason would prevail and that the final document of the Conference would contain specific commitments by the nuclear-weapon States in the areas of disarmament, their plans for their nuclear
arsenals, and the date by which they intended to implement the provisions of article VI.

33. Mr. TANAKA (Japan) drew attention to the draft text submitted by his delegation containing Japan's views on nuclear disarmament and the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, for incorporation into the final report.

34. Mr. PERUGINI (Italy) said that his delegation welcomed the text submitted by the United States and the statement that the nuclear-arms race was being reversed. All nuclear-weapon States should abide by their unilateral commitments and the moratorium on testing until the entry into force of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

35. Mr. ARCILLA (Philippines) said that, while his delegation welcomed reductions in nuclear weapons, article VI was more precise, calling for their elimination. It was not clear to him why disarmament must be conducted in stages. The call for a time-bound disarmament framework could not be considered impatience, since 25 years had passed since the Treaty's entry into force. A target date for complete nuclear disarmament was essential.

36. Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) said that nuclear weapons should never have been developed, and the only way to resolve the current world situation was through rapid progress towards their total abolition. When the international community had decided to address the question of chemical and biological weapons, its goal had been their complete elimination, but a different approach to nuclear weapons was favoured by some, who still held fast to the idea that nuclear weapons should remain in the arsenals of a few countries, including their own. The Treaty was not an end in itself, but a means of achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. How that goal could be reached was a question that the Parties must answer together.

37. The current state of disarmament negotiations gave rise both to encouragement and concern. The START I and II agreements had been concluded and negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty had begun at last. Debate had also begun on the elimination of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes and on various confidence-building measures. Yet there was a great deal of resistance to discussion of a prohibition of future production of nuclear weapons and of existing stocks of fissionable materials. While making efforts to ensure that certain countries could not produce materials for bombs, nothing was said about other countries' production of the same materials. While demanding greater transparency in conventional arms, some States opposed it with regard to nuclear weapons. The nuclear-weapon States had provided unconditional negative security assurances to the parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, but they could not do so for all parties to the non-proliferation Treaty. Some nuclear-weapon States, notably China, the former Soviet Union and France, had in the past sought the elimination of nuclear weapons as the only way to end the nuclear threat. That was the path that must be followed.

38. The international community had been told that the nuclear-arms race had ceased and that the Russian Federation and the United States had "undertaken effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament". If that was true, then a series of questions must be answered: If international tension had eased, why, then, had the manufacture of nuclear weapons not ceased? What was the meaning of the phrase "at an early date" in article VI? Were there plans to continue the modernization of existing arsenals? What would be the scope of the nuclear test ban? What would be done with fissionable materials? How would the international community ensure that none would be produced for military use or that such materials would not be diverted from peaceful to military uses? What was being done with the nuclear materials from dismantled weapons? Would the moratorium on nuclear testing continue until the entry into force of the comprehensive test-ban treaty? Would the parties request the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiations on a convention on the elimination of nuclear weapons? His delegation looked forward to hearing the response to those very important questions.
39. The CHAIRMAN said that the Committee should consider whether the nuclear-arms race had really ended, or merely abated. The East-West confrontation had been its most visible manifestation, and therefore, it should consider the truth of the assumption that, since the cold war was over, the arms race was also over.

40. Ms. CRITTENBERGER (United States of America) said that the conference room paper her delegation had submitted addressed that issue. Her delegation did not see the arms race as having abated, but as having ended.

41. Mr. MERNIER (Belgium) said that the Chairman’s premise was unacceptable to his delegation. Because it had seen the nuclear weapons deployed in its territory withdrawn and dismantled, in its view, the end of the arms race had been clearly and sufficiently demonstrated.

42. Mr. ARCILLA (Philippines) said that, from a layman’s view, the arms race appeared to have ceased among the declared nuclear-weapon States in accordance with article IX, but it was well known that there were other States that appeared to be in the business of producing nuclear weapons.

43. Mr. HASMY (Malaysia) said that his delegation contended that the arms race had merely ceased temporarily. Dramatic arms reductions depended entirely on relations between the two super-Powers. One nuclear Power was still conducting nuclear tests, and others were conducting laboratory simulations.

44. Mr. BERDENNIKOV (Russian Federation) said that his delegation’s position had been reflected in its statement to the plenary meeting that the arms race had not only halted, but was being reversed. His Government was profoundly convinced that the arms race was over, and if other delegations did not agree, he would welcome information on where it was continuing and between which States. The Russian Federation was not participating in any such activities and did not understand the assertion.

45. Furthermore, the role of the Chairman was not to provoke disagreement but to find common ground, and not to stress the national position of one country as opposed to another.


47. Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) said that his delegation found the current discussions useful. Referring to the first sentence of paragraph 3 of document NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/CRP.10, he said that it would be useful to conduct a collective exercise to ascertain when the arms race had begun, when it had ceased and to identify the main activities related to the arms race. Once such activities had been pinpointed, it would be possible to ascertain whether or not the arms race had ceased.

48. Mr. SHOUKRY (Egypt) said that his delegation fully supported the manner in which the Chairman was conducting the meeting as it was very healthy to afford both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States the opportunity to air their views on the various issues before the Committee.

49. Mr. ECHARIF (Algeria) said that the Chairman’s approach was a fair one. The Committee should hold collective discussions on the implementation of the non-proliferation Treaty. His delegation believed that the Chairman’s question could best be answered by the nuclear-weapon States as defined under article IX, paragraph 3 of the Treaty and undeclared nuclear-weapon States which could attend the Conference as observers. Those States could provide information on the number and type of nuclear weapons they intended to have under their future military programmes and what countries they intended to use such weapons against. The Conference could then judge from their answers whether or not the nuclear-arms race had ceased.
50. Mr. HERNANDEZ (Argentina) said that the Chairman's question should be answered by all participants and not by the nuclear-weapon States alone. Argentina fully endorsed document NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/CRP.12 and believed that not only was the nuclear-arms race over but that it had been reversed. The reduction of nuclear weapons arsenals was proceeding at a satisfactory rate. His delegation did not believe that progress had been frozen on a possible START III. Nuclear-weapon States had a special responsibility and Argentina appreciated the course they had undertaken which it felt indicated how future arms reductions could be achieved.

51. Mr. Liu JIEYI (China) said that China did not endorse the policy of nuclear deterrence. The nuclear weapons that had been developed by China were solely for self-defence and were never meant to threaten any country. China had always advocated the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and had never taken part in any arms race. It had always exercised the utmost restraint with respect to the development of nuclear weapons and had kept its nuclear arsenal to the minimum level.

52. Mr. ARCILLA (Philippines) endorsed the remarks made by the representatives of Egypt and Mexico. As to the statement made by the representative of Germany with respect to document NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/CRP.10, he wondered whether the document's sponsors expected their statements to be automatically endorsed by the Committee.

53. Mr. AL-ANBAKI (Iraq) said that one of the most urgent steps that needed to be taken in order to implement the Treaty was to establish a specific schedule for the reduction of nuclear weapons and their eventual elimination. He endorsed the statements of the non-aligned countries which had recommended inviting members of the Committee to ponder ways and means of verifying whether the arms race was over or not. The Chairman's conduct of the meeting would enhance its deliberations and make it easier for delegations to formulate appropriate recommendations.

54. Mr. EFFENDI (Indonesia) said that, while his delegation appreciated the positive developments that had taken place, it felt that certain steps still needed to be taken in specific areas in order to assist in the reduction of nuclear weapons throughout the world. He endorsed the statement made by the representative of Egypt.

55. Mr. ADEKEYE (Nigeria) said that the arms race was not over; it had only abated. Indeed, one could hardly talk about the end of the nuclear-arms race in a situation where weapons continued to be modernized and the range and payload of missiles continued to be improved. His delegation endorsed the remarks made by the delegations of Mexico, Egypt and Indonesia.

56. Mr. DEMBINSKI (Poland) said that the meeting could not but rely on the statement by the nuclear-weapon States which had in fact been involved in the arms race that they were no longer accumulating nuclear weapons but were in fact destroying their stockpiles. The nuclear-arms race had not only ceased but had actually been reversed.

57. Mr. KANTOLA (Finland) said that the discussions were sterile. Document NPT/INF/1995/MC.I/CRP.10 amply testified to the fact that the nuclear-arms race was over. It would be more useful to focus on the challenges ahead and to express concern over the potential nuclear-arms race which might be brewing in the regional context.

58. Mr. HASMY (Malaysia) agreed with previous speakers that the Chairman was conducting the meeting in a wholesome manner by trying to coax delegations to have as wide an exchange of views as possible and that there was no reason for the Chairman to change his approach.

59. Mr. BESANÇON (France) said that, while it was perfectly legitimate that a certain number of issues should be raised by various participants, it was also very important to try as much as possible to avoid creating dissension and engaging in useless polemics. The Committee should make the
most of the little time available to it in order to advance further in the absolutely unprecedented process that had begun in the strategic area and in disarmament.

60. The Conference was both an occasion to welcome the considerable achievements made and to try to evaluate prospects for the future in the most objective and least controversial manner possible. Indeed, as the representative of Argentina had noted, it would be very useful to have everyone's opinion not only on what had been achieved but also on what steps needed to be taken in future.

61. Mr. PERUGINI (Italy) said that he agreed with those delegations which felt that the discussions should be more purpose-oriented. In his delegation's view, the arms race was over. The international community must ensure that the achievements were irreversible. Since the various delegations had differing opinions, the Committee should try to find common political ground and to build on it in order to come up with recommendations which could be endorsed by the Conference.

62. Mr. GAJDA (Hungary) said that disarmament was a dynamic yet relative process which should never be measured in absolute terms. Therefore, while he welcomed the Indonesian statement that, despite the positive changes that had occurred in recent years, much more could have been achieved, he did not agree that the disarmament process had only just begun. Indeed, disarmament agreements were the products of years of arduous negotiations in which all States must participate. It had taken many years to negotiate and conclude the SALT and START I and II agreements as well as the Intermediate Nuclear Force Reduction Treaty. It was therefore no surprise that the comprehensive test-ban treaty, which he hoped would be ready in 1996, had not yet been concluded. The Committee should therefore look at things in relative terms when assessing achievements over the five-year period under review.

63. The CHAIRMAN, summing up the debate, said that Member States had the sovereign right to review the content of article VI and that, if the purpose of the Conference was simply to endorse the views of Member States on their defence profiles, then the Conference would have no goal at all. The purpose of the meeting had been to move delegations away from their defensive postures. All parties to the Treaty were being asked to justify whether or not they had fulfilled their obligations under article VI. Indeed, the most important thing was that all delegations had a collective duty to themselves as member States parties to the Treaty and were accountable to the international community as a whole. He would ensure that all views were taken into account in order to try to find a way of accommodating the different opinions. The debate had not been sterile. The meeting had reconfirmed the fact that there was disagreement as to whether the nuclear-arms race was actually over.

The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.
Chairman:
Mr. AYEWAH (Nigeria)

The meeting was called to order at 10.45 a.m.

REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY AS PROVIDED FOR IN ITS ARTICLE VIII.
PARAGRAPH 3 (agenda item 16) (continued)

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY RELATING TO
NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL
PEACE AND SECURITY:

(ii) ARTICLE VI AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 8 TO 12

1. The CHAIRMAN said that at its current meeting the Committee would
continue the debate on article VI and the eighth to twelfth preambular
paragraphs, specifically, the extent to which negotiations had been pursued in
good faith on effective measures towards nuclear disarmament. He had been
working on the text of the Chairman's working paper on article VI which he
hoped to submit to the delegations for their review in order to advance the
Committee's work in that area. In the afternoon, the Committee was expected
to finalize its drafting of articles I and II, while the Working Group
finalized its drafting on security assurances and article VII. Subject to the
availability of a conference room, work would continue on article VI on the
morning of 2 May; in the afternoon, the Committee would examine the Working
Group's report and undertake a first reading of the Chairman's working paper
on article VI. Since thereafter the Committee would have only two more formal
meetings to complete its report to the plenary, delegations should approach
their work in a very constructive spirit.

2. In order to give delegations the opportunity to review article VI in its
entirety before making concrete proposals, he would adjourn the meeting for
20 minutes and immediately reconvene it as a drafting group on articles I
and II.

The meeting rose at 11 a.m.
REVIEW OF ARTICLE VI AND OF THE EIGHTH TO TWELFTH PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS (agenda item 16) (continued)

1. The CHAIRMAN introduced his conference room paper on the review of article VI and of the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/CRP.20), in which the Conference recalled that, under article VI, each of the parties undertook to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. In the section on supporting measures, the conference room paper recalled that the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty was one of the most important measures to halt the nuclear-arms race and would significantly enhance the universality and continued viability of the Treaty. Other measures included a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, which would be the subject of a convention to be negotiated by an ad hoc committee of the Conference on Disarmament, as agreed in March 1995. In conclusion, the paper took note with appreciation of the reaffirmation at the Conference on Disarmament on 6 April 1995 by France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of their commitments to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament. In that regard, a programme for planned reductions would greatly assist the confidence of the non-nuclear-weapon States in the efficacy of the Treaty.

2. Ms. FORSYTH (New Zealand) said her delegation believed that it was necessary to look beyond the issues currently being negotiated, namely the comprehensive test-ban treaty and security assurances. She proposed that the text of document NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/CRP.22 should be inserted in the Chairman's conference room paper (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/CRP.20). The text read:

"The Conference welcomed statements by the United States and the Russian Federation that their bilateral nuclear-arms race had ended. The Conference expressed its wish to make permanent the cessation of the nuclear-arms race as a further contribution to meeting the goals of article VI. The Conference therefore agreed that consideration should be given to the merits of completing a comprehensive nuclear-test ban and a ban on the production of fissile material for weapons purposes with an effectively verifiable ban on the production of nuclear weapons."

3. Mr. BERNHARDSEN (Norway) said that, given the importance of the safe handling and storage of nuclear-weapons components, his delegation proposed that the first paragraph of document NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/CRP.16 should be inserted in the Chairman's paper (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/CRP.20), after paragraph 10, forming a new paragraph 11. The text of that paragraph read:

"The Conference welcomes the reversal and transformation of the nuclear-arms race into a process of nuclear-arms control and disarmament. Over the next decade, thousands of nuclear weapons are..."
scheduled for dismantling and destruction. This disarmament process requires strict procedures for the safe handling and storage of nuclear-weapons components and weapons-grade fissile material in order to prevent the material from falling into wrong hands and in order to take account of major environmental concerns."

4. Mr. WIRANATA-ATHADJA (Indonesia), speaking on the question of the cessation of the nuclear-arms race, said some nuclear-weapon States were continuing to develop weapons of mass destruction in contradiction to their commitments under the Treaty and that two such States had violated article VI and the relevant preambular paragraphs of the Treaty by extending an agreement to further develop nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles. Furthermore, in order to retain the technological edge in military systems, one major nuclear-weapon State had embarked upon a more sophisticated programme to refine its nuclear-weapons design using state-of-the-art technology. His delegation was very much concerned about that discouraging development, as it could trigger a renewed nuclear-arms race among nuclear-weapon States. Accordingly, his delegation proposed that the Conference should review the need to negotiate a nuclear-test-ban treaty in order to eliminate those weapons of mass destruction forever.

5. While his delegation commended the positive developments of recent years in the area of nuclear disarmament, it believed that many of the significant measures undertaken by the two major nuclear-weapon States, the Russian Federation and the United States of America, had not been adopted to fulfill their obligations under article VI, but rather as the result of fundamental changes in the international political landscape of the post-cold-war era. Furthermore, those exercises had been conducted at bilateral levels only and had not included other nuclear-weapon States. Article VI required multilateral negotiations on the issues under consideration. The Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body, could play a significant role in that regard. His delegation believed that the implementation of article VI had fallen far short of the expectations of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty and reiterated its firm position that it was preferable to extend the Treaty for fixed periods in order to give sufficient time for all States parties to fulfill their long overdue obligations assumed under the Treaty. Only once strong commitments from all States parties to achieve those long-sought objectives had been obtained, could the Treaty be extended well beyond 1995.

REVIEW OF ARTICLES I AND II AND OF THE FIRST TO THIRD PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS

6. Mr. KELLER (Germany) said that his delegation adamantly disagreed with the idea set forth in paragraph 9 of the Chairman's conference room paper on the review of articles I and II and of the first to third preambular paragraphs (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/CRP.8/Rev.4), and requested that the paragraph should be deleted.

7. Mr. MERNIER (Belgium) said that paragraph 9 of the Chairman's paper was redundant and diminished the ideas set forth in paragraphs 5 and 6. Moreover, it was untimely and unnecessary to clarify articles I and II, 25 years after their drafting. In particular, the last sentence of paragraph 9 was out of place and repeated the point made in paragraph 6 regarding the vital need for the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to comply scrupulously and unreservedly with their respective obligations under articles I and II.

8. The CHAIRMAN said that the Committee would now begin informal drafting.

The meeting rose at 4.05 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 9th MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 3 May 1995, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. AYEWAH (Nigeria)

The meeting was called to order at 10.50 a.m.

REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY AS PROVIDED FOR IN ITS ARTICLE VIII, PARAGRAPH 3

(a) IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY RELATING TO NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY:

(i) ARTICLES I AND II AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 1 TO 3

(ii) ARTICLE VI AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 8 TO 12

(iii) ARTICLE VII WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO THE MAIN ISSUES IN (a) AND (b) (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/CRP.8/Rev.5, CRP.24)

1. Mr. FRASER (Secretary of the Committee) drew attention to an oral amendment to NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/CRP.8/Rev.5, which had been circulated to members. The first sentence of paragraph 2 should be inserted in the fourth line of paragraph 1, becoming its third sentence.

2. Mr. STARR (Australia), speaking as Chairman of the Working Group on Security Assurances and Article VII, introduced the report of the Working Group, which had been the result of intensive efforts. Security assurances were a key concern of many delegations, and he sensed a mood favouring further consideration of that question outside the framework of the Conference.

3. The Working Group had reached full agreement on paragraphs 1, 3, 7 and 12 of the text. Paragraph 11 remained in brackets because of its late introduction into the deliberations. Paragraphs 2, 9 and 10 still contained material in brackets that must be discussed further. The version before members did not reflect the following oral amendment: in the third line of paragraph 9, "protection" should be placed in brackets and the word "assistance" should be inserted after it, also within brackets. Much progress had been achieved in addressing paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 as a package, although some substantial differences in approach remained, and consensus was near. Paragraph 8 was the most controversial, and it seemed likely that agreement on that paragraph could be achieved only in conjunction with agreement on other issues.

4. The CHAIRMAN urged all delegations to provide input to the Working Group.

5. Mr. KAREM (Egypt), supported by Mr. WIRANATA-ATMADJA (Indonesia) said, with regard to paragraph 9, that it had not been his delegation's understanding that "assistance" was to be included, nor that "protection" and "assistance" were to appear in separate brackets, since the entire paragraph remained in brackets.

6. Mr. HAJAYA (Jordan) said that he had serious concerns about the Committee's methods of work. After eight meetings, no real progress had been made, and time pressure was increasing. Perhaps its working methods were too
democratic, allowing too much freedom to delegations not wishing to enter into substantive discussion. His first impression was that the Committee was becoming polarized and totally entrenched in opposing positions; there was a great need to find some common ground. His second impression was that international peace and security were important only in so far as they affected or benefitted individual national interests.

7. A large majority were being denied the right to include paragraphs in the final document regarding regional security. His delegation wished in particular to include paragraphs expressing the concerns of Middle Eastern countries regarding the nuclear capability of Israel.

8. Ms. CRITTENBERGER (United States of America) noted that the final version of paragraph 9 had not been available to the members of the Working Group during their discussion. Her delegation had understood the final version to be as stated by the Chairman of the Working Group, but was willing to enter into consultations on that paragraph with all interested delegations.

The meeting rose at 11.20 a.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 10th MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Thursday, 4 May 1995, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. AYEWAH (Nigeria)

The meeting was called to order at 10.40 a.m.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE

1. Mr. DHANAPALA (Sri Lanka), President of the Conference, said that he had been assured by the Chairman of Main Committees I and II that those Committees would be able to submit their reports by the established deadline. He was aware of the inherent complexity of the issues faced by Main Committee I and recognized the efforts that were being made to reach agreement, but felt that it was his duty as President of the Conference to appeal to delegations to enter the negotiations and discussions in a spirit of cooperation and compromise so as to be able to conclude the work on time. The success of the Committee’s efforts was crucial to the outcome of the Conference and the future of the Treaty.

REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY AS PROVIDED FOR IN ITS ARTICLE VIII, PARAGRAPH 3

(a) IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY RELATING TO NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

(ii) ARTICLES I AND II AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 1 TO 3

Document NPT/CONF.1995/MC.1/CRP.8/Rev.6

2. The CHAIRMAN said there was no problem with the additional text in paragraph 1, listing the countries which had acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons since the previous Review Conference. Paragraphs 2–6 contained no new language.

3. Mr. MORADI (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that his delegation had not agreed to paragraph 5, and maintained its position that language similar to that used in paragraph 6 should be added in paragraph 5. His delegation had agreed to consider paragraph 5 in the context of paragraph 9, but since that had not been done at the previous meeting, it wanted the additional words inserted in paragraph 5. Many States and non-governmental organizations had expressed concerns about the violation of article 1 of the Treaty by certain nuclear-weapon States, and those concerns should be reflected in the final document.

4. Mr. HAMDAN (Lebanon) said that his delegation had also expressed reservations about paragraph 5 and had said that paragraph 5 should be considered in conjunction with paragraph 9.

5. Mr. BESANCENOT (France) said that document NPT/CONF.1995/MC.1/CRP.8/Rev.6 reflected the state of the discussion where it had been left off. There had been agreement on paragraphs 5 and 6, and various proposals had been made in regard to paragraph 9, on which agreement had not been reached.
6. Mr. HAMDAN (Lebanon) said that the representative of France was not taking into account Lebanon's reservation to paragraph 5; other delegations had also had doubts about paragraph 5, and he reserved the right to return to that paragraph after the consideration of paragraph 9 was completed.

7. Mr. COTAN (Indonesia) said his delegation had proposed that in paragraph 9 ter, the words "of certain aspects of" should be changed to "of the implementation of" so as to reflect the actual situation.

8. Mr. PERUGINI (Italy) felt that the Conference's task was to review the operation of the Treaty, not to interpret it; article VIII, paragraph 3, was quite clear in that respect. For that reason, the first three alternatives for paragraph 9 were not acceptable. Moreover, the paragraphs should have appeared in the order in which the proposals had been made; paragraph 9 quater should be paragraph 9 bis, and vice versa.

9. The CHAIRMAN said that the order of the paragraphs did not reflect any gradation in their importance; they appeared as submitted.

10. Mr. AKINCI (Turkey) said that none of the alternatives to paragraph 9 was acceptable. His delegation supported the compromise proposal made on the previous day by the Chairman to delete the original paragraph 9 and add a phrase at the end of paragraph 7. His delegation proposed that until the alternatives to paragraph 9 were deleted, the last phrase of paragraph 7 (in bold print) should be put in brackets.

11. Mr. HAMDAN (Lebanon) said that paragraph 9 ter had a certain degree of neutrality. States had the right to make various interpretations of the Treaty and no charge was being levelled against anyone. Some States had expressed concerns, and it was right that those concerns should be reflected in the final document. The other variants for paragraph 9 expressed the viewpoints of certain countries or groups of countries and such viewpoints could not be imposed on other States. In a spirit of consensus, paragraph 9 ter should be viewed as a way out which would help accelerate the pace of the Committee's work towards a speedy conclusion.

(b) SECURITY ASSURANCES

12. The CHAIRMAN drew attention to the report of the Working Group on Security Assurances and Article VII (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.1/CRP.26) which had been informally adopted on the previous day. The document had been finalized, and he took it that the Committee wished to accept it.

13. It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 11.15 a.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 11th MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Friday, 5 May 1995, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. AYEWAH (Nigeria)

The meeting was called to order at 11.35 a.m.

REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY AS PROVIDED FOR IN ITS ARTICLE VIII, PARAGRAPH 3 (continued)

(a) IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY RELATING TO NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

(i) ARTICLES I AND II AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 1 TO 3

(ii) ARTICLE VI AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 8 TO 12

(iii) ARTICLE VII WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO THE MAIN ISSUES IN (a) AND (b)

1. The CHAIRMAN drew attention to the draft report of Main Committee I, which had been circulated to members. After its adoption by the Committee, the report would be forwarded through the plenary Conference to the Drafting Committee of the Conference.

2. Mr. MORADI (Iran) said that, to the dismay of his delegation, the draft report was not a true reflection of what had taken place in the drafting sessions. None of his delegation's proposals were reflected as submitted, and those which were included had been relocated and thus distorted. It would, therefore, be difficult for his delegation to accept further consideration to the draft report.

3. Mr. EKWALL (Sweden) said that his delegation was also unable to accept the text in its current state and would have comments to make on it during the drafting session.

4. Mr. COTAN (Indonesia) said that some of his delegation's proposals had not been reflected either, although no objection had been raised when they had been put forward and the Secretariat had taken due note of them. Omission of some of the proposals submitted could prevent the Committee from reaching a consensus on the document.

5. Mr. ARCILLA (Philippines) said that he wished to know why paragraph 8 quater appeared in brackets in the draft report, since he had heard no dissent when that text had been proposed.

6. The CHAIRMAN said that the paragraph had been placed in brackets because no discussion had taken place on it; consequently, agreement could not have been reached on the text. It had not been physically possible to reflect every suggestion made, but substantive submissions had been reflected in so far as possible. Amendments could, of course, be made during the process of adopting the draft.

7. Mr. BESANÇON (France) said that he did not believe there was a true divergence between the views of the Chairman and those of delegations. Obviously it had not been possible to reflect the large number of proposals...
received, especially when it was unclear whether or not objections had been raised. The matter might best be addressed in the drafting session.

8. Mr. KAREM (Egypt) said that, regrettably, certain delegations had made official proposals which were not reflected in the draft, despite widespread support. While he commended the strenuous efforts of the Chairman and the Secretariat to finalize the document, it was nevertheless important for delegations to represent their national positions and implement directives from their Governments. Perhaps the time constraints could be noted in a footnote to the report or mentioned by the Chairman in his report to the Drafting Committee.

9. The CHAIRMAN said that any omissions had been inadvertent and were due to the difficulty of assembling the draft report and the complexity of the issues. Unless the Committee could find a way to move forward without reopening the discussion, however, it would be unable to submit its report to the plenary Conference as scheduled.

10. Mr. COTAN (Indonesia) proposed that the meeting should be suspended for one hour to allow the Secretariat sufficient time to incorporate all proposals in the draft.

11. Mr. NOBLE (United Kingdom) suggested that delegations should submit their amendments in writing in order to facilitate the work of the Chairman and the Secretariat.

12. Mr. MORADI (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that although his delegation's proposals had been submitted in writing, they still had not been reflected. He strongly supported the proposal made by the representative of Egypt: his delegation could agree to continue consideration of the draft report only if a footnote stating that the draft did not include all proposals submitted by delegations was inserted on page 1, or if all its paragraphs were placed within brackets.

13. Mr. EKWALL (Sweden) noted that language which had not been accepted at the drafting session had been included in the final draft of the report.

14. Mr. SCHAERLI (Switzerland) said that the current version of the draft posed problems to his delegation as well.

15. Mr. KAREM (Egypt) proposed that the meeting should be suspended in order to allow further consultation with the officers and interested delegations.

The meeting was suspended at 12.15 p.m. and resumed at 1.05 p.m.

16. The CHAIRMAN announced that the Committee would resume its consideration of the draft report in an informal drafting session.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 12th MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York,
on Saturday, 6 May 1995, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. AYEWAH (Nigeria)

The meeting was called to order at 11.10 a.m.

ADOPTION OF THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE

1. The CHAIRMAN said that the Committee would adopt the text of the draft report without reopening the debate. Editorial suggestions only would be entertained.

2. Mr. FRASER (Secretary of the Committee) said that it had been impossible to indicate the source of the language incorporated in the draft report because of the need to maintain the format required for submission to the Drafting Committee of the plenary. On page 8 of the English version of the draft, the second sub-item of paragraph 8 should be amended to read: "By agreement with the Chairman of Main Committee II, a joint working group was established to address that aspect of the Committee's work."

3. The following paragraph should be inserted on page 28 of the draft, before paragraph 42:

"The Conference concludes that the substantial progress made towards nuclear disarmament could only have taken place in a framework of stability and predictability. By preventing widespread proliferation, the non-proliferation Treaty has contributed substantially to that framework. The Conference recalls that, in order to build further on the momentum created by recent disarmament successes, by the measures in prospect or in progress, it must ensure that the essential framework provided by the Treaty is made permanent."

4. The CHAIRMAN said that the Committee would adopt the draft report paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 4

5. Paragraphs 1 to 4 were adopted.

Paragraph 5

6. Mr. MORADI (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that his delegation requested that document NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/CRP.11 and NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WG.1/CRP.11 (p. 8 of the English version) should be reissued as formal working papers of the Committee.

7. Mr. BERDENNIKOV (Russian Federation) said that it was his understanding that, as a cost-saving measure, documents which had already been issued could not be reissued under a different symbol.

8. Mr. FRASER (Secretary of the Committee) said that reissuing those documents as working papers meant that they would then be produced in all languages of the Conference and become part of the final report of the Committee.
9. **Mr. COTAN** (Indonesia) said that it had been clearly indicated that the proposals submitted by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries would be issued as formal working papers.

10. **The CHAIRMAN** said that he would take it that the Committee wished to reissue NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/CRP.11 and NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WG.1/CRP.11 as formal working papers of the Committee.

11. **It was so decided.**

12. **Paragraph 5 was adopted as amended.**

Paragraphs 6 and 7

13. **Paragraphs 6 and 7 were adopted.**

Paragraph 8

14. **Paragraph 8 was adopted as amended by the Secretariat.**

Paragraph 9

**Section I. Review of articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1 to 3**

15. **Mr. SCHEINMAN** (United States of America) said that his delegation had understood that additions were to be made to the draft only regarding section II, yet he noted that new language had been included in section I. If it had indeed been possible to propose further additions to section I, some delegations might be at a disadvantage, since they had been unaware of the possibility.

16. **The CHAIRMAN** said that, while the main focus of the discussion was section II, some delegations had taken the opportunity to introduce new language into section I. However, all the new language was in brackets and thus did not alter the sense of the draft.

17. **Mr. SCHEINMAN** (United States of America) requested that the insertions to section I should be identified and eliminated, in order to restore the draft to the version existing at the time the Committee began its consideration of section II.

18. **Mr. FRASER** (Secretary of the Committee) said that four delegations had submitted changes to paragraphs 2, 5, 8 bis, 8 qua, 8 qui, 9 and 9 qua. Four additional versions of paragraph 9 — qui, sex, sept and oct — which had been submitted in document NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/CRP.37 the previous day, had also been incorporated.

19. **Mr. SCHEINMAN** (United States of America) said that the new versions of paragraph 9 should be retained, but that the other changes should be removed, since their insertion would be inconsistent with the mandate which the Chairman had given the Committee.

20. **Mr. HERNANDEZ** (Mexico) recalled that those proposals had been included because they had been submitted in writing as requested at the time of the discussion.

21. **Mr. COTAN** (Indonesia) said that his delegation had put forward the changes to paragraph 9 on several occasions. Furthermore, the proposed change to paragraph 2 was simply editorial in nature.

22. **Mr. DUPREEZ** (South Africa) said that his delegation supported the proposal of the United States representative. He did not recall any discussion on paragraph 2.
23. Mr. KANTOLA (Finland) said that the Committee should avoid reopening negotiations on section I and simply transmit its draft report to the Drafting Committee.

24. The CHAIRMAN requested the representative of Indonesia not to insist on his insertion in paragraph 2.

25. Mr. COTAN (Indonesia) said that his delegation considered the word "welcomes" rather unusual in the context under discussion, and would prefer "congratulates". However, his delegation would raise the matter at the next Drafting Committee session.

26. The CHAIRMAN said that it would be better to leave the matter to the Drafting Committee.

27. Mr. SCHEINMAN (United States of America) said that the Main Committee session was not the appropriate forum to discuss the bracketed wording. The parts of the draft report identified by the Secretary as newly introduced should be set aside. The draft report had already been discussed, and the Main Committee could not therefore consider amendments to it without prejudicing the work of the Drafting Committee.

28. Mr. SCHAERLI (Switzerland) said that his delegation did not see the draft report as an accurate reflection of the discussions that had led to it and had made editorial changes to it on that basis.

29. Mr. WANGURU (Kenya) said that the use of the word "congratulates" was consistent with United Nations usage and was, furthermore, appropriate in the context.

30. Mr. NOBLE (United Kingdom) said that if the amendments remained, the whole of section I of the draft report would once again be open to debate.

31. Mr. MORADI (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that his delegation did not wish to have paragraphs 3 and 4 of the draft report bracketed, but would bring them up for consideration by the Drafting Committee.

32. The CHAIRMAN said that the proposed amendments regarding the draft report should be submitted to the Drafting Committee for its consideration.

33. Mr. WANGURU (Kenya) said that it would expedite the work of Main Committee I to forward the draft report as it was, with the bracketed language, to the Drafting Committee.

34. Mr. MORADI (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that his delegation concurred that the draft report should be submitted to the Drafting Committee as quickly as possible. However, the second and third sentences of paragraph 5 should not be bracketed, as there had been agreement on them in the Committee.

35. Mr. HUSSAMY (Syrian Arab Republic) said that paragraph 8 could be adopted, as it did not introduce a new issue. For 15 years, Israel had turned a deaf ear to General Assembly resolutions regarding its nuclear capability. The General Assembly was asking the States in the Middle East to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region. It was impossible to achieve that objective when Israel was acquiring nuclear weapons, thereby posing a threat to all the States in the region.

36. Paragraph 8 was moderately worded. It called upon all States non-parties to renounce the nuclear-weapons option, accede to the non-proliferation Treaty and accept full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. He wondered what was wrong with that exhortation, or why the Committee could not adopt it.

37. The CHAIRMAN said that he had asked a working group of interested States Parties to work towards consensus regarding the substance of paragraph 8. No such consensus had been reached to date.
38. Mr. MORADI (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that his delegation still had reservations as to the wording of paragraph 6.

39. The CHAIRMAN said that the Committee had taken note of the reservations expressed by the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Paragraphs 8 to 11

40. Paragraphs 8 to 11 were adopted.

Section II. Article VI and preambular paragraphs 8 to 12

Paragraphs 1 to 10

41. Paragraphs 1 to 10 were adopted.

Paragraph 11

42. Mr. NOBLE (United Kingdom) pointed out that his delegation had submitted a written proposal to insert two new sentences at the beginning of paragraph 11.

43. Paragraph 11 was adopted as amended.

Paragraph 12

44. Mr. EKWALL (Sweden) said that his delegation had proposed that the sentence "This would provide the basis for further nuclear disarmament involving all nuclear-weapon States" should be inserted after the fourth sentence of paragraph 12 bis.

45. Paragraph 12 was adopted as amended.

Paragraphs 13 and 14

46. Paragraphs 13 and 14 were adopted.

Paragraph 15

47. Mr. NOBLE (United Kingdom) said that his delegation had submitted a proposal to add a second sentence to paragraph 15 qua.

48. Paragraph 15 was adopted as amended.

Paragraphs 16 to 19

49. Paragraphs 16 to 19 were adopted.

Paragraph 20

50. Mr. SCHEINMAN (United States of America) said that paragraph 20 appeared to be an alternative to paragraph 19, since the same point was made in both paragraphs.

51. The CHAIRMAN said that paragraph 20 would become paragraph 19 bis and that the remaining paragraphs would be renumbered accordingly.

52. Paragraph 20 was adopted as amended.

Paragraph 21

53. Paragraph 21 was adopted.

Paragraph 22
54. Mr. COTAN (Indonesia) recalled that his delegation had proposed that the second sentence of paragraph 22 should be deleted.

55. The CHAIRMAN said that the sentence in question would be placed in brackets.

56. Paragraph 22 was adopted as amended.

Paragraphs 23 and 24

57. Paragraphs 23 and 24 were adopted.

Paragraph 25

58. Mr. SCHAERLI (Switzerland), supported by Mr. BERDENNIKOV (Russian Federation), said that the idea expressed in paragraph 25 ter did not belong under the heading "Ban on the Production of Fissile Material" and that the paragraph should be moved to a more appropriate location in the report.

59. Mr. MORADI (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that he supported the Swiss proposal and that his delegation had proposed the insertion of the words "unsafeguarded shipment of nuclear materials, including by terrorists, and the" in paragraph 25 ter after the words "The Conference expressed grave concern about the".

60. Ms. DUNCAN (New Zealand) pointed out that the language proposed by Iran had already been included in paragraph 17 bis.

61. Mr. MORADI (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that if the idea expressed in paragraph 17 bis was repeated in paragraph 25 ter, the latter should include the phrase proposed by his delegation.

62. The CHAIRMAN said that the phrase proposed by the Iranian delegation would be inserted into paragraph 25 ter in brackets, and that the paragraph would be moved to a more appropriate section of the report.

63. Paragraph 25 was adopted as amended.

Paragraph 26

64. Paragraph 26 was adopted.

Paragraph 27

65. Mr. EKWALL (Sweden) said that the last sentence of paragraph 27, which his delegation had proposed, should read "Not only future production but also existing stockpiles should be the subject of these negotiations".

66. Paragraph 27 was adopted as amended.

Paragraphs 28 to 31

67. Paragraphs 28 to 31 were adopted.

Paragraph 32

68. Mr. AKINCI (Turkey) said that a phrase proposed by his delegation had not been included in paragraph 32.

69. Mr. BERNHARDSEN (Norway) said that his delegation had requested that the phrase "the implementation of" in paragraph 32 should be placed in brackets.

70. Paragraph 32 was adopted as amended.

Paragraphs 33 to 36
Paragraph 37

72. Mr. OOTAN (Indonesia) noted that his delegation had proposed a new alternative to paragraph 37.

73. The CHAIRMAN said that the proposal would be inserted in brackets.

74. Mr. EKWALL (Sweden) said that the word "time-table" in the last sentence of paragraph 37 big, which his delegation had proposed, should read "time schedule".

75. Paragraph 37 was adopted as amended.

Paragraph 38

76. Mr. SCHEINHAN (United States of America) said that, as agreed by the Committee, the first bracket in paragraph 38 should appear before the word "However" and the beginning of the paragraph should be left outside brackets.

77. Paragraph 38 was adopted as amended.

Paragraph 39

78. Mr. NOBLE (United Kingdom) said that the words "the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons" should be placed in brackets and the words "and to" should be deleted from the bracketed phrase "and to General and Complete Disarmament", since the two expressions were alternatives, not consecutive phrases.

79. Paragraph 39 was adopted as amended.

Paragraphs 40 to 42

80. Paragraphs 40 to 42 were adopted.

81. Mr. MORADI (Islamic Republic of Iran), supported by Mr. NOBLE (United Kingdom), suggested that a footnote should be inserted in the report to indicate that his delegation felt that paragraphs 19 to 29 should be moved to the section "Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race". He also recalled that Iran had submitted a proposal to place brackets around the heading "Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)", which appeared before paragraph 19.

82. The CHAIRMAN said that the brackets would be included and that the footnote "A proposal was made that the placement of paragraphs 19 to 29 should be determined at a later stage" would be inserted. If he heard no objection, he would take it that the Committee wished to adopt the draft report as amended.

83. It was so decided.

CONCLUSION OF THE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE

84. The CHAIRMAN thanked the Committee members for the courtesy and cooperation they had shown in considering the issues entrusted to them. He hoped that the Committee's work would assist the progress of the Conference and strengthen the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.
1995 REVIEW AND EXTENSION CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

MAIN COMMITTEE II

SUMMARY RECORDS OF THE 1ST TO 10TH MEETINGS

Held at Headquarters, New York,
from 17 April to 12 May 1995

CHAIRMAN: Mr. ERDŐS (Hungary)
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 1ST MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 19 April 1995, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. ERDÖS (Hungary)

The meeting was called to order at 3.30 p.m.

PROGRAMME OF WORK (agenda item 13)

1. The CHAIRMAN said that the Preparatory Committee for the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had allocated to Main Committee II consideration of the review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its article VIII, paragraph 3, and specifically the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones under article III and the fourth and fifth preambular paragraphs, especially in their relationship to article IV and the sixth and seventh preambular paragraphs; articles I and II and the first, second and third preambular paragraphs in their relationship to articles III and IV; and article VII. The Committee would also consider other provisions of the Treaty, the role of the Treaty in the promotion of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and of nuclear disarmament in strengthening international peace and security and measures aimed at promoting wider acceptance of the Treaty. He proposed that the Committee should begin its work with a general exchange of views in order to give delegations an opportunity to express their positions on the operation of the relevant provisions of the Treaty and then proceed to its consideration of the operation of the Treaty relating to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones and of the role of the Treaty in the promotion of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and of nuclear disarmament, including measures aimed at promoting wider acceptance of the Treaty. Finally, the Committee would submit its finalized report to the Conference.

