Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

FINAL DOCUMENT

Part II

Geneva, 1985
REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE
TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

FINAL DOCUMENT

PART II

Geneva, 1985
The Final Document of the third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons consists of three parts:

I. Organization and Work of the Conference (NPT/CONF.III/64/I)

II. Documents issued at the Conference (NPT/CONF.III/64/II)

III. Summary Records (NPT/CONF.III/64/III)
Documents issued at the Conference \(^1\)

\(^1\) Documents NPT/CONF.III/1-15 were circulated as pre-session documents and are not reproduced here.
LETTER DATED 15 JULY 1985 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF DENMARK, FINLAND, ICELAND, NORWAY AND SWEDEN ADDRESSED TO THE PROVISIONAL SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE THIRD REVIEW CONFERENCE

We have the honour to transmit to you herewith a memorandum stating the views of the five Nordic countries on the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

We should be grateful if this letter and the memorandum could be circulated as an official document of the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

(Signed) Ole BIERRING
Ambassador,
Permanent Representative
of Denmark to the
United Nations

(Signed) Hórdur HELGASON
Ambassador,
Permanent Representative
of Iceland to the
United Nations

(Signed) Keijo KORHONEN
Ambassador,
Permanent Representative
of Finland to the
United Nations

(Signed) Tom Eric VRAALSEN
Ambassador,
Permanent Representative
of Norway to the
United Nations

(Signed) Anders FERM
Ambassador,
Permanent Representative
of Sweden to the
United Nations
Annex

MEMORANDUM ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

1. The most important task of the international community is to curb and reverse the nuclear-arms race and reduce the danger of nuclear war. Measures to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons are integral parts of efforts towards this end. Such measures are essential for security in regional and global contexts.

2. The Governments of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden attach the greatest importance to the non-proliferation Treaty as a means to safeguard international peace, strengthen the security of States and promote international co-operation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It is the most important instrument to combat the danger of nuclear proliferation. The non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty have undertaken not to acquire nuclear weapons. Since the Treaty came into force no non-nuclear-weapon State party to the non-proliferation Treaty has acquired nuclear weapons. Yet, broadly based efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons should be continued. All parties to the Treaty have undertaken to pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament. The continuing arms race and the lack of progress in disarmament forums give rise to grave concern. The new bilateral arms control negotiations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on nuclear and space arms are therefore most welcome.

3. The possibility that non-nuclear-weapon States may already have acquired or may be actively pursuing nuclear-weapon capabilities underlines the urgency of international non-proliferation measures. Such a possibility constitutes a particularly grave danger in regions where tension or conflicts may pose a threat to international peace and security.

4. The conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty would effectively enhance the non-proliferation régime. It would also be an important step towards disarmament on behalf of the nuclear-weapon States in the implementation of article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty. The Nordic Governments attach particular importance to the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty with universal adherence, which would be a most effective measure to halt further development of nuclear weapons and offer strong support for the purposes of the non-proliferation Treaty.

5. An effective international non-proliferation régime is indispensable for expanded international co-operation with regard to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Such co-operation, as envisaged inter alia in the non-proliferation Treaty, has not always proceeded without difficulty. The availability on a predictable and long-term basis of nuclear materials, equipment and technology should be assured under adequate safeguards. In some cases it has been difficult to obtain adequate guarantees with respect to exclusively peaceful use of nuclear material, and application of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. International efforts to alleviate such difficulties are undertaken in particular within IAEA. The activities of IAEA also reflect the significance of nuclear...
energy for social and economic development. It may be noted that the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session adopted by consensus a resolution on the convening of a United Nations conference for the promotion of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It should be kept in mind that the fundamental reason for the present limitations regarding international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is the fear of a possible acquisition of nuclear weapons by additional States. An effective non-proliferation régime should be seen as aimed at eliminating the reason for this fear.

6. In the view of the forthcoming Third Review Conference of the non-proliferation Treaty the Nordic Governments consider that progress concerning the realization of, inter alia, the following measures and objectives in the field of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament would be important:

- Adherence to the non-proliferation Treaty, to which more than 120 States are now parties, by all States which have not yet acceded to it;
- Acceptance also by all non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the Treaty of full scope IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear activities, present and future;
- The requirement of full scope IAEA safeguards by all supplier States as a minimum condition for exports of relevant nuclear material, equipment and technology to non-nuclear-weapon States;
- Steps towards separation of civilian and military nuclear sectors in the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, with application of IAEA safeguards in the civilian nuclear sector in these countries;
- Measures to assure the long-term supply of nuclear material, equipment and technology in a predictable manner, with appropriate assurances against the proliferation of nuclear weapons;
- Further strengthening of the safeguards system of IAEA in order to increase its capacity also in view of the development of nuclear technology;
- Full co-operation by all States with IAEA in its implementation of safeguards under existing and future bilateral and multilateral agreements;
- Conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and adherence to it by all States;
- Early results from the United States-Soviet negotiations on nuclear and space arms, including effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms and at strengthening the strategic stability;
Cessation of the production of fissile material for weapon purposes;
Agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at between the States of the regions concerned;
Other national, bilateral and multilateral measures aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and halting and reversing the nuclear-arms race.

7. These measures, all aiming at the strengthening of the non-proliferation Treaty, have objectives beyond this year's Review Conference.

The Nordic Governments reaffirm their commitments to the objectives of the non-proliferation Treaty. Article X of the Treaty stipulates the convening of the Conference in 1995 to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. All ways and means must be explored to ensure its prolongation and the continued effectiveness of the non-proliferation régime.
INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE UNITED KINGDOM REGARDING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

1. To assist the Review Conference, the Preparatory Committee decided at its second session in October 1984, to invite the nuclear weapon States and other parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to provide, sufficiently in advance of the Review Conference information relevant to the implementation of various articles of the Treaty, including especially Article VI.

2. The United Kingdom is strongly committed to supporting the Treaty and willing to provide information relevant to the implementation of the Treaty in the manner requested by the Preparatory Committee.

Article I

3. Article I binds the United Kingdom, as a nuclear weapon State, not to transfer nuclear weapons or any nuclear explosive devices to any other recipient. We have faithfully carried out this obligation. We have not transferred any such weapons or devices into the control of any other State. In addition, we have introduced legislation and administrative procedures governing the export of nuclear materials, materials, equipment and technology having characteristics relevant to the production of nuclear explosive devices so as to ensure that they are transferred only for legitimate purposes and with the minimum risk of diversion to nuclear explosive use. Detail of our policy in this regard has been communicated to the IAEA who published it in document INFCIRC/254. This policy is applied with careful regard to Article IV. We have also signed and taken steps to ratify the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials.

Article III

4. The United Kingdom considers the verification of Articles I and II by means of the safeguards provisions in Article III to be a vital part of the NPT. The United Kingdom has provided full co-operation to the IAEA in the operation of the safeguards system and has assisted the Agency's efforts to improve the system by participating in working groups and by providing technical support. All exports from the United Kingdom to any non-nuclear weapon State of special fissionable material or equipment designed for processing or use of such material, have been subject to appropriate safeguards agreements. The United Kingdom has also supported and taken an active role in the work of the group of NPT parties which has produced an expanded list of items which should trigger application of IAEA safeguards in accordance with Article III. (This list has been published by the IAEA as INFCIRC/209.) Although the Treaty does not require nuclear weapon States parties to do so, the United Kingdom has submitted all its peaceful nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards, and has concluded a safeguards agreement with the IAEA which gives the Agency the right to designate such facilities, at
its choice, for safeguards inspection. Such inspections strengthen the safeguards system because they give the IAEA an opportunity to gain experience by inspecting types of facility not yet in use in non-nuclear weapon States. In certain cases they can also be used to verify undertakings to non-nuclear weapon States that materials which they have sent to the United Kingdom will remain in the civil cycle.

Article IV

5. The United Kingdom takes its obligations under Article IV seriously. At the 1980 Review Conference, the Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Mr. Hurd, announced that the United Kingdom would spend a further 1 million dollars on IAEA technical assistance projects specifically for the benefit of parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, under the "Footnote A" system. This money, which has now been spent, was in addition to the sum of 3.7 million dollars contributed to the IAEA's voluntary fund for technical assistance in the period 1980-84, most of which has been devoted to projects in countries party to the NPT. In addition, the United Kingdom has made further sums available over the same period for training fellowships for nationals from NPT parties in the developing world. Another aspect of the United Kingdom's nuclear technology transfer has been the export of research reactors and the design and manufacture of equipment for PWR nuclear power stations overseas including in the Middle East and Far East. The United Kingdom nuclear industry has played a major role in the provision of fuel cycle services to a wide range of countries.

Article V

6. The United Kingdom has not detonated any nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes. We are not, therefore, in a position to make available to non-nuclear weapon States any information deriving from such explosions. The environmental and legal difficulties with peaceful nuclear explosions were explored in the report of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes published by the IAEA Board of Governors on 26 August 1977 (GOV/1854). It is the considered view of the United Kingdom Government that a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty would need to include or be accompanied by a ban on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. This is because there is at present no way in which nuclear explosions could be carried out for peaceful purposes without the nation carrying out the explosions having the opportunity to obtain benefits relevant to a nuclear weapons programme.

Article VI

7. The United Kingdom is firmly committed to the goals of this important Article. We play a major part in the multilateral arms control and disarmament process. We attach great importance to the work of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva as we did to its predecessor bodies. We have consistently played an active role in the Conference and its subsidiary bodies including those on chemical weapons, radiological weapons, a comprehensive programme of disarmament and negative security assurances. We welcome the creation this year for the first time of an Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space.

8. The United Kingdom also plays an active part in two European conventional arms control fora, the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe and the negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Vienna.
9. The United Kingdom took part in the tripartite negotiations on a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban with the United States and the Soviet Union which were held from 1977 to 1980. Since then we have supported and contributed actively to the work of the Conference on Disarmament Working Group on this subject in 1982 and 1983 and regret that it has not been re-established since. On 11 July 1985, we tabled a major paper in the Conference on Disarmament on "Seismic monitoring for a comprehensive nuclear test ban" (CD610). We adhere to the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, which we played an important role in helping to negotiate, and we also observe the provisions of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty agreed between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1974.

10. It is generally recognized that the first step in pursuing effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament rests on negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States, who possess the overwhelming proportion (95 per cent) of the world's total nuclear arsenal. We welcome the progress made on limiting strategic arms by the United States and the Soviet Union since the entry into force of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1970. We also warmly welcome and support the current negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States whose objective is to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and at strengthening strategic stability. These aims are in our view fully in accord with Article VI.

11. The United Kingdom nuclear deterrent forces represent less than 3 per cent of the strategic nuclear forces available to the United States or to the Soviet Union and the first priority must clearly be to reduce these. However, we have made it clear that if their strategic arsenals were to be very substantially reduced, and if no significant change had occurred in super-Power defensive capabilities, the United Kingdom would want to review her position to consider how best she could contribute to arms control in the light of the reduced threat.

Article VII

12. The United Kingdom supports attempts by groups of States to establish nuclear weapon-free zones where this could contribute to regional security, to non-proliferation and disarmament in general, provided that nuclear weapons do not already feature in the security of the region involved and all States concerned are prepared to participate on the basis of agreements freely entered into and in keeping with internationally recognized principles. We support the Treaty of Tlatelolco as being an embodiment of the aspirations contained in Article VII and pay tribute to those who drafted it. The United Kingdom is party to Additional Protocols I and II and we have scrupulously observed our obligation not to deploy nuclear weapons in the territories for which we are internationally responsible within the zone of application of the Treaty, or in the territories or territorial waters for which the Treaty is in force.

Article VIII

13. In our role as a depository government of the NPT, we have assisted in convening the 1985 Review Conference. We intend to play our full part in a thorough review of the achievement of the purposes of the Preamble and the fulfilment of the provisions of the Articles of this Treaty.
Article IX

14. As a depositary, the United Kingdom has promptly informed all signatory and acceding States of the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession. Since 1980, we have received three instruments of accession/instruments of ratification, and five instruments of succession to the Treaty. In addition, we have taken steps to encourage NPT non-parties to accede to the Treaty and 16 have done so since 1980, bringing the total membership to 129 States. The security of all States would be enhanced if there were universal adherence to the Treaty and the United Kingdom will therefore continue to urge non-parties to adhere to it. Annex A lists all States who signed the Treaty in London together with dates of deposit of instruments of ratification, accession, or succession where appropriate.
# Annex A

## Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

*(Entered into force on 5 March 1970)*

States which have signed and ratified the Treaty in London or have acceded to it in London (as of 29 July 1985)

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In a Note addressed to the Government of the United Kingdom dated 22 June 1971 the Government of Tonga declared that it considers itself bound by the Treaty.

In a Note dated 14 July 1972 and received by the Government of the United Kingdom on 14 August 1972, the Government of Fiji declared that it considers itself bound by the Treaty.

In a Note dated 2 September 1975 the Government of Grenada informed the Government of the United Kingdom that it confirmed its succession to the Treaty.

In a Note dated 16 July 1976, and received by the Government of the United Kingdom on 11 August 1976 the Government of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas declared that it considers itself bound by the Treaty.

/* The United Kingdom ratification was in respect of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St. Christopher-Nevis, Anguilla and St. Lucia and Territories under the territorial sovereignty of the United Kingdom, as well as the State of Brunei, the Kingdom of Tonga and the British Solomon Islands Protectorate. */

**/ Signed in Washington.

***/ Signed in Moscow.
Since its entry into force in March 1970, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has been a central component of international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons while encouraging the broadest application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. With more than 125 parties, it has the largest number of adherents of any arms control agreement in history.

The non-proliferation Treaty has three major goals. The first, which was the driving force behind the initial push for the Treaty, is to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. The second is to foster peaceful nuclear co-operation under international safeguards. The third goal, added during the ensuing multilateral deliberations, is to encourage negotiations to end the nuclear-arms race with a view to general and complete disarmament. The individual substantive articles of the Treaty have been carefully drawn up to serve these three important goals.

Preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons

Articles I and II of the Treaty specifically seek to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons, thereby strengthening the security and well-being of all States. Under article I, the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty pledge not to transfer nuclear explosives to any other State, and not to assist, in any way, non-nuclear-weapon States in manufacturing or acquiring such devices. Under article II, more than 120 non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty have pledged not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear explosives, or to seek or receive assistance in the manufacture of nuclear explosives.

Article III obligates the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to accept safeguards, administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), on their peaceful nuclear activities. Such safeguards provide assurance that nuclear materials in non-nuclear-weapon States are not diverted from peaceful purposes to the manufacture of nuclear explosives, and their acceptance demonstrates a country's peaceful intentions. This overall fabric of non-proliferation assurances and safeguards in turn is an essential basis for peaceful nuclear co-operation among parties to the Treaty provided for under article IV.

Article I

The United States has not transferred nuclear weapons, nor assisted, encouraged or induced any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire a nuclear explosive device. United States law, policy, procedures and regulations are designed to ensure that the United States does not directly or indirectly assist any non-nuclear-weapon State in building or acquiring a nuclear device.
Steps have been taken in the years since the Treaty's entry into force to tighten controls over United States exports of a so-called dual-use nature that might be used for nuclear explosive purposes. These controls are to ensure that such exports are approved only for legitimate non-explosive uses in conformance with the United States obligation under article I.

Further, in December 1982, the United States ratified the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The Convention (a) provides for certain levels of physical protection during international shipment of nuclear materials; (b) establishes a general framework for co-operation among States in the recovery and return of stolen nuclear material; and (c) defines certain serious offences involving nuclear material for which States parties define punitive action.

The United States also has a long-standing policy of encouraging all countries to join the Treaty. In recent years, it has actively promoted additional adherence to the Treaty. Continued, increased adherence represents a concrete demonstration of the strength and continuing vitality of the Treaty régime.

**Article III**

Under article III, IAEA has developed an extensive system of safeguards to ensure that nuclear materials in non-nuclear-weapon States parties are used solely for non-explosive purposes. Since 1979, there has been a 40 per cent increase in the number of major facilities under safeguards, and about 800 nuclear installations are now subject to IAEA safeguards in these States parties.

This system has demonstrated its value and effectiveness through some 13 years of experience in support of the Treaty. By providing a high degree of confidence that nuclear materials are used only for peaceful purposes, the IAEA safeguards system provides an indispensable basis of confidence for nuclear co-operation.

In the United States view, safeguards implementation has been conducted in careful conformity with the requirements of article III.3, including the important objective of ensuring that safeguards do not hamper international co-operation or economic or technological development. IAEA safeguards have not led to undue interference in facility operation or compromised information protected as commercially confidential. Moreover, the cost of implementing safeguards is a very small percentage of the overall operating costs of nuclear facilities. A high level of co-operation between IAEA and the inspected State is a key to achieving effective safeguards while protecting these interests of the parties to the Treaty.

All Member States contribute to the IAEA safeguards budget, which accounts for more than one third of the total IAEA budget. Under a special safeguards financing formula, however, a small group of about 36 Member States contributes over 98 per cent of the safeguards budget; the nuclear-weapon States bear a substantial share of these expenses.

As of 31 December 1984, the safeguards agreements required by article III had been negotiated and had entered into force for 77 parties, including 11 agreements that had entered into force since 1979. Agreements with 7 additional parties are
awaiting entry into force. While more than 40 parties to the Treaty have yet to negotiate the required safeguards agreements to meet fully their Treaty obligations, none of these countries has significant nuclear activities.

For its part, the United States concluded a voluntary safeguards agreement with IAEA in 1980. Under this agreement, IAEA has the right to apply safeguards to all nuclear material in all United States nuclear facilities, excluding only those facilities associated with activities having direct national security significance. The list of eligible facilities provided to IAEA includes more than 230 private and government-owned nuclear facilities. By submitting United States facilities to IAEA safeguards, the United States has sought to encourage wider adherence to the Treaty by demonstrating that such adherence and acceptance of IAEA safeguards are not impediments to commercial nuclear transactions. At the same time, United States acceptance of IAEA safeguards on its civil nuclear facilities provides an opportunity for IAEA inspectors and United States officials to combine their experience and develop the means for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the safeguards system.

The United States has fully participated in the work of the NPT Exporters Committee, also called the Zangger Committee, to develop and apply a consistent interpretation of article III.2 of the Treaty in which parties agree not to provide source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material "especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material", unless safeguards are applied to the source or special fissionable material produced, processed or used in such equipment. The list of equipment and materials developed by the Committee has made an important contribution to assuring uniform rules for international nuclear trade. Inconsistent or inappropriate non-proliferation export controls would disrupt efforts to promote the objectives of NPT. The United States has consistently supported efforts to preserve and enhance the effectiveness of this system.

In an effort to provide further support for the comprehensive safeguards concept which is embodied in the Treaty, in July 1981, President Reagan urged all major nuclear suppliers to require acceptance of such safeguards on all peaceful nuclear activities in non-nuclear-weapon States as a condition of significant new nuclear supply commitments. The United States applies this condition to its own significant nuclear exports and has continued to try to persuade other nuclear suppliers to do so. We believe that acceptance of comprehensive safeguards by all non-nuclear-weapon States, preferably by adherence to the Treaty, would greatly strengthen the non-proliferation regime and reinforce the security of all States.

The United States has supported international efforts to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system, voluntarily contributing more than $41 million to IAEA for the development and procurement of new safeguards equipment. This support also includes technical experts loaned to the Agency without charge to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards.

**Article VII**

Article VII of the Treaty states that "Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories."
Pursuant to article VII, and in accord with its overall non-proliferation policy, the United States believes the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones, under appropriate conditions, can contribute to regional and global security. The United States supports the establishment of such zones where:

- The initiative for the creation of the zone comes from the States in the region concerned;
- All States whose participation is deemed important participate in the zone;
- The zone arrangement provides for adequate verification of compliance with the zone's provisions;
- The establishment of the zone does not disturb existing security arrangements to the detriment of regional and international security;
- The zone arrangement effectively prohibits its parties from developing any nuclear explosive device, for whatever purpose;
- The zone arrangement does not seek to impose restrictions on the exercise of rights recognized under international law, particularly the principle of freedom of navigation on the high seas, in international air space and in straits used for international navigation and the right of innocent passage through territorial seas;
- The establishment of a zone does not affect the existing rights of its parties under international law to grant or deny transit privileges, including port calls and overflight, to other States.

The Treaty of Tlatelolco, which establishes Latin America as a nuclear-weapon-free zone, is the only existing nuclear-weapon-free zone in a populated area. The United States has signed and ratified Protocols I and II to this Treaty. By taking this step, the United States has pledged not to store or deploy nuclear weapons in territories within the zone for which it is internationally responsible. It also has pledged not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against Latin American States for whom the Treaty is in effect, or to store, install or deploy nuclear weapons in the territory of any such State.

The United States takes very seriously and is in full compliance with its obligations under both Protocols. It has also encouraged all eligible States that have not yet done so to take steps needed to bring the Treaty fully into force.

The United States has consistently supported proposals to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in South Asia, Africa and the Middle East consistent with the criteria noted above.
Fostering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy

When the non-proliferation Treaty was concluded, there was a fundamental understanding that non-nuclear-weapon States that adhered to the Treaty would be able to pursue the benefits of the peaceful uses of the atom either alone or in co-operation with States already possessing nuclear technology. Article IV of the Treaty thus recognizes "the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty". At the same time, it commits all parties to "facilitate ... the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy". It further calls for the development of applications of peaceful nuclear energy, especially in non-nuclear-weapon States and with "due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world".

Article IV

Since the "Atoms for Peace" programme was launched by President Eisenhower in 1953, nuclear energy has made remarkable strides in contributing to an improved quality of life in many nations.

There are over 340 nuclear-power reactors in operation around the world (approximately 200 GW(e)). Nearly 200 additional nuclear-power plants (approximately 200 GW(e)) are under construction or have been firmly committed. Much of this commitment to nuclear power is centred in the industrialized world; but developing nations parties to the Treaty, such as the Republic of Korea and Yugoslavia, are producing electricity from nuclear-power reactors, while others, such as Egypt, Indonesia, Mexico, the Philippines and Romania are moving toward the use of nuclear power. In turn, dozens of developing countries parties to the Treaty now have research reactors or the beginnings of nuclear scientific establishments. Even more parties to the Treaty have begun to make effective use of radioisotopes and radiation in medicine, industry and agriculture.

The advent of the non-proliferation Treaty has enhanced this contribution and furthered international co-operation in the civil nuclear field. In particular, the non-proliferation assurances and safeguards provisions of the Treaty provide an indispensable basis for confidence that such assistance will not be misused.

As one of the original proponents of the non-proliferation Treaty, the United States has long recognized that adherence to the Treaty should facilitate international nuclear co-operation. Parties to the Treaty should receive special consideration and special benefits in international civil nuclear co-operation in a manner consistent with the overall objectives and spirit of the Treaty. That approach is reflected in the record of specific United States nuclear co-operation and assistance since the 1980 Review Conference, as well as in the broad policies guiding United States nuclear relationships with other countries.
United States co-operation: a Treaty preference

United States preferential treatment of parties to the Treaty has been clearly demonstrated since the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, held in 1980. In particular:

- Since that Conference, all new or amended Agreements for Co-operation with non-nuclear-weapon States entered into by the United States have been with parties to the non-proliferation Treaty or the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

These include long-term Agreements for Co-operation with:

Australia  
Bangladesh  
Colombia  
Egypt  
Finland*

In addition, United States nuclear co-operation with the following parties to the non-proliferation Treaty has continued to be provided for under Agreements for Co-operation concluded before the 1980 Review Conference:

Austria  
Belgium**  
Canada  
Denmark**  
Germany, Federal Republic of**  
Greece**  
Ireland**  
Italy**  
Jamaica***  
Japan  
Luxembourg**

Malaysia***  
Mexico***  
Netherlands**  
Philippines  
Portugal  
Republic of Korea  
Romania***  
Switzerland  
Thailand  
United Kingdom**  
Yugoslavia***

- In 1980-1984, all significant United States exports of enriched uranium (totalling over 12 million kg) were to parties to the Treaty, except for 928,000 kg to Spain, which has IAEA safeguards on its entire civil

* The United States-Finland Agreement for Co-operation has not yet entered into force, but has been signed and transmitted to Congress for review.

** Under the United States Agreement for Co-operation with the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM).

*** Under the United States Agreement for Co-operation with IAEA.
nuclear programme; 381,000 kg to France; and a final shipment of 19,000 kg under a pre-Treaty commitment to India. Exports to parties to the Treaty in this period represented a 15 per cent increase over the corresponding figure for the preceding five years; had an energy equivalent value of some 3.45 billion barrels of oil; and required the energy equivalent of some 38 million tons of United States coal to enrich.

In 1980-1984, all nuclear export financing arrangements provided by the United States Export-Import Bank (totalling well over $1 billion) were for the benefit of parties to the Treaty, except for $61 million for Spain, which has IAEA safeguards on its entire civil nuclear programme.

These arrangements include those made with:

Greece  Republic of Korea
Indonesia  Romania
Philippines  Yugoslavia

The Export-Import Bank has indicated that it will be prepared to help finance proposed United States nuclear exports to Egypt.

Cumulative loans and guarantees extended by the Bank since 1970 to States parties to the Treaty total $7.5 billion.

Since 1980, all United States exports of research reactors have been to developing countries parties to the Treaty. These have included reactors (valued at $6.3 million) sold to:

Bangladesh
Malaysia
Morocco

In addition, the United States has previously furnished 59 research reactors to 28 other States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty.

Since 1980, all "sister laboratory" and "joint committee" arrangements concluded by the United States in the nuclear field have been with parties to the non-proliferation Treaty or the Treaty of Tlatelolco or both, including the following:

Colombia  Mexico
Egypt  Republic of Korea
Greece  Thailand

Since the 1980 Review Conference, 98 per cent (in value) of United States exports of drugs containing radioactive isotopes for use in internal medicine have been exported to parties to the non-proliferation Treaty, who have also received over $22 million worth of isotopes, heavy water and other nuclear-related materials from the United States.
96 per cent of all Type II Fellowships granted by the United States under IAEA in 1981-1984 (totalling approximately $6.7 million) have been for parties to the Treaty, including the following:

- Bangladesh
- Paraguay
- Cyprus
- Peru
- Ecuador
- Philippines
- Egypt
- Portugal
- El Salvador
- Republic of Korea
- Ethiopia
- Sri Lanka
- Ghana
- Sudan
- Greece
- Thailand
- Kenya
- Turkey
- Malaysia
- Uruguay
- Philippines
- Yugoslavia

Since the inception of Type II fellowships, the United States has allocated 932 such fellowships to nationals of 59 States parties to the Treaty, costing the United States approximately $20 million. The vast majority have gone to developing countries.

Since the 1980 Review Conference, all of the IAEA "Footnote A" technical assistance projects funded by extrabudgetary contributions by the United States have been for developing countries that are parties to the Treaty. These have included projects in:

- Bangladesh
- Peru
- Bolivia
- Philippines
- Ecuador
- Portugal
- Egypt
- Romania
- Ghana
- Senegal
- Greece
- Sudan
- Guatemala
- Thailand
- Indonesia
- Tunisia
- Kenya
- Turkey
- Malaysia
- Uruguay
- Mali
- Venezuela
- Mexico
- Yugoslavia
- Morocco
- Zaire
- Panama

In the period 1980-1984, these included 111 projects involving over 300 man-months of effort by experts and more than $4.5 million for equipment. They included projects in agricultural, medical and industrial applications; nuclear physics; chemistry and engineering; prospecting and mining; nuclear plant safety; and general atomic energy development. This programme is also directed to the needs of the developing world.
Since the 1980 Review Conference, all recipients of the annual United States gifts of special nuclear material to IAEA have been parties to the Treaty. A total of over $600,000 has been given to IAEA for designated parties to the Treaty since 1970. These countries include:

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The United States pledged to the IAEA Technical Assistance Programme a total of $21.8 million in 1980-1984, as well as assistance in kind (amounting to some $8.7 million in that time period, including the Type II fellowships) and extrabudgetary funds (amounting to $10.4 million in that period, including the Footnote A projects). Developing countries parties to the Treaty have been the prime beneficiaries of the over $41 million of voluntary United States technical assistance.

Parties to the Treaty have also been the primary beneficiaries of other efforts to share United States nuclear technology, expertise, and experience in this period, including:

- Ph.D. training from 1979-1983 of over 1,400 nationals from other countries parties to the Treaty in nuclear physics, nuclear chemistry and nuclear engineering;

- Participation, since the 1980 Review Conference, of an estimated 700 to 750 foreign students from 55 different IAEA member States, most of which were parties to the Treaty in the Nuclear Power Course run by the Argonne National Laboratory for IAEA;

- Certification, in the period 1981-1984, of 78 medical doctors from countries parties to the Treaty, from all regions of the world, in nuclear medicine by the American Board of Nuclear Medicine; attendance by others at the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)/IAEA special training course on the use of radioisotopes and radiation in entomology; and training for still others in non-power applications at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory;

- Provision to the IAEA International Nuclear Information System of approximately 100,000 abstracts, spanning the full range of peaceful nuclear technology.

/...
Since 1974, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission has entered into or renewed regulatory and safety research arrangements with the following parties to the Treaty:

- Belgium
- Denmark
- Egypt
- Finland
- Germany, Federal Republic of
- Greece
- Italy
- Japan
- Mexico
- Netherlands
- Philippines
- Republic of Korea
- Sweden
- Switzerland
- United Kingdom
- Philippines
- Republic of Korea
- Sweden
- Switzerland
- United Kingdom

and has such arrangements under active negotiation with Yugoslavia.

In the same period, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has entered into or renewed general research agreements or special projects with the following parties to the Treaty: Belgium, Canada, Finland, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Republic of Korea, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, as well as with EURATOM.

Preference in policy and law

Increased United States preference for parties to the Treaty since the Treaty first came into effect in 1970 also is dramatically reflected in United States policy, law, regulations and, most importantly, in practice.

The United States Atomic Energy Act, as amended by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, now limits exports of fissionable materials, reactors and major reactor components to those non-nuclear-weapon States that have all of their peaceful nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards. Nations that adhere to the Treaty clearly meet this criterion. As a consequence, the United States has not denied a single licence for the export of enriched uranium for power reactors to any party to the Treaty. On the other hand, the United States has cut off supplies of enriched uranium fuel to nations that are not parties to the Treaty or under "full-scope" safeguards.

All new or amended Agreements for Co-operation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy entered into by the United States with non-nuclear-weapon States in recent years have been with nations that are parties to the non-proliferation Treaty or the Treaty of Tlateloico, or both. United States law precludes entering into such new or amended agreements with non-nuclear-weapon States that do not accept full-scope safeguards.

To provide greater assurances of supply, the ceilings on low enriched uranium transfers under United States Agreements for Co-operation have been removed by statute for parties to the non-proliferation Treaty (but not non-parties). This permits the supply of additional power reactor fuel to parties to the Treaty in keeping with the view that nations possessing credible non-proliferation credentials should enjoy assurances of reliable fuel supply.
In the crucial area of financing, the United States Export-Import Bank has shown a marked preference for parties to the Treaty in granting credits and guarantees for nuclear exports, and United States laws governing participation in international financial institutions instruct the United States representatives to consider, in carrying out their duties, whether the recipient is a party to the Treaty.

Special preferences in the licensing of nuclear-related exports have been made for parties to the Treaty and other States having IAEA safeguards on their entire civil nuclear programmes:

- Expedited procedures are provided for the export to such countries of so-called nuclear-related "dual use" equipment (such as computers) and technology, and of types of nuclear components that do not require an Agreement for Co-operation;

- Only such non-nuclear-weapon States have been designated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as subject to the general licence for the export of nuclear reactor components (thus eliminating the need for separate licensing of components procured at different times);

- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has implemented revised general licences for the export of nuclear material which have more restrictive provisions with respect to non-parties to the Treaty.

Since 1982, special case-by-case consideration has been required under United States regulations to authorize United States persons or firms to engage in activities involving the transfer of unpublished, unclassified nuclear technology and know-how to non-parties to the Treaty that do not have IAEA safeguards on their entire civil nuclear programme; by contrast, most parties to the Treaty and States that have such full-scope safeguards have the benefit of a general authorization that permits such technology transfer activities in a wide variety of fields ranging from mining, milling and fuel fabrication to reactor design, construction, and operation. This regulatory aspect of United States policy is regarded as of particular importance since, under the United States system, private industry assumes much of the responsibility for transferring technology and engaging in co-operative activities with organizations in foreign countries.

This record reflects the continued strong United States commitment to fulfilling its obligations under article IV of the non-proliferation Treaty. That record is consonant with the spirit and vision of the Treaty that parties to it should obtain advantages not available to non-parties.

**Article V**

Article V of the non-proliferation Treaty ensures that should there be any benefits from peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs), these benefits will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States on a non-discriminatory basis.
The United States has not conducted any PNE experiments since 1970, and has not had an active PNE research and development programme since the mid-1970s. It is the view of the United States that the technology of PNEs is indistinguishable from that of nuclear weapons. In addition, the problems associated with potential applications of PNEs continues to outweigh their possible benefits. The United States has not realized any benefits from PNEs and has not provided any such benefits pursuant to article V.

Pursuit of effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear-arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament

From the earliest days of the post-war era, the United States has joined the search for ways to neutralize the threat of the non-peaceful uses of the atom and safeguard world peace. The prevention of nuclear war has been the most critical of concerns. As President Reagan has stated, "In today's world the existence of nuclear weapons could mean, if not the extinction of mankind, then surely the end of civilization as we know it."

The United States remains committed to the goal of deep reductions of nuclear weapons, with a view to their eventual elimination. In our view, the means of achieving that goal is the negotiation and effective implementation of concrete verifiable agreements. Only in such agreements can we achieve precision regarding undertakings, equality or equivalency of forces and effective verifiability, which are necessary if these agreements are to increase international security and stability. The issues are complex and the stakes high, but we are ready to make the commitments necessary to produce such measures.

Article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty obligates all Treaty parties "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear-arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control". Article VI complements the obligations with respect to horizontal proliferation assumed by the parties under articles I and II by addressing the problem of vertical proliferation.

Consistent with article VI, the United States since the last Review Conference has undertaken good faith negotiations in pursuit of effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and to nuclear disarmament. These are summarized below.

I. Nuclear arms control negotiations and United States proposals

November 1981

- President Reagan offered to forgo deployment of the United States Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missile if the Soviets would eliminate their SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles (the "zero/zero" outcome). Intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) negotiations with the Soviets began in Geneva on 30 November. The first round of talks ended 16 March 1982.
President Reagan proposed the opening of Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) in early 1982 with a goal of major reductions in all types of nuclear arms.

February 1982 - The United States tabled a draft INF Treaty in Geneva which embodied President Reagan's "zero/zero" proposal.

May 1982

- The second round of INF negotiations began in Geneva on 20 May. The round ended on 20 July.

- President Reagan again called for Strategic Arms Reduction Talks and proposed a first-phase cut of approximately one third in strategic ballistic missile warheads for both the Soviet Union and the United States. Under the terms of the proposal, each side would have no more than 5,000 ballistic missile warheads, of which no more than half could be on landbased intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). In a second phase, the sides would reduce the total throw-weight of their ballistic missile forces below the then current United States level. The President further indicated that no aspect of the problem would be excluded from consideration, and that the United States would negotiate in good faith on any topics the Soviets wished to raise.

June 1982 - START negotiations with the Soviets began in Geneva on 29 June. The United States indicated its willingness to accept equal levels of heavy bombers, including the Soviet Backfire bomber, in the context of agreements that included significant reduction in Soviet missile forces. The first round of talks ended on 12 August.

September 1982 - The third round of INF negotiations began in Geneva on 30 September and ended on 30 November.

October 1982 - The second round of START negotiations began in Geneva on 6 October and ended on 2 December.

January 1983 - The fourth round of INF negotiations began in Geneva on 27 January. In March, the United States tabled a proposal for an interim agreement establishing equal global levels of United States and Soviet longer-range INF missile warheads at the lowest mutually acceptable level. The round ended on 29 March.

February 1983 - A third round of START talks began in Geneva on 2 February and ended on 31 March.

May 1983 - At the fifth round of INF negotiations, which began in Geneva on 17 May, the United States tabled a draft Treaty incorporating its interim agreement proposal and proposed a series of equal warhead levels between 50 and 450. The United States indicated that it would consider any level of interest to the Soviets. The round ended on 14 July.
June 1983 - In preparation for the fourth round of the START talks, which began in Geneva on 8 June, President Reagan directed that new steps towards progress be taken in the strategic arms negotiations in order to adjust the United States START position to bring it into line with the recommendations of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces (Scowcroft Commission) and to provide additional flexibility to United States negotiators to explore areas of common ground with the Soviets.

The United States tabled a draft Treaty which:

- Relaxed its proposal for reductions to an 850 deployed ballistic missile limit;
- Indicated flexibility through a willingness to explore all appropriate avenues for achieving reductions in ballistic missile throw-weight;
- Combined the originally proposed two-phased agreement into one and placed all categories of strategic weapons on the table to be negotiated in a single agreement;
- Called for equal limits, below the levels set by SALT II, on the number of heavy bombers and the number of air-launched cruise missiles allowed on each bomber.

The fourth round ended on 2 August.

September 1983 - The sixth round of INF negotiations began in Geneva on 27 September. In the context of reaching an agreement providing for equal global limits on longer-range INF missile warheads, the United States proposed to:

- Consider a commitment not to offset the entire Soviet global longer-range INF missile deployment by United States Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missile deployments in Europe. The United States would retain the right, however, to deploy elsewhere to reach this global ceiling;
- Be prepared to apportion reductions of both Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles appropriately;
- Consider proposals involving limits on specific types of United States and Soviet land-based INF aircraft.

October 1983 - The fifth round of START talks began in Geneva on 5 October and ended on 8 December. President Reagan announced just prior to the round another United States START initiative, which provided for:

- Trade-offs between areas of United States advantage and areas of Soviet advantage;
A mutual guaranteed build-down of ballistic missile warheads by either 5 per cent per year or by deeper reductions linked to modernization in a way designed to improve stability;

A concurrent build-down of bombers.

November 1983 - The United States proposed a global limit of 420 longer-range INF missile warheads on each side, corresponding to the approximately 420 warhead limit the Soviets proposed for themselves in Europe, while indicating readiness to discuss other equal global ceilings. The negotiations were suspended on 23 November.

September 1984

At the General Assembly of the United Nations, President Reagan called for an overall arms control framework, or umbrella approach to nuclear negotiations to facilitate their progress. He pledged "redoubled efforts to meet the legitimate expectations of all nations" for substantial reductions in United States and Soviet nuclear arsenals.

At the same time, President Reagan also proposed an exchange of visits to allow Soviet experts to come to the United States nuclear test site and United States experts to go to a Soviet nuclear test site to measure directly the yields of nuclear weapons tests. The objective would be to establish the basis for verification for effective limits on underground nuclear testing.

November 1984 - The United States and the Soviet Union agreed to begin new negotiations on the full range of issues concerning nuclear forces, including strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons, and defensive and space arms.

January 1985 - The United States and the Soviet Union met in Geneva and agreed on the subject and objectives of these new negotiations. The two sides issued the following Joint Communiqué at the conclusion of this meeting:

"As previously agreed, a meeting was held on January 7 and 8, 1985, in Geneva between George P. Schultz, the US Secretary of State, and Andrei A. Gromyko, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U., first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

"During the meeting, they discussed the subject and objectives of the forthcoming US-Soviet negotiations on nuclear and space arms. The sides agree that the subject of the negotiations will be a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms, both strategic and intermediate range, with all the questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship. The objective of the negotiations will be to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms and at strengthening strategic stability."
"The negotiations will be conducted by a delegation from each side, divided into three groups. The sides believe that ultimately the forthcoming negotiations, just as efforts in general to limit and reduce arms, should lead to the complete elimination of nuclear arms everywhere.

"The date of beginning of the new negotiations and the site of these negotiations will be agreed through diplomatic channels within one month."

March 1985 - The first round of new United States-Soviet negotiations concerning the full range of nuclear force issues began in Geneva on 12 March and ended on 23 April.

May 1985 - The second round of the new talks began on 30 May and ended on 16 July.

II. Confidence-building measures, proposals and agreements

June 1982 - President Reagan proposed confidence-building measures to reduce the risk of nuclear war by accident or miscalculation, including measures for advance notification of test launches for all intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and longer-range INF ground-launched ballistic missiles, prior notification of major military exercises and an expanded exchange of information about nuclear forces.

May 1983 - President Reagan endorsed four confidence-building measures to:

- Improve the "hot line" between the United States and the USSR;
- Create the bilateral Joint Military Communications link between the United States National Military Command Center and its Soviet counterpart;
- Establish improved links between each of the two Governments and their embassies in each other's capitals;
- Facilitate consultations in the event that unauthorized individuals or groups acquire, use, or threaten to use nuclear explosive devices.

August 1983 - The United States and the USSR held preliminary discussions in Moscow pertaining to confidence-building measures related to communications.

January 1984

- The United States and the USSR held a second meeting in Washington, during which substantive agreement was reached on technical aspects of the hot line upgrade.
- The United States, in conjunction with NATO Allies, developed a package of proposed confidence- and security-building measures designed to reduce the risk of war, alleviate tensions and enhance stability in Europe.

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April 1984 - The United States and the USSR held a third meeting on the hot line upgrade in Moscow.

June 1984 - President Reagan offered to enter into discussions on the Soviet proposals in the Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) on non-use of force if the Soviets would negotiate on measures to give concrete meaning to that principle.

July 1984 - The United States and the USSR reached agreement on improving the hot line to include addition of a high-speed facsimile capability which will permit transmission of more complex data, including full pages of text, maps and graphs.

May 1985 - President Reagan at Strasbourg introduced a four-part proposal for reducing military tensions:

- The United States and the Soviet Union should exchange observers at military exercises and locations.

- The United States and the Soviet Union should institute high-level contacts between military leaders to develop better understanding and prevent potential tragedies from occurring.

- CDE should act promptly and agree on the concrete confidence-building measures proposed by NATO countries. The President reiterated United States preparedness to discuss the Soviet proposal on non-use of force in the context of Soviet agreement to concrete confidence-building measures.

- A permanent military-to-military communications link should be established to exchange notifications and other information regarding routine military activities, which could evolve into a "risk reduction" mechanism in times of crisis.

III. Other arms control measures

November 1981 - Additional Protocol I to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America was ratified by the United States. Under the terms of the Protocol, the United States agreed to apply the denuclearization provisions of the Treaty to those territories for which the United States is internationally responsible in the Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone.

May 1982 - President Reagan announced that the United States would refrain from actions which undercut existing strategic arms agreements as long as the Soviets showed equal restraint.

October 1983 - Outside the INF negotiations, NATO announced its intention to reduce the alliance's nuclear stockpile by an additional 1,400 warheads beyond the 1,000 removed in 1980 in conjunction with the NATO decision on INF.
April 1984

- At the Conference on Disarmament, the United States presented a complete text of a treaty which would comprehensively ban chemical weapons and provide for the internationally monitored destruction of declared existing stocks and facilities. The United States text also contained ground-breaking, mandatory inspection provisions.

- In the mutual and balanced force reduction negotiations, the West put forward a new proposal to break the deadlock on data.

June 1985 - President Reagan announced that the United States would continue to refrain from undercutting existing strategic arms agreements to the extent that the Soviet Union exercised comparable restraint, and provided that the Soviet Union actively pursued arms reduction agreements in the ongoing Geneva talks. The United States has implemented this policy by fully dismantling eight Polaris nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and some Titan ICBMs as new Trident SSBNs have been deployed. And as President Reagan announced, the United States will deactivate and dismantle an existing Poseidon SSBN according to agreed procedures when a new Trident submarine begins sea trials later this year.
AGENDA

1. Opening of the Conference by the Chairman of the third session of the Preparatory Committee.

2. Election of the President.


5. Election of Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the Main Committees, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee.

6. Election of Vice Presidents.

7. Credentials of representatives to the Conference.
   (a) Appointment of the Credentials Committee.
   (b) Report of the Credentials Committee.

8. Confirmation of the nomination of the Secretary-General.

9. Adoption of the Agenda.


11. Adoption of arrangements for meeting the costs of the Conference.


13. Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its Article VIII (3);

   A. Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament and international peace and security:

   (1) Articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1-3.

   (2) Article VI and preambular paragraphs 8-12.

   (3) Article VII with specific reference to the main issues in A and B.

GE.85-64155
B. Security assurances:
   (1) Resolution 255 (1968) of the United Nations Security Council
   (2) Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

C. Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones;
   (1) Articles III and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5, especially in their relationship to Article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7.
   (2) Articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1-3 in their relationship to Articles III and IV.
   (3) Article VII.

D. Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to peaceful applications of nuclear energy:
   (1) Article III (3) and IV, preambular paragraphs 6 and 7, especially in their relationship to Article III (1, 2, 4) and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5 as well as to Articles I and II.
   (2) Article V.

E. Other provisions of the Treaty.

14. Role of the Treaty in the promotion of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and of nuclear disarmament and in strengthening international peace and security;
   A. Acceptance of the Treaty by States.
   B. Measures aimed at promoting a wider acceptance of the Treaty.

15. Reports of the main Committees.

16. Other questions.

17. Preparation and Adoption of Final Document.
The information below is provided at the request of the Preparatory Committee for the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to the nuclear-weapon States and other parties to the Treaty to provide, prior to the Conference, "information relevant to the implementation of various articles of the Treaty, including especially article VI".

The information covers the period between the Second and Third Review Conferences.

**Articles I and II**

Between the Second and Third NPT Review Conferences, the USSR pursued its consistent efforts to prevent the emergence of new nuclear-weapon States and, with this aim in mind, to strengthen in every way the international régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Preventing the spread of these weapons of mass destruction over the planet is a central aspect of the struggle for the elimination of the threat of nuclear war, the limitation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, as well as a major factor in maintaining strategic stability at the regional and global levels.

As a nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty, the USSR has strictly complied with its obligation under article I of the Treaty not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; nor has the USSR in any way assisted, encouraged, or induced any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.
The USSR has proceeded on the principle that strict compliance with article II, as well as with article I, of the Treaty is one of the major means of preventing the emergence of new nuclear-weapon States. In its relations with other States Parties to the Treaty, the USSR has constantly emphasized the importance of complying with obligations under article II.

Article III

In accordance with its obligations under article III of the Treaty, the USSR has continued to provide nuclear materials and equipment to non-nuclear-weapon States for peaceful purposes on condition of their being subject to IAEA safeguards.

On 13 January 1982, the Council of Ministers of the USSR approved "Regulations concerning exports of nuclear materials, technology and equipment, facilities, special non-nuclear materials and services" which govern such exports from the Soviet Union. The Regulations are based on the obligations deriving from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as well as on other international treaties, agreements and accords relating to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Together with other nuclear-exporting States, the USSR has continued efforts to extend the inventory of nuclear materials and equipment whose export requires the application of IAEA safeguards under Article III. It has also continued to advocate that the nuclear-exporting countries should agree on the principle of IAEA safeguards being applied to all nuclear activities of non-nuclear countries not Parties to the Treaty whenever such countries receive nuclear exports.

