Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

FINAL DOCUMENT

Part II

Geneva, 1975
REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES
TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

FINAL DOCUMENT

Part II

Geneva, 1975
FINAL DOCUMENT OF THE REVIEW CONFERENCE
OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The Final Document of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons consists of three parts:

I. Organization and Work of the Conference (NPT/CONF/35/I)
II. Documents of the Conference (NPT/CONF/35/II)
III. Summary Records (NPT/CONF/35/III)
NOTE

The documents making up Part II of the Final Document are reproduced as initially issued.

The designation "Syrian Arab Republic" should be substituted for "Syria".
Provisional agenda items 9 and 10

ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA AND PROGRAMME OF WORK
First Report of the General Committee

At its first meeting on 5 May 1975, the General Committee considered items 9 and 10 of the Provisional Agenda entitled "Adoption of the Agenda" and "Programme of Work," respectively, with a view to making appropriate recommendations to the Conference. In doing so, the General Committee kept in mind that the Conference should complete its task by 30 May at the latest and organize its work accordingly. As a result, the General Committee decided to recommend to the Conference that:

I. The Provisional Agenda submitted to the Review Conference by the Preparatory Committee, contained in document NPT/CONF/1, should be adopted without change;

II. The first week of the Conference should be devoted to the general debate, to be concluded, if possible, by Friday 9 May and in any case not later than Tuesday 13 May;

III. Committee II should start its work on Monday, 12 May; and Committee I immediately after the conclusion of the general debate;

IV. The following items of the provisional agenda should be allocated to the Plenary:

- item 5  "Election of Vice-Chairmen of the two Main Committees, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee"
- item 7  "Credentials of representatives to the Conference
   (a) Appointment of the Credentials Committee
   (b) Report of the Credentials Committee

- items 9 and 10  "Adoption of the Agenda" and "Programme of Work"
- item 11  "Adoption of arrangements for meeting the costs of the Conference"
- item 12  "General Debate"
- item 15  "Reports of the Main Committees"
- item 16  "Other questions"
- item 17  "Preparation and Adoption of Final Documents", it being understood that the two Main Committees and the Drafting Committee would be involved in the preparation of documents, in accordance with the functions assigned to them under the rules of procedure of the Conference.
V. The following items should be allocated to Committee I:
- item 13 "Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its Article VIII(3):
  A. Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament and international peace and security:
   (1) Articles I, II and III (1, 2 and 4) and Preambular paragraphs 1-5
   (2) Article VI and Preambular paragraphs 8-12
   (3) Article VII
  C. Other provisions of the Treaty
- item 14 "Role of the Treaty in the promotion of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and of nuclear disarmament and in strengthening international peace and security:
  A. Acceptance of the Treaty by States
  B. Measures aimed at promoting a wider acceptance of the Treaty."

VI. The following items should be allocated to Committee II:
- item 13 "Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its Article VIII (3):
  B. Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to peaceful applications of nuclear energy:
   (1) Article III and Article IV
   (2) Article V and Preambular paragraphs 6 and 7."

VII. In connexion with the allocation of item 13 B (1) to Committee II, discussion on Article III should not be limited to paragraph 3, as in the provisional agenda. With regard to the allocation of item 14 B to Committee I, Committee II should be free to discuss also this sub-item.

VIII. In view of the fact that an extensive general debate will take place in Plenary, it would be useful for the Main Committees to go directly into the substance of the items allocated to them without holding another general debate.

IX. The Drafting Committee should meet as early as possible after the conclusion of the general debate, and delegations should name their representatives to this Committee as soon as possible.
CONTAINING A DRAFT ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY
ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS REGARDING
NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS

Introductory note

In its resolution 2373 (XXII) of 12 June 1968, the General Assembly of the
United Nations expressed inter alia "the hope for the widest possible adherence to the
Treaty" on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

That hope was undoubtedly based on the conviction stated in unequivocal terms in
the penultimate preambular paragraph of the same resolution in which the Assembly
declared itself "convinced" that "an agreement to prevent the further proliferation of
nuclear weapons must be followed as soon as possible by effective measures on the
cessation of the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament, and that the non-
proliferation treaty will contribute to this aim".