2. A major task of the Committee was to review the implementation of the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Previous Treaty review conferences had highlighted the key role of IAEA safeguards in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The process of strengthening IAEA safeguards and improving their efficiency was continuing. In that regard, IAEA had demonstrated its readiness to share with the Committee its experience related to "Programme 93 + 2" and to discuss current efforts to strengthen the safeguards system.

3. Finally, he recalled that at the Fourth Review Conference in 1990, Main Committee II had reached consensus on almost all the topics it had discussed. He believed that the agreed language reflected in the report of Main Committee II to the Conference (NPT/CONF.IV/45/II) should serve as a basis for discussion on which the Committee could elaborate in the light of developments of the past five years.

GENERAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS

4. Mr. WALKER (Australia) said his delegation had noted with satisfaction that, on the whole, safeguards had delivered the benefits envisaged by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Safeguards were the practical manifestation of a State's commitment under the Treaty not to acquire nuclear weapons. They enhanced security on a global and regional scale, provided a framework for cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear.
energy and maintained a necessary environment of confidence in which the process of nuclear disarmament could develop. It was in the interest of all States parties to the Treaty that those States which had not yet acceded to the Treaty should do so, and that all parties rapidly conclude and bring into force the required safeguards agreements.

5. Since the Fourth Review Conference two States parties had been found to be in non-compliance with their obligations under their NPT safeguards agreements and consequently under the Treaty. The experience with Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had confirmed the urgent need to strengthen safeguards, not only in order to keep up with developments in technology, but also to improve detection of undeclared nuclear activities. The Security Council had been directly involved in both cases of non-compliance and States parties to the Treaty should emphasize its vital role in enforcing compliance with IAEA safeguards agreements and obligations.

6. The Committee should review the implementation and effectiveness of safeguards and make clear recommendations for their future operations. It should support measures to ensure the early provision to IAEA of design information on nuclear facilities and the introduction of the universal reporting scheme. The Committee should support the access by IAEA to broader information and reaffirm the Agency's right to undertake special inspections. The value of these measures had been clearly demonstrated in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea where IAEA had been able to detect evidence of possible undeclared activity. Furthermore, he urged the Conference to call on those States parties who had not yet concluded their safeguards agreements to remedy that situation.

7. His delegation believed a new standard of cooperation with IAEA in safeguards implementation was needed and strongly endorsed the new measures proposed by the IAEA as part of its "Programme 93 + 2" to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards. Under "Programme 93 + 2" comprehensive safeguards agreements should provide for IAEA verification of the correctness and completeness of declarations by States to provide credible assurances of the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities and the absence of undeclared activities. Under comprehensive safeguards, States parties and IAEA had an obligation to cooperate fully to facilitate implementation of the agreements. "Programme 93 + 2" emphasized that a strengthened safeguards system would benefit from technological developments and called for greater access to relevant sites and information. As new measures were implemented and more facilities were placed under safeguards, the budget and resources of IAEA would continue to be stretched. It was absolutely essential that the Conference support efforts aimed at improving the efficiency of IAEA safeguards, as well as current measures to facilitate safeguards implementation and ensure that the safeguards programme was adequately funded.

8. The Conference should acknowledge that increased nuclear transparency and improved cooperation for safeguarding activities required providing greater information and facilitation in areas such as the designation of inspectors, multiple entry visas and independent communications for inspectors. The Conference should endorse basic principles on nuclear supply and enhance the role of national export and import control mechanisms to ensure that supplier countries complied with their obligations under articles I, II, III and IV of the Treaty. In addition, States parties should be encouraged to consider further ways to improve measures to stem nuclear proliferation without impeding their legitimate right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

9. The Conference should strongly urge nuclear weapon States which had not yet done so to place excess fissile material and nuclear installations transferred from military to peaceful uses under IAEA safeguards. It should call for the highest standards for the physical protection of nuclear material, especially when it was used for military purposes and should welcome the work undertaken by IAEA to respond to reports of illicit trafficking in nuclear materials, while recognizing that States parties needed to strengthen
international cooperation and physical protection. The States concerned
should be encouraged not to stockpile uranium and plutonium in excess of
normal civilian operational requirements.

10. With regard to the issue of nuclear-weapon-free zones under article VII
of the Treaty, his delegation welcomed the upcoming entry into force of an
African nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaty. He commended the important recent
steps taken by Brazil and Cuba which had helped to bring closer the entry into
force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and urged those countries to support non-
proliferation not only regionally, but globally by adhering to the Treaty.
His delegation strongly supported the agreed framework which had emerged from
negotiations between the United States of America and the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea, providing a basis for a thorough resolution of the nuclear
issue involving the latter country and for the implementation of an agreement
between the two Korean States for the denuclearization of the Korean
peninsula. Finally, he looked forward to the earliest possible discussions
for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and in
the South East Asian regions.

11. Mr. MACKINNON (Canada) said that IAEA safeguards not only ensured that
States were complying with their commitments under articles I and II of the
Treaty but also enabled States to engage in peaceful uses of nuclear energy,
as envisaged under article IV, in an atmosphere of confidence. In the long
term, such safeguards were also a key to the eventual implementation of
article VI.

12. IAEA safeguards had been put in place to detect the diversion of nuclear
energy from peaceful uses to the production of nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices. In that regard, the Conference should note with
regret that two States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty had been found
to be in non-compliance with the provisions of the Treaty or their safeguards
agreements with IAEA. While in one case non-compliance had been detected by
safeguards, the international community had been alarmed that, in the other
case, routine safeguards activities had not detected violations of the Treaty
and the safeguards obligations.

13. Efforts must be made to strengthen the safeguards system. An important
step had been taken in that direction in March 1995 at the meeting of the IAEA
Board of Governors, which had reiterated that the purpose of comprehensive
safeguards agreements was to verify that nuclear material in all nuclear
activities was not diverted to nuclear weapons. The Board had noted that the
safeguards system should be designed to provide for verification of the
correctness and completeness of States' declarations so that there was
credible assurance of the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and the
absence of undeclared nuclear material and related activities. In order to
achieve that broad purpose, increased rights of access to information and to
both nuclear and non-nuclear facilities would be required.

14. Increased access to nuclear facilities could be provided in a manner
compatible with the need for the efficient operation of facilities and could
lead to more cost-effective safeguards. Moreover, an enhanced and more
comprehensive declaration was critical to the Agency's ability to fulfil its
responsibilities and should not be an onerous or expensive development.

15. With the number of accessions to the Treaty and, consequently, to its
safeguards system since 1990, the international community had drawn
significantly closer to the universal application of IAEA safeguards.
Nevertheless, his delegation was concerned that a significant number of States
remained outside the NPT system and that many States parties to the Treaty had
not concluded safeguards agreements with IAEA.

16. The importance of recent unilateral offers to place excess fissile
material under IAEA safeguards should not be underestimated. His delegation
urged all nuclear-weapon States to offer for verification any nuclear
materials and nuclear facilities that might be transferred from military use
to peaceful nuclear activities by submitting them to IAEA safeguards. There
should also be greater transparency on matters pertaining to the management of plutonium and highly enriched uranium. Such material should not be stockpiled by any State in excess of normal civilian operational requirements.

17. States capable of supplying items that could be used for nuclear proliferation had an obligation to ensure that their nuclear exports were consistent with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty. Export controls enabled States to fulfill such obligations. National and multilateral measures in that regard were an essential element of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Since 1976, Canada had adopted a policy requiring full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply, and it hoped that the Conference would endorse that principle, as had the 1990 Review Conference. His delegation would be pleased to join as a co-sponsor of a proposal on the subject.

18. It was a misconception that export controls inhibited trade or that they were based on an assumption of denial. On the contrary, they were based on the assumption that nuclear cooperation was desirable as long as it did not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Such controls were not roadblocks but confidence-building measures that fostered cooperation. The multilateral nature of export controls ensured that nuclear non-proliferation concerns did not become an element of commercial competition. With nuclear cooperation and trade with over 30 States parties to the Treaty in all regions of the world, Canada, the world’s largest exporter of uranium and a major nuclear supplier, had found that such requirements had by no means hampered its cooperation.

19. Mr. HOFFMANN (Germany) said that, in the 25-year history of the non-proliferation Treaty, IAEA safeguards had been the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime. Germany was a large-scale user of nuclear energy and had decades of experience with the application of international safeguards. Such safeguards had enabled Germany to provide assurances about its compliance with its commitments under the Treaty. Germany’s experiences extended to the synergy of the global IAEA safeguard system with the regional safeguards activities of the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), and it welcomed the recent partnership agreement between IAEA and EURATOM.

20. The IAEA safeguards system had worked well and proven its flexibility and adaptability over time. Initially, there had been only limited experience with safeguarding sensitive facilities such as enrichment or reprocessing plants. In collaboration with certain of its members, including Germany, IAEA had developed credible safeguards approaches for those facilities.

21. With the revelation of Iraq’s secret nuclear weapons programme, it had become clear that the Agency had to improve its capability to detect undeclared nuclear activities. Germany had endorsed the steps taken by the IAEA secretariat and had co-sponsored and supported the decisions of the Board of Governors to that effect. As the case of non-compliance by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had demonstrated, the right of the Agency to conduct special inspections had not yet been accepted by all States parties to the Treaty. His delegation supported all steps to ensure the full implementation of that right as soon as possible.

22. His delegation fully supported current efforts to improve the Agency’s instruments for detecting undeclared nuclear plants and materials and enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of its safeguards approach. Germany welcomed the Agency’s research and development efforts and had oriented its national safeguards support programme towards the same objectives. As enhanced transparency offered by non-nuclear-weapon States better enabled the Agency to achieve that goal, a reduction in the routine safeguards effort should be considered.

23. While considerable efforts were being made to improve the safeguards system applicable to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, the international community should also take steps to universalize that system. His delegation strongly supported the requirement for full-scope safeguards as
a condition for all new nuclear supply contracts and it applied that principle in its own trade policy. His delegation called upon all nuclear supplier States that had not yet done so to incorporate the condition of full-scope safeguards into their own supply policies.

24. The principle of the universal application of IAEA safeguards should be indivisible. Recent concerns about accounting for nuclear material in nuclear-weapon States pointed to the general utility of safeguards for all peaceful activities in both non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon States. His delegation called upon all nuclear-weapon States to submit their peaceful nuclear activities to the safeguards standards that were applied to non-nuclear-weapon States under the provisions of the Treaty.

25. Mr. ANDREW (United Kingdom) said that the IAEA safeguards system had performed well over the years, and the application of safeguards had been fair and even-handed. One serious development over the past five years had been the bad faith of some States parties. Current events in Iraq had clearly demonstrated that it was not enough simply to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material. The Agency had recognized that fact and had presented an important set of proposals designed to strengthen the safeguards system by improving its ability to detect undeclared activities. His delegation had been encouraged by the positive response of the Agency’s Board of Governors to those proposals and looked forward to early agreement on their implementation. His delegation also welcomed the efficiency improvements already made by IAEA, as well as those proposed as part of “Programme 93 + 2”.

26. Neither the export controls applied responsibly by States parties in accordance with their obligations under the Treaty nor the Agency’s safeguards implementation had hampered the economic or technological development of non-nuclear-weapon States. The successful and wide-ranging nuclear programmes of many States were evidence of the fact.

27. His delegation urged all States parties that had not yet done so to conclude and bring into force their safeguards agreements with IAEA.

28. Mr. KULEBNIKOY (Russian Federation) said that, as a State party to the non-proliferation Treaty and one of its depositaries, the Russian Federation considered the IAEA safeguards system to be an effective instrument that increased confidence in the observance of the Treaty and the detection of unauthorized activities. The safeguards system was an additional means of strengthening security, especially at the regional level.

29. In keeping with its obligations under article III of the Treaty, the Russian Federation had continued to provide nuclear materials and equipment for peaceful purposes only to those non-nuclear-weapon States that agreed to the application of IAEA safeguards. Together with other nuclear supplier States, the Russian Federation was taking part in efforts to refine and update the list of nuclear materials and equipment whose export was subject to the application of IAEA safeguards, and it adhered strictly to that list in its export policy.

30. All nuclear supplier States should observe the principle of full-scope safeguards. In 1992, the Russian Federation had introduced a new system of export controls that required export and import licences for dual-purpose items that could be used to build a nuclear explosive device.

31. The Russian Federation was participating actively in the further development of the concept of special inspections, including the inspection of undeclared facilities. At the same time, the Agency’s efforts to apply the safeguards should not hinder scientific and technological progress or international cooperation among States in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Such efforts should be based on the optimum use of the Agency’s human and material resources.

32. In accordance with the safeguards agreement concluded between IAEA and the Soviet Union on 10 June 1985, the Russian Federation had cooperated with
the Agency and had allowed it to inspect its peaceful nuclear facilities. The Russian Federation had also provided the Agency with highly qualified specialists who had taken part in inspection activities in accordance with Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and in the assessment of South Africa’s former nuclear weapons programme. Experts from the Russian Federation had also taken part in the work of the advisory groups on the assessment of the effectiveness of safeguards and the elaboration of effective ways of improving the technical means of verification.

33. The Russian Federation had continued to contribute to the technical development of safeguards through its national programme of scientific and technical support for IAEA safeguards. Between 1990 and 1995, leading research institutes and organizations in the Russian Federation had taken part in the programme, and in 1994 alone more than 500 million roubles had been spent on activities under the programme. Research institutes in the Russian Federation assisted the Agency in carrying out analyses of used fuel samples taken by IAEA specialists during inspections and of samples from the environment taken to monitor undeclared activities in the reprocessing and enrichment of nuclear material. As part of its national programme, the Russian Federation had developed a small-scale spectrometric detector that had been widely used by the Agency in the monitoring of spent fuel.

34. The Russian Federation held annual international training courses for IAEA inspectors: beginning inspectors were trained at the Novovoronezh nuclear power plant and experienced inspectors at new nuclear facilities that had been placed under IAEA safeguards. In addition, Russian scientific institutes had held courses for the staff of national systems on methods of taking inventory of and monitoring nuclear material.

35. The Russian Federation was participating in "Programme 93 + 2" to improve the effectiveness of the IAEA safeguards system. Studies were being conducted on the ways to monitor the environment with a view to detecting signs of the undeclared construction and testing of nuclear explosive devices. Efforts were being made to establish indicators of nuclear weapons activities, develop methods for selecting and analysing samples of the environment and assess the effectiveness of the application of that method in international safeguards.

36. The Russian Federation was in favour of broadening international cooperation to prevent illegal trafficking in nuclear materials. All sovereign States that possessed nuclear materials had the obligation to guarantee their non-proliferation, physical protection, security and safekeeping, and they would also be held responsible in the event that such materials disappeared, were stolen or illegally moved. States should also help the Agency make use of its great potential to improve the level of physical protection and develop monitoring and inventory systems. Bilateral cooperation between law-enforcement agencies was of particular importance. The Russian Federation had signed a bilateral agreement with Germany on cooperation to prevent illegal trafficking in nuclear materials, and it intended to expand its cooperation in that area with other countries and organizations.

37. Mr. ROSENTHAL (United States of America) said IAEA safeguards were an effective means of demonstrating the transparency and irreversibility of nuclear arms reductions. The nuclear activities of non-nuclear-weapon States that had not concluded full-scope safeguards agreements represented a serious threat to nuclear proliferation. His delegation urged all States that had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty and conclude safeguards agreements. It also urged States parties to the Treaty that had not yet done so to conclude the required safeguards agreements.

38. While the IAEA safeguards system had performed well over the past five years, there was a clear need to enhance the safeguards. His delegation commended the Agency’s work in uncovering violations of safeguards agreements in Iraq and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The Conference should
take note of the Agency's efforts and recognize the important role of the Security Council in addressing cases of non-compliance with the Treaty.

39. The discovery of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons programme made it clear that IAEA safeguards needed to be strengthened. Relevant actions began at the meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors in February 1992, at which the Board had reaffirmed the Agency's right to conduct special inspections and require the early provision by States of information about their nuclear facilities. In February 1993, the Board had endorsed the reporting scheme for additional information on imports and exports. His delegation urged all States to provide the Agency with relevant information that would assist the Agency in fulfilling its responsibilities. At the same time, the Agency must carefully assess all such information.

40. Additional measures needed to be assessed and implemented to further strengthen IAEA safeguards. The Agency had responded by initiating its "Programme 93 + 2". The Conference provided the States parties to the Treaty with an opportunity to give substantial support to "Programme 93 + 2" as a means of fundamentally strengthening the verification of States parties' obligations under the Treaty. In particular, the Conference should express its conviction that the application of IAEA safeguards under NPT safeguards agreements must include the regular application of measures that provided credible assurance that there were no undeclared activities.

41. The Conference should express its strong support for adequate funding for IAEA safeguards and should urge the Agency, in particular its member States, to adopt arrangements that would ensure the long-term funding of IAEA safeguards at a level sufficient to maintain its important contribution to international security.

42. Since the early 1970s, the States parties to the Treaty had been meeting on a regular basis to ensure that the export of nuclear material and certain equipment was subject to IAEA safeguards. His delegation believed that the work of the Zangger Committee had been essential in giving effect to States parties' commitments under articles I, II and III of the Treaty, and should be continued. The work of the Zangger Committee, as well as the Nuclear Supplier Group, was open and transparent, and their guidelines were published by IAEA and available to all interested parties. His delegation urged all States parties to the Treaty to adopt the guidelines of the Zangger Committee.

43. The 1990 Review Conference had reached agreement on a number of important principles regarding export controls, including the need for all parties to take steps to ensure that their exports did not assist nuclear-weapon programmes in non-nuclear-weapon States, the need to ensure that preference in nuclear cooperation was provided to States parties to the Treaty, the need to coordinate the control of items not identified in article III, paragraph 2, that could assist nuclear-weapons programmes, and the need for full-scope safeguards as a condition of future supply. Those principles were just as valid in 1995 as they had been five years ago, and his delegation urged the Committee to adopt them again.

44. His delegation supported nuclear-weapon-free zones, such as those in Latin America, the South Pacific, Africa, South-East Asia, the Middle East and South Asia. Such zones could be an important complement to the global undertakings contained in the Treaty, and the Conference should recognize the many positive developments since 1990 relating to nuclear-weapon-free zones.

45. Mr. KAHILUOTO (Finland) said that, on the question of safeguards, article III of the Treaty was clear and unambiguous. The Treaty was also clear with regard to the time-frames involved. However, dozens of States parties to the Treaty had not agreed to comprehensive safeguards agreements of the type referred to in INFCIRC/153 of IAEA, and that situation was clearly unacceptable. In a diplomatic effort prior to the Conference, Finland and other Nordic States had approached States parties to the Treaty which had not concluded safeguards agreements. On a national basis, Finland had also participated as a donor country in organizing safeguards support programmes
for the Baltic States and Ukraine. Finland hoped that the Committee would continue to urge countries without safeguards agreements to live up to the non-proliferation commitment.

46. With regard to "Programme 93 + 2" of IAEA, the combined experience of non-compliance in Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had shown that the original safeguards concepts of IAEA was inadequate. Nevertheless, Finland strongly supported "Programme 93 + 2" and hoped that the Conference would endorse all the measures provided for in it.

47. Finland had accepted IAEA safeguards on all its nuclear activities and was prepared to embark on the legislative measures deemed necessary to implement the extended access facilities proposed in "Programme 93 + 2".

48. Regarding the question of trade-off, he noted that IAEA had proposed fundamental changes to the current safeguards system. The new approach, namely to target undeclared activities and sites, was absolutely necessary. Such an approach would also necessitate a new set of legal instruments to clarify the rights of the Agency and its inspectors in performing their duties. Finland believed that any new instrument should eventually involve an incentive or trade-off. Such a trade-off would mean that countries acceding to or adopting a new and more intrusive IAEA safeguards instrument should and could be subject to fewer routine inspections. Finland hoped that the Committee would support such an approach; it also hoped that the Conference would endorse a time-frame for the implementation of the main provisions of "Programme 93 + 2" so that the momentum of the process could be maintained.

49. On the topic of nuclear technology transfers, he said that Finland required the acceptance of full-scope safeguards from any non-nuclear weapons recipient and government-to-government guarantees on non-retransfer from any recipient of nuclear transfer originating in Finland. The Conference should urge those few suppliers who still did not require full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply to introduce such requirements without delay.

50. Mr. OUVRY (Belgium) reminded the Committee that article III of the Treaty obliged States parties without nuclear weapons to submit all of their nuclear installations and nuclear material for IAEA inspection. Since the discovery of Iraq's secret nuclear programme, the international community had recognized that the non-proliferation Treaty could only be credible if it stipulated really effective inspection measures. The human and financial resources of the Agency should therefore be more effectively targeted to detect not only the diversion of declared nuclear materials but also clandestine nuclear activities. Belgium supported the proposed reforms of the inspection system that would give inspectors greater access to nuclear sites and allow the Agency to pursue a more selective approach in its inspections.

51. Like its European partners, Belgium had already put in place measures designed to strengthen the safeguards system, such as rapid transmission of information about new facilities and the declaration of imports and exports of nuclear weapons and certain types of equipment.

52. It was clear that illegal trafficking in nuclear materials originating in former communist countries posed a grave proliferation risk. In addition, it was easier to gain access to the sensitive technologies which made it possible to build nuclear weapons. Inventories of nuclear materials and physical protection measures needed to be strengthened, and the international community and IAEA could make a valuable contribution by helping national authorities to establish such mechanisms. Effective monitoring was also a precondition of the development of trade and technology transfer. Without the credible guarantee that supplied material would not be diverted to military or terrorist uses, all such technology transfers would be risky. Therefore the general guarantees provided by the Treaty were a foundation of rather than an obstacle to the sustained development of trade between States parties to the Treaty.
53. In addition to strengthening the safeguards system, Belgium favoured universal monitoring. Therefore it supported the extension of such monitoring of fissionable material arising from the dismantling of nuclear arsenals and civilian nuclear facilities in nuclear-weapons States. Belgium welcomed the fact that Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton had announced that any fissionable material deriving from the dismantling process should be monitored by IAEA.

54. On the topic of regional control systems, he reminded the Committee that Euratom monitored all civilian nuclear activities of States members of the European Union, regardless of whether they were nuclear-weapons States or not. EURATOM and IAEA had inaugurated a particularly fruitful partnership and made it possible to achieve savings in the latter monitoring activities. More generally, IAEA could delegate certain monitoring activities to regional bodies provided that such bodies possessed a respectable technical record and adequate institutional credibility.

55. Belgium supported international nuclear cooperation and welcomed any measure designed to achieve that end without risk of proliferation. The commitment of as many supplier States as possible to equitable and universally applicable rules governing the transfer of nuclear material and equipment would be a major step forward. Comprehensive safeguards should be a precondition of all nuclear-related exports.

56. Mr. TALIANI (Italy) said that there seemed to be a consensus that the safeguards provided for in INFCIRC/153 were no longer appropriate or efficient and needed to be adapted, though such a task would be arduous and take a very long time. In the meantime "Programme 93 + 2" should be approved, which would effectively remedy the problem without having to resort to wholesale revision of INFCIRC/153. In addition, the Committee should support the attempts being made by IAEA to strengthen the NPT safeguards system.

57. The increased incidence of nuclear trafficking obviously indicated the inadequate nature of physical protection in many States. However, there was little IAEA could do about that problem without the cooperation of the States concerned.

The meeting rose at 5.25 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 2nd MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York,
on Friday, 21 April 1995, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. ERDŐS (Hungary)

The meeting was called to order at 3.20 p.m.

LECTURE BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA)

1. A lecture was given by Mr. HOOPER (International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)), who then answered questions from members of the Committee.

2. The CHAIRMAN thanked Mr. Hooper, and invited the Committee to resume its general debate.

GENERAL DEBATE

3. Mr. PAPADIMITROPOULOS (Greece) suggested that, given the nature and importance of the current Conference, the Committee's review of the application of safeguards should not be limited to the past five years.

4. The International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards had in general been very successful. The regular assurances that the Secretariat had detected no diversion of nuclear or non-nuclear material, or misuse of facilities or equipment placed under safeguards, had enjoyed the confidence of the international community. There had been some criticism, but it had not called into question the performance or the integrity of the system as such, and the Agency's Board of Governors had ensured that the system was steered onto the right course.

5. There had been in recent years a number of serious challenges, such as the cases of Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, demonstrating the urgent need for further strengthening of safeguards and for improvements in the detection of undeclared activities.

6. The Greek delegation fully endorsed the Agency's efforts to introduce new measures, known as the "Programme 93 + 2". The latter was expected to receive the necessary support and resources at the forthcoming meeting of the Board of Governors. The purpose of the strengthening process should be to achieve comprehensive safeguards, with full verification of all States' declared activities and of the absence of undeclared activities. The system should make use of any technological developments in the field. Narrow legalistic interpretations should be set aside, and the measures already available to the inspectorate should be modernized.

7. He welcomed the progress which had been achieved in cooperation between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), as a result of their new partnership approach. There was still room for the two organizations to make further improvements and reduce unnecessary routine activities without sacrificing their authority to produce independent conclusions.

8. The Conference should reaffirm the paramount role of national import and export controls and mechanisms. International cooperation and export control mechanisms, open, transparent and free from discrimination, were becoming widely accepted as a means to the objective of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
9. The international community should intensify its efforts to prevent illegal trafficking in nuclear materials, an issue having considerable implications in terms of both proliferation and human health. The European Union had instituted measures similar to those recently adopted by the International Atomic Energy Agency, such as the introduction of a data bank. The secretariats of the two bodies should begin consultations, in order to avoid duplication of work.

10. He reiterated that his Government strongly supported the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty, to be decided by consensus through transparent, democratic means.

11. Mr. PERERA (Sri Lanka) said that, since the safeguard system was the main verification instrument currently available, the Committee's work represented a crucial area for the operation of the Treaty. The serious compliance problems which had recently arisen pointed to the need to strengthen the safeguards regime. Verification should promote, rather than diminish, confidence in the Treaty. The Committee should take account of the call by the Non-Aligned Group for comprehensive and strengthened safeguards to all nuclear activities and facilities. Consideration should be given to creating a mechanism whereby compliance issues could be addressed periodically by all States parties on an equal footing. It would not require any amendment to the Treaty.

12. Recent incidents involving terrorism and the smuggling of nuclear material, representing both security and environmental threats, highlighted the need for more comprehensive safeguard policies. States parties would be well advised to look into urgent ways of addressing that problem.

13. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Latin America, Africa and the South Pacific was an important step forward, and the same process should be encouraged in areas such as his own region, South Asia. In that regard, the nuclear-weapon States should show a more forthcoming attitude to nuclear disarmament, a treaty on fissile material and a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Security concerns of all countries, including those of the threshold States, should be accommodated in a way that could promote both global and regional non-proliferation arrangements.

14. Mrs. KUROKOCHE (Japan) said that the Treaty had played a vital role in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and in providing significant security benefits. Some States parties, however, refusing to accept the IAEA safeguards, had attempted to develop or acquire nuclear weapons; that had necessitated a strengthening of the traditional safeguards system. Japan welcomed the recent IAEA decision regarding inspection and reporting, but considered that the action recommended by the IAEA secretariat at the recent meeting of the Board of Governors required further detailed consideration.

15. Japan had supported various research and development activities through its Support Programme for Agency Safeguards. Such cooperation greatly contributed to improving the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards implementation.

16. Concerning the implementation of safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Japan felt that it was extremely important that the framework agreed in 1994 between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea should be implemented, and hoped that that State would fully comply with its IAEA safeguards agreement.

17. Her Government attached great importance to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The development and utilization of nuclear energy must go hand in hand with non-proliferation and safety measures. In that connection, Japan believed that any nuclear fuel cycle programme should be carried out under the IAEA safeguards.

18. Nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States should be on an equal footing in the area of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Her Government
welcomed the conclusion of the voluntary safeguards agreement by all nuclear-weapon States and the acceptance of IAEA inspection at some of their nuclear facilities. Serious consideration should be given to the principle that the same level of safeguards should be applied to all facilities for civilian use in nuclear-weapon States as were applied to the facilities in non-nuclear-weapon States.

19. Japan called upon all States which had not yet acceded to the Treaty to do so as soon as possible, particularly those States which engaged in significant nuclear activities. They should also accept full-scope safeguards, and thereby dispel any suspicion regarding their motives for staying outside the Treaty regime.

20. Mr. DRAGOMIRESCU (Romania) said that as long as nuclear weapons existed, the risk of a nuclear war would persist; all possible steps should therefore be explored to move closer to a world free of that threat.

21. Greater importance should be given to the strengthening of IAEA safeguards, in order to provide maximum assurance of the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities. The current Conference should recommend improved measures to uncover non-declared nuclear installations and material. Those would include, inter alia, improved acquisition and evaluation of information, increasing special inspections of suspect sites, tightening up "significant quantity" thresholds and "timeliness goals", and expanding the ability of the Security Council to expose and even eliminate clandestine nuclear weapons facilities.

22. Romania abided firmly by its Treaty obligations and the IAEA safeguards system. It had joined the reporting scheme for exports and imports of nuclear material, non-nuclear material and specified equipment. He listed a number of other relevant agreements entered into by Romania. His Government also strongly supported Programme 93 + 2 aimed at evaluating the technical, financial and legal aspects of a comprehensive set of measures; that initiative proved the necessary responsiveness of the safeguards system to new challenges and circumstances. Consideration should be given to an expanded model for declaration of nuclear activities and intentions, and to the issue of dual purpose activities.

23. Romania attached high priority to activities aimed at improving cost-effectiveness, but efforts to save resources should not be allowed to jeopardize the effectiveness of the system. In addition, States parties should be called upon to strengthen their political, technical and financial support.

24. An efficient non-proliferation regime required appropriate measures to prevent access to nuclear materials, equipment and technologies, except for peaceful purposes. Any enhanced effort against proliferation should include a strong control regime, aimed at preventing proscribed nuclear activity. States had little to fear from well-conceived export controls and much to fear from a world in which no such controls existed. The Conference should stress the important role played in the supply field by export control regimes, and urge that those regimes be reinforced.

25. Romania held that the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones could significantly contribute to regional and global security, and constituted an important disarmament measure; it also strongly supported the regional non-proliferation treaties already in force in many areas, as well as proposals to create nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions such as Africa and the Middle East.

26. Mr. DEDEOGLU (Turkey) said that a decisive factor in the implementation of the Treaty was the verification of the fulfilment of Treaty obligations in the form of safeguards envisaged in article III, devised to prevent diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. It had become evident that the current safeguards system
was not adequate in that regard. The timely detection of the diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material required more than routine inspections aimed at declared material. Access to locations outside declared facilities and more intrusive inspection of declared nuclear facilities should be seriously taken into account. Increased access to relevant information and sites was essential for the realization of a more effective and efficient safeguards system. His delegation strongly supported the approach and recommendations proposed by IAEA to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of its safeguards system.

27. Ms. DELPECH (France) said her delegation welcomed the continued increase in the number of States parties since 1990. As previous review conferences had noted, universal accession to the Treaty and strict application of its provisions was the best way to limit the nuclear-weapon proliferation. The Treaty was the legal framework for international verification by IAEA whose safeguards played a key role in preventing nuclear-weapon proliferation and helped to strengthen collective security.

28. The commitments undertaken by States parties and the safeguards that made it possible to verify the implementation of those commitments were vital to cooperation in the area of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The recent solidarity among exporting countries in adopting measures to control nuclear exports was a positive development of recent years. Greater responsibility would give rise to greater trust among States and lead to increased cooperation.

29. Since the Fourth Review Conference in 1990, the serious events in Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had shown that States which had pledged not to acquire nuclear weapons could secretly conduct nuclear activities which were in contradiction with their commitments and had highlighted the need to change the safeguards system. The international system of verification should be able to adapt to circumstances and difficulties as they emerged in order to gain the confidence of the international community that it was fulfilling its role to prevent nuclear-weapon proliferation. Her delegation urged the Committee to support the recent decisions of the Board of Governors to extend IAEA's access to information and to sites and to call for voluntary and immediate communication of information regarding nuclear imports and exports by States. While the safeguards system had been found to be reliable for declared materials, installations and activities, it should be strengthened in order to detect non-declared activities in those States which had concluded general safeguards agreements. The objective of those agreements was to verify the correctness and completeness of the information submitted by the States and the Committee should encourage the Agency's work in that area.

30. Mr. SHA Zukang (China) said that the Treaty had played a positive role in containing nuclear-weapon proliferation, promoting nuclear disarmament and advancing international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Since the time the Treaty was concluded, however, circumstances had changed and certain limitations and defects in the Treaty had become apparent, including an imbalance in the rights and obligations of different States parties. His delegation believed that continued progress in nuclear disarmament and enhanced cooperation between countries for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy would help to rectify those limitations and defects. The People's Republic of China had strictly complied with its obligations under the Treaty and viewed the prevention of nuclear-weapon proliferation as an intermediate step towards the ultimate objective of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. Over the past 25 years, IAEA safeguards had provided an indispensable means to ensure the implementation of the Treaty.

31. His Government adhered to the three principles of nuclear export, namely, that exports should be exclusively for peaceful purposes, should be subject to IAEA safeguards and should not be retransferred to a third country without the consent of the original exporting country. Only those companies that had been especially designated by the Chinese Government were permitted
to engage in such exports and export applications were approved on a case-by-case basis by the appropriate government agencies. In support of IAEA safeguards, his Government had announced in November 1991 that it would notify the Agency of its exports to and imports from non-nuclear-weapon States of material exceeding one effective kilogram of nuclear material, and in July 1993, it had further undertaken to voluntarily notify IAEA of all its imports and exports of nuclear materials and exports of nuclear equipment and related non-nuclear materials. In 1985, his Government had announced its decision to voluntarily place certain of its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, and since 1989 it had established a system of accounting and verification of nuclear materials under those safeguards.

32. While his Government believed that the application of safeguards under the Treaty supported the prevention of nuclear-weapon proliferation, it held that the legitimate rights and requirements for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy of all countries, the developing countries in particular, should be fully respected. In no way should non-proliferation of nuclear weapons be used as a pretext to restrict or impede the peaceful application of nuclear energy by developing countries. In that regard, it was necessary to emphasize the relationship between the strengthening of the safeguards system and the promotion of cooperation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. While taking note of the positive recent efforts of IAEA to find ways to strengthen the safeguards regime, he underscored the need for appropriate measures to be adopted both within and beyond the legal framework of IAEA, in the form of agreements between IAEA and the appropriate States parties.

33. His Government supported the establishment, on a voluntary basis and through consultation, of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones free of weapons of mass destruction. Accordingly, his Government had signed the Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Additional Protocols II and III to the Treaty of Rarotonga. Furthermore, it supported the efforts made by Africa and the Middle East countries to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones free of weapons of mass destruction in those regions.

34. Mr. SCHERBA (Ukraine) said that his Government had consistently pursued a policy of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and had concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement which had entered into force on 13 January 1995 and would remain in force until a new safeguards agreement was concluded pursuant to article III of the Treaty. Considerable efforts had gone into the conclusion of that agreement, including the establishment of a system of accounting and verification of nuclear materials. Eight facilities, including five nuclear power plants, had been placed under safeguards, a process which had required substantial material, financial and human resources. Moreover, his Government had had no such previous experience and had greatly benefited from the assistance of IAEA and specific donor States such as Sweden, Finland, the United States and Japan who had provided expertise and technical support. In addition to setting up a system of accounting and verification of nuclear materials, his Government had introduced measures to provide effective controls of exports, imports and transfers of nuclear materials and technology.

35. While it supported the efforts of other States to provide effective verification of the delivery of nuclear materials and technology, his Government believed that such verification should in no way hinder legitimate international cooperation in the area of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. His delegation supported proposals to introduce additional measures to strengthen cooperation among States parties to the Treaty in that area. Believing that IAEA safeguards constituted an essential element of the international non-proliferation regime, his delegation urged all States parties to support the Agency’s activities which were directed at increasing the effectiveness of those safeguards. In that regard, the implementation of the programme to strengthen IAEA safeguards would help to promote compliance by States parties with their obligations under the Treaty and to strengthen collective security.

36. Mr. MIŠÁK (Slovakia) said that the Slovak Nuclear Regulatory Authority, an independent body of the State administration that did not report to any
organization that designed, constructed or operated nuclear facilities, was responsible for monitoring Slovakia's observance of its international obligations. The Authority was currently involved in the preparation of the Atomic Act, which would define conditions and ways to ensure the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Owners of nuclear materials were obliged to keep exact records of their amounts, imports, exports, storage sites, consumption and transport, as required by the Nuclear Regulatory Authority and IAEA.

37. IAEA inspectors had free access to all nuclear facilities in Slovak territory. Inspections have been carried out with the active participation of the Slovak Nuclear Regulatory Authority. Every year, the Agency conducted a number of inspections in Slovakia, and there had not yet been a single case in which a violation of the safeguards system had been found.

38. Slovakia fully supported every measure to strengthen the safeguards system in order to ensure the exclusively peaceful uses of nuclear material and prevent violations of obligations, as had occurred in Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

39. An effective safeguards system required prompt access to reliable information and an efficient data-collection system. In that regard, Slovakia was in favour of greater nuclear transparency, environmental monitoring and the expanded right to prompt access to nuclear facilities on short notice or no notice at all. Regional safeguards offices, enhanced communications capability, improved data processing and multiple-entry visas for inspectors could help make the inspection process more efficient. Those measures should be supported by effective and transparent multilateral export controls and measures to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear material. Slovakia welcomed the Agency's projects to prevent illicit trafficking; as a substantive part of such measures, it would be advisable to exchange information on international efforts and prepare guidelines for national authorities and customs officers on procedures and equipment to be used at border crossings.

40. Slovakia supported all measures to eliminate the accumulation of stockpiles of highly enriched uranium or plutonium and to ensure that such materials were subject to the highest standards of safety, security and international accountability in conformity with IAEA recommendations. With the end of the cold war, there were new opportunities for verification of nuclear material from dismantled weapons. The Agency should be allowed to take for safekeeping all fissionable materials that were no longer being used for the purpose of deterrence.

41. An inseparable part of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was export controls. Slovakia participated in the work of the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group and used the standard, transparent approach to export controls on items that could be used to produce nuclear explosive devices or in unsafeguarded nuclear fuel-cycle activities. Slovakia had incorporated the guidelines of the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group into its national legislation and it urged all States to adopt and apply such guidelines.

42. His delegation supported the implementation of article III. The future implementation of that article and the improvement of currently used procedures would further decrease the risk of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

43. Mr. COOK (New Zealand) said that, in recent years, two countries had been found to be in non-compliance with their safeguards undertakings and the international community had had to respond to unprecedented challenges. In that regard, New Zealand supported the continuing verification of IAEA in Iraq and welcomed the Framework Agreement between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as a basis for a pragmatic solution to a situation that was potentially destabilizing both for the Asia and Pacific region and for the Treaty itself. The Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea should carry out its stated intention of returning to full compliance with its safeguards agreement, which remained binding and in force.

44. His delegation strongly supported the proposed measures to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the safeguards system, commonly known as "Programme 93 + 2". The safeguards system must not only provide assurances that nuclear materials were not being diverted but also that no undeclared facilities were in operation. Such measures as improved access to safeguards-related sites and information, and environmental monitoring, were essential.

45. Full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply of nuclear material to non-nuclear-weapon States should be the international norm and should send a message to States that had chosen to remain outside the NPT system that they could not expect the same access to technology as States parties to the Treaty. The Conference should acknowledge that export licensing played an important role in fulfilling the commitments under article III, as well as articles I and II, by ensuring that nuclear transfers did not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The purpose of export licensing was to facilitate - not to hinder - trade in nuclear material and equipment, and his delegation believed that most States parties had benefited from the climate of confidence that export licensing created.

46. In the past few years, illicit trafficking in nuclear material had become another area of concern. While individual States were primarily responsible for ensuring the effective physical safety of nuclear material under their control, the 1995 Review and Extension Conference should endorse the supporting role of IAEA in such areas as data coordination and the provision of advice on ways of strengthening national systems of accountancy and control. The Conference should also encourage the relevant States not to stockpile plutonium and highly enriched uranium beyond the operational requirements of civil nuclear energy programmes. It was necessary to recognize the importance of the greatest possible transparency in the management of plutonium and highly enriched uranium and to encourage the consideration of long-term arrangements for their management. The Conference should further encourage all nuclear-weapon States to place under IAEA safeguards excess fissionable material and nuclear installations transferred from military to civil use.

47. As a member of the South Pacific Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, New Zealand believed that nuclear-weapon-free zones made a significant contribution to international confidence and stability, and hoped that the changing international situation would enable the United States, the United Kingdom and France to accede to the protocols of the Treaty of Rarotonga. New Zealand also welcomed the significant developments taking place in nuclear-weapon-free zones in Latin America and Africa and was following with interest the proposal to establish such a zone in South-East Asia.