The USSR has made every effort to increase the effectiveness of the system of IAEA safeguards provided for under article III of the Treaty, making sure that in its practical activities connected with the application of the safeguards the Agency continued to respect the sovereign rights of States and did not impede their economic, scientific or technical development or international co-operation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

In order to accommodate the wishes of non-nuclear States, the USSR has, as an act of good will, placed part of its peaceful nuclear activities under IAEA control. The Safeguards Agreement with IAEA, which entered into force on 10 June 1985, is based on the Agency's model agreement with States Parties to the Treaty and takes into account the nuclear-Power status of the USSR. IAEA has begun carrying out practical inspections in the USSR.

The Soviet Union has regarded the strengthening and expansion of IAEA monitoring activities as a reliable means at the disposal of the international community for preventing the diversion of fissionable materials for military purposes.

The Soviet Union has provided extensive support for the technical development of the IAEA safeguards. Over the past 10 years, the USSR has completed more than 30 research contracts related to safeguards. Research related to safeguards is being conducted in more than 15 leading research institutes. In 1984, 500 kg of heavy water were supplied to the Agency free of charge for the purpose of developing inspection techniques. Every year the USSR conducts courses for IAEA inspectors.
and national accounting and control system personnel, holds technical meetings on matters relating to safeguards and organizes study tours. By way of expanding its assistance to IAEA, in 1983-1985 the Soviet Union allocated some 2.5 million roubles to the programme of work on the development of safeguards and to training activities in Soviet territory.

The USSR took an active part in drafting the international Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and became one of the Convention's first signatories, ratifying it in May 1983. The Soviet Union has sought the Convention's early entry into force and, to that end, has urged signatory States to ratify it.

**Article IV**

The USSR has continued to proceed on the basis of the principle that, by promoting greater trust and co-operation among States, the Treaty and, in particular, its article IV provide favourable opportunities for broad international co-operation in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy with due consideration for the needs of the developing countries.

The USSR has advocated universal recognition of the inalienable right of all States to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and to participate, on an equal footing, in international co-operation in this field without discrimination and in accordance with articles I and II of the Treaty. It has consistently worked towards expanding such co-operation in every way and, for its part, has contributed significantly towards its development both on a bilateral and on a multilateral basis, *inter alia* within the framework of IAEA.

The Soviet Union's participation in international co-operation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy has included:

- Assistance in the construction of nuclear power stations and nuclear research centres and facilities, including the supply of complete sets of equipment and turnkey construction. In the past five years, the USSR has delivered and brought into operation seven power-generating reactors with a total capacity of 3,080 MW, and 22 reactors with a total capacity of 11,360 MW are under construction;
- Deliveries of nuclear materials and provision of services relating to uranium enrichment for nuclear power stations and research reactors;
- Joint development and co-operation in the manufacture of nuclear power equipment;
- Joint research and development activities;
- Training of national personnel. More than 2,000 foreign experts specializing in the operation of nuclear power stations were trained in the USSR between 1980 and 1984;
- Provision of Soviet experts to give technical assistance;
Delivery of nuclear equipment and instruments for use in national economies and for research purposes;

Publication of a large number of scientific and technical magazines and books on nuclear science and technology;

Opportunities for foreign specialists to acquaint themselves with the achievements of nuclear science and technology in the Soviet Union.

The USSR has never for political reasons refused to negotiate with any country party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons with a view to concluding a science and technology agreement or commercial contract. Nor has there been a single case in which the Soviet Union has, for such reasons, discontinued or delayed deliveries of nuclear materials or equipment or infringed the terms of agreements or contracts previously concluded by it.

The Soviet Union's recognition of the great importance of IAEA activities in the technical co-operation field is reflected in the constant increases in its voluntary contributions to the technical assistance fund, which generally exceed the figures recommended by the IAEA Secretariat. From 1980 to 1985, the annual contribution of the USSR (including the Ukrainian SSR and Byelorussian SSR) rose from 1,075,000 to 2,605,000 roubles, i.e. an increase of almost two and a half times.

The USSR has advocated reaching agreement on measures designed to expand privileges and advantages for developing countries parties to the Treaty with regard to technical assistance in the nuclear field, inter alia through the mechanism existing within IAEA. In 1984-1985, the USSR allocated 1 million roubles for technical assistance through IAEA to countries parties to the Treaty.

The USSR has proposed the establishment of a most-favoured-nation régime for developing States Parties to the Treaty. Such a régime could include an international system of assured nuclear supplies based on rules agreed in the IAEA Committee on Assurances of Supply. The USSR has taken an active part in the work of that Committee and in preparations for the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy.

The USSR delegation will circulate among participants in the Review Conference a booklet entitled "Activities of the Soviet Union in Promoting Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy".

Article V

As a nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty, the USSR has been prepared, as in the past, to discharge its obligations under article V as regards taking appropriate measures to ensure that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions should be made available to all non-nuclear-weapon States. In that connection, it has proceeded on the principle that the international body through which services related to such explosions would be supplied is IAEA.
The USSR has advocated that the Agency should continue its work on the study of problems connected with the supply of services in conducting peaceful nuclear explosions. It is ready to participate in the work of the IAEA Special Consultative Group on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions should the Group's meetings be resumed at the request of member States.

The USSR has continued to proceed from the premise that all nuclear explosive devices have common technical characteristics and could be used as nuclear weapons. In this connection, the "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests" submitted by the Soviet Union in the United Nations in 1982 contained a provision to the effect that the parties to the treaty should declare a moratorium on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and should accordingly refrain from causing, encouraging or in any way participating in carrying out such explosions until the relevant procedures had been worked out.

On the same occasion, the USSR proposed that all nuclear-weapon States should declare a moratorium on conducting any nuclear explosions, including nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, until the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. The moratorium on all nuclear explosions declared by the Soviet Union as from 6 August 1985 also extends to explosions for peaceful purposes.

**Article VI**

The Soviet Union continued to devote close attention to the implementation of article VI of the Treaty and of its tenth preambular paragraph which, respectively, contain an undertaking "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control" and recall the determination "to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end". For its part, it has done everything necessary to achieve the above-mentioned ends.

The Soviet Union regards the cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests as a measure of the highest priority in this field. On the eve of the Second Review Conference, the Soviet Union, together with the United States of America and the United Kingdom, submitted information on the progress of the trilateral negotiations on that subject which had been proceeding since 1977. In the information, the negotiating parties noted that they had come far in their pursuit of a treaty and were determined to exert their best efforts and necessary will and persistence to bring the negotiations to an early and successful conclusion.

Another round of the trilateral negotiations took place after the conclusion of the Second Review Conference in October-November 1980. However, through no fault of the USSR, it proved to be the last. In the ensuing years, the USSR repeatedly proposed the resumption of the trilateral negotiations. That proposal is still valid today. Furthermore, in the period following the Second Review Conference, the USSR repeatedly proposed the ratification and entry into force of the Soviet-United States treaties on the limitation of underground nuclear-weapon tests and on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, signed, respectively, in 1974 and 1976.
In 1982, guided by a desire to give a new impetus to the search for a radical solution to the problem, the USSR took the initiative of proposing that an item entitled "Immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests" should be included in the agenda for the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly and submitted a document containing "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests". The document took account of everything achieved in the course of many years of discussion in various forums of the problem of banning nuclear-weapon tests and also reflected additional views of many States, in particular on questions of verification. At the same time, the USSR proposed that all nuclear-weapon States should declare an moratorium on nuclear explosions of any kind pending the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and that the Committee (Conference) on Disarmament should, as a matter of priority, embark on practical negotiations with a view to drafting the treaty. The USSR has consistently advocated and still advocates an early start to such talks and the establishment for that purpose of a special body of the Conference with an appropriate mandate. In April 1985, the Soviet Union announced its agreement that the moratorium on all nuclear explosions should take effect on 6 August 1985, the fortieth anniversary of the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima, or even earlier.

The Soviet Union also took the next step by deciding to discontinue all nuclear explosions unilaterally starting on 6 August 1985. The moratorium has been declared until 1 January 1986, but it will remain in force beyond that date if the United States of America refrains from conducting nuclear explosions. A joint USSR and United States of America moratorium on nuclear explosions would serve as a good example to other nuclear Powers as well.

The USSR took this initiative in an endeavour to put an end to dangerous rivalry in the expansion of nuclear arsenals. It proceeded on the principle that the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests would be an effective step which would radically slow down the development of new kinds and types of such weapons and the improvement of existing nuclear-weapon systems and would lead to the elimination of existing stockpiles.

The USSR believes that an important step towards preventing nuclear war and curbing the nuclear arms race would be a nuclear-weapon freeze by all nuclear-weapon States and above all by the USSR and the United States of America.

In June 1983 the Soviet Union addressed a proposal to the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France and China to the effect that all the nuclear Powers should simultaneously freeze all the nuclear weapons in their possession. A resolution urging all nuclear-weapon States to agree to a freeze under appropriate control, both quantitative and qualitative, on all nuclear weapons in their possession was adopted at the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly at the Soviet Union's initiative. A similar resolution based on a draft submitted by the USSR and other socialist countries was adopted at the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly.

Considering a nuclear-weapon freeze to be not an end in itself but a first step towards the reduction of nuclear weapons and ultimately their complete elimination, the USSR has taken a number of steps towards that end since the Second Review Conference.
At the second special session of the General Assembly in 1982, the Soviet Union put forward a proposal for the elaboration, adoption and stage-by-stage implementation of a programme of nuclear disarmament which would include the cessation of the development of new nuclear-weapon systems, the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for the purpose of manufacturing nuclear weapons, the cessation of the production of all types of nuclear munitions and their delivery vehicles, the gradual reduction of accumulated stockpiles of nuclear weapons, including their delivery vehicles, and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. In the Soviet Union's view, such a programme could be elaborated by the Conference on Disarmament in the course of concrete negotiations under item 2 of its agenda, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". The USSR has repeatedly proposed that a start should be made on such negotiations and that a special committee of the Conference should be set up for the purpose of conducting them.

The USSR greatly appreciated the initiatives taken by the Heads of State and Government of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Tanzania and Sweden calling for the complete cessation of the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems and for the prevention of an arms race in space.

In the last few years the Soviet Union has repeatedly drawn the attention of other States to the fact that the spread of the arms race to outer space and, in particular, the development of space strike weapons could render the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons very difficult, if not impossible and add a highly dangerous dimension to the arms race in general. After the Second Review Conference the USSR put forward a series of proposals aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space.

At the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly in 1981, it submitted a draft treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space. The proposal was developed further in a draft treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth, submitted by the USSR at the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly in 1983, an important feature of which was its combination of political and legal obligations for States not to permit the use of force against one another in and from outer space with measures of a material nature designed to prevent the militarization of outer space. At the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly in 1984, the USSR came forward with an initiative on "The use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes, for the benefit of mankind". The object of this step was to provide a radical solution to the problem of preventing the militarization of outer space and, on that basis, ensuring its peaceful exploration and utilization, with the eventual creation of a world organization on the use of outer space for the benefit of mankind. In particular, it was proposed that the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth, as well as from the Earth against objects in outer space, should be banned and that agreement should be reached on the prohibition and the elimination of space strike weapons.

Since 1982 the USSR has advocated that concrete negotiations on the prevention of an arms race in outer space should be started at the Conference on Disarmament within the framework of an appropriate special committee.
As in the past, the Soviet Union continues to believe that, since the USSR and the United States of America possess the largest nuclear arsenals and in view of their successes in the exploration of outer space, the holding of bilateral negotiations between those countries on a number of key areas of arms limitation would indisputably be of benefit to the cause of curbing the arms race. The Second Review Conference was followed by Soviet-United States talks on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe (in 1981) and on the limitation and reduction of strategic weapons (in 1982). At those talks, the USSR sought radical reductions in corresponding weapons on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security. However, the talks broke down as a result of the implementation of the well-known programmes for the deployment in Europe of medium-range nuclear weapons targeted on the USSR. Nevertheless, the USSR did not abandon the search for ways of resuming the dialogue on disarmament, and in March 1985, on its initiative, new negotiations were started on the full range of questions concerning nuclear and space weapons.

The basis for holding these negotiations was formulated in the joint Soviet-United States communique of 8 January 1985. This text expresses the parties' agreement that the subject of the negotiations should be a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms - strategic and medium-range - with all those questions to be considered and resolved in their interrelationship. The objective of the negotiations was defined as working out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms and at strengthening strategic stability. Ultimately the forthcoming negotiations, like efforts in general to limit and reduce arms, should lead to the complete elimination of nuclear arms everywhere.

At the negotiations, which began on 12 March 1985, the Soviet side proposed an extensive and concrete programme of measures aimed at reaching those objectives.

On the key issue of the talks, that of space weapons, the USSR proposed that agreement should be reached on a complete ban on the development (including research activities), testing and deployment of space strike weapons. The USSR also proposed that both sides should cease all work on the development of new anti-satellite weapons and that anti-satellite systems already in the United States' and the USSR's possession, including those whose testing has not been completed, should be destroyed.

With regard to strategic offensive weapons, the USSR proposed, in the context of a complete ban on space strike weapons and in the light of any solution reached in the matter of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe, that strategic systems should be drastically reduced in terms of the number of both delivery vehicles and nuclear weapons on those vehicles and that programmes for the development and deployment of new strategic weapons (long-range cruise missiles, new types of ICBMs, new types of SLBMs, new heavy bombers) should be abandoned at the same time.

The USSR proposed that agreement should be reached on the withdrawal of new United States missiles from Europe and on a drastic reduction in Soviet medium-range missiles in the European area down to a level which, in terms of warheads, would at no time exceed the corresponding nuclear-missile arsenal of the United Kingdom and France. A reduction of that arsenal would be accompanied by a
cut in the number of Soviet medium-range missiles. The USSR remains ready for a still more radical solution to the problem - that of ridding Europe completely of nuclear weapons, both medium-range and tactical.

With a view to establishing appropriate conditions for effective agreement on the full range of problems under discussion, the USSR proposed that a moratorium on nuclear and space weapons should be declared for the whole period of the negotiations. Since April 1985 the Soviet Union has unilaterally suspended the deployment of medium-range missiles and the implementation of other counter-measures in Europe. In addition, the unilateral Soviet moratorium on the first placing of anti-satellite weapons in outer space has been in operation since August 1983.

Besides proposals for the limitation, reduction and elimination of material means of nuclear warfare, the USSR has in recent years come forward with a number of initiatives aimed at placing moral and political barriers in the way of unleashing a nuclear war. The Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe was adopted at its proposal at the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly in 1981 and the Declaration on the Condemnation of Nuclear War at the thirty-eighth session in 1983.

In 1982, the USSR undertook not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and proposed that other nuclear-weapon States which had not yet done so should assume similar obligations. At the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly in 1984, the USSR expressed its readiness to have the appropriate undertakings of the nuclear Powers set forth in a single document having the nature of an instrument in international law, e.g. a convention.

In March 1984 the USSR proposed that all nuclear-weapon States should agree to recognize certain norms to govern their mutual relations, a kind of code of conduct for nuclear Powers aimed at the prevention of nuclear war.

The USSR has also advocated an early start to businesslike negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament on the problem of the prevention of nuclear war and the establishment of a special committee of the Conference for that purpose.

In the context of efforts to implement the Treaty's provisions concerning the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, the USSR not only takes initiatives of its own but also supports proposals by other States aimed at achieving those ends. At several recent sessions of the General Assembly, it supported resolutions submitted by non-aligned and neutral countries concerning a nuclear-weapon test ban, a nuclear-weapon freeze and the preparation of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States. In addition, at the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly, the USSR voted in favour of a resolution on the cessation of the manufacture of fissionable materials for military purposes on the understanding that the matter would be considered in the course of negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament at the Conference on Disarmament.
The USSR continues to hold that the ultimate object of negotiations in the disarmament field should be general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. It is taking a constructive part in negotiations aimed at the preparation of a comprehensive disarmament programme. The Soviet proposal for general and complete disarmament remains valid.

Article VII

The USSR has been in favour of the establishment of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world. It considers such zones to be an important means of strengthening the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, reducing the threat of nuclear war and achieving military détente at the regional level. In its view, such zones should be genuinely free from nuclear weapons and the relevant agreements should not contain any loopholes allowing violation or circumvention of the zones’ non-nuclear status.

The USSR shares the opinion of many States which consider that, in scaling down the nuclear arms race, an important role is played by the establishment of zones in which such weapons may be neither produced nor deployed.

The USSR is a party to Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) whereby all nuclear Powers undertake to respect the demilitarized status of the zone with regard to the States parties to the Treaty.

The Soviet Union has consistently advocated the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of Europe. It regards the establishment of such zones as an important aspect of the struggle to consolidate peace and reduce the threat of war on the continent of Europe and as one means of ridding the whole of Europe of nuclear weapons, whether tactical or medium-range.

The USSR supported the proposal to turn Northern Europe into a nuclear-free zone and is prepared to co-operate in the zone's establishment, believing the creation of such a zone to be both desirable and possible. It has repeatedly confirmed its readiness to enter into an obligation to respect the status of the zone and to formalize relevant guarantees by concluding appropriate bilateral or multilateral agreements with the countries of Northern Europe which will form part of the zone. It has expressed itself in favour of corresponding guarantees also being given by NATO nuclear-weapon States for the purpose of further enhancing the Northern countries' security, without, however, making that a condition for its own obligation. It has declared its readiness to consider certain substantive measures with regard to its own territory adjacent to the zone, as well as to discuss with the countries concerned the question of according non-nuclear status to the Baltic Sea area.

The Soviet Union, fully sharing the desire of the Balkan peoples to enhance security in their region, has repeatedly declared its positive attitude towards the idea of establishing a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans.
The USSR has, in principle, taken a positive view of the initiative for the establishment in Europe of a zone free from battlefield nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union is prepared to participate in negotiations on the establishment of such a zone in the course of which the relevant issues, including verification of the parties' compliance with their obligations, would be discussed.

The Soviet Union has from the first supported the African countries' proposal for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa and has invariably supported General Assembly resolutions designed to bring that proposal into effect.

The Soviet Union considers that the time has come to translate into practice the proposal for a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East. The achievement of this objective would be assisted by the accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty of all Middle Eastern States which have not yet done so, the prevention of the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territories or in territories under their control and the placing of all their nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards.

The USSR is prepared to give positive consideration to the idea of the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific.

The USSR is in favour of the strict observance of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, which in practice converted the continent into a nuclear-free zone.

The Soviet Union has consistently supported and continues to support the non-aligned countries' proposal to convert the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace; it is taking an active part in the work of the United Nations Special Committee on the Indian Ocean and is working for the convening of an international conference on the Indian Ocean in Colombo in the first half of 1986, in accordance with the decision adopted at the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly.

The USSR has consistently advocated the transformation of the Mediterranean area from a region of military and political confrontation into a zone of stable peace and international co-operation. The Soviet Union is giving every support to the efforts of States in the area, especially non-aligned States, aimed at reducing tension and strengthening confidence and security.

The Soviet Union has actively supported proposals to establish a zone of peace and stability in South-East Asia, taking the view that the establishment of such a zone would promote the security and sovereign rights of the peoples of the region.

The USSR has advocated the implementation of the proposal not to station nuclear weapons in the territories of States where there are none at present, proceeding on the principle that the conclusion of an appropriate international agreement would prevent the spread of nuclear weapons over the globe and would represent an effective step towards the subsequent complete withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the territories of other States.
Article VIII

The Soviet Union has assisted with all the means at its disposal in the preparation and holding of the two previous Review Conferences, as well as of the present Conference.

Article IX

Taking the view that a further increase in the number of States Parties is a most important means of strengthening the Treaty and of enhancing its prestige and effectiveness, the USSR has continued in its consistent and active efforts to encourage new accessions to the Treaty. As is known, the number of Parties to the Treaty has now reached 129, the largest number of Parties to any international agreement in the arms limitation field.

As a Depositary of the Treaty, the Soviet Government has promptly transmitted to all Parties the information referred to in article IX, paragraph 5.

* * *

The USSR expresses the hope that the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will promote the strengthening of the international régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the further development of co-operation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy for the benefit of all mankind.
INTRODUCTION

1. It has long been recognized that the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, ranging from the production of electricity to the various applications of nuclear techniques in many fields, such as agriculture, medicine, industry, and hydrology, have an important role to play in the economic development of all countries including those in the developing world.

2. This was taken into account when the NPT was drafted. Article IV therefore states:

   (1) "Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty."

   (2) "All the parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organisations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear weapon States party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world."

3. In conjunction with effective non-proliferation conditions and safeguards this important Article has provided the basis for the safe expansion of the trade in nuclear materials, equipment and technology with resulting benefit to supplier and recipient parties alike. It has also given further encouragement to the provision of technical assistance to developing countries, both in helping them in their programmes for power production and in the agricultural, medical and industrial applications of nuclear energy. The purpose of this paper is to suggest, in the light of past performance in technology transfer and past experience in technical assistance delivery, ways in which there could be improvements in this field in the future. It concentrates upon technology transfer to developing countries through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
(1) PAST PERFORMANCE

4. Much has been achieved in the field of technology transfer to developing countries. In the multilateral area, the IAEA has been the principal agent for technology transfer amongst the international organizations referred to in Article IV(2). The Agency's technical assistance and co-operation programmes have the objective of "promoting the development process in developing countries by helping to build up the necessary physical infrastructure institutions and manpower". */ The resources for the programme come from:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Amount 1980-84</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(i) Technical Assistance and Co-operation</td>
<td>$81.06 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(TAC) Fund financed by voluntary contributions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from member States</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) Funds from the United Nations Development</td>
<td>$21.08 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programme (UNDP)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii) Extra-budgetary contributions (including</td>
<td>$29.07 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Footnote A&quot;)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iv) Assistance in kind</td>
<td>$12.17 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total **/</td>
<td>$143.38 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(To this needs to be added the value of the large proportion of the work of the Departments of Nuclear Energy and Safety and of Research and Isotopes which is devoted to helping developing countries.)

5. The largest component in the funding for the Regular Programme is therefore the TAC fund. In allocating its resources for the TAC fund, the Agency first makes provision for training courses and fellowships before determining the amounts available to finance projects. This reflects the valuable part which training in nuclear techniques plays in effective technology transfer. Thus from 1980-84, the Agency funded training abroad for 3,518 people, of whom 2,366 came from NPT parties.

6. Projects supported from the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Programmes between 1980-84 covered a wide spectrum of applications, the main area of work being the use of isotopes in agriculture, medicine, industry and hydrology. Projects in nuclear engineering and technology were also significant. Over this period, 78 per cent of the money contributed to the TAC fund was spent in projects in NPT States parties. Some member States make extra funds available to the IAEA as extra-budgetary resources for financing specific projects which are technically sound but which cannot be financed from the TAC fund ("Footnote A projects"). From 1980-84, 94 per cent of the money contributed for "Footnote A" projects was designated for use in NPT States parties. Some member States have also contributed extra-budgetary funds for technical co-operation activities other than "Footnote A". Most of these resources were made available to developing NPT States parties. This also applies to expert services provided as "in-kind" donations.

* / Background paper on Activities of the IAEA relevant to Article IV of the NPT; Document NPT/Conf.III/10, p. 27.

** / Not adjusted for inflation.
7. Some member States also make available extra-budgetary resources to fund projects under regional co-operative arrangements.

8. The Agency's other technical co-operation work is fully recorded in document NPT/CONF.III/10, and in the IAEA's Annual Report on its Technical Co-operation Activities.

9. Statistics on the considerable amount of bilateral technical assistance supported by governments, industry and research institutions are not kept centrally. Individual donor countries might make reference to these activities during the Conference.

(2) MEANS OF IMPROVING TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS

10. Although much has therefore been achieved in the area of technology transfer, it is necessary to maintain the momentum and to co-operate in the Agency's efforts to improve its own mechanisms, so that the most important requirements of the developing countries can continue to be met. The Agency's ability to deliver assistance has been continually improving. The Technical Co-operation Evaluation Unit is of great benefit in helping to identify problems which can lead to delays in implementing projects. The mid and end project evaluations will also give valuable information on project performance. A recent independent review by a management consultant of the Agency's organizational structure for administering aid recommended _inter alia_ a more active role for the Agency in helping developing countries to identify priority areas. Such action would also serve to improve effective and efficient utilization of resources.

A. Nuclear Planning Systems

11. A wide variation exists between developing countries in terms of their level of development, their needs, and the resources which they possess to meet them. Over the years the IAEA has introduced a considerable number of planning systems, including computer models, to assist developing countries in drawing up their own nuclear development plans. The IAEA, assisted by international experts, could usefully review the planning systems in order to identify areas for possible further efforts in this field. These planning systems, together with such further developments as may be possible represent a useful tool to assist developing countries in making decisions on these matters.

B. Country-Specific Development Strategies

12. Another valuable area of work by the IAEA lies in the promotion of country-specific development strategies. In the nuclear power sector, the IAEA has helped with such strategies since 1973. This assistance has steadily become more sophisticated and now goes beyond economic grid planning to include infrastructure assessments and development plans. In view of the fact that nuclear technologies and their application cut across the traditional sectoral boundaries such as agriculture, industry, etc. efforts are being made to elaborate development strategies which promote a multi-disciplinary approach. The aim will be to identify the technology applications that can be expected to contribute most to the development both of individual sectors and developing economies as a whole. This should make it easier for Member States to establish areas of concentration for co-operation with the Agency based on their own development priorities: individual projects can then be formulated so as to complement one another, resulting in a coherent development programme.
13. The establishment of country-specific development strategies will not only make it easier to identify priority areas for a number of years but also make it easier to determine which particular technical co-operation inputs — such as training, expert services, or equipment — should be given priority. Greater attention to programming at the country level will make it easier for Governments to improve co-ordination among their various ministries, and improve their ability to plan and organize their development activities.

C. Regional Co-operative Agreements (RCAs)

14. Apart from examining problems on a country-specific basis, it would facilitate the transfer of technology if more support were to be given to Regional Co-operative Agreements and Arrangements (RCAs). RCAs exist currently for the Asian and Pacific region and Latin America. Their significance lies in their co-operative approach involving the concept of regional projects based on regionally agreed priorities and using input from regional countries. Current regional co-operative arrangements are described on page 41 of document NPT/CONF.III/10.

D. Multi-year and Multi-donor Projects

15. Single year projects have been of considerable value and they have advantages because it is often easier for donor countries to provide money for projects of short duration. Some developmental problems are particularly complex, and require projects which need more than a year to complete. These so-called "multi-year" projects were first funded by the IAEA in 1980 and in 1985 they constitute 37 per cent of the projects approved under the Regular Programme. Another trend which it would be helpful to encourage in appropriate cases is that of financing projects from multiple sources. Before 1980, almost every project was looked at in isolation and supported from a single source of funds. By contrast multi-funded projects now account for around 20 per cent of the Regular Programme.

16. So far the trend towards more multi-year and multi-funded projects supported by the TAC fund has only to a limited extent been reflected in respect of "Footnote A" activities funded from extra-budgetary resources. This may be partly because donor countries contributing to "Footnote A" projects are themselves unable (for reasons related to internal budgeting procedures) to offer funding on a multi-year basis. "Footnote A" projects therefore most often tend to operate on a single donor, single year basis and to be restricted in size because of this. The scope for including multi-year, multi-funded projects under "Footnote A" could be examined. The IAEA might be encouraged to adopt a greater role in matching suitable projects and potential donors, and in co-ordinating their activities as appropriate.

E. Resources

17. There is however a limit to what can be achieved by means of improvements to the existing mechanisms of the IAEA without extra resources being made available for technical assistance by the Member States. One area in which extra money could be made available is that of "Footnote A". Another is the regional co-operative agreements mechanism.
18. At present, relatively few countries have been able to support "Footnote A" projects although that number is on the increase. Since the decision about whether or not to finance a particular "Footnote A" project rests with the potential donor, it is open to recipient countries to solicit such assistance as part of continuing bilateral aid programmes. Having agreed bilaterally that a project was to be picked up by a particular donor, the recipient country would then submit it to the IAEA for acceptance under the Agency's guidelines for technical assistance, noting that it should be placed in the "Footnote A" category. If more recipient countries were to approach donor countries in this way (as well as through the IAEA machinery) a higher flow of technology transfer might be achieved.

(3) PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH MAJOR CAPITAL PROJECTS, PARTICULARLY NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION

19. A developing country that intends to use nuclear energy for the purpose of generating electricity will require an adequate infrastructure for the purpose before it can embark upon building a power station. The IAEA has identified */ five essential conditions for the successful launching of a nuclear power programme

(i) the establishment of an adequate electricity grid;

(ii) the creation of an institutional infrastructure to implement the nuclear power programmes in the long term (this includes promulgating the necessary legislation to deal with safety aspects);

(iii) the existence of qualified manpower to ensure that the facilities are run and maintained to high standards of safety;

(iv) a well developed industrial infrastructure to provide a pool of the necessary skills for building, equipping, operating and maintaining the facility;

(v) the availability of finance on reasonable terms.

20. It is therefore clear that a country wishing to develop nuclear power must already possess a relatively advanced economy and be prepared to inject a considerable amount of its own resources over an extended period if it is to be successful.

21. Finance is often cited by developing countries as being the overwhelming problem because of the capital intensive nature of nuclear power projects and the lengths of time which must elapse before any return is possible. Some developing countries have nonetheless been successful in obtaining finance from commercial sources; others have encountered considerable difficulties, a situation exacerbated by the current international recession. These problems were explored at a meeting of international bankers in Vienna in October 1984 which was convened by the IAEA in the context of the Small and Medium Power Reactor Study (SMPR). This concluded that there were no easy solutions, but that it would help if there was early discussion of development plans between countries likely to be seeking loans and lenders, since this might create a climate of greater receptivity to requests for finance.

*/ "Energy and Nuclear Power Planning in Developing Countries", published by the IAEA in 1985 as No. 245 in their Technical Reports Series.
22. There may be scope for further examination under the auspices of the IAEA of the problem of international and multilateral finance. For example, to facilitate early contact between countries seeking loans and tenderers, it would help if there was greater emphasis in developing countries upon selecting financial officers, and providing them with appropriate training in the financial and economic aspects of nuclear programmes. This is an area in which the IAEA already provides assistance.

23. Another important task is that of preparing energy assessment studies, electricity supply planning studies and feasibility studies for specific plant projects. The IAEA is able to offer valuable assistance in these areas. In particular, electricity supply studies have been a regular activity of the IAEA since 1973 and have now been developed to include infrastructure considerations. The IAEA co-operates with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) in such studies, including assistance to the Bank in studies for countries not actively studying the nuclear power option. Such studies may conclude that nuclear power is not the most appropriate energy source for the country concerned. In other cases, they might conclude that all the pre-conditions are met for the successful launching of a programme. Studies of this kind might enhance the prospects for the country obtaining finance. Greater use could be made of these services.

24. Turning aside from the question of finance, the IAEA has traditionally played an important part in developing the infrastructure necessary for establishing a nuclear power programme. There is scope for continued efforts of the IAEA in this field, supported for example by multi-donor, multi-year financing using "Footnote A if not as part of the Regular Programme. Such assistance can take the form of manpower training, planning electricity grid requirements or advice for industrial support development, including assistance in occupational health, safety and environmental protection.

25. In addition to country specific assistance, the IAEA also addresses problems which are common to most countries wishing to embark upon a nuclear power programme. In particular, the SMPR study has been concerned with assessing the work necessary to bring forward suitable SMPR designs to the market place and in assessing the size of the likely buyer market. Further support for this programme could help the development of nuclear reactors more suited to the needs of many developing countries.

CONCLUSIONS

26. When considering the implementation of Article IV it is apparent that there has been a considerable level of achievement. The IAEA in particular deserves to be congratulated on its work. There is however scope for improving the mechanisms, by which technology is transferred, by:

- building further on the IAEA's technical co-operation evaluation activity,
- strengthening IAEA assistance in nuclear planning systems for developing countries,
- further developing current IAEA assistance on country specific development strategies,
- support for regional co-operative agreements and "Footnote A" projects,

- exploration of the scope for multi-year, multi-donor projects under the "Footnote A" mechanism,

- further exploration under the auspices of the IAEA of the problems of securing international and multilateral finance for major capital projects in the nuclear field,

- further IAEA assistance in the preparation of feasibility studies and infrastructure development,

- support for the IAEA Small and Medium Power Reactor study.
The Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Bearing in mind that under the Treaty, States Parties have reaffirmed their obligation under the Charter of the United Nations to refrain from the threat or use of force in their international relations,

Having regard to the fact that the non-nuclear-weapon States who are Parties to the Treaty have undertaken to renounce nuclear weapons, on the understanding that they will never to subjected to the use or threat of nuclear weapons, or to the use of force in general,

Reiterates its appeal to all States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons participating in the Geneva Disarmament Conference to increase their efforts at the Conference, to devise, at an early date and in any event before the next Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, effective international arrangements guaranteeing that non-nuclear-weapon States will never under any circumstances be subjected to the use or threat of nuclear weapons, or to the use of force in general,

Requests, to this end, the nuclear-weapon States in particular, to co-operate actively with a view to the earliest possible conclusion of such arrangements.
Intensification of negotiations on disarmament

The Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Bearing in mind the obligations assumed in virtue of preambular paragraph 8 and article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Recalling, among other texts, resolution 2373 (XXII) of 12 June 1968 in which the General Assembly of the United Nations expressed the conviction "that an agreement to prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons must be followed as soon as possible by effective measures on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament, and that the non-proliferation treaty will contribute to this aim",

Deeply concerned at the fact that during the time which has elapsed since the Non-Proliferation Treaty was concluded the arms race has not only not been halted but on the contrary has been intensified, thus increasing the risk of war and constituting a serious danger for the very survival of mankind,

Concerned also with the fact that negotiations on disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament, carried on during this period, and the agreements concluded have not substantially influenced the pursuit and intensification of the arms race, and that during the last few years negotiations on nuclear weapons have been only sporadic or have come to a complete standstill,

1. Welcomes the recent opening of negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America on nuclear and outer-space weapons and invites the Governments of the two States to negotiate in good faith and in a spirit of great responsibility with a view to achieving in the near future appropriate agreements calculated to lead to a cessation of the nuclear arms race on land and in outer space and to establishment of nuclear disarmament.
2. Urges the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons taking part in the Disarmament Conference at Geneva to work constructively with a view to embarking without delay on effective negotiations concerning questions of nuclear weapons on the agenda of the Conference and intensifying their efforts to reach substantive agreements as rapidly as possible with a view to ending production of new nuclear weapons and reducing and eliminating those already existing.

3. Urges the States parties to the Treaty taking part in other forums where negotiations on disarmament are being held, namely, the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe and the Vienna negotiations on mutual reduction of forces and armaments in central Europe, to demonstrate a spirit of co-operation with a view to reaching appropriate agreements in such forums so that their terms will help to establish conditions making for progress towards the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the initiation of nuclear disarmament.
Romania: Working Document

Nuclear arms freeze

1. In the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the States Parties declared "their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament" (eighth preambular paragraph).

At the same time, in article VI of the Treaty, "each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control".

2. Fifteen years after the date of entry into force of the Treaty, the negotiations undertaken in a number of forums on disarmament questions have failed to produce concrete results in regard to the implementation of these provisions of the Treaty, and particularly to the stipulations of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (special session devoted to disarmament), which was adopted by consensus. The nuclear arms race, far from being halted, has on the contrary been intensified and speeded up. As a result, the world is now faced with a vast stockpile of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, thus increasing the danger of war which represents a serious threat to the very survival of mankind.

3. The fact that over the five years which have elapsed since the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons such weapons have proliferated over an even greater area of the earth and that the number of countries with nuclear weapons on their territories has increased, in contradiction to the spirit of the Treaty, is particularly disturbing.

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4. The desire to ensure the viability of the Treaty calls for the adoption of immediate measures to eliminate the sources which engender this situation and sustain the pursuit of the nuclear arms race, to create the necessary conditions for bringing about the acceptance and application of all the provisions of the Treaty, and to put an end to the accumulation of new nuclear weapons, to reduce them and to eliminate them totally.

5. To this end, Romania submits for examination by the States Parties the following proposals for inclusion in the final document as documents of the Conference.

**ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL**

to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Bearing in mind the obligations assumed by each of the Parties to the Treaty in virtue of the eighth preambular paragraph and article VI, Being aware that the constant accumulation of nuclear weapons and the lack of results in the negotiations on nuclear weapons are at variance with the Treaty on Non-Proliferation and constitute a serious threat to mankind as a whole, Being aware also of the danger which the persistence of this situation represents for the viability of the Treaty, Determined to act jointly to agree effective measures to put an end to the nuclear arms race at an early date and to bring about nuclear disarmament, Bearing in mind that the nuclear weapons accumulated to date go far beyond any defence justification, Have agreed as follows:

**Article I**

The nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons announce their firm decision, in keeping with the legal commitments undertaken in the Treaty, to cease forthwith the testing, production and deployment of new nuclear weapons.

To this end they agree to undertake effective negotiations designed to conclude at an early date, and in any event before the next Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, a general political agreement on the cessation of all nuclear weapons tests, and the production and deployment of new nuclear weapons, including their carriers, and fissionable materials for military purposes.
**Article II**

The non-nuclear weapon States Parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation undertake to contribute by every possible means at their disposal to bringing about such an agreement and implementing it.

In particular, States which have agreed to admit nuclear weapons on their territories undertake not to facilitate in any way whatever the deployment of new nuclear weapons and to contribute to the reduction and elimination of those already deployed.

**Article III**

Following its signature, the present Protocol shall be submitted for ratification by all the States Parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation, and it shall enter into force on the date on which the instruments of ratification of two of the three depositary States of the Treaty have been transmitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall be the depositary of the Protocol.
AGENDA ITEM 10: PROGRAMME OF WORK

FIRST REPORT OF THE GENERAL COMMITTEE

At its first meeting on 30 August 1985, the General Committee considered item 10 of the Agenda I/ entitled "Programme of Work", with a view to making appropriate recommendations to the Conference. The General Committee decided to make the following recommendations:

I. The Conference should complete its work by 20 September.

II. The three Main Committees should accordingly complete their work on 17 September and the Drafting Committee should convene immediately thereafter.

III. The Main Committees should have one initial meeting each in the first three days of the week starting 2 September 1985, as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>P.M.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monday, 2 Sept</td>
<td>Main Committee II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuesday, 3 Sept</td>
<td>Main Committee III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wednesday, 4 Sept</td>
<td>Main Committee I</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the week beginning 9 September 1985, the work of the Main Committees would be scheduled as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>A.M.</th>
<th>P.M.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monday, 9 Sept</td>
<td>Main Committee I</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Main Committee II</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuesday, 10 Sept</td>
<td>Main Committee II</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Main Committee III</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wednesday, 11 Sept</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Main Committee III</td>
<td>Main Committee III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thursday, 12 Sept</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Main Committee II</td>
<td>Main Committee III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friday, 13 Sept</td>
<td>Main Committee II</td>
<td>Main Committee II</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1/ NPT/CONF.III/19.

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The General Committee agreed that the allocation of time to the Main Committees in the week beginning 16 September 1985 should be considered in due course by the General Committee in the light of needs.

IV. The General Committee recommends that the following items of the agenda should be allocated to the plenary:

- item 7 (b) Report of the Credentials Committee
- item 10 Programme of Work
- item 15 Reports of the Main Committees
- item 16 Other questions
- item 17 Preparation and Adoption of Final Document(s), it being understood that the Main Committees and the Drafting Committee would be involved in the preparation of documents, in accordance with the functions assigned to them under the Rules of Procedure of the Conference.

V. In view of the fact that an extensive general debate will have taken place in plenary, the Main Committees should concentrate on the substance of the items allocated to them.
MESSAGE OF MIKHAIL S. GORBACHEV
GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS TO THE PARTICIPANTS OF THE THIRD REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

I extend my greetings to the representatives of States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons assembled in Geneva for the Conference to review the operation of this most important international agreement.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty, which is an outcome of the collective efforts of many States, has proven its viability in practice. Not a single new nuclear-weapon State has appeared since the conclusion of the Treaty. In terms of participation, the Treaty is the most widely supported arms limitation agreement. It has provided the basis for the establishment of the international régime of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which has become an effective instrument of peace.

Another important result of the conclusion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is that it has created favourable conditions for broad international co-operation in the peaceful use of the atom which is, in turn, so essential for the solution of the problem of providing mankind with energy as well as of other major economic problems of concern to all peoples. No small credit for the practical implementation of these tasks goes to the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The Soviet Union is strongly in favour of the further expansion and deepening of such co-operation. It is important that the energy of the atom should indeed belong to all mankind and serve only the interests of peace and constructive work.

True to its obligations under the Treaty, the Soviet Union has been doing and will continue to do everything in its power in order not only to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons but also to stop and reverse the nuclear arms race.

The Soviet Union has many a time taken unilateral steps, setting an example for others and so contributing to the elaboration of agreements on limiting and halting the nuclear arms race. The USSR has made a pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. If those nuclear Powers that have not yet done so followed suit, it would all in all be tantamount to banning the use of nuclear weapons altogether.

The declaration by the Soviet Union of a moratorium on all nuclear explosions provides fresh evidence of our desire to smooth the way to the curbing of the nuclear arms race. There can be no doubt that a mutual moratorium by the USSR and the United States of America on nuclear explosions would create favourable conditions for the

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conditions for concluding an international treaty on the complete and general
prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and would contribute to the fuller
implementation of the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons.

In the nuclear and space age, the problem of curtailing the nuclear arms race
is inseparably linked with the task of preventing the militarization of outer
space. Using space in the service of war would result in a sharply increased
nuclear threat. But keeping space peaceful, outside the sphere of military
rivalry, would enable headway to be made in solving the whole set of questions
related to the limitation and reduction of nuclear arsenals. At the same time,
broad possibilities would open up for all-round international co-operation in the
most diverse spheres of human activities - both on Earth and in space. This is
also the intent of the concrete proposals on international co-operation in
peaceful exploration of outer space under conditions of its non-militarization
submitted by the Soviet Union to the fortieth session of the United Nations
General Assembly.

In short, we are in favour of energetic work on curbing the arms race being
done in every area. And, of course, measures to prevent the spread of nuclear
weapons continue to hold a prominent place in this regard.

I wish the participants in the Conference success in their efforts further
to strengthen the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
MESSAGE OF PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE THIRD REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

It gives me great pleasure to address this message to the delegates to the Third Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference – an event that also commemorates the fifteenth anniversary of that Treaty. The Non-Proliferation Treaty is an historic accomplishment. It is a critical cornerstone in our common effort to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons, while providing an essential framework for Parties to reap the benefits of the peaceful atom. By reducing the dangers of the spread of nuclear weapons and the risks of nuclear war, it contributes to the security and safety of all nations and all peoples.

My central arms control objective has been to reduce substantially and ultimately to eliminate nuclear weapons and rid the world of the nuclear threat. Toward that end, the United States has proposed in Geneva radical reductions in the number of existing nuclear weapons. This, I believe, is the most direct and best course to pursue if we are to eliminate the danger of nuclear war.

At the same time, I believe that verifiable limitations on nuclear testing can play a useful, although more modest, role. For this reason, on July 29, I reiterated my desire to get a process going which will enable the United States and the Soviet Union to establish the basis for effectively verifying limits on underground testing. We have invited the Soviet Union to send observers, with any instrumentation devices they wish to bring, to measure a nuclear test at our site. This invitation has no conditions.

Yet another critical objective of the United States is to build a stable, more cooperative relationship with the Soviet Union. Of the shared interests between our two countries, avoiding war and reducing the level of arms is among the greatest. As I have said before, cooperation begins with communication, and I look forward to meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev this November.
All Parties to the NPT now share the responsibility of taking stock, of looking in a fair and balanced way at how well the Treaty's vital goals are being met, and of considering how we might do even better.

As the operation of this important Treaty is reviewed, the Conference should also celebrate the fact that it is a tremendous success. The United States remains firmly committed to the objectives embodied in this Treaty, and to its vision of a more stable and secure world for all nations.
For the convenience of delegations, attached is the "Allocation of Items to the Main Committees of the Conference", which appeared as Annex III of document NPT/CONF.III/1 and was approved by the Conference at the opening meeting on 27 August 1985.
ALLOCATION OF ITEMS TO THE MAIN COMMITTEES OF THE CONFERENCE

The Preparatory Committee agreed to recommend for consideration by the Review Conference the following allocation of items to the three Main Committees, with the understanding that the remaining items would be considered in the Plenary:

(a) To Main Committee I:

- item 13. Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its Article VIII (3):

Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament and international peace and security:

   (1) Articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1-3.

   (2) Article VI and preambular paragraphs 8-12.

   (3) Article VII, with specific reference to the main issues considered in this Committee.

Security assurances

   (1) Resolution 255 (1968) of the United Nations Security Council,

   (2) Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

(b) To Main Committee II:

- item 13. Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its Article VIII (3):

Implementation of the provision of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear weapon free zones:

   (1) Article III and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5, especially in their relationship to Article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7.

   (2) Articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1-3 in their relationship to Articles III and IV.

   (3) Article VII.

Other provisions of the Treaty.

- item 14. Role of the Treaty in the promotion of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and of nuclear disarmament and in strengthening international peace and security:

A. Acceptance of the Treaty by States.

B. Measures aimed at promoting a wider acceptance of the Treaty.
(c) To Main Committee III

- item 13. Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its Article VIII (3):

Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to peaceful applications of nuclear energy:

(1) Articles IV and III (3) preambular paragraphs 6 and 7, especially in their relationship to Article III (1, 2, 4) and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5 as well as to Articles I and II.

(2) Article V.

- item 14. Role of the Treaty in the promotion of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and of nuclear disarmament and in strengthening international peace and security:

A. Acceptance of the Treaty by States.

B. Measures aimed at promoting a wider acceptance of the Treaty.

Remarks with regard to allocation of agenda items

It is understood that all articles, preambular paragraphs and agenda items allocated to the Main Committees shall be reviewed in their interrelationship. Main Committee I is entrusted with the task of assessing the extent to which obligations of Articles I, II and VI are being met.