To the foregoing one must add a whole series of facts which are equally pertinent
in this regard, some of the most outstanding of which are recalled here:

That the Non-Proliferation Treaty itself has reiterated in its preamble the
determination, proclaimed since 1963 in the Moscow Treaty, "to achieve the discontinuance
of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time";

That in four of its very numerous resolutions on this question, the Assembly has
"condemned" with the utmost vigour all nuclear weapon tests, in whatever environment
they may be conducted;

That the Assembly itself has repeatedly expressed the conviction that, "whatever
may be the differences on the question of verification, there is no valid reason for
delaying the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban";

* Re-issued for technical reasons

GB.75-65476
That it is also the Assembly, the most representative body of the international community, which has affirmed, in its most recent resolution - 3257 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974 - on this subject, that "the continuance of nuclear weapon testing will intensify the arms race, thus increasing the danger of nuclear war";

That, as the Secretary-General of the United Nations emphatically stated more than three years ago, in his first address to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, on 20 February 1972: "All the technical and scientific aspects of the problem have been so fully explored that only a political decision is now necessary in order to achieve final agreement".

The inevitable conclusion which, in the opinion of the delegations co-sponsoring this working paper, is to be drawn from facts such as those just recalled is that one of the most effective measures for strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty and for promoting universal adherence to it would be that the three nuclear-weapon States, which are not only Parties to the Treaty but act as its depositaries as well, demonstrate their readiness to support with tangible deeds the provisions of the Treaty's preamble regarding the cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

For this reason the sponsoring delegations believe that they are making a positive contribution to the work of the Conference in submitting to it a draft "Additional Protocol I" on this subject. They are also convinced that the entry into force of the proposed instrument would in no way undermine the security of the depositary States, since the extent of the lead in nuclear war technology and the enormity of the nuclear arsenals of the USSR and the United States of America are such that, even if they were to suspend all nuclear weapon tests for half a century, it is absolutely certain that they would continue to maintain an indisputable superiority. As if this were not sufficient, the Treaty's provisions regarding withdrawal, which would apply as well to the Protocol, would give each of the Parties the right to withdraw from the Protocol, "in exercising its national sovereignty", should any of them reach the conclusion that, at a given moment, the supreme interests of its country require it. On the other hand, it is equally certain that a Protocol such as the one proposed would constitute an incentive of particular value in order to prompt the other nuclear-weapon States to commit themselves to put an end to all of their tests with such weapons.

The text of the draft Protocol which, basing themselves on the foregoing considerations, the sponsoring delegations submit to the Conference is the following:
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The Depositary Governments of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, referred to in this Protocol as "the Treaty",

Conscious that universal, or at least the widest possible, adherence to the Treaty will contribute to avoid an increase in the danger of nuclear war,

Convinced that one of the most effective procedures for attaining such adherence would be the implementation of the provisions of the Preamble of the Treaty reiterating the determination, proclaimed since 1963 in the Moscow Treaty, to achieve "the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time",

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1. They undertake to decree the suspension of all their underground nuclear weapon tests for a period of ten years, as soon as the number of Parties to the Treaty reaches one hundred.

Article 2. They undertake also to extend by three years the moratorium contemplate in the preceding article, each time that five additional States become Parties to the Treaty.

Article 3. They undertake to transform the moratorium into a permanent cessation of all nuclear weapon tests, through the conclusion of a multilateral treaty for that purpose, as soon as the other nuclear weapon States indicate their willingness to become parties to said treaty.

Article 4. This Protocol will be of the same duration as the Treaty. Nevertheless the provisions of the latter's Article X regarding withdrawal shall apply to it.

Article 5. This Protocol shall be subject to ratification by the three Depositary States of the Treaty to which it is open for signature and shall enter into force on the date that the instruments of ratification of two of them are received by the Secretary-General of the United Nations who shall be the depositary of the Protocol.
ADDENDUM

GHANA, MEXICO, MOROCCO, NIGERIA, PERU, ROMANIA, SUDAN, YUGOSLAVIA AND ZAIRE

Working paper containing a draft additional protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons regarding nuclear weapon tests

Add Ecuador, Honduras, Jamaica, Lebanon, Liberia and the Philippines as sponsors.
ADDENDUM

GHANA, MEXICO, MOROCCO, NIGERIA, PARU, ROMANIA, SUDAN, YUGOSLAVIA AND ZAIRE

Working paper containing a draft additional protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons regarding nuclear weapon tests

Add Nepal as a co-sponsor.
GHANA, MEXICO, MOROCCO, NIGERIA, PERU, ROMANIA, SUDAN, YUGOSLAVIA AND ZAIRE

Working paper containing a draft additional protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons regarding nuclear weapon tests

Addendum

Add Nicaragua and Syrian Arab Republic as co-sponsors.