48. Mr. AITMATOV (Kyrgyzstan) said that his delegation welcomed the recent efforts undertaken by IAEA to improve the safeguards system. It was in the interest of all States parties to enhance the effectiveness, efficiency and universality of the safeguards system, which made nuclear cooperation and commerce possible. Full-scope safeguards should serve as a condition of supply to all non-nuclear-weapon States. In that respect, Kyrgyzstan commended the Nuclear Suppliers Group for its strengthened guidelines and encouraged the Group to expand its membership to include additional nuclear suppliers.

49. His delegation regarded the significant movement to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in Antarctica, Latin America and the South Pacific as a major achievement of the non-proliferation Treaty. Additional nuclear-weapon-free zones should be created in Africa, the Middle East, the Korean Peninsula and Central Asia. His delegation welcomed the opportunity to learn from the experience of other States and to develop its own ideas about that promising approach to non-proliferation.
50. Mr. SUDJADNAN (Indonesia) said that Indonesia had repeatedly called for the application of the IAEA safeguards system to the nuclear facilities of all countries with a view to redressing the asymmetrical nature of the non-proliferation Treaty. Although nuclear-weapon States were not obliged under the Treaty to submit all their nuclear facilities to the safeguards system, their cooperation in that regard would help build confidence and allay concerns and suspicions. His delegation looked forward to working closely with the United States and the other nuclear-weapon States in regional endeavours to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones, especially in South-East Asia.

51. His delegation appreciated the efforts of the United States and the Russian Federation to implement the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty), the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I) and the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II). However, his delegation remained to be convinced that by the year 2003, when START II had been fully implemented, the two major nuclear-weapon States and other nuclear-weapon States would abide faithfully by the spirit and letter of the Treaty, since those countries had often stated that they would continue to maintain the military doctrine of nuclear deterrence. If their position remained unchanged, the opportunity to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world would be lost.

52. It was discouraging to know that some nuclear-weapon States continued to develop nuclear weapons in violation of their commitments under the Treaty. Even more worrisome was the fact that two nuclear-weapon States were engaged in activities that were in contravention of article I. The international community should therefore take concrete steps to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons, thereby ensuring the future of the Treaty to well beyond 1995.

53. As the implementing agency of the Treaty, IAEA should find ways and means of strengthening the safeguards system in order to enable it to deter, to the maximum extent possible, the diversion of peaceful nuclear activities to military purposes in both non-nuclear-weapon and nuclear-weapon States and, at the same time, prevent any cooperation among the nuclear-weapon States that would violate article I. Indonesia had recently begun to use environmental aerosol monitoring equipment designed to detect any diversion of peaceful nuclear activities to military purposes, and the States parties to the Treaty should consider using such a system.

54. Indonesia attached great importance to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and welcomed the recent agreement on an African nuclear-weapon-free zone, which it hoped would soon be signed and ratified by all countries in that region. His delegation wholeheartedly supported the initiative taken by the Middle Eastern countries to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in their region. Indonesia was firmly committed to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South-East Asia and called upon all nuclear-weapon States to facilitate the achievement of that goal.

55. His delegation supported the legitimate right of non-nuclear-weapon States to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It was important to strive for the full implementation of article IV, and it was essential to reconsider the concepts of creating barriers in the form of unilateral restrictions that prevented the full implementation of the Treaty and compromised the interests of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties.

56. The existing export control regime should be replaced by multilaterally negotiated and legally binding commitments that were universal and more acceptable to the developing countries. Only after all States parties committed themselves fully to achieving those long-sought objectives would it be possible to extend the Treaty well beyond 1995.
The meeting rose at 6.15 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 3rd MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 24 April 1995, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. ERDÖS (Hungary)

The meeting was called to order at 3.30 p.m.

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. POSTA (Hungary) said that it was his delegation's expectation that the Committee would not only make an assessment of the implementation of the relevant provisions of the Treaty but would also be successful in formulating guidelines for the future, since application of the Treaty and nuclear cooperation would continue after the close of the Conference. The importance of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards as a fundamental element of the non-proliferation regime should also be strongly reaffirmed in the final document to be drafted by the Committee following its review of article III of the Treaty. The President of the Security Council had already emphasized the political importance of safeguards in his statement on 31 January 1992.

2. Since the previous Review Conference, two States parties to the Treaty had been found in non-compliance. The IAEA secretariat and the Member States had therefore taken steps to strengthen the safeguards system, notably in the context of Programme 93+2 recently approved by the IAEA Board of Governors. Hungary believed that IAEA should have greater access to relevant information and nuclear facilities, since the more the States parties cooperated with IAEA the more assurances the international community would have that nuclear material would not be diverted from peaceful purposes.

3. Moreover, the operation of a credible safeguards system required appropriate working conditions for inspectors and the assurance of regular financing. On the former point, Hungary had decided unilaterally to lift restrictions on the designation of IAEA inspectors and to issue them with multiple-entry visas. On the latter, it was well known that available resources could not keep pace with the growing number of nuclear facilities. Since it had become imperative to find a lasting solution to the problem of financing, his delegation hoped that the Committee's final document would urge the States parties to find such a solution.

4. Effectively functioning IAEA safeguards, while fundamental, were not the only element of the non-proliferation regime. Together with other States parties to the Treaty, Hungary attached high priority to full-scope safeguards as a precondition for any new supply of nuclear material or technology. It had therefore adopted and put in place a national export and import licensing mechanism based on the common export-control policy of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. It was convinced that such a policy served the interests of non-proliferation and it called on suppliers that had not yet done so to adopt and apply a similar policy.

5. Lastly, Hungary would like to see the content of the Committee's final document serve in the coming years as a solid basis for prosperous cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, while ensuring full implementation of the Treaty's non-proliferation objectives.

6. Mr. NKURU (United Republic of Tanzania), recalling the importance of the Treaty provisions that Main Committee II was responsible for reviewing,
said that article III, on safeguards, remained contentious since it required only non-nuclear-weapon countries to accept IAEA safeguards. Not only was that provision discriminatory but it had enabled the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to accumulate stockpiles of fissile material which had recently been the target of thieves and smugglers. It was high time that a comprehensive safeguards system was established that was universally applicable and based on the principles of transparency and accountability. Such a system should not, however, contradict the provisions of article IV, which enunciated the inalienable right of all the Parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. In that vein, exclusive nuclear clubs which imposed unilateral export mechanisms with regard to dual-use technology should be discouraged. While his delegation agreed that IAEA safeguards should be strengthened, it felt that Programme 93+2 initiated by IAEA should also apply to nuclear-weapon States parties, since they had helped to arm the undeclared nuclear-weapon States.

7. Turning to articles I and II, while the majority of non-nuclear-weapon States had adhered to the undertaking not to receive the transfer of nuclear devices nor to manufacture them, almost all undeclared nuclear-weapon States, including the one that had given up its nuclear arsenal, had at one time or another been closely linked technologically with one of the threshold States.

8. Turning to article VII of the Treaty, his delegation was a strong proponent of the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones and welcomed the conclusion of various treaties to that end. It particularly welcomed the draft treaty on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa and hoped that once the treaty came into force, the major nuclear Powers would accede to its protocols and help ensure the integrity and security of the African continent. The positive developments taking place in the Middle East should also enable that region to envisage the creation of such a zone.

9. Mr. PATOKALLIO (Finland) described the activities undertaken by the Nuclear Suppliers Group to contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in accordance with articles I, II and III of the Treaty and to ensure that transfers of nuclear material and technology promoted the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in accordance with article IV. In the 1970s, multilateral consultations had led to the establishment of two mechanisms for dealing with exports of nuclear material, equipment and technology: the Zangger Committee and what had come to be known as the Nuclear Suppliers Group. In 1974, the Zangger Committee had drawn up a list of items falling under paragraph 2 of article III of the Treaty and had established a number of preconditions for the supply of such items. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), created following India’s explosion of a nuclear device in May 1974, had brought together all the major suppliers of nuclear technology, including those which at the time had not yet been parties to the Treaty. NSG members had agreed on a set of guidelines (IAEA document INFCIRC/254) which were implemented by each member in accordance with its national laws and practices.

10. During the 1990 Review Conference, Main Committee II had made several recommendations of relevance to NSG activities in the 1990s. Among other things, it had recommended that States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty should consider further improvements in measures to prevent the diversion of nuclear technology to military purposes; that they should engage in consultations to ensure appropriate coordination of their activities to control exports of items not specifically identified in the Treaty; and that nuclear supplier States should require acceptance of IAEA full-scope safeguards for exports to non-nuclear-weapon States.

11. Shortly thereafter, it had become apparent that the export control provisions then in force had not prevented Iraq, a party to the Treaty, from pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons programme. Following those developments, NSG members had decided in 1992 to establish guidelines for transfers of dual-use equipment, material and technology and to make a full-scope safeguards agreement with IAEA a precondition for future nuclear supplies to all non-nuclear-weapon States.
12. The record showed clearly that NSG undertakings had not impeded legitimate nuclear trade or cooperation and that NSG members were committed to transparency, as illustrated by the publication of the NSG guidelines by IAEA. NSG members shared with all parties to the Treaty the objectives of non-proliferation and peaceful nuclear cooperation, and the Group remained an essential component of the international non-proliferation regime of which the Treaty was the cornerstone.

13. Ms. ALANI (Sweden) said that IAEA safeguards were of critical importance for the implementation of the non-proliferation Treaty and for enhancing international security. Her delegation therefore urged all States parties that had not yet done so to sign a safeguards agreement with IAEA.

14. Sweden welcomed recent unilateral offers by some nuclear-weapon States to place under IAEA safeguards fissile material that was not required for defence purposes; it urged all nuclear-weapon States to follow suit.

15. Believing that every effort should be made to reduce the production, transfer and use of weapons-useable material, Sweden regarded the direct disposal of spent nuclear fuel as preferable to reprocessing. Given concerns at the growing amounts of plutonium available from the reprocessing of nuclear reactor fuel, it requested all States not to stockpile plutonium in excess of normal requirements for civilian nuclear programmes and called for the adoption of long-term arrangements for the secure handling of plutonium and highly enriched uranium. Lastly, Sweden noted with concern the increasing number of reports of illicit traffic in radioactive substances and nuclear material and urged all countries to take the necessary precautions to stop such trafficking and to strengthen the protection and control of such materials.

16. The disclosure of clandestine activities in Iraq had demonstrated the need to strengthen the IAEA comprehensive safeguards, in particular the methods for revealing undeclared nuclear activities and facilities. In that connection, Sweden endorsed the new measures proposed in Programme 93+2 and thanked the Director-General of IAEA and his staff for their efforts to make the safeguards system more effective.

17. With regard to the financing of IAEA activities, Sweden urged all States to provide the Agency with sufficient contributions and to agree on a lasting and equitable solution to the financing of the safeguards system.

18. Referring to the fact that the Treaty promoted the exchange of material, services and scientific and technological know-how relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, he said that Sweden believed that preferential treatment should be given to non-nuclear-weapon States which had signed full-scope safeguards agreements with IAEA. As a supplier country, Sweden adhered to the guidelines governing nuclear exports published in IAEA documents INFCIRC/209 and 254. Moreover, it believed that the texts adopted at the 1990 Review Conference should be the basis for the discussions during the current Conference. Sweden had also prepared draft texts in conjunction with other non-nuclear-weapon States.

19. With regard to article VII of the Treaty, Sweden welcomed the conclusion of the Treaty of Tlatelolco in Latin America. Moreover, the accession of South Africa to the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State had made a significant contribution towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa. Lastly, Sweden would welcome the establishment of such zones in South-East Asia and in the Middle East.

20. Mr. de ICAZA (Mexico) said that, while he recognized the importance of the safeguards system, it had some shortcomings: too many countries had remained outside the system; and only declared nuclear activities were covered. For that reason Mexico strongly supported Programme 93+2 of IAEA and reaffirmed that safeguards agreements applied to all nuclear material and to all activities carried out in the territory of States parties or anywhere under their jurisdiction or control.
21. The Agency should have the means to verify that the declarations made by States were accurate, that there had been no diversion of nuclear materials and that there was no undeclared nuclear activity. The measures proposed in Programme 93 + 2 to strengthen the safeguards system should be endorsed in new legal instruments, prepared with the participation of all States, which would thus have a universal binding and non-discriminatory character.

22. The administration of safeguards absorbed a growing share of the IAEA budget (10 per cent in 1970, 34 per cent currently, excluding extrabudgetary contributions). If the implementation of Programme 93 + 2 was not to take place at the expense of technical cooperation, a financing formula would have to be found which would take account of the degree of nuclear development of the various countries, the amount of inspection work involved for the Agency and the special situation of the developing countries.

23. The Mexican Government believed that the strengthening of the safeguards system through agreements specifying the powers of IAEA and the obligations of States was an essential prerequisite for the extension of the Treaty. Decisions should also be taken on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban, the initiation of negotiations to prohibit the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, the reduction of nuclear arsenals, and the establishment of a mandatory system of safeguards for non-nuclear-weapon States and a strengthened mechanism for the review and revision of the Treaty.

24. The task of Main Committee II was to review article VII, whereby any group of States had the right to conclude a regional treaty in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in its territory; the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones marked an important stage towards the complete elimination of such weapons. The first instrument totally prohibiting nuclear weapons in an inhabited region was the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which had been expanded since the previous Conference with the accession of several countries. Since the ratification of Additional Protocol I by France, all countries with responsibilities in the area covered by the Treaty had now acceded to it.

25. His delegation believed that the Conference should reaffirm the importance of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones; take note of the expansion of the Treaty of Tlatelolco; urge the nuclear Powers to ratify without reservations Protocols II and III to the Treaty of Rarotonga; welcome the imminent adoption of the treaty making Africa a nuclear-weapon-free zone; and express the hope that the negotiations for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would soon commence.

26. Mr. SUKAYRI (Jordan) said that article III of the Treaty, which was under review by the Committee, was all the more important in that IAEA safeguards were the only mechanism available to the parties to ensure compliance with the provisions of the non-proliferation Treaty. The safeguards system should be reviewed regularly if it was to be strengthened. That might not, however, be sufficient to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials for military purposes as long as the objective of universal adherence to the Treaty had not been achieved. His delegation therefore called upon all States which had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty and to conclude full-scope safeguards agreements with IAEA opening up all their nuclear facilities to international inspection.

27. In a region like the Middle East, volatile as it was, peace and security could not really prevail unless all the regional Powers, in particular those with nuclear capabilities, acceded to the Treaty. All parties to the peace process must therefore take care to prevent any loopholes in that process if they wished to achieve comprehensive peace. In that connection, nuclear activities which were not placed under the safeguards system presented a serious danger of proliferation and of a nuclear arms race in the region and were thus a threat to international peace and security.

28. On the question of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, particularly in the Middle East and South-East Asia, where they were badly
needed, his delegation welcomed the conclusion of the Treaties of Tlatelolco and Rarotonga, and the imminent opening for signature of a treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa. It noted, however, that the situation in the Middle East was by no means as promising. After two decades of consideration of the question by the General Assembly, little progress had been achieved. The Arms Control and Regional Security Group, working within the framework of the Madrid peace process, had hardly been more successful. Indeed, as stated in a United Nations document entitled "Study on effective and verifiable measures which would facilitate the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East" (A/45/435 of 10 October 1990): "Adherence to the NPT by all States of the region - and notably by Israel - would be a most significant milestone. Pending such a measure, the acceptance by Israel of safeguards on the Dimona facilities would be an important move towards the establishment of a zone and could be realized well in advance of its adherence to the NPT."

29. The Committee should pay special attention to ways and means of facilitating universal adherence to the Treaty and the conclusion by all States Members of the United Nations of full-scope safeguards agreements with IAEA; the strengthening of IAEA safeguards through adequate financing; and the establishment of denuclearized zones, particularly in volatile regions such as the Middle East.

30. Mr. CHYN (Republic of Korea) commended the safeguards system, which had promoted international cooperation in the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Full-scope guarantees had been particularly effective in verifying declared nuclear materials and facilities and compliance with non-proliferation commitments.

31. The cases of Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, however, showed that the system was not sufficient and, in particular, that it did not resolve the problem of undeclared nuclear facilities. Despite the action taken by the Security Council, it had taken four years for IAEA to obtain full details of Iraq's undeclared activities.

32. As for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, IAEA had had to ask for the support of the Security Council simply to carry out its statutory task of verification and, despite all the pressure, both multilateral (IAEA and the Security Council) and bilateral (on the part of the Republic of Korea and the United States), Pyongyang had yet to comply with its obligations.

33. Compliance with safeguards was a service both to the States concerned themselves, which thereby demonstrated their good will, and to their neighbours, whose confidence was strengthened. In order to discourage any violation of safeguards agreements, it was important to ensure that violators were punished and that States which honoured their obligations enjoyed preferential treatment.

34. The two cases of non-compliance revealed loopholes and inherent limitations in the ability of the existing safeguards system to meet the requirements of assurance, especially with regard to the absence of undeclared nuclear material and installations. The steps taken by IAEA to bolster the safeguards system - early provision of design information, more extensive reporting of nuclear-related imports and exports, and reaffirmation of the Agency's right to undertake special inspections - were inadequate to ensure non-proliferation. The Republic of Korea therefore welcomed Programme 93 + 2, endorsed by the IAEA Board of Governors, which would give the Agency greater powers and strengthen the safeguards system, especially with regard to the non-diversion of nuclear material and the absence of undeclared activities. A strengthened safeguards system would benefit from technological developments and called for greater access to relevant sites and information.

35. The Republic of Korea, which had welcomed environmental monitoring tests and which issued one-year multiple-entry visas to inspectors, hoped that that approach would establish itself as a minimum universal standard, leading to acceptance of an "anytime, anyplace" concept of inspections as advocated in
the Programme. Recognizing the importance of State systems of accounting and control to the implementation of IAEA safeguards, the Republic of Korea had established, in April 1994, a technology centre for nuclear control, as a first step towards the introduction of a domestic safeguards system in 1996. The highest priority should be given to the strengthening of the State systems of accounting and control, so as to combat illicit trafficking in nuclear material, which constituted a serious proliferation risk. Moreover, all States should accede to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

36. While recognizing the importance of export controls and the need for full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply to non-nuclear-weapon States, as recommended by the 1990 Review Conference, the Republic of Korea took the view that the export requirements laid down by the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group for items on their "trigger list" and many dual-use items should not hamper the acquisition of such items by States parties for peaceful purposes.

37. The Republic of Korea upheld the principle of universality of safeguards obligations. It called upon all States parties which had not yet signed a full-scope safeguards agreement to do so without delay. It also stressed the need to provide IAEA with sufficient resources to implement Programme 93 + 2 and carry out all the verification activities that would be required with the strengthening of the safeguards system.

38. Mr. CISAR (Czech Republic) said that although the Czech Republic had succeeded to the Treaty early in 1993, it had not joined IAEA until September 1993. It was anxious, however, to have the safeguards agreements concluded by the former Czechoslovakia with IAEA remain in force provisionally, and hoped to conclude a new agreement in 1995. Recognizing the need for export controls, it applied to its own exports the guidelines of the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which it believed were an essential element in the non-proliferation regime. Since 1978, the former Czechoslovakia had been applying full-scope safeguards. The Czech Republic, as a producer of many nuclear components, strongly supported that principle. In line with its belief that the Treaty should be universal, it took the view that all the nuclear Powers should submit their supplies of nuclear material to full-scope safeguards, and should do their utmost to prevent nuclear material intended for civilian purposes from being diverted to military purposes.

39. The violations committed by two countries underscored the need to strengthen the safeguards system. Full-scope safeguards should give the assurance that material intended for declared activities was not diverted to other purposes, and that there were no undeclared activities. To that end, the Czech Republic hoped that Programme 93 + 2 would be fully supported.

40. In the Czech Republic, the functions of the State system of accounting and control (SSAC) were performed by the National Nuclear Safety Authority, which monitored 12 facilities and over 200 nuclear depositories. The Authority cooperated fully with IAEA inspection teams. In 1991, it had offered its material and human resources for the training of SSAC inspectors and agents. Several field tests and one training course had been conducted in the Czech Republic.

41. Experience with regard to trafficking in nuclear material highlighted the need for every State to safeguard material that might be used for military purposes. There must be cooperation among States in order to put an end to illicit trafficking.

42. The Czech Republic was pleased with the way in which article III of the Treaty was being applied. It hoped that the Committee would take its decisions by consensus.

43. Mr. NORDIN (Malaysia) said that it was essential to strengthen the Treaty, which must be a universal, non-discriminatory instrument. Malaysia
urged States that were not parties to the Treaty to accede to it, and urged States parties to negotiate and sign safeguards agreements. Malaysia itself had signed such an agreement, which facilitated the work of the inspectors in its territory. Only through such cooperation with IAEA could the international community collectively avoid the danger of nuclear proliferation. Recent events showed, however, that the safeguards system still needed to be strengthened.

44. At the same time, there was a need to study and resolve the legal and financial implications of new measures before any of them were implemented. It was of paramount importance to ensure that the new measures did not hinder the smooth flow of materials, equipment or information to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT. Most importantly, those new measures should be non-discriminatory, and language to that effect should be included in the final report of the Committee. Selective or discriminatory application would create uneasy feelings among States parties, and might worsen the climate of mistrust and undermine the integrity of the Treaty itself. All parties that had signed safeguards agreements with IAEA should be accorded the right to participate in the development and adoption of the "trigger list", within the framework of the General Conference of IAEA. It would thus have the required legitimacy as an international agreement.

45. The measures required for monitoring and verification, both existing measures and measures still under consideration, needed the political, technical and financial support of States parties. The cost of administering the safeguards system, which had grown from $12 million in 1970 to $72 million in 1995, was increasing at a much faster rate than the overall IAEA budget. The increase in the IAEA budget had been largely due to the growing number of nuclear power stations and research reactors. The cost of the monitoring and verification required under article III of the Treaty should be borne by the countries benefiting from nuclear energy and not by those that had not opted for nuclear energy.

46. Although future cost increases might also come as a result of the need to monitor nuclear materials not required for national defence and transfers of materials, and the need to implement the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and the cut-off convention banning production of fissile materials, a major portion of IAEA responsibilities related to safeguards. His delegation hoped that a proper balance between those responsibilities could be struck in the Committee’s report.

47. It had been suggested that inspectors should be stationed at frontiers to check the flow of trafficking in nuclear materials. His delegation was of the view that the question of illicit trafficking was not a question of safeguards. It was the responsibility of the respective countries to ensure and finance such monitoring. As a multilateral organization, IAEA should only be engaged in providing training or expert advice to strengthen State systems of accounting, so as to prevent pilfering of and illicit trafficking in nuclear materials. Nations that had the ability to stockpile large amounts of nuclear material should be in a position to prevent such things from happening. If they could not, they should place such material under international supervision or have it destroyed.

48. Mr. POTUYT (Netherlands) emphasized the importance of the review process. Even after the extension of the NPT, the review should continue. Transparency would create the necessary climate of confidence that would allow the further development of peaceful nuclear programmes of the States parties. The Netherlands appreciated the monitoring and control work of IAEA.

49. Referring to the examples of Iraq and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, he stressed the need to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system, as envisaged in Programme 93 + 2. The safeguards should be universal, and all nuclear facilities, in nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States alike, should be subject to no-notice inspections.
50. As agreed during the fourth Review Conference, suppliers should subject all nuclear exports to full-scope IAEA safeguards. Export licensing for nuclear exports was practised by his Government.

51. Arms control agreements and export licensing regimes were complementary elements of international security policy. Those regimes were intended to prevent proliferation without limiting the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. All States should have access to such technology in so far as that was one of the possible options for their economic development. The guidelines developed by the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group were necessary in order to arrive at some degree of coordination of nuclear export regulations. They were not intended to limit exports.

52. In conclusion, he referred to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and called on the Conference to support the establishment of such zones in Africa and the Middle East, where the renunciation of weapons of mass destruction would facilitate the peace process.

53. Mr. AYATOLLAHI (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that from the early days of the non-proliferation Treaty's operation, developing countries had highlighted the necessity of full implementation of article IV. However, some States that were not party to the Treaty were obtaining nuclear weapons despite the existence of the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. That problem could not be resolved through vertical or horizontal limitations. In order to ensure full compliance with the Treaty, it was necessary to look into ways to remove existing export control regimes and to create, where necessary, transparent international mechanisms with the participation of all States parties to the Treaty.

54. For example, it would be possible to establish a committee, in the context of the Treaty, which would formulate measures to ensure full access of all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, without discrimination, to nuclear equipment and technology for peaceful purposes and, at the same time find ways of strengthening the existing system of safeguards by formulating a set of guidelines which would replace existing unilateral arrangements. The committee would be open to all States parties to the Treaty and would meet regularly. The committee would be without prejudice to further enrichment of the discussions on strengthening the IAEA safeguards going on in Vienna.

55. In addition, the measures proposed in the "Programme 93 + 2" would help enhance confidence if they were properly integrated in or annexed to the agreements to be concluded between the Agency and States in the context of the Treaty (INFCIRC/153), if they could be applied to provide concrete results and if the conclusions of the strengthened safeguards system were used to enhance international cooperation in the field of peaceful applications of nuclear energy as stipulated in article IV.

56. Furthermore, the role of IAEA in general should be enhanced and it should be recognized once again that the Agency was the sole body responsible for verifying that States parties were complying with the Treaty. The Agency for its part must focus more on programmes which would help the developing countries secure financing for nuclear power projects to meet their energy needs. A financial assistance fund should be established for those countries, as had been proposed at previous Review Conferences.

57. Iran attached great importance to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in different regions of the world, particularly in the Middle East, and it had submitted a draft resolution on the subject to the General Assembly as far back as 1974. Unfortunately, that objective had not been realized because of Israel's stubborn refusal to accede to the Treaty; he hoped that the current Conference would be able to take the first practical steps towards the creation of such a zone.

58. Mr. SCHMIDT (Austria) pointed out that from the time it acceded to the Treaty, Austria had believed in the vital need for universality of the full-
scope safeguards, deeming that they should be applied to all non-nuclear-weapon States irrespective of whether or not they were party to the Treaty, and it hoped that that principle would be an important element in the report of Main Committee II.

59. Following the discoveries made in 1991 concerning Iraq, IAEA had undertaken to develop additional concepts or notions within the context of "Programme 93 + 2", which constituted a step in the right direction. His delegation also welcomed the efforts made by the Agency to create an integrated safeguards system.

60. Several non-aligned States had spoken out in favour of the multilateralization of export controls. Austria was in favour of that principle, which was inherent in the Treaty, since control of exports would be entrusted to a multilateral organization, IAEA. The decision concerning which equipment or material was "especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material" was left to each State. The Treaty provided for multilateralization through safeguards agreements concluded with the Agency covering control of exports upon arrival in the receiving country. It stipulated, in effect, that the IAEA safeguards should be full-scope safeguards. They must therefore apply to all nuclear material, in all activities undertaken in non-nuclear-weapon States whether or not they were party to the Treaty.

61. The Treaty had therefore given the Agency important responsibilities, for the latter must also be able to detect clandestine activities. Multilateralization could be ensured by developing the integrated safeguards system launched by IAEA in its "Programme 93 + 2" and by closer cooperation of all States parties regarding the "trigger list" outlined in document INFCIRC/209. Acceptance of that document could facilitate a dialogue among States parties to the Treaty and States members of the Zangger Committee. A clearer understanding of the obligations contracted under article III would facilitate achievement of the Treaty objectives, particularly with regard to article IV.

62. **Mr. Tayib (Saudi Arabia)** said that the non-proliferation Treaty was a cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and a legal instrument designed to safeguard international peace and security. Saudi Arabia attached particular importance to strengthening and to universal and effective implementation of the Treaty without exception.

63. The IAEA safeguards system had helped stem proliferation of declared nuclear material, but it left serious gaps for it had failed to prevent certain States parties, namely Iraq and North Korea, from producing nuclear material for military purposes. Those gaps in the safeguards system called into question the Treaty's credibility and its capacity to ensure international peace and security. The Conference should take the necessary steps to strengthen application of the safeguards system in accordance with the recommendations of the Security Council Summit held in 1992, which had underscored the essential role of the safeguards system in the effective application of the Treaty and the importance of export verification measures. However, the safeguards must in no way prevent States parties which were non-nuclear-weapon States from exercising their legitimate rights which were guaranteed by the Treaty, to conduct research and to produce nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

64. The creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones was encouraged by the General Assembly which saw that as a general disarmament measure. The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean had signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1967, and the States of the South Pacific had signed the Treaty of Rarotonga in 1985. In addition, South Africa had now acceded to the Treaty and submitted its installations to the IAEA safeguards system, thereby contributing to the success of efforts to conclude a treaty on nuclear non-proliferation in Africa; that treaty should soon be signed.
65. The idea of creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East had first been put forward in 1974, and since then the General Assembly had adopted a resolution on the subject every year. More than 20 years had elapsed and the States of the region had yet to achieve that objective, because Israel persistently refused to accede to the Treaty and to submit all its nuclear installations to the IAEA safeguards system. Saudi Arabia, for its part, had supported all international initiatives designed to prohibit the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and it hoped that the international community would enhance efforts to turn the Middle East into a zone free from all weapons of mass destruction and it hoped that the Treaty's credibility. The Conference should subscribe to the objective of turning the Middle East into a zone free from weapons of mass destruction, in accordance with article VII of the Treaty and with the communique issued by the Security Council Summit in 1992.

66. The Treaty's success depended on observance of its provisions by the States parties, those that had nuclear weapons and those that did not. The Conference should ask the Security Council in the context of its responsibilities for the preservation of international peace and security, to ensure the universality of all provisions relating to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons without any distinction, bearing in mind the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

67. Mr. ALHIJAJ (Iraq) pointed out that, in referring to Iraq's position on the question of the implementation of the IAEA safeguards regime, some representatives had distorted the facts. If the Conference wished to draw lessons from Iraq in the area of safeguards without trying to tarnish Iraq's reputation, it must go back to the source of the problem.

68. Those who accused Iraq were forgetting that Iraq's nuclear installations, which were subject to safeguards, had been attacked in 1981 by the army of Israel, a country which was not a party to the Treaty and which had not subjected its installations to those safeguards. That attack had been an attack on the Treaty and the safeguards system, as the Agency and the Security Council had pointed out, but the parties to the Treaty had not reacted.

69. Iraq’s purpose in building the Osirak reactor had been to make the complex an international centre open to inspection, but the Israeli attack on the complex had put an end to its plans. By continuing to threaten to destroy Iraqi nuclear installations, Israel was preventing Iraq from exercising its rights under article IV of the Treaty, and Iraq was therefore keeping its research and study programmes secret. Iraq had noted that neither the IAEA nor the Security Council had protected the nuclear installations at the time of the Israeli attack, and that the Security Council had merely adopted resolution 487 (1981), without taking any action when Israel failed to implement it. Raising the question of Iraq alone, without inquiring into the background, did not promote the cause of the Treaty. There were notorious cases of non-observance of the Treaty concerning, for example, the transfer of nuclear materials without prior notification of the Agency, as in the case of South Africa under the apartheid regime. Iraq could not be taken to symbolize the deficiencies of the Treaty and the safeguards system.

70. If real lessons were to be learned, attention should focus on article IV, which would remain a hypothetical provision as long as there were States, whether parties or not to the Treaty, which threatened to use force to destroy nuclear installations subject to the safeguards system.

71. With regard to article VII of the Treaty, the question of setting up a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East was of vital importance to the States of the region, which had been asking for the creation of such a zone since 1974. The main obstacle was the existence in the region of a State,
with a vast nuclear arsenal, which refused to accede to the Treaty. If Africa was now on the way to achieving the objective of creating such a zone, it was because South Africa had voluntarily renounced its nuclear weapons and decided to submit its installations to the safeguards system. Unless Israel did the same, the Middle East would remain the scene of military escalation and tensions.

72. In referring to Iraq and United Nations resolutions, some speakers seemed to forget that paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) provided for the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction. It so happened that that was the only paragraph in the resolution which had not been implemented. While the IAEA had discharged the task assigned to it under resolution 687 (1991) in the matter of monitoring, Iraq wondered if, as the sponsors of the resolution contended, stability had been achieved and an end put to the arms race in the region. By not applying paragraph 14 of the resolution they failed to take account of the imbalance regarding weapons in the region with all the attendant consequences in terms of tension, instability, the arms race and threats to security. The establishment in the Middle East of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction, in accordance with the provisions of article VII of the Treaty and the provisions of paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter, would provide a political guarantee for regional peace and security and be a decisive step towards achieving the universality of the Treaty.

73. Mr. FRIEDRICH (Switzerland) said that the credibility of the non-proliferation system set up by the Treaty was based on the IAEA safeguards system, which Switzerland wholeheartedly supported. In that connection, it was a matter of continuing concern that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was refusing to comply fully with its obligations under its IAEA safeguards agreement. It was in its own interest for the IAEA to be able to complete its international inspections without delay, so that the international community could be shown the entirely peaceful nature of the North Korean nuclear programme.

74. Iran's attempt to develop nuclear weapons secretly constituted the most serious case of non-observance of the Treaty in the past five years. Switzerland supported the measures taken by the IAEA, after the Iraq episode, to improve the capacity to detect undeclared nuclear installations, and it congratulated the Agency on the excellent evaluation work it had accomplished under the Programme 93 + 2, which was designed to improve the effectiveness of safeguards.

75. The Swiss Federal Council had decided in 1991 to require full-scope safeguards, in the future, in the case of new exports of nuclear material or equipment to non-nuclear-weapon States, and Switzerland strongly encouraged all States that had not yet done so to practice such a policy as well.

76. The recent cases of illicit trafficking in nuclear materials must be taken seriously because of the potential danger they posed to public health and because of their possible implications for nuclear non-proliferation. All States should take suitable measures to make such trafficking impossible. International safeguards should be applied to peaceful nuclear activities, even if they took place in the territory of a nuclear-weapon State. It was encouraging to note that France and the United Kingdom had already taken such action. All the nuclear-weapon States should also be encouraged to place fissile materials deriving from nuclear disarmament under international control, and it should be noted that the United States had taken an important step in that direction.

77. The only purpose of export controls was to ensure respect for the non-proliferation obligations undertaken under articles I, II and III of the Treaty, so that international exchanges for peaceful purposes could take place, as provided in article IV. Those controls were therefore required by the Treaty, and for that reason Switzerland was participating in the work of the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
78. Switzerland welcomed all the efforts being made to conclude regional treaties to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in certain regions. The prospect of the forthcoming establishment of a denuclearized zone in Africa and of the imminent entry into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco was very encouraging, and all the States that had contributed to that achievement were to be congratulated. It was to be hoped that other continents, including Europe, would also become denuclearized zones one day.

79. Mr. ABOU RADIO (Syrian Arab Republic) said that the Syrian Arab Republic, which had been one of the first countries to sign the Treaty, had never sought to acquire nuclear weapons and, on the contrary, was endeavouring to eliminate the terrible nuclear threat in the Middle East region. It had therefore called for the establishment in the Middle East, under the auspices of the United Nations, of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction, but it wondered if that would be possible when, in the heart of that region, there was a nuclear arsenal not subject to safeguards. The perpetuation of the status quo, which obliged all States in the Middle East except Israel to respect the Treaty, was a grave mistake that threatened peace and stability in the region and was therefore unacceptable.

80. The safeguards system currently applied by the IAEA was performing well. The existing violation was not due to any deficiency or inadequacy in the safeguards system, for the parties responsible were certain nuclear-weapon States which had not applied article I of the Treaty.

81. The safeguards system, according to the IAEA statute, must be applied by all States, and that was particularly true in the region of the Middle East, where the States were parties to the Treaty and had concluded safeguards agreements, with the exception of only one State, Israel, which still refused to accede to the Treaty, although it certainly had nuclear weapons. The behaviour of Israel was a threat to peace, security and stability in the region and made proliferation possible.

82. The application of safeguards must not in any way hinder economic and technological development or international cooperation in the field of nuclear activities for peaceful purposes. Any obstacle to trade between States prevented the developing countries from making progress. Restrictions should be limited to technologies that were directly connected with the production of nuclear weapons, and they should not affect dual-use materials and equipment because it was not easy for any State to convert them to military uses. The acquisition of equipment and the conduct of research for peaceful purposes and the use of research reactors and nuclear power plants should not be considered a threat to the States of the Middle East and should therefore be allowed. The double standard applied in the region was unacceptable. How could Israel be allowed to acquire nuclear technology, that it could even export, while the other states of the region could not obtain the basic equipment needed for purposes of scientific, medical and agricultural research? That was a violation of the right of the developing countries set forth in the Treaty.

83. Mr. ADEKEYE (Nigeria) said that it was essential, both for the sake of confidence among States parties and for the effectiveness of the Treaty, for all States parties to comply with their Treaty obligations. Recent events had brought to the fore the inadequacies of the existing safeguards system and he noted with satisfaction that the IAEA was addressing the problem through its Programme 93 + 2, and Nigeria supported the Agency in that endeavour. It was unfortunate, however, that the IAEA did not have the resources it needed, and it should be provided with the necessary means to enable it to discharge its new responsibilities.

84. However, the preoccupation with safeguards should not jeopardize the ability of the IAEA to perform its other crucial role regarding the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful uses. Nigeria, like other developing States parties, attached great importance to the implementation of article IV, and felt that a balance must be maintained in the allocation of resources for effective implementation of the Agency's dual mandate.
85. In demonstration of its commitment to the objectives of the Treaty, Nigeria had concluded a full-scope safeguards agreement with IAEA and hoped that other States which had not yet done so would do likewise. He particularly urged the nuclear-weapon States to open their peaceful nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards. Greater transparency on the part of those States would strengthen confidence in the Treaty.

86. The international community must adequately address the problem of illegal trafficking in nuclear material. As nuclear warheads were dismantled, fissile material would become readily available, and international cooperation in the physical protection of nuclear material should therefore be strengthened.

87. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones was a vital element of the non-proliferation regime and an important disarmament measure; the African countries were on the verge of finalizing a treaty establishing such a zone in Africa. The effective implementation of that treaty would require, inter alia, that the nuclear Powers should respect the status of that zone and support Africa in its quest to rid the region of all weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. Similarly, Nigeria and the other members of the zone of peace and cooperation of the South Atlantic had in 1994 declared the South Atlantic to be a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The cooperation of the nuclear-weapon States would be crucial in the realization of that goal as well. He also welcomed other initiatives aimed at establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, particularly in South-East Asia and the Middle East.

88. Mr. OSTROWSKI (Poland) recalled that his country had joined the non-proliferation system as a non-nuclear-weapon State and had placed all its facilities under IAEA safeguards. The universal application of full-scope safeguards satisfied both common sense and the international desire for security. Originally, the safeguarding of nuclear material through accountancy, containment and surveillance had been the only possible approach, and given the level of technology and financial resources available, access to fissionable materials had been sufficiently difficult. For 20 years, that scheme had fulfilled expectations, but when undeclared activities had been discovered in Iraq, it had become necessary to make improvements. It was in that context that IAEA had sought to deal with possible undeclared activities by setting up the 93 + 2 programme, which provided for regular inspections and environmental monitoring. An analysis of the model safeguards agreement showed that legal authority existed for a whole range of proposed new measures. For its part, Poland was prepared to adapt to any new legal instrument that might be needed to make the programme work and hoped that other countries would do the same. Lastly, with regard to export controls, States must understand their responsibilities under article III of the Treaty, but also under articles I and II. International export agreements also created a framework for cooperation, as mandated under article IV.

89. Mr. AYADI (Algeria) said that by becoming a party to the Treaty on 12 January 1995 his country had demonstrated its commitment to the goals of that instrument and had made a contribution to the effort to universalize the non-proliferation regime. A full-scope safeguards agreement was being prepared, and Algeria had already placed its two reactors for research and the production of radioisotopes under IAEA safeguards, thereby demonstrating its readiness to enjoy the technological benefits that could be derived from peaceful uses of the atom.

90. Through its cooperation with IAEA, which had always been based on the notion of transparency, Algeria had sought to extend the application of nuclear technology to such areas as health, agriculture, foodstuffs monitoring and the environment. Both the provisions of the Treaty and the IAEA Statute affirmed the inalienable right of non-nuclear States to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The Agency's resources should be increased so that it could perform its duties in that regard.
91. The Committee must promote that constructive view of the Agency's role, but it must not try to supersede the competent bodies by taking decisions on the issues before it.

92. Mr. WHEELER (South Africa) said that South Africa had developed a nuclear deterrence programme but had subsequently decided to dismantle all its nuclear devices, a step from which the Committee could learn some important lessons. Firstly, it was possible for a State with a well developed technological infrastructure and extended fuel-cycle activities to develop nuclear-weapons capability in spite of export control regimes. Secondly, South Africa had abandoned its nuclear deterrence programme as soon as the international climate had changed. However important safeguards and export control regimes might be, it was only by adequately addressing the security concerns of States, especially in a regional context, that nuclear proliferation could be halted. South Africa therefore strongly supported the objectives of article VII of the Treaty.