Drafting Committee

The Drafting Committee shall convene not later than on the first day of the fourth week of the Conference in order to carry out its functions in accordance with rule 36 of the Rules of Procedure, at which time all relevant texts and proposals shall have been referred to it by the Main Committees. It is understood that the Drafting Committee while carrying out its functions shall consider all elements of the Treaty in their interrelationship.
IRAQ: Working Paper

The Third Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons:

Recalling that in accordance with article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, all the parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy,

Recalling also preambular paragraph 5 of the Treaty, which emphasizes the undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Fully aware that the Treaty upholds the inalienable rights of all the parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of the Treaty,

Recognizing that the safeguards system operated by the IAEA is the only credible international system of verification of non-proliferation obligations assumed under the Treaty,

Noting that Iraq is a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and has accepted the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards with full compliance,

Taking note of the United Nations Security Council resolution 487 of June 1981 which considers that the Israeli military aggression against the Iraqi peaceful nuclear installations constitutes a serious threat to the entire IAEA safeguards régime which is the foundation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty,

Further taking note of the IAEA General Conference resolutions, GC(XXVII)RES/409 of 1983, GC(XXVIII)RES/425 of 1984 and in particular GC(XXV)RES/381 (1981), which considers that the Israeli act of aggression against the safeguarded Iraqi nuclear installations constitutes an attack against the Agency and its safeguards régime, which is the foundation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Viewing with deep concern Israel's refusal to comply with Security Council resolution 487 of 19 June 1981,

Deeply concerned that the Israeli aggression has caused a severe set back to the Treaty and to the IAEA and its safeguards system,

Taking into consideration the concern of non-nuclear-weapon States that in conjunction with their adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, appropriate measures be undertaken to safeguard their security,

Noting with profound concern Israel's persistent refusal to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, despite repeated calls by the United Nations General Assembly, the Security Council and the IAEA,

1. **Strongly condemns** Israel for its premeditated act of aggression against the Iraqi peaceful nuclear installations;

2. **Considers** that the Israeli military attack against the safeguarded Iraqi nuclear installations constitutes the most serious attack against the Treaty as well as against the IAEA and its safeguards since their inception;

3. **Urges** all member States to provide necessary technical assistance for Iraq to restore its peaceful nuclear programme and to overcome the damage caused by the Israeli attack;

4. **Requests** all member States, to fulfil their non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty by preventing Israel from acquiring nuclear technology that might contribute to its nuclear capability;

5. **Calls upon** Israel to submit forthwith all its nuclear facilities to the IAEA safeguards and join the Treaty in accordance with Security Council resolution 487 (1981);

6. **Demands** that Israel undertake forthwith not to carry out any further attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes, in Iraq or on similar facilities in other countries in disregard to the Agency's safeguards system;

7. **Request** the United Nations Security Council to take urgent and effective measures to implement its resolution 487 (1981) and to ensure that Israel complies with the provisions of that resolution;

8. **Affirms** the inalienable right of all member States to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under internationally accepted safeguards.
1. The principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology should be available to all and that in pursuance of this principle all Parties to the NPT are entitled to contribute to the further development of the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is clearly reflected in preambular paragraphs 7 and 8 as well as in Articles III and IV of the Treaty.

2. The Non-nuclear-weapon States which have foregone the nuclear weapon option, and submitted their nuclear facilities to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards can justifiably expect that their peaceful nuclear energy programmes be allowed to develop without hindrance or obstruction in pursuance of their social and economic goals.

3. The inviolability of such peaceful nuclear activities has been established through the international norms prohibiting the use of force in international relations, and in particular article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter. The added emphasis on their inviolability and the need for a specific prohibition of attacks against peaceful nuclear activities is a reflection of the highly dangerous political, economic and environmental implications of such an attack, particularly on the civilian inhabitants. This is universally acknowledged, and has been given special consideration in additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 which prohibits attacks against nuclear power reactors in time of war or armed conflict.

4. An attack against a peaceful nuclear activity would also constitute a serious setback to the international efforts aimed at establishing a universally acceptable régime encompassing a balance between assurances of co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, effective measures towards preventing further horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the achievement of concrete progress towards disarmament, and more particularly nuclear disarmament pursuant to article VI of NPT. It would also constitute a direct challenge to the credibility and validity of the IAEA safeguards system which is universally acknowledged to have been invaluable and greatly effective particularly as envisaged in document INFCIRC/153. Given the increasing importance of peaceful nuclear applications and the increasing...
frequency of their use in the generation of electrical energy, it is of paramount importance that the world community build upon what has already been achieved.

5. Without prejudice to efforts being undertaken in other fora, particularly the IAEA and the Conference on Disarmament, the Parties to the NPT, having established an international non-proliferation régime with universal adherence, bear a collective responsibility to continue to play a leading role in contributing to the establishment of comprehensive and universal norms and standards specifically prohibiting attacks against all peaceful nuclear activities. Pending the establishment of such specific universal and comprehensive norms and standards, the Parties to the NPT should endeavour to take interim steps amongst themselves establishing a mechanism to ensure that their safeguarded nuclear activities, especially those existing in non-nuclear-weapon States, will remain inviolable from attack. Such a mechanism should include appropriate measures to be taken by the Parties and particularly the Depositories of the Treaty to redress any such attack.

6. In this regard, we believe that the Third Review Conference should consider the following measures with respect to attacks, or threats of attacks, against nuclear activities in the States Party to the NPT which have accepted IAEA safeguards on all of their nuclear activities:

(a) Recognizing that such an attack, or threat of attack, would create a situation in which the Security Council and above all its nuclear-weapon state permanent members would have to act immediately in accordance with their obligations under the United Nations Charter, the Depositories of the NPT shall endeavour, in consultation with the other members of the Security Council, to give full consideration to all appropriate measures to be undertaken to deal with such a situation, including the application of measures under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

(b) Parties to the NPT should commit themselves to provide or support immediate assistance to the Party to the NPT whose such safeguarded nuclear activities are subject to an attack, or threat of an attack.

It is hopeful that the Third Review Conference will reach an agreement on the measures suggested.
EGYPT

Working Paper on Article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty

The inalienable right of all States to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to develop their nuclear energy programmes for peaceful purposes has become universally accepted as is abundantly reflected in the relevant documents of the United Nations. It also constitutes a fundamental aspect and cornerstone of the non-proliferation régime and it is evident from preambular paragraphs 7 and 8 as well as Article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Several countries have achieved a high level of technical expertise in the field of the peaceful applications of nuclear energy, however the substantial financial investments involved have restricted their ability to further develop their peaceful nuclear energy programmes or have made them greatly dependent on foreign resources. The experiences of the past few years have made it profoundly clear that the capital intensive nature of the nuclear energy industry has been a major factor in limiting its development, particularly in developing countries.

In the area of electrical power generation it has become increasingly evident that the scarcity of financial resources bears heavily against the peaceful nuclear programmes bearing fruition in several countries. The gravity of the situation is particularly acute in the developing countries, where the use of nuclear energy for the generation of the electrical energy requisite for the fulfilment of their development programmes has been greatly impeded by the exorbitant cost associated with the capital intensive nature of the peaceful nuclear power industries.

The role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is invaluable. The IAEA has, through its technical assistance programme, provided admirable assistance to several developing countries. It is however clear that this programme has been directed at peaceful applications of nuclear energy other than power generation. Even so, the resources made available to IAEA have not been sufficient to fulfil these limited areas as is reflected by the number of footnote projects which remain pending.

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The Third Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT is now seized by this problem which threatens to erode one of the basic tenets of the Treaty "that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available, for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States". We believe that the Third Review Conference should reconfirm the universal commitment to this principle. Furthermore, as a concrete expression of this commitment the Conference should take practical steps to surmount the obstacles which have obstructed its fulfilment, first and foremost with respect to the non-nuclear weapon developing parties to the Treaty.

In this regard, we believe that the Third Review Conference should endorse the establishment of a Financial Assistance Fund to assist developing countries Parties to the NPT in the development of their peaceful nuclear power programmes. This assistance could be provided through a mechanism to be agreed upon between the Parties, in order to provide concessionary soft loans and grants, as well as to facilitate access to commercial financial markets. We envisage this Fund as a complementary system to the activities of the IAEA and not as an alternative to it.

The scope and modalities of such a Fund should be negotiated between the Parties to the NPT within the context of a Preparatory Committee to be established by the Third Review Conference. The results of the work of the Preparatory Committee, which would convene at a date to be agreed upon after the conclusion of the Third Review Conference of the NPT, should be adopted at a specially convened conference to be held for that purpose as soon as possible, and in any case before the next Review Conference of the NPT.

We expect that negotiations to be undertaken in this regard shall be intensive and may be time consuming. In view of the urgent need for nuclear power programmes in developing countries it is our considered opinion that interim measures should be taken to facilitate the initiation and the preliminary studies necessary for such programmes. As an interim step towards the establishment of such a Fund, we believe the developed countries Parties to the NPT should commit themselves at the Third Review Conference to increase their financial assistance to the benefit of the developing countries Parties to the NPT, in the development of their nuclear power programmes.
I. OBLIGATIONS

1. The Group of Non-Aligned and Neutral States recalls that under the provisions of Article VI of the Treaty all parties have undertaken to pursue negotiations in good faith:

   - on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date;
   - on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament;
   - on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

2. The Group of Non-Aligned and Neutral States notes that the Preamble to the Treaty recalled the determination expressed by the parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosion on nuclear weapons for all time and the desire to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery.

   The Group also recalls that in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources as stated in the Preamble of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

3. The commitment of the Non-Aligned and Neutral Group of States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is, consequently, based on the Group's expectation that the Treaty would contribute to the implementation of the principles and purposes of the Charter, since the Group believes that nuclear disarmament constitutes an essential element for the realization of such principles and purposes, in particular the maintenance of international peace and security. The Treaty should be seen as part of a process aimed at the conclusion of further agreements in the field of disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament.
4. The Group of Non-Aligned and Neutral States recalls the Final Declaration of the NPT Review Conference held in 1975, in particular the contents on the review of Article VI of the NPT.

The Group also recalls the view expressed therein that the conclusion of a Treaty banning all nuclear weapon tests is one of the most important measures to halt the nuclear arms race and the hope that the Nuclear Weapons States Party to the Treaty will take the lead in reaching an early solution of the technical and political difficulties on this issue and to make every effort to reach agreement on the conclusion of an effective comprehensive test ban.

The Group also recalls the desire expressed by a considerable number of delegations at the Conference that the Nuclear Weapon States Party to the Treaty should as soon as possible enter into an agreement open to all States containing appropriate provisions to ensure its effectiveness to halt all Nuclear Weapon tests of adhering States for a specified time, whereupon the terms of such an agreement would be reviewed in the light of the opportunity at that time, to achieve a universal and permanent cessation of all Nuclear Weapon tests. Finally, the Group recalls the hope expressed in the 1975 Final Document of the NPT Review Conference that all States Party to the Treaty, through the United Nations and the CCD and other negotiations in which they participate, will work with determination towards the conclusion of arms limitation and disarmament agreements which will contribute to the goal of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

5. The Group of Non-Aligned and Neutral States further recalls the contents of paras. 50 and 51 under the Programme of Action in the final document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and regrets that the recommendations contained therein have not been realized since the adoption by consensus seven years ago.

In this context the Group also recalls the multilateral treaties which effectively prohibit the geographical and spatial proliferation of nuclear weapons such as by preventing the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof; in outer space and celestial bodies; and in the Antarctic area and urges universal and continued adherence to them.

II. RECENT DEVELOPMENT OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

The Group notes that during the last decade the world has witnessed a trend giving qualitative nuclear arms developments more importance than the size of nuclear arsenals. This trend is especially clear as regards one of the two major Powers. Since 1967 this Power has cut not only the number of nuclear weapons delivery vehicles but specifically reduced the explosive yield of the warheads in the inventories. However, the overall number of warheads has not noticeably diminished. The use of MIRV-techniques on the Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles has rather tended to increase the number of warheads on strategic systems. Information of the development of the size of the nuclear arsenals of the other major nuclear Power has not been as readily available. However, concerning that Power there is a tendency that the earlier steady increase has been slowed down. The slowing down of some quantitative elements of the nuclear arms race, has been
accompanied by; and indeed a function of an accelerating development of the quality and reliability of the nuclear weapon systems. The nuclear weapons programmes of the other three nuclear States are following, on a much smaller scale, a similar path as those of the big two.

The Group also notes that since 1975 and indeed since 1980 the relative importance of the actual number and the aggregate yield of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the major nuclear weapon States has been of relatively less significance in comparison with the rapid development with regard to the improvements in quality of the delivery vehicle component of the nuclear weapon systems. Thus it could with certainty be stated that, in spite of a possible stagnation of numbers of delivery vehicles and of a lowering of yields over some years, the potential nuclear arms destruction effect i.e. capacity to destroy selected targets is more severe than before.

This is further underlined by increases of technical and political risks, having accompanied the development of weapons technology.

The increase in the number of selectable targets may lead the nuclear weapon States into the temptation to prepare for limited war with surgical nuclear strikes. It is thus destabilizing as it assists in lowering the nuclear threshold and even invites pre-emptive action.

Other indicators pointing towards a disturbing future development is the present high rate of increase in the research and development component of military spending and the continued nuclear testing. Although the development of new and advanced delivery systems have been the most significant factor during the recent years of nuclear weapons development, the refinement of the explosive devices has not been unimportant. On the contrary the last 10 years have witnessed the emergence of the first third generation nuclear weapons in the form of the neutron bomb or the enhanced radiation weapons. Other third generation nuclear weapons subject to research and maybe also to development could be the X-ray laser and the EMP weapons, the latter designed to maximize the size of the electromagnetic pulse and its effects generated by a nuclear detonation.

The X-ray laser is contemplated to become an element in space-based strategic defensive systems and at present subject to strenuous research efforts. Although most ingredients of such strategic defensive systems are non-nuclear, any such strategic defensive effort on the part of the two major space Powers could have significant and even crucial effects on the nuclear strategic balance. It has, for example, been pointed out that one countermeasure with regard to a strategic defensive system could be a substantial increase in the number of strategic offensive nuclear missiles and warheads. Space defensive programmes, whatever their intention, could lead a new environment, space, being drawn into the arms race.

There are three different kinds of so-called vertical nuclear proliferation. First is the increase of the number of warheads or explosive devices of the nuclear arsenals of the major nuclear weapon States. The second is the rapid development of new and even more advanced weapon systems. This development has been especially rapid with regard to the delivery component of the systems. In addition to ballistic missiles the cruise missiles have rapidly increased in
number and importance. The nuclear weapon States have thus been able to enhance their capability to carry out nuclear warfare at an intermediate range. The third dimension is the geographic proliferation in the form of deployment outside the territories of the nuclear weapon States, within the territories of their alliances or on the high seas.

This development has not only adversely affected the stability of the security relations between the nuclear weapon States themselves but also the security of the non-nuclear weapon States. This proliferation has enhanced the danger of nuclear war.

The nuclear weapon States have repeatedly stated their commitment to the undertaking under Article VI. In November 1981, the United States and the Soviet Union started talks on Intermediate Range Nuclear Force. In January 1982 the two sides started talks on Strategic Arms. Both sides made proposals rejected by the other side during the course of the negotiations. The two sets of negotiations were suspended in November 1983 without any agreement reached. In March 1985 the first round of new bilateral negotiations concerning the strategic and intermediate range nuclear force as well as space arms began in Geneva. The second round of the new talks ended in July 1985, so far without result.

Thus hardly any results have been achieved in the bilateral talks. The international tension, first and foremost fuelled by the deep distrust between the two major nuclear weapon States has practically eliminated any chance to achieve a cessation of the unabated nuclear arms race, let alone made it possible to achieve nuclear disarmament. The new round of talks should nevertheless be considered as a positive development.

The fact remains that the achievement of the goal spelled out in Article VI of a cessation of the nuclear arms race "at an early date" now 15 years after the entry into force of the Treaty appears to be a more distant possibility than ever. The major nuclear weapon Powers should be reminded of their solemn undertaking under Article VI and that nuclear disarmament cannot be replaced by so-called crisis management or manipulation of the bilateral security balance under a consistent growth of their arsenals. Those Powers should be aware that security in the nuclear age cannot be divided and that all States, nuclear or non-nuclear alike, have an equal right to live in peace without the threat or use of force against their territorial integrity or political independence.

The Group of Non-Aligned and Neutral States is gravely concerned that during the period 1980-85 no negotiations took place on the question of a nuclear test ban. The trilateral talks were suspended during the period. An ad hoc Working Group on the question was established within the Committee on Disarmament for the session of 1982 and 1983 of the Committee. However, no actual negotiations took place during the period, although some useful proposals were made and though the work of a Group of Scientific Experts on Seismic Detection added to the understanding of the problem of verification. One of the major nuclear weapon Powers declared in 1982 that to it, a comprehensive test ban treaty was only a long term goal. In 1984 and 1985 the Conference could not agree on a mandate for a subsidiary body to elaborate a treaty. The other major nuclear weapon Power announced a five months' unilateral moratorium on
testing from 6 August 1985. Meanwhile the three Depository States to the
Non-Proliferation Treaty have conducted nuclear explosions as follows:
[Source: SIPRI Year Book: 1985]

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Considering the wording of Article VI on the cessation of the nuclear arms race "at an early date", the declared policy of a comprehensive nuclear test ban as a long term goal must be seen as a contradiction against fundamental elements of the Treaty, especially as one preambular paragraph is devoted solely to a comprehensive nuclear test ban, the only concrete disarmament measure specifically mentioned in the Treaty.

No progress has been reported from the Conference on Disarmament on such nuclear weapon issues on its agenda as the Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and the Prevention of Nuclear War. Neither is there any new development on the agenda item on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons.

Two Review Conferences have taken place since 1980, one on the Sea-bed Treaty and one on the Environmental Modification Treaty. In 1982, a Special United Nations General Assembly Session on Disarmament took place, without any results in matters directly linked to nuclear disarmament.

The last five years have thus not given any results concerning negotiations on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament. In the context of Article VI, it is the conclusion of the Group that the period between 1980 to 1985 has been five wasted years.

In this context the Group recalls the Political Declaration adopted by the heads of State or Government at the Seventh Non-Aligned Summit in March 1983 which "reiterated their conviction that international peace and security can only be ensured through general and complete disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament, under effective international control. In order to prevent effectively the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, nuclear weapon States should adopt urgent measures for halting and reversing the nuclear arms race. Pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament, the Heads of State or Government, in the name of humanity demanded an immediate prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by all nuclear weapon States. They further called for a freeze on the development, production, stockpiling and deployment of nuclear weapons and the speedy finalization of a comprehensive Treaty banning the testing of nuclear weapons. They also reiterated that the nuclear weapon States have an obligation to guarantee that non-nuclear weapon States will not be threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons. The Heads of State or Government recommended that negotiations should proceed without delay for the conclusion of an agreed international instrument on effective international arrangements to assure all non-nuclear weapon States, without any discrimination, against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".
It also recalls the declaration made by six Heads of States on 20 January 1985, New Delhi calling upon the nuclear weapon States to bring their arms race to a halt which has so far been unheeded.

The Group also recalls in particular the final paragraph of that Declaration which stated - "Forty years ago, in Hiroshima and San Francisco, the horror of nuclear war was matched by the hope for peace. We would like this year of 1985 to be the year when hope begins to prevail over terror. We dare to hope that by 23 October 1985, the Fortieth Anniversary of the United Nations, we might see the first concrete steps to avert the threat to the survival of humanity".

The Group welcomes the recent entry into force of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty signed in Rarotonga, and takes note of the three protocols now open to the signature of nuclear weapon States.

III. PROPOSALS

In the above circumstances the Group of Non-Aligned and Neutral States recommends the following for adoption and subsequent implementation by the States Parties to the Treaty:

1. The Group calls all Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and particularly the nuclear weapon States, to reaffirm their commitment to the implementation in good faith of Article VI and the tenth preambular paragraph closely related thereto of the NPT. The Group urges them to prove with deeds the authenticity of such a commitment.

2. The Group calls for the urgent initiation of negotiations towards a comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in the Conference on Disarmament as an effective measure for the cessation of a nuclear arms race at an early date.

To achieve this end the Group considers it urgent that the nuclear weapon States Parties to the Treaty in particular agree to commence work on a nuclear test ban in the Conference on Disarmament with a negotiating mandate. More specifically to establish an ad hoc Committee in the Conference on Disarmament on a Nuclear Test Ban to initiate the multilateral negotiation of a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests and report to the Conference on the progress of its work pursuant to its mandate. The ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban will take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives. In addition, it will draw on the knowledge and experience that have been accumulated over the years in the consideration of a comprehensive test ban in the successive multilateral negotiating bodies and the trilateral negotiations. The ad hoc Committee will also take into account the work of the ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to consider International Co-operative Measures to detect and identify Seismic Events.

Pending conclusion of a CTBT, the Group calls on all nuclear weapon States to establish an immediate moratorium on all nuclear weapon testing, as a measure of their sincerity in complying with Article VI and as a confidence-building measure that will facilitate the conclusion of an effective CTBT.

4. The Group calls for an immediate freeze on nuclear arsenals, in particular, of the two super-Powers with a view to cease the nuclear arms race at an early date and to arrive at nuclear disarmament agreements. In this context the Group
urges the cessation of the qualitative improvement and deployment of nuclear weapon systems and immediate halting of the further deployment of nuclear arsenals especially in areas where nuclear weapons have hitherto not been deployed and their eventual withdrawal and prohibition.

5. The Group calls for a clear-cut, unambiguous and internationally binding commitment from the nuclear weapon States Parties not to use nuclear weapons, and to proceed towards progressive and deep reductions of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time.

6. To achieve this end the Group calls for the immediate commencement of multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations in the single multilateral negotiating forum in the Conference on Disarmament, with a view to arriving at agreements at appropriate stages and with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to the States concerned for:

   (a) Cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapon systems;

   (b) Cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;

   (c) A comprehensive, phased programme with agreed time frames, whenever feasible, for progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time.

7. It also urges the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to pursue their bilateral negotiations on a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms both strategic and intermediate range with all questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship with determination and produce early and effective agreements, so as to complement and ensure the positive outcome of multilateral agreements on disarmament.

8. The Group calls upon all States, particularly the Nuclear Weapon States Parties to the NPT to accelerate and renew their commitment to the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament devoted to the elaboration of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
PROPOSAL BY AUSTRALIA ON ARTICLE III OF THE TREATY

Australia submits the following proposal for inclusion in the Final Declaration:

"The Conference affirms its determination to strengthen further the barriers against the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Parties remain convinced that universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty is the best way to do so and they urge all States not party to the Treaty to accede to it.

"In that context, the Conference declares that the commitment to non-proliferation by non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and the verification of that commitment by the acceptance of IAEA safeguards at all times on all peaceful nuclear activities within those States is a major contribution by those States to regional and international security. The Conference therefore specifically urges all non-nuclear-weapon States not Party to the Treaty to make this commitment and to accept those safeguards.

"The Conference further urges all States in their international nuclear co-operation to establish as an essential basis for the transfer of material, nuclear material, equipment and technology to non-nuclear-weapon States the acceptance of NPT or IAEA full-scope safeguards. The Conference expresses its strong view that accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty by all non-nuclear-weapon States is the best way to establish that basis."
Article III: Proposal for inclusion in the Final Declaration

The following proposal is submitted for consideration as an inclusion in the Final Declaration:

"The Conference affirms its determination to strengthen further the barriers against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. The Parties remain convinced that universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty is the best way to do so and they urge all States not party to the Treaty to accede to it.

In that context, the Conference declares that the commitment to non-proliferation by non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and the verification of that commitment by the acceptance of IAEA safeguards at all times on all peaceful nuclear activities within those States (i.e., NPT safeguards) is a major contribution by those States to regional and international security. The Conference therefore specifically urges all non-nuclear-weapon States not Party to the Treaty to make such a commitment and to accept IAEA safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear activities, both current and future.

The Conference further urges all States to establish as a necessary basis for international nuclear co-operation in the transfer of relevant nuclear supplies to non-nuclear-weapon States a commitment to non-proliferation and acceptance of NPT safeguards by those States. The Conference expresses its view that accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty by all non-nuclear-weapon States is the best way to establish that basis."
The Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Confirming its belief that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

Recalling the declared intention of the States Parties to the Treaty "to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament",

Further recalling the obligation undertaken by Article VI of the Treaty that "each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control",

Reaffirming the obligations of Article I and II of the Treaty and its basic spirit concerning non-proliferation of nuclear weapons,

Deeply concerned that 15 years after the date of entry into force of the Treaty the nuclear arms race, far from being halted, has on the contrary been intensified and speeded up, and that the negotiations undertaken so far in different disarmament forums did not produce concrete results in regard to the effective implementation of Article VI of the Treaty,

Convinced that only the nuclear-weapon States can stop vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons which would substantially contribute towards preventing their horizontal proliferation as well,

Convinced that the halting of nuclear arms race, the deployment of nuclear weapons and their effective reduction leading to their final elimination from the arsenals of nuclear-weapon States would significantly enhance the creation of essential conditions for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones,

1. Urges the nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty to initiate as soon as possible negotiations concerning theatre or tactical nuclear weapons aimed at the conclusion of a Treaty to halt their further deployment and on their withdrawal from the territories of the non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, including their delivery systems;
2. Requests the nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty to immediately discontinue further deployment of all types of tactical and other nuclear-weapon-delivery systems within the territories of the non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and to simultaneously commence with their gradual withdrawal pending the entry into force of the aforementioned Treaty;

3. Invites also the non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on whose territories, waterways or air space the nuclear-weapon delivery systems are deployed not to allow the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, in particular against other non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty.
The delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria to the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons suggests for consideration some observations relating to nuclear-weapon-free zones and to the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, dealt with in Article VII of the Treaty.

1. The most effective guarantee against the possible use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and the danger of a nuclear war is nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Pending the achievement of this goal on a universal basis, the particular importance of undertaking joint steps to enhance the security of non-nuclear-weapon States should be reaffirmed. Adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty by non-nuclear-weapon States is a valuable measure for strengthening their mutual security.

2. The States Parties to the Treaty find themselves in security situations which vary from region to region. Various appropriate means may, therefore, be necessary to meet the security concerns of States. Different approaches may be followed to this end, both globally and regionally.

3. Article VII of the NPT reaffirms the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories. The establishment of such zones completely free of nuclear weapons, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, constitutes an important measure which contributes to nuclear disarmament by effectively curbing various forms of the spread of nuclear weapons and would significantly strengthen the security of those States. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is fully consistent with and contributes to the achievement of the objectives of the NPT on a regional basis. The importance of pursuing in parallel these two complementary approaches to nuclear non-proliferation, which could contribute to reducing the nuclear threat and averting nuclear war, should be recognized. The adherence of non-nuclear-weapon States to the NPT is one of the most important factors facilitating the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, in various regions.

4. The process of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world free of nuclear weapons, being also one of the goals of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The nuclear-weapon States are invited
to assist in every possible way the efforts of States in a region to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone, and to enter into binding undertakings to respect strictly the status of such a zone and to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of the zone.

5. The creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America through the conclusion of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), and the assumption of obligations of non-use of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States in respect of that Treaty through its Additional Protocol II, is a matter of general satisfaction. Most recently, on 6 August 1985 - the 40th Anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima - the Forum of non-nuclear-weapon States from the South Pacific endorsed, and opened for signature a treaty designed to establish a nuclear-free zone covering a wide area of the Earth surface.

6. Various proposals for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Europe, including the Balkans, northern Europe and other parts of the continent, Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, etc., have been advanced or reiterated. Regional activities are under way to implement them. A proposal has also been put forward to establish in Europe a corridor free of battlefield nuclear weapons. The active efforts of States in the respective regions have to be encouraged and all States concerned, including all nuclear-weapon States, should be called upon to support and not to impede these joint regional endeavours. The success of these efforts, particularly in the regions with the densest concentration of nuclear weapons or in areas of conflict, would be of a great contribution to eliminating sources of regional distrust and instability, and to lessening international tensions and the danger of war.

7. In this context, it is important to note that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in a region may be fully compatible with membership in other security arrangements, and need not entail withdrawal from these arrangements. States belonging to different military alliances, for instance, have presented proposals aimed at creating nuclear-weapon-free zones in their respective regions, and have expressed their readiness to join such zones and are participating in the efforts towards the establishment of such zones.

8. Progress towards the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones will create conditions more conducive to the establishment of zones of peace in certain regions of the world.

9. Note should be taken of the continued determination of the Depositary States to honour their statements, which were welcomed by the United Nations Security Council in resolution 255 (1968), that to ensure the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT they will provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty which is a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used. These security guarantees should, however, be complemented by evolving uniform international legal measures to effectively strengthen the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the possible use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

10. The declarations on non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States made by nuclear-weapon States in connection with the Tenth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly were noted in the Final Document of that session. In that document the General Assembly urged the nuclear-weapon States
"to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons."

11. Consultations and negotiations on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons have been under way in the Conference on Disarmament for several years already. The Conference on Disarmament has repeatedly expressed its intention to explore ways and means to overcome the difficulties that have been encountered in its work and to continue to negotiate with a view to reaching appropriate agreement. The search should be expedited for a common approach acceptable to all, which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character. In this connection, it should be noted that in the Conference on Disarmament there was no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention to strengthen the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, although the difficulties involved were pointed out.

12. All States concerned, and especially the nuclear-weapon States, should be urged to actively co-operate in the search for agreement on the substance of such effective, unconditional and uniform international arrangements. In the search for a solution to the problem, priority should be given to the legitimate security concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States which, by virtue of their foregoing the nuclear option and of not allowing nuclear weapons to be stationed on their territories, have every right to expect to be most effectively guaranteed against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

13. The Conference on Disarmament should continue to negotiate with a view to reaching a meaningful agreement on guarantees to strengthen the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

14. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones may also be an effective means to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. All nuclear-weapon States should encourage and assist the efforts of States in various regions of the world to conclude appropriate arrangements to this end.

15. Solemn international undertakings of non-first use of nuclear weapons have been assumed by some nuclear-weapon States. If all nuclear-weapon States give similar pledges, this would amount, in practice, to banning the use of nuclear weapons altogether. The adoption of such obligations by all nuclear-weapon States would, therefore, constitute an invaluable contribution to strengthening the security of all States, including all non-nuclear-weapon States.

16. All States, both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, should also refrain, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, from the threat or the use of force in relations between States, involving either nuclear or non-nuclear weapons.
Article VI: Elements for a Report of Committee I

The Report would be built around the constituent elements of the Article itself. Firstly, developments related to the cessation of the nuclear arms race, secondly, progress on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament, and, lastly, progress towards General and Complete Disarmament. The Report would contain an evaluation of the achievements and lack of achievements in respect of each aspect of the Article, and in particular with regard to the goals set out in preambular paragraph X, which reaffirmed the commitment already contained in the Partial Test Ban to continue negotiations with a view to achieving a Comprehensive Test Ban.

The Report would conclude with a number of recommendations relevant to the implementation of this Article of the Treaty.

I

In examining the developments relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race, the Report would record the unremitting development of the nuclear potentials of the nuclear weapon States parties, and question the compatibility of such developments with the commitments contained in the Article. It would identify the principal characteristics of the nuclear arms race at present, including certain disquieting aspects of current approaches; it would note the regional intensification of the nuclear arms race.

II

A second part of the Report would deal with the progress in arms control and disarmament negotiations. It would examine the bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States, and in particular it would:

Narrate the sequence of events following the discontinuance of the SALT negotiations, including the declared intention of the parties that they would continue to uphold the restraints foreseen in the SALT II Treaty.

Narrate the facts relating to the pursuit and subsequent suspension of the START and INF negotiations.

Note the resumption of bilateral talks between the Soviet Union and the United States in 1985.

In its second part the Report would also evaluate the progress made in multilateral disarmament negotiations.
It would narrate the facts relating to the suspension of the Trilateral Negotiations on a CTBT, and of the subsequent failure to establish an Ad hoc Committee at the Conference on Disarmament for the pursuit of multilateral negotiations.

It would record the views of delegations regarding the relative importance of a CTBT in any programme designed to achieve the goal of nuclear disarmament and to prevent nuclear war.

It would record the views of delegations as to the purposes of such a Treaty in respect of scope and verification and duration.

It would record the calls by a number of parties for the introduction by the nuclear weapon States parties of a moratorium on nuclear testing in the context of negotiations for a CTBT.

It would note the lack of progress on other relevant items of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, in particular those relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race, the prevention of nuclear war and effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

III

It would record the failure of the Second Special Session of the United Nations devoted to Disarmament to build upon the Programme of Action of the First Special Session.

In addition, the Report would recall the more prominent of the proposals made in the multilateral field during the period of review, including:

Calls to halt the further vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, in particular by freezing the constituent elements of the nuclear arms race.

Calls for the cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes.

A third section of the Report considering progress towards General and Complete Disarmament would recall paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the First Special Session, which was re-affirmed at the Second Special Session. It would note the lack of progress in realizing the objectives of the Final Document, in particular the failure to agree upon a comprehensive programme of action for disarmament designed to facilitate the halting and reversing of the arms race.

In a final section the Report would aim to agree upon a number of recommendations, including:

Reaffirmation that the implementation of Article VI is central to the upholding of the Treaty.

A renewed commitment by the parties to the goals set out in Article VI.
A call upon the nuclear weapon States parties to demonstrate this commitment by the sincere and ongoing pursuit of the nuclear arms control negotiations which are their particular responsibility, as well as a similarly positive approach to multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations.

A reaffirmation of the importance attached by the NPT to the conclusion of a CTBT in the process of nuclear disarmament.

A call for the commencement of negotiations leading to the conclusion of a CTBT at the Conference on Disarmament, or alternatively as a first step, through the resumption of the Trilateral Negotiations.

Concern that the nuclear arms race has continued unabated, that there are now more types of newer weapons with greater destructive potential than before, and that the regional aspects of the nuclear arms race have taken on new dimensions.

A renewal of calls upon the Soviet Union and the United States to continue to uphold the provisions of the SALT II Agreement as they have undertaken to do.

Concern that the INF negotiations were suspended in 1983 and that deployment of medium range nuclear forces has continued in consequence.

A welcome for the resumption of bilateral talks between the Soviet Union and the United States in 1985 combined with a message of the urgency for the two governments to pursue the achievement of substantive measures of arms control, and to prevent the emergence of destabilizing developments.

Concern lest any new development with respect to the existing disposition of nuclear weapons be undertaken that would undermine the maintenance of international peace and security.

Concern at the prospect of the extension of the arms race to outer space and a call that no measure be undertaken that would undermine the existing instruments relating to the disposition of nuclear weapons, with particular regard to the ABM Treat.

Urge the Conference on Disarmament to proceed with multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations in implementation of Article 50 of the Final Document of the First Special Session.
The reaffirmation of the inalienable right and the undertakings with regard to international co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy provided for in Article IV and in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the preamble of the Treaty are an integral and essential part of the balance of rights and duties as well as mutual obligations of all Parties to the Treaty whether they are nuclear or non-nuclear-weapon States. Such international co-operation must embrace without discrimination all activities in the field of peaceful use of nuclear energy.

The Conference reaffirms that strict application of these provisions is a prerequisite for full implementation of the Treaty and for promoting universal adherence to it.

The Conference reaffirms that licences for exports and re-exports or fuel cycle authorizations where they are demanded by national policies should be issued in a foreseeable and reliable manner, based on appropriate agreed criteria and/or a programmatic approval with the objective of permitting a stable and long-term planification of nuclear activities.

The Conference notes that a clear separation of civilian and military nuclear programmes in nuclear-weapon-States would facilitate the co-operation between non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon States.

The Conference welcomes efforts already made concerning assurances of supply and assurances of non-proliferation within CAS and invites participants to pursue these efforts in order to consolidate the international co-operation in nuclear energy through a wider adherence to the non-proliferation régime.

The Conference requests that possibilities of improving the implementation of Article IV experienced on bilateral level should be presented in a special report based on national contributions to the next review conference.
Mechanisms of peaceful settlement of disputes have already been created in an increasing number of bilateral co-operation agreements as well as within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency. They have proven to foster both the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the objective of non-proliferation: e.g. INFCIRC/153 (Corr): The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (paragraphs 20 to 22); INFCIRC/274: Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (article 17).

The Conference recognizes therefore the establishment of a system for the peaceful settlement of disputes which could arise, among States Parties to the Treaty, from the interpretation or implementation of articles I to IV of the Treaty would be one effective measure to promote universal adherence to the Treaty and to strengthen the confidence in it.

The Conference invites the States Parties to establish a system for the peaceful settlement of disputes related to the rights and obligations contained in articles I to IV of the Treaty.
Working paper containing formulations for the Final Declaration on Article VI of the Treaty

The intentions and obligations provided for in Article VI and in paragraphs 8, 10 and 11 of the preamble of the Treaty concerning the cessation of the nuclear arms race and effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament are an essential part of the balance of responsibilities and mutual obligations of all Parties to the Treaty. Substantive results in applying these provisions are an indispensable element for full implementation of the Treaty and for its acceptability to States not member to the Treaty.

The Conference notes with deep concern the absence of results in the field of cessation of the nuclear arms race and disarmament, although the provisions under Article VI might be considered as formally fulfilled.

In view of the negotiations provided for in Article VI NPT, the Conference calls upon substantive steps in the field of nuclear arms reduction, with the aim of early, balanced and verifiable results, achieving stability on substantially lower levels of armament.

Bearing in mind that a lack of concrete measures seriously affects the spirit of the whole NPT the Conference will examine at its next meeting any results reached under Article VI of the Treaty.
RULES OF PROCEDURE

I. REPRESENTATION AND CREDENTIALS

Delegations of Parties to the Treaty

Rule 1

1. Each State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (hereinafter "the Treaty") may be represented at the Conference by a head of delegation and such other representatives, alternate representatives and advisers as may be required.

2. The head of delegation may designate an alternate representative or an adviser to act as a representative.

Credentials

Rule 2

The credentials of representatives and the names of alternate representatives and advisers shall be submitted to the Secretary-General of the Conference, if possible not less than one week before the date fixed for the opening of the Conference. Credentials shall be issued either by the Head of the State or Government or by the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Credentials Committee

Rule 3

The Conference shall establish a Credentials Committee composed of the Chairman and two Vice-Chairmen elected in accordance with rule 5, and six members appointed by the Conference on the proposal of the President. The Committee shall examine the credentials of representatives and report to the Conference without delay.

Provisional participation

Rule 4

Pending a decision of the Conference upon their credentials, representatives shall be entitled to participate provisionally in the Conference.

II. OFFICERS

Election

Rule 5

The Conference shall elect the following officers: A President and 26 Vice-Presidents, as well as a Chairman and two Vice-Chairmen for each of the three Main Committees, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee.
Acting President

Rule 6

1. If the President is absent from a meeting or any part thereof, he shall designate a Vice-President to take his place.

2. A Vice-President acting as President shall have the same powers and duties as the President.

Voting rights of the President

Rule 7

The President, or a Vice-President acting as President, shall not vote, but shall appoint another member of his delegation to vote in his place.

III. GENERAL COMMITTEE

Composition

Rule 8

1. The General Committee shall be composed of the President of the Conference, who shall preside, the 26 Vice-Presidents, the Chairmen of the three Main Committees, the Chairman of the Drafting Committee and the Chairman of the Credentials Committee. No two members of the General Committee shall be members of the same delegation and it shall be so constituted as to ensure its representative character.

2. If the President is unable to attend a meeting of the General Committee, he may designate a Vice-President to preside at such meeting and a member of his delegation to take his place. If a Vice-President is unable to attend, he may designate a member of his delegation to take his place. If the Chairman of a Main Committee, the Drafting Committee or the Credentials Committee is unable to attend, he may designate one of the Vice-Chairmen to take his place, with the right to vote unless he is of the same delegation as another member of the General Committee.

Functions

Rule 9

The General Committee shall assist the President in the general conduct of the business of the Conference and, subject to the decisions of the Conference, shall ensure the co-ordination of its work.

IV. CONFERENCE SECRETARIAT

Duties of the Secretary-General of the Conference

Rule 10

1. There shall be a Secretary-General of the Conference. He shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the Conference, its committees and working groups, and may designate a member of the Secretariat to act in his place at these meetings.

2. The Secretary-General of the Conference shall direct the staff required by the Conference.
Duties of the Secretariat

Rule 11

The Secretariat of the Conference shall, in accordance with these rules:

(a) interpret speeches made at meetings;
(b) receive, translate and circulate the documents of the Conference;
(c) publish and circulate any report of the Conference;
(d) take and arrange for the keeping of sound recordings and summary records of meetings;
(e) arrange for the custody of the documents of the Conference in the archives of the United Nations and provide authentic copies of these documents to each of the depositary Governments, and
(f) generally perform all other work that the Conference may require.

Costs

Rule 12

The costs of the Review Conference, including the sessions of the Preparatory Committee, will be met by the States Parties to the Treaty participating in the Review Conference in accordance with the detailed schedule attached as an Appendix. States which have signed but not yet ratified the Treaty, and which accept the invitation to take part in the Review Conference as provided by Rule 44, will share in such costs to the extent of their respective rates of assessment under the United Nations scale (and on an estimated basis for those participants not members of the United Nations).

V. CONDUCT OF BUSINESS

Quorum

Rule 13

A majority of the States Parties to the Treaty participating in the Conference shall constitute a quorum.

General Powers of the President

Rule 14

1. In addition to exercising the powers conferred upon him elsewhere by these rules, the President shall preside at the plenary meetings of the Conference; he shall declare the opening and closing of each meeting, direct the discussion, ensure

2/ It is understood that all financial arrangements for the Review Conference do not constitute a precedent.
observance of these rules, accord the right to speak, ascertain consensus, put questions to the vote and announce decisions. He shall rule on points of order. The President, subject to these rules, shall have complete control of the proceedings and over the maintenance of order thereat. The President may propose to the Conference the closure of the list of speakers, a limitation on the time to be allowed to speakers and on the number of times the representative of each State may speak on a question, the adjournment or the closure of the debate and the suspension or the adjournment of a meeting.

2. The President, in the exercise of his functions, remains under the authority of the Conference.

Points of order

Rule 15

A representative may at any time raise a point of order, which shall be immediately decided by the President in accordance with these rules. A representative may appeal against the ruling of the President. The appeal shall be immediately put to the vote, and the President's ruling shall stand unless over-ruled by a majority of the representatives present and voting. A representative may not, in raising a point of order, speak on the substance of the matter under discussion.

Speeches

Rule 16

1. No one may address the Conference without having previously obtained the permission of the President. Subject to rules 15, 17 and 19-22, the President shall call upon speakers in the order in which they signify their desire to speak.

2. Debate shall be confined to the subject under discussion and the President may call a speaker to order if his remarks are not relevant thereto.

3. The Conference may limit the time allowed to speakers and the number of times the representative of each State may speak on a question; permission to speak on a motion to set such limits shall be accorded only to two representatives in favour of and to two opposing such limits, after which the motion shall be immediately put to the vote. In any event, the President shall limit interventions on procedural questions to a maximum of five minutes. When the debate is limited and a speaker exceeds the allotted time, the President shall call him to order without delay.

Precedence

Rule 17

The Chairman of a committee may be accorded precedence for the purpose of explaining the conclusion arrived at by his committee.
Closing of list of speakers

Rule 19

During the course of a debate the President may announce the list of speakers and, with the consent of the Conference, declare the list closed. When the debate on an item is concluded because there are no more speakers, the President shall declare the debate closed. Such closure shall have the same effect as closure pursuant to rule 22.

Right of reply

Rule 19

Notwithstanding rule 19, the President may accord the right of reply to a representative of any State participating in the Conference. Such statements shall be as brief as possible and shall, as a general rule, be delivered at the end of the last meeting of the day.

Suspension or adjournment of the meeting

Rule 20

A representative may at any time move the suspension or the adjournment of the meeting. No discussion on such motions shall be permitted and they shall, subject to rule 23, be immediately put to the vote.

Adjournment of debate

Rule 21

A representative may at any time move the adjournment of the debate on the question under discussion. Permission to speak on the motion shall be accorded only to two representatives in favour of and to two opposing the adjournment after which the motion shall, subject to rule 23, be immediately put to the vote.

Closure of debate

Rule 22

A representative may at any time move the closure of the debate on the question under discussion, whether or not any other representative has signified his wish to speak. Permission to speak on the motion shall be accorded only to two representatives opposing the closure, after which the motion shall, subject to rule 23, be immediately put to the vote.
Order of motions

Rule 27

The motions indicated below shall have precedence in the following order over all proposals or other motions before the meeting:

(a) to suspend the meeting;
(b) to adjourn the meeting;
(c) to adjourn the debate on the question under discussion;
(d) to close the debate on the question under discussion.

Submission of proposals and substantive amendments

Rule 24

Proposals and substantive amendments shall normally be submitted in writing to the Secretary-General of the Conference, who shall circulate copies to all delegations. Unless the Conference decides otherwise, proposals and substantive amendments shall be discussed or decided on no earlier than 24 hours after copies have been circulated in all languages of the Conference to all delegations.

Withdrawal of proposals and motions

Rule 25

A proposal or a motion may be withdrawn by its sponsor at any time before a decision on it has been taken, provided that it has not been amended. A proposal or a motion thus withdrawn may be reintroduced by any representative.

Decision on competence

Rule 26

Any motion calling for a decision on the competence of the Conference to adopt a proposal submitted to it, shall be decided upon before a decision is taken on the proposal in question.

Reconsideration of Proposals

Rule 27

Proposals adopted by consensus may not be reconsidered unless the Conference reaches a consensus on such reconsideration. When a proposal has been adopted or rejected by a majority or two-thirds vote, it may not be reconsidered unless the Conference, by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting, so decides. Permission to speak on a motion to reconsider shall be accorded only to two speakers opposing the motion, after which it shall be immediately put to the vote.
VI. VOTING AND ELECTIONS

Section of Decisions

Rule 26

1. Decisions on matters of procedure and in elections shall be taken by a majority of representatives present and voting.

2. The task of the Review Conference being to review the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized, and thus to strengthen its effectiveness, every effort should be made to reach agreement on substantive matters by means of consensus. There should be no voting on such matters until all efforts to achieve consensus have been exhausted.

3. If, notwithstanding the best efforts of delegates to achieve consensus, a matter of substance comes up for voting, the President shall defer the vote for 48 hours and during this period of deferment shall make every effort, with the assistance of the General Committee, to facilitate the achievement of general agreement, and shall report to the Conference prior to the end of the period.

4. If by the end of the period of deferment the Conference has not reached agreement voting shall take place and decisions shall be taken by a two-thirds majority of the representatives present and voting, providing that such majority shall include at least a majority of the States participating in the Conference.

5. If the question arises whether a matter is one of procedure or of substance, the President of the Conference shall rule on the question. An appeal against this ruling shall immediately be put to the vote and the President's ruling shall stand unless the appeal is approved by a majority of the representatives present and voting.

6. In cases where a vote is taken in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 4 above, the relevant rules of procedure relating to voting of the General Assembly of the United Nations shall apply, except as otherwise specifically provided herein.

Voting Rights

Rule 29

Every State Party to the Treaty shall have one vote.