GE.75-65736
GHANA, MEXICO, MOROCCO, NIGERIA, PERU, ROMANIA, SUDAN, YUGOSLAVIA AND ZAIRE

Working paper containing a draft additional protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons regarding nuclear weapon tests

Addendum

Add Bolivia as a co-sponsor.
GHANA, MEXICO, MOROCCO, NIGERIA, PERU, ROMANIA, SUDAN, YUGOSLAVIA
AND ZAIRE

WORKING PAPER

CONTAINING A DRAFT ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS REGARDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS ARTICLE VI

Introductory note

In its resolution 2373 (XXII) of 12 June 1968, the General Assembly of the
United Nations expressed inter alia "the hope for the widest possible adherence to
the Treaty" on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

That hope was undoubtedly based on the conviction stated in unequivocal terms in
the penultimate preambular paragraph of the same resolution in which the Assembly
declared itself "convinced" that "an agreement to prevent the further proliferation
of nuclear weapons must be followed as soon as possible by effective measures on
the cessation of the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament, and that the
non-proliferation treaty will contribute to this aim".

It was no doubt for this same reason that the Treaty itself contains an article -
article VI - aimed at reaffirming the Assembly's conviction referred to by providing
that:

"Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations
in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear
arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on
general and complete "disarmament under strict and effective international
control."

If, as set forth in the Treaty's article VIII, the basic objective of this
Conference is to review how 'the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the
Treaty' have been, and are being, realized, the inevitable conclusions to be drawn
from any objective analysis of reality are, with regard to the above-mentioned article,
not only extremely disappointing but truly alarming. The nuclear arms race, far
from ceasing as contemplated in the Treaty's article VI, has been stepped up in such
a manner that it has given rise to the situation known as overkill. Implicit in
such a situation is the constant threat of a nuclear holocaust, as shown by the two
grave crises which in 1962 and 1973 gave rise to a general alert.

* Re-issued for technical reasons.

GE.75-55481
The imminence of this danger appears to have begun to find its way even in the highest political levels. Thus during the last session of the General Assembly, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of one of the two most powerful nuclear-weapon States stated emphatically:

"Stable and lasting peace is incompatible with the arms race. They are antipodes. One cannot seriously think of eliminating the threat of war, while at the same time increasing military budgets and endlessly building up armaments ... The supreme interests not only of the peoples of the Soviet Union and the United States, but also of the peoples of the whole world require that the Soviet Union and the United States, possessing the colossal might of nuclear weapons, should make every effort to achieve appropriate understandings and agreements".

To date the only results which the Treaty's depositary States can point to regarding their commitment under article VI are the meagre ones obtained in the bilateral negotiations on the limitation of strategic nuclear-weapon systems (SALT) which have been going on for some years. If in the international sphere those negotiations have had some beneficial consequences of a political and psychological nature, their very modest scope as disarmament measures has in practice appeared to be of no account. This has prompted the Assembly to urge the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States repeatedly, as it did in its latest resolution in this regard - resolution 3261 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974 - to broaden the scope and accelerate the pace of their negotiations, stressing anew 'the necessity and urgency of reaching agreement on important qualitative limitations and substantial reductions of their strategic nuclear-weapon systems as a positive step towards nuclear disarmament'.

In the light of the foregoing, it is axiomatic that one of the most effective measures for strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty and for promoting universal adherence to it would be that the two States possessing by far the largest nuclear arsenals in existence demonstrate their readiness to support with tangible deeds the provisions of the Treaty's article VI relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament.

