Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

FINAL DOCUMENT

Part III

Geneva, 1986
REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

FINAL DOCUMENT

PART III

Geneva, 1985
The Final Document of the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons consists of three parts:

I. Organization and Work of the Conference (NPT/CONF.III/64/I)

II. Documents issued at the Conference (NPT/CONF.III/64/II)

III. Summary Records (NPT/CONF.III/64/III)
CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS

SUMMARY RECORDS OF THE PLENARY MEETINGS

1st meeting ................................................................. 1

Opening of the Conference by the Chairman of the third session of
the Preparatory Committee (agenda item 1) and submission of the
final report of the Preparatory Committee (agenda item 3)

Election of the President (agenda item 2)

Message from the Secretary-General of the United Nations

Message from Mr. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

Statement by the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy
Agency

Adoption of the rules of procedure (agenda item 4)

Confirmation of the nomination of the Secretary-General
(agenda item 8)

Adoption of the agenda (agenda item 9)

Programme of work (agenda item 10) and adoption of arrangements for
meeting the costs of the Conference (agenda item 11)

2nd meeting ................................................................. 13

General debate (agenda item 12), incorporating the message of
Mr. Ronald Reagan, President of the United States of America

3rd meeting ................................................................. 35

General debate (agenda item 12) (continued)

4th meeting ................................................................. 39

General debate (agenda item 12) (continued)
### CONTENTS (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meeting</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5th meeting</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election of Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the Main Committees, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee (agenda item 5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election of Vice-Presidents (agenda item 6)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General debate (agenda item 12) (continued)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th meeting</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General debate (agenda item 12) (continued)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th meeting</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General debate (agenda item 12) (continued)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th meeting</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General debate (agenda item 12) (continued)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th meeting</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programme of work (agenda item 10) (concluded)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General debate (agenda item 12) (continued)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th meeting</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General debate (agenda item 12) (continued)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th meeting</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General debate (agenda item 12) (continued)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th meeting</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General debate (agenda item 12) (continued)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th meeting (first part)</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General debate (agenda item 12) (continued)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONTENTS (continued)

13th meeting (second part) ............................................... 181

General debate (agenda item 12) (continued)

Election of Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the Main Committees, the
Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee (agenda item 5)
(concluded)

Credentials of representatives to the Conference (agenda item 7)

(a) Appointment of the Credentials Committee

Admission of observers

14th meeting ................................................................. 187

Organization of work

15th meeting ................................................................. 189

Consideration of draft resolutions and proposals submitted under
agenda item 13

16th meeting ................................................................. 195

Expression of sympathy to Mexico on the occasion of the earthquake
in that country

Credentials of representatives to the Conference (agenda item 7)
(concluded)

(b) Report of the Credentials Committee

Reports of Main Committees (agenda item 15)

Report of the Drafting Committee

Preparation and adoption of the Final Document (agenda item 17)

Conclusion of the Conference
SUMMARY RECORDS OF THE MEETINGS OF COMMITTEE I

1st meeting ................................................................. 207
Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its article VIII (3) (agenda item 13):
A. Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament and international peace and security:
   (1) Articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1-3;
   (2) Article VI and preambular paragraphs 8-12;
   (3) Article VII with specific reference to the main issues in A and B.
B. Security assurances:
   (1) Resolution 255 (1968) of the United Nations Security Council;
   (2) Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

2nd meeting ................................................................. 209
General exchange of views

3rd meeting ................................................................. 221
General exchange of views (concluded)

4th meeting ................................................................. 231
Organization of work
Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its article VIII (3) (agenda item 13) (continued):
A. Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament and international peace and security:
   (1) Articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1-3.
CONTENTS (continued)

5th meeting .......................................................... 237

Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its article VIII (3) (agenda item 13) (continued):

A. Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament and international peace and security:

   (2) Article VI and preambular paragraphs 8-12

6th meeting .......................................................... 245

Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its article VIII (3) (agenda item 13) (continued):

A. Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament and international peace and security:

   (2) Article VI and preambular paragraphs 8-12

7th meeting .......................................................... 255

Organization of work

8th meeting .......................................................... 257

Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its article VIII (3) (agenda item 13) (concluded):

A. Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament and international peace and security:

   (1) Articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1-3;

   (2) Article VI and preambular paragraphs 8-12;

   (3) Article VII with specific reference to the main issues in A and B.
CONTENTS (continued)

B. Security assurances

(1) Resolution 255 (1968) of the United Nations Security Council;

(2) Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Draft report of the Committee

9th meeting ................................................................. 261

Consideration of reports of working groups I and III

SUMMARY RECORDS OF THE MEETINGS OF COMMITTEE II

1st meeting ................................................................. 267

Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its article VIII (3) (agenda item 13);

C. Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones:

(1) Article III and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5, especially in their relationship to article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7;

(2) Articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1-3 in their relationship to articles III and IV;

(3) Article VII.

2nd meeting ................................................................. 269

Election of officers

Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its article VIII (3) (agenda item 13) (continued);
CONTENTS (continued)

C. Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones:

(1) Article III and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5, especially in their relationship to article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7

Organization of work

3rd meeting .................................................. 277

Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its article VIII (3) (agenda item 13) (continued):

C. Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones:

(1) Article III and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5, especially in their relationship to article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7

4th meeting .................................................. 289

Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its article VIII (3) (agenda item 13) (continued):

C. Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones:

(1) Article III and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5, especially in their relationship to article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7;

(2) Articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1-3 in their relationship to articles III and IV;

(3) Article VII.
CONTENTS (continued)

5th meeting ........................................................ 299

Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its article VIII (3) (agenda item 13) (continued):

C. Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones:

(3) Article VII;

(1) Article III and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5, especially in their relationship to article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7.

6th meeting ........................................................ 305

Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its article VIII (3) (agenda item 13) (continued):

C. Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones:

(1) Article III and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5, especially in their relationship to article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7;

(3) Article VII.

7th meeting ........................................................ 309

Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its article VIII (3) (agenda item 13) (continued):

C. Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones:

(3) Article VII.
Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its article VIII (3) (agenda item 13) (continued):

C. Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones:

(1) Article III and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5, especially in their relationship to article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7.

9th meeting ...........................................•............ 323

Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its article VIII (3) (agenda item 13) (concluded):

C. Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones:

(1) Article III and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5, especially in their relationship to article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7;

(2) Articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1-3 in their relationship to articles III and IV;

(3) Article VII.

E. Other provisions of the Treaty

Draft report of the Committee

10th meeting ...........................................•............ 329

Draft report of the Committee (continued)

11th meeting ...........................................•............ 333

Draft report of the Committee (concluded)
CONTENTS (continued)

SUMMARY RECORDS OF THE MEETINGS OF COMMITTEE III

1st meeting ................................................................. 337

Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its article VIII (3) (agenda item 13);

D. Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to peaceful applications of nuclear energy;

(1) Articles III (3) and IV, preambular paragraphs 6 and 7, especially in their relationship to article III (1, 2, 4) and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5 as well as to articles I and II;

(2) Article V

2nd meeting ................................................................. 339

Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its article VIII (3) (agenda item 13) (continued);

D. Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to peaceful applications of nuclear energy:

(1) Articles III (3) and IV, preambular paragraphs 6 and 7, especially in their relationship to article III (1, 2, 4) and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5 as well as to articles I and II

3rd meeting ................................................................. 355

Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its article VIII (3) (agenda item 13) (continued);

D. Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to peaceful applications of nuclear energy:

(1) Articles III (3) and IV, preambular paragraphs 6 and 7, especially in their relationship to article III (1, 2, 4) and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5 as well as to articles I and II
CONTENTS (continued)

4th meeting ................................................................. 361

Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its article VIII (3) (agenda item 13) (continued):

D. Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to peaceful applications of nuclear energy:

  (1) Articles III (3) and IV, preambular paragraphs 6 and 7, especially in their relationship to article III (1, 2, 4) and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5 as well as to articles I and II;

5th meeting ................................................................. 369

Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its article VIII (3) (agenda item 13) (concluded):

D. Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to peaceful applications of nuclear energy:

  (1) Articles III (3) and IV, preambular paragraphs 6 and 7, especially in their relationship to article III (1, 2, 4) and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5 as well as to articles I and II

6th meeting ................................................................. 371

Draft report of the Committee

7th meeting ................................................................. 375

Draft report of the Committee (continued)

8th meeting ................................................................. 377

Draft report of the Committee (continued)

9th meeting ................................................................. 383

Draft report of the Committee (continued)

10th meeting ............................................................... 385

Draft report of the Committee (concluded)
ABBREVIATIONS

ABM anti-ballistic missile
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
INF Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons)
OAS Organization of American States
OAU Organization of African Unity
OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SPNFZ South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone
START Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
THIRD REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY
ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

SUMMARY RECORDS OF THE 1st TO 16th MEETINGS

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
from 27 August to 21 September 1985

President: Mr. SHAKER  (Egypt)

Note: For the list of participants, see Part I of the Final Document (NPT/CONF.III/64/1).
OPENING OF THE CONFERENCE BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE THIRD SESSION OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE (agenda item 1) AND SUBMISSION OF THE FINAL REPORT OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE (agenda item 3) (NPT/CONF.III/1)

1. The ACTING PRESIDENT, in his capacity as Chairman of the third session of the Preparatory Committee and in accordance with its decision, declared open the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Third Review Conference had been convened in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3, of the treaty, a decision taken during the Second Review Conference, and resolution 38/74 of the United Nations General Assembly. The number of States parties to the Treaty was 130, 16 more than at the Second Review Conference, an expansion which indicated the endorsement of about 80 per cent of the States Members of the United Nations and which represented a significant proportion of the international community. The Treaty had been in existence for 15 years, and in 10 years, in accordance with article X, paragraph 2, a conference would determine the duration of the Treaty by a majority decision. The deliberations of the current Review Conference would therefore have a special significance and impact on future decisions regarding the longevity of the Treaty. The Conference was also important in the current context of the nuclear arms race and efforts towards disarmament as well as the development of peaceful nuclear activities. Since the Second Review Conference, no disarmament agreement had been concluded and, even worse, existing disarmament agreements were imperilled by non-ratification, non-implementation or quite simply violation. The Third Review Conference must therefore work towards the attainment of all objectives of the Treaty.

2. Introducing the final report of the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.III/1), he noted that 71 States parties had taken part in the preparatory phase of the Conference, which had been characterized by a spirit of co-operation and harmony. Many complex and sometimes controversial issues had been resolved through mutual accommodation and compromise, and decisions had been adopted by consensus. The preparatory process for the Conference had extended over a period of about 17 months, in the course of which a considerable amount of useful work had been accomplished. The work was intended as the foundation for the deliberations of the Conference and, it was hoped, its success. Among the many anniversaries being observed in 1985 there was one which gave no cause for celebration - the tragedy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. True, those terrible events had not been re-enacted, but the nuclear arsenal of the world today comprised an equivalent of over one million Hiroshima bombs, thereby increasing the danger of nuclear war. It was just such a danger that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was endeavouring to avert by preventing the dissemination of nuclear weapons and fostering peaceful nuclear co-operation. The Treaty had unequivocally answered the question whether to use nuclear energy for co-operation or for
confrontation. It was therefore incumbent on the Third Review Conference to ensure that the implementation of the Treaty was equally unequivocal.

ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT (agenda item 2)

3. The ACTING PRESIDENT said that after consultation among the different regional groups represented at the Conference, it had been agreed to appoint Mr. Shaker (Egypt) as President of the Conference.

4. Mr. Shaker (Egypt) was elected President of the Conference by acclamation.

5. The PRESIDENT thanked all delegations for the honour they had done to his country and himself by electing him President of the Conference. There were many who considered the Conference to be the most important of the 1980s, since the results of its work could have wide repercussions for the future of peace and security in the world. He had succeeded as President of the Conference two eminent personalities who had greatly contributed towards strengthening the Treaty. He paid a tribute to them and assured the members of the third Review Conference that he would seek inspiration in their wisdom. He thanked the non-governmental organizations for their work in informing public opinion in that very important field, and he undertook to make every effort, with the co-operation of everyone, to bring the Conference to a successful conclusion. It provided a unique opportunity to review what had been done to put an end to the nuclear threat and see what might be accomplished both to remove the threat and to foster peaceful uses of nuclear energy. A great deal of progress had already been made and the international community had laid the foundations for co-operation among all countries in order to bring an end to the nuclear arms race and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. He expressed the hope that in the weeks to come participants might review what had been done so far and take decisions to make it possible to progress towards the targets set.

MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS

6. Mr. MARTENSON (Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs) read the following message to the Conference from the Secretary-General of the United Nations:

"Forty years ago Hiroshima and Nagasaki were in ruins. Smoke hung over the desolate wastelands. The survivors were exposed to the incurable afflictions of atomic radiation. Still today, thousands touched by that frightful phenomenon are burdened with an agonizing existence and demonstrate the horror caused by the use of what now must be seen as two small, primitive and inefficient atomic bombs.

As the Third Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons opens in Geneva, preparations are under way in New York for the fortieth session of the General Assembly of the World Organization that was created 'to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war'. In the 40 years of its existence, it has been a major objective of the United Nations to prevent the further use of nuclear weapons. This challenge must now be faced in the alarming
circumstances of even more sophisticated arms systems, and of the awareness that even a limited nuclear exchange could well jeopardize human survival.

Thus, for those vested with responsibility for the well-being of their countries, avoidance of a nuclear war is surely the most critical obligation. Political differences must not be allowed to impede that task. I particularly wish to stress again on this occasion, that unless the nuclear arms race between the major Powers is halted and the further spread of military nuclear capability deterred, the terrible possibility of wholesale destruction will increase yet further and the fear of a final catastrophe will shadow our daily existence.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was agreed upon as an important means of reducing the likelihood of this eventuality. It has already been a central element in efforts to restrain the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons. Many States now have the technical capability to undertake military nuclear programmes of their own, but consciously adopt a policy of restraint in this regard. The existence of the Non-Proliferation Treaty permits them to do so more readily because of the confidence engendered by the safeguards applied under the Treaty.

But the Treaty is not a one-way street. In signing it, the nuclear-weapons States Parties agreed to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. In this respect, the implementation of the Treaty has been largely one-sided, to the understandable concern and profound dissatisfaction of its non-nuclear-weapons parties. There must be recognition of the fact that restraint on one side can not reasonably be demanded in the face of unlimited expansion on the other. No doubt, as in the past, this issue will figure prominently in the present Review Conference and in discussions on the future of the Treaty.

The Treaty parties - nuclear and non-nuclear-weapons States alike - have a fundamental interest in its effectiveness and viability. This can be furthered by full compliance with the Treaty's provisions by all the parties and by progress towards nuclear disarmament, each of which can encourage the universal adherence to the Treaty that is also critical to its long-term effectiveness. It is highly welcome in this regard that the two most powerful nuclear States are again engaged in disarmament talks, although there has been no visible progress so far. Agreement between them that would lead to real progress in nuclear disarmament would accord with the expectations arising from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and with the most basic interests of the entire international community.

This Review Conference will be dealing with subjects that can profoundly influence the present world and the prospects for future generations. I send you my most sincere wishes for productive deliberations and a positive outcome."
7. Mr. PETROSYANZ (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) read a message from Mr. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in which he said that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the outcome of collective efforts, had proven its viability in practice. Not a single new nuclear-weapon State had appeared since its conclusion. It had also provided the basis for the establishment of an international régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which had become an effective instrument of peace. It had created favourable conditions for broad international co-operation in peaceful uses of the atom which was essential for the solution of the problem of providing mankind with energy as well as other major economic problems of common interest. In that respect credit should go to IAEA. The Soviet Union was strongly in favour of expanding and deepening such co-operation.

8. Faithful to its obligations under the Treaty, the Soviet Union had done and would continue to do its utmost in order both to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to halt the nuclear arms race. The Soviet Union had frequently taken unilateral steps in that direction, thereby setting an example and helping to reach agreement on the limitation and cessation of the nuclear arms race. The USSR was committed not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. If those nuclear Powers that had not yet done so would follow that example, it would be tantamount to banning the use of nuclear weapons. The moratorium on any nuclear explosion, announced by the Soviet Union, was fresh evidence of its desire to facilitate the cessation of the nuclear arms race. There should be no doubt that a mutual USSR-United States of America moratorium in that area would create favourable conditions for concluding an international treaty on complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapons tests and would contribute to a more comprehensive implementation of the provisions of the Treaty.

9. The issue was inseparable from that of the struggle to prevent the militarization of outer space. If space was used to serve war, the nuclear threat would be dramatically increased, but if the use of space was kept peaceful, it would become possible to make headway in solving a whole series of problems relating to the limitation and reduction of nuclear arsenals. It would likewise open up vast possibilities for all-round international co-operation in the most diverse spheres of human activity both on earth and in space. Such was also the objective of the concrete proposals on international co-operation in the peaceful exploration of outer space to be submitted by the Soviet Union to the fortieth session of the United Nations General Assembly.

STATEMENT BY THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

10. Mr. BLIX (Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency) said that although the Agency was not a mechanism for disarmament, one of its objectives was that nuclear energy should be used for exclusively peaceful
purposes, and it had acquired practical experience in that field, particularly in the implementation of the safeguards system, which might throw some light on obstacles to disarmament and the means of overcoming them.

11. While disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons were crucial issues which deserved to be resolved whatever the world political climate, the importance of the state of international relations for their solution should not be overlooked. It was therefore essential to create a climate in which Governments would feel less likely to resort to the nuclear deterrent in order to defend themselves. States could not be expected to give up their legitimate interests and ambitions for influence, but it was essential that they should adopt a code of conduct to limit competition between countries and social systems. Such a code of conduct would be based in particular on the principles of non-use of force, non-intervention and peaceful settlement of disputes. States should reach an understanding on the significance of those principles and respect them, thereby helping to create a climate of international confidence.

12. In addition, States should more consistently make use of the opportunities provided by the intergovernmental organizations which they themselves had created to serve as instruments of co-operation. Of course, those organizations did not have the power simply to make conflicts of interest disappear, but they had the advantage of helping States little by little to build up the habit of institutionalized co-operation, which was perhaps even more important.

13. The verification of the implementation of treaties relating to arms control and disarmament was a sine qua non for creating and maintaining international confidence. It was most certainly at the level of safeguards that the experience of the Agency had most to offer.

14. First, if States had deemed it necessary to establish an elaborate verification system simply to guarantee the observance of the principle of non-acquisition of nuclear weapons, any agreement relating to actual nuclear disarmament would presumably require reliable verification measures. But it could not be expected that such a system would become an international police force which would intervene in cases of non-application of the Treaty nor that the whole of the territory of a State would be open to inspection.

15. Secondly, implementation of the safeguards system by the Agency showed that the more sensitive the installation, the more intensive the verification, plants for reprocessing or enriching or manufacturing nuclear fuel were inspected more closely than, for example, light-water reactors.

16. Thirdly, there were those who would no doubt consider on-site inspections as an encroachment on the sovereignty of States. The fact should not be overlooked that, as was the case for the Agency, safeguards inspections only took place at the invitation of a sovereign State and on the basis of an agreement with it. It would be more appropriate to view the verification system as a service to a State wishing to acquire credibility it could not obtain by itself.
17. Fourthly, by agreeing to such inspection, a State naturally expected that other parties would be reassured about the peaceful use of the safeguarded installations and would act accordingly. It was for that reason that the Israeli attack in June 1981 on the IAEA-safeguarded nuclear research centre in Iraq had given cause for serious concern. Clearly a legal instrument should be adopted which explicitly prohibited any armed attack against nuclear installations devoted to peaceful purposes. It should perhaps be emphasized that anyone with doubts about the peaceful nature of a safeguarded installation should refer back to the international machinery responsible for safeguards.

18. Turning to matters dealt with in background papers submitted by the Agency and bearing on articles III, IV and V of the Treaty, he observed that whereas some aspects of the Treaty were very controversial, the international community was practically unanimous in its support of the broad objectives of the non-proliferation régime.

19. First, it was encouraging to note that almost all Governments agreed that the spread of nuclear weapons was to be avoided at all costs. That attitude ought to find expression in further formal adherence to the Treaty, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), of 14 February 1967, 1/ or other arrangements or full-scope safeguards agreements.

20. Secondly, Governments were practically all in agreement that the safeguards system maintained by the Agency was useful and even essential for maintaining nuclear trade, facilitating the transfer of nuclear technology and creating a climate of international confidence.

21. Thirdly, there was universal support for the idea of continuous transfer of knowledge and technology concerning the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Some criticized the restraints imposed on transfer but did not contest the principle.

22. The most important application of nuclear energy was certainly nuclear power, and the Agency was devoting an important part of its activities to that. Expert meetings organized by the Agency and its many publications constituted an important way in which States parties to the Treaty and other States might participate in the exchange of scientific and technological information on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Although the expansion of nuclear power worldwide had lagged behind anticipated growth for a number of reasons (low increase in electricity demand during the recession, high interest rates, public opposition etc.), he was confident that the economic viability, reliability and safety of nuclear plants, particularly from the environmental point of view, would in due course lead to a renewed upswing in demand for plants. One of the prime tasks of the Agency was to facilitate that evolution and solve some of the problems which it posed. Nuclear power

for the production of electricity was very unevenly spread among countries. One of the reasons was the size of current types of power reactors, which were often too large for the small grids of many developing countries. Inadequate skilled manpower, weak organizational and industrial infrastructures as well as the financial burden were also obstacles in the way of the adoption of nuclear power. The Agency was seeking to assist Member States to solve those problems and had undertaken a study on the viability of small and medium-sized power reactors.

23. Countries which might decide to install nuclear power plants would naturally wish to have the assurance that they would be able to continue to import fuel, spare parts and relevant technologies without any problem. Suppliers on the other hand would demand that importers should continue to show by their acts that they were respecting the commitment to use imported equipment or material for purely peaceful purposes. The Committee on Assurances of Supply had been dealing with that question within the Agency for five years. Its activities, as well as the evolution of the situation, had contributed towards attenuating the problem somewhat. While the number of suppliers of nuclear plant and uranium had increased, thereby giving a wider choice to importers and helping to ensure supply, the market trend in the field of enrichment, reduced interest in reprocessing, and the fact that suppliers were beginning to be aware that they must maintain or restore a record of reliability, had reduced the incentive to importing countries to acquire an expensive independence in their fuel cycle through technologies which might be used for military purposes. Lastly, the Committee itself had reached positive conclusions in its consideration of several practical measures to facilitate international co-operation, including measures for alleviating technical and administrative problems with international shipments, emergency and back-up mechanisms and mechanisms for the revision of intergovernmental nuclear co-operation agreements.

24. In his view it would be possible to take a number of other practical measures which could facilitate the use of nuclear power and increase international confidence. The existence of multinational facilities, for example, would give their owners a stronger feeling of participation, assurance and influence. Co-operation in the establishment of a system of international spent fuel storage might be a solution to a problem which would become urgent in a few years.

25. It would certainly be interesting to link fuel cycle services with high-level nuclear waste storage and disposal services. With the rapid progress being made in technology for the storage and disposal of such waste it should not be an insurmountable problem. Importing countries with limited nuclear programmes would probably be more inclined to turn to existing suppliers for reprocessing. Once they wished to ensure that their supplies were not contributing to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, ought suppliers not to feel an obligation to facilitate the storage and disposal of the high-level waste which their technology generated?

26. There were many applications of nuclear technology, particularly in industry and medicine and above all in agriculture. They were making their way rapidly in industrialized and developing countries alike. Nuclear
techniques to improve crops and preserve food — radiation-induced mutation in plants, the use of radioisotopes to measure the uptake of fertilizers or to trace groundwater and the use of irradiation as a means of decontaminating food — were assuming particular importance for many developing countries. In all those fields the Agency was assisting Governments to build up local scientific capacity through the supply of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information. It was also assisting them in the field of radiation protection and had been instrumental in the worldwide emergence of secondary standard dosimetry laboratories.

27. Generally speaking, nuclear techniques had come out of the laboratory to be put to practical use and that trend was reflected in the Agency's technical assistance and co-operation programme. Requests for training assistance were today focused less on pure science and more on applied topics. A training element was being increasingly integrated into projects and combined with provision of equipment and expert advice.

28. Resources available for technical assistance and co-operation through the Agency had increased by about 20 per cent per year through the 1980-1984 period. Targets for the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund, which were established each year on the basis of IPFs, had doubled from $13 million for 1981 to $26 million for 1985 and would increase to $30 million for 1986. The institution of IPFs was an important step towards making the financing of technical assistance predictable and assured. The Fund was supplemented by extra-budgetary resources, which, at the request of the donor, were often used preferentially or exclusively for non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. While it was obvious that the Agency could not fund large-scale projects such as power reactors, the fact remained that if given more resources it could do much more to assist developing countries in the early stages of introducing nuclear power and in an advisory capacity during siting, construction and operation.

29. Turning to the safeguards system, he observed that its establishment, development and functioning had certainly not been without problems; but many features of it were encouraging.

30. First, the fact that 125 States had explicitly accepted safeguards by accepting the Treaty, in addition to those States which were parties to other agreements and conventions, was in itself remarkable, even though the idea of full-scope safeguards remained unacceptable to some States.

31. Secondly, some 98 per cent of all nuclear installations in non-nuclear-weapon States were under safeguards. Throughout its existence the system had not once experienced any diversion of fissionable materials under safeguard or other misuse of safeguarded material or installation. In one case the installations of a State had been deemed inadequate from the point of view of safeguards, and that had been reported. The matter had subsequently been remedied with the co-operation of the State concerned. What was more serious, although it did not reflect on the manner in which the safeguards system operated, was that since 1979 the number of non-nuclear-weapon States
constructing or operating unsafeguarded facilities and having the capacity to produce material that could be used for weapons had increased from three to five.

32. Thirdly, 18 additional States had concluded safeguards agreements within the framework of the Treaty since the Second Review Conference. Some 40 States still had to conclude agreements, but since hardly any of them had significant nuclear activities, the problem was more a legal than a practical one.

33. Fourthly, there was nothing to suggest that the safeguards system had ever hampered production or use of nuclear energy or obstructed research in that field.

34. Fifthly, while the number and complexity of installations subjected to safeguards had continuously posed new challenges to the system, the Agency and the Governments had helped to keep the system viable through their programmes to support safeguards. Thus the problems raised by the safeguarding of on-load reactors, long-term storage facilities for spent fuel elements and enrichment plants using ultracentrifuge technology had been successfully tackled. However, it should not be forgotten that there must be adequate resources to maintain and improve the system so that it created the desired confidence while keeping the cost of verification as low as possible. The construction of facilities handling large quantities of enriched uranium or plutonium, or new technologies such as lasers, raised new problems which should really be addressed already at the stage when such technologies and facilities were being devised.

35. It was true that the safeguards system was still grappling with a number of problems. All Governments would naturally like to spend as few resources as possible on it, and most countries felt that it was more urgent to tackle development. The secretariat, which was responsible for the credibility of the system, was doing all it could to increase efficiency, but would like to see a steady increase in the resources made available. In view of what the safeguards system represented the $30 million spent on it annually would seem to be a very modest sum, and the 180 inspectors, backed up by 75 headquarters staff, would seem a very modest force to cover almost 900 nuclear facilities. On the whole, the secretariat enjoyed excellent co-operation with the Governments which invited the Agency to inspect their facilities. That was hardly surprising, since the issuing of safeguards reports was really a service to the safeguarded State, providing an assurance of the peaceful nature of its activities.

36. In his opinion, the formulation used to define the objective of safeguards, namely to deter from diversion by risk of detection, was misleading. Countries did not invite safeguards to avoid succumbing to temptation but to prove that they were continuing in good faith to pursue exclusively non-military aims with their safeguarded nuclear activities as pledged. However, it was true that in order to be credible, safeguards operations must be sufficiently thorough and frequent to make the risk of detection a deterrent against any idea of diversion.
37. In principle, safeguarded States and the Agency had an interest in allowing safeguards activities to proceed in the smoothest and most economical manner possible. In practice, however, problems might arise. For example, safeguards equipment might not be considered acceptable or the inspectors designated might not be accepted in sufficient numbers to permit the Agency to operate with maximum efficiency. All those problems could, however, be solved given good will. Governments had undoubtedly already gained very great benefits from the existence of the safeguards system in that it gave them increased confidence so that their nuclear trade was not obstructed by non-proliferation concerns. In addition, they were also provided with an opportunity to check on the effectiveness of their own national safeguards systems, particularly for the physical protection of nuclear material within their jurisdiction, for example against seizure of nuclear material by terrorists. In that context it should be mentioned that the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material had been ratified by 14 States. Seven more ratifications were necessary for its entry into force.

38. Given the slower pace of nuclear development foreseen for the years ahead, it could be expected that there would be a consolidation of the safeguards system, which had rapidly evolved to become a professional, experienced verification system serving the Treaty and relied on by the Treaty. Four of the nuclear-weapon States had concluded agreements with the Agency on safeguards in their peaceful nuclear sectors, and the fifth, China, had negotiated nuclear co-operation agreements with other States requiring safeguards on nuclear trade between the parties. It might thus be concluded that all nuclear-weapon States were ready to accept safeguard verification. Inspections had already taken place in the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France, and the first such inspection had recently taken place in the Soviet Union.

39. The importance of the safeguards system in the nuclear-weapon States was not so much what it implied in the field of non-proliferation as the fact that it constituted a precedent for verification of nuclear activities in those States and a first experience of such activities in that field which, it was to be hoped, would prove useful in discussions on the question of verification within the framework of agreements on nuclear disarmament. The world had been successful so far in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries. To sustain that success, an expanded transfer of technology in the peaceful nuclear field, a strengthening of the safeguards system and, above all, tangible results in nuclear disarmament negotiations were necessary. Only then could the Treaty be said to have lived up to the expectations placed on it in 1968.

ADOPTION OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE (agenda item 4)

40. The President said that if there was no objection he would take it that the Conference wished to adopt the draft rules of procedure as contained in annex IV of document NPT/CONF.III/1.

41. It was so decided.
42. The PRESIDENT said with reference to rule 44 of the rules of procedure, that a number of non-governmental organizations had requested observer status at the Conference. He intended to proceed with consultations on that issue and to submit his proposals for the consideration of the Conference. He suggested postponement of agenda item 5, on the election of the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the three Main Committees, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee, and of agenda item 6 on the election of Vice-Presidents, since not all regional groups were ready to propose candidates.

CONFIRMATION OF THE NOMINATION OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (agenda item 8)

43. The PRESIDENT said that, in accordance with the recommendation of the Preparatory Committee, the Secretary-General of the United Nations had decided to nominate Mr. Benjamin Sanders for the office of Provisional Secretary-General of the Review Conference. In the absence of any objection, he would take it that the Conference approved the decision.

44. It was so decided.

45. Mr. SANDERS (Secretary-General of the Conference) expressed his appreciation of the honour done to him and assured participants that the secretariats of the United Nations and IAEA would do all they could to assist them in their work.

ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA (agenda item 9)

46. The PRESIDENT said that if there was no objection he would take it that the Conference approved the provisional agenda as contained in annex II to the final report of the Preparatory Committee (document NPT/CONF.III/l), including the recommendation for the allocation of items to the three Main Committees.

47. It was so decided.

PROGRAMME OF WORK (agenda item 10) AND ADOPTION OF ARRANGEMENTS FOR MEETING THE COSTS OF THE CONFERENCE (agenda item 11)

48. The PRESIDENT briefly drew attention to matters of procedure concerning the programme of work and invited the Conference to accept the proposed cost-sharing formula proposed in the appendix to annex IV of document NPT/CONF.III/l with the necessary adjustments.

49. It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 5.05 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 2nd MEETING

Wednesday, 28 August 1985, at 10.55 a.m.

President: Mr. SHAKER (Egypt)

GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 12), INCORPORATING THE MESSAGE OF MR. RONALD REAGAN, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

1. Mr. BARRY (Ireland) said that at the beginning of the third review of the Treaty's implementation it was reassuring to note that the number of States parties had grown still further, a development which bore witness to the continuing validity of the Treaty's underlying premises. The international community was today called upon to pursue the goals of peace and security with greater dedication than ever before. Of all the attempts made to meet that challenge thus far, none had been more effective than the Treaty.

2. In reviewing the Treaty's implementation, the Conference had to adopt a dual perspective. On the one hand, it had to consider the achievements and failures of the past 15 years; on the other hand, it had to try to ensure that, when the Treaty reached its term in 10 years' time, the non-proliferation régime established in accordance with it would have become a continuing part of international discipline in the nuclear age.

3. The Treaty was one of the most important arms control agreements yet concluded. In its origins, it had represented a response to the danger, widely recognized in the 1950s, of the emergence of a large number of additional nuclear-weapon States. The Treaty had been designed to provide a framework in which nuclear disarmament negotiations could take place and, at the same time, had laid the foundations for an international order capable of providing for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Without the link established between the pursuit of nuclear disarmament negotiations and restraint by the international community, the Treaty would have had little meaning and even less support as an instrument of international law agreed between sovereign States.

4. The Conference's first task was to ascertain to what extent the Treaty's provisions in regard to the further spread of nuclear weapons had been respected. Like the two preceding Review Conferences, the present Conference would undoubtedly find that the parties to the Treaty, both nuclear and non-nuclear, had indeed demonstrated their commitment to the Treaty's provisions in that respect. The fact could not be ignored, however, that since the Treaty's entry into force, nuclear weapons capability had been acquired by a number of States which had remained outside the Treaty and that, moreover, those States were in regions troubled by tensions and instability. Those few States which today actively pursued the goal of acquiring nuclear weapons capability undoubtedly did so in pursuit of a notion of security which was undermined by their own actions.

5. The Conference also had to consider the implementation of the Treaty's provisions on measures of nuclear disarmament and the progress made towards the Treaty's ultimate objective, a world free of nuclear weapons. The world
had recently been reminded of the appalling consequences of the use of nuclear weapons 40 years previously. Clearly, nobody was advocating that such weapons should ever be used again, but as long as they existed, there could be no certainty of preventing nuclear war.

6. The Treaty was not in itself a programme for nuclear disarmament but, rather, its pre-condition. By foregoing the option of nuclear weapons capability and submitting to continuous scrutiny of their activities in the nuclear field, the 127 non-nuclear-weapon States had set the scene for action by the nuclear-weapon States. It was for the latter to take measures of actual nuclear disarmament. Unfortunately, little progress could be registered in that regard. Indeed, the levels of nuclear armaments held by the nuclear-weapon States today exceeded by several orders of magnitude the levels which had existed in 1970, when the Treaty had entered into force. It could be argued that, through the SALT negotiations, the balance of nuclear weapons had become more stable in the past 15 years. The mechanisms for consultation, verification and confidence-building in the intervening period might even have rendered nuclear war less likely. However, the Treaty had not yet induced the nuclear-weapon States to turn away from nuclear deterrence as the foundation of their security.

7. The fact that nuclear weapons were increasingly regarded as an essential foundation for international security in the nuclear age was a matter of grave concern to his Government as well as to many others. There was increasingly a resigned acceptance that negotiations could do no more in the foreseeable future than stabilize balances based on existing strategies and doctrines. Certainly, any destabilizing development had to be avoided, but it was essential, if the world was ever to shed its dependence on nuclear deterrence, to start looking seriously beyond nuclear weapons.

8. It would be irresponsible to erode the Treaty by threatening to overturn its achievements on account of those shortcomings. At the same time, it had to be emphasized yet again that the Treaty embodied an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations, and that those who had voluntarily surrendered the right to acquire nuclear weapons had, by so doing, accorded a special status and a special responsibility to the Powers already in possession of those weapons. The fact that so many sovereign States had refrained for so long, as a matter of political principle, from developing nuclear weapon capabilities of their own was a challenge to the nuclear-weapon States to take their responsibilities seriously in working towards a radical reduction in nuclear armaments.

9. For that reason, the idea of a comprehensive test-ban treaty had always occupied a particularly important place among disarmament measures. In the absence of such a treaty, the nuclear-weapon States' approach to the role of nuclear weapons in international security could not be considered to have changed and their commitment to the purposes of the Treaty in that respect could not be said to have taken concrete shape. To halt testing would not in itself imply the end of nuclear weapons; it would, however, be a first step towards lowering the emphasis on nuclear weapons in international security. A comprehensive test-ban treaty was therefore, as the Treaty had foreseen, the first milestone in any serious programme of nuclear disarmament.
10. At the Second Review Conference, Ireland had called for a moratorium on nuclear testing as a contribution towards progress at the trilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty taking place at that time. He wished to reiterate the call with renewed vigour on the present occasion. The Irish Government appealed for a demonstration of genuine willingness to give fresh impetus to the negotiation of such a treaty. What was needed was a commitment by all the nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT to halt testing at the earliest possible date, coupled with a commitment to proceed to the negotiated conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

11. It was disappointing to note that there had been little progress in any aspect of disarmament negotiations over the previous five years, despite a rising tide of world-wide public concern at the apparently ceaseless spiral of the arms race. The foundations of security and peace in the nuclear age had been subject to critical questioning. Ireland therefore welcomed the resumption of bilateral talks between the United States and the Soviet Union and urged them to maintain the dialogue with a view to achieving concrete results.

12. The commitment of the countries of the South Pacific region to the NPT was well known and the recent agreement, signed on 6 August 1985 at Rarotonga, on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific was a particular source of satisfaction. He willingly associated himself with the call made in the Treaty of Rarotonga for the nuclear-weapon States to respect its provisions.

13. Negative security assurances were a long-standing subject of discussion and it was disappointing that agreement had not been reached on even such a limited measure. Nevertheless, it had to be recognized that they could only be a part of the process leading to nuclear disarmament because the effects of a nuclear war would obviously ignore the boundaries on which such assurances were based.

14. In addition to providing the framework for a programme of nuclear disarmament, the Treaty had become the charter for peaceful nuclear co-operation. Nuclear energy could render great service to mankind, and co-operation in the nuclear field required confidence in the peaceful nature of the programmes pursued by States and institutions. Safeguards, implemented in an exemplary manner by IAEA, were the framework for all peaceful nuclear co-operation. Even if nuclear weapons ceased to exist, an effective safeguards régime would be necessary to guarantee confidence in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It should be emphasized that both suppliers and consumers parties to the Treaty must act consistently with its purposes and provisions. The consequences of adhering to the Treaty must not result in disadvantages for the parties. Some States refused to accept full-scope safeguards and, at the same time, developed major nuclear programmes in sensitive areas of the fuel cycle. Parties to the NPT had a responsibility to observe strictly its provisions. The introduction of full-scope safeguards as

---

a condition of supply by all parties would enhance the wider non-proliferation régime and would reduce the possibility of advantages accruing to States which had not adhered to the Treaty.

15. In recent years, the question of protecting peaceful nuclear facilities from attack had taken on new importance. Parties which had submitted to the discipline of safeguards on all their nuclear facilities were entitled to international guarantees that such facilities would not be attacked. The Review Conference would have to study what measures might be taken to resolve that problem. Since all the nuclear-weapon States parties had concluded agreements with IAEA to submit at least some of their civil facilities to safeguards, it seemed opportune to consider what further steps could be taken towards separation of the civil and military fuel cycles. Such separation would represent an important confidence-building measure as well as a genuine contribution towards an eventual cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapon purposes. IAEA's role in technical co-operation could perhaps be extended beyond matters relating to generation of power and encompass other applications of nuclear energy which currently offered considerable potential and might be more appropriate to immediate needs in the developing countries, as well as in many developed ones. For example, nuclear energy could be applied in fields such as agriculture and medicine.

16. The success of the Treaty depended on the attitude of all the parties. The premise of the Treaty was the expectation that its non-proliferation régime would become a part of generally accepted international law, but that expectation was threatened by the prospect of further spread of nuclear weapons capability and by the failure to curtail and eliminate nuclear weapons. States which still remained outside the Treaty must be urged to adhere to it, particularly those States with nuclear programmes of a type which fostered, even if they did not create, regional instability. The first bold step towards nuclear disarmament would be the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

17. The Third Review Conference should have as its primary goal the reaffirmation of the Treaty. It should underline the Treaty's successful record in the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons. To be effective, the review must be self-critical and must acknowledge that the Treaty's achievements had not fulfilled all expectations. The Conference should re-emphasize the overriding importance of the goal of nuclear disarmament and it must not become resigned to the absence of progress. It should also reaffirm the validity of the non-proliferation régime and recognize IAEA's important role in that respect. It must examine ways of continually improving the effectiveness of safeguards and of making peaceful nuclear energy available to parties in such a way as to extend the uses of such a valuable resource. Finally, it should conclude with a renewed commitment by the parties to the goals of rejection of nuclear weapon capability as a basis for security and the exercise or responsibilities by the nuclear-weapon States so as to achieve the elimination of such weapons for all time.
18. **Mr. ADELMAN** (United States of America) said that, 40 years earlier the world had witnessed the birth of a new weapon of unprecedented destructiveness. Since that time the world had had to face the promise and the peril of the atom. The Conference now had the solemn responsibility of considering the most important subject of the age, the nuclear challenge, and the contribution made by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In that connection, he read out the following message from President Reagan:

"It gives me great pleasure to address this message to the delegates to the Third Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference - an event that also commemorates the fifteenth anniversary of that Treaty. The Non-Proliferation Treaty is an historic accomplishment. It is a critical cornerstone in our common effort to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons, while providing an essential framework for Parties to reap the benefits of the peaceful atom. By reducing the danger of the spread of nuclear weapons and the risks of nuclear war, it contributes to the security and to the safety of all nations and all peoples.

"My central arms control objective has been to reduce substantially and ultimately to eliminate nuclear weapons and rid the world of the nuclear threat. Toward that end, the United States has proposed in Geneva radical reductions in the number of existing nuclear weapons. This, I believe, is the most direct and best course to pursue if we are to eliminate the danger of nuclear war.

"At the same time, I believe that verifiable limits on nuclear testing can play a useful, although more modest, role. For this reason, on July 29, I reiterated my desire to get a process going which will enable the United States and the Soviet Union to establish the basis for effectively verifying limits on underground testing. We have invited the Soviet Union to send observers, with any instrumentation devices they wish to bring, to measure a nuclear test at our site. This invitation has no conditions.

"Yet another critical objective of the United States is to build a stable, more co-operative relationship with the Soviet Union. Of the shared interests between our two countries, avoiding war and reducing the level of arms are among the greatest. As I have said before, co-operation begins with communication, and I look forward to my meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev this November.

"All Parties to the NPT now share the responsibility of taking stock, of looking in a fair and balanced manner at how well the Treaty's vital goals are being met, and of considering how we might do even better in the future.

"As the operation of this important Treaty is reviewed, the Conference should also celebrate the fact that the Treaty has been a tremendous success. The United States remains firmly committed to the objectives embodied in this Treaty, and to its vision of a more stable and secure world for all nations.".
19. At a point half way between the date of the entry into force of the NPT and the date when the question of its extension would have to be considered, it was incumbent upon the Conference to take stock of the Treaty. There was a diversity of views on how the nuclear challenge should be met - a diversity which the Americans, as free people, cherished. The actual outcome of the Conference was, however, far less important than the fact that it provided for an honest and balanced review which would undoubtedly disclose the stake that every nation had in the Treaty and prove that the Treaty had made the world a safer place.

20. The Treaty had three goals: to stop the spread of nuclear weapons; to help member nations acquire peaceful nuclear capabilities; and to promote further progress in comprehensive arms control and disarmament measures.

21. Most progress had certainly been achieved with the first of those goals. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, it had been feared that the spread of nuclear weapons could not be halted. A special committee of the United States National Planning Association, for example, had predicted that by 1970 most nations with appreciable military strength would have nuclear weapons in their arsenals; similar concerns had been partly responsible for a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly in 1961 calling attention to the dangers and the need to halt proliferation. Two years later, President Kennedy had warned of a world that would have 15 to 20 nations with nuclear weapons by 1975. World leaders had, however, wisely taken positive action to head off such danger, and the result had been the entry into force of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1970. Since then only one additional country - India - had detonated a nuclear explosive device.

22. The fact that the world was more secure today was partly due to the wide adherence to the Treaty, the readiness of more than 125 countries to renounce the acquisition of nuclear explosives and to accept IAEA safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear activities. The Treaty's provisions had also served as a foundation for sound nuclear supply policies. It was particularly important to note that 15 more countries had joined the Treaty régime since the previous Review Conference and that its norms had been continuously reinforced since its creation.

23. All countries had an interest in preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons, which would threaten the security not only of the country concerned and of its allies but also of its neighbours and would ultimately undermine the security of the new owners themselves. Long-standing suspicions and tensions would be heightened and the risk of conflict increased, with resultant less security for each and every State. That simple fact underlay the co-operation to strengthen the NPT and was reflected in the many efforts being made to convince still more countries to join the Treaty - the most widely adhered to arms control treaty in history.

3/ General Assembly resolution 1665 (XVI).
24. Pledges of commitment, however, were not enough. Words had to be matched by action. The United States of America, for its part, had in the first place tightened still further its export procedures to reduce even more the likelihood that United States exports could contribute to the risk of further proliferation. It had worked with other NPT suppliers to upgrade the "trigger lists" created to assist parties in meeting their obligations under article III of the Treaty. Second, it had urged all nuclear suppliers to require comprehensive or full-scope safeguards on all of a non-nuclear-weapon State's peaceful nuclear activities as a condition for significant new supply commitments. Parties to the NPT already accepted such safeguards on their peaceful activities, to require acceptance by non-parties as a condition of supply would equalize the treatment of the two. IAEA's job would also be made much easier and greater assurance would be provided of a country's peaceful intentions in the nuclear field. The United States would continue to urge all suppliers to adopt that approach.

25. Third, since the previous Review Conference, the safeguard agreement permitting routine inspection of United States peaceful nuclear facilities had been implemented and IAEA now had the right to apply safeguards at over 230 United States private and Government-owned nuclear facilities. The United States would continue to welcome such inspections as a demonstration of its support for effective safeguards and it urged others to do likewise. It was pleased to note the recent conclusion of a Soviet voluntary safeguards agreement with IAEA and trusted that the USSR would make additional types and numbers of facilities eligible for safeguards. Similarly, it hoped that China would accept IAEA safeguards on some of its nuclear facilities.

26. Fourth, in 1981 the United States had ratified Additional Protocol I 4/ of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America, and had thus pledged not to store or deploy nuclear weapons in United States territories in the zone. It had earlier ratified Additional Protocol II 5/ of the Treaty, whereby the United States undertook not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The United States was also ready to study a new draft treaty, recently announced, on a nuclear-free zone for the South Pacific.

27. As to the NPT's second goal, to foster the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the picture was very good. Since the early days of the Atoms for Peace programme, the United States had assisted other countries in gaining the peaceful benefits of nuclear energy in medicine, science, industry and agriculture, in the belief that all NPT countries, and developing countries in particular, had a legitimate right to receive the benefits of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Furthermore, since the Treaty had been in existence, peaceful nuclear co-operation among the parties to it had steadily increased. The non-proliferation commitments of the parties to the Treaty had provided

5/ Ibid., p. 364.
confidence that peaceful nuclear assistance and exports would not be misused to produce nuclear explosives and had thus made it possible for nuclear supply to take place.

28. Assistance to parties to the Treaty had also grown. Over the past 15 years tens of thousands of students from developing countries members of the NPT had been trained in nuclear and related sciences; nearly 20 developing member States now had nuclear reactors; and since 1980, IAEA had provided nearly $150 million in technical assistance, the bulk of which went to NPT parties. Partly as a result of that, a significant amount of the electricity supply of the Republic of Korea was generated from nuclear energy, while Mexico, the Philippines and Egypt were preparing to build nuclear power plants. Still others might follow suit in due course. The United States had helped greatly in that connection; for example, virtually all its nuclear export financing, totalling over $1 billion, had been given to NPT parties; special training arrangements had been introduced to foster the transfer of technology only with parties to the NPT or the Treaty of Tlatelolco; hundreds of followships had been granted for technical training under IAEA, exclusively for NPT parties; all United States extra-budgetary funding of technical assistance projects not funded by IAEA had gone to NPT parties; United States regulations had been modified to facilitate the licensing of exports to NPT parties; and the United States had pledged nearly $22 million to the IAEA's technical assistance programme.

29. Thus, the United States had done much to promote peaceful nuclear programmes of use to the developing countries, and would continue to work with other countries to ensure that full advantage was taken of the peaceful promise of the atom.

30. With regard to the third goal of the NPT, as expressed in article VI of the Treaty, the United States had embarked in good faith on a vast range of arms control negotiations. While it shared the general sentiment that the results of those negotiations had been disappointing, that was no reason to disparage the NPT. The goal of substantial arms control existed independently of the NPT, although clearly reinforced by it. No other nation or set of nations had a greater desire for progress under article VI or for progress in arms control than did the United States. Preventing nuclear war and moving towards the elimination of nuclear weapons was one of the top priorities of President Reagan, who had repeatedly stated, both in public and in private, that nuclear war could never be won and must never be fought. The United States agreed that there had been slender progress towards the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons since the Treaty had entered into force, but it did not altogether agree with the explanations for that situation. Nevertheless, some progress had been made. The ABM Treaty set limits on the deployment of strategic defensive forces and the SALT treaties limited, but unfortunately did not reduce, the growth of strategic offensive forces.

31. No one would deny that there were too many nuclear weapons in the world and that what was most urgently needed was to reduce and eventually eliminate those weapons. His country was totally committed to that task. In addition to negotiations, it had taken action on its own and together with its allies to reduce nuclear weapons. Specifically, since the NPT had been negotiated in the 1960s, it had unilaterally reduced its total nuclear arsenal by one fourth, reduced the total destructive power of its arsenal by well over
one half, and since the Second Review Conference, had with its NATO allies withdrawn 1,000 nuclear warheads from Europe. In 1983 it had decided to withdraw another 1,400. The United States had also proposed that the Soviet Union should send observers, with any instrumentation devices they wished to bring with them, to measure one of its nuclear tests in the hope of thereby starting up a process to help effectively to verify limits on underground nuclear testing.

32. The United States of America remained committed to a complete ban on nuclear testing as a long-term goal, but did not agree that it should be the next step in the efforts to reduce the nuclear threat, for such a ban would not reduce nuclear weapons by one single weapon. The most urgent task was to make significant reductions in existing nuclear arsenals. Since the previous Review Conference, therefore, the United States had tabled far-reaching proposals, at the START and INF talks and now in Geneva, with a view to reducing radically the number of strategic ballistic missiles, their warheads, and their destructive potential. Other proposals by the United States were designed to eliminate a whole class of weapons - the intermediate-range nuclear forces.

33. The next round of nuclear and space talks was to resume shortly in Geneva. Although the stakes were high, the United States remained convinced that agreements could be reached which would strengthen the interests and security of all countries and it stood ready to make the necessary commitment to that end.

34. Fifteen years after the entry into force of the Treaty, it could be said that on balance the NPT had successfully served the interests of the parties and also of global security. In the four decades since the dawn of the atomic age, nuclear weapons had, thankfully, not been used. Those four decades had, none the less, seen countless conventional smaller wars, with the loss of hundreds of thousands of lives. In the final analysis, therefore, the Non-Proliferation Treaty should be evaluated by reference to the consequences that would have ensued had nuclear weapons been readily available and used in any of those conflicts. The Treaty had served well as a cornerstone in preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons. It had provided a moral and political imperative for the existing nuclear-weapon States to negotiate further measures to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons. Both aspects served the security of member and non-member States alike. In addition, the Treaty had made a valuable contribution to making available the benefits of the peaceful atom. On the whole, therefore, the NPT had been very successful and, without it, the world would be a far more dangerous place. That essential point should never be lost sight of, even if there was disappointment with progress in certain areas.

35. He invited the Conference to rededicate itself to the Treaty's principles and goals, which remained sound today. The United States would stand with other delegations in that rededication and in matching its actions to those principles in building on the successes of the Treaty.
36. Mr. HAYDEN (Australia) said that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which had more adherents than any treaty on arms control or disarmament, had made an unqualified contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security and must continue to do so. The Third Review Conference was the most important to be held under the Treaty, and faced the single and compelling task of strengthening the Treaty and redoubling the efforts to bring into it the few remaining countries which, while benefiting from it, had decided to remain outside. The Conference also had to lay the foundations for continuation of the Treaty beyond 1995. It was unthinkable that the NPT should be allowed to lapse, for it supplemented and strengthened the Charter of the United Nations.

37. The fact that the use of nuclear energy, because of its benefits, had spread throughout the world should not be permitted to bring with it widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons. Australia, which had the technology and skills to do so, had considered whether or not to develop a nuclear weapon shortly after the Treaty had been opened for signature. Ultimately, however, it had decided to put its faith in collective international action to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons and had unreservedly committed itself to the Treaty. Such commitment had enormous force throughout the world community, and Australia, along with more than 100 non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, had achieved collective self-defence through collective self-denial for the common good.

38. Commenting on some of the issues central to the operation of the Treaty, he said that under articles I and II, States Parties were divided into two categories: nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, each with specific obligations. Australia, as a non-nuclear-weapon State, had fully performed its obligations. It was a fact of immense significance that there was no reason to believe that any non-nuclear-weapon State Party had violated or sought to violate its obligations under article II, and the control of horizontal proliferation as provided for under the Treaty had been effective so far as all non-nuclear-weapon States Parties were concerned. The nuclear-weapon State Parties, too, had impeccably performed their obligations as possessors of nuclear materials and technology, something that also had to be recognized as a significant source of strength to the Treaty.

39. However, the expectations in connection with article VI that there would be real progress on measures of nuclear disarmament to stop the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, together with the expectations regarding the reaffirmation by the nuclear-weapon States of the intention, in the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, signed in Moscow on 5 August 1963, 6/ to seek an end to nuclear testing, had not been adequately fulfilled. It was a matter of very serious concern to Australia that the nuclear-weapon States had not kept fully to their side of the bargain. There was an urgent need for a comprehensive test-ban treaty to strengthen the present Treaty and all actions designed to halt

6/ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 480, No. 6964, p. 43. This Treaty is also known as the Partial Test Ban Treaty.
the nuclear arms race. The call of the world community over 25 years for a complete end to all nuclear testing was reiterated in agreements that formed part of international law and the United States of America and the Soviet Union, which conducted the large majority of nuclear tests, were parties to those agreements. That call by the international community, with which those two countries associated themselves, must be answered as a matter of the utmost priority. Arguments about the relevance of a test-ban treaty to nuclear disarmament and the proliferation of nuclear weapons were unconvincing; it was more important to consider the facts. The major testing programmes had a direct functional relationship to vertical proliferation and it was abundantly clear that, if testing was not militarily significant, it would not occur. Precisely because it was an integral part of nuclear weapons development, nuclear testing should end.

40. The arguments about the verifiability of such a treaty were also significant, for a treaty which was not adequately verifiable would be a dangerous illusion. Australia had no interest in illusory arms control. The Australian Government, which had devoted considerable attention to a comprehensive test-ban treaty with a view to introducing truly effective arms control and disarmament, had been endeavouring to assist in overcoming the procedural obstacles in the way of such a treaty. In the absence of a consensus on a full negotiating mandate, which would have been his country's natural preference, Australia had proposed both in the Conference on Disarmament and in the General Assembly that the Ad Hoc Committee of the Conference on Disarmament should work on scope, verification and compliance with a view to the negotiation of such a treaty. It had also proposed the immediate establishment of an international seismic monitoring network as a means of ensuring compliance with a test-ban treaty and had itself started to introduce additional national seismic monitoring capabilities. That approach, though overwhelmingly endorsed by the General Assembly, had been blocked by a handful of States at the Conference on Disarmament.

41. Nuclear testing undoubtedly played a significant role in the proliferation of nuclear weapons and all those who were serious about halting the nuclear arms race and containing the spread of nuclear weapons must agree on a nuclear test ban. Unilateral, unverifiable moratoria were not the answer. It was the Australian Government's firm conviction that what was urgently required was a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty and the necessary global means of verification of compliance with the treaty. It saw the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a means of achieving that aim in concrete terms. Indeed, the Australian Government was concerned that it would not have the support of the Australian people along the path of a more limited comprehensive nuclear test ban negotiating mandate if the mandate continued to be ineffective. That was why the Conference should seek to reconcile differences amongst the parties in their approaches to that urgent requirement. Nothing would strengthen the Treaty more than a firm commitment to embark forthwith on the difficult path of negotiating a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. The conclusion of such a treaty should not be made hostage to bilateral nuclear-and space negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Both of those countries had stated that they sought radical reductions leading to the ultimate elimination of their nuclear
weapons. While Australia applauded that goal it could not support any suggestion that the test ban treaty should be a bargaining chip in those negotiations.

42. It would be insensitive not to recognize the wider international political difficulties that had contributed to the inadequate implementation by nuclear-weapon States of obligations in respect of nuclear disarmament and an end to testing. Irrespective of the outcome of the Conference with regard to vertical proliferation, nuclear disarmament and nuclear testing, the Treaty remained one of continuing necessity. Australia, however, appealed strongly to the nuclear-weapon States to meet the expectations of the world community, since failure to do so might damage the Treaty.

43. Some of the Australian Government's deepest concerns related to the policies of a small number of non-signatory States which had developed, or might be developing, a nuclear explosive device. Most of those States had repeatedly said that they supported the non-proliferation objective and had no intention of developing a nuclear weapon, while citing all kinds of reasons for not joining the treaty régime. The Conference should appeal to those States, and especially those whose nuclear activities created legitimate concern, to join the treaty régime or, at the very least, to submit their national programmes to the inspection and control that was vitally necessary for the maintenance of international confidence. If what they said was correct, such inspection would reveal nothing damaging to the non-proliferation objective.

44. As to other measures of control and disarmament envisaged in the Treaty, he would mention in particular the agreement reached on 6 August 1985 at Rarotonga between the 14 member States of the South Pacific Forum, declaring the South Pacific to be a nuclear-free zone. The Treaty, inter alia, prohibited the development, testing and use of nuclear explosive devices in the South Pacific, opposed the dumping of nuclear waste at sea in the region, and provided that the export of nuclear material from the region would be conducted under strict safeguards. The zone covered by the Treaty represented a significant portion of the earth. Plainly, the Treaty was an important contribution to disarmament and the maintenance of peace and stability in the region.

45. Articles III and IV of the NPT, taken together with articles I and II, provided the basis for safe and constructive international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. There had been a substantial debate in Australia on the role Australia should or should not play in the international nuclear fuel cycle. His country had a special interest in the matter, since it possessed a substantial portion of the world's recoverable uranium resources, and responsible concern about what, if anything, should be done with its nuclear raw materials, supported by wide fears about the folly of a continuing arms race, had placed great demands on the Australian Government. Ultimately the "uranium debate" - a debate on denial versus control - had been resolved in favour of control. The Australian people had demanded a clear stand from their Government on the issues of non-proliferation and Australia's role under the NPT. For that reason, in 1983 the Australian Government had invited the Australian Science and Technology Council to prepare a report on
Australia's role in the nuclear fuel cycle. The report, tabled before Parliament in 1984, had a direct bearing on the NPT, including articles III and IV.

46. Following that inquiry, Australia had taken three major decisions of relevance to the work of the Conference. First, it had decided to promote acceptance by all States of a commitment not to provide nuclear items to non-nuclear-weapon States which were not members of the NPT or a treaty of similar coverage unless IAEA safeguards were applied to all the nuclear activities in those States at all times. IAEA safeguards were fundamental to the operation of the NPT and his delegation would be submitting a proposal to the Conference calling on all non-parties to adhere to the Treaty or to accept IAEA's full-scope safeguards and seeking a commitment from all parties to require the application of NPT or IAEA full-scope safeguards to the supply of nuclear items to all nuclear-weapon States. Such a commitment would significantly strengthen the non-proliferation regime and would also remove discrimination between safeguards conditions on supply accepted by non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT and those not parties to the NPT.

47. Second, the Australian Government had decided to strengthen the operation of the Australian Safeguards Office in keeping with the importance of the State systems of accounting and control of nuclear material to the effective operation of IAEA safeguards. In his Government's view, such systems were a key factor in the effective application of IAEA safeguards. It was therefore preparing to introduce specific legislation setting out in detail the responsibilities of the Australian Safeguards Office and to assist NPT parties within the region to establish and develop State systems of accounting and control.

48. Third, the Australian Government had reiterated its support for the establishment of an effective scheme for international plutonium storage. Plutonium was a sensitive nuclear material, posing special concern regarding proliferation, and the need for such a scheme, administered by IAEA, was a matter of increasing priority. Australia hoped that the Conference would agree that the establishment of the scheme merited the support of all NPT parties. Also, it supported the general objective of separation of civil and military fuel cycles in the nuclear-weapon States, in principle. A solution to that complex issue could lay the ground for the implementation of future nuclear disarmament agreements.

49. With reference to article IV of the Treaty, a provision of great significance, he said that an integral part of the agreement reached under the Treaty was that, parallel with the non-proliferation undertaking, all parties to the Treaty would be committed to contribute to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, "especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world". One of the chief criticisms of the Treaty was that it discriminated in favour of countries which had nuclear technology and materials and against those which did not. The Australian Government rejected that criticism but recognized the damage it caused. However, the countries that chose not to enter the non-proliferation régime should not be seen to be rewarded in terms of
co-operation as compared with those that had. The consistent application of full-scope safeguards, as proposed by his delegation, would put an end to any such rewards. The Australian Government was committed to the principle that an integral part of a viable non-proliferation régime was continuing co-operation between States Parties, in line with the objective of article IV of the Treaty.

50. For the Government and people of Australia, the Treaty was of paramount importance, particularly because of the nuclear source materials Australia possessed and the depth of its concern about nuclear weapons. Australia was directly involved because of the joint Australian-American facilities, which the Australian Government regarded as an essential part of the monitoring system in effective arms control. The Australians were also a people deeply committed to and reliant upon international co-operation. His country, though far removed from the traditional flashpoints and pressure areas of history, realized that it could not escape the effects of a nuclear war. The message of Australians to the Conference, therefore, was that the Treaty must be defended and strengthened to ensure that the world could be handed on to future generations, whole and entire and at peace.

51. Mr. BODSTROM (Sweden) said that the international community had attempted to establish control over the nuclear weapon ever since it had first been used 40 years previously. Today's arsenals of nuclear weapons could destroy everything created by man and thus the future of civilization. As long as nuclear weapons existed, there was a danger that they might be used. Therefore, the ultimate goal must be to eliminate all nuclear weapons. Sixty years ago agreement had been reached on the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons and the Conference on Disarmament was currently negotiating a convention on a total ban of such weapons. However, the use of nuclear arms would lead to even more cruel and widespread effects. It was therefore both immoral and politically unacceptable that there was not even a serious discussion concerning total prohibition of nuclear weapons.

52. The 1980s had started, and were continuing, with the deployment of nuclear weapons by both alliances, for example, SS 20 missiles by the Soviet Union, and Pershing II and cruise missiles by the United States. Those developments followed the well-known pattern of action and reaction which fuelled the arms race. The massive deployment of nuclear weapons outside the territories of the nuclear-weapon States themselves was especially significant and was a development related to the non-proliferation régime, especially articles I and II of the Treaty. Nuclear weapons should not be used against the will of the countries where they were stationed and command and control over them should not be transferred to a non-nuclear-weapon State. That principle must be observed also in times of crisis and war. In the course of the international debate, some disturbing questions regarding general problems of command and control had been raised. One consequence of the forward-basing was that warning times would be even shorter, something that could have a destabilizing effect and be especially dangerous in times of tension between nuclear-weapon States. With the increased accuracy resulting from forward-basing, another incentive for pre-emptive strike was added. In addition, both major nuclear-weapon States were preparing new advanced systems and constructing new land-based intercontinental missiles to add to their already huge arsenals.
53. The Non-Proliferation Treaty was the foremost political and legal instrument available to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and was one of the most important international treaties signed since the Second World War. The Third Review Conference should help to make clear what the current situation was and what action had to be taken to ensure and strengthen the non-proliferation régime. In the aftermath of the failure of the Second Review Conference, there had been a series of setbacks in negotiations and talks in the disarmament field and they had contributed to current difficulties in arms limitation and disarmament. He welcomed the reopening of the bilateral talks between the two super-Powers, as well as the meeting to take place in Geneva between the Soviet and American leaders. The question of nuclear disarmament, however, concerned all States and it was not acceptable that the future of civilization should lie in the hands of only one or two - or five - nuclear-weapon States; the non-nuclear-weapon States must also have a say. There was a certain anomaly in a situation in which a small number of States persistently based their security policy on nuclear weapons while the overwhelming majority sought their security in non-nuclear options. The two major Powers appeared to be so strongly engaged in the nuclear-weapons dimension of their interrelationship that they hardly gave a fair chance to non-nuclear possibilities, such as peaceful co-operation and diplomacy. The parties to the Treaty had wisely stated the importance of seeking a constructive approach to security problems by expressing the desire "to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States".

54. An international debate had been initiated on nuclear warfare from the point of international law. The charter of the United Nations prohibited resort to the threat or use of force except for self-defence. But even then the use of force had to be proportionate to the type and extent of the force used by the attacker. Traditional international law relating to armed conflict contained some general principles which in fact outlawed certain methods of warfare. Any attacks in violation of those principles would constitute breaches of international law. Legal obligations thus placed heavy responsibility on any country considering resort to the use of nuclear weapons.

55. The Treaty itself had actually functioned in one very important way: no nuclear-weapon State had emerged among the parties since it had been concluded. In addition, the implementation of undertakings by the non-nuclear-weapon States had been adequate and satisfactory. Unfortunately, the same could not be said of some of the commitments of the nuclear-weapon States, for the Treaty also dealt with vertical proliferation - the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, liquidation of all existing stocks and the elimination of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery. The nuclear-weapon States which had signed and ratified the NPT should live up to the letter and the spirit of their obligations. In his view, it was the nuclear-weapon States themselves that held the key to progress in preventing both horizontal and vertical proliferation.

56. A number of States not parties to the Treaty were perhaps on the verge of acquiring nuclear weapons; indeed, some were suspected of already possessing them. Countries which had not yet adhered to the Treaty must therefore be
encouraged to do so, and to that end the Nordic countries had carried out joint démarches in many capitals. However, the best and probably the only way to achieve the goal of universal adherence was to observe strictly the letter and spirit of all of the Treaty's articles. The failure of the super-Powers fully to comply with their obligations not only gave non-parties a perceived excuse to remain outside, but might also endanger the future of the non-proliferation régime itself.

57. In the 1960s, Sweden had decided that nuclear weapons should not form part of its national defence. Following extensive public debate, the conclusion had been reached that the acquisition of nuclear weapons would not be in the interest of Sweden's national security and defence and that assessment had been confirmed internationally by Sweden's signature of the Treaty in 1968. The NPT had no doubt created political and moral pressure on non-parties as well, but it was to be hoped that the rule of non-acquisition of nuclear weapons by the non-nuclear-weapon States, as laid down in the Treaty, would gradually be accepted by the world community as part of customary international law.

58. Another dimension had been added to the problem of horizontal proliferation, namely the consequences of individual groups, gaining possession of nuclear weapons. Many people believed that it had now become possible for terrorist groups to acquire nuclear devices, thereby increasing the risk of an era of nuclear terrorism. The nuclear-weapon States had an obvious responsibility to prevent such devices from getting into the hands of terrorist groups and, in that context, he urged all States which had not already done so to sign and ratify the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material of 1980, so that it might come into force.

59. The obvious first step in the struggle to avoid the threat of nuclear proliferation would be to conclude a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. In their report to the Second Review Conference, the three nuclear-weapon Powers participating in the tripartite negotiations in 1977-1980 had recognized that the members of the Conference on Disarmament had a strong interest in negotiations on a treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon test explosions. They also recognized that such a treaty would be of importance to all mankind. As a minimum requirement, the three nuclear-weapon States parties should recognize anew what they had stated then and should take practical steps to implement negotiations on such a treaty.

60. There were no insurmountable technical obstacles to concluding a nuclear test-ban treaty and existing scientific and technical capabilities made it possible to verify adequately a comprehensive nuclear test ban. In 1983, Sweden had submitted a draft comprehensive test-ban treaty, but so far not even a mandate for an ad hoc committee within the Conference on Disarmament had been agreed upon. One of the nuclear-weapon States had now stated that a comprehensive test ban was a long-term goal. It was difficult to see how an obligation to reach results at an early date, an obligation now dating back more than 15 years, could be in accordance with a policy that regarded a comprehensive test ban as a long-term objective. Multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty should start immediately and a halt to the development, production and deployment of all nuclear weapons would help to
promote negotiations. That was the main proposal contained in the so-called "Delhi Declaration", signed by six Heads of State and Government on 20 January 1985, which also emphasized the urgency of a ban on space weapons as another important contribution in the field (see document CD/549).

61. By an overwhelming majority, the United Nations General Assembly had demanded an immediate halt to the nuclear arms race, a comprehensive test-ban treaty and a nuclear weapons freeze. The Swedish Government welcomed the moratorium on all nuclear testing announced by the Soviet Union and strongly hoped that it would be prolonged beyond 1 January 1986 and that the United States, together with other nuclear-weapon States, would join the moratorium. Again, Sweden attached major importance to the question of verification of a nuclear test ban. If the United States invitation to observe tests were to lead to multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, it would be of positive importance.

62. Referring to so-called "negative security assurances" by the nuclear-weapon States, he emphasized that non-nuclear-weapon States had every right to demand effective and unequivocal guarantees by the nuclear-weapon States against attack, or threats of attack, with nuclear arms. The risk of early use of battlefield nuclear weapons was a cause for deep concern, and therefore the idea of a corridor in Central Europe free from such weapons was worthy of further consideration. In addition, there were a number of other suggestions on how to avoid nuclear confrontation and proliferation, for instance, the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, an idea that was being discussed by the Nordic countries.

63. The basis of the NPT was an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States parties, but to achieve such a balance concrete actions towards disarmament had to be taken. If the Third Review Conference was to be successful, nuclear-weapon States would have to give concrete evidence that they took their obligations under article VI seriously.

64. The vital part of the Treaty dealing with the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should not be forgotten. The potential contribution of nuclear power to national energy supplies needed to be re-examined from time to time in the light of the most recent experience and realistic forecasts of future development. IAEA was the main channel for technical co-operation and assistance in the nuclear field. Sweden supported the rapid growth of the Agency's financial resources and had made extra-budgetary contributions to them. It urged all parties to the Treaty to secure the financial basis for a continued expansion of the IAEA programme for the benefit of the developing countries. Nuclear energy accounted for a vital part of the energy supply in many States parties and they had made it clear that real efforts were necessary to establish sound, predictable and fully reliable supply arrangements. The Committee on Assurances of Supply, within IAEA, did important work in that respect.

65. The Treaty also dealt with the question of safeguards and he expressed the hope that the Review Conference would agree that full-scope safeguards should be required for exports to countries not parties to the NPT. All
States exporting nuclear supplies to any non-nuclear-weapon State should be urged to demand a guarantee by the recipient State that the nuclear materials were to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. Such a guarantee should be verified through application of IAEA safeguards to all source and special fissionable materials in all nuclear activities in that State, thus helping to eliminate an unnecessary discrimination against NPT parties. Regrettably the principle of full-scope safeguards had been disregarded in important nuclear transactions and it was urgent to reach agreement on another stronger and more logical interpretation of paragraph 2 of article III. One of the main principles of international nuclear trade must be that participants could feel confident that material and equipment for peaceful purposes would in no circumstances be used for nuclear-weapons purposes. As the volume of the trade increased, particularly within the nuclear fuel cycle, application of that principle should be extended.

66. It was understandable that there was growing hesitation in the face of the double standards applied to nuclear-weapon and to non-nuclear-weapon States respectively. Sweden welcomed the fact that some nuclear-weapon States had offered all or part of their civil nuclear facilities for IAEA safeguards and he called upon each and every nuclear-weapon State to offer their full participation. Safeguards activities, which took place on a voluntary basis, were none the less far from sufficient. All installations and materials in the civil fuel cycle in all countries should be placed without delay under IAEA safeguards. Placing the nuclear industries of the nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States on an equal footing, would certainly help to promote international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It would increase public confidence and IAEA should be provided with the requisite resources to carry out that additional task. In addition, every effort should be made to reduce the circulation of weapon-grade materials. Sweden considered that direct disposal of spent nuclear fuel was preferable to reprocessing and it urged IAEA to establish the international plutonium storage régime foreseen in its statute. Although there had been an increase in the resources of the safeguards department, there should be further strengthening of the Agency's machinery so as to make it possible for IAEA to carry out equally effective safeguards operations in the nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States.

67. It was the Swedish Government's view that the problems connected with the non-proliferation régime were not to be found in the wording of the Treaty, but in the need to implement its main provisions in a more effective manner. His delegation was therefore not in favour of proposals to amend the Treaty, but its viability and credibility would have to be strengthened to ensure its survival. The NPT was the main instrument by which the final goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world could be achieved and the Third Review Conference would be decisive for its future. The nuclear-weapon States still held the key to success and they must demonstrate forthwith the political will to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race. What was ultimately at stake was the survival of humanity.

68. Mr. PETROSYANZ (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the Review Conference represented a major event in international life, its significance being determined by the role played by the Treaty in the modern
world. As pointed out in Mr. Gorbachev's message at the 1st meeting to the participants in the Conference, the Treaty had proved itself to be both viable and effective, since no new nuclear-weapon State had emerged in the 15 years of its existence. It was widely recognized that the Treaty, as the most important instrument for preventing the emergence of new nuclear-weapon States, met the interests of all countries alike and provided a basis for collective action by States to curb the nuclear-arms race.

69. With its 130 States parties, the Treaty was the most representative international agreement in the arms limitation field and he wished to take the present opportunity to welcome the representatives of the 16 countries which had acceded to the Treaty since the Second Review Conference. In order to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation régime it was essential to make active efforts to achieve universality for the Treaty and, above all, to ensure the accession of all nuclear and "threshold" countries. The fact that certain countries, and in particular Israel, South Africa and Pakistan, whose nuclear ambitions were a secret to no one, were stubbornly refusing to become parties to the Treaty could not be ignored.

70. As a nuclear-weapon State and one of the Treaty's Depositaries, the Soviet Union was particularly concerned with its strict implementation by all parties and, for its own part, complied to the letter with its obligations under the Treaty. In accordance with article I, it did not transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly, and did not in any way assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In accordance with article III, it provided non-nuclear-weapon States with nuclear material, equipment, facilities, technology and services for peaceful purposes in the nuclear fuel cycle field only if they were made subject to IAEA safeguards. In 1982 the Council of Ministers of the USSR had approved a decree governing its exports of nuclear materials, technology and equipment, facilities, special non-nuclear materials and services based on obligations deriving from the Treaty and other treaties and agreements relating to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

71. The Soviet Union was participating in efforts to extend the inventory of nuclear materials and equipment whose export to non-nuclear-weapon countries required the application of IAEA safeguards. In view of the continuing expansion of international contacts in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, it considered that IAEA safeguards should in principle be made applicable to all nuclear activities by all non-nuclear-weapon countries, whether or not they were parties to the Treaty. The Soviet Union also favoured enhancing the role of IAEA in the non-proliferation field and, more especially, increasing the effectiveness of the IAEA verification system. In order to accommodate the wishes of many non-nuclear-weapon States, the USSR had recently, as an act of goodwill, placed part of its civil nuclear activities under IAEA control. The appropriate safeguards agreement with IAEA had entered into force on 10 June 1985, and IAEA inspectors had already begun verification activities in the USSR. It was hoped that that step would help to build confidence among States, enhance the authority of IAEA and strengthen the non-proliferation régime as a whole.
72. The Soviet Union favoured early entry into force of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which had been opened for signature in 1980. As one of the first countries to sign and ratify the Convention, it appealed to countries which had not yet done so to follow its example. It was particularly important that countries engaged in international transport of nuclear materials or those providing transit facilities for such transport should become parties to the Convention. Early entry into force would help to prevent so called "sub-national" proliferation of nuclear weapons, which was potentially dangerous in the present international situation.

73. The Treaty had provided favourable opportunities for extensive international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, a form of co-operation which, as Mr. Gorbachev pointed out in his message, was essential in solving the problem of world energy supply and other major economic issues. The Soviet Union was actively engaged in such co-operation both on a bilateral and on a multilateral basis. In that connection, too, it attached great importance to the activities of IAEA. The Soviet Union's voluntary contributions to the Agency's technical co-operation activities had risen by a factor of 2.5 between 1980 and 1985, an additional million roubles being allocated to technical assistance through IAEA in 1984-1985.

74. Seven power reactors had been delivered to non-nuclear countries and commissioned by the Soviet Union during the past five years and a further 22 reactors were under construction. The Soviet Union also delivered nuclear materials and research reactors to many countries, especially developing countries, helped to train their national personnel, sent Soviet experts to provide technical assistance, and offered facilities to foreign specialists to acquaint themselves with the achievements of nuclear science and technology in the USSR. The Soviet Union would be prepared to take part in negotiations aimed at granting specific privileges and advantages, such as the establishment of a system of guaranteed nuclear supplies and the establishment of international and regional nuclear fuel cycle centres, to developing countries parties to the Treaty. It attached the greatest importance to the further expansion of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, regarding such co-operation as a matter of international security and a contribution to world peace.

75. With reference to article VI of the Treaty, he said that in the period since the Second Review Conference, the Soviet Union, faithful to its commitments, had continued to do everything in its power to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race and to achieve genuine disarmament. On a number of occasions it had taken unilateral steps in that direction in the hope of setting an example to others and assisting progress in the nuclear disarmament field. As far back as in 1982, his country had undertaken not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and had proposed that other nuclear-weapon States which had not yet done so should assume similar obligations. As Mr. Gorbachev had pointed out in his message, a decision by the Western nuclear Powers to do likewise would be equivalent to a general prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union was ready for the nuclear Powers' undertakings to that effect to be set forth in a single document bearing the status of an instrument in international law.
76. Like many other countries, the Soviet Union regarded the cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests as a step of the highest priority in the nuclear disarmament field. It had repeatedly proposed resumption of the tripartite negotiations, which, contrary to its wishes, had broken down in 1980, and had also consistently advocated the ratification and bringing into force of the Soviet-United States treaties on the limitation of underground nuclear-weapon tests and on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, signed in 1974 and 1976 respectively. It had placed an item entitled "Immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests" on the agenda of the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly and had submitted basic provisions of a draft treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapons tests. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries were actively working for a start on business-like negotiations on a nuclear test ban within the Conference on Disarmament.

77. Yet another demonstration of the Soviet Union's desire to scale down the nuclear-arms race, to halt the dangerous competition in building up nuclear arsenals and to set a good example to other nuclear-weapon States had been the decision, taken unilaterally, to cease all nuclear explosions from 6 August 1985, the fortieth anniversary of the atom bomb dropped on Hiroshima. The moratorium had been declared until 1 January 1986, but would remain in effect beyond that date if the United States, for its part, refrained from carrying out nuclear explosions. There could be no doubt that a moratorium on all nuclear explosions by the Soviet Union and the United States would serve as a good example for other nuclear-weapon States, create favourable conditions for the conclusion of an international treaty on a general and complete nuclear-weapon test ban and promote the fuller implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

78. Another important step towards preventing nuclear war and curbing the nuclear arms race would, in the Soviet Union's opinion, be a freeze on nuclear arsenals by all nuclear-weapon States. Resolutions to that effect had been adopted at the Soviet Union's initiative at the thirty-eighth and thirty-ninth sessions of the General Assembly. A proposal for the elaboration, adoption and stage-by-stage implementation of a programme of nuclear disarmament had been proposed by the Soviet Union at the second special session of the General Assembly. Within the Conference on Disarmament, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, together with non-aligned and neutral countries, advocated an early start to multilateral negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament. Bilateral and multilateral negotiations on that issue should complement one another and lead to achievement of the desired goal.

79. The problem of curbing the nuclear-arms race was today inseparably connected with that of preventing the militarization of outer space. The Soviet Union's proposals on that subject at the thirty-sixth, thirty-eighth and thirty-ninth sessions of the General Assembly were well known. A subsidiary body of the Conference on Disarmament to consider the problem of preventing an arms race in space had been set up, with the active participation of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, at the Conference's latest session. Placing outer space in the service of war would
greatly increase the nuclear threat. Conversely, the solution to the whole range of problems relating to the limitation and reduction of nuclear arsenals would be greatly advanced and extensive possibilities of co-operation both on the Earth and in space would be opened up if outer space were preserved as a sphere of peace. The Soviet Union's latest proposals submitted on 15 August 1985 for consideration at the fortieth session of the General Assembly were designed to achieve that end.

80. Referring to the bilateral Soviet-United States negotiations on nuclear and space weapons being held at Geneva, he noted that the Soviet Union had proposed a moratorium on nuclear and space weapons for the whole period of the negotiations and had unilaterally suspended the deployment of medium-range missiles and other countermeasures in Europe as from April 1985.

81. The Soviet Union regarded the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world as an important step towards strengthening the non-proliferation régime, reducing the threat of nuclear war and achieving military détente at regional level and, in that context, took a positive view of the recent decision by a forum of countries of the South Pacific to declare the region a nuclear-weapon-free zone. It was also making efforts to solve the problem of security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States which did not allow the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territories. In addition to putting forward its own proposals and initiatives, the Soviet Union also supported proposals by other States designed to achieve the cessation of the arms race and nuclear disarmament. Successes in that area would, of course, release considerable additional funds for social and economic development, particularly the developing countries.

82. In conclusion, he said that the Soviet Union continued to regard general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control as the end goal of negotiations in the disarmament field. The Soviet proposals for general and complete disarmament were still valid and his Government would continue to strive for its adoption and implementation. Despite the present tense world situation, it was convinced that a possibility remained of saving mankind from nuclear catastrophe. The Conference would have made a contribution towards consolidating peace and security, curbing the arms race and improving the international climate if it adopted decisions conducive to the further strengthening of the non-proliferation régime. The Conference should affirm that the Treaty was still an effective instrument of peace and security, that there was no alternative to the Treaty, and should appeal to States which were not parties to accede to it. His delegation, for its part, was willing to co-operate in a constructive and business-like manner with all States parties in the search for solutions to the important and responsible tasks before the Conference.

The meeting rose at 1.35 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 3rd MEETING

Wednesday, 28 August 1985, at 3.50 p.m.

President: Mr. SHAKER (Egypt)

GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 12) (continued)

1. Mr. SKALLI (Morocco) said that the adoption of the NPT in 1968 had undoubtedly been a crucial development in the history of disarmament since the end of the Second World War, since the Treaty was the most important multilateral legal instrument for the limitation of nuclear weapons. The accession of the Kingdom of Morocco in 1970 had resulted from his country's acute awareness of the urgent need to curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons and eliminate the risks of nuclear conflict, the interest which his country had always taken in preserving world peace and security, and the importance it attached to the aims of the Treaty, particularly in relation to access to nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes.

2. Fifteen years after the Treaty's entry into force, the question should be asked whether it had in fact fulfilled the hopes placed in it and whether, in its present form, it would provide a means of facing the many challenges of the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first. On those two questions, one could only feel sceptical, since for the 15 years of its existence the Treaty had simply vegetated and those who, like Morocco, were sincere champions of non-proliferation feared for its future. The Third Review Conference was opening at a time when the international situation was particularly disturbing, mainly because of East-West tensions which threatened international peace and security, and because of the alarming proportions assumed by the arms race. It must be recognized that every day that passed increased the risks of nuclear proliferation, whether horizontal proliferation in the case of non-nuclear-weapon States which cherished yearnings for power for various purposes, or vertical proliferation for which the nuclear Powers signatories to the Treaty were alone responsible. Those countries which had freely renounced possession of nuclear weapons had not received in return adequate guarantees of their safety against the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons. They could even be said to have become the hostages of such weapons, since should a conflict occur, which according to the experts could only be general and total, there could be no doubt that they would be among the victims.

3. In the face of such a threat, the guarantees offered by the nuclear Powers were unfortunately inadequate and conditional, since firstly, they had been conceived in the context of relations between nuclear-weapon States, and secondly they safeguarded the right of those States to resort to nuclear weapons in the event of an attack, even a non-nuclear one. The only means of strengthening the non-proliferation régime would be for the nuclear Powers to undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons in any circumstances, either among themselves or against countries which did not possess nuclear weapons.
4. Analysing the main articles of the Treaty in the light of the experience of the past 15 years, he noted that article I had not been fully complied with. Two States which were not parties to the Treaty, Israel and South Africa, were daily enhancing their nuclear capacity thanks to assistance and co-operation from nuclear States, which, according to certain disclosures, had enabled them to gain access to nuclear weapons. In that respect, it would be recalled that serious alarm had been expressed in the reports (A/35/402 and Corr. 1 and A/36/431) prepared by the groups of experts appointed by the United Nations to study the issue in 1979.

5. In the face of a situation of that nature, the non-nuclear States parties to the Treaty had scrupulously fulfilled the obligations devolving on them under article II. In addition, IAEA was to be commended for the way in which it had performed the role devolving on it under article III, particularly with reference to technical assistance to developing countries, although such assistance should be strengthened and endowed with increased resources.

6. Although the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes had become a vital need in a world in which no State was now immune from the crisis and where energy products placed a heavy burden on the budgets of many States, the developed countries had shown little zeal in fulfilling the commitments they had undertaken under article IV of the Treaty. It was maintained by some that the dissemination of the three sensitive technologies of uranium enrichment, plutonium reprocessing and breeder reactors had now altered the nature of the non-proliferation régime and had so merged the civilian and military aspects of the use of nuclear energy that it had become difficult to distinguish between them. However, one had only to refer to article II of the Treaty, whose provisions, if complied with, constituted barriers against the diversion of nuclear energy for military purposes.

7. Article V was the logical extension of article IV, since basically it set out what might be termed the converse of the commitments contained in the latter article. In the current precarious economic situation, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy would be extremely beneficial for many regions of the world, but to date they had been very limited. All countries must be allowed to benefit from the possible advantages of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy since the absence of resolute initiatives to that end would be largely responsible for the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The nuclear Powers should therefore agree on practical measures which would enable that objective to be attained.

8. While the NPT was not a disarmament treaty, it nonetheless provided an appropriate framework for developing one. For that reason the Kingdom of Morocco, a party to the NPT since 1969 and a member of the Conference on Disarmament, attached particular importance to article VI, which set out the basic principles in that respect, and noted with regret that the nuclear Powers unfortunately were not respecting them. Annual military expenditure throughout the world had increased from $180 billion in 1970, when the Treaty had entered into force, to $1,000 billion in 1984. Article VI thus simply emerged as something of a votive inscription on the façade of the temple of disarmament, it sufficed to look at the work of the Conference on Disarmament in order to see that, as far as negotiations were
concerned, the situation was rather one of a permanent confrontation where each participant clung to its own position. The mistrust which was poisoning East-West relations prevented any agreement being reached on disarmament; furthermore, it must be recognized that the world had become so accustomed to the existence of nuclear weapons that it no longer feared that they might one day jeopardize its own existence. And yet, thanks to technological progress, the number and destructive capacity of the nuclear weapons in the hands of the major Powers were growing constantly. The nuclear threat was becoming correspondingly greater and in those circumstances it would be more and more difficult to maintain peace. Consequently, the first step to be taken in order to achieve nuclear disarmament was to conclude a treaty banning nuclear tests.

9. Where the implementation of article VII of the Treaty was concerned, only States in non-nuclear-weapon regions had made any attempt to resist the installation of nuclear weapons in those regions. Their accession to the NPT and the establishment of denuclearized zones were an expression of their desire to preserve international peace and security. However, since article VII did not even constitute a recommendation but simply left States which so desired the freedom to declare their territory free of nuclear-weapons, there was no hope of ever seeing the nuclear States move towards denuclearization.

10. At the start of the Third Review Conference, convened pursuant to article VIII, paragraph 3, it must be acknowledged that the Treaty was not operating satisfactorily. Quite clearly, its various objectives could not be attained without adopting measures capable of translating the rights of non-nuclear States parties into action and ensuring respect for the obligations incumbent upon nuclear-weapon States. Non-nuclear-weapon States remained convinced of the usefulness of the NPT and continued to be profoundly attached to it. The major Powers should, however, appreciate the full extent of their responsibilities and themselves begin to show restraint in the area of proliferation before asking others to do so.

11. The cause of non-proliferation would be credible only if the three cardinal principles of non-proliferation, namely, prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy, were respected. The developing countries parties to the Treaty were, for their part, prepared to give it a fresh lease of life because they continued to believe that it answered a need, even a vital need. They wanted to show their desire for peace and sincerely hoped that the Third Review Conference would not be a purely formal exercise and would furnish an opportunity to make the Treaty both efficient and credible. They were prepared to work towards that goal, provided they could count on the political will and commitment of their nuclear partners.

12. His country very much hoped that the results of the work of the Conference would efface the memory of the failure of the two previous Conferences, in the interests of the international community as a whole.
13. The PRESIDENT announced that, in line with the practice followed at the previous Conferences, the message from Mr. Reagan, President of the United States of America, 7/ which had been read out that morning, would be circulated as a conference document, like the message from Mr. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 8/

The meeting rose at 4.20 p.m.

7/ Subsequently distributed as document NPT/CONF.III/27.

GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 12) (continued)

1. Mr. JAROSZEK (Poland) welcomed the 16 states that had become parties to the Treaty since the Second Review Conference. The Treaty could already be considered an international arms limitation agreement commanding the widest adherence and their accession was reassuring evidence of progress towards making the Treaty universal.

2. The previous five years had hardly been propitious for international peace and security. The world continued to witness policies that pitted confrontation against détente, and vast arms programmes against honest disarmament dialogue, programmes which tangibly increased the mortal danger of a nuclear conflagration. In such a serious situation any positive element that remained in international politics had to be preserved and strengthened. The Treaty was one such positive element and the strengthening of the NPT was the imperative, though highly exacting, task of the Conference. Although the Treaty was threatened by the continuing nuclear arms race and the deterioration of international security, it had withstood the test of time and proved its lasting effectiveness as a major international instrument for limiting and reducing the nuclear threat, enhancing the security of the States Parties and of the world as a whole, providing a measure of strategic stability and facilitating broad international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Treaty had always had its critics, but despite its imperfections it had effectively fulfilled its task of stemming the proliferation of nuclear weapons and had thus limited the probability of a nuclear catastrophe. Without the NPT, a race would emerge to develop national nuclear military potentials. It was not only a major factor in international security; it also fostered increased confidence.

3. The transfer of nuclear technology, equipment and materials was vital to meet development needs, but it would hardly be possible unless the suppliers could be assured that the materials would not be used for military purposes. In that regard IAEA played a crucial role in implementing the Treaty's provisions concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Poland had noted with satisfaction IAEA's enormous progress in perfecting the safeguards system, for it showed that headway in improving safeguards was possible and that the system could be further perfected to serve as a reliable instrument in the maintenance and enhancement of the non-proliferation regime. The application of IAEA safeguards, in full respect of the sovereign rights of States, and widespread acceptance of them as a means of international verification, were of considerable political importance. A recent agreement between the IAEA and the Soviet Union on the voluntary submission of several Soviet nuclear power plants and research reactors to Agency control was proof of that importance.
4. While the implementation of articles I, II and III had been generally satisfactory, the lack of universality of the non-proliferation régime was a substantial weakness. Unfortunately, not all States, including some with highly advanced nuclear technologies were parties to the NPT. The development of the nuclear potential of some of them, for example, South Africa or Israel, had given rise to serious concern as a threat to international peace. The Conference should unequivocally call for universal adherence to the Treaty, the application of full-scope safeguards to all nuclear activities in non-nuclear-weapon States, and wider acceptance of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

5. One major concern of a large number of participants in the Conference, notably the developing countries, was the implementation of their "inalienable right ... to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of the Treaty", as provided for in article IV. Poland fully shared their concern, since nuclear power was expected to be a major source of its energy in coming years. Since the Treaty had come into force, IAEA's technical assistance had increased substantially. Poland took an active part in such co-operation; despite recent serious economic difficulties, it had contributed, during the five-year period, about $1 million of voluntary assistance to developing countries and it intended to continue such aid. Poland agreed that wider and better use should be made of IAEA technical assistance mechanisms; in particular, developing countries parties to the Treaty should benefit from preferences in the supply of nuclear equipment, technology and materials.

6. The IAEA Committee on Assurances of Supply had made progress and it was to be hoped that its work would continue towards a successful outcome, which would help in facilitating the transfer of nuclear material and equipment. Poland was looking forward to the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and hoped that a strengthened Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons would provide the necessary premise for its success.

7. Article VI was one of the most important provisions of the Treaty because non-proliferation could be successful only if steady progress was made towards disarmament, above all nuclear disarmament, as well as détente and peaceful co-operation. The new format of the Geneva negotiations between the USSR and the United States of America reflected the interconnection between outer space and nuclear weapons, both strategic and medium-range, as well as the far-reaching objective of preventing an arms race in outer space. The negotiations provided an opportunity to halt and terminate the arms race, but the negotiating Powers would have to adopt the corresponding constructive policies, proposals and measures. It was Poland's opinion that that had been the USSR's approach to the Geneva negotiations, as embodied in a recent series of proposals and unilateral moves such as the moratorium on the deployment in Europe of medium-range nuclear missiles, the proposed immediate moratorium on nuclear and outer space offensive armaments, the readiness for large reductions in strategic offensive missiles, in terms of delivery vehicles and warheads, and a radical reduction in medium-range missiles in Europe. The USSR's decision on a unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions was
immediately relevant to the work of the Conference and the Polish Government fully supported the Soviet decision as a concrete step towards strengthening the Treaty. The nuclear Powers' willingness to ban all nuclear explosions had long been considered to be a criterion of their readiness to stop the arms race. In the context of the implementation of article VI, the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty should be a priority. The Soviet moratorium created favourable conditions for resuming the negotiations and reaching agreement on such a treaty. His country sincerely hoped that the United States and other nuclear Powers would follow the Soviet example.

8. The Soviet proposal on international co-operation in the peaceful exploration and non-militarization of outer space was of the utmost importance in helping to curb the arms race and it would obviously strengthen the Treaty. It was to be hoped that the proposed meeting between Mr. Gorbachev and President Reagan would mark a step forward in the prevention of nuclear war, and in progress towards disarmament and détente.