Meaning of the phrase "representatives present and voting"

Rule 30

For the purposes of these rules, the phrase "representatives present and voting" means representatives casting an affirmative or negative vote. Representatives who abstain from voting are considered as not voting.
Elections

Rule 31

All elections shall be held by secret ballot, unless the Conference decides otherwise in an election where the number of candidates does not exceed the number of elective places to be filled.

Rule 32

1. If, when only one elective place is to be filled, no candidate obtains in the first ballot the majority required, a second ballot shall be taken, confined to the two candidates having obtained the largest number of votes. If in the second ballot the votes are equally divided, the President shall decide between the candidates by drawing lots.

2. In the case of a tie in the first ballot among the candidates obtaining the second largest number of votes, a special ballot shall be held among such candidates for the purpose of reducing their number to two; similarly, in the case of a tie among three or more candidates obtaining the largest number of votes, a special ballot shall be held; if a tie again results in the special ballot, the President shall eliminate one candidate by drawing lots and thereafter another ballot shall be held in accordance with paragraph 1.

Rule 33

1. When two or more elective places are to be filled at one time under the same conditions, those candidates, in a number not exceeding the number of such places, obtaining in the first ballot the majority required and the largest number of votes, shall be elected.

2. If the number of candidates obtaining such majority is less than the number of places to be filled, additional ballots shall be held to fill the remaining places, provided that if only one place remains to be filled the procedures in rule 32 shall be applied. The ballot shall be restricted to the unsuccessful candidates having obtained the largest number of votes in the previous ballot, but not exceeding twice the number of places remaining to be filled. However, in the case of a tie between a greater number of unsuccessful candidates a special ballot shall be held for the purpose of reducing the number of candidates to the required number; if a tie again results among more than the required number of candidates, the President shall reduce their number to that required by drawing lots.

3. If such a restricted ballot (not counting a special ballot held under the conditions specified in the last sentence of paragraph 2) is inconclusive, the President shall decide among the candidates by drawing lots.

VII. COMMITTEES

Main committees and working groups

Rule 34

The Conference shall establish three Main Committees for the performance of its functions. Each such Committee may establish working groups. As a general rule each State Party to the Treaty participating in the Conference may be represented in the Working Groups unless otherwise decided.
Representation on the Main Committees

Rule 35

Each State Party to the Treaty participating in the Conference may be represented by one representative on each Main Committee. It may assign to these Committees such alternate representatives and advisers as may be required.

Drafting Committee

Rule 36

1. The Conference shall establish a Drafting Committee composed of representatives of the same States which are represented on the General Committee. It shall coordinate the drafting of and edit all texts referred to it by the Conference or by a Main Committee, without altering the substance of the texts, and report to the Conference or to the Main Committee as appropriate. It shall also, without reopening substantive discussion on any matter, formulate drafts and give advice on drafting as requested by the Conference or a Main Committee.

2. Representatives of other delegations may also attend the meetings of the Drafting Committee and may participate in its deliberations when matters of particular concern to them are under discussion.

Officers and Procedures

Rule 37

The rules relating to officers, the Conference Secretariat, conduct of business and voting of the Conference (contained in chapters II (rules 5-7), IV (rules 10-11), V (rules 15-27) and VI (rules 28-33) above) shall be applicable, mutatis mutandis, to the proceedings of committees and working groups, except that:

(a) unless otherwise decided, any working group shall elect a chairman and such other officers as it may require;

(b) the chairmen of the General, the Drafting and the Credentials Committee and the chairmen of working groups may vote in their capacity as representatives of their States;

(c) a majority of the representatives on the General, Drafting and Credentials Committee or on any working group shall constitute a quorum; the chairman of a Main Committee may declare a meeting open and permit the debate to proceed when at least one-quarter of the representatives of the States participating in the Conference are present.

VIII. LANGUAGES AND RECORDS

Languages of the Conference

Rule 38

Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish shall be the official languages of the Conference.
Interpretation

Rule 39

1. Speeches made in a language of the Conference shall be interpreted into the other languages.

2. A representative may make a speech in a language other than a language of the Conference if he provides for interpretation into one such language. Interpretation into the other languages of the Conference by interpreters of the Secretariat may be based on the interpretation given in the first such language.

Language of official documents

Rule 40

Official documents shall be made available in the languages of the Conference.

Sound recordings of meetings

Rule 41

Sound recordings of meetings of the Conference and of all committees shall be made and kept in accordance with the practice of the United Nations. Unless otherwise decided by the Main Committee concerned, no such recordings shall be made of the meetings of a working group thereof.

Summary records

Rule 42

1. Summary records of the plenary meetings of the Conference and of the meetings of the Main Committees shall be prepared by the Secretariat in the languages of the Conference. They shall be distributed in provisional form as soon as possible to all participants in the Conference. Participants in the debate may, within three working days of receipt of provisional summary records, submit corrections on summaries of their own interventions to the Secretariat; in special circumstances, the presiding officer may, in consultation with the Secretary-General of the Conference, extend the time for submitting corrections. Any disagreement concerning such corrections shall be decided by the presiding officer of the body to which the record relates, after consulting, where necessary, the sound recordings of the proceedings. Separate corrigenda to provisional records shall not normally be issued.

2. The summary records, with any corrections incorporated, shall be distributed promptly to participants in the Conference.

IX. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MEETINGS

Rule 43

1. The plenary meetings of the Conference and the meetings of the Main Committees shall be held in public unless the body concerned decides otherwise.

2. Meetings of other organs of the Conference shall be held in private.
X. PARTICIPATION AND ATTENDANCE

Rule 44

1. **Signatories**

Any State signatory to the Treaty which has not yet ratified it shall be entitled to participate, without taking part in the adoption of decisions, whether by consensus or by vote, in the deliberations of the Conference, subject to prior written notification to the Secretary-General of the Conference. This means that any of those signatory States shall be entitled to appoint officials to attend meetings of the Plenary and of the Main Committees; to address such meetings; to receive the documents of the Conference and to submit its views in writing to the Conference, which shall be considered as Conference documents.

2. **Observers**

(a) Any other State which, in accordance with Article IX of the Treaty, has the right to become a Party thereto but which has neither signed nor ratified it may apply to the Secretary-General of the Conference for Observer status, which will be accorded on the decision of the Conference. Such a State shall be entitled to appoint officials to attend meetings of the Plenary and of the Main Committees other than those designated closed meetings, and to receive documents of the Conference. An Observer State shall also be entitled to submit documents to the participants in the Conference.

(b) Any national liberation organization entitled by the General Assembly of the United Nations to participate as an Observer in the sessions and the work of the General Assembly, all international conferences convened under the auspices of the General Assembly, and all international Conferences convened under the auspices of other organs of the United Nations, may apply to the Secretary-General of the Conference for Observer status, which will be accorded on the decision of the Conference. Such a liberation organization shall be entitled to appoint officials to attend meetings of the Plenary and of the Main Committees other than those designated closed meetings, and to receive documents of the Conference. An Observer organization shall also be entitled to submit documents to the participants in the Conference.

3. **The United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency**

The Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, or their representatives, shall be entitled to attend meetings of the Plenary and of the Main Committees and to receive the Conference documents. They shall also be entitled to submit material, both orally and in writing.

"/ It is understood that any such decision will be in accordance with the practice of the United Nations General Assembly.

4. Specialized Agencies and Regional Intergovernmental Organizations

The Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, other regional intergovernmental organizations and any specialized agency of the United Nations may apply to the Secretary-General of the Conference for Observer Agency status which will be accorded on the decision of the Conference. An Observer Agency shall be entitled to appoint officials to attend meetings of the Plenary and of the Main Committees other than those designated closed meetings and to receive the documents of the Conference. The Conference may also invite them to submit, in writing, their views and comments on questions within their competence, which may be circulated as Conference documents.

5. Non-Governmental Organizations

Representatives of non-governmental organizations who attend meetings of the Plenary or of the Main Committees will be entitled upon request to receive the documents of the Conference.
APPENDIX

(to rule 12)

Schedule for the Division of Costs

This schedule is based on the list of Parties and of Signatories to the Treaty as of the end of the second session of the Preparatory Committee on 24 August 1979.

Costs will be divided as follows:

1. (a) The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will pay 16.05 per cent of the total; the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland will pay 6.13 per cent of the total; and the United States of America will pay 32.82 per cent of the total;

(b) The developing States Parties will pay to the extent of their respective rates of assessment under the United Nations scale; */

(c) The other States Parties will divide the balance among themselves according to the ratios of their respective assessments under the United Nations scale; */

(d) Signatories participating in the Conference will share in the costs to the extent of their respective rates of assessment under the United Nations scale.

2. The schedule for the division of costs will be subject to review in the light of the actual participation in the Conference.

*/ The assigned contributions of States Parties not members of the United Nations will be based on estimates.
Cost-sharing formula for the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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<th>Share of costs (in %)</th>
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In the view of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic, the work of Committee I should lead to a document which may, inter alia, contain the following basic ideas:

1. The Conference should recall the provisions of Article VI of the Treaty, under which all Parties undertook to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating:
   - to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date,
   - to nuclear disarmament and
   - to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

2. The Conference should draw attention to the fact that the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, has been accelerated and intensified in recent years.

   While welcoming the efforts in the field of arms limitation and disarmament aimed at the implementation of Article VI of the Treaty, the Conference should express its great concern that no concrete results in disarmament negotiations have been achieved for several years and that negotiations on disarmament issues are lagging far behind the rapid technological developments in the field of armaments, especially nuclear armaments. This development has rendered the current international situation even more dangerous and insecure. In particular, the extension of the arms race to outer space would lead to a sharp increase in the risk of nuclear war, foster the arms race in all areas and impair the prospects for limiting and reducing armaments in general.

   Mankind feels deeply alarmed by this threatening prospect. Stressing the urgent necessity to implement the obligations under Article VI of the Treaty, the Conference should call upon all Parties, in particular nuclear-weapon States, to redouble their efforts to implement these provisions effectively and without any further delay.

3. The Conference should welcome the beginning of new negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on the whole complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms, both strategic and intermediate range, with all questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship. The Conference should express the expectation that the negotiations will be undertaken in good faith on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security and will produce early and
effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms and at strengthening strategic stability. The Conference should particularly welcome the belief expressed by both sides that ultimately the negotiations, just efforts in general to limit and reduce arms, should lead to the complete elimination of nuclear arms everywhere.

4. The Conference should stress its conviction that the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests would constitute an indispensable element for the success of efforts to halt the nuclear arms race, especially the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, as well as the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries. It should reaffirm the determination expressed in the preamble to the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty and reiterated in the preamble to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and in the Final Declaration of the First Review Conference, to achieve the discountenance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time.

The Conference should deplore that there are no negotiations now with a view to reaching agreement on a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. It should urge resolutely all States, especially all nuclear-weapon States, to exert maximum efforts and exercise political will for the elaboration and conclusion, without any delay, of such a treaty.

The Conference should urge the Conference on Disarmament to carry out practical negotiations with a view to elaborating a treaty prohibiting all nuclear-weapon tests, taking into account all existing drafts, proposals and future initiatives. An immediate step to end nuclear testing and to facilitate the elaboration and conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty would be the proclamation by all nuclear-weapon States of a moratorium on all nuclear explosions.

In this connection, the Conference should welcome the recent unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions declared by the Soviet Union and express the expectation that the other nuclear-weapon States will follow that example.

5. The Conference should express its conviction that the threat of nuclear war is the main problem for the survival of mankind. Therefore, the removal of that threat is the most acute and urgent task of the present day. It should call on all Parties, in particular nuclear-weapon States, to take urgent measures for the prevention of nuclear war. Of special importance in this regard would be the renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States which have not yet done so, as well as the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States.

The Conference should express the view that the Conference on Disarmament is the appropriate forum to undertake negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war.

6. The Review Conference should recall that paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly
stated that the achievement of nuclear disarmament will require urgent negotiation of agreements at appropriate stages and with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to the States concerned.

The Conference should state the view that the Conference on Disarmament should proceed without delay to negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament and especially to begin the elaboration of practical measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and for nuclear disarmament in accordance with paragraph 50 of the Final Document, including a nuclear disarmament programme.

7. One important step to facilitate the beginning of a nuclear disarmament process would be a freeze on all nuclear weapons in quantitative and qualitative terms. This step should be taken by all nuclear-weapon States or, in the first instance and simultaneously, by the Soviet Union and the United States on the understanding that the other nuclear-weapon States would follow their example. To agree to a freeze would mean:

- to cease the build-up of all components of nuclear arsenals, including all kinds of nuclear weapon delivery systems and all kinds of nuclear weapons;
- not to deploy nuclear weapons of new kinds and types;
- to establish a moratorium on all tests of nuclear weapons and on tests of new kinds and types of their delivery systems;
- to stop the production of fissionable materials for the purpose of creating nuclear weapons.

8. The Conference should emphasize the close interrelationship between the halting of the arms race on earth and its prevention in outer space and should, therefore, express its conviction that outer space shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and that further measures are needed for the prevention of an arms race in that area. Therefore, it should state the view that the Conference on Disarmament should consider as a matter of priority the question of preventing an arms race in outer space and undertake negotiations to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space.

9. The Conference should reaffirm its hope that all States Parties to the Treaty, through the United Nations and the Conference on Disarmament and other negotiations in which they participate, will work with determination towards the conclusion of arms limitation and disarmament agreements, which will contribute to the goal of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Noting that a comprehensive programme of disarmament would be a practical means of facilitating the realization of the objectives of Article VI of the Treaty, the Conference should appeal to all States to support in an active manner the elaboration of such a programme.

The Conference should stress the vital importance of preserving the existing system of bilateral, regional and global arms limitation and disarmament agreements, as well as strictly observing those agreements.
Corrigendum

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Working Paper containing Considerations on the Review of Article VI and the Tenth Preambular Paragraph of the NPT

On page 2, paragraph 4 of the English text, in the penultimate line, the word "discountenance" should be replaced by "discontinuance".
Proposal for inclusion in the Final Declaration relating to Article VII

The Conference considers that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the zone constitutes an important and effective measure of curbing the spread of nuclear weapons, which contributes significantly to the security of the States concerned.

The Conference welcomes steps which have been taken towards the establishment of such zones.

The nuclear-weapon States are invited to enter into binding undertakings to respect strictly the status of the nuclear-weapon-free zones and to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of the zone.

The Conference expresses its satisfaction at the continued successful operation of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (the Treaty of Tlatelolco). It calls upon all States that are eligible to become parties to the Treaty or to its Additional Protocol I who have not yet done so to take all necessary steps without delay to bring the Treaty régime fully into force throughout Latin America at the earliest possible date.

The Conference welcomes the signature of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty and calls upon all States concerned to ratify the Treaty or its Protocols so as to bring the provisions of the Treaty and the Protocols fully into force.

The Conference takes note of the proposals for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various other regions, including Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia and various parts of Europe.
NAURU

A RECIPROCAL INCENTIVES REGIME:

A PROPOSAL FOR STRENGTHENING THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

OFFERED FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF COMMITTEE I OF THE THIRD
REVIEW CONFERENCE ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Despite the successes of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), dissatisfaction has been expressed by member States, and several States remain outside its provisions. In particular, non-nuclear weapon States have met their NPT obligations, but the nuclear weapon States have not made significant progress toward nuclear disarmament as envisaged under Article VI of the Treaty. Many parties therefore feel disadvantaged by adherence to the NPT, and the universal acceptance and long-term viability of the Treaty are compromised accordingly. The lack of balance inherent in the NPT threatens its effectiveness, and indeed the very future of the non-proliferation regime, which in turn lessens the security of all States.

The Republic of Nauru believes that the lack of balance inherent in the present Treaty could be redressed constructively by a system of Reciprocal Incentives. Specifically, the nuclear weapon States presently both judge the compliance of the non-nuclear weapon States with their Treaty obligations, with the technical assistance of the IAEA, and also withdraw incentives from States found not in compliance. A chief incentive to non-nuclear States is facilitated access to the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology.

We propose the establishment of a reciprocal mechanism, by which the non-nuclear weapon States define and assess the compliance of the nuclear weapon States with their Article VI obligations, and collectively withdraw incentives from any nuclear weapon State found not in compliance. In the interest of reciprocity, we propose that the incentive to nuclear weapon States be identical to that offered to non-nuclear weapon States, namely, continued access to the benefits accrued from commerce in peaceful nuclear technology.

The present Working Paper presents proposals by which this might be accomplished. These include establishment of a review mechanism by which compliance with Article VI can be defined and periodically assessed by non-nuclear weapon States; a decertification procedure through which non-nuclear weapon States can withdraw from participation in peaceful nuclear commerce with non-complying nuclear
I

weapon States, pending their compliance with Article VI; and appropriate co-operative arrangements to guarantee participating non-nuclear weapon States continued adequate access to desired nuclear technologies and materials. We recommend that these ideas be developed more fully during the period between the Third and Fourth Review Conference.

THE CONCEPT OF RECIPROCAL INCENTIVES

The Background Paper to this Proposal, submitted by the Republic of Nauru, reviews the history of Article VI and of concerns regarding the issue of balance in the Treaty. With respect to mutual obligations and responsibilities, it is widely acknowledged that the non-nuclear weapon States have met their obligations under the NPT. In their General Debate to the present (Third) Review Conference, numerous States noted that not a single new nuclear weapon State has emerged since the entry into force of the NPT. The Treaty has effectively restrained horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Also widely acknowledged, however, is that the Treaty has failed to restrain vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. Progress on "effective measures" toward nuclear disarmament "at an early date" has not, in the expressed opinion of most delegations, been made. There is generally shared feeling among the non-nuclear weapon States that despite its successes, the NPT remains a discriminatory and therefore unbalanced Treaty.

It is a tenet of any effective agreement between freely consenting and equal parties that each must both experience and perceive equal advantages from the arrangement. If any party or parties experiences or perceives a comparative disadvantage, then the agreement is doomed to eventual failure. Any such imbalanced contract is bound to lose universal appeal (acknowledged as one of the weaknesses of the NPT); and existing parties may be moved toward withdrawing (under the provisions of Article X of the Treaty) or neglecting to renew their Treaty obligations (as must occur within ten years under Article X). The Republic of Nauru believes that the NPT is too crucial to the security interests of all States to suffer this fate, and that it is the responsibility of all contracting parties to help avoid such an outcome.

We believe that the NPT could be strengthened and its longevity assured by a system of Reciprocal Incentives. As the Treaty presently stands, it is the nuclear supplier States, with the assistance of the IAEA, that judge compliance of non-nuclear weapon States with their Treaty obligations. If a non-nuclear weapon State is deemed in violation of its Treaty obligations, the nuclear supplier States withdraw one incentive for continued adherence, namely continued access to the peaceful atom. There is no explicit provision, however, for a reciprocal arrangement, whereby non-nuclear weapon States assess the compliance of nuclear weapon States. Moreover, there is no incentive at present that can be withdrawn from the nuclear weapon States to encourage them to meet their Treaty obligations, short of the extreme step of withdrawal of non-nuclear States from the NPT and the pursuit of their own nuclear weapons capability. In the interest of strengthening the NPT, we propose the establishment of such a reciprocal assessment mechanism and the creation of corresponding Reciprocal Incentives.
By this general concept, a mechanism would be established within the NPT by which the non-nuclear weapon States both define and assess compliance of the nuclear weapon States with their Treaty obligations, exactly as the nuclear weapon States presently do for the non-nuclear weapon States. Furthermore, according to this concept, incentives would be withdrawn from any and all nuclear weapon States or nuclear supplier States found not in compliance with their Treaty obligations, also exactly as presently practiced under the Treaty by nuclear weapon States. As the nuclear weapon States actively "safeguard" nuclear technology and material transfer, so should the non-nuclear weapon States actively "safeguard" the future from the threat of vertical proliferation that is the legitimate security interest of all.

We propose that, in the interest of balance and reciprocity, the incentive to nuclear weapon and supplier States be exactly the same as that offered to the non-nuclear weapon States, namely the privilege of continued access to the benefits accrued from commerce in peaceful nuclear technology. By this concept, nuclear weapon States found not in compliance with their obligations under the NPT would be decertified from engaging in peaceful nuclear commerce (e.g., from the buying and selling of nuclear materials, power and/or research reactors, other equipment related to nuclear technologies, etc.). This proposal amounts in essence to the formation of an international Nuclear Buyer's "Collective", whose reason for existence is to assure access to the benefits of the peaceful atom while simultaneously encouraging non-proliferation and eventual nuclear disarmament under the provisions of the NPT. Nuclear supplier States that are not signatory to the NPT would automatically be decertified unless they were judged by the assessment mechanism to be in full compliance with the terms of the Treaty.

STEPS TOWARD IMPLEMENTATION OF A RECIPROCAL INCENTIVE REGIME

To implement this concept requires:

1. Definition of Compliance: Establishment of a mechanism by which the non-nuclear weapon States define precisely what steps by the nuclear weapon States would comprise compliance of the nuclear weapon States with their obligations under the Treaty.

Fulfilling this role will require acceptance by the non-nuclear weapon States of the responsibility of establishing the minimal criteria of compliance, and the development of appropriate, technically informed institutions analogous to the IAEA, either inside or outside the context of the NPT. It is envisioned that compliance will be defined according to a growing dynamic process, with the eventual goal of fully implementing Article VI of the Treaty and achieving complete and general disarmament.

2. Assessment of Compliance: Establishment of a mechanism by which the non-nuclear weapon States periodically assess compliance with the Treaty by the nuclear weapon States.

This function is to some degree analogous to the one presently played by the IAEA in assessing compliance of the non-nuclear weapon States with safeguard régimes.
3. Decertification and Recertification Procedures: Provision of a mechanism for decertifying nuclear weapon States found not in compliance with their Treaty obligations, and recertifying nations that come into compliance.

This function is analogous to that currently practised by the nuclear weapon States in deciding to withdraw access to nuclear materials and technology from non-complying non-nuclear weapon States. Fulfilling this function will require political will and economic co-operation, and a degree of political unity on this issue within the non-nuclear weapon States.


The capacity of non-nuclear weapon States to acquire desired nuclear technologies must not be compromised by their membership in the proposed Nuclear Buyer's Collective. Toward this end, non-nuclear weapon States that are prospective suppliers of nuclear technologies must co-operate to make nuclear technologies available to non-nuclear States on terms comparable to those offered by decertified nuclear weapon States. Several such mechanisms can be imagined, including concessionary financial terms that are internally subsidized by the governments of the certified nuclear supplier States; special funds aimed at facilitating technology transfer, etc.


The incentive of continued access to commerce in peaceful nuclear technology is but one of the many incentives, positive and negative, that can be imagined to induce the nuclear weapon States to meet their Article VII obligations. Additional incentives could involve commerce in strategic materials, trade in other natural resources, linkage of compliance with access to other energy resources, conditional extension of business and trade concessions, banking and financial agreements, etc. Development and strengthening of the Reciprocal Incentive régime will require identification and incorporation of additional economically effective and politically realistic incentives.


In the longer term, the success of Reciprocal Incentives (and, for that matter, of the NPT itself) will require that nuclear weapon States come to see an effective NPT (including full implementation of Article VI) as vital to their own security interests; and reciprocity and balance within the NPT as keys to its effectiveness. The implementation of Reciprocal Incentives, as proposed here, may be expected to facilitate and accelerate that very evolution.

7. Sustained Political Will: Perseverance and patience in establishing and nurturing a Reciprocal Incentives régime.

The successful establishment of genuine reciprocity within the NPT will clearly require broad co-operation from all parties. We do not underestimate the difficulties in meeting these general conditions and criteria; but neither
do we underestimate the cost of failing to do so. We believe that the NPT may not survive past 1995 unless it evolves into a truly reciprocal instrument that extends balanced advantages to all signatories. We believe further that the NPT will never be universally accepted by all nations, as is eventually required for general and complete disarmament, unless and until the Treaty is perceived as reciprocally advantageous to all signatories. Finally we are convinced that a world without an effective, fully-subscribed NPT is too dangerous to contemplate and fully unacceptable. Establishing an effective non-proliferation régime is a goal that is worthy of the most strenuous efforts of all the world's peoples and their governments. There is, indeed, no higher priority.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

We understand that our proposal for a Reciprocal Incentives régime is both new and complex, and requires considerable thought and analysis before it could be implemented. We understand further that the delegates present already have many concerns to occupy them for the remainder of the Third Review Conference.

The Republic of Nauru therefore requests a recommendation from Committee I of the Third Review Conference to establish a Reciprocal Incentives Preparatory Committee with the charge of developing a detailed set of proposals aimed at establishing a Reciprocal Incentives régime and incorporating it into the NPT.

We propose:

1. that this Reciprocal Incentives Preparatory Committee be established at the present Third Review Conference;

2. that the Preparatory Committee immediately invite ideas and analyses pertinent to a Reciprocal Incentives régime from all parties to the NPT;

3. that the Preparatory Committee meet no later than one year following the Third Review Conference, and periodically thereafter as necessary to its charge;

4. that the Preparatory Committee formally present its detailed recommendations for the establishment of a Reciprocal Incentives régime at the Fourth Review Conference of the NPT, to be held in 1990.

In forwarding these proposals to Committee I of the Third Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Republic of Nauru is honoured and privileged to participate in a constructive and co-operative process which, it is hoped, will lead to a balanced, effective, survivable and universally subscribed Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The fate of the earth and its peoples may hinge upon our efforts.
NAURU

THE HISTORY OF ARTICLE VI IN RELATION TO A BALANCED
NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

BACKGROUND PAPER TO THE PROPOSAL FOR A RECIPROCAL INCENTIVES
REGIME OFFERED FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF COMMITTEE I OF THE
THIRD REVIEW CONFERENCE ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Republic of Nauru has, by means of Working Group Paper submitted to
Committee I, proposed a Reciprocal Incentives régime by which the Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) can be made balanced and non-discriminatory, and therefore stronger
and more universally accepted. This proposal was motivated by the widely-perceived
imbalance in the present NPT. The history of this imbalance, and in particular the
history and interpretation of Article VI of the NPT, is detailed in the present
document, which is intended as a supporting appendix to the Reciprocal Incentives

INTRODUCTION

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, hereafter called the
Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT, is widely acknowledged as the most important
multilateral arms regulation agreement of our time. The goals of the Treaty were
aptly expressed seven years ago in paragraph 65 of the final (consensus) document
of the First Special Session on Disarmament of the General Assembly of the
United Nations, as follows:

The goal of nuclear non-proliferation is on the one hand to prevent the
emergence of any additional nuclear-weapon States besides the existing
dfive nuclear-weapon States, and on the other progressively to reduce and
eventually eliminate nuclear weapons altogether. This involves
obligations and responsibilities on the part of both nuclear weapon
States and non-nuclear weapon States, the former undertaking to stop the
nuclear arms race and to achieve nuclear disarmament by urgent
application of the relevant paragraphs of this Final Document, and all
States undertaking to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.
The NPT provides for interrelating and reciprocal responsibilities on the non-nuclear weapon States and nuclear weapon States alike. The non-nuclear weapon States are obliged to refrain from obtaining nuclear weapons (Article II) and from using nuclear technologies for non-peaceful purposes (Article III). Towards this end the non-nuclear weapon States agree to accept safeguards established and implemented by the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) (Article III). In return, the security interests of non-nuclear weapon States are served by impediments to the spread of nuclear weapons, and the non-nuclear weapon States are guaranteed access to the benefits associated with the peaceful uses of the atom (Articles IV and V). By establishing such incentives conditional upon compliance, the NPT restrains horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, i.e., spread of nuclear weapons capability to more countries.

For their part, the nuclear weapon States are obliged to refrain from making nuclear weapons available to non-nuclear weapon States (Article I), and to pursue negotiations in good faith toward nuclear disarmament at an early date (Article VI).

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control (Article VI of the NPT).

We note, however, the conspicuous absence of a reciprocal incentive comparable to that offered the non-nuclear States under Articles IV and V. The Treaty thus, in principle, restrains vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons systems, i.e., proliferation of nuclear weapons within existing nuclear weapon States, but specific mechanism for defining and assessing compliance, as well as incentives for such compliance are not incorporated into the NPT.

How did this lack of reciprocity arise? The answer lies in the history of Article VI and the context of the negotiations from which the NPT emerged in 1968.

THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES

The history of the NPT makes clear both the intent and the difficulties of its framers to create a balanced (reciprocal) Treaty. Early drafts of the NPT proposed by both the United States (US) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) made no reference to the question of vertical proliferation. Their interest in such a treaty was, by implication, to prevent horizontal proliferation without impacting on their own nuclear weapons capability. In response to these omissions, the non-aligned States pressed for a "principled" approach to negotiating the Treaty. The outcome of this effort was the unanimous adoption of General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) on 19 November 1965.

The Principles agreed to in this resolution were five:

1. An acceptable Treaty must be void of loopholes that might permit nuclear weapons to proliferate in any form, horizontally or vertically;

2. An acceptable Treaty must embody a balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of nuclear and non-nuclear weapon States alike;

3. An acceptable Treaty must represent a step toward general and complete disarmament, and in particular nuclear disarmament;
4. An acceptable Treaty must incorporate workable provisions to assure its effectiveness;

5. An acceptable Treaty must contain no provision that would adversely affect the right of any group of States to conclude regional agreements assuring total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

A sharp debate on these Principles took place at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC), co-chaired by the United States and the USSR, and composed of the Western Group: Canada, France (absent), Italy, United Kingdom, United States; the Eastern Group: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, USSR; the Non-Aligned Group: Brazil, Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria and Sweden. The nuclear weapon States argued initially that only Principle 3 should apply to negotiations regarding an NPT, and that any such Treaty would in fact represent the step toward disarmament envisaged in this Principle.

Even many of their allies found this position unacceptable, however, arguing that the Principle of balance (Principle 2) was also relevant. There was broad agreement that the "cessation of the nuclear arms race" and other nuclear disarmament measures cited only in the preamble of the draft Treaty must be "embodied" in the provisions of the Treaty itself. Several of the non-aligned participants felt that the first Principle (closing of loopholes to horizontal and vertical proliferation) also should be incorporated within the provisions of the Treaty. A Treaty that did not include specific provisions against vertical proliferation was not, in their view, devoid of loopholes as required by Principle 1. The United Nations Ambassador of Sierra Leone expressed this view most succinctly:

According to General Assembly resolution 2028 the intention was to stop both dissemination - the so-called horizontal proliferation - and stockpiling - the so-called vertical proliferation. What the draft would do would be to stop the dissemination of nuclear weapons. It does not prevent the vertical accumulation of more massive means of destruction either directly or indirectly, single-handedly or jointly, by the nuclear Powers. (UNGA/C.I/1572, pp. 166 and 168).

The Ambassador for Egypt to Geneva argued that the five Principles embodied in General Assembly resolution 2028 are

... generally, and quite rightly, considered to be in some sort the charter of non-proliferation of which the preamble will for this reason greatly contribute, we hope to the proper implementation and sound interpretation of the Treaty. (ENDC/PV/367, p. 7).

The nuclear weapon States, however, rejected the idea, stating that this notion was controversial, and "we should not risk transferring this controversy about interpretation into the treaty itself" (United States comment, ENDC/PV/370, p. 88). The non-nuclear weapon States, however, continued to believe that the nuclear weapon States must, in the interest of a balanced treaty, accept special obligations regarding nuclear arms talks. This feeling was heightened by their exclusion from nuclear arms talks between the nuclear weapon States, which effectively placed the burden of achieving disarmament on the nuclear weapon States.
It was generally acknowledged that the nuclear weapon States were indeed chiefly accountable for nuclear arms reductions. Reference in Article VI to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament was not controversial; on the contrary, the negotiation of such a general Treaty constituted a separate, parallel agenda item for the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee from its inception in 1962. In contrast, however, objections were still raised on the general obligations of the nuclear weapon States under Article VI. The compromise that was eventually reached on this pivotal issue was the inclusion of the words "on effective measures" on disarmament (see above, text of Article VI).

Several delegations expressed the view that even this compromise fell short of what was desirable. Thus, the delegate of Ethiopia, hoping to obtain a more specific commitment by the nuclear weapon States to continue nuclear arms talks, observed that "The broad and generalized version of the new draft fails to ensure such a definitive commitment" (ENDC/PV/364, p. 48). Similarly, the delegate of Dahomey (now Benin) noted that:

... if this treaty is really to be a step toward the achievement of general and complete disarmament and more particularly, nuclear disarmament, it must include more precise provisions to achieve this than the vague joint commitment contained in the present Article VI "to pursue negotiations in good faith". We consider that part of this article at least should consist of a specific and concrete commitment on the part of the nuclear Powers, which are mainly responsible for the nuclear peril to which the world is being subjected today. (UNGA/C.I/1568, p. 111)

Belgium offered its interpretation of the reciprocal obligations of the nuclear weapon States under Article VI, as follows:

In our opinion, the preamble and Article VI of the draft treaty are not there merely for effect but are real political and legal commitments on the part of the nuclear weapon States (UNGA/C.I/1571, p. 114; emphasis added)

**INTERPRETATION OF THE PHRASE "GOOD FAITH"

Despite the dissatisfaction of the non-nuclear weapon States with the compromise wording regarding the obligations of the nuclear weapon States, the compromise endured. Article VI, as well as the rest of the Treaty, remained in its present form. This compromise language was perhaps made more acceptable by the reassuring interpretations offered by the nuclear weapon States. The United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Mr. Goldberg, stated the United States understanding of Article VI, and its Treaty implications, as follows:

Article VI added, and subsequently strengthened, gives further effect to the principle that the Treaty should embody an acceptable balance of obligations. It binds the parties to end the nuclear arms race at an early date and to seek effective disarmament. (UNGA/C.I/1568, p. 60; emphasis added).
Then President Lyndon B. Johnson had exhorted the drafters of the Treaty early in their efforts:

Agreement to a treaty to stop the spread of nuclear weapons will be a historic turning point in the long effort to bring the atom to heel. It will, I am confident, permit further co-operative steps to reduce nuclear armaments. Plain sanity calls for a halt to the competition in nuclear arms. (ENDC/187, a letter dated February 1967; emphasis added).

At the end of the deliberations, President Johnson addressed the concluding Plenary session, pledged the United States Government's acceptance of its negotiated obligations, and lent Presidential authority to Ambassador Goldberg's interpretation (see above) of United States commitments under the Treaty.

We shall, as a major nuclear weapon Power, promptly and vigorously pursue negotiations on effective measures to halt the nuclear arms race and to reduce existing nuclear arsenals. It is right that we should be so obligated. (UNGA, Plenary/1672, p. 72; emphases added).

The general understanding, then was that Article VI was intended to impose balanced, reciprocal obligations on the nuclear weapon States. Moreover, authoritative interpretations by the nuclear weapon States themselves held that concrete results would be the yardstick by which "good faith" was measured. Negotiations that failed to achieve promptly "effective measures" to end the nuclear arms race were described publicly and authoritatively by the United States as insufficient to its agreed obligations.

INTERPRETATION OF THE PHRASE "AT AN EARLY DATE"

During the negotiation of the NPT, the nuclear weapon States were reluctant to commit themselves to a specific time-table for the accomplishment of their Article VI obligations. Qualitative terms such as "promptly": (e.g. President Johnson's address to Plenary; see above) took the place of quantitative descriptions of time frames. The non-nuclear weapon States, troubled by the discriminatory character of a Treaty that prevented them from acquiring nuclear weapons while allowing the nuclear weapon States to add to their arsenals, had recourse to a "sense of urgency" to the achievement of Article VI obligations by the nuclear weapon States.

Such a sense of urgency is indicated in the interventions of several delegates. Egypt, for example, insisted:

a world split indefinitely into two parts - nuclear and non-nuclear - is inconceivable ... it is time that urgent and adequate steps were taken to halt the arms race. (ENDC/PV/367, p.35, emphasis added).

India expressed similar sentiments, as follows:

we still need to be convinced that the draft treaty before us does not amount to a unilateral disarmament measure. In order to become generally acceptable the treaty must have a provision for a degree of compulsiveness and a reasonable time-limit, indicating a sense of urgency on the part of the nuclear weapon States to move toward disarmament ... otherwise, this non-proliferation treaty ... will not be effective and will not last and our labours will have been in vain. (UNGA/C.1/1567, p.122, emphasis added).
The words "at an early date" were thus intended to express a strong sense of urgency felt by non-nuclear weapon States, and to limit the period of time during which the Treaty would, in effect remain discriminatory.

The United States and the USSR interpretations of the Treaty also laid emphasis on early results. President Johnson interpreted United States obligations as including "prompt and vigorous" progress (see above), while the USSR expected rapid results under the assumption of sincerity ("good faith") on the part of all parties, as indicated by the Soviet statement:

We have no doubt that if all the parties concerned show a willingness it will not be difficult to find a suitable form for negotiations on further measures to curtail the arms race and effect disarmament. USSR representatives will in seeking to obtain early practical results in the period immediately following the conclusion of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The future will show us what success awaits us. (UNGA/C.1/1571, pp. 20-21; emphasis added).

In other words, the USSR defined "good faith" in terms of the achievement of immediate, concrete results.

The United Kingdom implicitly defined "at an early date" in terms of the period of five years between reviews of the Treaty as established in Article VIII:

In short, we are all given five years notice - the two major nuclear Powers particularly - to produce real progress toward a better and saner world. (UNGA/C.1/1558, p. 13)

It seems clear that the United Kingdom equated "at an early date" with "before five years have passed". With respect to effective progress "at an early date", the delegate of the United Kingdom pleaded for trust:

I cannot prove (the nuclear Powers') sincerity. An act of faith rather than objective data is required. I accept that when they pledge themselves to pursue negotiations in good faith to end the nuclear arms race at an early date they mean what they say. (UNGA/C.1/1558, p. 15; emphasis added).

Whether this trust with respect to Article VI obligations has been fulfilled was left to the decision of periodic Review Conferences by Article VIII of the NPT. In a prescient intervention, the Ambassador for Sweden, Alva Myrdal, sounded an early note of warning, and raised the spectre of the ultimate sanction available to non-nuclear States, namely withdrawal from the Treaty:

An open question remains: namely, what action is supposed to follow if the verdict of a review turns out to be "unsatisfactory"? It would seem reasonable that, if it is manifest at a review conference that the intentions of the treaty to achieve cessation of the arms race and to obtain nuclear disarmament have in reality been blatantly disregarded, parties to the treaty may come to regard this as an extraordinary event jeopardizing their supreme interest, as mentioned in paragraph 1 of Article X (the clause on withdrawal from the treaty) (ENDC/PV/363, p. 17)
Captured in Ambassador Myrdal's quotation is the central problem with the Treaty, and the reason for the lack of balance that presently afflicts it and that troubles so many signatories: in the event that a Review of the Treaty concludes that progress toward Article VI obligations has indeed been unsatisfactory, non-nuclear weapon States have little recourse but to withdraw from the Treaty and pursue national policies independent from the existing global non-proliferation régime. To do otherwise could reasonably be interpreted as contributing, albeit tacitly, to the nuclear arms race.

In its present form, the NPT provides for direct leverage of the nuclear weapon States over the policies of the non-nuclear weapon States vis-à-vis proliferation issues; but reciprocal influence is absent. It is in this sense that the Treaty lacks balance; and it is precisely for this reason that the Republic of Nauru has proposed the establishment of a Reciprocal Incentives Régime, namely to give essential balance to the Treaty, without which, we believe, the Treaty cannot survive. Non-nuclear weapon States that are sincerely dissatisfied with progress toward Article VI implementation must have an option for exerting effective influence on the nuclear weapon States within the context of a global non-proliferation régime. Otherwise the goals of non-proliferation are certain to fail.

It falls to the Third Review Conference to render a decision on this crucial issue, and to make appropriate adjustments in approaches toward implementation of the original goals of the Treaty. And it falls to this Review Conference to seize the initiative of giving balance to the NPT. To shirk this duty is, we believe, to condemn the global non-proliferation régime to a crisis from which it may not recover.
NAURU

A CALL FOR SIGNATURE OF PROTOCOLS TO THE
SOUTH PACIFIC NUCLEAR FREE ZONE TREATY

A PROPOSAL OFFERED FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF
COMMITTEE II OF THE THIRD REVIEW CONFERENCE
ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty was signed by eight nations of the South Pacific Forum on 6 August 1985, and the Protocols opened for signature by the nuclear weapon States. We invite the Third Review Conference to demonstrate its continued support for the concept of nuclear free zones in general, and the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty in particular, by welcoming the signing of this Treaty and calling for the signature of the Protocols at the earliest practicable date.

INTRODUCTION

Article VII of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) states that "Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories." The origin of this article may be traced to United Nations General Assembly resolution 2028 which established the principles on which the NPT was to be negotiated, and which was unanimously adopted on 19 November 1965. This resolution, and article VII of the NPT, are widely interpreted as encouraging regional agreements establishing nuclear free zones.

The Final Declaration of the first NPT Review Conference, 1975, adopted by consensus, likewise portrayed the formation of nuclear free zones as consistent with the aims of the NPT and as effective means of implementing the goals of the NPT. According to the Final Declaration, the Review Conference "...considers that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon free zones at the initiative and with the agreement of the directly concerned States of the zone, represents an effective means of curbing the spread of nuclear weapons, and could contribute significantly to the security of these States. It welcomes the steps which have been taken toward the establishment of such zones."

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The first such nuclear free zone agreement since the entry into force of the NPT is the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty signed in Raratonga, Cook Islands, on 6 August 1985, the fortieth anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima. Initial signatories included eight nations of the South Pacific Forum: Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, New Zealand, Niue, Tuvalu and Western Samoa. The Republic of Nauru was, as announced in the General Debate, the first nation to ratify this Treaty, on 30 August 1985.

The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, hereafter termed the Raratonga Treaty or the Treaty, has been circulated to all delegations to the Third Review Conference for their consideration. The Protocols to the Treaty call upon the nuclear weapon States to respect the provisions of the Treaty. We here invite the Third Review Conference to welcome formally the signing of this Treaty, and we request that the Third Review Conference call for the signature and ratification of these Protocols at the earliest practicable date by the nuclear weapon States to which the Protocols are open.

DESCRIPTION OF THE SOUTH PACIFIC NUCLEAR FREE ZONE TREATY

An official copy of the Raratonga Treaty has been circulated to all delegations of the Third Review Conference by several South Pacific nations, including the Republic of Nauru. Delegates are invited to consult the official document for details of the Treaty. The present description will serve as a brief and unofficial summary.

Article 1 of the Treaty defines terminology used in subsequent articles of the Treaty.

Article 2 defines the region of application and pledges Parties to the Treaty to respect international law concerning freedom of the seas within the region covered by the Treaty.

Article 3 is a renunciation of nuclear explosive devices, pledging member States to desist from manufacturing, acquiring, possessing or controlling nuclear explosive devices, and from encouraging the same of other States.

Article 4 commits each Party to international non-proliferation régimes based on the NPT and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.

Article 5 commits Parties to prevent the stationing of nuclear explosive devices in their territory.

Article 6 commits Parties to prevent the testing of nuclear devices in their territory.

Article 7 pledges Parties to prevent dumping of radio-active wastes anywhere in the territory of the Treaty.

Article 8 establishes a control system to verify compliance with the Treaty.

Article 9 provides for the exchange of information concerning the Treaty and relevant events within its territory.

Article 10 provides for consultation and review of the operation of the Treaty.
Article 11 provides for amendments to the Treaty.

Article 12 provides for signature and ratification.

Article 13 establishes a mechanism for withdrawal from the Treaty.

Article 14 states that the Treaty is not subject to reservations.

Article 15 provides for the entry into force of the Treaty.

Article 16 defines depository functions.

Annex 1 to the Treaty defines the territory covered by its articles, including a map.

Annex 2 commits Contracting Parties to IAEA safeguards and defines these safeguards in greater detail.

Annex 3 establishes a Consultative Committee for the Treaty and provides for its costs.

Annex 4 establishes a complaints procedure.

PROTOCOLS TO THE SOUTH PACIFIC NUCLEAR FREE ZONE TREATY

The Raratonga Treaty contains three Protocols, which are open to the signature of nuclear weapon States outside the South Pacific region and not Party to the Treaty. The signing of these Protocols commits the signatories to respect the provisions of the Treaty. The Protocols, and Parties invited to subscribe, are as follows:

Protocol 1 invites Parties to respect the prohibitions contained in articles 3, 5 and 6, relating to the manufacture, stationing and testing of nuclear explosive devices within the zone of the Treaty. It is now open for signature by France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) and the United States of America (US).

Protocol 2 of the Treaty requests Parties to respect the articles of the Treaty and to desist from using, or threatening to use, nuclear explosive devices against Parties to the Treaty, or against any territory within the zone for which a State Party to Protocol 1 is responsible. Protocol 2 is now open to signature from France, the People's Republic of China (PRC), the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the UK and the US.

Protocol 3 of the Treaty commits each signatory Party to refrain from testing nuclear explosive devices in the region of the Treaty, and is now open to signature by France, the PRC, the UK, and the US.

A CALL FOR SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION OF THE PROTOCOLS

We believe that a formal statement to the South Pacific Forum welcoming the signing of the Raratonga Treaty, combined with a call by the Third Review Conference for signature and ratification of the Protocols to the Treaty by the nuclear weapon States, is consistent with the letter and spirit of article VII of the NPT, and would represent a valuable and concrete expression and reaffirmation of support for article VII of the NPT. We respectfully solicit the support of all States represented at the Third Review Conference in issuing such a statement.
The Conference notes with satisfaction that some nuclear-weapons States have submitted all or part of their peaceful nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards. The Conference calls on the IAEA to use these opportunities to a wider extent than hitherto and urges all nuclear-weapons States to offer their full participation.

The Conference notes that some nuclear-weapons States have committed themselves to use nuclear supplies from non-nuclear-weapons States for peaceful uses only and to have this commitment verified through the application of IAEA safeguards. The Conference urges all nuclear-weapons States to accept such undertakings for all relevant supplies.

The Conference urges all nuclear-weapons States to take steps towards separation of their civilian and their military nuclear activities and to commit themselves not to divert nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Such commitments should be verified through the application of IAEA safeguards at all times to all peaceful nuclear activities within their jurisdiction.

The Conference recognizes that the proposed measures are important in achieving the ultimate goal, namely the establishment of a world-wide, uniform safeguards régime, comprising all peaceful nuclear activities in all States.
The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany attaches great importance to the goal of a comprehensive test ban. Its efforts are directed towards the realization of all essential pre-requisites including all technical problems of such a treaty in order to allow for its early conclusion and effective functioning.

Its policy in this field is guided by the conviction that effective verification of compliance with a nuclear test ban constitutes the key to a successful conclusion of efforts to negotiate successfully, and secure the wide acceptance of a CTBT. Because of the particularly profound effects in military and security terms of such a test ban, the willingness of States to commit themselves to an absolute nuclear test stop presupposes the conviction at a very high level of confidence that continued and militarily significant nuclear testing cannot go undetected.