For this reason the sponsoring delegations believe that they are making a positive contribution to the work of the Conference in submitting to it a draft "Additional Protocol II" on this subject. They are also convinced that the entry into force of the proposed instrument could not undermine the security of those two depositary States. On the one hand, the reductions suggested would in no way affect the system on which are based the proportions that they freely accepted in the Vladivostok accords. On the other hand, the extent of their lead in nuclear war technology and the enormity of their nuclear arsenals are such that, even after they had carried out the parity reductions called for in the Additional Protocol, the number of nuclear weapons and of
delivery vehicles which each one would maintain would still be much superior to that
which might be at the disposal of all of the other nuclear-weapon States taken together.
As if this were not sufficient, the Treaty's provisions regarding withdrawal, which
would apply as well to the Protocol, would give each of the Parties the right to
withdraw from the Protocol, in exercising its national sovereignty", should either
of them reach the conclusion that, at a given moment, the supreme interests of its
country require it. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that a Protocol such as
the one proposed would constitute an incentive of particular value in order to prompt
the other nuclear-weapon States to adopt measures for reductions similar to those
set forth in it.

The text of the draft Protocol which, basing themselves on the foregoing
considerations, the sponsoring delegations submit to the Conference is the following:

ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II TO THE TREATY ON THE
NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The Depositary Governments of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons - referred to in this Protocol as "the Treaty" - which participate in the
bilateral negotiations on the limitation of strategic nuclear-weapon systems (SALT),
Conscious that universal, or at least the widest possible, adherence to the
Treaty will contribute to avoid an increase in the danger of nuclear war,
Convinced that one of the most effective procedures for attaining such adherence
would be the parallel achievement of tangible results relating to nuclear disarmament,
Bearing in mind that in the accords reached at Vladivostok in November of 1974
both Governments agreed that each side would be entitled to have an aggregate maximum
of 2,400 intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and
heavy bombers, and that only 1,320 of the ballistic missiles may be equipped with
multiple independently targetable warheads (MIRV's),
Have agreed as follows:

Article 1. They solemnly reaffirm the obligations undertaken in article VI of
the Treaty to pursue 'negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to
cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament'.

Article 2. They undertake, as soon as the number of Parties to the Treaty has
reached one hundred:

(a) To reduce by fifty per cent the ceiling of 2,400 nuclear strategic delivery
vehicles contemplated for each side under the Vladivostok accords;

(b) To reduce likewise by fifty per cent the ceiling of 1,320 strategic ballistic
missiles which, under those accords, each side may equip with multiple independently
targetable warheads (MIRV's).
Article 3. They also undertake, once such reductions have been carried out, to reduce by ten per cent the ceilings of 1,200 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and of 660 strategic ballistic missiles that may be equipped with multiple independently targetable warheads (MIRV's), each time that ten additional States become Parties to the Treaty.

Article 4. This Protocol will be of the same duration as the Treaty. Nevertheless the provisions of the latter's article X regarding withdrawal shall apply to it.

Article 5. This Protocol shall be subject to ratification by the two States to which it is open for signature and shall enter into force on the date both instruments of ratification have been received by the Secretary-General of the United Nations who shall be the depositary of the Protocol.
ADDENDUM

GHANA, MEXICO, MOROCCO, NIGERIA, PERU, ROMANIA, SUDAN, YUGOSLAVIA AND ZAIRE

Working paper containing a draft additional protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons regarding the implementation of its article VI

Add Ecuador, Honduras, Jamaica, Lebanon and Liberia as co-sponsors.
ADDENDUM

GHANA, MEXICO, MOROCCO, NIGERIA, PERU, ROMANIA, SUDAN, YUGOSLAVIA AND ZAIRE

Working paper containing a draft additional protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons regarding the implementation of its article VI

Add Bolivia and Nepal as co-sponsors.
GHANA, MEXICO, MOROCCO, NIGERIA, PERU, ROMANIA, SUDAN, YUGOSLAVIA AND TAIRE

Working paper containing a draft additional protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons regarding the implementation of its article VI

Addendum

Add Nicaragua and Syrian Arab Republic as co-sponsors.
Agenda of the Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons adopted
at the 4th Plenary Meeting on 7 May 1975