9. Poland's commitment to the Treaty and to strengthening it was firm and consistent because Poland believed that it was in the best interests of its national security, together with other European States, particularly those in the Central European area. In addition, his country had a long tradition of support for efforts to free the world from the danger of atomic weapons. Its tragic experience in the Second World War and its situation in a particularly vulnerable part of Europe made the Polish people especially sensitive to every threat to peace and eager to support every measure aimed at strengthening international security and protecting mankind against nuclear conflict. Poland took an active part in the elaboration of joint initiatives by the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and supported the disarmament initiatives of the non-aligned countries, as well as closely co-operating with them on furthering such initiatives at the United Nations, in particular in the Conference on Disarmament. The elimination of the nuclear threat had long been a major objective and as far back as 1946 and 1947 Poland had put forward proposals at the first and second sessions of the United Nations General Assembly for an international agreement on exclusively peaceful use of atomic energy and a total prohibition of nuclear weapons. However, the best-known Polish disarmament initiative was the Rapacki plan for a nuclear-free-zone in Central Europe, which had been followed by a more limited proposal by Mr. Gomulka for a nuclear freeze in the same area.

10. Unfortunately, those initiatives had not succeeded because of strong opposition on the part of the principal members of NATO, which were guided by well-known military concepts. In view of the present precarious situation in Central Europe, the wisdom of such opposition was questionable. Nevertheless, the idea of nuclear-free-zones had been actively followed up in Europe and other parts of the world and the creation of such zones had a direct positive bearing on implementation of the Treaty. In that context, the Treaty of Tlatelolco was an important factor in strengthening the non-proliferation régime and the recent decision of the South Pacific nations to establish a nuclear-free-zone was a source of satisfaction. Poland, together with other States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, actively supported proposals for a nuclear-free-zone in Northern Europe and in the Balkans.
11. His country would support all proposals that sought to strengthen the Treaty. It was Poland’s firm belief that consolidation of the non-proliferation régime was in the best interests of all States parties, since the Treaty in its present form met the vital needs of both the nuclear-weapon and the non-nuclear-weapon States.

12. Mr. STRAY (Norway) reiterated Norway’s unequivocal support for the Treaty, which remained one of the most important arms control instruments of the post-war period. It had made a major contribution to strengthening international security by preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons, and therefore Norway hoped that the Conference would make a constructive contribution towards maintaining and strengthening the non-proliferation régime.

13. Norway, together with the other Nordic countries, had submitted a memorandum (NPT/CONF.III/16) emphasizing the basic objectives of the Treaty and the important issues to be discussed. The signatories to the memorandum stressed that measures to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons must be an integral part of efforts to curb and reverse the nuclear arms race, that the continuing arms race and the lack of concrete progress in disarmament gave rise to grave concern and required intensified efforts, and that an effective international non-proliferation régime was indispensable in expanding international co-operation with regard to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

14. Norway had actively encouraged adherence to the Treaty and welcomed the fact that more than 130 States were parties, but there was no room for complacency. A number of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States were not yet parties and, although some of them pursued a policy that was in accord with the Treaty’s basic principles, others continued to voice reservations about the Treaty and the non-proliferation régime.

15. A full and balanced review of the Treaty must be undertaken, not only to maintain it, but also, if possible, to strengthen it. That was particularly important because a number of the non-parties were situated in regions of tension and conflict. Some States appeared to believe that it was in their interests to keep the nuclear option open, but such an approach created uncertainty and had a negative influence on the stability of the area concerned. If those countries at least concluded safeguards agreements with IAEA for all their nuclear facilities, such a course would have a stabilizing and confidence-building effect. Efforts to persuade more countries to adhere to the Treaty must continue. Norway held the conviction that it was in no country’s interest to pursue a policy aimed at a possible nuclear weapons capability, nor was there any justification for it.

16. Ending the arms race and implementing effective measures for nuclear disarmament were major and integral parts of the Treaty and the Norwegian Government regretted that no major breakthrough had been made in those fields since the second Review Conference. An arms race led to greater instability, yet security could be maintained and even enhanced at a lower level of armaments. If the present arms build-up was halted and substantial reductions were achieved, more resources would be available to meet basic human needs and to promote social and economic development, not least in the developing countries.
17. His country welcomed the resumption of negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union and fully supported the objectives of those important talks. It was to be hoped that they would result in substantial reductions in the number of nuclear arms and would make a significant contribution to preventing an arms race in outer space. Agreement in the negotiations would have a major impact on policies pursued by other countries in the nuclear field. Hence, progress in the Geneva talks was all the more important.

18. Efforts in the multilateral field should also be pursued and, in that context, he emphasized the important role played by the Conference on Disarmament. Norway was ready to welcome measures by the major Powers, either bilaterally or otherwise, to achieve a total and permanent ban on all nuclear explosions. Nevertheless, the principal objective should be a binding general international agreement subject to effective international control. Norway had actively supported efforts undertaken to set up an ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban and had recently joined with nine other Western States to propose a concrete work programme for such a committee. It regretted that the Conference on Disarmament had been unable to agree on a mandate for the committee, but hoped that during its forthcoming session the Conference would be able to resume its substantive work along the lines of the proposed work programme. In addition, Norway had hosted a Conference on Disarmament workshop on the seismological verification of a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

19. Non-proliferation efforts would be greatly assisted by the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones; the recent signing of the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty at Rarotonga represented a significant contribution in that respect. The protection of non-nuclear-weapon States against the threat or use of nuclear weapons also continued to be of great importance, and attention must still be paid to the idea of an adequately verified cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. Similarly, Norway considered that efforts should be made to create a basis for an agreed, balanced and verifiable freeze on nuclear weapons in the context of negotiations on substantial reductions.

20. Both in IAEA and in the preparatory work for the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, Norway had stated that an effective international non-proliferation régime was indispensable for expanded international co-operation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. He emphasized the need for further strengthening of the international safeguards system as an essential prerequisite for measures to assure the long-term supply of nuclear material, equipment and technology. All nuclear-weapon States parties and one nuclear-weapon State outside the Treaty had accepted international safeguards, which included on-site inspection of peaceful nuclear installations in their countries. Adequate safeguards were one of the significant challenges facing the present non-proliferation régime and, in order to strengthen the régime, emergent nuclear suppliers and nuclear threshold countries would have to be included in existing or new international export arrangements containing such safeguards. A minimum condition for allowing exports should be the application of full-scope safeguards by recipient countries. Norway closely followed the implementation of
obligations under the Treaty and monitored its export practices. It was committed to strict export controls in accordance with the Treaty and, in fulfilment of its obligations, was in the process of revising its national export regulations, including a list of items subject to licensing. It had also recently ratified the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials.

21. Parties to the Treaty had the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and special consideration had to be given to the nuclear energy needs of the non-nuclear-weapon States in the developing areas of the world. It was the view of his Government that the co-operation aspect of the Treaty should be reinforced by further measures, inter alia within the framework of IAEA. Norway would therefore make a contribution to assist parties to the Treaty under the so-called "footnote-a/ projects" in developing countries, as a means of promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

22. His delegation hoped that the Conference would agree on a final document reaffirming the basic principles of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, based on a commitment to the further strengthening of the non-proliferation régime. It was important to reiterate the universal aim of preventing further proliferation of nuclear weapons and express the urgent need for cessation of the arms race and for a commencement to nuclear disarmament. The Treaty should also be reaffirmed as a framework for co-operation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy on the basis of adequate international safeguards.

23. **Mr. MOLLEMANN** (Federal Republic of Germany) said that his country had acceded to the Treaty at an early date, in the expectation that it would help to secure peace throughout the world. At the same time, it had always emphasized the need for balanced implementation of the Treaty and had stressed that freedom of research and development and promotion of the peaceful use of nuclear energy should not be obstructed. The commitments embodied in the Treaty, more particularly non-proliferation, peaceful use of nuclear energy, supplemented by appropriate safeguards, and the pledge to disarm, formed a cohesive whole which, in the interests of all signatories, should not be altered. The Conference should analyse the Treaty and its implementation both critically and constructively, should reaffirm rights and responsibilities under the Treaty and should adopt recommendations that served to promote the Treaty's goals.

24. The Federal Republic of Germany considered it a significant success that no new nuclear-weapon State had emerged since the Treaty's entry into force, the parties having observed the prohibition on the transfer or receipt and development of nuclear weapons laid down in articles I and II. The Federal Government appealed to States parties and to those outside the Treaty to remain aware of their common responsibility for non-proliferation and to work together towards that goal.

25. The Federal Republic of Germany considered accession to the Treaty to be one of the most effective ways in which a State could associate itself with the non-proliferation régime and it therefore welcomed the accession of additional States since the Second Review Conference. While it was aware that
willingness to accede to the Treaty depended on the readiness of States parties to meet all of their commitments under the Treaty, it none the less urged those States still outside the Treaty to review their position.

26. His country's non-proliferation policy had constantly been guided by the three fundamental aims of the NPT, namely, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the peaceful use of nuclear energy, subject to international safeguards, and the search for nuclear disarmament. In 1954, within the framework of the Treaty establishing the Western European Union, the Federal Republic of Germany had become the first country in the world to incur an internationally binding commitment not to produce nuclear weapons. In a number of other international instruments it had accepted verification of its entire peaceful nuclear capacity and had ensured that German nuclear materials could only be exported to non-nuclear-weapon States if the recipients agreed to such items being subject to international control by IAEA. Through those and other measures, the Federal Republic had made an effective contribution to non-proliferation and believed it was entitled to demand that other States should be equally aware of their international responsibilities, so that the principle of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons - an essential factor in the pursuit of international peace - would gain general and universal acceptance.

27. Despite the revision of energy predictions as a result of the world economic recession, nuclear energy remained a factor in sustained social and economic progress in many countries, as well as a guarantee of their political independence. Awareness of the need to conserve the world's natural resources and the environment had further increased the importance of nuclear energy. The use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and international co-operation in that field were particularly important to his Government, which therefore supported the policy of broad international co-operation, particularly with developing countries crossing the threshold of the industrial age. The Federal Republic of Germany believed in participation by all nations on equal terms in technological development and in the opportunity to use nuclear energy. In paying tribute to the development of the IAEA safeguards system, he said that the Federal Government would continue to support the technical development of safety measures with a view to their becoming fully efficient and cost-effective and it would further pursue the programme of assistance it was implementing with IAEA in that field.

28. Although he did not wish to belittle the significance of IAEA, it must be stated that the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was primarily a political problem and that the technical aspect was of secondary importance. A policy of trust and co-operation was the most secure basis from which to combat the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Treaty must continue to permit the peaceful use of nuclear energy and international co-operation, so as to prevent the agreed basis of trust and commonsense from being jeopardized by the emergence of nuclear-weapon States. The international system of non-proliferation that had developed around the Treaty had proved its worth and non-proliferation had become a moral imperative of international politics, having become accepted by a large majority of countries. However, the inherent logic of the Treaty, which provided for different sets of rights and
responsibilities for the nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States, obliged the States parties to adopt different positions and to fulfil differing responsibilities and commitments.

29. There was only a narrow dividing line between peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the creation of new military threats. Responsible policy alone would ensure that knowledge and know-how was not withheld. The authors of the Treaty had been aware of that fact and consequently the NPT guaranteed the right of unhindered access to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, while committing the States parties to make efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to contribute to arms control and disarmament in the nuclear field.

30. The Treaty's objectives regarding disarmament went further than simply preventing any increase in the number of nuclear weapons. One expectation to which the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty had linked their final renunciation of nuclear weapons had been that the nuclear-weapon States would reduce their nuclear arsenals. While recognizing that the United States of America and the Soviet Union had conducted some important negotiations in accordance with article VI of the Treaty, his Government was nevertheless obliged to conclude that the results of negotiations on nuclear arms control had failed to meet his country's hopes when it had acceded to the Treaty. In particular, his Government regretted that the Soviet Union had failed to respond constructively to proposals by the United States, which, while safeguarding the legitimate security interests of all concerned, would have permitted drastic reductions in strategic nuclear arsenals as well as the mutual renunciation of an entire category of weapons in the intermediate range.

31. The negotiations now in progress between the United States and the Soviet Union opened up fresh opportunities not only to reduce nuclear arsenals but also to make progress in other fields of arms control and disarmament. The forthcoming meeting between President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev assumed great importance in that context. His Government unreservedly supported the far-reaching negotiating objectives specified in the agreement of 8 January 1985, which clearly demonstrated the comprehensive nature of the negotiators' task. Over and above the reduction and limitation of nuclear arms, a more permanent and stable relationship had to be created between the United States and the Soviet Union as well as between West and East in general.

32. In his Government's view, special importance attached to the reduction of intercontinental and intermediate-range nuclear potentials. In view of the differing structures and balances of forces existing in those fields, and given emerging developments, stability could only be established by means of reductions which were balanced and oriented to the agreed objective of strengthening strategic stability. In view of the size of existing nuclear arsenals, the negotiating sides should agree on drastic reductions so as to establish stability at a low level of nuclear arms. For that reason, priority should be given to negotiations on nuclear arms reductions, due account being taken of the connection between offensive and defensive weapons.
33. However, stability in the field of intercontinental and intermediate-range nuclear arms would not suffice to prevent any war - including conventional war - between East and West. Arms control agreements also had to ensure that existing military superiority was eliminated and stability was achieved at all force levels. The current multilateral negotiations in Vienna and Stockholm, and also in the Conference on Disarmament, were an essential complement to the bilateral United States of America-Soviet negotiations. In the nuclear age, when everything possible must be done to prevent any war, reliable security could not be based on autonomous efforts alone; serious co-operative efforts were also necessary in order to resolve security problems by taking account of the legitimate interests of all concerned. Solutions would be successful and permanent to the extent that they were rooted in a general improvement of East-West relations and in broad co-operation in all spheres. Efforts to achieve lasting stability between West and East at a lower level of armaments were in the interests not only of those directly engaged in them but of the world at large. They had to be regarded in the context of one of the Treaty's prime objectives, namely, the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear arms.

34. The emergence of further nuclear-weapon States, besides upsetting regional power balances, could also undermine efforts to achieve greater stability between East and West and trigger off destabilizing developments with global repercussions. New nuclear-weapon States without the experience and insight gathered in the course of decades would create greater risks and, in critical situations, would make crisis management even more difficult. The world would have good reason to fear growing insecurity and danger of war. That was another reason why his Government wholeheartedly supported non-proliferation and wanted the Conference to succeed.

35. The Federal Republic of Germany attached great importance to the goal of a comprehensive test ban but was convinced that, because of the particularly profound effects which such a ban would have in military and security terms, it should be implemented only if reliable verification was assured. A few weeks previously, in the hope of helping to solve that problem, it had submitted a proposal in the Conference on Disarmament for the establishment of a system for the gradual improvement of seismological monitoring and verification capabilities to register underground nuclear explosions. In that connection, the recent United States invitation to the Soviet Union to send a team of experts to the United States to observe an underground nuclear test represented a potential step towards resolving the problem of verification. Regrettably, the Soviet Union had not so far demonstrated any willingness to accept the invitation.

36. As to the unilateral test moratorium announced by the Soviet Union as from 6 August 1985, it did not provide for any monitoring mechanism and therefore did nothing to resolve the central issue of a comprehensive test ban. Neither did it do anything to reduce the high level of Soviet nuclear arms. His Government had noted with interest Mr. Gorbachev's statement that he, too, considered an appropriate system of national and international controls to be essential to a comprehensive test ban, and expected active co-operation in that field from all countries able to make a contribution
within the Conference on Disarmament. It was to be hoped that, in line with
his delegation's proposal, work would be started without delay on the
establishment of a global seismological monitoring system. It should be
recognized, however, that achievement of a comprehensive test ban would in no
way be equivalent to a reduction of nuclear potentials. The connection
between a comprehensive test ban and the aims of the bilateral negotiations
currently taking place had to be borne constantly in mind.

37. In conclusion, he wished to stress the importance which his Government
attached to regional agreements aimed at preventing further proliferation of
nuclear arms, in particular the Treaty of Tlatelolco, with reference to the
question of negative security guarantees, the Federal Republic of Germany
regarded as fully justified the demand addressed to the nuclear-weapon States
to develop and reinforce the negative security guarantees which they had
assumed. His Government would work with all its strength at the Third Review
Conference to bring about results which reaffirmed the aims of the Treaty and
established sound prospects for the future.

38. Mr. LUCE (United Kingdom) said that the British Government attached great
importance to the NPT and to the Conference, for it was essential to continue
to work for reductions in nuclear arsenals and to avoid the further spread of
nuclear weapons. Since the Treaty had come into force in 1970, the only
non-nuclear-weapon State to demonstrate the capacity to detonate a nuclear
explosive device had been India, a country which was not a party to the
Treaty. The Indian Government had always maintained that the explosion had
been for purely peaceful purposes. Meanwhile, there had been a steady
increase in the number of States parties to the Treaty, which now stood at
130, or four-fifths of the membership of the United Nations. The
United Kingdom had co-operated in recent efforts to persuade non-States
parties to adhere to the Treaty. The Treaty's continued vitality had been
demonstrated by the accession of 17 new parties since the Second Review
Conference, in 1980. The Treaty was the most widely supported arms control
agreement in existence and, by successfully curbing further nuclear
proliferation, it played a crucial role in the security of all its parties and
the world as a whole.

39. The NPT would, of course, be still more effective if membership were
universal. Of the two nuclear-weapon States which had not yet adhered, France
had said that it would act as if it were a party and China had declared that
it did not advocate or encourage proliferation. Another encouraging
development was China's recent decision to take up membership in IAEA.
Non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the Treaty which were situated in
areas of regional tension and possessed important nuclear facilities but
refused to join the Treaty or to open their nuclear facilities to IAEA
inspection, States which included Argentina, Israel, India, Pakistan and
South Africa, should be persuaded to accede to the Treaty or at the very least
to submit all their facilities to safeguards. His Government called upon them
urgently to do so.

40. The United Kingdom was strongly committed to the NPT and regarded the
preservation of the Treaty as a fundamental aim. The United Kingdom's record
regarding implementation of the Treaty was set out in document NPT/CONF.III/17. With regard to the first of the Treaty's three broad objectives, that of preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons, his Government took the view that the Treaty derived much of its strength from acceptance of the IAEA safeguards system provided for under article III. It was remarkable that so many States had voluntarily permitted outside inspectors to examine all their peaceful nuclear facilities. The efforts of IAEA, which administered the safeguards and which had done much to promote confidence in the peaceful intentions of the parties, deserved praise. The United Kingdom would continue to co-operate with the Agency's efforts to improve the system further. It had been the first nuclear-weapon State, almost a decade previously, to conclude a voluntary safeguards agreement with IAEA to submit all of its peaceful nuclear facilities to safeguards, with the object of encouraging widespread adherence to the Treaty by demonstrating that non-nuclear-weapon States would not be placed at a commercial disadvantage by accepting safeguards. All exports from the United Kingdom of fissionable material or equipment designed for its processing or use had been subject to appropriate safeguards agreements. The United Kingdom had taken an active role in the group of parties to the Treaty which had produced an expanded list of items to which IAEA safeguards should apply.

41. As a consequence of its obligations as a nuclear-weapon State under article I, his country had introduced legislation and administrative procedures governing the export of nuclear material, equipment and technology which could be used in the production of a nuclear weapon or explosive device. The object of the measures, set forth in detail in the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines published by IAEA, was to ensure that exported items were transferred only for legitimate purposes and with the minimum risk of nuclear explosive use. Twenty-three States, including some non-parties to the Treaty, now applied the Guidelines as part of their nuclear export policy. The passage of time had demonstrated that the Guidelines performed an important function in the international non-proliferation régime and had not interfered with the right of any State party to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

42. With regard to the Treaty's second objective, that of cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, his Government shared the widely felt disappointment at the lack of progress towards that goal. The United Kingdom was fully committed to the implementation of article VI and had consistently worked for constructive arms control negotiations, playing an active part in virtually all multilateral arms control negotiations since the Second World War. However, it firmly believed that nuclear disarmament must begin with effective bilateral negotiations between the two Powers which, between them, possessed 95 per cent of the world's nuclear weapons. It had warmly welcomed the resumption of talks between the United States and the Soviet Union, in the hope that effective agreements could be reached to prevent an arms race in space and to end it on Earth. It was clearly in the interests of mankind as a whole that the talks should succeed.

43. It was, of course, disappointing that the significant measures of arms control and disarmament agreed upon in the years following the Treaty's entry into force, the principal agreements being those between the United States and
the Soviet Union, had not been followed up with further progress in that field. Yet it should not be forgotten that the NATO allies had meanwhile taken important and concrete unilateral steps to reduce their nuclear weapons stockpile. As a result of decisions taken in 1980 and 1983, five nuclear warheads in Europe would have been withdrawn for every one deployed and the number of NATO nuclear weapons in Europe would be at the lowest level for over 20 years.

44. The argument was sometimes advanced that it was inconsistent for the United Kingdom to retain nuclear weapons while working to prevent others from acquiring them. The fact of the matter was that nuclear weapons had long been part of the East-West security relationship. It was vital to continue to prevent war between East and West through deterrence, while working for balanced and verifiable nuclear arms reductions. There was no inconsistency between that approach and preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to other regions where they were not part of the existing security picture. The United Kingdom's nuclear deterrent represented less than 3 per cent of the strategic nuclear forces available to the United States of America or to the Soviet Union. As matters stood, it would not make sense for the United Kingdom to seek to trade reductions with a super-Power. His Government had none the less made it clear that if Soviet and United States strategic arsenals were to be very substantially reduced, and if no significant changes had occurred in Soviet defensive capabilities, the United Kingdom would wish to review its position and to consider how it might best contribute to arms control in the light of the reduced threat.

45. As regards a comprehensive test ban, the problem throughout had been to ensure adequate verification, without which such a ban would not contribute to international stability. The United Kingdom had, since 1957, been in the forefront of attempts to make progress towards a comprehensive ban on all nuclear tests and had, in particular, played a part in the trilateral negotiations which had ended in 1980. Unfortunately, it had to be recognized that those negotiations had proved unsuccessful and that the reasons for the lack of success still persisted. Verifications problems continued to be a major obstacle. What was needed was the political will to overcome them. Until solutions to those problems became available, a resumption of formal negotiations would be premature. The United Kingdom had persistently sought solutions to those problems and, in 1982 and 1983, had tabled papers on verification in the Committee on Disarmament, as well as a comprehensive paper on seismic monitoring for a comprehensive nuclear test ban in July 1985. A comprehensive test ban which allowed any militarily significant cheating by its signatories would not be in the interests of international stability or security. The United Kingdom Government continued, however, to hold the view that a properly verified treaty which met the security interests of all parties would be a significant contribution to containing the proliferation of nuclear arms. On the other hand, a moratorium on nuclear testing of the kind which had recently been proposed would be neither verifiable nor legally binding. Such unverifiable declaratory gestures were no substitute for serious negotiations towards comprehensive agreements.
46. His Government wished to restate its view that any comprehensive test ban had to include nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, since, in practice, such explosions could not be distinguished from nuclear weapon tests and, moreover, they could confer military benefits.

47. With reference to the Treaty's third objective, that of promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, he said that since 1970 the use of nuclear power for peaceful purposes had grown markedly, despite the world economic recession. Thirteen per cent of the world's total electricity was now generated from nuclear energy, and several of the 24 countries with nuclear power stations regarded themselves as belonging to the developing world. The United Kingdom's particular contribution to the growing use of nuclear power had been in the provision of fuel cycle services to a wide range of countries. The central dilemma of technology transfer for the purposes of power generation was how to reconcile the need for an assured supply of nuclear materials with the need for mutually acceptable non-proliferation conditions. His Government welcomed progress made in recent months in the IAEA's Committee on Assurances of Supply in developing a set of principles in connection with that problem. The United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, to be held early in 1987, would also have a useful part to play in resolving those issues.

48. The non-power uses of nuclear energy, of which the eradication of the tsetse fly by means of the sterile insect technique or the use of radioisotopes in hydrology were good examples, could make a valuable contribution to economic development, especially in the poorest countries. For such countries, technical assistance might be a more appropriate method of technology transfer than trade. Accordingly, at the Second Review Conference the United Kingdom had announced that it would spend a further $1 million on technical assistance projects administered by IAEA in developing States parties to the Treaty, but it had actually spent more than that sum. The money had been channelled through the "footnote-a/" system, a mechanism established to fulfil one of the recommendations of the First Review Conference. He was pleased to announce that his Government intended to double the amount of money it contributed to developing States parties through that system over the period up to 1990. Since the Second Review Conference, the United Kingdom had also contributed $3.7 million to the Agency's Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund and had made further amounts available for training fellowships for candidates from developing countries parties to the Treaty. His Government had been giving consideration to the question of how existing mechanism for nuclear technology transfer might be further improved. A series of proposals in that connection were contained in a working paper sponsored by his delegation together with several others, and he commended the paper (NPT/CONF.III/21) to the Conference's attention.

49. In conclusion, he expressed the hope that the Conference, having reviewed the Treaty as a whole in a constructive and balanced manner, would produce a worthwhile final document recognizing the crucial contribution which the NPT had made to world security by preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons, acknowledging the important part it played in promoting the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy and reflecting disappointment that progress on article VI had not been as great as might have been wished, while at the same time recognizing achievements in arms control since 1970 and recording the fervent hope that the current talks between the United States of America and the Soviet Union would be successful.

50. It had been predicted in some quarters that the Treaty would collapse unless there was greater progress on article VI. The question which had to be asked was whether the world would be a safer place without the Treaty. He, for one, believed that the answer was emphatically no. The Non-Proliferation Treaty was too important in its own right.

51. Mr. IMAI (Japan) said that at the Second Review Conference his delegation had made the point that, unless the Treaty's three main objectives - prevention of nuclear proliferation, peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and nuclear disarmament - were promoted in a balanced manner, the credibility of the régime as a whole would be greatly impaired. Today, five years later, there was some talk of an erosion of trust as regards the relationship between those three aspects. Yet the very fact that the parties to the Treaty now numbered 130 seemed to indicate that the Treaty was the most universally accepted agreement in the history of world arms control.

52. Nuclear energy now accounted for 3 to 4 per cent of the world's energy needs. The atmosphere of a frantic rush for nuclear power generation at any cost, characteristic of the decade of oil crisis, was now a thing of the past, and nuclear power as a form of energy technology could be said to have entered an era of maturity. Again, the fact that the number of nuclear-weapon States had not increased in the 15 years since the Treaty's entry into force had to be regarded as a major achievement. The relatively smooth development of and accomplishments in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy were to a large extent due to the effective functioning of the non-proliferation régime. In contrast to the satisfactory and stable situation with regard to those two main objectives of the Treaty, it could not be denied that the situation concerning the third objective, that of nuclear disarmament, was disappointing and was becoming a cause of serious frustration. The fact that an outbreak of nuclear war had been deterred was no excuse for the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament or for the erosion of efforts to develop international trust in that regard. At the same time, to negate the achievements in other important areas or to take any action that might undo those achievements on the ground that progress in the field of nuclear disarmament had been unsatisfactory would be a serious mistake. Progress towards nuclear disarmament had to be made step by step, in that effort, the responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States was, of course, particularly great.

53. Further efforts were required in order to increase adherence to the NPT régime. His country hoped that both China and France would accede to the Treaty at the earliest opportune moment and, until then would maintain the policy of supporting the spirit of the non-proliferation régime. His Government also wished to urge those non-nuclear-weapon States which had not yet acceded to the Treaty and in which there were significant unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in operation or under construction to join the NPT régime.
as soon as possible. Such countries should take concrete measures for early acceptance of full-scope safeguards, thereby erasing any doubts or suspicions that the international community might harbour about their motives.

54. Nuclear-weapon States were not required under the Treaty to accept IAEA safeguards. His Government took the view that in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the distinction between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States should not be reflected in any inequality of treatment. It welcomed the recent conclusion by the Soviet Union of a safeguards agreement with IAEA following on the arrangements already in existence with the United States, the United Kingdom and France, and called upon China to accept safeguards voluntarily in a similar manner. Japan would also wish to see all nuclear-weapon States give serious consideration to the principle that all of their facilities for civilian uses of nuclear energy should be submitted to the application of IAEA safeguards.

55. His country was satisfied with the operation of IAEA safeguards and hoped to see further improvements in their technical and institutional applications. The comprehensive safeguards system whereby all non-nuclear-weapon States parties were under an obligation to accept full-scope safeguards on virtually all of their nuclear activities lay at the very core of the non-proliferation regime. In the light of increases in both the number and the size of nuclear facilities throughout the world, the trend towards their standardization and increased automation, as well as other related technological advances, and in the light of the administrative and financial constraints upon the Agency, it was essential to explore ways and means of further improving the cost-effectiveness of safeguard measures, thereby introducing in addition a more rational inspection régime. His Government was fully prepared to take an active part in endeavours to that end. The IAEA safeguards were a unique example of multilateral verification of arms control and disarmament agreements. More satisfactory functioning of the safeguards would, on the one hand, encourage the idea of international verification in general and, on the other, provide much by way of useful concepts for the verification of other disarmament agreements. That aspect of the safeguards was of very great importance, even beyond the framework of the Treaty.

56. As to the discussions in IAEA on developing international institutional arrangements that would take due account of nuclear non-proliferation and strengthen its effectiveness, measures of that kind would undoubtedly be a useful supplement to the Treaty in the context of comprehensive non-proliferation. It should be noted, however, that consideration of the question of international management of plutonium and spent fuel had not yet produced satisfactory results. His Government would wish such consideration to be continued, with due regard being paid to national policies concerning the completion of the nuclear fuel cycle and the effective utilization of resources. As for the problem of assurances of supply within the overall context of nuclear non-proliferation, Japan was greatly interested in the work being done within the IAEA Committee on Assurances of Supply in connection with possible international systems of long-term stable trade in nuclear materials, technologies and equipment, welcomed the progress achieved thus far in the present year, and hoped for further progress in the future.
57. In the matter of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, article IV, paragraph 1, of the Treaty referred to the "inalienable right" of States Parties in that regard. The utilization of nuclear energy could play an important role in the economic and social development of States and his country had provided, in the Atomic Energy Basic Law, that the development and utilization of atomic energy should be limited to peaceful purposes and that the results thereof should be made available for international co-operation. It considered that three basic issues should be borne in mind. The first concerned nuclear non-proliferation, in which connection the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation work showed that the measures taken to that end could be carried out without prejudice to the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

58. The second basic issue was nuclear safety, which involved the solution of a number of technical problems relating to plant design and operation, as well as the creation of a public awareness and acceptance of its safety. Thirdly, there was the question of economy: each country should take account of its existing infrastructure, level of technology, and availability of natural resources with a view to determining nuclear power economies by comparison with the cost of energy from other sources. For an effective assessment of those issues, an international exchange of information, technology and manpower was required and his delegation pledged its continuing support for the valuable part played by IAEA in that regard.

59. Article IV, paragraph 2, called for "due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world". There had been a steady increase in recent years in international co-operation with the developing countries in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Japan placed emphasis on multilateral co-operation through IAEA and had greatly increased its financial contributions. Its contribution to the IAEA Technical Assistance Co-operation Fund in the fiscal year 1985 amounted to $2,650,000, or 10.2 per cent of the total amount, and it marked a 270 per cent increase over its contribution five years earlier. Japan also played a central role in the assistance rendered to the developing countries of Asia and the Pacific under the Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (RCA) and, despite severe budgetary restraints, would continue to contribute as much as possible to the strengthening of multilateral co-operation through IAEA. Also, bearing in mind the increasing requests from the developing countries and the recent decision of the Atomic Energy Commission, Japan intended to step up its efforts in the bilateral field through technical and research co-operation activities.

60. The most important issue, of course, was the need for nuclear disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States. It was of paramount importance that those States should abide by their obligations under article VI and work for nuclear disarmament in response to the trust of the vast majority which had renounced the nuclear option for the sake of the peace and security of mankind as a whole. Certain issues were of particular importance. In the first place, Japan attached great importance to the new arms control and disarmament negotiations in Geneva between the United States of America and the
Soviet Union, which had commenced in March 1985, and the forthcoming summit meeting scheduled in that city for November 1985. Its fervent hope was that those two countries, with their special responsibility for nuclear disarmament, would engage in patient dialogue and pursue their negotiations in a constructive manner so as to arrive at concrete measures for a radical reduction in, and eventual abolition of, nuclear weapons. Of particular concern to Japan were the Soviet SS 20 missiles, which were being discussed as part of the intermediate-range nuclear forces. With a view to security in Asia in general, Japan again appealed to the two sides to seek a global solution.

61. Secondly, Japan considered that a comprehensive test ban, which was mentioned in the preamble to the Treaty, was an important first step on the road to nuclear disarmament, and it objected to nuclear tests by any State. Such a ban was of importance in preventing not only vertical but also horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and would be a valuable complement to the NPT régime. His delegation hoped that the Conference on Disarmament, at its session in 1986, would resolve the problem of the mandate of the proposed ad hoc committee to pursue the subject and thus be able to embark on the detailed consideration of such issues as verification and compliance. It also hoped that the proposal submitted by the Japanese representative to the Conference on Disarmament in June 1984 on a step-by-step approach to a comprehensive test ban would receive due consideration by the ad hoc committee.

62. Thirdly, questions of compliance with existing arms control and disarmament agreements had recently become major issues and Japan called upon all parties concerned to observe faithfully their treaty obligations. The matter of compliance could have major consequences for the development of trust among parties and could prejudice the outcome of new negotiations by undermining even the minimum amount of trust necessary for such negotiations to succeed. Lastly, the halting of the production of weapon-purpose nuclear fission material, or the so-called problem of "cut-off", deserved mention in view of new developments in related technology. A "cut-off" would expedite the termination of the quantitative aspect of the nuclear arms race and his country therefore hoped that preliminary consultations would commence at an appropriate time.

63. Japan had, under its Constitution, renounced war and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. The basis of its foreign policy, and the obligation it had imposed upon itself following the tragic experiences of the Second World War, was to contribute to world peace and prosperity. That was why its Atomic Energy Basic Law provided that the development of nuclear energy should be limited to peaceful purposes. Japan had decided to accede to the NPT in 1976 not only because it believed that the international régime established therein accommodated its own philosophy, but also because it considered that its adherence would contribute greatly to peace and stability, particularly in Asia. The maintenance of the NPT régime was a matter of national interest to Japan, which would do its utmost to maintain and strengthen that régime.
64. Those who had been involved in the birth of the Treaty felt that they had an obligation to enhance its universal acceptance, to reaffirm its importance in 1995, and to pass it on to the next century. The only way in which nuclear disarmament would be achieved, however, and the world freed from nuclear weapons was for all States to recognize their responsibility and to work together constantly and sincerely.

65. Mr. STEPHANOU (Greece) said that the fortieth anniversary of the first use of nuclear weapons had served to remind the world of the shock and enormity of that event. Attempts to found a harmonious post-war order based on the United Nations and its Charter had soon encountered difficulties owing to the traditional mistrust, prejudices and clash of ideologies among States; but the presence of weapons which enabled a State to shatter cities and wipe out millions of lives was a new factor. World opinion had thus begun to harden behind two propositions: that States already in possession of nuclear weapons should seek agreement on arms control and disarmament measures, and that States not in possession of such weapons should refrain from developing them, on the understanding that they would not thereby be debarred from using nuclear power for peaceful purposes. Out of those basic propositions had emerged the NPT, the only world-wide instrument of its kind, and it had worked positively and was one of the most important agreements of the twentieth century.

66. The first two Review Conferences had concluded that the obligations under articles I and II of the Treaty had been closely observed by all parties, and the background paper (NPT/CONF.III/3) now before the Third Review Conference noted that there had been no suggestion that either nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty had failed to carry out those obligations. Nor had any State Party abrogated the Treaty or even questioned its importance. It could therefore be assumed that the NPT had become the most important element in developing an effective international non-proliferation régime and the fact that 130 States had become parties to it proved beyond doubt that the principle of non-proliferation was more and more widely recognized by the international community. Certain developments in a small number of countries that were not parties to the Treaty could not, however, be disregarded. It was a matter of serious concern, and one to which the Conference should give its urgent attention, that many of those countries, which had not subscribed to the obligations under articles II and III of the Treaty, had built or were building, without the application of safeguards, plants capable of producing substances that could be used to make nuclear weapons.

67. One of the main aims of the NPT was to achieve, through development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, a reduction in the eventual elimination of existing economic and social imbalances. While Greece did not question the right of every State to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and indeed attached special importance to that right, it continued to believe that peaceful applications of nuclear energy should take place under credible and effective international safeguards, something which, unfortunately, was not always the case. Such safeguards provided for international verification to ensure that material was not diverted to nuclear weapons and other nuclear
explosive devices, and they were therefore an important confidence-building measure. For that reason, Greece was strongly in favour of the application of IAEA safeguards on a universal basis. It had also been pleased to hear that all nuclear-weapon States were prepared to accept safeguards verification in their non-military nuclear installations and considered that the fact that the Soviet Union had recently joined the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France in accepting on-site inspections in its nuclear plants was a positive development. In that connection, he noted that EURATOM safeguards were applied within the European Community and the results were verified by IAEA in full accordance with the agreements between those countries, EURATOM and IAEA.

68. His country supported the further development of IAEA safeguard techniques and considered that full account should be taken of new technological developments. Nuclear trade should only take place under adequate non-proliferation conditions, including IAEA safeguards, and the necessary security conditions, in view of the danger in transporting nuclear material. It was gratifying to note that IAEA had not detected any anomaly indicating the diversion of a significant amount of safeguarded material for the manufacture of a nuclear explosive device. Deliberate violation of a safeguards agreement with the intent to divert such material would seriously undermine trust in international nuclear co-operation. Greece, as a signatory to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, also wished to stress the importance of adequate measures for such protection.

69. Under the NPT, States parties had a duty to continue in good faith the negotiations for general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, that was a cornerstone of Greece's foreign policy. The obligations imposed on non-nuclear-weapon countries not to generate horizontal nuclear proliferation by acquiring nuclear weapons had its counterpart in the obligation imposed on nuclear-weapon countries to fulfil their duty by ending vertical proliferation and achieving genuine nuclear disarmament. In that context, Greece welcomed the new bilateral arms control negotiations between the United States of America and the Soviet Union and trusted that agreements would be reached to reduce nuclear armaments, end the arms race on Earth and prevent an arms race in space.

70. Within the broader international setting, the goals of non-proliferation could more effectively be pursued in a spirit of respect for the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of sustained endeavours towards the peaceful settlement of disputes, and in an environment that provided for verifiable arms control and disarmament measures in the nuclear, chemical and conventional fields, where the progress made thus far had been insufficient.

71. The regional approach was an essential ingredient of non-proliferation strategy and the Greek Government was convinced that progress could be achieved through the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, as attested by the Tlatelolco Treaty. It welcomed the recent creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific and favoured the initiative of the Balkan countries, including Greece, for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Balkans. At a meeting of government experts
from Balkan countries convened by the Greek Government in Athens in 1984, it had been agreed that suggestions regarding the establishment of such a zone should be referred to the Governments of the participating States for the purposes of continuing the dialogue.

72. The conclusion of a comprehensive test ban-treaty would be a significant demonstration of the intention of nuclear-weapon States to work for nuclear disarmament, as specified in article VI of the NPT, while the accession to such a treaty by States non-parties to the NPT could provide a measure of assurance against the proliferation of nuclear explosive capability. For that reason, multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty should commence forthwith, as proposed in the Delhi Declaration, signed by six Heads of State and Government in January 1985. Greece, which would support any effort aimed at achieving a comprehensive test ban treaty, regarded the announcement by the Soviet Union of a nuclear moratorium until the end of 1985 as an essential step in stopping the nuclear arms race. It strongly hoped that the moratorium would be extended beyond 1 January 1986 and that the United States and other nuclear-weapon States would join in it. The statements made by the United States and Soviet Union representatives the previous day contained very promising references regarding their attitude to a test-ban treaty.

73. The Non-Proliferation Treaty had withstood the test of time and become one of the foundation stones on which international security rested. While the multilateral effort should continue, non-proliferation was primarily a political matter, for a non-proliferation system would be respected only if it was based upon the conviction of States that their interests were better safeguarded within the system rather than outside it. His delegation therefore considered that the Conference should also seek to give new impetus to the efforts to achieve nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament with a view to making the advantages of the NPT known not only to member States but also to non-parties. It sincerely hoped that the number of accessions to the Treaty would continue to increase.

74. Mr. HEGNER (Switzerland) said that the objectives of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, namely to promote nuclear disarmament and avert the danger of nuclear war, had been partially attained. Since its entry into force 15 years earlier, the general view was that no new nuclear Power had emerged. The continuing increase in existing arsenals, however, represented a formidable challenge for mankind, a challenge that could be met if the community of States observed the NPT both in letter and in spirit. The Treaty, the arms control instrument with the largest number of States parties and the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation system, was the most suitable means for averting the twin dangers of vertical and horizontal proliferation, but its effectiveness could be guaranteed only if all its provisions were duly enforced and observed. It was in that spirit that his Government had committed itself to non-proliferation and would support all measures that seemed reasonable. In particular, Switzerland would continue to perform faithfully the obligations it had assumed under the Treaty.
75. The statement that satisfactory compliance with the terms of the Treaty was the sole guarantee of its effectiveness was particularly relevant in the case of a non-proliferation treaty which stipulated for an unequal distribution of the rights and obligations of the parties. The Treaty, however, also contained provisions whereby a balance could be restored in regard to the inherent discrimination, namely the obligations regarding military security, the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy, and international co-operation. Therein lay the guarantee not only of the continuance of the Treaty but also of its wider acceptability for other States.

76. Referring first to the military security, he noted that guarantees of security had been the subject of renewed attention by the Conference on Disarmament. So far as the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament were concerned, little progress had been recorded since the previous Review Conference. From the strictly legal point of view, it could certainly be said that there had been formal compliance with the obligations under article VI of the NPT, for negotiations on arms limitation and disarmament had indeed been held. Politically, however, the situation was different, since any successes or failures could have a decisive effect on the outcome of the international non-proliferation régime. As the United States representative had stated when the Treaty had been concluded, nuclear-weapon States knew full well that the long-term effectiveness of the Treaty depended in large measure on positive results being achieved in the negotiations which those States were required to hold under article VI. While Switzerland appreciated the complexity of the problems involved it greatly regretted that the efforts undertaken over the past five years had not led to any results.

77. A comprehensive test-ban treaty had still not been concluded, even though it had been mentioned not only in the preamble to the NPT but also in the preamble to the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty. Bearing in mind that disarmament and the measures leading up to it were not the monopoly of a few countries but were the fervent wish of the international community as a whole, Switzerland supported any measures or proposals designed to achieve a significant reduction in offensive nuclear weapons and greater security. Accordingly, it welcomed the resumption of the dialogue between the two major Powers in Geneva and trusted that the results would be fruitful for the NPT.

78. The second element of the Treaty, reflected in article IV, concerned the peaceful use of nuclear energy and international co-operation in that regard. One of the basic conditions for Switzerland's accession, as for that of many other States, was that it should continue to enjoy the inalienable right to engage in the research, production and utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, on the understanding that those activities would be supervised by IAEA. Switzerland likewise relied on the international co-operation that was essential for the extension and promotion of such activities. It was therefore gratified to note that a measure of progress had been achieved in that respect over the past five years, including the technical and geographical extension of peaceful uses, something which had facilitated the supply of fuel and services. The marked trend towards rationalization of co-operation at the bilateral level would likewise help to solve supply problems. It should none the less be noted that the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy encompassed, on a non-discriminatory basis, all
activities in that field, including the right to choose a fuel cycle, in keeping with the national priorities, interests and needs of each State party.

79. A clear separation between the civilian and military sectors in nuclear-weapon States would be another contribution to the promotion of international trade, and Switzerland recognized the advances in that field. Such separation was essential to the co-operation of non-nuclear-weapon States with nuclear-weapon States, on which many of their nuclear energy programmes depended.

80. Considerable progress had been achieved in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the capabilities had increased fivefold over the past 15 years. Of 325 nuclear power stations, 40 were situated in the developing countries. During the past 15 years of the nuclear contribution to North-South co-operation, the volume of IAEA's assistance had multiplied tenfold. Switzerland was gratified to see the machinery for international co-operation in such a difficult technical area had proved its worth.

81. The Swiss Government, which was aware of the danger that proliferation might accompany the technological development of nuclear energy, recognized the need to adapt or clarify non-proliferation measures. In that connection, account should be taken of a number of factors. First, as the developments of the past five years had clearly shown, nuclear energy had made an essential contribution to solving world energy problems. Consequently, it would be quite unrealistic to claim that the proliferation problem could be overcome by restrictions on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Second, any non-proliferation policy should take account of the principle of the sovereignty of all States regarding the use of nuclear energy. Non-proliferation was a political, not a technical, matter. A non-proliferation system could be effective only if it was based on the conviction of States that their interests were better safeguarded within the system rather than outside it. That object could only be attained by political measures, in particular by facilitating international co-operation.

82. Third, a policy of denial of or restrictions on supply would not, as the experiences of the 1970s had shown, lessen the risk of non-proliferation; on the contrary, it would push the States concerned along the path towards uncontrolled self-sufficiency. Fourth, administrative complications and bottle-necks which made the planning of the fuel cycle difficult should be averted and eliminated. Lastly, though non-proliferation inevitably involved discrimination in the military field, it was unacceptable in the field of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Hence, a non-proliferation policy which sought to keep some technologies that were necessary for the achievement of peaceful purposes for a small circle of States would have scant chance of success.

83. It followed that non-proliferation measures were more likely to be respected on a lasting basis if all States concerned could contribute to them from the outset. The importance of bodies concerned with matters such as supply and non-proliferation, like the Committee on Assurances of Supply, should not be underestimated. The fact that it was extremely difficult to
arrive at a consensus in that body should not be grounds for discouragement but, on the contrary, should serve as encouragement to pursue the work in a constructive way.

84. It was the view of his Government that the operation of the NPT and the achievement of its objectives depended in the main on the application of the provisions of article IV as well as of article VI. It reserved the right to submit to the Conference proposals on ways to ensure that those provisions were more faithfully respected.

85. Non-proliferation was a global problem and the solution depended on co-operation among all States. His Government therefore appealed to those States which had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty, for its effectiveness would be considerably enhanced. A prerequisite for increasing the number of parties to the Treaty, however, was to make it more acceptable. That required, on the one hand, the application of all the operative provisions of the Treaty and, on the other, prudence in the non-proliferation policy so as not to prejudice the NPT and the closely related IAEA controls. If the Conference made the NPT an instrument of greater acceptability, positive elements would be furnished for a discussion that should be pursued at the international level in the years to come.

86. The developments over the past decade had not rendered those principles obsolete, but had indeed confirmed how topical they were. If he had reiterated them at the present Review Conference, it was simply to lay down a sounder basis for future discussions. Integration of new supply countries into the non-proliferation system should be the most important task. The year 1995 was not far off and the question of the Treaty's continuation should be considered as soon as possible. One question that arose was whether a formula for extension that was lacking in the necessary strength and precision would in fact give satisfaction. It was difficult to imagine that provisions embodied in an international instrument as sensitive as a treaty on arms control could be deemed to be incorporated in a system of customary law.

87. It was his delegation's hope that, as a result of the progress made at the Conference, it would be possible in the future to deal with the question of continuation of the Treaty in a manner in keeping with the objectives that had been set.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 5th MEETING
Thursday, 29 August 1985, at 3.40 p.m.

President: Mr. SHAKER (Egypt)

ELECTION OF CHAIRMEN AND VICE-CHAIRMEN OF THE MAIN COMMITTEES, THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE AND THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE (agenda item 5)

Chairmen

1. The PRESIDENT drew attention to rule 31 of the rules of procedure and noted that the number of candidates did not exceed the number of elective places to be filled, proposed that the Conference might dispense with a secret ballot.

2. It was so decided.

3. The PRESIDENT suggested that, regard being had to the outcome of consultations within the various groups, that Mr. Dhanapala (Sri Lanka) should be elected Chairman of Main Committee I, Mr. Vejvoda (Czechoslovakia) Chairman of Main Committee II, Mr. Imai (Japan) Chairman of Main Committee III, Mr. Ekeus (Sweden) Chairman of the Drafting Committee and Mr. Keisalo (Finland) Chairman of the Credentials Committee.

4. It was so decided.

Vice-Chairmen

5. The PRESIDENT said that the list of candidates was not yet complete and that the election of the Vice-Chairmen would therefore be postponed.

ELECTION OF VICE-PRESIDENTS (agenda item 6)

6. The PRESIDENT said that in accordance with rule 5 of the rules of procedure, the Conference was required to elect 26 Vice-Presidents. Noting that the number of candidates did not exceed the number of places to be filled, he proposed that the Conference might dispense with a secret ballot.

7. It was so decided.

8. The PRESIDENT said that the candidates to those posts were the representatives of the following countries: Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, German Democratic Republic, Germany (Federal Republic of), Ghana, Hungary, Jordan, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Peru, Poland, Romania, Senegal, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Yugoslavia. If there was no objection, he would take it that the Conference wished the representatives of those countries to be elected as Vice-Presidents.

9. It was so decided.
10. Mr. ROCHE (Canada) recalled that this country had been the first to forego the development of nuclear weapons, despite having the technology and capability to do so, from the earliest days of the nuclear era; it had adhered to that decision ever since. Canada's nuclear programme was strictly for peaceful purposes and entirely subject to safeguards. His Government required the same commitment by those States to which it exported nuclear materials, equipment and technology. Canadian foreign policy in the nuclear field therefore fully complied with the objectives of the NPT. His Government deeply valued the NPT and hoped that the Third Review Conference would ensure a complete and honest review of all its provisions.

11. In that regard, he considered it useful to review past successes and failures. Only at the last moment of the First Review Conference had States parties succeeded in adopting by consensus a Final Declaration, which had nevertheless reflected the frustration felt by many States, in particular the non-aligned and neutral countries, at the lack of implementation of the commitments made by the nuclear Powers under articles IV and VI of the Treaty, over the previous five years. The Second Review Conference had ended without a final document because of lack of agreement on issues relating to nuclear disarmament, particularly on a comprehensive nuclear test ban; no final agreement had been reached on non-proliferation or nuclear co-operation.

12. During the period 1980-1985, a number of opportunities had been lost. The trilateral talks on a comprehensive test ban had ceased, the Conference on Disarmament had not been able to agree on a practical mandate for a nuclear-test-ban ad hoc committee. The second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament had not been able to produce a consensus final document. The intermediate-range nuclear forces negotiations had been broken off and the strategic arms reduction talks suspended. On the other hand, there had been a few encouraging signs: the SALT II agreement continued to be the basic strategic working document of the United States of America and the Soviet Union; the number of nuclear-weapon States had remained at five; IAEA continued to make a major contribution to the non-proliferation regime through its system of safeguards, and NATO had decided to reduce the nuclear stockpile in Europe to its lowest level in more than 20 years.

13. Still more significantly, the United States of America and the Soviet Union had resumed bilateral negotiations; although the two parties had agreed on the objectives, namely, the prevention of an arms race in space and its termination on Earth, the limitation and reduction of nuclear arms and the strengthening of strategic stability, leading ultimately to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, they differed dramatically about how to achieve them. The decision to hold a summit meeting was nevertheless a very important development, since dialogue at the highest level set the tone and firm guidelines for those who must carry them out in detailed technical negotiations. The forthcoming summit had the potential for breaking the disarmament impasse.
14. In participating in the Third Review Conference, Canada was striving to achieve two basic objectives: the maintenance of the NPT as the basic element of an effective international non-proliferation régime, and the reaffirmation by the States Parties of the purpose and provisions of the NPT. Those objectives, which might appear modest at first glance, were truly critical in the long run. As far as article VI was concerned, it meant reconfirming the need for the nuclear Powers to renew the commitments taken under the terms of that article. Progress towards a comprehensive-test-ban treaty had traditionally been associated with compliance with article VI. For Canada, such a treaty would be a concrete, realistic measure towards curbing the development of new and more sophisticated nuclear weapons and it was regarded as an important step towards halting both the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. One of the major political and technical obstacles involved the verification of an eventual treaty. For that reason, Canada had been an active participant in the Conference on Disarmament's Seismic Experts Group, strengthening the capability for seismic verification of a CTB.

15. With regard to articles III and IV, what was needed was a broad recognition of the crucial role played by the Treaty in reducing the risks of proliferation while at the same time providing the necessary framework for nuclear co-operation to take place. Canada hoped that the Conference would endorse a principle of a comprehensive, binding non-proliferation commitment and full-scope safeguards as an essential condition of nuclear supply.

16. Concerning articles V and VII, his Government believed that nuclear-weapon-free zones were not a fully satisfactory alternative to the ratification of the NPT but that in the absence of universal or near-universal adherence to the latter, the creation of such zones could make a significant contribution to the objective of non-proliferation. Canada had therefore supported, inter alia, measures to consolidate the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America in accordance with the Treaty of Tlatelolco, although that Treaty contained a provision which allowed for the explosion of nuclear devices for so-called peaceful purposes. Canada had some doubts as to the economic value of the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions, since the possession of nuclear explosive devices by non-nuclear-weapon States would pose a threat to regional and international security.

17. In the final analysis, the Treaty was still a valuable international instrument whose credibility and applicability must be constantly monitored. The fact that countries were continuing to sign it was a tribute to both its moral force and practical utility, and it was important to induce those States which had not yet done so to ratify it or to accede to it. It should be pointed out to those States which argued that the Treaty was discriminatory, that the same discrimination existed in the United Nations Security Council, to those that called for an end to the nuclear arms race while themselves refusing to sign the NPT, it should be suggested that their appeal would be more credible if they were parties to the Treaty; those States which retained the nuclear option should be asked to consider the tragic and devastating consequences of a nuclear war; finally, those nuclear-weapon States which
remained outside the Treaty should be invited to recognize that security and sovereignty of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union had in no way been compromised thus far. It should be demonstrated that adherence to the letter and the spirit of the Non-Proliferation Treaty would result in a powerful non-proliferation regime guaranteeing the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

18. Mr. GOTZEV (Bulgaria) recalled, first of all, that the problem of curbing the arms race, and particularly the nuclear arms race, was central to international politics. The way in which it was approached reflected the attitude of States towards the major task of the present day, namely that of removing the danger of a nuclear war and of creating a reliable basis for peaceful co-existence and co-operation among countries with different socio-political systems.

19. The Third Review Conference took on an increased importance in the current tense state of international relations, which was being aggravated by the alarming growth of the arms race, particularly in the nuclear field. His delegation shared the view expressed in the message to the Conference by Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, that in the nuclear and space age, the problem of curtailing the arms race was inseparably linked to the task of preventing the militarization of outer space. The new Soviet initiative submitted to the fortieth session of the General Assembly opened the way towards a solution to the complex problem of international co-operation in the peaceful use of outer space in conditions of non-militarization.

20. In the conviction that the Treaty was an objective necessity, Bulgaria had been one of the first countries to sign and ratify it. Fifteen years after its entry into force, one was in a position to state that the NPT had formed a barrier to further proliferation of nuclear weapons and had been a factor in the strengthening of international peace and security. It had also laid down a basis for the development of international co-operation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and had thereby proved its effectiveness as all States Parties were complying with the commitment to prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons. As the Secretary-General, Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar, had rightly stressed in his message to the Conference, "the Treaty Parties - nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States alike - have a fundamental interest in its effectiveness and viability". Bulgaria reiterated its commitment to and support for the objectives and principles of the NPT and its determination to further implement all its provisions and to discharge its obligations, particularly under articles I and II.

21. The major objective of the NPT was to curb the spread of nuclear weapons and limit the number of nuclear-weapon States, thus diminishing the danger of a nuclear conflict. Consequently, Bulgaria attached major importance to the provisions of article VI and the relevant preambular paragraphs of the Treaty, which were fully in line with a position of principle held by it. At the current phase in international relations there was no other task more important than the preservation of world peace, the elimination of the nuclear threat and the achievement of disarmament, particularly in the nuclear field.
All countries should jointly adopt and implement effective practical measures to achieve that goal. The socialist countries, including Bulgaria, had frequently reaffirmed their readiness to engage in negotiations and to conclude agreements on the limitation and reduction of weapons, above all nuclear weapons, on the basis of mutual and strict respect for the principle of equality and equal security. Bulgaria welcomed the opening of negotiations on that issue between the Soviet Union and the United States of America, and hoped that both States would strive to reach agreement on substantive measures aimed at preventing the arms race in space and terminating it on Earth.

22. Bulgaria considered that the best way of implementing the provisions of article VI of the Treaty would be the adoption and progressive implementation of a programme for nuclear disarmament. A proposal along those lines had been put forward by the socialist countries to the Conference on Disarmament. A complete and general prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests could also play a very significant role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and, consequently, in strengthening the non-proliferation régime established by the NPT. It was not by chance that the Treaty reaffirmed the commitments by the States Parties to the Partial Test Ban Treaty, signed in Moscow in 1963, to seek to achieve the ending of all test explosions of nuclear weapons. His delegation wished to stress the importance of the unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions declared by the Soviet Union with effect from 6 August 1985. The decision, which had been welcomed by the Conference on Disarmament and throughout the world, faithfully reflected the General Assembly's specific request in five resolutions adopted since 1980. It was to be hoped that the United States of America would also associate itself with the moratorium so that it might be extended beyond 1 January 1986. Such a measure would not only be a major step forward towards the limitation of the nuclear arms race but also offer an example for other nuclear-weapon States. A complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests would in fact open the way towards the practical elimination of such weapons. The elaboration of a nuclear test-ban treaty and the resumption of trilateral negotiations between the Depository States of the NPT would form a valuable contribution to the solution of that problem.

23. An early adoption of effective guarantees to strengthen the security of non-nuclear-weapon States would have an extremely beneficial effect on the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty. The Treaty itself had contributed to that end, and Security Council resolution 255 (1968) provided for immediate assistance to any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty which might be subjected to nuclear aggression. The socialist countries, including Bulgaria, had consistently put forward constructive proposals, both in the General Assembly and in the Conference on Disarmament, for the adoption of more effective and uniform guarantees for the security of those States. As one Depositary State had already done, all nuclear-weapon States should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, thus greatly strengthening the non-proliferation régime. A quantitative and qualitative freeze on all nuclear arsenals could be the starting point for reinforcing implementation of the Treaty. Further, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world, as envisaged in article VII of the Treaty, could play an important role in that context. The
existence of such zones would contribute not only to reduce the nuclear threat but also to strengthen regional co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In that respect, Bulgaria welcomed the recent decision of South Pacific countries to establish a nuclear-free zone in their region. The creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Balkans was one of Bulgaria's most important foreign policy goals, and in that connection mention should be made of the Athens meeting of experts from Balkan countries in January-February 1984. The implementation of the proposals to create nuclear-weapon-free zones in northern Europe and the Balkans would indubitably be a significant contribution towards eliminating nuclear weapons from the whole of the European continent. His delegation intended to submit to the Conference a working paper on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones and the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.

24. Most States recognized with good reason that the non-proliferation régime, while contributing to the maintenance of international stability, had established a basis for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and had an important role to play in the promotion of international co-operation in that field. Its effectiveness would be increased by the accession of more countries to the NPT. The existence of "near-nuclear" States, such as South Africa and Israel, which did not conceal their nuclear ambitions and which remained outside the Treaty, gave particular cause for concern. As nuclear power production increased, so did the need to improve the effective functioning of the IAEA safeguards system. Experience had shown that its implementation in no way infringed on the sovereign rights of Member States or hampered the development of their peaceful nuclear activities. The importance of measures for the protection of nuclear materials against theft by terrorists, for example, should also be stressed, and in particular the Convention on Physical Protection, which Bulgaria had recently ratified and whose early entry into force would also contribute towards strengthening the non-proliferation régime.

25. As a non-nuclear-weapon State, Bulgaria consistently supported all initiatives which could lead to the adoption of effective measures to reduce the danger of a nuclear conflict, to curb the arms race and to achieve disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament. It believed that the Third Review Conference would contribute to strengthening the Treaty and to stabilizing international relations and the political environment. Its delegation would make every effort to help to achieve those lofty goals.

26. Mr. BOLT (New Zealand) said that 15 years after the entry into force of the Treaty, the same fears and hopes which had called it into existence must be kept in mind in reviewing the NPT and the non-proliferation régime it had established.

27. His Government was firm in its conviction that the task of all countries represented at the Conference was to reaffirm, sustain and strengthen the Treaty. Significant achievements had already been secured and 130 countries had become Parties to the Treaty, thereby demonstrating that no prestige attached to the possession of nuclear weapons. It was also with a sense of relief that one noted that as far as could be determined, no
non-nuclear-weapon States had undertaken a nuclear test explosion for the past decade. Nevertheless, it must be recognized that a number of significant countries had so far declined to join the régime established by the Treaty and that the objectives of article VI had not been achieved.

28. New Zealand supported the observance of article I of the Treaty by the nuclear-weapon States and welcomed the evidence that article II continued to be faithfully observed by the non-nuclear-weapon States. Although the NPT played a significant role in the area of peaceful nuclear co-operation, it had a prime importance as an arms control treaty. Article III provided for detailed verification of articles I and II. The system of safeguards, so ably administered by IAEA, was essential to the non-proliferation régime since it provided an example of verification in practice and pointed the way towards a solution to the far more urgent problems to which article VI was addressed. His country strongly endorsed the remarks made by Mr. Blix (1st meeting), the Director General of IAEA in that connection. It was pleased to note the steady expansion in the application of safeguards. It commended the efforts of countries that exported nuclear material to prevent nuclear proliferation, but believed that the application of fullscope safeguards, under IAEA supervision, was the best means to prevent such proliferation. Naturally, the application of safeguards must be balanced by assurances that no unnecessary obstacle would be placed in the way of the acquisition of nuclear material, equipment or technology by countries that had accepted such safeguards and wished to make use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, as provided in article IV of the Treaty. Having said that, he wished to emphasize once more that the exploitation of nuclear energy must be secondary to the goal of non-proliferation whenever there was any risk of diversion of nuclear equipment or material to the production of nuclear weapons.

29. Article VI was the most difficult of all the articles of the Treaty, and in its implementation, the least satisfactory. The results of disarmament negotiations over the past 15 years and, in particular, over the last five years had been disappointing. Much effort had gone into negotiations at both the bilateral and multilateral levels and some significant agreements had been concluded, but despite those achievements and despite the undertaking accepted by Parties to the NPT under article VI, no agreement had been concluded to reduce the number of existing weapons and no significant agreement on nuclear weapons had been concluded among the nuclear Powers since the last review of the Treaty.

30. There could be no dispute that in practice the NPT had been more effective in discouraging horizontal proliferation by non-nuclear-weapon States than it had been in restraining vertical proliferation by nuclear-weapon States parties. That state of affairs was of the greatest concern to people in all countries of the world, and in his address to the General Assembly in 1984 (see A/39/PV.7), the Prime Minister of New Zealand had very clearly conveyed the alarm felt by New Zealanders at the continuing build-up of nuclear arsenals. He had also conveyed their frustration at the inability of the nuclear-weapon States to agree on practical measures to halt and reverse the process of building more and "better" nuclear weapons. All
States Parties to the Treaty had a responsibility to contribute to the implementation of article VI and to the disarmament process. As a party to the Treaty, New Zealand had forgone the possession of nuclear weapons and had declared unambiguously that it did not want any country to defend it with nuclear weapons, that it would not have any nuclear weapons in its territory, and that it would not allow any to be brought in. It intended that the South Pacific area should not become one for confrontation between the super-Powers.

31. The options for small countries like New Zealand to contribute to global disarmament were, however, limited and the primary responsibility for disarmament fell on the nuclear-weapon States, particularly the United States of America and the Soviet Union. New Zealand had welcomed the resumption in the current year of bilateral negotiations between the United States of America and the Soviet Union and the agreement reached on their objectives. The New Zealand Government had particularly welcomed the statement in the joint communiqué of 8 January 1985 that the negotiations should lead to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons everywhere. The two rounds of bilateral talks which had been held in 1985 had not led to an agreement, but that was not surprising given the complexity of the issues to be resolved. What did give cause for concern, however, was the dissatisfaction expressed on both occasions by each side not only at the proposals but also the good faith of the other party. New Zealand therefore called on them to pursue their talks with vigour and good faith, to refrain from seeking temporary political advantage and to work assiduously for the conclusion of concrete agreements that would promote mutual, balanced and verifiable reductions in the existing levels of nuclear weapons.

32. Bilateral talks were not the only forum for making progress towards disarmament. Multilateral negotiations, principally the Conference on Disarmament, had a major role to play in the realization of the objectives of article VI of the Treaty. Yet the results achieved by the Conference during its session in 1985 gave scant cause for satisfaction. For New Zealand the lack of progress on the nuclear-test ban item was of major concern. Every year since 1972, New Zealand, together with Australia, had put forward a resolution calling for the urgent conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Those resolutions had secured the support of the overwhelming majority of the members of the United Nations. Such a treaty was the most practical measure to halt the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons and would provide much greater assurance than would interim measures such as a freeze or an unverified moratorium on testing. Given the importance placed on the nuclear test ban by the international community, it was distressing to observe that the Conference on Disarmament had failed to agree to establish an ad hoc committee to discuss the issues relating to the negotiation of a comprehensive test ban. He was deeply disappointed that the Conference had not responded to the injunctions contained in the resolutions put forward by New Zealand and Australia in 1983 and 1984. In directing those criticisms at the implementation of article VI, New Zealand was not calling into question the Treaty itself, but it was particularly concerned that the nuclear-weapon States as well as the non-nuclear-weapon States, should use the Review to reaffirm their commitment to the Treaty as a whole.
33. Under article VII, his Government was pleased to inform the Conference that agreement had been reached to establish the first nuclear-free zone since the adoption of the Treaty in 1968. On 6 August 1985, at Rarotonga, the South Pacific Forum had endorsed and opened for signature the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty. The Treaty had already been signed by New Zealand and seven other Pacific countries; that action showed the resolve of Forum countries to have no nuclear weapons in the region. The nuclear-free zone established by the Treaty was vast and bordered two other nuclear-free zones, those covered by the Treaty of Tlatelolco in Latin America and by the Antarctic Treaty. That meant that a large part of the southern hemisphere had declared its determination to be free of nuclear weapons. The countries of the South Pacific Forum hoped that the five nuclear-weapon States would, after consultations with them, sign the protocols to the Treaty and thereby agree not to use or threaten to use nuclear explosive devices against any country or territory in the zone and undertake not to test nuclear explosive devices there.

34. In that connection, he could not fail to mention that the French Government was continuing to test nuclear weapons at Mururoa Atoll in the South Pacific, displaying an extraordinary disregard of the interests and concerns of the countries of the region. He recalled that an act of international terrorism involving murder had recently taken place in New Zealand in connection with the continuation of those tests. The circumstances of the act had already gained world-wide notoriety. The New Zealand Prime Minister had stated that the attack "showed the insanity to which nuclear testing had led. The obsession with pursuing the tests had resulted in an infringement of New Zealand's sovereignty by the French Government and an unacceptable insult to New Zealand".

35. In conclusion, it should be emphasized that New Zealand regarded the Treaty as a whole. It balanced the three elements of non-proliferation, nuclear co-operation and nuclear disarmament as part of a package, and it was therefore concerned that the various elements should be adequately scrutinized and reinforced during the Conference. The interlocking parts were designed to remove the threat of the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war. Whatever the shortcomings of the Treaty, there was general agreement that it offered protection against that threat. New Zealand would continue to abide by it, support it in every possible way and work for the extension of the number of States parties to this instrument. In particular, it looked forward to the emergence of a consensus final document which would give encouragement to the bilateral negotiations being conducted by the United States of America and the Soviet Union and respond to the sense of urgency which dominated world opinion on the need for nuclear disarmament.

36. Mr. DATCU (Romania) pointed out that the Conference was of unusual importance, since it was being held at a time when the international situation was one of tension and conflict and marked by an unprecedented intensification of the arms race. The participants should therefore undertake a thorough and serious analysis of the issues in order to contribute, by means of constructive results to the advancement of negotiations with a view to achieving agreements in the field of disarmament. As the President of Romania
had recently emphasized, the basic contemporary problem consisted of curbing
the arms race, above all the nuclear arms race, on the road towards nuclear
disarmament, followed by general and complete disarmament, ending the
deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe and halting the militarization
of outer space.

37. It should be noted that the adoption of effective measures relating to
the cessation of the arms race and a treaty on general and complete disarmament
under strict and effective international control was a legal obligation to
which the parties to the Treaty were committed under article VI. However,
15 years after the entry into force of the Treaty, negotiations on disarmament
conducted in various bodies had not led to any really positive result as far
as the implementation of the Treaty and the Final Document of the
tenth special session of the General Assembly (first special session devoted
to disarmament), 9/ adopted by consensus, were concerned. The nuclear-arms
race had not only continued but had been intensified. A particularly serious
situation had thus been created in Europe following the deployment by the
United States of America of medium-range nuclear missiles and countermeasures
announced by the Soviet Union. The fact that since the Second Review
Conference such weapons had increased in number and were to be found in a
greater number of countries was incompatible with the spirit of the Treaty and
was a particularly alarming trend. In order to ensure the viability and
credibility of the NPT, measures to eliminate the causes of that situation and
create the necessary conditions to ensure respect for and implementation of
all the provisions of the Treaty should be adopted as a matter of priority.
Accordingly, his delegation had prepared a working document for considerati<?n
by States Parties containing proposals for the adoption of an additional
protocol concerning a freeze on nuclear weapons (NPT/CONF.III/24).

38. Like other countries, Romania had welcomed the resumption of the
negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America and was
hopeful that they would lead to specific agreements. As matters stood, it was
necessary that during the negotiations both sides should suspend research,
production and use of new nuclear weapons and refrain from any acts of
militarization of space and that, at the same time, other countries should
take on more direct responsibility as far as the realization of reaching
agreements in that field was concerned.

39. Romania had also welcomed the decision taken by the Soviet Union to
introduce a unilateral moratorium on nuclear weapon tests and hoped that the
United States would respond positively to that initiative. A moratorium of
that kind should be designed with the aim of banning all nuclear weapon tests
by means of a global agreement. It was obvious that multilateral negotiations
should be undertaken urgently within the Conference on Disarmament, as a

9/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session,
Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4), resolution S-10/2.
number of representatives had already emphasized. States Parties to the NPT had the obligation to act in a highly responsible manner, both within the framework of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament and the Vienna negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions as well as in other international meetings in order to achieve positive results as soon as possible on disarmament issues as a whole, and nuclear disarmament in particular. Consequently, his delegation intended to submit a working document to the Conference. It also deemed it necessary for the States parties to the Treaty to make new efforts to conclude effective international agreements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against them or the use of force in general. His delegation intended to submit a working document inviting all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, to co-operate actively in order to finalize such arrangements.

40. The provisions of article VI of the Treaty, concerning the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, had recently elicited new interest in various parts of the world. Romania had always considered that the establishment of such zones was a very important area where the initiative could lie with the non-nuclear-weapon States. Already in 1957, it had proposed the establishment of a zone of peace and good neighbourliness, free from nuclear weapons, in the Balkans and had since restated that proposal on several occasions. It had also supported proposals by States in other parts of the world to free certain territories from the threat of nuclear weapons. It welcomed the recent establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific.

41. His delegation considered articles III and IV of the Treaty concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to be extremely important for the maintenance and strengthening of the non-proliferation régime. It wished to underscore once again that it was vital to implement the provisions relating to unimpeded access by all States, in particular the developing countries, to information, technology and equipment for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The documents presented by IAEA made it clear that the current system of safeguards applied by the Agency had proved that it was capable of preventing the use of nuclear equipment and material for non-peaceful purposes. His delegation was prepared to examine constructively any proposal on methods of implementing the safeguards provided in article III of the Treaty. At the same time, it wished to emphasize that in the light of the above, any measure calculated to limit further access by States to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy would seem to be unacceptable and incompatible with the letter and spirit of the Treaty. The adoption of constructive measures and recommendations designed to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful use of nuclear energy should be a priority task for the Conference.
42. With regard to article X, paragraph 2 of which made provision for convening a conference 25 years after the entry into force of the Treaty, it was already time to give consideration to the preparation of such an important conference for the Treaty and for the non-proliferation régime in general. Needless to say, the United Nations must play an important role in that process. The nuclear Powers and the non-nuclear-weapon States must also make their contribution to the organization of that meeting. His delegation endorsed the idea of convening a new conference of non-nuclear-weapon States to undertake a thorough review of the present situation and to agree on a joint plan of action.

The meeting rose at 5.30 p.m.
GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 12) (continued)

1. Mr. ELLEMANN-JENSEN (Denmark) said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was perhaps the single most important contribution towards safeguarding peace and security throughout the world and it was a remarkable achievement that, despite predictions to the contrary, the number of nuclear-weapon States had not changed. An increase in that number would have far-reaching consequences for international security and stability.

2. Mutual trust was a prerequisite for the prevention of war, and the Treaty's main achievement was that it increased confidence among nations, the beneficiaries being all nations, not just the NPT parties. It was vital that all of the commitments under the Treaty should be strictly observed, for otherwise, sooner or later, new nuclear-weapon States would emerge. The significance of the Conference, therefore, could hardly be over-estimated since it was in the joint interest of all participants to pursue and, where possible, strengthen the non-proliferation regime. To that end, it was important to engage in a constructive dialogue to pave the way for full implementation of the Treaty. While the adoption by consensus of a substantive final document should be the outcome of that dialogue, such a document should not be made the touchstone for the success of the Conference. The most important thing was for the Conference to contribute to the continuation of the non-proliferation regime so as to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and enhance world security.

3. The Danish Government's attitude was reflected in the Nordic memorandum (NPT/CONF.III/16), which had been circulated as an official conference document and was an expression of its commitment to non-proliferation and of the high priority it attached to the NPT. Referring to the main points in the memorandum, he said that the Nordic countries saw a close connection between non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. Accordingly, they considered that the broadly-based efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons should continue, in which connection arms control and disarmament negotiations were important measures. They welcomed the bilateral arms control negotiations between the United States of America and the Soviet Union on nuclear and space weapons: attainment of the objectives of those negotiations would significantly strengthen the non-proliferation regime. The Nordic countries also attached particular importance to the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty, which was one of the vital issues before the Conference on Disarmament. The urgency of the disarmament endeavour, and especially of a comprehensive test ban treaty, was underlined by the fact that a number of States possibly already had, or were actively pursuing, nuclear-weapon capabilities. The Nordic memorandum also underlined the need to expand international co-operation in regard to the peaceful use of nuclear
energy, in particular by assuring that appropriate safeguards measures were being applied, thereby enabling verification to be carried out by IAEA.

4. The Danish Government took the view that wider adherence to the NPT was crucial to non-proliferation and enhanced international security. It was gratified to note the increasing number of parties to the Treaty and that no party had thus far renounced the Treaty. There had, however, been a number of rejections to the Nordic countries' request for all non-NPT parties to reconsider their attitude to the Treaty, including rejections from countries with a high degree of technological development. He therefore appealed to those countries once again to sign and ratify the Treaty and thereby become active participants in it rather than free-riders enjoying the increased international security under the NPT. In particular, he called upon the two nuclear-weapon States not party to the Treaty and on countries with advanced nuclear technology to become parties to the Treaty.

5. Denmark considered that the safeguards system provided for under article III was of crucial importance for the operation of the Treaty and international nuclear co-operation, and also as a confidence-building measure. It was therefore essential that IAEA safeguards should be regarded as effective and credible. In view of the advances in nuclear technology, further strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system was desirable and adequate resources must be made available for the purpose. The ultimate objective should be to subject all civil nuclear facilities throughout the world to IAEA safeguards. Confidence in the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy would be heightened if all non-nuclear-weapon States accepted full-scope safeguards. That objective, which would benefit the whole of the international community, might be achieved sooner if all supplier States agreed to make full-scope safeguards a prerequisite for exports of relevant nuclear materials, equipment and technology. Also, the attractions of accession to the NPT could be increased if supplier States gave priority to States parties to the NPT when rendering technical assistance.

6. Global security would be strengthened by measures such as nuclear weapon-free-zones and negative security assurances by the nuclear-weapon Powers. In that connection, his Government had taken note with interest of the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty and welcomed the decision to resume work on negative security assurances in the Conference on Disarmament.

7. The Nordic memorandum also referred to the importance of a comprehensive test ban (CTB), which would have a positive impact on both nuclear disarmament in general and on the non-proliferation régime, and at the same time make accession to the NPT more attractive for non-parties. Verification, continued to be the crucial problem in the CTB deliberations. Despite the progress made in regard to seismic detection, the position was not satisfactory to all parties and efforts to achieve a reliable detection system should therefore be pursued as a matter of priority. To that end, proper use should be made of the most recent initiatives and working papers in the Conference on Disarmament.
8. His Government welcomed the United States invitation to the Soviet Union to send observers to be present at a nuclear test, which would be a step towards the establishment of an international verification system, and therefore, it was unfortunate that the Soviet Union had declined the offer. The Soviet moratorium on test explosions, however, could be of value, in that it might lead towards agreement on a binding and verifiable test ban. His Government trusted that such initiatives were an indication that agreement was nearer and called on the nuclear Powers to do their utmost to reach such agreement.

9. The NPT was one of the cornerstones of a construction that was still imperfect. The task of the Conference should be to fortify the foundation on which that construction rested, in a way that allowed for the incorporation of new elements.

10. Mr. FLORET (Italy) said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was essential to the security of all States, had prevented the spread of nuclear weapons, and had reduced the risk of wholesale destruction and death. It also afforded a solid basis on which to achieve disarmament. Accordingly, it was in the interest of all countries to ensure that the Treaty was scrupulously observed and that its effectiveness was enhanced by universal accession.

11. The Treaty was based on a specific balance and on interrelated commitments. Thus, the obligation of non-nuclear-weapon States regarding the prohibition of horizontal proliferation had its counterpart in the commitment of nuclear-weapon States to put an end to vertical proliferation and proceed towards negotiated nuclear disarmament. The Treaty also provided for all signatories to engage in good faith in negotiations aimed at general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Consequently, the Treaty should be strengthened through full implementation of its terms, through agreements on disarmament in a context of stability and international security, and through co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

12. The States parties had complied with the terms of articles I and II and the fact that the number of nuclear-weapon States had not increased since the NPT had come into force in 1970, despite technological advances, was an important achievement. Moreover, the 15 years that had elapsed since 1970 had demonstrated the validity of the Treaty's principles and the awareness of international public opinion of the NPT's decisive role in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. The nuclear programmes of some States not parties to the Treaty, however, were a cause of concern, but the complexity of the factors underlying the critical attitude of certain States towards the Treaty should not be overlooked, since their reluctance to forgo the nuclear option was often due to security requirements arising out of unstable regional situations. That consideration should reinforce the determination of all Governments to exert efforts to defuse regional crises and to promote the obligation to refrain from the use or the threat of force.

13. It was the Italian Government's firm conviction that a process of gradual and balanced disarmament under effective international control was the only way to ensure a stable and lasting international peace. Inasmuch as the
Treaty's provisions relating to the reduction of the nuclear arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States had not been fully implemented, arms reduction agreements should be pursued on the basis of a realistic assessment of the existing balance of forces, which implied that such reduction should take place progressively and in association with the adoption of measures in other disarmament sectors.

14. The start of negotiations between the United States of America and the USSR on nuclear and space weapons was an event of major political significance. The negotiations would undoubtedly facilitate the negotiations on all aspects of disarmament, in accordance with article VI of the Treaty. Every State, however, had to make its own contribution to the negotiations on the various aspects of disarmament and Italy, for its part, basing its action on the need to maintain the balance of forces that ensured European security, had played a constructive role within the framework of the United Nations and at the Conference on Disarmament in regard to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It had also been actively engaged in the attempts to promote talks on a comprehensive test ban and believed, despite the difficulties encountered at the Conference on Disarmament, that there were concrete prospects for making progress. For instance, the study carried out by the group of seismic experts with a view to solving the problem of verification had yielded significant results and the Italian Government intended to pursue its efforts to make concrete progress towards a CTB treaty.

15. With regard to negative security assurances by the nuclear-weapon States, the Italian Government further considered that solutions should be found which fully satisfied the security requirements of the non-nuclear States.

16. Nuclear-weapon-free zones were also extremely important and could make a significant contribution to reducing the risk of nuclear conflicts. Progress in that respect could be achieved more easily in regions that were already free of nuclear weapons or where such weapons did not constitute a component of existing equilibria. However, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones would be possible only if certain basic principles were scrupulously observed, those principles related to the need to safeguard regional and international stability, to ensure the voluntary and unanimous participation of countries of the region, to develop an effective verification system, and to ensure observance of the norms of international law governing freedom of navigation and of the seas.

17. Other sectors of disarmament requiring attention included chemical weapons and conventional armaments. Reports on the use of chemical weapons in certain crisis areas underlined the urgent need for a convention to ban such weapons and provide for effective verification procedures. Such a convention should take account of the fact that weapons of that kind could undermine existing equilibria and spark off an escalation of conflicts. As to conventional armaments, it should be remembered that, although they had been at the origin of conflicts in recent decades, they were very often a crucial element in the existing balance of forces. His Government would support any initiative to achieve effective measures of disarmament in that connection,
since that would help to reduce tensions while laying the ground for a gradual renunciation of attempts to acquire nuclear weapons by countries that had hitherto kept the option open.

19. Italy had complete confidence in the IAEA safeguards system and considered that compliance with the relevant Treaty provisions was one of the cornerstones of the non-proliferation regime. All measures likely to strengthen such confidence and thus attract new accessions to the Treaty should be encouraged. Specifically, the effectiveness of the safeguards system should be enhanced without adding unduly to the burdens faced by States parties. Efforts to rationalize the system could, for instance, include such measures as more effective use of the inspection personnel and improved implementation of safeguards in the more sensitive installations by means of more comprehensive and faster accounting techniques. It was also to be hoped that the technique of non-destructive analysis would become a part of day-to-day inspection and that the inspection personnel would be trained in the use of such new technologies. The Italian Government, which believed that it was very important for NPT parties to participate directly in the rationalization effort, had recently proposed to IAEA a support programme which would entail the development of measurement and control techniques in plants for reprocessing irradiated fuel and for the production of mixed uranium-plutonium oxides.

19. The weak link in the existing safeguards system lay in its lack of universality, and Italy had always been convinced that universal accession to the NPT was a prerequisite for curbing proliferation. Accession by new States, however, would follow from an objective assessment of the advantages that could accrue to the prospective new member - and the international community - from participation in the Treaty and could not be imposed by States that were in a more favourable technological and scientific position. Respect for national sovereignty was a fundamental principle on which profitable co-operation had to be based, but universal adherence to the NPT and the ensuing international détente would undoubtedly have beneficial economic consequences and would facilitate access to nuclear materials and technology.

20. The Italian Government therefore hoped that all countries that had not yet done so would sign the NPT and agree to subject their nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards. All countries should increasingly understand the importance of those safeguards, including countries that had gradually developed their own technological capacities in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. In that sector, too, IAEA had an important role to play. The interests of equity would also be met by augmenting the degree to which the peaceful nuclear installations of nuclear-weapon States were subjected to the IAEA system of safeguards. Italy, which welcomed the agreement between IAEA and the USSR, trusted that nuclear-weapon States would gradually make all their peaceful installations subject to IAEA safeguards, granting the Agency wide discretionary powers to select the most significant installations over which to exert its controls.
21. While a major effort had been made to implement the provisions of the Treaty on co-operation in the field of nuclear energy, more would have to be done to make the Treaty an effective tool of co-operation. To that end, the advantages accruing from the peaceful applications of nuclear technology should be made available to all States Parties by providing free access to scientific information and the benefits of technological research. His Government would make every effort to achieve that objective. The nuclear-weapon Powers could make a special contribution in that connection by providing assistance and know-how to other countries, as a result of the beneficial spin-off to their civilian economies from the advancement of military programmes. Italy, which actively supported IAEA initiatives, considered that the CAS exercise was the most noteworthy. The participation of importers and exporters of nuclear materials in the Committee on Assurances of Supply made it possible to pursue two simultaneous aims, avoidance of the risk of nuclear proliferation and assurance of supplies that would allow for an increase in the peaceful uses of nuclear weapons.

22. Italy's twin objectives had always been to co-operate effectively in the development programmes of emerging countries, and to ensure full observance of the safeguards system. Its policy in regard to technical aid was characterized by considerable flexibility to make sure that the aid rendered met the specific requirements of the areas or countries concerned. The Italian Government was thus mindful of the need to ensure the implementation of article IV of the Treaty and to pay due account to the specific requirements of the areas or countries concerned. The Italian Government was thus mindful of the need to ensure the implementation of article IV of the Treaty and to pay due account to the specific requirements of developing areas. Accordingly, it was going to great lengths to make a significant contribution to relevant IAEA activities, mostly the financing of special projects which could not be implemented for lack of funds under the Agency's technical assistance programme. The Italian Government regarded the projects in question, which related in particular to agriculture and medicine, as extremely valuable for the quality of life in the recipient countries. With a contribution of 62 per cent of the total available funds in 1984, Italy had been the largest contributor of extra budgetary funds earmarked for IAEA technical assistance. The total sum contributed by Italy had amounted to $3.6 million and the overall Italian contributions for the 1981-1986 period had amounted to over $18 million, which, given the size of the Italian economy, was a remarkable financial effort.

23. Again, Italy contributed $3 million annually to the International Centre for Theoretical Physics in Trieste, which was co-managed by IAEA and UNESCO — in others words, over two-thirds of the Centre's budget. In 1985, the Italian Government had contributed supplementary funds in the amount of $4.5 million to boost the Centre's activities, with particular reference to the requirements of related national centres in the developing countries. The same programme also provided for the training of technical personnel from developing countries at Italian laboratories and industries. His Government realized that more should be done in the field of technical assistance for the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and was prepared to make further efforts in that direction. It also trusted that the more advanced
countries would engage in special co-operation endeavours to narrow existing imbalances between different geographical areas, something that would help to reduce international tensions and would meet the expectations of many countries that looked to the Treaty as an instrument for peace as well as a means for more fruitful co-operation in the field of economic development.

24. The NPT was not a perfect instrument but its strength lay in the shared perceptions of the 130 States parties to it. That kind of solidarity contained the potential for promoting mutual trust and lending new impetus to the effort to achieve disarmament, reduce tension and consolidate peace. It was the Italian Government's hope that the Review Conference would conclude its work with a reaffirmation of the lasting validity of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and a renewed commitment to improving its effectiveness by fully observing the obligations thereunder.

25. Mr. HORN (Hungary) said that the Conference had been assigned the specific task of reviewing the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the achievement of the NPT's aims. Given the current international situation, however, and recent unfavourable trends, he believed that the Conference might have an important role to play in a wider sense. A successful outcome to the review of the important issues involved could contribute to the efforts to curb the arms race and promote meaningful progress in disarmament, while improving the international atmosphere in general.

26. At the Second Review Conference, the Hungarian delegation had noted that, owing to the activities of certain extremist circles, the process of détente had lost some of its momentum. In the intervening five years, détente had been repeatedly imperiled and relations between some States had been strained by dangerous tensions. His Government none the less remained of the view that there was a genuine possibility for changing the unfavourable course of events and strengthening mutual understanding and co-operation among States. To that end, it was necessary to make use of the possibilities that existed for developing mutually advantageous relations but, above all, to summon the political will to solve existing problems on the basis of mutual respect.

27. It would be a decisive step forward in the reduction and ultimate elimination of the danger of nuclear war if agreements based on principles of equality and equal security were reached at the Soviet-American talks on the questions of prevention of the militarization of outer space and of strategic and medium-range nuclear weapons. His Government supported the constructive proposals of the Soviet Union and its efforts to ensure the success of the negotiations. At the same time, it believed that every State had a responsibility to bear in lessening international tension and promoting efforts to curb the arms race.

28. The Hungarian People's Republic had been among the first countries to sign and ratify the Treaty and he reaffirmed his Government's commitment to its principles and objectives and also to the fulfilment of its obligations under the NPT, which was one of the most important arms limitation accords. It was of paramount importance that the Review Conference should strengthen
the commitment of the States Parties and should contribute to further strengthening the non-proliferation régime. It was his Government's conviction that strengthening the Treaty was in the interests of both the nuclear-weapon and the non-nuclear-weapon States. The Treaty had a role to play in consolidating peace and security and it could be a useful political tool for advancing the cause of nuclear disarmament, even if the results achieved so far fell short of expectations.

29. The effectiveness of the NPT would be increased if those States outside the Treaty signed and ratified it. The fact that no additional nuclear-weapon State had emerged was a positive result of the Treaty's operation, but a great deal of work still remained to be done to implement certain other provisions. The overt or covert nuclear ambitions of a number of States constituted a potential threat, not only to their immediate neighbours but to international security as a whole. A particular cause for concern was that such threats should occur in those parts of the world which were already flashpoints in international Politics. His country condemned such dangerous ambitions, as well as the conciliatory attitude adopted by certain States.

30. The Hungarian Government attached paramount importance to the obligations undertaken by the States parties under article VI, for the positive role played by the Treaty in strengthening international security would certainly be enhanced by consistent implementation of the terms of that article. Enforcing a new spiral in the arms race and extending it to new areas, as well as the efforts by certain militarist circles to obtain military superiority, were contrary to the letter and the spirit of the Treaty. It was his Government's firm hope that a successful outcome to the Third Review Conference would have a beneficial effect on the disarmament talks taking place in different forums. Disappointment at the lack of results in the disarmament talks should not lead the Conference into channels that were likely to undermine or weaken the Treaty and the non-proliferation régime as a whole.

31. The Hungarian Government had participated actively in the formulation of proposals by the member States of the Warsaw Treaty on averting nuclear war, halting the nuclear arms race and adopting concrete disarmament measures. A general and comprehensive nuclear test ban would be an extremely important measure and it was regrettable that the Conference on Disarmament had been unable to make substantive progress in elaborating a comprehensive test ban treaty. Agreement on such a treaty would be proof of the sincerity of intentions to halt the arms race. The Hungarian Government warmly welcomed the unilateral moratorium by the Soviet Union on its nuclear test explosion and hoped that other nuclear Powers would soon respond by a similar step.

32. Hungary considered that there was a need for additional concrete and more far-reaching international measures to strengthen the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, because the so-called positive security guarantees contained in Security Council resolution 255 (1968) had not been implemented. Every nuclear-weapon State should renounce first use and it would be a significant factor for the prevention of nuclear war if, following the example
of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, the other nuclear Powers concerned would undertake similar obligations. The Hungarian Government considered that there should be a rapid and positive response by the NATO countries to the call by the Committee of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Treaty member States at Budapest in 1984 for the mutual renunciation of the first use of nuclear and conventional weapons.

33. The safeguards system was the cornerstone of the non-proliferation régime. His Government had taken an active part in elaborating the model safeguards agreement with IAEA and had been one of the first countries to conclude such an agreement. The safeguards system was functioning satisfactorily as a whole and Hungary continued to take an interest in the smooth operation, development and extension of the verification and safeguards systems. It had in addition ratified the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and contributed to the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime at the political, administrative and technical levels. The IAEA safeguards system was not an impediment to Hungary's utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The obligations incurred by participants were insignificant compared with the advantages afforded by the non-proliferation régime in promoting international political stability and international co-operation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

34. In that respect, his Government welcomed the recent decision of the Soviet Union to place some of its peaceful nuclear establishments under IAEA safeguards. The development of the nuclear energy industry in the Hungarian People's Republic had led to an increasing interest in international co-operation in the field. However, Hungary made every effort to ensure that international co-operation took place in full conformity with the objectives of the Treaty and the non-proliferation régime. It stood ready to make an active contribution to international efforts and had communicated its intention to do so to the Director-General of the Agency. It also shared its practical experience in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its achievements in scientific and technical research, as a contribution to the development of international co-operation.

35. It was indeed gratifying that a number of new States had become parties to the NPT, but deplorable that several countries with advanced nuclear industries and capabilities and nuclear threshold States, as well as two nuclear Powers, had not acceded to the Treaty. Accession was in the interests of all States and an important element in the struggle for nuclear disarmament. Concrete and substantive progress in nuclear disarmament, in its turn, would also make for wider international acceptance of the Treaty and would ultimately result in more stable international peace and security and a lessening of the danger of nuclear war.

36. In conclusion, he said that his delegation intended to make a constructive contribution to the success of the Conference and expressed the hope that it would adopt a final document, based on a broad consensus, that would be conducive to strengthening the Treaty, the non-proliferation régime and the commitment of the States Parties, as well as to wider acceptance of the Treaty.
37. Mr. ABDEL-MAGUID (Egypt) pointed out that the Conference coincided with the fortieth anniversary of the first, and it was to be hoped, the last use of nuclear weapons. It was also meeting in the year of the fortieth anniversary of the foundation of the United Nations, whose Charter enshrined international norms governing relations between States, including non-recourse to force in international relations and the need to avert the ravages of armed conflict. Furthermore, the Treaty was well past the half-way stage before a decision was to be taken on renewing it in 1995.

38. Although the Review Conference was the first in which Egypt was participating as a full member following its ratification of the Treaty, on 26 February 1981, Egypt had been among the first countries to sign the NPT, on 1 July 1968. In addition, it had put forward many constructive ideas and proposals for the establishment of a non-proliferation regime within the framework of the 18-nation Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. While conditions in the Middle East had prevented early ratification, after careful consideration, Egypt had eventually taken that step because it believed that higher objectives would be attained by a halt in the proliferation of nuclear weapons, thereby making a move towards nuclear disarmament supplemented by arrangements to guarantee the security of non-nuclear States and to promote peaceful nuclear co-operation, bearing in mind the ultimate goal: general and complete disarmament.

39. Egypt was attending the Conference in a spirit of enthusiasm and expectation. The Treaty was a human achievement, the outcome of efforts by many countries, and represented what was possible, pending attainment of the ideal. All parties bore collective responsibility for the Treaty. The Conference did not represent an opportunity to apportion blame, but to define duties and responsibilities. The deliberations must be guided by spirit of dialogue, and collaboration must prevail over confrontation, recrimination and conflict. The NPT must be evaluated objectively, taking account of the negative aspects so as to rectify them, and the positive aspects so as to strengthen them. The parties must make a greater commitment to support the Treaty, enhance its effectiveness and uphold its credibility. He expressed the hope that many participants would put forward useful ideas and initiatives so that the Third Review Conference would be a landmark on the road to horizontal and vertical cessation of the arms race.

40. The NPT contained three major elements: cessation of the nuclear arms race, security, and co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. With regard to ending the nuclear arms race, it should be emphasized that the parties had undertaken to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Undeniably, progress had been disappointing. At the time of the first Review Conference, the two super-Powers had submitted a list of 11 bilateral and multilateral conventions as an indication that they were honouring their promise to end the arms race; at the Second Review Conference they had presented a list of three conventions, and only one convention was now before the Third Review Conference.
41. Nevertheless, despite the importance given to the multilateral conventions, they had no direct bearing on the main postulate of the Treaty, namely, cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. It had to be admitted that SALT I and SALT II had failed to live up to expectations. At present, there was an escalation, rather than a reduction, of the qualitative and quantitative arms race, thus heightening the probability of nuclear war, consuming vast material and human resources which could have been used to satisfy development needs, undermining efforts to reduce international tension and diminishing the chances for agreement on disarmament measures. Plainly, there was indeed a close connection between disarmament and relaxation of international tension.