The Federal Government, therefore, endeavoured to help solve this central problem of a comprehensive test ban by tabling a proposal in the Conference on Disarmament that an international seismic monitoring and verification system for the registering of underground nuclear explosions be established and progressively improved (CD/612, CD/624). To start with, the international seismic data exchange system, as tested in the 1984 GSE test run, should be put into a continuous operating mode. While in operation, this system would be geographically expanded and technically upgraded. The proposed project would give scientists the opportunity to resolve, in a learning-by-doing process, remaining problems of monitoring and verification and to increase progressively the system's capability to detect and identify explosions at any relevant level within the purview of a global network.

The installation of such a seismic network should be carried out in conjunction with efforts directed towards the conclusion of a CTBT treaty of which the envisaged international seismic system would become a legal part upon its entering into force.

An international seismic monitoring and verification system whose physical installation will take up a considerable amount of time, will have to be set up in any case in order to verify compliance with a comprehensive test ban treaty. The time between now and the conclusion of a CTBT should therefore not elapse unused but be utilized in the most practical and effective manner.

For the above stated reasons the Federal Government remains convinced that the initiation of the establishment of a global seismic network already during the pre-treaty period is the way in which a major step can be taken towards the realization of the important goal of a comprehensive test ban.

The Federal Government also looks at this initiative as an effective contribution to the fulfilment of commitments of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The Federal Government seeks the active support of States for this initiative in order to start work without delay on the establishment of a global seismic monitoring and verification system in relation to a comprehensive test ban treaty.
Proposal by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Article III of the Treaty for inclusion in the Final Declaration

"1. The Conference expresses the conviction that IAEA safeguards play a key role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other explosive devices. Safeguards provide assurance that States are complying with their undertakings and assist States in demonstrating this compliance. They thereby promote further confidence among States.

"2. The Conference notes with satisfaction that as a result of its safeguards activities the Agency has not detected any diversion of safeguarded material to the production of nuclear weapons, other nuclear explosive devices or to purposes unknown. Nor has the Agency detected any misuse of safeguarded facilities.

"3. The Conference notes with satisfaction the conclusion of further safeguards agreements in compliance with the undertaking in Article III (1) of the Treaty. The Conference urges the non-nuclear weapon States Parties to the Treaty that have not concluded the agreements required under Article III (4) to conclude such agreements with IAEA as soon as possible. To this end, the Conference requests the Director-General of IAEA to take the initiative and submit to all States concerned draft agreements to facilitate the conclusion of corresponding safeguards agreements.

"4. The Conference welcomes the conclusion and implementation of safeguards agreements with nuclear weapon States as a move to strengthen the non-proliferation régime and to increase the authority of the Agency and the effectiveness of its safeguards system.

"5. The Conference believes that all non-nuclear weapon States not Parties to the Treaty should place all their present and future nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards and appeals to such States to do so.

"6. The Conference calls upon all States, associations, institutions and individuals concerned to stop nuclear co-operation with Israel and South Africa immediately. The latter States are once again urged to subject without delay all their present and future nuclear installations to IAEA safeguards.

"7. The Conference notes with satisfaction that IAEA safeguards continue to respect the sovereign rights of States and that there are no indications that IAEA safeguards have hampered the economic, scientific or technological development of States or international co-operation in peaceful nuclear activities.
"8. The Conference, noting that existing IAEA safeguards approaches are capable of adequately dealing with current facility types, emphasizes the importance of continued improvements in the effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards, in particular:

- the importance of a uniform implementation of safeguards using the same set of inspection goals under all agreements,
- the rapid development and fast and efficient implementation of new instruments and techniques,
- the further development of effectiveness evaluation methods in combination with the automated data processing of safeguards information, and
- better utilization of human and budgetary resources.

The Conference calls upon States to continue their support for the IAEA safeguards system.

"9. The Conference calls upon States to take IAEA safeguards requirements fully into account in planning, designing and constructing nuclear fuel cycle facilities.

"10. The Conference welcomes the Agency's endeavours to train and recruit staff for safeguards implementation on the basis of widest possible geographical distribution, in accordance with Article VII D of IAEA's Statute. It calls upon States to exercise their right to accept or reject proposals for the designation of IAEA inspectors in such a way as to facilitate the effective use of human resources.

"11. The Conference again draws the attention of States Parties to the Treaty to the great importance of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and asks all those who have not yet done so to accede to the Convention."
EGYPT

WORKING PAPER CONTAINING FORMULATIONS FOR INCLUSION IN THE FINAL DOCUMENT UNDER ARTICLE VII OF THE NPT

Bearing in mind article VII of the Treaty,

Recalling paragraph 60 of the final document of SSOD I - adopted by consensus - stipulates that 'the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned constitute an important disarmament measure';

Recalling further the consensus reached by the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East would greatly enhance international peace and security,

The Conference urges all parties directly concerned to consider seriously taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

The Conference also calls upon all countries of the region that have not done so, pending and during the establishment of such a zone, to declare solemnly that they will refrain on a reciprocal basis, from producing, acquiring or in any other way, possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices and from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory by any third party, to promptly adhere to the non-proliferation Treaty, and to agree to place all their nuclear facilities under international atomic energy agency safeguards,

The Conference also invites the nuclear-weapon States and all other States to render their assistance in the establishment of the zone and to refrain from any action which may cause prejudice or runs counter to the purpose of establishing such a zone.

GE.85-64472
Third Review Conference of the
Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

WORKING PAPER CONTAINING FORMULATIONS FOR THE FINAL DECLARATION
ON ARTICLE IV OF THE TREATY

1. The Conference re-affirms the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II.

2. The Conference re-affirms Article IV (2) and recalls that all the parties have undertaken to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Conference re-affirms the call upon States in a position to do so to co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear weapon States party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing world.

3. The Conference notes that the assurance provided by effective non-proliferation arrangements through adherence to the Treaty provides an important basis for the expansion of trade and co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

4. The Conference notes with satisfaction the considerable level of bilateral co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, through the supply of nuclear materials, equipment and technology, the services of experts and the provision of training places both as a result of trade and as development assistance. The Conference urges that States in a position to do so should continue and where possible increase the level of their co-operation in these fields.

5. The Conference acknowledges the importance of the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as the principal agent for technology transfer amongst the international organizations referred to in Article IV (2) and welcomes the successful disbursement of the sum of $143.38 million which was contributed during the period 1980-1984, to the Agency’s technical assistance and co-operation programmes. The Conference records with appreciation that projects supported from these programmes covered a wide spectrum of applications, primarily in the non-power uses of nuclear energy, notably in agriculture, medicine, industry and hydrology, and that the chief beneficiaries have been developing States parties to the Treaty.

GE.85-64483
6. The Conference welcomes the establishment by the IAEA, following a recommendation of the First Review Conference of the parties to the Treaty, of a mechanism to permit the channeling of extra budgetary funds to projects additional to those financed from the IAEA Technical Assistance and Co-operation fund. The Conference notes with satisfaction that this channel has been used to make additional resources available for a wide variety of projects in developing States party to the Treaty.

7. Although much has been achieved in the area of technology transfer through the agency of the IAEA, the Conference acknowledges that it is necessary to maintain the momentum and to co-operate in the Agency's efforts to improve its own mechanisms. In this context, the Conference proposes the following measures for consideration by the IAEA:

(i) The IAEA's technical co-operation evaluation activity to be further developed, so as to enhance the Agency's ability to provide technical assistance;

(ii) IAEA assistance in nuclear planning systems for developing countries to be strengthened in order to help such countries draw up their own nuclear development plans;

(iii) IAEA assistance on country-specific nuclear development strategies to be further developed, with a view to identifying the applications of nuclear technology that can be expected to contribute most to the development both of individual sectors and developing economies as a whole;

(iv) Greater support for regional co-operative agreements, promoting regional projects based on regionally agreed priorities and using inputs from regional countries;

(v) Exploration of the scope for multi-year, multi-donor projects financed from the extra budgetary resources of the IAEA.

8. The Conference recalls the importance of reconciling the need for assurances of supply of nuclear items with the need for adequate assurances of non-proliferation. In this regard, the Conference commends the recent progress which the IAEA's Committee on Assurance of Supply (CAS) has made towards agreeing a set of principles related to this problem, and expresses the hope that the Committee will complete this work soon. The Conference further notes with satisfaction the measures which CAS has produced for alleviating technical and administrative problems in international shipments of nuclear items, emergency and back-up mechanisms, and mechanisms for the revision of international nuclear co-operation agreements and calls for their early implementation.

9. For many developing countries, the most urgent task is to facilitate the transfer of nuclear technology for non-power uses such as agriculture, medicine or industry. However, for those countries which have reached a stage of development where nuclear power is a feasible option, lack of adequate finance can be one of the most serious obstacles. The Conference requests the IAEA to explore further the problems of securing international
and multilateral finance for major capital projects in the nuclear field. The Conference recognises that further IAEA assistance in the preparation of feasibility studies and infrastructure development might enhance the prospects for developing countries obtaining finance, and recommends such countries to apply for such help under the Agency's technical assistance and co-operation programmes. The Conference also acknowledges that further support for the IAEA's Small and Medium Power Reactor (SMPR) Study could help the development of nuclear reactors more suited to the needs of developing countries.

10. In view of the important role foreseen for the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (PUNE) the Review Conference further requests that the PUNE Preparatory Committee should consider at its sixth meeting how best to provide for discussion of these issues at the PUNE Conference.
States Members of the Non-Aligned Group participating in the Third NPT Review Conference

WORKING PAPER CONTAINING FORMULATIONS FOR THE FINAL DECLARATION ON ARTICLE IV OF THE TREATY

1. The Conference, in accordance with paragraph 1 of Article IV, reiterates, once more, the "inalienable right of all States to apply and develop their programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development in conformity with their priorities, interests and needs".

2. The Conference confirms the significance of peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic development and its important role in accelerating the growth of developing countries. This can greatly contribute to progress in general, and to the elimination of technological and economic gaps between the developed and developing countries.

3. The Conference stresses in the framework of Article IV.2 of the Treaty that all Parties to the Treaty have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, services and scientific and technological information and to contribute, alone or in co-operation with other States, to the further development of the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Furthermore, it is indispensable to ensure a free transfer of nuclear technology, including its latest achievements and its use in the interest of the accelerated development of States Parties to the Treaty and, particularly, of the developing ones.

4. The Conference confirms that each country's choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing their respective fuel cycle policies or international co-operation agreements and contracts for peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

5. The Conference expresses dissatisfaction with the implementation of the preambular paragraphs 6 and 7 and of Article IV, as well as of the related obligations deriving from the "Final Document of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons", (May 1975).

6. The Conference notes with deep concern that instead of facilitating the fullest exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes to non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty particularly
developing countries as called for by the Treaty, some States Parties to the Treaty continue to co-operate and give assistance in the nuclear field to States like Israel and South Africa, not Parties to the Treaty and known to have acquired the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons, while at the same time applying discriminatory policies against the non-nuclear-weapon developing States Parties to the Treaty.

7. The Conference deplores the nuclear collaboration between those States and the régimes of South Africa and Israel for their quest to acquire and manufacture nuclear weapons, hence posing a grave danger to peace and security in Africa and the Middle East.

8. The Conference demands that all States suspend any nuclear co-operation with South Africa and Israel until they renounce to the nuclear-weapon option by joining the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, accepting the IAEA safeguards and pledging not to manufacture nor acquire nuclear weapons.

9. The Conference considers that unilaterally enforced restrictive measures beyond safeguards required under NPT are in contradiction with the spirit of the NPT, since they seriously limit the right of the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and some of them indirectly affect the sovereign rights of the Parties to the Treaty. Such measures have contributed to a slow-down in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and caused serious complications in relations between the Parties and have eroded confidence.

10. Furthermore, unilateral measures invoked for the abrogation of a number of formalized and valid contracts have provoked serious problems in relations among the parties concerned.

11. The Conference reaffirms the responsibility on nuclear supplier States Parties to the Treaty to promote legitimate nuclear energy needs of the Parties, especially developing ones, by allowing the latter to participate in the fullest possible transfer of nuclear equipment, materials, scientific and technological information.

12. The Conference commends the role and activities of the IAEA in the field of technical assistance and co-operation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, for the benefit of developing countries in particular.

13. The Conference agrees that:

I. Concern for non-proliferation should not be used as a pretext to prevent States from acquiring and developing nuclear technology for peaceful uses and to impose conditions which are incompatible with the sovereign rights and independence of countries.

II. All contracts in force in the nuclear field for peaceful uses should be honoured;
III. Threats of cut-off of supplies covered by contracts or agreements in force must not be used as an instrument of negotiation;

IV. No single State or group of States shall impose unilaterally or collectively any precondition of access to or transfer of equipment, materials, services and scientific and technical information, nor impose any non-proliferation conditions which go beyond the safeguards required under the Treaty.

V. Non-proliferation requirements in future transactions should be limited to conditions and criteria agreed to by the Board of Governors of the IAEA;

VI. Predictable and internationally agreed criteria for the transfer and reprocessing of spent fuel should be established;

VII. Non-nuclear weapon States Parties to the Treaty and States that have safeguards equal to those required under Article III. 1 of the Treaty should be provided preferential treatment in access to or transfer of equipment, materials, services, and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, taking particularly into account special needs of developing countries. In doing so, special attention shall also be given to the needs of the least developed countries;

VIII. States Parties to the Treaty should set up conditions for long term assurances of supply;

IX. A financial Assistance Fund should be established to assist developing countries Parties to the NPT in the development of their peaceful nuclear power programmes and the other peaceful applications of nuclear techniques. The Conference also decides to establish a Preparatory Committee open ended to all the Parties, to consider the scope and modalities of such a Fund. The Preparatory Committee, shall submit its conclusions to a special conference of the Parties to be held before the next Review Conference of the NPT.

X. The Conference urges all States to provide necessary technical assistance to Iraq to restore its peaceful nuclear programme and to overcome the damage caused by the Israeli attack.

The Conference further agrees:

I. To suggest the continuation of the study on financing the technical assistance programme of the IAEA, in accordance with resolution GC/XXV/RES/388.

II. To urge the IAEA to further expand its activities for the promotion of international co-operation in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and for the further development of these uses, to call on States Parties to the Treaty to substantially increase in real terms, their support required for this objective;
III. To call on all States Parties of the Treaty to significantly increase their technical assistance, bilaterally and through international bodies such as IAEA and the UNDP, in order to meet the growing needs of the developing countries in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

IV. To call further to States Parties to the Treaty to meet the "technically sound" requests for technical assistance submitted by developing States Parties to the Treaty that the IAEA is unable to finance from its own resources, as well as such "technically sound" requests as may be made by developing States Parties to the Treaty which are not members of the IAEA;

V. To call upon the IAEA to fully implement its General Conference resolution GC(XXVIII)/RES/439, dated 28 September 1984, which requests the Director General, inter alia, to provide, upon request, assistance in securing financing from outside sources for nuclear power projects in developing countries, and in particular the least developed countries;

VI. To encourage further IAEA studies on small and medium power reactors;

VII. To stress the importance of the work being done by the Committee on Assurances of Supply in establishing principles for international co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the adoption of measures to assure the long-term supply of nuclear material, equipment and technology in a predictable manner, with appropriate assurances against the proliferation of nuclear weapons;

VIII. To condemn Israel for its premeditated military aggression against the safeguarded nuclear research reactor, which constitutes an aggression against the Treaty and the IAEA safeguards system, as well as against the inalienable rights of all States to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes;

IX. The Conference reaffirms the inviolability of peaceful nuclear activities emanating from the international norms prohibiting the use of force in international relations, and in particular Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter. It considers that any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear activities would entail highly dangerous political, economic and environmental implications particularly on the civilian inhabitants. It acknowledges that this has been given special consideration in additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention of 1949. The Conference believes that the Parties bear a solemn responsibility to continue to play a leading role in the concerned fora towards the establishment of comprehensive and universal norms and standards, specifically prohibiting attacks, or threats of attacks, against all peaceful nuclear activities.
The Conference decides that, pending the establishment of such norms and standards, measures should be agreed by the Parties to ensure that their safeguarded nuclear activities, especially in non-nuclear-weapon States, will remain inviolable from attack or threat of attack. In this regard:

(a) the Depositories shall endeavour, in consultations with the other members of the Security Council, to give full consideration to all appropriate measures to be undertaken to deal with such a situation, including the application of measures under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

(b) the Parties should commit themselves to provide or support immediate assistance to the Party victim of such an attack or threat of attack.

The Conference stresses that the problems of peaceful uses of nuclear energy can be solved primarily by political means. In this context, the Conference expresses its satisfaction at the progress in the preparations for the United Nations Conference on the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy for Social and Economic Development, in the interest of developing countries and the international community as a whole. The Conference expresses its satisfaction at the results of the work of the Preparatory Committee of the Conference and underlines the necessity for continuing detailed preparations, with the active participation of all countries, in order to fully realize the goals of the Conference. The participants in the Conference reaffirmed their conviction that the results of the Conference should contribute to free and unhampered access on a just and non-discriminatory basis to nuclear technology, equipment and materials needed for the development of national programmes of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
Australia, Nauru, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea

Working Paper on Article VII

South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone

This paper is presented also on behalf of the other South Pacific Forum countries parties to the NPT - Fiji, Kiribati, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Western Samoa.

On 6 August 1985 the Heads of Government of Member States of the South Pacific Forum, at meeting in Rarotonga, Cook Islands, unanimously endorsed and opened for signature the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty. The text of the Treaty has been circulated in NPT/CONF.III/INF.4.

Eight countries were in a position to sign the Treaty in Rarotonga and did so: Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, New Zealand, Niue, Tuvalu and Western Samoa. The Treaty will come into force when eight countries have submitted instruments of ratification.

The Treaty is the result of deep concern in the South Pacific Community of Nations about the on-going nuclear arms race, the testing of nuclear explosive devices in the region and proposals to dump nuclear wastes in the oceans of the region.

At its meeting in Canberra in 1983 the Forum approved an Australian proposal that consideration be given to the drafting of a Treaty on a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific. In the following year, at its meeting in Tuvalu, the Forum endorsed a set of principles for such a Treaty and directed a Working Group of officials from Forum Members to undertake an examination of the issues and to prepare a draft Treaty for consideration at its next meeting. The Working Group held five meetings and was able to submit to the Forum meeting in Rarotonga a comprehensive draft Treaty and a Chairman's Report summarizing its deliberations. The draft Treaty represented a collaborative effort on the part of all participants.

* The South Pacific Forum is an annual meeting of Heads of Government from Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia (as an observer), Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Western Samoa.

GE.85-64535
In brief the Treaty provides that no South Pacific country which becomes a party to the Treaty will develop, manufacture, acquire or receive from others any nuclear explosive device.

Second, there will be no testing of nuclear explosive devices in the territories of participating States nor will these States assist any other State to test such devices.

Third, there will be no stationing of nuclear explosive devices in the territories of participating States.

Fourth, all peaceful nuclear activities in the territory of parties will be subject to full scope safeguards and the export of nuclear material will be in accordance with strict non-proliferation measures. Parties also commit themselves to support the continued effectiveness of the international non-proliferation régime based on the NPT and IAEA safeguards.

Fifth, international law with regard to freedom of the seas will be fully respected, and

Finally, performance of obligations by parties will be verified by IAEA safeguards under agreements with the Agency and a system of consultations including provision for on-site inspections subject to the directions of a Consultative Committee provided for in the Treaty.

The Treaty also reflects the Forum's strong opposition to the dumping at sea in the region of nuclear waste.

There are three Protocols to the Treaty. The first of these invites France, the United States and the United Kingdom to apply key provisions of the Treaty to their South Pacific territories. The other two Protocols respectively invite the five nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear explosive devices against parties to the Treaty and not to test nuclear explosive devices within the Zone.

In broad terms, the Treaty provides for a nuclear-free zone over an area bounded by the Indian Ocean coast of the Australian continent in the West, the boundary of the Treaty of Tlatelolco in the east, the Equator in the north and the boundary of the Antarctic Treaty in the south.

The Forum has directed the Working Group to organize consultations on the Protocols with the countries eligible to sign them and to submit recommendations on the adoption of the Protocols to the next meeting of the Forum in 1986 or earlier if practicable.

The Member States of the South Pacific Forum parties to the NPT commend the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty to this Review Conference as an initiative consistent with Article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as a demonstration of the commitment of South Pacific States to the objectives of the NPT and as an important contribution to disarmament, to arms control, and to the maintenance of peace and stability. The Treaty establishes only the second nuclear free zone in a permanently inhabited region and the first to be concluded since the signature of the NPT.
ARTICLES III/IV: PROPOSAL FOR INCLUSION IN THE FINAL DOCUMENT

The following proposal is submitted for consideration as an inclusion in the Final Document:

A

"As a means further to enhance and facilitate peaceful nuclear co-operation between non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon States, the Conference affirms the importance of commitments by the nuclear-weapon States that relevant nuclear supplies for peaceful purposes will not be used for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. A clear and visible separation of military and civilian nuclear activities in the nuclear-weapon States would support such undertakings. The Conference accordingly calls on the nuclear-weapon States, insofar as they have not yet done so, to establish a clear separation of military and civilian nuclear activities, as soon as this will be economically and practically feasible.

B

The Conference notes with satisfaction that all nuclear-weapon States, Party to the Treaty and one nuclear-weapon State non-Party have voluntarily submitted part or all of their peaceful nuclear activities to IAEA-safeguards. The Conference calls on the other nuclear-weapon State recognized by the Treaty to make a similar voluntary offer. These offers are important in view of the desirability to diminish the different treatment of nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States in the field of safeguards.

C

Safeguards in nuclear-weapon States can also verify the commitments by the nuclear-weapon States that material, nuclear material, equipment or technology supplied to them will not be used for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Conference calls on the nuclear-weapon States to broaden the scope of the agreements concluded with the IAEA to the widest extent possible so as to reach the situation that in principle all peaceful nuclear installations are eligible for safeguards. A gradual extension of the IAEA-safeguards in nuclear-weapon States should be subject to further study, in view of the desirability that over the longer term all peaceful nuclear installations in nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States are brought under IAEA-safeguards."

THE NETHERLANDS
CANADA

GE.85-64625
INDONESIA

Proposal for inclusion in the Final Declaration relating to Article VII

1. The Conference considers that the establishment of properly constituted and effective nuclear-weapon-free zones freely arrived at by the States of the region is an important and effective measure to promote regional and global peace and security by curbing the spread of nuclear weapons.

2. The Conference holds the view that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones will create conditions conducive to the establishment of zones of peace in different regions of the world.

3. The nuclear-weapon States are called upon to give their full cooperation to the States establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones and to enter into binding undertakings to respect strictly the status of nuclear-weapon-free zones, and to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear-weapon against the States of the zones.

4. The Conference expresses its satisfaction at the creation of such a zone in Latin America through the conclusion of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and at the assumption of obligations by the nuclear-weapon States in respect of the Treaty of Tlatelolco through its Additional Protocol II. It calls upon all States that are eligible to become parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco or to its Additional Protocol I who have not yet done so to take all necessary steps without delay to bring the Treaty régime fully into force throughout Latin America at the earliest possible date.

5. Equally, the Conference expresses its satisfaction at the signature of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty and calls
upon all States concerned to become parties to the Treaty or to its Protocols without delay in order to bring the Treaty régime fully into force in South Pacific.

6. The Conference takes note of the proposals and measures taken for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various other regions, including Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, South-East Asia and various parts of Europe.
Establishment and Terms of Reference

1. Under rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure, the Conference established Committee III as one of its three Main Committees and referred to it the following items for initial consideration (NPT/CONF.III/28):

   Item 13. Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its article VIII (3): Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to peaceful applications of nuclear energy:

      (1) Articles IV and III (3), preambular paragraphs 6 and 7, especially in their relationship to article III (1, 2, 4) and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5 as well as to articles I and II.

      (2) Article V.

   Item 14. Role of the Treaty in the promotion of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and of nuclear disarmament and in strengthening international peace and security:

      A. Acceptance of the Treaty by States.

      B. Measures aimed at promoting a wider acceptance of the Treaty.

Officers of the Committee

2. The Conference elected Ambassador Ryukichi Imai (Japan) as the Committee's Chairman; Ambassador A.H.S. Ataul Karim (Bangladesh) and Ambassador Borislav Konstantinov (Bulgaria) served as Vice-Chairmen.

Documents before the Committee

3. The Committee had before it the following background documentation:

   NPT/CONF.III/4 Working Paper on basic facts within the framework of the United Nations in connection with the realization of the purposes of articles IV and V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

   NPT/CONF.III/10 IAEA activities under article IV of NPT.

   NPT/CONF.III/11 IAEA activities under article V of NPT.
Letter dated 15 July 1985 from the Permanent Representatives of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden addressed to the Provisional Secretary-General of the Third Review Conference.

Information provided by the United Kingdom regarding the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

United States information pertaining to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Information on the implementation by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Documents containing elements relevant to a Final Declaration

4. The following documents were introduced in the Committee:

A. Documents submitted to the Conference

- A Working Paper relating to article IV submitted by Australia, Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. NPT/CONF.III/21

- Working Paper submitted by Iraq NPT/CONF.III/29

- Working Paper on articles III and IV submitted by Egypt NPT/CONF.III/30

- Working Paper on article IV submitted by Egypt NPT/CONF.III/31

- Working Paper containing formulations for the Final Declaration on article IV, submitted by Switzerland NPT/CONF.III/38

- Working Paper containing formulations for the Final Declaration on article IV, submitted by Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland NPT/CONF.III/51

- Working Paper on article IV submitted by States Members of the Non-Aligned Group participating in the Conference NPT/CONF.III/52
B. Documents submitted to the Committee

- Remarks of Ambassador R. Imai, Chairman of Main Committee III
  NPT/CONF.III/C.III/1
- Working Paper submitted by Iraq
  NPT/CONF.III/C.III/2
- Programme of Work of Main Committee III
  NPT/CONF.III/C.III/3
- Draft Report of Main Committee III Proposal by the Chairman
  NPT/CONF.III/C.III/4
  NPT/CONF.III/C.III/5

Work of the Committee

5. The Committee held 10 meetings between 3 and 17 September 1985; its discussions are summarized in documents NPT/CONF.III/C.III/SR.1-10. After an initial general exchange of views on the agenda items referred to it, the Committee, following agreement on a programme of work suggested by the Chairman (NPT/CONF.III/3), proceeded to a detailed consideration of the proposals and papers before it. The Committee notes that the various views expressed and proposals made are fully reflected in the Summary Records of the Committee and in the documents submitted to and considered by the Committee. These Summary Records and documents form an integral part of the report of the Committee.

6. At its meeting on 13 September 1985 the Committee, at the suggestion of the Chairman, went into an open-ended working group which later split into four subgroups for informal consultations on the draft report.

7. The Committee agreed on the following formulations for the Final Declaration of the Conference:

I. INALIENABLE RIGHTS AND FULLEST POSSIBLE EXCHANGE

1. The Conference affirms that the NPT fosters the world-wide peaceful use of nuclear energy and reaffirms that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of any Party to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II.

2. The Conference reaffirms the undertaking by all Parties to the Treaty, in accordance with Article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7, to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the right of all Parties to the Treaty to participate in such exchange. In this context, the Conference recognizes the importance of services. This can contribute to progress in general and to the elimination of technological and economic gaps between the developed and developing countries.
3. The Conference reaffirms the undertaking of the Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so to co-operate in contributing, alone or together with other States or international organizations, to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of the non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world. In this context the Conference recognizes the particular needs of the least developed countries.

4. The Conference requests that States Parties consider possible bilateral co-operation measures to further improve the implementation of Article IV. To this end, States Parties are requested to give in written form their experiences in this area in the form of national contributions to be presented in a report to the next Review Conference.

II. SUPPLY ASSURANCES/NON-PROLIFERATION ASSURANCES

1. The Conference recognizes the need for more predictable long-term supply assurances with effective assurances of non-proliferation.

2. The Conference commends the recent progress which the IAEA's Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS) has made towards agreeing a set of principles related to this matter, and expresses the hope that the Committee will complete this work soon. The Conference further notes with satisfaction the measures which CAS has recommended to the IAEA Board of Governors for alleviating technical and administrative problems in international shipments of nuclear items, emergency and back-up mechanisms, and mechanisms for the revision of international nuclear co-operation agreements and calls for the early completion of the work of CAS and the implementation of its recommendations.

3. The Conference reaffirms that in accordance with international law and applicable treaty obligations, States should fulfill their obligations under agreements in the nuclear field, and any modification of such agreements, if required, should be made only by mutual consent of the parties concerned.

4. The Conference confirms that each country's choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing their respective fuel cycle policies. International co-operation in this area, including international transfer and subsequent operations should be governed by effective assurances of non-proliferation and predictable long-term supply assurances. The issuance of related licences and authorization involved should take place in a timely fashion.

5. While recognizing that the operation and management of the back-end of the fuel cycle including nuclear waste storage are primarily a national responsibility, the Conference acknowledges the importance for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy of international and multilateral collaboration for arrangements in this area.
III. PROTECTION OF SAFFGUARDED NUCLEAR FACILITIES

1. The Conference recognizes that an armed attack on a safeguarded nuclear facility, or threat of attack, would create a situation in which the Security Council would have to act immediately in accordance with provisions of the United Nations Charter. The Conference further emphasizes the responsibilities of the Depositaries of NPT in their capacity as permanent members of the Security Council to endeavour, in consultation with the other members of the Security Council, to give full consideration to all appropriate measures to be undertaken by the Security Council to deal with the situation, including measures under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

2. The Conference encourages Parties to be ready to provide immediate peaceful assistance in accordance with international law to any Party to the NPT, if it so requests, whose safeguarded nuclear facilities have been subject to an armed attack, and calls upon all States to abide by any decisions taken by the Security Council in accordance with the United Nations Charter in relation to the attacking State.

3. The Conference considers that such attacks could involve grave dangers due to the release of radioactivity and that such attacks or threats of attack jeopardize the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Conference also acknowledges that the matter is under consideration by the Conference on Disarmament and urges co-operation of all States for its speedy conclusion.

4. The following paragraph was proposed and supported by many to become the opening paragraph of this section, but the Committee was unable to achieve consensus:

"The Conference recalls Security Council resolution 487 and considers that the Israeli attack on the safeguarded Iraqi nuclear installation in 1981 was an affront to the NPT and the IAEA safeguards régime."

In this context the following material provided a basis for the Committee's deliberations:

"The Conference urges all States to provide necessary technical assistance to Iraq to restore its peaceful nuclear programme and to overcome the damage caused by the Israeli attack."

"The Conference condemns Israel for its pre-meditated military aggression against the safeguarded nuclear research reactor, which constitutes an aggression against the Treaty and the IAEA safeguards system, as well as against the inalienable rights of all States to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes."

"The Conference notes that the Islamic Republic of Iran states its concern regarding attacks on its nuclear facilities."
IV. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

1. The Conference acknowledges the importance of the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as the principal agent for technology transfer amongst the international organizations referred to in Article IV (2) and welcomes the successful operation of the Agency's technical assistance and co-operation programmes. The Conference records with appreciation that projects supported from these programmes covered a wide spectrum of applications, related both to power and non-power uses of nuclear energy notably in agriculture, medicine, industry and hydrology. The Conference notes that the Agency's assistance to the developing States Party to the Treaty has been chiefly in the non-power uses of nuclear energy.

2. The Conference welcomes the establishment by the IAEA, following a recommendation of the First Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, of a mechanism to permit the channelling of extra-budgetary funds to projects additional to those financed from the IAEA Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund. The Conference notes that this channel has been used to make additional resources available for a wide variety of projects in developing States Party to the Treaty.

3. In this context, the Conference proposes the following measures for consideration by the IAEA:

   (i) IAEA assistance to developing countries in siting, construction, operation and safety of nuclear power projects and the associated trained manpower provision to be strengthened.

   (ii) To provide, upon request, assistance in securing financing from outside sources for nuclear power projects in developing countries, and in particular the least developed countries.

   (iii) IAEA assistance in nuclear planning systems for developing countries to be strengthened in order to help such countries draw up their own nuclear development plans.

   (iv) IAEA assistance on country-specific nuclear development strategies to be further developed, with a view to identifying the application of nuclear technology that can be expected to contribute most to the development both of individual sectors and developing economies as a whole.

   (v) Greater support for regional co-operative agreements, promoting regional projects based on regionally agreed priorities and using inputs from regional countries.

   (vi) Exploration of the scope for multi-year, multi-donor projects financed from the extra-budgetary resources of the IAEA.
(vii) The IAEA's technical co-operation evaluation activity to be further developed, so as to enhance the Agency's effectiveness in providing technical assistance.

4. The Conference underlines the need for the provision to the IAEA of the necessary financial and human resources to ensure that the Agency is able to continue to meet effectively its responsibilities.

5. The Conference notes the appreciable level of bilateral co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and urges that States in a position to do so should continue and where possible increase the level of their co-operation in these fields.

6. The Conference urges that preferential treatment should be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty in access to or transfer of equipment, materials, services and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, taking particularly into account needs of developing countries.

* * *

7. The Committee was unable to reach consensus on the following paragraph:

"The Conference demands that all States suspend any nuclear co-operation with South Africa and Israel until they renounce to the nuclear-weapon option by joining the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, accepting the IAEA safeguards and pledging not to manufacture nor acquire nuclear weapons."

V. FUND/FINANCING

1. The Conference recognizes the growing nuclear energy needs of the developing countries as well as the difficulties which the developing countries face in this regard, particularly with respect to financing their nuclear power programmes. The Conference calls upon States Party to the Treaty to promote the establishment of favourable conditions in national, regional and international financial institutions for financing of nuclear energy projects including nuclear power programmes in developing countries. Furthermore, the Conference calls upon the IAEA to initiate and the Parties to the Treaty to support the work of an expert group study on mechanisms to assist developing countries in the promotion of their nuclear power programmes, including the establishment of a Financial Assistance Fund.

2. The Conference recognizes that further IAEA assistance in the preparation of feasibility studies and infrastructure development might enhance the prospects for developing countries for obtaining finance, and recommends such countries as are members of the Agency to apply for such help under the Agency's technical assistance and co-operation programmes. The Conference also acknowledges that further support for the IAEA's Small and Medium Power Reactor (SMPR) Study could help the development of nuclear reactors more suited to the needs of some of the developing countries.

VI. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE FOR THE PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION IN THE PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY

1. The Conference expresses its satisfaction at the progress in the preparations for the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (UNCPICPUNE) and its conviction that
UNCPICPUNE will fully realise its goals in accordance with the objectives of resolution 32/50 and relevant subsequent resolutions of the General Assembly for the development of national programmes of peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development, especially in the developing countries.

2. The Conference considers that all proposals related to the promotion and strengthening of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy which have been produced by the Third Review Conference of the NPT, be transmitted to the Preparatory Committee of the UNCPICPUNE.

VII. REVIEW OF ARTICLE V

1. The Conference reaffirms the obligation of Parties to the Treaty to take appropriate measures to ensure that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions are made available to non-nuclear weapon States Party to the Treaty in full accordance with the provisions of Article V and other applicable international obligations, that such services should be provided to non-nuclear weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used should be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development.

2. The Conference confirms that the IAEA would be the appropriate international body through which any potential benefits of the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions could be made available to non-nuclear weapon States under the terms of Article V of the Treaty.

3. The Conference notes that the potential benefits of the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions have not been demonstrated and that no requests for services related to the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions have been received by the IAEA since the Second NPT Review Conference.

VIII. REVIEW OF ARTICLE IX

The Conference, having expressed great satisfaction that the overwhelming majority of States have acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and having recognized the urgent need for further ensuring the universality of the Treaty, appeals to all States, particularly the nuclear-weapon States and other States advanced in nuclear technology, which have not yet done so, to adhere to the Treaty at the earliest possible date.
Establishment and Terms of Reference

1. Pursuant to Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure, the Conference established Main Committee I as one of its three main Committees and referred to it the following items for its consideration (NPT/CONF.III/28):

   Item 13 Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its Article VIII (3):
   Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament and international peace and security:
   (1) Articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1-3
   (2) Article VI and preambular paragraphs 8-12
   (3) Article VII with specific reference to the main issues considered in this Committee

   Security assurances
   (1) Resolution 255 (1968) of the United Nations Security Council
   (2) Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Officers of the Committee

2. The Conference elected Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala (Sri Lanka) as the Committee's Chairman; Ambassador Richard Butler (Australia) and Dr. Hubert Thielicke (German Democratic Republic) served as Vice-Chairmen of the Committee.

Documents before the Committee

Background documentation:

3. The Committee had before it the following background documentation:

   NPT/CONF.III/2 Basic facts within the framework of the United Nations in connection with the implementation of the tenth preambular paragraph of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

* Some of the documents may also cover items allocated to other Main Committees.

GE.85-64591
Basic facts within the framework of the United Nations in connection with the implementation of Articles I and II of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Basic facts within the framework of the United Nations in connection with the implementation of Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Dynamics and consequences of the Nuclear-Arms Race including its quantitative, qualitative and Vertical aspects

Dynamics and consequences of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons

Memorandum from the Secretariat of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear weapons in Latin America in response to the request of the Preparatory Committee for the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Studies relevant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Present status of negotiations of the Conference on Disarmament on Nuclear Test Ban

Present status of negotiations on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear-arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on the treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control

Present status of negotiations of the Conference on Disarmament on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

Documents containing elements relevant to a Final Declaration

4. The following documents were submitted to the Conference on the items allocated to the Committee:

Letter dated 15 July 1985 from the Permanent Representatives of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden addressed to the Provisional Secretary-General of the Third Review Conference

Information provided by the United Kingdom regarding implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
5. The Committee held nine formal meetings between 4 and 17 September 1985; its discussions are summarized in documents NPT/CONF.III/C.I/SR.1-9. In addition, during that time the Committee held a number of informal meetings.
After an initial general exchange of views on the agenda items referred to it, the Committee gave consideration to the proposals contained in the documents listed in paragraphs 3 and 4 above. Exchanges of views also took place within informal open-ended working groups established by the Committee.

6. At its meeting on 10 September 1985, the Committee established three informal open-ended Working Groups to facilitate the consideration of matters before it. The first Working Group considered Articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1-3; the second Working Group considered the question of security assurances and Article VII, with specific reference to the main issues considered in the Committee. The third Working Group dealt with Article VI and preambular paragraphs 8-12. The Groups were Chaired by Ambassador Richard Butler (Australia) - (Working Group I); Dr. Hubert Thielicke (German Democratic Republic) - (Working Group II) and Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala (Sri Lanka) - (Working Group III).

7. The Committee agreed to submit to the Conference the following report on its work:

I. Review of Articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1-3

The Conference noted the concerns and convictions expressed in preambular paragraphs 1 to 3 and agreed that they remain valid. The States Party to the Treaty remain resolved in their belief in the need to avoid the devastation that a nuclear war would bring. The Conference remains convinced that any proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously increase the danger of a nuclear war.

The Conference agreed that the strict observance of the terms of Articles I and II remains central to achieving the shared objectives of preventing under any circumstances the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and preserving the Treaty's vital contribution to peace and security, including to the peace and security of non-Parties.

The Conference acknowledged the declarations by nuclear weapons States Party to the Treaty that they had fulfilled their obligations under Article I. The Conference further acknowledged the declarations that non-nuclear weapons States Party to the Treaty had fulfilled their obligations under Article II. The Conference was of the view therefore that one of the primary objectives of the Treaty had been achieved in the period under review.

The Conference also expressed deep concern that the national nuclear programmes of some States non-Party to the Treaty may lead them to obtain a nuclear weapon capability. States Party to the Treaty stated that any further
detonation of a nuclear explosive device by any non-nuclear-weapon State would constitute a most serious breach of the non-proliferation objective.

The Conference noted that specific concerns were expressed about the nuclear weapon capability of South Africa and Israel. The Conference further noted that calls were made for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear facilities, resources or devices to South Africa and Israel and to stop all exploitation of Namibian uranium, natural or enriched, until the attainment of Namibian independence.

II. Review of Article VI and preambular paragraphs 8-12

A.

1. The Committee recalled that under the provisions of article VI all parties have undertaken to pursue negotiations in good faith:
   - on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date;
   - on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament;
   - on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

2. The Committee undertook an evaluation of the achievements in respect of each aspect of the article in the period under review, and paragraphs 8 to 12 of the preamble, and in particular with regard to the goals set out in preambular paragraph 10 which recalls the determination expressed by the parties to the partial test ban to:
   - continue negotiations to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time.

3. The Committee recalled the declared intention of the parties to the Treaty to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament and their urging made to all States parties to co-operate in the attainment of this objective. The Committee also recalled the determination expressed by the parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions on nuclear weapons for all time and the desire to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery.
4. The Committee notes that the tenth special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations concluded, in paragraph 50 of its Final Document, that "the achievement of nuclear disarmament will require urgent negotiations of agreements at appropriate stages and with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to the States concerned for:

(a) Cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems;

(b) Cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;

(c) A comprehensive, phased programme with agreed time-tables whenever feasible, for progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time".

5. The Committee also recalled that in the Final Declaration of the First Review Conference, the parties expressed the view that the conclusion of a treaty banning all nuclear-weapon tests was one of the most important measures to halt the nuclear arms race and expressed the hope that the nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty would take the lead in reaching an early solution of the technical and political difficulties of this issue.

6. The Committee examined developments relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race, in the period under review and noted in particular that the destructive potentials of the nuclear arsenals of nuclear-weapon States parties, were undergoing continuing development, including a growing research and development component in military spending, continued nuclear testing, development of new delivery systems and their deployment.

7. The Committee noted the concerns expressed regarding developments with far reaching implications and the potential of a new environment, space, being drawn into the arms race. In that regard the Committee also noted the fact that the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are pursuing bilateral negotiations on a broad complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms, with a view to achieving effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth.
8. The Committee noted with regret that the development and deployment of nuclear weapon systems had continued during the period of review.

9. The Committee also took note of numerous proposals and actions, multilateral and unilateral, advanced during the period under review by many States with the aim of making progress towards the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

10. The Committee examined the existing situation in the light of the undertaking assumed by the parties in article VI to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. The Committee recalled that a stage of negotiations on the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT II) had been concluded in 1979, by the signing of the Treaty which had remained unratified. The Committee noted that both the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America have declared that they are abiding by the provisions of SALT II.

11. The Committee recalled that the bilateral negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America which were held between 1981 and 1983 were discontinued without any concrete results.

12. The Committee noted that bilateral negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America had been held in 1985 to consider questions concerning space and nuclear arms, both strategic and intermediate-range, with all the questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship. No agreement has emerged so far. These negotiations are continuing.

13. The Committee evaluated the progress made in multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations in the period of the Review.

14. It recalled that the trilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty, begun in 1977 between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, had not continued after 1980, that the Committee on Disarmament and later the Conference on Disarmament had been called upon by the General Assembly of the United Nations in successive years to begin negotiations on such a Treaty, and noted that such negotiations had not been initiated, despite the submission of draft treaties and different proposals to the Conference on Disarmament in this regard.

15. The Committee noted the lack of progress on relevant items of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, in particular those relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, the prevention of nuclear war
including all related matters and effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

16. The Committee noted that two Review Conferences had taken place since 1980, one on the Sea-bed Treaty and one on the Environmental Modification Treaty and three General Conferences of the Organization for the Prevention of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. In 1982, a Special United Nations General Assembly Session on Disarmament took place without any results in matters directly linked to nuclear disarmament.

17. It has also noted the last five years had thus not given any results concerning negotiations on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament.

The Committee recommends to the Conference the adoption of the following conclusions and recommendations in respect of the review of preambular paragraphs 8 to 12 and Article VI.

1. The Conference concluded that, since no agreements had been reached in the period under review on effective measures relating to the cessation of an arms race at an early date, on nuclear disarmament and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, the aspirations contained in preambular paragraphs 8 to 12 had still not been met, and the objectives under Article VI had not yet been achieved.

2. The Conference reiterated that the implementation of Article VI is essential to the maintenance and strengthening of the Treaty, reaffirmed the commitment of all States Parties to the implementation of this Article and called upon the States Parties to intensify their efforts to achieve fully the objectives of the Article. The Conference addressed a call to the nuclear-weapon States Parties in particular to demonstrate this commitment.

3. The Conference welcomes the fact that the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are conducting bilateral negotiations on a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms - both strategic and intermediate-range - with all these questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship. It hopes that these negotiations will lead to early and effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and at strengthening strategic stability. Such agreements
will complement and ensure the positive outcome of multilateral negotiations on disarmament, and would lead to the reduction of international tensions and the promotion of international peace and security.

The Conference recalls that the two sides believe that ultimately the bilateral negotiations, just as efforts in general to limit and reduce arms, should lead to the complete elimination of nuclear arms everywhere.

4. The Conference urges the Conference on Disarmament, as appropriate, to proceed to early multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament in pursuance of paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament.

5. The Conference reaffirms the determination expressed in the preamble of the 1963 partial test ban Treaty, confirmed in Article I (b) of the said Treaty and reiterated in preambular paragraph 10 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time.

6. The Conference also recalls that in the Final Document of the First Review Conference, the Parties expressed the view that the conclusion of a Treaty banning all nuclear weapons tests was one of the most important measures to halt the nuclear arms race. The Conference stresses the important contribution that such a treaty would make toward strengthening and extending the international barriers against the proliferation of nuclear weapons; it further stresses that adherence to such a treaty by all States would contribute substantially to the full achievement of the non-proliferation objective. The Conference deeply regrets that until now a comprehensive multilateral nuclear test-ban treaty has not been concluded and therefore calls on the nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty to take the lead in working for negotiation and conclusion of such a Treaty in the context of the Conference on Disarmament.

7. The Conference also took note of the appeals contained in five successive United Nations General Assembly Resolutions since 1981 for a moratorium on nuclear weapons testing pending the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban Treaty, and of similar calls made at this Conference.

It also took note of the measure announced by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for a unilateral moratorium on nuclear weapons testing from 6 August 1985 until 1 January 1986, which would continue beyond that date if the United States of America, for its part, refrained from carrying out nuclear explosions. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics suggested that this would provide an example for other nuclear-
weapon States and would create favourable conditions for the conclusion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the promotion of the fuller implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

8. The Conference took note of the unconditional invitation extended by the United States of America to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to send observers, who may bring any equipment they deem necessary, to measure a United States of America nuclear test in order to begin a process which in the view of the United States of America would help to ensure effective verification of limitations on underground nuclear testing.

9. The Conference also took note of the appeals contained in five United Nations General Assembly resolutions since 1982 for a freeze on all nuclear weapons in quantitative and qualitative terms, which should be taken by all nuclear-weapon States or, in the first instance and simultaneously, by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the understanding that the other nuclear-weapon States would follow their example, and of similar calls made at this Conference.