1. Opening of the Conference by the Chairman of the third session of the Preparatory Committee.
2. Election of the President.
5. Election of Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the two Main Committees, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee.
6. Election of Vice Presidents.
7. Credentials of representatives to the Conference.
   (a) Appointment of the Credentials Committee
   (b) Report of the Credentials Committee
8. Confirmation of the nomination of the Secretary-General.
9. Adoption of the Agenda.
11. Adoption of arrangements for meeting the costs of the Conference.
13. Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its Article VIII (3):
   A. Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament and international peace and security:
      (1) Articles I, II and III (1, 2 and 4) and Preambular paragraphs 1 - 5
      (2) Article VI and Preambular paragraphs 8 - 12
      (3) Article VII

GE.75-65428
B. Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to peaceful applications of nuclear energy:

(1) Article IV and Article III (3)

(2) Article V and Preambular paragraphs 6 and 7

C. Other provisions of the Treaty


14. Role of the Treaty in the promotion of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and of nuclear disarmament and in strengthening international peace and security:

A. Acceptance of the Treaty by States

B. Measures aimed at promoting a wider acceptance of the Treaty

15. Reports of the main Committees.

16. Other questions.

17. Preparation and Adoption of Final Documents.
RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE REVIEW CONFERENCE

I. REPRESENTATION AND CREDENTIALS

Delegations of Parties to the Treaty

Rule 1

1. Each State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (hereinafter "the Treaty") may be represented at the Conference by a head of delegation and such other representatives, alternate representatives and advisers as may be required.

2. The head of delegation may designate an alternate representative or an adviser to act as a representative.

Credentials

Rule 2

The credentials of representatives and the names of alternate representatives and advisers shall be submitted to the Secretary-General of the Conference, if possible not less than one week before the date fixed for the opening of the Conference. Credentials shall be issued either by the Head of the State or Government or by the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Credentials Committee

Rule 3

The Conference shall establish a Credentials Committee composed of the Chairman and two Vice-Chairmen elected in accordance with rule 5, and six members appointed by the Conference on the proposal of the President. The Committee shall examine the credentials of representatives and report to the Conference without delay.

Provisional participation

Rule 4

Pending a decision of the Conference upon their credentials, representatives shall be entitled to participate provisionally in the Conference.

II. OFFICERS

Election

Rule 5

The Conference shall elect the following officers: A President and 26 Vice- Presidents, as well as a Chairman and two Vice-Chairmen for each of the two Main Committees, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee.
Acting President

Rule 6

1. If the President is absent from a meeting or any part thereof, he shall designate a Vice-President to take his place.

2. A Vice-President acting as President shall have the same powers and duties as the President.

Voting rights of the President

Rule 7

The President, or a Vice-President acting as President, shall not vote, but shall appoint another member of his delegation to vote in his place.

III. GENERAL COMMITTEE

Composition

Rule 8

1. The General Committee shall be composed of the President of the Conference, who shall preside, the 26 Vice-Presidents, the Chairman of the two Main Committees, the Chairman of the Drafting Committee and the Chairman of the Credentials Committee. No two members of the General Committee shall be members of the same delegation and it shall be so constituted as to ensure its representative character.

2. If the President is unable to attend a meeting of the General Committee, he may designate a Vice-President to preside at such meeting and a member of his delegation to take his place. If a Vice-President is unable to attend, he may designate a member of his delegation to take his place. If the Chairman of a Main Committee, the Drafting Committee or the Credentials Committee is unable to attend, he may designate one of the Vice-Chairmen to take his place, with the right to vote unless he is of the same delegation as another member of the General Committee.

Functions

Rule 9

The General Committee shall assist the President in the general conduct of the business of the Conference and, subject to the decisions of the Conference, shall ensure the co-ordination of its work.

IV. CONFERENCE SECRETARIAT

Duties of the Secretary-General of the Conference

Rule 10

1. There shall be a Secretary-General of the Conference. He shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the Conference, its committees and working groups, and may designate a member of the Secretariat to act in his place at these meetings.

2. The Secretary-General of the Conference shall direct the staff required by the Conference.
Duties of the Secretariat

Rule 11

The Secretariat of the Conference shall, in accordance with these rules:

(a) interpret speeches made at meetings;
(b) receive, translate and circulate the documents of the Conference;
(c) publish and circulate any report of the Conference;
(d) make and arrange for the keeping of sound recordings and summary records of meetings;
(e) arrange for the custody of the documents of the Conference in the archives of the United Nations and provide authentic copies of these documents to each of the depositary Governments, and
(f) generally perform all other work that the Conference may require.