93. The Treaty's largely positive aspect should be emphasized. The overwhelming majority of Member States had abided by their commitments, as IAEA had verified. However, there had been two events in recent years to which IAEA had reacted by reviewing safeguards practices. His delegation fully supported a system that would not be more onerous but would be more flexible and would provide greater assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities. Exporters could then have greater confidence in the intentions and activities of technology importers. The benefits of technology transfers to States that needed them and could benefit from them would offset any increase in costs the new system might entail.

94. With regard to paragraph 2 of article III of the Treaty, the Zangger Committee should be commended for the role it had played; however, the export control regimes authorized under that provision were often contrary to the spirit of article IV. He was pleased that the concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty had been addressed as a result of greater transparency and an increase in the number of States parties.

95. South Africa looked forward to the day when the situation foreseen in article VI was finally realized by means of an effective treaty aimed at cutting off the production of nuclear material and a comprehensive test-ban treaty, whose verification still posed technical problems. The peaceful use of weapons-grade nuclear stockpiles posed a new challenge, and the risks of re-proliferation would have to be balanced against the benefits of the peaceful use of those materials.

96. Mr. DE LA TORRE (Argentina) said that although Argentina had not become a party to the Treaty until February 1995, it had already demonstrated its commitment to the goals of that instrument through a number of decisions taken over the years. In July 1991, for example, it had concluded an agreement with Brazil that had led to the establishment of a body for the control and accountancy of nuclear material. In 1994 it had concluded a full-scope safeguards agreement with IAEA. In addition, all its nuclear facilities had been placed under the safeguards regime.

97. Argentina had also taken various steps to abide by the provisions of the Treaty concerning horizontal non-proliferation, and a stringent import control regime had been in place since 1992. Argentina was also a full member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and had recently become a member of the Zangger Committee.

98. In the area of cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, Argentina had recently concluded cooperation agreements with several countries, and other agreements were in preparation. Argentina had also participated actively in the IAEA technical cooperation programme.

99. Lastly, with regard to article VII, Argentina was a party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which it had accepted without reservations.
100. In view of the seriousness of the recent violations of the Treaty by Iraq and by the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, it was imperative that the safeguards regime should be strengthened, and his delegation supported the development of technological resources for detecting declared and undeclared nuclear activities. States parties had a duty to cooperate fully with IAEA. Argentina supported the 93 + 2 Programme and also believed that the Agency must be able at a reasonable cost, to obtain data and have access to facilities, whether or not in the context of special inspections. In that spirit, Argentina had cooperated fully with IAEA in environmental monitoring at its Pilcaniyeu facility.

101. Argentina was party to various conventions relating to nuclear security and welcomed the unilateral offer to place surplus fissionable material under IAEA safeguards. It likewise favoured a convention to halt the production of fissionable material.

102. Mr. SHOUKRY (Egypt) said that he attached particular importance to two items on the agenda. Egypt had always strongly supported an effective safeguards regime, which must be applied if confidence was to be built. All States parties must be urged to abide by that regime.

103. There was also an urgent need to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones, particularly in the Middle East. It was extremely important that Israel should participate in that regime and that all States in the region should cooperate in good faith in order to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The progress made in that area in Africa was encouraging.

104. The CHAIRMAN announced that the Committee had concluded its general debate.

The meeting rose at 6.50 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 4th MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York,
on Wednesday, 26 April 1995, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. ERDÖS (Hungary)

The meeting was called to order at 10.30 a.m.


1. The CHAIRMAN said that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss the progress made towards consensus and agreed language concerning non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones. Two days previously he had circulated a proposal (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/CRP.2) covering a number of points, including non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and safeguards, which could, if there was no objection, provide a possible structure for the discussion. The Committee had before it a number of working papers (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.1, WP.2, WP.6 and WP.10) which would be introduced by their authors later in the meeting.

2. Mr. TATAR (Algeria) thanked the Chairman for preparing NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/CRP.2, but said that, the prerogatives of Main Committee III notwithstanding, the proposal contained in that document, which was supposed to provide a possible structure for the discussion, took insufficient account of article III, paragraph 3, of the non-proliferation Treaty, concerning the implementation of safeguards, and of article IV, under which all the parties to the Treaty undertook to facilitate, and had the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It was true that some of those concerns could be glimpsed in the Chairman's proposal, but the headings under which they were included modified their scope somewhat, for they were approached from an angle different from that prevailing when they were incorporated in the Treaty. His delegation considered that the Chairman's proposal could be improved, and that in particular the ninth line of point 2 should be emphasized, in accordance with the conclusions of the Chairman of the Board of Governors of IAEA who, at the March 1995 session of the Board, had noted certain reservations expressed while at the same time endorsing the general outline of Programme "93 + 2".

3. The CHAIRMAN said it had been his understanding that most, if not all, delegations deemed his proposal acceptable and thought that it could serve as a basis for the Committee's discussion. He would prefer recommendations to be made and changes proposed during consideration of the points to which they related, for otherwise the work might be delayed. When introducing his proposal he had emphasized that it was a purely indicative list that should be completed by specific proposals, the basic objective of the discussion being the preparation of a final text. He therefore invited delegations to make specific proposals concerning the headings or texts they would like to see added to his proposals.

4. Mr. BAIIDI-NEJAD (Islamic Republic of Iran) said he saw no reason why document NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/CRP.2 should not serve as a basis for the discussion, since it was a purely indicative document and not a straight-jacket; however, he hoped that the Committee could begin its substantive debate quickly. His delegation had some reservations about certain aspects of point 8, in particular the heading relating to export licensing. That heading
could cause confusion, because in recent years there had been a tendency to refer rather to export control regimes; for greater clarity, it would be preferable to continue using the same term. The reference under point 8 to the complementary and important role of national export mechanisms was too vague and should be amended by including the words "multilaterally agreed, transparent guidelines to supplement safeguards". Lastly, he did not quite understand what the term "lists" in the fifth line in point 8 referred to.

5. Mr. ROSU (Romania), supported by Mr. TALIANI (Italy) said the time had come to formulate specific proposals instead of lingering over a pointless debate on the heading in the Chairman's proposal which, in the last analysis, was only a tool intended to help guide the discussion.

Working paper NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.1

6. Ms. ALANI (Sweden), introducing document NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.1 on behalf of the authors (Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden), recalled that they had met regularly during the 1980 Review Conference to prepare their own proposals for texts to be included in the final report as well as to study the texts prepared by other countries. Since they had started to work together, those States had called for the application of full-scope safeguards as a condition for nuclear supplies to non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the Treaty.

7. Extensive texts to be used in the work of Main Committee II had been prepared for the 1985 and 1990 Review Conferences. Those texts, which had been widely accepted, had formed the basis for the 1985 Final Document and the report of Main Committee II at the 1990 Review Conference. In preparing texts on articles III and IV for the 1995 Review Conference, the 11 authors of the document under consideration had met a number of times in Vienna to discuss developments since 1990 and had adjusted the agreed texts accordingly, taking into account also the comments made by other countries in a consultation process. The texts had been prepared as working papers and would be available to all delegations. Document NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.1 was based to a large extent on the text submitted in 1990. The first paragraph had been adjusted slightly in comparison to the 1990 text, but it covered the same substance, i.e., the generally positive assessments of the implementation of article III produced by earlier conferences. The text as a whole had been updated to include developments during the past five years and contained a reference to the Security Council and the statement made by its President in January 1992, reinforcing the message that nuclear proliferation was a major threat to international peace and security. She hoped that the text would facilitate the work of Main Committee II and would help it to agree on a final text.

Working paper NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.10

8. Mr. WAN JUN (China), introducing document NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.10, said it was based on statements made by his delegation in the plenary and in the Committee and took into account comments by other delegations. The text was very clear and needed no explanation. It related mainly to point 1 in document NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/CRP.2 ("Introduction") except for part III, entitled "Nuclear-weapons-free zones" which referred to a question mentioned in point 9.

9. Mr. TALIANI (Italy) said that document NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.2 was notable for being well thought out, very useful, and a good introduction to consideration of the implementation of article III. It should not be controversial for it was drafted clearly and completely neutral in that it dealt solely with undisputed facts.

10. On the other hand, that document, although in itself completely acceptable, did not seem relevant to the point under consideration, at least as far as part I was concerned. The part concerning safeguards seemed to be more relevant, but his delegation had only just received the document and would like to study it more thoroughly. It would perhaps be helpful if the
Chinese delegation were to give a detailed explanation concerning each of the issues dealt with during the point-by-point discussion of the Chairman's proposal.

11. Mr. SCHMIDT (Austria) said that, while to a large extent he subscribed to the remarks made by the representative of Italy, he wished to state that the working paper submitted by China seemed to provide an excellent basis which should be taken into account in the drafting of the Committee's report. Having said that, it was important to determine where in the working paper some of its elements should be included; he wondered, for example, whether the link established in part I, paragraph 2, between nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy really belonged in an introduction to article III. On the other hand, while some of the elements dealt with in part II, entitled "Nuclear safeguards", merited inclusion in the introduction, other, more specific, elements would benefit from further consideration at a later stage of the discussions.

12. The CHAIRMAN invited interested delegations to meet to find a text acceptable to all so that at a later stage of its deliberations the Committee would have a better structured basis for discussion. To that end, he urged those delegations which had submitted working papers NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.1, 2 and 10 to submit specific proposals and to try to find a common language.

Working paper NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.2

13. Mr. MACKINNON (Canada), introducing working paper NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.2 on behalf of the authors (Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden), said that the starting point of the text was the conviction that IAEA safeguards provided assurance that States were complying with their undertakings and helped them to demonstrate that compliance. Safeguards thus played a key role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and in the strengthening of collective security.

14. The working paper dealt extensively with the problem of non-compliance with undertakings, which underlined the significance of the Treaty. Continued efforts must be made to give the Treaty a universal character. The States which had submitted the working paper attached great importance to the strengthening of safeguards, which would have to evolve if they were to become integral components of national security interests in an increasingly nuclear-free world. IAEA had done much in that regard and, by reiterating that the main purpose of comprehensive safeguards agreements was to verify that nuclear materials were not diverted to the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the Board of Governors of IAEA had taken an important step towards strengthening safeguards. The safeguards system should therefore be designed to provide for verification of the correctness and completeness of the declarations made by States.

15. Programme 93 + 2 had many complex components which would need to be carefully examined. The Conference could play an important role in that regard by ensuring recognition of the importance for the signatories to the Treaty of the continuing improvement of the safeguards system. The working paper situated safeguards in the broader context of ensuring compliance with and enforcement of obligations under the Treaty. He noted the responsibility of all parties to the Treaty and of the Security Council and emphasized the need for transparency in national nuclear policies and programmes.

16. Mr. WANG JUN (China), referring to part II of the working paper which he had just introduced (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.10), said that the IAEA safeguards system had two objectives: to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. There was unanimity among the participants in the Conference regarding the prevention of proliferation and the strengthening of safeguards. The safeguards system was specifically mentioned in the preamble and in article III, paragraph 3, of the non-proliferation Treaty, but the Treaty specified that the system should in no
way hamper the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. His delegation emphasized that point in the working paper it had submitted.

17. As to how to strengthen the safeguards system, his delegation believed that the question should be considered by the competent international bodies, but that due account should also be taken of the financial and legal implications. Only negotiations could lead to progress on those questions, which were not new since they had already been raised within the framework of IAEA. In paragraph 4 of its working paper, his delegation had indicated the principles to be followed to strengthen the safeguards system and it believed that those elements should be taken into consideration in the Committee’s report.

18. Mr. ADEKEYE (Nigeria) said that he had carefully studied the two working papers and had found them very useful. He noted, however, that some very important elements were missing in working paper NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.2. With regard to working paper NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.10, he drew attention, in particular, to the balance to be established between safeguards and the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy (para. 5) and to the principles to be observed in strengthening the safeguards system (para. 7). Those questions, which were of great importance to his delegation, should be dealt with in the part of the final document relating to article III.

19. Mr. OUVRY (Belgium), referring to working paper NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.10, submitted by China, observed that, in paragraph 5, it would be preferable to use a more positive formulation such as "the prevention of nuclear weapon proliferation promotes peaceful uses ..." instead of the phrase "the prevention of nuclear weapon proliferation should be beneficial for the promotion of peaceful uses ...". In the last sentence of paragraph 6, the word "agreements" in the plural was used. At the meeting of the Board of Governors in March, the consensus had been that, if there were other agreements, a model agreement should be adopted, not different agreements. Belgium would not wish to see the establishment of an "À la carte" safeguards system and hoped that the Chinese delegation would agree to use the term "model agreement", for example, in its formulation. Work had been done on the basis of a universal system of safeguards and it was important to ensure that a new system was not established which was no longer universal.

20. With regard to paragraph 7, his delegation agreed with the principles set out therein. However, it had had long experience of safeguards and knew that their application required a certain effort on the part of the State which was subject to them. For its part, it was prepared to make that effort and hoped that all States would be prepared to do the same. The Chinese proposal should therefore be qualified and should clearly indicate that all States should make an effort, in some cases a financial effort.

21. Mr. TALIANI (Italy) said he saw nothing in part II of working paper NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.10, submitted by China, which could give rise to objections, except that the text appeared to be too circumspect. That had certainly not been the intention of its author. That there was a need to strengthen safeguards was quite evident and many speakers had not failed to mention it in the plenary Conference. The fear that safeguards might hamper the promotion of peaceful uses was hardly justified. Italy attached great importance to the question of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and had even feared, at the time of signing the Treaty, that safeguards might put non-nuclear-weapon States at a disadvantage in relation to nuclear-weapon States. It had ceased all nuclear activities, even for peaceful purposes, but its experience, although not as long as that of Belgium, had shown it that safeguards also had a price for States which accepted them and that they had never hampered activities relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. To say that safeguards should not prevent countries from using nuclear energy might lead to confusion.

22. With regard to the mention of measures beyond the existing legal framework (para. 6), it was evident that any measure which was beyond that
framework should be the subject of negotiations, even if that involved only a few of the measures set out in IAEA Programme 93 + 2. Assuming that there were such measures, however, insistence on that point would give the impression that in reality the Conference was extremely circumspect on the question of strengthening safeguards, whereas in fact it very much wanted to strengthen them.

23. Mr. SCHMIDT (Austria) supported the representative of Belgium and agreed that the Chinese document contained a number of elements which might be incorporated in the final document. However, regarding the strengthening of guarantees, the concept must first of all be understood and a degree of flexibility demonstrated so as not to give the impression that it was the intent of the Conference to pre-empt a flexible approach by referring to the legal aspects before it was even determined what the concept of strengthening involved. The legal aspects were certainly important, but should come into play later. In making a statement on the future activities of IAEA, a clear indication must be given that the Conference supported the work of the Agency aimed at formulating the concept of strengthening. The legal provisions that that commonly shared concept would entail would then become a secondary issue.

24. Ms. KUROKUCHI (Japan) said that as a result of the increase in nuclear activities throughout the world, as well as the financial constraints experienced by IAEA, the question of the strengthening of the effectiveness of the system of safeguards, broached in particular in the working paper submitted by China, was of great interest to her delegation, which wished to play an active part in the drafting of the text on the question.

25. Ms. DELPECH (France) said that it was important to emphasize that non-proliferation commitments and IAEA safeguards played an essential role in the development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy, since they constituted a proper framework for nuclear trade for peaceful purposes and nuclear technical cooperation. With regard to the strengthening of safeguards, the work of the Committee was awaited with some expectation, since the strengthening of controls was at a particularly important stage. While it was true that the main aim of comprehensive safeguards agreements was to verify that materials under safeguards were not diverted for the production of nuclear weapons, it should be emphasized that such agreements and the IAEA statute provided the necessary authority to take appropriate measures to detect potentially undeclared nuclear activities - an essential consideration after the experience of the Iraqi programme. The strengthening of safeguards should, above all else, enable the Agency and member States to strengthen their assurances in that regard, and also constituted an essential element in the collective security to which the Treaty contributed.

26. Mr. NORENDAL (Norway), referring to the working paper submitted by China (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.10), said that the approach taken was not fully satisfactory, since it entailed mention in the Committee report of a debate long pursued at IAEA, namely the balance to be struck between safeguards and the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The manner in which the question of safeguards was included with other elements was also unsatisfactory. His delegation would vastly prefer a statement to be made in support of the strengthening of assurances without mentioning conditions, as the Chinese paper did.

27. Mr. HOFFMANN (Germany), referring to document NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.2, said that, in view of developments since the 1990 Review Conference, IAEA safeguards should not only seek to provide assurances that nuclear materials would not be diverted from declared facilities but should also be strengthened to ensure that no undeclared nuclear activities were being carried out. To that end there was a need for full transparency with respect to national nuclear policies and programmes, ensured by States parties, and enhanced detection capabilities on the part of the Agency. Germany thus called upon all the parties to the Treaty to implement the measures approved by the Board of Governors of the Agency aimed at improving its ability to detect the existence of undeclared nuclear activities in States with comprehensive
safeguards agreements and obtain access to the related installations. Germany strongly endorsed the thrust of the programmes currently being pursued by the Agency and called on all States parties to do likewise. His delegation expected firmer assurances regarding the absence of undeclared activities to provide a basis for reducing costs in implementing safeguards relating to declared materials.

28. As for the working paper submitted by China (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.10), his delegation had no specific objection to the language contained in part I, but anticipated that it might prove controversial as far as some other delegations were concerned. Germany would prefer to emphasize that non-proliferation commitments, good faith compliance and full scope safeguards constituted the necessary framework for "enhanced cooperation between countries on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy".

29. In part II, his delegation suggested the replacement of the words "IAEA safeguards have become ..." by "IAEA safeguards are ...", since the Agency’s safeguards had from the outset been an integral part of the international non-proliferation regime. Germany did not propose to discuss, in the context of the Conference, the objectives of IAEA, which was an independent international organization whose objectives fell within the purview of its own organs. On the other hand the Conference might discuss the goals of the Treaty, or the adequate execution by IAEA of the tasks conferred upon it by the Treaty and by States parties. If safeguards and cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy were discussed in that context, it should be made clear that non-proliferation commitments, in particular full scope safeguards required under the Treaty from non-nuclear-weapon States, constituted the necessary framework for international cooperation. Non-proliferation and safeguards were not only two goals in parallel to peaceful nuclear cooperation, but were the conditions upon which such cooperation depended.

30. Furthermore, the principles emphasized in the paragraph under consideration already constituted the basis for the Agency’s activities under the Treaty, whereas the wording gave the impression that IAEA and its system of safeguards did not respect those principles and that the Agency needed to be exhorted to return to them. His delegation would like to avoid giving such an impression.

31. With regard to nuclear-weapon-free zones, his delegation thought that it would be preferable not to repeat the contents of Protocols II and III of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and, to avoid possible difficulties which some members of the Committee might have with the last sentence of the paragraph, it would be advisable to use less strong language than "urge".

32. Mr. KHLEBNIKOV (Russian Federation) said that the question of IAEA safeguards was extremely important, as evidenced by the attention which various delegations had given to it. The two working papers before the Committee were extremely different, but the substance of both were acceptable to his delegation, which would nevertheless like to propose a few amendments. Furthermore, if a working group was to be established to draft the Committee’s final document, his delegation wished to be a member of it.

33. Mr. de ICAZA (Mexico) said that, on the question of safeguards, the two working papers complemented rather than countered each other.

34. His delegation supported the 93 + 2 programme and understood that the IAEA Board of Governors had adopted the general approach but had not yet agreed on specific measures. It was therefore vital to determine first, among the measures proposed to strengthen the safeguards system, those which were part of the existing legal framework and those which went beyond it. It was also important to emphasize that, to be able to apply measures which went beyond the existing agreements, an appropriate legal framework would have to be established, negotiated and approved, not only by the Board of Governors, but by all the States parties to the Treaty, the objective being to make the framework binding, universal and non-discriminatory and to avoid establishing
a layering of different types of agreements in force as a result of the NPT. In that regard, his delegation supported the Belgian proposal to avoid the plural use of the word "agreement". On the contrary, what was necessary was to strengthen the idea of a standard agreement to which all States would be called upon to subscribe. It had submitted to the plenary Conference a working paper on the question (NPT/CONF.1995/23), containing elements that the Committee might wish to retain. Section 4, for example, referred the importance of strengthening the current IAEA safeguards system on the basis of the proposal by the Director General, in the light of the comments made by various States in the Board of Governors and on the basis of agreements clearly stating the powers of IAEA and the obligations of States.

35. His delegation would also like to take part in the work of any drafting group asked to prepare the text of the paragraphs relating to those questions.

36. Mr. DE LA TORRE (Argentina) said that working paper NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.2 accurately reflected new developments since the last Review Conference. The question of safeguards was one of the most important which had been considered in recent years, not only in IAEA but also at the level of the Security Council and the international community as a whole. The working paper’s approach was realistic in that it emphasized the international community’s immense interest in the current process. To overlook those new developments would have a negative impact on the Conference’s evaluation of the safeguards system at a time when the international community was on the threshold of a consensus designed to strengthen the system. If, instead of focusing on those questions, the Conference dealt with more general ideas, its proceedings would be deprived of much of their substance and would therefore lose some of their precision and political commitment.

37. Mr. CHUN (Republic of Korea) said that the ideas in document NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.10, especially part II, were entirely reasonable and needed no change except that the references to legal, financial and technical questions in the 93 + 2 programme could impair the political support the programme currently received. China’s observations, especially with respect to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, should perhaps be presented differently.

38. Mr. RAZLEY (Malaysia) said that he too favoured the strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system, whose effectiveness and viability needed to be enhanced. However, the Agency’s current efforts in that regard should be taken into consideration. Accordingly, when the final document was drafted, care should be taken to reflect the formulation used in the agreements which States had signed with IAEA.

39. Mr. PAPDIMITROPOULOS (Greece) fully supported document WP.2. In document WP.10, the last sentence of paragraph 6, concerning measures which went beyond the existing legal framework, posed a problem: it was still too early for delegations to be able to determine that question, because they did not have the IAEA secretariat document, which would not be submitted until mid-1995. As to the formulation describing the new legal framework, his delegation preferred the wording of document WP.2, which spoke of existing safeguards agreements or complementary authority to be conferred by the States involved. The IAEA Statute and the existing safeguards machinery envisaged in document INF/CIRC/153 would provide the necessary framework of reference for new arrangements.

40. Mr. WALKER (Australia), speaking as a sponsor of documents WP.1 and WP.2, said that they had been established on the basis of the 1990 consensus, which had been updated to reflect events since that date and the consequent need to strengthen the safeguards system, especially with a view to detecting undeclared nuclear activities. Those were new and important elements, and his delegation wished the Committee to discuss them in detail.

41. With respect to document WP.10, he said that the provisions of paragraphs 4 and 5 and the first part of paragraph 6 dealing with general principles should rather be placed in the introduction of the document devoted
to the question of safeguards. The second part of paragraph 6 and paragraph 7, however, were concerned more especially with the strengthening of the safeguards system and, while his delegation did not subscribe to their formulation, it considered that their key idea corresponded to a principle of which the Committee should take cognizance. His delegation intended to introduce, on behalf of the sponsors, a text on comprehensive safeguards.


42. Mr. POSTA (Hungary), introducing working paper NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.6 on behalf of the 11 non-nuclear-weapon countries which had prepared it, said that the effectiveness of the safeguards system depended to a large extent on the professional qualifications of the IAEA inspectors and the conditions in which they worked. The sponsors of the text had therefore noted with satisfaction the IAEA secretariat's efforts to ensure the highest professional standards were maintained as well as having the widest geographical distribution possible. With respect to conditions of work, some States continue to impose restrictions affecting the designation of inspectors. As IAEA stated, only 23 countries were currently applying the simplified procedures proposed by the Director General. Yet, the adoption of those procedures, together with the issue of multiple entry and exit visas or any other arrangement facilitating the activities of the inspectors, would help to establish greater trust and enable IAEA to make better use of its human and material resources. Accordingly, the second paragraph of the text called for increased cooperation by all States. On behalf of the sponsors, he expressed the hope that the document would be approved by all the members of the Committee.

43. Mr. ANDREW (United Kingdom) said that the working papers before the Committee provided an excellent basis for considering the safeguards question. His delegation would submit comments on the subject during the drafting of the final document.

44. Mr. SUKAYRI (Jordan), referring to paragraph 6 of document WP.2, said that the importance of the universal application of IAEA safeguards should be effectively underlined but that the emphasis should be on universal accession to the Treaty. Accordingly, it would revert to that wording during the drafting of the final document.

The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 5th MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Thursday, 27 April 1995, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. ERDÖS (Hungary)

The meeting was called to order at 3.25 p.m.

REVIEW OF ARTICLE III AND THE FOURTH AND FIFTH PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS, ESPECIALLY IN THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO ARTICLE IV AND THE SIXTH AND SEVENTH PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS (agenda item 16)

Article III: State systems of accounting and control (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.3)

1. Mr. SCHMIDT (Austria) introduced the working paper on State systems of accounting and control (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.3), which was based on the consensus language adopted at the Fourth Review Conference in 1990 but also incorporated developments since 1990, in particular with regard to "Programme 93 + 2" and related activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to strengthen safeguards (NPT/CONF.1995/7/Part I). The aim of the working paper was to ensure that the Conference recognized the importance of State systems of accounting and control and of existing regional safeguards systems.

2. Paragraph 1 of the working paper included a reference to the New Partnership approach developed between IAEA and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the quadripartite comprehensive safeguards agreement between IAEA, Brazil, Argentina and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC). In paragraph 2 of the working paper, the Conference noted the further efforts of IAEA to strengthen cooperation and enhance the cost-effectiveness of safeguards in the States of the European Union, and in paragraph 3 it called upon States to take safeguards requirements into account when planning, designing and constructing new nuclear facilities, thereby facilitating the work of IAEA and the establishment of a State system of safeguards.

3. Ms. DELPECH (France) emphasized that the fact that EURATOM had nearly four decades of experience should be reflected in the working paper. Therefore her delegation proposed an amendment to paragraph 1 by inserting at the end of the second sentence, following the word "EURATOM", the words "which enables both agencies to benefit to the fullest possible extent from their lengthy experience".

4. Mr. BLANKENSTEIN (Germany) endorsed the amendment proposed by France and said that his delegation proposed an amendment to paragraph 2 by inserting the words "the Agency's" in the second sentence so that it read "enhancing the cost-effectiveness of the Agency's safeguards in the States of the European Union", in order to avoid confusion with EURATOM safeguards, which were also mentioned in the working paper.

5. Mr. NORDIN (Malaysia) welcomed the implementation of the New Partnership approach between IAEA and EURATOM and asked whether either agency could provide further details regarding specific actions to implement the partnership and clarify whether the approach could be extended to other regions. He suggested that the second sentence in paragraph 2 of the working paper was not emphatic enough in urging intensified collaboration between
States and IAEA with regard to the establishment of new State or regional systems.

6. Mr. PAPADIMITROPOULOS (Greece) endorsed the amendment proposed by France, but did not agree with that of Germany, since he believed the reference was to safeguards in general, and not just those applied by IAEA.

7. Mr. TALIANI (Italy) endorsed the amendments proposed by France and Germany and believed that the reference in paragraph 2 to the efforts to establish new or improved State or regional systems was sufficient.

8. Mr. KAYSER (Luxembourg) said that increased cooperation between IAEA and EURATOM would lead to greater cost-effectiveness on the part of IAEA, and he endorsed the amendment proposed by Germany.

9. Mr. HAMEL (IAEA) said in reply to the representative of Malaysia that the New Partnership between IAEA and EURATOM was well under way and was making use of the capabilities of both agencies while avoiding duplication of efforts. The New Partnership approach was a concept that had also been incorporated into "Programme 93 + 2" which relied on the development of cooperation between IAEA and State systems — and, where they existed, regional systems — of accounting and control.

10. Mr. AGRELL (United Kingdom) said that he endorsed the French amendment to paragraph 1. He also proposed that, in the last line of that paragraph, the word "improving" should be replaced by the word "extending", so that the wording would be "... as a positive development in extending regional systems." The existing language gave the inaccurate impression that ABACC took the concept of regional development even further than EURATOM.

11. His delegation agreed with the Malaysian delegation that the important question was not the further development of the New Partnership approach and the efficiency of safeguards in the States of the European Union, but rather the need to explore the possibility of extending regional systems and increasing collaboration among them and IAEA worldwide. He therefore suggested that the whole second sentence of paragraph 2 should be deleted.

12. Mr. SCHMIDT (Austria) said that he supported the amendments proposed by France and Germany, which helped clarify the text. With regard to the United Kingdom proposal to delete the second sentence of paragraph 2, he would need more time to consider it.

13. Mr. ROSENTHAL (United States) said that his delegation supported IAEA efforts to work with States and regional systems to improve them, but felt that cooperation between States was also important. He therefore proposed that in the last sentence of paragraph 2, the words "and among States" should be added after "IAEA". The text would then read "... collaboration between States and IAEA and among States with regard to ...".

14. Mr. KHLEBNIKOV (Russian Federation) said that, in the first line of paragraph 1, the words "and regional" should be added after the word "State", so that it would read "... the importance of State and regional systems of accounting ...". Also, at the end of paragraph 1, the words "in improving regional systems" should be deleted.

15. Mr. OUVRY (Belgium) said that his delegation endorsed the amendments proposed by France, Russia and Germany. His delegation did not, however, agree with the United Kingdom proposal to delete the second sentence of paragraph 2. As the IAEA representative had mentioned, the final report on the partnership had not yet been issued; work on the matter was still in progress. His delegation therefore wished to retain that sentence, with the change proposed by the delegation of Germany.

16. Mr. PAPADIMITROPOULOS (Greece) said that he agreed with the United Kingdom proposal to delete the second sentence of paragraph 2.
17. The CHAIRMAN said that he intended to prepare an updated draft of working paper 3 to reflect the various changes proposed and to submit it to the open-ended informal working group.

Article III: Safeguards in nuclear-weapon States (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.5)

18. Mr. WALKER (Australia) introduced the working paper on safeguards in nuclear-weapon States (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.5), which was based on the consensus language adopted at the Fourth Review Conference in 1990 but had been updated to take into account events since 1990. In paragraph 1, the Conference underlined the importance of international verification of the transfer to peaceful or non-proscribed military utilization of nuclear-weapon materials that had been withdrawn from weapons use. The Conference supported unilateral offers to place excess fissile material under IAEA safeguards and urged all nuclear-weapon States to offer for verification any nuclear materials and nuclear installations that were transferred from military use to peaceful nuclear activities. Furthermore, the Conference strongly supported negotiation of a fissile material cut-off convention. In paragraph 2 of the working paper, the Conference called for substantial progress without delay towards the separation of the peaceful and the military nuclear facilities in the nuclear-weapon States, noting that it strongly believed that supplies for peaceful purposes should be subject to the safeguards agreements concluded between the nuclear-weapon States and IAEA.

19. Mr. KHLEBNIKOV (Russian Federation) said that his delegation supported negotiation of a fissile material cut-off convention, as mentioned in paragraph 1. However, to mention the convention in that specific paragraph, which concerned safeguards in nuclear-weapon States, would narrow and change the meaning of those negotiations. The reference to a cut-off convention should be placed in the preamble or in some other part of the document, and in a more general form. In any case, it should be deleted from paragraph 1 of working paper 5.

20. Turning to paragraph 2, he noted that much of the wording of the Final Document of the 1990 Review Conference was repeated in the text of working paper 5. He wished to stress, however, that at that Conference, the whole issue of separating peaceful and military uses had been stated much more appropriately. The issue was a technical rather than a political one; therefore, not only time but also a great deal of money was required to address it. The words "without delay" in the first sentence of paragraph 2 should be deleted. It would not be right to take on commitments which, for technical reasons, could not be physically fulfilled within a short period of time. The words "safeguards in nuclear-weapon States should bear in mind the available resources within the Agency" should also be included in the text.

21. Ms. DELPECH (France) said that, although her delegation was willing to accept language regarding a fissile-material cut-off convention, it did not agree with the placing of the reference to such a convention. In the view of her delegation, and probably many other delegations, the cut-off convention was particularly aimed at drawing in those States which were not parties to the Treaty and which were not, as far as she knew, nuclear-weapon States. The sentence should therefore be moved to another place in the final document.

22. Turning to paragraph 2, she said that the first sentence should be deleted. The wording in the 1990 Final Document was different in very substantial ways, inasmuch as it invited nuclear-weapon States to submit all their peaceful nuclear facilities to safeguards. The new text, on the other hand, spoke of substantial progress. Her delegation did not see how any substantial progress could be made in that area. The words "without delay" were also inappropriate.

23. Mr. TALIANI (Italy) said that his delegation agreed that the reference to the cut-off convention did not belong in the section pertaining to safeguards in nuclear-weapon States. In fact, the matter did not even fall within the scope of Main Committee II, as it had been discussed at length in Main Committee I.
24. With regard to paragraph 2, he said that Italy would very much like to see the separation of peaceful and military nuclear facilities implemented; however, as Russia and France had pointed out, the issue was a technical one. To call for something that everyone knew could not happen soon was self-defeating. His delegation was not opposed to the wording, but felt that it would be more appropriate to replace the words "substantial progress" by the words "further progress", and to replace the words "without delay" by the words "as soon as possible". His delegation would not go so far as to delete the sentence altogether.

25. Mr. BLANKENSTEIN (Germany) suggested that the second sentence of paragraph 1 might be amended to read: "The Conference calls on all States which have not yet done so to place their sensitive civilian materials (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) as a first step under international safeguards." That language had been accepted by the European Union in 1994. Such an amendment would also replace part of paragraph 2, and help to streamline working paper 5 in general.

26. Mr. AGRELL (United Kingdom) said that the German proposal, although useful, departed too much from the reference to excess military material, which was the main point of paragraph 1, and went into the question of the possible extension of safeguards to all separated civilian plutonium and highly enriched uranium, whether or not of military origin. He therefore suggested that the second sentence of paragraph 1, the text following the words "urges all nuclear-weapon states" should be amended to read: "to bring separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium no longer required for military purposes under international safeguards."

27. With regard to the first sentence of paragraph 2, his delegation agreed with the comments made by the French delegation, since the United Kingdom would also have difficulty with making "substantial progress" towards the separation of peaceful and military nuclear facilities, and was not convinced that delay had anything to do with it. In a spirit of compromise, he would suggest replacing the words "substantial progress" by the words "further progress".

28. In the second sentence of paragraph 2, he suggested that, after the words "nuclear supplies", the words "delivered to them" should be inserted in order to reflect the fact that the text was not intended as a call to nuclear-weapon States to control exports more strictly, but rather to give non-nuclear-weapon States certain formal commitments.

29. Lastly, his delegation questioned the use of the word "strongly" in the last sentence of both paragraphs. That word was not used in any of the other working papers, and it was not clear why it was used in working paper 5.

30. Mr. OUVRY (Belgium) said that he supported the German proposal. In the second sentence of paragraph 1, the wording should read "... the recent unilateral offer ...", since, as far as he knew, only one country, the United States, had made such an offer.

31. Mr. ROSENTHAL (United States of America) said he had no objection to the idea of transferring the reference to the cut-off convention to the text being drafted by Main Committee I or to some other location.

32. His delegation was prepared to accept the change in paragraph 1 proposed by the United Kingdom. However, the first sentence of the paragraph created some difficulty, partly because of the lack of clarity regarding the intention of the paragraph and partly because the verification of transfers was a very complex issue. His delegation had consulted informally with some other delegations, and wished to suggest that the sentence should be deleted. An addition to the second sentence of paragraph 1 might accomplish the objective sought in the first sentence. He therefore suggested that the following words should be added at the end of the language proposed by the United Kingdom: "in order to demonstrate the transparency and irreversibility of nuclear-arms reductions".
33. Turning to the last sentence in paragraph 2, he noted that the words "these supplies" referred to the supplies mentioned in the second sentence, i.e., the supplies delivered to nuclear-weapon States for peaceful purposes. It further stated that those supplies should be subject to safeguards agreements. The safeguards agreement between the United States and IAEA provided for the application of safeguards to all nuclear material and all nuclear facilities except those of direct national-security significance. Because of the character of the agreement, his Government would be unable to do what was asked for in that sentence. He therefore suggested that the beginning of the sentence should be replaced by the words: "The Conference believes that nuclear-material supplies for peaceful purposes should be subject ....".

34. With regard to the amendment proposed by Germany, he said that his delegation needed more time to consider it.

35. Mr. WANG Jun (China) said that, in the second sentence of paragraph 1, after the word "offer", the words "on a voluntary basis" should be added. He agreed with the proposal to delete the last sentence of paragraph 1, for the same reasons already mentioned by other delegations. The Chinese Government supported the negotiation and conclusion of the cut-off convention; however, to discuss, in connection with safeguards, a convention that had yet to come into being was inappropriate and might even be misleading.

36. With regard to the German proposal, he said that it lacked clarity on many points. For instance, whether plutonium and highly enriched uranium could be regarded as civilian material or sensitive civilian material was still not clear to his delegation.

37. In the first sentence of paragraph 2, his delegation agreed that the word "substantial" should be replaced by "further" and the words "without delay" should be deleted. After that sentence, a new sentence should be added, reading: "The Conference recognizes the value of the voluntary safeguards agreements of the five nuclear-weapon States in strengthening the non-proliferation regime." In fact, that wording reflected the consensus reached in 1990. That could be followed by the words "with respect to those nuclear supplies". As to whether they should be under IAEA safeguards, his delegation shared the view of the United Kingdom that separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium no longer required for military purposes should be placed under IAEA safeguards.

38. Mr. WALKER (Australia) said that, in the last sentence of paragraph 1, the Conference might wish to note that the conclusion of a cut-off convention would result in a significant extension of safeguards in the nuclear-weapon States. The drafters of working paper 5 would attempt to accommodate all the concerns that had been expressed by delegations.

Article III: Financing safeguards (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.4)

39. Mr. SIERLA (Finland) introduced the working paper on the financing of safeguards (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.4), which called upon States parties to continue their political, technical and financial support of the IAEA safeguards system in order to meet its international legal obligations pursuant to safeguards agreements under the Treaty. The Conference requested IAEA to continue to identify all resources needed to meet its safeguards responsibilities and urged all States to ensure that the Agency was provided with those resources. In paragraph 2, the Conference encouraged significant contributions by States parties to the safeguards development programme by facilitating and assisting the application of safeguards and in supporting research and development to strengthen and advance the application of effective and efficient safeguards.

40. Ms. DRDÁKOVÁ (Czech Republic) said that the first sentence of paragraph 1 should be replaced by the corresponding wording of the 1990 Final Document, in which the Conference called upon States parties to continue their political, technical and financial support of the IAEA safeguards system in
order to ensure that IAEA was able to meet its international legal obligations pursuant to safeguards agreements under the Treaty and its increasing safeguards responsibilities.

41. **Mr. NORDIN (Malaysia)** said that the second sentence of paragraph 1 should be reworded to reflect the Agency's other important functions. In the third sentence of paragraph 1, the Conference should also take account of the ways in which the IAEA Statute guided the Agency on safeguards financing. The guiding principle should be that contained in the Statute and in document INFCIRC/153. The Conference should also take account of the nuclear-weapon States' voluntary offer to IAEA.

42. The **CHAIRMAN** suggested that the representative of Malaysia should submit his proposals in writing.

43. **Mr. ROSENTHAL (United States of America)** proposed that, after the first sentence of paragraph 1, a new sentence should be added, reading: "The Conference notes the financial constraints under which the IAEA safeguards system has had to function."

44. He also proposed the addition, at the end of paragraph 2, of the words "and that additional States extend their cooperation and support".

45. **Mr. de ICAZA (Mexico)** said that, in the last sentence of paragraph 1, the order of the words "lasting" and "equitable" should be reversed, since it was more important that the solution should be equitable.

46. **Mr. CHEBO (Cameroon)** said that his delegation supported the United States representative's proposal to add a new sentence in paragraph 1. However, in the view of his delegation, the new sentence should be the first sentence of the paragraph and not the second.

47. **Mr. ROSENTHAL (United States of America)** said that his delegation accepted the proposal made by the representative of Cameroon.

**Article III: Plutonium (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.9)**

48. **Mr. BOJER (Denmark)** introduced the working paper on plutonium (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.9), in which the Conference recognized that the use of separated plutonium for peaceful purposes was expected to increase over the next several years and expressed satisfaction at the considerable work undertaken to ensure the continuing effectiveness of IAEA safeguards in relation to reprocessing and the storage of separated plutonium. In paragraph 2, the Conference called for greater transparency on matters pertaining to the management of plutonium and highly enriched uranium. It encouraged the relevant States to use restraint when stockpiling such materials and reaffirmed that all such excess fissile material should be under IAEA safeguards. Finally, the Conference encouraged States to continue to examine long-term arrangements for the management of plutonium and highly enriched uranium.

49. **Mr. BLANKENSTEIN (Germany)** said that working paper 9 took up a discussion that had long been held between IAEA and the plutonium-producing or plutonium-using countries. The paper should reflect the development of that discussion in different forums, in particular the group established by the Director General of IAEA, which met regularly in Vienna. Since the last two sentences of paragraph 2 dealt with outdated ideas, they should be deleted.