10. The Conference took note of proposals by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America for the reduction of nuclear weapons.

11. The Conference took note of proposals submitted by States Parties on a number of related issues relevant to achieving the purposes of Article VI and set out in paragraph 4 of the Report and in the statements made in the General Debate of the Conference.

III. Review of Security Assurances and Article VII with specific reference to the main issues considered in Main Committee I

Security assurances

1. The Conference considers that the most effective guarantee against the possible use of nuclear weapons and the danger of nuclear war is nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Pending the achievement of this goal on a universal basis and recognizing the need for all States to ensure their independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty, the Conference reaffirms the particular importance of assuring and strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapons States Parties which have renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The Conference recognizes that different approaches may be required to strengthen the security of non-nuclear-weapons States Parties to the Treaty.

2. The Conference underlines again the importance of adherence to the Treaty by non-nuclear-weapons States as the best means of reassuring one another of their renunciation of nuclear weapons and as one of the effective means of strengthening their mutual security.
3. The Conference takes note of the continued determination of the Depositary States to honour their statements, which were welcomed by the United Nations Security Council in resolution 255 (1969), that, to ensure the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty, they will provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty which is a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.

4. The Conference reiterates its conviction that, in the interest of promoting the objectives of the Treaty, including the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties, all States, both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States, should refrain, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, from the threat or the use of force in relations between States, involving either nuclear or non-nuclear weapons.

5. The Conference recalls that the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly in paragraph 59 of the Final Document took note of the declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States regarding the assurance of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and urged them to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

6. Being aware of the consultations and negotiations on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, which have been under way in the Conference on Disarmament for several years, the Conference regrets that the search for a common approach which could be included in an international legally binding instrument, has been unsuccessful. The Conference takes note of the repeatedly expressed intention of the Conference on Disarmament to continue to explore ways and means to overcome the difficulties encountered in its work and to carry out negotiations on the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In this connection, the Conference calls upon all States, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, to continue the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament devoted to the search for a common approach acceptable to all, which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character.

Article VII with specific reference to the main issues considered in Main Committee I

1. The Conference recognizes that for the maximum effectiveness of any Treaty arrangements for establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone the co-operation of the nuclear-weapon States is necessary. In this connection, the nuclear-weapon
States are invited to assist the efforts of States to create nuclear-weapon-free zones, and to enter into binding undertakings to respect strictly the status of such a zone and to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of the zone.

2. The Conference welcomes the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) by all nuclear-weapon States.

3. The Conference takes note of the draft Protocols to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty and further notes the agreement of the South Pacific Forum that consultations on the Protocols should be held between members of the Forum and the Nuclear Weapon States eligible to sign the Protocols.

IV. Other decisions of the Committee

(a) The Committee was unable to reach consensus on the following sentence contained in paragraph 6 of Section II B. within square brackets:

"The Conference deeply regrets that until now a comprehensive multilateral nuclear test-ban treaty has not been concluded and therefore calls on the nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty to take the lead in working for negotiation and conclusion of such a Treaty in the context of the Conference on Disarmament."

The Committee decided to refer this sentence to the Drafting Committee for its consideration.

(b) The Committee also decided to refer to the Drafting Committee the Working Paper submitted by Switzerland on 9 September 1985 (NPT/CONF.III/39) containing formulations for the Final Declaration which inter alia invites States Parties to establish a system for the peaceful settlement of disputes related to the rights and obligations contained in Articles 1 to 4 of the Treaty.
REPORT OF MAIN COMMITTEE I

Corrigendum

On page 3, after line 5 please insert the following:

REPORT OF MAIN COMMITTEE II

Establishment and Terms of Reference

1. Under Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure of the Conference, the Conference established Committee II as one of its three Main Committees and referred to it the following items for initial consideration (NPT/CONF.III/28):

Item 13: Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its Article VIII (3):

Implementation of the provision of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones:

(1) Article III and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5, especially in their relationship to Article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7.

(2) Articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1-3 in their relationship to Articles III and IV.

(3) Article VII.

Other provisions of the Treaty:

Item 14: Role of the Treaty in the promotion of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and of nuclear disarmament and in strengthening international peace and security:

A. Acceptance of the Treaty by States;

B. Measures aimed at promoting a wider acceptance of the Treaty.

Officers of the Committee

2. The Conference elected Mr. M. Vejvoda (Czechoslovakia) as the Committee's Chairman; Mr. S. Sutowardovo (Indonesia) and Mr. M. Alessi (Italy) served as Vice-Chairmen of the Committee.

Documents before the Committee

Background documentation

3. The Committee had before it the following background documentation:

NPT/CONF.III/9 Background paper on the activities of the IAEA relevant to Article III of the NPT:
NPT/CONF.III/16 Letter dated 15 July 1985 from the Permanent Representatives of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden addressed to the Provisional Secretary-General of the Third Review Conference;

NPT/CONF.III/17 Information provided by the United Kingdom regarding implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

NPT/CONF.III/18 United States information pertaining to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 29 July 1985;

NPT/CONF.III/20 Information on the implementation by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Documents containing elements relevant to a Final Declaration

4. The following documents were introduced in the Committee:

A. Documents submitted to the Conference:

- Working Paper on Articles III and IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty submitted by Egypt

- Proposal by Australia on Article III of the Treaty

- Article III: Proposal for inclusion in the Final Declaration submitted by Canada and Sweden


- Working Paper containing formulations for the Final Declaration submitted by Switzerland

- Proposal for inclusion in the Final Declaration relating to Article VII submitted by Finland

- A call for signature of Protocols to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty; a proposal offered for the consideration of Committee II of the Third Review Conference on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons submitted by Nuuru

- Working Paper containing formulations for the Final Declaration on Article III of the Treaty submitted by Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden
- Proposal by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Article III of the Treaty for inclusion in the Final Declaration

- Working Paper containing formulations for inclusion in the Final Document under Article VII of the NPT submitted by Egypt


- Articles III/IV: Proposals for inclusion in the Final Document submitted by Canada and the Netherlands

- Proposal for inclusion in the Final Declaration relating to Article VII submitted by Indonesia

B. Documents submitted to Main Committee II:

- Opening Statement of the Chairman of Main Committee II, Ambassador M. Vejvoda of Czechoslovakia, at the meeting of 2 September 1985

- Working Paper submitted in connection with Article III of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons submitted by Iraq

- Proposal by the African Group for Main Committee II on Article VII


5. In addition, a number of informal documents were introduced in the Committee by:

- Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden;

- Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

- Ireland;

- Mexico;

- United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland;

- United States of America.
6. The Committee held 11 meetings from 2 to 17 September 1985; its discussions are summarized in documents NPT/CONF.III/C.II/SR.I-SR.11. The Committee also held various informal consultations. After an initial discussion of the agenda items referred to it, the Committee proceeded to a detailed consideration of the proposals and papers before it. The Committee notes that the various views expressed and proposals made are fully reflected in the Summary Records of the Committee and in the documents submitted in and considered by the Committee. They form an integral part of the report of the Committee and are forwarded to the Conference for its consideration as such.

Result of consideration of items 13 and 14 of the Agenda of the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

7. The Committee agreed on the following formulations for the Final Declaration of the Conference:

(A) Article III and its relation to Articles I, II and IV; and role of the Treaty in the promotion of non-proliferation

1. The Conference affirms its determination to strengthen further the barriers against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices to additional States. The spread of nuclear explosive capabilities would add immeasurably to regional and international tensions and suspicions. It would increase the risk of nuclear war and lessen the security of all States. The Parties remain convinced that universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty is the best way to strengthen the barriers against proliferation and they urge all States not party to the Treaty to accede to it. The Treaty and the régime of non-proliferation it supports play a central role in promoting regional and international peace and security, inter alia, by helping to prevent the spread of nuclear explosives. The non-proliferation and safeguards commitments in the Treaty are essential also for peaceful nuclear commerce and co-operation.

2. The Conference expresses the conviction that IAEA safeguards provide assurance that States are complying with their undertakings and assist States in demonstrating this compliance. They thereby promote further confidence among States and, being a fundamental element of the Treaty, help to strengthen their collective security. IAEA safeguards play a key role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. Unsafeguarded nuclear activities in non-nuclear-weapon States pose serious proliferation dangers.

The above paragraph achieved consensus support in the Committee, but the delegation of Iraq proposed the following addition:

"The Conference strongly condemns Israel for its deliberate act of aggression against the Iraqi safeguarded nuclear installations which constitutes the most serious attack on the Treaty and also against the IAEA and its safeguards system since their inception. The Conference calls upon Israel to undertake immediately not to carry out any attack on nuclear installations devoted to peaceful purposes in Iraq or in other countries, and to place all its nuclear installations under the IAEA safeguards."
The proposal did not gain consensus support, and the delegation of the United States found it to be highly objectionable. The Chairman proposed, and the Committee agreed by consensus, that the Iraqi proposal should be conveyed to the President of the Conference to be addressed in a wider context by the Conference at a later stage.

3. The Conference declares that the commitment to non-proliferation by nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty pursuant to Article I, by non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty pursuant to Article II, and by the acceptance of IAEA safeguards on all peaceful nuclear activities within non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty pursuant to Article III is a major contribution by those States to regional and international security. The Conference notes with satisfaction that the commitments in Articles I-III have been met and have greatly helped prevent the spread of nuclear explosives.

4. The following paragraph was proposed by the Chairman and supported by many delegations, but the Committee was unable to achieve consensus on the second sentence:

"The Conference therefore specifically urges all non-nuclear-weapon States not party to the Treaty to make an international legally-binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and to accept IAEA safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear activities, both current and future, to verify that commitment. The Conference further urges all States in their international nuclear co-operation to establish as a necessary basis for the transfer of relevant nuclear supplies to non-nuclear-weapon States such a commitment to non-proliferation and acceptance of such safeguards by those States. The Conference expresses its view that accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty by all non-nuclear-weapon States is the best way to establish that basis."

With regard to the second sentence, the following alternative formulation was proposed by the delegation of Switzerland, but also did not gain consensus support:

"The Conference further urges all States in their international nuclear co-operation to work in pursuit of these objectives."

5. The Conference expresses its satisfaction that four of the five nuclear-weapon States have voluntarily concluded safeguards agreements with the IAEA, covering all or part of their peaceful nuclear activities. The Conference regards those agreements as further strengthening the non-proliferation régime and increasing the authority of IAEA and the effectiveness of its safeguards system. The Conference calls on the nuclear-weapon States to continue to co-operate fully with the IAEA in the implementation of these agreements and calls on IAEA to take full advantage of this co-operation. The Conference urges the People's Republic of China similarly to conclude a safeguards agreement with IAEA. The Conference recommends the continued pursuit of the principle of universal application of IAEA safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities in all States. To this end, the Conference recognizes the value of voluntary offers and recommends further evaluation of the economic and practical possibility of extending application of safeguards to additional civil facilities in the nuclear-weapon States as and when IAEA resources permit and consideration of separation of the civil and military facilities in the nuclear-weapon States. Such an extending of safeguards will enable the further development and application of an effective régime in both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States.
6. The Conference also affirms the great value to the non-proliferation régime of commitments by the nuclear-weapon States that nuclear supplies provided for peaceful use will not be used for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive purposes. Safeguards in nuclear-weapon States pursuant to their safeguards agreements with IAEA can verify observance of those commitments.

7. The Conference notes with satisfaction the adherence of further Parties to the Treaty and the conclusion of further safeguards agreements in compliance with the undertaking of the Treaty and recommends that:

(a) The non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty that have not concluded the agreements required under Article III (4) conclude such agreements with IAEA as soon as possible;

(b) The Director-General of IAEA intensify his initiative of submitting to States concerned draft agreements to facilitate the conclusion of corresponding safeguards agreements, and that Parties to the Treaty, in particular Depositary Parties, should actively support these initiatives;

(c) All States Party to the Treaty make strenuous individual and collective efforts to make the Treaty truly universal.

8. The Conference notes with satisfaction that IAEA in carrying out its safeguards activities has not detected any diversion of a significant amount of safeguarded material to the production of nuclear weapons, other nuclear explosive devices or to purposes unknown.

9. The Conference notes that IAEA safeguards activities have not hampered the economic, scientific or technological development of the Parties to the Treaty, or international co-operation in peaceful nuclear activities and it urges that this situation be maintained.

10. The Conference commends IAEA on its implementation of safeguards pursuant to this Treaty and urges it to continue to ensure the maximum technical and cost effectiveness and efficiency of its operations, while maintaining consistency with the economic and safe conduct of nuclear activities.

11. The Conference notes with satisfaction the improvement of IAEA safeguards, which has enabled it to continue to apply safeguards effectively during a period of rapid growth in the number of safeguarded facilities. It also notes that IAEA safeguards approaches are capable of adequately dealing with facilities under safeguards. In this regard, the recent conclusion of the project to design a safeguards régime for centrifuge enrichment plants and its implementation is welcomed. This project allows the application of an effective régime to all plants of this type in the territories both of nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty.

12. The Conference emphasizes the importance of continued improvements in the effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards, for example, but not limited to:

(a) Uniform and non-discriminatory implementation of safeguards;

(b) The expeditious implementation of new instruments and techniques;
(c) The further development of methods for evaluation of safeguards effectiveness in combination with safeguards information;

(d) Continued increases in the efficiency of the use of human and financial resources and of equipment.

13. The Conference believes that further improvement of the list of materials and equipment which, in accordance with Article III (2) of the Treaty, calls for the application of IAEA safeguards, should take account of advances in technology.

14. The Conference recommends that IAEA establish an internationally agreed effective system of international plutonium storage in accordance with Article XII(A)5 of its statute.

15. The Conference welcomes the significant contributions made by States Parties in facilitating the application of IAEA safeguards and in supporting research, development and other supports to further the application of effective and efficient safeguards. The Conference urges that such co-operation and support be continued and that other States Parties provide similar support.

16. The Conference calls upon all States to take IAEA safeguards requirements fully into account while planning, designing and constructing new nuclear fuel cycle facilities and while modifying existing nuclear fuel cycle facilities.

17. The Conference also calls on States Parties to the Treaty to assist IAEA in applying its safeguards, inter alia, through the efficient operation of State systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material, and including compliance with all notification requirements in accordance with safeguards agreements.

18. The Conference welcomes the Agency's endeavours to recruit and train staff of the highest professional standards for safeguards implementation with due regard to the widest possible geographical distribution, in accordance with Article VII D of the IAEA Statute. It calls upon States to exercise their right regarding proposals of designation of IAEA inspectors in such a way as to facilitate the most effective use of safeguards manpower.

19. The Conference also commends to all States Parties the merits of establishment of international fuel cycle facilities, including multi-nation participation, as a positive contribution to reassurance of the peaceful use and non-diversion of nuclear materials. While primarily a national responsibility, the Conference sees advantages in international co-operation concerning spent fuel storage and nuclear waste storage.

20. The Conference calls upon States Parties to continue their political, technical and financial support of the IAEA safeguards system.

21. The Conference underlines the need for IAEA to be provided with the necessary financial and human resources to ensure that the Agency is able to continue to meet effectively its safeguards responsibilities.

22. The Conference urges all States that have not done so to adhere to the Convention on the physical protection of nuclear material at the earliest possible date.
(B) Article VII, and role of the Treaty in nuclear disarmament and
in strengthening international peace and security

1. The Conference observes the growing interest in utilizing the provisions of
Article VII of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which recognizes the right of any
group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the absence of
nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

2. The Conference considers that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones
on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region
concerned constitutes an important disarmament measure and therefore the process
of establishing such zones in different parts of the world should be encouraged
with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear
weapons. In the process of establishing such zones, the characteristics of each
region should be taken into account.

3. The Conference emphasizes the importance of concluding nuclear-weapon-free
zone arrangements in harmony with internationally recognized principles, as
stated in the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations
devoted to disarmament.

4. The Conference holds the view that, under appropriate conditions, progress
towards the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones will create conditions
more conducive to the establishment of zones of peace in certain regions of the
world.

5. The Conference expresses its belief that concrete measures of nuclear
disarmament would significantly contribute to creating favourable conditions for
the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

6. The Conference expresses its satisfaction at the continued successful
operation of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America
(Treaty of Tlatelolco). It reaffirms the repeated exhortations of the
General Assembly to France, which is already a signatory of Additional Protocol I,
to ratify it, and calls upon the Latin American States that are eligible to
become parties to the Treaty to do so.

7. The Conference also notes the continued existence of the Antarctic Treaty.

8. The Conference notes the endorsement of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone
Treaty by the South-Pacific Forum on 6 August 1985 at Rarotonga and welcomes
this achievement as consistent with Article VII of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
The Conference also takes note of the draft Protocols to the South Pacific
Nuclear Free Zone Treaty and further notes the agreement at the South Pacific
Forum that consultations on the Protocols should be held between members of the
Forum and the nuclear-weapon States eligible to sign them.

9. The Conference takes note of the existing proposals and the ongoing
regional efforts to achieve nuclear-weapon-free zones in different areas of the
world.

10. The Conference recognizes that for the maximum effectiveness of any treaty
arrangements for establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone the co-operation of the
nuclear-weapon States is necessary. In this connection, the nuclear-weapon States
are invited to assist the efforts of States to create nuclear-weapon-free zones, and to enter into binding undertakings to respect strictly the status of such a zone and to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of the zone.

11. The Conference welcomes the consensus reached by the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East would greatly enhance international peace and security, and urges all parties directly concerned to consider seriously taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East.

12. The Conference also invites the nuclear-weapon States and all other States to render their assistance in the establishment of the zone and at the same time to refrain from any action that runs counter to the letter and spirit of United Nations General Assembly resolution 39/54.

13. The Conference considers that acceding to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and acceptance of IAEA safeguards by all States in the region of the Middle East will greatly facilitate the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region and will enhance the credibility of the Treaty.

14. The Conference considers that the development of a nuclear weapon capability by South Africa at any time frustrates the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, and that collaboration with South Africa in this area would undermine the credibility and the stability of the Non-Proliferation Treaty régime. South Africa is called upon to submit all its nuclear installations and facilities to IAEA safeguards and to ratify the Non-Proliferation Treaty. All States Parties directly concerned are urged to consider seriously taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa. The nuclear-weapon States are invited to assist the efforts of States to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa, and to enter into binding undertakings to respect strictly the status of such a zone and to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of the zone.
REPORT OF MAIN COMMITTEE II

Corrigendum

1. On page 1, under "Officers of the Committee", delete paragraph 2 and replace by:

"2. The Conference elected Ambassador Milos Vejvoda (Czechoslovakia) as the Committee's Chairman; Ambassador Sularto Sutowardoyo (Indonesia) and Ambassador Mario Alessi (Italy) served as Vice-Chairmen of the Committee."

2. On page 3, paragraph 5, last line, replace "full stop" by "semi-colon" and add "- Yugoslavia.".
The Conference takes note of the appeal addressed to the Nuclear Weapon States, Parties to the Treaty by the Non-Nuclear Weapon States, Parties at the Third NPT Review Conference. The text of the appeal is as follows:

APPEAL BY THE NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES PARTIES

The Non-Nuclear Weapon States, Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, at the Third NPT Review Conference, meeting in Geneva, address the following appeal to the Nuclear Weapon States, Parties:

"to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end".

They recall further that the Final Declaration of the First NPT Review Conference contained an appeal to the Nuclear Weapon States, Parties, in particular,

"to make every effort to reach agreement on the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban".

They reaffirm their conviction that the conclusion of a Treaty to prohibit all nuclear test explosions by all States for all time is a matter of the highest priority and of the first importance in halting and reversing the nuclear arms race and eliminating nuclear weapons as well as in preventing their dissemination.

They therefore call upon the Nuclear Weapon States, Parties to negotiate without further delay on the elaboration and conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty.
SCHEDULE OF DIVISION OF COSTS

In accordance with the cost-sharing formula adopted by the Conference, contained in the Appendix to Rule 12 of the Rules of Procedure (NPT/CONF.III/41), the following is the schedule for the division of costs based on the actual participation of States Parties and Signatories in the Review Conference:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Share of costs (in %)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

1. **Depositary States**

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2. **Developing States Parties**

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<td>Bhutan</td>
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<td>Brunei Darussalam</td>
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### 3. Other States Parties

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<td>Signatory States</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Share of costs (in %)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Depositary States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Developing States Parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhutan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunei Darussalam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran (Islamic Republic of)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libyan Arab Jamahiriya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maldives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Share of costs (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Share of Costs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nauru</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian Arab Republic</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viet Nam</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Subtotal** 4.70

### Other States Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Share of Costs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>3.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany, Federal Republic of Germany</td>
<td>8.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holy See</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>3.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>10.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liechtenstein</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Share of costs (in %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Marino</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**Subtotal** 39.93

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Signatory States</th>
<th>Share of costs (in %)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen Arab Republic</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Subtotal** 0.37

**Total** 100.00
REPORT OF THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE

1. In accordance with Rule 36 of the Rules of Procedure, the Conference established a Drafting Committee composed of representatives of the States represented on the General Committee, that is, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Hungary, Japan, Jordan, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Peru, Poland, Romania, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Yugoslavia.

2. The Committee met under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Rolf Ekeus (Sweden). Ambassador Tadeusz Strulak (Poland) and Ambassador Gustavo-Adolfo Vargas (Nicaragua) served as Vice-Chairmen.

3. The Committee held 5 meetings, from 18 to 20 September.

4. The Committee had before it the reports of Main Committees I, II and III (documents NPT/CONF.III/57 and Corr.1, NPT/CONF.III/58 and Corr.1 and NPT/CONF.III/56, respectively), including all the relevant documents listed therein. The Committee considered all these documents and, in addition, the following documents which were subsequently referred to it:

- **NPT/CONF.III/39** Working paper on the peaceful settlement of disputes containing formulations for the Final Declaration submitted by the delegation of Switzerland
- **NPT/CONF.III/59** Proposal for inclusion in the Final Declaration submitted by the delegation of Ireland
- **NPT/CONF.III/L.1** Draft resolution by the Group of Non-Aligned and Neutral States
- **NPT/CONF.III/L.2** Draft resolution by the Group of Non-Aligned and Neutral States
- **NPT/CONF.III/L.3** Draft resolution by the Group of Non-Aligned and Neutral States

CE.85-64922
5. The Drafting Committee gave careful and thorough consideration to the various proposals put forward by delegations. Its deliberations were marked by a spirit of goodwill and mutual accommodation which enabled it to adopt by consensus a Draft Final Document for consideration by the Conference (see Annex). The Draft Final Document consists of four parts: I. Organization and Work of the Conference; II. Final Declaration; III. Documents of the Conference; IV. Summary Records of the Conference and its Main Committees.
ANNEX

DRAFT FINAL DOCUMENT OF THE THIRD REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

I. ORGANIZATION AND WORK OF THE CONFERENCE

Introduction

1. The Final Document of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in the section entitled "Conclusion of the Conference", contains the following statement:

   "At its final plenary meeting, on 7 September, the Conference proposed to the Depositary Governments that a third conference to review the operation of the Treaty be convened in 1985. The Conference accordingly invited States Parties to the Treaty which are Members of the United Nations to request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to include the following item in the provisional agenda of the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly: Implementation of the conclusions of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Establishment of a Preparatory Committee for the Third Conference."

2. At its thirty-eighth session the General Assembly of the United Nations in resolution 38/74 noted that, following appropriate consultations, an open-ended preparatory committee had been formed of parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons serving on the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency or represented in the Committee on Disarmament as well as any party to the Treaty which would express its interest in participating in the work of the Preparatory Committee.

3. Accordingly, the following 71 States parties participated in the work of one or more sessions of the Preparatory Committee:

   Afghanistan, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya,
Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, 
Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Senegal, 
Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, 
Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, 
Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia and Zaire.

4. The Committee held three sessions at Geneva: the first from 2 to 6 April 1984, the second from 1 to 11 October 1984 and the third from 22 April to 1 May 1985. Progress reports on the first two sessions of the Committee were issued as documents NPT/CONF.III/PC.I/4 and NPT/CONF.III/PC.II/13, which were circulated to the States Parties.

5. At its first session, the Preparatory Committee unanimously elected Ambassador J. Dhanapala (Sri Lanka), Ambassador R. Imai (Japan) and Ambassador M. Vejvoda (Czechoslovakia) to serve together as members of the Bureau for the three sessions that the Committee intended to hold and decided that Ambassador Imai would be the Chairman of the first session, Ambassador Vejvoda Chairman of the second session and Ambassador Dhanapala Chairman of the third session. When one member of the Bureau was serving as Chairman of a given session, the two other members would serve as Vice-Chairmen of the Committee. The Committee authorized its Bureau to handle technical and other matters in the period before the Review Conference was convened. Furthermore, the Committee decided that the Chairman of the third session should open the Review Conference.

6. Pursuant to the request of the Preparatory Committee, the Secretariat of the United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America prepared a number of background papers which were submitted to the Conference as background documents as follows:

(a) by the Secretariat of the United Nations:

- Working Paper on the basic facts within the framework of the United Nations in connection with the realization of the purposes of the tenth paragraph of the Preamble of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT/CONF.III/2)
- Working Paper on the basic facts within the framework of the
  United Nations in connection with the realization of the purposes of
  articles I and II of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT/CONF.III/3)
- Working Paper on basic facts within the framework of the
  United Nations in connection with the realization of the purposes of
  articles IV and V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT/CONF.III/4)
- Working Paper on basic facts within the framework of the
  United Nations in connection with the realization of the purposes of
  article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
  (NPT/CONF.III/5)
- Working Paper on the dynamics and consequences of the nuclear arms
  race including its qualitative, quantitative and vertical aspects
  (NPT/CONF.III/6)
- Working Paper on the dynamics and consequences of the wider
  dissemination of nuclear weapons (NPT/CONF.III/7)
- Studies relevant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
  Weapons (NPT/CONF.III/12)
- Report on the present status of negotiations of the Conference on
  Disarmament on "Nuclear Test Ban" (NPT/CONF.III/13)
- Report on the present status of negotiations of the Conference on
  Disarmament on effective measures relating to cessation of the
  nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and
  on the treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and
  effective international control (NPT/CONF.III/14)
- Report on the present status of negotiations of the Conference on
  Disarmament on "Effective international arrangements to assure
  non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear
  weapons" (NPT/CONF.III/15)

(b) by the International Atomic Energy Agency:
- IAEA's activities under article III of NPT (NPT/CONF.III/9)
- IAEA's activities under article IV of NPT (NPT/CONF.III/10)
- IAEA's activities under article V of NPT (NPT/CONF.III/11)
(c) by the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America:

- Memorandum from the Secretariat of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) prepared for the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.III/8)

7. In addition, to assist the Review Conference, the Preparatory Committee invited the nuclear-weapon States and other parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to provide, sufficiently in advance of the Review Conference, information relevant to the implementation of various articles of the Treaty, including especially article VI. Pursuant to the Committee's invitation the following documents were submitted to the Conference:

- Information provided by the United Kingdom regarding implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.III/17)
- United States information pertaining to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 29 July 1985 (NPT/CONF.III/18)
- Information on the implementation by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.III/20)

8. The Final Report of the Preparatory Committee for the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.III/1) was also issued as a document of the Conference prior to its opening. The report included, inter alia, the Provisional Agenda for the Conference, a proposed Allocation of Items to the Main Committees of the Conference, the Draft Rules of Procedure and a Schedule for the Division of Costs of the Conference.

Organization of the Conference

9. In accordance with the decision of the Preparatory Committee, the Conference was convened on 27 August 1985 at the Palais des Nations in Geneva. After the opening of the Conference by Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala of Sri Lanka, Chairman of the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee, the Conference elected by acclamation as its President, Ambassador Dr. Mohamed Ibrahim Shaker of Egypt. The Conference unanimously also confirmed the nomination of Mr. Benjamin Sanders as Secretary-General of the Conference. The nomination had been made by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, following an invitation by the Preparatory Committee.
10. At the same meeting, Mr. Jan Martenson, Under-Secretary-General, Department for Disarmament, United Nations, conveyed to the Conference a message of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and Dr. Hans Blix, Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, addressed the Conference.

11. Also at the opening meeting, a message was addressed to the participants in the Conference by Mr. Mikhail S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (NPT/CONF.III/26).

12. At the 2nd meeting, a message was also addressed to the Conference by President Ronald Reagan of the United States of America (NPT/CONF.III/27).

13. At the opening meeting, the Conference adopted its agenda (NPT/CONF.III/19) as recommended by the Preparatory Committee. At the same meeting, the Conference adopted the Allocation of Items to the Main Committees of the Conference as proposed by the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.III/28).

14. Also at the 1st meeting, the Conference adopted the Rules of Procedure recommended by the Preparatory Committee. At its 13th plenary meeting, on 4 September, the Conference decided to amend Rule 44 (2) of the Rules of Procedure, bearing the subheading "Observers", by adding the following subparagraph:

"(b) Any national liberation organization entitled by the General Assembly of the United Nations** to participate as an Observer in the sessions and the work of the General Assembly, all international Conferences convened under the auspices of the General Assembly, and all international Conferences convened under the auspices of other organs of the United Nations, may apply to the Secretary-General of the Conference for Observer status, which will be accorded on the decision of the Conference. Such a liberation organization shall be entitled to appoint officials to attend meetings of the Plenary and of the Main Committees other than those designated closed meetings, and to receive documents of the Conference. An Observer's organization shall also be entitled to submit documents to the participants in the Conference.

**Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 3237 (XXIX) of 22 November 1974 and 3280 (XXIX) of 10 December 1974 and 152/31 of 20 December 1976."
The original text of Rule 44 (2) is now designated as subparagraph (a). The Rules of Procedure of the Conference are contained in document NPT/CONF.III/41.

15. The Rules of Procedure provided for the establishment of (a) three Main Committees; (b) a General Committee, to be presided over by the President of the Conference and composed of the Chairmen of the Conference's three Main Committees, its Drafting Committee and its Credentials Committee, as well as the 26 Vice-Presidents of the Conference; (c) a Drafting Committee, composed of representatives of the 32 States Parties represented on the General Committee, but open to representatives of other delegations when matters of particular concern to them were under discussion; and (d) a Credentials Committee, composed of a Chairman and two Vice-Chairmen elected by the Conference, and six other members appointed by the Conference on the proposal of the President.

16. The Conference unanimously elected the Chairmen and Vice Chairmen of the three Main Committees, the Drafting Committee, and the Credentials Committee, as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Committee I</th>
<th>Chairman</th>
<th>Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala (Sri Lanka)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vice-Chairman</td>
<td>Ambassador Richard Butler (Australia)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice-Chairman</td>
<td>Dr. Hubert Thielicke (German Democratic Republic)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Committee II</th>
<th>Chairman</th>
<th>Ambassador Milos Vejvoda (Czechoslovakia)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vice-Chairman</td>
<td>Ambassador Mario Alessi (Italy)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice-Chairman</td>
<td>Ambassador Sularto Sutowardoyo (Indonesia)</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Committee III</th>
<th>Chairman</th>
<th>Ambassador Ryukichi Imai (Japan)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vice-Chairman</td>
<td>Ambassador Ataul Karim (Bangladesh)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice-Chairman</td>
<td>Ambassador Borislav Konstantinov (Bulgaria)</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Drafting Committee</th>
<th>Chairman</th>
<th>Ambassador Rolf Ekeus (Sweden)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vice-Chairman</td>
<td>Ambassador Tadeusz Strulak (Poland)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice-Chairman</td>
<td>Ambassador Gustavo-Adolfo Vargas (Nicaragua)</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Credentials Committee</th>
<th>Chairman</th>
<th>Ambassador Paavo Keisalo (Finland)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vice-Chairman</td>
<td>Ambassador David Meiszter (Hungary)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice-Chairman</td>
<td>Ambassador Andros Nicolaidis (Cyprus)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Conference also unanimously elected 26 Vice-Presidents from the following States Parties:

Burundi  
Cameroon  
Canada  
German Democratic Republic  
Germany, Federal Republic of  
Ghana  
Hungary  
Iran (Islamic Republic of)  

Burundi  
Cameroon  
Canada  
German Democratic Republic  
Germany, Federal Republic of  
Ghana  
Hungary  
Iran (Islamic Republic of)  

Iraq  
Ireland  
Jordan  
Malaysia  
Mexico  
Mongolia  
Morocco  
Nicaragua  
Norway  

The Conference also appointed, on the proposal of the President, the following six States Parties as members of the Credentials Committee: Denmark, Jordan, Senegal, Thailand, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America.

Participation in the Conference

Eighty-six States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons participated in the Conference, as follows:

Afghanistan  
Australia  
Austria  
Bangladesh  
Belgium  
Bhutan  
Bolivia  
Brunei Darussalam  
Bulgaria  
Burundi  
Cameroon  
Canada  
Cyprus  
Czechoslovakia  
Democratic Yemen  
Denmark  

Afghanistan  
Australia  
Austria  
Bangladesh  
Belgium  
Bhutan  
Bolivia  
Brunei Darussalam  
Bulgaria  
Burundi  
Cameroon  
Canada  
Cyprus  
Czechoslovakia  
Democratic Yemen  
Denmark  

Ecuador  
Egypt  
Ethiopia  
Finland  
German Democratic Republic  
Germany, Federal Republic of  
Ghana  
Greece  
Guatemala  
Holy See  
Honduras  
Hungary  
Iceland  
Indonesia  
Iran (Islamic Republic of)  

Ecuador  
Egypt  
Ethiopia  
Finland  
German Democratic Republic  
Germany, Federal Republic of  
Ghana  
Greece  
Guatemala  
Holy See  
Honduras  
Hungary  
Iceland  
Indonesia  
Iran (Islamic Republic of)  

Iraq  
Ireland  
Italy  
Japan  
Jordan  
Kenya  
Lebanon  
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya  
Leichtenstein  
Luxembourg  
Malaysia  
Maldives  
Malta  
Mauritius  
Mexico  
Mongolia  

223
Morocco  Portugal  Tunisia
Nauru  Republic of Korea  Turkey
Nepal  Romania  Uganda
Netherlands  Rwanda  Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
New Zealand  San Marino  United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Nicaragua  Senegal  Somalia
Nigeria  Seychelles  United States of America
Norway  Sudan  Uruguay
Panama  Sri Lanka  Venezuela
Papua New Guinea  Switzerland  Viet Nam
Peru  Sweden  Yugoslavia
Philippines  Syrian Arab Republic  Zaire
Poland  Tunisia
Thailand

19. In addition, Colombia and the Yemen Arab Republic, two Signatory States which had not yet ratified the Treaty, participated in the Conference without taking part in its decisions, as provided for in paragraph 1 of Rule 44 of the Rules of Procedure.

20. Ten additional States, neither Parties nor Signatories of the Treaty, namely, Algeria, Argentina, Bahrain, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Israel, Pakistan, Spain and United Republic of Tanzania, were granted observer status in accordance with subparagraph 2(a) of Rule 44.

21. The Palestine Liberation Organization was granted observer status in accordance with subparagraph 2(b) of Rule 44, as amended.

22. The United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency participated in the Conference under paragraph 3 of Rule 44.

23. The Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, the League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity, and the Organization of American States were granted Observer Agency status under paragraph 4 of Rule 44.

24. Forty-three Non-Governmental Organizations attended the Conference under paragraph 5 of Rule 44.

25. A list of all delegations to the Conference, including States Parties, States Signatories, Observers, the United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency, Observer Agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations, is contained in Annex III to this report.
26. The Credentials Committee met on 18 September and adopted its report to the Conference on the credentials of States Parties (NPT/CONF.III/...). At its ... plenary meeting on .... September, the Conference took note of the report.

Financial arrangements

27. At its 1st plenary meeting, the Conference decided to adopt the cost-sharing formula proposed by the Preparatory Committee in the Appendix to Rule 12 of the Rules of Procedure. The final schedule based on the actual participation of States Parties and Signatories in the Conference was set out in document ....

Work of the Conference

28. The Conference held ... plenary meetings between 27 August and ............., when it concluded its work.

29. The general debate in plenary, in which 61 States Parties and 1 Signatory took part, was held from 28 August to 4 September.

30. The General Committee, at its 1st meeting on 30 August, considered item 10 of the Agenda entitled "Programme of Work" and decided, inter alia, to make the following recommendations:

(1) the Conference should complete its work by 20 September;
(2) the three Main Committees should accordingly complete their work on 17 September and the Drafting Committee should convene immediately thereafter.

31. At its 9th meeting, on 2 September, the Conference adopted the above recommendations of the General Committee.

32. Main Committee I held 9 meetings from 4 to 17 September. Its report (NPT/CONF.III/57 and Corr.1) was submitted to the Conference at its 15th meeting on 18 September. Main Committee II held 11 meetings from 2 to 17 September. Its report (NPT/CONF.III/58 and Corr.1) was submitted to the Conference at its 15th meeting on 18 September. Main Committee III held 10 meetings from 3 to 17 September. Its report (NPT/CONF.III/56) was submitted to the Conference at its 15th meeting on 18 September. At the same meeting, the Conference decided to take note of the three reports.

33. The Drafting Committee met from 18 to 20 September.

Documentation

34. A list of the documents of the Conference is attached as Annex I.

Conclusion of the Conference

(to be added)
II. FINAL DECLARATION

THE STATES PARTY TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHICH MET IN GENEVA FROM 27 AUGUST TO . . . SEPTEMBER 1985 TO REVIEW THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY SOLEMNLY DECLARE:

- their conviction that the Treaty is essential to international peace and security,

- their continued support for the objectives of the Treaty which are:

  - the prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

  - the cessation of the nuclear arms race, nuclear disarmament and a Treaty on general and complete disarmament;

  - the promotion of co-operation between States Parties in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy,

- the reaffirmation of their firm commitment to the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty,

- their determination to enhance the implementation of the Treaty and to further strengthen its authority.
Review of the Operation of the Treaty and Recommendations

Articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1-3

The Conference noted the concerns and convictions expressed in preambular paragraphs 1 to 3 and agreed that they remain valid. The States Party to the Treaty remain resolved in their belief in the need to avoid the devastation that a nuclear war would bring. The Conference remains convinced that any proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously increase the danger of a nuclear war.

The Conference agreed that the strict observance of the terms of Articles I and II remains central to achieving the shared objectives of preventing under any circumstances the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and preserving the Treaty's vital contribution to peace and security, including to the peace and security of non-Parties.

The Conference acknowledged the declarations by nuclear-weapons States Party to the Treaty that they had fulfilled their obligations under Article I. The Conference further acknowledged the declarations that non-nuclear-weapons States Party to the Treaty had fulfilled their obligations under Article II. The Conference was of the view therefore that one of the primary objectives of the Treaty had been achieved in the period under review.

The Conference also expressed deep concern that the national nuclear programmes of some States non-Party to the Treaty may lead them to obtain a nuclear weapon capability. States Party to the Treaty stated that any further detonation of a nuclear explosive device by any non-nuclear-weapon State would constitute a most serious breach of the non-proliferation objective.

The Conference noted that specific concerns were expressed about the nuclear weapon capability of South Africa and Israel. The Conference further noted that calls were made for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear facilities, resources or devices to South Africa and Israel and to stop all exploitation of Namibian uranium, natural or enriched, until the attainment of Namibian independence.

Article III and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5

1. The Conference affirms its determination to strengthen further the barriers against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices to additional States. The spread of nuclear explosive capabilities would add immeasurably to regional and international tensions and suspicions. It would increase the risk of nuclear war and lessen the security of all States. The Parties remain convinced that universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty is the best way to strengthen the barriers against proliferation and they urge all States not party to the Treaty to accede to it. The Treaty and the régime of non-proliferation it supports play a central role in promoting regional and international peace and security, inter alia, by helping to prevent the spread of nuclear explosives. The non-proliferation and safeguards commitments in the Treaty are essential also for peaceful nuclear commerce and co-operation.
2. The Conference expresses the conviction that IAEA safeguards provide assurance that States are complying with their undertakings and assist States in demonstrating this compliance. They thereby promote further confidence among States and, being a fundamental element of the Treaty, help to strengthen their collective security. IAEA safeguards play a key role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. Unprotected nuclear activities in non-nuclear-weapon States pose serious proliferation dangers.

Proposed addition under consideration with the President:

"The Conference strongly condemns Israel for its deliberate act of aggression against the Iraqi safeguarded nuclear installations which constitutes the most serious attack on the Treaty and also against the IAEA and its safeguards system since their inception. The Conference calls upon Israel to undertake immediately not to carry out any attack on nuclear installations devoted to peaceful purposes in Iraq or in other countries, and to place all its nuclear installations under the IAEA safeguards."

3. The Conference declares that the commitment to non-proliferation by non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty pursuant to Article I, by non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty pursuant to Article II, and by the acceptance of IAEA safeguards on all peaceful nuclear activities within non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty pursuant to Article III is a major contribution by those States to regional and international security. The Conference notes with satisfaction that the commitments in Articles I-III have been met and have greatly helped prevent the spread of nuclear explosives.

4. The Conference therefore specifically urges all non-nuclear-weapon States not party to the Treaty to make an international legally-binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and to accept IAEA safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear activities, both current and future, to verify that commitment. The Conference further urges all States in their international nuclear co-operation and in their nuclear export policies and, specifically as a necessary basis for the transfer of relevant nuclear supplies to non-nuclear-weapon States, to take effective steps towards achieving such a commitment to non-proliferation and acceptance of such safeguards by those States. The Conference expresses its view that accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty is the best way to achieve that objective.

5. The Conference expresses its satisfaction that four of the five nuclear-weapon States have voluntarily concluded safeguards agreements with the IAEA, covering all or part of their peaceful nuclear activities. The Conference regards those agreements as further strengthening the non-proliferation régime and increasing the authority of IAEA and the effectiveness of its safeguards system. The Conference calls on the nuclear-weapon States to continue to co-operate fully with the IAEA in the implementation of these agreements and calls on IAEA to take full advantage of this co-operation. The Conference urges the People's Republic of China similarly to conclude a safeguards agreement with IAEA. The Conference recommends the continued pursuit of the principle of universal application of IAEA safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities in all States. To this end, the Conference recognizes the value of voluntary offers and recommends further evaluation of the economic and practical possibility of extending application of safeguards to additional civil facilities in the
nuclear-weapon States as and when IAEA resources permit and consideration of separation of the civil and military facilities in the nuclear-weapon States. Such an extending of safeguards will enable the further development and application of an effective régime in both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States.

6. The Conference also affirms the great value to the non-proliferation régime of commitments by the nuclear-weapon States that nuclear supplies provided for peaceful use will not be used for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive purposes. Safeguards in nuclear-weapon States pursuant to their safeguards agreements with IAEA can verify observance of those commitments.

7. The Conference notes with satisfaction the adherence of further Parties to the Treaty and the conclusion of further safeguards agreements in compliance with the undertaking of the Treaty and recommends that:

   (a) The non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty that have not concluded the agreements required under Article III (4) conclude such agreements with IAEA as soon as possible;

   (b) The Director-General of IAEA intensify his initiative of submitting to States concerned draft agreements to facilitate the conclusion of corresponding safeguards agreements, and that Parties to the Treaty, in particular Depositary Parties, should actively support these initiatives;

   (c) All States Party to the Treaty make strenuous individual and collective efforts to make the Treaty truly universal.

8. The Conference notes with satisfaction that IAEA in carrying out its safeguards activities has not detected any diversion of a significant amount of safeguarded material to the production of nuclear weapons, other nuclear explosive devices or to purposes unknown.

9. The Conference notes that IAEA safeguards activities have not hampered the economic, scientific or technological development of the Parties to the Treaty, or international co-operation in peaceful nuclear activities and it urges that this situation be maintained.

10. The Conference commends IAEA on its implementation of safeguards pursuant to this Treaty and urges it to continue to ensure the maximum technical and cost effectiveness and efficiency of its operations, while maintaining consistency with the economic and safe conduct of nuclear activities.

11. The Conference notes with satisfaction the improvement of IAEA safeguards which has enabled it to continue to apply safeguards effectively during a period of rapid growth in the number of safeguarded facilities. It also notes that IAEA safeguards approaches are capable of adequately dealing with facilities under safeguards. In this regard, the recent conclusion of the project to design a safeguards régime for centrifuge enrichment plants and its implementation is welcomed. This project allows the application of an effective régime to all plants of this type in the territories both of nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty.

12. The Conference emphasizes the importance of continued improvements in the effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards, for example, but not limited to:
(a) Uniform and non-discriminatory implementation of safeguards;

(b) The expeditious implementation of new instruments and techniques;

(c) The further development of methods for evaluation of safeguards effectiveness in combination with safeguards information;

(d) Continued increases in the efficiency of the use of human and financial resources and of equipment.

13. The Conference believes that further improvement of the list of materials and equipment which, in accordance with Article III (2) of the Treaty, calls for the application of IAEA safeguards should take account of advances in technology.

14. The Conference recommends that IAEA establish an internationally agreed effective system of international plutonium storage in accordance with Article XII(A)5 of its statute.

15. The Conference welcomes the significant contributions made by States Parties in facilitating the application of IAEA safeguards and in supporting research, development and other supports to further the application of effective and efficient safeguards. The Conference urges that such co-operation and support be continued and that other States Parties provide similar support.

16. The Conference calls upon all States to take IAEA safeguards requirements fully into account while planning, designing and constructing new nuclear fuel cycle facilities and while modifying existing nuclear fuel cycle facilities.

17. The Conference also calls on States Parties to the Treaty to assist IAEA in applying its safeguards, inter alia, through the efficient operation of State systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material, and including compliance with all notification requirements in accordance with safeguards agreements.

18. The Conference welcomes the Agency's endeavours to recruit and train staff of the highest professional standards for safeguards implementation with due regard to the widest possible geographical distribution, in accordance with Article VII D of the IAEA Statute. It calls upon States to exercise their right regarding proposals of designation of IAEA inspectors in such a way as to facilitate the most effective use of safeguards manpower.

19. The Conference also commends to all States Parties the merits of establishment of international fuel cycle facilities, including multination participation, as a positive contribution to reassurance of the peaceful use and non-diversion of nuclear materials. While primarily a national responsibility, the Conference sees advantages in international co-operation concerning spent fuel storage and nuclear waste storage.

20. The Conference calls upon States Parties to continue their political, technical and financial support of the IAEA safeguards system.

21. The Conference underlines the need for IAEA to be provided with the necessary financial and human resources to ensure that the Agency is able to continue to meet effectively its safeguards responsibilities.
22. The Conference urges all States that have not done so to adhere to the Convention on the physical protection of nuclear material at the earliest possible date.

**Article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7**

1. The Conference affirms that the NPT fosters the world-wide peaceful use of nuclear energy and reaffirms that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of any Party to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II.