42. Responsibility for taking the initiative to curb the arms race and to adopt concrete measures on nuclear disarmament fell squarely on States which possessed, produced and developed nuclear arms and weapons of mass destruction. The announcement that the United States of America and the USSR were to initiate bilateral talks with a view to preventing an arms race in space and to terminating it on Earth had aroused optimism. Unfortunately, the talks had run into difficulties and it was feared that they would meet the same end as previous negotiations; countless opportunities to reach agreement had been lost because they hinged solely on relations between the two super-Powers, although they were of vital importance to the world as a whole.

43. Non-nuclear-weapon countries must participate in discussions on disarmament issues through the Conference on Disarmament, United Nations bodies and political groupings such as the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and OAU, because they had an inherent right to express their views. Nuclear catastrophes would not distinguish between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. International security was indivisible. Experience had shown that bilateral talks between the two super-Powers were no substitute for multilateral negotiations. Bilateral efforts should not be used as a pretext to obstruct multilateral endeavours, since the two were complementary. Egypt therefore viewed with great concern the recurring failure of discussions within the Conference on Disarmament.

44. His delegation was also concerned at the lack of progress on a comprehensive test ban treaty, which would represent a first serious and tangible step towards ending the nuclear arms race and halting horizontal and vertical proliferation. It was particularly disappointing that the Conference on Disarmament had failed to agree on a mandate for the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban. Any initiative that would give an impetus to comprehensive test ban talks should be encouraged, including a moratorium on testing until a comprehensive test ban treaty could be concluded. In that respect, Egypt welcomed the Soviet Union's decision to freeze nuclear tests until 1 January 1986. It was to be hoped that the United States would reciprocate so that the moratorium could be extended.

45. On ratifying the Treaty, Egypt had urged nuclear-weapon States parties to limit the arms race, to achieve nuclear disarmament by respecting their obligations and to halt all tests as soon as possible. He hoped that more countries would accede to the Treaty rapidly, because the quicker they did so,
the quicker a halt to the arms race could be implemented. Every day without progress on halting the nuclear arms race could bring closer the time when such goals might become unobtainable and mankind's very existence impossible. In that connection, he was reminded of the declaration by a representative of a nuclear-weapon State at the time of the adoption of the Treaty in 1968, namely "Review Conferences will provide the opportunity to apply the provisions of article VI". It was to be hoped that the outcome of the Third Review Conference would prove that that representative was right.

46. The dawning of the nuclear age in 1945 had given the non-nuclear-weapon States a sense of insecurity and the ones which were not protected by the nuclear umbrellas of the two major military alliances found themselves particularly vulnerable. It was therefore legitimate that they should seek security guarantees within the Treaty. Their security requirements had none the less been ignored, the only response being in the unsatisfactory form of Security Council resolution 255 (1968), which patently lacked the elements of effectiveness and reassurance required by any country exposed to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The nature of decision-making in the Security Council imposed limitations that reduced the requisite degree of decisiveness and promptitude, and also as well allowed the possibility of veto. At the first Review Conference, the non-nuclear-weapon States had tried to put forward their case, but the nuclear-weapon Powers had insisted that Security Council resolution 255 (1968) constituted an adequate and effective guarantee. At the General Assembly's tenth special session (first special session devoted to disarmament), in 1978, the five nuclear Powers had issued unilateral declarations on their concept of security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon countries against the use of or threat of use of nuclear weapons. With the exception of the statement made by the Chinese delegation, the guarantees were neither unconditional nor unqualified, despite the fact that the final document had urged the nuclear Powers to pursue efforts aimed at concluding effective and appropriate agreements capable of safeguarding non-nuclear-weapon States from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

47. The Second Review Conference had not yielded any more positive results for the non-nuclear-weapon countries. At the second special session devoted to disarmament, non-nuclear-weapon States, including Egypt, had reiterated that the question of their security must be satisfactorily resolved, for they had renounced their nuclear option in return for assurances that they would not be exposed to the use of nuclear arms or nuclear blackmail. That session too, had failed to provide the required solution. Non-nuclear-weapon States parties were entitled to effective and reliable comprehensive security guarantees - unconditional, unrestricted and immune to threat - based on binding commitments and contained in a credible and applicable international instrument.

48. Egypt, as well as being a third-world country belonging to the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries whose principles it upheld, was a country with a special geopolitical situation. It therefore viewed the approaches to cessation of the arms race and security from a special perspective. In addition to an overall integrated approach, it was in favour of nuclear-weapon-free zones, a concept reaffirmed in the Treaty itself.
Clearly, the establishment of such zones could consolidate the non-proliferation régime. In 1974, Egypt, aware of the importance of the Middle East region and the dangers of policies which threatened peace and security and aggravated an already serious situation, had proposed the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The initiative had been greeted with international acclaim and the United Nations had adopted 11 resolutions thereon, in addition to paragraph 63 (d) of the Final Document of the General Assembly's tenth special session, in 1978.

49. It was a positive development that, since the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly, the relevant resolutions had been adopted by a consensus which included Israel. However, he wondered to what extent that consensus decision had really been implemented. United Nations resolutions on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East contained two sets of measures: (a) measures aimed at protecting the non-nuclear-weapon States of the region and securing the abstention by countries in the region or by nuclear Powers from any act which might cause prejudice to the purpose of such a zone, and calling upon all countries of the region to adhere to the NPT, and (b) measures to create a momentum towards objectives such as an agreement not to produce or possess nuclear explosive devices and to apply IAEA safeguards to all nuclear activities.

50. Egypt had viewed with grave concern the report by United Nations experts which left no doubt that Israel would soon acquire a nuclear capability, if it had not already done so. Security in the Middle East could never prevail in the face of the threat to introduce nuclear weapons in the region. If Israel was truly sincere in joining the international consensus and in its desire for security and stability, it would have to follow up its theoretical position at the United Nations with a positive act. It must accede to the Treaty and apply comprehensive IAEA safeguards to all its nuclear activities. General Assembly resolution 39/54 requested the Secretary-General to seek the views of all concerned parties regarding the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East and it was to be hoped that the Secretary-General's report to the fortieth session of the Assembly would give renewed impetus to the establishment of such a zone as soon as possible.

51. Egypt had also shown great interest in efforts to declare Africa a nuclear-weapon-free zone, especially in the light of the increasing menace posed by South Africa's nuclear capability, as confirmed by reports by United Nations experts. South Africa, with its already considerable arsenal of conventional weapons, represented a real threat to its neighbours, whereas the contrary was hardly conceivable. It pursued its aggressive policy in the entire region and had been repeatedly condemned by the United Nations. At the first ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU, held at Cairo in 1964, Egypt had joined with other African countries in declaring Africa a non-nuclear zone. The United Nations General Assembly had endorsed that decision in a number of resolutions. He therefore called upon all States parties and all peace-loving countries to urge the Security Council to take the necessary measures, in accordance with its mandate under Article 26 of the Charter of the United Nations, towards the denuclearization
of Africa. In its capacity as an African member of the Security Council, Egypt would spare no effort, in collaboration with the other members of the Council, to attain that objective, which would achieve peace and security in Africa.

52. As a country engaged in an ambitious nuclear power programme, Egypt was particularly interested in the faithful implementation of article IV of the Treaty. Although agreements on peaceful nuclear co-operation had been concluded with a number of countries, the programme was still faced with a number of obstacles, the first being the very large investments needed. Even if current bilateral and IAEA assistance were to increase, developing countries would still fall far short of their requirements. His delegation therefore called upon the Conference to endorse the idea of establishing a fund to help developing countries parties to the Treaty to develop their peaceful nuclear programmes, and would submit a detailed proposal to that effect to the appropriate Conference Committee.

53. Another subject which deserved attention was that of protection of peaceful nuclear installations. An attack on such installations would have devastating economic and environmental consequences and would jeopardize the right of every State to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In view of the cost of nuclear reactors, his delegation wished to propose the idea of arrangements to provide NPT parties with necessary protection and appropriate mechanisms to face any attack or threat of attack against any State party's peaceful nuclear installations. The proposal did not imply any loss of confidence in the efforts of other international forums, and especially of the Conference on Disarmament. Indeed, the proposed arrangements would mark an attempt to enhance those efforts and would act as an interim measure until the Conference on Disarmament had elaborated a treaty totally prohibiting strikes against nuclear facilities. His delegation would submit the proposal in greater detail at a later stage of the proceedings.

54. Another obstacle was the difficulty of securing supplies of nuclear fuel on a stable, fair and non-discriminatory basis. Adherence to the Treaty, entailing as it did IAEA supervision of nuclear facilities, should be the only condition for access to nuclear fuel. There was no need for other restrictions. His Government was therefore alarmed when supplier countries tried to impose limitations on their exports beyond those required by the IAEA safeguards system. It was surely ironic that certain supplier countries should rigorously apply such restrictions to States parties to the Treaty while, at the same time, practising greater leniency in respect of States outside the Treaty. The reverse might be expected to be the rule, at least until the non-party States had placed their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. The motive for applying stringent conditions to States parties was doubtless a desire to strengthen the non-proliferation régime; it was to be feared, however, that the opposite result would be achieved, since countries acutely in need of nuclear fuel would always strive independently to obtain it. His delegation therefore welcomed the efforts of the IAEA Committee on Assurances of Supply to elaborate principles of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Commandable efforts being made to establish special arrangements regarding an emergency back-up
system and revision mechanism to guarantee equipment and material supplies in cases of disruption that were caused by emergencies and did not result from a breach of non-proliferation provisions, and also to ensure continuity of supplies while nuclear contracts were being renewed.

55. IAEA was capable of playing an effective supportive role in assisting developing countries which had embarked on nuclear power programmes. In so doing, the Agency could utilize its resources or could serve as an intermediary between the developing countries concerned and the donors of facilities, nuclear equipment and material. Assistance of that kind, to which the Director-General of IAEA had referred in his statement at the opening meeting, could include financing. Such a role would be a true implementation of the Agency's Statute. In that connection, he paid tribute to IAEA's effective role in applying the safeguard system to peaceful nuclear activities of States parties to the Treaty. Egypt considered the system to be one of the pillars of the non-proliferation regime. Nevertheless, his delegation hoped that the Conference would undertake a comprehensive evaluation of the system with a view to seeking all possible means to enhance its effectiveness, as well as lending support to the Agency in the field of technical assistance and transfer of nuclear technology.

56. It was his hope that the Conference would conclude with a reaffirmation of all the principles of the Treaty relating to vertical and horizontal non-proliferation, peaceful co-operation in the nuclear field, nuclear disarmament, enhanced security for non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones, especially in regions facing a high internal risk of nuclear proliferation. Another outcome of the Conference should be a categorical pledge by the nuclear-weapon States to implement the Treaty and to fulfil the obligations they had assumed when it had been concluded. More than half-way through the period of operation of the Treaty, it was becoming difficult to wait much longer. The need was required for unequivocal promises concerning qualitative and quantitative nuclear disarmament, including a comprehensive nuclear test ban, an international undertaking formulated in straightforward, effective, definite and bona fide terms to guarantee non-nuclear States against nuclear threats or aggression, and a commitment to enable non-nuclear States which had acceded to the Treaty and placed their nuclear activities under the international safeguards system to benefit from peaceful international nuclear co-operation in the interests of progress and development. Lastly, the Conference should undertake to protect peaceful nuclear installations; it was inconceivable that countries should fall victim to aggression and suffer the destruction of their nuclear facilities and the attendant radioactive perils merely because they believed in non-proliferation and adhered to the safeguard system while other countries which chose to remain outside the system felt free to attack and destroy costly development projects.

57. Mr. FLORIN (German Democratic Republic) said that his country had been one of the first States to accede unconditionally to the Treaty when it had been opened for signature 17 years previously. His Government was participating in the Third Review Conference with the firm intention of working towards the all-round strengthening and greater universality of the
Treaty. The Conference was taking place in the year of the fortieth anniversary of the victory over fascism and of the founding of the United Nations, which had been the result of the joint struggle of different political forces against a common danger. Today, all peace-loving forces were rallied together by the need to combat the threat of nuclear catastrophe and the danger of self-destruction of that kind. The Treaty was one of the most important outcomes to date of the joint efforts being made towards that end.

58. Most countries agreed that the Treaty had been instrumental in preventing the emergence of new nuclear-weapon States and it was thus a reliable and central factor in international and regional security. Since 1968, a number of additional agreements on arms limitation and disarmament had been reached and important negotiations started on the basis of the Treaty. With 130 States parties, which made it the most universal agreement in the arms limitation field, the NPT had proved its viability and had stood the test of time. Its basic provisions had become a durable norm in international relations and had, to a considerable extent, assisted and stimulated international co-operation in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The Treaty's effectiveness was thus conclusively demonstrated, and his country would continue, as before, to advocate that the NPT should be strengthened and would oppose any suggestion to review or amend its provisions.

59. Since the Second Review Conference, the fundamental undertakings set forth in articles I and II had been strictly observed by the States parties. It was impossible, however, to ignore the dangers inherent in the nuclear ambitions of the South African racist régime and Israel. His delegation therefore called for the cessation of nuclear co-operation with South Africa, in accordance with resolutions of the Security Council, the General Assembly and the General Conference of IAEA. South Africa and Israel should be made to place all their nuclear installations under IAEA safeguards. Such a step would be an effective means of removing the threats to peace and security in southern Africa and the Middle East, as well as contributing decisively to the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime.

60. With regard to the implementation of obligations under article VI, his Government welcomed the Soviet-United States negotiations on a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms, strategic and intermediate-range. Effective agreements could be reached if the framework provided in the agreement of 8 January 1985 was maintained and if the negotiations were conducted on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security. His Government attached great importance to the Soviet proposals aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth, and, in particular, to the proposal for international co-operation in the peaceful exploration of outer space under conditions of its non-militarization, submitted by the USSR for inclusion in the agenda of the fortieth session of the General Assembly, a proposal which enjoyed the German Democratic Republic's full support.

61. His country, together with other States members of the Warsaw Treaty, had proposed an extensive programme for reducing the threat of nuclear war, halting the arms race, and disarmament. The programme centred on such issues
as the prevention of an arms race in outer space, the renunciation of first use of nuclear weapons, a nuclear-weapon freeze and the reduction of nuclear weapon arsenals until they were completely eliminated, and the cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests. The German Democratic Republic worked towards the starting of the appropriate negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament. Its proposals in the General Assembly on the renunciation of first use of nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament and the prohibition of neutron and chemical weapons had met with the approval of an overwhelming majority of States Members. To act in accordance with article VI of the Treaty would be to ensure the immediate implementation of those proposals as well as of others aimed at arms limitation and disarmament. Everyone knew who it was had stubbornly rejected all constructive proposals to date.

62. A comprehensive test ban would obviously block the way to the further proliferation and qualitative development of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union was the only nuclear-weapon State which consistently favoured an early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban agreement. The Soviet moratorium on all nuclear explosions as from 6 August 1985 afforded yet further proof of that consistent position and the cause of non-proliferation would be greatly served if the United States of America and other nuclear-weapon States associated themselves with that bold step. It had been scientifically proved that possibilities of reliable verification of the implementation of a nuclear test ban was now possible. Attempts still being made to evade the issue of a comprehensive nuclear test ban by artificially inflating the verification aspect were to be regretted.

63. At the European level, his Government played an active part in the Vienna negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions and in the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament. It was in favour of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and, in particular, had reacted positively to the recent agreement on the establishment of such a zone in the South Pacific by a forum of countries in the region. The German Democratic Republic reaffirmed its readiness to make the whole of its territory available, on a basis of reciprocity, for the establishment of a zone free from battlefield nuclear weapons in Central Europe. The establishment in that area of a zone free of chemical weapons would also help to enhance security in Europe and in the world at large. Proposals to that effect were contained in a joint document prepared by the Socialist Unity Party in the German Democratic Republic and the Social Democrat Party in the Federal Republic of Germany.

64. As a country with an extensive economic and social programme but with limited natural resources, the German Democratic Republic was naturally interested in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and had achieved successes in that field as a result of close co-operation with the Soviet Union and other CMEA countries. As a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty, it had placed all its nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards, the application of which had not caused any discrimination and had in no way impeded the peaceful use of nuclear energy in the German Democratic Republic.
His Government welcomed the recently concluded safeguards agreement between the USSR and IAEA and was in favour of further improving the existing safeguards system. In the past five years his country had made considerable contributions towards that end by sending experts, organizing study courses, and so on, and had also contributed towards the application of the IAEA technical assistance programme, which it would like to see expanded for the benefit of developing countries.

66. In conclusion, he expressed the hope that the Final Document of the Conference would take note of the Treaty's observance by States parties and its role in international life and would call for continued strengthening and the attainment of complete universality of the NPT.

67. Mr. COSTA LOBO (Portugal) said that, 15 years after the Treaty's entry into force and only 10 years before a decision had to be taken regarding its future in accordance with article X, the responsibility of the present Conference was particularly great. With regard to the Treaty's first major objective, that of preventing horizontal nuclear proliferation, it could be said that the success achieved had been complete, inasmuch as no non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty had decided to embark on the production of nuclear weapons.

68. Again, the second main objective, that of international co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, could, on the whole, be considered to have been achieved. It would be remembered that numerous criticisms had been made of that aspect of the Treaty in the early stages of its implementation. However, thanks to a fruitful dialogue which had led to changes in co-operation mechanisms and increases in the volume of resources made available for co-operation, those criticisms had, to a large extent, been answered. The situation was not yet perfect; in particular, some importing countries were complaining that the assurances required by certain exporting countries were too rigorous and went beyond the obligations established under the Treaty. While it experienced some sympathy for the importing countries' position, his delegation took the view that a genuine risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons did exist and that precautions had to be taken in order to prevent it. However, the supplier countries' legitimate concern for non-proliferation should not serve as an excuse for procedures prejudicial to the importing countries' expectations of access to the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It was to be hoped that a compromise between the various interests involved would be arrived at as a result of constructive dialogue.

69. In the matter of co-operation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, IAEA had a most important role to play. The mechanisms established for that purpose had been gradually improved, but the process of perfecting them still had to be carried on. Special responsibility in that respect devolved upon the States already in possession of nuclear technology, and it was desirable for those States to co-operate closely with the Agency. One sector in which the Agency's contribution in the field of co-operation could be enhanced was that of the identification of priority programmes, leading to a more rational and equitable allocation of the resources available for co-operation. Another
such sector was the identification of national development strategies in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, especially electric power generation.

70. The third main objective of the Treaty was that of negotiating effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament. In that area, responsibility devolved entirely upon the nuclear-weapon States, and especially on the two Powers with the largest nuclear arsenals. Unfortunately, the implementation of the Treaty in that respect had to be recognized as a failure. Not only had the nuclear arms race not been halted, it had actually speeded up in both quantitative and qualitative terms. His country deplored such a state of affairs, which seriously undermined the authority of the Treaty and of the non-proliferation régime as a whole. It was not enough to say that negotiations were taking place and that positive results were being hoped for. The negotiations must produce measures leading to significant reductions in nuclear arsenals.

71. Before concluding his brief review of the implementation of the Treaty's three major objectives, he wished to express appreciation of the work being done by IAEA in the field of verification of the obligations assumed by States. The importance of the satisfactory operation of verification mechanisms could hardly be exaggerated.

72. As to the question of the future of the non-proliferation régime, the fundamental principle underlying the Treaty was the conviction, generally held among members of the international community, that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by States other than the five nuclear-weapon Powers would not enhance their security in a lasting manner and would weaken international security and stability. In his delegation's view, that principle had lost none of its force. Portugal was therefore opposed to any attempt to amend the text of the Treaty. The fact that 16 additional States had acceded to the Treaty would seem to imply that the text remained satisfactory. It was to be hoped that States which had not yet acceded to the Treaty would do so as soon as possible. In cases of mutual mistrust, a consultative mechanism might be envisaged to ensure that instruments of accession were deposited simultaneously. Universal adherence to the Treaty and strict observance of the consequent obligations it could alone guarantee the authority of the non-proliferation régime.

73. Another essential pre-condition for maintaining the régime's authority was the quality of verification procedures and mechanisms. It was to be expected that in future the verification system as a whole would be subject to still greater pressures than hitherto. The growing role of nuclear energy in the economy represented a major challenge in that connection. Special problems arose in connection with the appearance on the market of breeder reactors because of the large quantities of fissionable materials more or less suitable for the manufacture of nuclear weapons that would become available as a result. The danger of diverting such materials for unlawful purposes, including appropriation by terrorist groups, was all too real and serious. Increased attention should therefore be given to the problem of improving the relevant procedures and mechanisms, for the confidence-building that was essential if the régime's authority was to be maintained.
74. It was essential that the nuclear-weapon Powers should show imagination and good will in discharging the undertakings they had freely accepted with regard to achieving progress in the field of nuclear disarmament. The concept of arms limitation, which had failed to curb the arms race, should give way to that of significant arms reductions. The task was admittedly a highly complex one, but his delegation hoped that a gradual approach which took due account of international realities would eventually lead to balanced and verifiable measures stipulating significant reductions in existing nuclear arsenals. His country was following with great interest the current negotiations between the United States of America and the Soviet Union, in the hope that they would result in effective nuclear-weapon reduction measures. The negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty incorporating adequate verification measures would constitute a major step in that direction. The Conference must strengthen the authority of the NPT and lay the foundations for continuing the non-proliferation régime beyond 1995.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.
GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 12) (continued)

1. Mr. DOWIYOGO (Nauru) said that the Third Review Conference was particularly important for his Government because, of all the nations represented, the island of Nauru was the closest to the site of nuclear tests carried out by a foreign Power and was thus in the front line. Unfortunately, that situation was not new for the peoples of the Pacific, where nuclear tests had been carried out for 40 years and where they had suffered, and continued to suffer, the consequences of the atomic age. They had nothing to gain from the struggle between the super-Powers and everything to lose: happiness, health, their economy and, ultimately, their lives. That is why the members of the South Pacific Forum had concluded the treaty of Rarotonga, which Nauru had recently signed and ratified, and which made the South Pacific a nuclear-free zone. The countries of the Pacific therefore had great hopes for the Third Review Conference, because the Treaty not only offered a forum where their concerns could be made known to the international community, but it was also an instrument of nuclear disarmament that could lead to a truly nuclear-free Pacific. Nauru appealed to the super-Powers - the United States of America and the Soviet Union - finally to accept their responsibilities because it was on them that any real progress in that sphere depended.

2. While the non-nuclear-weapon States had by and large fulfilled their commitments under the Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States, on the other hand, had not made any meaningful progress towards nuclear disarmament, as required by article VI of the Treaty. In the opinion of his delegation, strengthening the Treaty implied the development of reciprocal incentives. A treaty that disadvantaged some parties was doomed to failure; the States parties should therefore ensure that the NPT did not suffer that fate. In the interests of reciprocity, non-nuclear-weapon States should be able, just as the nuclear-weapon States did about them, to assess those States' compliance with the provisions of article VI and act accordingly. The Treaty should prohibit not only the manufacture of nuclear weapons, but also the production of the materials required for their manufacture. He fully endorsed the views of the representative of Australia (2nd meeting) and other speakers on the desirability of a comprehensive test-ban treaty as a realistic first step towards fulfilling the goals of the NPT. He urged the United States and the Soviet Union to recommence negotiations on the question immediately.

3. In the meantime, the Conference should declare its support for the establishment of a moratorium on nuclear explosions which, despite the Opposition of the member countries of the South Pacific Forum, continued to be
carried out in the region. Nauru supported the New Zealand delegation's appeal (5th meeting) to the five nuclear-weapon States to sign the relevant protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga and to undertake not to carry out nuclear tests in that zone. His delegation hoped that, in its final declaration, the Conference would clearly affirm its opposition to all current nuclear tests and would take concrete steps to urge all States which had not yet done so to accede to the NPT. Nauru also supported the multinational agreements establishing nuclear-free zones in various regions, as well as similar initiatives taken elsewhere, in particular, in the Nordic countries. That was one of the many ways in which non-nuclear-weapon States could encourage compliance with article VI of the Treaty by the nuclear-weapon States.

4. In conclusion, he hoped that the Conference would lead to constructive results and would breathe new life into the NPT, as well as strengthening it and increasing its effectiveness so that it would fulfil its intended functions, for the benefit of all peoples of the earth.

5. Monsignor BACKIS (Holy See) said that his delegation's participation in the Conference sprang from the same desire and convictions which had lain at the base of its accession to the Treaty in 1971. But above all, as a religious and moral authority, the Holy See wished to contribute to initiatives which sought to promote freedom, security, mutual confidence among nations and that harmonious co-operation which would lead to a peaceful world. Such a commitment was expressed in the activities of the Holy See in various international agencies and meetings, as well as in the pastoral visits of His Holiness Pope John Paul II to various parts of the world. The Holy See was never a party to any particular political bloc, it only sought to help nations and peoples to reflect more deeply on the moral implications of political choices, and observance of the Treaty was undoubtedly a moral issue since the Treaty was aimed at securing world peace through nuclear disarmament.

6. Without being falsely optimistic, limited but real progress had been made since the Second Review Conference. The two super-Powers had resumed their negotiations, more States had accepted the safeguards established by IAEA, and no new nation had actually produced and tested nuclear weapons since the Second Conference. Furthermore, nuclear energy and nuclear technology had been applied for peaceful purposes in a large number of fields. All those advances were to be praised and should be continued in the interests of mankind as a whole. All countries should set aside their prejudices and reappraise their perceptions and attitudes, so as to further the positive effects of the Treaty. If they believed in peace, they should deepen mutual trust as a first step towards establishing peace. The Treaty clearly reflected a number of different viewpoints which had been expressed when it had been drafted, yet what mattered was that the good it had accomplished should be confirmed and that its potential should be realized, using all possible diplomatic and political means. The world had changed in 15 years, but the reasons which had originally justified the Treaty still existed. His delegation therefore invited all those States which had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty.
7. The Conference should be the opportunity for honest evaluation of what could be improved and what had not been done. His delegation therefore wished to draw the Conference's attention to three important points relating to the Treaty.

8. The first related to article VI and the question of vertical proliferation. Whatever means were used, that trend must be reversed. There was a moral link between the limitation of horizontal proliferation and the reversal of the trend towards vertical proliferation. It must be remembered that there were many more weapons and weapon systems than were needed to ensure the security of all nations. In that connection, his delegation reiterated the appeal to reverse the arms race made by His Holiness Pope John Paul II on 11 June 1982, at the twelfth special session of the General Assembly (second special session devoted to disarmament).

9. The second point concerned something which was clearly expressed in articles IV and V, and throughout the Treaty: the sharing of the benefits of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Those nations which had entered into agreements on the question deserved esteem, but it was obvious that more could be done in that area. Access to nuclear technology should not be desired solely for reasons of prestige; one of its objectives should be to ensure the legitimate economic interests of non-nuclear-weapon States.

10. The third point concerned the establishment of nuclear-free zones as provided for in article VII of the Treaty and the conclusion of regional treaties such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco and, more recently, the Treaty of Rarotonga. Declarations of intent were not enough; all nations should make specific commitments in the form of agreements or treaties to guarantee a more peaceful and secure world, taking into account the existing balance of forces and the needs of universal security.

11. The sentiments expressed by His Holiness Pope John Paul II on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were similar to those which had compelled the nations of the world, in the aftermath of the Second World War, to found the United Nations in June 1945. Those two anniversaries constituted an encouragement to renew efforts to increase the effectiveness of the Treaty, so as to promote the security of nations and peace in the world. His delegation was convinced that people of goodwill were capable of working together to that end and hoped that the Treaty would help to promote peace in the following 10 years and beyond. In that spirit, it encouraged all leaders and nations to find the means that would further the noble aims of the Treaty.

The meeting rose at 4.10 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 8th MEETING

Monday, 2 September 1985, at 10.45 a.m.

President: Mr. SHAKER (Egypt)

GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 12) (continued)

1. Mr. AL-KITAL (Iraq) extended a warm welcome to the representatives of countries which had acceded to the Treaty during the past five years and emphasized the great responsibility borne by all participants in the Conference. His country, like other States parties, had undertaken to abide by the provisions of the Treaty, despite the latter's basic imbalances and inherently discriminatory nature. Dedication to the Treaty's purposes, however, went hand-in-hand with an equally strong commitment to be frank and critical in reviewing the implementation of the NPT. The obligations assumed by all parties, whether nuclear-weapon States or non-nuclear-weapon States, were one and indivisible, all parties alike were called upon to live up to all of the Treaty's requirements, for failure to observe one obligation would have a profound effect on the credibility of the whole non-proliferation régime. The discussions at the Second Review Conference - presided, as would be remembered, by the representative of Iraq - had reflected the full range of difficulties facing the Treaty. On that occasion, his delegation had already drawn attention to the close relationship between the Treaty's two major purposes, horizontal and vertical non-proliferation on the one hand, and the promotion of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes on the other.

2. Careful examination of the implementation of article IV over the past five years showed that the exporting countries parties to the Treaty had failed to fulfil their obligations under that article. The exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information had not been facilitated. Indeed, it had been severely restricted and quite often hindered by unilateral policies applied in a discriminatory fashion against non-nuclear-weapon States. The restrictions had reached an unprecedented magnitude, extending even to laboratory equipment such as oscilloscopes and multichannel analysers and computer software. Yet, the same supplier States had found no compelling reason to apply the same principles to non-parties to the NPT known to have acquired nuclear capabilities. The status of nuclear power plants in developing countries was another case in point. The number of nuclear power plants had increased worldwide from 255 units in 1980 to 441 in 1985, but only few of them had been constructed in developing countries. It was the responsibility of all parties to reverse those trends, which constituted an indisputable threat to the non-proliferation régime and to the Treaty's credibility.

3. The Conference should show determination in seeking a mutually accepted understanding for the proper implementation of articles III and IV. As the Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries had pointed out in
the Political Declaration of the Seventh Conference, 10/ held in New Delhi in March 1983, international co-operation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy was in the interests of both the developed and the developing countries. In expressing their support for convening the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (PUNE), the non-aligned countries had stressed that full and unrestricted access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, under non-discriminatory conditions, was the inalienable right of every State. His delegation was actively involved in the preparatory work for PUNE and believed that the outcome of the present Conference should serve as a catalyst for PUNE's success.

4. The fact that the number of nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty had not risen above the original three showed that the non-nuclear weapon States parties had lived up to their commitments in good faith. While it welcomed such a positive outcome, his delegation none the less wished to point out that the world was no safer now than it had been in 1980 or earlier. On the contrary, the arms race continued unabated and had, indeed, been extended to outer space. The march towards self-destruction had to be checked.

5. Lack of significant progress in the implementation of article VI had been largely responsible for the Second Review Conference's failure to produce an agreed final document. Today, some delegations appeared to rejoice at the mere fact that the super-Powers were talking to each other. In fact, the Conference should endeavour to clear the air for a better understanding between the super-Powers and should appeal to them to commit themselves to making a first positive step towards the implementation of article VI within a definite period of time. In that connection, his delegation welcomed the Soviet Union's decision to freeze nuclear weapon tests for six months. Similar action on the part of other nuclear Powers could lead to a comprehensive nuclear-test ban.

6. In the absence of positive assurances against a nuclear attack or threat of such attack, countries in Africa and the Middle East were greatly alarmed by the growing nuclear capability of the racist and aggressive régimes of South Africa and Israel. His delegation noted with indignation that while non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaties faced ever-increasing obstacles to the development of their peaceful nuclear programmes, the régimes of South Africa and Israel still enjoyed the assistance and co-operation of certain parties to the Treaty. The unlimited protection extended to those régimes by some Western countries made them feel immune to world reaction and punitive action. The increasing co-operation between South Africa and Israel in the nuclear field was also a matter of deep concern to his Government, which had on more than one occasion unequivocally stated its position on the matter. In his message to the Conference on Peace and Solidarity to Prevent a Nuclear War, held in Sofia in October 1983, President Sadam Hussein had warned

the world of the dangers of the nuclear arms race and nuclear-weapon tests and of the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the racist régimes in Pretoria and Tel Aviv.

7. Among the most serious events which had undermined the Treaty and endangered the non-proliferation régime in the past five years had been the Israeli military aggression against Iraq's safeguarded nuclear research reactor in June 1981. The world's reaction to the aggression could be gauged from the texts of resolutions adopted by the Board of Governors and the General Conference of IAEA as well as by the Security Council and the General Assembly. The salient features of the resolutions had been strong condemnation of Israel and the attack; a demand to Israel to withdraw its threat again to attack peaceful nuclear facilities in Iraq and elsewhere; suspension of IAEA technical assistance to Israel, the demand that Israel should place all its nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards; and formal expression of the view that the Israeli aggression had been an attack against the Non-Proliferation Treaty as well as against IAEA and its safeguards system.

8. Israel had not only failed to respond to any of those resolutions but had also declared on many occasions that it would again attack Iraq's nuclear facilities, the most recent threat being proffered by Ariel Sharon in May 1985. Despite its serious consequences to the Treaty, the IAEA safeguards and the peaceful development of nuclear energy, the Israeli act of aggression had gone unpunished. It was imperative that the Conference should study the issue and arrive at an objective understanding of the volume of devastating damage and the serious consequeunces caused by the attack against a safeguarded nuclear facility in a country that was a party to the NPT. The Director-General of IAEA, addressing the General Assembly in November 1981, had rightly said that a military attack against a nuclear facility under IAEA safeguards could not but undermine the credibility not only of the Agency's activities but also of the NPT. In that connection it was worth nothing that the Israeli ambassador to Canada had said in a television interview in December 1983 that his country would not sign the Treaty because it was not satisfied with the type of supervision exercised by IAEA.

9. International figures and organizations, as well as individual Governments, had assessed the Israeli aggression as an unprecedented attack which had escalated the danger of nuclear and radiological warfare by providing a first example of a pre-emptive strike against nuclear facilities; a blatant violation of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law in general, capable of profoundly destabilizing international peace and security in the Middle East region; an attack against IAEA and its safeguards system; an attack against the credibility of the Non-Proliferation Treaty; a dangerous precedent which South Africa, Israel's partner, could follow by resorting to a similar act of aggression to prevent African States from developing their peaceful nuclear programmes especially if such aggression went unpunished; and a serious act which undermined the prospects of establishing a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.

10. The fact that Israel had developed nuclear weapons as far back as in 1968 was widely confirmed. By 1973, at the time of the so-called October war,
Israel had been in possession of at least 13 nuclear weapons ready for use. A number of resolutions on the subject of Israel's nuclear armament had been adopted in the United Nations, and the Secretary-General, assisted by a group of experts, had stated in a report issued in 1981 (document A/36/431) that there were significant indications that Israel had reached the threshold of becoming a nuclear-weapon State at least a decade previously.

11. The future of the Treaty would largely depend on how the Conference dealt with such problems. Lip service could not be a substitute for action. Events which had dealt a blow to the Treaty had to be carefully analysed with a view to taking corrective action of commensurate magnitude. His delegation urged the Conference to deplore in the strongest possible terms the Israeli military attack on the Iraqi nuclear research centre as being the most serious offence against the Treaty. The regimes of South Africa and Israel should be denied access to nuclear technology by all States until such time as they agreed to join the Treaty and to submit their nuclear activities to full-scope safeguards. All States should receive positive assurances against military attack on their nuclear installations devoted to peaceful purposes. Lastly, States parties to the Treaty were duty bound to give technical assistance to Iraq so as to enable it to compensate for the damage inflicted upon its reactor by the Zionist régime. Such positive and effective action would immensely enhance the statute and credibility of the Treaty.

12. Mr. NGOUBEYOU (Cameroon), underlining the particular importance of the Conference, expressed the hope that it would lead to a reaffirmation by all parties of their commitment to effective implementation of all of the Treaty's provisions, because for 15 years, the Treaty had been implemented only unilaterally. Non-nuclear-weapon States had respected their commitments in good faith, thereby halting horizontal proliferation, whereas vertical proliferation had increased and the nuclear-weapon States had not respected their obligation to prevent such proliferation. If the Treaty's future was not to be jeopardized, non-proliferation must be both horizontal and vertical. Clearly, the Treaty could not be an effective means of safeguarding collective security if the already over-armed super-Powers and their allies continuously increased their arsenals.

13. Concrete steps by the nuclear-weapon States to curb vertical proliferation and to halt the arms race, in accordance with the provisions of article VI of the Treaty, would be a confidence-building measure and would also enhance the credibility of the Treaty, thus leading to accession by all States. The continuation of nuclear tests and the expansion of existing programmes, notably by the super-Powers, merely encouraged the reluctance displayed by some States towards the Treaty, which they regarded as an instrument that was beneficial to the super-Powers. The Government of Cameroon attached particular importance to universal accession to the Treaty, to the commitment by all States to scrupulous observance of its provisions, and to the international community's efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament. His Government therefore viewed with dismay the absence of a number of States, especially two nuclear-weapon States that were permanent members of the Security Council, even though under Article 24 of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council had "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security".
14. Cameroon had been one of the first States to accede to the Treaty. It had always believed in the benefits of the peaceful uses of atomic energy and in the need to make every effort to prevent nuclear war. The success and credibility of the Treaty and of any non-proliferation régime depended on fulfilment of the commitments undertaken by both sides. However, the selective policy of transfer of nuclear technology followed by some countries in favour of their allies could only lead to the spread of nuclear weapons all over the world, including the continent of Africa.

15. Cameroon’s early accession to the Treaty was a concrete demonstration of Africa’s position in favour of a non-proliferation régime and the prevention of nuclear war. At its first regular session, held at Cairo in July 1964, the Assembly of Heads of State or Government of OAU had adopted the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa. 11/ Africa had thus become the first region in the world to renounce unilaterally the right to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons. The Declaration represented a considerable contribution towards the régime of non-proliferation, but unfortunately it had been violated by the acquisition of nuclear technology by the racist régime in South Africa, with the collaboration of some developed countries. When such collaboration involved nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT, it not only destroyed the very basis of the Treaty but also encouraged horizontal proliferation, for other African States had the right and the duty to ensure the security of their population. Despite their affirmations, some nuclear-weapon States had encouraged proliferation by supporting the national nuclear programmes of their allies, as was the case with South Africa, which refused to become a party to the Treaty or submit its programmes to appropriate international control.

16. Article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty stipulated that the supply of "source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article". Hence, the collaboration in the nuclear field between some States and racist South Africa was a blatant violation of the letter and the spirit of the NPT. It was extremely difficult to believe that such an internally repressive and externally destabilizing régime as South Africa could develop nuclear capability solely for peaceful purposes. Again, with reference to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, some nuclear-weapon countries, in breach of the terms of article IV, gave preference to States which, like South Africa, were not parties to the Treaty and were not committed to the non-proliferation régime. His delegation considered that proper implementation of article IV would facilitate the widest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information, so that developing countries could benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In addition to being an important confidence-building measure, it would show third-world States Parties that the Treaty was worthwhile and would encourage other States to accede to it.

17. Articles IV and VI were the two basic elements of the Treaty in that they concerned the peaceful use of nuclear energy and effective measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race. Hence, progress in implementing not only article IV but also article VI would unquestionably contribute to the non-proliferation régime. The Government of Cameroon considered that the reason for non-implementation lay not in any inadequacy in the legal formulation of the NPT, but rather in the lack of political will on the part of States, together with their refusal to attach sufficient importance to the IAEA system of safeguards. The Agency played an indispensable role as the only body responsible for the safeguards system and for verification of the fulfilment of the obligations of States Parties under the Treaty to prevent diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

18. His delegation fervently called upon all States Parties which had relations with racist South Africa to cease collaborating with the apartheid régime. It also appealed to those Powers with nuclear technology to contribute to the further development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties, in the light of the very real needs in the regions concerned.

19. One of the first priorities listed in the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly (first special session devoted to disarmament) was the need to cope with the nuclear holocaust that threatened mankind. Cameroon strongly supported the international community's efforts to achieve general and complete disarmament. Urgent and effective concrete measures must be taken to restore international confidence and to encourage negotiations on disarmament. The United Nations, established "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war", should play a major role in promoting the non-proliferation régime and in negotiations on effective measures to halt the nuclear arms race, as well as in the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Cameroon believed that the NPT was a major contribution to implementation of the Charter of the United Nations and that nuclear disarmament was an essential element in achieving the objective of collective security laid down in the Charter. The Treaty was the beginning of a process that should lead to other agreements in the field of nuclear disarmament. The Cameroonian Government therefore reiterated its proposal that the five nuclear-weapon States permanent members of the Security Council, whether or not parties to the Treaty, should meet within the framework of the Council and should hold a conference of nuclear-weapon States to study all questions relating to nuclear disarmament, with a view to reaching concrete agreement, and should subsequently report to the Security Council as a whole and to the General Assembly.

20. The Third Review Conference would in the days ahead be assessing the extent to which the goals and objectives of the Treaty had been reached, and many remarks and proposals would be made regarding its implementation. Participants should always keep in mind that vertical and horizontal proliferation were interlinked and that the Treaty had been drawn up not only to prevent the emergence of new nuclear-weapon States, but also to reduce
gradually, and finally to destroy, nuclear weapons. Both the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States must unite their efforts against the common danger which threatened mankind's very existence. Either the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States undertook a firm commitment to engage in nuclear disarmament, or they would face a nuclear holocaust.

21. Cameroon supported all initiatives aimed at establishing security, peace and confidence, because it believed that peace was an essential pre-condition for socio-economic development. It had therefore noted with satisfaction, and with high expectations, the announcement of the forthcoming summit conference between the two super-Powers. It hoped that the meeting would not simply be another addition to the long list of lost opportunities; it should provide an occasion for fruitful and constructive dialogue on all disarmament problems. His delegation also considered that, on the fortieth anniversary of the foundation of the United Nations, all Member States should reaffirm their commitment to the principles and objectives of the Charter and to the hopes to which the Organization's creation had given rise, so that, in the words of the Delhi Declaration of 20 January 1985, the year 1985 could be "the year when hope begins to prevail over terror" (see document CD/549). Peace and security had become very scarce commodities; hence they were very costly. His country believed that one of the best ways of achieving peace and security was accession to the Treaty, along with the determination to respect it both in letter and in spirit. Consequently, good faith and political will must underlie the actions and the positions of all.

The meeting rose at 11.35 a.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 9th MEETING

Monday, 2 September 1985, at 3.20 p.m.

President: Mr. SHAKER (Egypt)

PROGRAMME OF WORK (agenda item 10) (concluded) (NPT/CONF.III/25)

1. The PRESIDENT said that, if there was no objection, he would take it that the Conference adopted the recommendations made by the General Committee in its first report (NPT/CONF.III/25).

2. It was so decided.

GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 12) (continued)

3. Mr. TERWISSCHA van SCHELTINGA (Netherlands) said that the NPT must be placed in the wider context of the non-proliferation régime, in which it played a vital role and whose performance needed to be judged critically. The Treaty had been intended as an instrument to prevent a further proliferation of nuclear weapons all over the world. That goal remained as valid today as at the Treaty's inception, and it was a reassuring thought that 130 States had acceded to the NPT, thereby confirming their commitment to non-proliferation. That was not to say that the Treaty was the only element of the non-proliferation régime - a régime which consisted of a complex set of norms and obligations both within and outside the NPT, of bilateral and multilateral agreements and arrangements, and of safeguards covering an increasing number of nuclear materials. More and more countries, some of them outside the NPT, were participating in that process and, in that connection, his delegation welcomed the public commitment to non-proliferation by China and its evolving policy with respect to the IAEA safeguards system. It must be realized that proliferation was essentially a political problem and that any non-proliferation policy involved the obligation to mitigate regional tensions which could fuel proliferation tendencies. His Government was convinced that the observance of the provisions of the Treaty remained for any country the best means of expressing its adherence to the objective of non-proliferation. It followed that all countries should accede to the Treaty.

4. In that connection, his country favoured the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones under proper conditions, particularly where they could increase regional stability. The Netherlands was a party to Additional Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco - a Protocol which unfortunately had not yet entered into force. His Government had also taken note with keen interest of the recent agreement on a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific. The argument that stability would be enhanced by an increase in the number of nuclear-weapon States was a dangerous one since it would obviously only increase the risk of nuclear war and, in particular, regional conflicts. It was true that the international security system was characterized by a kind of stability, since nuclear conflicts has so far been avoided, but that degree of stability could not be taken for granted. It was necessary to ensure that any
shift in the strategic balance due to the ever-changing composition of nuclear arsenals would enhance, and not undermine, political and strategic stability.

5. The fortieth anniversary of the first use of atomic weapons was a reminder to the international community of the importance of making every effort to lessen the risk of nuclear war and achieving nuclear disarmament. That was the perspective in which a distinction had been made between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States when the NPT had been drafted; that distinction was considered discriminatory by certain countries, but was it discrimination when one agreed voluntarily to accept a distinction in the interests of security for all? In addition, it should not be forgotten that the NPT obliged each of the parties to pursue arms limitation negotiations in good faith and to achieve nuclear disarmament.

6. The results obtained in that field were undoubtedly disappointing. In that connection, the Netherlands looked forward to the forthcoming summit meeting between the leaders of the United States of America and the Soviet Union, and wished to emphasize that the alliance of which his country was a member was dedicated to an integrated approach to security, which consisted of a sound defence to the extent necessary and arms control to the extent achievable. The Netherlands continued to support a total and comprehensive nuclear test ban and would spare no effort in working towards that goal. A comprehensive nuclear test ban constituted an important and realistic measure which would contribute towards the cessation of the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. In that field, progress had been slow in recent years but some advances had been made in the technical aspects of verification. Everything now depended on the political will of the States concerned, and a first step in the right direction would be the solution of the problems which prevented the application of the treaties on the limitation of nuclear-weapon tests between the United States and the Soviet Union. His delegation welcomed the decision by the Soviet Union to observe a moratorium on nuclear testing until 1 January 1986, but stressed that a moratorium which was not accompanied by adequate verification measures could not be a substitute for a treaty.

7. Turning to the NPT itself, he expressed dissatisfaction at the failure to implement article VI. That, of course, did not detract from the value of the Treaty, even though its credibility was necessarily affected by the lack of results in the arms control area. The fact that the United States and the Soviet Union had renewed their bilateral arms control negotiations and contemplated substantial reductions in their strategic nuclear arsenals was nevertheless encouraging.

8. With regard to security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States, his delegation reminded the Conference that all the nuclear-weapon States had now given such assurances in the form of solemn unilateral declarations to the effect that they would never use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. While it was true that a Security Council resolution on the question would be welcome, the value of those assurances could not be denied, regardless of the form in which they had so far been made.
9. Although the implementation of article VI since the Second Review Conference had remained disappointing, there had nevertheless been impressive achievements in the area of peaceful co-operation, as evidenced by the increase in the resources of the IAEA technical assistance and co-operation fund, which had trebled in the past few years. For that reason his country had supported the proposal by the United Kingdom and other countries to improve the implementation of article VI of the Treaty (NPT/CONF.III/21).

10. The question of the relationship between proliferation, on the one hand, and the structure of the nuclear fuel cycle and the connected restraint on the export of sensitive technology, on the other, appeared to have lost some of its political sharpness but was still very relevant. Taking into account the work of the IAEA Committee on Assurances of Supply and bearing in mind the forthcoming United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and what had been achieved in the preparatory process for that Conference, it was to be hoped that an international consensus in the field of nuclear co-operation could indeed be reached in the coming years. In that connection, he congratulated IAEA, whose activity in the framework of the NPT was essential in relation to both article IV and article III. Nearly 98 per cent of nuclear installations in non-nuclear-weapon States were now under safeguards.

11. The Netherlands had always supported the strengthening of the safeguards system, and continued to believe that the increasing stocks and potential large-scale use of plutonium in the civilian cycle called for special safeguard measures which should be worked out in the context of IAEA. In that connection, he sincerely hoped that the work on an international plutonium storage scheme would be revitalized, thereby implementing the relevant provision of the Statute of IAEA. It was also desirable to diminish the use of highly-enriched uranium and it was encouraging to note that progress was at present being made in that field on the initiative of the United States of America. In addition, his delegation noted with pride that in the Netherlands recently the first gas-centrifuge enrichment facility had been brought under an advanced safeguards régime; the special features of that régime included the fact that all States — whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States — had accepted the same safeguards systems for similar plants. In that regard, it was indeed a very welcome development that a kind of international verification régime was now in place in four of the five nuclear-weapon States. In future, all nuclear-weapon States should make their civil nuclear installations, including advanced installations, subject to IAEA safeguards. The voluntary offer by the nuclear-weapon States contained by definition an element of symbolism because non-proliferation was basically not at stake but, from a political standpoint, particularly in order to achieve a fair balance of rights and obligations, the voluntary offers were important. The Netherlands favoured a cut-off in the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes by the nuclear-weapon States. In that case, a safeguards system with a wider coverage would be called for, which would also help to ensure more certainty about continuing non-military use of nuclear materials in civil installations in nuclear-weapon States. His country, like many others, attached great value to the system of guarantees which would facilitate nuclear trade. An additional guarantee would be
afforded if military and civil nuclear facilities were separated in the nuclear-weapon States. That goal was no doubt difficult to achieve but it should be envisaged in a long-term perspective.

12. The fact that the basic provisions of the Treaty, namely the obligations under articles I and II, had not been violated was of enormous importance. It now remained for the Conference to produce a fair balance between that achievement, underlining the fundamental value of the Treaty, and a frank review of shortcomings in its implementation.

13. **Mr. MURIN** (Czechoslovakia) said that his country regarded the NPT as a cornerstone of the existing non-proliferation régime. The Treaty made an effective contribution to the stabilization of international relations and the strengthening of confidence among States, and in general satisfactorily fulfilled its historic role. The Treaty had again demonstrated its viability in the past five years, since a further 16 States had acceded to it and the number of nuclear-weapon States had not increased. In addition, the Treaty had provided, and continued to provide, considerable possibilities for the development of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy on a multilateral as well as bilateral basis. It was in the interest of all States to implement all the provisions of the Treaty and to make it as universal as possible. He noted with satisfaction that the fundamental provisions of the Treaty, namely articles I and II, had been faithfully observed by the States parties, including both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, but it should not be forgotten that there were still some 20 States in the world which were not parties to the Treaty and which had nuclear programmes capable of giving rise to military applications in the relatively near future. That fact was all the more alarming since some of them, such as Israel and South Africa, were located in sensitive areas which were hotbeds of international tension.

14. With its safeguards system, IAEA played an increasingly important role in the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, as evidenced by the fact that, by the end of 1984, it had concluded a total of 163 safeguards agreements with 95 States. With a few exceptions, practically all the peaceful nuclear activities being carried out in non-nuclear-weapon States were under IAEA control. It should be noted that the continuous verification of observance of the commitments entered into by the parties to the Treaty, which was being carried out with the aid of the IAEA safeguards system, had never hindered the economic, scientific and technological development of those countries or international co-operation in peaceful nuclear activities.

15. As a non-nuclear-weapon State and as a party to the Treaty, his country had placed all its nuclear activities under the IAEA safeguards. The national system of registration and control of nuclear materials and facilities in Czechoslovakia was a reliable one and fulfilled IAEA requirements. Nevertheless, Czechoslovakia continued to advocate the strengthening and improvement of the IAEA safeguards system. It welcomed in that respect the agreement concluded in 1985 by IAEA and the USSR on the voluntary submission of part of its peaceful nuclear activity to IAEA control, a step which was
bound to strengthen the authority of the Treaty as well as that of IAEA. It was indispensable that all the non-nuclear-weapon States which benefited, or would benefit, from peaceful applications of nuclear energy should submit all their nuclear activities to IAEA inspection, whether or not they were parties to the Treaty.

16. A number of steps had been taken both within and outside IAEA to facilitate the co-ordinated and controllable development of international co-operation in that field and much useful work had been performed, in particular by the Zangger Committee and the IAEA Committee on Assurances of Supply. His country also welcomed the efforts being made by the exporters of nuclear materials and products. It would be most timely for the 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials to enter into force; for that purpose, however, a larger number of States would have to ratify it, as had been done by Czechoslovakia and by some other countries, which, moreover, had been applying its provisions in practice. Czechoslovakia also supported steps aimed at implementing programmes for strengthening safety measures in nuclear facilities. Some of those problems had been examined at a meeting of experts from socialist countries parties to the international agreements on the control of exports of nuclear materials, equipment and technology which had been held in February 1985 in Bratislava.

17. In keeping with the provisions of the Treaty, Czechoslovakia was participating actively in the exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technical information relating to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. With the assistance of the Soviet Union and the co-operation of the CMEA countries and other countries, Czechoslovakia had been able to achieve in the nuclear field results which placed it among the leading countries in the utilization of nuclear energy and among producers and exporters of equipment for nuclear power plants. There were at present five nuclear-power plants in operation in Czechoslovakia and another seven were under construction. His country was pleased that its co-operation with developing countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy had been expanding from year to year, both along bilateral lines and within the framework of IAEA. He emphasized, however, that in the development of that co-operation Czechoslovakia continued to give preference to those countries which were parties to the NPT and had signed agreements with IAEA. In 1985, Czechoslovakia had contributed 2.8 million Czechoslovak koruny to the IAEA Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund. Through the Agency, Czechoslovakia had been organizing conferences, symposia, seminars and training courses of various types, and it also granted scholarships.

18. The reduction of the threat of nuclear war and complete nuclear disarmament would be the most reliable guarantee for securing respect for the non-proliferation régime. In the first half of the 1980s, Czechoslovakia, along with other socialist countries, had endeavoured to consolidate and develop all the positive achievements in the area of arms limitation and disarmament during the period of détente. To that end, the socialist countries had advanced a number of peace initiatives, including the 1983 resolution entitled "Condemnation of nuclear war", the unilateral commitment assumed by the USSR in 1982 not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, the support given to the resolutions on a nuclear-weapons freeze adopted by the General Assembly.
at its thirty-eighth and thirty-ninth sessions, and the 1982 proposals of the Soviet Union on the elaboration, adoption and stage-by-stage implementation of a programme of nuclear disarmament. In addition, the socialist countries were ready to negotiate on any measure for the prevention of nuclear war and the promotion of nuclear disarmament within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament.

19. In view of the current tensions, Czechoslovakia welcomed the resumption of negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States on nuclear disarmament issues and was convinced that those negotiations could lead to a positive outcome. For that purpose, however, both parties should comply with the agreement of 8 January 1985. In April 1985, the USSR had unilaterally committed itself to halt the deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Europe until November 1985 and had issued an appeal to the United States of America to introduce a moratorium on the development, testing and deployment of offensive nuclear weapons in space for the duration of the talks. Unfortunately, instead of making a positive response to those peace initiatives, the United States had taken steps aimed at upsetting the existing strategic balance and gaining military superiority, as was clearly shown by the strategic defence initiative. His country and other socialist countries considered it their first foreign-policy task to avert a nuclear war on earth and to prevent the militarization of outer space. They were aware that the solution of other urgent global issues of an economic, social, ecological or other nature depended to a considerable extent on the attainment of progress in those areas. They therefore expected a great deal from the summit meeting which was to take place in November 1985 in Geneva between the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the President of the United States of America.

20. As to the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime, Czechoslovakia attached very great importance to the conclusion of a treaty on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapons tests. It had welcomed the Soviet Union's draft submitted in 1982, which represented a good basis for negotiations on that question. As for the Soviet-American Treaty on Limiting Nuclear Tests and the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes which had been signed in 1974 and 1976 respectively, it was high time they were ratified and entered into force. It was a matter for regret that the 1980 trilateral talks between the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests had been interrupted and not resumed. Czechoslovakia, together with other peace-loving States, had accordingly welcomed the unilateral decision by the Soviet Union to halt all nuclear explosions from 6 August 1985 until 1 January 1986, by instituting a moratorium which would be extended if it was joined by the United States. Czechoslovakia appealed to the other nuclear-weapon States to join that moratorium and noted with profound regret that the United States had not responded positively to the Soviet proposal.

21. In his delegation's view, the observance of the existing nuclear-weapon-free zones, such as that set up by the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and the creation of new nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world could not but strengthen the non-proliferation régime, it therefore
welcomed all initiatives in that direction. Of course, as a European country, Czechoslovakia was interested in the establishment of such zones in its continent. It had therefore followed carefully and supported the efforts aimed at establishing nuclear-free zones in northern Europe, in the Balkans and in the so-called "corridor" in Central Europe.

22. The inadequate progress in disarmament and the increased tensions in the world must not lead to the weakening of the NPT but rather to its strengthening. In order to prevent nuclear war, effective measures must be undertaken to avoid both vertical and horizontal proliferation. The socialist countries supported all constructive proposals aimed at curbing the nuclear arms race and the achievement of nuclear disarmament. They had therefore welcomed the appeals made by six Heads of State and Government in 1984 and 1985 concerning a freeze on nuclear weapons, eliminating nuclear weapons forever and averting an arms race in outer space.

23. His delegation noted with great satisfaction that 130 States, i.e. the absolute majority of the countries of the world, had now become parties to the NPT and reiterated its hope that the remaining countries, which for various reasons were still not parties to the Treaty, would accede to it in the near future. Czechoslovakia had resolutely advocated the all-round strengthening and universality of the NPT. It had consistently fulfilled the obligations resulting from it. It hoped that the final document to be produced by the Conference would contain a well-balanced and realistic assessment of the situation, along with suggestions for a positive solution of the outstanding problems, and pledged to do its utmost for the attainment of that goal.

24. Mr. NGUYEN THUONG (Viet Nam) said that his country, which was among those that had acceded to the NPT since 1980, expected the present Conference to strengthen the non-proliferation régime and to enhance the participation of the developing countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. So far the Treaty had helped considerably to limit the number of nuclear-weapon States and, consequently, in spite of the heightening of international tension, it had also helped to diminish the risk of nuclear war. Nevertheless, that progress was insufficient and, above all, did not wholly satisfy the expectations of States parties, particularly the developing countries. For its part, Viet Nam deplored the fact that States such as South Africa and Israel had acquired nuclear weapons. It also regretted that no progress had been made on the question of guarantees of the non-use of nuclear weapons against countries that did not possess such weapons.

25. However, the main cause of concern remained ever-increasing vertical proliferation. In spite of their obligations under article VI of the Treaty, some nuclear Powers were refusing to respond to the constructive proposals that were submitted each year to the Conference on Disarmament and the General Assembly by the neutral, non-aligned and socialist countries. The Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned countries held in New Delhi, in 1983, had called for general and complete disarmament and, in particular, nuclear disarmament under effective international control. In January 1985, six Heads of State had made similar proposals which, unfortunately, had been favourably received by only one nuclear Power.
Viet Nam welcomed the proposals of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries, to which reference had been made in Mr. Gorbachev's message at the 1st meeting. Like many non-aligned countries, Viet Nam believed that the main objective should be to put an end to the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. In that respect, his country welcomed the initiatives taken by the USSR concerning the draft treaty on the prohibition of all nuclear weapons tests, the proposal to resume trilateral discussions on such tests, and the unilateral moratorium that had recently been announced by the USSR. On the other hand, his delegation could not accept that the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests should be regarded solely as a long-term objective, since it believed that such an approach was contrary to the basic principles of the NPT.

26. With regard to the objective of enabling all States parties to have access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, his delegation wished to pay tribute to IAEA for its activities in that field. Viet Nam, which possessed only one reactor, was grateful to the Agency and to the Soviet Union for the assistance that they had provided. It hoped that improvements would be made in the implementation of article IV of the NPT in order to facilitate greater international co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

27. Since the NPT's entry into force, efforts had been made to establish nuclear-free zones and zones of peace, which had helped to limit horizontal proliferation. Viet Nam was in favour of the establishment of such zones and, in particular, supported the proposals to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of Europe and in the Balkans, since it was convinced that such zones would help to promote peace in Europe and throughout the world. As an Asian country, Việt Nam had declared itself in favour of the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean and welcomed the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific. Việt Nam also supported the proposed establishment of a zone of freedom, peace and neutrality in South-East Asia (ZOPPAN).

28. In his opinion, the limited progress made in the campaign against the proliferation of nuclear weapons could be attributed not to the Treaty but to the lack of political will on the part of certain nuclear Powers and also to the heightening of international tension. However, there were some hopeful signs, particularly the increased awareness by international public opinion of the absolute need to avoid nuclear war. The resumption of negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States was another positive development. Throughout their negotiations, those two countries should suspend all activity relating to nuclear weapons. It was equally imperative that they should make a joint effort to prevent the arms race and particularly the nuclear arms race, from spreading into space.

29. Việt Nam hoped that the interesting proposals made by the socialist countries, the non-aligned group and other countries would be given favourable consideration so that the Conference could achieve the concrete results expected by all the peoples of the world. For its part, his delegation was willing to participate actively in the endeavours that would be made with a view to the achievement of such results.
Mr. Roche (Canada), Vice-President, took the Chair.

30. Mr. DORJI (Bhutan) said that, since his country was party to the Partial Test Ban Treaty, it had been a logical step to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. As a Buddhist and non-aligned country, Bhutan categorically rejected any form of nuclear proliferation which might endanger world peace. The existence of nuclear weapons and arsenals was the greatest threat facing mankind.

31. Although it had only recently acceded to the Treaty, his country was convinced that its provisions were basically sound and remained as valid as on the day they had been adopted. One of the main objectives of the Treaty was to avoid the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons in non-nuclear-weapon States. It was an undeniable fact that the Treaty had achieved considerable results since its entry into force, essentially because the non-nuclear-weapon States had kept their part of the bargain. On the other hand, the nuclear-weapon States, particularly the super-Powers upon whom the success of the Treaty depended, had not accepted their responsibilities, particularly those incumbent upon them under article VI. The increase in the number of nuclear weapons since 1970, when the Treaty had entered into force, proved that the nuclear arms race was continuing. In addition, negotiations between the two super-Powers to put an end to the race had not yet made any appreciable progress. If the two super-Powers, which bore a major responsibility in ensuring the success of the Treaty, continued to ignore their obligations, they would only lend credence to critics' claims that the objectives of the Treaty were discriminatory and questionable.

32. He expressed profound disappointment at the obstacles which continued to hamper the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Such a treaty would be a major step towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. His delegation welcomed any measure to halt nuclear-weapon testing and any other steps which might lead to a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

33. In the meantime, his delegation favoured the establishment of nuclear-free zones, provided they were set up with the agreement of all the States concerned. The creation of such zones would be a step towards the fulfillment of the ultimate goal. In that context, his delegation welcomed the recent initiative taken by the members of the South Pacific Forum in declaring a nuclear-free zone in their region.

34. The importance of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes was acknowledged in the Treaty. The matter had received extensive consideration in various international forums, and it was clear that many countries wished to take advantage of technological progress by using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as an aid to their development. In many countries, it had already been proved that nuclear energy could serve as a useful alternative to other sources of energy. Innovations in that area should be encouraged as a contribution to social and economic progress. His delegation therefore considered that States which wished to engage in nuclear activities for peaceful purposes had the legitimate right to do so without any discrimination and in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Treaty.
35. It was also very important to strengthen safeguard and verification measures, an area in which IAEA had a crucial role to play. All countries concerned should subject their nuclear activities to inspection and verification by IAEA, and make an effort to promote mutual confidence and to show the world that their nuclear activities were compatible with accepted international norms and regulations.

36. Mr. VIDAS (Yugoslavia) recalled that one of the main objectives of the NPT was the prevention of the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. The main responsibility for horizontal proliferation lay with the non-nuclear-weapon States, whereas vertical proliferation was primarily the concern of the nuclear-weapon States.

37. From Yugoslavia's point of view, the NPT could contribute to the establishment of a universal system of international security which could facilitate lasting peace. The results of the Treaty's implementation should therefore be judged by the extent to which its objectives had been attained, in order to draw the necessary conclusions and make recommendations designed to strengthen the Treaty in the future.

38. Realization of the objectives of the Treaty called for far-reaching changes in international relations and a climate conducive to the strengthening of mutual trust and international co-operation. That was certainly not the case in the present situation, owing to a concentration of power in the hands of a few major States and the unbridled arms race. In the previous 15 years, nuclear weapons had spread to the territory, waters and airspace of non-nuclear-weapon States. That was particularly true of the continent of Europe, where the deployment of a vast number of intermediate-range missiles and tactical nuclear weapons, particularly along the East-West frontier, considerably increased the risk of nuclear confrontation. Technical improvements had made such weapons more reliable, more accurate, faster, and thus more dangerous. A nuclear war would have catastrophic effects on the entire world, including the country which started it. There was no possible defence against nuclear weapons and thus it was a fallacy to talk of their deterrence value.

39. The NPT had had one important effect in that no new country had acquired nuclear weapons since its adoption. The non-nuclear-weapon States had always fully honoured their commitments under the Treaty.

40. The same could not be said of the nuclear-weapon States with regard to vertical proliferation, the arms race and nuclear disarmament. The two series of negotiations between the United States of America and the USSR on intermediate-range nuclear weapons, which had begun in 1981, and on strategic weapons, which had begun in 1982, had been suspended in 1983 without agreement. The new bilateral negotiations on the same weapons and on armaments in space, which had opened in March 1985, had as yet produced no results. It must therefore be acknowledged that the cessation of the nuclear arms race referred to in article VI of the Treaty was now a more remote possibility than it had been 15 years before when the Treaty had entered into force. The nuclear-weapon States could not evade the solemn pledges they had
made under the article by making vain declarations and promises, while their arsenals continued to expand. Nevertheless, the negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States were of vital importance, since they involved the security of the whole world.

41. Those negotiations were even more important in view of the total failure of the Conference on Disarmament for many years. It had made no progress in such matters as the cessation of the arms race, nuclear disarmament, a nuclear test ban, the prevention of nuclear war and the protection of non-nuclear-weapon States. It was particularly regrettable that no comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty had been concluded and that the three nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT had not fulfilled their obligations; indeed, more tests than ever were taking place. A treaty banning all nuclear tests would be an important first step in the cessation of the nuclear arms race and of the horizontal and vertical proliferation of such weapons.

42. In the Final Declaration of the First Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, held in 1975, \(^{12}\) the parties to the Treaty had considered that the conclusion of a treaty banning all nuclear-weapon tests was one of the most important measures for halting the nuclear arms race. They had expressed the hope that the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty would set an example to the others, but the trilateral negotiations between those States had been broken off. Within the Conference on Disarmament, deliberations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty were confined to a small ad hoc committee. That restrictive step had a most adverse effect on the implementation of the NPT. In respect of tactical nuclear weapons, it had been claimed that negotiations would be pointless because a reduction could not be monitored. That assertion was not convincing and, in fact, concealed a lack of political will.

43. The negotiations held since the Second Review Conference, aimed at the adoption of measures to put an end to the arms race and ensure nuclear disarmament, had also failed to yield results. The Heads of State or Government of the non-aligned countries, meeting in New Delhi in 1983, had nevertheless called for general and complete disarmament under effective international control, to ensure peace and security throughout the world. They had further declared that the nuclear-weapon States had an obligation to guarantee that other States would not be threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons.

44. It was encouraging to note, however, that IAEA's safeguards activities under article III of the Treaty had been satisfactory. In the previous five years, there had been no reports of peaceful nuclear facilities being diverted for military purposes. Yugoslavia attached great importance to the application of safeguards, on a non-discriminatory basis, in the interests of all parties to the Treaty. The Agency's safeguards system met the need to

\(^{12}\) NPT/CONF/35/I, part I, annex I.
establish international monitoring of the implementation of multilateral agreements, but no safeguards could be effective if the States parties were not prepared to abide fully by the Treaty. In any case, any success enjoyed by the Treaty in preventing horizontal proliferation was attributable not to the application of safeguards, but rather to the goodwill of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties. Yugoslavia, although adhering to the principle of non-proliferation, considered that the control measures imposed unilaterally by some exporting countries were unacceptable and that any new measure of that kind could only be acceptable if it was approved by a consensus of the parties to the Treaty and formalized within the context of IAEA.

45. The Third Review Conference should stress the obligation of the nuclear-weapon States and developed countries to promote the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The Conference should take note of the current unfavourable situation in that respect and the ineffectiveness of the relevant provisions of the Treaty.

46. The unprovoked attack, some years before, against a non-aligned developing country, which had led to the destruction of a nuclear installation, had been an act of aggression against the Treaty itself and its objectives since it has been aimed at a State party which had been engaged in the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

47. The Third Review Conference should mark a decisive stage in paving the way for genuine non-discrimination and ensuring that the developing countries could gain easy access to nuclear technology, profit from scientific advances and obtain nuclear material for peaceful purposes. His country therefore called for the suppression of exclusive associations such as the "London Club", which aimed to impose more restrictions on the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and for the abandonment of the unilateral restrictions imposed by national legislation. The achievements of the Third Review Conference should contribute to the success of the forthcoming United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and promote a favourable atmosphere for the wider use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. IAEA should improve its activities and functions relating to technical assistance and financing, particularly for the developing countries.

48. The participants in the present Conference should strive to ensure that it achieved a maximum of tangible results. His delegation would spare no effort to that end. In 10 years' time, it would be necessary to decide whether the Treaty should continue in force, as provided for in article X, paragraph 2; the present Conference should already be making preparations for that decision by means of continuous and organized action.

49. In February 1970, his Government had published a declaration explaining the reasons underlying its ratification of the NPT; it had been inspired above all by a desire for peace, general and complete disarmament, international security and development. That declaration was still valid in all respects: prohibition of the manufacture and use of nuclear weapons, the
responsibility incumbent on the nuclear-weapon States in view of the voluntary renunciation of nuclear weapons by other States, the continuation of negotiations between the super-Powers on the limitation and cessation of the strategic nuclear arms race, extension of the negotiations to tactical weapons, the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones with reduced weapon levels, the need for the nuclear-weapon States to initiate negotiations for the completion of the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, signed in Moscow in 1963, maintaining the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, the right of all States parties to the NPT to benefit from all the achievements of nuclear research for peaceful purposes in conformity with appropriate international procedures, non-discriminatory control of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, assistance from the nuclear-weapon States to other States in such use, and the need for adaptation by IAEA in order to meet the needs of developing countries more effectively.

50. His Government considered it very important to take universal action in achieving the objectives of the Treaty. It was convinced that all States parties would respect the Treaty in letter and in spirit in order to facilitate, inter alia, the accession of all countries to the Treaty.

51. Mr. PARK (Republic of Korea) said that the régime established under the Treaty was a just one, because it attempted to establish a balance between the nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, granting the former a monopoly of nuclear weapons and recognizing the right of the latter to financial assistance and technical co-operation in the utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. However, that balance was, as yet, far from being achieved. Moreover, one could not overlook the fact that several States which were on the point of becoming nuclear Powers had not yet acceded to the Treaty or accepted the IAEA safeguards system. It was most important to persuade those States to ratify the NPT but, in the final analysis, only concerted efforts by all States parties to rectify the existing imbalance in the non-proliferation régime could ensure the success of that régime. His Government had noted with concern the recent measures taken by nuclear-material-exporting countries to strengthen control over their supplies. It was unjust that excessive surveillance measures should hinder the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in importing countries which, like the Republic of Korea, had scrupulously honoured their commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons, and that the surveillance measures should jeopardize supplies. Surveillance should be confined to the Agency's safeguards system, which was already adequate and could always be improved as technology developed. If confidence in the non-proliferation régime were to increase, it was also essential that the safeguards should be applied without discrimination to installations in the nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States.

52. With regard to nuclear disarmament, his Government was aware that some progress had been made since the Second Review Conference in the field of nuclear arms limitation, but those primarily concerned should make further joint efforts to bring about substantial reductions and, eventually, complete disarmament. It would be difficult to maintain the non-proliferation régime, and even more difficult to strengthen it, in an atmosphere of nuclear
insecurity. His delegation therefore welcomed the resumption of bilateral negotiations between the United States of America and the Soviet Union. However, the success of the non-proliferation régime also depended on the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT. Assurances that nuclear weapons would not be used against non-nuclear-weapon States parties, such as that contained in Security Council resolution 255 (1968), could not replace the commitment to assist such States in the event of attack or the threat of attack by nuclear weapons.

53. Mr. YONDON (Mongolia) said that the Treaty under review remained the cornerstone of the nuclear-weapon non-proliferation régime; one of the main objectives of the Third Review Conference must be to strengthen that instrument. The continuing and welcome increase in the number of States parties to the NPT proved that most countries recognized the Treaty’s importance for the consolidation of international peace and security.

54. It was encouraging to note that no other State had acquired nuclear weapons since the Treaty’s entry into force, but the fact that a considerable number of countries - in particular China and France, as well as several countries on the point of becoming nuclear Powers - had not yet acceded to the NPT was inevitably disturbing for the international community. The Third Review Conference should therefore issue an urgent appeal to all such States to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible. It was an undeniable fact that any increase in the number of nuclear Powers would heighten the risk of irreparable damage to regional and global strategic stability and of a chain reaction in other countries which would in turn seek to obtain nuclear weapons. In particular, it was difficult to calculate fully the dangerous consequences for international security of the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Israel and South Africa, whose policy of aggression and annexation had already been acknowledged by the international community as a threat to peace. The Third Review Conference should demand that those two States make all their nuclear installations subject to IAEA safeguards without delay.

55. The safeguards system referred to in article III of the NPT was a sure means of preventing any diversion of fissile material for non-peaceful purposes, and its effectiveness should accordingly be increased. In implementing the system, the Agency had abided strictly by the provisions of its statute and had not infringed the sovereignty of States. The fact that no complaints had been received concerning the Agency’s activities and the increase in the number of States which had concluded safeguards agreements with it since the Second Review Conference proved that the implementation of guarantees of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons made it possible to establish wide-ranging and mutually beneficial co-operation. The Soviet Union had decided to make some of its activities relating to the peaceful use of nuclear energy subject to Agency inspection; similar action by the Chinese Government could only serve to strengthen the international safeguards system and increase trust between States.

56. Countries which exported nuclear material, equipment and technology should adopt legislation regulating the supply of nuclear material in order to avoid any proliferation of nuclear weapons, and should reach an agreement
whereby the entire nuclear programme of non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the Treaty to which they exported nuclear material would be made subject to the Agency's safeguards system.

57. As the nuclear industry developed, the volume of radioactive waste was increasing. The long-term consequences of any pollution of the environment by such waste were so dire that the countries which produced and used nuclear material had a duty to take all measures necessary to ensure the absolute security of their storage systems. They should co-operate more effectively to avoid any diversion of nuclear material, equipment and technology by terrorist groups or individuals for extortion or other purposes.

58. Any negotiations on the limitation of the arms race and disarmament could not be successful unless the parties were willing to improve the international situation and seek a solution in good faith to the problems facing them. The Soviet Union had taken a unilateral decision to suspend all nuclear explosions between 6 August 1985 and 1 January 1986. Similar action by the United States would provide a favourable basis for negotiations on the banning of nuclear explosions, which had been at a standstill for many years. Moreover, by such action the United States of America would prove that it intended to abide by the provisions of the treaties banning nuclear weapon testing in outer space, on land and at sea. That was particularly important for progress in the negotiations between the United States and the USSR which had begun in March 1985 with the aim of formulating effective agreements, especially agreements to prevent an arms race in space and to put an end to the arms race on earth. Arms limitation on earth would be unthinkable if the arms race were to spread to outer space. The only acceptable solution, therefore, was to work towards the use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes. The Soviet Union was preparing a proposal to that effect for submission to the General Assembly at its fortieth session. Progress towards disarmament and the cessation of the arms race depended in great measure on the state of relations between the USSR and the United States. It was to be hoped that the forthcoming Soviet-American summit would live up to the hopes cherished by the peoples of the world.

59. His Government favoured the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones as an effective way of strengthening the non-proliferation régime. However, it was important to ensure that agreements on such zones did not contain any loopholes which would enable the parties to evade their provisions. The decision taken at the sixteenth session of the South Pacific Forum to adopt the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty could contribute to the development of co-operation and good-neighbourly relations between all the States of the region.

60. In order to strengthen the non-proliferation régime even further, it was obviously essential to eliminate as far as possible all motives for acquiring nuclear weapons. It was accordingly vital to improve the international political climate, to eliminate sources of conflict and tension, to obtain tangible results in the limitation of the arms race as soon as possible and above all to ban all nuclear explosions.

The meeting rose at 6.10 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 10th MEETING

Tuesday, 3 September, 1985, at 10.25 a.m.

President: Mr. SHAKER (Egypt)

GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 12) (continued)

1. Mr. DHANAPALA (Sri Lanka) said that the Third Review Conference should not constitute a ritualistic exercise, but rather an opportunity for the NPT parties to review and reflect on the Treaty's implementation. The review must be completely honest and comprehensive, so as to strengthen the Treaty and ensure its durability. Although it must not be forgotten that the Second Review Conference had failed to reach consensus on a final document, he believed that negotiation and compromise would resolve the problems facing the Third Review Conference, and the success of the Preparatory Committee sessions augured well for the outcome. Since 1980, the international situation had seriously deteriorated and a significant trend had emerged towards the qualitative improvement of nuclear arms. At the same time, the geographical proliferation of nuclear weapons in non-nuclear-weapon countries of the two military alliances under a diffused command structure had brought the danger of a nuclear war even closer and outer space was threatened with weaponization, including nuclear strike weapons. Neither multilateral nor bilateral forums had yielded concrete results and it could only be hoped that the summit meeting between the United States of America and the USSR, to be held in November 1985, would, despite the sense of déjà vu, help to curb the arms race.

2. In 1995, a majority decision would have to be taken on how the Treaty should be extended. The pertinent question was the length of the extension, because there might well be such disillusionment with the Treaty that extending it for periods of one to five years would in itself be an indictment. If the Treaty was fully implemented so that it could achieve the nuclear partnership for peace that was its objective, there was no reason to take such a decision. Without success in the Third and the Fourth Review Conferences, the prospects for 1995 would be bleak. It was not enough to infer that implementation was unsatisfactory, the necessary corrective action had to be taken. There must be honest acceptance of the deficiencies in the Treaty's implementation and credible undertakings must be given that the next five years were not to be a repetition of what had gone before.

3. Sri Lanka had only ratified the Treaty in 1979, after a careful analysis that had led to the conviction that the NPT enhanced international security and multilateral co-operation for the peaceful development of nuclear energy. Sri Lanka's ratification was an act of faith that the duties and obligations imposed upon nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States would be honoured. The sovereign right of self-defence recognized in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations had been voluntarily narrowed in the wider interests of global peace and security. The renunciation of nuclear weapons by a small developing country like Sri Lanka might seem too academic to be credible as a
security sacrifice, but the political sacrifice was significant. Sri Lanka's choice of non-alignment rather than membership of alliances under security treaties was eloquent proof of how it perceived its security interests to be best protected. The Treaty was a composite whole and it was not possible to develop international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy while at the same time allowing a nuclear arms race to continue unabated. For the same reason, there could be only one final document at the end of the Conference evaluating the implementation of the Treaty in all its aspects.

4. Sri Lanka had scrupulously observed the various articles of the Treaty. With regard to articles I and II, it had long pursued a policy of prohibiting foreign ships carrying nuclear weapons from entering its ports. As to article IV, nuclear energy was a low priority because Sri Lanka was maximizing other available sources of energy, but it did use nuclear technology in agriculture and medicine with the assistance of IAEA and it would like those programmes to be expanded, perhaps through special extra-budgetary arrangements. With reference to article VI, his country had taken every opportunity to urge the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the conclusion of nuclear disarmament negotiations and agreements. However, it was dismayed by the lack of political will to negotiate on priority nuclear issues such as a comprehensive nuclear test ban and the prevention of nuclear war. It had also co-sponsored a resolution calling for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Sri Lanka was Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean and hoped that a conference would be convened on the subject in Colombo without delay. It was also Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference. The failure to achieve success in all those efforts had to be attributed to the lack of political will on the part of those nuclear-weapon States which remained impervious to appeals for negotiation.

5. The increase in the number of States parties was a source of satisfaction and his delegation welcomed the 16 countries which had acceded to the NPT since the Second Review Conference. However, there was no indication that other countries were likely to change their policies and accede to the Treaty, although the presence of some at the Conference in an observer capacity must be welcomed. It was the responsibility of the States parties to demonstrate the value of the Treaty régime by ensuring that it was fully implemented and demonstrating by their actions that the Treaty was not simply a device to confer legitimacy on the possession of nuclear weapons by some and not by others. Such a demonstration could only be achieved by substantial reduction and ultimate dismantling of the nuclear arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States parties. As an essential initial step, an agreement on a nuclear test ban was imperative. The acquisition of nuclear arms contravened an internationally accepted norm, something that was not disputed even by those countries outside the Treaty. The question was of the utmost urgency because terrorism, already fuelled by the $35 billion conventional arms trade, might soon be armed with the "suitcase" nuclear bomb or other nuclear weapons. An unequivocal declaration by non-parties that they would join the régime if at least a comprehensive test-ban treaty was negotiated would be a contribution to global efforts towards disarmament.
6. With regard to international co-operation for peaceful nuclear activities, he welcomed China's admission to IAEA and the USSR's recent agreement to place part of its civilian facilities under IAEA safeguards. Again, in the context of article VII, he congratulated the countries of the South Pacific Forum on concluding the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty and called upon all States to respect it as another extension of the nuclear-weapon free areas of the world. It was gratifying to note the references to the NPT in the preamble to the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty and the fact that the parties guaranteed prevention of the diversion of fissionable material for non-peaceful purposes.

7. His delegation unreservedly endorsed the working paper that was to be submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned and Neutral States (NPT/CONF.III/32) and supported the proposals contained therein. In general, however, he was concerned at the stationing of nuclear weapons on the soil of non-nuclear-weapon States in pursuance of military alliance obligations, for the act of transfer itself was precluded by article I and receipt of the transfer was a breach of article II. He therefore called upon both military alliances to halt and reverse the trend. It was not possible to condemn the clandestine manufacture of a nuclear weapon by a threshold State while at the same time acquiescing in the placement of nuclear weapons in non-nuclear-weapon States parties. His country was also concerned about ongoing nuclear trade not subjected to safeguards - which were mandatory for States parties. Devious arrangements were made in that respect to circumvent the Treaty, and sometimes even domestic legislation, in the name of political expediency. Non-nuclear-weapon States exporters of fissionable material must also consider themselves bound by article II.

8. In view of the deep anxiety about persistent reports regarding the nuclear capability of Israel and South Africa, special guarantees within the NPT were necessary to prevent nuclear proliferation to expansionist regimes and racist minority groups outside the Treaty. Sri Lanka would also like to see its understanding that article I precluded transfers between nuclear-weapon States embodied in a final document of the Conference.

9. The limited benefits given to non-nuclear-weapon States in the supply of nuclear technology and material, as well as the paucity of financial resources for nuclear co-operation, were deplorable and it was to be hoped that IAEA's Committee on Assurances of Supply would devise a code acceptable to all. IAEA's limited budget for technical co-operation and "footnote a/ projects" had to be expanded and his delegation welcomed the relevant proposals being made at the Conference. The target for IAEA's Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund was $26 million for 1985, yet $1,000 billion was spent on arms each year, and just one-fifth of that sum would abolish hunger in the year before the end of the century. He urged developed countries parties to the Treaty to increase their assistance to the developing countries in accordance with article IV, paragraph 2 and paid tribute to the excellent work done by IAEA in that field.

10. Unfortunately, no progress was being made in connection with article IV and the Treaty could not sustain such persistent erosion of its credibility.
very much longer. His country could not accept the argument that the world was made safer by freezing the number of nuclear-weapon States at five, when their nuclear weapons were increasing both quantitatively and qualitatively. At the very least, an undertaking should be made to resume the tripartite talks and to work towards a nuclear test ban. In that context, he had noted the reports of the nuclear-weapon States parties on their compliance with article VI and it was difficult to understand why, if negotiations had been conducted "in good faith", the tripartite talks had been suspended since 1980. If the nuclear-weapon States could not at least take the first step towards nuclear disarmament, how was it possible to believe seriously that article VI would ever be implemented? Progress should also be made at the present Conference on the question of negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States, so that they could be given credible and legally binding guarantees.

11. The Treaty had been concluded at a time of détente, but the world had now slipped back into a period of tension, insecurity and distrust. Proliferation, whether horizontal or vertical, was the product of such a climate, forcing nations into the treacherous spiral of an arms race. The nuclear-weapon States were obviously the States best able to change the climate and, by so doing, they would preserve the Treaty. The USSR's unilateral declaration of a moratorium was an opportunity that had to be grasped and if the other two nuclear-weapon States parties reciprocated, there was no reason why the moratorium should not continue beyond January 1986 until a comprehensive test ban was agreed upon.

12. In conclusion, he emphasized that the Sri Lankan delegation was ready to co-operate with all other delegations in working for the success of the Conference, so as to strengthen the Treaty and increase the number of accessions and ensure the durability of the NPT.

13. Mr. AL-ALFI (Democratic Yemen) said that the atomic age had started with optimism, before the spectre of mankind's destruction had emerged. The Conference was taking place in the year of the fortieth anniversary of the United Nations, whose Charter included the aim of saving "succeeding generations from the scourge of war", and 40 years after the dropping of the first atomic bomb, on Hiroshima. The results of the Conference, whether positive or negative, would be vital in determining whether the Treaty was to be extended further in the year 1995. The NPT was a binding legal instrument and one of the most important international conventions on the cessation of the arms race, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. All peoples of the world pinned their hopes on the Treaty as a contribution to the first step in securing general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

14. The Treaty, to which there were now 130 States parties, had been successful in halting horizontal proliferation, but the provisions on vertical proliferation had not been strictly observed. It should be emphasized that the effectiveness of the NPT was tied in with the conduct of each and every State party, but especially the behaviour of the nuclear-weapon States in fulfilling their commitments. It was particularly disappointing that results
under article VI had not met expectations: the nuclear arms race had in actual fact speeded up and the expenditure on nuclear weapons had reached massive proportions. The tripartite negotiations, the Conference on Disarmament, and bilateral negotiations had not yielded any concrete results and, since the Second Review Conference, no success had been achieved in halting the arms race.

15. His delegation supported the constant positive initiatives by the USSR in unilaterally enacting measures to achieve progress in disarmament, such as refraining from first use of nuclear weapons and the recent declaration of a moratorium on testing nuclear explosive devices. It was to be hoped that other nuclear-weapon States would follow the example set by the Soviet Union.

16. Co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy played an important role in strengthening non-proliferation. Acceptance of IAEA safeguards would facilitate access to nuclear technology and increased co-operation under IAEA control would help to foster the advancement of the developing States parties. Unfortunately, the Israeli attack on the Iraqi peaceful nuclear installation in 1981 had merely underlined a new problem: the protection of peaceful nuclear installations under IAEA safeguards, an issue to which the Conference must draw attention.

17. Democratic Yemen supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and wished to emphasize that Israel's attitude seriously compromised the creation of such a zone in the Middle East. The international community must condemn Israel for its stance and reprimand it for threatening to make further attacks on peaceful nuclear installations. States parties should immediately end nuclear co-operation with Israel, which helped it to acquire nuclear weapons in violation of article I. There were three essential preconditions, set forth in many General Assembly resolutions, to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East: Israel should accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, it should submit to IAEA safeguards and it should end the development and manufacture of nuclear weapons, as well as the testing and deployment of such weapons, whether in Israel or in the territories under its occupation.

18. The racist régime in South Africa also represented a threat to international peace and security. In 1964, OAU had adopted the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, but South Africa's nuclear activities clearly jeopardized such a course as denuclearization of the continent. South Africa's aim was to consolidate the apartheid régime, contrary to the hopes and aspirations of the African people, and more particularly the peoples of southern African and Namibia. Accordingly, all States parties should terminate co-operation with South Africa until it acceded to the Treaty and officially declared that it had ended the development, testing, manufacture and acquisition of nuclear weapons and would submit to IAEA safeguards. Efforts should also be continued to establish the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, in keeping with General Assembly resolution 2832 (XXVI). Expanded United States military activities, along with the reports of the introduction of nuclear weapons in the area, plainly constituted an obstacle to establishing such a zone.
19. The Conference would mark a turning point in the implementation of the Treaty and all States parties, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, bore special responsibility for adopting measures to avoid nuclear war. They must reaffirm their full commitment to all of the provisions of the NPT. In keeping with paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly, multilateral negotiations should start forthwith and, as a first step, negotiations should commence on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. At the same time, it was essential to prevent the militarization of outer space.

20. He appealed to all States to show the necessary political will to avert a nuclear holocaust. The promotion of peaceful nuclear activities and the adoption of disarmament measures would enhance international peace and security. It was not enough simply to increase the number of States parties; what was needed was universal compliance with the Treaty's provisions. He was convinced that the Conference was capable of adopting the necessary specific measures to avoid the danger of nuclear war.

21. Mr. HAMID (Malaysia) said that his country had become a party to the Treaty in July 1968 and had ratified it in March 1970. The growing number of parties to the Treaty demonstrated the increasing significance attached to it by the international community. However, there was growing dissatisfaction with the implementation of the Treaty's provisions, for it was widely felt that the nuclear-power States had not kept their part of the bargain. To expect compliance with the Treaty to come from the non-nuclear-weapon States alone was both unrealistic and unfair. The nuclear-weapon States, too, should fulfil their obligations under articles I and VI. The Treaty's success depended on the sincerity of all parties in abiding by the true spirit of the NPT and on an equal sharing of responsibilities.

22. The Third Review Conference offered an opportunity to appeal to the nuclear-weapon States to resort less to rhetoric and to come to grips with the problem of checking the quantitative and qualitative escalation of the arms race. The level of nuclear weapons had already reached alarming proportions and it was necessary to strive together for general and complete disarmament under effective international control through the mechanism provided by the Treaty. His delegation hoped that the dissensions and disagreements which had bedevilled the Second Review Conference would be avoided on the present occasion, for only from a position of unity could the parties appeal to States still outside the Treaty to join their ranks.

23. Malaysia supported the Treaty fully and without preconditions or double standards. It was against the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the testing of nuclear weapons, the dumping of nuclear wastes and the stationing of nuclear weapons in its region. In connection with article III, it welcomed the discussion initiated at the Conference on the role of IAEA in world-wide nuclear scientific activity. Although it was true to say that nuclear science and technology were highly specialized matters, they were not as radically different from other human activities as many people still believed. Nuclear science had to be viewed in an overall perspective so that its enormous potentialities might be exploited in the way most beneficial to all.
24. While adhering to the Treaty's provisions, his country also believed in bilateral co-operation in the development of peaceful nuclear energy. Under bilateral agreements, Australia, Japan and other friendly countries had actively promoted the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Malaysia. There was great social merit in the endeavour to achieve international co-operation and understanding in the field of peaceful nuclear technology, and the cost of scientific research had become so great that it was now prudent as well as efficient to participate in some form of international co-operation in that regard. His Government firmly believed that the development and benefits of peaceful nuclear energy should be accessible to all countries alike, whether or nor they were parties to the Treaty.

25. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world, as provided under article VII, could contribute greatly to the maintenance of world peace and stability. The ASEAN countries - Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand - were actively working towards the establishment of a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality (ZOPFAN) in South-East Asia in order that the region might be kept free from any form of interference by foreign Powers. As an integral part of the establishment of ZOPFAN, ASEAN senior officials were also studying the prospects for establishing a nuclear weapon-free zone in South-East Asia as a complement to similar efforts in other regions. However, the military occupation of Kampuchea by foreign troops, violating as it did the basic principles of ZOPFAN, constituted a serious setback to ASEAN's pursuit of the ZOPFAN objectives. ASEAN would continue to seek a comprehensive political solution to the Kampuchean problem, in the hope that the long-cherished dream of establishing a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in South-East Asia would soon be realized.

26. All the NPT States parties should engage in the fullest co-operation to ensure the successful outcome of the Conference, bearing in mind the noble principles of the dignity of man, the pursuit of mankind's welfare in the social, economic and scientific domains, and the need for universal peace.

27. Mr. VEJJAJIVA (Thailand) said that, despite its alleged shortcomings, the Treaty was a genuine attempt to confront the nuclear age, to reap its benefits and to destroy its evils. The NPT served an undeniably useful and important role in recognizing the dangers of nuclear proliferation and providing guidelines for their elimination. The successive Review Conferences, furthermore, provided a forum where parties to the Treaty could evaluate and be reminded of the gravity of the nuclear situation.

28. The Treaty was based on two equally important considerations: first, the need for co-operation in promoting the peaceful application of nuclear fission, and second, the need to reduce and ultimately eliminate the danger associated with nuclear weapons by preventing nuclear proliferation. Nuclear energy, like its primordial ancestor, fire, was a double-edged tool which men could use for either good or evil. While it was imperative to prevent proliferation and eliminate the nuclear threat, the possibilities of increasing and facilitating the peaceful uses of nuclear energy must not be ignored.
29. The prevention of horizontal nuclear proliferation had been and still remained one of the Treaty's major corner-stones. Horizontal proliferation assumed greater importance if the programme of peaceful applications of nuclear energy was to be executed on a global scale. His delegation therefore agreed with the careful distinction drawn between the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the proliferation of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. IAEA had played a prominent role in reducing nuclear proliferation, especially of the horizontal kind. The recent acceptance of IAEA safeguards by several States had encouraged the spirit of non-proliferation and disarmament. His delegation wished to record its satisfaction with the operation of IAEA safeguards and to express the view that the IAEA safeguards procedures should be strengthened and that IAEA should have greater control over nuclear installations, the production and transport of nuclear materials and related processes.

30. Confidence in the Treaty would be revived if co-operation in the application of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes taking place between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States under the IAEA umbrella was strengthened further. But the survival of the Treaty and perhaps of the non-proliferation régime as a whole might depend upon the ability of the nuclear-weapon States to convince the other parties of their determination to adopt concrete and significant measures to end the arms race and to embark upon nuclear disarmament. Discussions which had taken place between the nuclear Powers in past months to prepare for future negotiations concerning nuclear arms reduction and related issues should be regarded as positive developments. His country took the view that a comprehensive test-ban treaty was a vital prerequisite for preventing further vertical and horizontal proliferation, and would support all initiatives to that end.