50. **Mr. ROSENTHAL (United States of America)** said that the last sentence of paragraph 1 should be amended to read:

"The Conference welcomes the considerable work undertaken to ensure the continuing effectiveness of IAEA safeguards in relation to reprocessing and to the storage of separated plutonium, and urges that it continue."
51. Mr. TALIANI (Italy) said that his delegation did not agree with the representative of Germany that the ideas expressed in the last two sentences of paragraph 2 were outdated. Those ideas were "dormant" and could still be revived. Consequently, his delegation was in favour of retaining the last two sentences of paragraph 2.

52. Mr. COOK (New Zealand) said that the projected increase in the use of separated plutonium presented a number of problems, since small quantities of plutonium could be used for the construction of nuclear weapons and therefore required stringent measures to ensure their physical protection and security. The Agency had made a considerable effort to ensure that special difficulties in safeguarding such materials were overcome and that safeguards on reprocessing and storage facilities for plutonium were fully effective. At the same time, the projected increase in separated plutonium would place a heavy burden on the Agency’s safeguards resources. The text should also mention that there were concerns about the safety of shipping plutonium by sea.

53. His delegation strongly supported the forthcoming negotiations to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons as a further contribution to strengthening the non-proliferation regime. However, since, from a technical point of view, there was no difference between military and civilian weapons-grade material, a cut-off convention should be supplemented by concrete measures to provide greater international confidence in plutonium management. The Conference’s endorsement of the points in the proposed text would represent a step forward.

54. Further consideration should be given to the long-term management of plutonium and highly enriched uranium, which should include the possibility of the Agency’s making the necessary arrangements for the deposit of such material. The establishment of regional nuclear-fuel centres under IAEA administration should also be considered. Unlike the representative of Germany, his delegation felt that the last two sentences of paragraph 2 should be retained.

55. Mr. PAPADIMITRIOPOULOS (Greece) said that his delegation supported the statement made by the representative of Italy. There was no harm in retaining the last two sentences of paragraph 2, and it might perhaps be useful to add a reference to article XII (A) (5) of the IAEA statute.

56. Mr. OUVRY (Belgium) said that his delegation supported the proposal made by the representative of Germany. Further, he proposed that the word "excess" should be deleted from the third sentence of paragraph 2, since States parties to the Treaty already had all their fissile material under IAEA safeguards. In the second sentence of paragraph 1, after the word "reprocessing", the word "handling" should be inserted.

57. Mr. WANG Jun (China) said that the words "for civil purposes" should be added at the end of the first sentence of paragraph 2.

58. Mr. AGRELL (United Kingdom) said that his delegation supported the arguments forwarded by the German representative, since there was considerable doubt as to whether an international plutonium-storage centre or a regional nuclear-fuel centre owned and managed by IAEA was a feasible concept for the foreseeable future, if only because of the enormous capital investment involved.

59. With regard to the reference in the second sentence in paragraph 2 to "excess" stockpiles, he noted that ordinary working stocks needed just as much safeguarding and protection as "excess" stocks. The very definition of the word "excess" posed a considerable problem. He proposed that paragraph 2 should be reformulated to read:

"The Conference calls for greater transparency on matters relating to the management of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for civil purposes. The Conference notes the existence of substantial stocks of
separated plutonium and reaffirms that all such stocks should be under international safeguards. The Conference urges users and producers of plutonium to continue to examine long-term arrangements for the management and use of plutonium and highly enriched uranium. These arrangements could include consideration of arrangements for deposit with IAEA, as envisaged in its Statute, of separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium as an additional precaution against diversion of direct-use materials to nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, as well as the possibility of regional fuel centres."

60. Mrs. COLL (Ireland) said that her delegation hoped that the last two sentences of paragraph 2 would be retained in some form. In the light of the progress achieved since the end of the cold war, it was not the time to renounce ideas that had been put forward when the likelihood of their realization had been minimal. While the proposal made by the representative of the United Kingdom appeared promising, it should be examined more closely.

61. Mr. WALKER (Australia) said that his delegation looked forward to the new text that would be issued on the basis of the proposals made by various delegations. The extensive reformulation of paragraph 2 proposed by the United Kingdom representative seemed to suggest that future work should be reserved for producers and users of plutonium; that was not the view of his delegation.

62. Mr. TALIANI (Italy) said that his delegation supported the Chinese representative's amendment of the first sentence of paragraph 2. The current language of the last two sentences of paragraph 2 was appropriate and did not require the radical reformulation proposed by the representative of the United Kingdom. His delegation supported the proposal made by the Australian representative.

63. Mr. TATAH (Algeria) said that his delegation supported the two amendments proposed by the Belgian representative. In the second sentence of paragraph 1 he suggested that the words "of fuel" should be inserted after the word "reprocessing" in order to ensure that the word "reprocessing" was not construed as referring to separated plutonium. In the second sentence of paragraph 2, the words "such material" should be replaced by "fissile material", which was more likely to be stockpiled than nuclear material.

Article III: Physical protection (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.8)

64. Mr. POTUYT (Netherlands) introduced the working paper on physical protection (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.8), in which the Conference noted the paramount importance of effective physical protection of nuclear material, especially that usable for military purposes, and called on nuclear-weapon States to maintain the highest standards of security and physical protection of nuclear-weapon systems and materials. Furthermore, the Conference expressed grave concern at reports of illicit trafficking of nuclear materials since the last Review Conference and noted the need for strengthened international cooperation in physical protection. In paragraph 2, the Conference urged all States that had not done so to adhere to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material at the earliest possible date. In paragraph 3, the Conference recognized the non-proliferation benefits of the conversion of civilian research reactors from high-enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium and recommended that international cooperation to facilitate such conversion should be continued.

65. Mr. KHLEBNIKOV (Russian Federation), referring to the first sentence of the first paragraph, said that if the material referred to was direct-use material, then the call should be addressed to all States using that material. He suggested that the second part of the first sentence should read: "and calls on all States to maintain the highest standards of security and physical protection of direct-use materials." He also proposed that the end of the second sentence of paragraph 1, after the words "to protect", should be amended to read: "and ensure the security of such material." In addition, at
the end of paragraph 2, the words "including separated plutonium" should be deleted.

66. Mr. BLANKENSTEIN (Germany) said he felt that the responsibility of States for such material should be emphasized more strongly. He therefore proposed that the second sentence of paragraph 1 should be moved to the beginning of paragraph 2. The latter would read: "The Conference notes the responsibility of all States to protect and ensure the security of material that may be used for nuclear weapons. It expresses grave concern at reports of illicit trafficking of nuclear materials since the last Review Conference. The Conference notes the need for strengthened international cooperation in physical protection, and in this respect welcomes the work being conducted under the aegis of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on this issue." He also supported the proposal by the representative of the Russian Federation to delete the last three words of paragraph 2.

67. His delegation felt strongly that the second sentence of paragraph 3 should be deleted, since it called for restrictions on technological development which the German Government could not accept.

68. Mr. SCHMIDT (Austria) said that the new wording proposed by the German delegation for paragraph 2 was an improvement, as was the text proposed by the Russian Federation for paragraph 1.

69. Mr. TALIANI (Italy) supported the German proposal to delete the second sentence of paragraph 3; each State had the right to choose whatever fuel cycles it considered appropriate.

70. Mr. ROSU (Romania) proposed that, in the last sentence of the first paragraph, after the words "physical protection", the words "and prevention of illicit trafficking" should be inserted.

71. Ms. KUROKOCHI (Japan), Mr. OUVRY (Belgium) and Mr. PAPADIMITROPOULOS (Greece) supported the German proposal to delete the second sentence of paragraph 3.

72. Mr. TATAR (Algeria) suggested that the second sentence of paragraph 1 should be amended in order to call upon States to ensure the security of all nuclear materials, not only those that could contribute to the construction of nuclear weapons; and in the last line of paragraph 2, the words "enriched uranium" should be added before "separated plutonium". He also concurred with the proposal to delete the second sentence of paragraph 3.

73. Mr. ROSENTHAL (United States of America) said that, while he understood the concern of the German delegation regarding the second sentence of paragraph 3, he felt that rather than deleting it, it should be amended to read: "It recommends that the use of high-enriched uranium in new civilian reactors be avoided to the extent possible."

74. Mr. SCHMIDT (Austria) said that the figure 53, the number of States which had acceded to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, should be inserted at the end of the first sentence of paragraph 2.

75. Mr. AVATOLLAHI (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that his delegation had no problem with the amendments that had been proposed. However, in the fifth line of paragraph 1, the word "reports" was inappropriate. While it was indeed necessary to put a stop to any trafficking of nuclear materials if and when it occurred, he wondered about the reliability of the reports referred to. It was important to avoid over dramatization in the final document; the Committee should avoid referring to those unconfirmed reports in such a way as to give the impression that they were necessarily all true.

76. The CHAIRMAN, speaking in his personal capacity, supported by Mr. KHLEBNIKOV (Russian Federation), suggested that the use of the word "reports" was intended to avoid precisely that over dramatization.
77. Mr. TALIANI (Italy) said that, since some of the reports had proved to be well-founded, the word "reports" should be replaced by "evidence".

78. Mr. SCHMIDT (Austria), speaking as one of the drafters of the working paper, said that the word "reports" had been chosen because it was precisely the fact that the trafficking had been reported which had alerted the international community to the problem.

79. Mr. AYATOLLAHI (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that any overdramatized version of the facts would be reflected in the media, whose exaggerated account of the trafficking would lead to further alarm in the international community; it could become a vicious circle. The Committee should take only verified facts into account.

80. The CHAIRMAN considered that all delegations were in agreement on the fact that the trafficking really existed, and on the need to avoid overstating the situation.

81. Mr. BLANKENSTEIN (Germany) said that Germany was doing all that was possible and scientifically advisable to convert research reactors from high-enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium. He could not accept the suggestion of the United States delegation to retain the second sentence of paragraph 3 in an amended form; the first and third sentences of that paragraph stated the case sufficiently well.

82. He also suggested that it would be more appropriate for the subject of the use of high-enriched uranium in civilian reactors to be discussed in Main Committee III, under the heading of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

83. Mr. WALKER (Australia), referring to the German proposal to delete the second sentence of paragraph 3, said that it would be strange if the Conference called for the conversion of existing resources to low-enriched uranium while remaining silent on the question of construction of new research reactors.

84. Mr. ROSENTHAL (United States of America) agreed with the Australian delegation. He also concurred with the point made by the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding the second sentence of paragraph 1, and proposed that the word "instances" should be substituted for the word "reports".

85. Hr. PAPAPIMITROPOULOS (Greece) concurred with the remarks made by the United States and Australian delegations. He proposed that the second sentence of paragraph 3 should read: "It recommends that new civilian reactors minimize as much as possible the use of high-enriched uranium as fuel."

86. Mr. AGRELL (United Kingdom), regarding paragraph 3, said that the first protection against proliferation risks must be the commitment of the States involved, coupled with international safeguards. The Conference should be extremely cautious about seeking to proscribe, or strongly to discourage, a legitimate form of peaceful nuclear activity pursued by a responsible State.

87. Mr. TATAH (Algeria) supported the suggestion made by the United States delegation. He suggested that the second sentence of paragraph 1 should refer to "reported instances of illicit trafficking".

88. Mr. TALIANI (Italy) concurred with the wording proposed by the United States.

89. The CHAIRMAN suggested that, to avoid spending too much time on minor drafting matters, the Committee should accept the wording for paragraph 1 proposed by the representative of the United States.

The meeting rose at 6.20 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 6th MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Friday, 28 April 1995, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. ERDÖS (Hungary)

The meeting was called to order at 3.30 p.m.

REVIEW OF ARTICLE III AND THE FOURTH AND FIFTH PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS, ESPECIALLY IN THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO ARTICLE IV AND THE SIXTH AND SEVENTH PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS (continued)

Article III: Export licensing (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.7 and WP.12)

1. The CHAIRMAN drew attention to two working papers on the subject of export licensing (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.7 and WP.12).

2. Working paper 7, concerning the importance of national export- and import-control mechanisms, described the work of the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group in encouraging States to apply an agreed set of guidelines to the export of certain equipment and materials. For that purpose, the Zangger Committee had produced a list, known as the "trigger list", of items triggering International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.

3. Working paper 12, which consisted of a single paragraph, also dealt with export-control policies and the guidelines of the two aforementioned groups.

4. Mrs. TISCHLER (Germany), supported by Mr. SCHMIDT (Austria) and Mrs. DELPECH (France), proposed an amendment to working paper 7 by adding the following at the end of paragraph 4:

"The Conference notes with appreciation the decision of some States parties to give the IAEA comprehensive information about the export and import of nuclear-related materials, equipment and technology. The Conference recognizes that such transparency of international transfers enhances confidence among States parties, that international nuclear trade and exchange serves exclusively to promote peaceful objectives, and that it strengthens the capability of the IAEA to apply safeguards effectively."

5. Mr. ROSU (Romania) welcomed the content of working paper 7, and supported the amendment proposed by the German delegation. He proposed that the text of working paper 12 should be added to the beginning of working paper 7 as a new paragraph 1.

6. The CHAIRMAN suggested that the existing paragraph 1 of working paper 7 should become the last sentence of the new paragraph 1, except that it should then begin with "It urges all States parties ...".

7. Mr. NORDIN (Malaysia) proposed that, in the proposed new paragraph 1, the words "and the Nuclear Suppliers Group" should be deleted.

8. The CHAIRMAN said that the representative of Romania had agreed that the last part of that sentence, beginning with the words "by supporting or strengthening", could be deleted.
9. **Mr. BAEIDINEJAD** (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that guidelines for the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes should not be agreed within closed clubs such as the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. In the interest of transparency, any such guidelines should be decided in a forum open to all States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty.

10. **Mr. PAPADIMITROPOULOS** (Greece) supported the amendment proposed by the German delegation.

11. **Mr. AGRELL** (United Kingdom) also supported the German amendment. He also proposed that paragraph 5 should be amended to read:

   "The Conference further notes that a number of States parties also cooperate in an informal group known as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). NSG members have established agreed guidelines for the export of nuclear and nuclear-related items, which are published in IAEA document INFCIRC/254 as amended."

12. **Mr. SCHMIDT** (Austria) proposed that the following words should be added at the end of the first sentence of paragraph 4: "and to adhere to the understandings as set forth in IAEA document INFCIRC/209 as amended."

13. **Mr. WANG Jun** (China) proposed that the end of the original first sentence of working paper 7 should be amended to read "... to acquire, develop or construct nuclear weapons or any other nuclear explosive devices."

14. His delegation would welcome the opportunity to discuss the ideas put forward by the delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran for a forum open to all States for the discussion and formulation of global guidelines.

15. **Mrs. DELPECH** (France) supported the amendments proposed by the delegations of the United Kingdom and Austria.

16. **Mr. TALIANI** (Italy) concurred with the amendments proposed by the German and Austrian delegations in respect of paragraph 4, and by the United Kingdom delegation in respect of paragraph 5.

17. Regarding the Iranian proposal, it should be understood by all that the Zangger Committee included representatives of 34 States from various regions of the world, and that the guidelines that it had produced were applied by individual States on their own responsibility. The same applied to the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which had been established to complement the work of the Zangger Committee in certain areas not covered by its proceedings. The two groups were open to new members, they functioned within the spirit of the non-proliferation Treaty, and their proceedings were not secret; if any States wished to follow the example of the two groups, that would be a welcome development.

18. **Mrs. TISCHLER** (Germany) supported the amendments proposed by the United Kingdom and Austrian delegations regarding paragraph 4.

19. **Ms. DRDÁKOVA** (Czech Republic) endorsed the amendments proposed by Germany, the United Kingdom and Austria.

20. **Mr. PARNOHADININGRAT** (Indonesia) endorsed the views expressed by the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran and said that any guidelines regarding the transfer of technology should be discussed in a broad forum that included the participation of all States parties to the Treaty so that the guidelines satisfied all States parties.

21. **Mr. OUVRY** (Belgium) endorsed the United Kingdom’s amendment to paragraph 5 and said that, while it was the role of the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group to reach informal agreements on the general guidelines for export licensing, it remained within the competence of individual States to apply those guidelines in the form of export-licensing policies.
22. **Mr. SCHMIDT** (Austria) drew attention to a working paper entitled "Multilateral nuclear supply principles" (NPT/CONF.1995/21), which contained information about the Zangger Committee and would help to clarify the allocation of Treaty responsibilities at the national level. He emphasized that it was the responsibility of each State to adopt the requirements of the Treaty in its legislation. He said that Greece should be added to the list of countries that had submitted that working paper.

23. **Mr. ADEKEYE** (Nigeria) endorsed the views of the representative of Indonesia and said that his delegation believed that emphasis should be placed on multilateral efforts aimed at transparency rather than the establishment of informal groups.

24. **Mr. BAEIDINEJAD** (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that his delegation did not question the logic behind the establishment of groups such as the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, but emphasized that the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries had objected to the formation of "closed door" clubs for the establishment of guidelines for the transfer of technology. If the decisions of such bodies were to be consistent with the objectives of the Treaty, they should be adopted with the participation of all States parties and not on an informal and secretive basis.

25. **Mr. ABU-HADID** (Syrian Arab Republic) endorsed the views expressed by the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Indonesia and Nigeria and said that his delegation did not accept paragraph 5 of working paper 7 as it stood, especially in the light of the amendments proposed to paragraph 4 which referred to the Zangger Committee. His delegation believed that the list of items triggering IAEA safeguards and the procedures for implementation were adequate for use by the Conference and not in need of review, and proposed that paragraph 4 should be deleted from working paper 7.

26. **Mr. TATAR** (Algeria) endorsed the views of the representative of Indonesia and said his delegation believed that the multiplication of "closed door" groups did not correspond to the objectives of transparency and favoured a multilateral framework for gathering information.

27. **Mr. WALKER** (Australia), introducing a working paper on IAEA safeguards (NPT/CONF.1995/NC.II/WP.15), said that the text responded to a widely expressed concern that non-nuclear-weapon States which had not accepted non-proliferation commitments and full-scope safeguards should not receive nuclear supplies from parties to the Treaty. The text said exactly that, and concluded by urging those suppliers which had not yet done so to require such conditions without delay. He wished to thank the many delegations whose suggestions were reflected in the actual wording.

28. **The CHAIRMAN** said that the working paper introduced by Australia would be taken up in the framework of the informal open-ended working group under the topic of export licensing.

29. **The CHAIRMAN** drew attention to a composite draft text of the introduction, pertaining to article III, that had been circulated as an informal paper. He pointed out that the last sentence of paragraph 3 was in square brackets; a decision on that sentence would be made later on, as the study of other draft texts progressed. He asked whether the Committee was prepared to approve the text as it stood, leaving in the square brackets for the time being. If the Committee agreed, the text could be passed on to the Drafting Committee of the Conference.

30. **Mr. WANG Jun** (China) asked whether delegations might have another opportunity to consider the sentence that was in square brackets.

31. **The CHAIRMAN** said that the sentence in square brackets would be clarified in the context of the section on safeguards, which would be examined by the Committee on 1 May.
32. Mr. ROSENTHAL (United States of America) said that, although he sympathized with the Chinese request, he felt that the matter could be left up to the Chairman, on the understanding that the decision to leave the square brackets did not prejudice the final language to be adopted. With regard to paragraph 4, he pointed out that the version that was before the Committee did not accurately reflect the agreed text. The words "placing all their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards" should therefore be deleted.

33. The CHAIRMAN said that the text should indeed be corrected as noted by the United States delegation. He also confirmed that leaving the square brackets was without prejudice to the positions of members.

34. Mr. AGRELL (United Kingdom) said that his delegation was willing to maintain the square brackets for the time being. In paragraph 5, however, after the words "the safeguards required by article III shall be implemented in a manner designed", the words "to comply with article IV of the Treaty and" were missing. Those words should be restored in order to maintain the actual language of article III, paragraph 3, of the Treaty.

35. Mr. WANG Jun (China) endorsed the United Kingdom proposal.

36. The CHAIRMAN said he would take it that the Committee agreed to reinstate the words "to comply with article IV and" in paragraph 5 of the draft text.

37. It was so decided.

38. The CHAIRMAN said he would take it that the Committee agreed that he should transmit the draft text entitled "Article III - Introduction", as corrected and amended, to the Drafting Committee of the Conference, on the understanding that the Committee's approval of the text did not prejudice any delegation's position on the sentence that remained in square brackets.

39. It was so decided.

REVIEW OF ARTICLE VII (agenda item 16)

40. Mr. WANG Jun (China) introduced a working paper on the prevention of nuclear-weapon proliferation, nuclear safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.10). Section I highlighted the positive role of the non-proliferation Treaty in containing nuclear-weapon proliferation and the preservation of international peace and security. Section II discussed the importance of IAEA safeguards and what principles should be observed in improving the safeguards regime. In section III, the Conference supported the establishment on a voluntary basis of nuclear-weapon-free zones or zones free of weapons of mass destruction and welcomed the fact that all nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty had signed Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. It urged other nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty that had not signed Additional Protocols II and III to the Treaty of Rarotonga to do so at an early date. The Conference supported the efforts made by the African and Middle Eastern countries to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones free of weapons of mass destruction in their respective regions.

41. He proposed that the working paper should be merged with the Egyptian working paper on nuclear-weapon-free zones (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.13).

42. Mr. ERFAN (Egypt) introduced a working paper on nuclear-weapon-free zones (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.13) which discussed the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in general and, specifically, recent events in the Middle East regarding the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region. The Conference urged all States of the Middle East to take the practical and urgent steps required for the establishment of such a zone, and called upon all States of the region, pending the establishment of the zone, in particular Israel, which had a significant nuclear programme, to declare solemnly that they would refrain from developing, producing, testing or acquiring nuclear weapons and from permitting the stationing on their
territories or territories under their control of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.

43. His delegation welcomed the proposal of the Chinese delegation to merge the two working papers.

44. Mr. ABDUL MOMIN (Brunei Darussalam) introduced a working paper on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South-East Asia (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.14), in which the Conference noted that the representatives of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) emphasized their determination to intensify efforts for the early establishment of such a zone. The Conference noted further that the idea of establishing the zone had been endorsed by other South-East Asian countries and constituted a concrete contribution of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to nuclear disarmament as stipulated in the non-proliferation Treaty.

45. Mr. COOK (New Zealand) introduced a working paper on nuclear-weapon-free zones (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.16), which emphasized the importance of concluding such zones in harmony with internationally recognized principles and recognized that the cooperation of all nuclear-weapon States was essential for the maximum effectiveness of any treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The Conference further expressed its satisfaction at the adherence by all countries in the region of Latin America and the Caribbean to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, including Protocols I and II, but regretted that not all the nuclear-weapon States had adhered to the relevant protocols of the South Pacific Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga). It commended efforts to conclude the Treaty on an African nuclear-weapon-free zone to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions, especially in the Middle East and South-East Asia.

46. Mr. AITMATOV (Kyrgyzstan) introduced a paragraph to be included in the final document of the Conference on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia which read:

"The Conference takes note of the interest of Kyrgyzstan in creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia and considers that a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia would contribute to the strengthening of peace, stability and security in this region."

47. In that regard, his delegation believed that such a zone, underpinned by legally binding and unequivocal security assurances, was the best way to prohibit sensitive nuclear activities which produced nuclear-weapon material. It would require stricter nuclear-export controls, such as full-scope safeguards in the importing State, and would enhance the effectiveness of safeguards by mutual inspections. His delegation hoped that the establishment of such a zone in Central Asia, a region which bordered on two powerful nuclear-weapon States, would enhance a willingness on their part to reduce their nuclear arsenals and would provide an element of stability that might eventually stretch southward to encompass areas that were sensitive in terms of nuclear proliferation.

48. Mr. WALKER (Australia) said that he supported the working paper introduced by New Zealand (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.16). He noted that the sponsors of the working paper included States that were parties to the three existing nuclear-weapon-free zones, as well as a number of African countries, reflecting the rapid progress being made towards the conclusion of a nuclear-weapon-free zone for the African continent. It was also significant that the sponsors indicated their support for other countries which also aspired to establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in their own regions.

49. Mr. ADEKEYE (Nigeria) said that his country was a sponsor of the working paper submitted by New Zealand. His Government strongly supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones throughout the world, and was particularly happy at the progress being made towards that end in the African continent. He encouraged States in other regions to intensify their activities towards the goal of denuclearization.
50. Mr. YABKA (Papua New Guinea) said he endorsed the working papers introduced by China, Egypt and New Zealand. His Government attached great importance to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. He noted with disappointment that a number of nuclear-weapon States had not yet signed the protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga. Their refusal to do so raised questions about their sincerity. He suggested that the Committee should consider the possibility of including in the text on article VII a phrase that would provide for a specific time-frame to be set for nuclear-weapon States to accede to the relevant protocols to nuclear-free-zone treaties. He complimented China and the Russian Federation on their swift action in signing the Rarotonga protocols. He also pointed out that dependent territories were excluded from effective participation in denuclearization unless the administering Powers acceded to the relevant protocols. It was of the utmost importance that such territories should be included in the nuclear-free zones.

51. Mr. SAINT-MIEUY (France) said that the Egyptian working paper (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.13) was acceptable to his delegation. He suggested that paragraph 1 should be amended to read:

"The Conference reaffirms that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by States is an important non-proliferation and disarmament measure. In the establishment of such zones, account must be taken of the particular characteristics of each region."

52. Mr. ROSENTHAL (United States of America) said that his delegation, which strongly supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, would need time to study the working papers that had just been submitted.

53. Mr. de ICAZA (Mexico) said that his delegation was a sponsor of the working paper introduced by New Zealand (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.16). As depositary of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, his Government attached great importance to the recent accession to that Treaty of Argentina, Brazil, Cuba and Guyana. The Latin American and Caribbean region had thus become the first densely inhabited zone to be unconditionally free of nuclear weapons. At the request of certain States parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, his delegation would seek to have some recognition of that important fact inserted in the final text when the drafting group took up its examination of the text.

54. His delegation endorsed the amendment to working paper 13 proposed by France, which was similar to paragraph 2 of working paper 16.

55. Mr. PAPADIMITROPOULOS (Greece) reiterated his Government’s support for efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and in other regions. On the question of modalities for the application of safeguards, he stressed the importance of early studies concerning verification, bearing in mind the special characteristics of each region.

56. Mr. ODAGI-JALAMAYO (Uganda) said that in general terms, his delegation agreed with the proposals in working papers 13 and 16; however, it would have to wait until they were circulated before taking a definite stand. He had some concerns regarding the definition of "region". There were some small islands which should fall within the African region and which were known to contain nuclear arsenals. When African States claimed that those islands belonged to the African region, they were told that the islands did not belong to that region.

57. Mr. ERFAN (Egypt) said that in principle, his delegation was willing to accept the French proposal to amend working paper 13, which he understood to reflect two main concerns, namely, that arrangements should be freely arrived at, and that the specific characteristics of each region should be taken into account.

The meeting rose at 5.35 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 7th MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 1 May 1995, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. ERDÖS (Hungary)

The meeting was called to order at 10.25 a.m.

ROLE OF THE TREATY IN THE PROMOTION OF NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT IN STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY AND MEASURES AIMED AT PROMOTING WIDER ACCEPTANCE OF THE TREATY (agenda item 17)

1. The CHAIRMAN, after summarizing the Committee’s work thus far, said that, although required to consider the question of a wider acceptance of the Treaty, the Committee was not expected to report on that subject.

2. Mr. WALKER (Australia) said that the Committee must nevertheless deal with the issue, because of the close connection between it and the work already undertaken on questions relating to article III, especially the requirement that full-scope safeguards should be accepted as a precondition for any transfer of fissionable material or products. Three more delegations, those of Armenia, Belgium and Thailand, wished to co-sponsor document NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.15, which Australia had introduced on Friday, 28 April, on behalf of its many sponsors.

3. Regarding the question of the universality or wider acceptance of the Treaty, the fifth Review Conference should not restrict itself to renewing the appeals for universality made at preceding Conferences but should deal with the matter in greater depth. During the general debate in the plenary Conference, the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs had stated that the Treaty contained international rules of conduct. It was a source of great satisfaction that the number of States parties to the Treaty had increased and that only 12 non-parties remained, some of which had announced their intention to accede to the Treaty. A sensible approach might be to enter into direct contact with those countries with a view to encouraging them to accede, thereby ensuring that those last 12 hurdles to be cleared before the goal was reached were the main focus of the future strengthened review of the operation of the Treaty.

4. Ms. SAYAF (Syrian Arab Republic) said that universality was indeed an essential feature of the Treaty’s effectiveness and that all States not yet parties should accede to it. That was especially relevant in the case of Israel, which should become a party to the Treaty and subject its installations to IAEA safeguards, given the importance of such a decision for peace and security throughout the region.

5. Mr. SHOUKRY (Egypt) said that countries which had not yet acceded to the Treaty represented a threat to international peace and security. The difficulties which non-proliferation still posed were caused by the non-universal character of the Treaty.

6. The CHAIRMAN said that, in response to the request of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and provided that the Committee had no objection, the deadline for the submission of working papers would be changed to 6 p.m.

7. It was so decided.
8. Mr. SUKAYRI (Jordan) said that he fully shared the views expressed by the Australian representative on the question of the universality of the Treaty, which should be an absolute requirement. The Australian representative having referred to the fact that the Treaty established to some extent international rules of conduct, he would point out that the head of the Jordanian delegation had stated in the plenary Conference that nuclear weapons were so abominable that anyone who sought to acquire them should be considered an outlaw from the standpoint of international law. He also endorsed the views expressed by the representatives of Syria and Egypt regarding Israel’s accession to the Treaty and its submission to IAEA safeguards.

9. Mr. ADEKEYE (Nigeria) associated himself with the views of the Australian representative in connection with the universality of the Treaty and expressed satisfaction that only a handful of States had not yet become parties. Although few, those States were nevertheless of crucial importance in their respective regions. The international community should accordingly establish conditions conducive to peace and security in those regions, thereby encouraging States which were not parties to the Treaty to accede to it.

10. It was worth mentioning that many States were unhappy about the implementation of some provisions of the Treaty, especially article VI; that situation also might impede universality. The States parties, especially those with nuclear weapons, should renew their commitment to nuclear disarmament so as to encourage other States to accede to the Treaty. He would remind the Committee that, in 1989, Nigeria had made a proposal with respect to negative security assurances which, if adopted, would be a step in the right direction. Progress had definitely been made towards universality, but there were still many problems to be settled.

11. Mr. SCHMIDT (Austria) said that universality in terms of accession was not sufficient; it was also necessary to ensure universality in terms of the implementation of the Treaty, namely the universality of full-scope safeguards. As the Australian representative had explained, mechanisms reflecting the interests of all groups of countries should be envisaged. The implementation of the provisions of the Treaty should be both predictable and reliable. If those conditions were met, the States parties to the Treaty would know exactly why they were parties and would firmly uphold the Treaty’s principal goals. Total acceptance of the spirit of the Treaty was the surest way to encourage the remaining States to become parties in their turn.

12. Mr. NORDIN (Malaysia) associated himself with the Australian representative in supporting the principle of universality but thought that ways of attaining such universality must be found. As the Austrian representative had explained, modalities for implementing the provisions of the Treaty, especially article III, must be predictable and reliable. The Committee must give special attention to that question. States which were not yet parties to the Treaty would certainly be encouraged to accede to it if they saw those two concepts become reality.

13. Mr. AYATOLLAHI (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that he endorsed the comments of previous delegations and approved in advance anything the Conference could do to persuade non-parties to accede to the Treaty, especially Israel. It must be explained to them that their security assurances were not automatically increased because of their hesitations and that accession to the Treaty was the best of all possible assurances. In any event, the universality of the Treaty must go hand in hand with the implementation of all its provisions, whose application was extremely important not only to maintain peace but also in respect of security assurances and the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

14. The CHAIRMAN reviewed the documentation before the Committee and the items referred to it which it had dealt with. He announced that the consideration of agenda item 17 had been concluded.

The meeting rose at 11.15 a.m.
CONSIDERATION OF VARIOUS WORKING PAPERS ON ISSUES RELATING TO ARTICLE III OF THE TREATY

1. The CHAIRMAN reviewed the work carried out and said that the Committee should decide on the final text of its report as speedily as possible. Of the five working papers under consideration, three had met with the approval of all delegations: the working paper on State systems of accounting and control (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.3), the paper on the safeguards in nuclear-weapon States (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.5) and the paper on the financing of safeguards (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.4). Only two working papers were still pending, namely the papers on plutonium and physical protection. He suggested that the Committee should first of all resume consideration of the working paper on plutonium (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.9), focusing on the proposal put forward by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

2. Mr. BAEIDINESAD (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that following consultations and in order to facilitate the discussion, it had been decided to shorten the text of the paragraph initially proposed to two lines only: "The Conference endorses further work of IAEA on improving the safeguards arrangements for large-scale commercial reprocessing facilities." That sentence could constitute the third sentence of paragraph 1 of the working paper.

3. Mr. AGRELL (United Kingdom) noted with satisfaction that the wording of the proposal by the Islamic Republic of Iran had thus been shortened. That proposal affirmed that and supported the purpose of the second sentence in paragraph 1. It was absolutely necessary to recognize the efforts made in recent years to improve the effectiveness of the Agency's safeguards relating to large-scale commercial reprocessing facilities and it would be desirable if the Islamic Republic of Iran agreed to certain amendments to the text, namely: replacing the word "further" with the word "continuing" and inserting the word "further" between the words "on" and "improving".

4. Mr. ISASHIKY (Japan) said that the text proposed by the Iranian delegation was not acceptable since the budget for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) activities could be approved only by the Agency itself and not the Conference. The Conference could not take decisions that would prejudice decisions to be taken by the Agency. For that reason, the word "further" did not seem appropriate. While the proposal by the United Kingdom was most certainly an improvement, it would be better to delete that adjective.

5. Mr. BAEIDINESAD (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that he supported the comments made by the previous speakers. The proposal by the representative of the United Kingdom was acceptable and should allay the concerns expressed by Japan since it merely referred to the continuation of the work of IAEA. The Iranian delegation was prepared to accept the amendments proposed by the United Kingdom.
6. Mr. Walker (Australia) said that he supported the text as amended by the representative of the United Kingdom and felt that it took account of the concerns expressed by Japan.

7. Mr. Saint-Mieux (France) said that, while he supported the substance of the Iranian proposal since France was also in favour of improving the safeguards system, particularly with regard to reprocessing facilities, he felt that the wording was somewhat blunt. The word "improving" implied that the current safeguards for reprocessing plants were not very good. As indicated by the representative of the United Kingdom, there was a need therefore to recognize the fact that the work carried out to date had been very satisfactory, although it was desirable to improve it further.

8. The Chairman suggested that the Committee should adopt the new wording of the proposal submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran as amended by the United Kingdom and include it as the third sentence of paragraph 1 of the working paper.

9. It was so decided.

10. Mr. Walker (Australia) said that consultations had been held by several delegations on certain points in the working paper on plutonium which were still controversial. The text that had resulted from the consultations, however, had not yet been finalized. The delegations concerned would meet as a working group that afternoon in order to reach agreement on the final wording to be adopted.

Chairman's working paper on IAEA safeguards

11. The Chairman suggested turning to consideration of paragraphs 14.a.1 and 14.a.2 of the working paper on IAEA safeguards which he had submitted to the Committee and had already been discussed in great detail, with two versions on one issue and some differences as to wording. The question of the Agency as the sole responsible body had also arisen. He felt that the differences with regard to wording could be resolved in order to be able to submit a consensus text on IAEA. It should be recalled that, following consultations with his colleagues in Vienna, the IAEA representative in New York felt that the wording to the effect that the Agency was the sole responsible body for applying the safeguards was completely valid legally.

12. Since it had not been possible to reach agreement on the wording of the paragraphs under consideration or on the amendments proposed by certain delegations, he urged the members of the Committee to meet as a working group in order to draw up a text that could be adopted by consensus.

Physical protection (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.8 and revised version)

13. The Chairman requested the members of the Committee to express their views on the paper on physical protection in order to adopt a definitive text.

14. Mr. Houck (United States of America) referring to paragraph 2, said that the Russian Federation had proposed adding the word "unirradiated" before the phrase "nuclear material".

15. Mr. Schmidt (Austria) said that, in paragraph 1, unlike paragraph 2, the words "nuclear material" should be used instead of "unirradiated direct-use materials".

16. Mr. Rosu (Romania) proposed that the phrase "and prevention of illicit trafficking" should be inserted after the words "in physical protection" in the last sentence of paragraph 1.

17. Mr. Blankenstein (Germany) welcomed the changes that had been made in the paper on physical protection following the consultations. He supported the proposals made by the representatives of Austria and Romania because illicit trafficking had become a growing concern. Referring to paragraph 3,
he proposed that the words "or minimize" should be inserted after the word "avoid", as had already been proposed by the delegation of Greece.

18. Mr. SCHMIDT (Austria) said that he supported the proposal by the representative of Germany with regard to paragraph 3.

19. Mr. MACERO (Mexico) said that he also supported the proposals by the representatives of Austria and Romania.

20. The CHAIRMAN concluded the discussion on the working paper on physical protection, pointing out that four amendments to the text had already been adopted: two relating to paragraph 1, one concerning paragraph 2 and another regarding paragraph 3.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.
Chairman: Mr. ERDŐS (Hungary)

The meeting was called to order at 5 p.m.

REVIEW OF ARTICLE III AND THE FOURTH AND FIFTH PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS, ESPECIALLY IN THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO ARTICLE IV AND THE SIXTH AND SEVENTH PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS (continued)

Article III: Safeguards

1. The CHAIRMAN drew attention to the third revision of the draft text on the subject of safeguards. The Committee should focus its attention on those parts of the text on which the Drafting Committee had not been able to reach agreement.

Paragraph 2

2. Mr. WANG Jun (China) said that his delegation wished to know when the Drafting Committee had decided to insert the word "full-scope" after "IAEA" and before "safeguards". The second revision of the text had contained only the words "IAEA safeguards", and his delegation could not find in its notes any indication that "full-scope" had been added to the text.

3. Mr. SCHMIDT (Austria) said that he had proposed the addition of the word "full-scope" because paragraph 2 of article III of the non-proliferation Treaty referred to the principle of full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply. Moreover, when he had made his proposal, he had stressed that article III as a whole dealt with one major issue, namely, the universality of full-scope safeguards. As far as he could recall, there had been no objection to that explanation.

4. Mr. KLEBNIKOV (Russian Federation) proposed that, in the fourth line of paragraph 2, "condition of supply" should be amended to read "condition of new arrangements for supply", since it was important to emphasize that the new agreement did not have any retroactive effect.

5. Mr. BAEIDINEJAD (Islamic Republic of Iran) proposed that paragraph 2 should be deleted in its entirety, since the issue of full-scope safeguards was dealt with in other parts of the document.

6. The CHAIRMAN, supported by Mr. TALIANI (Italy), Mr. KAYSER (Luxembourg), Mr. BLANKENSTEIN (Germany) and Mr. WALKER (Australia), urged delegations not to reopen the discussion on those parts of the text on which agreement had already been reached. He strongly recommended that the Committee should accept paragraph 2 without any additional revisions.

7. Mr. ODAGA-JALOMAYO (Uganda) said that, instead of reopening the discussion on agreed paragraphs, the Committee should refer the matter to a higher forum.

8. Mr. WANG Jun (China) said that his delegation could accept the proposal by the Russian Federation. If the Russian proposal was not acceptable to the Committee, his delegation would have to insist that the word "full-scope" should be placed within square brackets.
9. **The CHAIRMAN** said that the word "full-scope" would be placed within square brackets and the text would be submitted to the Drafting Committee for further discussion.

**Paragraph 4**

10. **The CHAIRMAN** said that further consultations had been held on paragraph 4, and all delegations had reached agreement on the text of the paragraph.

11. Mr. **HASAN** (Iraq) said that, after a consensus had been reached on paragraph 4, one delegation had proposed a new addition to the text, which had reopened the discussion and resulted in a rewording of the text. In the last sentence of the new text, the Conference stressed "the need for Iraq to continue its cooperation fully" with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) but did not acknowledge the fact that Iraq had been cooperating with the Agency. The Committee should therefore decide either to keep the wording of the original consensus text or add a sentence acknowledging Iraq’s cooperation. If the Committee wished to retain the current wording of paragraph 4, the text of the paragraph in its entirety should be placed in square brackets.

12. **The CHAIRMAN** said that, while the original text of paragraph 4 had not contained any acknowledgement of Iraq’s cooperation with IAEA, the new text referred to the need for Iraq to continue its cooperation, thereby acknowledging that such cooperation existed. The agreed text had more or less met the expectations of delegations, and he urged the Committee not to introduce any new drafting changes.

13. Mr. **HASAN** (Iraq) said that, since one delegation had been given an opportunity to change the text after a consensus had been reached, his delegation should also be allowed to introduce a change that was not damaging to any delegation.