2. The Conference reaffirms the undertaking by all Parties to the Treaty, in accordance with Article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7, to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the right of all Parties to the Treaty to participate in such exchange. In this context, the Conference recognizes the importance of services. This can contribute to progress in general and to the elimination of technological and economic gaps between the developed and developing countries.

3. The Conference reaffirms the undertaking of the Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so to co-operate in contributing, alone or together with other States or international organizations, to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of the non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world. In this context the Conference recognizes the particular needs of the least developed countries.

4. The Conference requests that States Parties consider possible bilateral co-operation measures to further improve the implementation of Article IV. To this end, States Parties are requested to give in written form their experiences in this area in the form of national contributions to be presented in a report to the next Review Conference.

5. The Conference recognizes the need for more predictable long-term supply assurances with effective assurances of non-proliferation.

6. The Conference commends the recent progress which the IAEA's Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS) has made towards agreeing a set of principles related to this matter, and expresses the hope that the Committee will complete this work soon. The Conference further notes with satisfaction the measures which CAS has recommended to the IAEA Board of Governors for alleviating technical and administrative problems in international shipments of nuclear items, emergency and back-up mechanisms, and mechanisms for the revision of international nuclear co-operation agreements and calls for the early completion of the work of CAS and the implementation of its recommendations.

7. The Conference reaffirms that in accordance with international law and applicable treaty obligations, States should fulfill their obligations under agreements in the nuclear field, and any modification of such agreements, if required, should be made only by mutual consent of the parties concerned.
8. The Conference confirms that each country's choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing their respective fuel cycle policies. International co-operation in this area, including international transfer and subsequent operations should be governed by effective assurances of non-proliferation and predictable long-term supply assurances. The issuance of related licences and authorization involved should take place in a timely fashion.

9. While recognizing that the operation and management of the back-end of the fuel cycle including nuclear waste storage are primarily a national responsibility, the Conference acknowledges the importance for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy of international and multilateral collaboration for arrangements in this area.

10. The Conference recognizes that an armed attack on a safeguarded nuclear facility, or threat of attack, would create a situation in which the Security Council would have to act immediately in accordance with provisions of the United Nations Charter. The Conference further emphasizes the responsibilities of the Depositaries of NPT in their capacity as permanent members of the Security Council to endeavour, in consultation with the other members of the Security Council, to give full consideration to all appropriate measures to be undertaken by the Security Council to deal with the situation, including measures under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

11. The Conference encourages Parties to be ready to provide immediate peaceful assistance in accordance with international law to any Party to the NPT, if it so requests, whose safeguarded nuclear facilities have been subject to an armed attack, and calls upon all States to abide by any decisions taken by the Security Council in accordance with the United Nations Charter in relation to the attacking State.

12. The Conference considers that such attacks could involve grave dangers due to the release of radioactivity and that such attacks or threats of attack jeopardize the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Conference also acknowledges that the matter is under consideration by the Conference on Disarmament and urges co-operation of all States for its speedy conclusion.

13. Proposed texts under negotiations among delegations:

(a) "The Conference recalls Security Council resolution 487 and considers that the Israeli attack on the safeguarded Iraqi nuclear installation in 1981 was an affront to the NPT and the IAEA safeguards régime."

(b) "The Conference urges all States to provide necessary technical assistance to Iraq to restore its peaceful nuclear programme and to overcome the damage caused by the Israeli attack."

(c) "The Conference condemns Israel for its pre-meditated military aggression against the safeguarded nuclear research reactor, which constitutes an aggression against the Treaty and the IAEA safeguards system, as well as against the inalienable rights of all States to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes."

(d) "The Conference notes that the Islamic Republic of Iran states its concern regarding attacks on its nuclear facilities."
14. The Conference acknowledges the importance of the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as the principal agent for technology transfer amongst the international organizations referred to in Article IV (2) and welcomes the successful operation of the Agency's technical assistance and co-operation programmes. The Conference records with appreciation that projects supported from these programmes covered a wide spectrum of applications, related both to power and non-power uses of nuclear energy notably in agriculture, medicine, industry and hydrology. The Conference notes that the Agency's assistance to the developing States Party to the Treaty has been chiefly in the non-power uses of nuclear energy.

15. The Conference welcomes the establishment by the IAEA, following a recommendation of the First Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, of a mechanism to permit the channelling of extra-budgetary funds to projects additional to those financed from the IAEA Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund. The Conference notes that this channel has been used to make additional resources available for a wide variety of projects in developing States Party to the Treaty.

16. In this context, the Conference proposes the following measures for consideration by the IAEA:

(i) IAEA assistance to developing countries in siting, construction, operation and safety of nuclear power projects and the associated trained manpower provision to be strengthened.

(ii) To provide, upon request, assistance in securing financing from outside sources for nuclear power projects in developing countries, and in particular the least developed countries.

(iii) IAEA assistance in nuclear planning systems for developing countries to be strengthened in order to help such countries draw up their own nuclear development plans.

(iv) IAEA assistance on country-specific nuclear development strategies to be further developed, with a view to identifying the application of nuclear technology that can be expected to contribute most to the development both of individual sectors and developing economies as a whole.

(v) Greater support for regional co-operative agreements, promoting regional projects based on regionally agreed priorities and using inputs from regional countries.

(vi) Exploration of the scope for multi-year, multi-donor projects financed from the extra-budgetary resources of the IAEA.

(vii) The IAEA's technical co-operation evaluation activity to be further developed, so as to enhance the Agency's effectiveness in providing technical assistance.

17. The Conference underlines the need for the provision to the IAEA of the necessary financial and human resources to ensure that the Agency is able to continue to meet effectively its responsibilities.
18. The Conference notes the appreciable level of bilateral co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and urges that States in a position to do so should continue and where possible increase the level of their co-operation in these fields.

19. The Conference urges that preferential treatment should be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty in access to or transfer of equipment, materials, services and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, taking particularly into account needs of developing countries.

20. Proposed text under negotiation among delegations

"The Conference demands that all States suspend any nuclear co-operation with South Africa and Israel until they renounce to the nuclear-weapon option by joining the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, accepting the IAEA safeguards and pledging not to manufacture nor acquire nuclear weapons".

21. The Conference recognizes the growing nuclear energy needs of the developing countries as well as the difficulties which the developing countries face in this regard, particularly with respect to financing their nuclear power programmes. The Conference calls upon States Party to the Treaty to promote the establishment of favourable conditions in national, regional and international financial institutions for financing of nuclear energy projects including nuclear power programmes in developing countries. Furthermore, the Conference calls upon the IAEA to initiate and the Parties to the Treaty to support the work of an expert group study on mechanisms to assist developing countries in the promotion of their nuclear power programmes, including the establishment of a Financial Assistance Fund.

22. The Conference recognizes that further IAEA assistance in the preparation of feasibility studies and infrastructure development might enhance the prospects for developing countries for obtaining finance, and recommends such countries as are members of the Agency to apply for such help under the Agency's technical assistance and co-operation programmes. The Conference also acknowledges that further support for the IAEA's Small and Medium Power Reactor (SMPR) Study could help the development of nuclear reactors more suited to the needs of some of the developing countries.

23. The Conference expresses its satisfaction at the progress in the preparations for the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (UNCPIPCUNE) and its conviction that UNCPIPCUNE will fully realize its goals in accordance with the objectives of resolution 32/50 and relevant subsequent resolutions of the General Assembly for the development of national programmes of peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development, especially in the developing countries.

24. The Conference considers that all proposals related to the promotion and strengthening of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy which have been produced by the Third Review Conference of the NPT, be transmitted to the Preparatory Committee of the UNCPIPCUNE.
Article V

1. The Conference reaffirms the obligation of Parties to the Treaty to take appropriate measures to ensure that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions are made available to non-nuclear weapon States Party to the Treaty in full accordance with the provisions of article V and other applicable international obligations, that such services should be provided to non-nuclear weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used should be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development.

2. The Conference confirms that the IAEA would be the appropriate international body through which any potential benefits of the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions could be made available to non-nuclear weapon States under the terms of article V of the Treaty.

3. The Conference notes that the potential benefits of the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions have not been demonstrated and that no requests for services related to the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions have been received by the IAEA since the Second NPT Review Conference.

Article VI and preambular paragraphs 8-12

A.

1. The Conference recalled that under the provisions of article VI all parties have undertaken to pursue negotiations in good faith:

   - on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date;

   - on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament;

   - on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

2. The Conference undertook an evaluation of the achievements in respect of each aspect of the article in the period under review, and paragraphs 8 to 12 of the preambles, and in particular with regard to the goals set out in preambular paragraph 10 which recalls the determination expressed by the parties to the Partial Test Ban Treaty to:

   - continue negotiations to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time.

3. The Conference recalled the declared intention of the parties to the Treaty to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament and their urging made to all States parties to co-operate in the attainment of this objective. The Conference also recalled the determination expressed by the parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and the desire to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery.
4. The Conference notes that the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations concluded, in paragraph 50 of its Final Document, that the achievement of nuclear disarmament will require urgent negotiations of agreements at appropriate stages and with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to the States concerned for:

(a) Cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems;

(b) Cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;

(c) A comprehensive, phased programme with agreed time-tables whenever feasible, for progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time".

5. The Conference also recalled that in the Final Declaration of the First Review Conference, the parties expressed the view that the conclusion of a treaty banning all nuclear-weapon tests was one of the most important measures to halt the nuclear arms race and expressed the hope that the nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty would take the lead in reaching an early solution of the technical and political difficulties of this issue.

6. The Conference examined developments relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race, in the period under review and noted in particular that the destructive potentials of the nuclear arsenals of nuclear-weapon States parties, were undergoing continuing development, including a growing research and development component in military spending, continued nuclear testing, development of new delivery systems and their deployment.

7. The Conference noted the concerns expressed regarding developments with far reaching implications and the potential of a new environment, space, being drawn into the arms race. In that regard the Conference also noted the fact that the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are pursuing bilateral negotiations on a broad complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms, with a view to achieving effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth.

8. The Conference noted with regret that the development and deployment of nuclear weapon systems had continued during the period of review.

9. The Conference also took note of numerous proposals and actions, multilateral and unilateral, advanced during the period under review by many States with the aim of making progress towards the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

10. The Conference examined the existing situation in the light of the undertaking assumed by the parties in Article VI to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. The Conference recalled that a stage of negotiations on the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT II) had been concluded in 1979, by the signing of the Treaty which had remained unratified. The Conference noted that both the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America have declared that they are abiding by the provisions of SALT II.
11. The Conference recalled that the bilateral negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America which were held between 1981 and 1983 were discontinued without any concrete results.

12. The Conference noted that bilateral negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America had been held in 1985 to consider questions concerning space and nuclear arms, both strategic and intermediate-range, with all the questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship. No agreement has emerged so far. These negotiations are continuing.

13. The Conference evaluated the progress made in multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations in the period of the Review.

14. The Conference recalled that the trilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty, begun in 1977 between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, had not continued after 1980, that the Committee on Disarmament and later the Conference on Disarmament had been called upon by the General Assembly of the United Nations in successive years to begin negotiations on such a Treaty, and noted that such negotiations had not been initiated, despite the submission of draft treaties and different proposals to the Conference on Disarmament in this regard.

15. The Conference noted the lack of progress on relevant items of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, in particular those relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, the prevention of nuclear war including all related matters and effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

16. The Conference noted that two Review Conferences had taken place since 1980, one on the Sea-bed Treaty and one on the Environmental Modification Treaty and three General Conferences of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. In 1982, a Special United Nations General Assembly Session on Disarmament took place without any results in matters directly linked to nuclear disarmament.

17. The Conference also noted the last five years had thus not given any results concerning negotiations on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament.

B.

1. The Conference concluded that, since no agreements had been reached in the period under review on effective measures relating to the cessation of an arms race at an early date, on nuclear disarmament and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, the aspirations contained in preambular paragraphs 8 to 12 had still not been met, and the objectives under Article VI had not yet been achieved.

2. The Conference reiterated that the implementation of Article VI is essential to the maintenance and strengthening of the Treaty, reaffirmed the commitment of all States Parties to the implementation of this Article and called upon the States Parties to intensify their efforts to achieve fully the objectives of the Article. The Conference addressed a call to the nuclear-weapon States Parties in particular to demonstrate this commitment.
3. The Conference welcomes the fact that the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are conducting bilateral negotiations on a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms - both strategic and intermediate-range - with all these questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship. It hopes that these negotiations will lead to early and effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and at strengthening strategic stability. Such agreements will complement and ensure the positive outcome of multilateral negotiations on disarmament, and would lead to the reduction of international tensions and the promotion of international peace and security. The Conference recalls that the two sides believe that ultimately the bilateral negotiations, just as efforts in general to limit and reduce arms, should lead to the complete elimination of nuclear arms everywhere.

4. The Conference urges the Conference on Disarmament, as appropriate, to proceed to early multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament in pursuance of paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament.

5. The Conference reaffirms the determination expressed in the preamble of the 1965 Partial Test Ban Treaty, confirmed in Article I (b) of the said Treaty and reiterated in preambular paragraph 10 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time.

6. The Conference also recalls that in the Final Document of the First Review Conference, the Parties expressed the view that the conclusion of a Treaty banning all nuclear weapons tests was one of the most important measures to halt the nuclear arms race. The Conference stresses the important contribution that such a treaty would make toward strengthening and extending the international barriers against the proliferation of nuclear weapons; it further stresses that adherence to such a treaty by all States would contribute substantially to the full achievement of the non-proliferation objective. [The Conference deeply regrets that until now a comprehensive multilateral nuclear test-ban treaty has not been concluded and therefore calls on the nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty to take the lead in [working for] [negotiation and] conclusion of such a Treaty in the context of the Conference on Disarmament].

7. The Conference also took note of the appeals contained in five successive United Nations General Assembly resolutions since 1981 for a moratorium on nuclear weapons testing pending the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban Treaty, and of similar calls made at this Conference. It also took note of the measure announced by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for a unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions from 6 August 1985 until 1 January 1986, which would continue beyond that date if the United States of America, for its part, refrained from carrying out nuclear explosions. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics suggested that this would provide an example for other nuclear-weapon States and would create favourable conditions for the conclusion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the promotion of the fuller implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

8. The Conference took note of the unconditional invitation extended by the United States of America to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to send observers, who may bring any equipment they deem necessary, to measure a United States of America nuclear test in order to begin a process which in the view of the United States of America would help to ensure effective verification of limitations on under-ground nuclear testing.
9. The Conference also took note of the appeals contained in five United Nations General Assembly resolutions since 1982 for a freeze on all nuclear weapons in quantitative and qualitative terms, which should be taken by all nuclear-weapon States or, in the first instance and simultaneously, by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the understanding that the other nuclear-weapon States would follow their example, and of similar calls made at this Conference.

10. The Conference took note of proposals by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America for the reduction of nuclear weapons.

11. The Conference took note of proposals submitted by States Parties on a number of related issues relevant to achieving the purposes of Article VI and set out in Annex I to this document and in the statements made in the General Debate of the Conference.

Article VII and the Security of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States

1. The Conference observes the growing interest in utilizing the provisions of Article VII of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which recognizes the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

2. The Conference considers that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned constitutes an important disarmament measure and therefore the process of establishing such zones in different parts of the world should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons. In the process of establishing such zones, the characteristics of each region should be taken into account.

3. The Conference emphasizes the importance of concluding nuclear-weapon-free zone arrangements in harmony with internationally recognized principles, as stated in the Final Document of the First Special Session of the United Nations devoted to disarmament.

4. The Conference holds the view that, under appropriate conditions, progress towards the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones will create conditions more conducive to the establishment of zones of peace in certain regions of the world.

5. The Conference expresses its belief that concrete measures of nuclear disarmament would significantly contribute to creating favourable conditions for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

6. The Conference expresses its satisfaction at the continued successful operation of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco). It reaffirms the repeated exhortations of the General Assembly to France, which is already a signatory of Additional Protocol I, to ratify it, and calls upon the Latin American States that are eligible to become parties to the treaty to do so. The Conference welcomes the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II to this Treaty by all nuclear-weapon States.
7. The Conference also notes the continued existence of the Antarctic Treaty.

8. The Conference notes the endorsement of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty by the South-Pacific Forum on 6 August 1985 at Rarotonga and welcomes this achievement as consistent with Article VII of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Conference also takes note of the draft Protocols to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty and further notes the agreement at the South Pacific Forum that consultations on the Protocols should be held between members of the Forum and the nuclear-weapon States eligible to sign them.

9. The Conference takes note of the existing proposals and the ongoing regional efforts to achieve nuclear-weapon-free zones in different areas of the world.

10. The Conference recognizes that for the maximum effectiveness of any treaty arrangements for establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone the co-operation of the nuclear-weapon States is necessary. In this connection, the nuclear-weapon States are invited to assist the efforts of States to create nuclear-weapon-free zones, and to enter into binding undertakings to respect strictly the status of such a zone and to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of the zone.

11. The Conference welcomes the consensus reached by the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East would greatly enhance international peace and security, and urges all parties directly concerned to consider seriously taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East.

12. The Conference also invites the nuclear-weapon States and all other States to render their assistance in the establishment of the zone and at the same time to refrain from any action that runs counter to the letter and spirit of United Nations General Assembly resolution 39/54.

13. The Conference considers that acceding to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and acceptance of IAEA safeguards by all States in the region of the Middle East will greatly facilitate the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region and will enhance the credibility of the Treaty.

14. The Conference considers that the development of a nuclear weapon capability by South Africa at any time frustrates the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa and that collaboration with South Africa in this area would undermine the credibility and the stability of the Non-Proliferation Treaty régime. South Africa is called upon to submit all its nuclear installations and facilities to IAEA safeguards and to accede the Non-Proliferation Treaty. All States Parties directly concerned are urged to consider seriously taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa. The nuclear weapon States are invited to assist the efforts of States to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa, and to enter into binding undertakings to respect strictly the status of such a zone and to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of the zone.
15. The Conference considers that the most effective guarantee against the possible use of nuclear weapons and the danger of nuclear war is nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Pending the achievement of this goal on a universal basis and recognizing the need for all States to ensure their independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty, the Conference reaffirms the particular importance of assuring and strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties which have renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The Conference recognizes that different approaches may be required to strengthen the security of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty.

16. The Conference underlines again the importance of adherence to the Treaty by non-nuclear-weapon States as the best means of reassuring one another of their renunciation of nuclear weapons and as one of the effective means of strengthening their mutual security.

17. The Conference takes note of the continued determination of the Depositary States to honour their statements, which were welcomed by the United Nations Security Council in resolution 255 (1968), that, to ensure the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty, they will provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty which is a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.

18. The Conference reiterates its conviction that, in the interest of promoting the objectives of the Treaty, including the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties, all States, both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States, should refrain, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, from the threat or the use of force in relations between States, involving either nuclear or non-nuclear weapons.

19. The Conference recalls that the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly in paragraph 59 of the Final Document took note of the declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States regarding the assurance of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and urged them to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

20. Being aware of the consultations and negotiations on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, which have been under way in the Conference on Disarmament for several years, the Conference regrets that the search for a common approach which could be included in an international legally binding instrument, has been unsuccessful. The Conference takes note of the repeatedly expressed intention of the Conference on Disarmament to continue to explore ways and means to overcome the difficulties encountered in its work and to carry out negotiations on the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In this connection, the Conference calls upon all States, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, to
continue the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament devoted to the search for a common approach acceptable to all, which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character.

Article VIII

(to be added)

Article IX

The Conference, having expressed great satisfaction that the overwhelming majority of States have acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and having recognized the urgent need for further ensuring the universality of the Treaty, appeals to all States, particularly the nuclear-weapon States and other States advanced in nuclear technology, which have not yet done so, to adhere to the Treaty at the earliest possible date.
REPORT OF THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE

Addendum

1. On page 23, after para. 11, please add the following new paragraph 12:

12. The Conference reiterated its conviction that the objectives of Article VI remained unfulfilled and concluded that the nuclear-weapon states should make greater efforts to ensure effective measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date, for nuclear disarmament and for a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

The Conference expressed the hope for rapid progress in the US-USSR bilateral negotiations.

The Conference except for certain states whose views are reflected in the following sub-paragraph deeply regretted that a comprehensive multilateral Nuclear Test Ban Treaty banning all nuclear tests by all States in all environments for all time had not been concluded so far and, therefore, called on the nuclear weapon States Party to the Treaty to resume trilateral negotiations in 1985 and called on all the nuclear-weapon States to participate in the urgent negotiation and conclusion of such a Treaty as a matter of the highest priority in the Conference on Disarmament.

At the same time, the Conference noted that certain States Party to the Treaty, while committed to the goal of an effectively verifiable comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, considered deep and verifiable reductions in existing arsenals of nuclear weapons as the highest priority in the process of pursuing the objectives of Article VI.

The Conference also noted the statement of the USSR, as one of the nuclear weapon States Party to the Treaty, recalling its repeatedly expressed readiness to proceed forthwith to negotiations, trilateral and multilateral, with the aim of concluding a comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the submission by it of a draft Treaty proposal to this end.

2. On page 22, please delete the sentence in brackets at the end of para. 6.

* Re-issued for technical reasons
REPORT OF THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE

Addendum

1. On page 8, please add the following to the end of paragraph 20:

"The Chairman of the Group of Non-Aligned Countries made a statement expressing the reservation of the Group on Israel's application for observer status."

2. On page 8, please add the following to the end of paragraph 21:

"The representative of the United States of America expressed his Government's reservations with respect to the Palestine Liberation Organization."
On page 26, under Article VIII, please add the following:

The States Party to the Treaty participating in the Conference propose to the Depositary Governments that a fourth Conference to review the operation of the Treaty be convened in 1990.

The Conference accordingly invites States Party to the Treaty which are Members of the United Nations to request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to include the following item in the provisional agenda of the forty-third session of the General Assembly:

"Implementation of the conclusions of the third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and establishment of a Preparatory Committee for the fourth Conference."
On page 26, under Article VIII, please add the following:

The States Party to the Treaty participating in the Conference propose to the Depositary Governments that a fourth Conference to review the operation of the Treaty be convened in 1990.

The Conference accordingly invites States Party to the Treaty which are Members of the United Nations to request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to include the following item in the provisional agenda of the forty-third session of the General Assembly:

"Implementation of the conclusions of the third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and establishment of a Preparatory Committee for the fourth Conference."
CREDENTIALS OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE CONFERENCE

Report of the Credentials Committee

1. In accordance with rule 5 of its Rules of Procedure, the Conference, at its 5th plenary meeting held on 29 August 1985, unanimously elected Ambassador Paavo Keisalo (Finland) as Chairman of the Credentials Committee, and at its 13th plenary meeting on 4 September 1985, Ambassador David Meiszter (Hungary) and Ambassador Andros A. Nicolaides (Cyprus) as Vice-Chairmen of the Committee.

2. At the 14th plenary meeting on 13 September 1985, the Conference, in accordance with rule 3 of the Rules of Procedure appointed, on the proposal of the President, the following countries as members of the Credentials Committee: Denmark, Jordan, Senegal, Thailand, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and United States of America.

3. The Committee held its meeting on 18 September 1985, and had before it a memorandum dated 12 September 1985 from the Secretary-General of the Conference, concerning the status of the credentials of the 86 States parties attending the Conference. According to that memorandum:

(a) As of 12 September 1985, 86 States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons were participating in the Conference.

(b) As of the same date, formal credentials in due form, as provided for by rule 2 of the Rules of Procedure, had been received by the Secretary-General of the Conference from the following States Parties: Afghanistan, Australia, Austria, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, San Marino, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela, Viet Nam and Yugoslavia.

(c) Provisional credentials of the representatives of the following States parties had been communicated to the Secretary-General of the Conference in the form of cables by the respective Foreign Ministers: Burundi, Italy, Lebanon, Papua New Guinea and Senegal.

(d) The designation of the representatives of the following States parties had been communicated to the Secretary-General of the Conference by note verbales or letters from the respective Permanent Missions in Geneva or New York: Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Burundi, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Iran (Islamic Republic of),...
Italy, Ivory Coast, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mauritius, Nicaragua, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Uruguay and Zaire.

4. Subsequently, on 16 September 1985, formal credentials in due form, as provided for by rule 2 of the Rules of Procedure, were received by the Secretary-General of the Conference from Italy.

5. The Committee examined and accepted the credentials of the representatives of all the participating States referred to in the Secretary-General's memorandum of 12 September and in paragraph 4 above, on the understanding that those States that had not yet submitted formal credentials for their representatives as required by rule 2 of the Rules of Procedure of the Conference should communicate them to the Secretary-General of the Conference as soon as possible.

6. The Committee unanimously adopted its report to the Conference.
After paragraph 3, please add the following sub-paragraph (e):

On 20 September 1985, provisional Credentials of the representatives of Peru were communicated to the Secretary-General of the Conference in the form of a telegram from the Foreign Minister of Peru.

I should like to recall a statement by my delegation in Main Committee I on 11 September 1985 (cf. document NPT/CONF.III/C.I/SR.5, p.9), and by which it requested that the name of my country, Federal Republic of Germany, be correctly rendered in the Russian language version of all relevant Conference documents. In that connection, my delegation drew attention, by way of example, to document NPT/CONF.III/48 where, falsely, the word Germany had been put in the genitive instead of in the nominative.

It appears that a reissue of the document in question has not been circulated during the meeting time of the Conference, a fact that is undoubtedly due to the inordinate amount of work your Secretariat had to face during this period.

May I therefore request that a corrected version of all relevant documents in the Russian language be included in the final proceedings of the Conference, and that this letter be included as part of the Conference documentation.
DRAFT RESOLUTION ON A COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN

The Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Noting the reiteration in the Preamble of the Treaty of the determination proclaimed since 1963 in the Preamble and Article I, paragraph 1 (b), of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water "to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end",

Convinced that one of the most effective measures for strengthening the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and promoting universal adherence to it would be to put into practice that determination,

Urges the three Depositary States of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to undertake negotiations during the year of 1985 for the elaboration and adoption of a comprehensive nuclear test ban Treaty.
GROUP OF NON-ALIGNED AND NEUTRAL STATES

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON A NUCLEAR TEST BAN MORATORIUM

The Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Recalling that article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons contains an undertaking by each of the Parties "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date",

Considering that the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests would constitute a most important and effective measure for the qualitative cessation of the nuclear arms race,

Considering further that a moratorium on nuclear test explosions, as a provisional measure, has been called for by the General Assembly of the United Nations at each of its last five sessions,

Calls upon the three Depositary States of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to institute, as a provisional measure, an immediate moratorium on all nuclear weapon tests.
The Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Recalling that the Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons contains an undertaking by each of the Parties "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear-arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament",

Considering that a nuclear-arms freeze, while not an end in itself, would constitute the most effective first step for a cessation of the nuclear-arms race,

Calls on the three Depositary States of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons:

1. To agree on a complete freeze on the testing, production and deployment of all nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles;

2. To begin negotiations for substantial reductions of their existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles.
Draft Resolution

The consequences of the Israeli military attack against the safeguarded Iraqi research reactor on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the IAEA safeguards system

The Third Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons:

Recalling that in accordance with article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, all the parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy,

Recalling also preambular paragraph 5 of the Treaty, which emphasizes the undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Fully aware that the Treaty upholds the inalienable rights of all the parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of the Treaty,

Recognizing that the safeguards system operated by the IAEA is the only credible international system of verification of non-proliferation obligations assumed under the Treaty,

Noting that Iraq is a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and has accepted the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards with full compliance,

Taking note of the United Nations Security Council resolution 487 of June 1981 which considers that the Israeli military aggression against the Iraqi peaceful nuclear installations constitutes a serious threat to the entire IAEA safeguards régime which is the foundation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty,

Further taking note of the IAEA General Conference resolutions, GC(XXVII)RES/409 of 1983, GC(XXVIII)RES/425 of 1984 and in particular GC(XXV)RES/381 (1981), which considers that the Israeli act of aggression against the safeguarded Iraqi nuclear installations constitutes an attack against the Agency and its safeguards régime, which is the foundation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Viewing with deep concern Israel's refusal to comply with Security Council resolution 487 of 19 June 1981,

Deeply concerned that the Israeli aggression has caused a severe set back to the Treaty and to the IAEA and its safeguards system,

Taking into consideration the concern of non-nuclear-weapon States that in conjunction with their adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, appropriate measures be undertaken to safeguard their security,

Noting with profound concern Israel's persistent refusal to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, despite repeated calls by the United Nations General Assembly, the Security Council and the IAEA,

1. Strongly condemns Israel for its premeditated act of aggression against the Iraqi peaceful nuclear installations;

2. Considers that the Israeli military attack against the safeguarded Iraqi nuclear installations constitutes the most serious attack against the Treaty as well as against the IAEA and its safeguards since their inception;

3. Urges all member States to provide necessary technical assistance for Iraq to restore its peaceful nuclear programme and to overcome the damage caused by the Israeli attack;

4. Requests all member States, to fulfil their non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty by preventing Israel from acquiring nuclear technology that might contribute to its nuclear capability;

5. Calls upon Israel to submit forthwith all its nuclear facilities to the IAEA safeguards and join the Treaty in accordance with Security Council resolution 487 (1981);

6. Demands that Israel undertake forthwith not to carry out any further attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes, in Iraq or on similar facilities in other countries in disregard to the Agency's safeguards system;

7. Requests the United Nations Security Council to take urgent and effective measures to implement its resolution 487 (1981) and to ensure that Israel complies with the provisions of that resolution;

8. Affirms the inalienable right of all member States to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under internationally accepted safeguards.
Amendment by the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Draft Resolution NPT/CONF.III/L.4
Tabled by Iraq

REPLACE OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 3 BY THE FOLLOWING:

3. URGES all member States to provide necessary technical assistance to any member State whose peaceful nuclear installations have been subjected to military attack so that its peaceful nuclear programme may be restored and the damage caused by the attack may be overcome.
Third Review Conference
of the Parties to the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

At its second session, the Preparatory Committee for the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, at the initiative of the representative of Austria, requested the Secretariat to prepare a list of States (including States not Members of the United Nations) indicating their status in relation to the non-proliferation Treaty. The list is as follows:

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<td>Gambia</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>Germany, Federal Republic of</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* x Parties to the Treaty.
* xx Signatories of the Treaty.
60 Grenada x
61 Guatemala x
62 Guinea x
63 Guinea-Bissau x
64 Guyana
65 Haiti x
66 Holy See x
67 Honduras x
68 Hungary x
69 Iceland x
70 India
71 Indonesia x
72 Iran (Islamic Republic of)
73 Iraq x
74 Ireland x
75 Israel
76 Italy x
77 Ivory Coast x
78 Jamaica x
79 Japan x
80 Jordan x
81 Kenya x
82 Kiribati x
83 Kuwait xx
84 Lao People's Democratic Republic x
85 Lebanon x
86 Lesotho x
87 Liberia x
88 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya x
89 Liechtenstein x
90 Luxembourg x
91 Madagascar x
92 Malawi
93 Malaysia x
94 Maldives x
95 Mali x
96 Malta x
97 Mauritania
98 Mauritius x
99 Mexico x
100 Monaco
101 Mongolia x
102 Morocco x
103 Mozambique
104 Nauru x
105 Nepal x
106 Netherlands x
107 New Zealand x
108 Nicaragua x
109 Niger
110 Nigeria x
111 Norway x
112 Oman
113 Pakistan
114 Panama x
115 Papua New Guinea x
116 Paraguay x
117 Peru x
118 Philippines x
119 Poland x
120 Portugal x
121 Qatar
122 Republic of Korea x
123 Romania x
124 Rwanda x
125 Saint Christopher and Nevis
126 Saint Lucia x
127 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
128 Samoa x
129 San Marino x
130 Sao Tome and Principe x
131 Saudi Arabia
132 Senegal x
133 Seychelles x
134 Sierra Leone x
135 Singapore x
136 Solomon Islands x
137 Somalia x
138 South Africa
139 Spain
140 Sri Lanka x
141 Sudan x
142 Suriname x
143 Swaziland x
144 Sweden x
145 Switzerland x
146 Syrian Arab Republic x
147 Thailand x
148 Togo x
149 Tonga x
150 Trinidad and Tobago xx
151 Tunisia x
152 Turkey x
153 Tuvalu x
154 Uganda x
155 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>156</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>157</td>
<td>United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>158</td>
<td>United Republic of Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>159</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>160</td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>161</td>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
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<tr>
<td>162</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>163</td>
<td>Viet Nam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>164</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>165</td>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>166</td>
<td>Zaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>167</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>168</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ESTIMATED COST OF THE THIRD REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

At its third session, the Preparatory Committee for the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons accepted revised cost estimates of the Conference, including the sessions of the Preparatory Committee. The revised cost estimates are contained in document NPT/CONF.III/PC.III/15 which as amended and corrected is reproduced hereafter for the information of the Conference.
ESTIMATED COST OF THE THIRD REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Note by the Secretariat

1. At the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, held at Geneva from 1 to 11 October 1984, the Committee deferred to its third session the consideration of the costs of the Review Conference, including the sessions of the Preparatory Committee. The Committee requested the Secretariat to revise the cost estimates contained in document NPT/CONF.III/PC.III/II and Corr.1 (which the Secretariat had prepared for the Committee's second session) and invited the Secretariat to make every possible effort to contain those costs in a more rigorous manner, taking into account the views expressed in the Committee. In pursuance of the Committee's request, the Secretariat submits below a revised summary of the estimated cost of the Third Review Conference, including the meetings of the Preparatory Committee.

A. Estimated conference-servicing cost

2. The estimates of the conference-servicing costs given below are based on the actual costs involved in servicing the first two sessions of the Preparatory Committee and on the revised forecast of the workload for the third session of the Committee and for the Conference. The final cost of the provision of conference services for the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will depend on the total actual workload arising from all three sessions of the Preparatory Committee and from the Conference itself.

3. At its first session, the Preparatory Committee decided that the working languages for the Conference and its preparation would be Arabic, English, and...
French, Russian and Spanish. The Committee also decided that summary records should be kept of meetings of the Committee's third session and the Conference itself and only records of decisions should be kept for the first and second sessions. The related estimates of conference-servicing costs take account of these two decisions as well as of the Committee's request to the Secretariat for a number of additional background papers. 2/ The opportunity was also taken to revise the conference servicing requirements to take into account the latest salary rates for conference servicing staff. The initial estimates are also shown in comparison with the revised estimates.

4. On this basis, the conference-servicing requirements have been revised as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Initial Estimates</th>
<th>Revised Estimates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$US</td>
<td>$US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First session of the Preparatory Committee (2 – 6 April 1984)</td>
<td>30 000</td>
<td>20 885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second session of the Preparatory Committee (1 to 11 October 1984)</td>
<td>206 600</td>
<td>103 572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third session of the Preparatory Committee (22 April to 3 May 1985)</td>
<td>288 700</td>
<td>421 400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Review Conference – September 1985 (4 weeks)</td>
<td>1 019 400</td>
<td>971 600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 544 700</td>
<td>1 517 457</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. The breakdown of conference-servicing costs incurred for the first and second sessions of the Preparatory Committee and the revised estimated conference-servicing costs of holding the third session of the Preparatory Committee and the Review Conference itself is set out in Annex I to the present document.

6. Because of the fact that no summary records were required at the second session and due in part to a considerably smaller volume of documentation than had been originally foreseen and to reduced requirements under interpretation, the actual cost of the first and second sessions of the Preparatory Committee is substantially lower than the initial estimates.

With regard to the third session of the Committee and to the Conference, the estimates for meeting services, in-session documentation and summary records to be incurred in Geneva have been recalculated in US dollars at the rate of SF 2.50 to the US dollar (the revised budget rate for the year 1985) whereas the related initial estimates were based on an exchange rate of SF 2.18 to the US dollar which result in a reduction of $135,400 in the revised estimates, offset to some extent by an increase in salary rates of $27,300. On the other hand the pre-and post-session documentation to be prepared in New York have been revised in line with the Committee's request to the Secretariat for a number of additional background papers, i.e. from 250 pages of nine documents to 412 pages of 18 documents in Arabic, English, French, Russian and Spanish. In addition, 323 pages of 4 documents in Arabic, English, French, Russian and Spanish will have to be typed, reproduced and distributed. These resulted in an increase of $193,000 in the revised estimates. Furthermore it should be noted that in accordance with the established procedure, conference servicing costs are prepared on the basis of full costing, i.e., on the assumption that no part of the conference servicing requirements would be made available from within existing resources and therefore would have to be provided through recruitment of temporary staff.

B. Estimated non-conference servicing costs

7. In addition to the conference servicing cost, other costs are also incurred for which the initial estimates are shown in comparison with the revised estimates as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Initial Estimates $US</th>
<th>Revised Estimates $US</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Travel and daily subsistence allowance (DSA) of substantive staff from New York</td>
<td>62 500</td>
<td>51 720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary-General of the Conference</td>
<td>28 100</td>
<td>27 553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fees and travel of consultants</td>
<td>102 000</td>
<td>81 260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary assistance</td>
<td>26 300</td>
<td>31 070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media cover, public information activities</td>
<td>12 300</td>
<td>12 300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous supplies, communications</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>7 010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>241 200</strong></td>
<td><strong>210 913</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The importance of the Review Conference demands the involvement of an adequate number of secretariat staff but a vigorous effort is made to keep staff travel to a minimum in view of the foregoing and in light of experience to date. A revised estimate of $51,720 for travel and subsistence of substantive staff from the Department for Disarmament Affairs would be required to reflect the attendance at each session of the Preparatory Committee of the Secretary of the Committee assisted by three officers from New York. To the extent possible, travel in connection with the Review Conference is combined with other duty trips so as to achieve economy. At the Conference itself, the Secretary-General of the Conference will be assisted by the Secretary of the Preparatory Committee functioning as Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference, and eight other professional members of the Secretariat, of whom six will come from the Secretariat of the United Nations Headquarters and two will be borrowed from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, both for reasons of economy and for substantive considerations.

It is now estimated that an amount of $27,553 is required for the Secretary-General of the Conference to cover the usual special post allowance from D-2 to Assistant Secretary-General, the costs of travel exclusively between New York and Geneva and representation allowance.

At its first session, the Preparatory Committee, inter alia, invited the Secretary-General of the United Nations to prepare six background papers which would take into account and reflect adequately the views expressed in its discussion. The preparation of these documents, including the introduction of a range of substantive amendments, amplifications and corrections which the Preparatory Committee, at its second session and subsequently, has requested, and the updating of these background papers in light of recent developments, is estimated to require a total of at least 18 work months. The regular staff from the Department for Disarmament Affairs devote to this task as much time as their other mandatory activities permit but as on previous occasions it has been necessary to entrust the bulk of the writing work to outside experts. In light of the experience gained to date the amount estimated to be involved is revised to $81,260 which covers travel and subsistence in connection with the attendance of two consultants at the second session of the Preparatory Committee as well as the further work done on the papers after their initial
consideration by the Committee. At its second session the Preparatory Committee additionally requested the Secretariat to provide it with three reports which it had initially invited the Conference on Disarmament to prepare, as well as with a background paper presenting brief descriptions of disarmament studies relevant to the Treaty that had been prepared by the United Nations and bodies of the United Nations system of organizations. In an effort to reduce the total cost of documentation a great part of the work on the additional papers has been done by regular professional staff of the Department for Disarmament Affairs outside working hours so that the extra expenditure involved pertains only to translation and printing of the paper.

11. In addition, in order to assist in all administrative arrangements related to the conference and due to the very limited level of clerical/secretarial resources in the Department for Disarmament Affairs, an estimated amount of $31,070 is included under temporary assistance for a clerk-typist at the G-3 level for 18 work-months and takes into account expenditures recorded to date.

12. The Third Review Conference is expected to raise considerable interest among the press media. In order to meet the many inquiries that may be expected and to provide the media regularly with adequate information, it will be necessary to involve two press officers at P-2/P-3 levels, one for the English language media and one for the many French-speaking press representatives operating in Geneva. Provision is made in an amount of $4,800 for salary for a period of four weeks and $7,500 for travel and subsistence for a total of $12,300 in light of the inability of the Geneva-based office of the United Nations Department of Public Information to provide this assistance at the time in question from its own staff. Nevertheless, every attempt is being made to find this assistance from within the available personnel resources.

13. Based on the experience to date, the provision for miscellaneous supplies to cover the cost of stationery, office supplies and communications costs (such as cables and telex charges, long-distance telephone calls, postage and the diplomatic pouch) has been revised to $7,010.

14. The breakdown of non-conference servicing costs incurred for the first and second sessions of the Preparatory Committee and the revised estimates expected to arise in servicing the third session of the Preparatory Committee and the Review Conference is set out in Annex I of the present document.
C. Estimated programme support costs

15. The provision for reimbursement of programme support costs is based on the practice of the Organization with respect to activities financed from extrabudgetary sources. The percentage applied, namely 13 per cent, reflects the standard rate approved by the General Assembly. Accordingly, a provision of $224,688 is included to offset the cost of administrative and other support provided by the organization of the Conference.

D. Aggregation of the revised estimates of conference and non-conference-servicing costs of the Review Conference and the three sessions of its Preparatory Committee

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$US</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First session of the Preparatory Committee</td>
<td>38 460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second session of the Preparatory Committee</td>
<td>208 883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third session of the Preparatory Committee</td>
<td>530 063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review Conference</td>
<td>1 175 652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1 953 058</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

16. The total final cost will be established after the closure of the Conference and each participating State will be advised of its share of the cost.