Costs

Rule 12*

The costs of the Review Conference, including the sessions of the Preparatory Committee, will be met by the States Parties to the Treaty participating in the Review Conference in accordance with the detailed schedule attached as an Appendix. States which have signed but not yet ratified the Treaty, and which accept the invitation to take part in the Review Conference as provided by Rule 44, will share in such costs to the extent of their respective rates of assessment under the United Nations scale (and on an estimated basis for those participants not members of the United Nations).

V. CONDUCT OF BUSINESS

Quorum

Rule 13

A majority of the States Parties to the Treaty participating in the Conference shall constitute a quorum.

General powers of the President

Rule 14

1. In addition to exercising the powers conferred upon him elsewhere by these rules, the President shall preside at the plenary meetings of the Conference; he shall declare the opening and closing of each meeting, direct the discussion, ensure

*/ It is understood that all financial arrangements for the Review Conference do not constitute a precedent.
obser\vance of these rules, accord the right to speak, ascertain consensus, put questions to the vote and announce decisions. He shall rule on points of order. The President, subject to these rules, shall have complete control of the proceedings and over the maintenance of order thereat. The President may propose to the Conference the closure of the list of speakers, a limitation on the time to be allowed to speakers and on the number of times the representative of each State may speak on a question, the adjournment or the closure of the debate and the suspension or the adjournment of a meeting.

2. The President, in the exercise of his functions, remains under the authority of the Conference.

**Points of order**

**Rule 15**

A representative may at any time raise a point of order, which shall be immediately decided by the President in accordance with these rules. A representative may appeal against the ruling of the President. The appeal shall be immediately put to the vote, and the President's ruling shall stand unless overruled by a majority of the representatives present and voting. A representative may not, in raising a point of order, speak on the substance of the matter under discussion.

**Speeches**

**Rule 16**

1. No one may address the Conference without having previously obtained the permission of the President. Subject to rules 15, 17 and 19-22, the President shall call upon speakers in the order in which they signify their desire to speak.

2. Debate shall be confined to the subject under discussion and the President may call a speaker to order if his remarks are not relevant thereto.

3. The Conference may limit the time allowed to speakers and the number of times the representative of each State may speak on a question; permission to speak on a motion to set such limits shall be accorded only to two representatives in favour of and to two opposing such limits, after which the motion shall be immediately put to the vote. In any event, the President shall limit interventions on procedural questions to a maximum of five minutes. When the debate is limited and a speaker exceeds the allotted time, the President shall call him to order without delay.

**Precedence**

**Rule 17**

The Chairman of a committee may be accorded precedence for the purpose of explaining the conclusion arrived at by his committee.
Closing of list of speakers

Rule 18

During the course of a debate the President may announce the list of speakers and, with the consent of the Conference, declare the list closed. When the debate on an item is concluded because there are no more speakers, the President shall declare the debate closed. Such closure shall have the same effect as closure pursuant to rule 22.

Right of reply

Rule 19

Notwithstanding rule 18, the President may accord the right of reply to a representative of any State participating in the Conference. Such statements shall be as brief as possible and shall, as a general rule, be delivered at the end of the last meeting of the day.

Suspension or adjournment of the meeting

Rule 20

A representative may at any time move the suspension or the adjournment of the meeting. No discussion on such motions shall be permitted and they shall, subject to rule 23, be immediately put to the vote.

Adjournment of debate

Rule 21

A representative may at any time move the adjournment of the debate on the question under discussion. Permission to speak on the motion shall be accorded only to two representatives in favour of and to two opposing the adjournment after which the motion shall, subject to rule 23, be immediately put to the vote.

Closure of debate

Rule 22

A representative may at any time move the closure of the debate on the question under discussion, whether or not any other representative has signified his wish to speak. Permission to speak on the motion shall be accorded only to two representatives opposing the closure, after which the motion shall, subject to rule 23, be immediately put to the vote.
Order of motions

Rule 23

The motions indicated below shall have precedence in the following order over all proposals or other motions before the meeting:

(a) to suspend the meeting;
(b) to adjourn the meeting;
(c) to adjourn the debate on the question under discussion;
(d) to close the debate on the question under discussion.