31. At a meeting of ASEAN Foreign Ministers held in Kuala Lumpur in July 1985, Thailand, together with the other members of ASEAN, had urged the nuclear-weapon States to engage in serious negotiations on disarmament, taking account not only of their own security concerns but also those of others, and especially of the developing non-nuclear-weapon States. The meeting had also urged the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to fulfil their obligations under article VI and to proceed without further delay to undertake multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test ban.

32. His delegation regarded the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones as a step towards the ultimate goal of disarmament. As the representative of Malaysia had already stated, Thailand and the other ASEAN countries had since 1971 called for the establishment of a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality (ZOPFAN) in South-East Asia, of which the nuclear-weapon-free zone concept was a component of that idea.

33. As a non-nuclear-weapon State, Thailand would continue to abide by the Treaty and give consistent support to proposals capable of leading to the adoption of effective measures to avert the danger of nuclear war and to maintain international peace and security.
34. Mr. ROSANA (Kenya) said that his country attached great importance to the Review Conference. Having ratified the Treaty at an early stage, it was gratified that the majority of States Members of the United Nations had taken similar action and it commended the Treaty to those States - especially nuclear-weapon States - to demonstrate a spirit of good will by ratifying the NPT. In its relatively short life, the Treaty had served as an important instrument in restraining the spread of nuclear weapons. It had to be recognized, however, that the hopes entertained at the time of the Treaty's conclusion now seemed like lost dreams. While horizontal proliferation might indeed have been curbed, vertical proliferation of nuclear arms had continued unabated, becoming an ever more serious threat to world security. The nuclear-weapon States, which held the key to progress in preventing both the horizontal and the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, should honour through deeds the obligations they had assumed under the Treaty. His country would continue, as it had always done, to exert every effort to contribute to the cause of disarmament. It could see no moral, ideological or political justification for the present use of colossal human and material resources to improve and enlarge the already formidable array of nuclear weapons. Non-nuclear States had the right to receive effective guarantees containing unequivocal undertakings by nuclear-weapon States that they would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons. The only lasting assurance to that effect, together with joint or unilateral assurances by nuclear-weapon States on the non-use of nuclear weapons, was the prohibition of nuclear weapons.

35. While it considered the Treaty to be a useful document, his Government was not unaware of the Treaty's weaknesses. Instead of imposing an obligation on the nuclear-weapon States to take positive action to curb the arms race, the Treaty as it stood merely exhorted them to do so. A still more important weakness was the serious imbalance of obligations inherent in the Treaty. The nuclear-weapon States were not prevented by the Treaty from developing their nuclear capability for whatever purpose, on the other hand, non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty could not develop nuclear technology in any form without the nuclear Powers' blessing. Thus the Treaty effectively curbed horizontal proliferation, while leaving States free to engage in vertical proliferation. That imbalance of obligations could and should be rectified, and the present Review Conference was an appropriate occasion to do so.

36. The Conference should also express concern at the fact that, despite the stringent provisions of the Treaty and the safeguards provided by IAEA, several States had steadily acquired technology which could potentially be used to produce nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, such a development had been made possible by covert and often overt transfers of technology from the nuclear States in gross contravention of the Treaty. Since most of the countries concerned had been reluctant to enter into safeguards agreements with IAEA as provided in article III, it had been virtually impossible to control and monitor the operation of their nuclear installations. In that connection, it should also be pointed out that, although periodic inspections were supposed to be carried out at the nuclear installations of those States which had entered into agreements with IAEA, the system had been short-circuited by those States' refusal to permit inspection of their military installations. His delegation would take an active part in discussing such aspects of the
Treaty in detail in the appropriate committees at a later stage of the Conference. It believed that all people of good will would join together to answer the call made in the Charter of the United Nations and in the NPT for a world of peace. Kenya would work unstintingly towards the realization of that goal.

37. Mr. BARAKAT (Jordan) said that his country had been one of the first States to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Jordan had ratified the Treaty in 1970 because it had considered and still considered it to be a sound basis for the efforts being made to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Treaty also helped people to avoid suffering from the possible use of such weapons. Recently, the world had commemorated the fortieth anniversary of the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which had caused the deaths of hundreds of thousands of persons. Mankind hoped that nuclear weapons would not be used again. However, the world lived in fear of the possibility of a nuclear holocaust.

38. His Government considered that the Conference was an appropriate setting to review the implementation of the Treaty. It was participating in the Conference as a State party to the Treaty and was prepared to co-operate with other States parties in fostering a climate that would enhance the effectiveness of the Treaty, promote nuclear disarmament and enable non-nuclear States to benefit from nuclear energy.

39. The Middle East was witnessing a series of tragic events and destructive wars. The Iraqi-Iranian war was in its sixth year and the bloody events in Lebanon were continuing. All efforts to achieve a comprehensive and just peace between Israel and its neighbours had failed. It was therefore logical to assume that a general confrontation might develop in the Middle East and that nuclear weapons might be used in such a confrontation. The introduction of nuclear weapons in the region would increase tension and pose a threat to world peace.

40. The Arab countries were parties to the Treaty and none of them had nuclear capability. Egypt was trying to acquire nuclear capability in order to raise the standard of living of its people. Iraq was also trying to use nuclear power for peaceful purposes and had built a nuclear facility subject to IAEA safeguards system. In 1981, however, Israel had attacked that facility, an act which constituted a major challenge to the Treaty. It also gave rise to a number of questions concerning guarantees for the protection of non-nuclear States.

41. His Government supported the Egyptian proposal for the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities used for peaceful purposes. The report by United Nations experts indicated that Israel had the capability to produce nuclear weapons, possessed rockets with nuclear warheads and had received assistance and information from nuclear States or nuclear threshold States, such as South Africa. Moreover, Israel refused to accede to the Treaty and did not allow IAEA to apply its safeguards system to its nuclear installations.
42. At its most recent session, the General Assembly had requested the Secretary-General to ascertain the views of all interested parties concerning the possible establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. In principle, his delegation supported that idea. However, in order to create such a zone in the Middle East, a number of preconditions must be met, such as agreement by all States in the region to submit to international supervision and the IAEA safeguards.

43. The Treaty was a splendid humanitarian endeavour aimed at preserving the human race from extinction, yet the continuing arms race and the number of nuclear weapons stockpiled in the various arsenals were sufficient to destroy the world several times over. The Treaty reaffirmed the right of mankind to live secure from the threat of nuclear war. Non-nuclear States therefore had an obligation not to try to acquire nuclear weapons, and nuclear States had an obligation not to transfer such devices to non-nuclear States.

44. The disarmament negotiations had not made much progress because of a lack of genuine will. His delegation believed that IAEA was an appropriate body to assume responsibility for ensuring the peaceful uses of nuclear power and supported the appeal for a special fund for the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear power, which could be of great benefit to developing countries. His Government called on the developed countries to create more opportunities for developing countries to exchange equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In that connection, he pointed out that, under the terms of article IV of the Treaty nuclear energy would help the developing countries to resolve many of the problems facing them in a number of sectors, such as agriculture and medicine.

45. In conclusion, he referred to a statement by the Crown Prince of Jordan to the effect that peace was possible and could become a reality if there was adequate political will at the regional and international levels and that whatever the justification - balance of power, deterrence or national security - to go nuclear for military purposes was to opt for collective suicide.

The meeting rose at 12.25 p.m.
1. Mr. EL DEEB (Sudan) said that the adoption of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1968 had marked the culmination of the efforts made right from the beginning by States Members of the United Nations to have international rules to govern nuclear energy and ensure its exclusively peaceful use. A particularity of the Treaty was that it brought together a very large number of States, both nuclear Powers and non-nuclear-weapon States, in an effort to achieve three objectives - non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, international co-operation with a view to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and nuclear disarmament - while attributing to both types of States specific tasks in one or other of those fields. An organic link existed between the three objectives and they could not be isolated from one another when reviewing the operation of the Treaty.

2. The Treaty currently had 130 States parties, or four fifths of United Nations Member States, which was evidence of the extent of its importance. Participants in the Third Review Conference should therefore reaffirm their determination to fulfil their commitments under the Treaty and encourage States which had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty so that it could become a truly universal instrument. In that respect he was very concerned at the growing nuclear capacity of Israel and South Africa, which constituted a threat to the non-proliferation régime and presented a number of risks at both the regional and international levels. Israel's attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor in June 1981 showed how important it was to protect nuclear facilities used for peaceful purposes.

3. Concerning article IV on international co-operation with a view to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, the transfer of technology in that field was of particular importance to the developing countries. The situation of a number of African countries, for example, was critical and technical co-operation programmes in the nuclear field could help them to overcome the problems impeding their development, in particular drought and desertification. The many applications of nuclear energy in industry, medicine and agriculture, not to speak of electric power, could also be very useful to them and it would be desirable for non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to receive preferential treatment in the transfer of nuclear technology.

4. With regard to article III, he greatly appreciated the role played by IAEA, which had become a pillar of the non-proliferation régime through its application of the safeguards system and its technical co-operation activities for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. He therefore called upon States parties to increase their contributions to the Agency's activities so as to
enable it to go on functioning effectively at a time when technology was advancing and the number of nuclear facilities was increasing.

5. Concerning the implementation of article VI, it was disappointing to note the lack of progress towards nuclear disarmament. At a time when the international situation gave rise to considerable concern it was important that the nuclear Powers should fulfil their commitments in that field, just as the non-nuclear-weapon States had done in relation to non-proliferation. It was to be hoped that the negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States started in March 1985 would mark a breakthrough towards a solution of the problem of disarmament. A complete nuclear test ban was closely linked to the objectives of disarmament and the conclusion of a treaty on that matter would have the effect of increasing confidence among States as well as providing evidence of a real political will to achieve disarmament on the part of the nuclear Powers. His delegation hoped that participants in the Third Review Conference would give that matter the attention which it deserved.

6. Lastly, with reference to the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty of 1985 and the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa of 1964, he hoped that other nuclear-free zones would be established in accordance with article VII.

7. Mr. TONWE (Nigeria) said that the Treaty remained without doubt the most effective way of halting and reversing the nuclear arms race and avoiding horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. For that reason he hoped that the Third Review Conference would not be a mere routine meeting but that all States parties would demonstrate their genuine commitment to honour all their obligations under the Treaty. In so far as no additional nuclear-weapon State had emerged since the entry into force of the Treaty, it could be said that the non-nuclear-weapon States parties had completely fulfilled their obligations. That was unfortunately not the case for the nuclear-weapon States. If so many non-nuclear-weapon States parties had refrained from taking the nuclear option, even at the risk of diminished national security, it was not only because of technological or financial constraints but also because they had a genuine desire to contribute to the realization of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Under those conditions, it was quite natural that they should expect the nuclear Powers to play the game according to the rules.

8. Concerning the implementation of article VI, developments since 1980 had proved disappointing: the arsenals of the nuclear powers had been increased and improved and those States were envisaging an extension of the arms race into outer space. What was even more serious was that policy-makers seemed to have become increasingly insensitive to public outcry and failed to take into consideration the economic and social consequences of diverting enormous sums of money to nuclear arms programmes. They took no account of existing international legal instruments on arms control and disarmament aimed at using outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes. Certain of them put forward the argument of deterrence to justify the unrestrained acquisition of nuclear arms, even though the nuclear Powers themselves had become aware that their arsenals did not ensure their security and that what was required was a
security system to be established in co-operation with other nations and not at their expense. It was regrettable to note that in spite of the efforts by non-nuclear-weapon States parties to give unflinching support to the non-proliferation régime, the nuclear Powers had adopted a position which might put the régime in jeopardy. States would surely have been fewer in ratifying the Treaty had they been able to foresee that such would be the case.

9. It should be noted that for the first time since the adoption of the Treaty, no major progress had been achieved in negotiations on disarmament over the previous five years. The breakdown of trilateral talks on the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban had been blamed on the difficulties of verifying such an agreement, even though existing national or transnational means of verification of contractual commitments had been found to be adequate. The three nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty should either resume their trilateral talks or begin negotiations within the multilateral framework of the Conference on Disarmament. Pending such an agreement they should all declare a moratorium on nuclear-weapon testing.

10. Bilateral talks between the two major nuclear-weapon States had also floundered in the previous five years. According to what information was available, talks between the United States and the Soviet Union begun in March 1985 had made little progress and the positions of the two parties remained as far apart as ever. It was likely that the nuclear Powers, conscious of their failure in respect of the implementation of article VI, would try to point to the bilateral talks as evidence of compliance with their obligations under NPT. There should be no mistake, however. Negotiations which did not lead to concrete results served no other purpose than to raise false hopes. For them to be successfully concluded, both parties would have to show the necessary political will.

11. Concerning article III, he commended the efforts of IAEA to implement the safeguards system. He noted with satisfaction that 18 additional safeguard agreements had been concluded since 1980 and that the Agency's resources for technical co-operation had increased tremendously over the previous five years. None the less, he called on donor countries to increase further their extra-budgetary assistance to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

12. He recalled the attack launched in June 1981 by Israel against the Iraqi nuclear reactor being built under IAEA safeguards and drew attention to the positive role which nuclear power could play in the economies of many countries, particularly the developing countries. He urged participants in the Third Review Conference to take steps to prohibit any attack against peaceful nuclear facilities.

13. The information in relation to South Africa was cause for alarm. It had been established that South Africa had succeeded, with the aid of a number of countries and transnational corporations, in obtaining the technical capability to manufacture nuclear weapons. Uranium production in South Africa and Namibia had increased by about 50 per cent since 1980 and a pilot enrichment plant, which had been in operation for several years and provided
enriched uranium for the SAFARI-I reactor, had opened the way to the construction of a semi-commercial enrichment plant which was expected to be in operation by 1986 or 1987. The South African Government had refused to place its nuclear facilities under the Agency safeguards system and that could have very serious consequences. If the racist régime one day had its back against the wall it might come to regard its nuclear capacity not as a deterrent but as a weapon to be used. Moreover, the recent publication by the Government of South Africa of guidelines for the export of nuclear materials was reason to fear that South Africa might shortly become an important supplier of nuclear technology, materials and equipment outside the non-proliferation régime. If the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, adopted 20 years previously, had not yet been fully implemented it was partly because South Africa had developed a nuclear weapon capability. For all those reasons he demanded that South Africa should conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency and refrain from manufacturing, testing, deploying, transporting, storing or using or threatening to use nuclear weapons. He appealed to all nuclear-weapon States to desist from contributing, directly or indirectly, to the development of South Africa's nuclear weapon capacity.

Mr. Meiszter (Hungary), Vice-President, took the Chair.

14. Mr. RAEMAECKERS (Belgium) said that the anniversary of the atomic bomb attack on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had served to remind all mankind how important it was to banish the spectre of war of any kind, nuclear or other. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons now had 130 States parties, 17 more than in 1980, and it was a source of satisfaction to see the ideal of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons being increasingly supported, contrary to certain pessimistic predictions in the past that it would be impossible to avoid an increase in the number of nuclear-weapon States. It was the duty of all States, and above all the promoters and depositaries of the Treaty, to take account of the criticisms of those States which still refused to accede to the Treaty and to explore how to reach agreement with them in order to attain the ultimate objective of the Treaty - the prohibition of nuclear weapons.

15. One of the main criticisms made of the Treaty by its detractors was the discrimination which it established between the nuclear-weapon States and the others, from both the military and the civilian points of view. However, the Treaty had been intended to be a first step towards disarmament, both nuclear and conventional, by providing a means to achieve a parallel reduction in the discrimination which already existed, since an increased number of nuclear-weapon States would only have made discussions to achieve a balanced reduction of existing forces more difficult. It was with that in mind that Belgium had agreed to become a party to the Treaty, taking into account also that article IV, in counter-balance to the measures provided for in articles II and III, contained formal guarantees relating to the right of every State to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The Treaty was only a starting-point and not an end in itself and could in no way be considered as an instrument providing permanent sanction to a privileged situation for recognized nuclear-weapon States. As the representative of Belgium had said at the Second Review Conference in 1980, the Treaty should be followed up by...
thorough implementation in the civil field and by precise, concrete decisions on disarmament if it were to maintain its credibility. For that reason, Belgium once again urged the Powers concerned to renew their efforts towards a progressive reduction in their nuclear capabilities.

16. Although efforts at negotiation on disarmament had continued since 1980, no significant new international instruments had been added to the list of agreements on strategic arms limitations, and the deterioration in the international climate had contributed greatly to the stagnation of results. Belgium welcomed the resumption of talks between the United States and the Soviet Union on that matter. Recently, the Soviet Union had proposed a moratorium on nuclear testing, while the United States had offered to allow observers to attend nuclear tests. These proposals were to be evaluated within the framework of efforts aiming at the conclusion of a treaty on a permanent and verifiable nuclear test ban. Indeed, the measure which had really been expected for many years was the conclusion of a treaty on a comprehensive nuclear test ban. It was to be hoped that the question of the verification of such an agreement, which had been a stumbling block to talks so far, would shortly cease to pose an insoluble problem. In that respect there was cause for satisfaction at the work accomplished within the Conference on Disarmament by the Group of Scientific Experts which was making a major contribution in the search for a better solution to the problems of verification in the aspects of detection and interpretation of seismic events. However, progress had not been fully conclusive and in any case it was not sufficient simply to express the will to conclude an agreement. There must also be a willingness to submit to strict verification procedures, including, as appropriate, on-the-spot inspection. It was regrettable that it had not been possible within the Conference on Disarmament to establish a subsidiary body on the question of a general and complete nuclear test ban, which would have made it possible to take up the work again in its essential features, so as to progress towards the conclusion of a treaty on the matter. Such an instrument would contribute to strengthening the Treaty and give it increased credibility in limiting so-called vertical proliferation.

17. His delegation noted with satisfaction that, in the course of the implementation of its safeguards system, in accordance with article III of the Treaty, IAEA had not detected any anomaly which would indicate the diversion of a significant amount of raw or special fissionable material for the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices. That was a positive outcome of the Treaty. Belgium also welcomed the Soviet Union's decision to accept - as the other nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty had already done - the principle of Agency inspection of some of its civil facilities.

18. The final objective, however, was and must remain the implementation of "generalized safeguards" for the overall civil nuclear activities in the world, of both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the Treaty. That implied first and foremost a clear separation between civil and military facilities in nuclear-weapon States and the application of the same safeguards to all commercial transactions, whatever the nuclear status of the State in question. Meanwhile, the legitimate objective of strengthening safeguards should be directed above all at States which refused
to accede to the Treaty and to accept that binding legal commitment to reject the military nuclear option. However, it should not increase the obligations of non-nuclear-weapons States parties to the Treaty, which were already subject to rigorous controls. The strengthening of safeguards could also be accompanied by related measures such as the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities, as provided for in the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The Belgian Parliament had already approved the Convention and Belgium would soon be able to ratify it together with those other European Community members which had signed it.

19. Despite the economic crisis which had seriously affected a large number of both developed and developing countries and had had the effect of slowing down nuclear energy programmes throughout the world, efforts at bilateral or multilateral co-operation had been continued, as was testified by agreements on nuclear co-operation reached in recent years, the exchanges of research and other workers organized with the aid of IAEA and the individual support of States, as well as other co-operation activities in which Belgium was participating as far as its technical and financial capabilities allowed.

20. In conclusion, he emphasized once again that although certain positive results could be seen in relation to the horizontal non-proliferation of nuclear arms because of the Treaty, there remained a great deal to be done to maintain their credibility and to reinforce the non-proliferation régime. Firstly, efforts to convince States which had not yet done so to accede to the non-proliferation régime and the Treaty must be continued, particularly in the case of States which were able to produce explosive nuclear devices relatively soon. To that end, it was important to make an effort to reduce the initial discrimination within the Treaty. Secondly, the Treaty must be made to continue to attract those who were already parties. Belgium would make every effort to contribute to the realization of that two-fold objective, which was an essential stage towards disarmament.

21. Mr. NICOLAIDES (Cyprus) said that the fortieth anniversary of the atomic bombardment of Hiroshima and Nagasaki had reminded the whole world of the horror that nuclear war would visit upon mankind, especially at the current time when even more sophisticated and destructive nuclear weapons existed. As other speakers had already said, the prime importance of the Treaty lay in the fact that it was essentially an arms control agreement. It had effectively contributed to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, at least horizontal non-proliferation, and had proved that political will, when it existed, could really produce effective agreement even on the most difficult issues. It had not, however, achieved its objective as far as vertical proliferation was concerned. Nuclear-weapon States had been constantly increasing and improving their nuclear arsenals. None the less, the States parties to the Treaty were bound to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Results obtained in that field had been disappointing and, despite the conclusion of a number of treaties on that issue, particularly on a bilateral basis between the United States of America and the Soviet Union, the objectives of article VI of the Treaty were far from having
been achieved. His delegation therefore welcomed the resumption of negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union and expressed the hope that they would successfully conclude in an agreement preventing an arms race in space and ending it on earth.

22. The Treaty also had the aim of promoting the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. There could be no doubt that mankind could only benefit from peaceful applications of nuclear energy and it was therefore essential to apply an international system of safeguards to avoid any diversion of nuclear material to other purposes. In that respect his delegation congratulated IAEA on its efficient administration of the safeguards system. It was certain that any improvement in the system would constitute a substantial contribution towards the overall goals of the Treaty given its crucial importance within the non-proliferation régime.

23. Concerning article VII, Cyprus had always supported the principle of creating nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world as an essential and practical contribution towards reducing the danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons and the risk of nuclear war. His delegation therefore welcomed the conclusion of the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty, as well as the Treaty of Tlatelolco which created a similar zone in Latin America, and the initiative taken by the Government of Greece to establish a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans. The conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty was of crucial importance for the non-proliferation régime established by the Treaty. The resumption of negotiations to that end and the institution of moratoria on nuclear tests by the nuclear-weapon States would be an important step towards halting the nuclear arms race and towards nuclear disarmament.

24. The fact that 130 countries had acceded to the Treaty was evidence that the non-proliferation régime which it had established and its objectives were widely accepted. The Conference should provide an opportunity for all States to review the operation of the Treaty in a frank and objective manner and try to identify its successes and weaknesses so as to strengthen it and better respond to its objectives while at the same time reaffirming the need to respect its fundamental principles. It should not be forgotten that, in compliance with the Charter of the United Nations, States should abstain from using or threatening to use force against the territorial integrity and political independence of any State and that international peace and security should be promoted with the least diversion of the world's human and economic resources for armaments.

25. Mr. SUTOWARDOYO (Indonesia) said that his country had taken part in the Second Review Conference in 1980 but not in the first one. Although it had participated in the 1968 Geneva negotiations and signed the Treaty in 1970, Indonesia had not ratified it until late 1979. The long delay between signing and ratification was due to the fact that a large part of public opinion had considered the Non-Proliferation Treaty to be discriminatory against the non-nuclear-weapon States parties. It was therefore not surprising that Indonesia's ratification had been accompanied by a declaration in which it had drawn attention to the obligations of the nuclear countries under article IV with respect to co-operation with the non-nuclear countries in the use of
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and under article VI relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race. Although Indonesia had been reasonably satisfied with the subsequent implementation of the provisions of article IV, that was not the case with regard to observance by the nuclear-weapon Powers of the provisions of article VI. Whereas apparently it had indeed been possible to check horizontal proliferation, vertical proliferation had continued unabated as though article VI had not existed. The fact simply had to be faced that the situation had worsened considerably since 1980, and a number of examples illustrated the less than sincere attitude of the nuclear-weapon States with respect to the performance of their obligations: the nuclear arms race had accelerated and had now spread to space, nuclear weapons had been deployed outside the territories of the nuclear-weapon States; negotiations for a comprehensive test ban and talks on intermediate-range nuclear weapons and on the reduction of strategic arms had been abandoned, and although talks between the United States and the USSR on nuclear and space-based weapons had resumed, the prospect of early progress was uncertain; lastly, there had been no progress over the previous five years on any substantive issue of nuclear arms control.

26. As a member of the Conference on Disarmament, Indonesia shared the frustration of the overwhelming majority of the world's nations over such disappointing results. Although the overall picture was not entirely bleak, the positive factors were very few. Such a situation had led the Foreign Ministers of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), at their meeting in Kuala Lumpur on 8 August 1985, to express their deep concern on that matter and, in a joint communiqué, to urge the nuclear-weapon States to halt the accumulation and modernization of nuclear armaments by engaging in serious negotiations on disarmament, taking into account not only their own security concerns but also the concern of others, especially the developing non-nuclear-weapon States; moreover, they had expressed their concern over the unbalanced implementation of essential elements of NPT and urged the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to fulfil their obligations under article VI of NPT and stressed in particular the need to ensure the fullest possible exchange of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, which was of fundamental importance to the developing countries. Lastly, the Foreign Ministers of the States members of ASEAN had called upon the nuclear Powers to proceed without further delay to undertake multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

27. With respect to the implementation of various provisions of NPT, it was generally recognized that article 1 had been strictly observed by the three nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. On the other hand, those States had thus far failed to implement the provisions of the eighth to eleventh preambular paragraphs and article VI of the Treaty. Since the Treaty's entry into force, no real progress had been made towards halting the nuclear arms race and vertical proliferation. That situation contrasted sharply with the fact that the obligations under article II had been fully discharged by the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. Such an imbalance had to be corrected, and that was the purpose of the Conference. As a non-nuclear State party to NPT, Indonesia not only had scrupulously observed the provisions of article II but also had fully implemented the provisions of the pertinent
paragraphs of article III. All Indonesian nuclear installations had been placed under IAEA safeguards. But the Indonesian Government held that the priority attached to non-proliferation should not be used as a pretext to hamper access by States parties to peaceful nuclear technology and deprive them of their rights to utilize nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

28. In respect of safeguards, the Indonesian delegation welcomed the recent decision by the USSR to place some of its civilian nuclear installations under the Agency's safeguards, and it viewed the decision as a reaffirmation by that country of the credibility and effectiveness of IAEA safeguards. As the validity of the Agency's safeguards was clearly beyond doubt, endeavours had to be made to prohibit any attack on safeguarded peaceful nuclear installations and provide effective and credible assurances for potential victims.

29. The implementation of the provisions of article IV of NPT was of the utmost importance to developing countries parties to the Treaty, and one important function of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was that it was a way to transfer peaceful nuclear technology. In that connection, his delegation commended the important and useful activities carried out by IAEA. Indonesia had two research reactors and was in the process of building a 30-MW multi-purpose reactor, which was expected to be operational as from 1987, and therefore attached great importance to the full implementation of article IV. Indonesia considered that regional co-operation in the field of the peaceful application of nuclear energy, as a complement to international co-operation, was both useful and beneficial to the countries and regions concerned. Indonesia also wished to note the important work done by the IAEA's Committee on Assurances of Supply. Indonesia would continue to participate in, and contribute to, the work of that Committee. In that connection, it considered that the results of the Third Review Conference, particularly with respect to article IV of the Treaty, would undoubtedly have an important bearing on the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, scheduled to be held in 1987.

30. In respect of article VII of the Treaty, Indonesia had always emphasized the importance of the regional approach to security, inter alia through the establishment of zones of peace, nuclear-weapon-free zones, or regional co-operative security arrangements. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones was not only consistent with article VII but was also an effective contribution towards the attainment of the Treaty's goals. In that connection, the Indonesian Government welcomed the recent creation of a South Pacific nuclear-free zone. Interest in the establishment of such a zone in South-East Asia dated back to 1971 and had intensified in the last few years. The question was currently being examined by the ASEAN Working Group on a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality in South-East Asia (ZOPFAN), and the Ministerial Meeting had recently endorsed various recommendations, including studies on ways and means of implementing a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

31. The Third Review Conference was a crucial one, because it had to decide whether the Treaty should continue in force indefinitely or be extended for an
additional fixed period or periods. Indonesia considered that the Conference should reaffirm the validity of NPT and adopt one or more concluding documents containing a set of measures aimed at the full implementation of all NPT provisions by all parties to the Treaty. The Indonesian delegation, for its part, would continue to press for a comprehensive test ban, nuclear disarmament and assurances that nuclear weapons would not be used or held out as threats against non-nuclear countries, as well as for greater assistance in the peaceful use of atomic energy.

32. Indonesia was worried about the generally recognized nuclear weapon capability of Israel and South Africa. Even though those two countries might have acquired such a capability in spite of NPT, the fact remained that the existing non-proliferation régime really needed strengthening. Therefore, a sincere willingness on the part of all parties faithfully to preserve their obligations under the Treaty was essential. In fact, the very difficulty of nuclear weapons problems should make nuclear-weapon Powers realize the untenability of their position on such issues. Such Powers should stop thinking solely of their own survival and take into consideration the survival of other States, because the future of all mankind was at stake.

33. Mr. SALCEDO (Colombia), speaking at the invitation of the President in accordance with rule 44, paragraph 2 (a) of the Conference's rules of procedure, adopted at the 1st plenary meeting, said that although his country had not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, it observed it strictly, both in letter and spirit. In all circumstances, its attitude was governed by the desire to strengthen peace and avert the threat of nuclear war. With that in mind, Colombia, together with all the CONTADORA Group members and other neighbouring countries, was endeavouring to find ways to restore peace in Central America.

34. Like delegations which had spoken before it, the Colombian delegation was gratified to note that the provisions on horizontal non-proliferation were being observed by virtually all the non-nuclear-weapon countries. But it could not help but express its profound concern about the absence of progress with respect to vertical non-proliferation. Were the nuclear-weapon Powers really willing to fulfil their obligations under the Treaty, or were they simply attempting to promote an image of peacekeepers while actually preparing for war? The fact that proliferation was continuing suggested that such countries were not willing to meet the commitments made, and such a state of affairs aroused the dissatisfaction of the non-nuclear developing countries, whose legitimate expectations of reaping the benefits of the peaceful use of atomic energy were far from having been realized.

35. In order to attain the Treaty's objectives, the international atmosphere had to be changed and a climate of understanding created that was conducive to constructive dialogue. For example, the continuation of nuclear explosions was a pretext for nuclear Powers not parties to the Treaty to carry on with their testing. If that situation were to persist, the number of signatory States would no longer grow and might even drop, thereby endangering previous results. Nevertheless, Colombia was convinced that common sense would prevail and that the nuclear Powers would see fit to review their position and
participate genuinely and rapidly in common efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons. It hoped that the bilateral negotiations between the USSR and the United States, which were scheduled to resume shortly, would enable progress to be made along those lines, and although Colombia favoured a multilateral approach in that area, it attached the greatest importance to the summit meeting in November between the leaders of the two great Powers.

36. In accordance with the aspirations of all non-nuclear-weapon countries, in particular the non-aligned and neutral nations, Colombia was duty-bound to remind the Conference that the Treaty recognized the right of all States, in particular developing countries, to benefit from the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes under non-discriminatory conditions, it being understood that the dual usage that might be made of that technology required the application of effective safeguards, because the distinction between peaceful applications and military uses was poorly defined. The application of safeguards should not, however, serve to restrict indefinitely the legitimate use, once duly verified, of nuclear technology to meet the needs of the world's poor countries in various fields, for example industry, agriculture, health, etc. At the same time, it was essential to create denuclearized zones, which would gradually spread as negotiations between nuclear Powers advanced towards the objective of disarmament. Such a zone already existed in Latin America under the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which Colombia had ratified.

37. The results of the Third Review Conference might make a real contribution towards creating an atmosphere of détente between the nuclear Powers and saving humanity from taking the short step separating it from the point of no return. But the realization of all the objectives mentioned depended to a large extent on the means available for verifying the application of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Such means, the most sophisticated ones at any rate, were highly technical and beyond the reach of most non-nuclear States, in particular the developing countries. It was therefore essential for the nuclear States to provide the non-nuclear States with the clearest and most exact information on their situation with regard to the Treaty. NPT was an important means of safeguarding international peace and security and should therefore be strengthened on the basis of experience acquired in previous years and in keeping with the joint aspirations of all peoples, whatever their disagreements in other areas might be. At a time when humanity was threatened by war and self-destruction, his delegation was prepared to support all constructive efforts that might contribute to halting the nuclear arms race.

The meeting rose at 5.20 p.m.
GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 12) (continued)

1. Mr. VAVRYNEN (Finland) said that his Government regarded the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a most important instrument in the pursuit of basic security interests of the international community. The wide adherence to the Treaty was a graphic illustration of support for its goals. In terms of its principle purpose - the prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons - the Treaty had been a success. States parties had complied with their basic obligations under articles I and II, on the non-transfer and non-acquisition of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The reason for concern regarding the danger of the spread of nuclear weapons lay mainly in the fact that some countries were not yet parties to the Treaty and were not prepared to accept full scope safeguards on all their nuclear activities, yet the capabilities required for manufacturing nuclear explosive devices were available in many of them. In view of that concern, Finland had, together with the other Nordic countries, appealed earlier in the year to all States not parties to the Treaty to adhere to it.

2. In a memorandum submitted to the Third Review Conference (NPT/CONF.III/16), the Nordic countries drew attention among other things to the grave danger to the international community constituted by the possibility that non-nuclear-weapon States had already acquired or might be actively pursuing nuclear weapon capabilities. Such capabilities could also be detrimental to the efforts to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. As the very essence of the Treaty was in the non-proliferation commitments under articles I and II, the Conference should reiterate the conviction that continued strict observance of those articles was essential to the objective of averting the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Conference should also appeal to supplier States not parties to the NPT to adhere or continue to subscribe to the non-proliferation objectives of the Treaty.

3. Nuclear power was one of the most important energy sources for electricity production in the world. Its share varied from country to country and amounted to as much as 50 per cent in some European States. Hence nuclear energy played a vital role in the social and economic welfare of many countries, a development made possible by the Treaty, which had paved the way for international co-operation as well as for the exchange of commodities and know-how. Under the Treaty, IAEA was entrusted with the difficult task of verifying that nuclear energy was not diverted from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons in non-nuclear-weapon States. His delegation had learned with satisfaction from the IAEA safeguards implementation reports that that Treaty commitment had been consistently honoured and that IAEA had continued to live up to its obligations in that field. The role of IAEA was vital in creating
and maintaining international confidence, the only basis on which the use of nuclear energy and its manifold applications for peaceful purposes could be safely promoted for the benefit of all mankind. In fact, the experience gained in the functioning of the IAEA safeguards system had been a successful feature of the operation of the Treaty.

4. Despite that encouraging experience, however, there was no room for complacency. The IAEA safeguards system was constantly facing new challenges. Progress in the use of nuclear power inevitably led to a steady growth in the number of nuclear facilities other than reactors. That in turn placed heavier demands, both qualitative and quantitative, on the IAEA inspectorate. New enrichment technologies, to mention but one example, kept emerging and would necessarily require the development of new and more sophisticated safeguards approaches. Account should also be taken of the possible need for entirely new institutional arrangements to complement the traditional safeguards.

5. Continued efforts were therefore required to ensure that the Agency was given all the necessary resources in the years ahead, so as to maintain the high level of mutual trust in the functioning of the NPT safeguards, an essential condition for promoting nuclear trade and co-operation on a predictable, equitable and mutually beneficial basis. The ultimate goal should be the acceptance of full-scope safeguards by all non-nuclear-weapon States, whether NPT parties or not, on all their nuclear activities, present and future. It was not possible to arrive at internationally acceptable norms for assurances of supply without adequate assurances of non-proliferation. The experience of the IAEA Committee on Assurances of Supply had certainly made that amply clear.

6. The promotion of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was an integral part of the Treaty. Interpreted broadly, peaceful uses of nuclear energy, ranging from the production of electricity to various applications of nuclear technologies in such fields as agriculture, medicine, industry and hydrology, had an important role to play in the economic development of all countries. His Government considered that, with regard to the special needs of the developing countries, attention should be given to the search for more effective measures to implement the provisions of article IV, particularly through improvements in international financial arrangements for peaceful applications of nuclear technology. Finland was also prepared to share its experience, based on co-operation with both the East and the West, with other NPT parties, through both bilateral and multilateral channels.

7. The objective of nuclear disarmament, envisaged in article VI, had proved to be more difficult to reach. The nuclear arms race had continued both qualitatively and quantitatively. In view of that disappointing record, new hope had emerged as a result of the start, early in 1985, of the new bilateral negotiations between the USSR and the United States of America. The objectives were far-reaching, since they included effective agreements on preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth, ultimately leading to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons everywhere. Those
objectives thus concurred with the goals shared by the entire international
community, and a successful outcome to the negotiations would obviously be a
strong contribution to the implementation of the Treaty.

8. The lack of positive results in previous bilateral talks was not the only
disappointment in regard to arms control and disarmament. The ultimate goal
of a comprehensive nuclear test ban seemed at present to be as remote as
ever. The potential significance of concluding a comprehensive test ban
treaty was far greater in value than a mere ban on test explosions. Its
political significance could not be overestimated. Such a treaty would also
constitute an essential element in efforts to restrain qualitative improvement
in nuclear weapons, thereby putting a brake on the arms race.

9. Undoubtedly, significant differences still existed on the political and
technical aspects of a comprehensive test ban. Verification requirements were
a case in point. Differences of view concerning the verification requirements
should not, however, prevent negotiations for a comprehensive test ban treaty
from proceeding. On the contrary, agreement on the verification provisions
should form one of the main issues to be discussed in the negotiations.
Sophisticated methods for verification were already available and various
proposals had been made for progress towards a complete cessation of nuclear
test explosions. A moratorium, particularly if extended represented a welcome
application of the step-by-step approach in the present impasse. While
interim solutions should not divert the international community from
concluding a comprehensive test ban treaty, they could be useful if they
formed part of an agreed framework leading to a treaty in the not too distant
future.

10. The NPT was and must be a global undertaking and its effectiveness was in
direct proportion to its coverage. Despite that global approach, however, the
Treaty also provided for a regional approach, one which his Government
considered to be an important element in the endeavours to prevent the further
spread of nuclear weapons. Article VII of the Treaty confirmed the right of
States to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of
nuclear weapons in their respective territories. In his Government's opinion,
the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones could build up confidence,
enhance security and lessen the danger of nuclear conflict. Finland had
sought to consolidate the existing nuclear-weapon-free status of the Nordic
countries through a proposal for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in
its region. In the Nordic countries, consolidation of the absence of nuclear
weapons from their territories was more and more widely understood as a
desirable goal. The fact that the Treaty of Tlatelolco had so far remained
the only one establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in a densely populated
region should not cast doubt on the effectiveness of the regional approach to
non-proliferation. The recent signing by eight South Pacific countries of a
treaty to make their region a nuclear-free zone, along with comparable
proposals, were clear evidence of the vitality of that approach.

11. So far, the question of ensuring the security of non-nuclear-weapon
States had not received a satisfactory solution. His Government considered
that an effective and comprehensive form of security assurances should
urgently be found. The assurances given by the nuclear-weapon States were welcome, but they fell short of the goal of effective international arrangements. Rather, they were functions of different military doctrines and political perceptions. Countries like his own, which had refrained from the option of acquiring nuclear weapons or permitting their stationing in their territories, had the right to expect nuclear-weapon States to renounce the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against them. More broadly, nuclear-weapon States should renounce the use of nuclear weapons in any manner which violated the sovereignty of non-nuclear-weapon States. Their assurances must be binding, uniform and comprehensive and should correspond to the right of non-nuclear States to remain outside all nuclear strategic speculations.

12. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was the most widely accepted international disarmament agreement and could be considered a permanent stabilizing factor not only to the States parties but to the international community as a whole. The Treaty offered a safe way to the utilization of the benefits of nuclear technology and also strengthened the security of all States by building confidence about the intentions of other States and by maintaining barriers to nuclear proliferation.

13. It was therefore important to guarantee the continued long-term functioning of the NPT. The time was approaching when the States parties would be convened, in 1995, to decide whether the Treaty should continue in force indefinitely or be extended for an additional period or periods. It was not insignificant that the NPT framework was maintained as a basis for the growing number of commercial contracts and other arrangements extending beyond the current twenty-five year period of the Treaty. His Government was prepared to exchange views with all interested parties on the necessary steps to ensure the continuity of the NPT régime.

14. If the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty had been disappointing in some respects, that fact should stimulate further efforts to make it even more useful. Finland had resolved to contribute to such a collective effort and stood firmly attached to the objectives of non-proliferation as incorporated in the Treaty.

15. Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) said that Main Committee III of the Conference would deal essentially with peaceful applications of nuclear energy. Article IV of the Treaty, which was the principal article concerned with that question, set forth the inalienable right of the parties to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, so as to further their scientific, economic and technological advancement. The article also stressed the need for parties in a position to do so to co-operate alone or together with other States or international organizations so as to ensure that due account was taken of the needs of the developing areas of the world. However, the ambivalent character of nuclear energy, whose explosive force could move easily from peaceful to belligerent use, made it essential for the necessary precautions to be taken to prevent use for war.

16. To achieve the objectives of article IV, the best instrument was technical co-operation in its two aspects, multilateral and bilateral, which in practice were complementary.
17. The deficiencies in IAEA technical co-operation lay in the fact that, for lack of means, particularly financial resources, it was unable to meet the needs of the recipient countries at the desired rate. The real measure of growth of such assistance should be assessed not by comparing it with figures from previous years but on the basis of the requirements of the member States of IAEA and the availability of funding.

18. Multilateral technical co-operation should be the main tool to secure the objectives of article IV, so as to make for greater regularity in raising development levels and to avoid harmful political consequences for the recipient States.

19. The application of the provisions of the Treaty relating to the IAEA safeguards system constituted the main function of Main Committee II of the Conference. Under article III of the Treaty, States parties had an obligation to accept that safeguards system at all their nuclear installations. To date, IAEA had concluded 80 agreements and those still pending were, in the majority of cases, agreements with countries in which nuclear activities were not of major significance.

20. The IAEA safeguards system covered at present 98 per cent of the nuclear activities of the countries which had ratified the Treaty and were non-nuclear-weapon States. It was an indication of the effectiveness of the system that, from an initial inspection of three tons of natural uranium in 1958, it now employed 180 inspectors, analysed over 800,000 data a year, used the most sophisticated instruments and was applied in some of the most advanced industrial plants in the world.

21. The IAEA safeguards system was a good ally of those countries which wished to assure their neighbours that their nuclear programmes or facilities were exclusively peaceful in nature. To that end, it was necessary for the system to operate on the basis of the most advanced technology and for its application to be increasingly more extensive. The system had not been designed to prevent proliferation. Its function was to detect in time possible violations of the commitments assumed and, by making them public, to exert pressure on the party concerned to cease any activities which might violate the Treaty. It should not be forgotten that IAEA was the sole body with direct access to the United Nations Security Council.

22. Unfortunately, the safeguards system could only cover the nuclear installations declared to the Agency. It could not be responsible for the activities carried out in the installations of countries which were not parties to the NPT or in those for which the Treaty of Tlatelolco had still not entered into force.

23. His delegation had noted with satisfaction that the three Depositary States and France had concluded agreements with IAEA to submit some of their nuclear facilities to the safeguards régime. With that first step they had proved to themselves and demonstrated to others that the safeguards régime did not involve commercial or other risks and his delegation therefore believed
that it was difficult to claim that the safeguards system should not apply to all the nuclear installations which had been built and were intended for civilian use.

24. Furthermore, it was essential to ensure that the nuclear installations subject to the safeguards system were not the object of military attacks. As pointed out previously, the safeguards system should be sufficient guarantee for neighbouring countries or potential adversaries that a country's nuclear activities and facilities were exclusively peaceful in nature. He trusted that the system would one day cover all civilian nuclear facilities throughout the world.

25. Before discussing in detail the topics assigned to Main Committee I of the Conference, it was useful to bear in mind the provisions of the tenth preambular paragraph and of article VI of the NPT. The conduct of the Depositary States, or at least two of them, nourished with some frequency the fear that they had forgotten those legally binding commitments. In the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Depositary States, which were the same as the ones for the NPT, had proclaimed "as their principal aim the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control", adding that they would seek to achieve "the discontinuance of all test explosions for all time". Article I of the PTBT prohibited "any nuclear weapon test explosion" in the atmosphere, in outer space or under water, and specified that the provisions of the article were "without prejudice to the conclusion of a treaty resulting in the permanent banning of all nuclear test explosions, including all such explosions underground, the conclusion of which, as the parties have stated in the Preamble to this Treaty, they seek to achieve", obviously, similar provisions were to be found in the preamble and in article VI of the NPT. An assessment of the behaviour of the Depositary States for the NPT, in terms of the aims of "cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date", "nuclear disarmament" and "a treaty on general and complete disarmament" could only be made with some irony.

26. The main argument advanced by the Western nuclear-weapon States which were parties to the NPT in refusing to comply with their commitments under the Treaty concerning the prohibition of all nuclear-test explosions, including underground explosions, was that adequate verification was impossible in practice. The total lack of foundation of such a statement was made clear by a number of the most authoritative and impartial sources. For example, on 29 February 1972, Kurt Waldheim, then Secretary-General of the United Nations, had stated in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament that all the technical and scientific aspects of the problem had been so fully explored that only a political decision was necessary in order to achieve final agreement, that when the existing means of verification were taken into account it was difficult to understand further delay in achieving an agreement on an underground-test ban, and that the potential risks of continuing underground nuclear-weapon tests would far outweigh any possible risks from ending such tests. Again a report prepared in 1980 under the auspices of the United Nations by virtue of a decision taken by the General Assembly on 11 December 1979 had concluded, inter alia, that the complete prohibition of
tests was regarded as the first and most urgent measure for the cessation of the nuclear arms race, that verification of compliance did not appear to be an obstacle to an agreement and that to achieve an advance or advantage in that field it would be necessary to carry out a series of tests which were unlikely to take place without being noticed.

27. Considerable progress had been made in the past five years with regard to verification and control methods. On 27 June 1985, the Prime Minister of Sweden had said in a speech in a seminar held at Geneva that the progress made had been so extraordinary that Sweden could announce nuclear-weapon testing while it was being carried out and before it was announced by the nuclear Power which had conducted it.

28. The views to which he had just referred showed clearly that the General Assembly of the United Nations had been right in expressing in resolution 39/52 its conviction that the existing means of verification were adequate to ensure compliance with a nuclear-test ban and that the alleged absence of such means was nothing but an excuse for further development and refinement of nuclear weapons.

29. The importance of a nuclear-test ban as a disarmament measure had been minimized by the head of one of the super-Power delegations when he had stated that such a ban would not reduce nuclear weapons by a single one, a statement that was patently correct. However, the objective of a nuclear-test ban was to prevent not only an increase in the already vast nuclear arsenals but also further refinement of their death-dealing and destructive capacity. The importance of such a measure had been recognized in many authoritative documents; for example, the Final Declaration of the first Review Conference had considered that it was one of the most important measures to put an end to the arms race. The second Review Conference, although it had been unable to adopt a final declaration, had agreed that a nuclear-test ban was a fundamental requirement for halting the arms race, the qualitative advances in nuclear weapons and the proliferation of such weapons.

30. Moreover, on 12 December 1984, the Secretary-General of the United Nations had called for renewed efforts to reach agreement on a nuclear-test ban as proof of the will to achieve nuclear disarmament. Finally, the symposium on "Survival in the Nuclear Age", organized under the auspices of the Third World Foundation for Social and Economic Studies and Parliamentarians for World Order, had adopted a Statement (CD/609) affirming that a nuclear-test ban was crucial for the success of efforts to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race and to prevent the expansion of existing arsenals and the spread of nuclear weapons. His delegation therefore considered that agreement on banning nuclear tests, including underground tests, should occupy a major place in the Final Declaration to be adopted by the Third Review Conference. The Final Declaration should also include a number of other measures, such as the immediate adoption of a moratorium in response to the appeal invariably made in five consecutive General Assembly resolutions since 1980, the latest being contained in resolution 38/62, paragraph 7. Another measure would be a proclamation by the two major nuclear-weapon States, either through simultaneous unilateral declarations or
through a joint communique, of an immediate nuclear-weapons freeze, in
accordance with the three consecutive resolutions adopted by the
General Assembly the last being resolution 38/73.

31. In addition, the Depository States should give an undertaking at the
start of the 1986 session of the Conference on Disarmament to support the
establishment of ad hoc committees to study the following items on the
Conference's agenda: a nuclear test ban, the cessation of the nuclear arms
race and nuclear disarmament; prevention of nuclear war, including all
related matters. The Depository States should agree that the ad hoc
committees' mandates should specifically state that the committees' objectives
were multilateral negotiation of the treaties, conventions or other
international agreements required to achieve the objectives pursued in each
case. On the basis of their Joint United States-Soviet Statement of
8 January 1985, the United States and the Soviet Union should continue
negotiations on "a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms -
both strategic and intermediate-range - with all these questions considered
and resolved in their interrelationship" (CD/570, p.2), with a view to
preventing the arms race in space and terminating it on Earth until nuclear
weapons were finally eliminated. In the Delhi Declaration, Heads of State or
Government from six countries on four continents had emphasized that "an arms
race in space would be enormously costly and have grave destabilizing
effects. It would also endanger a number of arms limitation and disarmament
agreements" (CD/549, p.3). In that context, he cited the section on "Outer
Space" on pages 4 and 5 of the Statement adopted by the Symposium on "Survival
in the Nuclear Age" (CD/609), which he considered to be the most concrete and
comprehensive expose of the question.

32. The appropriate context for setting out the measures he had outlined
would be the Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference. However, if
the Conference was unable to adopt a Final Declaration, it should formulate
and adopt one or more resolutions in accordance with rule 28 of its rules of
procedure. Mexico, which had had the privilege of taking the initiative to
include article VII in the NPT, had a special interest in the establishment of
nuclear-free zones. In addition, it had set in motion the negotiations that
had resulted in the Treaty of Tlatelolco and was the Depository State
therefor. Accordingly, it was gratifying to learn of the conclusion of the
South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty and he hoped that all States, but
particularly the nuclear-weapon States, would sign the three Protocols thereto.

Mr. Barakat (Jordan), Vice-President, took the Chair.

33. Mr. SANZE (Burundi) stressed that, since the human race had first
appeared on Earth, no other phenomenon had aroused such emotions as the world
wide build-up of nuclear weapons, as could be seen from the innumerable
bilateral and multilateral conferences and negotiations and the wealth of
documentation on the subject. Scientists and experts had unceasingly alerted
the world to the danger represented by the ultimate weapon. The bombs dropped
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki should have been sufficient to demonstrate the
destructive capacity of atomic energy, but instead of learning the painful
lesson of that bitter experience, the political and military protagonists had
set in motion an unending nuclear spiral. Immanuel Kant, the great
philosopher, had rightly said that history taught that man forgot history.

34. Nuclear weapons had been developed in three successive phases: the first
was the fission stage, which had produced nuclear weapons of the type dropped
in 1945; the second was the fusion stage, which had led to the hydrogen bomb,
which accounted for the major part of current nuclear arsenals; finally, the
third stage at present being developed following the neutron bomb was
characterized by the fact that the energy produced by the explosion was partly
transformed into a force that was better adjusted to requirements than heat
and blast. Among such weapons were bombs that maximized the electromagnetic
impulse from nuclear explosions so as to neutralize or incapacitate the
enemy's electronic communications and installations. That type of nuclear
weapon had been developed for use in a "limited" nuclear war and constituted
the most radical development in nuclear weapon technology since the beginning
of the nuclear age.

35. Economic stagnation made a stark contrast with the soaring rise in the
nuclear industry. The saturation of nuclear weapons meant that there were
three tons of nuclear explosives for each citizen on the planet. Such a
phenomenal growth in nuclear arsenals presaged an inferno. If over-arming
continued at such a frenetic pace, there was a risk that the Earth would
degenerate into an endless desert where all human life would be impossible.

36. For geographical and politico-economic reasons, the situation of
nuclear-weapon States could not be separated from that of non-nuclear-weapon
States. Nuclear explosions at high altitude produced gamma rays which sent
out electromagnetic impulses over an area of several thousand kilometres and
created a formidable electromagnetic field. In the "Star Wars" context, the
implementation of the Excalibur programme around about 1990 would demonstrate
the unlimited scope of nuclear weapons. Geographical distance was therefore
irrelevant and even countries that were not parties to thermonuclear war
automatically became a battleground in the same way as did the belligerents.
From a politico-economic point of view, the nuclear threat affected the
periphery rather than the centre. Since 1945, the security of the two major
nuclear-weapon Powers had not been jeopardized, on the contrary, the ultimate
weapon had been transformed into a tool of their geopolitics. Indeed, nuclear
weapons could well explode on the soil of the super-Powers' scapegoat allies
so that the super-Powers themselves were preserved from direct confrontation.
In that connection, he expressed concern at the nuclear activities of
South Africa, which not only served to consolidate the apartheid régime but
also represented a threat to the whole of the continent of Africa.

37. The global economy would suffer the immeasurable effects of a nuclear
war. If one of the hemispheres suffered a thermonuclear catastrophe, it would
be difficult to see how the other could survive even if it escaped the
immediate effects of the apocalypse, such as radioactive fallout. Many
scientists and politicians believed that nuclear war was inconceivable unless
it was accidental, but they were burying their heads in the sand like the
ostrich. It was essential to combat the idea that a nuclear disaster could
not take place unless there was an accident, for accidents spark off nuclear
The decision to use nuclear weapons was the preserve of the Head of State, but he was not necessarily technically infallible nor were his advisers always political virtuosos; one of them could push the apocalyptic button. Technical failure could also be a cause of nuclear disaster. Recent events had shown that, despite impressive technological and scientific advances, catastrophic accidents could occur. It was difficult to see why the nuclear field should be the one area free from defects that could lead to accidental consequences. The large number of nuclear weapons in the hands of novices merely made the risks worse. If a Head of State was unable to take a decision, the target country would obviously not wait to receive explanations or excuses; its first reflex and its paranoia would precipitate it towards the fatal button. The result would be a lethal confrontation that would be as disastrous as a war launched deliberately.

38. The diversion of nuclear science to military objectives was a crime committed by mankind against itself. Nuclear development could have meant material well-being for mankind if its use had respected the peaceful and energy objectives laid down in article IV of the Treaty. Instead of using nuclear energy to cure all manner of ills, vast resources were squandered on weapons while the majority of mankind lived in destitution.

39. Drawing attention to the similar positions on the principle of nuclear disarmament reflected in Mr. Gorbachev's and President Reagan's messages to the Conference (NPT/CONF.III/26 and NPT/CONF.III/27), he said that it was the super-Powers' duty to go beyond a mere declaration of intentions and actually to apply the provisions of article VI of the Treaty. Reluctance to submit to inspection by international experts could, of course, be dictated by apprehensions as to the experts' impartiality. Yet it was hardly reasonable to suspect the members of an inspection unit to favour one of the super-Powers to the detriment of the other, since they, of all people, would be aware that the security of the world at large, including their own security, depended upon the conscientiousness with which they carried out their task. However, to make assurance doubly sure, the group of inspectors could be divided into two sub-units and their activities in the Soviet Union and the United States of America could be synchronized.

40. In conclusion, referring to the forthcoming summit meeting between Mr. Gorbachev and President Reagan, he wondered whether greater impact might not be achieved if the meeting was held within the context of the United Nations and placed within the setting of the Organization's fortieth anniversary.

Mr. Bayart (Mongolia), Vice-President, took the Chair.

41. Mr. YAVUZALP (Turkey) said that the Third Review Conference underscored the Treaty's relevance and viability. The Treaty's near-universality highlighted the prevailing faith in its effectiveness. But the decision as to the Treaty's future in 1995 would depend not only on no change taking place in the number of nuclear-weapon States but also on the security and technological benefits derived by non-nuclear-weapon States from the relevant Treaty provisions. Another determining factor would be the results of the various Review Conferences. In that connection it had to be recognized that the first two Review Conferences had been less successful than might have been expected.
Although the value of the Treaty as such had never been called into question, there had been, and still were, important divergencies concerning its implementation, especially with regard to article VI.

42. It was indeed regrettable that although some achievements had been accomplished in the direction of cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date, nuclear disarmament and a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, no significant steps had yet been taken to fulfil the spirit of article VI. In spite of all efforts made by the Depositary States to comply with their Treaty obligations, the results were still far from encouraging. The bilateral negotiations on nuclear and space arms currently taking place between the United States of America and the Soviet Union were, of course, greatly to be welcomed. However, while it was true to say that there had been no horizontal proliferation since 1964, vertical proliferation still continued unabated.

43. With regard to the implementation of article IV, he referred to the relevant background paper on IAEA activities (NPT/CONF.III/10) which made it clear that nuclear energy, although involving intricate and sensitive technologies, remained the most available and valuable alternative source of electricity for the developing as well as the developed world. Hence, it was discouraging to note that 11 developing countries between them had only 17 power reactors in operation and 23 under construction, while the corresponding figures for the industrialized countries, both in the West and in the East, were 328 and 157. Furthermore, out of a world wide total of 34 new units, only two units with a total capacity of 0.8 GWe had been connected to grids in developing countries. There was thus a strong case for urging increased assistance to developing countries parties to the Treaty, as stipulated in article IV. In that connection, it was gratifying to see that the ratio of extrabudgetary funds to IAEA technical co-operation resources had reached 40.2 per cent in 1984 in conformity with the recommendation of the first Review Conference and he hoped that the trend would be maintained in the years ahead. Another source of satisfaction was the fact that during the period 1980-1983, 95 per cent of the extrabudgetary resources had been utilized by the developing members of IAEA which were parties to the Treaty. It was to be hoped that some non-party States, at least, would therefore consider the disadvantages of their status in the light of that situation. In that connection, his delegation was convinced that the non-proliferation régime should be based mainly on the Treaty, with the safeguards system being applied through efficient and effective IAEA mechanisms. The IAEA control systems should be made still more credible and reassuring, and an effort should be made to persuade non-parties still reluctant to join the Treaty for one reason or another to accept full-scope IAEA safeguards.

44. Another situation which gave cause for concern was that of certain non-nuclear States which had not acceded to the Treaty and which operated significant nuclear facilities without international safeguards. Some of them doubtless entertained nuclear ambitions, while others were motivated solely by a sincere desire to make progress in peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It was imperative to make such a distinction. It had to be recognized that export denials, disruption of and delays in supply, and the policies of the late 1970s involving imposition of technologies regarding the nuclear fuel cycle had proved counterproductive in terms of stemming the atomic tide. By
compelling certain countries to see that their best interest lay in self-sufficiency through the acquisition of sensitive nuclear technologies, such policies had actually made the risk of proliferation greater. In trying to curb proliferation through strict export controls, nuclear exporters should be very careful to avert the likelihood of horizontal proliferation. The sensitive balance between technology and proliferation should be meticulously weighed. As to the NPT States parties, all their bilateral and international co-operation agreements should be subject to the Treaty's provisions; extra-NPT conditions should be strictly avoided for fear of diminishing the Treaty's attractiveness to non-parties.

45. In the light of the present circumstances in which nuclear transactions took place and of past controversies among industrialized countries and between developing and developed countries, the work of the IAEA Committee on Assurances of Supply deserved praise as a valuable exercise aimed at finding ways and means for a more predictable and unambiguous framework for nuclear co-operation among nations. While noting with satisfaction that progress had been achieved on some aspects of the Committee's work, such as emergency and back-up and revision mechanisms, he urged the Committee's members to do their utmost to reach agreement on the most crucial issue before them, namely, the definition of non-proliferation. In that context he also referred to the forthcoming United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (PUNE), whose success would undoubtedly be influenced by progress made in the work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply as well as by the results of the present Conference.

46. In conclusion, he expressed the hope that the Conference would produce a substantial final document that was based on consensus and eschewed mutual recriminations, and also that the Conference would serve to convince the nuclear-weapon States parties that an internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive test ban treaty would enhance the credibility of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as well as constitute a step forward in the cause of nuclear disarmament.

47. Mr. GONZALES TERRONES (Peru) said that the point of reference for any assessment of the implementation of the NPT was General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX), which had given shape to the principles embodied in the Treaty. It should not be forgotten that the preambular paragraphs of the NPT established the objectives of the Treaty and were the raison d'être of the measures incorporated in the operative part. While article II had, beyond any doubt, been implemented to the letter by the non-nuclear-weapon States parties, the situation with regard to the application of article I was less clear. So far as was known, the nuclear-weapon States Parties had not transferred any nuclear weapons to other States parties. However, they had stationed nuclear weapons in the territory of other States parties, with a possibility, and in some cases the declared intention, of transferring control over those weapons to the receiving States in the event of an armed conflict. Secondly, as previous speakers had already pointed out, some States not parties to the Treaty had reached a level of nuclear technological development which rendered them capable of manufacturing nuclear weapons; it was difficult to imagine that the States in question had not received any materials, equipment or technology from the nuclear-weapon Powers.
48. With regard to the implementation of article VI, it was widely agreed that the situation had not changed radically since the Treaty's entry into force. Fifteen years on, the reference to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date had a hollow ring, while that to nuclear disarmament and a treaty on general and complete disarmament seemed to border on Utopia. The nuclear Powers' reciprocal accusations, the existence of treaties not subsequently ratified and agreements not respected, negotiations broken off or postponed, cast doubt upon the negotiating parties' good faith. The situation was serious, amounting as it did to non-implementation of the Treaty, which automatically released the other States parties from their obligations. A solution had to be found if the Treaty was not to become completely ineffective.

49. As to article III, the NPT had not so far proved to be an obstacle to the nuclear suppliers' trade with non-party States under conditions outside the NPT régime, something that failed to foster further accessions to the Treaty and was detrimental to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. Peru therefore advocated the adoption of a rule making it compulsory for all supplier States parties to demand the acceptance of full-scope safeguards by their trading partners as a precondition for the provision of nuclear materials, equipment, technologies and services. In that connection, he referred to resolution 163 (VIII), adopted by the General Conference of the International Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) in 1983, which stated that the IAEA safeguards system negotiated under article 13 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and article III of the NPT, together with the system of control established in articles 13, 14, 15, 16, 18 and 20 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, were sufficient to ensure the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and formed a suitable basis for facilitating international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Hence, additional supervision and control requirements imposed unilaterally or jointly by supplier States on importing States parties to both of those instruments were unacceptable and incompatible with the sovereign rights and independence of the latter States.

50. With regard to article IV, the supplier countries' technical assistance through IAEA contributions should be channelled for the benefit of States parties. The principle of non-discrimination was valid inasmuch as it benefited all States that had accepted the application of full-scope safeguards in their territory. Inverse discrimination would discourage countries from becoming parties to the Treaty and erode the security of non-nuclear-weapon States already parties to it.

51. The provisions of article V had not been fully implemented to date. In that connection, his delegation attached great importance to the forthcoming PUNE Conference, the first international effort of its kind. The use of nuclear energy could be of the utmost value not only in regard to electric power but also in the field of medicine, health, agriculture, industry and other applications. Hence he hoped that the present Conference would make a constructive contribution towards the preparation for PUNE.
52. To sum up, it could be said that the Treaty's objective of guaranteeing the right of all countries to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and promoting international co-operation in that respect had been achieved in part and that, if discrimination was eliminated, it was reasonable to hope that co-operation would prove more fruitful for the purposes of peace and development.

53. As to the Treaty's other objective, that of preventing nuclear war, avoiding the proliferation of nuclear weapons and promoting nuclear disarmament, the results were far from satisfactory. While the non-nuclear-weapon States had fully discharged their obligations under the Treaty, the same could not be said of the nuclear-weapon States. The large number of accessions to the Treaty demonstrated that a great majority of nations wanted nuclear arms limitation and nuclear disarmament and were prepared to make sacrifices in order to achieve those goals. Instead of recognizing that fact as an appeal to their sense of responsibility, certain nuclear Powers accepted it cynically as a confirmation of their nuclear hegemony.

54. The fact that President Kennedy's prophecy of a world with 15 or 20 nuclear Powers had not thus far been fulfilled was not wholly due to the Treaty. States with nuclear ambitions were pursuing their aims outside the régime imposed by the Treaty, so that the grim situation which President Kennedy had envisaged might still come about. Contrary to the principles set forth in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX), the Treaty did not establish an equitable balance between the obligations of nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, respectively. The nuclear-weapon Powers' failure to fulfil their part of the bargain provided certain non-party States with arguments for remaining outside the Treaty, while developing their nuclear technology; some States parties might even feel compelled to withdraw from the NPT. The only way of ensuring the Treaty's complete universality and ensuring the permanence of the non-proliferation régime was to give tangible proof of good faith by negotiating sound disarmament agreements, without which the Treaty would lose its entire credibility and, indeed, its raison d'être.

55. The first step in that direction was, of course, early cessation of nuclear-weapon tests. To those who argued that a nuclear-test ban would become possible only when real conditions for initiating the disarmament process were available, he would reply that it was inconceivable that disarmament negotiations should take place at the same time as new and still more deadly nuclear weapons were being devised. For that reason, his delegation appreciated the unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions declared by the Soviet Union and urged the nuclear Powers to conclude as early as possible an agreement on the cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests in accordance with the preamble of the Partial Test Ban Treaty and the preamble to the NPT.

56. Security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States were another essential step towards the attainment of the Treaty's objectives. The non-aligned and neutral States had repeatedly explained their position in the matter, both in the Conference on Disarmament and at the previous Review Conferences. The
nuclear-weapon States' failure to provide a positive response incorporated in an international treaty cast doubt upon their good faith and their intentions with regard to the non-nuclear-weapon States.

57. Lastly, his delegation noted with satisfaction the conclusion of the Treaty of Rarotonga on the South Pacific nuclear-free zone, which concerns the prohibition of nuclear weapons and other explosive nuclear devices in the South Pacific, an area contiguous with that covered by the Treaty of Tlatelolco, to which Peru was a party. Developments of that kind deserved encouragement as being in the spirit of article VII of the Treaty.

58. Peru, a country with a consistently peaceful historical record, had always considered the NPT régime to be precarious so long as its objectives were not completely fulfilled. Recently, the Peruvian President had issued a further call for regional negotiations on disarmament and announced concrete and unilateral measures concerning the reduction of expenditure on arms. Naturally, the one-sided sacrifices his country was able to make were not unlimited. The fact that expressions of good faith had not so far been backed up by actions demonstrating the Treaty's viability was completely deplorable. His delegation hoped, however, that the results of the present Conference would give satisfaction to countries which had discharged their obligations and would rekindle optimism about the Treaty's future.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.
1. Mr. KARIM (Bangladesh) pointed out that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was not a treaty of unlimited duration and that its very existence depended on its continued usefulness as an effective multilateral arms regulation agreement. It was therefore important that the Conference should engage urgently in a critical and constructive process of review to enable the Treaty to achieve its objectives. States parties must accordingly strive to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and work for nuclear arms control and disarmament, while stressing the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. All those objectives were interrelated and one of the main purposes of the Conference should therefore be to examine whether the Treaty provisions aimed at attaining them had been implemented over the last few years and how that had been done.

2. No problem appeared to have arisen in connection with articles I and II although a significant number of States had not yet become party to the Treaty. That factor by itself was disquieting as those countries with their capabilities for the production of strategic nuclear materials could have a significant influence on the process of future proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world. Bangladesh shared the concern which had been expressed at the lack of progress in the implementation of article VI. The undertaking of the non-nuclear-weapon States not to acquire nuclear weapons was to have been matched by that of the nuclear-weapon States parties to facilitate nuclear disarmament and to pursue negotiations in good faith to halt the nuclear-arms race. There was clearly a deadlock in that area. Quantitatively and qualitatively, the arsenals of the nuclear Powers had expanded and, since the conclusion of the SALT I agreement, existing agreements had increasingly come under severe strain while no new nuclear-arms-control treaty had been concluded. Testing of nuclear weapons continued and the failure by the nuclear States to respect their obligations in that connection might in the long run damage the very credibility of the Treaty. The Third Review Conference was a useful occasion for all participants to take up that issue in its true perspective.

3. While articles I, II and VI were at the centre of the Conference's work, Bangladesh attached equal importance to the implementation of other articles of the Treaty, particularly article IV, which was one of the main pillars of the Treaty. On that point it was disappointing to note that, although the viability of the Treaty depended a great deal on the effective implementation of that article, the economic and technical assistance flowing to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties continued to be very inadequate. Such assistance, which would have enabled the non-nuclear-weapon States to meet their current and future needs, particularly in the field of the peaceful use
of nuclear energy, had not increased to any significant degree during recent years. The dismal situation was reflected in the report of IAEA for 1984, where it was noted that during that year only 14 new nuclear power plants had been commissioned in the world as a whole; none of those plants had been located in the developing countries although energy problems in many of those countries had reached a critical stage. The nuclear development programme in all those countries had thus continued to stagnate in the face of mounting financial difficulties and the lack of sufficient resources and assured supply of nuclear materials from developed countries. Despite its wide international acceptance, the Treaty remained a fragile instrument and, unless there was a sustained effort, it would continue to have only a limited value. One of the main ways in which the viability of the Treaty could be enhanced in the years to come would be to ensure that the interdependence of the rights and obligations of the States parties was respected. During the current Conference it would be important to renew the undertakings assumed in that connection.

4. Bangladesh also believed that, in considering the best ways of achieving the objectives of the Treaty and the measures aimed at strengthening it, the significant role which the nuclear Powers could, and should, play should not be overlooked. If the latter did not respect their commitments, particularly the obligations which they had assumed under article VI, the Treaty would clearly remain a dead letter. It was heartening to note in that connection that the United States of America and the Soviet Union had once again started negotiations on various questions relating to their strategic and other nuclear-weapon systems. It was to be hoped that the optimism generated by those negotiations would make it possible to make progress within the framework of a clearly defined time-table. Bangladesh would also like to re-emphasize the crucial importance of the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and hoped that serious efforts would be undertaken to achieve decisive progress in that particular field. His delegation also wished to reiterate the view that the continued credibility of the Treaty would depend to a large extent on the ability of the States parties to provide satisfactory security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States parties. The security assurances provided so far had fallen far short of the expectations of the States concerned. It was therefore essential to provide the latter with unconditional, uniform and all-encompassing security assurances, which would be an important step towards strengthening the Treaty. The establishment of nuclear-free zones and the full implementation of article VII would also generate a sense of security. The readiness of States parties, particularly the developed States parties, to fulfil their commitment under article IV would undoubtedly make a positive contribution in removing the understandable concern and disaffection of the developing countries. Through the fulfilment of that particular commitment, the developed States parties would not only help the developing non-nuclear-weapon States parties but would at the same time make a lasting contribution to universal adherence to the Treaty and to its long-term effectiveness.

5. The President of Bangladesh, in his address at the twelfth special session of the General Assembly (second special session devoted to disarmament), had said that Bangladesh's policy on disarmament was based on
the concept of general and complete disarmament. The past few years had not been particularly remarkable from the standpoint of the utilization of the full potential of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, but it nevertheless remained one of the most important basic elements of an appropriate framework for world peace and security. Concrete measures must therefore be taken to reinforce the Treaty and Bangladesh would spare no effort in that connection.

6. Mr. BALLESTEROS (Uruguay) said that any review of the Treaty must take into consideration not only the guiding principles which had prevailed during the negotiation of the Treaty itself and continued to be its main support and the reference point for its periodic review, but also the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX), adopted on 19 November 1965. It must also be made abundantly clear at the outset that the non-nuclear-weapon States parties, apart from their obligations under the Treaty, had the right to require the nuclear Powers to conduct themselves in conformity with the unequal commitment enshrined in the Treaty. Any analysis of the Treaty and its operation should ensure that the political attitudes of the States parties were consistent with the objectives of the agreement. The nuclear Powers, in particular, had the duty to demonstrate, on a continuing basis, that their acts were in conformity with the provisions of the Treaty. In the case of the Latin America countries, the right to which he had made reference was the more legitimate in view of the fact that those countries, even before the Treaty had come into existence, had created the first denuclearized zone. The views which his delegation would express during the Third Review Conference would take those considerations into account. Uruguay wished in the first place to reaffirm its support for the Treaty as demonstrated by the fact that it had adhered to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco). The corner-stone of those two international instruments was the IAEA system of safeguards which represented the first world-wide experiment in the international verification of the implementation of a treaty. The Treaty, being the result of compromise, was not perfect; it could nevertheless be improved and had already had a certain deterrent effect. The acceptance by the nuclear-weapon States of IAEA safeguards should make it possible to use the system for future arms limitation agreements. Uruguay, within the limits of the research programmes which it had undertaken, had been able to establish that the IAEA safeguards system did not represent an obstacle to the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and indeed that it had even facilitated the development of exchanges and international co-operation in that important field of modern technology. His country attached great importance to the elaboration of more effective guarantees provided that process was accompanied by an expansion of the resources provided for IAEA's work in the promotion of nuclear technology. Increased technology transfer through technical assistance and co-operation was of great importance for those countries which were little developed in the nuclear field. IAEA's programme of technical assistance represented the principal multilateral approach in that connection. His Government therefore welcomed the substantial increase in IAEA technical assistance activities since the Second Review Conference.

7. If the safeguards had contributed to the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the same could not be said of unilateral restrictive
policies. In that connection, Uruguay shared the view expressed by the representative of Switzerland for whom proliferation was not a technical but rather a political problem. The objective of non-proliferation could not be achieved except by means of political measures and international co-operation. His delegation therefore associated itself with all those who had urged that efforts should be made to promote co-operation and the free transfer of nuclear material and technology for peaceful purposes through the elimination of useless restrictions. Restrictive policies had a doubly negative effect in so far as they hindered the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in States parties to the Treaty while at the same time they encouraged certain non-party States not to adhere to the Treaty and to develop nuclear technology outside the IAEA safeguards system. Every State with a nuclear programme should have a clear picture of the conditions which applied to the transfer and supply of technology. The IAEA Committee on Assurances of Supply was important and in a good position to elaborate acceptable international principles on safeguards covering supply and non-proliferation.

8. In addition, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material was an important instrument for the non-proliferation system and the Third Review Conference should encourage its entry into force as soon as possible. For its part, Uruguay intended to ratify the Convention in the near future.

9. It could not be ignored that the very existence of the Treaty and the adhesion thereto of important countries depended on the success of the negotiations on nuclear disarmament. The nuclear Powers must therefore understand that, if many countries were hesitating to sign the Treaty, it was not because they wished to join the "atomic club", but because they rejected a Treaty which they regarded as discriminatory and had taken note that the nuclear-weapon States parties had not respected all its provisions. It was for that reason that, in Latin America, countries which were not parties to the Treaty had voluntarily opened their nuclear installations to IAEA safeguards. It must thus be recognized that, if certain countries had not yet adhered to the Treaty, it was not in order to escape the control of IAEA but above all because the nuclear-weapon States had not respected their obligations under article VI and that the provisions of article IV had not been implemented as they should have been.

10. Regarding the prospects for the two principal goals of the Treaty, two encouraging facts were to be noted: the messages from the Heads of State of the two great nuclear Powers (NPT/CONF.III/13 and NPT/CONF.III/20) on their obligation under article VI and the initiative of a number of developing countries on article IV designed to strengthen technical co-operation bearing in mind in particular the needs of the developing countries (NPT/CONF.III/21). His delegation had high expectations regarding the work to be done by the two Main Committees of the Conference on assistance and co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy on a non-discriminatory basis and on general and complete nuclear disarmament.
11. Uruguay would support any proposal which would promote the objectives of the Treaty and any initiative requiring the nuclear-weapon States to take effective measures to end the nuclear-arms race, to eliminate stockpiles and to declare a moratorium on the testing of all nuclear weapons and delivery systems. In that connection, Uruguay, together with other nations, would wish to see the Partial Test-Ban Treaty of 1963 become a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

12. In conclusion, he welcomed the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific.

13. Mr. SHRESTHA (Nepal) said that his country considered the Non-Proliferation Treaty to be an important instrument in response to the challenge of nuclear proliferation. It was in that spirit that Nepal had adhered to the Treaty on the first day it was open for signature. Notwithstanding all its flaws and the criticisms levelled against it, the Treaty, if fully and faithfully implemented, might serve the interests not only of the States parties but also those of the whole community of nations.

14. Since the Treaty's entry into force, results had been obtained in the field of horizontal non-proliferation, but the same could not be said of vertical non-proliferation; furthermore, it had to be recognized that it had not yet been signed by any of the countries which were believed to have independent nuclear capabilities. His delegation hoped that the Third Review Conference would induce new countries to adhere to the Treaty.

15. It was generally accepted that security and survival were the first concerns of men and nations. However, in their efforts to achieve security and tempted by the possibility for greater power and influence, nations had often tended to forget the security and independence of others. When it addressed that urgent problem, the Conference must therefore try to understand the deep reasons which caused nations to engage in an arms race despite the conviction that that was not a wise course. In the current context of mutually assured destruction, it was essential to strengthen the environment of security, not of one or some States, but of all States, on the basis of mutual trust, understanding and respect. It was important to understand that no concept of national security should in any way prove a hindrance to international security for all.

16. Since the threat to peace lay as much in the existing stockpiles of nuclear and conventional weapons as in nuclear proliferation, his delegation fully shared the general anxiety concerning the non-fulfilment of the obligations assumed under article VI of the Treaty. The arms race was accelerating and, in spite of the resumption of the Soviet-American negotiations, showed no sign of a slow-down. Nepal therefore called upon the States parties to the Treaty to honour their obligations under article VI and to pursue negotiations in good faith with a view to adopting effective measures to put an end to the nuclear-arms race and to achieve general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. His delegation would support any initiative designed to promote security and stability at a lower level of armament. Within that context, Nepal welcomed
the moratorium on all nuclear testing that had been announced unilaterally by the Soviet Union, and called upon the United States of America and other nuclear-weapon States to follow the example of the USSR. The forthcoming summit meeting between the heads of State of the United States and the Soviet Union also constituted a significant development which he hoped would set the tone for a constructive dialogue to break the present deadlock.

17. Questions of verification, which had always posed problems in the disarmament deliberations, were another important area in which Nepal would like to see progress. The invitation that the United States had addressed to the Soviet Union to send observers to a nuclear test could constitute a first step towards the establishment of an international verification system. The concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones, which would be highly instrumental in promoting regional and international stability, could also play a significant role in promoting the non-proliferation régime.

18. In short, to ensure the viability and credibility of the NPT, endeavours should be made to strengthen all, and not just some, aspects of the Treaty.

19. Mr. GLEISSNER (Austria) said that, since its entry into force 15 years earlier, the Treaty had been partially but not wholly successful. At all events, it was far from being a failure. In fact, of the 130 States that had become parties to the NPT, 16 had acceded to the Treaty since the last Review Conference. Hence, continuing efforts should be made towards the full implementation of the principle of universality with regard to the rights and obligations stemming from the Treaty. It would be a development of great political importance if the nuclear-weapon States that had not become parties to the Treaty decided to accede thereto. Those States that had not given up the option of becoming nuclear-weapon States should also be encouraged to accede to the NPT, which constituted one of the most important instruments of international law adopted since the Second World War. The extent to which the Treaty was implemented by both the nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States parties would influence the decision of other States which were hesitating as to whether they should accede to the NPT. The principle of universality of the NPT was linked to a feeling of awareness concerning the common destiny of mankind.

20. From the standpoint of the implementation of the Treaty in regard to the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons during the period under review, it seemed that the nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States had fulfilled their respective obligations under articles I and II. Since, as stated in the preamble to the NPT, the proliferation of nuclear weapons would considerably augment the risk of nuclear war, it was in the interests of the international community that the number of nuclear-weapon States should not increase because any such increase would make the elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems even more difficult to achieve. Unfortunately, the expectations to which the Treaty had given rise had not been fulfilled and there had been no decisive reduction in nuclear arsenals. Quantitative steps in the desired direction had been counterbalanced by qualitative steps in the opposite direction. Some disarmament negotiations had been broken off and the endeavours undertaken to formulate common concepts of international security
had given way to policies that relied more on technological innovation. However, international politics was not a game in which one side's gain was the other's loss.

21. The negotiations envisaged in article VI of the Treaty undoubtedly involved extremely complex problems that could be overcome only by a strong political will. The meeting between the President of the United States of America and the Secretary-General of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, scheduled to be held in November 1985 at Geneva, should help to strengthen international security and promote stability and peace. It was to be hoped that that meeting would give added momentum to the disarmament negotiations in a manner conducive to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and the achievement of nuclear disarmament.

22. To that end, there was an urgent need to initiate negotiations with a view to the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty in accordance with a concept of international security that included the elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. There was no insurmountable technical obstacle to the conclusion of such a treaty, and a politically acceptable solution could be found to the technical question of verification. The Conference on Disarmament should give urgent attention to the issues involved in the drafting of a treaty. For its part, Austria welcomed all proposals made with a view to facilitating the conclusion of such a treaty, particularly the moratorium proposed by the Soviet Union and the willingness expressed by the United States to admit observers to nuclear tests. Given the requisite political will, agreement could be reached on a treaty that would make it possible to limit the nuclear-arms race in a decisive manner.

23. Although the end of testing would not automatically lead to a reduction of nuclear weapons, the prospects of negotiations on such reductions would have an impact on the negotiations concerning the conclusion of a treaty. However, the achievement of progress in one area of disarmament should not be regarded as a prerequisite for progress in other areas. Nuclear disarmament could not be viewed in isolation from other international endeavours aimed at promoting security and stability, and the important negotiations taking place at Vienna and Stockholm had a bearing on the NPT. One of the principal confidence-building measures required for disarmament was the mutual conviction that the international obligations under existing agreements would continued to be observed.

24. The NPT reaffirmed that right of States to develop research, production and the use of nuclear energy for useful purposes and established the principle of international co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy in association with IAEA, the headquarters of which was situated in Austria. Such multilateral co-operation was particularly essential for the medium-sized and smaller countries. IAEA could also acquaint public opinion with the latest information concerning nuclear energy and the experience gained in other countries.

25. Technical co-operation and assistance in the nuclear field were important for many States. Since the NPT committed all parties to co-operate in the
development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, with due consideration for the needs of the developing countries, it could play an important role in the formulation of the policies of IAEA States parties to the Treaty. However, the essential role of IAEA with regard to the NPT lay in the application of safeguards. Only an efficient safeguard system could prevent the use of nuclear technology for military purposes without impeding the development of its peaceful uses. The Conference should consider how the principle of full safeguards in international nuclear exchanges could be applied on a wider scale.

26. It was encouraging that nuclear-weapon States had offered to place civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. In fact, the experience gained by IAEA in the field of safeguards could prove useful for the development of disarmament and arms-control verification techniques in general. Human ingenuity, which had succeeded in discovering the secrets of the atom, should be able to overcome the political problems that it created. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons constituted a turning point in the history of that endeavour.

27. Mr. VARGAS (Nicaragua) said that, 15 years after the entry into force of the NPT which, at the time, had been regarded as an effective obstacle to the military uses of the atom and an instrument which would enhance international peace and security, some States parties to that Treaty, such as Nicaragua, felt disillusioned at the continuing arms race and the apocalyptic danger that was threatening civilization. Exactly 40 years after the first use of atomic energy for military purposes, the first time man came face to face with its power of total destruction, the whole of mankind shared a common anxiety that the world might be destroyed by a war between the super-Powers. The discovery, in 1939, of the unsuspected power of a new energy had marked the beginning of the atomic era and its achievements which, in the view of scientists and humanists, should be used for the development and progress of mankind. The discovery of the controlled chain reaction in 1942 by the Nobel prize winner Enrico Fermi had offered new prospects for the production of electricity on an industrial scale. Today, more than 300 reactors throughout the world, of which two were situated in Argentina and one in Brazil, were producing about 280,000 MW, which would be increased by the future production from the reactors under construction in Cuba and Mexico.

28. Unfortunately, the military uses of the atom had turned it into a fundamental issue affecting international relations and world stability. However, since 1948, the atom had contributed to peace by creating a balance of terror and the fear of mutual assured destruction. Nevertheless, a short-term nuclear war remained possible due to the horizontal and vertical proliferation of atomic weapons and their potential use in regional wars. That balance had been called into question by new defence systems which would enable one of the parties to use nuclear weapons. It should not be forgotten that the United States, which had a monopoly of nuclear weapons from 1942 to 1949, had used them on two occasions against Japan in order to put an end to the Second World War, with all the resulting consequences for international life.
29. Some current projects, such as the "Star Wars" programme announced by President Reagan, were making world peace even more precarious. In fact, through the use of a protective barrier of laser beams for the alleged defensive purpose of protecting the territory of North America, it would be possible to envisage a pre-emptive strike in which everything would be staked on an unproven invulnerability. The equivalent of 13 million tonnes of TNT stockpiled in nuclear arsenals represented a million atomic bombs similar to those dropped on Japan, not to mention the extremely destructive effect of the hydrogen bomb.

30. Nicaragua welcomed the conclusion, on 6 August 1985, of the Treaty on the Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone in the South Pacific, opened for signature at Rarotonga (Cook Islands), which had already been signed by eight Heads of Government (see NPT/CONF.III/INF.4 and Corr.1).

31. Although the countries of Latin America and the nuclear-weapon Powers parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco had undertaken to respect the nuclear-weapon-free status of the region, Nicaragua was concerned at the occurrence of conflicts such as that in the South Atlantic, during which a State party to that Treaty and to the NPT had resorted to nuclear equipment. Argentina and other Latin American States members of OPANAL had condemned the use of nuclear submarines during that conflict and Nicaragua had noted with concern that the United States was using nuclear-powered naval vessels in its territorial waters, which constituted an infringement of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Nicaragua also condemned the manner in which the ecological balance was being upset by the military tests that some nuclear Powers were carrying out in the atmosphere, underground and in territories far from their metropolis.

32. Nicaragua, which welcomed the moratorium on nuclear tests until January 1986 that had been announced by the USSR, hoped that the time-limit would be extended and that other States would follow that example. His country also welcomed the signature and ratification of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the efforts that had been made to avoid the militarization of outer space.

33. When signing the treaties prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons, Nicaragua had given up neither its right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes nor its right to share in the benefits of nuclear science and technology for the development of peoples. His country was participating in the technical co-operation programmes and activities of the Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission, the last meeting of which, at Caracas, had been attended by the Director General of IAEA. Nicaragua welcomed the inception of the Regional Co-operation Agreement for Latin America (ARCAL) for the development of research reactors, radiological protection activities and nuclear instrumentation, uranium prospection and the use of nuclear energy in agriculture, industry and medicine.

34. To ensure the survival of civilization and mankind as a whole, it was essential that the measures of a legal nature that had been adopted to prevent a war should be put into practice and strictly observed since the use of
nuclear weapons affected not only military forces but also the civilian population and the prolonged aftermath of radio-activity posed a threat to the entire human race. As long as nuclear weapons existed, and as long as new prototypes were being tested, some parties would be tempted to use them. Hence the need to prevent their development and encourage their destruction. At all events, military denuclearization did not constitute an end in itself; it was merely a means to reach the subsequent stage of general and complete disarmament.

35. Mr. FERJANI (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) said that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was the only instrument that the international community possessed to ward off the danger of a nuclear holocaust. Consequently, the international community was duty-bound to eliminate the loopholes and update the articles in the Treaty.

36. The relative lack of action that had been observed since the Second Review Conference five years earlier should not give rise to despair even if very little progress had been achieved. In fact, although 16 new States had become parties to the NPT, in theory there were still only five nuclear Powers. Notwithstanding the evident horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, States like the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya which needed nuclear energy for peaceful purposes were unable to obtain it. In view of the current international economic crisis, the non-nuclear-weapon States parties urgently required nuclear energy, particularly in the agricultural, chemical and medical sectors. Although the endeavours made by IAEA to promote co-operation and safeguards were commendable, it had to be admitted that the NPT remained an expression of wishful thinking in regard to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which was still being employed primarily to further the interests of the nuclear Powers. Contrary to the provisions of article IV, an economic embargo had been imposed on some small countries seeking to enter the nuclear era, while others had seen their nuclear installations destroyed.

None of the 350 nuclear reactors operating throughout the world were situated in the developing countries that had acceded to the Treaty notwithstanding the fact that, under article IV, all parties to the Treaty had the inalienable right to develop "research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination".

37. The hopes of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties concerning the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones had not been fulfilled. According to some delegations from the Pacific region, entire populations had been displaced so that nuclear Powers could carry out tests. The very expression "nuclear-weapon-free zone" might well be come obsolete in spite of the fact that provision had initially been made for three such zones. That negative development was due, in particular, to the activities of South Africa and the Zionist entity, which was an outlaw nuclear Power in the Middle East. By acquiring nuclear weapons, South Africa had flouted all the resolutions concerning the denuclearization of Africa that had been adopted by OAU in 1964. According to a study carried out by a group of experts on South Africa's capability in the nuclear field, "there was no doubt that South Africa had the technical capability to make nuclear weapons and the necessary means of delivery". The introduction of nuclear weapons to the
African continent, and particularly in such a volatile region as southern Africa, "not only would be a severe blow to world-wide efforts at non-proliferation but also would upset many years' efforts to spare the African continent from the nuclear arms race and to make it a nuclear-weapon-free zone" (see NPT/CONF.III/7, para. 59). It was obvious that the racist South African régime had been able to achieve that capability only with assistance from some nuclear Powers parties to the Treaty and also from the Zionist régime. The General Assembly, which had been considering the question of Israeli nuclear armament since 1979, had adopted a number of resolutions by which, inter alia, it had appealed to all States to end any co-operation with Israel which might assist it in acquiring nuclear weapons; requested the Secretary-General to prepare a study on Israeli nuclear armament; and condemned the Israeli refusal to renounce any possession of nuclear weapons and to place its nuclear facilities under international safeguards (see NPT/CONF.III/3, para. 23). That showed that Israel undoubtedly possessed nuclear weapons and had installed means for their delivery in the Negev Desert and the Golan Heights. By bombing the Iraqi experimental reactor, which had been placed under the IAEA safeguards system, Israel had also struck a blow against the Treaty by helping to promote horizontal proliferation. At the same time, Israel was still refusing to accede to the Treaty and to abide by the IAEA safeguards system. Although Israel had transformed the Middle East and the Mediterranean into nuclear-weapon zones, it had insisted on attending the present Conference only as an observer.

38. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya was also disappointed that a more encouraging position had not been adopted in regard to the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, with the exception of the unilateral undertaking of the Soviet Union to suspend all nuclear explosions with effect from 6 August 1985 and China's decision to place its nuclear activities under IAEA control. For its part, the first country that had resorted to the use of nuclear weapons had invited the Soviet Union to send observers to monitor the tests that it was conducting.

39. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya was calling upon all the nuclear-weapon States which had the ability to destroy the entire human race to honour their obligations under the NPT. Those States should halt their nuclear tests, put an end to the nuclear-arms race, gradually destroy their existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and give an unconditional undertaking not to export nuclear technology to other countries for political purposes. That type of transfer should be placed under IAEA control.

40. While the developing countries were endeavouring to acquire nuclear energy for the development of their infrastructures, the nuclear Powers were creating a climate of terror and providing themselves with atomic shelters. It was essential that the results obtained by 1995 should be much more positive and tangible than those achieved during the past 15 years. The States parties to the Treaty should renounce their procrastinatory manoeuvres aimed at postponing indefinitely the cessation of nuclear tests. The decision-making process provided for in the Treaty must be implemented, albeit gradually, so that those wishing to withdraw from the NPT would not be able to
do so under that pretext. Courage was needed to surmount the political pressures and intimidation that could turn the Treaty into a scrap of paper.

41. Mr. TER HORTST (Venezuela) said that his country remained convinced that it had taken the right decision in signing the Treaty, even though it had not derived any direct benefit therefrom. By acceding to the NPT, Venezuela had helped to make the world a less dangerous place and had thereby made it known that no other country had anything to fear from Venezuela. His country had definitely renounced nuclear weapons, as it had frequently stated at meetings of IAEA, the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) and the Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission of OAS. Venezuela did not wish to impress anyone; and by acquiring nuclear weapons it would induce other countries in the region to procure the same "defence". His country had acceded to the Treaty because it approved of the objectives set forth therein. However, even if the Treaty had not existed, Venezuela would not have acquired nuclear weapons. His country had abundant local sources of petroleum and hydraulic power and had no intention of acquiring installations for the production of nuclear energy in the foreseeable future, although it did have a small 3 MW reactor for scientific purposes and was using nuclear technology to further its national development.

42. The NPT had been concluded not on the basis of a unilateral renunciation of nuclear weapons by neutral and non-nuclear weapon States but rather on the basis of the undertaking by the signatory nuclear Powers, under article VI of the Treaty, to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures for the cessation of the nuclear-arms race at an early date, the achievement of nuclear disarmament and the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Although neither the United States, the Soviet Union nor the United Kingdom had honored that undertaking, an increasing number of countries were acceding to the Treaty which had not been denounced by any of the States parties. That joint approach bore witness to a considerable moral force and a resolutely optimistic outlook.

43. It was comforting to know that 109 of the signatory States still believed in the Treaty and were continuing to place the long-term interests of mankind as a whole above their immediate national interests. For their part, the nuclear Powers should enter into negotiations in a spirit of good faith with a view to the conclusion of a treaty on the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. In fact, since the signature of the Treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union had been conducting underground tests at a more rapid pace than the atmospheric tests conducted prior to the signature of the Treaty. In an article published in the Scientific American, William Epstein had recently emphasized that, as a consequence, the Treaty constituted an ecological or sanitary measure rather than a restraint on the nuclear-arms race.

44. Latin America could be proud of having established the first militarily demilitarized zone in a populated region of the planet, and he paid tribute to Mr. García Robles, the "father" of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and head of the Mexican delegation to the Conference. Venezuela also welcomed the fact that
the 14 States members of the South Pacific Forum had decided on 6 August 1985, 40 years after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, to establish a denuclearized zone in the South Pacific. That new zone, which adjoined the zone covered by the Treaty of Tlatelolco, apart from constituting an additional guarantee of security for Latin America, would have a highly positive effect on the rest of world, particularly since the Pacific continued to be the scene of nuclear tests carried out in the atmosphere by a non-indigenous nuclear Power. It was also encouraging to note that the Nordic countries were considering the establishment of their own denuclearized zone in the near future.

45. The IAEA safeguards system contained some loopholes that were detracting from its effectiveness. Its scope should be extended to new member States and it should be applied without discrimination. Venezuela, which recognized the competence of the IAEA staff and appreciated the technical assistance that it had received from the Agency, was participating with 10 other Latin American countries in the Regional Co-operation Agreement for Latin America for development, research and training in the field of nuclear science and technology in Latin America, the principal objective of which was the adoption of nuclear technology in various fields such as radiological protection, nuclear instrumentation, immuno-analysis, irradiation of foodstuffs, and so forth.

46. With regard to the nuclear "suppliers", although it might be useful to have a certain amount of co-ordination in order to ensure that material and equipment for the peaceful use of the atom are not diverted for military purposes, it should be noted that that group of countries, or some of its members, had sometimes resorted to restrictive business practices that impeded the transfers of technology for which provision had been made under article IV of the Treaty. If the member countries of OPEC had occasionally been accused of acting as a cartel, he wondered what could be said of that far smaller and much more powerful and exclusive group of "supplier countries" whose existence and operations were based on a discriminatory philosophy.