17. The Preparatory Committee at the fourth meeting of its first session agreed, inter alia, to apply the principle spelled out in the cost-sharing formula employed by the Second Review Conference, on the understanding that it should be supplemented in the light of the addition of new States parties to the Treaty and any changes that have been made since then in the United Nations scale of assessments. Annex II to the present document shows an updated cost-sharing formula reflecting the latest situation known at this time.
# ANNEX 1

REVISED ESTIMATES OF CONFERENCE AND NON-CONFERENCE-SERVICING COSTS OF THE REVIEW CONFERENCE AND THREE SESSIONS OF ITS PREPARATORY COMMITTEE

## 1. CONFERENCE-SERVICING COSTS

### A. PRE-SESSION DOCUMENTATION (NEW YORK)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1st session</th>
<th>2nd session</th>
<th>3rd session</th>
<th>Review conference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of Prepcon</td>
<td>of Prepcon</td>
<td>of Prepcon</td>
<td>conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(actual cost)</td>
<td>(actual cost)</td>
<td>(actual cost)</td>
<td>(actual cost)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Translation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>21 650</td>
<td>36 900</td>
<td>44 800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revision</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8 650</td>
<td>11 500</td>
<td>14 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typing</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17 809</td>
<td>123 900 a/</td>
<td>39 700 b/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reproduction</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12 600</td>
<td>35 500 a/</td>
<td>24 100 b/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2 900</td>
<td>5 300 a/</td>
<td>3 500 b/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>63 609</td>
<td>213 100</td>
<td>126 100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### B. MEETING SERVICING (GENEVA)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interpretation</td>
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<td>23 338</td>
<td>43 500</td>
<td>233 600</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Meeting room attendant</td>
<td>1 404</td>
<td>2 419</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>3 700</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sound technician</td>
<td>601</td>
<td>1 439</td>
<td>2 700</td>
<td>15 100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conference officer</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2 100</td>
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<tr>
<td>Documentation clerk</td>
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<td>447</td>
<td>700</td>
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<tr>
<td>Messengers</td>
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<td>1 046</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cleaners</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>1 378</td>
<td>1 400</td>
<td>7 000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11 400</td>
<td>30 089</td>
<td>51 100</td>
<td>273 800</td>
<td>366 399</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### C. SUMMARY RECORDS (GENEVA)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Translation/précis-writing</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revision</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14 800</td>
<td>44 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typing</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>34 400</td>
<td>103 300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reproduction</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5 500</td>
<td>31 700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2 300</td>
<td>13 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>113 700</td>
<td>362 700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^b/\) Typing, reproduction and distribution of additional 140 pages (total of 265 pages in A,E,F,R,S).
ANNEX 1

D. IN-SESSION DOCUMENTATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1st session</th>
<th>2nd session</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>of Prepcom</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 pages in A,E,F,R,S</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(actual cost)</td>
<td>$2,294</td>
<td>$2,640</td>
<td>$5,134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Translation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revision</td>
<td>$836</td>
<td>$1,591</td>
<td>$2,427</td>
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<tr>
<td>Typing</td>
<td>$1,226</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reproduction</td>
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<td>$650</td>
<td>$1,118</td>
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<tr>
<td>Distribution</td>
<td>$334</td>
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<tr>
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<td><strong>$5,158</strong></td>
<td><strong>$6,491</strong></td>
<td><strong>$11,649</strong></td>
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</table>

E. POST-SESSION DOCUMENTATION (NEW YORK) a/  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(actual cost)</td>
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<td>$10,700</td>
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<td>Typing</td>
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<td>Reproduction</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$2,578</strong></td>
<td><strong>$10,700</strong></td>
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F. THREE BACKGROUND PAPER TO BE TRANSLATED AND REPRODUCED BY IAEA

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<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>$30,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

G. BILINGUAL SECRETARIES (GENEVA)

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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$2,260</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total I</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$20,885</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

a/ Post-session documentation for the first session of the Preparatory Committee was processed in Geneva.
NON-CONFERENCE-SERVICING COSTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First session of Prepcom</th>
<th>Second session of Prepcom</th>
<th>Third session of Prepcom</th>
<th>Review Conference</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Actual cost)</td>
<td>(Actual cost)</td>
<td>(Actual cost)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>$</td>
<td>$</td>
<td>$</td>
<td>$</td>
<td>$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A. Travel and daily subsistence allowance (DSA) of substantive staff

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Travel and daily subsistence allowance (DSA) of substantive staff</th>
<th>First</th>
<th>Second</th>
<th>Third</th>
<th>Review</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Prepcom</td>
<td>Prepcom</td>
<td>Conference</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Actual cost)</td>
<td>(Actual cost)</td>
<td>(Actual cost)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$</td>
<td>$</td>
<td>$</td>
<td>$</td>
<td>$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel and DSA</td>
<td>7 718</td>
<td>7 002</td>
<td>7 000</td>
<td>30 000</td>
<td>51 120</td>
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<tr>
<td>Special post allowance (SPA) for six months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10 700</td>
<td>10 700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representation allowance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 200</td>
<td>1 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (B)</td>
<td>4 974</td>
<td>2 179</td>
<td>3 500</td>
<td>16 900</td>
<td>27 553</td>
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</table>

B. Secretary-General of NPT Conference

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>First</th>
<th>Second</th>
<th>Third</th>
<th>Review</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Travel and DSA</td>
<td>4 974</td>
<td>2 179</td>
<td>3 500</td>
<td>5 000</td>
<td>15 653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special post allowance (SPA) for six months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10 700</td>
<td>10 700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representation allowance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 200</td>
<td>1 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (B)</td>
<td>4 974</td>
<td>2 179</td>
<td>3 500</td>
<td>16 900</td>
<td>27 553</td>
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</table>

C. Consultant (total of 18 work months at P-4 level; 3 work months for each of 6 papers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>C. Consultant (total of 18 work months at P-4 level; 3 work months for each of 6 papers)</th>
<th>First</th>
<th>Second</th>
<th>Third</th>
<th>Review</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consultancy</td>
<td>53 580</td>
<td></td>
<td>27 680</td>
<td></td>
<td>81 260</td>
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<tr>
<td>Temporary assistance (total of 18 work months at the G-3 level)</td>
<td>17 070</td>
<td>7 000</td>
<td>7 000</td>
<td>31 070</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (B)</td>
<td>12 300</td>
<td>4 800</td>
<td>7 500</td>
<td>18 600</td>
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</tr>
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D. Temporary assistance (total of 18 work months at the G-3 level)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>D. Temporary assistance (total of 18 work months at the G-3 level)</th>
<th>First</th>
<th>Second</th>
<th>Third</th>
<th>Review</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Temporary assistance (total of 18 work months at the G-3 level)</td>
<td>17 070</td>
<td>7 000</td>
<td>7 000</td>
<td>31 070</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total (B)</td>
<td>12 300</td>
<td>4 800</td>
<td>7 500</td>
<td>18 600</td>
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</table>

E. Two press officers (salary for a total of 8 weeks at the P-2/3 level)

<table>
<thead>
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<th>E. Two press officers (salary for a total of 8 weeks at the P-2/3 level)</th>
<th>First</th>
<th>Second</th>
<th>Third</th>
<th>Review</th>
<th>Total</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Two press officers (salary for a total of 8 weeks at the P-2/3 level)</td>
<td>4 800</td>
<td></td>
<td>4 800</td>
<td></td>
<td>4 800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel and DSAF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7 500</td>
<td>7 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (E)</td>
<td>12 300</td>
<td>4 800</td>
<td>7 500</td>
<td>18 600</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

F. Miscellaneous supplies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>F. Miscellaneous supplies</th>
<th>First</th>
<th>Second</th>
<th>Third</th>
<th>Review</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$</td>
<td>459</td>
<td>1449</td>
<td>2 502</td>
<td>2 600</td>
<td>7 010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (II)</td>
<td>13 151</td>
<td>81 290</td>
<td>47 682</td>
<td>60 800</td>
<td>210 913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total I and II</td>
<td>34 036</td>
<td>184 852</td>
<td>469 062</td>
<td>1 040 400</td>
<td>1 228 370</td>
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</table>

III. 1 PER CENTS OF PROGRAMME SUPPORT COSTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First session of Prepcom</th>
<th>Second session of Prepcom</th>
<th>Third session of Prepcom</th>
<th>Review Conference</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Actual cost)</td>
<td>(Actual cost)</td>
<td>(Actual cost)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$</td>
<td>$</td>
<td>$</td>
<td>$</td>
<td>$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand total I, II, III</td>
<td>4 424</td>
<td>24 031</td>
<td>60 581</td>
<td>135 652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>36 460</td>
<td>208 883</td>
<td>530 063</td>
<td>1 175 652</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX II

Cost-sharing formula for the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Share of costs (in %)

1. Depository States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>55.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Developing States Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antigua and Barbuda</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahamas</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunei Darussalam</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Kampuchea</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Yemen</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominica</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
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<td>Grenada</td>
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<td>Guatemala</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
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<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iran (Islamic Republic of)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao People's Democratic Republic</td>
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</table>
## ANNEX II

### Share of costs (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>0.01</td>
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<tr>
<td>Libyan Arab Jamahiriya</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maldives</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>0.01</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
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<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nauru</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
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<tr>
<td>St. Christopher and Nevis</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Lucia</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Vincent and Grenadines</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoa</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Tome and Principe</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
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<tr>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
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<td>Somalia</td>
<td>0.01</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>0.01</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
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<td>Suriname</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Republic of Cameroon</td>
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<td>Upper Volta</td>
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<td>Viet Nam</td>
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<td>Yugoslavia</td>
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<td>Zaire</td>
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**Subtotal** 5.23
ANNEX II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other States Parties</th>
<th>Share of cost (in $)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
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<td>Bulgaria</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
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<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
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<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany, Federal Republic of</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holy See</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>0.03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
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<td>Luxembourg</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
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<td>Norway</td>
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<td>0.18</td>
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<tr>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Marino</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>39.37</strong></td>
</tr>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Signatory States</th>
<th>Share of cost (in $)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>0.25</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Yemen Arab Republic</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.40</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Total**                                              | **100.00**           |
LETTER DATED 27 AUGUST 1985 FROM MR. MAHU U TUPOUNIUA,
DIRECTOR OF THE SOUTH PACIFIC BUREAU FOR ECONOMIC
COOPERATION (SPEC), WHICH SERVES AS THE SECRETARIAT
FOR THE SOUTH PACIFIC FORUM, ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT
OF THE THIRD REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE
TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

On behalf of Mr. Mahu U Tupouniua, the Director of the South Pacific
Bureau for Economic Co-operation, which serves as the Secretariat for the
South Pacific Forum, and in accordance with the wish of the Leaders of the
14 Member States of the South Pacific Forum, the Delegations of Australia,
Nauru, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea, by letters, dated 29 August 1985,
addressed to the President of the Third Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, have requested
that the letter of Mr. Mahu U Tupouniua, dated 27 August 1985, addressed
to the President of the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, be circulated to the
Conference for the information of delegates. The letter is accordingly
reproduced hereafter.
27 August 1985

President
Review Conference of the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
United Nations Office
Geneva, Switzerland

Dear Sir,

I have the honour to write to you on behalf of the Leaders of the fourteen member states of the South Pacific Forum to bring to your attention the adoption of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty by the South Pacific Forum.

On 6 August 1985, the Forum at its 16th Session in Rarotonga, Cook Islands, adopted the Treaty which established a South Pacific nuclear free zone. The Treaty was signed by eight members of the Forum, namely - Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, New Zealand, Niue, Tuvalu and Western Samoa.

The provisions of article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons recognizes the right of any group of states to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

In this context, I should like to highlight the following points:

(i) Article 4 of the SPNFZ Treaty provides for the adherence by the parties to the safeguards required under article III.1 of the NPT and the IAEA safeguards. The parties are further obligated to support the continued effectiveness of the international non-proliferation system based on the NPT and the IAEA safeguards systems.

(ii) Article 15 of the Treaty provides that it will enter into force upon the deposit of the eighth instrument of ratification with the depositary. The depositary of the Treaty is the Director of the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Co-operation.

(iii) The adoption of the Treaty and the establishment of the nuclear free zone by the Forum are in conformity with article VII of the NPT.

I have the honour to request that the Review Conference on the NPT accord to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty the appropriate status required under article VII of the NPT. A copy of the Treaty is enclosed.

Yours faithfully,

[Signature]
[Name]
Director
SOUTH PACIFIC NUCLEAR FREE ZONE TREATY

PREAMBLE

The Parties to this Treaty,

United in their commitment to a world at peace;

Gravely concerned that the continuing nuclear arms race presents the risk of nuclear war which would have devastating consequences for all people;

Convinced that all countries have an obligation to make every effort to achieve the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, the terror which they hold for humankind and the threat which they pose to life on earth;

Believing that regional arms control measures can contribute to global efforts to reverse the nuclear arms race and promote the national security of each country in the region and the common security of all;

Determined to ensure, so far as lies within their power, that the bounty and beauty of the land and sea in their region shall remain the heritage of their peoples and their descendants in perpetuity to be enjoyed by all in peace;

Reaffirming the importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and in contributing to world security;

Noting, in particular, that Article VII of the NPT recognizes the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories;

Noting that the prohibitions of emplantation and emplacement of nuclear weapons on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof contained in the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thence apply in the South Pacific;

Noting also that the prohibition of testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere or under water, including territorial waters or high seas, contained in the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water applies in the South Pacific;

Determined to keep the region free of environmental pollution by radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter;

Guided by the decision of the Fifteenth South Pacific Forum at Tuvalu that a nuclear free zone should be established in the region at the earliest possible opportunity in accordance with the principles set out in the communiqué of that meeting;

Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE 1

USAGE OF TERMS

For the purposes of this Treaty and its Protocols:

(a) "South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone" means the areas described in Annex 1 as illustrated by the map attached to that Annex;

(b) "territory" means internal waters, territorial sea and archipelagic waters, the seabed and subsoil beneath, the land territory and the airspace above them;

(c) "nuclear explosive device" means any nuclear weapon or other explosive device capable of releasing nuclear energy, irrespective of the purpose for which it could be used. The term includes such a weapon or device in unassembled and partly assembled forms, but does not include the means of transport or delivery of such a weapon or device if separable from and not an indivisible part of it;

(d) "stationing" means emplantation, emplacement, transportation on land or inland waters, stockpiling, storage, installation and deployment.

ARTICLE 2

APPLICATION OF THE TREATY

1. Except where otherwise specified, this Treaty and its Protocols shall apply to territory within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone.

2. Nothing in this Treaty shall prejudice or in any way affect the rights, or the exercise of the rights, of any State under international law with regard to freedom of the seas.

ARTICLE 3

RENUNCIATION OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

Each Party undertakes:

(a) not to manufacture or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over any nuclear explosive device by any means anywhere inside or outside the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone;

(b) not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture or acquisition of any nuclear explosive device;

(c) not to take any action to assist or encourage the manufacture or acquisition of any nuclear explosive device by any State.
ARTICLE 4

PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES

Each Party undertakes:

(a) not to provide source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material for peaceful purposes to:

(i) any non-nuclear-weapon State unless subject to the safeguards required by Article III.1 of the NPT, or

(ii) any nuclear-weapon State unless subject to applicable safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Any such provision shall be in accordance with strict non-proliferation measures to provide assurance of exclusively peaceful non-explosive use;

(b) to support the continued effectiveness of the international non-proliferation system based on the NPT and IAEA safeguards system.

ARTICLE 5

PREVENTION OF STATIONING OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

1. Each Party undertakes to prevent in its territory the stationing of any nuclear explosive device.

2. Each Party in the exercise of its sovereign rights remains free to decide for itself whether to allow visits by foreign ships and aircraft to its ports and airfields, transit of its airspace by foreign aircraft, and navigation by foreign ships in its territorial sea or archipelagic waters in a manner not covered by the rights of innocent passage, archipelagic sea lane passage or transit passage of straits.

ARTICLE 6

PREVENTION OF TESTING OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

Each Party undertakes:

(a) to prevent in its territory the testing of any nuclear explosive device;

(b) not to take any action to assist or encourage the testing of any nuclear explosive device by any State.

ARTICLE 7

PREVENTION OF DUMPING

1. Each Party undertakes:

(a) not to dump radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter at sea anywhere within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone;
(b) to prevent the dumping of radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter by anyone in its territorial sea;

(c) not to take any action to assist or encourage the dumping by anyone of radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter at sea anywhere within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone;

(d) to support the conclusion as soon as possible of the proposed Convention relating to the protection of the natural resources and environment of the South Pacific region and its Protocol for the prevention of pollution of the South Pacific region by dumping, with the aim of precluding dumping at sea of radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter by anyone anywhere in the region.

2. Paragraphs 1(a) and 1(b) of this Article shall not apply to areas of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone in respect of which such a Convention and Protocol have entered into force.

ARTICLE 8

CONTROL SYSTEM

1. The Parties hereby establish a control system for the purpose of verifying compliance with their obligations under this Treaty.

2. The control system shall comprise:

(a) reports and exchange of information as provided for in Article 9;

(b) consultations as provided for in Article 10 and Annex 4 (1);

(c) the application to peaceful nuclear activities of safeguards by the IAEA as provided for in Annex 2;

(d) a complaints procedure as provided for in Annex 4.

ARTICLE 9

REPORTS AND EXCHANGES OF INFORMATION

1. Each Party shall report to the Director of the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Co-operation (the Director) as soon as possible any significant event within its jurisdiction affecting the implementation of this Treaty. The Director shall circulate such reports promptly to all Parties.

2. The Parties shall endeavour to keep each other informed on matters arising under or in relation to this Treaty. They may exchange information by communicating it to the Director, who shall circulate it to all Parties.
3. The Director shall report annually to the South Pacific Forum on the status of this Treaty and matters arising under or in relation to it, incorporating reports and communications made under paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article and matters arising under Article 8(2)(d) and 10 and Annex 2(4).

ARTICLE 10
CONSULTATIONS AND REVIEW

Without prejudice to the conduct of consultations among Parties by other means, the Director, at the request of any Party, shall convene a meeting of the Consultative Committee established by Annex 3 for consultation and co-operation on any matter arising in relation to this Treaty or for reviewing its operation.

ARTICLE 11
AMENDMENT

The Consultative Committee shall consider proposals for amendment of the provisions of this Treaty proposed by any Party and circulated by the Director to all Parties not less than three months prior to the convening of the Consultative Committee for this purpose. Any proposal agreed upon by consensus by the Consultative Committee shall be communicated to the Director who shall circulate it for acceptance to all Parties. An amendment shall enter into force thirty days after receipt by the depositary of acceptance from all Parties.

ARTICLE 12
SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION

1. This Treaty shall be open for signature by any Member of the South Pacific Forum.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification. Instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Director who is hereby designated depositary of this Treaty and its Protocols.

3. If a Member of the South Pacific Forum whose territory is outside the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone becomes a Party to this Treaty, Annex 1 shall be deemed to be amended so as is required to enclose at least the territory of that Party within the boundaries of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. The delineation of any area added pursuant to this paragraph shall be approved by the South Pacific Forum.
ARTICLE 13

WITHDRAWAL

1. This Treaty is of a permanent nature and shall remain in force indefinitely, provided that in the event of a violation by any Party of a provision of this Treaty essential to the achievement of the objectives of the Treaty or of the spirit of the Treaty, every other Party shall have the right to withdraw from the Treaty.

2. Withdrawal shall be effected by giving notice twelve months in advance to the Director who shall circulate such notice to all other Parties.

ARTICLE 14

RESERVATIONS

This Treaty shall not be subject to reservations.

ARTICLE 15

ENTRY INTO FORCE

1. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of deposit of the eighth instrument of ratification.

2. For a signatory which ratifies this Treaty after the date of deposit of the eighth instrument of ratification, the Treaty shall enter into force on the date of deposit of its instrument of ratification.

ARTICLE 16

DEPOSITARY FUNCTIONS

The depositary shall register this Treaty and its Protocols pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations and shall transmit certified copies of the Treaty and its Protocols to all Members of the South Pacific Forum and all States eligible to become Party to the Protocols to the Treaty and shall notify them of signatures and ratifications of the Treaty and its Protocols.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their Governments, have signed this Treaty.

DONE at , this day of , , One thousand nine hundred and eighty five, in a single original in the English language.
ANNEX 1

SOUTH PACIFIC NUCLEAR FREE ZONE

A. The area bounded by a line:

(1) commencing at the point of intersection of the Equator by the maritime boundary between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea;

(2) running thence northerly along that maritime boundary to its intersection by the outer limit of the exclusive economic zone of Papua New Guinea;

(3) thence generally north-easterly, easterly and south-easterly along that outer limit to its intersection by the Equator;

(4) thence east along the Equator to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude 163 degrees East;

(5) thence north along that meridian to its intersection by the parallel of Latitude 3 degrees North;

(6) thence east along that parallel to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude 171 degrees East;

(7) thence north along that meridian to its intersection by the parallel of Latitude 4 degrees North;

(8) thence east along that parallel to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude 180 degrees East;

(9) thence south along that meridian to its intersection by the Equator;

(10) thence east along the Equator to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude 165 degrees West;

(11) thence north along that meridian to its intersection by the parallel of Latitude 5 degrees 30 minutes North;

(12) thence east along that parallel to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude 154 degrees West;

(13) thence south along that meridian to its intersection by the Equator;

(14) thence east along the Equator to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude 115 degrees West;

(15) thence south along that meridian to its intersection by the parallel of Latitude 60 degrees South;

(16) thence west along that parallel to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude 115 degrees East;
Annex 1
page 2

(17) thence north along that meridian to its southernmost intersection by the outer limit of the territorial sea of Australia;

(18) thence generally northerly and easterly along the outer limit of the territorial sea of Australia to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude 136 degrees 45 minutes East;

(19) thence north-easterly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 10 degrees 50 minutes South, Longitude 139 degrees 12 minutes East;

(20) thence north-easterly along the maritime boundary between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea to where it joins the land border between those two countries;

(21) thence generally northerly along that land border to where it joins the maritime boundary between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea, on the northern coastline of Papua New Guinea; and

(22) thence generally northerly along that boundary to the point of commencement.

B. The areas within the outer limits of the territorial seas of all Australian islands lying westward of the area described in paragraph A and north of Latitude 60 degrees South, provided that any such areas shall cease to be part of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone upon receipt by the depositary of written notice from the Government of Australia stating that the areas have become subject to another treaty having an object and purpose substantially the same as that of this Treaty.
ATTACHMENT TO ANNEX 1 TO THE SOUTH PACIFIC NUCLEAR FREE ZONE TREATY:

ILLUSTRATIVE MAP

(Australian islands in the Indian Ocean, which are also part of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, are not shown)

I. ANTARCTIC TREATY AREA

II. ZONE OF APPLICATION OF THE TREATY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR PROGRESS IN LATIN AMERICA

Appendix 1
ANNEX 2

IAEA SAFEGUARDS

1. The safeguards referred to in Article 8 shall in respect of each Party be applied by the IAEA as set forth in an agreement negotiated and concluded with the IAEA on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of the Party, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. The agreement referred to in paragraph 1 shall be, or shall be equivalent in its scope and effect to, an agreement required in connection with the NPT on the basis of the material reproduced in document INFCIRC/153 (Corrected) of the IAEA. Each Party shall take all appropriate steps to ensure that such an agreement is in force for it not later than 18 months after the date of entry into force for that Party of this Treaty.

3. For the purposes of this Treaty, the safeguards referred to in paragraph 1 shall have as their purpose the verification of the non-diversion of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to nuclear explosive devices.

4. Each Party agrees upon the request of any other Party to transmit to that Party and to the Director for the information of all Parties a copy of the overall conclusions of the most recent report by the IAEA on its inspection activities in the territory of the Party concerned, and to advise the Director promptly of any subsequent findings of the Board of Governors of the IAEA in relation to those conclusions for the information of all Parties.
ANNEX 3

CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE

1. There is hereby established a Consultative Committee which shall be convened by the Director from time to time pursuant to Articles 10 and 11 and Annex 4 (2). The Consultative Committee shall be constituted of representatives of the Parties, each Party being entitled to appoint one representative who may be accompanied by advisers. Unless otherwise agreed, the Consultative Committee shall be chaired at any given meeting by the representative of the Party which last hosted the meeting of Heads of Government of Members of the South Pacific Forum. A quorum shall be constituted by representatives of half the Parties, Subject to the provisions of Article 11, decisions of the Consultative Committee shall be taken by consensus or, failing consensus, by a two-thirds majority of those present and voting. The Consultative Committee shall adopt such other rules of procedure as it sees fit.

2. The costs of the Consultative Committee, including the costs of special inspections pursuant to Annex 4, shall be borne by the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Co-operation. It may seek special funding should this be required.
ANNEX 4

COMPLAINTS PROCEDURE

1. A Party which considers that there are grounds for a complaint that another Party is in breach of its obligations under this Treaty shall, before bringing such a complaint to the Director, bring the subject matter of the complaint to the attention of the Party complained of and shall allow the latter reasonable opportunity to provide it with an explanation and to resolve the matter.

2. If the matter is not so resolved, the complainant Party may bring the complaint to the Director with a request that the Consultative Committee be convened to consider it. Complaints shall be supported by an account of evidence of breach of obligations known to the complainant Party. Upon receipt of a complaint the Director shall convene the Consultative Committee as quickly as possible to consider it.

3. The Consultative Committee, taking account of efforts made under paragraph 1, shall afford the Party complained of a reasonable opportunity to provide it with an explanation of the matter.

4. If, after considering any explanation given to it by the representatives of the Party complained of, the Consultative Committee decides that there is sufficient substance in the complaint to warrant a special inspection in the territory of that Party or elsewhere, the Consultative Committee shall direct that such special inspection be made as quickly as possible by a special inspection team of three suitably qualified special inspectors appointed by the Consultative Committee in consultation with the complained of and complainant Parties, provided that no national of either Party shall serve on the special inspection team. If so requested by the Party complained of, the special inspection team shall be accompanied by representatives of that Party. Neither the right of consultation on the appointment of special inspectors, nor the right to accompany special inspectors, shall delay the work of the special inspection team.

5. In making a special inspection, special inspectors shall be subject to the direction only of the Consultative Committee and shall comply with such directives concerning tasks, objectives, confidentiality and procedures as may be decided upon by it. Directives shall take account of the legitimate interests of the Party complained of in complying with its other international obligations and commitments and shall not duplicate safeguards procedures to be undertaken by the IAEA pursuant to agreements referred to in Annex 2 (1). The special inspectors shall discharge their duties with due respect for the laws of the Party complained of.

6. Each Party shall give to special inspectors full and free access to all information and places within its territory which may be relevant to enable the special inspectors to implement the directives given to them by the Consultative Committee.

7. The Party complained of shall take all appropriate steps to facilitate the special inspection, and shall grant to special inspectors privileges and
immunities necessary for the performance of their functions, including inviolability for all papers and documents and immunity from arrest, detention and legal process for acts done and words spoken and written, for the purpose of the special inspection.

8. The special inspectors shall report in writing as quickly as possible to the Consultative Committee, outlining their activities, setting out relevant facts and information as ascertained by them, with supporting evidence and documentation as appropriate, and stating their conclusions. The Consultative Committee shall report fully to all Members of the South Pacific Forum, giving its decision as to whether the Party complained of is in breach of its obligations under this Treaty.

9. If the Consultative Committee has decided that the Party complained of is in breach of its obligations under this Treaty, or that the above provisions have not been complied with, or at any time at the request of either the complainant or complained of Party, the Parties shall meet promptly at a meeting of the South Pacific Forum.
The Parties to this Protocol,

Noting the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (the Treaty)

Have Agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

Each Party undertakes to apply, in respect of the territories for which it is internationally responsible situated within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, the prohibitions contained in Articles 3, 5 and 6, in so far as they relate to the manufacture, stationing and testing of any nuclear explosive device within those territories, and the safeguards specified in Article 8 (2)(c) and Annex 2 of the Treaty.

ARTICLE 2

Each Party may, by written notification to the depositary, indicate its acceptance from the date of such notification of any alteration to its obligations under this Protocol brought about by the entry into force of an amendment to the Treaty pursuant to Article 11 of the Treaty.

ARTICLE 3

This Protocol shall be open for signature by France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

ARTICLE 4

This Protocol shall be subject to ratification.

ARTICLE 5

This Protocol shall enter into force for each State on the date of its deposit with the depositary of its instrument of ratification.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their Governments, have signed this Protocol.

DONE at , this day of , One thousand nine hundred and eighty-five , in a single original in the English language.
PROTOCOL 2

The Parties to this Protocol Noting the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (the Treaty) Have Agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

Each Party undertakes not to contribute to any act which constitutes a violation of the Treaty or its Protocols by Parties to them.

ARTICLE 2

Each Party further undertakes not to use or threaten to use any nuclear explosive device against:

(a) Parties to the Treaty; or

(b) any territory within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone for which a State that has become a Party to Protocol I is internationally responsible.

ARTICLE 3

Each Party may, by written notification to the depositary, indicate its acceptance from the date of such notification of any alteration to its obligations under this Protocol brought about by the entry into force of an amendment to the Treaty pursuant to Article 11 of the Treaty or by the extension of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone pursuant to Article 12(3) of the Treaty.

ARTICLE 4

This Protocol shall be open for signature by France, the People's Republic of China, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

ARTICLE 5

This Protocol shall be subject to ratification.

ARTICLE 6

This Protocol shall enter into force for each State on the date of its deposit with the depositary of its instrument of ratification.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their Governments, have signed this Protocol.

DONE at , this day of One thousand nine hundred and eighty-five, in a single original in the English language.
The Parties to this Protocol

Noting the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (the Treaty)

Have Agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

Each Party undertakes not to test any nuclear explosive device anywhere within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone.

ARTICLE 2

Each Party may, by written notification to the depositary, indicate its acceptance from the date of such notification of any alteration to its obligation under this Protocol brought about by the entry into force of an amendment to the Treaty pursuant to Article 11 of the Treaty or by the extension of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone pursuant to Article 12(3) of the Treaty.

ARTICLE 3

This Protocol shall be open for signature by France, the People's Republic of China, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

ARTICLE 4

This Protocol shall be subject to ratification.

ARTICLE 5

This Protocol shall enter into force for each State on the date of its deposit with the depositary of its instrument of ratification.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their Governments, have signed this Protocol.

DONE at , this day of One thousand nine hundred and eighty-five, in a single original in the English language.
LETTER DATED 27 AUGUST 1985 FROM MR. MAHU U TUPOUNIUA, DIRECTOR OF THE SOUTH PACIFIC BUREAU FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION (SPEC), WHICH SERVES AS THE SECRETARIAT FOR THE SOUTH PACIFIC FORUM, ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE THIRD REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Corrigendum

Page 3, ARTICLE IV: The last two lines of subparagraph (a) should read as follows:

"Any such provisions shall be in accordance with strict non-proliferation measures to provide assurance of exclusively peaceful non-explosive use;"

and subparagraph (b) should read as follows:

"(b) to support the continued effectiveness of the international non-proliferation system based on the NPT and the IAEA safeguards system."

Page 5: The fourth line should read as follows:

"matters arising under Articles 8(2)(d) and 10 and Annex 2(4)."

and the last two lines of ARTICLE 11 should read as follows:

"into force thirty days after receipt by the depositary of acceptances from all Parties."

Page 7: The attestation clause at the end of the text of the Treaty should read as follows:

"DONE at Rarotonga, this sixth day of August, One thousand nine hundred and eighty-five, in a single original in the English language."

Annex 3: The eighth line of paragraph 1 should read as follows:

"Forum. A quorum shall be constituted by representatives of half the Parties."

Protocols 1, 2 and 3: At the top of each page, delete "Annex 4" and the respective page numbers.

Also, delete the word "five" in the attestation clause at the end of each of these three Protocols.

GE.85-64498
"The Conference reaffirms the urgent need for the full implementation of the provisions of Article I which obliges nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

The Conference in this connection calls for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear facilities, resources or devices to South Africa since it has attained a nuclear weapon capability and thus undermines the principles and purposes of the Treaty.

The Conference furthermore, calls for the total and complete prohibition of all purchases of uranium, natural or enriched from South Africa."
Distinguished Delegates,

I wish first as I call the meeting to order to welcome you, the delegations here represented, to this opening meeting of Main Committee II. At the same time, I wish to express my gratitude to you and the Conference as a whole for the trust that it has placed in me in electing me Chairman of this important Main Committee. So far, no Vice Chairman has been elected for our Committee. I hope that this will happen soon. I shall keep you informed.

Our task is a large one, and no doubt in some respects will not be easy because the overall situation related to our work is clearly not less complicated than it was in 1980. On the other hand, thanks to the work of the Preparatory Committee, our terms of reference are well set out and, because there are three Main Committees designated for this Review Conference, the separate mandates of Committees II and III are somewhat narrower in scope than those outlined for Main Committee II in 1980.

Before we turn to our first and main task of the day, which is to consider and arrive at decisions on how we should proceed, it might be well to review the scope of our work, as that will no doubt have an effect on our decisions.

As set out in Annex III to document NPT/CONF.III/1 - the Final Report of the Preparatory Committee, which was adopted by the Conference in accordance with its agenda at the opening plenary meeting - we shall review the "Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards, and nuclear-weapon-free zones". That will be our "chapeau". Within that "chapeau", our focal point or central consideration - from which we should not stray too far - will be Article III.

Now, in more detail, under the main theme as stated in Annex III to the Final Report, we are mandated to consider "Article III and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5, especially in their relationship to Article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7".

In this regard, it is encouraging to note, on the basis of its background paper and the statement of the Director General, Dr. Blix, that the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency is well established, in operation and providing a positive contribution to non-proliferation issues without hampering the advancement of nuclear research and development in any country. The system also enhances the flow of international trade in the nuclear industry as applied to peaceful purposes. This is clearly reflected in the wide acceptance of safeguards, in fact by more than 125 States.
Moreover, in the application of Article III in all these States, there has not been detection of any diversion of a significant quantity of either "source" or "special" fissionable materials since the initiation of any safeguards agreements. Furthermore, voluntary offers by the nuclear-weapon States to submit facilities for IAEA inspection have been acted upon in the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union. The first IAEA inspection facilities in the Soviet Union commenced on 12 August 1985.

In the light of this still developing picture, it seems that a possible outcome of the work of this Committee might take the form of an appeal for wider adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which would further enhance the effectiveness of this link in the non-proliferation chain. In addition to such an appeal, specific proposals directed towards increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of the IAEA safeguards system, taking account of available human and financial resources, would be welcomed as offering ideas on which our Committee might well reach agreed recommendations.

Articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1-3 in their relationship to Articles III and IV are also covered in our mandate.

Finally, Article VII is assigned to us as our third aspect.

As you know, this article refers to the right of any group of States to conclude regional agreements to assure the absence of nuclear weapons in their territories. In this connection, the Committee might refer to the well-known Treaty for the Prevention of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and to an encouraging prospect which emerges through the endorsement by the South Pacific Forum on 6 August 1985 of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty.

With regard to the final aspect of our mandate, concerning other provisions of the Treaty and under the "chapeau" of its "Role in the promotion of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and of nuclear disarmament and in strengthening international peace and security", we are finally to consider:

Acceptance of the Treaty by States, and

Measures aimed at promoting its wider acceptance.

To serve as an easy reference and an aide-memoire regarding the scope of the task that I have outlined, the Secretariat will re-issue Annex III of the Final Report of the Preparatory Committee as a separate information document showing the allocation of items to the Main Committees. So you will have that "ready reference" conveniently at hand as we move on to the substantive work of this Committee.

Now, I would like to move on to the question of the organization and scheduling of our work. In this regard, I would welcome proposals for recommendations pertaining to the issues I have introduced. In order to ensure our steady progress, I would appeal to you not to make general statements or to mix statements relating to Article III with those referring to Article VII, but rather that we should consider the various questions within our mandate separately. To facilitate the smooth execution of our work, I would ask that papers and proposals under consideration be submitted as soon as possible, preferably not later than next Monday, so that the Committee will have enough time for their thorough
consideration. However, if someone is ready to introduce a paper today, they may do so. This is in view of the fact that we should complete our substantive consideration of all items so as to enable us to have a first draft of our report to the plenary of the Conference by the end of next week, that is, 13 September. In turn, this will leave us two meetings in the week commencing 16 September to finalize our report or any other paper we may agree upon. While we cannot and must not make any attempt to preconceive the outcome, we should none the less make an effort throughout our meetings that will enable us to arrive at an agreed result.

With all this kept in view, I would like now to open the meeting to ideas from the floor. In this way, I hope to be able to determine how your views of coverage, priorities and timing might coincide with, or differ from, my own, and then arrive at a compromise on a schedule of our plan.
Iraq

Working paper submitted in connection with article III of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

1. The International Atomic Energy Agency should continue to endeavour to enhance the effectiveness of the system of safeguards so that it will always be able to verify the peaceful operation of all types of nuclear installations, bearing in mind the need to avoid an increase in expenditure. In this respect, we believe that the International Atomic Energy Agency is the sole body competent to shoulder this responsibility.

2. Any change made in the system of safeguards must be in accordance with the methods adopted by the Agency in conformity with its statutes.

3. Israel should be strongly condemned for its deliberate act of aggression against peaceful Iraqi nuclear installations.

4. The Israeli military attack on Iraqi nuclear installations subject to international supervision should be regarded as constituting the most serious attack on the Treaty and also on the Agency and the systems of safeguards since their establishment.

5. Israel should be called upon to undertake immediately not to carry out any attack on nuclear installations devoted to peaceful purposes in Iraq or on any similar installations in other countries, and to make all its nuclear installations subject to the systems of safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
PROPOSAL BY THE AFRICAN GROUP

MAIN COMMITTEE II

Article VII:

Africa has constantly adopted a position in favour of non-proliferation of nuclear arms as well as the prevention of nuclear war. It was in line with this position that at the 1st Summit of the Organisation of African Unity, held in Cairo, Egypt in July 1964, a "Declaration on the Denuclearisation of Africa" was adopted. By this solemn document, Africa became the first region in the World to renounce the right to acquire or manufacture nuclear arms. Thus the Continent was unilaterally declared a nuclear-free zone.

Unfortunately, the implementation of this Declaration, which is an important contribution to the Non-Proliferation régime, has been hampered by the acquisition of nuclear technology by the racist régime of South Africa.

The African Group therefore is convinced of the following:

(i) that South Africa's unsafeguarded nuclear programme and its nuclear weapon capability frustrate the implementation of the "Declaration on the Denuclearisation of Africa";

(ii) that collaboration in any form, in the nuclear field with the South African régime seriously undermines the credibility and the stability of the Non-Proliferation régime;

(iii) that all States, corporations and institutions, which have not done so, should terminate all forms of such collaborations with South Africa;

(iv) that South Africa should submit all its nuclear installations and facilities to inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency;

(v) that all States parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation and all other nuclear-power States should take concrete measures that will facilitate the implementation of the "Declaration on the Denuclearisation of Africa".

The African Group further proposes the adoption of the following text by the Conference:

GE.85-64638
"The Conference considers that the development of nuclear-weapon capability by South Africa frustrates the implementation of the 'Declaration on the Denuclearisation of Africa'. Any form of collaboration or co-operation in the nuclear field with South Africa seriously undermines the credibility and stability of the Non-Proliferation régime. Consequently, all States Parties and corporations and institutions of those States Parties which have not done so, are called upon to terminate all forms of such collaboration with the South African régime. At the same time, the South African régime is called upon to submit all its nuclear installations and facilities to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency. All States Parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as well as other nuclear-power States are requested to take concrete measures that will facilitate the implementation of a nuclear-free zone in Africa".
Item 14: Role of the Treaty in the promotion of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and of nuclear disarmament and in strengthening international peace and security:

A. Acceptance of the Treaty by States;

B. Measures aimed at promoting a wider acceptance of the Treaty.

MONGOLIA

Working Paper on the Review of Article IX

The Conference, having expressed great satisfaction that the overwhelming majority of States have acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and having recognized the urgent need for further ensuring the universality of the Treaty, appeals to all States, particularly the nuclear-weapon States and other States advanced in nuclear technology, which have not yet done so, to adhere to the Treaty at the earliest possible date.
Remarks of Ambassador R. Imai  
Chairman, Main Committee III  
3 September 1985

Distinguished Delegates,

Calling to order the first meeting of Main Committee III, it is my pleasure, first of all, to welcome you all and to say how much I am looking forward to working together with you in the days to come. I hope to be soon assisted by two Vice-Chairmen and have already taken the liberty to call on the advice of Ambassador Konstantinov of Bulgaria, on the assumption that his nomination will be confirmed.

It is my intention today to review our terms of reference, the documents that we have before us so far, and then to outline, with your agreement, in general terms a method of work.

The terms of reference of Main Committee III have been worked out by the Preparatory Committee and adopted by the Conference. Our primary task is to review the implementation of the Treaty relating to peaceful applications of nuclear energy. This includes:

1. Articles IV and III (1), preambular paragraphs 6 and 7, especially in their relationship to Article III (1, 2, 4), and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5 as well as to Articles I and II.

2. Article V.

We also share with Main Committee II the review of Agenda Item 14.

This allocation is outlined in detail in Annex III of document NPT/CONF.III/1. Because of the links between international co-operation in the nuclear field and non-proliferation assurances through safeguards there might be some overlap between this Committee and Main Committee II. My colleagues and I will maintain close contacts with the Bureau of Main Committee II to avoid any duplication of work and to make most efficient use of the time allotted to us.

Our task is made somewhat easier for us by extensive documentation related to our work. The International Atomic Energy Agency has prepared two
background papers on Articles IV and V (NPT/CONF.III/10 and NPT/CONF.III/11, respectively). The Director General of the IAEA has also provided us with food for thought on these subjects in his speech to the Conference at the opening session. Parts of the papers provided by the depositaries are also relevant (UK - NPT/CONF.III/19; US - NPT/CONF.III/18; USSR - NPT/CONF.III/20) as well as parts of a memorandum stating views of five Nordic countries (NPT/CONF.III/16). One working paper specifically related to Article IV of the Treaty has been submitted by Australia, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom (NPT/CONF.III/21). I have also been informed that Egypt has submitted two working papers on Articles III and IV and on Article IV which are being processed at this time.

I expect there may be other working papers and would like to appeal to members of the Committee to submit them this week if possible and, in any event, not later than Monday, 9 September 1985, so that we can begin consideration of them at the beginning of next week.

The delegates will have seen from the First Report of the General Committee that we are expected to complete our work on 17 September. This means that the main bulk of our substantive work must be accomplished in the six meetings which are scheduled for next week. This automatically imposes upon us a strict discipline. In order to make the best use of our time I would like to suggest that we begin with a general exchange of views which I hope will avoid repetition of statements made in Plenary and be more issue-oriented. We could thus conclude such an exchange in one session, if possible, including the introduction of working papers. Although this in no way should restrict delegations who wish to make statements at a later stage.

From this exchange of views should emerge the main issues on which the Committee will wish to concentrate its efforts. It may be advisable, and for this I'll obviously be guided by the Committee, to prepare, in due course, a short list of items as they emerge from the general exchange. We would then be able to proceed to an Article by Article examination and try to formulate as many points of agreement as possible for inclusion in our report. I think we should aim at having a first draft of our report finalized by 13 September.

With this much opening and general remarks, the floor is now open to any considerations, or observations, by delegates.
IRAQ

Working paper on article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Third Committee

1. In addition to compliance with the provisions of article IV, the Iraqi delegation proposes that the final report of the Committee should reaffirm the need for all exporting States parties to the Treaty to facilitate the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, as well as nuclear technological material and information for peaceful purposes. We believe that the Treaty reinforces the established rights of States parties to develop research, production and the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in accordance with articles I and II of the Treaty.

2. States parties should be urged to provide assistance in the form of equipment, experts and repair of the damage caused to Iraq's peaceful nuclear installations as a result of the Israeli military attack. The application of this principle is in keeping with the objectives of the Treaty, particularly article IV thereof.

3. Within this context, with a view to maintaining the inviolability and protection of the Treaty and the States parties against any threat or aggression to which they might be exposed, in compliance with the principles of non-proliferation embodied in the Treaty and in conformity with General Assembly resolutions 36/27 of 13 November 1981, 37/18 of 16 November 1982, 38/91 of 10 November 1983 and 39/14 of 16 November 1984 concerning the Israeli attack on peaceful Iraqi nuclear installations and the serious consequences of that attack in regard to the nuclear non-proliferation system, and with a view to deterring Israel from repeating such attacks in the future, the Conference should urge all States to halt all nuclear assistance to Israel in order to avoid strengthening its nuclear capabilities which it is using for the manufacture and production of nuclear weapons. The achievement of this objective would have positive implications and consequences for the Treaty by, for example, strengthening and consolidating the concept of compliance with the Treaty. It would also constitute a practical step towards averting any future threat to any party to the Treaty, which would unquestionably also constitute an attack on the Treaty itself. The credibility of the Treaty and compliance with its provisions are reflected in the extent to which it protects States parties, particularly those that have waived the nuclear option and are endeavouring to further the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
PROGRAMME OF WORK OF MAIN COMMITTEE III

I. Enhanced co-operation
   Progress in peaceful uses
   Assurance of no diversion
   Building of confidence
   Inalienable rights and fullest possible exchange
      of equipment, materials and scientific and
      technological information
   Due consideration for the need of developing areas

II. Long-term supply assurance in predictable manner
    Each country's choice of fuel cycle, without prejudice
    Restraints on nuclear trade, no preferential treatment
    Suppliers to live up to commitments
    Work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply
    International fuel cycle facilities
    Supply Assurances/Non-proliferation assurances

III. Protection of safeguarded nuclear facilities from
     military attack

IV. Technical assistance
    Sharing of technology
    Priority and further increase to NPT parties
    IAEA as co-ordinator

V. Fund - financing
   - for R & D
   - for industrial infrastructure
   - for power project
   - for other applications of nuclear techniques

VI. Article V

VII. Item 14 of the Agenda
I. INALIENABLE RIGHTS AND FULLEST POSSIBLE EXCHANGE

1. The Conference confirms that the NPT has proved to be a sound basis for the worldwide peaceful uses of nuclear energy and reaffirms that nothing in the Treaty affects the inalienable right of any Party to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II.

2. The Conference reaffirms the undertaking by all Parties to the Treaty, in accordance with Article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7, to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the right of all Parties to the Treaty to participate in such exchange. This can contribute to progress in general and to the elimination of technological and economic gaps between the developed and developing countries.

3. The Conference notes that the assurance provided by effective non-proliferation arrangements through adherence to the Treaty provides an important basis for the expansion of trade and co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

4. The Conference reaffirms the undertaking of the Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so to co-operate in contributing, alone or together with other States or international organizations, to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world, and in particular the needs of the least developed countries.

5. The Conference requests that possibilities of improving the implementation of Article IV experienced on bilateral level should be presented in a special report based on national contributions to the next Review Conference.
II. SUPPLY ASSURANCES/NON-PROLIFERATION ASSURANCES

1. The Conference recognises the need for long-term supply assurances accompanied by adequate non-proliferation assurances.

2. The Conference commends the recent progress which the IAEA's Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS) has made in agreeing a set of principles related to this problem, and expresses the hope that the Committee will complete this work soon. The Conference further notes with satisfaction the measures which CAS has produced for alleviating technical and administrative problems in international shipments of nuclear items, emergency and back-up mechanisms, and mechanisms for the revision of international nuclear co-operation agreements and calls for their early implementation.

3. The Conference urges that in accordance with international law and applicable treaty obligations, States should fulfill their obligations under agreements in the nuclear field, and any modification of such agreements, if required, should be made only by mutual consent of the parties and through revision mechanisms previously agreed to by the parties.

4. The Conference confirms that each country's choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing their respective fuel cycle policies, and that predictable and agreed criteria should govern international transfers in this area, provided that agreed non-proliferation commitments are made.

5. The Conference recognizes the importance of the internationalization of the nuclear fuel cycle by setting up nuclear fuel cycle centres; acknowledges the growing need for an international system of spent nuclear fuel disposal; urges the IAEA and States in a position to do so to speed up relevant projects.

III. PROTECTION OF SAFEGUARDED NUCLEAR FACILITIES

1. The Conference, recognizing that an attack on a safeguarded nuclear facility, or threat of attack, would create a situation in which the Security Council and above all its nuclear-weapon State permanent members would have to act immediately in accordance with their obligations under the United Nations Charter, requests the Depositories of the NPT to endeavour, in consultation with the other members of the Security Council, to give full consideration to all appropriate measures to be undertaken to deal with such a situation, including the application of measures under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.
2. The Conference encourages Parties to commit themselves to provide immediate assistance to any Party to the NPT whose safeguarded nuclear activities are subject to an attack, or threat of an attack, and to withdraw nuclear co-operation with and assistance to the attacking State.

3. The Conference acknowledges that the threat of attack is a disincentive to the fulfilment of the Treaty in relation to the promotion of nuclear energy and calls for the early elaboration of appropriate measures prohibiting attacks on safeguarded nuclear installations.

IV. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

1. The Conference acknowledges the importance of the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as the principal agent for technology transfer amongst the international organizations referred to in Article IV (2) and welcomes the successful operation of the Agency's technical assistance and co-operation programmes. The Conference records with appreciation that projects supported from these programmes covered a wide spectrum of applications, primarily in the non-power uses of nuclear energy, notably in agriculture, medicine, industry and hydrology, and that the chief beneficiaries have been developing States Parties to the Treaty.

2. The Conference welcomes the establishment by the IAEA, following a recommendation of the First Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, of a mechanism to permit the channeling of extra-budgetary funds to projects additional to those financed from the IAEA Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund. The Conference notes that this channel has been used to make additional resources available for a wide variety of projects in developing States Party to the Treaty.

3. In this context, the Conference proposes the following measures for consideration by the IAEA:

   (i) The IAEA's technical co-operation evaluation activity to be further developed, so as to enhance the Agency's ability to provide technical assistance;

   (ii) IAEA assistance in nuclear planning systems for developing countries to be strengthened in order to help such countries draw up their own nuclear development plans;

   (iii) IAEA assistance on country-specific nuclear development strategies to be further developed, with a view to identifying the applications of nuclear technology that
can be expected to contribute most to the development of both of individual sectors and developing economies as a whole;

(iv) Greater support for regional co-operative agreements, promoting regional projects based on regionally agreed priorities and using inputs from regional countries;

(v) Exploration of the scope for multi-year, multi-donor projects financed from the extra budgetary resources of the IAEA.

4. The Conference notes the considerable level of bilateral co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and urges that States in a position to do so should continue and where possible increase the level of their co-operation in these fields.

5. The Conference urges that preferential treatment should be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty in access to or transfer of equipment, materials, services, and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, taking particularly into account needs of developing countries.

6. The Conference demands that all States suspend any nuclear co-operation with South Africa and Israel until they renounce to the nuclear-weapon option by joining the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, accepting the IAEA safeguards and pledging not to manufacture nor acquire nuclear weapons.

V. FUND FINANCING

1. The Conference requests Parties to consider the establishment of a financial assistance fund to assist developing countries Parties to NPT in the development of their peaceful nuclear power programmes and the other peaceful applications of nuclear technology. The Conference proposes to establish a Preparatory Committee open-ended to all the Parties, to consider the scope and modalities of such a Fund.

2. The Conference requests the IAEA to consider establishing an expert Working Group to explore further the problems of securing international and multilateral finance for major capital projects in the nuclear field. The Conference recognizes that further IAEA assistance in the preparation of feasibility studies and infrastructure development might enhance the prospects for developing countries obtaining finance, and recommends such countries to apply for such help under the Agency's technical assistance
and co-operation programmes. The Conference also acknowledges that further support for the IAEA's Small and Medium Power Reactor (SMPR) Study could help the development of nuclear reactors more suited to the needs of the developing countries.

IV. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE FOR THE PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION IN THE PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY

The Conference expresses its satisfaction at the progress in the preparations for the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (PUNIE) and its conviction that the Conference will contribute to international co-operation for the promotion of the transfer and utilization of nuclear technology for economic and social development, especially in the developing countries.
Item 14: Role of the Treaty in the promotion of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and of nuclear disarmament and in strengthening international peace and security:

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