Submission of proposals and substantive amendments

Rule 24

Proposals and substantive amendments shall normally be submitted in writing to the Secretary-General of the Conference, who shall circulate copies to all delegations. Unless the Conference decides otherwise, proposals and substantive amendments shall be discussed or decided on no earlier than 24 hours after copies have been circulated in all languages of the Conference to all delegations.

Withdrawal of proposals and motions

Rule 25

A proposal or a motion may be withdrawn by its sponsor at any time before a decision on it has been taken, provided that it has not been amended. A proposal or a motion thus withdrawn may be reintroduced by any representative.

Decision on competence

Rule 26

Any motion calling for a decision on the competence of the Conference to adopt a proposal submitted to it, shall be decided upon before a decision is taken on the proposal in question.

Reconsideration of Proposals

Rule 27

Proposals adopted by consensus may not be reconsidered unless the Conference reaches a consensus on such reconsideration. When a proposal has been adopted or rejected by a majority or two-thirds vote, it may not be reconsidered unless the Conference, by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting, so decides. Permission to speak on a motion to reconsider shall be accorded only to two speakers opposing the motion, after which it shall be immediately put to the vote.
VI. VOTING AND ELECTIONS

Adoption of decisions

Rule 28

1. Decisions on matters of procedure and in elections shall be taken by a majority of representatives present and voting.

2. The task of the Review Conference being to review the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized, and thus to strengthen its effectiveness, every effort should be made to reach agreement on substantive matters by means of consensus. There should be no voting on such matters until all efforts to achieve consensus have been exhausted.

3. If, notwithstanding the best efforts of delegates to achieve consensus, a matter of substance comes up for voting, the President shall defer the vote for 48 hours and during this period of deferment shall make every effort, with the assistance of the General Committee, to facilitate the achievement of general agreement, and shall report to the Conference prior to the end of the period.

4. If by the end of the period of deferment the Conference has not reached agreement, voting shall take place and decisions shall be taken by a two-thirds majority of the representatives present and voting, providing that such majority shall include at least a majority of the States participating in the Conference.

5. If the question arises whether a matter is one of procedure or of substance, the President of the Conference shall rule on the question. An appeal against this ruling shall immediately be put to the vote and the President's ruling shall stand unless the appeal is approved by a majority of the representatives present and voting.

6. In cases where a vote is taken in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 4 above, the relevant rules of procedure relating to voting of the General Assembly of the United Nations shall apply, except as otherwise specifically provided herein.

Voting rights

Rule 29

Every State Party to the Treaty shall have one vote.

Meaning of the phrase "representatives present and voting"

Rule 50

For the purposes of these rules, the phrase "representatives present and voting" means representatives casting an affirmative or negative vote. Representatives who abstain from voting are considered as not voting.

Elections

Rule 31

All elections shall be held by secret ballot, unless the Conference decides otherwise in an election where the number of candidates does not exceed the number of elective places to be filled.
1. If, when only one elective place is to be filled, no candidate obtains in the first ballot the majority required, a second ballot shall be taken, confined to the two candidates having obtained the largest number of votes. If in the second ballot the votes are equally divided, the President shall decide between the candidates by drawing lots.

2. In the case of a tie in the first ballot among the candidates obtaining the second largest number of votes, a special ballot shall be held among such candidates for the purpose of reducing their number to two; similarly, in the case of a tie among three or more candidates obtaining the largest number of votes, a special ballot shall be held; if a tie again results in the special ballot, the President shall eliminate one candidate by drawing lots and thereafter another ballot shall be held in accordance with paragraph 1.

Rule 33

1. When two or more elective places are to be filled at one time under the same conditions, those candidates, in a number not exceeding the number of such places, obtaining in the first ballot the majority required and the largest number of votes, shall be elected.

2. If the number of candidates obtaining such majority is less than the number of places to be filled, additional ballots shall be held to fill the remaining places, provided that if only one place remains to be filled the procedures in rule 32 shall be applied. The ballot shall be restricted to the unsuccessful candidates having obtained the largest number of votes in the previous ballot, but not exceeding twice the number of places remaining to be filled. However, in the case of a tie between a greater number of unsuccessful candidates a special ballot shall be held for the purpose of reducing the number of candidates to the required number; if a tie again results among more than the required number of candidates, the President shall reduce their number to that required by drawing lots.