14. **The CHAIRMAN** said that the Committee had no other alternative than to place paragraph 4 within square brackets.

15. Mr. **AL-SHAMMAM** (Yemen) proposed that a sentence should be added to the end of paragraph 4, to read as follows: "The Conference commends Iraqi cooperation so far and stresses the need for Iraq to continue."

16. **The CHAIRMAN** reminded the representative of Yemen that the Committee had just decided to place the entire paragraph within square brackets pending further discussion.

17. Mr. **ROSENTHAL** (United States of America) said he had a compromise proposal to make regarding paragraph 4 if the Chairman was unwilling to put the paragraph between square brackets.

18. **The CHAIRMAN** said it had been agreed that paragraph 4 should be placed between square brackets. If the delegation of the United States had any further ideas it should submit them to the Drafting Committee since he was unwilling to reopen discussion of the issue.

**Paragraph 5**

19. **The CHAIRMAN** said it had not been possible to reach a compromise with the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and it had therefore been decided to retain the original paragraph but to place it between square brackets.

20. Mr. **KIM Chang Guk** (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) said that the paragraph as it stood was totally unacceptable to his delegation. It dealt with a contentious issue that could only be settled through the agreed framework between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the United States. He was unclear as to how IAEA could verify full compliance without
the implementation of the agreed framework. The paragraph had no real meaning and was simply designed to put pressure on his country.

**Paragraph 10**

21. The CHAIRMAN asked whether the language of the paragraph was fully acceptable to all delegations.

22. Mr. WALKER (Australia) said that he wished to raise the issue of what had happened at the meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors in March 1995. His delegation believed that the Board had taken a decision and the Conference should refer to that decision. Others believed that the Conference should refer to the conclusions of the Chairman of the Board of Governors. He wished to propose a neutral formulation that would take account of both views, and thus the first part of the sentence would read: "The Conference welcomes the outcome of the March 1995 meeting of the Board of Governors of IAEA." Furthermore, since his delegation believed that the role of the Conference was to give guidance to IAEA, he proposed replacing the phrase "in which it" by "and" so that the rest of the sentence would read: "and endorses the general direction of Programme 93 + 2 for a strengthened and cost-effective safeguards system and calls on all States parties to support this programme".

23. Mr. BLANKENSTEIN (Germany) proposed subamending the first part of the sentence to read: "The Conference welcomes the outcome of the March 1995 meeting of the Board of Governors, which endorses the general direction of Programme 93 + 2."

24. Mr. BAEIDINEJAD (Islamic Republic of Iran) proposed the inclusion of a new second sentence which would read: "The Conference reiterates therefore that once the safeguards system has been strengthened, no nuclear-weapon State may attempt to impede or deny access by non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to nuclear materials, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes unless non-compliance is verified and established by IAEA."

25. Mr. SAINT-MIEUX (France), Mr. TALIANI (Italy), Mrs. DRPAKOVA (Czech Republic), Mr. ROSENTHAL (United States of America), Mr. EKECRANTZ (Sweden), Mr. COOK (New Zealand), Mrs. BESKER (Croatia), Mr. OUVRY (Belgium), Mr. In GuK PARK (Republic of Korea), Mr. PAPADIMITROUPOLOS (Greece), and Mr. WIELAND (Switzerland) endorsed the Australian amendments.

26. Mr. TALIANI (Italy), Mrs. DRPAKOVA (Czech Republic), Mr. ROSENTHAL (United States of America), Mr. EKECRANTZ (Sweden), Mr. COOK (New Zealand), Mr. OUVRY (Belgium) and Mr. In GuK PARK (Republic of Korea) said they could not endorse the Iranian proposal.

27. Mr. AXADI (Algeria) said he supported the first Australian amendment but was reluctant to see the Conference endorse a decision which was still under consideration by the IAEA Board of Governors. He proposed that the Conference should await the outcome of the IAEA General Conference.

28. Mr. SUDJAPNAN (Indonesia) endorsed the Iranian proposal, but wondered whether it would be better to insert it as the penultimate sentence of paragraph 8.

29. Mr. WANG Jun (China) said that he could accept the first Australian amendment, but was concerned that the second gave an inaccurate picture of what had happened at the meeting of the Board of Governors. Nevertheless, his delegation was prepared to endorse the German subamendment.

30. Mr. de ICAZA (Mexico) endorsed the first Australian amendment, but pointed out that a logical contradiction would arise if the second amendment was approved. It was unclear how the Conference could call on States parties to do more than it did itself.

31. Mr. BLANKENSTEIN (Germany) said he wished to withdraw his subamendment in the light of the emerging consensus.
32. **Mr. ROSENTHAL** (United States of America) proposed that the Mexican objection could be dealt with by changing the final part of the first sentence to read: "and calls on all States to support this programme with practical cooperation and assistance".

33. **The CHAIRMAN** said that in his view the wording proposed by the Islamic Republic of Iran did not belong in paragraph 10. Without prejudging the merits of the Iranian proposal, he suggested that it might be more appropriate to bring the matter up in connection with the still-unresolved issue of expert control.

34. **Mr. AYADI** (Algeria) said that his delegation could accept the proposed changes to the first part of the sentence, but that States could not be called upon to support a programme on which IAEA had not taken a final decision, especially since the Board of Governors itself had endorsed only the general direction of Programme 93 + 2. He suggested repeating that phrase, so that the end of the sentence would read: "and calls on all States to support the general direction of this programme."

35. **Mr. SCHMIDT** (Austria) noted that Programme 93 + 2 was an ongoing programme that was expected to culminate in a new, integrated safeguards system. Since many countries already participated in it, the reference to cooperation and assistance could be seen as an invitation to States to continue or begin to participate. That would be better than repeating the phrase "general direction", and would not represent an obligation on any individual State.

36. **Mr. ODAGA-JALOMAYO** (Uganda) said that he supported the addition of the phrase suggested by the United States delegation, but that it would be more meaningful to reverse the word order to read "practical assistance and cooperation".

37. **Mr. WANG Jun** (China) recalled that the original version of paragraph 10 had been proposed by his delegation. Although he did not object to the word "outcome", it was important that the rest of the sentence should reflect the endorsement of the general direction of Programme 93 + 2 by the IAEA Board of Governors. The Conference, in turn, expressed its endorsement in paragraph 12 by urging IAEA "to proceed expeditiously ... on all aspects of Programme 93 + 2". It was therefore unnecessary for the Conference to declare its support for the programme in paragraph 10 as well.

38. **Mr. PAPADIMITRIOPOULOS** (Greece) said that the Chinese delegation should not object to the inclusion of the Conference's endorsement of Programme 93 + 2 in paragraph 10, since China had been a key player in the discussions on that programme in the Board of Governors.

39. **Mr. BAEDIJEJAD** (Islamic Republic of Iran) noted that the new sentence he had proposed related to the question of strengthening the safeguards system, and should therefore appear as either the second sentence of paragraph 10 or the fourth sentence of paragraph 8. The new sentence could be placed in brackets and submitted to the Drafting Committee for a final decision.

40. **Mr. SCHMIDT** (Austria) said that the issue of safeguards systems was not central to the Iranian proposal, which dealt mainly with impediments to access to technology. The sentence therefore belonged in the section on export controls.

41. **Mr. BENATALLAH** (Algeria) said that he agreed with the Chinese delegation that the language of paragraph 10 must be compatible with that of paragraph 12, and that the Conference must not prejudge the decisions of the Board of Governors on Programme 93 + 2. The Board had only endorsed the "general direction" of the programme, whose technical, financial and legal aspects were still under discussion. He suggested that in order to reflect the language of paragraph 12, the sentence in paragraph 10 should be changed to read: "and calls on all States to proceed expeditiously with consideration and decision on all aspects of Programme 93 + 2".
42. **Mr. ROSENTHAL** (United States of America) said that if IAEA was to proceed expeditiously with the programme, it would need the "practical assistance and cooperation" of States. However, to ensure that the inclusion of that phrase in paragraph 10 was not construed as an endorsement of the programme, the phrase "and calls on all States to support this programme's investigations with practical assistance and cooperation" could be substituted.

43. **Mr. WANG Jun** (China) said he did not understand what the United States representative meant by "investigations".

44. **Mr. SCHMIDT** (Austria) said that the Algerian proposal had introduced a new concept. Paragraph 10 referred to the support of States for the programme, while paragraph 12 spoke of IAEA as an organization. Since the paragraphs differed in scope, they should remain separate.

45. **Mr. WALKER** (Australia) said that different delegations were interpreting the word "support" in different ways. He agreed with the Algerian representative that no decisions had yet been taken regarding the end result of the programme, which was still at the research and development stage. The concern about not prejudging its outcome was legitimate. He therefore suggested adding "without prejudging its outcome" after the words "this programme".

46. **Mr. SCHMIDT** (Austria) said that it was important to retain the phrase "with practical assistance and cooperation" because countries that did provide such cooperation deserved to be recognized.

47. **Mr. BENATALLAH** (Algeria) said that the proposal put forward by the Australian delegation partially addressed his concerns, but that the main problem was that the Conference was endorsing a programme which had not yet been adopted. He proposed that the end of the sentence should be changed to read: "and calls on all States to support the global orientation of the programme without prejudging the outcome of this programme".

48. **Mr. SCHMIDT** (Austria) said that Programme 93 + 2 was still incomplete and that certain aspects of it remained to be developed in the future. The words "global orientation" might seem to refer only to the programme's current orientation. Since the ultimate aim of the programme was to institute comprehensive safeguards, the Conference should take care not to limit its prospects.

49. **Mr. ODAGA-JALOMAYO** (Uganda) said he supported the view of the Austrian representative, and suggested, as a compromise, the omission of the word "global" and the retention of the word "orientation" and the phrase "with practical assistance and cooperation, without prejudging its outcome".

50. **Mr. ERfAN** (Egypt) said that he understood the Algerian representative's concerns and that the reference to "practical assistance and cooperation" was too concrete, since the programme had not been finalized. However, he also agreed with the Austrian representative that the States which had provided such cooperation should be recognized. He therefore suggested that the end of the sentence should read: "... and in this respect, calls on all States to continue their support for this programme".

51. **Mr. BENATALLAH** (Algeria) said he shared the views of the Ugandan and Austrian delegations, and suggested that their concerns could be met by repeating the words "general direction" in place of "global orientation".

52. **Mr. MIRAILET** (France) said that he applauded the Australian delegation's spirit of compromise, but that the phrase "without prejudging its outcome" sounded too negative. He supported the Egyptian proposal because it was more direct and did not imply a value judgement.

53. **Mr. AGRELL** (United Kingdom) said that it was unclear whether the Conference was calling on all States to adopt an attitude of general political
support for the programme, as in the Egyptian formula, or specifically urging them to support IAEA in the study and development of proposals under the programme. If the second interpretation was correct, he would suggest the phrase "to continue their support for the further definition of this programme, without prejudging its outcome".

54. Mr. WANG Jun (China) said he wondered whether the word "definition" meant that countries' support for the programme should be confined to that particular aspect of it. He still preferred the original wording, which was the simplest.

55. Mr. PAPADIMITRPOULOS (Greece) favoured retaining the original wording at the end of the first sentence in paragraph 10.

56. Mr. BLANKENSTEIN endorsed the amendment proposed by the representative of the United Kingdom.

57. Mr. WALKER (Australia) withdrew his amendment to insert the words "without prejudging its outcome", but said his delegation did not support the United Kingdom amendment as the programme did not require further definition. He proposed either to retain the original text or to adopt the amendment proposed by the representative of Egypt.

58. Mr. KLEBNIKOV (Russian Federation) said that since it was inappropriate to predict the outcome of the programme, he proposed that the word "additional", used in reference to "additional costs of measures" in the last sentence in paragraph 10 should be deleted.

59. Mr. OUVRY (Belgium) said to use the word "programme" was misleading since Programme 93 + 2 was in fact more of a project. He proposed to use the word "project" instead of "programme" and to adopt the amendment proposed by the United Kingdom.

60. Mr. PAPADIMITRPOULOS (Greece) said that his delegation would endorse the version proposed by the representative of the United Kingdom if the word "definition" were changed to "development", since the programme had already been defined. The new version would read: "to continue their support for the further development of this programme".

61. Mr. de ICAZA (Mexico), supported by Mr. OUVRY (Belgium), proposed that the first sentence be simplified to read as follows: "The Conference welcomes the outcome of the March 1995 meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors and supports the general direction of Programme 93 + 2 for a strengthened and cost-effective safeguards system".

62. Mr. SCHMIDT (Austria) said that it would weaken the text to delete the call to all States to support the programme individually.

63. Mr. ERFAN (Egypt) endorsed the Greek amendment but favoured using the word "process" instead of "programme".

64. Mr. WALKER (Australia), supported by Mr. AYADI (Algeria), proposed that, as a compromise to avoid the use of the word "programme", the sentence should be amended to read: "... calls on all States to support continuation of this work".

65. Mr. PAPADIMITRPOULOS (Greece) said that the Australian amendment weakened the text. There was a need to explicitly urge States to support the programme. His delegation therefore preferred the amendment proposed by Mexico.

66. Mr. MIRAILLET (France) said that his delegation could not accept the Mexican amendment since it would omit the reference to an appeal to States, which was an important point of the paragraph. However, it was ready to accept the amendment proposed by Egypt, as subamended by Greece.
67. Mr. AGRELL (United Kingdom) and Mr. TALIANI (Italy) endorsed the Egyptian amendment.

68. Mr. MIRAILET (France) said that his delegation could accept the Chairman’s formulation.

69. Mr. PAPADIMITROPOULOS (Greece), supported by Mr. NORDIN (Malaysia), said that he agreed with the proposal made by the representative of Egypt, as supplemented by the representative of Italy.

70. The CHAIRMAN asked whether the Committee could now accept the first sentence of paragraph 10, amended to read: "The Conference welcomes the outcome of the March 1995 meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors and endorses the general direction of 'Programme 93+2' for a strengthened and cost-effective safeguards system and in this respect calls on all States to continue their support for this programme."

71. Mr. WANG Jun (China) and Mr. TALIANI (Italy) said that they could accept the sentence as currently formulated.

72. Mr. AYADI (Algeria) said that his understanding was that the end of the first sentence would refer to "this process" and not "this programme".

73. The CHAIRMAN said that while the original formulation had referred to the "process", there had been a proposal from Italy to amend the sentence to refer to the "programme", which had seemed to be acceptable to the Committee.

74. Mr. PAPADIMITROPOULOS (Greece) said that use of the word "programme" better reflected IAEA practice and gave more substance and clarity to the text. Use of the word "process" would be vaguer and would raise the issue of how to define that term.

75. Mr. SCHMIDT (Austria) agreed that use of the word "programme" better reflected the IAEA reality, and it would be preferable for the Committee to avoid the confusion that might arise if the word "process" were used.

76. The CHAIRMAN appealed to the delegation of Algeria to accept the word "programme", bearing in mind that the text would subsequently be reviewed by the Drafting Committee, in which it would still be possible to raise issues.

77. Mr. WANG Jun (China) said that difficulty might be resolved by reformulating the end of the sentence to read: "... and in this respect calls on all States for their continued support".

78. Mr. AYADI (Algeria) said that his preference for the word "process" reflected his wish to be faithful to the position of the IAEA Board of Governors, as well as the fact that only the general thrust of the programme had yet been determined. Perhaps the sentence could be amended to read "... support for the general direction of this programme".

79. The CHAIRMAN asked whether the Committee could accept the simplified formulation proposed by China.

80. Mr. SCHMIDT (Austria) said that his delegation would have no difficulty in so doing.

81. The CHAIRMAN said that he took it that the Committee accepted the formulation proposed by the representative of China, as well as the amended first part of the sentence which he had read out earlier. The paper would now be referred to the Drafting Committee.

Article III: Plutonium

82. Mr. ISASHIKI (Japan) said that the final sentence of paragraph 1 of the paper on plutonium should be corrected to read: "The Conference endorses continuing work of IAEA on further improving safeguards arrangements for
large-scale commercial reprocessing facilities, for fuel handling and storage of separated plutonium and for uranium enrichment”.

83. The CHAIRMAN said that he took it that the Committee accepted the corrections proposed by the representative of Japan, and that the paper could now be considered by the Drafting Committee.

OTHER MATTERS

84. The CHAIRMAN proposed to establish a working group to expedite the drafting of the paper on export licensing and to appoint Mr. MacKinnon of Canada as Chairman of the working group.

85. Mr. de ICAZA (Mexico) endorsed the Chairman’s proposal and asked how the Committee would be kept informed of the group’s work.

86. The CHAIRMAN said that the results of the working group’s deliberations would be reported to a formal meeting of the Committee before they were referred to the Drafting Committee.

87. Mr. SUDJADNAN (Indonesia) said that his delegation believed that the issue of export licensing should be dealt with in formal meetings of the Committee.

88. The CHAIRMAN said that no formal meetings were available to the Committee but that any delegation which wished to do so could attend the meetings of the working group.

The meeting rose at 8.30 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 10th MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Friday, 5 May 1995, at 3.35 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. ERDÖS (Hungary)

The meeting was called to order at 3.35 p.m.

ADOPTION OF THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE

1. The CHAIRMAN drew attention to the draft report which was before the Committee, and suggested that the Committee should examine the text page by page.

2. Mr. PAPADIMITRIOPOULOS (Greece) pointed out that, on page 3 of the draft, the name of Greece had been erroneously omitted from the list of sponsors of document NPT/CONF.1995/21.

3. Mr. WALKER (Australia) said that in the paragraph on page 6 concerning document NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.15 and Add.1, the title of the document should read International Atomic Energy Agency Full-Scope Safeguards, and that Armenia, Belgium, Brunei Darussalam, Kyrgyzstan, and Thailand had been mistakenly omitted from the list of sponsors.

4. Mr. SUDJAPNAN (Indonesia) said that at the end of the paragraph on page 6 concerning document NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.18, the words "States parties to the Treaty" should be added after the word "Movement".

5. The CHAIRMAN said that the appropriate corrections would be made, and that a number of typographical errors contained in the draft would be corrected in the final version.

6. Mr. SUDJAPNAN (Indonesia), supported by Mr. BAEIDINEJAD (Islamic Republic of Iran) and Mr. WANG Jun (China), referring to the eighth and ninth lines of paragraph 3 on page 8 of the draft, suggested that the word "vital" should be replaced by "final" and that the word "enforcing" should be replaced by "ensuring".

7. Mr. TALIANI (Italy) said that the Committee had agreed on the word "vital", and that "final" would be inappropriate. However, his delegation could accept the suggestion of the representative of Indonesia concerning the word "ensuring".

8. Mr. BLANKENSTEIN (Germany) said that the language which had been agreed on should be retained.

9. Mr. PAPADIMITRIOPOULOS (Greece) agreed with the representative of Italy that the word "final" would be inappropriate.

10. The CHAIRMAN suggested that the word "vital" should remain unchanged, but that the Committee could accept the substitution of "ensuring" for "enforcing".

11. It was so decided.

12. Mr. BAEIDINEJAD (Islamic Republic of Iran) recalled that at an earlier meeting, his delegation had proposed the addition of a sentence in paragraph 16.
13. Mr. AL-ZAHAWI (Iraq), referring to the sentence in brackets at the end of paragraph 21 on page 12 of the draft, proposed that the words "or undermine the status and the authority of IAEA" should be added to the end of the sentence, after the words "in the Treaty".

14. The CHAIRMAN said that the remarks made by the Iranian and Iraqi delegations had been noted and that due account would be taken of them in the drafting committee.

15. Mr. MIRAILLET (France) said that his delegation maintained its reservations regarding the words "sole responsible body" in the first sentence of paragraph 21, and would propose an alternative wording in the drafting committee.

16. Mr. ADEKANYE (Nigeria) pointed out that in the last sentence of paragraph 23, the comma should be replaced by the word "and".

17. Mr. WANG Jun (China) recalled that it had been agreed at a previous meeting that the three paragraphs in parentheses immediately preceding paragraph 25 should be placed at the very end of the draft report.

18. Mr. WALKER (Australia) said that it would be more appropriate for those paragraphs to be put after paragraph 36 of the draft, since paragraph 37 and subsequent paragraphs dealt with an entirely different subject.

19. Mr. WANG Jun (China) said that his delegation insisted that the three paragraphs should be placed after paragraph 51 and not after paragraph 36.

20. Mr. TALIANI (Italy), while agreeing with the representative of Australia, proposed that, in order to expedite matters, the Committee should place the three paragraphs at the end of the report.

21. Mr. ROSENTHAL (United States of America) proposed that, in the second line of paragraph 31 "to do so in consistence with" should be amended to read "to do so consistent with".

22. Mr. SHOUKRY (Egypt), referring to the first sentence of paragraph 38, recalled that the Committee had agreed to delete the word "international" before the word "conflicts".

23. Mr. de ICAZA (Mexico), supported by Mr. WALKER (Australia) and Mr. TALIANI (Italy), said that the last sentence in paragraph 38 should be amended to read: "Nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties, especially those covering issues such as dumping of radioactive waste, contribute to the protection of the environment."

24. Mr. AGRELL (United Kingdom) said that, while his delegation preferred the original formulation, it would not block consensus at the current stage of the Committee’s deliberations.

25. Mr. LAPTSENAK (Belarus) said that, in the third line of paragraph 48, "by Belarus" should be replaced by "by the Republic of Belarus and Ukraine". He suggested the use of the full names of countries for the sake of consistency and in order to conform with the practice of other Committees.

26. The CHAIRMAN said that the Committee had not used the full name of countries in every case in its draft report and it would look into the matter when it made its final drafting changes.

27. Mr. TESHABAЕV (Uzbekistan) said that, in the first line of paragraph 50, "Kyrgyzstan" should be followed by the words "and Uzbekistan".

28. Mr. DORJI (Bhutan) said that, with respect to paragraph 51, it had been the view of his delegation that any reference to a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the south Asian region, while laudable, would be pointless and in fact
counterproductive if it did not enjoy the full support of all States of the region.

29. The draft report, as orally revised, was adopted.

30. The CHAIRMAN said that the Drafting Committee would continue its work on the section of the report dealing with exports controls.

The meeting rose at 4.35 p.m.
1995 REVIEW AND EXTENSION CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

MAIN COMMITTEE III

SUMMARY RECORDS OF THE 1ST TO 6TH MEETINGS

Held at Headquarters, New York, from 17 April to 12 May 1995

CHAIRMAN: Mr. RAMAKER (Netherlands)
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 1st MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York,
on Thursday, 20 April 1995, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:
Mr. RAMAKER
(Netherlands)

The meeting was called to order at 10.20 a.m.

ORGANIZATION OF WORK

1. The CHAIRMAN said that under the terms of reference worked out by the Preparatory Committee and adopted by the Conference, the primary task of Main Committee III was to review the operation of the Treaty relating to the peaceful applications of nuclear energy. The items allocated to the Committee were outlined in annex V to document NPT/CONF.1995/l. Agenda item 17 would be considered by Main Committee II as well. Because of the links between international cooperation in the nuclear field and non-proliferation assurances through safeguards, the officers of Main Committees II and III would maintain close contacts in order to avoid any duplication of work and in order to make the most efficient use of the time allotted.

2. Document NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/CRP.l contained an indicative timetable, which should be viewed as a flexible guideline for the Committee's work. The President of the Conference had asked the Chairmen of the Main Committees to complete their review by the end of the third week. To that end, delegations would need to submit written contributions or documents as early as possible. The Drafting Committee of the Conference would start its work on Friday, 28 April, at the same time as Main Committee III was drafting its formulations. At that juncture, Main Committee III would need to consider how best to contribute to the work of the drafting committee.

3. Although the report on the work of Main Committee III during the 1990 Review Conference (NPT/CONF.1990/45/II) had not been finally adopted, it contained much agreed language that could be useful. The papers prepared by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on articles IV and V (NPT/CONF.1995/8 and NPT/CONF.1995/9, respectively) were of relevance to the Committee's work. They had been supplemented by the statement of the Director-General of IAEA at the opening meeting of the Conference, and by parts of the IAEA paper on safeguards (especially NPT/CONF.1995/7/Part I). The views of the Group of Non-Aligned and Other States on peaceful uses of nuclear energy were set forth in document NPT/CONF.1995/14.

GENERAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS

4. Mr. HOFFMANN (Germany) said that the solution of the energy problem was the key to the realization of sustainable development world wide. If nuclear energy was to play a significant role in that concept, the development of the technical basis, safety of nuclear installations, physical security of radioactive and fissile materials, and non-proliferation must be assured. Germany had a pivotal interest and played a prominent role in international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as demonstrated by its contributions to the IAEA Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund. Since the previous Review Conference, Germany had contributed annually about 9 per cent of the resources, a contribution amounting to $5,550,000 in 1995. In addition, Germany implemented substantive bilateral cooperation programmes through research institutions and industry.

5. Germany attached the greatest importance to the application of the highest standards for nuclear safety nationally and internationally. It was
the leading donor in connection with the improvement of nuclear safety of facilities in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union. On the basis of a German initiative, the Nuclear Safety Convention had been concluded in 1994. It represented a significant first step for an international nuclear safety regime that would encompass all types of nuclear activities. Germany called on all States to ratify it as soon as possible.

6. In recent years, the problem of illicit trafficking in radioactive and fissile material has grown worse. That development pointed to the pivotal importance of an effective system of physical protection and reliable national systems of accountancy and control as a crucial element of international safeguards. Safeguards should become a universal principle, applicable to both nuclear- and non-nuclear weapon States. Germany therefore welcomed the announcement that the United States would submit a huge amount of fissile material formerly used for weapons purposes to IAEA safeguards - an example that should be followed by other nuclear-weapon States. In that connection, he recalled the proposal by the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Kinkel, to establish an international plutonium regime, under which safeguards would be applied to all non-military separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium which had not been subject to international monitoring. That proposal had been explicitly supported by the European Council. The problems raised by nuclear trafficking should be solved bilaterally and multilaterally. Germany and the Russian Federation had agreed to intensify bilateral cooperation, and the States members of the European Union had agreed to offer assistance, inter alia, in establishing and improving national systems of accountancy and control in countries in need. Germany and its European partners supported IAEA efforts in that area.

7. In contributing to the fullest possible international exchange with regard to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, Germany, as a major exporting country was under the obligation to prevent its nuclear transfers and exports from being misused for non-peaceful purposes. Together with other supplier countries, first in the Zangger Committee and later in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, it had tried to establish the necessary international framework for international cooperation and the transfer of technology and material, including transfers to developing countries. The principle of full-scope safeguards as a condition for the supply of material gave a clear preference to international cooperation with States parties to the NPT and equivalent undertakings. Export licensing and controls were in full conformity with the NPT and were indeed an indispensable element in its implementation. All States parties to the NPT that were in a position to transfer nuclear material, equipment and technology were under an obligation to set up reliable systems of export controls. In that context, Germany welcomed the fact that Argentina and South Africa had joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and hoped that other countries would declare their readiness to apply its guidelines. It expected that the contribution of export controls to the viability of the international non-proliferation system would be fully reflected in the final document of the Conference.

8. Mr. MISÁK (Slovakia) said that the Slovak Republic had succeeded the former Czech and Slovak Federal Republic in respect of all its international rights and obligations, including instruments of international law in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In addition, Slovakia had ratified the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and the Joint Protocol, as well as the Nuclear Safety Convention.

9. In the Slovak Republic, nuclear energy was used exclusively for peaceful purposes. Since domestic primary sources of energy covered only 14 per cent of energy consumption, nuclear energy played an inevitable role in the national economy. That had been recognized in long-term plans for the energy sector. In 1994, nearly 50 per cent of the electricity generated in Slovakia had come from nuclear sources. Nuclear energy was also used, although to a smaller degree, in health care, scientific research and industry.
10. The Slovak Republic had entered into a number of intergovernmental agreements dealing with the exchange of information and the transfer of nuclear technology, materials and equipment for scientific, research and energy generation purposes. In all cases, those agreements were in strict compliance with the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and of the agreements between the Slovak Republic and IAEA, as well as with other international obligations and recommendations. In recent intergovernmental agreements in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the Slovak Republic also strictly followed international practices. Cooperation with IAEA, of whose Board of Governors it was a member, had an important place in the international activities of the Slovak Republic. Technical assistance and cooperation had been particularly successful. At present, Slovakia was taking an active part in 6 national and 11 regional projects and was successfully developing bilateral and multilateral cooperation with countries in the Group of 24 and with other countries. All nuclear projects in the Slovak Republic had a significant international character. Mention should also be made of the valuable cooperation, particularly in matters relating to nuclear safety, with the industrialized countries, which provided Slovakia with technical support, engineering services and nuclear components.

11. Slovakia’s assessment of the implementation of article IV of the Treaty and its promotion of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was positive. It also believed that nothing in the Treaty should be interpreted as affecting the right of the parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy or to participate in the fullest exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

12. Mr. STOIBER (United States of America) said he hoped that, with the cooperation of all delegations, the Committee’s deliberations on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy would have a constructive outcome and would result in a report reflecting a consensus among delegations as to how the articles of the Treaty under review could be implemented more effectively. The Committee’s work could make an important contribution towards promoting the interest of all nations in using nuclear technology to advance their economic and social development, while at the same time assuring global peace and security. It should be remembered that, at the 1990 Review Conference, Main Committee III had been able to achieve such a result, notwithstanding the inability of the Conference to approve a final document incorporating the results of the Committee’s work. Having said that, it was important not to produce an extensive report but, rather, not to lose sight of the primary goal of the Conference, which was the extension of the Treaty. In that connection, whatever conclusion was reached should reflect the consensus approach adopted at previous Review Conferences. Achieving consensus was a difficult task which required good will and flexibility on the part of all concerned. Since it was recognized that all national interests must be accommodated, the best approach would be to prepare a relatively brief report recording the main lines of consensus with regard to the peaceful uses provisions of the Treaty, as well as guidelines designed to make them more effective in the future.

13. The use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes was a central element of the Treaty which had not always received all the attention it deserved. The current deliberations would serve to strengthen the effectiveness of three key elements of article IV, namely, the reaffirmation of the basic right of each nation to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in accordance with the commitments made under the Treaty; an undertaking by each party to facilitate "the fullest possible exchange" of technology to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; and an undertaking to cooperate with other parties and international organizations in contributing to the further development of nuclear technology, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

14. It was important to recognize the vital link between the commitment to peaceful nuclear development and the non-proliferation provisions of the Treaty. Without an effective non-proliferation system, the United States and
most other countries which had highly developed nuclear programmes would not be willing to cooperate in the exchange of technology or materials which could pose a risk that other countries and regions might acquire a nuclear explosive capability. Article IV established the right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes "without discrimination", a term which would undoubtedly give rise to an extensive debate. In his view, the term meant that States which made binding commitments with regard to non-proliferation under the Treaty and which provided convincing evidence that they were abiding by those commitments should be able to choose their own path of peaceful nuclear development, regardless of their level of economic development, political structure or political relationships.

15. With regard to the undertaking to facilitate "the fullest possible exchange", his delegation believed that it had been in strict compliance with article IV and it could present an extensive and detailed record of the cooperation and facilitation activities it had supported during the past quarter of a century, as indicated in the fact sheet which it had distributed to delegations. For many years, the United States had implemented a preferential policy in its nuclear commerce and cooperation with parties to the Treaty, a policy which was consistent with the purposes of the Treaty. However, in analysing that element, it was important to understand what it did not mean. It did not mean that every party was bound to undertake any kind of cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with any other party at that party’s demand, but that the parties could choose what activities of other nations they wished to support and which they did not. In practice, the parties would make their own choices about the development of nuclear energy, including their choice of fuel cycle. Those choices must be respected, but article IV did not require any nation to support them actively unless it chose to do so. Moreover, article IV was not, and had not been intended to be, an "assistance" or "resource transfer" provision. Nations which chose to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes should do so on the basis of sound economic, technical and non-proliferation grounds. In that connection, it was significant to note that the largest volume of technology transfer in the nuclear area was conducted not by States but by private commercial entities — suppliers of equipment, architectural and engineering firms, consultants, producers of materials and others. The use of the term "facilitate" in article IV did not suggest that those commercial arrangements should be replaced by Government financing or support. Those parties which decided to enter the field must be prepared to bear the very large financial burden of those capital-intensive projects. Article IV did not alter the economic or commercial realities of nuclear power.

16. His delegation, which intended to make some recommendations regarding the future work of IAEA, hoped that the Committee would give due recognition to the assistance provided by the Agency in the transfer of peaceful nuclear technology. For many member States, including the United States, however, it would be difficult to find resources to finance the Agency’s activities. The United States would continue to provide support, including financial support, for the Agency’s important programmes in technical cooperation and research and isotopes, but, at a time of budgetary constraints and efforts to reduce the budget deficit, the resources allocated to IAEA could not be increased as much as might be wished. His delegation would therefore insist upon caution and realism when requests were being formulated for new programmes or for an increase in resources for cooperative nuclear activities, whether within IAEA or elsewhere.

17. Mr. TITKOV (Russian Federation) said that his country remained faithful to the principle of equitable international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to the provision of assistance to the developing regions of the world, without discrimination, in order to satisfy legitimate development needs, in accordance with the Treaty. The Russian Federation, like the former Soviet Union, was doing its utmost to create conditions enabling the non-nuclear-weapon States to have access to the equipment, material and information they needed in the field of nuclear energy and to reap the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, at both the
bilateral and the multilateral level, including in the framework of IAEA. Many measures in that field had been introduced during the past five years.

18. Development and the applications of nuclear energy were one of the most important and most enduring aspects of cooperation. On the basis of projects developed by the Russian Federation, 20 nuclear power stations had been constructed and were in operation in Bulgaria, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Finland, producing a total of 9,980 megawatts. Another four such stations were currently under construction in Slovakia, two in the Czech Republic and two in Cuba. In addition, two international cooperation agreements had been signed with Iran for the construction in that country of two nuclear power plants and for the promotion of cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. With regard to the construction of nuclear power plants and other installations abroad, Russian organizations had provided services in many fields, including selection of sites, design, and manufacture and supply of nuclear equipment and fuel. During the period between 1990 and 1994, nuclear fuel had been shipped to Russia for reprocessing after use in a certain type of nuclear reactor in Hungary, Finland, Ukraine and Slovakia. Furthermore, within the framework of technical cooperation carried out with the United Nations and IAEA, and in accordance with Security Council resolutions 687 (1991) and 707 (1991), nuclear fuel extracted from an experimental Iraqi reactor had been shipped to Russia for recycling. Iraq had taken all the appropriate measures regarding the work carried out in its own territory.

19. Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the developing countries had been oriented towards meeting their urgent needs. One example was seawater desalination: on the basis of IAEA recommendations, a project had been prepared for constructing a nuclear desalination plant aimed at producing drinking water by the year 2000. At IAEA meetings in Vienna and Cairo in 1994, Russia had presented an advanced plan for a floating desalination plant at greatly reduced cost which would use ships equipped with nuclear reactors. It had also developed projects for the construction of thermal power stations in countries with a severe climate. Following the Chernobyl accident, programmes for building atomic power plants in Russia and in eastern Europe had been drastically cut back in favour of research on enhanced security in the production of nuclear energy, an aspect in which Russia was conducting wide-ranging cooperation with other countries, including the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Baltic countries. As a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union, a new situation had arisen, since some of the nuclear power stations were located beyond Russian frontiers, while the majority of the specialists who had been responsible for operating them had remained in Russia. Nevertheless, Russia acknowledged its responsibility with regard to those plants. Collaboration with the Commonwealth of Independent States was being conducted on the basis of the fundamental principles laid down in a multilateral agreement concluded in Minsk in June 1992 with Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan, which established the machinery for cooperation and reflected the principles of non-proliferation at the international level. Under that agreement, representatives of the competent bodies of those countries held periodic consultations to consider practical issues and the status of implementation of the agreement. As a result of those consultations, it had been decided to establish greater coordination of activities, and groups of experts had been formed in many spheres of cooperation. The participants in those meetings had requested Russia to organize ongoing, high-level courses for the training of specialists in accountability for and control of nuclear materials.

20. Despite the economic difficulties that Russia was facing, it had found funds, in the form of regular voluntary contributions, to finance assistance to the developing countries that were members of IAEA. In 1994, Russia's voluntary contributions had amounted to 3 billion roubles. Through IAEA, Russia had supplied the developing countries with electron accelerators, cyclotron systems, neutron generators and other materials and equipment. In the context of IAEA cooperation with Russian scientific research institutes and enterprises, annual courses were organized for training, including on-the-
job training, apprenticeships, scientific visits and other special courses for the developing countries that were members of IAEA. Advanced courses had covered medicine, biophysics, biochemistry and other areas; research had also been conducted on cyclotrons, practical work had been carried out on neutron accelerators and generators and the processing of nuclear waste, and courses have been given on the production of liquid nitrogen.

21. The non-proliferation Treaty had created a unique structure which facilitated growing cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with an eye to the future. In the light of that structure, new opportunities constantly arose for socio-economic development in the developing countries, with which Russia was ready to continue expanding its cooperation on the basis of their specific needs and characteristics.

22. Mr. AKAO (Japan) said that the Treaty was founded on three main pillars, namely, prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. To slight any one of those pillars would seriously jeopardize the credibility of the entire regime. The non-proliferation regime, far from restricting exchanges among the States parties in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, served as an international framework to facilitate cooperation not only among industrialized countries but also with developing countries. Japan, as one of the most advanced countries in that area, was determined to do its best to extend such cooperation and promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, while, at the same time, ensuring non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In that respect, Japan greatly appreciated and supported the important role played by IAEA in pursuing the objectives of both non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

23. Nuclear power was, and should continue to be, one of the major sources of energy, in addition to fossil fuels and hydroelectric power, and its utilization - which should go hand in hand with assurances of non-proliferation and safety - played and would continue to play an important role in economic and social development. In particular, nuclear power contributed to efforts to combat global warming by minimizing the emission of carbon dioxide. It was the view of Japan that each country's decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing its respective fuel-cycle policies, and any programme in that sphere should be carried out in accordance with the principle of not holding surplus plutonium and observing as much transparency as possible.

24. IAEA had been playing a significant role in international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, with due consideration for the needs of the developing countries. Japan had actively supported multilateral cooperation through IAEA, and had steadily increased its financial contribution. Japan played a central role in technical cooperation with developing countries in Asia and the Pacific through the Regional Cooperative Agreement on Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology in Asia and the Pacific. The programmes under that Agreement had been very successful. Regional cooperation schemes had also been established in Africa and in Latin America and the Caribbean which should benefit the countries in those regions. Japan hoped that the new model-project concept introduced by IAEA in 1994 would improve significantly the effectiveness and efficiency of technical cooperation activities and increase the benefit for recipient countries. Japan had carried out various bilateral cooperation programmes for the exchange of technical experts and information. It would continue its technical cooperation activities, taking into account the financial situation, technical capability and needs of recipient countries. His delegation would make available a document on Japan's cooperation efforts, both multilateral and bilateral, in the field of the peaceful application of nuclear energy.

25. Responsibility for nuclear safety lay with each individual country, but international cooperation was essential to achieve and maintain a high level of nuclear safety, since an accident at any nuclear power plant had a global negative effect. It was therefore of great significance that the convention
on nuclear safety had been signed by 56 Governments, including that of Japan, since it had been opened for signature in September 1994. Japan strongly hoped that the Convention would enter into force as soon as possible and that as many countries as possible would participate in it. With respect to radioactive waste management, Japan recognized the increasing importance of all aspects of the issue and endorsed the preparations for the convention on the safety of radioactive waste management. Japan shared the great concern over recent reports of illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and felt that there was a need for strengthened international cooperation in that area. In that regard his delegation appreciated the efforts of IAEA to strengthen physical protection, to support the establishment of the State system of accounting and control in the countries concerned, and to establish a database of non-sensitive information within the Agency.

26. Regarding the export of nuclear-related equipment, materials and technology to non-nuclear-weapon States, the Government of Japan strictly controlled export licences for such items and technology, issuing them only when the recipient country adhered to the non-proliferation Treaty, or an equivalent treaty, and accepted all IAEA safeguards, a policy which also applied to bilateral cooperation. Other countries should take similarly strict measures. Japan recognized and supported the mechanism of the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, since both strengthened the non-proliferation regime established by the Treaty. Japan also recognized the importance of the new IAEA reporting scheme on international nuclear transactions, introduced by decision of the Board of Governors in June 1993. All those measures would contribute greatly to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and would encourage States that were not yet parties to the Treaty to accede to it.

27. Mrs. CZOCH (Hungary) said that Hungary had been among the first states to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and that it considered it a fundamental multilateral instrument for the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. During the 25 years of operation of the Treaty, Hungary had developed significant nuclear generating capacity, which it used for the benefit of its people. Hungary also shared its knowledge and professional experience with other countries. Compliance with the obligations assumed under the Treaty not only served the country's fundamental national security interests, but also opened the door to international cooperation and facilitated access to nuclear technology, equipment and material, as well as the exchange of experience with other countries.