47. The group of non-nuclear-weapon and neutral countries was putting the final touches to a draft text reflecting their position, which was fully in keeping with the objective of the Venezuelan delegation to the present Conference. The negotiation of a treaty on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons tests was a subject to which particular importance had been attached in that text, as might logically have been expected. The nuclear Powers, regardless of whether they were parties to the Treaty, had too often regarded it as normal that the other countries should comply strictly with the Treaty while they themselves did not feel bound by the obligations that they had assumed under article VI. It was as though the non-nuclear and neutral signatory States had no choice but to apply the NPT. However, since it was very easy to denounce the Treaty, it would be a grave mistake for the nuclear Powers to continue to believe that they could disregard their commitments with full impunity. The Conference provided an opportunity for a reaffirmation of the importance of the Treaty and for an undertaking to comply with its provisions in the interests of mankind. Since the non-nuclear countries such as Venezuela had fulfilled their obligations, the nuclear signatory Powers should now fulfil theirs. Instead of further talk, the time had come to take
tangible action to restore the credibility of all the States parties to the Treaty. As Erich Fromm, the American psycho-analyst, put it, "this is probably mankind's last chance to choose between life and destruction".

48. Mr. KHERAD (Afghanistan) expressed the hope that the Conference would help to enhance the effectiveness of the NPT, encourage countries that had not already done so to accede to the Treaty, and promote a gradual decrease in international tension through the limitation of armaments, the achievement of disarmament and, above all, the cessation of the nuclear-arms race. It was to that end that the NPT had been concluded 15 years ago, and it could not be denied that it had played a major role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The fact that 130 States had become parties to the Treaty proved that it had gained widespread international recognition and confirmed the validity of its principles such as, in particular, the commitment not to promote the proliferation of nuclear weapons, which had become a recognized norm in international law.

49. During the last five years, the States parties had scrupulously fulfilled their main obligations under the first two articles of the NPT and 16 other States had acceded to the Treaty. However, the ultimate objective would not be attained until some States that possessed the means to manufacture nuclear weapons, such as South Africa, Israel and Pakistan, agreed to submit to the non-proliferation measures. Every endeavour should therefore to made to increase the number of parties to the NPT.

50. Afghanistan recognized the importance of the tangible proposals aimed at halting the arms race from both the qualitative and quantitative standpoints, as well as the importance of article VI of the NPT, under which the States parties undertook to pursue negotiations with a view to halting the nuclear-arms race and concluding a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. The consolidation of the peace and security of peoples, détente, disarmament and peaceful coexistence among States with different social systems currently constituted the only reasonable course of action in international politics. The cessation of the arms race and the full utilization of mankind's creative potential for peaceful purposes would make it possible to create a suitable international climate for the solution of the crises that the world was facing in the ecological, energy, demographic, food and other spheres.

51. The NPT had helped to create favourable conditions for the international co-operation that was essential if mankind was to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and in order to solve the problem of energy supplies. However, the development of that co-operation should not obscure the main purpose of the NPT which was to form an effective obstacle to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

52. It was essential to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system in view of the increasing needs for nuclear material, equipment and technology. That Agency was playing a highly important role by effectively aiding the developing countries through its Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund, its scientific and technological programmes, its network of scientific and
technical information and its organization of joint research activities. The safeguards referred to in article III of the NPT would facilitate the international co-operation advocated in article IV, which should effectively serve the interests of all countries. An expansion of IAEA control activities was the best way to avoid the diversion of fissionable material and Afghanistan fully supported the safeguards system that had been further strengthened by the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

53. The cessation of nuclear tests constituted a reliable method of reducing and even eliminating nuclear stockpiles and putting an end to the threat of a new world war and a global nuclear conflict in which there would be neither victor nor vanquished and which would destroy everything that mankind had achieved over the centuries. The conclusion of a treaty on the complete prohibition of nuclear tests would be an important step towards the cessation of the arms race and would also strengthen the non-proliferation régime. Within that context, he welcomed the moratorium on nuclear tests until January 1986 that had been announced by the USSR and expressed the hope that the initiative would be imitated by the United States. Such a decision could be the starting-point for a prohibition of nuclear tests and could set an example for other nuclear-weapon States while, at the same time, promoting favourable conditions for the conclusion of an international treaty in that respect.

54. Like other members of the Non-Aligned Movement, Afghanistan was in favour of the adoption by the Conference on Disarmament of urgent and effective measures to prevent the arms race and a nuclear war in space with all the political, military, economic and other consequences that they would entail. His country was strongly opposed to the militarization of space and favoured the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, such as that in the South Pacific, and zones of peace with a view to limiting the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, promoting regional military détente and reducing the threat of nuclear war.

55. He supported the Mongolian proposal concerning the conclusion of a treaty of non-aggression and non-use of force in relations between the countries of Asia and the Pacific, as well as the proposal by the Soviet Union aimed at strengthening peace and security in Asia. He also supported the idea of making Asia and the Indian Ocean a zone of peace and hoped that an international conference to that end would be organized without further delay.

56. With regard to vertical proliferation, Afghanistan supported the proposal concerning preliminary consultations on the prohibition of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and the gradual reduction of stockpiles until they were totally eliminated. As a non-nuclear-weapon State, Afghanistan strongly advocated a strengthening of the security guarantees designed to safeguard that category of States against any resort or threat to resort to nuclear weapons. His country was in favour of the drafting of an international convention to strengthen those guarantees and was advocating a general prohibition of the use of such weapons within the context of an international agreement on the renunciation of the use of force which would further impede the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
57. The problems currently facing the human race could still be overcome if mankind recognized the fact that the only common enemy of all peoples was nuclear weapons and if all countries agreed categorically to reject that type of armament. The NPT, the objectives of which reflected the political realities of the contemporary world, constituted a balanced instrument of international co-operation designed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to ensure the peaceful use of atomic energy. The decisions taken by the Conference should not only strengthen the role of the Treaty in regard to the security of peoples and the peaceful applications of science but should also encourage all States that had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty.

58. Mr. SENE (Senegal) said that a review of the success achieved in the application of the NPT since 1980 showed that the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty had respected the provisions of article II, although the same could not be said of all the obligations undertaken by the nuclear Powers under article I, it was no secret that South Africa had been able to strengthen its nuclear capability with the help received from those Powers.

59. With regard to article III, he congratulated IAEA on its successful application of the safeguards system. He emphasized the need to increase not only the financial but also the technical and human resources of that Agency in order to enable it to contribute effectively to the economic development of States parties through international co-operation activities in the field of the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

60. On the subject of article IV, he expressed the opinion that the developed countries had not contributed adequately to a solution of the problems facing the developing countries in the spheres of health, agriculture, food and industrial development which could be mitigated by some applications of nuclear energy.

61. With regard to article V, he said that the establishment of the international body envisaged could enable all the parties to the NPT to enjoy the benefits derived from the peaceful applications of nuclear energy.

62. Although the NPT was not a disarmament treaty, it contained general principles on that subject, particularly in its eighth and eleventh preambular paragraphs. In article VI, it also stipulated that States parties should pursue negotiations relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and disarmament. In fact, the most urgent task at the present time was to halt the arms race which, apart from swallowing up huge material and human resources, could not in the final resort ensure the maintenance of peace. The only implication that could be drawn from the declarations of the super-Powers concerning loss of parity between their forces in any field was that the arms race posed a constant threat to the balance of forces and that the effectiveness of nuclear-weapon stockpiles as a deterrent was short-lived. No one could believe that such an escalation would always maintain a balance of forces in such a way as to guarantee that nuclear weapons would never be used and in the light of which each protagonist would feel safe from any ultimate nuclear riposte. Furthermore, the arms race tended to increase the variety, precision and destructive power of weapons systems notwithstanding the fact...
that the increasing complexity of those systems magnified the risk that those weapons might be used by mistake due to a technical fault or human error.

Finally, it was inadmissible that some States should use the threat of annihilation of the human race as a means to ensure their own security.

63. If the arms race continued, there was a risk that a minor armed conflict might lead to a nuclear war, particularly since force was being resorted to with increasing frequency in international relations. Hence, there was a need to identify the potential causes of a nuclear conflict and to take the requisite countermeasures. In particular, the risks inherent in the increasing tension between the super-Powers were so great that various proposals had been made to the effect that nuclear stockpiles should be frozen and that each nuclear Power should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. While commending those proposals which, in his opinion, could constitute a starting point for negotiations aimed at reducing the danger of a nuclear war, he welcomed the resumption of the Soviet-American arms limitation negotiations.

64. In that connection, the nuclear capability of some countries which were now in a position to manufacture nuclear weapons posed a threat that should not be disregarded. The case of South Africa was a source of particular concern in that respect since, as long as apartheid existed in that country, violence would only increase and there was no hope of stabilization in the region. There was even a risk that some non-nuclear-weapon States might feel sufficiently threatened to take up the nuclear option. All countries should therefore refrain from supplying South Africa with nuclear material and technology and should do their utmost to induce that country to place all its nuclear installations under the IAEA safeguards system in order to avoid the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the African region.

65. Finally, an increasing number of countries were on the verge of mastering the technology of nuclear explosions, which magnified the danger of proliferation. Conflicts between States could therefore assume new dimensions and the probability of a nuclear war would thereby be considerably increased. Consequently, it was essential that the parties to the Treaty of 1963 Banning Nuclear-Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water should pursue negotiations with a view to ensuring the cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons.

66. It was obvious that horizontal and vertical proliferation were closely linked. In connection with article VII, he recalled that, in spite of the accession of 38 African States to the NPT and their joint desire to ensure respect for the principle of the denuclearization of Africa, in keeping with the 1964 Declaration on that subject the continent of Africa could hardly be said to be safe from a nuclear war in view of the fact that South Africa's nuclear capability was sufficient for the production of weapons. Furthermore, little progress had been made in the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the regions in which the arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT were located. However, it was precisely there that a start should be made. It was also clear that provisions should be adopted to protect the non-nuclear-weapon-States parties to the NPT from the use of
nuclear weapons or the threat to resort to such weapons. It should be acknowledged that, by acceding to the NPT those countries had renounced nuclear weapons in a permanent and legally binding manner, in return for which they had not been given any firm and binding assurance that nuclear weapons would not be used against them. The guarantees provided by Security Council resolution 255 (1968) were not legally binding and, therefore, not fully satisfactory. In fact, only the elimination of nuclear weapons would provide an adequate guarantee for all. The nuclear Powers should therefore give up the illusory benefits that they allegedly derived from the possession of nuclear weapons and should manifest the necessary political will to halt the vicious spiral of the arms race and pursue the negotiations referred to in article VI. The viability of the non-proliferation régime ultimately depended on the active support of the nuclear Powers.

67. He expressed the hope that the participants in the Third Review Conference would succeed in restoring not only the credibility of the NPT but also mutual confidence among the parties, and thus meet the expectations of the entire international community.

[The summary record of the second part of the 13th meeting appears as document NPT/CONF.III/SR.13/Add.1.]
GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 12) (concluded)

1. Mr. SHAHABI SIRJANI (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that, notwithstanding the strength of feeling in favour of the expansion and universality of the Treaty, the world had been horrified to see that the gap between perception and expectation which had existed during the first five years of the Treaty had widened considerably. That was a consequence of the irresponsibility displayed by the nuclear-weapon States in a number of areas directly relating to their undertakings and obligations under the Treaty. Through the continuing nuclear arms race and the lack of any serious negotiations to halt and reverse it, the nuclear-weapon States had continued to undermine the expectations and good faith upon which the non-nuclear-weapon States had relied when they had acceded to the Treaty.

2. The non-nuclear-weapon States had been humiliated by the abuse of their trust and confidence. In such circumstances, it was unrealistic to stress the desirability of expanding the membership of the Treaty, especially since the parties to the Treaty were bewildered about the meaning of their membership. It was impossible to say for how much longer the non-aligned States parties would continue to regard themselves as restricted by its terms. What was certain, however, was that, when all hope had vanished, the practical, if not legal, collapse of the Treaty could be expected.

3. Of immense concern to his delegation, and to others representing non-aligned countries, was the nuclear arms race pursued by the nuclear-weapon States. That trend was in itself a violation of articles I and VI of the Treaty. Under article I, each nuclear-weapon State party had undertaken not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In the current circumstances, the arms race itself was encouraging non-nuclear weapon States to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons as a legitimate means of self-defence, since they had found that their national sovereignty and security had become gravely threatened.

4. For 40 months, the civilian population of his country had been subjected to continuous bombing and, in accordance with the strict orders issued by the Imam, there had been no retaliation in kind. It had been hoped during that period that international pressure would have persuaded the enemy to refrain from such bombing. Such manifestations of tolerance had, however, led to the intensification of violence by the enemy, with the result that his country had been obliged, albeit painfully, to follow a different course. The situation with regard to the Treaty in the face of the continuing nuclear arms race was similar to the situation he had just described. It was therefore the hope of his Government that the champions of the arms race would come to their senses and cease putting pressure on other States to follow a different course from that described in the Treaty.
5. The PRESIDENT said that the views which had been expressed reflected general agreement on the importance of the Treaty. The number of parties to the Treaty had increased steadily to 130, or more than four fifths of the States Members of the United Nations, since the first Review Conference alone, 17 new parties had acceded to the Treaty. Those facts made the Treaty the most widely supported arms control agreement in existence. The Treaty had undoubtedly contributed to an international non-proliferation regime and had helped to create a favourable international climate for the conclusion of a number of agreements in the field of arms control and disarmament.

6. Nuclear-weapon States as well as non-nuclear-weapon States shared the conviction that the spread of nuclear arms must be checked. Many delegations had referred to the fact that, since the conclusion of the Treaty, not a single new nuclear-weapon State had emerged. That was an element of success which he attributed to the Treaty. Reference had also been made to the fact that many States had voluntarily allowed inspectors to examine all their peaceful nuclear facilities and many had renewed their commitment to co-operate with IAEA in improving the safeguards system. Concomitantly, many speakers had praised the Treaty for reaffirming the right of States parties to the development, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination.

7. Everyone realized that the implementation of the Treaty was not perfect. It was, however, propitious to build on the basis of success rather than to belittle what had been painstakingly achieved and had been regarded by many as constructive. Such should be the spirit guiding the Conference.

8. Many shared the conviction that little, if any, progress had been made in negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race. It was equally true, however, that many, including the depositary Governments, had expressed their readiness to achieve progress in that field. It was his hope that the Conference would work towards that long-awaited objective. Many constructive proposals had been made during the general debate and they deserved full consideration.

ELECTION OF CHAIRMEN AND VICE-CHAIRMEN OF THE MAIN COMMITTEES, THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE AND THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE (agenda item 5) (concluded)

9. The PRESIDENT suggested that, as the number of candidates did not exceed the number of places to be filled, a secret ballot might be dispensed with, as provided for in rule 31 of the rules of procedure of the Conference, as adopted at the 1st plenary meeting of the Conference. It was his understanding that agreement had been reached on the following candidates:

As Vice-Chairmen of Main Committee I: Mr. Butler (Australia) and Mr. Thielicke (German Democratic Republic);

As Vice-Chairmen of Main Committee II: Mr. Alessi (Italy) and Mr. Sutowardoyo (Indonesia);
As Vice-Chairmen of Main Committee III: Mr. Karim (Bangladesh) and Mr. Konstantinov (Bulgaria).

As Vice-Chairman of the Drafting Committee: Mr. Strulak (Poland) (A proposal had not yet been received for the second Vice-Chairman of the Drafting Committee);

As Vice-Chairmen of the Credentials Committee: Mr. Meiszter (Hungary) and Mr. Nicolaidis (Cyprus).

10. If there was no objection, he would take it that the representatives whose names he had mentioned were duly elected Vice-Chairmen.

11. It was so decided.

CREDENTIALS OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE CONFERENCE (agenda item 7)

(a) APPOINTMENT OF THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE

12. The PRESIDENT announced that he had not yet been able to conclude his consultations on all six of the members of the Credentials Committee who, under rule 3 of the rules of procedure, were appointed by the Conference on the proposal of the President. He was continuing his contacts on the matter.

ADMISSION OF OBSERVERS

13. The PRESIDENT announced that the Secretary-General of the Conference had received applications for observer status from a number of States which had neither signed nor ratified the Treaty. The States concerned were: Algeria, Argentina, Bahrain, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Israel, Pakistan, Spain and United Republic of Tanzania. In accordance with rule 44 (2) of the rules of procedure, such status should be accorded on the decision of the Conference.

14. The secretariat of the Conference had received a letter from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) stating that it wished to participate in the Conference with observer status.

15. The Secretary-General had also received applications from a number of intergovernmental organizations for observer agency status. The organizations concerned were: Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, Organization of American States, League of Arab States, and Organization of African Unity. In accordance with rule 44 (4) of the rules of procedure, observer agency status would be accorded to such organizations on the decision of the Conference.

16. Mr. SENE (Senegal) said it was the view of the non-aligned countries that national liberation movements represented peoples wishing to exercise their natural right to be free of colonialism so that they might enjoy their inalienable right to self-determination. The non-aligned countries parties to
the Treaty, aware of the value of the participation of such movements in the work of the General Assembly, IAEA and other specialized agencies, considered it necessary to amend the rules of procedure of the Conference with a view to enabling national liberation movements recognized by the United Nations to participate in the Conference as observers. The proposed amendment would involve the addition of a subparagraph to rule 44, so that the existing paragraph 2 would become paragraph 2 (a) and the proposed additional paragraph would become paragraph 2 (b). The amendment read:

"Any national liberation movement authorized by the United Nations General Assembly to participate as an Observer in the sessions and work of the General Assembly and all international conferences held under the auspices of other organs of the United Nations may apply to the Secretary-General of the Conference for Observer status, which will be accorded on the decision of the Conference. Such liberation organizations shall be entitled to appoint officials to attend meetings of the Plenary and of the Main Committees other than those designated closed meetings, and to receive documents of the Conference. An Observer organization shall also be entitled to submit documents to the participants in the Conference."

17. The Group of Non-Aligned Countries, taking account of rule 44 of the rules of procedure, welcomed all applications to participate in the work of the Conference. The group was, however, aware that the conduct and activities of Israel were not compatible with the Treaty's objectives. Instead of adhering to the principles of non-proliferation, Israel had sought to acquire nuclear arms in a clandestine and illegal manner, including co-operation with the racist régime in South Africa. Israel's possession of nuclear weapons had been confirmed by facts, by United Nations studies and by references contained in resolutions of the General Assembly. In defiance of the principles of international law and the Charter of the United Nations, Israel had made an armed attack on a nuclear research reactor under IAEA surveillance situated in the territory of a State party to the Treaty and had thereby created an environmental hazard. By that fact, Israel had committed an act of aggression which was harmful not only to the credibility of the Treaty and to IAEA and its system of safeguards, but also to the inalienable right of States to exploit and use nuclear energy in their development programmes. Israel's attitude had been censured by the Director-General of IAEA and in a number of resolutions adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly, as well as by the Board of Governors and General Conference of IAEA.

18. Israel continued to threaten further attacks against nuclear reactors in Iraq and elsewhere, thereby jeopardizing the future peaceful use of nuclear energy, the safeguards system and the Treaty itself. Israel had demonstrated its contempt for the safeguards system by rejecting the resolutions of those bodies which had urged it to open all its nuclear installations to international inspection.

19. The Group of Non-Aligned countries accordingly expressed reservations on Israel's application for observer status.
20. The PRESIDENT said that the proposed new paragraph to be added to rule 44 of the rules of procedure would permit the PLO and similar organizations to attend the Conference in an observer capacity.

21. In that connection, he drew attention to rule 24 of the rules of procedure, according to which proposals and substantive amendments should normally be submitted in writing to the Secretary-General of the Conference, who should circulate copies to all delegations. The rule further stated that, unless the Conference decided otherwise, proposals and substantive amendments should be discussed or decided on no earlier than 24 hours after copies had been circulated in all languages of the Conference to all delegations.

22. He hoped that the issue of observers could be dealt with expeditiously and that a decision could be taken on each category of observers so that the Conference could start its substantive work free of outstanding procedural matters. He further hoped that, with regard to the proposed amendment to the rules of procedure, the Conference would agree to waive the requirements that it be submitted in writing and that its consideration be delayed for 24 hours after the amendment had been circulated. That should not be interpreted as a precedent.

23. It was his understanding that there was a consensus to proceed as he had suggested. If there was no objection, he would take it that the Conference wished to follow that course and that the amendment to the rules of procedure of the Conference was adopted.

24. It was so decided. 13/

25. Mr. DUNN (United States of America) said that his delegation had reservations about creating a special category in the rules of procedure for "national liberation organizations" and did not recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization. However, in the interests of preserving a spirit of consensus and harmony at such a very important Conference and maintaining the spirit of co-operation which had prevailed throughout the preparatory process, his delegation had not objected to any of the consensus decisions just adopted.

The meeting rose at 7.25 p.m.

13/ The final text of the amendment was subsequently issued as document NPT/CONF.III/41.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 14th MEETING
Friday, 13 September 1985, at 4.20 p.m.

President: Mr. SHAKER (Egypt)

ORGANIZATION OF WORK

1. The PRESIDENT said that he had convened a plenary meeting to deal with certain outstanding matters. First of all, the Conference had to take a decision regarding the membership of the Credentials Committee, it had already elected the Chairman and two Vice-Chairmen but still had to appoint the six members of the Committee under rule 3 of the rules of procedure (NPT/CONF.III/41). He suggested, in the light of the consultations he had held on the subject, that the representatives of the following six countries should be appointed: Denmark, Jordan, Senegal, Thailand, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America. If there was no objection, he would take it that the Conference adopted that suggestion.

2. It was so decided.

3. The PRESIDENT said that, during the second part of the 13th plenary meeting, the Conference which, on 4 September 1985, had elected the Vice-Chairmen of the Main Committees and of the Credentials Committee, still had to elect a second vice-Chairman of the Drafting Committee. As Mr. Gustavo-Adolfo Vargas, head of the Nicaraguan delegation, was the only candidate for the post, he suggested that a vote should not be taken by secret ballot, as provided for under rule 31 of the rules of procedure. If there was no objection, he would take it that the Conference appointed Mr. Vargas (Nicaragua) Vice-Chairman of the Drafting Committee.

4. It was so decided.

5. The PRESIDENT said that, bearing in mind the work that remained to be done, he would request all delegations to do their utmost to ensure that results were achieved and, in particular, that agreement was reached on the text of the Final Declaration. That would call for much imagination and flexibility and, above all, for the will to co-operate on the part of all participants. He then read out the time-table of meetings of the Main Committees for the week of 16 to 20 September as recommended by the Bureau, and invited the Conference to adopt it.

6. It was so decided.
7. The PRESIDENT pointed out that, under article 36 of the rules of procedure, the Main Committees could refer texts directly to the Drafting Committee without the need to convene a plenary meeting of the Conference. If there was no objection, he would take it that the Conference agreed to that more expeditious procedure.

8. It was so decided.

9. The PRESIDENT invited delegations which had not already done so to present their credentials to the Credentials Committee.

The meeting rose at 4.30 p.m.
CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS AND PROPOSALS SUBMITTED UNDER AGENDA ITEM 13 (NPT/CONF.III/L.1 to L.4, NPT/CONF.III/59)

Draft resolutions NPT/CONF.III/L.1 to L.3

1. Mr. SENE (Senegal), speaking as co-ordinator of the Group of Non-Aligned and Neutral States, said that, in general, the members of that Group shared the ideas expressed in the draft resolutions under consideration which were basically derived from document NPT/CONF.III/32, concerning article VI of the Treaty, that had been submitted by their Group. Those draft resolutions, which recalled fundamental principles to which those States remained committed, dealt with important problems that were major causes of concern to the international community. As such, they deserved to be taken into consideration. With regard to the procedure for the adoption of decisions, as stipulated in rule 28 of the rules of procedure of the Conference (NPT/CONF.III/41), he reaffirmed that the Group of States of which he was the co-ordinator wished to adopt a conciliatory approach with a view to avoiding controversy and confrontation and showing a spirit of understanding during the consideration of those draft resolutions so that they could be adopted by consensus. However, if it proved impossible to reach a consensus, the Group of Non-Aligned and Neutral States would feel obliged to request that those draft resolutions be put to the vote in spite of the adverse consequences that such a vote would have in terms of the political impact of the Final Document of the Conference.

2. Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico), introducing draft resolutions NPT/CONF.III/L.1 to L.3 on behalf of the Group of Non-Aligned and Neutral States, pointed out that those three texts, which were very short and concisely worded, were in no way controversial and related solely to questions with which the States Members of the United Nations had been familiar for many years.

3. Since, in the preamble to those draft resolutions, the sponsors had merely referred to provisions and instruments that were well known to all the States parties to the Treaty, he had decided to confine his comments to the contents of the operative paragraphs of those draft resolutions. In the draft resolution on a comprehensive nuclear test ban (NPT/CONF.III/L.1), the three Depositary States of NPT were merely requested to resume during 1985 the negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty that they had suspended in 1980. The draft resolution on a nuclear test ban moratorium (NPT/CONF.III/L.2) only repeated what the General Assembly had been calling upon the three Depositary States to do for the past five years. No comment was needed on the draft resolution on a nuclear-arms freeze (NPT/CONF.III/L.3).
4. He recalled that, throughout the deliberations of the Main Committees of the Conference, the Mexican delegation had made every effort to convince the participants in the Conference that their Final Declaration should contain a simple recommendation to the three Depositary States of NPT concerning a comprehensive nuclear test ban, a moratorium on nuclear tests and a nuclear-arms freeze. Since those efforts had been to no avail, the Mexican delegation had decided to submit for consideration the three draft resolutions that had been approved by all the members of the Group of Non-Aligned and Neutral States. During the time that remained before the Conference was called upon to take a decision on those texts, the Group of Non-Aligned and Neutral States would continue to make every effort to ensure that those draft resolutions could be adopted by consensus and incorporated in the Final Declaration of the Conference. If such a consensus could not be reached, the Group would be compelled to request a vote on those texts in accordance with rule 28 of the rules of procedure.

5. The President drew the attention of the States parties to the provisions of rule 28 of the rules of procedure of the Conference and said that he would make every effort within 48 hours to secure general agreement on the questions that had not been settled. He expressed his great appreciation of the work carried out by the three Main Committees, whose reports represented an enormous joint effort, and were a striking demonstration of the goodwill that had been shown by all the parties. He was convinced that just a little more goodwill was all that was needed to achieve a consensus on the questions dealt with in the draft resolutions under consideration. Therefore, he strongly urged the participants to continue their efforts to that end since the success or failure of the Conference, which was concerned with a matter of vital importance to all and for which the States parties had been preparing for more than a year, would be decided during the following two days. He appealed to all States to do their utmost to ensure its success.

Draft resolution NPT/CONF.III/L.4

6. Mr. AL-KITAL (Iraq) expressed full support for draft resolutions NPT/CONF.III/L.1 to L.3 and for the views that had been expressed during their introduction.

7. Introducing draft resolution NPT/CONF.III/L.4, he drew attention to the fact that, in the preamble of that draft, the Conference would recall various provisions of NPT, together with the inalienable right to all the parties to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes (first to third preambular paragraphs); make a neutral declaration on the subject of the safeguards system operated by IAEA and mention the fact that Iraq was a party to NPT (fourth and fifth preambular paragraphs); take note of the relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions on the Israeli armed aggression against the Iraqi nuclear installations (sixth and seventh preambular paragraphs), as well as the IAEA General Conference resolutions which regarded the aggression in question as an attack on the Agency and its safeguards system (eighth preambular paragraph); and take note of the threat of further such attacks by Israel (eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs).
8. In the operative part of the draft resolution, the Conference would consider the Israeli military attack as the most serious blow ever struck against the Treaty, would condemn Israel for its act and would call upon all member States to provide Iraq with the assistance needed to repair the damage caused by the Israeli attack (paragraphs 1 to 3). Operative paragraphs 5 to 8 dealt with other aspects and consequences of the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear installations.

9. His delegation would make every effort to ensure that its draft resolution could be adopted by consensus and incorporated in the Final Document of the Conference. However, if its efforts were unsuccessful, it would be compelled to request a vote on the text in accordance with the provisions of rule 28 of the rules of procedure of the Conference.

10. Mr. HILALE (Morocco) said that his delegation shared the concerns that had led to the formulation of draft resolution NPT/CONF.III/L.4 and was not satisfied with the progress made in the consultations undertaken on the subject of the last part of the Final Declaration concerning the condemnation of the Israeli attack on the civilian nuclear installations in Iraq. Morocco's support for that draft resolution was in keeping with its attachment to the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and its commitment to the principles set forth in the Treaty which implicitly prohibited any infringement of the inalienable right of the States parties to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The Conference was duty-bound to condemn that act of aggression, as had been done by the General Assembly and the Security Council, which had adopted unambiguous resolutions on that subject in order to avoid the recurrence of such incidents. A failure to condemn such practices was tantamount to encouraging them. Consequently, the members of the Conference should respond to Iraq's appeal and reach a consensus on that question. He thanked the President for the efforts that he was making to that end.

11. Mr. AL-TELL (Jordan) said that his delegation was greatly disappointed at the lack of consensus concerning the Israeli attack on the Iraqi civilian nuclear installations. All States should unanimously acknowledge the fact that that act of aggression constituted one of the greatest challenges to the Treaty. It was absolutely essential to put an end to all forms of assistance to Israel in the nuclear field in order to induce that country to accede to the Treaty and subject its nuclear installations to IAEA safeguards. Consequently, he supported draft resolution NPT/CONF.III/L.4 as well as the comments made during its introduction by the representative of Iraq and expressed the hope that it would be adopted by consensus without a vote.

Proposal for inclusion in the Final Declaration by Ireland (NPT/CONF.III/59)

12. Mr. HAYES (Ireland), introducing document NPT/CONF.III/59, said that it was not a draft resolution but, rather, a proposal for incorporation in the Final Declaration of the Conference. He recalled that the non-nuclear-weapon States had expressed the view that the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty was a matter of the highest priority for the achievement of the objectives laid down in NPT. Hence, that proposal constituted an appeal
made by the non-nuclear-weapon States to the nuclear-weapon States. His
delegation hoped that all the non-nuclear-weapon States would associate
themselves with that appeal and support that proposal, which was in no way
intended to prevent the Conference from reaching a consensus on other parts of
its Final Declaration which were currently under consideration.

13. Mr. SENE (Senegal) said that the non-aligned and neutral countries were
more than ever in favour of reaching a consensus with a view to ensuring the
credibility and universality of NPT and achieving the Treaty's objectives.
Attention should therefore be focused on the general principles, fundamental
obligations and commitments stipulated in the Treaty in order to overcome the
few remaining problems. Instead of beginning voting procedures and thereby
embarking on a collision course, endeavours should be made to adopt a
conciliatory approach and seek compromise. In that respect, he paid a tribute
to the Chairmen of the three Main Committees which had performed their task
with remarkable success, as shown in their reports which reflected the spirit
of dialogue, tolerance and mutual understanding that had characterized the
work of the Conference. Every effort should therefore be made to draw up a
Final Document that truly reflected that spirit of consensus on which all
valid international co-operation was based. On behalf of the non-aligned and
neutral countries, he thanked the President of the Conference for the efforts
that he had made to that end and requested him to continue those efforts.

14. Mr. DUNN (United States of America) said he agreed with the
representative of Senegal that there was no reason to abandon all hope of
reaching a consensus. The three Main Committees of the Conference had already
achieved a consensus on many questions such as the measures to be taken and
the recommendations to be incorporated in the Final Document of the Conference
with a view to strengthening the non-proliferation régime. Nevertheless, it
would not be possible to adopt that Final Document by consensus if some of the
proposed resolutions were contested. If the Conference was divided, it would
be difficult for it to attain its objective of strengthening the Treaty which,
in spite of its fairly disappointing results, remained an important
achievement in the field of disarmament. He was convinced that all the
possibilities of reaching a consensus had not yet been exhausted, although
that did not mean that it would be easy to achieve unanimity on the remaining
issues since they were the most difficult. All States naturally had the right
to defend their position. However, notwithstanding their legitimate
differences of opinion, they all recognized the importance of the Treaty for
international peace and security and the need to eliminate nuclear weapons, to
apply more fully the provisions of article VI of the Treaty and, above all, to
strengthen NPT. Efforts should therefore be continued to find common ground
for agreement while, at the same time ensuring that all States could make
their views known.
15. Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) agreed with the representative of the United States of America that every endeavour should be made to reach an agreement. The Mexican delegation, for its part, would spare no effort to achieve that objective. However, it should not be forgotten that consensus implied reciprocal concessions and he hoped that all the parties would be willing to make such concessions.

16. The PRESIDENT urged all the members of the Conference to respond to that appeal for the achievement of a consensus in order to ensure the success of the Conference.

The meeting rose at 6.35 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 16th MEETING
Saturday, 21 September 1985, at 1.45 a.m.

President: Mr. SHAKER (Egypt)

EXPRESSION OF SYMPATHY TO MEXICO ON THE OCCASION OF THE EARTHQUAKE DISASTER IN THAT COUNTRY

1. The PRESIDENT asked the Mexican representative to convey to the Government and people of Mexico the sincere sympathy of the whole Conference on the occasion of the earthquake disaster which had struck that country on 19 September 1985.

2. Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) expressed his delegation's gratitude for those generous words of sympathy and said he would be honoured to convey that message to his Government.

CREDENTIALS OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE CONFERENCE (agenda item 7) (concluded)

(b) report of the credentials committee

3. Mr. KEISALO (Finland), Chairman of the Credentials Committee, introduced that Committee's report (NPT/CONF.III/62 and Add.1), which had been adopted unanimously; the Committee had accepted all credentials communicated to the Secretary-General of the Conference in accordance with rule 2 of its rules of procedure. It suggested that all those participating States which had not yet done so should communicate their credentials in due form to the Secretary-General of the Conference as soon as possible.

4. After the adoption of its report, the Credentials Committee had received two statements. In the first, the representative of the United States of America had indicated that his country's acceptance of all the credentials was not to be construed as acquiescence in the Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan, or as implying that the régime in that country was considered representative of the Afghan people. In the second statement, the USSR representative had rejected that United States statement as unwarranted and slanderous.

5. The PRESIDENT said that, since there were no comments, he would take it that the Conference wished to take note of the report of the Credentials Committee.

6. It was so decided.
REPORTS OF THE MAIN COMMITTEES (agenda item 15)


7. Mr. Dhanapala (Sri Lanka), Chairman of Committee I, introduced the Committee's report which was self-explanatory. He took the opportunity to thank the other officers and all those who had worked in Committee I.

8. The President said that, since there were no comments, he would take it that the Conference wished to take note of the report of Committee I.

9. It was so decided.

Report of Committee II (NPT/CONF.III/58 and Corr.1)

10. Mr. Vejvoda (Czechoslovakia), Chairman of Committee II, introduced the Committee's report and said that consensus had been reached on all points except for paragraph 7A (4) of the document. In that regard, negotiations had taken place after the conclusion of the work of Committee II which had resulted in the formulation of a text for paragraph 7A (4) acceptable to all, he had supplied that text to the President and the Secretary-General of the Conference.

11. The President said that, since there were no comments, he would take it that the Conference wished to take note of the report of Committee II, subject to that explanation regarding paragraph 7A (4).

12. It was so decided.

Report of Committee III (NPT/CONF.III/56)

13. Mr. Imai (Japan), Chairman of Committee III, introduced that Committee's report and paid a tribute to the hard work of all participants.

14. The President said that, since there were no comments, he would take it that the Conference wished to take note of the report of Committee III.

15. It was so decided.

REPORT OF THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE (NPT/CONF.III/61 and Add.I-3)

16. Mr. Ekeus (Sweden), Chairman of the Drafting Committee, introducing that Committee's report said that pursuant to rule 36 of the rules of procedure of the Conference, the Drafting Committee had co-ordinated and edited the reports of the Main Committees and had formulated drafts requested of it.

17. The President said that, since there were no comments, he would take it that the Conference wished to take note of the report of the Drafting Committee.

18. It was so decided.
PREPARATION AND ADOPTION OF THE FINAL DOCUMENT (agenda item 17)

19. The PRESIDENT said it could be seen from the reports of the three Main Committees and of the Drafting Committee that, at the time when those reports had been concluded, there had still been a number of important matters on which no agreement had been reached. He was now glad to report that, as a result of intensive efforts and a great deal of goodwill, it had been possible to solve most of those problems. The Drafting Committee's report already mentioned the solution of one problem which had been left unsettled, concerning paragraph 7A (4) of the report of Committee II (NPT/CONF.III/58), namely that of nuclear export policies, dealt with in paragraph 4 of the section entitled "Article III and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5" in the Drafting Committee's report (NPT/CONF.III/61, annex, part II).

20. He drew attention to the fact that, in part I of the draft Final Document set out in the annex to the Drafting Committee's report, the last sentence of paragraph 32 should be corrected to read: "At its 16th meeting on 20 September 1985, the Conference decided to take note of the three reports". Also, in paragraph 33, two additional sentences should be inserted, reading: "Its report (NPT/CONF.III/61 and Add.1-3) was submitted to the Conference at its 16th meeting, on 20 September 1985. At that meeting, the Conference took note of the report."

21. With regard to the Final Declaration, he read out a redrafted version of certain passages, which had been approved by consensus. In the first place, the fifth paragraph of the section entitled "Articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1-3" (NPT/CONF.III/61, annex, part II) had been reformulated to read:

"The Conference noted the great and serious concerns expressed about the nuclear capability of South Africa and Israel. The Conference further noted the calls on all States for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear facilities, resources or devices to South Africa and Israel and to stop all exploitation of Namibian uranium, natural or enriched, until the attainment of Namibian independence."

22. In the section entitled "Article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7" (ibid.) the following new paragraph should be inserted immediately after paragraph 9,

"10. The Conference expresses its profound concern about the Israeli military attack on Iraq's safeguarded nuclear reactor on 7 June 1981. The Conference recalls Security Council resolution 487 of 1981, strongly condemning the military attack by Israel, which was unanimously adopted by the Council and which considered that the said attack constituted a serious threat to the entire IAEA safeguards régime which is the foundation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Conference also takes note of the decisions and resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly and the International Atomic Energy Agency on this attack, including resolution 425 of 1984 adopted by the General Conference of the IAEA."
23. Paragraph 20 of the same section had been redrafted to read:

"Great and serious concerns were expressed at the Conference about the nuclear capability of South Africa and Israel and that the development of such a capability by South Africa and Israel would undermine the credibility and stability of the Non-Proliferation Treaty régime. The Conference noted the demands made on all States to suspend any co-operation which would contribute to the nuclear programme of South Africa and Israel. The Conference further noted the demands made on South Africa and Israel to accede to the NPT, to accept IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear facilities and to pledge themselves not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."

24. Mr. SENE (Senegal) recalled that the delegations of the States members of the Group of Non-Aligned and Neutral States participating in the Conference had submitted three draft resolutions dealing respectively with a comprehensive nuclear test ban (NPT/CONF.III/L.1), a nuclear test ban moratorium (NPT/CONF.III/L.2) and a nuclear arms freeze (NPT/CONF.III/L.3). The objective pursued by the first of those draft resolutions had been achieved thanks to the approval by consensus of a text for inclusion in the Final Declaration, a text in which, with the exception indicated therein, it was unequivocally declared that the Conference

"deeply regretted that a comprehensive multilateral nuclear test ban treaty banning all nuclear tests by all States in all environments for all time had not been concluded so far and, therefore, called on the nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty to resume trilateral negotiations in 1985 and called on all the nuclear-weapon States to participate in the urgent negotiation and conclusion of such a treaty as a matter of the highest priority in the Conference on Disarmament".

25. With regard to the other two draft resolutions, the sponsors had decided not to press them to a vote because there had been unanimous acceptance for the reproduction of the texts, together with the statement which he had just read, immediately following the text of the Final Declaration. Moreover, in the section entitled "Article VI, and preambular paragraphs 8 and 12" of the Final Declaration (NPT/CONF.III/61, annex, part II), in paragraphs B-7 and B-9, the Conference explicitly took note of the repeated appeals contained in many resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, as well as of "similar calls made at this Conference" in connection with a moratorium on nuclear weapons testing and a quantitative and qualitative freeze on all nuclear weapons.

Turning once more to the section under "Article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7", he pointed out that, in paragraph 13, headed "Proposed texts under negotiation among delegations", subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) should be deleted. There remained only subparagraph (d), reading: "The Conference notes that the Islamic Republic of Iran states its concern regarding attacks on its nuclear facilities." Despite all the efforts made, no consensus had yet been reached on that passage. One possible solution would be to retain it in the document, while adding that it had not generated a consensus.

28. Mr. SHAHABI SIRJANI (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that, as the Conference was probably informed, the peaceful nuclear facility of Bushehr had been subjected on three occasions to military attacks: twice in 1985 and once in 1984. Those attacks had been deliberate in nature, in that there were no significant military objectives to be achieved by attacking the area or its surroundings. As a result of the attack carried out in February 1985 against the Bushehr nuclear power plant with two missiles, one of the members of the site personnel had been killed within the boundary of the plant and material damage had been caused to the plant. The third attack on the plant - and the second in 1985 - had occurred in the month of March, causing much more extensive damage. On that occasion, damage had been inflicted on the plant's operating diesel generator house and the concrete structures of the reactor building of the plant.

29. Each of those attacks had been appropriately reported to the Director-General of IAEA. In response to the attack carried out on 4 March 1985, the Director-General had declared, in his communication dated 8 March 1985, that he wished to express deep regret at the serious material losses reported. The Director-General had also pointed out that he continued to concur with the view expressed in resolution GC(XXVII)/RES/407 of the IAEA General Conference in 1983, that all armed attacks against nuclear installations devoted to peaceful purposes should be explicitly prohibited.

30. In the context of the recent attacks against peaceful nuclear facilities, it was also appropriate to refer to the statement made on 19 February 1985 in the General Conference of the IAEA to the effect that one of the most serious problems facing the Agency in recent years had been the threat of armed attack on peaceful nuclear facilities. At another point in the same meeting, the Director-General had observed that in view of proposals to construct nuclear-power reactors in several countries of the Middle East, those countries, and indeed the world at large, would naturally require without delay a firm assurance that such peaceful facilities be immune from attack.

31. At the 7th meeting of Committee III of the present Review Conference his delegation had made a very modest proposal to the effect that the Conference strongly deplored attacks against the peaceful nuclear facilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It was reflected in the formulation put forward by the Chairman of that Committee to be found in the subparagraph just referred
to by the President (see above, para.27). His delegation had decided to go along with that formulation in a spirit of co-operation, although it fell short of meeting its real concerns. With that text, his delegation could join a consensus on the whole report; without it, it would be unable to do so. His delegation was of course prepared to hear any proposals reflecting appropriately its concerns; it had been consulting with the President on that point and awaited his proposals for a solution.

32. Mr. AL-KITAL (Iraq) said it was a matter for deep regret that Iran had considered the present Review Conference merely as an opportunity for propaganda and fabrications against Iraq. As everyone knew, a war had been in progress between Iraq and Iran for over five years. The only constructive intervention should be with a view to stopping that war. The war, however, was continuing because Iran was disregarding the Security Council resolutions on the matter. Nor had Iran responded to the numerous efforts made by many other international bodies, such as the Islamic Conference and the Non-Aligned Movement.

33. Turning to the specific question of Bushehr, he wished to make it clear that Bushehr fell into a war zone declared by Iraq: it was a port, where the installations in question were located. Nevertheless, the Iraqi military authorities had once again emphatically denied that any deliberate attack on that construction site had taken place. The alleged attacks had first been reported in April 1984, when the Islamic Republic of Iran had requested an urgent meeting of the Board of Governors of IAEA. The Director-General, however, had found no reason for such a meeting. Again, in June 1984, the Islamic Republic of Iran had called for consideration of the matter by the Board of Governors of IAEA, but the Board had refused to include the question in its agenda because there was no evidence of such an attack. The report presented to the General Conference of IAEA in 1984 had been submitted by the Director-General in direct response to General Conference resolution GC(XXVII)/RES/409, adopted in 1983, in regard to the Israeli attack on Iraqi peaceful nuclear facilities and not to any other matter. The Bushehr site contained no nuclear materials; it had no facility attachment negotiated with IAEA and it did not qualify as a nuclear facility. Those were the actual words of the Director-General of IAEA.

34. In the circumstances, the present Review Conference could not take into account considerations arising from disputes - or for that matter armed conflicts - between two States. The Conference was not the place where the war should be discussed. There were other forums for that purpose, such as the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations.

35. In conclusion, he pointed out that every time the question of the Israeli attack came under discussion, the Iranian delegation immediately levelled allegations against Iraq. His own delegation would not let itself be affected by that; its position would remain firm and it would never cease to ensure that its point of view was well recognized with regard to Israeli aggression.
36. Mr. SENE (Senegal), speaking on behalf of the Neutral Group of Non-Aligned States, moved the closure of the debate under rule 22 of the rules of procedure of the Conference, on the understanding that the statements of the representatives of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq would be included in the summary record of the present meeting and that, in any event, they should in no way call into question the consensus on the reports under discussion.

37. The PRESIDENT said that, in accordance with rule 22 of the rules of procedure, he would give the floor only to two representatives opposing the motion for closure.

38. Mr. SHAHABI SIRJANI (Islamic Republic of Iran) opposed the motion for closure of the debate. If his delegation's fair request that its concerns should be reflected in the final report of the Conference was not granted, it could not go along with the consensus on the whole report. He drew attention to the section entitled "Protection of safeguarded nuclear facilities" in the report of Committee III (NPT/CONF.III/56, para.7, sect.III), and in particular to the opening words of paragraph 4 of that section: "The following paragraph was proposed and supported by many ...". The concluding subparagraph of that paragraph 4 dealt precisely with concern of the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding attacks on its nuclear facilities. Accordingly, it would be only the reflection of the wishes of many of the participants if the Conference agreed to refer to the attacks on nuclear facilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as part and parcel of the Conference's report.

39. The PRESIDENT pointed out that the opening phrase of that paragraph 4 related only to the subparagraph which mentioned Security Council resolution 487 (1981) and the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear installation in 1981. The remaining subparagraphs, including the one mentioned by the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, were covered by a different introductory sentence, reading: "In this context the following material provided a basis for the Committee's deliberations".

40. Mr. SHAHABI SIRJANI (Islamic Republic of Iran) asked whether the closure of the debate would mean that paragraph 13, subparagraph (d) of the section entitled "Article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7" would be eliminated from the Final Document.

41. The PRESIDENT explained that, at the present stage, he would put to the vote only the motion for closure of the debate.

42. The motion for closure of the debate was carried by 55 votes to 1, with 7 abstentions.

43. The PRESIDENT invited the Conference to proceed with the adoption of the Final Document, including the Final Declaration. Before that, however, he asked whether the delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran agreed that it should be adopted by consensus and whether it would be satisfied to express a reservation regarding the lack of consensus as to the language contained in subparagraph (d), to which the representative of that country had just referred.
44. Mr. SHAHABI SIRJANI (Islamic republic of Iran) said that his delegation regretted to say that it could not agree to a consensus on the report as a whole.

45. The PRESIDENT said that despite all the efforts made to reach a consensus, the Conference had reached a deadlock and it appeared that he had no alternative but to apply paragraph 3 of rule 29 of the rules of procedure of the Conference, i.e. to defer a vote on the Final Document for 48 hours.

46. Mr. RAEYMAECKERS (Belgium) moved that the meeting should be suspended, under rule 23 (a) of the rules of procedure.

47. The motion was carried by 48 votes to 1, with 4 abstentions.

The meeting was suspended at 3.10 a.m. and resumed at 4.50 a.m.

48. The PRESIDENT said that the consultations which had taken place during the suspension had produced a consensus on the whole Final Declaration. Paragraph 13 (d), and indeed the whole of paragraph 13 of the section entitled "Article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7 would be eliminated. The statements made by the representatives of the Islamic Republic of Iran and of Iraq would be reproduced in full as annexes to the Final Document.

49. He now proposed to move on to the adoption of the Final Declaration by consensus, after which delegations, including those of the Islamic Republic of Iran and of Iraq, would have an opportunity to make statements. Those statements would be incorporated in the summary record of the meeting which, like the other summary records of the Conference, would form part of the Final Document.

50. Mr. SHAHABI SIRJANI (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that it had also been agreed in the consultations that the paragraph 13 mentioned by the President would be replaced by a text on the following lines: "In this regard, the Conference notes the statements as annexed made by the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq".

51. The PRESIDENT said he recalled that the text in question had been put forward during the consultations; however, he was not aware that it formed part of the agreement reached.

52. Mr. SHAHABI SIRJANI (Islamic Republic of Iran) said it was his delegation's understanding that the inclusion of the text in question was part of the agreement reached. In order to facilitate the work of the Conference, however, he would not press that point.

53. Mr. AL-KITAL (Iraq) said that he did not recall the term "annex" being used at any moment during the consultations. It had simply been agreed that the two statements by Iraq and the Islamic Republic of Iran would be reproduced in the Final Document, but not in the form of annexes.
54. The PRESIDENT said that the two statements in question would be reproduced in full as documents and included in the Final Document of the Conference. The two statements would be reproduced after the Final Declaration. The documents of the Conference would include the summary records.

55. If there were no further comments, he would take it that the Conference agreed by consensus to adopt the Final Document, including the Final Declaration.

56. The Final Document, including the Final Declaration, were adopted.

CONCLUSION OF THE CONFERENCE

57. The PRESIDENT expressed satisfaction at the successful outcome of the Conference - an outcome to which all the participants had greatly contributed. He wished to thank the Chairmen of the three Main Committees, of the Drafting Committee and of the Credentials Committee, the Vice-Presidents and all the participants for their contributions, and the Secretary-General of the Conference and all members of the secretariat for their valuable work.

58. The representatives of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq had requested the floor to make statements before the conclusion of the Conference.

59. Mr. SHAHABI SIRJANI (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that in the view of his delegation, and many other delegations, there was hardly any difference between the military attack carried out by Iraq against the peaceful nuclear facilities in his country on the one hand and the attack by Israel on the Tammouz nuclear facility on the other. In both cases, peaceful nuclear facilities of a State party to NPT had been attacked. Apart from the three recent attacks which had been carried out on the Bushehr nuclear energy plant, safeguarded operational nuclear research facilities in Teheran had also come under attack in three separate raids carried out by Iraq. It was his delegation's stance at the present Conference that the concern of the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding Iraqi attacks on its peaceful nuclear facilities should be reflected in some way in the report of the Conference. That position stemmed from Iranian experience regarding the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Bases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925. 14/ It believed that, unless breaches of international law were dealt with in an appropriate manner, repeated violations would occur.

60. Mr. AL-KITAL (Iraq), speaking on a point of order, said that the Iranian representative was totally out of order and should be directed to limit his remarks to the question of the contents of the Final Declaration of the Conference.

61. **Mr. SHAHABI SIRJANI** (Islamic Republic of Iran) said it was the Iraqi Government which was out of order concerning NPT and other international treaties. The position taken by his delegation during the recent consultations had been calculated to facilitate the reaching of a consensus by the Conference on very important issues in its report. Although his delegation's concerns had not been reflected adequately in the report, it had acted in a spirit of co-operation, and had endeavoured to avoid obstructing a consensus.

62. **Mr. AL-KITAL** (Iraq) reiterated his delegation's regret at the fact that another representative should continue to use the Conference for purposes of propaganda and false statements. As he had mentioned earlier, the statement of the Director-General of IAEA which had been quoted related to the Israeli attack. Nevertheless, an attempt had been made to misrepresent it as relating to the Iranian complaint.

63. Reference had again been made by the same representative to so-called peaceful nuclear installations. He was obliged to repeat that the installation in question was under construction, that it had no nuclear materials, and no facility attachment and did not qualify for description as a peaceful nuclear facility.

64. Everyone knew that Iraq had agreed to stop the war and to engage in negotiations for a peace settlement right from the time, on 28 September 1980, when the Security Council had called for a halt to the war. The response of the Islamic Republic of Iran had been to describe the Security Council as a tool in the hands of the imperialists. Iran's reaction to the resolutions to the same effect adopted by the Islamic Conference and a number of other bodies had been equally negative.

65. **Mr. SHAHABI SIRJANI** (Islamic Republic of Iran), speaking on a point of order, said that the Conference was called upon to discuss the operation of an international treaty, namely NPT. Nowhere in international law or international usage had it been suggested that an international treaty could be broken because of a war. In fact, many treaties were precisely intended to be applied during conflicts, since their aim was to prevent unnecessary suffering being inflicted in the course of hostilities.

66. **Mr. AL-KITAL** (Iraq), resuming his statement, said that the purpose of his remarks had been to show that the motivation of the Iranian delegation was totally alien to NPT. As for the sufferings due to armed conflict, he could only say that the suffering inflicted on both the Iranian and the Iraqi peoples was the work of the Iranian Government.

67. The Conference should focus its concern not on a single nuclear installation but on the war which the Islamic Republic of Iran insisted on continuing. The remarks by a representative who had not really participated in the work of the Conference were intended solely for the purpose of
introducing into the report a statement of some kind mentioning the name of Iran. Over and over again, the Iranian delegation had diverted the attention of the third Review Conference from NPT in order to make repeated references to Iraq. Actually, all that the Iranian delegation had succeeded in doing had been to divert the attention of the Conference from the real aggression carried out by Israel against Iraq's peaceful nuclear facility.

68. The PRESIDENT declared the third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons concluded.

The meeting rose at 5.20 a.m.
THIRD REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON
THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

COMMITTEE I

SUMMARY RECORDS OF THE 1st TO 9th MEETINGS

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
from 4 to 17 September 1985

Chairman          Mr. DHANAPALA     (Sri Lanka)
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 1st MEETING

Wednesday, 4 September 1985, at 4.15 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. DHANAPALA (Sri Lanka)

REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY AS PROVIDED FOR IN ITS ARTICLE VIII (3) (agenda item 13):

A. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY RELATING TO NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY:

(1) ARTICLES I AND II AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 1-3;
(2) ARTICLE VI AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 8-12;
(3) ARTICLE VII WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO THE MAIN ISSUES IN A AND B.

B. SECURITY ASSURANCES:

(1) RESOLUTION 255 (1968) OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL;
(2) EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS TO ASSURE NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES AGAINST THE USE OR THREAT OF USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

1. The CHAIRMAN reminded members of the Committee that the items under consideration were articles I and II and the first to third preambular paragraphs, article VI and the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs, article VII, with specific reference to the main issues considered in the Committee, as well as security assurances, including resolution 255 (1968) of the Security Council and effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Consideration of article VII would have specific reference to the main issues dealt with by the Committee. The article related to the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories. The Conference had allocated article VII to both Committees I and II, and there was bound to be some degree of overlap which would be reflected in the respective reports.

2. The President of the Conference had suggested that there should be no general debate in the main committees, but it was likely that members might wish, as a first phase in their work, to engage in a general exchange of views, focusing on the items allocated to Main Committee I or on proposals. The second phase would be a detailed discussion on the items allocated to the Committee, bearing in mind the relevant working papers submitted by delegations with a view to identifying elements for the report. The third phase would be consideration of the report to be submitted to the Drafting Committee. The method of work should be as flexible as possible; the creation of working groups might help to save time if the discussion of particular items proved long or detailed. There was a need for speedy and efficient work because of the limited time in hand.
3. Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico), referring to the reservations he had made at the 12th plenary meeting of the Conference, said that if no final document resulted from the Conference, delegations would be entitled, in accordance with rule 28 of the rules of procedure, to adopt such resolutions as might be necessary.

4. Mr. MAC FHIONNBHAIRR (Ireland) asked if the Committee's work and its report would be related to a final document, regardless of its nature.

5. The CHAIRMAN said that his expectation was that the report to be submitted to the Conference would be a reflection of the discussions in Main Committee I, and that it was the function of the Drafting Committee to put it, together with the reports of the other main committees, into the shape of a final document. There was no contradiction between the point made by the representative of Mexico and his suggested plan of work.

6. Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) asked whether there would be a time-table for considering the four points allocated to Main Committee I and whether the issues would be considered together or consecutively.

7. The CHAIRMAN said that while he would prefer a flexible approach, if it was the wish of the Committee to have a stricter time-table it could be prepared. His intention was to take each issue in turn rather than to deal with them as a whole.

8. If there were no further comments, he would take it that the consensus of the meeting was to adopt the proposed plan for the organization of work.

9. It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 4.50 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 2nd MEETING

Monday, 9 September 1985, at 10.25 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. DHANAPALA (Sri Lanka)

GENERAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS

1. Mr. HAYES (Ireland) stressed the fundamental importance of the tenth preambular paragraph and of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and said that, in order to evaluate the implementation of the article since the Second Review Conference, the first question to examine was whether the policies of the nuclear-weapon States had demonstrated a commitment to the article's objective, namely, "cessation of the nuclear arms race". Secondly, it was necessary to look at the concrete measures taken in the direction of nuclear disarmament.

2. It had to be acknowledged that since 1980 the nuclear arms race, far from slowing down, had become intensified, with the development of new and more destructive weapons. Indeed, the prospect now was of an extension of the arms race to outer space and the future looked bleak. The nuclear-weapon States had failed to take the "effective measures" called for in article VI, and the past five years had been marked by a number of unfulfilled expectations, particularly in regard to the demise of the SALT negotiations, and a number of false starts as in the case of the START and INF talks. The recent resumption of bilateral talks between the Soviet Union and the United States of America showed, however, that the two super-Powers recognized the need to pursue their dialogue in view of their role in the maintenance of international peace and security. Their commitment to the restraints of the SALT agreements, and in particular to those of the unratified SALT II Treaty, was also to be welcomed. Despite the dearth of concrete results, it did seem that the past five years had witnessed some degree of reappraisal of the premises on which nuclear deterrence was based. As to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties, they were above all required to abide by article II, but all parties accepted responsibility under article VI to contribute towards disarmament negotiations.

3. In the field of multilateral disarmament there had been a series of disappointments. The promise of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly (first special session devoted to disarmament) had not been realized, multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty had not started - indeed, not even the conditions for such negotiations had been decided upon - and earlier consensus on major issues, such as outer space, was breaking down. There had been a number of multilateral initiatives aimed at setting out new approaches, but they had had little effect, and calls for a halt to the development, testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons had elicited little response.

4. With regard to the question of the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, foreseen in the tenth preambular paragraph of the Treaty, although all recognized its importance for disarmament, States were not agreed either on the degree of priority to be accorded to such a treaty or on its scope.
Lastly, he announced that his delegation had drawn up a number of proposals relating to the Committee's report to the Conference and said that the proposals, whose main elements he outlined, would be distributed to participants as a working paper of the Committee.

5. Mr. PETROSYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), referring to the implementation of the provisions of article VI and of the tenth preambular paragraph concerning the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests, recalled that the parties to the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water had expressed their determination to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to that end. Since the adoption of that instrument, the Soviet Union had done everything it could to translate that intention into reality.

6. In 1974 and 1976, the USSR had signed agreements with the United States of America on the limitation of underground nuclear-weapon tests and it was prepared to ratify them if the United States was willing to do likewise.

7. From 1977 to 1980 the Soviet Union had participated in tripartite negotiations on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. When agreement on the text of an instrument had practically been reached, the negotiations had been broken off by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States. The Soviet Union had repeatedly proposed that they should be resumed or that a start on negotiations on the question of nuclear tests should be made within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament.

8. Guided by the desire to seek a radical solution to the problem, the Soviet Union had proposed the inclusion of an item entitled "Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear-weapons" in the agenda for the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly, and had submitted a document containing basic provisions for a treaty prohibiting nuclear tests. The document, which was still before the Conference on Disarmament, took account of results achieved over the years in various forums.

9. Within the Conference on Disarmament, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries had consistently advocated the establishment of an ad hoc committee for the purpose of negotiating a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and had supported proposals made in that connection by the Group of Non-Aligned and Neutral States. The USSR had always taken the view that such an instrument should provide for adequate verification measures. During the tripartite negotiations, all the essential points of a verification system had virtually been settled and set forth in a technical protocol, which the negotiating partners had submitted to the Committee on Disarmament 15/ and to the Second Review Conference. Verification of the implementation of a nuclear-test-ban treaty did not in fact give rise to any difficulty at the technical level. The problem was purely a political one.

15/ The Committee on Disarmament was redesignated the Conference on Disarmament as from 7 February 1984.
and could be reduced to the following: in reality, certain countries wanted to continue nuclear-weapon tests so as to be able to go on building up their arsenals and developing new weapons systems.

10. The Soviet Union had declared a unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions for the period between 6 August 1985 and 1 January 1986 and had announced that if the United States did likewise, the moratorium could be extended. As Mr. Gorbachev had told a journalist on the staff of Time, by taking that decision the USSR had wanted to break the vicious circle of the arms race. The Soviet Union was deeply convinced that it was not only essential but also perfectly possible to arrive at a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. It would do everything in its power to ensure that the objectives of article VI were achieved.

11. Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany) said that the purpose of the Conference was to make a sober assessment of the implementation of the Treaty, not hesitating to be critical where necessary but also emphasizing positive aspects.

12. In the matter of negative security assurances, nothing seemed to stand in the way of finding a common formula. But the Committee's central assignment was to review the implementation of article VI and the preambular paragraphs relevant to it. By virtue of article VI, non-nuclear-weapon States had a legal claim to nuclear disarmament, independently of their right to participate actively in multilateral arms control endeavours. The article thus imposed special obligations on the nuclear-weapon States.

13. Article VI stipulated that the parties to the Treaty should pursue negotiations "in good faith", a provision that was obviously addressed above all to the nuclear-weapon States, which were under the obligation not only to enter into negotiations but also to pursue them. Between the Second and Third Review Conferences a grave incident had occurred when the Soviet Union had withdrawn from the INF and START negotiations, an action which, in his Government's view, was clearly at variance with the obligations under article VI. As Mr. Möllemann, the Minister of State of the Federal Republic of Germany, had stated at the 4th plenary meeting, on 29 August, his Government regretted that the Soviet Union had failed to respond constructively to proposals by the United States which, while safeguarding the legitimate security interests of all concerned, would have permitted the mutual renunciation of an entire category of weapons in the intermediate range. Happily, the suspension of the talks had since been healed and, to the substantial gratification of all, the Soviet Union seemed once more prepared to negotiate in good faith.

14. Important as it was, however, the criterion of good faith was not enough. The will to achieve concrete results was also needed. It was obvious from the Treaty that the States which had armed themselves more must also make more concessions. That was where the "quantitative" aspect of nuclear disarmament came in. The members of NATO, of which his country was one, knew that nuclear weapons were still necessary to their security and their defence. But defence against whom? Against a country - the Soviet Union, since it had to be named - which in the past 15 years, in other words,
since the Treaty's entry into force, had pursued a policy of unprecedented nuclear armament, unlike the United States, whose nuclear armament had today reached its lowest point since the early 1960s. It should be noted that the huge nuclear deployment of new Soviet INF missiles - a major threat against Central Europe - had taken place mostly since the Second Review Conference. Moreover, during the same period, Soviet nuclear weapons had been stationed in East European countries where, at least allegedly, there had been none before. Those armament efforts, when seen in conjunction with the steady increase in the conventional superiority in Europe, far beyond any defensive needs, of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, ran counter to the principle of strategic parity between the two great Powers as agreed in 1972 and to their mutual undertaking not to acquire unilateral advantages. They also deviated from the Brezhnev-Schmidt understanding of 1978 that no further deterioration of the military balance in Europe should take place. On the whole, Soviet nuclear policy since 1970 showed that the Treaty had not had the hoped-for constraining influence on Soviet nuclear armament.

15. The importance of progress towards the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty was, of course, extremely great, but it had to be recognized that the present Conference was not on a comprehensive test-ban treaty and that such a narrowing of the focus of the Conference's work would be a mistake. Nevertheless, his delegation would spare no effort to contribute towards the speedy conclusion of such a treaty.

16. Substantial testing had taken place since the Second Review Conference, and there again, the Soviet Union had been well ahead, having conducted more registered tests since 1980 than all other nuclear-weapon States together and leading the United States by a margin of more than 60 per cent. In such circumstances, the moratorium recently announced by the Soviet Union inevitably gave rise to certain doubts. His delegation was not alone in taking the view that unverifiable moratoriums which were revokable at any time did not provide a long-term solution to the problem of tests. It should not be forgotten that the test moratorium which had prevailed from 1958 to 1961 had been breached unilaterally.

17. At the latest session of the Conference on Disarmament, his country's delegation had made constructive proposals intended to make progress towards a comprehensive test ban. Unfortunately, the proposals had been rejected. The main need at present was for the creation and improvement of a comprehensive verification scheme for a future treaty. The issue was extremely complex and, in that connection, he drew attention to two documents (CD/612 and CD/624) which his delegation had submitted at the Conference on Disarmament and in which it proposed the establishment as early as possible of a global seismological monitoring network that would incorporate the latest technology.

18. In conclusion, he again stressed the need for constructive criticism. Parties against whom criticism was voiced should earnestly search themselves and should take the review of the Treaty and its future to heart. A consensus might then be reached on the basis of honest give and take, which was the only way of making headway.
19. Mr. BOLT (New Zealand) said that he wished to draw attention to some of the statements made in plenary in order to pinpoint some of the elements which should, in his opinion, give shape to the Committee's report. First of all, it should be borne in mind that the Treaty had two categories of parties, nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States. Remarkably enough, article VI - the article on which views were most sharply divided - did not draw such a distinction. Yet it was clear that States in the first category bore special responsibilities, particularly in matters of nuclear disarmament, as Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Shultz, two spokesmen of the two major nuclear-weapon States, had recently reaffirmed. It was equally clear that States in the second category were critical of the way in which those responsibilities had been discharged. On that issue, New Zealand, as a non-nuclear-weapon State, was in broad agreement with what most of the other States in the same category had said in plenary. Such differences as existed were largely a matter of emphasis or of special regional interests, such as, in New Zealand's particular case, its firm opposition to French nuclear testing in the South Pacific.

20. So far as articles I and II were concerned, there was virtual unanimity amongst nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States that their provisions had been faithfully observed. Such unanimity should be reflected in the report.

21. His delegation would speak about aspects of the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty in connection with the consideration of article VII in Committee II. Respect for nuclear-weapon-free zones by nuclear-weapon States was, however, a matter of relevance to Committee I. The South Pacific countries hoped that the five nuclear-weapon States would become parties to the relevant protocols to the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty and would undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear explosive devices against any country or territory in the zone and not to test nuclear explosive devices there. In that connection, he acknowledged with appreciation the interest in that Treaty expressed by the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union.

22. The lack of progress in implementing article VI should be duly reflected in the report of the Conference. To recognize, as the United States representative had done, that there was a diversity of views on how to meet the nuclear challenge seemed essential to the success of the Conference. Both the United States representative and the United Kingdom representative had acknowledged that the progress of arms control negotiations had been disappointing in the light of the provisions of article VI. The phrase "at an early date" in article VI was essential in reviewing the article and could not be overlooked. The representative of the USSR, in his address, had at no point expressed any disappointment in that connection, confining himself instead to reciting a number of unilateral steps setting an example for other countries. Yet experience had shown that such measures had not provided the basis for fruitful disarmament negotiations. A forthright acknowledgement that the disarmament process called for under article VI had proved highly unsatisfactory would therefore be preferable.

23. A great number of non-nuclear-weapon States, including his own country, had welcomed the statements made by the three nuclear-weapon States parties
with reference to the objectives set out in the communique of 8 January 1985 concerning bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States. In its report, the Conference should express the fervent hope that the negotiations would lead to effective measures of disarmament at an early date. The communique did not, however, provide for means of halting the increased sophistication of and qualitative changes in nuclear weapons. Hence it was not surprising that all non-nuclear-weapon States had called for the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. In that connection, the United States representative had made the point that such a ban would not reduce the number of nuclear weapons. In reply, it might be said that a quantitative reduction in the number of nuclear weapons would not prevent further qualitative improvements. Indeed, as the Swedish representative had pointed out, a nuclear-test-ban treaty would be a good complement to the current bilateral negotiations between the two major Powers by preventing cuts in arsenals being nullified by the development of new nuclear systems. The generally favourable response to the idea of supplementing the bilateral disarmament negotiations with a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty should find a prominent place in the Committee's report, for the conclusion of such a treaty was considered a matter of urgency by the overwhelming majority of delegations.

24. The United Kingdom delegation had emphasized the need for adequate verification within the context of such a treaty. Although some speakers had claimed that existing verification techniques were already sufficient, there could be no mutual confidence so long as genuine doubts persisted. His own delegation took the view that gaps in the verification system should be honestly recognized and promptly dealt with. As some speakers had pointed out, the NPT derived much of its strength from the fact that the implementation of obligations under article II was verified by the acceptance under article III of IAEA safeguards. International on-site verification measures afforded an example of what could be achieved when the necessary good will was applied to the task. The Conference on Disarmament was the appropriate forum for resolving any outstanding verification problem deemed to stand in the way of the conclusion of a treaty to put an end to all nuclear test explosions in all environments for all time. It was to be hoped that the Soviet Union would respond positively to the invitation addressed to it by the United States to send observers with any instrumentation devices they wished, so as to measure one of the United States nuclear tests. Acceptance of the invitation would be a useful, if modest, step along the road of verification and a helpful move for promoting a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

25. The United States representative had emphasized that the Non-Proliferation Treaty provided a moral and political imperative for the nuclear-weapon States to negotiate additional measures to reduce and eventually eliminate the threat of nuclear war. The present Conference indeed provided the platform for voicing that imperative and enabled the non-nuclear States to call upon nuclear-weapon States to enter into negotiations with a view to adopting such measures, in particular in the form of a verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. In his opinion, the Conference should adopt a final document reflecting the fears and hopes of non-nuclear-weapon States with regard to article VI, as well as their desire for bilateral negotiations to lead at an early date to effective measures of
disarmament, complemented by a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The nuclear-weapon States, in turn should give a sincere response to those views which would ensure the continuing integrity of the obligations in article VI and the purposes of the tenth preambular paragraph of the Treaty. It was to be hoped that neither of the two super-Powers would seek to shift responsibility to the other. The world expected leadership and a united responsibility from them.

26. All participants in the Conference should agree on the continuing value of the Treaty and the fact that its existence helped to make the world a safer place. The number of States parties should be increased and implementation of the Treaty improved, so that there would be no doubt that it would remain in force after 1995.

27. Mr. von ARX (Switzerland) said that the Treaty was based on a delicate balance between a number of rights and duties. It was composed of three parts: articles I to III dealt with non-proliferation, articles IV and VI concerned what might be termed compensation, and the last part was of an administrative nature. However, while all non-nuclear-weapon States parties had accepted the duties contained in the first part, the implementation of articles IV and VI had not been as satisfactory. At the legal level, the obligations laid down in article VI had been respected as a matter of form because negotiations on nuclear disarmament had actually taken place, but the same was not true at the political level, where success or failure would have a decisive influence on the future of the international non-proliferation régime. When the NPT had been signed in 1968, the nuclear-weapon States had been told that the long-term effectiveness of the Treaty would depend on the positive results of the negotiations they were obliged to undertake in accordance with article VI.

28. Switzerland realized the complexity of the problems raised by nuclear arms control and by disarmament and regretted that the efforts made during the past five years had not yet yielded any results. As a contribution to the final document, Switzerland would be submitting a working paper to the Committee urging that concrete results in implementing article VI should be achieved before the next Review Conference, which would probably be the penultimate review conference.

29. His delegation would also submit a working paper on article IV to Main Committee III. It would also like to reintroduce a document it had submitted five years previously at the Second Review Conference, but which had not been discussed due to lack of time. The document reiterated an idea dear to its heart, namely, peaceful settlement of disputes, and proposed inserting in the Treaty such a system of settlement for cases arising within the framework of the Treaty, along the lines of the systems contained in bilateral treaties on international nuclear co-operation and in the Convention for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

30. The Swiss delegation would endeavour to make a constructive contribution to the Conference so as to make the NPT more effective, in keeping with the system of non-proliferation.
31. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that the document to be submitted by the Swiss delegation on the peaceful settlement of disputes should be submitted to Main Committee I, since the twelfth preambular paragraph dealt specifically with the issue and had been allocated to Committee I for discussion.

32. Mr. BUTLER (Australia) said that the Conference was not one to negotiate a new arms control agreement but one intended to review the Treaty, to study precisely what the various articles stipulated and to decide whether or not they had been implemented adequately. If the answer was in the negative, participants would have to discuss what needed to be done in the future. The way in which views on what needed to be done was expressed was itself an important part of the Conference's work. His delegation believed that consensus was the most desirable modus operandi. Admittedly, consensus implied mutual accommodation and flexibility, but participants were well aware that the Treaty was vital to the security of all and that it must continue to play its unique role in international relations.

33. Certainly, the impact of the Treaty as a whole had been positive in terms of the conduct of international relations over the past 17 years, and in terms of the international community's commitment to maintaining international peace and security. The Conference should therefore seek to strengthen the Treaty's role and should consider how that could be achieved, bearing in mind that the Treaty as a whole was more than the sum of its individual parts. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia had stated at the 2nd plenary meeting that, whatever the findings of the Conference, the Treaty remained a necessity. It had contributed to the security of all States, whether signatories or not.

34. Indicating the approach that his delegation believed should be taken in reviewing the articles and paragraphs of the Treaty, he said that the Conference should reaffirm the essential validity of the first three preambular paragraphs, for prevention of nuclear war remained one of the central goals of today, and in order to achieve it, prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons was imperative. Articles I and II embodied the fundamental obligations of the nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States under the Treaty. In his opinion, those commitments had been respected and one of the essential purposes of the Treaty had therefore been fulfilled during the period under review.

35. The consideration of article VII and implementation thereof was largely a matter for Main Committee II, but since it had also been referred to Main Committee I, he would draw attention to the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty, signed at Rarotonga on 6 August 1985 and endorsed by the 14 member States of the South Pacific Forum, thereby exercising the right assured to them under article VII. Nuclear-weapon States which had been invited to endorse Protocol I to the Treaty should do so as soon as possible. The Conference should take note of the Rarotonga Treaty and of the call by the South Pacific States to nuclear-weapon States to endorse the protocols thereto.

36. Like many others, his delegation considered that article VI and the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs, which were based on the relevant
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, were of fundamental importance. It was essential for the maintenance of international peace and security that States should refrain from the use of force, should settle political disputes by peaceful means and should respect the territorial integrity and political independence of other States, as provided for in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations. The NPT could be seen as supplementing the Charter, by adding concerns, rules and concepts not known or thought of when the Charter had been drawn up. The eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs emphasized the need for effective measures of disarmament, an end to nuclear testing and the ultimate complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The Conference should reaffirm the continuing validity of those provisions as well as the necessity for them to be fully implemented. Article VI was a shorter form of expression of those concerns and obligations set forth in the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs, but the economy of language did not diminish their importance.

With regard to the undertaking to adopt effective measures for cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date, the absence of concrete results caused grave concern. The Conference would inevitably come to the conclusion that the undertakings given in Article VI had not been respected, it would therefore be right for the Conference to express its disappointment and concern and to call upon those concerned to respect Article VI so that the nuclear arms control negotiations could achieve more tangible results.

37. The Australian delegation believed that negotiation of a comprehensive treaty banning nuclear tests by all States in all environments for all time was an integral part of the implementation of the nuclear disarmament provisions of the Treaty. The Conference should also express its disappointment and concern at the failure of efforts towards resumption of negotiations on such a treaty. The States parties to the Treaty should realize that it was their responsibility to ensure that a firm undertaking was given to start the long and difficult process of negotiating a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Procrastination could not be condoned; the only solution was to enter into full-scale negotiations on the scope of such a treaty and on the means of verification and compliance. Whatever the differences in points of view, it was time to put an end to questions on the format of such negotiations.

38. Some States affirmed that there was no point in discussing the scope of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, or verification and compliance, without the political will beforehand to negotiate. Other States believed that an *a priori* expression of political will alone was meaningless and that what was really at issue was a willingness to begin practical work. His delegation believed the most important point was that such a treaty was foreseen and called for in the preambular paragraphs and in Article VI of the NPT. In the context of the review of the Treaty and its implementation, the Conference should recognize that a comprehensive test-ban treaty was required for full implementation of the NPT and it should call upon those States concerned to bring about the negotiation of such a treaty at the earliest possible date.

39. As to overall strengthening of the Treaty, the first point was that it should command universal adherence. The Conference's conclusions should contain the firmest appeal ever made to those few States which had not acceded
to the Treaty to reconsider their position. Among them were the threshold States whose national nuclear programmes gave cause for concern. The Conference should draw attention to the fact that the only thing the threshold States had in common was precisely that they were not parties to the Treaty. They must be told that it would be intolerable to the 130 States parties if a State which was not at present a nuclear-weapon State ever detonated a nuclear explosive device. The Australian Government called upon all nuclear-weapon States to enter into a treaty banning nuclear tests forever.

40. Lastly, he emphasized that the Australian delegation was well aware of the special nature of a conference whose mandate was to review implementation of a treaty. His delegation would make every effort to secure consensus to strengthen the NPT, which was of inestimable value and must continue to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security.

41. Mr. QUARM (Ghana) said that the Treaty had achieved one of its objectives, for no new nuclear-weapon State had emerged since the date of signature and the number of States parties now stood at 130. The majority of the non-nuclear-weapon States had complied with their obligations, but the same could not be said of the nuclear-weapon States: the arms race was continuing and even threatened to extend into outer space.

42. It was essential for all States parties to respect the Treaty's provisions, particularly in regard to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. To that end, the nuclear Powers should match the commitments they had undertaken with concrete action, and in the first place they should rapidly resume negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Meanwhile, a moratorium on nuclear weapon testing would be an important confidence-building measure. The arguments put forward in the past against such a treaty were no longer tenable in the light of the present available means of verification. Needless to say, such measures would have to be complemented by negotiations on nuclear and general disarmament.

43. The nuclear-weapon capability of South Africa caused great concern because it threatened the security of the whole of Africa and inevitably compromised the achievement of the Treaty's goals. South Africa was producing unsafeguarded nuclear weapon material and, according to some reports, might already have carried out a nuclear weapon test. It was no secret that South Africa's nuclear capability had been developed with the co-operation of some NPT States parties. Ghana called on those States to respect the desire of the African continent to be a nuclear-free zone and to desist from aiding South Africa. Africa's warnings in the past about the dangers of apartheid had gone unheeded and those dangers had become all too obvious. As a result of the difficulties resulting from its racist policy, the South African régime might well take desperate measures and the nuclear threat it posed must not be taken lightly.

44. It was essential for the nuclear-weapon States to give concrete assurances against nuclear threat and nuclear blackmail, in particular by reaffirming Security Council resolution 255 (1968), on the security of non-nuclear-weapon States parties. The creation of nuclear-free zones was provided for under the NPT and his delegation therefore welcomed the recent
7. The Conference should endorse it and should call upon all nuclear Powers to respect the zone as well as all other declared nuclear-free zones.

45. Mr. THIELICKE (German Democratic Republic) said there was general agreement that the Treaty should be upheld and not be revised and that it should be strengthened further so that it might continue in force after 1995. His delegation was ready to make an active contribution to drawing up a final document outlining in a balanced manner the results achieved and indicating what remained to be done to strengthen the Treaty and the non-proliferation régime.

46. The basic obligations set out in articles I and II had been complied with by all States parties. The Treaty should now become truly universal through accession by other States, an aspect that should be clearly reflected in the document to be drawn up by the Conference. The German Democratic Republic regarded the Treaty as an indispensable element for arms control and disarmament. Since the Treaty had entered into force, progress had been made with regard to those objectives: no new nuclear-weapon State had emerged and in the 1970s important agreements had been reached, such as the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, the SALT I and SALT II agreements, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. Such progress was in keeping with the letter and spirit of article VI.

47. Unfortunately, progress had not continued in the 1980s. Lengthy discussion of the causes would be pointless. On the contrary, it was necessary now to act and to use the present Conference to provide a fresh impetus to negotiations on cessation of the arms race and on nuclear disarmament. The recent initiatives taken by one of the NPT depositaries, the Soviet Union, responded to that need, for example, the moratoriums on nuclear explosions, on anti-satellite missiles and on the deployment of medium-range missiles, as well as the Soviet proposals regarding its negotiations with the United States and on the prevention of the militarization of outer space. The USSR had thereby underlined its resolve to live up to its responsibility as a nuclear-weapon state and a depositary of the Treaty.

48. The document to be prepared by the Committee should reflect a common understanding regarding implementation of article VI. It should start by stressing the crucial nature of a comprehensive test ban treaty. All States, especially nuclear-weapon States, should be urged to exert maximum effort to work out and conclude such a treaty without further delay. The Conference on Disarmament should proceed promptly to the relevant negotiations. The Review Conference should stress that a moratorium on nuclear explosions would facilitate the conclusion of a test-ban treaty and should state clearly that it expected other nuclear-weapon States to follow the example of the USSR. Even a unilateral moratorium would be beneficial if it led to a kind of "chain reaction". The United States and other nuclear-weapon Powers should therefore join the moratorium declared by the Soviet Union, so that it could remain in force throughout the negotiations on a future comprehensive test-ban treaty.
49. The document on the review of article VI should also emphasize the need for urgent measures to prevent nuclear war, such as non-first-use, a freeze on nuclear arsenals, the prevention of the arms race in outer space, and the start of multilateral negotiations on cessation of the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament. In that regard, it was gratifying to note that the ideas contained in his delegation's working paper on the review of article VI (NPT/CONF.III/42 and Corr.1) coincided with proposals made in the working paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned and Neutral States.

50. Mr. ALFARARGI (Egypt) expressed the hope that the Committee would engage in frank and objective discussion that would highlight the responsibilities or the shortcomings of States parties, so as to secure universal implementation of the Treaty and to reach agreement on the measures to be taken to strengthen its credibility.

51. In its analysis, the Committee would have to reply to a number of questions. What measures had been taken to eliminate the threat of nuclear war? What reasons had prevented the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests and what reasons had led to the failure of the relevant negotiations? What remedial measures would it be possible to take? Had States parties followed a policy that was really favourable to international détente and to the cessation of the arms race? Had they respected the obligation not to use the threat of force against another State? Had their defence policy attempted to reduce arms investment to the minimum? Had nuclear-weapon States refrained from transferring nuclear weapons and explosive devices directly or indirectly to a non-nuclear-weapon State and from helping them to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or explosive devices? To what extent had non-nuclear-weapon States respected their commitment not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons? What measures had been taken in accordance with article VI to pursue negotiations on cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and on the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament? What measures had been taken to give assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the threat to use nuclear weapons and to remedy the assurances if they were inadequate? To what extent had article VII, on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones established under regional treaties, been applied and what would be the most prompt method of guaranteeing the effective existence of such zones in Africa, the Middle East and other regions?

52. The Conference would have to discuss such issues democratically and frankly, so that it could include in its final declaration measures whereby the States parties would reaffirm their commitment to respect the obligations laid down in the Treaty.

The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 3rd MEETING

Monday, 9 September 1985, at 3.30 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Dhanapala (Sri Lanka)

GENERAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS (concluded)

1. The CHAIRMAN, after reading out a list of the documents relating to the agenda items allocated to Main Committee I, invited the Committee to continue its exchange of views.

2. Mr. Konstantinov (Bulgaria) said that the main purpose of his statement was to introduce a working paper of his delegation on the subject of nuclear-weapon-free zones and the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, dealt with in article VII of the Treaty. Before doing so, however, he had a few remarks to make on the review of the NPT provisions allocated to Main Committee I.

3. His country considered that the result of that review should be a short but comprehensive statement concerning the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty. His delegation had an open mind as to the structure of that document, which could equally well be organized on an article-by-article basis or consist of three major parts, each covering the work of one of the main committees; what was important was the substance of the declaration. The Committee should work with the aim of strengthening the continuing operation of the Treaty as an instrument that contributed to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons by precluding the emergence of new nuclear-weapon States and thereby restricting the possibility of a nuclear conflict at regional level, which could trigger off a global nuclear war. The Committee should keep that idea in mind when drawing the conclusions from its work and when reviewing the various proposals inspired by the desire to prevent a nuclear war through measures aimed at stopping and reversing the nuclear-arms race and fostering nuclear disarmament or by the conclusion of a treaty on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. Such a ban would serve as an effective barrier to the acquisition of nuclear-weapon capability by non-nuclear-weapon States that might eventually decide to go nuclear. The example of the Soviet Union, which had declared a unilateral moratorium on all nuclear test explosions, ought to be followed by the other nuclear-weapon States, in particular the United States of America. If followed by those States, that moratorium would start a process leading to the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Negotiations on such a treaty, and restraints on nuclear testing, constituted the necessary prerequisites for the success of that process.

4. An immediate freeze of nuclear arsenals was another important step which would go in the same direction as the test ban and nuclear disarmament. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries had made numerous proposals in that regard. Unfortunately, certain Western countries had failed to respond to those proposals for practical measures aimed at curbing the nuclear-arms race and at nuclear disarmament, measures which enjoyed the support of the overwhelming majority of the States Members of the United Nations, socialist and non-aligned countries alike. That situation had blocked all progress in the negotiations on nuclear disarmament.
5. When reviewing the implementation of article VI of the Treaty, it was necessary not to lose sight of the fact that nuclear disarmament was the common goal to be attained for all parties, whether nuclear-weapon States or non-nuclear-weapon States. It was also essential not to neglect the highly detrimental effect on all nuclear disarmament endeavours exercised by the persistence of the United States and its allies in the doctrines of nuclear deterrence, which closed all the roads leading to nuclear disarmament. His delegation hoped that those delegations which could positively influence the thinking of those who were expected by the overwhelming majority of States parties to demonstrate the required political will, would not fail to exert that influence rather than become engaged in unproductive polemics based on distortion of historical facts and futile attempts to avoid responsibility for the present lack of progress on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban.

6. The Conference should highlight, and deplore, the fact that two nuclear-weapon States were still not parties to the Treaty, thereby detracting from its universality. It should also consider in depth all aspects of the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty, the impediments to that implementation and the means of strengthening the non-proliferation régime as a whole.

7. The enormous potential of the NPT and its review mechanism for stimulating the efforts of the international community in all those fields should be used wisely. In doing so, the Committee should not lose sight of the continuing urgent need to strengthen the foundations of the Treaty and promote its main objectives.

8. After recalling the statement made at the 5th plenary meeting, on 29 August 1985, by the head of his delegation, he stressed that his delegation regarded the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various areas of the world as a useful contribution to the achievement of the non-proliferation objectives and to the elimination of the nuclear threat at regional level. He believed that all would agree that the significance of such steps went beyond the areas covered by the zones. As a non-nuclear-weapon State, his country was actively involved in a regional process leading to the establishment of a non-nuclear status for the Balkans. Thus, in 1981 his country had taken the initiative -- which contributed to the achievement of non-proliferation objectives -- to convene a meeting of the leaders of the Balkan countries to agree on joint practical steps to turn the Balkans into a zone free of nuclear weapons; in 1984, the first meeting in Europe had taken place of governmental experts from States belonging to different military alliances, or having non-aligned status, for the purpose of examining the proposals made in that respect.

9. Turning to the document submitted by his country relating to nuclear-weapon-free zones and the security of non-nuclear-weapon States (NPT/CONF.III/36), he stressed that it took into account the relevant parts of the Final Declaration of the 1975 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly (first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament), as well as other initiatives and new developments in that field, and should assist the Committee in its review
of the application of article VII. The paper discussed the relationship
between the application of article VII and the security of non-nuclear-weapon
States, bearing in mind the need to strengthen that security pending the
achievement of a more effective guarantee system against possible use of
uclear weapons. His country recognized that, from the point of view of
security, the situation of the various States parties varied from region to
region, whence the need to employ different measures. With reference to the
regional approach, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones contributed
to nuclear disarmament and significantly strengthened the security of the
States concerned. The adherence of non-nuclear-weapon States to the NPT was
acknowledged to be one of the most important factors facilitating the
establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world.
The nuclear-weapon States were invited therefore to assist the States in a
region to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone, to enter into binding
undertakings, to respect strictly the status of such zones and to refrain from
the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States in them.

10. In its working paper, the Bulgarian delegation noted with satisfaction
the achievements and projects in that field, which related to Latin-America,
the South Pacific, the Balkans, Northern Europe, Africa, the Middle East,
South Asia and others. After reviewing the activities for implementing the
proposals in that direction, the paper stressed that the creation of a
nuclear-weapon-free zone in any region was fully compatible with membership in
other security arrangements. On the subject of security assurances for
non-nuclear-weapon States, the working paper referred to the provisions of
Security Council resolution 255 (1968) and the need to supplement
them, and also to the non-use declarations by the nuclear-weapon States and to the
Final Document adopted at the tenth special session of the General Assembly
(first special session devoted to disarmament). He emphasized the need to
elaborate further on the practical applications of the non-first-use
undertaking and suggested that the Conference on Disarmament should continue
to negotiate with a view to reaching meaningful agreements. All States
concerned should be urged to co-operate actively in the search for agreement
on the substance of effective, unconditional and uniform international
arrangements to strengthen the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against
the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, with due regard for the
legitimate security concerns of those States. The establishment of
nuclear-weapon-free zones could also be an effective means of assurance in
that regard. All nuclear-weapon States should therefore encourage the
efforts of States in various regions of the world to conclude suitable
arrangements, as well as to assume obligations, in an appropriate form, not to
use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the participants in such zones.

11. He expressed the hope that the working paper would be viewed in a
positive light by the delegations represented in the Committee, with a view to
drafting on that basis a document stating the Commission's conclusions from
its review of article VII.

12. Mr. DUNN (United States of America) said that the general debate in the
plenary and the discussion in Committee I had shown that there was broad
agreement, first, on the security value of the Treaty and, secondly, on the
importance of the review of the articles allotted to Committee I, in
particular article VI. His country welcomed the opportunity for an honest review of the progress made in that field. It was fully committed to pursuing negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament; it recognized, however, that there had been far less progress than expected towards the proposed nuclear disarmament. His country was therefore as dissatisfied as any other State present at the Conference with the slow progress of the negotiations aimed at controlling, reducing and finally eliminating nuclear weapons. It was committed to redoubled efforts in that respect, but none the less recognized that the path to the desired objective would continue to be difficult. There were bound to be honest differences of opinion between certain States regarding the steps to be taken as well as regarding their timing. Nevertheless, even on the subject of disarmament, the States parties to the Treaty had much more in common than they had dividing them. They all agreed on the ultimate goal, the elimination of nuclear weapons, and they all appreciated that that objective was of such importance that they must make every effort towards it, but must do so realistically and with extreme care.

13. His country believed that first priority must be assigned to reducing nuclear weapons. It therefore looked forward to the resumption shortly of the nuclear and space talks at Geneva. With seriousness and flexibility on both sides, progress could be made towards a radical reduction of nuclear weapons, and their eventual elimination. As to the question of how to proceed in that respect, the best approach to achieve the goals of the Treaty was the negotiation and effective implementation of concrete, verifiable agreements. Only such agreements could serve to achieve precise undertakings, equal or equivalent forces, and effective verification. Those aspects were essential if the steps now to be taken towards the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons were to lead truly to that goal and not constitute mere detours which undermined international confidence, sowed suspicion and hindered the necessary progress.

14. In conclusion, he stressed the need for further progress in the area; at the same time, it was necessary to build on the successes already obtained and not belittle them. Without the Treaty, there would be neither more disarmament nor greater security.

15. Mr. CHANDOGA (Czechoslovakia) pointed out that during the period under review, Czechoslovakia had worked actively, together with the other socialist countries, to curb the nuclear arms race and to strengthen the non-proliferation régime. The socialist countries had launched a number of peace initiatives: the Soviet Union had undertaken the unilateral commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and had, also unilaterally, declared a moratorium on all nuclear explosions from 6 August 1985 until 1 January 1986; the socialist countries had made proposals aimed at the prevention of nuclear war and of the militarization of outer space, the freezing of nuclear-weapon arsenals and the elimination of tactical and intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe. In addition, they had worked on the formulation of a realistic programme of stage-by-stage disarmament by proposing the adoption of concrete political, legal and material measures based on the principle of reciprocity and security for all and accompanied by
suitable control measures. At the same time, they had given full consideration to the concrete proposals made by other States, in particular the non-aligned and neutral countries.

16. In that connection, he stressed that none of the attempts, such as that made by the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany at the 2nd meeting of Main Committee I, to misrepresent the facts and to minimize the initiatives taken by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries in the field of nuclear disarmament, could possibly mislead the international community with regard to the real intentions of their authors.

17. His delegation shared the concern of many non-nuclear-weapon States about lack of progress made in curtailing the arms race and in disarmament. Vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons were intimately interconnected; any result obtained in one of those fields would directly or indirectly favour progress in the other; the stronger the non-proliferation régime, the better the prospects for the elimination of nuclear weapons, and the reverse was also true.

18. His country would spare no effort to ensure that a decisive turning-point was reached in the field of disarmament. It was also very important that the Review Conference should reaffirm most explicitly in its final document the common goal of the States parties: to avoid the proliferation of nuclear weapons in any form and to perform strictly the obligations undertaken under the Treaty to ensure that nuclear energy was used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

19. Mr. AKAY (Turkey) said that it was extremely important, in order to maintain and strengthen the international non-proliferation régime, that the nuclear-weapon States should have the political will to end the arms race. His delegation understood the disappointment expressed by many delegations regarding the lack of progress in international negotiations on arms control and disarmament. Although the situation in that respect was in fact very worrying, it would nevertheless be unfair to minimize the importance and the value of the Treaty when criticizing the implementation of some of its provisions. Moreover, those criticisms should not make one forget the joint responsibility of the parties to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to end the arms race as a whole. The States parties should do everything in their power to ensure that progress was made in the field of disarmament and to fulfill their obligations under article VI of the Treaty. In that connection, his delegation welcomed the resumption at Geneva of the bilateral negotiations between the United States of America and the Soviet Union. His Government had always been convinced of the need for that dialogue and could not but express its deep satisfaction at that positive development. It hoped that those negotiations would be a turning-point in East-West relations. The issues at present being discussed by those two great Powers were extremely complex and related to the fundamental problem of maintaining the international balance in respect both of arms control and of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

20. It was very important that a multilateral treaty on a comprehensive nuclear-weapon-test ban should be concluded, as it would contribute to nuclear
disarmament and to the strengthening of the Treaty. Turkey was, however, convinced that a reliable international verification system was indispensable for the implementation of such a treaty. In that context, it supported the proposals made by a number of countries for the progressive improvement of verification capabilities for underground nuclear tests. Moreover, it stressed that the conclusion of a treaty on a comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapon testing would not be equivalent to the reduction of existing nuclear arsenals.