28. Hungary commended IAEA on its technical assistance and cooperation programme, which had played an outstanding role in the nuclear development of Hungary, and whose importance for developing countries could not be overestimated. Further, he welcomed the recent introduction of the model project concept as a way to improve the efficiency and the socioeconomic impact of the programme on the end-users of nuclear technology. The programme, which had greatly benefited the nuclear industry and scientific community within Hungary, had also served as a clearing-house for the transfer of knowledge and technology to other countries. For example, in 1994, Hungarian institutes working in the nuclear field had accepted 48 fellows and had organized training courses for 19 experts from 22 developing countries.

29. The nuclear-related export-import licence mechanism was a useful and indispensable tool in creating an environment of confidence and a secure framework for legitimate trade to foster the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

30. The final document of the Conference should contain a strong reaffirmation of the importance of international cooperation in nuclear energy, particularly among parties to the Treaty and with special emphasis on the needs and priorities of developing countries, and should reflect a clear determination to promote such cooperation at the multilateral and bilateral levels. It should also reflect the progress made in the field of nuclear safety, including the elaboration and adoption of the convention on nuclear safety, as well as the need to strengthen the legal bases of such areas as nuclear waste management and nuclear liability, which were of great importance
with regard to the wider application and transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Thus the final document would duly reflect the importance of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the outstanding role of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in that regard.

31. Mr. SCHMIDT (Austria) said that Austria had renounced the use of nuclear energy for the generation of electricity since its population was not willing to accept the risks inherent in the technology, as a result of which Austria was not involved in cooperation in that field, which did not exclude its having an interest in the safety of nuclear power stations or cooperation with IAEA and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). Further, article IV did not require cooperation in specific areas of application of nuclear energy, or provide a blank cheque for the activities of neighbouring countries when the security and health of the population were at stake. Austria was cooperating in the IAEA technical cooperation programme in areas not related to the generation of electricity, and over the past 10 years had participated in 62 different activities, such as the financing of 200 fellows from 62 developing countries for training in radiation protection, nuclear medicine, agriculture, basic physics, radiochemistry and other areas, the provision of funds for special multi-year programmes in agriculture in Africa and Asia, and the sending of scientists to give training courses in developing countries.

32. The opinion was often heard that the industrialized countries that were parties to the Treaty displayed little will to cooperate in assistance and technical cooperation programmes, and that export controls in accordance with article III.2 hampered development. Austria did not share those views, which was not surprising since it had been a member of the Zangger Committee since 1971 and had been a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group since 1992. Nevertheless such talk of impediments to development and the complaint that export controls were the main such impediment should be taken seriously, perhaps in a forum to be established after the Conference. Impediments existed to the development of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, caused by national realities and policies and the lack of educational infrastructure, a lack of an adequate national electricity supply grid or appropriate energy systems, and, in some cases, public rejection of nuclear technology. All those impediments should be listed as an input to any new forum so that they could be analysed and efforts made to devise proposals or programmes that would help to eliminate them. That idea could be discussed in the framework of Main Committee III, which would help article IV to assume its appropriate role in the future of the Treaty.

33. The Conference had two tasks before it: to review the implementation of the Treaty and to determine whether it should be extended. Thorough review of implementation of the Treaty would provide a basis for a decision on extension, and would shape and facilitate such a decision.

The meeting rose at 11.45 a.m.
Chairman: Mr. RAMAKER (Netherlands)

The meeting was called to order at 10.20 a.m.

GENERAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS (continued)

1. Mr. BARRETT (Director, Division of Technical Cooperation Programmes, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)) said that IAEA mechanisms for the transfer of technology consisted of its regular programme (activities relating to standards, codes of practice, guides, seminars, research contracts and laboratories, together with information exchange through a multitude of meetings, symposia and publications disseminated to member States) and the technical cooperation programme. In 1994, the latter programme had assisted 88 countries, maintained 1,192 ongoing projects, provided the services of 3,205 experts, trained 2,785 persons and supplied equipment and material (3,484 requests). The total value of the programme had increased in that year to more than $53 million, the bulk of it financed from voluntary contributions to the Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund (84.8 per cent); it had also relied on extrabudgetary resources (9.3 per cent), in-kind contributions (3.3 per cent) and funds from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2.6 per cent). Since 1970, the resources for technical cooperation had increased, although in recent years the level had stabilized. In 1992, a marked decrease of resources had occurred owing to the devaluation of the currency of one of the principal programme donors. For a number of years, around 1975, a large part of the programme had been financed with UNDP funds, but towards the 1990s, the share of those funds had declined and it currently represented a mere 2 per cent. The probable explanation was that those then participating in technical cooperation had been interested in nuclear energy projects or other costly activities and through IAEA had utilized indicative planning figure funds, which were resources provided by UNDP for development; with the passage of the years, those projects had lost some of their priority in the developing countries and the funds from UNDP had accordingly decreased.

2. The technology transfer programme included the following activities: nuclear energy, nuclear fuel cycle, radioactive waste management, food and agriculture, human health, industry and earth sciences, physical and chemical sciences, radiation protection, safety of nuclear installations and direction and support. In 1994, the sectors which had received most of the resources had been food and agriculture (22.5 per cent), physical and chemical sciences (17.3 per cent) and human health (13.2 per cent). During the period 1990–1994, however, when a total of $241 million had been allocated, safety activities as a whole (radiation protection, safety of nuclear installations and radioactive waste management) had received most of the funds. In terms of regions, the distribution of resources had been relatively balanced; it was not possible to predict whether that trend would be maintained, since IAEA responded to the requests of States members from various regions. It also financed interregional activities (for example, training courses) in which all member States were eligible to take part. In terms of components, the bulk of the assistance represented equipment, services of experts, training and fellowships. The share of resources devoted to training per se was approximately equivalent to that devoted to equipment, which showed that the programme was relatively balanced from that standpoint also.

3. The requirements for participation in the technical cooperation programme were to be a member State of IAEA and to conclude an agreement with
IAEA for the provision of assistance. The latter requirement was based on the revised guiding principles and general operating rules to govern the provision of technical assistance by IAEA and the revised supplementary agreement concerning the provision of technical assistance by IAEA to individual Governments, under which all technical assistance projects were subject to applicable IAEA safety standards and measures. The Government undertook to ensure that the assistance received would be used solely for peaceful applications of atomic energy. In addition, the IAEA safeguards were applied wherever necessary to technical cooperation projects. The physical protection of nuclear facilities, equipment and materials relating directly to the IAEA technical assistance was the responsibility of the recipient Government. That was an extremely important point, since all the equipment provided to member States was the property of IAEA until it was transferred, the transfer taking place after the project was terminated or in some cases midway through the project. In recent years, IAEA had been paying increased attention to physical protection, especially in view of the current traffic in nuclear material, and it had planned a major programme to prepare member States by means of training, the establishment of infrastructure and the supply of equipment to carry out their own physical protection activities.

4. A major achievement of IAEA since 1988 had been to secure the signing by almost all the recipients of technical assistance of the revised supplementary agreement. Those who had not signed were new member States, whose signing was currently being negotiated. The number of member States of IAEA which were parties to the non-proliferation Treaty had increased spectacularly in recent years; only very few were currently not parties to the Treaty. In providing assistance and cooperation, IAEA did not take into account whether the member State was a party or not to the Treaty when it came to resources from the Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund; resources were allocated on the basis of requests from member States and evaluations and recommendations received from the technical divisions. With respect to extrabudgetary contributions, however, the donor countries decided whether those resources would go only to countries which were parties to the Treaty. Not all the donors imposed such a requirement; the majority did so, however, and IAEA complied with their instructions. In the research contract programme, which was financed from the regular budget, not the technical cooperation budget, the allocation of funds varied according to whether countries were parties to the Treaty or not, even though the resources in question were being provided to individuals, not Governments.

5. Various trends were observable in the technical assistance programme: needs exceeded resources, regional cooperation was expanding and concern about nuclear safety and environmental protection was increasing. Both pledges and actual contributions had been decreasing, as had the UNDP contribution, while the number of requests for projects and the size of projects had been increasing. Income had declined since 1984 and the target set by member States and endorsed by the General Conference had not been reached. Approximately 60 per cent of the projects submitted by member States were financed from the Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund. Another 20 per cent should be financed in principle from extrabudgetary funds but in fact, owing to a lack of funds, only 10 per cent were catered for. The financing of the remaining 20 per cent was not being recommended.

6. Within the framework of IAEA, there were three programmes to catalyse cooperation among the member States of the developing regions: the Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training related to Nuclear Science and Technology (RCA) (for East Asia and the Pacific region), the Regional Cooperative Agreement for the Development of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America (ARCAL), and the Africa Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training (AFRA). Those regional programmes had produced satisfactory results, especially in Africa and Asia, as was demonstrated by the rapid increase in the number of participating countries.

7. Interest in nuclear safety and environmental protection was growing as nuclear applications were no longer confined to research institutions but had
spread to agriculture, industry, medicine and other fields. In order for public opinion to accept those applications, specific requirements must be met. IAEA was therefore examining the projects submitted in terms of worker safety and possible hazards to the environment.

8. With a view to the continuing promotion of nuclear energy and its applications in developing member States, IAEA was carrying out transfer of technology activities reinforced by health and safety standards; project safeguards; guidelines and codes of practice; and the relevant international conventions. IAEA had machinery to formulate policy, obviate nuclear proliferation and monitor security, including the periodic policy review seminars, the Board of Governors and the Technical Assistance and Cooperation Committee, which considered individual programmes. IAEA provided a unique instrument for promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under article IV of the Treaty. There were many opportunities to expand the scope of technology transfer if the level of resources could be made to match demand. In order to improve cooperation and strengthen technology transfer, IAEA required increased cooperation from the authorities of the recipient countries and the growth of extrabudgetary contributions.

9. Mr. AKAO (Japan) said that there was a disturbing gap between technical assistance goals and the contributions of donor countries. Accordingly, an informal working group had been formed to consider the matter and to highlight how important it was that donor countries should fully honour their pledges.

10. Mr. PAPADIMITROPOULOS (Greece) asked whether the reduction in IAEA technical assistance was a reflection of a lack of resources or the assistance being given in parallel by other international organizations, such as the World Health Organization (WHO) in respect of nuclear medicine projects, and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) in respect of agricultural projects.

11. Mr. BARRETT (Director, Division of Technical Cooperation Programmes, International Atomic Energy Agency) said that IAEA was concerned solely with the nuclear component of programmes in countries, and, in order to avoid duplication, cooperated with other organizations such as FAO, WHO and UNEP. He considered it positive that Japan had referred to the need for member States to achieve established goals so that the IAEA programme could be fully implemented.

12. Mr. COOK (New Zealand) said that his country, which did not possess nuclear weapons, had decided that nuclear power had no place in its economic development. Although New Zealand made use of sophisticated nuclear technology in medical, industrial and agricultural applications, it was dependent on other countries for the supply of basic resources such as isotopes, and therefore shared some common interests with developing countries in connection with the implementation of article IV, one of the central articles of the Treaty. Each country had a sovereign right to decide for itself whether or not to participate in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. New Zealand reaffirmed its commitment to the undertaking made by all States parties to facilitate and cooperate in the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. The non-proliferation regime provided for in the Treaty had generated the climate of confidence essential to international cooperation in that domain. One measure of the success of the Treaty was that all members, and not just the limited number of countries which had opted for large-scale nuclear-power development, could benefit from the exchange of nuclear technology. New Zealand both benefited from and contributed to such cooperation. For example, New Zealand had recently become a member of the Regional Cooperative Agreement for Asia and the Pacific (RCA), an important mechanism for sharing experience in research and development. Moreover, his Government was making a financial contribution to the joint UNDP/RCA/IAEA project to strengthen technology and support environmentally sustainable development, and would host the mid-term review meeting for the project in July. To facilitate cooperation within RCA, New Zealand had appointed national coordinators in various areas of research and hoped to collaborate with nuclear science organizations in the region in such sectors as hydrology,
pollution monitoring, geothermal development and control of industrial processing. New Zealand had expertise in the use of isotopes for geothermal development. In that connection the Auckland Institute of Geothermal Studies was providing training for students around the world. New Zealand had also supplied technical experts on radioactive and stable isotope applications to a number of countries in Central America and Asia.

13. In the technical cooperation programme administered by IAEA, New Zealand had noted a move away from support for the promotion of nuclear power and an increased focus on environmental protection, sustainable development and assistance to least developed countries in terms of meeting such basic human needs as health, food security and fresh water supplies. His delegation fully supported that trend.

14. One area of critical importance in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was the need to maintain the highest standards of safety in nuclear installations. In that regard he welcomed the conclusion of the International Convention on Nuclear Safety and urged all nuclear-power States to ratify it. Another issue of considerable concern in the countries of the South Pacific was the transport through the region of plutonium and nuclear waste. While the shipments met current safety standards, consideration should be given to measures that would complement the code for the safe carriage of radioactive material by sea of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the International Maritime Organization. He urged all countries involved in the transport of nuclear material by sea to ensure the highest possible level of safety. He also welcomed the start of the process of negotiating an international convention on the safe management of nuclear waste; the amendment of the London Dumping Convention; and the proposal for a diplomatic conference in 1996 in respect of a convention on liability for nuclear damage.

15. New Zealand believed that article IV had been implemented satisfactorily and looked forward to cooperation that would enable more countries to benefit from nuclear technology. None of that would be possible without the climate of confidence created by the non-proliferation Treaty, which provided the essential framework for the transfer of technology for peaceful purposes.

16. Mr. PARFAIT (France), speaking on behalf of the European Union, noted the active participation of the Union in international cooperation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under optimum conditions of safety, as well as its general, sustained policy of development assistance, including technical cooperation aimed at strengthening the institutional capacity of recipient countries, particularly developing countries, at facilitating the transfer of appropriate technology to such countries, and at promoting their integration into the world economy. The European Union had always viewed itself as having particular responsibility in terms of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, since one third of the world output of nuclear energy came from its member countries.

17. The member States of the European Union played a fundamental role in the funding of the technical assistance projects executed under IAEA auspices. The Union's total contribution, which had increased from $11.5 million in 1990 to $14.1 million in 1994, represented more than one third of the resources of the Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund and was complemented by various extrabudgetary contributions made voluntarily by various member States for the financing of specific Agency projects. The European Union also provided basic underpinning for the successful IAEA technical cooperation programme, which gave priority to the application of nuclear technology to food, agriculture, the physical and chemical sciences and industry.

18. In bilateral terms, the member States of the European Union were cooperating in various ways with developing countries and a number of them had concluded bilateral cooperation agreements on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The management of radioactive waste had been the subject of particular attention in countries with nuclear power stations, especially the countries of central and eastern Europe. There had been considerable development of the application of nuclear energy in medicine, agriculture and
food, and fellowships had been made available for developing countries, to which experts had also been sent. Every effort had been made to make skilled technical staff available to developing countries, in addition to which the establishment of nuclear research centres was being encouraged. The question of nuclear safety was broached in all the association agreements concluded with the countries of central and eastern Europe and funding was provided through the nuclear safety account of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

19. If cooperation was not on a larger scale, it was not because of export controls but for other reasons. For example, a lack of interest on the part of some countries in the nuclear sector owing to the existence of other, more economical, sources of energy. Export controls were an obligation for all parties under the Treaty and were enshrined in national legislation. They were based on transparent rules issued by IAEA and established by consensus among the Suppliers Group on the basis of objective criteria applicable to all, including the members of the Group. The Suppliers’ regime also provided an essential guarantee that the Treaty would be respected and that cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy would take place to the benefit of the developing countries. As a result of the controls, exchanges were the norm and restrictions the exception. Only minimal exports were rejected and restrictions affected only three countries: Iraq, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The export controls were not secret; their aim was not to create exporters’ cartels but to develop the transfer of nuclear technology with guarantees of its use for peaceful purposes. They only obstructed exchanges with countries within the international community that had placed themselves beyond the pale.

20. The basic concern was to promote cooperation for the benefit of all countries that respected their non-proliferation commitments. In that regard the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty was of fundamental importance. Otherwise a lack of trust would re-emerge, the progress made in terms of cooperation would be undermined, and States which respected their commitments would be penalized. Indefinite extension would establish the trust essential to continue with such cooperation in the service of peace and development.

21. Mr. Westdal (Canada) said that his country was a major nuclear supplier and exporter of nuclear-related goods, from natural uranium to the CANDU nuclear-power reactor. Nuclear energy benefited the environment: carbon dioxide emissions from the electricity sector would double if the current nuclear contribution had to be generated from fossil fuels. The peaceful use of nuclear energy depended on the assurances provided by the non-proliferation Treaty. The Canadian public would not countenance use of nuclear energy or exports without assurances that such activities took place within an enduring non-proliferation framework. The Canadian commitment to nuclear non-proliferation was long-standing and deeply entrenched. In the past, Canada had terminated or restricted nuclear cooperation and trade with countries unwilling to make a legally binding commitment. Political, economic and technical factors conditioned such cooperation. The non-proliferation Treaty did not obligate every State party to cooperate with every other; bilateral cooperation remained a sovereign national decision. Canada’s bilateral nuclear cooperation network was widespread and expanding. Its bilateral cooperation agreements contained a number of reciprocal provisions relating to retransfers to third parties, situations in which IAEA could not apply safeguards agreements, and physical protection. As a major nuclear supplier, Canada required full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply, and looked to the Conference to endorse that policy again.

22. IAEA offered a wide range of assistance to its members to enable them to use nuclear energy for their economic and social development. It examined the economic and environmental advantages of nuclear energy as a source of power. Its safety missions provided valuable independent advice to Governments. Canada strongly supported IAEA efforts to promote the role of nuclear power in sustainable development, and hoped that the Conference would endorse those efforts. IAEA devoted considerable resources to the issue of nuclear safety.
Canada welcomed the Convention on Nuclear Safety, and called on States which had not yet done so to sign it. The Convention complemented other work of IAEA and would benefit all States. Similarly, Canada supported the early completion of a waste-management convention.

23. Canada made a regular voluntary contribution to the IAEA Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund, which it had maintained despite fiscal austerity, and was pleased with the improvements in the conduct of technical assistance activities, particularly those resulting from the Fund’s September 1994 policy seminar. The Fund had been successful, but the Conference should be cautious in calling for massive increases in contributions at a time of financial restraint in international organizations. Canada’s support for the role of IAEA was reflected in its active participation. For example, it participated in IAEA technical meetings and missions, and hosted IAEA interregional training courses. In that way, it shared information on a wide range of topics, all of which helped to fulfil the spirit and objectives of article IV.

24. Mr. SHA Zukang (China) said that his country had observed the relevant provisions of the Treaty by engaging in cooperation with developing and developed countries as well as with IAEA, and by adhering to the following principles: exports should be exclusively for peaceful purposes; they should be subject to IAEA safeguards; and they should not be retransferred to a third party without China’s prior consent. In addition, China required the recipient country to take effective measures to ensure the protection of nuclear materials imported from China.

25. China actively engaged in bilateral cooperation. It had concluded governmental agreements on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with 14 countries, and carried out fruitful cooperation, which included the import of some advanced nuclear-power technologies and equipment, and hoped to expand and enhance that cooperation. China also benefited from exchange and cooperation with IAEA in areas of nuclear-power-plant construction, nuclear safety and radiation protection, and nuclear-technology application. In doing so, China had, to the best of its capacity, contributed to the IAEA Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund. In 1994, China had made an extra contribution of $1 million for the technical cooperation model projects of IAEA.

26. It was the inalienable right of States parties, especially the developing countries, to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and to carry out international cooperation in that regard. That was an important means to achieve a balance between rights and obligations under the Treaty. International cooperation was of primary importance, given that countries were at varied stages of economic, scientific and technological development and that the exploitation of nuclear energy put high demands on infrastructure, financing, technology and expertise. Hence, the promotion of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as a major objective of the Treaty, should be accorded the same importance as the other provisions.

27. The prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons should not impair the exercise of the legitimate right of the developing countries to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and should not in any way impede international cooperation in that respect. The unreasonable restrictions imposed on the transfer of nuclear technology on the pretext of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons should be removed, and assistance should be given to developing countries in mastering technologies for using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

28. IAEA had an important role to play in promoting international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and that role should be further strengthened. States parties should readily make financial and technical contributions to IAEA and its programmes. China hoped that the States parties concerned would demonstrate their political will and take practical steps to strengthen international cooperation in the peaceful uses
of nuclear energy with a view to the full and effective implementation of the Treaty.

29. Mr. ROSU (Romania) said that the non-proliferation regime was premised upon the right of all nations to acquire and use nuclear materials for peaceful purposes, but subject to safeguards that would prevent those materials from being diverted to nuclear-weapons programmes. The Treaty created an irreplaceable framework for expanding the peaceful uses of nuclear energy among States committed to non-proliferation. Previous review conferences had considered commercial and aid-assisted activities between States parties in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to be relevant to article IV of the Treaty. IAEA, as the major international organization with a mandate in that area, provided a unique mechanism for the furtherance of the utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in medicine, agriculture and industry as well as power generation. In addition, its technical cooperation had been instrumental in creating in many developing countries which were parties to the Treaty a scientific infrastructure aimed at enabling them to benefit fully from the applications of nuclear technology.

30. Most States parties to the Treaty were developing countries that lacked resources for civilian nuclear programmes and for preventing clandestine nuclear-weapons programmes. The Conference should urge all States parties to declare that they would honour their commitments under article IV to provide assistance to developing countries. Furthermore, IAEA and the nuclear-weapon States should provide greater technical assistance and financial support for the safety and security of civilian nuclear facilities. The Conference should declare that no potential benefits from the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions were adequate to justify the serious proliferation risks they entailed. Romania fully supported the activity of IAEA aimed at achieving an agreement on international liability for nuclear damage. At the same time, taking into account the danger of radioactive releases, the final document of the Conference should include an appeal to all states to refrain from armed attacks against nuclear facilities.

31. The non-proliferation regime included national measures, such as export controls, which were designed to make development of nuclear weapons more difficult. States should not undercut their own security by aligning themselves with campaigns against such controls. Arrangements to control dual-use nuclear exports contributed to the implementation of Treaty obligations and complemented the verification agreements. Furthermore, export licensing arrangements created an environment of confidence for the operation of legitimate nuclear trade. In 1992, the Nuclear Suppliers Group decided that full-scope safeguards should be a condition for supply; that had since become the norm in nuclear trade and was applied by almost all suppliers. Romania was a member of the Zangger Committee and of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and it considered that the Conference should stress the important role played in the supply field by the export control regimes; it called for a strengthening of those regimes through the broadest possible adherence to them.

32. Romania had done major research work in various applications of nuclear technology. In the implementation of its nuclear-power programme, which was given high priority, it relied to a great extent on highly qualified foreign specialists and on international cooperation. Participation in the IAEA technical cooperation programme, which was a powerful tool for the transfer of nuclear know-how, had helped Romania strengthen its nuclear capability and promote a large number of applications in vital sectors such as industry, agriculture, medicine, environmental protection and hydrology.

33. Mr. AYATOLLAHI (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that during the negotiations on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons it had been felt that a principal element of the Treaty would be to contribute to the technological development of non-nuclear-weapon States that accepted its obligations. It had been understood that non-nuclear-weapon States must have not only unrestricted but even preferential access to technology and material for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Once the Treaty was concluded, a
A group of member States, including the supplier States, meeting in the Zangger Group, had drawn up a list of materials and equipment suggesting that any non-nuclear-weapon State that was not party to the Treaty and that desired to acquire any of the items on the list should be required to agree to safeguards. However, in 1977, the supplier States decided to apply export controls to all non-nuclear-weapon States, and they later added dual-use material, equipment and technology to the list of controlled and restricted items. Non-nuclear-weapon developing States opposed such measures, arguing that they eliminated the distinction between non-nuclear-weapon States that were parties to the Treaty and those that were not. Furthermore, the introduction of the term "dual use" resulted in additional limitations on the transfer of material, equipment and technology that was commonly used in predominantly peaceful areas. Accordingly, the developing countries highlighted, at all relevant conferences, the need for full implementation of article IV and for the lifting of existing restrictions on States that were parties to the Treaty.

34. The problem of the acquisition of nuclear weapons by certain countries that were not parties to the Treaty would not be resolved either by extending vertical limitations to all dual-use material and equipment or by extending horizontal limitations to include States parties to the Treaty. Ways must be found to remove all existing export control regimes and to create transparent international mechanisms with full participation of all States parties to the Treaty in the decision-making process, so as to ensure compliance with the Treaty. That end his delegation proposed that a committee be established within the context of the non-proliferation Treaty. The committee would formulate specific measures to ensure the full access of all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, without discrimination, to nuclear material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes; it would find means of strengthening existing safeguards with a view to enhancing international efforts to curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons and would formulate guidelines which would replace the existing unilateral arrangements in the field of the transfer of nuclear material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes; moreover, the Committee would be open to all States parties to the Treaty and would meet regularly; the first meeting, which might finalize the organizational and procedural questions, could be scheduled by the current Conference.

35. At the same time, discussions on the strengthening of IAEA safeguards should continue. Some suggestions for expanding existing safeguards had already been accepted and other suggestions had been made for strengthening their effectiveness. Those measures could enhance confidence if they were properly accommodated in safeguard agreements of the type outlined in document INFCIRC/153. If they could provide concrete results regarding verification of undeclared facilities within the territory or under the jurisdiction of States parties to the Treaty; if the findings and conclusions of the strengthened IAEA safeguards system could be fully utilized to enhance international cooperation in the field of the peaceful applications of nuclear energy as stipulated in article IV.

36. Iran believed that the role of IAEA should be enhanced in a number of areas. It was essential to recognize, once again, that the Agency was the sole body responsible for verifying that States parties did comply with the Treaty. In the area of technical cooperation, IAEA had an important role to play; it could help the developing countries secure financing for nuclear-power projects to meet their basic energy requirements. In that connection, attention should be drawn to the proposal concerning the establishment of a financial assistance fund. The activities of IAEA regarding safeguards should not restrict the allocation of Agency resources to the promotion of technical cooperation.

37. Finally, he underscored the importance of prohibiting attacks on nuclear facilities. Since the Conference on Disarmament had, unfortunately, been unable to make progress in that area, the current Conference should provide new impetus for the conclusion of a legally binding international agreement to prohibit attacks on nuclear installations under IAEA safeguards.
38. Mr. PEDRAJA (Mexico) said that the non-proliferation Treaty sought to establish a complex and delicate network of balances, political, legal and, above all, regarding elementary justice and equity, between the aspirations of the various peoples regarding the positive utilization of nuclear energy. The current Conference provided an outstanding opportunity to move ahead with the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime, some of whose most constructive aspects were those corresponding to the application of technology for the common good, as outlined in article IV.

39. Mexico participated actively in the various IAEA forums, supporting efforts to facilitate international cooperation for the effective utilization of nuclear energy and enhancement of the efficient use of the scarce resources allocated for that purpose. In that context, he was concerned that the growing operational needs for safeguards was resulting in a further reduction of the amounts allocated for the priority positive aims of the majority of States. The necessary enhancement of protective and security systems in nuclear installations called for effective international cooperation and would be better guaranteed to the extent that the transfer of technology between the various countries was facilitated. His Government joined in appealing for prompt signing or ratification of the Convention on Nuclear Safety; Mexico would soon be depositing its instrument of ratification thereto.

40. The question of nuclear waste management was also a matter of concern and work should shortly commence on the definition of the terms of a convention on safety in radioactive waste management which should cover the products of military installations and not be limited to reactors for civilian use. That subject was receiving increasing attention from Governments and public opinion because of the potential indiscriminate risks involved for civilian society. Given its global character, it would be appropriate to hold prior consultations among the Governments concerned, especially in cases where there were plans to dump radioactive materials in areas close to frontiers.

41. It was important to emphasize that, in addition to nuclear reactors for the production of electrical power, many economic and social development projects, particularly in the areas of public health and environmental protection, required international support which would permit not only the unrestricted transfer of technology but also a reduction in costs that would facilitate increasing access to the benefits for the greatest possible number of countries. Such uses provided many of the keys to success in the fight against extreme poverty.

42. The area of legal codification with regard to nuclear development was a broad and complex one and should be approached in a constructive and methodical manner, taking advantage of the experience and methods of work offered by IAEA. His delegation, which believed that there was a relationship of interdependency and balance between all the provisions of the Treaty, had prepared a position paper (NPT/CONF.1995/23) containing suggestions which it felt might be useful for the purposes of the Conference.

43. Mr. CHOI (Republic of Korea) said that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had provided a framework of confidence within which peaceful uses of nuclear energy could be developed, and acknowledged the crucial role which IAEA had played in promoting such uses. The Republic of Korea believed that the nuclear power programme was indispensable to sustainable development and it was prepared to participate in the promotion of international cooperation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as was demonstrated by its contributions to IAEA programmes and the courses and workshops on various subjects organized with a view to sharing experience with the developing countries.

44. Public acceptance of nuclear energy was essential to the promotion of its peaceful uses, and the safety factor was central in that regard. Given the enormous potential of nuclear energy as an alternative to fossil fuels and its contribution to the reduction of CO₂ emissions, easing public anxiety about nuclear safety was a key issue. That required the application of
strict safety standards and the effective use of the technical know-how of IAEA. It was to be hoped that international nuclear safety could be effectively enhanced by the Convention on Nuclear Safety, which established international standards for the safety of nuclear power plants.

45. Another issue of vital importance to the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was radioactive waste management, given its implications for human health and the environment. In that regard, he welcomed the safety standards adopted by the Board of Governors of IAEA and the preparatory work which had been done by the secretariat of IAEA on the convention on the safety of radioactive waste management, which it hoped would soon be concluded.

46. With regard to the argument that export controls could impede the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy in developing countries, he recognized that those controls had a complementary role in the attainment of the objectives of non-proliferation. The concerns of some developing countries on that issue should, however, be addressed in one way or another. In that connection, it was important that the actions of the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group should remain open and transparent.

47. The Republic of Korea supported the concept of giving preference to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty which had concluded full-scope safeguards agreements with IAEA in respect of all activities relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. More specifically, countries which had advanced nuclear technology should step up cooperation with States parties to the Treaty in such areas as the transfer of key nuclear technology and the supply of fuel cycle services.

48. Discussions were under way between the United States and North Korea concerning the provision of light-water nuclear reactors to the latter under the Agreed Framework between the two countries signed in October 1994. That project would be implemented to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy in North Korea by replacing graphite-moderated reactors with light-water nuclear reactors, on the condition that North Korea remained a party to the non-proliferation Treaty and complied with its undertaking under the full-scope safeguards agreement. It was to be hoped that that project would give an impetus to the strengthening of cooperation between North Korea and South Korea in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and would ultimately lay the foundation for the implementation of the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

49. Mr. TATAH (Algeria) said that nuclear technology had reached the stage of maturity throughout the world both in its development proper and in its use for the benefit of the economy and the population. Humanity could not stop its progress in the nuclear sphere and must therefore strengthen the role of IAEA in the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The activities of IAEA relating to safeguards and control over the exclusively peaceful use of the atom must be strengthened in accordance with the objectives of non-proliferation, but not to the detriment of the Technical Assistance and Cooperation Programme of IAEA, which should remain its principal mission. There should be a balance between the activities of IAEA as a whole, particularly between those in the sphere of safeguards and those relating to technical cooperation. The Agency should show itself receptive to the legitimate demands of the developing countries which wanted to see activities relating to technical assistance and the transfer of technology strengthened in order to promote and expand the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the service of peace and the well-being of all peoples.

50. The cooperation of IAEA had had a positive impact on the Algerian population, society and the environment in various sectors of economic and social development such as health, agriculture, hydrology and industry. Practices relating to protection against radiation and nuclear safety, which in Algeria were considered prior to any nuclear activity, had been promoted with the help of the Agency both in the establishment of regulations and in the application of procedures. Algeria also attached great importance to the activities coordinated by IAEA in the field of radioactive waste management,
food irradiation and the economic production of fresh water through nuclear desalination. In the context of the exploitation of its uranium resources, Algeria also proposed to use nuclear technology to meet its energy needs at the appropriate time when conditions made it economically viable to use such technology as opposed to other methods. Those examples showed the importance which Algeria attached to the peaceful use of the atom and the strengthening of technical cooperation. It was to be hoped that IAEA and the international community would continue to encourage cooperation through increased assistance and a genuine transfer of technology between States.

51. Mr. BAER (Switzerland) said that Switzerland depended greatly on nuclear energy and at the same time was an importer and exporter of that technology. It was therefore in favour of the extension of the Treaty, which was the only international instrument which guaranteed the inalienable right to develop research, production and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. That included the right to choose the type of nuclear fuel cycle which was best adapted to the needs and priorities of each country. The negation of that right would undermine the IAEA safeguards system, the object of which was to prevent the non-nuclear-weapon States from using nuclear energy for non-peaceful purposes. That right was offset by a duty: to guarantee at all times and in all places the physical protection of nuclear materials. There were many countries which fulfilled that obligation, as could be seen by the fact that the illegal traffic in nuclear materials had not reached the dimensions that were expected at the outset.

52. The inalienable right of developing the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes must be exercised with all the necessary precautions to ensure the safety of nuclear installations. Such precautions were in the interest of all States. The International Convention on Nuclear Safety was therefore a first stage in the task of establishing an international nuclear safety regime which was to be applied to all nuclear installations, whatever their nature. Switzerland would ratify the Convention as soon as possible.

53. One of the most important aspects of article IV of the Treaty was the obligation it established to facilitate the international exchange of equipment, materials and information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Switzerland was fulfilling that obligation through its annual contributions to the IAEA Fund and through its participation in the financing of activities designed to improve the safety of old reactors of the Soviet type, among other activities. Sometimes Switzerland had been accused of applying the Treaty provisions unfairly and of not recognizing the right of the parties to have free access to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. In fact, in view of its experience, Switzerland had to adopt specific precautions; hence, it only engaged in the transfer of nuclear material when it was convinced that the non-proliferation obligations imposed by the Treaty were respected.

54. Mr. MINTY (South Africa) said that his country was committed to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. To implement that policy, South Africa had dismantled an existing nuclear-weapons programme before becoming a State party to the Treaty; it had adopted a law and established a council for controlling the use, export and transit of all dual-use equipment and technology; it had promulgated a law prohibiting both horizontal and vertical nuclear proliferation; it had played an active role in the negotiations for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa; it had applied for membership in the Conference on Disarmament and the Missile Technology Control Regime; it was a signatory of the Chemical Weapons Convention; it had joined the Zangger Committee and more recently the Nuclear Suppliers Group; and, as a non-aligned country and a developing country with an advanced nuclear industry, South Africa not only encouraged a policy of non-proliferation but also considered that non-proliferation controls should not prevent the developing countries from gaining access to the advanced technologies they required for their development.

55. At the Conference the South African Foreign Minister had put forward several proposals for strengthening the NPT review process. He had made those proposals because of the failure to implement fully the disarmament provisions
of the Treaty by totally eliminating the arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States; to provide the non-nuclear-weapon States with effective security assurances; and to ensure the unencumbered transfer of peaceful nuclear technology.

56. As the Minister had stated, South Africa favoured the exchange of technology for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy between the developed and developing world. South Africa was therefore participating in the IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Programme and recognized the importance of the concept of sustainable development as a guiding principle for all peaceful uses of nuclear energy. At the IAEA’s Board of Governor’s meeting in March 1995 South Africa had supported the establishment of a Standing Advisory Group on Technical Assistance and Cooperation (SAGTAC). South Africa also believed that SAGTAC could usefully convene a meeting of all interested parties, particularly the developing countries, for a discussion of specific problem areas in the field of nuclear technology transfer. South Africa, with its extensive infrastructure, had further pledged to participate actively in the African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training related to Nuclear Science and Technology. South Africa would like to see greater levels of involvement on the part of the developed world in the transfer of peaceful nuclear technologies to the developing world, especially to Africa.

57. Mr. RAJA ADNAN (Malaysia) said that his country was a non-nuclear weapon State and like the vast majority of the States parties had no intention of changing that status. Malaysia, having signed a safeguard agreement, called upon all States parties which had not done so to conclude an agreement of that kind immediately. Malaysia also urged all nuclear-weapon States parties to accept voluntarily international monitoring and verification of their nuclear material and activities for peaceful purposes. Such a step could further boost confidence among States parties to the Treaty. Although Malaysia accepted the importance of a strengthened safeguards system, it was also important that a balance be struck between promotional and regulatory activities and that included the issue of their financing.

58. Malaysia’s programme of nuclear science and technology was focused on programmes and projects that were sustainable and end-user oriented, creating an impact on national socio-economic development and having an adequate infrastructure for its safe implementation. Besides the technical assistance and cooperation of the IAEA, Malaysia participated in the Regional Cooperation Agreement and in other direct bilateral technical cooperation programmes, notably of Japan and Australia. Malaysia had pledged and paid its assessed contribution in a full and timely manner. It called upon the other Member States to do likewise. He regretted that there had been a decline in financial contributions to the Fund and that some industrialized Member States had failed to make any pledges whatsoever.

59. Article IV of the Treaty spoke not of "assistance" per se but of commitment of States parties to exchange and cooperate in order to facilitate the transfer of technology. The relationship between articles III and IV was most important in providing a sound basis for international cooperation. Malaysia therefore urged that the Conference should redouble its efforts towards international nuclear trade for peaceful purposes and facilitate the transfer of technology and technical cooperation in peaceful applications among States parties.

60. Some States parties had suggested that export controls might be exercised in a discriminatory manner against some States parties and therefore would hamper their development. So far, Malaysia had had no experience of such discrimination but it was imperative that the Conference should institute a forum to address such complaints. Those issues would have implications not only on nuclear related activities but also on non-nuclear-related activities in the future. The Conference should reaffirm that the States parties had full rights to participate in the exchange of technology for peaceful uses of nuclear energy without discrimination and those in a position to do so should reaffirm their undertaking to contribute to the development of the peaceful
applications of nuclear energy. Malaysia urged that the Conference should take note of the special needs of the least developed States parties.

61. Mr. LUCK (Australia) said that article IV of the Treaty established an undertaking to facilitate cooperation consistent with the basic obligations of non-proliferation set out in articles I and II and the verification and supply provisions of article III. In other words, peaceful nuclear activities and cooperation could not occur in isolation. The way in which States parties implemented the provisions of article IV must respond to the interests and concerns of Governments and peoples about the security, economic and environmental dimensions of peaceful nuclear activity. The Conference should reaffirm those basic principles as well as the principle of giving preferential treatment to States parties in the area of cooperation.

62. The Asia-Pacific region provided an example of the benefits of nuclear cooperation made possible by the Treaty at the multilateral, regional and bilateral levels, and of the way in which the Treaty had underpinned regional security and economic prosperity, facilitated nuclear cooperation and trade, contained proliferation and provided an environment of confidence and security, which were essential for countries embarking on long-term and costly investments in peaceful nuclear programmes.

63. IAEA technical assistance programmes had facilitated the access of developing countries to the benefits of nuclear technology by means that included the provision of infrastructure and the transfer of technology. Those programmes had undergone a number of changes in recent years, as IAEA was conscious of the increasing global competition for development cooperation funding and of the need for Agency programmes to remain relevant to the evolving needs of recipient countries. The introduction of the model project concept was an excellent example of the Agency's capacity to respond to the changing global environment.

64. Australia, too, was concerned with ensuring that nuclear cooperation activities continued to attract an appropriate share of available funding and was working closely with IAEA to develop a more strategic approach in that area. It therefore welcomed the statement by the Director General of the Agency that those ideas would be incorporated in the global strategy of the Department of Technical cooperation, and especially the emphasis he had placed on the importance of a strategic approach to such issues as women in development, poverty alleviation, and the environment and sustainable development.

65. The Conference should welcome the gains achieved in the efficiency and effectiveness of the Agency's technical cooperation programme and should seek to ensure its continued relevance to the evolving needs of member States. The special needs of the least developed countries that were parties to the Treaty should also be acknowledged. The Agency's ability to respond to the interests of member States was constrained by the failure of many of them, both developed and developing countries, to contribute fully to the Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund. Australia believed that it had contributed its due and hoped that other countries would do likewise, since it firmly believed that IAEA should have the financial and human resources it needed to meet its objectives, a principle which the Conference should strongly endorse.

66. It had been said that technology transfers had been inadequate as a result of a conspiracy or cartel among nuclear suppliers. That was evidently not the case; such transfers were a key element of nuclear cooperation activities, and many of the countries represented on the Committee had been recipients of some form of nuclear technology. All countries, whether suppliers or recipients, wished to be assured that their cooperation would be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and that there was no risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons. To that end, they had endeavoured to meet one of their basic obligations under the Treaty by establishing export licensing arrangements, which did not constitute an impediment to cooperation but were intended to create an environment of confidence conducive to such cooperation. There were many reasons why the use of nuclear technology was
not more widespread: the economic priorities and development needs of countries, the availability of less costly alternative sources of energy, the cost of developing infrastructure to support nuclear activities, the capacity of countries' educational, scientific and industrial bases to absorb and utilize that technology, and the availability of international financing. Public perceptions were also crucial in determining levels of nuclear activity.