21. Mr. MELESCANU (Romania) recalled that his delegation had already stated at the 5th plenary meeting its position regarding the operation of the Treaty; his statement would therefore be confined to a few preliminary remarks on the subject of working papers NPT/CONF.III/22, NPT/CONF.III/23 and NPT/CONF.III/24.

22. The discussions in plenary and some statements made before the Committee, such as that of Bulgaria, had shown clearly that the question of security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States was of extreme importance to those States. That was the reason why Romania had submitted a working paper on that question (NPT/CONF.III/22). His delegation was prepared to support all initiatives and proposals which could provide a formula which guaranteed the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. Moreover, it appealed to all States participating in the Conference on Disarmament to redouble their efforts in order to reach an agreement on that subject.

23. It was also necessary to intensify the negotiations on disarmament, and close links should be maintained between the bilateral and multilateral efforts being made to that end. It was for that reason that Romania had submitted working paper NPT/CONF.III/23. The question of a nuclear-weapon freeze also deserved priority consideration. In order to stress that fact, Romania had submitted proposals in the form of a draft additional protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.III/24). His delegation hoped that those three documents would receive a favourable reception, and was fully prepared to participate actively and constructively in the work of the Committee.

24. Mr. ROCHE (Canada) said that although the Committee's task was to examine the Treaty part by part, in focusing on certain aspects of the Treaty it should not lose sight of the fundamental importance of the Treaty as a whole. It was necessary to bear continually in mind that the very existence of the Treaty served the security interests of all States. In the general view, the operation of articles I and II did not appear to have given rise to any difficulties. The same was true of article VII, as shown by the recent creation of the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone. With regard to negative security assurances, there was still much to be done. On that subject, there was a consensus document from the Conference on Disarmament's Ad Hoc Committee which recommended that ways and means should continue to be explored to overcome the difficulties encountered in that Committee's work in carrying out negotiations on the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
25. The statements made both in the Committee and in the plenary meetings of the Conference had emphasized the fundamental importance of article VI and the need to examine critically what had been accomplished in that regard over the past five years, and what remained to be done for the full implementation of that article. For his country, the achievement of an effective, verifiable, multilateral comprehensive test-ban treaty remained a fundamental arms-control objective. It was to be deplored that during the past two years there had been no progress on that issue in the Conference on Disarmament, in which his country had urged that an attempt had to be made, however modestly, to extend the area of common ground.

26. It was obvious that fundamental differences existed as to how to progress towards a comprehensive test ban. The Review Conference could not expect to bridge those differences; still less could it hope to negotiate an agreement which the Conference on Disarmament and the trilateral negotiations had failed to achieve. Nevertheless, it should be able to assess the situation and determine the direction to be taken in order to make realistic and concrete progress in that field. In that regard, his country believed that with a willingness on the part of States parties to compromise on certain points -- without thereby yielding on matters of principle -- it should be possible to overcome the existing technical differences.

27. It was the lack of consensus over questions on article VI which explained the limited results of the Second Review Conference. That lesson should not be forgotten during the present deliberations. The Committee should above all not be bogged down by technical considerations which had to be dealt with in detail in other forums. It had to consider arms control and disarmament issues in their broadest sense and determine in which direction to proceed in terms of the NPT. The strongest possible effort had to be made to reach a consensus in the Committee on the implementation of article VI on that point as well as on those points which still gave rise to major problems.

28. He urged the members of the Committee to consider that what was at stake was nothing less than the continued viability of the Treaty. One hundred and thirty nations had expressed, by their signatures, their conviction that the Treaty was essential to nuclear non-proliferation. It was necessary therefore to avoid any action which could weaken the Treaty. Polemics and divisions should be ruled out. Consideration of one another's views and a certain measure of flexibility would make it possible to strengthen the Treaty. It was true that there were significant differences with regard to article VI but the whole of the Treaty was greater than the sum of its parts. The Committee's goal should be to contribute to the formulation of a report that would strengthen the Treaty. For its part, his delegation would participate in that work, taking the approach that a way could be found to solve the problems, that such a way must be found and that, through a collective effort, it would be found.

29. Mr. CROMARTIE (United Kingdom) said that his delegation's views on the implementation of the articles of the Treaty which were the responsibility of Committee I had been clearly set out in document NPT/CONF.III/17. He wished nevertheless to stress a number of points and, in the first place, that the
observance of articles I and II of the Treaty had contributed enormously to the security of the parties and to the safety of the world as a whole. That was true also of other aspects of the Treaty, even if some had attracted criticism. His country's commitment as a party to the Treaty and, in particular, as a nuclear-weapon State party, was firm and unequivocal. Since the Second Review Conference, the United Kingdom had continued to play an active part in the search for practical and realistic solutions to the complex problem of arms control and disarmament.

30. The United Kingdom did not, and would not expect to, play a direct role in the negotiations between the United States of America and the Soviet Union on nuclear and space weapons. Compared to the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union, his country's nuclear arsenal was very small, less than 3 per cent of the total. The Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly made it clear that the primary responsibility for reducing nuclear weapons rested with those States with the major nuclear arsenals. His country's nuclear deterrent was the minimum judged necessary to safeguard its security in a part of the world where nuclear weapons formed part of the overall balance. However, should substantial cuts be made in the nuclear arsenals of the super-Powers, and if there was no significant change in their defensive capabilities, it would be ready to consider how it could contribute to arms control in the light of the reduced threat.

31. The resumption, on a broader basis than before, of the negotiations on disarmament between the Soviet Union and the United States gave the world new hope that it was moving forward towards the desired objectives. That was the second important point which he wished to stress. It was essential to support the Soviet Union and the United States in their negotiations, and nothing should be done which might jeopardize their success.

32. At the time of the Second Review Conference, his country had been participating in trilateral negotiations with the United States and the Soviet Union on the prohibition of nuclear tests. Those negotiations had not been successful for a number of reasons which were still present, the most important of them being the question of verification. That issue was a vital one and the problem of providing assurances of treaty implementation by other States had not yet been solved satisfactorily. In the absence of a solid technical basis, the United Kingdom did not consider it useful to engage in further negotiations. The point was that any treaty which was not adequately verifiable would not command any confidence in its effectiveness on an issue so vital to both individual and collective security. Unfortunately, some countries had shown a disinclination to discuss in detail the problems of verification; because of that, substantive work in the Conference on Disarmament on that issue had been at a standstill since 1983. The United Kingdom had submitted three major technical papers which still awaited proper consideration; the most recent one, submitted two months ago, contained a precise statement of the United Kingdom position on the various outstanding problems. It was believed in some quarters that the problem of verification had been settled. If that were so, why not meet again in the framework of the Conference on Disarmament, in order to discuss it?
33. With regard to nuclear tests, his Government, in accordance with its international obligations, remained firmly committed to the pursuit of a verifiable comprehensive test ban which would constitute in its view an important step towards nuclear disarmament.

34. Turning to the tasks allotted to Committee I, he stressed that the Committee’s report to the Conference should contain the views of States and groups of States on the implementation of the disarmament aspects of the Treaty and on ways to reach those common objectives.

35. His country, which respected all viewpoints on that question, hoped that its own view would also be taken into account. The Committee should be realistic and practical in assessing the next steps to be taken. Unrealistic rhetoric would do nothing to achieve the objectives aimed at, or to enhance the status of the Treaty. Proposals should be effective, equitable and verifiable. The members of the Committee needed to reaffirm their ideals but also to map out a practicable path for attaining them; and it was to be hoped that the work of the Committee and the Conference would ensure progress on those lines.

The meeting rose at 4.55 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 4th MEETING

Tuesday, 10 September 1985, at 3.30 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. DHANAPALA (Sri Lanka)

ORGANIZATION OF WORK

1. The CHAIRMAN proposed that, in view of the complexity of the questions allocated to Main Committee I and the number of documents to be dealt with, as well as the time-limit for submitting the Committee’s report to the plenary, three open-ended working groups should be set up. Working Group I, chaired by Mr. Butler, the representative of Australia, would deal with articles I and II and the first to third preambular paragraphs. Working Group II would deal with security assurances and article VII, more particularly from the standpoint of the issues studied by the Committee, and it would be chaired by Mr. Thielicke, the representative of the German Democratic Republic. Working Group III would deal with article VI and the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs and he himself would chair the Group.

2. In the absence of any objection, he would take it that the Committee decided to approve his proposal.

3. It was so decided.

REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY AS PROVIDED FOR IN ITS ARTICLE VIII (3) (agenda item 13) (continued):

A. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY RELATING TO NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

(1) ARTICLES I AND II AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 1-3

4. Mr. MIYAMOTO (Japan) said it was gratifying that, over the past 15 years, all States parties had faithfully respected their commitments under articles I and II. Continued strict observance of their provisions was of paramount importance in achieving the common objective: prevention of any further spread of nuclear weapons. The States parties, which made up the overwhelming majority of the international community, should call upon all those States which had not yet done so to accede to the NPT as soon as possible, in the interest of strengthening international peace and security. Such an appeal should be addressed first of all to China and France. In the meantime, those two nuclear Powers should continue to follow their declared policy of respecting the spirit of the Treaty. It was to be hoped that the final document would take due account of those points.

5. Mr. KARIYAWASAM (Sri Lanka) said some delegations considered that articles I and II were of prime importance and even regarded them as the core of the Treaty. It was therefore reasonable to expect that those countries should strictly respect the provisions of those two articles.
6. Nevertheless, some States parties - admittedly not many - had failed to fulfill their commitments regarding the transfer of nuclear weapons.

7. Again, the two military alliances continued to deploy nuclear weapons, thus leading to so-called "geographical proliferation" and to a vicious circle in which deployment of weapons by one alliance immediately led to counter-deployment by the other. Technical and strategic weapons were growing more and more sophisticated all the time and the grey area between the act of transfer and control of such weapons would become even more blurred, in particular in the case of submarine-based deployment. The command structure was so diffused, even in peacetime, that it contributed towards instability and consequently to violation of the spirit of article I.

8. Furthermore, if Israel and South Africa did in fact have nuclear capability, as was reported, they must have benefited from some co-operation in the nuclear field. The provisions of articles I and II might therefore have been violated, at least indirectly.

9. He paid tribute to those States parties whose international and domestic procedures were fully consonant with their obligations under articles I and II and he called upon other States to follow their example, something that was obviously possible even in the context of transnational commercial competition for the supply of nuclear know-how.

10. The provisions of the articles in question had been violated in spirit. However, the non-implementation of article VI was blatant. In that connection, the Group of Non-Aligned and Neutral States had submitted a working paper (NPT/CONF.III/32), which his delegation fully supported.

11. Mr. ALFAR ARGI (Egypt) said that the Treaty had stemmed from the international community's concern to eliminate the risks of nuclear war and the attendant destruction. In actual fact, articles I and II highlighted the close link between the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the possibility that such weapons would be used. In the beginning, such concern had been the response to a moral need, but subsequently the international community had realized that the very survival of mankind was at stake, for the growth of nuclear arsenals and the development of increasingly deadly weapons were a threat to belligerent and non-belligerent alike. The proliferation of nuclear weapons, particularly vertical proliferation, had continued. Despite all the efforts by non-aligned countries within the Conference on Disarmament, the latter remained powerless to negotiate agreements on effective ways and means of preventing nuclear war, a failure that lay in the obstacles continually raised by some members.

12. In response to the General Assembly's invitation to Member States in resolution 39/148 P, the Egyptian Government had appealed to all the nuclear Powers to fulfill their commitments with regard to the prevention of nuclear war, to conclude an agreement not to use nuclear weapons, to halt the arms race, which now threatened to extend into outer space, and to reach agreement on a comprehensive nuclear test ban as soon as possible. It had also called for the continued establishment of denuclearized zones and for the major Powers to refrain from placing such zones in jeopardy.
13. He wished to renew Egypt's appeal, invited all States parties to respect fully the provisions of the NPT and underlined the need for all nuclear Powers to halt the provision of assistance in the nuclear field to countries recognized as being liable to use nuclear arms as offensive weapons. Ultimately, general and complete disarmament would be the surest guarantee against the risk of nuclear war and it was high time that genuine negotiations on effective and concrete disarmament measures were undertaken.

14. Mr. GYORFFY (Hungary) said that a consensus appeared to have emerged in connection with two key articles of the Treaty, namely articles I and II, which, in the view of the majority of delegations, had been respected. That conclusion should be mentioned in the final document, as should the role played by the Treaty in a broader sense. Indeed, the idea that the Treaty was one of the most effective and useful international instruments in the non-proliferation field, along with the fact that it had been of decisive importance since its entry into force in promoting international peace, security and co-operation, and in preventing nuclear war, had practically met with consensus. Another factor to be taken into account was the problem of quasi-nuclear States. Many delegations had expressed their concern at the nuclear ambitions of some countries which were a threat not only to the security of their immediate neighbours but also to international peace and security in general. The final document should express the States parties' disapproval of such a development and of the conciliatory attitude adopted by certain States.

15. Mr. HAYES (Ireland) said that, in evaluating the implementation of articles I and II, two principal questions had to be considered. First, had the non-nuclear-weapons States parties faithfully respected the provisions of those articles? Second, had the nuclear-weapon States undertaken their obligations not to transfer nuclear weapons to any other country? It was important to distinguish clearly between the actions of parties in their relations with other parties and their actions vis-à-vis non-parties. With regard to the former, it had to be recognized that no nuclear weapon capability had been transferred by one State party to another State party. On the other hand, many delegations had referred to the problem of the acquisition of nuclear weapon capability by States outside the Treaty, in addition to the original five nuclear-weapon States. In one case, the detonation of a nuclear explosive device and, in at least two other cases, acts which confirmed the existence of such a capability, illustrated the problem. The Committee therefore might wish to express the concern of States parties regarding the threat to international peace and security represented by the acquisition of nuclear weapon capability by any State and, in particular States situated in areas of tension such as South Asia, southern Africa and the Middle East.

16. In its report, the Committee should draw attention to the special vigilance required by the danger of dissemination of nuclear weapons among non-parties and should reaffirm the obligation of non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon States alike to prevent any nuclear co-operation with States not parties to the Treaty.

17. Mr. MELESCANU (Romania) said that the Romanian Government was deeply concerned at the stockpiling of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass
destruction, which increased the risk of war and constituted a grave threat to mankind's very existence. He drew attention to the especially serious situation in Europe following the deployment by the United States of America of medium-range nuclear missiles and the nuclear countermeasures announced by the Soviet Union. In regard to articles I and II of the Treaty, it was his belief that mention should be made of those concerns, which were shared by other delegations, in connection with the commitments undertaken both by nuclear-weapon States and by other States. Particularly worrying was the fact that, since the Second Review Conference, nuclear weapons had spread further in the world, contrary to the spirit and the objectives of the Treaty.

18. Mr. DUNN (United States of America) said that the United States shared the concern expressed with regard to nuclear co-operation with countries that had unsafeguarded nuclear activities. He wished, however, to give some clarification in that regard. Points of view could indeed differ, but it was essential from the outset to be well informed and to base oneself on the actual facts.

19. The United States had repeatedly urged Israel and other States not parties to the Treaty to accept IAEA safeguards, preferably by acceding to the Treaty, in order to satisfy the conditions established by United States policy and law for peaceful nuclear co-operation with non-nuclear-weapon States. As a consequence, the United States had no agreement on peaceful nuclear co-operation with Israel nor did it engage in nuclear commerce with Israel.

20. Again the United States had repeatedly sought to persuade South Africa to accede to the Treaty and to accept full-scope safeguards. For many years, United States law and policy had precluded the provision by the United States to South Africa of any significant nuclear assistance, including nuclear fuel, reactors or components, until South Africa acceded to the NPT or accepted IAEA safeguards on all its nuclear facilities. In fact, United States law was more restrictive than the NPT in respect of nuclear exports to non-nuclear-weapon States. Whereas the NPT merely required IAEA safeguards on exported nuclear material, United States law required that IAEA safeguards be maintained with respect to peaceful nuclear activities in the recipient country at the time of export. In the case of nuclear exports to South Africa, United States policy had been even more restrictive than the law, the United States would not export nuclear equipment or material to South Africa unless the latter acceded to the NPT or accepted comprehensive safeguards. The United States had recently stopped granting authorizations requested by United States companies and individuals for assistance and exports for the South African nuclear programme. In the past the only assistance permitted had been limited to non-sensitive technologies at IAEA safeguarded facilities.

21. The United States believed that its very limited contacts with South Africa in the nuclear field had been a useful vehicle for encouraging South Africa to take positive steps towards acceptance of safeguards; it had therefore been encouraged by the noticeable progress in discussions between South Africa and IAEA on a semi-commercial enrichment plant under construction in South Africa. Lastly, on the previous day, 9 September, President Reagan had announced the adoption of a number of sanctions against South Africa which reduced the already limited nuclear co-operation between the United States and South Africa to virtually nothing.
22. Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) welcomed the decision to set up three working groups and hoped that they would draft the relevant sections of the final document without delay. Many proposals had already been made and they should be taken into account, along with the general debate both in the plenary and in the Committee.

23. Since the Second Review Conference, the Soviet Union, as a nuclear-weapon State, had continued to respect faithfully its commitments under article I. It had neither assisted nor encouraged non-nuclear-weapon States to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons and had proceeded in the belief that strict observance of articles I and II of the Treaty constituted one of the essential means of preventing the emergence on the international scene of more nuclear-weapon States. In its relations with other States parties, the USSR had always stressed the importance of respecting commitments undertaken under article II.

24. With reference to a key aspect of present policy, namely, the prevention of nuclear war as referred to in the preamble to the NPT, over the past five years his country had taken a number of concrete steps towards solving that burning issue. For example, in 1981 the General Assembly had adopted a draft resolution submitted by the USSR on the prevention of nuclear war. At the twelfth special session of the General Assembly (second special session devoted to disarmament), the Soviet Union had made a solemn undertaking to refrain from making first use of nuclear weapons. It had also proposed a freeze on nuclear weapons, a moratorium on nuclear explosions and other measures to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear conflict. In the Conference on Disarmament, the USSR, together with other socialist countries, had supported the establishment of an ad hoc subsidiary body of the Conference to open negotiations for the elaboration of concrete measures to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear conflict. The Soviet Union was determined to continue its efforts in that direction.

The meeting rose at 4.25 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 5th MEETING

Wednesday, 11 September 1985, at 10.45 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Dhanapala (Sri Lanka)

REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY AS PROVIDED FOR IN ITS ARTICLE VIII (3) (agenda item 13) (continued):

A. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY RELATING TO NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY:

(2) ARTICLE VI AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 8-12

1. Mr. MIHAILOVIC (Yugoslavia), introducing the working document on tactical nuclear weapons prepared by his delegation (NPT/CONF.III/35), recalled that Yugoslavia, as a European non-aligned country, had repeatedly pointed to the dangers arising from the spiralling of nuclear weapons in Europe, the deployment of new generations of nuclear weapons and the emergence of new concepts of their uses, such as the limited use of tactical nuclear weapons. As the Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia had said in the conference on Disarmament on 13 June 1985, tactical nuclear weapons were no less dangerous than other weapons of mass destruction, and their tactical and technical integration with conventional forces and weapons rendered them even more dangerous, making it imperative to start negotiations on the reduction of such weapons as soon as possible.

2. The nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty bore direct responsibility both for vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons through their development, production and stockpiling in their territories and for the horizontal proliferation of such weapons through their deployment in the territories, waters or airspace of some non-nuclear-weapon States as well as in international waters. Such practices could only harm the credibility of the Treaty. The danger of miniaturization of nuclear weapons and of the improvement of their guidance systems and target-hitting precision could not be exaggerated, and it was increased still further by their possible use as an alternative to conventional weapons and for waging limited nuclear wars. If Europe became a nuclear battlefield, it was easy to foresee that short-range weapons would be rapidly followed by intermediate-range tactical nuclear weapons. The fact that those weapons were intended to be used for limited aims and were regarded as "acceptable", whereas, in fact, they could not be controlled, made them extremely destabilizing. The distinction between tactical and strategic weapons was unreal. The targets which would be destroyed were not chosen haphazardly but were already stored in the computer memory. The so-called strategy of flexible response, which would allow retaliation short of all-out destruction, would ultimately lead to nuclear suicide.

3. The presence or deployment of such weapons in the territory of some non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty stood in the way of the
establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and of arrangements for a binding international instrument providing security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States by confusing and complicating the status of those countries.

4. The proliferation of nuclear weapons, which, far from diminishing, had on the contrary been intensified since the Treaty's entry into force, was seriously increasing the danger of nuclear war. The aim of the working paper submitted by Yugoslavia was precisely to reaffirm the main obligations of the States parties in respect of articles I, II and VI of the Treaty and to propose measures for fulfilling those obligations. The paper urged the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to initiate as soon as possible negotiations concerning theatre or tactical nuclear weapons aimed at the conclusion of a treaty to halt their future deployment and on their withdrawal from the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, including their delivery systems. It also requested them immediately to discontinue further deployment of all types of tactical and other nuclear weapon delivery systems within the territory of those States and, simultaneously, to start on their gradual withdrawal pending the entry into force of such a treaty.

5. The undertaking of concrete measures of arms limitation and disarmament would unquestionably have a beneficial effect on international security. The non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty in whose territories, waterways or air-space the nuclear-weapon delivery systems were deployed were therefore invited not to allow the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, in particular against other non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

6. Turning to the consideration of article VI, he noted that 15 years after the Treaty's entry into force the cessation of the nuclear arms race appeared more remote than ever. Between 1980 and 1985 no negotiations on the question of a nuclear-test ban had taken place, the trilateral talks had been suspended, and one of the major nuclear Powers had declared that it saw a comprehensive test-ban treaty only as a long-term goal. In 1984 and 1985 the Conference on Disarmament had failed to agree on a mandate for a subsidiary body to elaborate a test-ban treaty. To consider a comprehensive nuclear-test ban as a long-term goal was in contradiction with fundamental elements of the Treaty and, in particular, with its tenth preambular paragraph, which was devoted entirely to a comprehensive nuclear-test ban, the only concrete disarmament measure specifically mentioned in the Treaty.

7. The Conference on Disarmament had made no progress with regard to the cessation of the nuclear arms race or international arrangements for security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States.

8. It was to be hoped that the nuclear-weapon States would reconsider their positions and take into account the unanimous insistence of all States in favour of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. His delegation also hoped that the proposals relating to article VI put forward by the Group of Non-aligned and Neutral States (NPT/CONF.III/32), as well as its own proposals on tactical nuclear weapons, would be carefully considered and adopted by the Conference in its final document.
9. Mr. SENE (Senegal), introducing document NPT/CONF.III/32 on behalf of the Group of Non-Aligned and Neutral States, said that the working paper took account of the Group's views on article VI - which was the fundamental element of the Treaty and was designed to guarantee its successful operation - and should therefore provide a good basis for discussion. The paper reflected the diversity of opinions expressed within the Group, taking account of its members' geopolitical situation and of their dedication to the principles of non-alignment neutralism, the desire of all to preserve their national integrity and independence, and their strong sense of international solidarity in the cause of world peace and security.

10. The first of the paper's three sections - section I - recalled the obligations of all States parties and their will to put an end to all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to promote international détente and the strengthening of trust between States. The paper's authors expressed the wish that the nuclear-weapon States should, as soon as possible, enter into an agreement open to all States providing for the halting of all nuclear-weapon tests for a specified time with a view to their permanent cessation. They stressed the need for all States parties to work through the United Nations, the Conference on Disarmament and other competent negotiating forums towards the conclusion of arms limitation and disarmament agreements which would contribute to the goal of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

11. Section II of the working paper dealt with the nuclear arms race and the nuclear disarmament. It contained a critical assessment of the quantitative and qualitative development of nuclear arms over the past decade and of various aspects of vertical nuclear proliferation. It emphasized the concern aroused by the research and development component of military spending, the continuation of nuclear tests, and space defence programmes. The section also contained a historical review of talks between the two super-Powers, which had produced hardly any results, although the new round of talks could nevertheless constitute a positive development, and recalled that the Conference on Disarmament had achieved no progress in the matter of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the prevention of nuclear war or of security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States.

12. The last section - Section III - contained basic proposals and a reaffirmation of commitment to the implementation of article VI and the tenth preambular paragraph of the Treaty. The Group of Non-Aligned and Neutral States expressed the wish that the Conference on Disarmament should serve as the framework for the initiation of negotiations on nuclear disarmament and on the adoption of adequate verification measures, as well as the prompt conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

13. In addition to the establishment of an immediate moratorium on all nuclear-weapon tests which should facilitate the conclusion of such a treaty, the Group advocated an immediate freeze on nuclear arsenals with a view to halting the arms race and the deployment of nuclear weapons, as well as the progressive reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of
delivery leading to their complete elimination at the earliest possible time. Lastly, it urged the United States of America and the Soviet Union to pursue their bilateral negotiations on strategic and intermediate-range arms so as to complement multilateral agreements on disarmament.

14. The Group hoped that the working paper would reconcile all the interests involved and that its components would be taken into account in the final document on the Committee's work. The implementation of article VI was indeed crucial to the viability of the Treaty, but it was necessary to learn from past experience and avoid confrontation and sterile polemics so as to give careful attention to arms control measures in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty.

15. Mr. MIYAMOTO (Japan) said that the Treaty rested on three main principles which could not be dissociated from one another, namely the prevention of nuclear proliferation, the right to peaceful use of nuclear energy, and nuclear disarmament. So far as arms control and disarmament were concerned, Japan regarded the achievement of the comprehensive test-ban treaty as a priority measure and had therefore taken an active part in the work of the Conference on Disarmament on that subject. In June 1984, Mr. Abe, his country's Foreign Minister, had proposed in the Conference on Disarmament a step-by-step approach taking underground nuclear-test explosions of a yield now considered technically verifiable on a multinational basis as the threshold. That threshold would subsequently be lowered as verification capability improved. His delegation had also submitted two supplementary working papers (CD/524 and CD/626).

16. However, during the past two years the Conference on Disarmament had been unable to establish an ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban owing to persisting differences of view on the mandate of such a body, and work had therefore remained at a standstill. It should be resumed as soon as possible, for much remained to be done. Many vital issues had to be solved and many valuable proposals considered before a treaty could be elaborated.

17. His delegation strongly hoped that at its next session the Conference on Disarmament would solve the problem of the mandate and would be able to resume consideration of substantive issues. It highly appreciated the contributions by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, whose work should be continued and strengthened, and hoped that the point would be duly reflected in the final document.

18. Mr. LUNDBO (Norway) drew attention to the memorandum containing several proposals submitted by the Nordic countries (NPT/CONF.III/16). Those relevant to the work of Committee I concerned the bilateral negotiations on nuclear and space arms between the United States and the Soviet Union, a comprehensive test-ban treaty, and "negative" security assurances.

19. His delegation regretted that no major breakthrough had taken place in nuclear disarmament since the Second Review Conference. However, the starting of negotiations on nuclear and space arms between the United States and the
Soviet Union opened new prospects and the Conference in its final declaration should encourage the two parties to achieve early results.

20. The conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and adherence to it by all States would contribute to halting the build-up of nuclear arms and promoting non-proliferation efforts. In order to have significant effects, the treaty would have to prohibit both nuclear-weapon tests and so-called nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes completely and on a permanent basis.

21. In 1982 and 1983 the ad hoc subsidiary body of the Conference on Disarmament on a nuclear test ban had done useful and necessary work in the field of verification and compliance. It was therefore regrettable that no agreement had been reached on a mandate for such a body in 1984 and 1985. The Conference should therefore appeal to the Conference on Disarmament to do everything in its power to overcome that obstacle at the beginning of its 1986 session.

22. Mr. KOETTER (German Democratic Republic) said that non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament were interrelated. Multilateral negotiations should be initiated with a view to setting into motion a phased process of nuclear disarmament involving, inter alia, the following measures: cessation of the production of new nuclear-weapon systems; cessation of the production of fissionable material for nuclear-weapon purposes; cessation of the production of all types of nuclear munitions and their means of delivery; and gradual reduction of nuclear-weapon stockpiles, including delivery systems for nuclear weapons. The process should lead to the final and complete elimination of nuclear weapons everywhere.

23. His delegation, which regarded the Conference on Disarmament as the most appropriate forum for conducting such negotiations, reaffirmed its conviction that multilateral and bilateral negotiations were not mutually exclusive but could complement each other in a meaningful way. The start of bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States on the question of space and nuclear weapons was therefore to be welcomed, and it was to be hoped that the negotiations would yield early and effective results.

24. The Review Conference should call for the earliest possible initiation within the Conference on Disarmament of negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. An ad hoc committee with a clear-cut mandate providing for the formulation of practical measures, including a nuclear disarmament programme, should be established for that purpose. An appeal to that effect would help to overcome the present standstill on that subject in the Conference on Disarmament and would also help to strengthen the non-proliferation régime in accordance with article VI. His delegation had put forward a proposal on that subject (NPT/CONF.III/42 and Corr.1) and would support any initiative designed to achieve that purpose.

25. Mr. MAJOOD (Iraq) said that some parties to the Treaty had disregarded articles I and II by supplying nuclear technology to the aggressive and racist régimes of Israel and South Africa despite the fact that the United Nations and other organizations had warned the international community of the danger
which the nuclear potential of those two countries, and particularly of Israel, represented to the non-proliferation system. Numerous studies emanating from private and scientific circles, both in the East and in the West and even from Israeli sources, had confirmed the existence and extent of the Israeli nuclear arsenal. From those studies it emerged that Israel had the means not only to acquire nuclear weapons but also to manufacture them and to conduct nuclear explosions. Israel was also adopting some dangerous military doctrines, such as that of so-called nuclear superiority and nuclear deterrence, which corroborated those reports. In spite of all the evidence, some States parties to the Treaty continued to supply Israel with nuclear technology in violation of the Treaty and of the IAEA safeguards system.

26. Those practices should be publicly denounced and States parties to the Treaty should be reminded of their obligations under the Treaty so that the non-proliferation régime should not remain a dead letter.

27. With regard to article VI, his delegation supported the proposals contained in the working paper submitted by the delegation of Senegal on behalf of the Group of Non-Aligned and Neutral States (NPT/CONF.III/32).

28. Mr. CHANDOGA (Czechoslovakia) noted with satisfaction that the unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions declared by the Soviet Union in July 1985 had been favourably received throughout the world and by many delegations to the Conference.

29. It was to be desired that the moratorium might become bilateral through the adherence of the United States, or even multilateral, thus assisting the elaboration of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, which had not proved possible either during the trilateral talks between the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom or in the Conference on Disarmament.

30. The moratorium would be easy to apply with existing national verification systems. Thanks to the network of seismological stations existing all over the world and to observations by satellite, all explosions, even underground or low-yield, could now be detected with precision. The conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty was therefore not, as some would have it, subordinated to means of verification but only to the political will of the States concerned.

31. His delegation hoped that the United States Government would reconsider its position in the matter and would, together with other nuclear-weapon States, join the moratorium declared by the USSR. Such an initiative could curb nuclear escalation and strengthen the non-proliferation régime.

32. His delegation unreservedly supported the proposal made at the 12th plenary meeting, on 4 September, by the Mexican delegation and seconded by other delegations to the effect that the three nuclear-weapon Powers parties to the Treaty should undertake forthwith, collectively or individually, to declare a moratorium on nuclear-weapon tests. Such an undertaking could be proclaimed in the final document of the Conference.
33. Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany) drew attention to an error in
the Russian test of the working paper on the question of a comprehensive test
ban submitted by his delegation (NPT/CONF.III/48). The error concerned the
expression "Federal Republic of Germany" in the title, where the word
"Germany" appeared in the genitive case, whereas it ought to be in the
nominative. That error should be corrected and his country's name should
appear in the proper form in all Conference documents. Moreover, it was
surprising that the document had not yet been distributed in its original
language, English.

34. Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) suggested that the
task of applying the rules in force in the United Nations with regard to the
names of countries should be left to the Secretariat.

35. Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany) said that every State had the
right to decide upon the manner in which its own name should be spelt and
translated.

The meeting rose at 11.45 a.m.
REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY AS PROVIDED FOR IN ITS ARTICLE VIII (3) (agenda item 13) (continued):

A. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY RELATING TO NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY:

(2) ARTICLE VI AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 8-12

1. Mr. WINGREN (Sweden) drew attention to working paper NPT/CONF.III/32 containing the views of the Group of Non-Aligned and Neutral States on article VI of the Treaty and urged the Committee to consider carefully the proposals which it contained. He also stressed the importance of the recommendations formulated by the Nordic countries in paragraph 6 of their memorandum (NPT/CONF.III/16).

2. Article VI imposed upon the parties, and in particular the nuclear-weapon States, the obligation to negotiate on "effective measures" to halt the nuclear arms race and to achieve general and complete disarmament - an obligation of which the States concerned appeared to be fully aware. Nevertheless, although the parties to the Treaty were in agreement as to the aim of the negotiations, opinions diverged regarding the best way of achieving it. In his delegation's view, it was necessary at the outset for the major nuclear-weapon States to reach an early agreement on deep quantitative reductions in the nuclear arsenals.

3. As stated in the working paper of the non-aligned and neutral States, "during the last decade the world has witnessed a trend giving qualitative nuclear arms developments more importance than the size of nuclear arsenals" (NPT/CONF.III/32, sect.II) and resulting in increased risks and destabilizing effects. An agreement had therefore to be reached as soon as possible on a nuclear-test-ban treaty, since that would hamper the further technical improvement nuclear weapons and, as pointed out by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden at the 2nd plenary meeting, would also be a good complement to the bilateral negotiations by reducing the risk that quantitative cuts would be nullified by the "qualitative" improvement of nuclear weapons. Such an agreement would also inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons, a fact which explained the importance attached to it by the Treaty.

4. It was therefore difficult to see why negotiations on a nuclear-test ban had still not been started. Particular importance should be attached to verification, but the issue was essentially a political one; the negotiators would have to agree on the establishment of a dense network of seismic stations that would make it possible to detect the slightest breach of the future treaty.
5. In conclusion, he urged the participants to review their position and to spare no effort to ensure the early formulation of a draft treaty on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban.

6. Mr. GROOT (Denmark) said that his delegation agreed with that of Australia that the Conference should urge countries which were not yet parties to the Treaty -- and particularly the so-called "threshold States" -- to sign and ratify that instrument. If the overwhelming majority of nations acceded to the Treaty, that would prompt the nuclear-weapons States to embark more resolutely on the nuclear disarmament process. The results obtained in that field had been most disappointing, and the Conference should therefore also urge those States to fulfill their commitments under article VI.

7. Nuclear disarmament would be greatly facilitated by the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty; to that end, the trilateral negotiations should be resumed or negotiations conducted within a special committee of the Conference on Disarmament. In that connection he mentioned General Assembly resolution 39/53, which had been adopted without a single vote against and with a great majority in favour, and the proposal recently submitted to the Conference on Disarmament by Australia and other countries concerning the elaboration of a programme of work on that issue.

8. With regard to article VII, the Danish Government welcomed the conclusion of the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty. As stated by the Nordic countries in their memorandum (NPT/CONF.III/16), the "establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at between the States of the regions concerned" was an important contribution to disarmament and the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime. The establishment of a denuclearized zone in northern Europe, which was referred to in one of the working papers, was of interest to the Danish Government, which was prepared to support that initiative, with the guarantee of the super-Powers.

9. Lastly, he appealed to all members of the Committee to adopt a flexible approach and not to seek to settle questions which were on the agenda of other bodies, such as the Conference on Disarmament and the General Assembly.

10. Mr. ISSRAELIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that since the Second Review Conference, the Soviet Union had continued to devote close attention to the implementation of article VI of the Treaty and had adopted a whole series of measures to achieve the aims specified therein.

11. The Soviet Union felt that a nuclear-weapon freeze by all nuclear-weapon States, and above all by the Soviet Union and the United States of America, could make a substantial contribution towards preventing nuclear war and curbing the nuclear arms race. In 1983, the Soviet Union had made a proposal to the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and China to the effect that all the nuclear Powers should simultaneously freeze all the nuclear weapons in their possession. The General Assembly, at its thirty-eighth and thirty-ninth sessions, had adopted resolutions to that effect at the Soviet Union's initiative.
12. In 1982, the Soviet Union had proposed to the General Assembly the elaboration, adoption and stage-by-stage implementation of a programme of nuclear disarmament which would include the cessation of the development of new nuclear-weapon systems, the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for the purpose of manufacturing nuclear weapons, the cessation of the production of all types of nuclear munitions and their delivery vehicles, the gradual reduction of accumulated stockpiles of nuclear weapons, including their delivery vehicles, and lastly, the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

13. The Soviet Union had also put forward a series of proposals aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space, the dangers of which it had repeatedly stressed. In 1981, at the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly, it had submitted a draft treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space. That proposal had been developed further in 1983, at the thirty-eighth session of the Assembly, in a draft treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth. In 1984, at the thirty-ninth session of the General assembly, the Soviet Union had made a proposal on "the use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes, for the benefit of mankind". Since 1982, the USSR had been urging the Conference on Disarmament to engage in concrete negotiations - in the framework of an appropriate special committee - on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

14. The Soviet Union had engaged in talks with the United States on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe (in 1981) and on the limitation and reduction of strategic weapons (in 1982), talks at which it had always sought a radical arms reduction on the basis of the principle of equality and security. Those negotiations had been interrupted for a time, but in March 1985, on the initiative of the USSR, new negotiations had started between the Soviet Union and the United States on the full range of questions concerning nuclear and space weapons. The objective of those negotiations was to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms and at strengthening strategic stability. Ultimately, the forthcoming negotiations should lead to the complete elimination of nuclear arms everywhere. The Soviet Union had proposed a moratorium on nuclear and space weapons throughout the duration of the negotiations.

15. The Soviet Union had, moreover, taken a series of initiatives aimed at placing moral and political barriers in the way of unleashing a nuclear war. Following Soviet proposals, the General Assembly had adopted in 1981 a Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe 16/ and in a 1983 resolution on the condemnation of nuclear war. 17/ In 1982, the Soviet Union had undertaken not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and had proposed that other nuclear-weapon States should follow that example. It had also

---

16/ General Assembly resolution 36/100.

17/ General Assembly resolution/75.
consistently supported the proposals of other States aimed at achieving the same ends. Document NPT/CONF.III/20 contained more ample information on the measures taken by the USSR to promote the implementation of article VI.

16. He expressed satisfaction at the spirit of co-operation and compromise which had prevailed thus far in the plenary and in Committee I and hoped that the participants would continue to adopt a constructive approach. One country, unfortunately, was an exception to the rule: the Federal Republic of Germany, whose representative, on 9 September 1985, had made a whole series of untruthful accusations against the USSR. It was worth noting, however, that representative had not received any support.

17. **Mr. DUNN (United States of America)** said that his country, which had spared no effort to achieve the objectives of article VI, was greatly disappointed at the slow progress being made. With regard to the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, on which attention appeared to have centred, it should be realized that that was only one aspect of the question and that such a ban would not by itself bring the nuclear arms race to an end. The conclusion of such a treaty would moreover not be easy, since it was first necessary to solve a number of complex problems, such as that of verification.

18. In the view of the United States, priority should instead be given to a radical reduction of nuclear arms. His country had submitted a number of proposals to that effect to the Conference on Disarmament, proposals which were marked by great flexibility and deserved careful consideration.

19. **Mr. CHUNGONG-AYAFOR (Cameroon)** drew attention to the terms of article VI of the Treaty and said that Cameroon was gravely concerned at developments in South Africa, where the régime in power had succeeded in achieving a nuclear capability with the assistance and co-operation of certain States and in particular of nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. That situation constituted a violation of article I of the Treaty but it also hampered the implementation of article VII, bearing in mind in particular the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU. The Assembly should therefore decide to forbid all States parties from co-operating with South Africa in the nuclear field, since that country was not a party to the Treaty and refused to accept the IAEA safeguards. Moreover, the General Assembly and the Security Council had declared that the racist régime of South Africa, and in particular its nuclear and military programmes, constituted a threat to international peace and security.

20. The prohibition of co-operation with South Africa in the nuclear field should also apply to the purchase of uranium from that country, whether in the form of ore or any other form, since it was obtained illegally from Namibia, a Territory under United Nations trusteeship which South Africa was occupying illegally in violation of the decisions of the international community, the International Court of Justice and the Security Council. In any case, there could be no "peaceful" nuclear co-operation with a régime whose policy was aimed exclusively at fostering instability.
21. Bearing those considerations in mind, his delegation had submitted to the Committee, through its Working Group I, a proposal concerning article I of the Treaty (NPT/CONF.III/C.I/l), which he read out and which his delegation hoped to see included in the final document of the Conference.

22. Mr. THIELICKE (German Democratic Republic) said that his delegation, like other delegations, considered that the main problem to be solved by the Conference was that of the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. To that end, it urged the starting of immediate negotiations, which would be facilitated if all the nuclear-weapon States declared a moratorium on nuclear explosions, as stated by the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic at the 6th plenary meeting and as indicated in working paper (NPT/CONF.III/42 and Corr.1).

23. During the general debate in Main Committee I, two delegations had seen fit to raise the question of the verification of the implementation of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, and had even claimed that the trilateral negotiations which had taken place on that subject had failed because of the difficulties encountered in that respect. That assertion was no more than a smokescreen to conceal the reluctance of certain nuclear-weapon States to engage in negotiations on the substance of such a treaty.

24. It had to be stressed in that connection that in the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly (first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament), all the States Members of the United Nations had recognized that the verification arrangements to be made under a specific agreement would depend on the aims, scope and nature of the agreement. It would therefore be unrealistic to deal with the question of verification separately from the negotiations on substance. That question should be examined in the actual framework of the negotiations on the treaty; that approach, moreover, had not been disputed during the negotiations on a convention relating to chemical weapons.

25. It should also be recalled that for over 25 years, all the problems raised by a nuclear-test ban had already been examined from every possible angle and that a considerable number of comprehensive proposals had already been formulated. The trilateral negotiations had nearly succeeded in elaborating a draft treaty but the talks had been broken off by the very parties who were currently attempting to start an interminable discussion on the question of verification and who regarded the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty as a long-term objective.

26. In that connection, it was worth noting that, in the tripartite report submitted to the Committee on Disarmament in 1980, 18/ the three parties to the negotiations had declared that the proposed verification measures, in particular the international exchange of seismic data, the establishment of a

18/ See CD/139/Appendix II/vol. II, document CD/130.
committee of experts and the organization of on-site inspections, constituted new departures in the field of international arms reduction and gave all the parties to the treaty an opportunity to participate in a constructive manner in the verification procedure.

27. His delegation shared the views expressed on that problem by the representative of Mexico in the 12th plenary meeting, by the head of the Soviet delegation to Committee I and by Mr. David Owen, former Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom, in a statement published in Geneva in August 1985. All those statements proved that the breaking off of the trilateral negotiations had not been brought about by the problem of verification. The real obstacle to the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty had been the desire of certain nuclear-weapon States to continue their tests and develop new nuclear warheads. The technical questions which had been invoked should therefore not be allowed to conceal the lack of political will to conclude such a treaty. As stressed by the representative of Sweden, the problem of verification, too, was primarily a political issue.

28. Mr. HILALE (Morocco) stressed the permanent threat of a thermonuclear conflict arising from the unabated nuclear arms race and noted that the two States which were the depositaries of the Treaty were also the main participants in that race. Over $1 trillion had been spent on armaments during 1984 alone. That huge expenditure sustained a vertical proliferation, marked by the qualitative and quantitative growth of nuclear arsenals, as well as a horizontal proliferation, since new nuclear Powers had emerged which had in common the fact that they conducted aggressive and racist policies.

29. In the presence of a world arsenal consisting of over 50,000 nuclear warheads equivalent to 16 billion tonnes of TNT, or 3.5 tonnes of explosives per person, one could not but ask what had happened to article VI of the Treaty. It had to be recognized that the article had remained a dead letter, since its authors, who had presented it in a promising light 17 years previously, had rendered it ineffectual by their policy of nuclear deterrence. History, however, had proved that force would never be a bulwark for peace and security, which could only be assured by mutual trust, understanding and unselfishness. The nuclear-weapon States were entitled to base their security on their nuclear arsenals but the remainder of humanity was also entitled to enjoy peace without fear of a nuclear war or of an irreparable computer error.

30. All the hopes of success of the negotiations conducted in pursuance of article VI had been dashed, whether it was the tripartite negotiations at the end of the 1970s, the START and INF negotiations between the two super-Powers in 1984 or the multilateral negotiations conducted in the framework of the Conference on Disarmament. Nearly all the representatives who had spoken since the opening of the present Conference had come to the same conclusion, and that applied even to the representatives of the nuclear-weapon Powers who had acknowledged implicitly in their documents (NPT/CONF.III/17, NPT/CONF.III/18 and NPT/CONF.III/20) that article VI had not been implemented despite the numerous proposals which they had made and which they were trying to present in a favourable light in order to relieve themselves of responsibility.
31. His delegation supported the document submitted by the Group of Non-aligned and Neutral States (NPT/CONF.III/32), in which those States noted that article VI had not been effective mainly because of the lack of real political will on the part of the nuclear-weapon States. During the negotiations on a nuclear test ban and on the prevention of nuclear war and nuclear disarmament conducted in the framework of the Conference on Disarmament, those countries had consistently adopted an approach which revealed their negative attitude, in defiance of the provisions of article VI and the commitments assumed in the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly (first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament).

32. The Third Review Conference should be the occasion for the nuclear-weapon States to shoulder their responsibilities in conformity with article VI and also their responsibilities towards the peoples and States which were the hostages of a nuclear strategy that inspired a fear which was amplified by the risk of a new arms race in space. It was also essential to recall the moral obligations those Powers, which should be aware of their responsibilities and their duty to work for peace and security.

33. The first measure to be adopted by the Conference should be the formulation of an international treaty on a nuclear-test ban, as proposed by the non-aligned and neutral countries and by certain socialist countries, for although a real political will had thus far been lacking, some 100 resolutions had been adopted in favour of such a treaty in the course of the past 25 years and the Secretary-General of the United Nations had declared, as long as 15 years ago, that it was technically feasible.

34. A second measure would be to give the non-nuclear-weapon States positive safeguards against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Lastly, the Conference should call for the observance of the other articles of the Treaty, which constituted a balanced set of obligations and rights. Only the complete observance of NPT could ensure the credibility of that instrument.

35. It had been possible for countries like Israel and South Africa to obtain nuclear weapons because certain nuclear-weapons States which co-operated with them had not observed the provisions of NPT. His delegation accordingly welcomed the embargo on assistance to South Africa decided upon by a great Power and hoped that a similar decision would be taken with regard to Israel.

36. Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) recalled that he had already spoken at the 12th plenary meeting on the implementation of article VI; he wished however, to revert to the question of verification and the importance of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

37. In substance, the argument put forward by the opponents of such a treaty was the inadequacy of means of verification and control. However, according to several reputable sources, that argument was baseless. As long ago as 1972, the Secretary-General of the United Nations had stated to the Committee on Disarmament that the technical questions involved had been examined thoroughly and that the time had come to take a political decision to ban underground nuclear tests. Since then, there had been further technical
progress which had made it possible to improve still more the effectiveness of methods for monitoring explosions. Thus, Sweden had made it known that it was in a position to announce any nuclear explosion at the same time as the country making it, or even before it. In the circumstances, the General Assembly had very appropriately stressed, in its resolution 39/52 on the cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons, that the alleged absence of means of verification was nothing but an excuse for further development and refinement of nuclear weapons.

38. Certain Powers have asserted that a comprehensive nuclear test ban would have only a limited effect since it would not make it possible to reduce the existing nuclear arsenals. All the same, it would have the advantage of preventing those arsenals from being further built up. It had been recognized in authoritative documents that the elaboration of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty would make a decisive contribution to halting the arms race and preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. For his part, he was convinced that such a treaty would afford the best proof that States really had the will to make progress in the negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

39. Mr. EDIS (United Kingdom) said that he had a clarification to make regarding relations with South Africa. The United Kingdom Government took care not to maintain with that country any co-operation which could be of assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. It did not supply it with materials, installations or technical assistance for that purpose. It did not even co-operate with the South African régime with regard to the civilian applications of atomic energy. Moreover, he understood that none of the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty was contributing to the development of the South African potential for the production of such weapons. One of those States had in fact made a statement to that effect before the Committee.

40. Mr. HILALE (Morocco) explained that, with regard to the co-operation of certain nuclear-weapon Powers with Israel and South Africa, he had referred to concrete facts which were related, among other places, in the General Assembly document dealing with Israeli nuclear armament (A/36/431), a document which showed that Israel had in fact been able to acquire nuclear weapons with the help of other States. Those involved were not so much the Governments of one or other country but undertakings in the private sector, in particular transnational companies, which maintained commercial relations with the two régimes in question and supplied them with nuclear materials. His delegation had deemed it necessary to refer to that situation because the nuclear potential of Israel and South Africa constituted a danger not only for the neighbouring countries but also for the whole of Africa and for all the countries of the Middle East and the Mediterranean.

41. Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany), exercising his right of reply under rule 19 of the rules of procedure of the third Review Conference, protested against the statement by the Soviet delegation which had criticized, and misrepresented in the process, a statement which he himself had made a few days previously at the 4th plenary meeting and in which he had merely related certain concrete facts concerning the alarming growth of both the traditional
and the nuclear arsenal of the Soviet Union since the conclusion of NPT. On that occasion, he had pointed out that that growth constituted a direct threat for his country and he considered that he had every right to denounce that fact and to state the views of his country on the manner in which article VI was being implemented. In his country's view, the Soviet Union was in no way observing the provisions of article VI and he wished to reiterate that fact officially and firmly.

42. The Soviet delegation had long been making declarations and submitting arguments which had been repeatedly refuted in the Conference on Disarmament and in the General Assembly. Unfortunately, none of those declarations was calculated to reduce in any way the immense Soviet arsenal.

43. He had made an effort to review objectively the results of the implementation of the Treaty and he was surprised at the reaction of the Soviet delegation, which apparently did not admit constructive criticism. He was bound to note that no country whatsoever could prevent assessment of its record in implementing the Treaty or evade its obligations under article VI.

44. Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) noted that, already at the second meeting of the Commission, the statement by the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany had been the only discordant note in a general debate marked by a spirit of conciliation and co-operation. In any event, it would be useless to try to make that delegation change its attitude and he would therefore refrain from continuing the controversy.

The meeting rose at 12.10 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 7th MEETING

Friday, 13 September 1985, at 3.45 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Dhanapala (Sri Lanka)

In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Butler (Australia), Vice-Chairman, took the chair.

ORGANIZATION OF WORK

1. Mr. AL-ALFI (Democratic Yemen) drew attention to the difficulties created by the Conference's methods of work for small delegations, some of which had only one or two members. It was very difficult for such delegations to follow the work being carried out concurrently by several working groups. The usefulness of such groups was undeniable but delegations which had not participated in their work should have an opportunity to raise any point which they had been unable to bring before a working group.

2. The CHAIRMAN said that there was no intention to deny any delegation the opportunity to make its views known.

3. He noted that no representative had asked for the floor with regard to the substantive matters allocated to Main Committee I and invited the members of Working Group I to meet him for informal consultations.

The meeting rose at 3.50 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 8th MEETING

Monday, 16 September 1985, at 3.30 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. DHANAPALA (Sri Lanka)

REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY AS PROVIDED FOR IN ITS ARTICLE VIII (3) (agenda item 13) (concluded):

A. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY RELATING TO NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY:

(1) ARTICLES I AND II AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 1-3;
(2) ARTICLE VI AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 8-12;
(3) ARTICLE VII WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO THE MAIN ISSUES IN A AND B.

B. SECURITY ASSURANCES:

(1) RESOLUTION 255 (1968) OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL,
(2) EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS TO ASSURE NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES AGAINST THE USE OR THREAT OF USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

1. Mr. GARCÍA ROBLES (Mexico) reiterated what he had said at the 12th plenary meeting to the effect that his delegation would spare no effort to ensure that the final declaration was adopted by consensus, but there could only be a consensus if all parties contributed to it. The Conference's work so far gave little hope that the consensus sought would be achieved, at any rate with regard to a number of issues that were of special importance to Mexico. He would therefore have to submit two or three draft resolutions on those issues, and he asked what was the time-limit for doing so.

2. The CHAIRMAN drew attention to rule 24 of the rules of procedure and added that he would bring the matter to the attention of the President of the Conference.

DRAFT REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE

3. The CHAIRMAN invited members of the Committee to comment on the section dealing with procedural aspects (NPT/CONF.III/C.I/CRP.2).

Paragraphs 1 and 2

4. The CHAIRMAN said that if he heard no objections to the paragraphs he would take it that the Committee accepted them.

5. Paragraphs 1 and 2 were adopted.
Paragraphs 3 and 4

6. The CHAIRMAN said that the document submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany (NPT/CONF.III/48) should be added to the list of documents in paragraph 3. It might also be advisable to include the documents submitted by the three Depositary States and by the Nordic countries, which at present appeared under the background documentation for the Conference, in the list of documents containing elements relevant to the Final declaration, because they also concerned the work of Main Committee I. If there were no objections, he would ask the Secretariat to include them in the Committee's report.

7. Paragraph 3, as amended, and paragraph 4, were adopted.

Paragraphs 5, 6 and 7

8. The CHAIRMAN said that, in the absence of any objection, he would consider that the Committee adopted the paragraphs.

9. Mr. RAEMYMAECKERS (Belgium), referring to paragraph 7, said that the summary records had not yet all been issued and he would therefore propose that a decision on paragraph 7 should be postponed until the Committee had studied the summary records.

10. The CHAIRMAN proposed that the paragraph should be adopted provisionally, subject to subsequent study of the relevant summary records.

11. Mr. DUNN (United States of America) endorsed the proposal of the representative of Belgium and also asked that the decision on paragraph 7 should be postponed.

12. The CHAIRMAN said that he would consider the draft report adopted up to and including paragraph 6, while paragraph 7 remained pending in view of the proposal made by the representatives of Belgium and the United States.

13. He invited members of the Committee to take up the second part of the draft report concerning security assurances (NPT/CONF.III/C.I/CRP.2/Add.2).

14. Mr. THIELICKE (German Democratic Republic), introducing the draft report in his capacity as Chairman of the Working Group which had elaborated the text, said that the Group had worked on the basis of the consensus text and the proposals made by delegations during the discussions. He expressed the hope that the Committee would adopt the text.

Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3

15. The CHAIRMAN said that in the absence of any objection he would consider that the Committee wished to adopt the paragraphs.

16. Mr. WINGREN (Sweden), referring to paragraph 3 concerning Security Council resolution 255 (1968), said that it should be noted in the summary record of the meeting that, should assistance to a country be
contemplated under those provisions, the country in question shall have the right to decide if and under what conditions such assistance might be provided.

17. The CHAIRMAN said that, if there were no objections, he would consider paragraph 3 adopted. The comment of the Swedish delegation would be noted in the summary record.

18. **Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 were adopted**

Paragraphs 4, 5 and 6

19. **Paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 were adopted.**

20. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to study the section of the draft report dealing with article VII. If there were no objections, he would consider that the paragraphs contained therein had been adopted.

21. **Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 were adopted.**

*The meeting rose at 4.00 p.m.*
CONSIDERATION OF REPORTS OF WORKING GROUPS I AND III

Report of Working Group III (part I)

1. The CHAIRMAN thanked the members of Working Group III for their efforts and for the spirit of co-operation which they had shown, in particular the representative of Ireland who had drawn up the basic working document. He invited the members of the Committee to study part I of the report of Working Group III paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1-7

2. Paragraphs 1-7 were adopted.

Paragraph 8

3. The CHAIRMAN, referring to the English text, informed the members of the Committee that, following consultations, it had been decided to delete the square brackets round the words "had continued", as well as the word "proliferated".

4. Mrs. HOI (United States of America) asked why the words "with regret", inserted after the word "noted" in the document adopted by the Working Group, did not appear in the text before the Committee.

5. The CHAIRMAN said that the words had been omitted by mistake and the text would be amended accordingly.

6. Paragraph 8 was adopted, subject to the changes orally indicated by the Chairman.

Paragraph 8 (bis)

7. The CHAIRMAN said that the following paragraphs of the document had been renumbered and that paragraph 8 (bis) had become paragraph 9.

8. Paragraph 8 (bis) (new paragraph 9) was adopted.

Paragraphs 9-14 (new paragraphs 10-15)

9. Paragraphs 9-14 (new paragraphs 10-15) were adopted.
Paragraph 15 (new paragraph 16)

10. Mrs. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO (Mexico) pointed out that an amendment to replace the words "the General Conference" by the words "the three General Conferences" had already been adopted by the Working Group.

11. The CHAIRMAN said that the text of paragraph 16 would be amended accordingly.

12. Paragraph 15 (new paragraph 16) was adopted, subject to the amendment referred to orally by the representative of Mexico.

Paragraph 16 (new paragraph 17)

13. Mr. CROMARTIE (United Kingdom) said he had some reservations concerning the words in square brackets at the end of the paragraph. He therefore asked the representative of Switzerland, who had proposed their addition, not to insist upon his amendment because it altered the general tenor of the report.

14. Mr. von ARX (Switzerland) said that in a spirit of co-operation he would agree to withdraw his proposal, but he would like to know what had happened to other proposals formulated by Switzerland in other documents.

15. The CHAIRMAN thanked the representative of Switzerland for his gesture and suggested that the phrase in question should provisionally be deleted from paragraph 17.

16. Paragraph 16 (new paragraph 17) was adopted.

17. He proposed that the meeting should be suspended for a few minutes to enable members of the Committee to study the text of part II of the report of Working Group III, which was in the process of being distributed.

The meeting was suspended at 4.45 p.m. and resumed at 4.50 p.m.

Report of Working Group III (part II)

18. The CHAIRMAN invited members of the Committee to consider part II of the report of Working Group III, paragraph by paragraph.

Introduction

19. The introduction was adopted.

Paragraphs 1-5

20. Paragraphs 1-5 were adopted.
Paragraph 6

21. The CHAIRMAN suggested that the Committee should revert to the last sentence, which appeared between square brackets, when it had completed consideration of all the other paragraphs and, in the meantime, should adopt the first two sentences of paragraph 6.

22. The first two sentences of paragraph 6 were adopted.

Paragraphs 7 and 8

23. Mr. DUNN (United States of America) suggested that, for the sake of clarity, the square brackets in paragraphs 7 and 8 should be deleted.

24. Paragraphs 7 and 8, as amended, were adopted.

Paragraphs 9, 10 and 11

25. Paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 were adopted.

26. The report of Working Group III as a whole, as amended, was adopted, with the exception of the sentence in square brackets in paragraph 6 of part II.

27. The CHAIRMAN suggested that it should be indicated in the report that, in the absence of a consensus on paragraph 6, the Committee had decided to refer the question to the Drafting Committee. If there was no objection, he would take it that the Committee accepted his proposal.

28. It was so decided.

Report of Working Group I

29. Mr. BUTLER (Australia), Chairman of Working Group I, introducing the Group's report, said that it did not yet have a symbol, was available only in English, and that the paragraphs were not numbered.

30. Discussions in the Working Group had been long, detailed and sometimes difficult, because the problems referred to it were of paramount importance for implementation of the Treaty. However, all members had shown a spirit of compromise and flexibility and it had finally proved possible to reach agreement on the text submitted to the Committee.

31. Nevertheless some problems still remained, in particular with regard to the working paper submitted by Switzerland (NPT/CONF.III/39) on a system for the settlement of disputes. The Working Group had studied the paper and had decided not to mention it in the report and to let the Committee decide how the ideas it contained might be reflected in the Conference’s final document. Nor had there been agreement as to whether certain countries should be specifically named in the report, and the Committee would have to take a decision on the question.
32. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to consider the report of Working Group I paragraph by paragraph.

First, second and third paragraphs

33. The first, second and third paragraphs were adopted.

Fourth and fifth paragraphs

34. Mr. MEERBURG (Netherlands) said that the words "or has already led" should be added after the words "may lead" in the second line of the fourth paragraph so as not to exclude any possibility. Regarding the fifth paragraph, he thought it would be preferable to delete the mention of the exploitation of Namibian uranium, which would more appropriately be dealt with under article IV of the Treaty.

35. Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), Mr. BUTLER (Australia) and Mr. CHUNGONG AYAFOR (Cameroon) having called on the representative of the Netherlands not to insist, Mr. MEERBURG (Netherlands) withdrew his proposal.

36. The fourth and fifth paragraphs were adopted.

37. The CHAIRMAN said that, within the Committee, delegations would be able to come back to the question of the reference to Namibia. If there was no objection, he would take it that the Committee wished to adopt the report of Working Group I.

38. The report of Working Group I was adopted.

39. Mr. CHUNGONG AYAFOR (Cameroon) said that his delegation had accepted the fifth paragraph of the report of Working Group I in a spirit of compromise and in order to facilitate the Conference's work. Cameroon nevertheless remained convinced that any nuclear co-operation with South Africa was contrary to the principles and objectives of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In his delegation's view, there could be no "peaceful nuclear co-operation" with a régime whose policies and activities in any sphere were aimed only at provoking instability and violence. Cameroon would have preferred the Conference to adopt a clear and definite position on the issue since South Africa's nuclear activities, as well as its illegal exploitation and export of Namibian uranium, continued to strengthen the apartheid régime's capability to develop, test and deploy nuclear weapons in Africa. The adoption by the Conference of a clear unequivocal position on the issue would have enhanced the credibility of the Treaty and increased the effectiveness of the non-proliferation régime.

40. Mr. von ARX (Switzerland) asked what action the Committee intended to take on the working paper submitted by his delegation (NPT/CONF.III/39). Switzerland would like the ideas expressed in that working paper to be reflected in the Conference's final document. In order to make the last paragraph more acceptable, he proposed that it should be amended to read:
"The Conference invites the States parties to study the problem raised by a system for the peaceful settlement of disputes related to the rights and obligations contained in articles I to IV of the Treaty."

41. The CHAIRMAN, replying to the Swiss delegation, said that in paragraph 11 of part II of its report, Working Group III had recommended that the Conference should take note of proposals submitted by States parties on a number of related issues referred to in paragraph 4 of the Committee's report - a paragraph comprising a list of documents containing elements relevant to a final declaration, including the document submitted by Switzerland. Since the peaceful settlement of disputes was not an issue that had been directly allocated to Main Committee I, and the document submitted concerned the implementation of articles I to IV, he suggested that the question raised by the Swiss delegation should be referred to the Drafting Committee. If there was no objection, he would ask the Secretariat to include that proposal in the Committee's report.

42. It was so decided.

43. After thanking the members of the Committee and the secretariat staff for their co-operation, the CHAIRMAN said that Main Committee I had completed its work.

The meeting rose at 5.30 p.m.
THIRD REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE
NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

COMMITTEE II

SUMMARY RECORDS OF THE 1st to 11th MEETINGS

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
from 2 to 17 September 1985

Chairman: Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia)
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 1st MEETING

Monday, 2 September 1985, at 4.25 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia)

REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY AS PROVIDED FOR IN ITS ARTICLE VIII (3) (agenda item 13):

C. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY RELATING TO NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, SAFEGUARDS AND NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONES:

(1) ARTICLE III AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 4 AND 5, ESPECIALLY IN THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO ARTICLE IV AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 6 AND 7;

(2) ARTICLES I AND II AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 1-3 IN THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO ARTICLES III AND IV;

(3) ARTICLE VII

1. The CHAIRMAN said that the task of Main Committee II was not an easy one since the overall situation was no less complicated than it had been in 1980. Thanks to the work of the Preparatory Committee, however, the terms of reference of the Main Committee were clearly set out, and the separate mandates of Main Committees II and III were narrower in scope than those which had been outlined for Main Committee II in 1980. According to Annex III of the Final Report of the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.III/1), Main Committee II would review the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones. Within that main theme, the Committee was more particularly mandated to consider Article III and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5, especially in their relationship to Article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7.

2. It was encouraging to note that the safeguard system of IAEA was well established and making a positive contribution to non-proliferation issues without hampering progress in nuclear research and development in any country. The system also enhanced the flow of international trade in the nuclear industry as applied to peaceful purposes. More than 125 States had accepted the safeguards, and in none of them had any diversion of significant quantities of fissionable materials been detected since the initiation of any safeguards agreements. Action had been taken on the voluntary offers by nuclear-weapon States to submit their facilities to inspection by IAEA in the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The situation was still developing, and a possible outcome of the work of the Committee might be an appeal for wider adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which would further enhance the effectiveness of that link in the non-proliferation chain. In addition specific proposals to increase the effectiveness of the IAEA safeguards system, taking account of existing human and financial resources, would be welcomed.
3. Articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1 to 3 in their relationship to Articles III and IV were also covered by the Committee's mandate, as was the consideration of Article VII. That Article referred to the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories. The Committee might wish to refer to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), and to the encouraging prospect which emerged from the endorsement by the South Pacific Forum on 6 August 1985 of the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty.

4. With reference to the final aspect of the Committee's mandate, concerning other provisions of the Treaty, and the role of the Treaty in the promotion of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and of nuclear disarmament and in strengthening international peace and security (agenda item 14), the Committee would consider acceptance of the Treaty by States and measures aimed at promoting a wider acceptance of the Treaty.

5. Where organization of work was concerned, he would welcome proposals for recommendations regarding the issues he had introduced. In accordance with a request from the President of the Conference, he would ask that no general or lengthy statements should be made, nor statements covering more than one Article of the Treaty except to introduce specific recommendations or conclusions. The various issues arising under the mandate should be considered separately and all proposals should be submitted promptly. While the Committee should not anticipate the outcome of its deliberations, efforts should be made to arrive at an agreed result.

6. In answer to a request by the representative of Papua New Guinea, he said that his opening statement would be circulated as a document of the Committee. 19/

7. If there were no further comments, he would take it that the consensus of the Committee was to adopt the proposed plan for the organization of work.

8. It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 4.55 p.m.

19/ This document was published as NPT/CONF.III/C.II/1.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 2nd MEETING

Monday, 9 September 1985, at 10.35 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia)

ELECTION OF OFFICERS

1. The CHAIRMAN announced that Mr. Alessi (Italy) and Mr. Sutowardoyo (Indonesia) had been elected Vice-Chairmen.

REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY AS PROVIDED FOR IN ITS ARTICLE VIII (3) (agenda item 13) (continued):

C. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY RELATING TO NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, SAFEGUARDS AND NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONES:

(1) ARTICLE III AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 4 AND 5, ESPECIALLY IN THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO ARTICLE IV AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 6 AND 7

2. Mr. THOMPSON (Ireland) said that, while the proposals he was about to make in connection with article III were not intended to be exhaustive, they related to points his delegation would wish to see incorporated in the final document of the Third Review Conference. First, the Conference should acknowledge the crucial importance of IAEA full-scope safeguards, without which it would not have been possible to agree on a non-proliferation régime nor, subsequently, to check the spread of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. Although safeguards might have the effect of deterring diversion, their primary purpose was to provide mutual assurances of good faith in complying with the political commitments contained in the Treaty. The fact that full-scope safeguards were not universally accepted was the non-proliferation régime's principal weakness. The Conference should call on all States to adhere to the Treaty and to submit all their peaceful nuclear installations to IAEA safeguards by concluding agreements based on document INFCIRC/153. In recognizing the pivotal role of safeguards in the verification of political commitments under the Treaty, the Conference should acknowledge that the main threat to non-proliferation arose where the safeguards régime ended.

3. Secondly, the Conference should call for the strengthening and extension of the safeguards régime. New techniques had to be developed in order to keep pace with new technologies, and adequate financial resources had to be provided for that purpose. In future, as sensitive activities of the nuclear fuel cycle, such as laser enrichment, became less obtrusive, consideration would have to be given to a challenge system. The establishment by IAEA of a system of international plutonium storage was a further extension of the régime which should be undertaken as soon as possible. His delegation was concerned at the growing use and movement of plutonium, of which there were now roughly 400,000 kilograms in existence. In calling for the creation of an international plutonium storage system, it was not his Government's intention to underwrite the emergence of a plutonium economy but, rather, to create a
mechanism which would ultimately enable all plutonium - except unseparated plutonium in reactors and plutonium being put to immediate use in power generation or civil research - to be removed from circulation. Plutonium storage centres could ultimately be used as repositories for the surplus plutonium of nuclear-weapon States as they reduced the quantity and quality of their nuclear weapons in accordance with their obligations under article VI. In its final document, the Conference should express its concern at the growing use and movement of plutonium and should call for the direct disposal of plutonium surplus to the immediate needs of power generation and civil research.

4. The Conference should agree that all parties would require the application of IAEA full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply of nuclear material, equipment and technology to non-parties, thereby enhancing the wider non-proliferation régime. It was not acceptable that States should be able to obtain commercial advantages through not being parties to the Treaty.

5. Lastly, the Conference should note that all three nuclear-weapon States Parties had now submitted at least some of their nuclear installations to safeguards. It should call on those States to separate their civil and military facilities and to offer all their peaceful facilities for IAEA inspection, a course that would initially act as a confidence building measure. So far as non-proliferation was concerned, the immediate advantages of the voluntary offers were of course very modest; they did, however, demonstrate a willingness on the part of the nuclear-weapon States to accept some of the inconveniences and incidental costs involved in accepting Agency safeguards and, in two of the three nuclear-weapon States Parties, they enabled the Agency to develop new safeguards techniques by giving inspectors experience of new and sensitive technologies. Once facilities were separated, the voluntary offers might prove to be a first step towards assuring that no further material was transferred from civil to military uses. That, in turn, could lead to the cut-off of production of further fissionable material, which, especially in conjunction with a comprehensive test ban, would mark a decisive renunciation of the concept of nuclear deterrence by the nuclear-weapon States. Early separation of their facilities would represent a first step towards that ultimate goal.

6. The significance of the NPT safeguards régime on the non-proliferation of nuclear arms should not be underestimated. It was the first, and so far the only, working example of an international system for arms control verification.

7. Mr. KENYON (United Kingdom) said that information provided by the United Kingdom regarding its implementation of the Treaty, including article III, was to be found in document NPT/CONF.III/17, while the political position of his Government had been stated by the Head of the United Kingdom delegation at the 4th plenary meeting. At the present juncture he proposed merely to list some of the items his delegation would wish to see included in the final report of the Conference, in the hope of identifying those points on which a consensus already existed and those still requiring discussion.

8. First, the Conference should acknowledge the vital contribution of IAEA to the functioning of the non-proliferation régime in general, and in
9. In connection with article III (1) of the Treaty, the Conference should reaffirm that each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty should accept safeguards applied to all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, and should note that the voluntary acceptance by nuclear-weapon States of safeguards on their peaceful nuclear activities effectively extended the application of article III (1).

10. Again, it should note the successful implementation of article III (2), and the fact that the "trigger list", which indicated materials or equipment that should be subject to the safeguards required by the article, had been improved so as to take account of advances in technology, particularly in enrichment and reprocessing. The final document should also contain a call for the acceptance of full-scope safeguards by non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the Treaty as a condition of supply.

11. In connection with article III (4), the Conference should note the large number of agreements with IAEA concluded by States Parties since the Second Review Conference, and, in particular, should mention that the Soviet Union had, since the previous review, concluded a voluntary offer agreement and had implemented it.

12. Mr. BETTAUER (United States of America) said that he wished to draw attention to the level of compliance with article III of the Treaty. By the end of 1984 the safeguards agreements required by article III (1) and (4) had entered into force for 78 parties, with agreements for several additional parties awaiting entry into force or being negotiated. Those included all non-nuclear-weapon States Parties with significant nuclear activities. All of these agreements were in full conformity with article III (1). Yet by the end of the same year, more than 40 non-nuclear-weapon States, none of which engaged in significant nuclear activities, had not yet negotiated the required safeguards agreements. Accordingly, the Committee's report should recognize that the requirements in article III (1) and (4) regarding the conclusion of safeguards agreements had been met in States where it had practical significance, i.e., with significant nuclear activities. At the same time,
the Conference should urge all non-nuclear-weapon States Parties that had not yet done so to negotiate and bring into force the requisite safeguards agreements.

13. With regard to paragraph 2 of the article, the record of NPT parties in ensuring IAEA safeguards on trigger list exports was generally good. Since 1980, the United States had further tightened its nuclear export procedures to reduce still more the likelihood of any of its exports contributing to further proliferation. It had also worked with other suppliers to clarify the trigger lists drawn up to help parties to comply with their obligations under paragraph 2 and those efforts had contributed to the uniformity of the application of the paragraph. The United States therefore believed that the Committee's report should recognize the central importance of paragraph 2 in the non-proliferation regime and that the efforts to clarify trigger lists had helped parties to the Treaty to fulfil those obligations and had made for uniform application of the terms of the paragraph.

14. The implementation of safeguards had been conducted in careful conformity with the requirements of paragraph 3, including the important objective of ensuring that safeguards did not hamper international co-operation or economic or technological development. It had been the experience of the United States of America that the IAEA safeguards had not resulted in undue interference in facility operations or compromised information protected as commercially confidential and that the cost of implementing the safeguards was a very small percentage of the overall operating costs of nuclear facilities. A high level of co-operation between IAEA and the inspected State was of key importance in achieving effective safeguards while protecting those particular interests of the NPT parties. His delegation therefore believed that the report should recognize that the IAEA safeguards system had been implemented in a manner that did not hamper the economic and technical development of parties or international co-operation and should acknowledge the need for the continued application of safeguards in that way. In that connection, his delegation agreed that recognition should be given to the importance of safeguards for the non-proliferation regime. It should also be noted that the voluntary offers of nuclear-weapon States, including the United States, demonstrated that IAEA safeguards did not create a burden and that they helped in the development of IAEA safeguards for new types of facilities.

15. IAEA could take pride in having developed an extensive system of safeguards to ensure that nuclear materials in non-nuclear-weapon States were used solely for non-explosive purposes. Since 1979, there had been a 40 per cent increase in the number of major facilities under safeguards and about 800 nuclear installations were now subject to safeguards in States Parties. Since 1980, IAEA had not detected any anomaly that would indicate a diversion of any significant amount of safeguarded material. IAEA safeguards had thus demonstrated their effectiveness over a period of some 13 years and had provided an indispensable foundation of confidence for nuclear co-operation. Further improvements in safeguards implementation were none the less needed to create still greater confidence. Indeed, safeguards could not be static, since additional nuclear facilities and new nuclear processing activities were regularly coming into operation, and hence, continued steps to ensure adequate political, technical and financial support
were essential. The report should acknowledge the success to date of IAEA and of the parties to the Treaty in establishing the safeguards required under article III, the positive conclusions from the implementation of those safeguards, including their contribution to international confidence in the continued peaceful uses of nuclear material; and the need for all countries to provide adequate political, technical and financial support for safeguards.

16. Under the fourth and fifth preambular paragraphs to the Treaty, the parties undertook to facilitate the application of IAEA safeguards and expressed their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application of those safeguards. In that respect, the extent of the efforts by States Parties to support safeguards research and development and otherwise assist IAEA had been impressive. Eight States Parties now had formal support programmes and assistance was being provided in inspector training by three more parties. There had also been substantial co-operation, both by individual States and on a multilateral basis, in facilitating the application of IAEA safeguards. Important progress was being made in collaboration between States and IAEA to ensure that advanced nuclear facilities were designed for effective application of safeguards. The report by the Committee could well acknowledge such indispensable support by parties to improve safeguards and also urge other NPT parties to join in those efforts.

17. He also suggested the report recognize that IAEA safeguards were essential to the non-proliferation régime and made an important contribution to confidence that undertakings of parties were being met. His delegation, which joined the two previous speakers in supporting the call for full-scope safeguards in all States engaging in nuclear activities, considered that the existence of unsafeguarded nuclear activities in several non-nuclear-weapon States was a significant weak point in the international non-proliferation régime and a source of tension and insecurity for many countries. It was important to continue to urge those States to accept safeguards on all of their peaceful nuclear activities, but even more important that those States should not derive benefit from any significant new nuclear supply commitments so long as that situation persisted. The United States, for its part, had not entered into any such commitment with respect to non-nuclear-weapon States with unsafeguarded nuclear activities, and it would continue to exhort all nuclear suppliers to agree to require full-scope safeguards on all of a non-nuclear weapon State's peaceful nuclear activities as a condition for significant new supply commitments. The NPT parties already accepted comprehensive safeguards on their peaceful nuclear activities. Accordingly, a requirement that non-parties should agree to the same safeguards would make for equal treatment. The report, therefore, should note the deleterious effects on regional and international confidence and security of unsafeguarded activities in non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the Treaty; should also note the desirability of bringing all peaceful nuclear activities in all such States under safeguards; and lastly, should recommend that all parties adopt full-scope safeguards as a condition for significant new nuclear supply commitments to non-nuclear-weapon States.

18. Mr. RYZHKOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that, during the period since the Second Review Conference, the States Parties to the Treaty had on the whole strictly complied with their obligations under article III.
All peaceful nuclear activities of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties were conducted under IAEA control, which ensured the exclusively peaceful nature of nuclear exports and scientific and economic co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The IAEA safeguards system had proved to be an effective tool for verifying compliance with the Treaty. At the same time, the Agency's safeguards did not hamper the economic or technological development of States Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment.

19. A significant increase in the volume of IAEA inspection activities had been accompanied by marked improvements in the quality of inspections. An increase in the stock of non-destructive assay instruments had led to improved evaluation of safeguards effectiveness; the successful operation of the Agency's field offices in Canada and Japan had enhanced the efficiency of inspectors' activities and facilitated the extension of their experience to other regions. The IAEA secretariat's work on standardizing inspection report forms, computerizing reports and reducing the time required to process report data also deserved approval. His delegation noted with satisfaction that IAEA inspection findings invariably demonstrated that nuclear materials and installations subject to safeguards were not being used for purposes inconsistent with obligations under the Treaty.

20. Work on improving the IAEA safeguards system should be continued in such a way as to ensure that inspection activities stayed at a consistently high standard, that the inspection data obtained were reliable and authentic, and that safeguards procedures, instruments and methods were steadily developed and introduced into inspection practice.

21. With regard to the more general problem of increasing the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards, his delegation was in favour of extending the safeguards system to all nuclear activities in non-nuclear-weapon countries, whether or not they were parties to the Treaty. As recent General Assembly sessions and the general debate at the present Conference had shown, the overwhelming majority of countries wanted Israel and South Africa, in particular, to place all their nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards.

22. All participants in the Conference were agreed that nuclear exports should not be used as a channel for the proliferation of nuclear weapons. His delegation was in favour of expanding the list of nuclear materials and equipment whose export required IAEA safeguards in accordance with the undertakings set forth in article III (2).

23. Referring to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which had been opened for signature in March 1980, he noted that, five years later, the Convention had not yet entered into force. The Conference should advocate the earliest possible entry into force for the Convention and, in particular, urge countries engaged in international transport of nuclear materials or those providing transit facilities for such transport to become parties to it.
24. In conclusion, he said that the USSR, as an act of goodwill and in the interests of enhancing the efficiency of the safeguards system, the Agency's authority and strengthening the non-proliferation régime as a whole, had placed part of its civil nuclear activities under IAEA control. He also drew attention to his country's assistance to the Agency in the field of technical improvement of the safeguards system, as well as the special decree on nuclear exports adopted by the USSR in 1982. The Soviet Union, together with other socialist countries, would be submitting specific proposals for inclusion in the Committee's report regarding article III.

25. Mr. MAHMOUD (Iraq), stressing the importance of the IAEA system of safeguards in convincing States to accede to the NPT, said that it afforded the only valid method of controlling the movement of fissionable material while ensuring the peaceful use of nuclear energy. It also helped to build confidence among States. Israel, however, had seen fit to launch an armed attack on a nuclear reactor which had been under IAEA supervision. Israel did not place its trust in safeguards or in the evidence they provided; indeed, it had decided on its own that the reactor had represented a danger and that the best course had been to destroy it, without regard for the Treaty, for the system of international supervision, or for the serious consequences at the international level. Israel now threatened to repeat its aggressive act against installations in Iraq and other countries with similar installations under international supervision, something that was a grave challenge to the system of safeguards and the Treaty as a whole. His delegation was therefore submitting a working paper (NPT/CONF.III/C.II/2) which contained a number of recommendations with a view to strengthening the safeguards system and enhancing its stability.

26. First, IAEA should make every effort to improve the effectiveness of the system of safeguards so that it would always be able to verify that all nuclear facilities were being used for peaceful purposes. Due account should be taken of the need to avoid an increase in expenditure. In his delegation's view IAEA was the sole body competent to shoulder that responsibility.

27. Second, any change in the system of safeguards should be in keeping with the methods adopted by the Agency in conformity with its Statute. Third, Israel should be strongly condemned for its act of aggression against peaceful Iraqi nuclear installations. Fourth, the Israeli military attack on Iraqi nuclear installations subject to international supervision should be regarded as constituting an attack on the Treaty and also on the Agency and the safeguards system. Fifth, Israel should be exhorted to undertake forthwith not to carry out any attack on nuclear installations devoted to peaceful uses in Iraq or on any similar installations in other countries, and also to make all Israeli nuclear installations subject to the IAEA system of safeguards.

ORGANIZATION OF WORK

28. The CHAIRMAN suggested that, in order to expedite the business of the Committee, delegations might wish to submit their proposals in writing for circulation in one working language.

29. It was so agreed.

The meeting rose at 11.35 a.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 3rd MEETING

Tuesday, 10 September 1985, at 11.05 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia)

REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY AS PROVIDED FOR IN ITS ARTICLE VIII (3) (agenda item 13 (continued):

C. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY RELATING TO NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, SAFEGUARDS AND NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONES:

(1) ARTICLE III AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 4 AND 5, ESPECIALLY IN THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO ARTICLE IV AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 6 AND 7

1. Mr. REHAK (German Democratic Republic) said that the safeguards system had greatly contributed to the promotion of confidence among States, especially in the 15 years during which it had been used for verification within the framework of the Treaty. The German Democratic Republic and Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the Soviet Union had presented a paper (NPT/CONF.III/49) concerning the implementation of article III that they believed could provide a basis for the Committee's contribution to the final declaration.

2. Paragraph 1 of the paper, on the key role of IAEA safeguards in the non-proliferation regime, highlighted the fact that safeguards provided assurance of compliance by States with their undertakings, thereby fostering confidence. The Conference should emphasize that aspect, in keeping with the widely held views on safeguards.

3. Paragraph 2 noted with satisfaction that no diversion of safeguarded material nor any misuse of safeguarded facilities had been detected by the Agency and paragraph 3 contained a proposal to accelerate the conclusion of some 40 safeguards agreements still outstanding under article III (4). The Director-General of the Agency was requested to take the initiative and to submit draft agreements to all the States concerned. Such action would be more effective than reiterating another appeal.

4. Paragraph 4 welcomed the conclusion and implementation of safeguards agreements with nuclear-weapon States as a move to strengthen the non-proliferation regime and paragraph 5 contained an appeal to all non-nuclear-weapon States to place all their present and future nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards. The best solution would, of course, be for those countries to accede to the NPT, particularly in view of the provisions of article III (2) and the conditions imposed on nuclear exports by many States. Paragraph 6 consisted of a call on all countries to cease nuclear co-operation with Israel and South Africa and it once again urged the latter States to subject all their present and future nuclear installations to IAEA safeguards.
5. Paragraph 7 dealt with article III (3), noting with satisfaction that safeguards continued to respect the sovereign rights of States and that there had been no indication that they hampered economic, scientific or technological development. Safeguards had been implemented in the German Democratic Republic for 13 years without ever unduly hampering or interfering with its nuclear programme, as a result primarily of the excellent co-operation between IAEA and the State system for accounting for and control of nuclear material. Paragraph 8 of the paper outlined four particularly important areas in which further efforts were required: uniformity of safeguards implementation, using the same set of inspection goals in all agreements; rapid development and fast, efficient implementation of new instruments and safeguards techniques; further development of effectiveness evaluation methods in combination with automated data processing of safeguards information; and better utilization of human and budgetary resources. States were called upon to continue their support for the IAEA safeguards system, but he emphasized that the Agency bore the main responsibility for improving the system. Naturally, the Government of the German Democratic Republic would continue to contribute to IAEA research and training activities and it urged all States to support IAEA's safeguards system.

6. The need to design safeguards-oriented facilities was dealt with in paragraph 9 and it would become even more important as fuel cycle installations became increasingly complex. Compliance with safeguards requirements should be considered as indispensable to the operation of nuclear facilities as nuclear safety, radiation protection, and physical protection.

7. In that connection, paragraph 11 contained an appeal to States to accede to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material in order to bring it into force. Finally, paragraph 10 welcomed the Agency's endeavours to improve the representation of developing countries on the safeguards staff. States were urged to treat proposals for designation of inspectors in such a way as to make the best possible use of the Agency's inspectorate.

8. Mr. KONISHI (Japan) said that the voluntary acceptance of IAEA safeguards by four of the five nuclear-weapon States was a welcome development in the direction of universal acceptance of international verification measures. It should also be noted that another nuclear-weapon State outside the NPT had accepted IAEA safeguards in recent nuclear co-operation agreements with some countries, including Japan. Nevertheless, further efforts should be made to widen the scope of application of safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities in all nuclear-weapon States, something that might admittedly only have a marginal effect for non-proliferation purposes, but non-nuclear-weapon States Parties should not suffer disadvantages because they had accepted full-scope safeguards. Effective safeguards in nuclear-weapon States were also necessary in order to ensure that all nuclear material, equipment and facilities transferred from non-nuclear weapon States were used exclusively for peaceful purposes and not for strengthening nuclear weapon capabilities. In principle, Japan supported the concept of separating civil and military nuclear activities in nuclear-weapon States so as to facilitate application of IAEA safeguards, but was none the less aware that the financial and technical
questions involved in enlarging the scope of safeguards would have to be studied further, perhaps in an appropriate forum of the IAEA, in order to ascertain the most cost-effective manner of application.

9. In view of the key role played by the IAEA safeguards system in verifying fulfilment of the non-proliferation commitment by States Parties, the Committee should note with satisfaction in its final report that IAEA had verified that there had been no diversion of any significant quantity of nuclear material. Despite certain setbacks, the system had become firmly established as an indispensable element in the international non-proliferation regime and as a viable and effective means of preventing and deterring diversion of nuclear material. If international confidence in the system was to be maintained, continued efforts would have to be made to improve its operation; for example, further development of national systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material, the early establishment of adequate safeguards approaches and concepts applied in certain large-scale bulk-handling facilities, and continued research and development of safeguards-related instruments and techniques. IAEA should be encouraged to pursue its efforts in those areas, taking into account the need to ensure optimum cost effectiveness.

10. The 1970s had witnessed a remarkable increase in the construction and operation of nuclear facilities and, although the upward trend had been less noticeable in the 1980s, the total number of nuclear facilities to which IAEA safeguards were applied was still rising and would do so in years to come. Moreover, there had been a general trend towards construction of large-scale nuclear facilities. The system must therefore be responsive to the world-wide development of nuclear technology and it should be reviewed so that IAEA would be able to make the requisite adjustments within the existing framework. However, financial and administrative constraints meant that, in order to cope with an ever-increasing inspection load without sizeably increasing its budget, IAEA would have to improve efficiency in safeguards implementation and explore more rational safeguards approaches. His delegation believed that substantial improvements could be achieved, inter alia, by concentrating verification procedures on the most sensitive nuclear material, by applying a level of inspection of nuclear facilities in line with records of safeguards performance, and by introducing an advanced system of communication of safeguards information and data. The Committee's final report should request IAEA to intensify its efforts to ensure the most efficient implementation of safeguards and the most rational use of the safeguards budget.

11. With regard to the application of full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply, the question was not simply one of interpreting article III (2) of the Treaty, but of the need for a political commitment by all concerned. His delegation shared the view that full-scope safeguards should be accepted by all non-nuclear-weapon States, whether parties or not. Moreover, adequate measures should be adopted to rectify the situation in which non-nuclear-weapon States Parties were accorded less favourable treatment in nuclear trade than were States still outside the NPT. He nevertheless stressed that no nuclear export measures would be effective unless they were applied by all supplier countries. Article III (2) specified clearly which
nuclear items could only be supplied subject to IAEA safeguards and the nuclear items whose supply necessitated full-scope safeguards should likewise be specified.

12. With reference to article VII, Japan had consistently maintained that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions where appropriate conditions existed and on the basis of agreements freely concluded among the countries concerned could make an important contribution to the objective of non-proliferation and could enhance the peace and security of the region concerned. Japan had therefore voted in favour of the relevant resolutions submitted to the General Assembly. In that connection, it had noted with interest the conclusion of the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty (see NPT/CONF.III/INF.4 and Corr.1) and expressed the hope that the Zone would contribute not only to peace and security in the South Pacific region, but also in the world as a whole.

13. Mr. CAMPBELL (Australia) said that, consistent with the Chairman's opening statement (NPT/CONF.III/C.II/1) and with his Government's own views on priorities for the Conference, he proposed to concentrate on the prospects for enhancing the role of the Treaty in the promotion of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and of nuclear disarmament and in strengthening international peace and security, and in particular on the acceptance of the Treaty by States and on measures aimed at promoting wider acceptance of the NPT.

14. The Treaty's record in the area of verification since 1980 was a good one. No problems in respect of safeguards implementation had been recorded in non-nuclear-weapon States Parties. Safeguards coverage had been widened through the adherence of a number of countries and their conclusion of safeguards agreements with IAEA. Safeguards agreements between IAEA and two nuclear-weapon States, the United States and the Soviet Union, had entered into force in accordance with the Treaty's fifth preambular paragraph. A safeguards régime for centrifuge-enrichment plants which was non-discriminatory as between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States had been developed and was being implemented. Control lists for exports to non-parties had been updated to take account of advances in technology, particularly in the enrichment and reprocessing areas. No situations had been identified where safeguards might have hampered peaceful activities and IAEA had maintained the effectiveness, efficiency, acceptability and credibility of safeguards.

15. Australia believed that every possible political and practical support should be extended to IAEA in order to assist it in maintaining the effectiveness and credibility of international safeguards, particularly in respect of the safeguarding of special nuclear material. It supported the progressive intensification of IAEA safeguards application in nuclear-weapon States and the objective of separation of military and civil fuel cycles in those States as important preliminary measures for the implementation of future nuclear disarmament agreements. It therefore urged those States Parties which had not yet done so to conclude and bring into force their safeguards agreements with IAEA, and was ready to assist them and others, with IAEA and/or bilaterally, in establishing their national nuclear
materials control systems. In addition, it associated itself with the States seeking early entry into force of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

16. His country was vitally concerned with the maintenance of an effective non-proliferation regime and, as part of that general concern, with the application of effective safeguards and controls to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy as a means of contributing to the effective non-proliferation regime as well as with building the confidence in the regime that was necessary in order to permit the smooth and continuous conduct of nuclear trade and co-operation.

17. In the latter part of the period since the Second Review Conference there had been a protracted and probing debate in Australia about what role, if any, the country should play in the international nuclear fuel cycle. It had been confirmed that Australia’s role as a responsible supplier should be continued and that its contribution to the non-proliferation regime should be correspondingly strengthened. The Treaty had been and would remain pivotal to Australia’s position. Australia was a supplier in the spirit of article IV and in conformity with the obligations set forth in article III. His delegation’s proposal concerning article III (NPT/CONF.III/33) was designed to defend the Treaty and its central role in the non-proliferation regime, to maintain its effectiveness and to strengthen it. It would be seen that the proposal emphasized the importance of Treaty membership for the non-proliferation objective and, to that end, urged universal adherence, that it stressed the significant role in furthering global and regional security to be played by the non-nuclear weapon States when they joined the Treaty and accepted IAEA safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear activities, and that it also emphasized the significant role, in encouraging Treaty membership and its attendant non-proliferation benefits, that all States could play by maintaining the non-proliferation objective, best exemplified by membership in the Treaty, as the centre of their international nuclear co-operation.

18. Adoption of the proposal would remove the current discrimination in the safeguards conditions concerning nuclear supply to non-nuclear-weapon States Parties and countries not parties to the Treaty, and would also help to rationalize the range of safeguards conditions now applying to nuclear trade.

19. The proposal sought to obtain a political commitment by all States to follow a new practice with regard to safeguards conditions on exports - a political commitment for supplier States to require, and for non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the Treaty to accept, IAEA safeguards on all existing and future nuclear activities as an essential basis for the transfer of material, nuclear material, equipment and technology. The proposal was forward-looking, as the safeguards system itself had been since its inception. Had the system not been so, it would not have survived as a unique instrument of international reassurance.

20. As to the scope of the proposal, his delegation took the view that it should encompass all items of nuclear supply which currently attracted safeguards, including nuclear material, equipment and technology already
defined in international trigger lists developed by NPT exporters in connection with supply to non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the Treaty.

21. The proposed commitment was for the application of the full-scope safeguards requirement to all supply. With regard to current supply covered by existing contracts and existing nuclear co-operation agreements, which were generally concluded for 10 or more years, the proposal was only that suppliers and recipients should accept and implement the full-scope safeguards requirement by negotiating new arrangements or amendments to existing arrangements, and that every available opportunity should be taken to do so.

22. The proposal did not involve any imposition of safeguards. His delegation recognized that States were sovereign and that, since nuclear co-operation arrangements were concluded by mutual agreement, such agreement was also necessary in order to make changes in existing arrangements. States not parties to the Treaty or a treaty of similar coverage would be free to reject the new proposals for safeguards on supply or for amending agreements. However, they would also have to be prepared to accept the consequences of failing to accept adequate non-proliferation conditions and of failing, for whatever reasons, to offer the demonstration of peaceful intent which NPT States Parties offered to other Parties and to the international community as a whole.

23. Lastly, the proposal would not involve any significant increase in costs either to users of nuclear energy or to IAEA, since the overall increase in the safeguarding effort would be small.