67. His delegation believed that the Conference should welcome the conclusion of the Convention on Nuclear Safety and should ask the diplomatic conference scheduled for early 1996 for a satisfactory international agreement aimed at the establishment of a credible civil international nuclear liability regime with adequate compensation levels. The Conference should endorse both the Agency's call for the early preparation of a waste management safety convention and its work in that field. The Conference should also call upon States to adhere to the strict application of international safety standards in the transport of nuclear material.

68. Australia, which had significant nuclear science and technology research capacities, attached importance to human resource development and offered facilities and courses for training in many areas. From 1970 to 1995 the proportion of all IAEA and UNDP trainees receiving nuclear-related training in Australia had quadrupled.

69. While the overall record in respect of compliance with article IV was a good one, there was still room for improvement. As for article V, it had long been accepted that nuclear weapons could not be distinguished from peaceful nuclear explosives. His delegation proposed that the Conference should agree that the potential benefits of the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions had not been demonstrated, that serious concerns existed with regard to the environmental consequences of such applications, and that IAEA had received no requests for services related to the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions since the entry into force of the Treaty. That was hardly surprising in the light of the experience of nuclear testing and the Chernobyl accident. Accordingly, the Conference ought to recommend to the Conference on Disarmament that it should take those factors into account in its negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. It should also note that a ban on all kinds of nuclear explosions should not be detrimental to the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 3rd MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York,
on Tuesday, 25 April 1995, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. RAMAKER (Netherlands)

The meeting was called to order at 10.20 a.m.

GENERAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS (continued)

1. Mr. ABDEL AZIZ (Egypt) said that the provisions of articles IV and V of the Treaty had been those least applied since the Treaty's entry into force. While, on the one hand, non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty complained of the restrictions to which they were subjected, particularly by the industrialized States, which prevented them from developing the peaceful applications of nuclear energy, on the other hand there were States which, without being parties to the Treaty, had obtained privileges and assistance that had enabled them to develop nuclear programmes not subject to the full-scope safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a practice which weakened the credibility of the Treaty.

2. Also, the activities of certain export control groups, consisting of a small number of States, contributed in some cases to the application of a double standard in the matter of exports, which restricted freedom of trade and the effectiveness of the appropriate international body contemplated in article V of the Treaty. Egypt therefore asked that the work of the control groups concerning the transfer of nuclear technology should be reviewed, so as to set up an international system requiring all the nuclear activities of any State to be subject to full-scope IAEA safeguards. In that matter there should be no discrimination between States that were parties and States that were not parties to the Treaty.

3. With regard to international technical cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, there were great shortcomings as a result of the continual drop in pledges for IAEA activities, which showed a lack of will on the part of States that were in a position to make contributions. Another question to be considered by the Conference was the optional nature of those contributions, which entailed no obligations. It was necessary to seek another formula that would combine the optional status of contributions with continuity at a level that would permit proper planning. Account needed to be taken of the increasing technological needs of the developing countries, which made it essential to have more reliable and sustainable resources for international cooperation.

4. With regard to the unconditional extension of the Treaty, which some considered essential to ensure international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, Egypt believed that the manner in which article IV was applied, particularly with regard to States that were not parties to the Treaty and which enjoyed substantial privileges, justified the arguments against that type of extension. A formula should be found which would both strengthen the provisions of the non-proliferation regime, maintain the necessary balance between the legitimate interests of States parties, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States, and achieve universality for the Treaty through the accession of States which, without being parties to the Treaty, benefited from it.

5. Mr. HULSE (United Kingdom) said that it was to be hoped that the text agreed upon, although not issued, in 1990 could be taken as a starting-point
for the work of the Committee, although it would need updating and streamlining. The objective of the Conference was to review compliance with the Treaty and renew the framework for future compliance when the Treaty was extended. With regard to article IV of the Treaty, concerning the exchange and transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, he said that the United Kingdom had been at the forefront of research, production and the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. The main industrial organization in that field, the British Nuclear Industry Forum, had a membership of 70 corporations whose products were available on the international market. But article IV also covered technology transfers to Governments, and the United Kingdom considered that the IAEA should be the primary conduit for that type of transfer. Accordingly it channelled most of its contributions through the Agency. In addition to its contribution to the regular budget, in 1995 the United Kingdom had contributed over 5 per cent of the total Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund target; since 1985 it had committed up to $7.5 million in additional voluntary contributions to Fund footnote a/ projects. It had also made substantial in-kind contributions to scientific and academic activities. The United Kingdom urged all States to match its record. An issue of major concern was that many States made neither pledges nor payments to the Fund and even more remained significantly below their target figures. Since those figures were carefully adjusted to account for ability to pay, there were few reasons to justify contributions below target. Although the funds available for technical assistance and cooperation were significant, they fell far short of the target set. Therefore the first step towards securing the future development of the programme was for all States to make their contributions.

6. The final documents of the previous Review Conferences had urged preferential treatment for States parties in the disbursement of resources from the Fund. The United Kingdom supported that goal and targeted its footnote a/ contributions accordingly. Although the United Kingdom did not want to prevent technical assistance to non-parties, particularly in the area of safety, it would support an increase in the proportion of technical assistance and cooperation funds assigned to parties to the Treaty.

7. The United Kingdom welcomed the model project approach since it believed that would lead to a more cost-effective technical cooperation programme with more funds spent on the transfer of technology and less on administration. Model projects which were closely linked to long-run national development goals would also be more relevant and sustainable. The Standing Advisory Group on Technical Assistance and Cooperation recently proposed by the Director General of IAEA should help to ensure that that was so.

8. There were, of course, some restrictions on the transfer of technology, apart from those imposed by the Treaty itself. The United Kingdom took the view that, in general, goods should be traded freely. But since almost all nuclear technology for civil uses could be used in ways which could also constitute a proliferation threat - and the intentions of some States gave cause for concern in that respect - nuclear technology had to be set in a framework which helped to prevent transfers that would constitute a breach of the obligations undertaken under article I and article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty. At the 1990 Conference the valuable work of the Zangger Committee had been acknowledged.

9. The Nuclear Suppliers Group had also been helpful in enabling supplying countries committed to non-proliferation to exchange information, clarify what needed to be controlled and assist each other in establishing effective controls which reduced the risks while leaving trade largely unaffected. The fact that some goods were controlled did not mean that they could never be exported, only that licences were required. In reality the impact on trade and technology transfer was minimal, since less than 6 per cent of total visible exports required licences and only about 1.5 per cent of licence applications were denied each year. Indeed, there were many greater constraints, particularly in the establishment of nuclear power programmes which had nothing to do with the export control regimes: cost, infrastructure, safety and environmental concerns, for example. The United
Kingdom supported the nuclear energy elements of the technical cooperation programme and believed that IAEA could and should play a significant role in helping Member States to decide whether nuclear power was a sensible option, to determine the type of plant, to strengthen the necessary infrastructure, to establish waste-handling mechanisms and to ensure safety and radiation protection frameworks. But nuclear power must compete with other sources of energy and it only needed to be decided whether it was economically beneficial to and sustainable by the user.

10. Lastly, it was worth mentioning that, despite the practical difficulties, the record for the transfer of nuclear technology from the industrial countries to many recipients had been excellent. Since 1970, some $270 million had been spent on technical cooperation, with notable benefits of various kinds to the recipients. The United Kingdom remained committed to the full implementation of article IV and wanted nuclear trade and technology transfer to continue to flourish. Non-proliferation safeguards were key to that endeavour. Accordingly the indefinite extension of the Treaty was an essential prerequisite, since anything less would jeopardize the framework of cooperation built up over the past 25 years.

11. Mr. ROLAND (Belgium) said that the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty was vital to the establishment of lasting peace, without which international cooperation, exchange and trade could hardly flourish. It was also essential to the development of the civil nuclear industry and to energy and non-energy applications.

12. Belgium had signed scientific, industrial and technical cooperation agreements with a number of States, and with others it had entered into nuclear cooperation agreements. For some time it had been an active partner in international cooperation for the peaceful applications of nuclear energy and intended to continue it participation, especially for the benefit of developing countries. In the past decade Belgium had received more than 200 fellows from developing countries to whom it had provided training in various fields. With respect to energy applications, in addition to the training of technicians and administrators, cooperation covered the study of facilities, assistance with safety, planning aid and operational assistance.

13. In the non-energy sector, Belgium had made a valuable contribution to sustainable development in many countries and had helped to develop radioisotope application techniques for medical and industrial purposes, together with sterilization and food conservation techniques. It was contributing actively to technical assistance in the area of nuclear safety, with special emphasis on the countries of central and eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States. Since 1991, Belgium had been providing ongoing assistance in the context of the PHARE and TACIS programmes of the European Union, with the active participation of Belgian agencies specialized in nuclear safety whose expertise was helpful in nuclear licensing procedures and nuclear engineering activities.

14. Within the framework of the IAEA Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund, Belgium had contributed actively to research for the eradication of sleeping sickness and had participated in a number of IAEA expert and assistance missions and in more than 40 industrial projects in many countries not members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. Belgium wanted to continue to support any measure that would promote cooperation without the danger of proliferation. An important step in that direction would be to ensure that the largest possible number of States complied with universally recognized standards for the transfer of nuclear equipment and material. Belgium scrupulously observed those standards, whose goal was to encourage the fullest possible international exchange in the field of peaceful applications of nuclear energy and at the same time to attain non-proliferation objectives.

15. Belgium wished to highlight its decision to participate in international cooperation and the exchange of information on radioactive waste management. It was vital that every State should have the necessary financial and
strategic means to manage safely the radioactive waste for which it was responsible, but that requirement should not represent an obstacle to regional and international cooperation. That important step would facilitate the access of a large number of States to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Lastly, Belgium reaffirmed its support for the cause of nuclear non-proliferation and one of its corollaries, namely, technical cooperation in the nuclear sector, as established by article IV of the Treaty.

16. Mr. OSTROWSKY (Poland) said that, in Poland’s view, the principles of furthering development in peaceful applications of nuclear energy under article IV of the Treaty responded to the needs of countries desiring to develop their nuclear industry. Although Poland was largely a recipient of cooperation and assistance activities, it tried to render assistance to other countries within its possibilities.

17. The framework and structure provided by the International Atomic Energy Agency had been and remained the decisive factor for developing cooperation in the nuclear field. The IAEA secretariat was to be commended for its effectiveness and for furthering relevant programmes tailored to the needs of recipient member States. Eight major centres in Poland were developing peaceful nuclear technologies. Those centres also took part in international exchange and cooperation. A review of Poland’s assistance in the spirit of article IV revealed cooperation activities during the period 1990-1995 with over 50 countries, the majority of them developing. That focus on developing countries reflected a clear political will and the availability of relevant programmes in Polish laboratories. Scientists and experts from developed countries also had participated in training or seminars organized and supported by Polish institutions. Assistance activities had focused on training, expertise, technology transfer, equipment transfer, research material and other services.

18. Poland had also received fellows, mostly through IAEA, which had provided funds for fellowships, while Polish institutes had provided research facilities and scientific guidance. Equipment deliveries were usually effected within the framework of IAEA contracts. In the absence of a nuclear energy programme for electricity generation in Poland, cooperation activities consisted of industrial isotope applications, radiological protection and environmental monitoring, and biotechnology and genetics. In the field of nuclear energy as applied to power generation, however, there had been some studies of the use of computer analysis and the development of codes. Polish experts had participated in evaluations of the nuclear safety of some installations carried out under the auspices of IAEA.

19. Mr. PARFAIT (France) said that his country’s broad experience in the nuclear field was in three main sectors: nuclear energy; basic research in such areas as agriculture, food, environmental protection, medicine and waste management; and safety and radiation protection. It therefore had a special responsibility in international cooperation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Aware of the importance of technology transfer to the success of development strategies, it was endeavouring to respond, to the extent possible, to requests for cooperation in the civil nuclear field, especially when received from developing countries parties to the Treaty. In that regard, it had adopted an active participation policy in the cooperation programmes of the international organizations concerned (principally IAEA) and had carried out cooperation programmes at the national level.

20. France provided a large share (7 per cent) of the resources of the Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund of IAEA, which was funded by voluntary contributions from member States. In 1994, it had provided 25 per cent of the contributions of the European Union to the budget of the Fund. In 1995, it would further increase its participation, which had increased by more than 20 per cent in the past five years. It had also steadily increased its extrabudgetary contributions since 1990. At the national level, France had concluded 23 intergovernmental nuclear cooperation agreements, two thirds of them with developing countries. It had also signed technical agreements in that area with more than 20 developing countries which
were parties to the Treaty. The implementation of article IV of the Treaty thus covered research and development agreements, preliminary studies for the installation of nuclear power stations, the supply of reactors for research and the generation of electricity, nuclear waste management, the environment, nuclear safety, radiation protection, and the medical, agricultural, food, industrial or environmental applications of atomic energy. The agreements relating to research and investigation included the granting of study fellowships, the organization of visits of experts, the exchange of information and the transfer of software. France participated actively in nuclear safety cooperation programmes financed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the European Union and had been one of the promoters of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, which had been adopted in Vienna on 17 June 1994.

21. It was clear that international cooperation should be carried out in accordance with the obligations deriving from the Treaty, in particular article I and article III, paragraph 2. It was important to reconcile the legitimate use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and the need for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. To attain that objective, international controls were planned. The establishment of strict international controls was of enormous importance to France since the vital interests of all States, both North and South, were at stake. That did not mean that new limitations should be imposed, especially on the developing countries. On the contrary, it was a question of responding to their needs in terms of safety and development. France wished to see the Treaty extended indefinitely since that was the only way to create the climate of confidence necessary to pursue cooperation in the service of peace and development.

22. Mr. JUSUF (Indonesia), commenting on the implementation of article IV of the Treaty, said that his country had already embarked on the use of nuclear energy and was very appreciative of the cooperation and assistance provided by IAEA well before the entry into force of the non-proliferation Treaty in 1970. Indonesia had also benefited greatly from cooperation and exchange of information with various industrialized countries and with developing countries. During the first 25 years of Indonesia’s Long-term Development Plan, initiated in 1969, the National Atomic Energy Agency (BATAN) had devoted great attention to the nuclear programme, which had contributed to the development of agriculture, public health and industry.

23. With regard to technical cooperation, particular mention should be made of the very efficient Regional Cooperative Agreement for the Asia and Pacific region. Parallel to those regional agreements, efforts were being made to intensify cooperation with the Northern Hemisphere, as well as between countries of the South, in the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology. Consequently, his delegation was very keen to enhance such cooperation with other States parties to the Treaty. Indonesia appreciated the assistance and support of those nations which had helped it to develop and bring into operation the Serpong complex for nuclear research and development, and it was ready to share the utilization of those and other facilities with other States. In all those activities, particular importance was attached to the safety aspect and, in that connection, it should be pointed out that Indonesia had signed the Convention on Nuclear Safety in 1994 and had taken progressive steps towards the establishment of an independent national regulatory agency.

24. Despite the positive developments in Indonesia’s nuclear programme, there had been other, less favourable, circumstances concerning the acquisition of technical know-how in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology. Indonesia had always stressed the necessity of ensuring the availability of resources so that the various national programmes could be pursued continuously and without interruption. However, the zero growth budget policy adopted by many international organizations, such as IAEA, had resulted in the rejection or postponement of various proposed projects. Although the annual target for voluntary contributions to fund IAEA technical assistance projects had been increasing slightly, his Government was concerned that many countries had not made pledges of voluntary contributions.
to the Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund. It appeared that that matter would remain a topic for discussion by the Board of Governors of IAEA. Indonesia supported the remarks made by the Director General of IAEA on the question and fully agreed that much more could be done if greater resources were available. Another matter of concern to his Government was the existence of export control regimes; they should be replaced by multilateral agreements, which were more acceptable to recipient countries. Such agreements would enable countries embarking on long-term nuclear programmes for peaceful purposes to consult interested supplier countries with regard to their economic development needs. His delegation welcomed the idea put forward by the Austrian delegation that the question should be considered in a special forum. It was also pleased to announce that a non-governmental organization, the Indonesian Nuclear Society (HIMNI) had recently been established with a view to supporting and promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in Indonesia.

25. In conclusion, it could be stated that article IV of the Treaty had been implemented satisfactorily for a number of countries, while others had not benefited sufficiently from international cooperation to implement their programmes in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. A number of the issues which had been mentioned required greater compliance on the part of supplier States parties with their obligations.

26. Mr. OTHMAN (Syrian Arab Republic) said that his country had been one of the first to sign the non-proliferation Treaty. It had also resolutely complied with the comprehensive safeguards agreements established by the Treaty. The IAEA safeguards regime adequately fulfilled the purposes for which it had been created and the decision of a State to acquire nuclear technological know-how did not necessarily mean that it would seek to use such technology for non-peaceful purposes. If it was generally accepted, that interpretation would help to widen still further the gap between the nuclear-weapon and the non-nuclear-weapon countries with regard to know-how about the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the utilization of nuclear materials and radioisotopes.

27. The Syrian Arab Republic participated actively in the various activities of IAEA and every year sponsored training seminars organized by IAEA at the regional level. It also benefited from the IAEA programme of technical assistance for developing countries. In that connection, it hoped that the volume of that assistance would increase so that it could improve its capacity in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The Syrian Arab Republic continued to support the activities of IAEA relating to the safeguards regime and the control of nuclear materials. IAEA played a very effective role in providing assistance to the developing countries and offered training not only in nuclear energy but also in nuclear safety, radiation protection and the various peaceful uses of radioisotopes.

28. The new restrictions which might be imposed on the exchange of nuclear technology and radioactive materials between States would prevent the developing countries from acquiring the knowledge, materials and installations necessary for scientific research. Those restrictions would contradict the provisions of article IV.2 of the Treaty which called upon all the States parties to facilitate the exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information necessary for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Such restrictions should be confined to technologies directly and specifically related to the production of nuclear weapons. They should not include dual-use equipment and materials because it was not so easy to use them for military purposes. It was wrong to prevent certain States of the Middle East from acquiring nuclear equipment and knowledge resulting from research into the peaceful uses of nuclear energy or to prevent the utilization of powerful reactors, if the other States of the region were allowed to do so. It was unacceptable to apply a double standard to the region. It was hard to understand how Israel was allowed to acquire advanced nuclear technology and to be able to export it while the other States of the region were forbidden to acquire equipment and materials to carry out research in the fields of medicine, agriculture and science. Syria had signed the Convention on the
early notification of nuclear accidents and the International Convention on Nuclear Safety and at an appropriate time would sign the agreement on radioactive wastes.

29. The delegation of Syria reiterated that the Treaty's success would depend on the achievement of broad nuclear disarmament and the total cessation of nuclear tests in all forms. It also depended on the universality of the Treaty. To that end, from the rostrum of the United Nations, Syria called upon Israel to adhere to the NPT and submit to IAEA inspections so that all the countries of the region could accept the extension of the Treaty. The attainment of that objective would create a climate of greater confidence in the region and hence would strengthen peace and security.

30. Mr. DE LA TORRE (Argentina) pointed out that the Treaty provisions under consideration by the Committee referred to the inalienable right of all the parties to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II. The interpretation given to those provisions would influence the attitude of delegations: on the one hand, a competitive and contradictory interpretation would give rise, under the prohibitions in articles I and II, to the possibility that the countries possessing nuclear technology would use it in a discriminatory manner in order to withhold nuclear cooperation from certain States, contrary to the provisions of article IV; on the other hand, if those provisions were considered to be complementary, the Treaty would be considered as an international instrument allowing nuclear cooperation by providing sufficient guarantees on the peaceful nature of those activities. The difficulty of those two interpretations arose from doubts about the good faith shown in the application of the Treaty provisions by those who, in violation of it, tried to engage in activities prohibited by the Treaty and by those, under pretext of those provisions, arbitrarily withheld technical cooperation. Argentina considered that transparency and confidence were the only solutions to that dilemma.

31. It must be recognized that confidence in the safeguards system had been affected by violations of the Treaty by two of the parties; hence the attempt to restore that confidence with a safeguards system strengthened by improved transparency. Argentina supported those efforts and its present policy was based on its own experience: in the past, the failure to accept the main international instruments on non-proliferation, such as NPT, had meant that Argentina had become increasingly isolated from the technological viewpoint so that at the beginning of the 1990s there was no nuclear cooperation agreement between Argentina and the most advanced nuclear countries. In fact, such isolation brought with it backwardness and backwardness led to poverty and underdevelopment. In order to break that vicious circle, Argentina opted for transparency, by adhering to all the international instruments in the field, including the present Treaty. The change in policy allowed renewed links of cooperation with the technologically most advanced countries. For example, Argentina had concluded important international instruments from 1992 onwards with France, Canada, the United States and Germany. Argentina was also conducting negotiations with the European Atomic Energy Commission (EURATOM) and with the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) of OECD and with Japan. At the same time, he wished to mention the signing of a memorandum of understanding with the United States on the transfer of strategic technology (1995) and the elimination of the provisions which restricted nuclear trade with Argentina. Such cooperation was also extended to other fields with many other European countries, such as Germany, Italy and Spain. He also drew attention to the agreement between the national space agencies of the United States and Argentina for cooperation in the civil use of outer space (1991) and the memorandum of understanding between those two agencies for the preparation of the first Argentina satellite, SAC B, which would be launched in 1995. During that process, Argentina was admitted to the Australian Group (MTCR), the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee, groups with which Argentina shared the objectives of non-proliferation included in articles I and II of the Treaty.
32. Argentina, which fully supported the objectives of horizontal non-proliferation and cooperated freely with the most advanced countries in the field of nuclear technology, possessed the oldest nuclear programme in Latin America and was engaged in a vast range of cooperation in that field. At the moment, 15 per cent of its energy production came from nuclear sources; 87.6 per cent of the work on the third nuclear power station had been completed; and in 1994 heavy water production had begun, up to 99.89 per cent in the Arroyito plant, which had a production capacity of 250 tons a year. Cooperation with IAEA included scholarships, scientific visits, participation in technical meetings, technical cooperation projects covering several years of basic and applied research, supply of equipment, etc. Current projects included uranium exploration, studies of the factors limiting the useful life of nuclear power stations and medical, industrial and agricultural applications. Argentina had participated from the beginning, in the early 1980s, in the broadest nuclear cooperation programme of the region, the Regional Cooperation Agreements for the Promotion of Science and Technology in Latin America (ARCAL). In 1994, in the publications of IAEA, Argentina appeared as the fifth largest donor in the matter of experts.

33. Finally, he repeated the statement made by the Argentine delegation at the inauguration of the first seminar on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and non-proliferation, organized by Argentina, together with Brazil and the United States, in Bariloche in 1994. He considered that the statement was still valid and summed up Argentine experience in the nuclear field: "Access to advanced technology is essential for the modernization of the country and undoubtedly requires international cooperation. The possibilities of cooperating with the most advanced countries increased in direct proportion to the degree of active commitment to non-proliferation. This is logical because the weapons of mass destruction constitute a specific and serious threat to the survival of humanity."

34. Mr. TVU (Ukraine) recalled that 26 April was the ninth anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster whose aftermath had remained with Ukraine for a long time. He informed the Committee of the measures adopted in Ukraine to strengthen security and to solve the problems of dismantling that installation. Ukraine understood the anxiety of the international community at the continued operation of the Chernobyl plant. The President of Ukraine had announced that the plant would close at the latest in the year 2000 and had given the assurance that Ukraine was doing its utmost to accelerate that process, bearing in mind how important it was to guarantee security at each stage of dismantling. With that objective, between 1986 and 1994, Ukraine had adopted numerous measures to modernize the installation, a move which had considerably strengthened its safety.

35. It should not be forgotten that Ukraine was currently carrying out far-reaching social, political and economic transformations, the system of production had been disrupted, and the country was facing an energy crisis. Consequently, Ukraine was not in a position to dismantle immediately and on its own the Chernobyl power station, since it had to create alternative sources of energy which would produce the equivalent power. At the same time, it was necessary to resolve a whole series of complex scientific and technical problems: it would have to strengthen the security of the "tomb" of the fourth reactor of the power plant without overlooking the means of protecting the environment; provide scientific and technical support for dismantling the power plant, especially if account was taken of the exceptional conditions prevailing in the Chernobyl exclusion zone; construct storage facilities for the fuel used and for the radioactive and other waste; and tackle the complex social problems arising from the closure of the power plant. It was estimated that the closure would cost Ukraine more than $4 billion, and such a colossal programme could never be implemented without the technical, scientific and financial support of the international community.

36. One of the most important tasks facing the Committee was the review of the implementation of the articles of the Treaty, especially article IV. In that regard, he said that cooperation for the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was constantly being expanded, overcoming - not without
difficulty - selfish national interests and, at times, the mercenary interests of certain donor countries. The world was becoming increasingly aware that stable development and progress hinged upon broad cooperation among equals. Those ideas were congruent with the objective information contained in the excellent documents of the IAEA secretariat. In that regard, Ukraine proposed that efforts should be centred on the creation of effective machinery aimed at strengthening cooperation among the States parties to the Treaty, increasing nuclear security, promoting the transfer of technology and the exchange of information on nuclear energy and the fuel cycle, and locating the technical and financial resources needed to achieve those tasks. With a view to creating a climate of confidence among suppliers and recipients, his delegation proposed the periodic publication of all statistical information relating to the granting of licences to countries which were not parties to the Treaty. In addition, periodic consultations should be held between the nuclear suppliers and recipient countries in order to consider export systems in general.

37. Ms. BEšKER (Croatia) said that the Director General of IAEA had addressed two of the most important questions pertinent to the review and extension of the Treaty: (a) the possibility of eventually eliminating the threat of nuclear weapons and attaining international stability, and (b) the possibility of harnessing the tremendous force of the atom as a sustainable, environmentally benign source of energy for constructive purposes, and he had suggested that both those objectives were attainable. Croatia also subscribed to that view, but she wanted to emphasize that the elements of the Treaty were conditional on one another and that only in their mutuality could they underpin and reinforce the system and operation of the Treaty. Therefore, only the full cooperation of all States in the attainment of that objective would render the Treaty relevant to world stability and to further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes for the benefit of all countries.

38. Commenting on Croatia’s experience in the implementation of article IV of the Treaty and the activities of IAEA to facilitate the peaceful application of nuclear technology, she said that her country had joined the family of nations during the historic changes of the past few years. As was generally known, Croatia had been faced with enormous problems related to its territorial integrity and sovereignty, and to the half a million refugees displaced by the aggression and the war. Nevertheless, it had made every effort to fulfil its obligations as a non-nuclear-weapon State with a deep interest in strengthening the non-proliferation regime and a strong wish to cooperate fully with IAEA in the peaceful applications of atomic energy. Croatia had become party to the Treaty by virtue of succession in 1992. In June 1994, it had signed a comprehensive safeguards agreement which had taken effect on 29 January 1995. On 10 April 1995, it had signed the Convention on Nuclear Safety, which was expected to be ratified soon. Croatia was aware that the financial resources of IAEA had been fully stretched; it had therefore made an extraordinary effort to pay its arrears for 1992 and 1993, and also hoped to fulfil its pledge, despite its formidable economic and financial problems. In that context, her delegation acknowledged the performance of donor countries in facilitating access to the peaceful uses of nuclear technology by States parties to the Treaty through their voluntary contributions to the Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund, their extrabudgetary contributions, and "assistance in kind". Croatia hoped that they would continue their financial support to IAEA as the world’s principal forum for scientific and technical cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. She commended the continuing professionalism, dedication and skill of the IAEA secretariat and staff and their responsiveness to Croatia’s needs and interests. She also commended the efforts and initiatives of IAEA to strengthen its main activities, particularly technical cooperation, through the development of effective programmes aimed at improving national scientific and technological capabilities, especially of developing countries and countries in transition, in the peaceful applications of nuclear energy.

39. Croatia had embarked on a new biennial cycle of technical cooperation with IAEA whose main objectives for 1995 and 1996 were: upgrading nuclear
analytical services for environmental and health studies, and applications in industry; developing nuclear methods of modification and analysis of materials; modernizing infrastructure and improving the preparedness of technical staff of national regulatory and inspection bodies in the field of nuclear safety, radiation protection and radioactive-waste management; and strengthening radiation applications in medicine.

40. Croatia had also benefited from the participation of its scientists and specialists in IAEA conferences and seminars, and had in turn contributed to IAEA activities in that field. Croatia strongly supported IAEA regional and interregional technical cooperation activities and projects. Its future technical cooperation with IAEA would continue to focus on the need to address the interest in and concern about nuclear energy, the strengthening of the radiation-protection and nuclear-safety infrastructure, radioactive-waste management, and the upgrading of radiotherapy methods and facilities in human health.

41. In closing, she expressed her delegation's strong support for the overall objectives formulated by IAEA for its medium-term activities in fulfilling the objectives of article IV of the Treaty. Croatia especially welcomed the decision of IAEA to ensure the compatibility of its technology-transfer activities with national development plans and goals, a decision which would strengthen the relevant national infrastructures. It would also induce the competent authorities and national infrastructures to focus their activities on priority areas of cooperation that would most benefit basic human needs and promote sustainable development. It also welcomed the readiness of IAEA to deal imaginatively with the challenges provoked by the diversity and complexity of nuclear technology in an "Agenda 21" world, and in the changed political and economic landscape in Central and Eastern Europe. In view of those factors, her delegation offered its strong support to the ongoing redirection of IAEA technical cooperation activities. It was convinced that they had substantially contributed and would contribute in the future to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for the benefit of all countries.

The meeting rose at 11.55 a.m.
REVIEW OF WORK TO DATE

1. The CHAIRMAN reviewed the progress of the Committee’s work. In its capacity as an open-ended Drafting Group, the Committee had completed its first reading of working papers 1, 2, 3 and 4. He characterized the examination of those papers as constructive and said that the Drafting Group would proceed to combine into a cohesive text the many proposals that had been put forward.

2. Mr. STOIBER (United States of America) expressed his delegation’s agreement with the Chairman’s positive assessment of the Committee’s work. Certain questions were raised by some of the suggestions which had been offered, but the positive tenor of the debate thus far encouraged his delegation to look forward to further productive work on the document dealing with the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under the Treaty.

3. Mrs. QQLL (Ireland) said that Ireland, a co-sponsor of the working papers, had opted not to use nuclear energy for power generation. Its peaceful nuclear policy strongly emphasized nuclear safety, including radiological protection and the safe management of nuclear waste. Issues of nuclear safety before the Committee were therefore of greatest concern to her delegation. Ireland’s approach to the issue of nuclear safety and to the nuclear-safety programme of IAEA was based on a firm conviction that nuclear safety was a matter of legitimate international concern. Her delegation was also pleased and reassured to note that increased concern for nuclear safety had become one of the key factors shaping the activities of the IAEA in the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

4. Her delegation had been disappointed with the limited scope of the nuclear safety Convention opened for signature in 1994; it therefore attached considerable importance to complementing that Convention with a sound and comprehensive nuclear waste-management safety convention, as reflected in the draft language proposed in the Committee. In the adoption of decisions concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, it was legitimate to expect that all countries would take account of the potential for transboundary impact and its implications for nuclear waste management and other issues related to such uses.

The meeting rose at 10.35 a.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 5th MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 3 May 1995, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. RAMAKER (Netherlands)

The meeting was called to order at 3.40 p.m.

ARTICLE IV AND RELATED ISSUES (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/WP.6)

1. Mr. LUCK (Australia), introduced the working paper (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/WP.6), which concerned the potential benefits of nuclear explosions. In that paper, the Conference drew the conclusion that such benefits had not materialized; it noted that serious concerns had been expressed regarding the possible environmental and other consequences of such applications, and drew the situation to the attention of the Conference on Disarmament for its consideration in connection with negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

2. Mr. WANG Xiaoning (China) pointed out that the question of whether or not an article of the non-proliferation Treaty was applicable or functionally obsolete had to do with amending the Treaty. Such an approach did not fall within the purview of either the Committee or the Conference.

3. He wished to propose an amendment to the second paragraph. After the words "proliferation of nuclear weapons", the words "if such applications are not subject to international supervision" should be added.

4. The last paragraph of working paper 6 went beyond the mandate of the Committee, which should not prejudge the outcome of negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. That paragraph should therefore be deleted, and should not be included in the report of the Committee.

5. Mr. AKAO (Japan) said he wished to place on record his delegation's full endorsement of working paper 6, including the last paragraph. He wished to suggest only that, in the second paragraph, the words "for non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty" should be deleted.

6. Mr. JUSUF (Indonesia) suggested that, in the second paragraph of the working paper, the word "eventuated" should be changed to "materialized".

7. The CHAIRMAN said that delegations should discuss any proposed amendments to working paper 6 with its sponsors.

8. He informed members that the draft report of the Committee was in the process of reproduction by the Secretariat. He suggested that the meeting should be suspended until the draft report was available.

The meeting was suspended at 4.05 p.m. and resumed at 4.45 p.m.

DRAFT REPORT OF MAIN COMMITTEE III (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/CRP.4)


10. Mr. WANG Xiaoning (China) said it was unfortunate that the draft report was available only in English. He also noted that the full text of working paper 6 was incorporated in part V of the draft report, even though the
substance of that part of the report had not yet been discussed by the Committee.

11. The CHAIRMAN said that the official language versions of both working paper 6 and conference room paper 4 would be available on the following day. He took it that the Committee wished to adjourn the formal meeting and continue its discussions as an open-ended working group.

12. It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 5.35 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 6TH MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York,
on Friday, 5 May 1995, at 11 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. RAMAKER (Netherlands)

The meeting was called to order at 11.25 a.m.


1. The CHAIRMAN commended the spirit of cooperation and the flexibility shown by all delegations. The text was fair and balanced because the views of all delegations had been taken into account in drafting it. Since the changes that had been made were not substantive, he suggested that the meeting should be suspended for 10 minutes to enable delegations to look closely at the revised text (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/CRP.4/Rev.1).

2. It was so decided.

The meeting was suspended at 11.30 a.m. and resumed at 11.45 a.m.

3. Mr. RAJA ADMAN (Malaysia) proposed that the following words should be added at the end of paragraph 4 of section III: "In this context, the Conference notes with appreciation the contribution of the extrabudgetary funds mechanism in providing additional resources".

4. Mr. NAHID NAI (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that, on direct and explicit instructions from his Government, he wished to propose that the text of paragraph 7 of document NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/WP.5 should be inserted after paragraph 10 of section III. If his proposal was not adopted, the text should be added in square brackets and referred to the Drafting Committee. While Iran did not want to open a Pandora's box or obstruct the Committee's work, there was some overlapping between the tasks of the Main Committees which would have to be resolved by striking a balance on all the questions under discussion.

5. Mr. RIDER (New Zealand) said that he had thought that all the substantive issues had been resolved in the informal meetings and that all that remained to be done was to make certain technical corrections. He therefore considered it unfortunate that a substantive point was being raised at the present stage. He believed that the final sentence of paragraph 11 of section III addressed Iran's concerns about restrictions on the transfer of nuclear technology and he therefore favoured retaining the current wording, which had the support of all delegations.

6. Mr. ODAGA-JALAMAYO (Uganda) noted that, once again, a difficult situation had arisen. He feared that if the debate on substantive questions was reopened, the end result would be a very different document from the one currently under discussion. The negotiation of a consensus document required that a solution be accepted even if it did not entirely meet the desired objectives. He favoured the inclusion in square brackets of the text proposed by Iran.

7. Mr. TITKOV (Russian Federation) said that the wording of section V posed a number of difficulties and that his delegation, while joining the consensus, reserved the right to raise the issue again at a later stage when it was considered by the Drafting Committee.
Mr. STOIBER (United States of America) said that he was deeply disappointed that an issue which he had thought resolved was being raised again at such a late stage in the negotiations. The current wording of paragraph 11 of section III adequately reflected the main thrust of the proposal by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. All States had agreed to make some sort of concession, and one delegation was now trying to reopen the debate and upset the complex balance that had been achieved. He could not agree to the introduction of the proposed text in square brackets, since the Drafting Committee's job was purely stylistic and mechanical.

Mr. PATTISON (United Kingdom) said that, thus far, the work done by Main Committee III had been a model of how to conduct complex international negotiations in a constructive spirit of compromise. Documents agreed at the international level were often extremely complex. Paragraph 11 of section III was the result of an extensive search for common ground and that was also the spirit in which delegations should approach the final days of the Conference. He therefore very much regretted that, at that late stage, one delegation had adopted a partisan stance which ruled out the possibility of a solution that was acceptable to everyone. The issue was extremely delicate and complex and, while his delegation understood the concerns that it aroused, he believed that the current wording dealt with them satisfactorily.

Mr. ESCOBAL (Argentina) supported the statement made by the representative of New Zealand. He felt that all delegations had made concessions in all the texts and that it was irresponsible at that late stage to reopen issues which had been dealt with earlier. Argentina deferred to the judgement of the Chairman, who had a vital role to play in wrapping up the debate and arriving at balanced texts.

Mr. LUCK (Australia) echoed the remarks made by the representative of New Zealand. The results which had been achieved represented a delicate balance, based on a full awareness of the existence of common ground. The delegation which appeared to have upset that balance should therefore desist from reopening issues which had already been dealt with. He considered the report to be a satisfactory outcome. With regard to the remarks made by the Iranian representative, a footnote should be added to paragraph 11 of section III, indicating that amendments might have to be made as a result of the deliberations of other organs of the Conference. That would avoid involving the Drafting Committee in issues which did not necessarily fall within its competence.

Mr. NAIMIARFA (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that his delegation had shown flexibility in the deliberations on the texts, an attitude which had not always been reciprocated by other delegations. He had received precise instructions from his Government and therefore reiterated his proposal. If the paragraph could not be included, he proposed that it should be placed in square brackets and referred to the Drafting Committee.

The CHAIRMAN suggested that, since the proposal did not appear to enjoy wide acceptance, paragraph 7 of document NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/WP.5 should be placed in square brackets and inserted between paragraphs 10 and 11 of section III of the draft report, for submission to the Drafting Committee.

It was so decided.

Mr. ALVAREZ (Uruguay) said that Uruguay wished to be included in the list of delegations that had submitted document NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/WP.6.

The CHAIRMAN suggested that the text of the draft report should be considered section by section. It was his understanding that the Committee wished to replace the word "on" in paragraph 7 by "to transmit".

It was so decided.
18. Mr. SIERLA (Finland) pointed out that, through an oversight, the original version of the second sentence of paragraph 3 had not been deleted when the text was amended.

19. The CHAIRMAN said that, if he heard no objection, he would take it that the Committee adopted the text of section I, as orally revised.

20. It was so decided.

Section II

21. Mr. NWOGUGU (Deputy Secretary) said that the full title of INSAG, which was mentioned in paragraph 2, was International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group. In addition, at the request of the representative of New Zealand, he pointed out that the correct form of the title appearing in paragraph 10 was "IMO Code for the Safe Carriage of Irradiated Nuclear Fuel, Plutonium and High-level Nuclear Radioactive Wastes in Flasks on Board Ships".

22. Ms. CLAEYS (Belgium) said that paragraph 13 of subsection (b) should be placed immediately after paragraph 8 of subsection (a).

23. The CHAIRMAN said that, if he heard no objection, he would take it that the Committee adopted the text of section II, as orally revised.

24. It was so decided.

Section III

25. Mr. TATAH (Algeria), referring to the sentence which the representative of Malaysia had proposed adding at the end of paragraph 4 of section III, proposed, in turn and following consultations with the representative of Malaysia, that the addition should read: "In this context, the Conference notes the potential contribution that extrabudgetary mechanisms may have in providing additional resources."

26. Mr. WHANNOY (Benin) asked why the original proposal had been toned down to what was, in his opinion, a less interesting formulation.

27. Mr. TATAH (Algeria) said that, in recent years, a number of Algerian projects had failed to obtain sponsors or funding. The mechanisms in question were important and should be strengthened to ensure funding by sponsors. Algeria appreciated the potential contribution mentioned in the proposed amendment, but considered the present state of affairs unsatisfactory.

28. Mr. WHANNOY (Benin) said that he understood Algeria's concern, but felt that the text proposed by Malaysia did not make a categorical statement. All it said was that the Technical Cooperation Fund could make a contribution to technical cooperation activities and would continue to do so. Algeria, however, felt that the Fund had not done enough. He hoped that an intermediate solution might be found which would reconcile the two positions.

29. The CHAIRMAN said that the observations made by the representative of Benin would be duly noted. If he heard no objection, he would take it that the Committee adopted section III, as orally amended.

30. It was so decided.

Sections IV and VI

31. The CHAIRMAN said that, if he heard no objection, he would take it that the Committee adopted sections IV and VI.

32. It was so decided.
33. The CHAIRMAN said that, if he heard no objection, he would take it that the Committee decided to adopt the draft report as a whole, including the paragraph in square brackets and the oral amendment and revisions.

34. It was so decided.

CONCLUSION OF THE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE

35. After an exchange of courtesies, the CHAIRMAN announced that Main Committee III of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had concluded its work.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.