24. Australian delegations to the present Conference and other arms control conferences and negotiations had made very clear the central importance which the Australian Government attached to the effective verification of arms control obligations and to the widest possible adherence to arms control instruments. His Government believed that the Treaty had the most effective verification system of any arms control agreement in existence and that the system was operating well. Precisely for that reason it would be wrong, in an evolving situation, to do no more than invoke the system as it stood. There would always be room for improvement. The Second Review Conference had come close to achieving an improvement which would have contributed to the present Conference's aims. Five years on, it was apparent from statements made in the Committee that the mutual gain now being sought should and could be obtained. Endorsement of the Australian proposal would constitute a major additional step in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

25. Mr. LINEHAM (New Zealand) said it could be argued that the purpose of IAEA safeguards was to verify fulfilment of each non-nuclear weapon State's obligations under the Treaty with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to use in nuclear weapons or other explosive devices. Again, it could be held that countries invited safeguards in order to verify that they were containing in good faith to pursue exclusively non-military aims in their safeguarded nuclear activities. Either way, the importance of the safeguards system was the confidence it provided that horizontal proliferation was not taking place, in other words, that nuclear
materials were not being assembled for potentially destructive purposes in States which were not already possessors of nuclear weapons. In reviewing article III, the Committee must consider the extent to which confidence in the system was justified and whether there were any deficiencies which States Parties might be able to rectify.

26. IAEA, which was to be commended for its effectiveness and professionalism, had given an impressive account of the success of its safeguards system. While considering it reasonable to conclude that all nuclear material under IAEA safeguards had remained in peaceful nuclear activities or was otherwise accounted for, the Agency was quite open about the problems that still remained. Foremost among them was the increasing number of non-nuclear-weapon States operating or constructing unsafeguarded facilities which had a significant capacity to produce weapon-usable material. Although the safeguards régime commanded a high degree of acceptability, the building of a world-wide non-proliferation régime inspiring full confidence was incomplete so long as a significant group of non-nuclear-weapon States with substantial nuclear activities remained outside the Treaty and failed to submit those activities to satisfactory safeguards arrangements.

27. His delegation welcomed the decisions of the nuclear-weapon States Parties to submit all or part of their peaceful nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards, and hoped that the process would be extended further and that all nuclear-weapon States would enter into arrangements with IAEA.

28. Article III (2) should be construed as imposing a commitment on supplier States to make the establishment of full-scope safeguards in recipient countries not parties to the Treaty a precondition of future transfer of nuclear equipment and material. His delegation agreed with the widely held view that, by not requiring full-scope safeguards on contracts with non-party countries, the Treaty allowed discrimination against its own members. Furthermore, the fact that non-party recipient countries were able to purchase on less stringent terms than States Parties discouraged accession to the Treaty. It was interesting to note that many speakers in the Committee had referred positively to the need for full-scope safeguards. Like those speakers, he had little sympathy for arguments that might be advanced in favour of some weaker safeguard formulation, since no argument could justify potential weakening of the non-proliferation régime or placing nuclear materials in the hands of purchasers not ready to have the materials safeguarded in a way that the NPT States Parties regarded as affording the minimum level of security.

29. For all those reasons, his delegation fully supported the Australian proposal contained in document NPT/CONF.III/33. In stressing the importance of universal adherence to the Treaty, the proposal appeared to admit that the acceptance of, or requirement for, full-scope safeguards on the part of States not parties to the Treaty was only a second best. However, in the absence of universal accession to the Treaty, that alternative was of paramount importance in strengthening the non-proliferation régime.
30. Mr. LOVALD (Norway) said that his delegation was basically in agreement with the Australian proposal as well as the proposal by Canada and Sweden (NPT/CONF.III/34), which, in a number of respects, were analogous to the proposals contained in the Nordic memorandum on the NPT (NPT/CONF.III/16), and more particularly the second and third measures and objectives listed in paragraph 6 of the memorandum, namely, acceptance by all non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the NPT of full-scope IAEA safeguards on all their present and future nuclear activities, and the requirement of those standards by all supplier States as a minimum condition for relevant exports to non-nuclear-weapon States. The next question dealt with in the same paragraph, that of the separation of civilian and military nuclear sectors in the nuclear-weapon States Parties under appropriate safeguards, had also been mentioned by previous speakers. His delegation wished to reiterate its support in principle to the objective of future steps in that direction.

31. Norway welcomed the fact that four nuclear-weapon States had concluded voluntary safeguards agreements with IAEA and would wish to see the Conference address an appeal to the fifth nuclear-weapon State to do likewise.

32. Norway had ratified the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material on 15 August 1985. The Convention was important and the Conference should urge all States which had not yet done so to become party to it at the earliest possible date.

33. As the head of the Norwegian delegation had stated in the general debate at the 4th plenary meeting, non-proliferation efforts would be greatly assisted by the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. His delegation would expect that aspects to be underlined in the final document, more particularly in view of the recent signing of the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty.

34. Mr. TELLO (Mexico) said that, with a view to assisting the Committee's work in connection with article III, his delegation proposed to circulate an informal paper reproducing the four paragraphs relating to article II on which consensus had been achieved at the Second Review Conference. It should, of course be understood that some of the ideas reflected in those paragraphs might now be obsolete and that some additional ideas might need to be introduced in the light of developments which had taken place in the meanwhile.

35. Mr. BOJILOV (Bulgaria) said that the non-proliferation regime contributed to the maintenance of stability in international relations, created a basis for the peaceful uses of atomic energy in non-nuclear States, and played an important role in the expansion of international co-operation in that regard. Wider adherence to the NPT, above all accession to it by countries with a significant amount of nuclear activities, would undoubtedly be highly conducive to strengthening the non-proliferation regime. In the context of the growth in nuclear energy production, the further improvement of the IAEA safeguards system assumed ever greater importance. As experience had proved, application of the Agency safeguards did not infringe the sovereign rights of States, or hamper the economic, scientific and technological development of States or international co-operation in peaceful nuclear activities. His
delegation shared the view that IAEA safeguards promoted confidence among States and thus created the necessary conditions for strengthening international security.

36. It was clear from the basic documents prepared for the Conference by the IAEA secretariat, particularly in connection with article III of the Treaty, that IAEA inspections had not revealed any violation whatsoever of commitments undertaken by States Parties. The Agency had not detected any diversion of safeguarded material to the production of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, nor had it detected any misuse of safeguarded facilities. In his delegation's view, efforts to upgrade the safeguards should continue, with priority being given to enhancing their effectiveness, consolidating the Agency's technological basis in that field, and expanding the staff and improving the activities of the inspection bodies. Needless to say, States which produced and exported nuclear materials and technologies should comply with the nuclear export principles laid down by the Agency.

37. His country, which valued highly IAEA's efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation régime and institute effective international control of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, was anxious to facilitate the task carried out by the Agency with respect to the inspection of Bulgarian nuclear facilities. In January 1985, it had adopted the guidelines for export of nuclear materials, technologies and equipment (INFCIRC/254). In addition to strict compliance with agreements signed with IAEA, Bulgaria had entered into commitments to assist the Agency in the application of the safeguards with a view to the elaboration and implementation of new methods in that regard. Also, construction had begun of a computerized national accounting system for nuclear fuel which was compatible with the IAEA computer facilities. Bulgaria would be pleased to share its experience with interested States parties in the future. In 1985, an unpaid expert had been detached to the data processing office of the Safeguards Department. An experiment on telecommunication links with that Department - the first of its kind - was to be conducted in Bulgaria with a view to the transmission of the report on nuclear materials. It was to be hoped that those modest efforts would serve to strengthen the IAEA safeguards.

38. As already mentioned by the representative of the German Democratic Republic, the Bulgarian delegation was co-sponsoring a paper (NPT/CONF.III/49) which reflected the Bulgarian Government's position on article III of the NPT. His delegation also considered that the Conference should call upon States to maintain their support for the IAEA safeguards system and urge those non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty which had not concluded with IAEA the agreements required under article III (4) to do so as soon as possible. The Conference should welcome the implementation of safeguards agreements with nuclear-weapon States as a means of strengthening the non-proliferation régime and increasing the authority of the Agency and the effectiveness of its safeguards system. It should also draw the attention of the NPT States Parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and invite all those States which had not yet done so to accede to the Convention. Lastly, with a view to strengthening the non-proliferation
régime, the Conference should appeal to all non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the Treaty to place all their present and future nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards.

39. Mr. ROCHE (Canada) said that he proposed to focus his comments on two central aspects of the Treaty: the critical importance of the non-proliferation commitment by non-nuclear-weapon States as embodied in the Treaty, and the verification of that commitment by IAEA safeguards.

40. With regard, first, to the non-proliferation commitment, Canada had been concerned by the possible outcome of some of the recurrent attempts made in various forums to define an effective non-proliferation commitment. In its view, the most effective and widely endorsed definition was that set forth in article II of the Treaty, whereby each non-nuclear-weapon State Party undertook not to receive or acquire directly or indirectly by any means "nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices". That wording removed any ambiguity, intentional or otherwise, that might arise from a briefer definition. Hence, Canada's first main proposal was that the Conference should reaffirm that definition as the one shared and maintained by all States Parties. Such was the motivation behind the first paragraph of the Canada/Sweden proposal (NPT/CONF.III/34). His delegation considered that element to be of central importance and believed that States Parties, having affirmed that definition at the Conference, should advocate it in other forums where the question arose.

41. That definition of non-proliferation was essential in the context of verification, the other theme of his remarks. Obviously, the value of any verification mechanism, no matter how efficient, had to be measured in the final analysis against the objective it was designed to serve. Article III (1) of the Treaty specified clearly the purpose, and the manner of application of the IAEA safeguards, namely, to prevent "diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices" and application "on all source or fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory" of the "State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere." It was the safeguards system called for by that provision, as incorporated in IAEA document INFCIRC/153, that Canada believed fulfilled the requirements and provided the most cost-effective way for the IAEA safeguards system to give the international community the degree of verification it required and expected. That combination of non-proliferation commitment and verification thereof provided a positive and binding international contribution to regional and international security and Canada therefore invited the Conference to endorse it wholeheartedly. The vast majority of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties had made the contribution, and the Conference should call upon the non-nuclear-weapon States non-parties to the Treaty to do likewise. Such was the basis for the second paragraph of the Canada/Sweden paper.

42. The third paragraph of the paper dealt with the proposal that the Conference should urge all States to make it an essential requirement for international nuclear co-operation that their non-nuclear-weapon State nuclear partners must have made an NPT-level non-proliferation commitment and have accepted NPT-level safeguards on all of their peaceful nuclear activities,
current and future. It was no secret that Canada attached major importance to
that requirement, for three basic reasons. In the first place,
non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the Treaty which wished to secure the
benefits of participation in broadly-based international nuclear co-operation
should be required to make the same contribution to regional and international
security, in terms of commitments to non-proliferation and acceptance of NPT
safeguards, as did non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty. The prime
motivation behind that proposal was that it would promote attainment of the
objective stated in the first two preambular paragraphs of the Treaty.

43. The second reason concerned the reality of international nuclear
co-operation as required by article IV of the NPT. Nuclear relationships in
the 1980s involved more and more frequently multiple suppliers that provided a
range of materials, nuclear materials, equipment, facilities, and technologies
as well as the skills and know-how to use those items in a nuclear programme.
Canada, as the world's largest producer of uranium and a country that exported
a mature and proven nuclear fuel cycle technology, was keenly aware of that
market reality. It was equally aware that it was exceedingly difficult to
isolate those nuclear supplies in the safeguarded sector of the nuclear
programme of a non-nuclear-weapon State which also maintained an unsafeguarded
programme, something that was particularly true in the case of nuclear
technologies and human resources. The consequent potential security concerns
of the neighbours of such a State and of the international community at large,
as well as the heavy burden on the IAEA safeguards system, should not be
regarded as acceptable. Canada therefore believed that all States engaged in
nuclear co-operation and in particular all States Parties to the NPT should be
prepared to take the necessary policy steps.

44. Thirdly, Canada took the view that States which chose not to make the
proposed non-proliferation commitment and accept NPT safeguards, and thus
chose not to enhance international security, should not receive the benefits
of international nuclear co-operation; rights and obligations went hand in
hand. For those, and other reasons, Canada had adopted its national policy
and put forward the proposal in the third paragraph of the Canada/Sweden paper.

45. In short, Canada strongly recommended that the Conference should reaffirm
the nature of the non-proliferation commitment made by non-nuclear-weapon
States Parties to the Treaty, declare that it considered the commitment and
the verification thereof by IAEA safeguards to be a major contribution to
regional and international security and urge all non-nuclear-weapon States not
parties to make such a verified commitment, and urge all States to establish
as a necessary basis for international nuclear co-operation with
non-nuclear-weapon States an NPT-level non-proliferation commitment and
acceptance of NPT safeguards by those States. It was particularly important
for the Third Review Conference to deal with that subject in a positive and
constructive way.

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 4th MEETING

Tuesday, 10 September 1985, at 3.25 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia)

REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY AS PROVIDED FOR IN ITS ARTICLE VIII (3) (agenda item 13) (continued):

C. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISION OF THE TREATY RELATING TO NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, SAFEGUARDS AND NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONES:

(1) ARTICLE III and PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 4 AND 5, ESPECIALLY IN THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO ARTICLE IV AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 6 AND 7;

(2) ARTICLES I AND II AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 1-3 IN THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO ARTICLES III AND IV;

(3) ARTICLE VII

1. Mr. HOEKEMA (Netherlands) said that his delegation associated itself with many of the points made on the pivotal role of safeguards for the NPT and the non-proliferation regime, the significance of the fact that no diversion of nuclear material had taken place, and the need for improvement in the effectiveness of safeguards in co-operation with IAEA and member States.

2. His delegation endorsed the objective of full-scope safeguards in all non-nuclear-weapon States and believed that the proposal submitted by Australia (NPT/CONF.III/33), requiring full-scope safeguards as a basis for trade, was a step in the right direction. It also believed that those States parties that had not concluded safeguards agreements with IAEA should do so in order further to increase confidence.

3. Attention should be given to advanced technologies both in safeguards and in export controls. As mentioned earlier in the debate, the hexapartite study programme (HSP) exercise was a good example of an advanced safeguards regime applied in both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. His country was proud to have the first gas centrifuge facility attachment under that régime in operation. In the field of export control, useful work had been done on updating the trigger list in the fields of enrichment and reprocessing, and in the future there would be a particular need to cope with new techniques such as laser enrichment. In general his delegation favoured a tailoring of advanced installations and techniques for safeguards application.

4. A subject of particular attention in his country had been international plutonium storage (IPS). Extensive discussion in the late 1970s about the relationship between non-proliferation and the structure of the fuel cycle had indicated that the use of plutonium in the fuel cycle should not be rejected, but did require special attention, for instance, in the field of physical protection. Safeguards applied also to those installations where large amounts of weapon-usable material were produced and used. A paragraph on that
issue should be included in the final declaration. In that connection, article XII (A-5) of the IAEA Statute provided special possibilities for strengthening safeguards for plutonium that had been produced through reprocessing but was not being used directly in the peaceful cycle for research and reactors. The question of how to implement that dormant article in the Statute had been studied extensively in the IAEA expert group, but the group had not succeeded in producing a single report. The three systems developed to implement the paragraph were largely politically motivated. Furthermore, despite several proposals in the IAEA Board and the stimulating role of the United Kingdom, the Board had not succeeded in reactivating discussion on IPS, which was an important contribution to making large-scale use of plutonium more transparent and linking it to proper conditions, thus laying foundations for better co-operation in that sensitive area. The Review Conference should stimulate the Board to continue examining that important question, and his delegation would submit a text on that issue for inclusion in the final document.

5. His country had given prominent attention to guarantees on peaceful use of supplies to nuclear-weapon States, and its policy was to require the corresponding commitments by those States, to be verified preferably by IAEA safeguards. As a long-term objective, a further separation, where feasible in the nuclear-weapon States between the military and civilian fuel cycle could contribute to such commitments. A gradual widening of the scope of the existing voluntary offers by nuclear-weapon States would also contribute to confidence and lessen present iniquities. The ultimate goal was a uniform world-wide safeguards régime in nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States.

6. From the perspective of further facilitating nuclear trade, his delegation was submitting the working paper it had prepared for consideration in Main Committee III, and hoped it would receive careful and positive attention.

7. Mr. KOESSLER (Federal Republic of Germany) stated that his delegation was convinced that the acceptance of full-scope safeguards on all peaceful nuclear activities by all States was an ideal. However, from a realistic point of view, other solutions should be sought which served non-proliferation aims equally well. The commitment of States to respecting the international safeguards system through co-operation in the peaceful nuclear field was by far the best means of enlarging the IAEA safeguards régime.

8. The method of making the acceptance of full-scope safeguards a precondition for nuclear exports had already proved to foster the creation of independent, unsafeguarded second fuel cycles in countries which, for political reasons, had decided not to accept full-scope safeguards. That was a tendency which his country considered extremely dangerous for the international non-proliferation and safeguards régime, and it would not support such a development. It would, however, continue to grant licences for nuclear exports in non-nuclear-weapon States only if the receiving State was a party to the NPT or the Treaty of Tlatelolco or had in an equivalent manner renounced nuclear explosive devices and accepted the corresponding international safeguards.
9. For those reasons, his delegation would not be in a position to join a consensus on the basis of proposals made by certain previous speakers regarding full-scope safeguards.

10. Mr. EKEUS (Sweden) said that the working paper introduced by the delegation of Canada and his own delegation (NPT/CONF.III/34) concerning the requirement for full-scope safeguards in all non-nuclear-weapon States represented a most effective measure aimed at establishing equality between parties and non-parties to the Treaty in the field of nuclear trade.

11. On behalf of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and his own country, he introduced working paper NPT/CONF.III/47, which addressed civilian nuclear activities in nuclear-weapon States. All participants in international nuclear trade must feel confident that material and equipment for peaceful purposes would under no circumstances be put to military use. As the volumes of trade increased, that principle became even more important.

12. When the NPT had been negotiated in the 1960s, the nuclear-weapon States had been presumed to be the sole suppliers not only of key materials and services offered for civilian use in other countries, but also of equipment and technology over the whole field of peaceful utilization of nuclear energy. That situation had changed radically; many other countries had built up independent and competitive nuclear industries and others would emerge. Against that background there was growing concern over the double standard between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States implied in article III. While some nuclear-weapon States had submitted all or part of their peaceful nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards, those voluntary activities were far from sufficient.

13. A necessary pre-requisite for the proposal of the Nordic States was that nuclear-weapon States should establish and maintain a clear separation between their civilian and military sectors and undertake not to divert nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, a commitment which should be verified through the application of IAEA safeguards.

14. Placing the nuclear industries of the nuclear-weapon and non-weapon-weapon States on an equal footing would help to promote international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and increase public confidence in that field, and could also pave the way for verifying a halt to the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes.

15. The safeguards system enjoyed broad support and the resources of the safeguards department of IAEA had been built up. The further strengthening of the Agency's machinery might therefore be fully feasible, thus enabling it to carry out protective safeguards operations in nuclear-weapon as well as non-nuclear-weapon States. His delegation had made a study on the cost involved and would be happy to make it available to interested delegations. The establishment of a world-wide uniform safeguards régime, comprising all peaceful nuclear activities in all States, would facilitate international trade in the nuclear field, put all civilian nuclear activities in all States parties to the Treaty on an equal footing, and lay the foundation for the verification of a halt of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes.
16. Mr. MWAGIRU (Kenya) said that, although article III was well meant, as his delegation had pointed out in the general debate, at the 10th plenary meeting, the NPT was riddled with unequal obligations for non-nuclear and nuclear States parties to the Treaty. For example, under article III (2), States parties should not provide nuclear material or equipment to non-nuclear-weapon States for peaceful purposes in the absence of safeguards. In practice, however, non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the Treaty had benefited, contrary to the spirit of article III. The Third Review Conference should decide what to do about that situation, it would not help the spirit of the NPT to brush aside such fundamental issues.

17. Secondly, in his delegation's view, article III (4) appeared to place an especially heavy burden on non-nuclear-weapon States. His own country had already concluded negotiations on a safeguard agreement, and considered that all States parties to the NPT should honour their signature. The Treaty placed all States parties, regardless of their nuclear capabilities, on an equal footing.

18. His delegation had briefly read the Netherlands proposal and found it to have some merit. However, the separation of military and civilian nuclear activity should not be a matter of economic and practical feasibility, but was a Treaty imperative. If non-nuclear-weapon States could bind themselves on important issues, so could nuclear-weapon States.

19. Mr. MATTEUCCI (Switzerland) said that his delegation shared the views of previous speakers on the important role of safeguards in the implementation of the Treaty. His country supported all technical measures designed to reduce the proliferation of nuclear weapons and would continue its contribution to IAEA activities. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was a political goal which would only be achieved by political means.

20. Some delegations had called upon all States parties to the Treaty not to co-operate with States which had not accepted the safeguards. However, such a policy would not prove a deterrent to those States which had developed an independent nuclear technology, but would merely encourage them to export to other States in the same position. The result would be a further loss of influence over those countries it was most important to reach.

21. In view of the grave dangers posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons, it was understandable that some countries should wish to insist on the observance of the safeguards. However, his delegation considered that such a policy would be counter-productive, and would find it difficult to accept any consensus decision to that effect. His delegation reserved the right to return to points connected with article III of the Treaty at a later stage.

22. Mr. BOSSOY (Turkey) said that it was essential to control the movement of nuclear material used in peaceful nuclear activities. The IAEA safeguards system, described in detail by the Agency's Director-General at the 1st plenary meeting, had been instrumental in creating confidence among nations. The IAEA should continue its safeguards programme with even greater efficiency, especially in the field of bulk handling facilities.
Ninety-eight per cent of all nuclear installations in non-nuclear-weapon States were covered by the safeguards, which had helped to facilitate trade and the transfer of nuclear technology.

23. It was gratifying to note that some nuclear-weapon States had decided to subject their civilian nuclear facilities to international control. All the civilian nuclear activities of the nuclear-weapon States should be covered by the safeguards, and his delegation supported moves to separate civilian and military installations in nuclear-weapon States to that end. The establishment of the international plutonium storage scheme would also help to strengthen the safeguards system.

24. He called upon the 40 non-nuclear-weapon States which were parties to the Treaty but which had not yet concluded safeguard agreements with the IAEA to do so as soon as possible.

25. Mr. LENDVÁI (Hungary) said that his delegation was one of the sponsors of a forthcoming proposal from the socialist group of countries.

26. His country had acceded to the Treaty and had some experience of the safeguards system. The IAEA inspectors from all over the world who had visited Hungary had always been fair and impartial, and it was to be hoped that that impartiality would be preserved as the safeguards system expanded.

27. There was still room for technical improvements, however, and the Hungarian Atomic Energy Commission had undertaken research and developed efficient techniques which were later adopted in everyday practice by the operators of both research and power reactors.

28. He had noted with interest the Canadian statement at the third meeting of the Committee concerning the export of nuclear material, equipment and technology. As an exporter of technology and know-how, Hungary had adopted the international guidelines drawn up by nuclear exporters, and was anxious to participate in the elaboration of further guidelines.

29. Mr. BETTAUER (United States of America) said that all the parties to the Treaty understood that the further spread of nuclear explosives would increase the danger of nuclear war and that they had accordingly all committed themselves in articles I and II to avoiding any action that would contribute to that proliferation. Those commitments were closely tied to both the safeguards procedures and the peaceful-use activities of articles III and IV.

30. Under article III a verification mechanism had been set up which established confidence that non-proliferation commitments under the Treaty were being met; it was also the basis for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Committee's report should recognize the importance of safeguards to the non-proliferation regime in helping to reduce suspicions that could lead to proliferation. It should also recognize the proliferation risks of unsafeguarded nuclear activities in non-nuclear-weapon States.

31. The non-proliferation commitments in articles I and II were also the foundation of peaceful nuclear commerce. The confidence generated by those
commitments and safeguards had allowed many countries, including his own, to pursue vigorous peaceful nuclear co-operation programmes with other NPT parties. The Committee's report should recognize that those non-proliferation and safeguards commitments were the foundation for peaceful nuclear commerce and co-operation.

32. There could be no doubt that the Treaty had also made a fundamental contribution to strengthening international peace and security. It had established for the first time a framework under which both the nuclear-weapon and the non-nuclear-weapon States agreed to specific commitments and verification measures to prevent the spread of those weapons. Those commitments, contained in articles I, II and III of the Treaty, had been met and had greatly helped to prevent the spread of nuclear explosives. The Treaty had also strengthened international pressures against the acquisition of nuclear explosives.

33. The Committee's report should reaffirm that the spread of nuclear explosive capabilities would add immeasurably to regional and international tensions and suspicions. It would increase the risk of nuclear war and lessen the security of all States. It should also recognize that the Treaty played an essential role in promoting regional and international peace and security by helping to prevent the further spread of nuclear explosives. Those States which had joined in the Treaty since the Second Review Conference should be commended. Their national decisions had shown the vitality of the Treaty and had contributed greatly to the security of all countries.

34. The Committee's report should contain an appeal to all countries not parties to the Treaty to adhere to it as promptly as possible. That would be in the interests of each country concerned, in that it would decrease regional suspicions, enhance security and expand access to the benefits of peaceful nuclear co-operation. It would also contribute to world peace and security by decreasing the risk of a nuclear conflict that would affect all nations. In that light, it was in the national interests of each Party to the Treaty to make efforts to render the Treaty truly universal.

35. Finally, he stressed that physical protection measures enhanced the security of nuclear materials and contributed to international peace and security by decreasing the risk that nuclear material would be stolen and misused by individuals or subnational groups. It was important that the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which his country had ratified, should come into force at the earliest possible time, and the Committee's report should call on States and had not yet done so to become parties to it.

36. Mr. HOEKEMA (Netherlands), addressing articles I and II of the Treaty, in relation to articles III and IV, associated himself wholeheartedly with the remarks of the previous speaker concerning their importance. The Committee had the duty to reflect in its report the fact that the core of the Treaty had been implemented properly. There might be some criticism - justified in many cases - regarding the implementation of other articles, notably article VI, but the crucial fact should not be overlooked that the basic obligations of the Treaty, as contained in articles I and II, had not been violated. His
delegation continued to believe that the Treaty served the security interests of countries that were parties to it, as well as of those outside it. It followed logically that the world would be a far more insecure place without the Treaty. That basic truth required adequate attention when reviewing the operation of the Treaty in its various aspects. It needed also to be adequately reflected in the final document of the Conference.

37. Mr. POPOV (Romania) recalled the recent resurgence of interest in the concept of nuclear-free-zones, an area in which non-nuclear-weapon States could take the initiative. His delegation welcomed the decision to create a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific area. The creation of peace and collaboration zones in Europe, too, was an essential prerequisite if real security was to be achieved. The reference in article VII of the Treaty to the creation of nuclear-free zones showed the important contribution they had to make to the non-proliferation régime and the security of all States.

38. Romania, as a Balkan country, had supported all security and demilitarization initiatives, not only in that area but also in Northern and Central Europe. Less wide-ranging measures, such as the creation of demilitarized zones, a freeze on military spending and the balancing of armaments levels, would also serve to strengthen security in Europe and throughout the world.

39. It was essential that nuclear-weapon States should undertake not to use their weapons against States which had no nuclear capability, and that the right of all States to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes should be guaranteed. Co-operation would be mutually advantageous and would help to strengthen security and build confidence.

40. In view of the desirability of establishing nuclear-free zones throughout the world, the Conference should call for the creation of such zones, especially in densely populated regions and those areas where large numbers of nuclear weapons were already deployed. His delegation supported the proposals on article VII made by various delegations, including Bulgaria (NPT/CONF.III/36) and Finland (NPT/CONF.III/43).

41. Mr. MAHMOUD (Iraq) recalled that his country had always been firmly convinced of the need to establish a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East, a position reflected in its support for all United Nations decisions on that subject. It had also recently taken urgent measures to remove the danger of nuclear weapons from the region by ratifying the NPT and by making all its nuclear installations subject to IAEA safeguards.

42. In that connection, he stressed that numerous international decisions, in particular General Assembly resolutions 36/27, 37/18, 38/9 and 39/14, as well as Security Council resolution 487 (1981), had called for accession to the NPT and IAEA supervision as an important step towards the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones throughout the world.

43. Accordingly, all the nuclear installations in the Middle East region were now subject to IAEA supervision as well as to the NPT provisions, with the exception of the nuclear installations in Israel, which possessed considerable
military potential, as had been stated in the study submitted by a United Nations group of experts in the report of the Secretary-General (A/36/431).

44. The Middle East was not free from nuclear weapons at present because of the failure to verify the Israeli nuclear installations, which international sources indicated had a military potential. A 1984 report by the Institute of Strategic Studies of Georgetown University (United States) stated that Israel had between 50 and 100 nuclear warheads. Other sources indicated that Israel had installed "Jericho II" nuclear missiles in the Negev desert and in the Golan Heights. A number of Israelis— and indeed some members of the Israeli Government— had stated that Israel had the potential to produce nuclear weapons, thereby increasing the United States Government's fears that Israel might possess nuclear weapons. Furthermore, Israel had illegally obtained explosive timing devices and nuclear materials, including 41 tons of uranium that could be used to manufacture nuclear weapons.

45. His delegation considered that it was first necessary to free the Middle East region from nuclear weapons altogether before a nuclear-free zone could be established. It was essential to ascertain that there were no nuclear weapons in the region by means of IAEA inspection in accordance with its safeguards system and with the NPT. The fact that Israel had not adhered to the NPT showed that it was actually in possession of nuclear weapons and acting contrary to the objectives of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The only solution was for Israel to take the step of renouncing the nuclear option, acceding to the NPT and making all its nuclear installations subject to IAEA safeguards. A step of that kind would undoubtedly be conducive to the setting up of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

46. In conclusion, he requested that his statement should be suitably reflected in the final document of the Conference.

47. Mr. CASTILLO RAMIREZ (Peru) said that he would speak only on article VII of the Treaty, since his delegation had already referred specifically to article III in its statement in the 12th plenary meeting of the Conference.

48. Bearing in mind the inalienable right enshrined in article VII, his country reiterated its satisfaction at the adoption of the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty by the South Pacific Forum, which had been signed at Rarotonga on 6 August 1985 by eight members of that Forum. That important achievement was bound to contribute to the consolidation of the process of military denuclearization established for Latin America by the Treaty of Tlatelolco. That Treaty had been in force for 18 years but had not yet been acceded to by some of the most developed countries in nuclear matters of the region, nor had its Additional Protocol I been ratified by a nuclear Power which had territories in the zone covered by the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

49. It was to be hoped that the new contribution now made by a group of nuclear-weapon countries would serve as an example for those bearing responsibility for the nuclear disarmament process. A special reference to the Treaty of Rarotonga should be made in the Committee's report.
50. Mr. NIEUWENHUYS (Belgium) said that he wished to comment briefly on the proposal that consideration be given to making full-scale safeguards a precondition for the export of nuclear materials - in other words, that full-scope safeguards should be applied to the export of such materials. If that proposal could be accepted by all exporters and all importers, it would indeed constitute an important contribution to the NPT system. Belgium wished membership in the NPT to be as broad as possible. It would make for the universality of IAEA safeguards and would be a step in the direction of gradually submitting all nuclear activities to the safeguards system, with regard to both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States.

51. His delegation recognized that with regard to the acceptance of full-scale safeguards by the importer as a preliminary condition to nuclear exportation, the co-operation and attitude of countries that were not parties to the NPT were particularly important. In that connection, it was essential to draw a distinction between the aim pursued and the means available in the present circumstances for attaining it.

The meeting rose at 4.45 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 5th MEETING

Wednesday, 11 September 1985, at 3.30 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia)

REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY AS PROVIDED FOR IN ITS ARTICLE VIII (3) (agenda item 13) (continued):

C. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY RELATING TO NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, SAFEGUARDS AND NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONES:

(3) ARTICLE VII

1. Mr. ALFARARGI (Egypt) said that nuclear-weapon-free zones had the merit of reducing international tension, promoting the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and averting the danger of nuclear war, while at the same time safeguarding the security of the States situated in the zones protected by the relevant agreements. The principle of nuclear-free zones, which dated back to 1959, appeared recently to have been the subject of renewed interest, as shown by the signing on 6 August 1985 of the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty and the proposals concerning the establishment of similar zones in other regions. In that connection, the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa and the General Assembly resolutions on that subject, as well as the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, which had been reiterated in several General Assembly resolutions, clearly demonstrated the importance which the international community attached to that means of contributing to international peace and security.

2. Egypt had whole-heartedly supported all those initiatives. In 1964, the African leaders, meeting in Cairo, had declared the nuclear neutrality of Africa and every year since then they had submitted a resolution on that subject to the General Assembly. In addition, at the 6th plenary meeting of the present Conference, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt had invited all the States parties to the NPT and all peace-loving countries to appeal to the Security Council to take the necessary steps in accordance with its mandate under Article 26 of the Charter of the United Nations to implement the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa. Egypt, as a member of the Security Council, had undertaken to spare no effort to that end.

3. With regard to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, Egypt had been among the first countries to submit a proposal to that end in 1974. That proposal had received the immediate support of the General Assembly, which had subsequently adopted four resolutions on the question, all of them unanimously except for one vote, that of Israel. In 1979, however, the Israeli delegation had for the first time voted in favour of a resolution calling for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. In 1980, the General Assembly had given its approval to the Egyptian initiative by unanimously adopting the proposal to establish such a zone in the Middle East (resolution 35/147), which meant that all the States in the world had committed themselves to taking the necessary steps to ensure
the full implementation of that resolution. In all the General Assembly had adopted 11 resolutions calling for the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East. For those resolutions to be implemented, however, two types of measures were now necessary: one set of measures actually to create the zone and ensure that it was respected both internally and externally, and another set to ensure that all nuclear activities in the region were made subject to IAEA safeguards.

4. Egypt hoped that that zone, for which it had worked unceasingly, would finally be created, in order to avoid wars and destruction in the region and to contribute to universal peace. His delegation had submitted a document containing the proposals which it wished to be included in the final document of the Conference. It hoped that those proposals would be approved by consensus, as had been the case with the initiatives aimed at the establishment of other nuclear-free zones.

5. Mr. LINEHAM (New Zealand) said that the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty, the signing of which his delegation had had the pleasure of announcing to the Conference, was the outcome of a process initiated by New Zealand in 1975. It was based on a number of principles which had been adopted by the member countries of the South Pacific Forum, such as the prevention of the stationing and testing of any nuclear explosive device in the region.

6. The decision to create a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific represented a very significant achievement for the region. The text of the Treaty and the protocols thereto had been submitted to the Conference (NPT/CONF.III/INF.4 and Corr.1) and further details were given in a working paper (NPT/CONF.III/53) which had been submitted by the members of the South Pacific Forum participating in the Conference. He expressed the hope that the creation of that zone, which was consistent with article VII of the NPT, would keep the South Pacific free from rivalry involving nuclear weapons, promote the security of all the countries of the region, strengthen the non-proliferation régime and contribute to the disarmament and arms control process.

7. The members of the South Pacific Forum recognized that a zone of that kind would not be fully effective unless it was respected by the nuclear-weapon States. It was for that reason that the Treaty was accompanied by protocols, which would not be adopted until consultations had been held with those States. One of the draft protocols (Protocol 3) provided that no nuclear explosive device would be tested in the zone. In that connection, New Zealand and the other countries of the South Pacific took particular exception to the fact that France was continuing to conduct nuclear tests at Mururoa, in contempt of the interests of the countries of the region. At their recent meeting, the members of the South Pacific Forum had reiterated their total opposition to French nuclear testing in the region. They had urged France to cease immediately its nuclear test programme at Mururoa and noted that one of the main reasons which had led them to adopt the Treaty of Rarotonga had been their profound wish that no nuclear tests be conducted anywhere within the region.
8. His delegation was glad to note the interest aroused by the decision to establish a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific and particularly welcomed the comments made by countries bordering the Pacific, including ASEAN and Latin American countries and, more recently, Japan. It hoped that, in its final document, the Conference would be able to take note of the efforts made by the Governments of the States members of the South Pacific Forum in negotiating and endorsing the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty. It might also be appropriate for the Conference to take note of the hope expressed by the South Pacific countries that the nuclear-weapon States would in due course become parties to the Protocols to that Treaty.

9. Mr. MISHARIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) recalled that his country had always favoured the establishment of nuclear-free zones. Thus it had supported the proposal made by Poland in the mid-1950s to establish a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe and had become a party to the Antarctic Treaty of 1959. In addition, the Soviet Union was a party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and was prepared to support any proposal aimed at creating nuclear-free zones in other regions of the world, within or outside the framework of the United Nations. It favoured particularly the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa, and had followed with great attention and interest the negotiations that had led to the creation of a zone of that kind in the South Pacific. His delegation wished to stress its view that the establishment of such zones constituted an excellent means of strengthening the non-proliferation régime.

10. Of course, it was essential that the non-nuclear-weapon States having territory within a nuclear-free zone should undertake to make all their nuclear activities subject to IAEA safeguards. The Soviet Union hoped that, in its final document, the Conference would express its support for the creation of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world.

11. Mrs. NYMAN (Finland), introducing a text on nuclear-weapon-free zones (NPT/CONF.III/43) which her Government proposed for inclusion in the final declaration of the Conference, said that the establishment of many such zones would build confidence among States, enhance security and lessen the danger of nuclear conflict. For that reason her Government felt that the Conference should, in its final declaration, pay due attention to the experience gained by the countries in the only existing nuclear-free zone in the world, welcome the signature of the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty and take note of the proposals for the establishment of zones of that type elsewhere in the world. The Conference would thus give fresh impetus to the regional approach to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

12. The text proposed by her Government did not deal in detail with the fundamental issues relating to the establishment of nuclear-free zones, since the Conference was not called upon to make any specific proposals on that matter. It was for the States of a particular region to take the initiative.

---

in establishing a nuclear-free zone and to negotiate the terms of an agreement on the subject with due regard for the circumstances prevailing in the region. On the other hand, the Conference could and should express its general evaluation of the execution of article VII and consider ways and means of ensuring its broader implementation in the future.

13. Mr. BOJILIOV (Bulgaria), referring to the working paper (NPT/CONF.III/36) submitted by his Government, and in particular paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 6 thereof, said that the Treaty of Tlatelolco had for a long time been the only practical step taken pursuant to article VII. He welcomed the decision of the member countries of the South Pacific Forum to open for signature a treaty which established a nuclear-free zone in their region, drew attention to the various proposals for establishing such zones in other parts of the world, and expressed the hope that the Conference would approve and encourage in its final document the efforts being made to that end by various States.

14. There were a number of considerations which militated in favour of the establishment of nuclear-free zones. While it was obvious that the States Parties to the NPT found themselves in security situations which varied from region to region, and that different means might be needed to meet the security concerns of those States, his Government was convinced that the establishment of nuclear-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region, contributed not only to the achievement of the objective of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons on a regional basis, but also to a lessening of the nuclear threat, a result which was perhaps even more important in the case of continents such as Europe, where the concentration of nuclear weapons was very high and the risk of direct nuclear conflict more than real. For such a measure to be really effective, however, it was obviously essential that the nuclear Powers should co-operate by respecting strictly the status of the nuclear-free zones, and refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of those zones.

15. Mr. AKAY (Turkey) said that his Government had always favoured any initiative which could enhance international security and stability, and had supported the idea of establishing nuclear-free zones wherever that had appeared feasible. However, certain conditions must be met before such zones could be established. In particular, the countries of the region concerned must co-operate in an adequate manner and conduct negotiations in good faith.

16. Experience had shown that the security of the Balkans was directly linked with that of Europe as a whole; it was therefore difficult to contemplate the establishment of a nuclear-free zone comprising only the Balkan countries while those countries continued to be under threat from other neighbouring regions. Moreover, the presence of nuclear weapons in Europe, and in particular in the Balkans, was the result of the general strategic balance in Europe and of the security requirements dictated by that balance. Experts from Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Turkey and Yugoslavia who had taken part in two meetings in Athens in January and February 1984, meetings which had dealt inter alia with the adoption of procedures aimed at transforming the Balkan peninsula into a nuclear-free zone, had transmitted to their respective
Governments, for consideration, the proposals and suggestions made at those meetings with a view to permitting the continuation of the dialogue on that question.

17. Mr. NIEUWENHUYYS (Belgium), referring to the Tlatelolco Treaty and the Antarctic Treaty, said that he shared the views of those delegations which had stressed the contribution made by the existing nuclear-free zones to the strengthening of the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons at the regional level.

18. Mr. DOWIYOGO (Nauru) noted with satisfaction that many countries, including not only members of the non-aligned and neutral group but also countries in Western and Eastern Europe, had welcomed the efforts of the members of the South Pacific Forum to establish a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific. In his view, it would be appropriate to note that fact in the final document of the Conference. He commended to the attention of the Committee the proposal contained in document NPT/CONF.III/46 which, in particular, called on the Conference to reaffirm that nuclear-free zones constituted an effective means of curbing the spread of nuclear weapons and protecting non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of such weapons. The Conference should, moreover, make a formal statement welcoming the signing of the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty and call for the signature and ratification of the protocols to that Treaty by the nuclear-weapon States.

19. Mr. CAMPBELL (Australia) pointed out that, although far removed from the historic centres of confrontation, the countries of the South Pacific had been acutely aware of the dangers of nuclear conflict since the dawning of the nuclear age. It should not be forgotten that the tragic events at Hiroshima and Nagasaki had taken place in the North Pacific. The South Pacific countries were at present gravely concerned about proposals to dump nuclear waste in the oceans of the region and perhaps even more concerned about the continued testing of nuclear explosive devices, espacially in their own region. Throughout the 1950s, nuclear testing in the atmosphere had taken place in the North Pacific and, with the concurrence of the Australian Government, in Australia. In 1973, however, the Governments of Australia and New Zealand, motivated by the outrage of the peoples of those countries, had referred to the International Court of Justice the question of French nuclear testing in the atmosphere in the South Pacific. Although those tests in the atmosphere had ceased, France remained the only nuclear-weapon State which continued to conduct underground nuclear tests in the region. Why did not France conduct its tests on its own territory? The member countries of the South Pacific Forum utterly rejected the French attitude, as was strikingly illustrated by their vehement reaction to the recent Rainbow Warrior affair.

20. He proceeded to summarize the main provisions of the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty and the three draft protocols thereto. He expressed the hope that the nuclear-weapon States would give positive consideration to the draft protocols, so that they could be adopted at the next meeting of the Forum in 1986 and early agreement could be reached with the States invited to sign them. The Treaty covered a truly significant portion of the earth and he called on the Committee to acknowledge that that instrument constituted an
initiative consistent with article VII of the NPT, as well as a demonstration of the commitment of the South Pacific States to the objectives of the NPT and an important contribution to disarmament, nuclear arms control and the maintenance of peace at both the regional and world levels.

21. Mr. BETTAUER (United States of America) said that his Government had only recently received the text of the protocols to the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty, texts which, according to the countries which had participated in the negotiation of the Treaty, would not be finally determined until after consultations with the nuclear-weapon States. His Government accordingly wished to study the implications of the protocols carefully before taking a decision on them. That having been said, it had long been his Government's policy to support the establishment of nuclear-free zones. He therefore felt that the Committee should, in its report to the Conference, welcome the adoption of the Treaty in question but refrain from calling on States which had not participated in its formulation to ratify texts which were not final. Such a step would be premature.

REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY AS PROVIDED FOR IN ITS ARTICLE VIII (3) (agenda item 13) (continued):

C. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY RELATING TO NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, SAFEGUARDS AND NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONES:

(1) ARTICLE III AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 4 AND 5, ESPECIALLY IN THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO ARTICLE IV AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 6 AND 7

22. Mr. SREKOVIĆ (Yugoslavia) said that the implementation of the safeguards system under article III had undoubtedly been very satisfactory on the whole. He recalled that no safeguards system could be effective unless the States parties were willing to comply fully with the provisions of the NPT. In that respect he considered that the conduct of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty had been exemplary, as was shown by the IAEA report (NPT/CONF.III/9), para. 29).

23. In his Government's view, proposals for unlimited strengthening of the non-proliferation régime which went far beyond the safeguard requirements deriving from article III were neither the best nor the only way to improve international confidence and security. Any new non-proliferation measure in addition to those already accepted by the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT could only be accepted on the basis of a negotiated agreement among the parties.

The meeting rose at 4.35 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 6th MEETING

Thursday, 12 September 1985, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia)

REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY AS PROVIDED FOR IN ITS ARTICLE VIII (3)
(agenda item 13) (continued):

C. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY RELATING TO
NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, SAFEGUARDS AND NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE
ZONES:

(1) ARTICLES III AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 4 AND 5, ESPECIALLY IN THEIR
RELATIONSHIP TO ARTICLE IV AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 6 AND 7,

(3) ARTICLE VII

1. Mr. LINEHAM (New Zealand), acting on behalf of the delegations of
Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway and
Sweden, said that he proposed to circulate an informal proposal in connection
with article III, with a view to assisting the Chairman in the preparation of
the draft report on that article.

2. The CHAIRMAN thanked the representative of New Zealand and all other
members of the Committee who had submitted or intended to submit proposals to
assist him in preparing the draft report.

3. Mr. TELLO (Mexico) said that his delegation was circulating an informal
paper containing a paragraph which might be included in the part of the
draft report dealing with article VII. It should be noted that the proposed
paragraph was based on a text which had commanded consensus at the
Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, in 1978.

4. Mr. REHAK (German Democratic Republic) said that his country regarded the
establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones as a significant move to strengthen
peace and security in the areas concerned and as being complementary to
nuclear non-proliferation. It had welcomed the creation of such zones in the
Antarctic and in Latin America and the recent conclusion of the South Pacific
Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty, as well as the efforts to establish
nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Balkans, the Middle East and Africa and a
zone of peace in South-East Asia.

5. The German Democratic Republic attached special importance to the
establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Europe. Accordingly, his
Government had supported the Swedish initiative of 1982 to set up a zone free
of battlefield nuclear weapons in Europe, stating on that occasion that the
German Democratic Republic was prepared to make its entire territory available
for such a zone, provided the principle of equality and security was observed.
6. Agreements on nuclear-weapon-free zones should, of course, contain an understanding by all the non-nuclear-weapon States concerned to the effect that they accepted IAEA safeguards in respect of all their current and future nuclear activities.

7. Mr. SUTOWARDOYO (Indonesia) recalled that, at the 11th plenary meeting, his delegation had expressed his Government's views on the implementation of article VII and, in that connection, had stressed the importance of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, referring in particular to specific measures by the countries of ASEAN to promote the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone as a component of a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality to be created in South-East Asia.

8. Indonesia believed that regional peace and stability were essential elements for the security and survival of the States and peoples of the region concerned. Regional conflicts, on the other hand, constituted a destabilizing factor affecting the efforts by countries of the region to preserve their sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and to promote their peoples' well-being. It was unfortunate that regional conflicts were all too often aggravated by external factors in the form of direct or indirect involvement by competing major Powers. That was where the threat of use of nuclear weapons came into play and where the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones became relevant and essential.

9. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, freely arrived at by the States of the region involved, would promote peace and security in the region through the effective exclusion of nuclear weapons from the territory of States concerned and, at the same time, would contribute towards efforts to promote the objectives of the Treaty, and particularly that of curbing the spread of nuclear weapons.

10. Unquestionably, the non-nuclear-weapon countries had as much right as the nuclear-weapons Powers to security and survival. His Government therefore firmly believed that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone anywhere should in no way be hampered on the grounds that it might be prejudicial to any nuclear-weapon Power's global strategic interests. Hence, his delegation would wish the final declaration to include elements stressing the importance of a nuclear-weapon-free zone as a component of the concept of a zone of peace and the imperative nature of the nuclear-weapon Powers' obligation to respect the wishes of non-nuclear-weapon countries to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in their own region. The text of his delegation's proposal would be circulated shortly.

11. Mr. BETTENBERG (United States of America) recalled that, at the 2nd meeting, his delegation had expressed its views on the desirability of comprehensive safeguards as a condition for significant new nuclear supply commitments to non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the Treaty. The same suggestion was to be found in several proposals, both formal and informal. He recognized that those views were not shared by all delegations. In particular, it had been argued that the proposed system would not work and that it had never worked previously. In his opinion, the prospect of being able to gain the benefits of nuclear co-operation and assistance from other
States could indeed lead States either to become parties to the Treaty or to accept comprehensive safeguards. He stated that had happened in the past and that efforts should continue to be made to obtain such a response. Non-nuclear-weapon States which were unwilling to accept comprehensive safeguards and which sought to establish unsafeguarded nuclear activities should not be able to gain the benefits available to parties to the Treaty. Further, in his delegation's view, efforts to restrict nuclear exports to non-nuclear-weapon States did not foster the establishment of unsafeguarded nuclear activities in those States; rather, such activities were another reason the adoption of the full-scope safeguards policy was all the more important.

12. A number of delegations had made proposals for inclusion in the Committee's report on the subject of separation of civil and military nuclear activities and on that of mandatory safeguards on civil nuclear activities in nuclear-weapon States. His own delegation could support those concepts in principle and as long-term goals. There were, however, several important practical aspects to be considered. First, the magnitude of IAEA's task in carrying out such proposals should not be underestimated. The inspection effort required was likely to exceed the 1984 level by a factor of 3 to 4 and not 1 to 2, as had been suggested. Further, it was essential not to jeopardize IAEA's ability to carry out its mandate fully with regard to the application of safeguards in non-nuclear-weapon States. The language employed in the relevant part of the final document should reflect those practical considerations and should not be rigid or inflexible. The proposal put forward by the Netherlands and Canada (NPT/CONF.III/54) would appear to offer the best basis for devising a consensus formulation.

13. Mr. NGSOXWERE (Nigeria), stressing the great importance his delegation attached to the implementation of article VII, referred to the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa and its surrounding areas, adopted by the OAU as far back as 1964. In furtherance of the laudable objective of the Declaration, the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly had decided that the Security Council should take appropriate effective steps to prevent the OAU's important decision from being frustrated. The international community's profound and sustained interest in implementation of the Declaration was underlined by several resolutions adopted over the years by the General Assembly, calling on all States to consider the continent of Africa and its surrounding areas as a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

14. The only obstacle to implementation of the OAU Declaration was the Pretoria régime's active interest in producing nuclear weapons. South Africa's acquisition of so-called "bomb in the basement" status was a matter of grave concern to his country. Events following Pretoria's announcement in 1970 of its development of a new process for uranium enrichment and the detection in 1977 of its efforts to build a nuclear test site in the Kalahari Desert clearly indicated the course which South Africa's nuclear-weapon ambition was taking and the serious threat it represented to peace and stability in the African region.

15. In reaffirming Nigeria's full support to all regional efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones, which it recognized as an important step
towards the achievement of the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty, his delegation urged the Committee to take into account in its report that any collaboration with South Africa in the nuclear field jeopardized the aims of the Treaty. It was a negation of the Treaty's credibility and stability that the apartheid régime, which was not a party to the Treaty and had consistently refused to submit its nuclear facility to IAEA inspection, should be granted access to nuclear technology, especially since there was no doubt that the apartheid régime's actions in southern Africa constituted a grave threat to international peace and security.

16. His delegation therefore urged the Committee to affirm, inter alia, that South Africa's unsafeguarded nuclear programme and its nuclear-weapon capability thwarted implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, to recommend that any form of collaboration with the South African régime in the nuclear field seriously undermined the credibility and stability of the non-proliferation régime, that all States, corporations and institutions which had not yet done so should terminate all forms of such collaboration with South Africa, and that South Africa should submit all its nuclear installations and facilities to inspection by IAEA.

17. It was necessary to highlight those points because of the unsettling consequences of South Africa's nuclear weapon capability for the African region. While recognizing the Treaty's enormous accomplishment in halting the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons, his delegation was concerned to note that the Treaty was under growing strain. The time had come for the international community to establish the confidence and mutual trust needed in order to guarantee renewal of the NPT in 1995. South Africa's nuclear capability would certainly not be conducive to that aim. The international community should not allow South Africa to continue to stand in the way of realization in Africa of the objective set forth in article VII. At a time when the Pretoria régime was responding with intensified mindless brutality to protests by the black people of South Africa against their political powerlessness and economic deprivation and the dehumanizing policy of segregation, and was also continuing its brazen violations of its neighbours' territorial integrity, he fervently hoped that the Committee would have no difficulty in supporting Nigeria's proposal.

The meeting rose at 11.05 a.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 7th MEETING

Friday, 13 September 1985, at 11.15 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia)

REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY AS PROVIDED FOR IN ITS ARTICLE VIII (3) (agenda item 13) (continued):

C. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY RELATING TO NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, SAFEGUARDS AND NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONES:

(3) ARTICLE VII

1. The CHAIRMAN drew attention to the following working paper on the review of article VII:

"1. The Conference observes the growing interest in utilizing the provisions of article VII of the Treaty, which recognizes the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

"2. The Conference considers that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned constitutes an important disarmament measure and therefore the process of establishing such zones in different parts of the world should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons.

"3. The Conference expresses its satisfaction at the continued successful operation of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco). It calls upon all States that are eligible to become parties to the Treaty or to its Additional Protocol I, thereby bringing the Treaty régime fully into force.

"4. The Conference regards as encouraging the prospect which emerges through the conclusion of the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty.

5. The Conference emphasizes the importance of concluding nuclear-weapon-free zone arrangements in keeping with internationally recognized principles.

"6. The Conference takes note of the ongoing regional efforts to achieve nuclear-weapon-free zones, for example, in various areas of Europe, including in the Balkans and in Northern Europe, and in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia."

2. Mr. TELLO (Mexico) introduced the amendments submitted by his delegation. In paragraph 3, the second sentence of the text submitted by the Chairman should be replaced by: "It reaffirms the repeated exhortations of
the General Assembly to France which is already a signatory of Additional Protocol I to ratify it and calls upon the Latin American States that are eligible to become parties to the Treaty to do so. The purpose of the amendment was to repeat the General Assembly's appeal to France to ratify Additional Protocol I, an appeal made in resolution 39/51, which had been adopted by a large majority. It should be emphasized that, although France had abstained, it had not voted against the resolution in question. His delegation also considered that a special appeal should be made to Latin American States that were not yet parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco to accede to it.

3. With regard to paragraph 4, the text proposed by the Chairman was not acceptable. The general debate had clearly underlined the strong support among delegations for the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty. Hence paragraph 4 should be replaced by: "The Conference welcomes the conclusion and signing of the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty and expresses the hope that the consultations that have been announced regarding the Protocols will have a prompt and successful conclusion."

4. Lastly, paragraph 5 should be deleted, for the importance of concluding nuclear-weapon-zone arrangements was fully covered in paragraph 2.

5. Mr. von WAGNER (Federal Republic of Germany) proposed that the last line of paragraph 2 of the Chairman's proposal should be amended by replacing the full stop with a comma and adding the words "in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly. In the process of establishing such zones, the characteristics of each region should be taken into account."

6. The amendments proposed by Mexico to paragraphs 3 and 4 were acceptable but paragraph 5 of the Chairman's text should be retained in its present form.

7. Paragraph 6 raised a political problem for his delegation and he could propose three alternative forms of wording: a full stop could be inserted after the words "nuclear-weapon-free zones" and the remainder of the text deleted; alternatively, the text after the words "for example" could be amended to read "in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia"; or, finally, the text after the words "for example" could be amended to read "in Africa, the Middle East, South Asia and various parts of Europe, on the latter, differing views were expressed." He could agree to changes in the wording of those proposals, but insisted that the paragraph must reflect the dissent regarding Europe.

8. Mr. DIOP (Senegal), introducing the amendments proposed by the Group of African States (NPT/CONF.III/C.II/3), said that the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa had been a constant objective since the OAU had adopted its Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa. South Africa represented a threat to the establishment of such a zone. Prompted by three basic considerations, namely, the need to end nuclear co-operation with South Africa, the acceptance by South Africa of safeguards, and the importance of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the Group of African States proposed that the following should be inserted in the Chairman's text:
"The Conference considers that the development of nuclear weapon capability by South Africa frustrates the implementation of the 'Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa'. Any form of collaboration or co-operation in the nuclear field with South Africa seriously undermines the credibility and stability of the non-proliferation régime. Consequently, all States Parties and corporations and institutions of those States Parties which have not done so are called upon to terminate all forms of such collaboration with the South African régime. At the same time, the South African régime is called upon to submit all its nuclear installations and facilities to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency. All States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as well as other nuclear-power States, are requested to take concrete measures to facilitate the implementation of a nuclear-free-zone in Africa."

9. Mr. MONIB (Egypt) said that, since the Second Review Conference, there had been positive developments regarding nuclear-weapon-free zones. The consensus reached by the General Assembly in a number of resolutions on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, should be endorsed, and the Conference should call upon the international community, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, to support the creation of such a zone. Accordingly, the following two paragraphs should be added at the end of paragraph 6:

"The Conference welcomes the consensus reached by the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East would greatly enhance international peace and security, and urges all parties directly concerned to consider seriously taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East.

"The Conference also invites the nuclear-weapon States and all other States to render their assistance in the establishment of the zone and to refrain from any action which may cause prejudice or run counter to the purpose of establishing such a zone."

10. Mr. KONISHI (Japan) said that an amendment could be made to paragraph 2 along the lines proposed by the Federal Republic of Germany. At the end of the paragraph, the full stop should be replaced by a semi-colon and followed by the words "in the process of establishing such zones, the characteristics of each region should be taken into account."

11. With regard to Mexico's proposal to delete paragraph 5, he could not agree that the subject was covered in paragraph 2, which contained no reference to the principle of concluding nuclear-weapon-free zone arrangements.

12. Mr. MAHMOUD (Iraq) said that nothing in article VII of the Treaty seemed to justify the manner in which different regions were grouped in paragraph 6 of the text proposed by the Chairman. As the representative of Egypt had pointed out, the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East formed the subject of numerous resolutions and appeals by the
General Assembly. The paragraph as it stood failed to place the Middle East in the proper context. He therefore suggested that the word "regional", before the word "efforts", should be deleted and that the last part of the paragraph should read "... Europe, including in the Balkans and in Northern Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia". In addition, a new paragraph should follow the text proposed by Egypt and should read:

"Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to the safeguards system by all States in the region of the Middle East will greatly facilitate the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region and will enhance the credibility of the Treaty."

13. Mr. LINEHAM (New Zealand), after thanking the Chairman and the representative of Mexico for their helpful and constructive suggestions, said that it might be useful to hold informal consultations on the wording of paragraph 4 of the Chairman's proposal, especially since Main Committee I was working on certain aspects of the question of the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty and had, in fact, already agreed on a text concerning the Protocols to that Treaty. Paragraph 4 might be replaced by the following:

"The Conference notes the endorsement of the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty by the South Pacific Forum on 6 August at Rarotonga and welcomes this achievement as consistent with article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Conference also takes note of the draft Protocols to the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty and further notes the agreement of the South Pacific Forum that consultations on the Protocols should be held between members of the Forum and the nuclear-weapon States eligible to sign the Protocols."

14. Mr. AKAY (Turkey) said that his delegation had already stated its views on article VII at the 5th meeting and, at the present juncture, he merely wished to add that, like several other representatives, he had objections to paragraphs 2 and 6. If paragraph 2 was retained, he would support the amendments thereto proposed by the Federal Republic of Germany and endorsed by Japan. Paragraph 5 of the Chairman's proposal stated a well-known fact and should be maintained. So far as paragraph 6 was concerned, his delegation would greatly prefer the sentence to end after the word "zones", but if, in the interest of achieving consensus, it was found desirable to maintain the remainder of the paragraph, he would support the suggestion for an additional sentence made by the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany.

15. Mr. NIEUWENHUYS (Belgium) said that a sentence reading: "The Conference also notes the continued existence of the Antarctic Treaty" should be inserted at the end of paragraph 3.

16. Mr. GIEROW (Sweden) proposed that the words "in keeping with", in paragraph 5, should be replaced by "in harmony with".

17. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to consider the text paragraph by paragraph.
Paragraph 1

18. The CHAIRMAN noted that there were no comments regarding paragraph 1.

Paragraph 2

19. The CHAIRMAN drew attention to the amendments proposed by the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany and supported by representatives of Japan and Turkey.

20. Mr. TELLO (Mexico) said that the first part of the proposal by the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany, namely, the insertion of a reference to the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, was superfluous. The right of any group of States to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones derived clearly and unambiguously from article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which was the instrument under consideration by the Conference. He had no objection to the second proposal, namely, the insertion of a sentence to the effect that in the process of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones the characteristics of each region should be taken into account, for the wording of the proposal - as indeed the whole of paragraph 2 - was in actual fact a textual reproduction of passages from the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

21. Mr. SUTOWARDOYO (Indonesia) proposed that the phrase "in addition to contributing to the promotion of regional peace and security" should be inserted after the words "important disarmament measure", and a sentence reading: "The Conference holds the view that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones will create conditions conducive to the establishment of zones of peace in different regions of the world" should be added at the end of the paragraph.

22. Mr. MIHAJLOVIC (Yugoslavia) supported the amendment proposed by the representative of Indonesia and, in addition, proposed that the following sentence should be added to paragraph 2 or inserted as a separate paragraph:

"The Conference confirms its belief that halting of further deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems and their gradual withdrawal and elimination from the arsenals of nuclear-weapon States would significantly enhance the creation of essential conditions for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones."

23. The CHAIRMAN, noting that there appeared to be no objection to the second part of the amendment proposed by the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany, namely, the insertion of a formulation reading: "In the process of establishing such zones, the characteristics of each region should be taken into account", suggested that it should be incorporated as a sentence in paragraph 2.

24. It was so decided.
25. Mr. von Wagner (Federal Republic of Germany) said that, in view of the objection raised by the representative of Mexico, he would withdraw the first part of his amendment to paragraph 2, namely the reference to the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly.

26. The Chairman thanked the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany for his cooperation. He suggested that further consideration of paragraph 2 should be deferred until the texts of the amendments proposed by the delegations of Indonesia and Yugoslavia had been circulated in writing.

27. It was so agreed.

Paragraph 3

28. The Chairman drew attention to the amendments proposed by the delegations of Mexico and Belgium.

29. Mr. Tello (Mexico) said that he had no objection to the Belgian amendment; however, since it referred to an instrument different from the one dealt with in paragraph 3, he thought that it should form a separate paragraph.

30. The Chairman concurred with that suggestion. Noting that there appeared to be no objection either to the Belgian amendment or to the Mexican amendment relating to paragraph 3, he suggested that they should be incorporated in the proposed text subject to final renumbering at a later stage.

31. It was so decided.

Paragraph 4

32. Mr. Tello (Mexico) reiterated his delegation's view that paragraph 4 of the Chairman's draft was inadequate and therefore unacceptable. The delegation of New Zealand, a country directly concerned with the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty, had not expressed any disagreement with the Mexican amendment but had proposed an amendment of its own. He therefore suggested that consideration of paragraph 4 should be suspended until the text of the New Zealand amendment had been circulated in writing.

33. Mr. Lineham (New Zealand) supported that suggestion. Deferring consideration of paragraph 4 until a later stage would allow time for informal consultations among interested countries.

34. Mr. Campbell (Australia) also endorsed the Mexican representative's comments. His delegation, too, considered that paragraph 4 failed to accord any real recognition to the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty and was altogether inadequate. With regard to procedure, he agreed with the two previous speakers that the issue should be left pending so as to enable interested delegations to confer among themselves.

35. The Chairman noted that there appeared to be a general wish to leave paragraph 4 in abeyance for the present.
Paragraph 5

36. The CHAIRMAN reminded members that the Committee had before it a Mexican proposal to delete the paragraph. There was also a Swedish proposal to replace the words "in keeping with" by "in harmony with".

37. Mr. TELLO (Mexico) said that his delegation had proposed deletion of paragraph 5 because it was already covered by paragraph 2. He did not see how a nuclear-weapon-free zone could be established without due account being taken of internationally recognized principles, and those principles were already enunciated in paragraph 2, which had been reproduced directly from the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Furthermore, the Committee had accepted the part of the amendment proposed by the Federal Republic of Germany to the effect that the special characteristics of each region should be duly taken into account - something that was another internationally accepted principle for the establishment of such zones. Hence he saw no need for paragraph 5, unless there was some reason he had overlooked.

38. Mr. NIEUWENHUYYS (Belgium) said that his delegation was in favour of retaining paragraph 5. With reference to the Mexican representative's remarks, he considered that other principles might be applicable, although he was not in a position at that point to state whether they could be regarded as internationally recognized. He had in mind, for instance, the form of language used in certain studies carried out by the United Nations Secretariat within the framework of the regional approach to disarmament, particularly with regard to denuclearized free zones.

39. Mr. von WAGNER (Federal Republic of Germany) said that in his view there was no complete equivalence between paragraphs 2 and 5, since paragraph 5 contained certain new elements that were not covered, at any rate expressly, in paragraph 2. He was thinking in particular of the principles relating to the law of the sea, which were internationally recognized, and of those relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. He therefore urged the Committee to retain paragraph 5 as drafted.

40. Mr. CARNAHAN (United States of America) said that his country supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, but only in accordance with certain specified criteria as stated in the United States information document (NPT/CONF.III/18) circulated to the Conference. Accordingly, his delegation believed it would be desirable, without prejudice to the ultimate status of paragraph 5, to insert in paragraph 2, after the words "establishing such zones", the words "under appropriate conditions".

41. The CHAIRMAN suggested that the United States proposal should be considered when the Committee reverted to its examination of paragraph 2. With regard to paragraph 5, interested delegations should perhaps be invited to consult among themselves and they might also wish to consider including in paragraph 2 the words "in conformity with internationally recognized principles", after the word "concerned".

42. It was so decided.
Paragraph 6

43. The CHAIRMAN reminded members that the Committee had before it a number of proposals, including those submitted by Egypt, the Federal Republic of Germany and Iraq.

44. Mr. BOJILIOV (Bulgaria), expressing strong support for paragraph 6 as drafted, said that it contained a simple statement of fact and was precisely what was needed. His delegation would have no difficulty in accepting paragraph 5 of the Mexican proposal, and also the Indonesian proposal, but it could not accept as either logical or necessary the amendments proposed by the Federal Republic of Germany, since they had no place in such a document. They might have done, had paragraph 6 stated that the Conference "welcomed", "encouraged", or "supported" proposals on the ongoing regional efforts to achieve nuclear-weapon-free zones. It did nothing of the sort, however, being couched in purely neutral language. The paragraph could perhaps, however, be slightly reworded to read: "The Conference takes note of the existing proposals on the ongoing regional efforts to achieve nuclear-weapon-free zones, for example, in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, South Asia and South-East Asia".

45. Mr. SUTOWARDOYO (Indonesia) emphasized that paragraph 6 must include a reference to South-East Asia.

46. Further to a query by Mr. MAHMOUD (Iraq), Mr. BOJILIOV (Bulgaria) said that he experienced no difficulty whatsoever with regard to the Iraqi proposal.

47. Mr. NGUYEN THUONG (Viet Nam) said that Viet Nam, a country of South-East Asia, supported the Indonesian proposal that South East Asia should be included among the regions where efforts were being undertaken to achieve nuclear-weapon-free zones; it also supported the amendment to the end of paragraph 2 proposed by Indonesia. So far as the rest of paragraph 6 was concerned, however, his delegation preferred the Chairman's text, particularly in regard to the reference to Europe.

48. Mr. HASSAN (Egypt) said that, since the Second Review Conference in 1980, there had been a number of positive developments in connection with the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. As a result of those developments, a degree of unanimity had been reached among Member States at the General Assembly since the thirty-fifth session and had been reflected in the adoption by consensus of various resolutions calling for practical and effective measures to establish such a zone in the Middle East. His delegation considered that those measures should be welcomed and commended in the report of the Third Review Conference and it had therefore proposed the addition of two paragraphs which could either be incorporated in paragraph 6 of the Chairman's proposal or could stand as a separate paragraph 7.

49. Mr. KEISALO (Finland) said that, of the three alternative proposals put forward by the Federal Republic of Germany, his delegation preferred the third. For the sake of a consensus, it could also accept the first proposal, albeit with less enthusiasm, since the inclusion or omission of such a reference would not have any effect on the talks that were under way.
50. **Mr. MELESCANU** (Romania), supporting the Bulgarian proposal, said that there were two possibilities: either the Conference could simply take note of certain initiatives, without implying any value judgement, in which case paragraph 6 as drafted would be acceptable, or it could agree on a form of wording that would express a value judgement, if need be quoting the relevant General Assembly resolutions, in which case, a consensus would be necessary. The main thing, however, was to give a clear picture of developments since the Second Review Conference without entering into too much detail, since that would only create difficulties.

51. **Mr. von WAGNER** (Federal Republic of Germany) said that he agreed on the need for a consensus and was also inclined to agree on the need to avoid undue detail. With that in mind, he would propose that paragraph 6 should end with the words "nuclear-weapon-free zones". In that way, the Committee could perhaps conclude the discussion fairly quickly.

52. **Mr. BOJILLOV** (Bulgaria) asked whether his delegation's proposal was acceptable to the Federal Republic of Germany.

53. **Mr. von WAGNER** (Federal Republic of Germany) replied that, as his delegation understood the proposal, it was not acceptable.

54. The CHAIRMAN invited members to reflect on the various proposals, with a view to resuming consideration of paragraph 6 at the next meeting.

*The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.*
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 8th MEETING

Friday, 13 September 1985, at 4.35 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia)

REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY AS PROVIDED FOR IN ITS ARTICLE VIII (3)
(agenda item 13) (continued):

C. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY RELATING TO
NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, SAFEGUARDS AND NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE
ZONES:

(1) ARTICLE III AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 4 AND 5, ESPECIALLY IN THEIR
RELATIONSHIP TO ARTICLE IV AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 6 AND 7

1. The CHAIRMAN drew the Committee's attention to the document which had
just been distributed in English, namely, the revised version of the text
previously submitted on implementation of article III of the Treaty. He
suggested that the meeting should be suspended to allow participants to
familiarize themselves with the document.

The meeting was suspended at 4.40 p.m. and resumed at 4.55 p.m.

2. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to consider the document in its only
existing (English) version, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraph 1

3. Paragraph 1 was adopted.

Paragraph 2

4. Mr. TELLO (Mexico) said that the word "can" before the word "pose" in the
penultimate line should be deleted.

5. Mr. MAHMOUD (Iraq), noting that the document before the Committee
contained no reference to the concern expressed by his delegation in document
NPT/CONF.III/29, proposed that the following text should be added after
paragraph 2:

"Israel should be strongly condemned for its deliberate act of aggression
against safeguarded Iraqi nuclear installations which constitutes the
most serious attack on the Treaty and also on the Agency and the system
of safeguards since their establishment. The Conference calls on Israel
to undertake immediately not to carry out any attack on nuclear
installations devoted to peaceful purposes in Iraq or on any similar
installation in other countries and to make all its nuclear installations
subject to the system of safeguards applied by the International Atomic
Energy Agency."
6. Mr. CARNAHAN (United States of America) said that his delegation could not accept the Iraqi amendment.

7. The CHAIRMAN suggested that, in the absence of a consensus on paragraph 2, the text should be discussed in informal negotiations at a later stage.

Paragraph 3

8. Paragraph 3 was adopted.

Paragraph 4

9. The CHAIRMAN drew attention to the omission of a phrase in the third line, which should read: "to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and to accept IAEA safeguards for peaceful activities, both current and future, ...". Since the text was still the subject of consultations, he suggested that its consideration and adoption should be postponed.

Paragraph 5

10. Mr. ALGER (Sweden) said that in the penultimate sentence, the word "and" should be added after the words "resources permit".

11. Paragraph 5, as amended, was adopted.

Paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10

12. Paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 were adopted.

Paragraph 11

13. Mr. HOUCK (United States of America) proposed that the words "the types of" in the fifth line should be deleted.

14. Paragraph 11, as amended, was adopted.

Paragraph 12

15. Mr. HOUCK (United States of America) said that in subparagraph (b) the words "the expedition and implementation" should read "the expeditious implementation".

16. Paragraph 12, as amended, was adopted.

Paragraph 13

17. Mr. MAHMOUD (Iraq) emphasized that no agreement had emerged from the discussions on the question of international plutonium storage which had taken place within IAEA, it would therefore be better to delete the paragraph.
18. Mr. von WAGNER (Federal Republic of Germany) said that if the paragraph was not deleted, his delegation would express a reservation on the question because it was a delicate matter and the wording departed from the wording of the document originally submitted to the Committee.

19. Mr. NIEUWENHUYJS (Belgium) said that if the Committee were to retain the paragraph, the words "which would enjoy universal acceptance" should be added after the words "its statute".

20. Mr. TOWNSEND (Australia) said that his delegation could not agree to delete a text that concerned an essential aspect of the fuel cycle and an important element of IAEA's Statute. He could not endorse the proposals to delete or amend if.

21. The CHAIRMAN invited interested delegations to hold consultations on paragraph 13 at a later stage.

**Paragraph 14**

22. Paragraph 14 was adopted.

**Paragraph 15**

23. Mr. NIEUWENHUYJS (Belgium) proposed that the words "in so far as this is economically and practically feasible" should be added after the word "facilities" at the end of the paragraph.

24. Mr. TELLO (Mexico) proposed that the order of the stages mentioned in paragraph 15 should read: "... into account in planning, designing, constructing and modifying ...".

25. Mr. HOEKEMA (Netherlands) said he endorsed the amendment proposed by Mexico, but preferred the original text to the amendment proposed by the Belgian delegation.

26. Mr. von WAGNER (Federal Republic of Germany) supported the two amendments proposed.

27. Mr. BIGGAR (Ireland) endorsed the amendment proposed by Mexico, but expressed reservations concerning the Belgian amendment.

28. The CHAIRMAN proposed that paragraph 15 should be the subject of consultations among interested delegations.

**Paragraph 16**

29. Paragraph 16 was adopted.
Paragraph 17

30. Mr. TOWNSEND (Australia) said that the word "due" should be added before the word "regard" in the third line.

31. Paragraph 17, as amended, was adopted.

Paragraph 18

32. Paragraph 18 was adopted.

Paragraph 19

33. Mr. NIEUWENHUYS (Belgium) said he was somewhat reluctant to approve a text that emphasized the role played by a body in which his country was not represented. In a spirit of compromise, he proposed that the words "a group that needs to be strengthened by the inclusion of additional members with significant safeguards experience" should be added after the acronym "(SAGSI)".

34. Mr. TOWNSEND (Australia) said that the Belgian amendment implicitly criticized the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation, yet its advice was beneficial to many countries which were not members.

35. Mr. RYZHKOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the Belgian amendment radically altered the meaning of paragraph 19. The adoption of the amendment would involve the Conference in studying the question of the orientation of the Advisory Group's work. The Group was composed of consultants to the Director-General of IAEA who were appointed in a personal capacity and not as representatives of their countries. To adopt the Belgian amendment would be tantamount to exerting pressure on the Director-General, which would be ill-advised.

36. Mr. NIEUWENHUYS (Belgium) said that some delegations were attributing to his amendment intentions that he had never had. It was not intended as a criticism, either implicit or explicit, of the Advisory Group, but in view of the comments made by the Soviet representative and in a spirit of compromise, the Belgian delegation would study the question further.

Paragraphs 20, 21 and 22

37. Paragraphs 20, 21 and 22 were adopted.

38. The CHAIRMAN invited interested delegations to hold consultations during the weekend regarding the paragraphs still outstanding.

39. Mr. TELLO (Mexico) paid a tribute to the Chairman, Mr. Vejvoda, who had made it possible for the Committee to adopt the major part of the document under discussion. He expressed the hope that a satisfactory solution would be found to the problems raised by the outstanding paragraphs, so that the document on article III of the Treaty could be adopted by consensus and referred to the Drafting Committee.

The meeting rose at 5.45 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 9th MEETING

Monday, 16 September 1985, at 11.05 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia)

REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY AS PROVIDED FOR IN ITS ARTICLE VIII (3) (agenda item 13) (concluded):

C. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY RELATING TO NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, SAFEGUARDS AND NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONES:

(1) ARTICLE III AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 4 AND 5, ESPECIALLY IN THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO ARTICLE IV AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 6 AND 7;

(2) ARTICLES I AND II AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 1-3 IN THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO ARTICLES III AND IV;

(3) ARTICLE VII.

E. OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY

DRAFT REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE

1. The CHAIRMAN invited members of the Committee to examine the draft report of Main Committee II (NPT/CONF.III/C.II/CRP.1) paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3

2. Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 were adopted.

Paragraph 4

3. The CHAIRMAN said that the list of documents submitted to the Conference took account only of those submitted formally, and excluded those circulated unofficially in the course of consultations or in order to facilitate the Committee's work. The list was in any case not exhaustive and any further documents that were presented would be added.

4. Mr. TELLO (Mexico) proposed the addition of a new subparagraph after subparagraph B, indicating that a number of unofficial documents had also been submitted, in particular by the delegations of Australia, Ireland, Mexico, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and other countries.

5. The CHAIRMAN said that the secretariat would take that suggestion into account.

6. Mr. BOLD (Mongolia) pointed out that the working paper on article IX submitted by his delegation (NPT/CONF.III/C.II/4) should be listed in subparagraph B.
7. The CHAIRMAN said that the document would be added to the list.

8. Paragraph 4 was adopted.

9. Paragraph 5 was adopted.

10. The draft report of Main Committee II as a whole was adopted.

Working paper on the review of article III

11. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to consider paragraph by paragraph the unofficial working paper on the review of article III. Some paragraphs had already been adopted, but those which had formed the subject of informal consultations still needed to be considered.

12. Referring to the second paragraph of the working paper, he said that, following the consultations just mentioned, it had been proposed to change the order of sentences, the first sentence of the paragraph becoming the third.

13. Mr. MAHMOUD (Iraq) recalled that at the previous meeting his delegation had made proposals concerning the paragraph under consideration and expressed the hope that the Committee would now take a decision on those proposals. In addition, he suggested the addition of a new paragraph referring to a fact which threatened the credibility of the Treaty and consequently of the IAEA safeguards. The new paragraph should be worded as follows:

"The Conference expresses concern that a significant quantity of depleted uranium has been transferred from a State party to the Treaty to a non-party without due notification to the IAEA in disregard of the safeguards system."

14. The CHAIRMAN requested the representative of Iraq to transmit the text he was proposing for the whole of the paragraph to the secretariat. The matter had given rise to certain objections at the previous meeting and the proposal as a whole would have to form the subject of informal consultations before the Committee could take a decision.

15. Turning to the third paragraph, he said that it had been approved at the previous meeting but that informal consultations had nevertheless continued and a number of minor changes had been proposed, in particular the deletion of the words "at all times" in the fourth line.

16. Mr. TOWNSEND (Australia), supported by Mr. von WAGNER (Federal Republic of Germany), said that informal consultations on the third paragraph had not yet been completed. It was hoped that they might be resumed at the earliest opportunity.

17. The CHAIRMAN said that the Committee would await the results of those consultations. The same applied to the first and third paragraphs on page 5 of the document.
18. Mr. NIEUWENHUYS (Belgium) said that his delegation had submitted an amendment to the first sentence on page 6. However, in view of comments made and explanations given concerning the role of the IAEA Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation, it now thought that the sentence might perhaps be deleted. The Committee had congratulated IAEA on the role it was playing several times in the remainder of the text and it was perhaps not necessary to do so again in connection with a group of unofficial advisers.

19. Mr. TOWNSEND (Australia) asked whether the Belgian delegation was making a new proposal. He would prefer it if the matter were left in abeyance, bearing in mind the second and fourth paragraphs on page 5 of the working paper.

20. Mr. NIEUWENHUYS (Belgium) said that he maintained his proposal.

21. The CHAIRMAN said that, in that case, it would be preferable to await the outcome of the informal consultations.

Working paper on the review of article VII (revised draft No. 1)

22. The CHAIRMAN invited the members of the Committee to consider the document paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3

23. Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 were adopted.

Paragraph 4

24. The CHAIRMAN asked whether the Indonesian delegation, which had submitted the working paper from which the paragraph had been taken, would agree not to insist upon the paragraph's inclusion in the report, as several delegations had requested in the course of the informal consultations.

25. Mr. SUTOWARDOYO (Indonesia) recalled that his delegation's original proposal on the highly important matter in question had been supported by several other delegations. He therefore wished the paragraph to be maintained or, at least, informal consultations concerning it to be pursued with the delegations which had supported the proposal.

26. The CHAIRMAN noted that the paragraph would form the subject of new consultations.

Paragraphs 5, 6 and 7

27. Paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 were adopted.

Paragraph 8

28. Mr. FALZON (Malta) again urged that the Mediterranean region should be mentioned in the paragraph.
29. The CHAIRMAN, noting that informal consultations had not yet yielded a decision, suggested that the consultations should be pursued.

Paragraph 9

30. Paragraph 9 was adopted.

Paragraph 10

31. The CHAIRMAN said that the question referred to in the paragraph had also been considered by Committee I, whose conclusions ought to be taken into account. It might therefore be preferable to revert to the paragraph at a later stage.

32. Mr. KAREM (Egypt) said that his delegation would prefer Committee II to approve paragraph 10 without waiting to see the text produced by Committee I.

33. Mr. BETTAUER (United States of America) said that the text approved by Working Group 2 of Committee I was slightly different from paragraph 10 and seemed to his delegation to be better. He therefore proposed that the Committee should consider reproducing that text.

34. Mr. KEISALO (Finland) supported the Egyptian representative's proposal. Committee II could perfectly well approve paragraph 10 as it stood and then refer it to the Drafting Committee, which would settle the problem of harmonizing the texts.

35. Mr. BOJILOV (Bulgaria) endorsed the proposals made by Egypt and Finland.

36. Mr. AL-ALFI (Democratic Yemen) said that Committee II should take its own decisions without waiting for those of others. Moreover, the wording of paragraph 10 more or less reproduced the text of General Assembly resolution 39/54 and, in particular, of its paragraph 5. His delegation therefore supported the Egyptian proposal.

37. Mr. BETTAUER (United States of America) pointed out that Committee I was also entrusted with the consideration of matters relating to article VII of the Treaty. The text agreed upon in Committee I should at least be distributed to Committee II.

38. Mr. TELLO (Mexico) said that his delegation was inclined to favour the solution proposed by Egypt, Bulgaria and Democratic Yemen, taking account of the fact that the text of paragraph 10 was based on General Assembly resolution 39/54, which had been adopted by consensus. His delegation proposed that, if the Egyptian delegation had no objection, the terms employed should be those of the resolution.

39. Mr. KAREM (Egypt), noting that his views were shared by several delegations, urged the United States delegation not to press its proposal and expressed the wish that paragraph 10 should be maintained.
40. Mr. Bettauer (United States of America) requested some time for consultations with a view to reaching a consensus.

41. The Chairman said that the Committee would resume consideration of the paragraph on the next day.

Paragraph 11

42. Mr. Al-Alfi (Democratic Yemen) pointed out that the language of the paragraph should be brought into line with that of the other paragraphs, so that it would start with the words "The Conference considers that".

43. The Chairman said that the proposal was indeed an improvement.

44. Mr. Al-Alfi (Democratic Yemen) stressed that his delegation had approved paragraphs 9 and 11 on the understanding that paragraph 10 would be maintained.

Paragraph 12

45. The Chairman said that several delegations had proposed that the text of paragraph 12 should be shortened by the deletion of the second and third sentences and of the words "At the same time" at the start of the fourth sentence, and had also suggested that the word "therefore" should be inserted after the words "the South African régime". The delegations concerned took the view that the two sentences whose deletion they were proposing did not deal with matters of direct concern to Committee II. He invited delegations to think about the proposed new text and to resume consideration of paragraph 12 at a later stage.

Working paper on the review of article IX submitted by Mongolia (NPT/CONF.III/C.II/4)

46. The Chairman suggested that the working paper should appear in the list of documents submitted to Committee II included in the report which would be referred to the Drafting Committee.

47. It was so decided.

48. Mr. Bettauer (United States of America) wondered whether it was necessary, within the framework of article IX, to invite countries which had not yet done so to adhere to the Treaty, since an appeal to that effect was already addressed to them in connection with article III. Furthermore, he thought that a distinction should not be drawn between nuclear-weapon States or those advanced in nuclear technology and other States, that distinction seemed to imply that States in the second category could refrain from adhering to the Treaty so long as those in the first category had not done so.

49. The Chairman said the question of texts duplicating one another would be considered by the Drafting Committee.

The meeting rose at 12 noon.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 10th MEETING

Tuesday, 17 September 1985, at 5.55 p.m.

Chairman. Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia)

DRAFT REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE (continued) (NPT/CONF.III/C.II/CRP.1/Add.1)

Section (A)

1. The CHAIRMAN said that informal consultations on section (A) of the draft report (NPT/CONF.III/C.II/CRP.1/Add.1), dealing with article III of the Treaty, were still in progress and that the final text would be submitted to the Committee at its next meeting.

Section (B)

2. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to consider the changes which had been made to section (B) of the same document, dealing with article VII of the Treaty. Section (B), paragraph 5, had been amended to read "The Conference expresses its belief that concrete measures of nuclear disarmament ...".

3. The following draft text had been considered for section (B), paragraph 9:

"9. The Conference takes note of the existing proposals and the ongoing regional efforts to achieve nuclear-weapon-free zones, for example, in various areas of Europe, including in the Balkans and in northern Europe, in Africa, the Middle East, South Asia and South-East Asia."

The Federal Republic of Germany had proposed that references to specific regions should be replaced by the phrase "...(nuclear-weapon-free zones) in several parts of the world".

4. Mr. BOJILOV (Bulgaria) recalled that in the open-ended working group the Mexican representative had proposed the alternative wording "... in different areas of the world". His delegation preferred the formula "in different areas of all continents".

5. Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany) expressed a preference for the Mexican formulation.

6. Mr. BOJILOV (Bulgaria) said that the Mexican proposal did not fully reflect his delegation's position, but that, in a spirit of compromise, he was willing to accept it.

7. Mr. KEISALO (Finland) said that his delegation would accept the proposal of the Mexican representative, and thanked the latter for his efforts to achieve a compromise.
8. The CHAIRMAN said that, if there were no objection, he would take it that the Committee wished to adopt the wording proposed by the Mexican representative.

9. It was so decided.

10. The CHAIRMAN said that the following draft text had been drawn up by the Group of African States for section (B), paragraph 14:

"14. The Conference considers that the development of a nuclear weapon capability by South Africa at any time frustrates the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, and that collaboration with South Africa in this area would undermine the credibility and the stability of the Non-Proliferation Treaty régime. South Africa is called upon to submit all its nuclear installations and facilities to IAEA safeguards and to ratify the Non-Proliferation Treaty. All States Parties directly concerned are urged to consider seriously taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa. The nuclear-weapon States are invited to assist the efforts of States to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa, and to enter into binding undertakings to respect strictly the status of such a zone and to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of the zone."

11. Mr. THOMPSON (Ireland) said that his delegation accepted the draft text, but considered that any measures to implement a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa should include adherence to the Treaty. He therefore proposed that the end of the penultimate sentence of the paragraph should be amended to read "...a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa, including adherence to the NPT by those States which have not already done so".

12. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that the draft text under consideration had only been achieved after long and delicate negotiation. He appealed to the Irish representative not to insist upon an amendment which might jeopardize the consensus which had been achieved.

13. Mr. KONATE (Senegal) said that the Group of African States had listened to the objections raised by other groups and had agreed to accept the compromise text under consideration. He reiterated the Chairman's appeal to the Irish representative not to insist on an amendment.

14. Mr. THOMPSON (Ireland) said that he would accept the inclusion of the phrase he had suggested in square brackets.
15. The CHAIRMAN observed that it had been agreed that no phrases within square brackets should be included in the text. The Irish representative's reservations about the text would be fully reflected in the summary records.

16. Mr. THOMPSON (Ireland) withdrew his amendment.

17. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to adopt section (B) of its draft report, dealing with article VII of the Treaty.

18. Section (B) of the draft report was adopted.

The meeting rose at 6.15 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 11th MEETING

Tuesday, 17 September 1985, at 9.25 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia)

DRAFT REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE (concluded) (NPT/CONF.III/C.II/CRP.1/Add.1)

Section (A), paragraph 4

1. The CHAIRMAN stated that informal consultations concerning article III had failed to produce a consensus with regard to several paragraphs. He invited the Committee to consider the text proposed by the Chair for paragraph 4:

"The Conference therefore specifically urges all non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the Treaty to make an international legally-binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and to accept IAEA safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear activities, both current and future, to verify that commitment. The Conference further urges all States in their international nuclear co-operation to establish as a necessary basis for the transfer of relevant nuclear supplies to non-nuclear-weapon States such a commitment to non-proliferation and acceptance of such safeguards by those States. The Conference expresses its view that accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty by all non-nuclear-weapon States is the best way to establish that basis."

2. Mr. TELLO (Mexico) said that since the informal consultations had not led to an agreement, his delegation would support the Chairman's proposed draft. However, it would be necessary to find a way to express the reservations of those delegations unable to join in a consensus.

3. Mr. MATTEUCCI (Switzerland), referring to a procedure followed by Main Committee III, suggested that the Chairman's proposal should be preceded by an introductory statement to the effect that it had been supported by many delegations but that the Committee had been unable to achieve consensus on the second sentence. Material should then be collected from the delegates to indicate alternative wordings. He wished to submit a compromise text that had attracted some interest during the informal consultations, which read "The Conference further urges all States in their international nuclear co-operation to work in pursuit of these objectives.". The third sentence in the paragraph would then have to be slightly reworded.

4. Mr. NIEUWENHUYS (Belgium), supported by Mr. von WAGNER (Federal Republic of Germany), said that his delegation also had difficulty with the second sentence in paragraph 4 of the Chairman's revised draft. He endorsed both the procedural formula and the alternative language put forward by the representative of Switzerland.

5. Mr. KENYON (United Kingdom) suggested that the second sentence of paragraph 4 should be deleted and the word "basis" at the end of the third
sentence changed to "commitment". In that way, the original first and third sentences could be adopted by consensus. The two proposals for the second sentence, the Chairman's draft and the proposal by the representative of Switzerland, could then be set out as proposed by the representative of Switzerland.

6. Mr. TOWNSEND (Australia) stated that his delegation had no difficulty with the Swiss proposal for a procedure to handle the absence of consensus concerning paragraph 4. He noted that the delegation of Mexico, while supporting the consensus, had raised a valid point, namely the protection of the rights of delegations which felt their positions were not included. The United Kingdom proposal appeared to be a substantial departure from the Chairman's original draft, although a way should indeed be found to indicate that there had been consensus regarding parts of paragraph 4. It was preferable, however, to concentrate on the Swiss proposal in its procedural and substantive aspects. He noted that while the substantive proposal had received some support, consensus had not been reached. The Committee should decide whether it adequately reflected the point raised by the delegation of Mexico.

7. The CHAIRMAN suggested that the entire paragraph should be set out as originally proposed, preceded by a statement to the effect that only two of the sentences had been the object of a consensus, and followed by the alternative proposed by the delegation of Switzerland. If he heard no objection, he would take it that the Committee agreed to follow that procedure.

8. It was so decided.

Paragraph 14

9. The CHAIRMAN drew the attention of the Committee to the proposed text of paragraph 14, of which the Committee had approved only the last sentence in informal consultations. He would like to know whether the rest of the paragraph was acceptable.

10. Mr. THOMPSON (Ireland) stated that his delegation wished to put on record its regret that it had not been possible to reach consensus on the language before the Committee which had been contained in the working paper introduced by New Zealand on behalf of a number of countries, including his own. While his delegation strongly supported the creation of a system of international plutonium storage in accordance with the Statute of the IAEA, it did not believe it was sufficient to establish a system just for plutonium containment and control. Plutonium was a highly sensitive material, and his delegation regretted that it had not been possible to agree on the importance of restricting its production in a separated form to the minimum commensurate with civil requirements.

11. The CHAIRMAN said that if he heard no objection, he would take it that the Committee approved paragraph 14.

12. It was so decided.
Paragraph 2

13. Mr. MAJOOD (Iraq) said that his delegation had proposed, at the meeting of the Committee, a reference to the Israeli military attack against his country's safeguarded research reactor, which had been dealt with in Security Council resolution 487 (1981) as, in particular, an attack against the IAEA safeguards system and the NPT as well as against the peaceful use of nuclear energy. His delegation believed that it was within the mandate of Main Committee II to deal with that issue in the context of an attack against the safeguards system. Since the Committee had failed to consider his delegation's proposal, which had been supported by a number of other non-aligned countries, he was unfortunately obliged to refrain from joining the consensus on the paragraph.

14. The CHAIRMAN suggested that paragraph 2 should be included as it stood, preceded by a statement to the effect that consensus had not been reached concerning it and followed by the text of the Iraqi delegation's proposal.

15. Mr. BETTAUER (United States of America) pointed out that there had been consensus concerning all the material in paragraph 2 with the exception of the Iraqi proposal. Furthermore, his delegation found that proposal highly objectionable. It was the only proposal of that nature submitted for inclusion in the report, and perhaps it should more appropriately be examined by the President of the Conference.

16. The CHAIRMAN said that he had informed the President of the Iraqi proposal and that a compromise solution was being sought, since many delegations felt that that important issue could not be omitted from the work of the Drafting Committee. He therefore suggested wording such as the following: "The following proposal was submitted by the delegation of Iraq and supported by many non-aligned countries", followed by the text of the proposal, followed by a statement to the effect that it would be dealt with at a further stage in the Conference. In the light of the remarks made by the United States, a sentence would then be added saying that the United States found the proposal highly objectionable. In that way, paragraph 2 could be retained and sent to the Drafting Committee and the President of the Conference. If he heard no objection, he would take it that the Committee agreed to follow that procedure.

17. It was so decided.

18. The CHAIRMAN said that on the basis of the discussion, he understood that the Committee approved the section on article III in its entirety. Although consensus had not been reached on a number of important issues, in particular that of safeguards, he was pleased at the high proportion of consensus that had been reached on other issues. If he heard no objection, he would take it that the Committee decided to adopt document NPT/CONF.III/C.II/CRP.1/Add.1.

19. It was so decided.
20. Mr. PRAMOV (Bulgaria) stated that, with reference to article VII, his delegation considered the efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation régime essential. That was especially true of the proposals and ongoing regional efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in various areas of Europe, including the Balkans and Northern Europe, Africa, the Middle East, South Asia and South-East Asia.

21. The CHAIRMAN, noting that Committee II had thereby completed its work, thanked members for their kind expressions of appreciation.

The meeting rose at 10.30 p.m.
THIRD REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY
ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

COMMITTEE III

SUMMARY RECORDS OF THE 1st TO 10th MEETINGS

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
from 3 to 17 September 1985

Chairman: Mr. IMAI (Japan)
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 1st MEETING

Tuesday, 3 September 1985, at 4.15 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. IMAI (Japan)

REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY AS PROVIDED FOR IN ITS ARTICLE VIII (3) (agenda item 13):

D. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY RELATING TO PEACEFUL APPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY:

(1) ARTICLES III (3) AND IV, PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 6 AND 7, ESPECIALLY IN THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO ARTICLE III (1, 2, 4) AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 4 AND 5 AS WELL AS TO ARTICLES I AND II;

(2) ARTICLE V

1. The CHAIRMAN said that the terms of reference of Main Committee III had been worked out by the Preparatory Committee and adopted by the Conference. Its primary task was to review the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to peaceful applications of nuclear energy. They included Article IV and Article III (3) and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7, especially in their relationship to Article III (1, 2, 4) and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5, as well as to Articles I and II, and Article V. Committee III shared with Committee II the review of agenda item 14. The details of its mandate could be found in annex 3 of the Final Report of the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.III/1). Some overlap with the work of Main Committee II might exist because of the links between international co-operation in the nuclear fields and non-proliferation assurances through safeguards. He would therefore maintain close contact with the Bureau of Main Committee II in order to avoid any duplication of work and to make the most efficient use of the time allotted.

2. The Committee's task had been made easier by the extensive documentation relating to its work. IAEA had prepared two background papers on Articles IV and V, and the Director-General of IAEA had already made a statement on those subjects at the opening meeting of the Conference. Parts of the papers provided by the depositories were also relevant as well as parts of memorandums stating the views of five Nordic countries. A working paper on Article IV had been submitted by Australia, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom, while Egypt had submitted a working paper on Articles III and IV (NPT/CONF.III/30) and another on Article IV (NPT/CONF.III/31). Any further papers should be submitted as soon as possible.

3. He proposed that the series of meetings of Main Committee III should begin with a general exchange of views which he hoped would avoid a repetition of statements made in plenary meetings and be more issue-oriented, he would like to see emerge from the exchange the main issues on which the Committee
might wish to concentrate its efforts. The Committee could then proceed on an article-by-article basis and formulate as many points of agreement as possible for inclusion in its report.

4. In answer to a request by the representative of the Netherlands, he said that his opening statement would be circulated as a document of the Committee.

5. If there were no further comments, he would take it that the consensus of the Committee was to adopt the proposed plan for the organization of work.

6. It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 4.30 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 2nd MEETING

Monday, 9 September 1985, at 3.20 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. IMAI (Japan)

REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY AS PROVIDED FOR IN ITS ARTICLE VIII (3) (agenda item 13) (continued):

D. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY RELATING TO PEACEFUL APPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY:

(1) ARTICLES III (3) AND IV, PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 6 AND 7, ESPECIALLY IN THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO ARTICLE III (1, 2, 4) AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 4 AND 5 AS WELL AS TO ARTICLES I AND II

1. Mr. CROMARTIE (United Kingdom), speaking on behalf of the 10 sponsoring delegations, introduced working paper NPT/CONF.III/21 relating to article IV of the Treaty and containing a review of past performance and an examination of options for further improvement of technology transfer mechanisms with due consideration for the needs of developing areas of the world.

2. It was not the sponsors' intention to duplicate in any way the excellent work done by IAEA in preparing the full report on its involvement in nuclear technology transfer (NPT/CONF.III/10). It had, however, seemed worthwhile to summarize achievements in the operation of article IV, with special reference to technical assistance to developing countries, and endeavours to identify areas where improvement was necessary or possible.

3. The sponsors' review of past performance had shown the excellent work performed by IAEA over the previous five years. No glaring omissions had been identified in the system. However, any system dealing with an evolving technological situation was susceptible to fine tuning and most of the proposals in the working paper should be seen in that light.

4. Any programme for development had to begin with adequate planning. In that connection, the Conference should encourage developing countries to make greater use of the services of IAEA, which provided assistance to individual countries in the preparation of specific development strategies. IAEA should be encouraged continually to review the operation of those services and to improve them in the light of experience.

5. Regional Co-operative Agreements/Arrangements (RCAs) constituted an important mechanism for technology transfer; they existed at present for the Asia and Pacific region and for Latin America. They were important because projects were agreed upon regionally, and inputs from regional countries were used. Similar arrangements for other areas could be considered.

6. The core of the IAEA technical assistance effort was of course constituted by the body of projects financed from the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund (TACF), supplemented by extra-budgetary resources, in particular the so-called "footnote-a/ projects". While TACF was used to
benefit any State member of IAEA, the "footnote-a/ projects" could be used to benefit more particularly the States parties to the Treaty, such had been the intention when the 1975 Review Conference had recommended the establishment of such a system. Accordingly, the present Conference should consider ways of further developing the "footnote-a/ projects" as a means of channelling funds for multi-donor, multi-year technology transfer projects. The process could be facilitated by establishing a co-ordinating mechanism involving potential donors and recipients.

7. He noted that IAEA had identified five central conditions for success in launching a nuclear power programme: first, the establishment of an adequate electricity grid; secondly, the creation of an institutional infrastructure to implement the nuclear power programmes in the long term, including the necessary legislation on safety aspects; thirdly, the existence of qualified manpower to ensure high standards of safety; fourthly, the existence of a well-developed industrial infrastructure; and, fifthly, the availability of finance on reasonable terms. That last hurdle could be the most difficult to overcome; clearly, there were no easy solutions, but the IAEA background paper NPT/CONF.III/10 made a number of suggestions for alleviating the problem.

8. In its review of the operation of article IV of the Treaty, the Committee could appropriately identify areas where constructive work could be done, and the agencies which might be asked to carry out the tasks. It could, for example, identify issues to be referred to the IAEA General Conference at the end of September 1985 with recommendations for IAEA action. It could also consider whether there were any issues that could fruitfully be discussed in the course of preparations for the forthcoming United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. In that case, the General Assembly should be asked to adopt a resolution requesting the Preparatory Committee for that Conference to undertake the necessary work.

9. Mr. ALFARARGI (Egypt) stressed that the NPT régime encompassed a balance between obligations to pursue measures towards alleviating the negative implications of the military applications of nuclear energy and obligations to promote co-operation in the peaceful applications of that energy. The credibility of NPT and its viability as the basis of a universal non-proliferation régime lay in its ability to sustain that balance.

10. One of the issues which had emerged since the entry into force of the Treaty had been the circumstances where peaceful nuclear activities were attacked or threatened with attack. Any such attack, particularly in States parties to NPT, was a matter of concern. With the expansion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy that issue had become more urgent. The attack which the world had witnessed and deplored against the Iraqi nuclear reactor had changed the nature of the problem from a theoretical possibility to a gruesome reality.

11. His delegation had accordingly submitted a working paper on that issue (NPT/CONF.III/30). The inviolability of peaceful nuclear activities had been established under the rules of international law prohibiting the use of force in international relations, in particular Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations. The need for added emphasis on the specific prohibition of
attacks against peaceful nuclear activities was a reflection of the highly
dangerous political, economic and environmental implications of such an
attack, particularly for the civilian population. That point was universally
acknowledged and had been specifically recognized by the Additional
Protocol I 21/ to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, which prohibited attacks
against nuclear power reactors in time of war or armed conflict.

12. An attack against a peaceful nuclear activity would also constitute a
serious setback to international efforts aimed at establishing a universally
acceptable régime encompassing a balance between assurances of co-operation in
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, effective measures towards preventing
further horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the
achievement of concrete progress towards disarmament, and more particularly
nuclear disarmament pursuant to article VI of the Treaty. It would also
constitute a direct challenge to the credibility and validity of the
IAEA safeguards system.

13. Without prejudice to the efforts of IAEA and the Conference on
Disarmament, the parties to NPT had a collective responsibility to continue to
play a leading role in contributing to the establishment of comprehensive and
universal norms and standards to prohibit attacks against all peaceful nuclear
activities. Pending the establishment of such norms and standards, the
parties to NPT should take interim steps to establish a mechanism to ensure
that their safeguarded nuclear activities, especially those existing in
non-nuclear-weapon States, would remain inviolable from attack. The mechanism
should include appropriate redress measures.

14. He expressed the hope that the Committee and the Conference would be able
to adopt the specific measures suggested in his delegation’s working
paper (NPT/CONF.III/30).

15. The inalienable right of all States to benefit from the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy, which had become universally recognized, constituted a
fundamental pillar of a non-proliferation régime, as was made clear by the
seventh and eighth preambular paragraphs and by article IV of the Treaty.
When the Treaty had been drawn up very few developing countries had had
nuclear energy programmes and very few had had any short-term need for such
applications or indeed the technical means to sustain peaceful applications of
nuclear energy. That situation had now changed. The social and economic
development plans of many developing countries had greatly increased their
needs for electric power. Many of those countries had emerging industries in
sophisticated fields. Accordingly, many of them now had the immediate need,
and the basic prerequisites, to embark on a peaceful nuclear programme,
including nuclear power.

16. Despite those facts, there had been no progressive development in the
peaceful nuclear programmes of the developing countries, particularly the

21/ International Committee of the Red Cross, Protocols Additional to
nuclear power programmes. Recent experience had made it abundantly clear that
the capital-intensive nature of the nuclear energy industry had been a major
restraining factor on the developing countries. In the area of electric power
generation, it had become increasingly evident that the scarcity of financial
resources worked heavily against peaceful nuclear programmes.

17. The Conference was now seized with that problem, which threatened to
erode one of the basic tenets of the Treaty, "that the benefits of peaceful
applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products
which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear
explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to
the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States"
(sixth preambular paragraph). The Conference should reaffirm the universal
commitment to that principle. It should in addition take practical steps to
surmount the obstacles which had obstructed its fulfilment, first and foremost
with respect to the non-nuclear-weapon developing countries parties to the
Treaty.

18. In that respect, the Conference should endorse the establishment of a
financial assistance fund to enhance the ability of the developing countries
parties to NPT to develop their peaceful nuclear power programmes. That
assistance should be provided through a mechanism to be agreed upon between
the parties, in order to provide concessionary soft loans and grants, as well
as to facilitate access to commercial financial markets. That fund should be
complementary to the activities of IAEA and not an alternative to them. The
scope and modalities of the fund should be negotiated between the parties to
NPT within the context of a Preparatory Committee to be convened after the
Third Review Conference. The results of the work of that Committee should be
adopted at a special conference of the States parties to NPT to be held for
that purpose as soon as possible. As an interim step, the developed countries
parties to NPT should commit themselves to increasing their financial
assistance to the developing countries parties to NPT in the development of
their nuclear power programmes.

19. It was in that spirit that his delegation had submitted a working paper
on that issue (NPT/CONF.III/31) and expressed the hope that it would be
possible to reach agreement thereon.

20. Mr. TIMERBAEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) recalled the message
of the Soviet leader, Mr. Gorbachev, to the Review Conference, which had
stressed the importance of the Treaty in promoting international co-operation
in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In the 15 years of its existence, the
Treaty had exercised a stabilizing effect which was essential for the success
of long-term nuclear projects. The USSR was continuing to increase its
contribution to international co-operation in that field at all levels. Since
the previous Review Conference, the USSR had built seven reactors in
non-nuclear States, each with a capacity of over 3,000 MW, and a further
22 reactors were being constructed in various countries. The Soviet Union
also provided essential research assistance, which took such forms as the
establishment of research centres in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Viet Nam,
and help in the modernization of experimental reactors in Bulgaria and Iraq.
The USSR provided equipment, fuel, heavy water, isotopes and an enrichment service. All assistance afforded by the USSR complied with its international commitments to avoid the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

21. The USSR provided training for a large number of foreign students in such subjects as nuclear power station engineering, radiochemistry and isotope technology. A special training centre had been set up at the Novovoronezhsky nuclear power station, and experts were sent on courses at the factories where nuclear equipment was made. Soviet scientists frequently travelled abroad to advise their foreign colleagues on research into the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

22. A great deal of Soviet assistance was provided within the framework of CMEA. The States members of CMEA had signed an agreement on multilateral international co-operation and specialization in the field of nuclear power stations for the period 1981-1990. For instance, reactors were being manufactured in Czechoslovakia, biological shielding equipment in Bulgaria and heat exchange equipment in Poland. Two nuclear power stations, each with a capacity of 4,000 MW, had been built on Soviet territory to provide electricity for other CMEA countries. Two agreements had been signed in 1980 concerning co-operation in the fields of fast neutrons and water-water reactors.

23. The USSR appreciated the IAEA technical assistance programme, and its voluntary contribution to the programme amounted to over 3 million roubles in 1985. Priority in technical assistance should be accorded to States parties to the Treaty; to that end, the USSR was to provide an additional sum of 2 million roubles for such States within the framework of the technical assistance programme in the period 1986-1988. The USSR actively supported other IAEA activities, such as the International Nuclear Information System (INIS) and the International Tokamak Reactor (INTOR).

24. The USSR had played an active part in preparations for the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy; it was to be hoped that it would benefit from the progress made at the Third Review Conference. Soviet scientists were always prepared to share their knowledge with colleagues from other countries, and no country had been excluded from negotiations on scientific agreements or commercial contracts on political grounds. No foreign scientists had been prevented from attending international conferences on Soviet territory.

25. The USSR would continue to provide assistance and co-operation in various ways, and would listen to the ideas put forward by other delegations to the Conference in a constructive spirit. Co-operation between countries in such a field could only be based upon strict observance of the conditions of the contract or treaty concerned, including the provisions of the Treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

26. Mr. HAYES (Ireland) said he would confine his remarks to the subject-matter of article IV, namely the fostering of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Such co-operation would clearly be impossible without the binding non-proliferation commitments.
contained in the Treaty, which established broad principles governing nuclear exchanges and which bound parties to facilitate mutual co-operation.

27. That Treaty had never been intended to prescribe a set of rules for the conduct of nuclear co-operation. The history of nuclear exchange had been troubled, mainly because of suppliers' fears of proliferation. Ireland, like a number of other countries with varying socio-economic systems, applied common guidelines to nuclear exchanges. Those guidelines must be understood within the framework of non-proliferation where they properly belonged rather than against the broader background of the transfer of technology; they were fully consistent with his country's obligations under article III (2) of the Treaty and applied to it equally as exporter and importer.

28. His delegation believed that the Conference should express its support for the negotiations taking place in the IAEA Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS). That Committee had now completed its work on the emergency back-up mechanism and revision mechanisms. The Conference should call for those mechanisms to be implemented, since they would strengthen the non-proliferation régime by providing for the contingency of supply interruptions.

29. Naturally, much of the present discussion would focus on the IAEA's record in the provision of technical assistance, including "footnote-a/ projects". It was also important not to forget the considerable amount of bilateral assistance among parties. By comparison, however, with the cost of even one nuclear power project, the amount of that assistance was modest. It was clearly unrealistic to expect IAEA funds to be able to finance the construction of power plants. The Agency, however, had a role to play in helping States to secure international and multilateral finance for those major projects. CAS should be encouraged to take up other items on its agenda, such as multinational ventures and regional fuel-cycle centres, which would enable developing and other countries to benefit from economies of scale when instituting power programmes. The IAEA studies on small- and medium-power reactors were of interest, especially to developing countries, since they could bring power generation within the reach of many more States.

30. For the foreseeable future, most developing countries would be interested essentially in non-power technology such as radioisotopic applications, general training, research reactor operation and safety and health and waste aspects of the operation of nuclear facilities. In that connection, his delegation welcomed the ideas contained in document NPT/CONF.III/21 as to how to make technical assistance widely available among developing countries parties to NPT.

31. The question of the prohibition of armed attacks on peaceful nuclear installations, on which the Egyptian delegation had submitted a working paper (NPT/CONF.III/30), constituted a legitimate concern of the Conference. Under article IV parties had a mutual obligation to facilitate the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. They should therefore have assurances against any such attack, especially as it could result in serious radiological harm. NPT had as its ultimate objective the abolition of nuclear weapons as agents of indiscriminate mass destruction. It was therefore appropriate for...
the Conference to concern itself with the danger to peaceful nuclear activities. The non-nuclear-weapon States had voluntarily surrendered the right to develop nuclear weapons as a means of defence. It was therefore the responsibility of all States parties to NPT, and in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to devise a means of defending the interests of a party when its safeguarded installations came under attack.

32. In 1983, the IAEA General Conference had called for the working out of a legal instrument prohibiting attacks on nuclear installations devoted to peaceful purposes. It was obvious that such an instrument would require as reasonable proof of the peaceful nature of an installation, the on-site verification provided by IAEA itself in the form of full-scope safeguards.

33. In conclusion, he suggested a number of elements for incorporation into the final document of the Third Review Conference. Firstly, the Conference should call for a role for IAEA in helping States to secure international and multilateral finance, especially in the area of power projects. Secondly, the Conference should express support for the IAEA studies in small and medium power reactors. Thirdly, it should declare the interest of parties in obtaining a successful conclusion to the negotiations taking place in CAS and should call for the implementation of its proposals for an emergency back-up mechanism and revision mechanisms, as well as asking the Committee to address other items on its agenda such as multinational ventures and regional fuel cycle centres. Fourthly, the Conference should recognize that in order to maintain the viability of NPT it was necessary that technical assistance be made available on as wide a basis as possible, and that in most cases that could best be accomplished in areas of non-power technology. Fifthly, the Conference should acknowledge that the threat of armed attack was a disincentive to the fulfilment of the Treaty in relation to the promotion of nuclear energy and should call for the early elaboration of appropriate measures prohibiting armed attacks on peaceful nuclear installations.

34. Mr. ZANGGER (Switzerland), referring to the working paper submitted by Switzerland (NPT/CONF.III/38), stressed the need for the Third Review Conference, in its final declaration on article IV of the Treaty, to reaffirm that the inalienable right and the undertakings with regard to international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy as provided in the sixth and seventh preambular paragraphs and in article IV of the Treaty were an integral and essential part of the balance of rights and duties as well as mutual obligations of all parties to the Treaty. That international co-operation had to embrace without discrimination all activities in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Conference should make the point that strict application of those provisions was a prerequisite for full implementation of the Treaty and for promoting universal acceptance of it. It should also reaffirm that licences for exports and re-exports or fuel cycle authorizations should be issued in a foreseeable and reliable manner based on appropriate agreed criteria or approval with the objective of permitting stable, long-term planning of nuclear activities. The Conference should stress that a clear separation of civilian and military nuclear programmes in nuclear-weapon States would facilitate co-operation between non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon States and it should welcome the efforts already being made concerning assurances of supply and assurances of non-proliferation
and invite participants to pursue those efforts in order to consolidate international co-operation. Lastly, it should request that the possibilities of improving the implementation of article IV of the Treaty which resulted from experience at the bilateral level should be presented to the Fourth Review Conference in a special report based on national contributions.

35. Although Switzerland produced 40 per cent of its electricity in nuclear power plants, it had neither nuclear fuel of its own nor enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, nor did it have its own manufacturing installations for complete nuclear reactors or for fuel elements. His country was therefore heavily dependent on foreign countries with regard to the fuel cycle and nuclear installations. For those reasons, reliable international co-operation was of particular importance to Switzerland, both as a customer in the nuclear market and as a supplier of high-quality components for nuclear installations.

36. For Switzerland, as for many other States, one of the reasons for acceding to the Treaty had been to continue to enjoy the inalienable right to develop, research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with the provisions of articles I and II of the Treaty. Furthermore, it relied on international co-operation for the expansion and promotion of those activities.

37. In the light of those general remarks, his delegation proposed that consideration should be given to the following four issues related to peaceful nuclear co-operation: firstly, for the further successful planning and development of nuclear energy, a reliable and predictable trade with nuclear fuel and with all services related to the fuel cycle was indispensable. International co-operation in the nuclear fuel cycle was increasing, largely because of the growing number of partner States. Note should also be taken of the fact that disruptions in the implementation of fuel cycle planning and uncertainties concerning the granting of licences made for additional unnecessary costs. While Switzerland had no problems concerning the front end, with regard to certain authorizations concerning the back end it had had to wait for several months and even up to over two years. That fact had demonstrated the necessity to rationalize the implementation of the procedures of authorization.

38. In order to assure the long-term planning of stable nuclear activities, licences for exports, re-exports or fuel cycle authorizations where they were demanded by national policies should be based on appropriate agreed criteria and/or programmatic approval. His delegation noted with interest that important nuclear suppliers had taken first steps in that direction in their bilateral co-operation and it welcomed all efforts to expand and develop such concepts.

39. Secondly, an important aspect of international co-operation concerned the relationships between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. There had recently been criticism that Governments of non-nuclear-weapon States could, by their peaceful nuclear energy programmes, inadvertently support the weapons programmes of the nuclear-weapon States. Such criticisms could endanger public acceptance of nuclear energy in non-nuclear-weapon States. His delegation recognized that article III, paragraph 1 (safeguards) and
paragraph 2 (export controls) did not legally require any constraints on the
the nuclear-weapon States. However, in line with article IV, paragraph 2 of
the Treaty, all steps leading to a clear separation between civilian and
military nuclear programmes could be considered as welcome contributions to
facilitating nuclear co-operation. In particular, that goal could be
furthered by: submission of peaceful nuclear activities of nuclear-weapon
States to IAEA safeguards; agreement between the nuclear-weapon States
concerning standardization of the conditions accepted for imports from
non-nuclear-weapon States; a ban on exports from non-nuclear-weapon States to
nuclear-weapon States without requests concerning peaceful use and
IAEA safeguards for the exported items.

40. Thirdly, co-operation on a global level was essential for furthering the
goals of the Treaty. Organizations and institutions working on questions
related to assurances of supply and non-proliferation were important in that
context. The major role now fell to CAS, where the dialogue between
NPT States and non-NPT States continued, especially in view of the forthcoming
Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful
Uses of Nuclear Energy.

41. Fourthly, consideration of the issues relating to the implementation of
article IV and to bilateral co-operation was an important prerequisite for
increasing accession to and acceptance of the Treaty. Annual discussions of
the application of article IV had been envisaged in the draft final document
of Committee II of the Second Review Conference. His delegation proposed that
possibilities for improving the implementation of article IV pertaining to
bilateral co-operation should be presented to the Fourth Review Conference in
a special report based on national contributions.

42. Mr. IWASAKI (Japan) pointed out that Japan was a sponsor of working paper
NPT/CONF.III/21 regarding the implementation of article IV of NPT, which
contained many useful and constructive suggestions and proposals deserving the
most serious consideration by all. As the head of his delegation had already
stated in the plenary, his Government attached great importance to the need
for increasing co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and was
ready to continue doing its utmost to contribute to the development of such
coopera irreversible with regard to the needs of developing countries. As
he saw it, the task before the Committee was to make a fair and objective
assessment of the past performance of international endeavours in that area
and to attempt to explore ways and means of making further improvements.

43. His country itself had enjoyed a great deal of benefit from international
co-operation in a long process of nuclear development starting some three
decades earlier. Its consistent goal had been to achieve self-reliance in
research, development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and he
believed it had been successful in that regard. There were 30 nuclear power
reactors in operation, generating nearly 23 per cent of total electricity
supply in the country, and the country was 99 per cent self-reliant in terms
of equipment and technology required for the construction and operation of
commercial power reactors.
44. Achieving that self-reliance had been no easy task. It had begun in 1955 with the introduction of basic nuclear energy laws and regulations and the subsequent establishment of semi-governmental research and development institutions for carrying out nuclear research and development programmes. Almost 10 years had been devoted to establishing and consolidating the necessary infrastructure and to developing badly needed human resources. The relatively smooth and steady development of his country's nuclear programme had been largely due to its consistent efforts to develop human resources and consolidate a basis for self-reliant research and development programmes.

45. His country was ready and willing to strengthen its co-operation efforts, bilaterally or multilaterally, to encourage and facilitate the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy in an increasing number of developing countries. The substantial annual increase in its contribution to TACF, as well as to RCAs and the Trieste Centre's associate fellowship programmes, was representative of its firm resolve in that respect. That contribution included support to "footnote-ag/ projects" that had been executed on a bilateral basis for developing States parties to the Treaty.

46. All agreed that IAEA was the most appropriate international organization through which to channel resources for multilateral co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. All were also aware that IAEA focused on technical co-operation in the form of training, fellowship, scientific visits, provision of research equipment, co-ordinated research programmes, and exchange of scientific and technical information. In his country's view and as analysed by IAEA, nuclear development programmes would require long-term planning beginning with the development of human resources and the establishment of suitable support infrastructure. It was in that area that international co-operation was most urgently needed and that his country was capable of making a real contribution, either to the development of agricultural, medical or industrial application of radioisotopes or in helping developing countries embark upon nuclear power programmes. Like others, his country was sensitive to the expressed needs of developing countries. Since there were inevitable constraints, financial or otherwise, needs should be defined and priorities set. IAEA had an important role to play in that context.

47. His country was aware of the need for some developing countries to secure financial resources for their nuclear power programmes. However, there should be more extensive utilization of the various financial mechanisms available multilaterally or bilaterally rather than the establishment of a new multilateral financial mechanism for that purpose.

48. His delegation agreed with others that a text on peaceful nuclear facilities should be presented and had, in 1982, submitted a proposal in a similar vein (CD/323) to the Committee on Disarmament. It appreciated the contribution made on that subject by the Egyptian delegation (NPR/CONF.III/110). In that connection, he recalled that in its statement at the 4th plenary meeting, his delegation had referred to nuclear safety as one of the three basic issues to be borne in mind in the future development and utilization of nuclear energy. It would therefore examine the Egyptian proposal with care and revert to it at an appropriate stage.
49. Mr. AL-SAIDI (Iraq) said that his delegation would co-operate as fully as possible in the work of the Conference. Article IV of the Treaty dealt with the inalienable right of all States to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The results of the Second Review Conference had been disappointing, and no solution to the problems raised seemed likely in the near future, the prospects for the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy did not seem good. He appealed to the developed world to support CAS by showing more flexibility and refraining from introducing issues which were not covered by the rules of procedure.

50. In its Final Declaration, the Conference should reiterate the need for parties to facilitate the transfer of nuclear technology and allow free access to it.

51. Assistance in the repair of the damage caused to Iraqi nuclear facilities in the Israeli attack of 7 June 1981 would be in accordance with the spirit of article II of the Treaty. Various resolutions of the General Assembly had condemned Israeli aggression against Iraq and its consequences for the international community. It was essential to prevent Israel from producing nuclear weapons, and a resolution to that effect would strengthen the Treaty and help to reduce the threat to States not Parties to it. His country supported the Egyptian proposal for measures to protect peaceful nuclear installations from military aggression.

52. Mr. NITZSCHE (German Democratic Republic) said that the Treaty had created favourable conditions for international co-operation. More countries should accede to the Treaty and comply with IAEA safeguards concerning nuclear activities in non-nuclear-weapon States. The Treaty's provisions should always take priority over unilateral commercial interests in dealings with States not parties to it.

53. The use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes had steadily increased since the Second Review Conference, as shown by document NPT/CONF.III/10, and his country appreciated the efforts of IAEA in that respect. The German Democratic Republic had increased its contributions to the IAEA technical assistance programme and had given particular support to developing countries which were parties to the Treaty by providing professional training and nuclear equipment. It participated actively in the work of CAS. Fuel-cycle services and assured supplies of fuel and equipment could only be established under a nuclear non-proliferation régime which effectively prevented the transfer of nuclear weapons. The German Democratic Republic also took part in regional co-operation schemes with the USSR and other States members of CMEA.

54. The United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy would provide a further opportunity for the discussion of nuclear energy problems and the principles of international co-operation, and could help to find ways to increase the economic and social advancement of developing countries.

55. In its final declaration, the Conference should reaffirm the rights, duties and mutual responsibilities of parties to the Treaty and affirm the
value of the Treaty and its protection of parties' rights to conduct research and make use of nuclear energy in accordance with the agreed safeguards. The Conference should express its appreciation of IAEA activities in the field under discussion, especially of the technical assistance programme and CAS, and agree on further measures within the framework of IAEA to provide more technical assistance for developing countries. The final document should call for the establishment of nuclear fuel-cycle centres and acknowledge the growing need for an international system of spent nuclear fuel disposal.

56. Mr. HAVEL (Czechoslovakia) said that the expansion of his country's nuclear programme had ensured a reliable and safe source of energy. Five water-water reactors with a capacity of 440 MW were already in operation and seven more were being constructed. With the assistance of the USSR, his country had begun to manufacture its own nuclear equipment.

57. His country took an active part in the work of IAEA. It was both a provider and a recipient of assistance under the technical assistance programme, sending experts to developing countries and providing equipment and training courses.

58. It had been claimed that the Treaty had adversely affected the introduction of nuclear technology throughout the world. However, the first task was to establish priorities and pave the way for greater exchange of information, an area in which CAS had done much valuable work. It did not seem fair to criticize the Treaty for the slow development of nuclear energy in developing countries, which was, in many cases, due to other factors such as the reduced demand for new energy sources, more stringent safety and legislative requirements and problems of finance. His country was only too familiar with the problems of planning and constructing power stations and training staff, experienced by the developing countries.

59. Reactor size was also a problem; the 1,000-MW reactors favoured by the industrialized countries were often too big for developing countries. The recent tendency in some countries towards the construction of smaller reactors was a valuable new development.

60. The Treaty was not responsible for the difficulties encountered in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Recent experience had shown that natural fuels could be used to the benefit of the economy and without endangering the environment. International co-operation in the spirit of article IV of the Treaty would be even more important in the future for the solution of the problems which had arisen. The Treaty posed no threat to the peaceful development and use of nuclear energy and encouraged planned research, production and construction of nuclear installations in individual countries, while promoting international co-operation.

61. Mr. STORHAUG (Norway) said that, as stressed in the Nordic memorandum in document NPT/CONF.III/18, an effective international non-proliferation regime was indispensable for expanded international co-operation with regard to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The present relatively satisfactory situation regarding nuclear trade and co-operation was largely due to the
establishment of CAS, which might have a justification beyond its present mandate. It would provide a suitable forum for settling problems as well as a valuable link between the NPT and non-NPT countries.

62. IAEA's programme of technical assistance and co-operation, in particular the TACF, had been growing at an impressive rate, and his delegation was confident that the funds available to IAEA would continue to grow at a mutually acceptable rate.

63. Parties to the Treaty had a special duty to further the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. His country was in favour of increased financing of selected "footnote-a/ projects" in NPT countries as one way of meeting that obligation. His delegation had also noted with interest some of the suggestions put forward in that regard in working paper NPT/CONF.III/21 and was prepared to take part in more detailed discussions. However, it had reservations concerning the suggested procedure whereby "footnote-a/ projects" in practice were presented to IAEA in the form of ready-made packages. The authority to determine which projects merited a "footnote-a/" label properly should rest with IAEA; improvements should be sought in the area of informal co-ordination and consultation between "footnote-a/" donor countries.

64. Although IAEA was the principal multilateral channel for the transfer of knowledge and technology in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the major international transfers were probably made bilaterally, and it was precisely in bilateral dealings that the benefits of NPT to all States parties were most evident. Detailed and informative exposés given by some of the nuclear-weapon States parties had clearly demonstrated that parties to NPT were given preferential treatment of a substantial character. However, it would have been very useful for the Conference to have had access to even more information on the bilateral co-operation conducted by States, the extent of such co-operation, its pattern and basic philosophy. Norway supported the position of the Swiss delegation in that regard.

65. His own country's export of nuclear material and equipment since the Second Review Conference had been to parties to the NPT only. As stated by its Minister for Foreign Affairs during the 4th plenary meeting, Norway would claim as a minimum condition for allowing export of nuclear materials and equipment the application of full-scope safeguards by the recipient country.

66. In conclusion, he wished to submit that: firstly, parties to the Treaty could be reasonably satisfied with its operation with regard to article IV; secondly, a further strengthening of the non-proliferation régime, in particular the requirement of full-scope IAEA safeguards as a minimum condition for export and co-operation, would make possible expanded co-operation; thirdly, more countries should be in a position to support "footnote-a/ projects" in parties to NPT; and, fourthly, it might be worthwhile to consider multi-year, multi-donor projects under the "footnote-a/" mechanism as a certain co-ordination between donor countries.

67. Mr. McGOLDRICK (United States of America) said that, as one of the original proponents of NPT, the United States had long recognized that the
non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty had the basic right to develop the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which it strongly believed should be facilitated by their accession to NPT. For that reason, article IV was a fundamental provision of the Treaty.

68. For more than three decades the United States had played a leading role in developing the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and in sharing its nuclear technology with other nations, and it had strengthened that policy after the Treaty had entered into force in 1970. Its record on peaceful nuclear co-operation, both bilaterally and through IAEA, was very strong as shown in the information paper it had submitted to the Review Conference (NPT/CONF.III/18). It was firmly committed to strengthening the framework for international co-operation in that area under effective non-proliferation conditions. In particular, it strongly endorsed the idea that all nuclear-exporting nations should require comprehensive safeguards as a condition of significant new nuclear supply commitments. Such a requirement would reduce doubts concerning the importing country's peaceful intentions in the eyes of both that country's neighbours and the international community as a whole and would also facilitate international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

69. In its primary task of reviewing the implementation of NPT concerning the peaceful applications of nuclear energy, the Committee should consider incorporating a number of ideas into its final document. All of the provisions of article IV, which he read out, should be reaffirmed; the need should be reaffirmed to assist developing countries parties to NPT bilaterally and through such multilateral channels as IAEA and UNDP; serious consideration should also be given to developing improved methods for co-ordinating technical assistance to ensure more efficient efforts to implement the provisions of article IV; the central importance of the activities of IAEA in world-wide co-operation in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be affirmed; preferential treatment should be urged for non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty in access to or transfer of equipment, materials, services, and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; all States parties to the Treaty in a position to do so should meet the "technically sound" requests for technical assistance submitted by developing States parties that IAEA was unable to finance from its own resources; all parties should be urged to give serious consideration to the establishment of international nuclear fuel cycle facilities; all parties should be urged to take the IAEA study on spent-fuel storage and other such studies into account in their plans for managing spent fuel; assurances of supply and assurances of non-proliferation should be recognized as being complementary, interdependent and essential for international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and CAS should be commended on the work it had done to date and urged to complete its remaining work as soon as possible.

70. His country was aware of the concerns that had been voiced about the possible consequences of attacks against peaceful nuclear facilities. It opposed all threats or use of force against States in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, including attacks against nuclear facilities. However, that question raised complex issues regarding the law of armed conflict which
were outside the scope of NPT. If the 40 nations of the Conference on Disarmament had been unable to agree on that issue over a period of five years, the Third Review Conference, which was an even larger multilateral conference and had only four weeks in which to review an exceedingly broad treaty régime, was clearly not the appropriate forum for examining that issue.

71. The CHAIRMAN said that he had prepared an informal list of suggestions to facilitate the general discussion, which had been distributed to delegations. If there was no objection he would take it that the list would be considered at the following meeting of the Committee.

72. It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 5.45 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 3rd MEETING
Tuesday, 10 September 1985, at 11.00 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. IMAI (Japan)

REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY AS PROVIDED FOR IN ITS ARTICLE VIII (3)
/agenda item 13/ (continued)

D. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY RELATING TO PEACEFUL
APPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY:

(1) ARTICLES III (3) AND IV, PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 6 AND 7, ESPECIALLY
IN THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO ARTICLE III (1, 2, 4) AND PREAMBULAR
PARAGRAPHS 4 AND 5 AS WELL AS TO ARTICLES I AND II

1. Mr. BASTRUP-BIRK (Denmark) said that article IV of the Treaty, together
with safeguards against proliferation, had provided a basis for the
development of exchange and transfer of nuclear materials, equipment and
technology with benefits to the recipients not only with regard to power
production but also in other fields, such as agriculture, medicine or
hydrology, which were very important in many countries, especially the
developing countries. In that regard the Treaty was a success, but it could be
still more effective if the States supplying technical assistance gave
priority to States Parties to the Treaty.

2. The transfer of technical assistance had to a very large extent taken
place through IAEA, and it was through that Agency that Denmark had in almost
all cases channelled its technical assistance. His country made every year a
voluntary contribution to the IAEA Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund
on the basis of its full rate of assessment to the Agency's budget. Apart
from that financial assistance, Denmark also provided other forms of technical
assistance, in particular for "footnote-2/ projects".

3. The Danish delegation welcomed the working paper relating to article IV
(NPT/CONF.III/2I). It agreed with the paper's analysis of the problems and
found the suggestions for improving the transfer of technical assistance
interesting, in particular nuclear planning systems and country-specific
development strategies. It therefore broadly agreed with the conclusions
stated in that document.

4. Mr. CAMPBELL (Australia) noted that there had been considerable
controversy regarding performance under article IV. The criticisms came from
a number of States which were neither participants in the present Conference
nor parties to the NPT and which, having reached an advanced level of nuclear
development, did not receive IAEA technical assistance and did not in any case
have the same needs as many of the developing countries signatories of the
NPT. The Committee had to draw a distinction between constructive criticism
from Parties to the Treaty and criticism from outside aimed at belittling
technical co-operation and the Treaty itself.
5. One of the features of article IV was that, in undertaking peaceful nuclear activities, Parties to the Treaty were entitled to expect preference in international co-operation by other parties. For its part, Australia scrupulously observed that provision.

6. In Australia, a controversy had arisen with regard to the nuclear fuel cycle between those who advocated the denial of the sale of uranium and those who favoured its sale under control; as an exporting country, Australia had finally opted for the second solution. The signatories to the NPT had undertaken to facilitate the exchange of equipment and materials, including uranium. In order to observe article IV, Australia marketed its uranium under effective non-proliferation and safeguards conditions applicable under the Treaty. His country was anxious to extend the peaceful uses of the atom by satisfying the energy requirements of fuel-deficient nations and it had accordingly concluded co-operation agreements with all the countries to which it sold uranium ore concentrates, 16 of them States Parties to the Treaty. Australia thus abided by the link existing between article III relating to the safeguards system and article IV.

7. Australia practised also other forms of international co-operation: it had thus concluded agreements with the United Kingdom and Japan regarding research and development work relating to a new Australian process for the elimination of highly radio-active waste. In addition, with regard to applied nuclear energy, it was co-operating with 12 other countries of the Asia/Pacific region under the IAEA Regional Co-operation Agreement (RCA). Since the Second Review Conference in 1980, Australia had furnished assistance under that Agreement or under bilateral programmes and had supported IAEA activities by making voluntary contributions to the IAEA Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund.

8. On the bilateral plane, Australia's main activity had related to co-operation with the countries of the region, in particular Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand. In all those co-operation activities, Australia had sought to place its technical expertise at the service of its partners and to provide them with practical assistance adapted to their needs, an approach which was fully in keeping with the spirit of article IV.

9. With regard to co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, IAEA had done much since the Second Review Conference, and the Parties to the Treaty gave and received preference in that respect. In its information document (NPT/CONF.III/10), the IAEA secretariat acknowledged that there was room for further co-operation among Parties to the Treaty, in particular for the financing of large-size projects such as the construction of power reactors. Since the Second Review Conference, some progress had been achieved with regard to assurances of supply, but the Parties to the Treaty still needed to reach agreement on the principles underlying that supply, and the Conference could play a useful role in that respect.

10. His delegation expected the Committee to place on record that none of the provisions of the Treaty affected the inalienable right of all the Parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II, subject to
the provisions of article III. The Committee should note the increase in the provision of technical assistance through IAEA and regional and bilateral programmes and stress the usefulness of regional co-operation agreements by emphasizing the key role of IAEA. For its part, the Third Review Conference should urge the Parties to the Treaty to support the IAEA programmes and to encourage that Agency to build further on its technical co-operation evaluation activities. In that regard, he urged delegations to consider carefully working paper NPT/CONF.III/21. At the same time, the Committee should highlight the peaceful non-power applications of nuclear technology and strike a proper balance between the need for action in the area of finance for power applications and the more modest, but equally important, needs of countries which had no wish to take advantage of the power application of nuclear energy. Finally, the Committee should express a view on the issue of preference to non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty in the provision of technical assistance.

11. His delegation hoped that the Conference would adopt by consensus a final document of substance, and intended to work towards that end in Committee III.

12. Mr. BRACEGIRDLE (New Zealand) said that his country was not as directly concerned as some countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, being neither a recipient nor a supplier of significant nuclear equipment, material and technology. It made use of nuclear energy for medical, agricultural, scientific and other purposes but it had no nuclear power or research reactor and no nuclear facility or material requiring the application of IAEA safeguards.

13. In assessing each of the proposals before it, the Committee should bear in mind their possible impact on the work of the other Committees. In particular the issue of safeguards under consideration in Committee II was relevant to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The need to develop or improve ways for financing certain peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which was the subject of a working paper submitted by Egypt on article IV, was being examined by several agencies. It was dealt with in the document submitted by the United Kingdom and a number of other countries (NPT/CONF.III/21), which contained suggestions deserving consideration in depth. The Committee's objective should be to facilitate social and economic development, in particular that of the developing countries. While recognizing the concern at attacks on peaceful nuclear facilities, the Committee might perhaps leave the elaboration of concrete measures to the Conference on Disarmament.

14. His delegation hoped that the Committee would be able to agree on other measures to improve co-operation among the Parties to the Treaty, subject to the provisions of article III. In particular, the internationalization of certain elements of the nuclear fuel cycle was a suggestion which deserved consideration. In a general way, the Committee, in its consideration of article IV, could draw inspiration from the suggestions contained in the report prepared on article IV in Committee II at the Second Review Conference, in 1980.

15. Mrs. MASSIP (Canada) reaffirmed her delegation's commitment to the principles set forth in article IV of the Treaty and expressed satisfaction at
their implementation. Canada was a large-scale nuclear supplier and that article was of fundamental importance to it. Its annual exports of uranium amounted to approximately $1,000 million and Canada had concluded nuclear co-operation agreements with 21 countries, including 6 developing countries and 18 non-nuclear-weapon countries Parties to the Treaty. Since the Second Review Conference, it had supplied reactors to two countries, Romania and the Republic of Korea, and was examining a number of suggestions for possible co-operation with certain States Parties. It was the policy of Canada to co-operate only with partners that had ratified the Treaty or subscribed an equivalent legal commitment and concluded a general safeguards agreement; that policy was distinctly favourable to the Parties to the Treaty.

16. Her delegation fully supported the analysis contained in document NPT/CONF.III/21 on the special needs of the developing countries with regard to the planning and elaboration of strategies and the financing of projects. In particular, it fully appreciated the importance attached to the decisive role played in the field of technical co-operation by IAEA, the activities of which ought to be continued and intensified.

17. The Canadian delegation also approved the statements contained in the document submitted by Switzerland (NPT/CONF.III/38) regarding the mutual rights and obligations of the Parties under article IV of the Treaty, and recognized that in the matter of nuclear co-operation it was desirable to act in a flexible and foreseeable manner. With regard to the work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply of IAEA, which was referred to in that document, she recalled that there was a close link between assurances of supply and non-proliferation safeguards. It was only by combining the principles of article IV with effective non-proliferation safeguards that it would be possible to minimize the risk of proliferation inherent in nuclear trade, and there was a simple method of arriving at that result: that of giving preferential treatment to States Parties to the Treaty.

18. In its final declaration, the Conference should reaffirm the principles of article IV and the will of the Parties to facilitate the exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technical information with the aim of favouring the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; it should stress the importance of the role played by IAEA in that matter, and that of its technical assistance; it should call for the strengthening of the machinery of IAEA in the sector of technical assistance; it should recognize the special difficulties encountered by the developing countries in financing their programmes and the need to find a solution for their problems; it should call on the supplier countries to give a preferential treatment to the States Parties to the Treaty; it should recognize the usefulness of work done by the Committee on Assurances of Supply; and lastly, it should recognize the importance for nuclear co-operation of the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy which was to be held early in 1987.

19. Mr. Konstantinov (Bulgaria) said that the application of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had favoured international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and had opened the way for the solution of energy, industrial, medical, ecological and other problems in
many countries, beginning with the developing countries. An increasingly important role in that field was played by IAEA, which furnished valuable technical assistance, in particular to non-nuclear-weapon States and more especially to third world countries.

20. The People's Republic of Bulgaria was resolutely in favour of international co-operation in that field, provided that such co-operation did not lead to the development of nuclear-weapons capability. The steadily growing role of nuclear energy in his country's economy was one of the primary factors in its development. The bilateral and multilateral co-operation agreements concluded with the Soviet Union and the other CMEA countries were particularly important in that connection. Bulgaria also maintained close links with IAEA and received from it an extremely useful technical assistance in various forms and participated actively in the elaboration and implementation of joint programmes. The main results - among others - of the fruitful co-operation had been the manufacture by his country of specialized equipment for other countries and the organization of meetings, seminars and in-service training schemes in Bulgaria. His country also co-operated very actively with IAEA in the field of the safety of nuclear facilities.

21. He therefore noted with satisfaction the growth over the past few years of the IAEA Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund, the resources of which should reach $30 million in 1986. Bulgaria considered that the Fund was well managed and that it could help to solve pressing problems, particularly those of the developing countries.

22. Mr. BASSOV (Turkey) expressed his satisfaction at the implementation of the recommendations of the First Review Conference, which had called for additional IAEA extrabudgetary assistance for the financing of technically sound projects, particularly for States Parties to the Treaty, which had acted as an incentive to other countries to join the NPT. The extrabudgetary funds made available to IAEA for those projects had increased from $2.6 million in 1980 to $8.9 million in 1984; 95 per cent of the total for the five years, i.e. nearly $13 million, had been designated for countries parties to the Treaty.

23. It was, however, necessary to avoid complacency about what had been achieved. Nuclear energy production and research and development were complex activities with long lead-times; hence the need for increased aid in the regulatory field, including safety, manpower development, industrial orientation and financing. Financial problems had long been an impediment to the implementation of nuclear energy projects in the developing countries; that issue should therefore be resolutely tackled. His delegation, for its part, would spare no effort to contribute to the search for a solution.

24. Mr. JANKOWSKI (Poland) pointed out that there was a close link between the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. He also drew attention to the fact that the Preparatory Committee had adopted its decisions by consensus; it was therefore desirable to follow its example and work in a spirit of co-operation and compromise. His
delegation had already stated its views on the peaceful use of nuclear energy and would not revert to that point, except to stress the importance it attached to that question.

25. After an extensive debate on the wording and the order of the questions which the Committee was called upon to examine, the CHAIRMAN announced that the final programme of work would be drawn up with due regard for the relevant observations of the delegations and would be circulated shortly.

The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 4th MEETING

Wednesday, 11 September 1985, at 10.40 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. IMAI (Japan)

REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY AS PROVIDED FOR IN ITS ARTICLE VIII (3) (agenda item 13) (continued)

D. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY RELATING TO PEACEFUL APPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY:

(1) ARTICLES III (3) and IV, PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 6 AND 7, ESPECIALLY IN THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO ARTICLE III (1, 2, 4) AND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 4 AND 5 AS WELL AS TO ARTICLES I and II

1. Mr. GERDTS (Federal Republic of Germany), speaking with reference to article IV, said that, according to data published by IAEA, by the end of 1983, 317 nuclear power plants had been in operation, 209 under construction and 130 at the planning stage. By that time, one out of every four States in the world had taken the decision to develop the peaceful uses of nuclear power. About 10 per cent of world-wide electricity consumption in 1983 had been generated by nuclear energy, with a proportionally far higher share in specific regions or countries. The need for further electricity supplies was expected to continue to increase, though at a somewhat lower rate than the predicted level. In addition there was a growing number of non-energy applications of nuclear technology. The Federal Government therefore attached the greatest importance to the inalienable right of the parties to the Treaty to develop and use nuclear energy and participate in the widest possible exchange of equipment and scientific and technological information for the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

2. The rights and commitments of States as laid down in article IV of the Treaty remained an issue of central importance to the interests of non-nuclear-weapon States. The benefits of the peaceful application of nuclear energy should be made available to all States, with particular attention being paid to the developing countries' special needs. In the period since the Second Review Conference the Federal Republic of Germany, for its part, had contributed some DM 23 million to IAEA's Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund; had spent approximately DM 6.6 million on "footnote-a/ projects", about three-quarters of which had been used for projects of NPT member States; and had contributed some DM 4.3 million to co-ordinated research programmes in which the majority of participants were members of the NPT. The activities of the Federal Government in the framework of bilateral co-operation with developing countries parties to the NPT in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy included delivery of nuclear research reactors and their components, joint programmes for the use of research reactors, and co-operation in the safety aspects of nuclear reactors.

3. His Government considered that the provisions of article IV of the Treaty had been instrumental in creating favourable conditions for the effective
participation of States in the benefits of the peaceful application of nuclear energy. Furthermore, the information compiled by IAEA in the various background documents, along with the statements made by delegations in the Committee, indicated that the objectives of article IV had been satisfactorily implemented during the period since the Second Review Conference. That fact should be reflected in the final document, which should also take account of the continued efforts to enhance co-operation in the peaceful application of nuclear energy, with particular regard to the needs of developing countries. To that end, his delegation had sponsored working paper NPT/CONF.III/21, which included recommendations for the improvement of technology transfer mechanisms, with special regard to the needs of the developing areas of the world. Reference was made, inter alia, to the strengthening of IAEA assistance in nuclear planning systems for developing countries, the broadening of the IAEA technical co-operation evaluation activity, the further development of current IAEA assistance in country-specific development strategies, support for regional co-operative agreements and "footnote-a/ projects", and the exploration of the scope for multi-year, multi-donor projects under the "footnote-a/" mechanism.

4. His delegation had reached the conclusion that considerable progress had been made in the implementation of article IV, in which connection IAEA was to be congratulated on its work. There was, however, room for further improvement in co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, particularly with regard to the mechanism by which technology was transferred. His country stood ready to make an active contribution to further improvement of the implementation of article IV.

5. Mr. HOSSAIN (Bangladesh) said that his delegation, which had already stressed the importance it attached to article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, believed that paragraph 2 of the article provided for much broader co-operation among States Parties to the Treaty in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy than had in fact been the case since the entry into force of the Treaty in 1970. That applied both to exchange of information and transfer of technology and also to the actual financing of peaceful nuclear programmes in the developing countries. Since the 1970s in particular, the developing countries, and more especially the least developed, had faced enormous financial constraints in meeting their energy requirements. Very little had been done by the developed States Parties to find a long-term solution to that situation. At a meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the Third Review Conference, in April 1985, the representative of Bangladesh had pointed out that the acute nature of the problems faced by the least developed countries in regard to energy had not been referred to in the IAEA report and had urged that an appropriate reference should be included. That view had been welcomed by the Preparatory Committee and his delegation would therefore urge that the final document of the Conference should adequately reflect the problems of the least developed countries.

6. While his delegation acknowledged the assistance extended by certain developed States Parties to the developing countries through bilateral and multilateral channels, it felt that the quantum of such assistance fell far short of the needs of the developing countries that were parties to the NPT. The result had been frustration, and disillusionment with respect to the
obligations, and intentions of the developed States Parties under article IV and their apparent failure to accord preferential treatment to the developing States Parties in the development of nuclear facilities for useful peaceful purposes. The same views had been expressed by the delegation of Bangladesh to the IAEA General Conference in 1984.

7. The developed States Parties should therefore take stock of the situation with a view to making a greater contribution, through bilateral and multilateral channels, to the development of peaceful nuclear facilities in the developing States Parties, particularly in the energy sector. In that connection, he drew attention to resolution GC (XXVIII) Res/439 of the IAEA General Conference in 1984, which related to financing from outside sources for nuclear power projects in the developing countries and urged that special consideration should be given to the least developed countries. His delegation requested that the broad lines of that resolution should be adequately reflected in the section of the final document of the Conference that dealt with technical assistance.

8. Lastly, his delegation supported the proposals put forward by Egypt in regard to protection against attacks on peaceful nuclear facilities of non-nuclear weapon States Parties to the NPT and the establishment of a financial assistance fund (NPT/CONF.III/30 and NPT/CONF.III/31 respectively). It also agreed with the Chairman's suggested format for the Committee's final report.

9. Mrs. VISCONTI (Italy) said that her delegation was a co-sponsor of document NPT/CONF.III/21, introduced by the United Kingdom representative, and requested that those views should be reflected in the final document.

10. Italy fully appreciated that the basic object of the Treaty was to combine nuclear development and security against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. As a staunch supporter of the economic development of the least developed countries, it adopted a flexible policy in regard to nuclear co-operation with other countries and believed that the least developed countries should be assisted, in so far as possible, in a manner that was in keeping with their diverse and changing needs and in full respect for their sovereign independence of choice.

11. Her Government considered that the financing of technical assistance through IAEA provided a valid means of meeting those requirements and hoped to be in a position to co-operate more fully in the Agency's development activities. As far as extrabudgetary resources were concerned, it had been the main contributor to those activities in 1984. The projects financed had been mainly concerned with agriculture and health, two top priority sectors that were essential in order for an effective development process to ensue. A particularly significant project was the one on the Egyptian fruit fly eradication. The overall sum allocated by Italy to IAEA over the five-year period 1980-1985 amounted to over $20 million.

12. Another key aspect of development co-operation was training, which Italy regarded as essential in triggering a self-reliant development process.
13. As a result of the priority accorded to those objectives and in accordance with an agreement reached between IAEA and the Italian Government, there had been a considerable increase in the contributions made to the International Centre for Theoretical Physics (ICTP), in Trieste. Allocations during the period 1980-1985 had amounted to approximately $17 million, part of which had been earmarked for training foreign scientists in Italian research laboratories and centres as a follow-up to the courses held at ICTP. Furthermore, mindful of the importance of co-operation, her delegation trusted that, by expediting the work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply of IAEA, the spirit of article IV of the Treaty would be implemented in a meaningful way. The conclusion of the work now under way in that Committee would serve as an example of fruitful co-operation between countries with divergent interests.

14. Mr. POP (Romania), noting that there had been a considerable increase in the industrialization of nuclear energy in the period since the Second Review Conference, said that the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy for the production of electricity had proved not only useful but also competitive, particularly during the energy crisis, and that fact should be duly reflected in the final document of the Conference.

15. The nuclear activities of developing countries, however, had not increased at the rate anticipated partly because the assistance rendered by IAEA and the developed countries had not answered all the developing countries' needs. His delegation therefore supported the proposal submitted by Egypt in document NPT/CONF.III/31 for the establishment of a financial assistance fund to assist developing States parties in developing their civilian electro-nuclear programmes. The Conference should take a decision in the matter, with a view to arriving at a significant increase in assistance to developing countries parties to the NPT, particularly in connection with activities concerned with the industrialization of nuclear energy, above all electricity production.

16. A further point concerned the right of all States to have access to nuclear information, materials and technology. His country had always taken the view that the non-proliferation régime was based on a responsible political commitment and that measures designed to strengthen that régime by placing restrictions on the transfer of nuclear technology and equipment were not only unacceptable but also ineffective. He therefore trusted that the Conference would reaffirm in unambiguous terms the inalienable right of all States to international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and, in that connection, he supported the proposals put forward by the Swiss delegation (NPT/CONF.III/38).

17. Romania also favoured the adoption of recommendations to ensure supplies of nuclear and other materials necessary for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, for the purpose of normal and planned development of nuclear activities that depended on imports of such products. It had therefore welcomed the establishment by IAEA of the Committee on Assurances of Supply and supported the recommendations made regarding that Committee's further work.
18. Lastly, he joined other delegations in emphasizing the crucial importance of effective measures to guarantee the widest possible implementation of the terms of article IV of the Treaty, an article that was a pillar of the non-proliferation régime. Any measure designed to strengthen it would therefore strengthen the régime.

19. Mr. GHAZALI (Malaysia) said his country was of the opinion that the full benefits of nuclear energy had yet to be reaped. If nuclear science was regarded as a living organism, moral, economic, scientific and political considerations should be dealt with as a planned and harmonious operation and the aims involved should not be at cross purposes.

20. Malaysia believed in the right of every nation to offer assistance to such other nations as it saw fit, yet in a way that would not jeopardize either the NPT or IAEA. Accordingly, Malaysia adhered to the provisions of the NPT but also favoured bilateral co-operation in the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, in the belief that the benefits of those uses should be accessible to all nations. Major efforts were required to secure greater economy and efficiency through co-operation in the use of the limited resources available in terms of manpower, facilities and development technology. All NPT members had a duty to uphold the ideals for which the NPT and IAEA stood and to ensure that those ideals were not endangered.

21. The CHAIRMAN drew attention to document NPT/CONF.III/C.III/3, which contained the programme of work for Main Committee III, and invited comments on section I. There appeared to be general agreement that the Conference should confirm that the NPT had proved to be a sound basis for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy worldwide; should reaffirm that nothing in the Treaty affected the inalienable right of any State Party to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II, and should reaffirm the undertaking by all States Parties to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the right of all parties to participate in such exchange. There had also been a considerable measure of agreement that the assurances afforded by effective non-proliferation arrangements under the NPT provided an important basis for expanding trade and co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Those basic concepts could perhaps be reflected in the report but the exact form of wording would require further consideration.

22. Mr. ZANGGER (Switzerland), referring to the element "building of confidence" in section I of the Committee's programme of work (NPT/CONF.III/C.III/3), said that his delegation agreed with the Chairman's overall assessment but trusted that the proposal it had submitted in the last paragraph of document NPT/CONF.III/C.III/38, which had been introduced at the 2nd meeting of the Committee, would be incorporated in the Committee's report. At the Second Review Conference, the Swiss delegation had expressed the view that, since there was a mechanism under article III for monitoring commitments under article II of the Treaty, there should also be a mechanism for verifying the implementation of undertakings under article IV. The Drafting Committee of Committee II at the Second Review Conference had in fact agreed to a form of wording to the effect that States Parties should meet
annually at IAEA Headquarters to discuss the implementation of article IV, particularly in the context of article III of the Treaty, and that States Parties should request the Agency to take the necessary steps in that connection. In the event, however, the wording had not been finally adopted. His delegation's latest proposal was motivated solely by the wish to make article IV, and hence the NPT as a whole, more attractive to countries outside the Treaty and so encourage them to accede to it. That proposal, which was couched in wording that was not as strong as the earlier formulation, would have the merit of enhancing the implementation of article IV.

23. The CHAIRMAN noted that a number of delegations had emphasized the importance of article IV, paragraph 2, and their views would have to be reflected in the report.

24. Mr. KENYON (United Kingdom), referring to the proposal made by the Swiss representative, pointed out that article VIII, paragraph 3, provided for review of the Treaty as a whole and his delegation would have to study carefully the question of introducing a new review mechanism for a particular part of the Treaty.

25. Mr. SALONEN (Finland) endorsed the comments by the United Kingdom representative.

26. Mr. ZANGGER (Switzerland) emphasized that there was no intention to set up a new mechanism. His delegation had noted the absence of information on the implementation of article IV in bilateral co-operation and had therefore suggested that there should be a report based on national contributions, similar to the reports on articles I and II prepared by the Secretariat of the United Nations.

27. Mr. FAHMY (Egypt) said that it would be difficult for the Committee to deal adequately with non-diversion and safeguards in its report unless it was informed of Committee II's work on safeguards.

28. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that safeguards that had a bearing on the Committee's work would have to be studied and subsequently assimilated in a section on safeguards as a whole in the final report.

29. Mr. SALONEN (Finland) said that the work would be facilitated if the first and last elements of section II of its programme of work were combined, in keeping with the work done by the IAEA Committee on Assurances of Supply.

30. The CHAIRMAN explained that the programme of work was only intended to act as a general guideline for the Committee. With regard to IAEA's Committee on Assurances of Supply, a number of delegations had expressed support for its work and had underscored the importance of both the elements mentioned by the representative of Finland, namely, long-term supply assurances and non-proliferation assurances.

31. Mr. FAHMY (Egypt) said that long-term supply assurances were particularly important in view of the nature of nuclear energy, although non-proliferation assurances should not be neglected.
32. Mr. McGregor (Australia) pointed out that a number of delegations held the view that there was a necessary link between assurances of supply and appropriate assurances of non-proliferation.

33. Mr. Fahmy (Egypt) said that he did not in any sense wish to belittle the importance of such a link.

34. The Chairman said that another point which had emerged in the course of the discussion was the importance of internationalization of nuclear fuel cycles by setting up nuclear fuel cycle centres and an international system of spent fuel disposal, as well as IAEA's role in such projects. Since there had not been complete agreement on the action to be taken, he suggested that the Committee's report should merely state that the question had been discussed. Several delegations had expressed different views regarding the extent of restrictions on the international transfer of spent fuel or related materials. In view of the difficulty of reconciling differing national policies, in its report the Committee could simply recognize the issue as another important area.

35. With regard to the protection of safeguarded nuclear facilities from military attacks, Egypt had made a proposal in document NPT/CONF.III/30, one which had been supported by a number of delegations, although the United States delegation had not agreed that the subject should be mentioned per se.

36. As to section IV of the programme of work, a number of delegations had proposed that preferential treatment should be granted to non-nuclear-weapon States Parties. They had expressed satisfaction at the development of bilateral co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and had urged that efforts in that field should continue.

37. Mr. Al-Kitali (Iraq) said he wished to reiterate his delegation's call to all States to provide assistance to replace the peaceful installations in Iraq destroyed by the Israeli military attack. He also called upon all States to refrain from assisting Israel, which was using its nuclear capability to produce nuclear weapons.

38. The Chairman said that, under section V of the programme of work, a number of views had been expressed about the establishment of a fund to cover nuclear power programmes and IAEA's involvement in that regard, and also the importance of the IAEA small- and medium-sized power reactors study. Again, a number of comments had been made in connection with the forthcoming United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, and a consensus would have to be reached on the Committee's attitude towards the Conference.

39. Since no delegation wished to take the floor on sections VI and VII of the programme of work, he suggested that delegations should set out their views in documents to be submitted to the Committee so that progress could be made in drafting the final report.

The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 5th MEETING

Wednesday, 11 September 1985, at 5.25 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. IMAI (Japan)

REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY AS PROVIDED FOR IN ITS ARTICLE VIII (3),
(agenda item 13) (concluded):

D. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY RELATING TO PEACEFUL
APPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY;

(1) ARTICLES IV AND III (3) PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS 6 AND 7, ESPECIALLY IN
THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO ARTICLE III (1, 2, 4) AND PREAMBULAR
PARAGRAPHS 4 AND 5 AS WELL AS TO ARTICLES I AND II

1. The CHAIRMAN invited the representative of the United Kingdom to
introduce the working paper prepared by Belgium, the Federal Republic of
Germany, Finland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway and the
United Kingdom, containing formulations for the final declaration on
article IV of the Treaty (NPT/CONF.III/51).

2. Mr. KENYON (United Kingdom) said that paragraphs 1 and 2 of the working
paper drew on the language of the Treaty. Paragraph 3 seemed a necessary
statement in order to put article IV and the important expansion of trade and
co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy in the context of the
necessary non-proliferation arrangements, an issue on which there had been
differences of view within the group of sponsors. Some felt that trade and
coopération should take place only on the basis of Treaty membership, while
others believed that, while the Treaty was indeed an important basis, such
exclusivity went beyond their national policies; slightly different language
might be necessary in order to achieve a consensus.

3. With paragraph 4, the working paper moved more closely to the area
covered by working paper NPT/CONF.III/21. In that connection, he pointed out
an omission in the text: the words "the supply of nuclear" should be added
after the word "through" in line 2. Paragraph 4 also contained a proposal to
call on States who were at present co-operating through trade and development
assistance to maintain and, where possible, to increase the level of their
activities.

4. Many statements heard in the Committee had praised the work of IAEA in
the area of technical assistance and co-operation. The sponsors had therefore
included paragraph 5, which summarized some of that activity and acknowledged
its importance. Similarly, several statements had stressed the importance of
the so-called "footnote-a/" system which had been put in place as a result of
a recommendation by the First Review Conference. Paragraph 6 welcomed the
establishment of that mechanism but avoided using the term "footnote-a/",
which was considered not suitable for a paper which it was hoped would have a
wider circulation. Paragraph 7 summarized proposals for improvement in IAEA
activities relating to technical assistance, which had been the main subject
5. In paragraph 8, the working paper NPT/CONF.III/51 then moved back to section II of the programme of work of Committee III (NPT/CONF.III/C.III/3) and included a paragraph on the importance of the Committee on Assurance of Supply (CAS) of the IAEA. The sponsors considered it most important that account should be taken of the long hours spent in that Committee reconciling many different views and producing what was an almost complete set of principles for nuclear trade, the necessary basis for the proper functioning of article IV.

6. The Committee had heard much discussion of the problem of financing major nuclear projects; document NPT/CONF.III/21 had recognized the problem and suggested that it should be addressed in appropriate fora. Paragraph 9 of the working paper under study suggested that IAEA might be asked to look closely at that problem. It also referred to the importance of IAEA work in the area of feasibility studies and development of infrastructure and to its Small and Medium Power Reactor Study. Finally, since many of the issues discussed in Committee III would also form the substance of the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, the sponsors had felt it useful to include a reference to that Conference in paragraph 10.

7. Mr. DE ROSENZWEIG-DÍAZ (Mexico), introducing the working paper of the States Members of the Non-aligned Group containing formulations for the final declaration on article IV of the Treaty (NPT/CONF.III/52), said that nearly 80 per cent of the working paper was based on the document submitted to the second Review Conference by the Group of 77 (NPT/CONF.II/C.II/34) and that it reproduced views that were unfortunately still valid with respect to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the core of the implementation of article IV of the Treaty. In particular, it emphasized that non-proliferation should not serve as a pretext to prevent States from acquiring and developing nuclear technology for peaceful uses. Some paragraphs were new. For example, paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 referred to the problem of discrimination and nuclear co-operation with South Africa and Israel. Paragraph 13 (X) appealed to parties to provide technical assistance to Iraq, whose nuclear reactor had been destroyed, a figure should be set in that connection. The paper included an appeal to IAEA to implement resolution 439 of the IAEA General Conference GC(XXVIII)/RES/439, regarding assistance to least developed countries, and a reference to the importance of the work of the Committee on Assurance of Supply of IAEA.

8. Mr. BRACEGIRDLE (New Zealand) said that the two working papers submitted represented valuable contributions to the final declaration on article IV of the Treaty. Supported by Mr. FAHMY (Egypt), Mr. NORDENFELT (Sweden) and Mr. KONSTANTINOV (Bulgaria), he proposed that the Chairman should be authorized to prepare a consolidated text for the delegates' consideration drawing on the statements heard in Committee III, the relevant comments in the plenary and the papers tabled in the Committee.

9. It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 6th MEETING
Thursday, 12 September 1985, at 3.35 p.m.
Chairman: Mr. IMAI (Japan)

DRAFT REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE

1. The CHAIRMAN introduced his proposal for the draft report of Main Committee III (NPT/CONF.III/C.III/4), consisting of a synthesis of the statements and working papers which had been submitted to the Committee. He hoped that the major concerns of all delegations had been included, and that the document would form a basis for discussion leading to a final report acceptable to all. He invited the Secretary of the Committee to announce some corrections to the text.

2. Mrs. OPELZ (Secretary of the Committee) said that the following subparagraph should be inserted under chapter IV, paragraph 3 of the Chairman's draft proposal:

"(vi) To provide, upon request, assistance in securing financing from outside sources for nuclear power projects in developing countries, and in particular the least developed countries."

3. The title of chapter V should be amended to read "FUND/FINANCING". The first sentence of chapter V, paragraph 2 should be amended to read "the Conference requests the IAEA to explore further the problems of securing ...".

4. Mr. NORDENFELT (Sweden) said that in chapter II, paragraph 2, line 2, the word "in" should be changed to "towards", to read, "the Conference commends the recent progress ... made towards agreeing a set of principles ...". The amendment would bring the text into line with paragraph 8 of working paper NPT/CONF.III/51, from which it had been taken.

5. The CHAIRMAN suggested that the meeting should be suspended in order to allow delegates to study his draft.

The meeting was suspended at 3.45 p.m. and reconvened at 4.10 p.m.

6. The CHAIRMAN invited comments on the text of his proposal.

7. Mr. AL-KITAL (Iraq) expressed appreciation of the work done by the Bureau and the Secretariat in producing the document, but considered that the views expressed in the Non-Aligned Group's working paper (NPT/CONF.III/52) had not been adequately reflected. In particular, chapter III of the document made no specific reference to the Israeli attack on safeguarded Iraqi nuclear facilities. His delegation had no objection to a generalized statement, but considered that the Israeli attacks should be specifically condemned in the Committee's report.

8. Mr. MGBOKWERE (Nigeria) said that a concern expressed in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Non-Aligned Group's working paper (NPT/CONF.III/52) had not been
reflected in the Chairman's proposal. The lack of co-operation afforded to non-nuclear-weapon States in the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes should be mentioned in the Committee's report. Non-nuclear-weapon States deserved greater assistance in return for their decision to renounce nuclear weapons, if the very survival of the Treaty was not to be jeopardized in future years.

9. Mr. FAHY (Egypt) said that the Non-Aligned Group's call for more resources to be allocated to IAEA for the promotion of international co-operation should be reflected in the Committee's report. The problems confronting IAEA were not merely of an institutional nature; more resources were needed.

10. Mr. DE ROSENZWIG-DÍAZ (Mexico) expressed doubts about the accuracy of the assertion made in chapter I, paragraph 1, of the proposal by the Chairman (NPT/CONF.III/C.III/4), that "the Conference confirms that the NPT has proved to be a sound basis for the world-wide peaceful uses of nuclear energy", and considered that the phrase should be deleted.

11. There was no mention in the document of an important concept which had appeared in sub-paragraph I of the first part of paragraph 13 of the Non-Aligned Group's working paper (NPT/CONF.III/52), namely the principle that "concern for non-proliferation should not be used as a pretext to prevent States from acquiring and developing nuclear technology". In section II, paragraph 3, of the Chairman's proposal, States were urged to fulfil their obligations under nuclear agreements, but his delegation considered that a more categorical wording was required. The document did not call for any increase in real terms in the resources allocated to IAEA for the promotion of international co-operation, which was surely one of the Agency's most important functions. Finally, section IV of the Chairman's proposal, concerning the preparations for the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (PUNE), made no mention of a substantive suggestion made by the Non-Aligned Group in its working paper, namely that arrangements should be made for the salient issues of the present Review Conference to be discussed at the PUNE Conference.

12. Mr. SHAHABI SIRJANI (Islamic Republic of Iran) agreed with previous speakers that more attention should be paid to the Non-Aligned Group's working paper. In particular, the reference in the working paper to the Israeli attack on Iraqi nuclear facilities was balanced and impartial and should be reproduced in the Committee's final report. He spoke not out of sympathy with Iraq, since his country had often found the conduct of the Iraqi authorities unacceptable, but in a spirit of simple justice. His country, also, had often been a victim of attacks on its non-military nuclear facilities and was, therefore, convinced that all such acts should be openly condemned.

13. Mr. THOMPSON (Ireland) said that he would prefer to reserve judgement on the Chairman's text until he had had time to consider it more thoroughly.

14. Mr. NORDENFELT (Sweden), said that, as the representative of a neutral country, he found unacceptable the wording of section III, paragraph 2 of this
text, which encouraged parties to provide assistance to any party whom they considered to be under threat of attack. He proposed adding a comma after the acronym NPT in line 2, followed by the words "if it so requests,". Secondly, with regard to section III, paragraph 3, he would like to remind the meeting that efforts were already under way to elaborate appropriate measures prohibiting attacks on safeguarded nuclear installations. Therefore, a comma should be added after the word "and" in line 3, followed by the words "noting with satisfaction that the Conference on Disarmament is engaged in efforts aimed at prohibiting attacks on nuclear facilities, ".

15. Mr. SALONEN (Finland) stated that he endorsed both points raised by the representative of Sweden.

16. Mr. AL-KITAL (Iraq) said that despite the fact that Iraq was the victim of aggression by Iran, he had refrained from introducing the war issue in view of the difficult issues facing the Conference. His delegation would continue to exercise the maximum restraint in that regard.

17. Mr. SHAHABI SIRJANI (Islamic Republic of Iran) pointed out that his intervention had not referred to Iraqi aggression against his country; he had simply said that his delegation was "not sympathetic" to Iraq because of certain actions by the Iraqi authorities. However, if the Iraqi delegation wished to make references to aggression, he for one would not deny them.

18. Mr. KENTON (United Kingdom), referring to earlier interventions on whether draft article IV was being adequately fulfilled, said that his delegation agreed with Mexico in that regard. The working paper co-sponsored by the United Kingdom (NPT/CONF.III/51) spoke of the considerable level of co-operation that was already taking place but urged, in the final sentence of paragraph 4, that States in a position to do so to continue and increase the level of their co-operation.

19. Mr. WEMBOU (Cameroon) said that the optimistic tone of the Chairman's text was somewhat at variance with the feeling of the Non-Aligned Group and his own delegation. The Non-Aligned Group's working paper (NPT/CONF.III/52) showed that those States which had developed nuclear technologies were not developing States parties to the Treaty. In particular, paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 had not been developed in the Chairman's draft. Perhaps that had been done in a spirit of compromise, but it was not helpful to obfuscate all differences.

20. Mr. McGOLDRICK (United States of America) said that his country would not support the proposal by the delegation of Iran for a reference to the 1981 Israeli attack on Iraqi nuclear facilities. Concerning the general issue of protection of safeguarded nuclear facilities, his delegation had already made its position clear, but would, in a spirit of co-operation, study the language of the Chairman's draft.

21. Section IV, paragraph 6, singled out two countries when in fact a number of countries had not made effective non-proliferation commitments. If such a statement were to be included, it should be directed at a broad range of countries about which there were non-proliferation concerns. With regard to section V, paragraph 1, his delegation had some doubts about the
practicalities of the concept of a fund, but would, again in a spirit of co-operation, study the language of the Chairman's draft more thoroughly.

22. Mr. NITZSCHE (German Democratic Republic) said that the views of his delegation as expressed at the Committee's 2nd meeting were well represented in the Chairman's draft.

23. The CHAIRMAN said that as he understood it, his paper could be taken as a basis for further discussion leading to a consensus text. He had taken note of the points and comments of the various delegations. With regard to the points raised in the Non-Aligned Group's working paper, it was difficult to incorporate a seven-page working paper in its entirety. Nevertheless he had tried to make sure that every point raised in that working paper was reflected in one place or another in his draft, and he therefore urged the delegations to read the document carefully to see whether their points were thus accommodated.

The meeting rose at 5 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 7th MEETING
Friday, 13 September 1985, at 10.40 a.m.
Chairman: Mr. IMAI (Japan)

DRAFT REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE (continued)

1. The CHAIRMAN invited members to continue their consideration of the draft report of Main Committee III (NPT/CONF.III/C.III/4) which he had submitted at the previous meeting. The final section of the document on the final page should bear the number VI, and not IV.

2. Mr. SOEPRAPTO (Indonesia) recognized that it would have been difficult to adopt all the proposals made by delegations in the working papers they had submitted and the statements they had made, but regretted that many of the points contained in the Non-Aligned Group's working paper (NPT/CONF.III/52) had not been reflected in the draft report.

3. He wished to propose some amendments to the draft report. In section I, paragraph 1, the word "affects" should be replaced by "shall be interpreted as affecting", in line with the wording used in article IV (1) of the Treaty itself.

4. In section II, paragraph 1, the words "more predictable and" should be inserted between "the need for" and "long-term supply ...", as stated in the terms of reference of the IAEA Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS). In the first sentence of section II, paragraph 2, it would be preferable to adopt the wording used in paragraph VII of the second part of paragraph 13 in the Non-Aligned Group's working paper and to insert after the words "principles related to this problem" the phrase "with appropriate assurances against the proliferation of nuclear weapons".

5. In section VI, the last three lines should be replaced by the corresponding text from the end of the Non-Aligned Group's working paper, namely: "... conviction that the results of the Conference should contribute to free and unhampered access on a just and non-discriminatory basis to nuclear technology, equipment and materials needed for the development of national programmes of peaceful uses of nuclear energy". His delegation considered that, although the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy was a valuable initiative in itself, more emphasis should be placed on the importance of its results.

6. Mr. SHAHABI SIRJANI (Islamic Republic of Iran) agreed with the Indonesian representative that more attention should have been paid in the draft report to the proposals made by the Non-Aligned Group.

7. In the first sentence of section III, paragraph 1, he suggested that the words "or threat of attack," should be followed by the phrase "which it condemns". The following sentence should be added at the end of the
paragraph: "The Conference strongly deplores the repeated bombardments of Bushehr's safeguarded peaceful nuclear plant situated in the Islamic Republic of Iran".

8. After an exchange of views on the desirability of further consideration of the draft report in plenary session, the CHAIRMAN recalled that he had drawn up his draft text on the basis of statements made in plenary and of working papers submitted by various groups. He proposed that the Committee should split up into official open-ended working groups which would be in a better position to reconcile differing points of view.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 11.10 a.m.
1. The CHAIRMAN drew attention to four informal documents prepared by discussion groups on the basis of the text he had proposed for inclusion in the draft report (NPT/CONF.III/C.III/4). Those documents, relating respectively to sections I, II, IV and VI of his proposed text, read:

"I. INALIENABLE RIGHTS AND FULLEST POSSIBLE EXCHANGE"

1. The Conference affirms that the NPT fosters the world-wide peaceful use of nuclear energy and reaffirms that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of any Party to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II.

2. The Conference reaffirms the undertaking by all Parties to the Treaty, in accordance with article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7, to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the right of all Parties to the Treaty to participate in such exchange. This can contribute to progress in general and to the elimination of technological and economic gaps between the developed and developing countries.

3. The Conference [notes] [affirms] that the assurance provided by effective non-proliferation arrangements through adherence to the Treaty [should] provide an [important] [essential] basis for the expansion of trade and co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

4. The Conference reaffirms the undertaking of the Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so to co-operate in contributing, alone or together with other States or international organizations, to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world. In this context the Conference recognizes the particular needs of the least developed countries.

5. The Conference requests that States Parties consider possible bilateral co-operation measures to further improve the implementation of article IV. To this end, States Parties are requested to give in written form their experiences in this area in the form of national contributions to be presented in a report to the next Review Conference.
II. SUPPLY ASSURANCES/NON-PROLIFERATION ASSURANCES

1. The Conference recognizes the need for more predictable long-term supply assurances with effective assurances of non-proliferation.

2. The Conference commends the recent progress which the IAEA's Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS) has made towards agreeing a set of principles related to this matter, and expresses the hope that the Committee will complete this work soon. The Conference further notes with satisfaction the measures which CAS has recommended to the IAEA Board of Governors for alleviating technical and administrative problems in international shipments of nuclear items, emergency and back-up mechanisms, and mechanisms for the revision of international nuclear co-operation agreements and calls for their early implementation.

3. The Conference reaffirms that in accordance with international law and applicable treaty obligations, States should fulfill their obligations under agreements in the nuclear field, and any modification of such agreements, if required, should be made only by mutual consent of the parties concerned.

4. The Conference confirms that each country's choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing their respective fuel cycle policies, and that predictable and agreed criteria, including [effective] [appropriate] non-proliferation assurances, should govern international co-operation in this area.

5. While recognizing that the management of the back-end of the fuel cycle including nuclear waste storage is primarily a national responsibility, the Conference acknowledges the importance for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy of international collaboration for arrangements in this area.

IV. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

1. The Conference acknowledges the importance of the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as the principal agent for technology transfer amongst the international organizations referred to in article IV (2) and welcomes the successful operation of the Agency's technical assistance and co-operation programmes. The Conference records with appreciation that projects supported from these programmes covered a wide spectrum of applications, both in power and non-power uses of nuclear energy notably in agriculture, medicine, industry and hydrology, and that the chief beneficiaries of the Agency's assistance in the non-power projects have been the developing States Parties to the Treaty.

2. The Conference welcomes the establishment by the IAEA, following a recommendation of the first Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, of a mechanism to permit the channelling of extrabudgetary funds to projects additional to those financed from the IAEA Technical
Assistance and Co-operation Fund. The Conference notes that this channel has been used to make additional resources available for a wide variety of projects in developing States Party to the Treaty.

3. In this context, the Conference proposes the following measures for consideration by the IAEA:

(i) IAEA assistance to developing countries in siting, construction, operation and safety of nuclear power projects and the associated trained manpower provision be strengthened;

(ii) To provide, upon request, assistance in securing financing from outside sources for nuclear power projects in developing countries, and in particular the least developed countries;

(iii) IAEA assistance in nuclear planning systems for developing countries to be strengthened in order to help such countries draw up their own nuclear development plans;

(iv) IAEA assistance on country-specific nuclear development strategies to be further developed, with a view to identifying the application of nuclear technology that can be expected to contribute most to the development both of individual sectors and developing economies as a whole;

(v) Greater support for regional co-operative agreements, promoting regional projects based on regionally agreed priorities and using inputs from regional countries;

(vi) Exploration of the scope for multi-year, multi-donor projects financed from the extrabudgetary resources of the IAEA;

(vii) The IAEA's technical co-operation evaluation activity to be further developed, so as to enhance the Agency's ability to provide technical assistance.

4. The Conference underlines the need for the provision to the IAEA of the necessary financial and human resources to ensure that the Agency is able to continue to meet effectively its responsibilities.

5. The Conference notes the appreciable level of bilateral co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and urges that States in a position to do so should continue and where possible increase the level of their co-operation in these fields.

6. The Conference urges that preferential treatment should be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty in access to or transfer of equipment, materials, services and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, taking particularly into account needs of developing countries.
[7. The Conference demands that all States suspend any nuclear co-operation with South Africa and Israel until they renounce to the nuclear-weapon option by joining the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, accepting the IAEA safeguards and pledging not to manufacture nor acquire nuclear weapons.]

VI. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE OF THE PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION IN THE PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY

The Conference expresses its satisfaction at the progress in the preparations for the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (UNCPICPUNE) and its conviction that UNCPICPUNE will fully realize its goals in accordance with the objectives of resolution 32/50 and relevant subsequent resolutions of the General Assembly for the development of national programmes of peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development, especially in the developing countries.

The Conference considers that all proposals related to the promotion and strengthening of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy which have been produced by the third Review Conference of the NPT, be transmitted to the Preparatory Committee of the UNCPICPUNE."

2. Referring to the status of work in the discussion groups, he said that the group co-ordinated by the Canadian representative had examined sections I and II of the proposed text and had come close to a consensus, but one or two points had still to be decided. It was to be hoped that further deliberations in the group would resolve the issues involved.

3. The group considering section III, a group of which he was the co-ordinator, was still seeking a consensus.

4. The group dealing with sections IV and V, co-ordinated by the Nigerian representative, had made considerable progress but there were still one or two major areas to be considered.

5. The group for section VI, co-ordinated by the representative of the German Democratic Republic, had completed its work and arrived at a consensus.

6. Mr. MGBOKWERE (Nigeria), referring to the informal document prepared on section IV, said it had been agreed in the discussion group that, in order to draw a distinction between the level of technical assistance, the second sentence of paragraph 1 of the informal document should be altered to read:

"The Conference records with appreciation that projects supported by these programmes covered a wide spectrum of applications related to both power and non-power uses of nuclear energy notably in agriculture, medicine, industry and hydrology. The Conference notes that the Agency's assistance to the developing States Parties has been chiefly in the non-power uses of nuclear energy."
7. Paragraph 3 (i) of the Chairman's text (NPT/CONF.III/C.III/4) had been transposed to become paragraph 3 (vii), and the words in that subparagraph reading "the Agency's ability to provide technical assistance" should be replaced by "the Agency's effectiveness in providing technical assistance."

8. A new paragraph 4 had been added, stating that the Conference underlined the need for the provision to the IAEA of the necessary financial and human resources to ensure that the Agency was able to continue to meet effectively its responsibilities. No agreement had been reached on paragraph 7, previously paragraph 6 of the Chairman's text, and it had therefore been placed between square brackets.

9. A problem also arose in regard to fund financing, the subject of section V of the Chairman's proposed text. The delegations of Egypt, Nigeria and the United Kingdom, however, were due to meet shortly in an endeavour to agree on a text that would replace paragraph 1 and the first sentence of paragraph 2 of section V; the rest of paragraph 2 would remain unchanged.

10. The CHAIRMAN urged any delegations experiencing difficulties with regard to new paragraph 7 of section IV to make suggestions for arriving at a solution.

11. Mr. NITZSCHE (German Democratic Republic) reported that a consensus had been reached in the group that had considered section VI, following discussions held in an open-minded and constructive atmosphere.

12. The CHAIRMAN invited delegations to consider further the informal documents prepared in connection with sections I, II, IV and VI, so that action could be taken at the Committee's next meeting.

13. The Committee was required in addition to review article V of the Treaty and to consider item 14 of the agenda, an item that had also been allocated to Committee II. In that connection, he understood the Mongolian delegation had prepared a working paper and it could, if necessary, be distributed that afternoon. He suggested that, if no delegation wished to take the floor in that regard, he should prepare a draft text, based largely on the draft report of the second Review Conference.

14. It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 11.05 a.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 9th MEETING

Monday, 16 September 1985, at 4.40 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. IMAI (Japan)

DRAFT REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE (continued)

1. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that approval of individual sections of the draft report would be ad referendum until the entire report was available in its final form.

NPT/CONF.III/C.III/CRP.1

2. The CHAIRMAN drew attention to the fact that the working paper submitted by Mongolia (NPT/CONF.III/C.III/5) should be included as the fifth item in the list contained in paragraph 4.B. If he heard no objection, he would take it that the Committee approved document NPT/CONF.III/C.III/CRP.1.

3. It was so decided.

NPT/CONF.III/C.III/CRP.1/Add.1

4. The CHAIRMAN, recapitulating the status of the different sections of the draft report, said that a consensus had nearly been reached on sections I and II, with some minor wording problems to be worked out, and that the final texts of those sections would be distributed as soon as possible. Section III was still under discussion.

5. As he understood it, section IV was the object of a consensus with the exception of paragraph 7.

6. Mr. MGBOKWERE (Nigeria) pointed out that there should be a hyphen between the words "extra" and "budgetary" in section IV, paragraph 3 (vi).

7. Section IV, with the exception of paragraph 7, and as amended, was adopted.

NPT/CONF.III/C.III/CRP.1/Add.2

8. The CHAIRMAN indicated that the final text of section V, (NPT/CONF.III/C.III/CRP.1/Add.2) had just been made available and would be discussed at the 10th meeting.

NPT/CONF.III/C.III/CRP.1/Add.1, section VI

9. The CHAIRMAN said that if he heard no objection, he would take it that the Committee approved section VI concerning the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy.

10. It was so decided.
Examination of article V

11. The CHAIRMAN, recalling that article V had not been discussed by the Committee, invited members to consider his proposal for a text concerning that article.

12. Mr. MOHER (Canada) said that he would need more time to reflect on the Chairman's suggested text and would endeavour to give his answer as soon as possible.

NPT/CONF.III/C.III/5

13. The CHAIRMAN stated that there also had been no active discussion concerning agenda item 14, and asked whether the Committee wished to include a text along the lines of the working paper submitted by Mongolia.

14. Mr. McGOLDRICK (United States) said that the Committee should make some comment on agenda item 14. However, he would like to reserve judgement on the language of working paper NPT/CONF.III/C.III/5 until he had had more time to study it.

15. The CHAIRMAN said that consideration of sections I, II and III, section IV paragraph (7) and section V, as well as article V and agenda item 14, would be completed at the following meeting.

The meeting rose at 5.15 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 10th MEETING  
Tuesday, 17 September 1985, at 10.45 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. IMAI (Japan)

DRAFT REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE (concluded)

1. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to consider the revised version of the remainder of the draft report, contained in document NPT/CONF.III/C.III/CRP.1/Add.1/Rev.1. In accordance with delegations' wishes, no square brackets had been used, but the strokes and underlinings employed in several places of the text served the same purpose. References to the Committee's failure to reach consensus on certain paragraphs were to be found in sections III and IV. In those cases, divergence of opinion had been considerably more deep-rooted than in the case of the undecided points indicated by strokes or underlinings. Although efforts to reach consensus would certainly continue, it seemed clear that agreement could not be achieved by the time the Committee was required to adopt its report. If and when consensus was reached, even after the adoption of the report, the Committee could be reconvened for the purpose of recording the fact. The text of the draft report should be considered on that understanding.

2. Ms. OPELZ (Secretary of the Committee) said that the Working Group wished to make a number of changes in document NPT/CONF.III/C.III/CRP.1/Add.1/Rev.1.

3. A new paragraph should be inserted between paragraphs 5 and 6 on page 1, reading: "At its meeting on 13 September 1985, the Committee, at the suggestion of the Chairman, went into an open-ended working group which later split into four subgroups for informal consultations on the draft report".

4. In section I, paragraph 2, a new sentence was to be inserted after the first sentence, stating: "In this context, the Conference recognizes the importance of services".

5. At the end of section II, at the end of the last sentence of paragraph 2, the words "their early implementation" should be replaced by "the early completion of the work of CAS and the implementation of its recommendations".

6. In section II, paragraph 5, the words "operation and" were to be inserted before "management", the word "is" before "primarily", was to be placed in the plural, and the words "and multilateral" should be added before "collaboration".

7. In section III, paragraph 2, the word "peaceful" should be added after the word "immediate" at the end of the first line.

8. The second paragraph on page 4 should be replaced by: "In this context the following material provided a basis for the Committee's deliberations".
9. Lastly, at the end of section III, a new paragraph should be added, reading: "The Conference notes that the Islamic Republic of Iran stated its concern regarding attacks on its nuclear facilities".

The meeting was suspended at 11 a.m. and resumed at 11.50 a.m.

10. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to consider the various sections of the revised version of the draft report (NPT/CONF.III/C.III/CRP.1/Add.1/Rev.1).

Work of the Committee

11. The CHAIRMAN suggested that the new paragraph to be inserted between paragraphs 5 and 6 should be approved.

12. It was so decided.

13. The section entitled "Work of the Committee", as amended, was approved.

Sections I and II

14. Mr. MOHER (Canada) said that consensus had now been reached in the subgroup dealing with those sections. In addition to the changes read out by the Secretary of the Committee, the following amendments had been agreed upon: paragraph 3 of section I should be deleted, and paragraph 4 of section II should read:

"The Conference confirms that each country's choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing their respective fuel cycle policies. International co-operation in this area, including international transfers and subsequent operations, should be governed by effective assurances of non-proliferation and predictable long-term supply assurances. The issuance of related licenses and authorizations involved should take place in a timely fashion."

15. Mr. AL-KITAL (Iraq) said that his delegation was prepared to join the consensus on section II only if the whole of the Committee's draft report was adopted by consensus. The Iraqi delegation's position stemmed from that adopted by the Group of Non-Aligned and Neutral States, namely, that the Conference should produce only one text, not two texts, one being unanimous and the other not.

16. Sections I and II, as amended, were approved subject to that reservation.

Section III

17. The CHAIRMAN said that the statement in paragraph 4 to the effect that the Committee had been unable to achieve consensus on a paragraph dealing with the Israeli attack on the safeguarded Iraqi nuclear installation in 1981 correctly reflected the present situation in that regard. It did not mean,
however, that efforts to arrive at a consensus had been terminated. As he had already said at the beginning of the meeting, the Committee could revise its draft report if and when a consensus was reached.

18. Replying to a point raised by Mr. THOMPSON (Ireland), the CHAIRMAN said that the paragraph noting the Islamic Republic of Iran's concern regarding attacks on its nuclear facilities, to be inserted at the end of section III, should be regarded as part of the material providing a basis for the Committee's deliberations, or, in other words, as a third disputed paragraph.

19. Mr. AL-KITAL (Iraq) said that, as already stated at the previous meeting, his delegation was not party to a consensus on any part of paragraph 4 of section III.

20. The CHAIRMAN said that that position would be duly noted.

21. Section III, as amended, was approved subject to consensus being reached at a later stage.

Section IV

22. The CHAIRMAN drew attention to the passage appearing at the end of the section which recorded the Committee's inability to reach consensus on a specific paragraph.

23. Mr. KENYON (United Kingdom) said that he regretted the absence of consensus on the paragraph in question and hoped that the Chairman's earlier remarks in connection with section III also applied to section IV.

24. The CHAIRMAN said that such was indeed the case. Various delegations were still working towards a consensus and he hoped that those efforts would be continued.

25. Section IV was approved subject to consensus being reached at a later stage.

Section V

26. Mr. SAVERYS (Belgium) said that his delegation had a reservation in regard to the section but hoped to be able to withdraw it in the course of the day.

27. The CHAIRMAN said that due note would be taken of the Belgian delegation's position.

28. Mr. BASSOY (Turkey), referring to paragraph 2, proposed that, in the first sentence, the word "countries" should be replaced by "members" and, in the last sentence, the words "some of" should be added before "the developing countries".
29. Mr. KENYON (United Kingdom) said that, for stylistic reasons, he would propose that the word "countries", in the first sentence of paragraph 2, should be retained but that the words "as are members of the Agency" should be added after "countries".

30. It was so decided.

31. Section V, as amended, was approved.

Sections VI and VII

32. Sections VI and VII were approved.

Section VIII

33. The CHAIRMAN said that the text of section VIII was based on a proposal submitted by the Mongolian delegation (NPT/CONF.III/C.III/5).

34. Mr. MGBOKWERE (Nigeria) proposed that the section should be prefaced by an additional sentence, reading:

"The Conference calls upon all States Parties, particularly the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, to create and promote the conditions that would enhance the credibility and universal acceptability of the Treaty by faithfully honouring the undertakings they have assumed under the Treaty".

35. Mr. KENYON (United Kingdom) said that that formulation was unacceptable to his delegation since it seemed to contain the implication that nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty had not undertaken their commitments to date. He completely refuted any such implication and would refer the Conference to the paper on the implementation of the Treaty submitted by his delegation (NPT/CONF.III/17).

36. Mr. McGOLDRICK (United States of America) said that he fully concurred with the remarks by the United Kingdom representative. Also, since the matter was already before Committee II, it might perhaps be preferable not to take it up in Committee III.

37. The CHAIRMAN said that, in view of the late stage reached in the deliberations, the Committee might wish to indicate to the plenary that certain general points had been made but to state that, since the matter was being dealt with in Committee II, Committee III had decided not to act on it.

38. Following a brief exchange of views in which Mr. MGBOKWERE (Nigeria), Mr. BAYART (Mongolia) and the CHAIRMAN took part, Mr. BAYART (Mongolia) said he understood, following consultations, that the Nigerian representative would
have no objection if the Committee approved the section and the Nigerian proposal was discussed in Committee II. He therefore proposed that section VIII should be approved as drafted.

39. It was so decided.

40. Section VIII was approved.

41. The CHAIRMAN, noting that the Committee had concluded its work on the draft report, said that he would present it to the plenary for further consideration in connection with the elaboration of the final document of the Conference, and that Committee III had concluded its work.

The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.