3. If such a restricted ballot (not counting a special ballot held under the conditions specified in the last sentence of paragraph 2) is inconclusive, the President shall decide among the candidates by drawing lots.

VII. COMMITTEES

Main committees and working groups

Rule 34

The Conference shall establish two Main Committees for the performance of its functions. Each such Committee may establish working groups. As a general rule each State Party to the Treaty participating in the Conference may be represented in the Working Groups unless otherwise decided.
Each State Party to the Treaty participating in the Conference may be represented by one representative on each Main Committee. It may assign to these Committees such alternate representatives and advisers as may be required.

Drafting Committee

Rule 36

1. The Conference shall establish a Drafting Committee composed of representatives of the same States which are represented on the General Committee. It shall co-ordinate the drafting of and edit all texts referred to it by the Conference or by a Main Committee, without altering the substance of the texts, and report to the Conference or to the Main Committee as appropriate. If shall also, without reopening substantive discussion on any matter, formulate drafts and give advice on drafting as requested by the Conference or a Main Committee.

2. Representatives of delegations proposing texts referred to the Drafting Committee in conformity with paragraph 1 of this rule shall be entitled to participate, at their request, in the discussion of those texts in the Drafting Committee.

Officers and procedures

Rule 37

The rules relating to officers, the Conference Secretariat, conduct of business and voting of the Conference (contained in chapters II (rules 5-7), IV (rules 10-11), V (rules 13-27) and VI (rules 28-33) above) shall be applicable, mutatis mutandis, to the proceedings of committees and working groups, except that:

(a) unless otherwise decided, any working group shall elect a chairman and such other officers as it may require;

(b) The Chairmen of the General, the Drafting and the Credentials Committee and the chairmen of working groups may vote in their capacity as representatives of their States;

(c) a majority of the representatives on the General, Drafting or Credentials Committee or on any working group shall constitute a quorum; the chairman of a Main Committee may declare a meeting open and permit the debate to proceed when at least one-quarter of the representatives of the States participating in the Conference are present.

VIII. LANGUAGES AND RECORDS

Languages of the Conference

Rule 38

Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish shall be the official languages of the Conference.
Interpretation

Rule 39

1. Speeches made in a language of the Conference shall be interpreted into the other languages.

2. A representative may make a speech in a language other than a language of the Conference if he provides for interpretation into one such language. Interpretation into the other languages of the Conference by interpreters of the Secretariat may be based on the interpretation given in the first such language.

Language of official documents

Rule 40

Official documents shall be made available in the languages of the Conference.

Sound recordings of meetings

Rule 41

Sound recordings of meetings of the Conference and of all committees shall be made and kept in accordance with the practice of the United Nations. Unless otherwise decided by the Main Committee concerned, no such recordings shall be made of the meetings of a working group thereof.

Summary records

Rule 42

1. Summary records of the plenary meetings of the Conference and of the meetings of the Main Committees shall be prepared by the Secretariat in the languages of the Conference. They shall be distributed in provisional form as soon as possible to all participants in the Conference. Participants in the debate may, within three working days of receipt of provisional summary records, submit corrections on summaries of their own interventions to the Secretariat; in special circumstances, the presiding officer may, in consultation with the Secretary-General of the Conference, extend the time for submitting corrections. Any disagreement concerning such corrections shall be decided by the presiding officer of the body to which the record relates, after consulting, where necessary, the sound recordings of the proceedings. Separate corrigenda to provisional records shall not normally be issued.

2. The summary records, with any corrections incorporated, shall be distributed promptly to participants in the Conference.

IX. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MEETINGS

Rule 43

1. The plenary meetings of the Conference and the meetings of the Main Committees shall be held in public unless the body concerned decides otherwise.

2. Meetings of other organs of the Conference shall be held in private.
X. PARTICIPATION AND ATTENDANCE

Rule 44

1. Signatories

Any State signatory to the Treaty which has not yet ratified it shall be entitled to participate, without taking part in the adoption of decisions, whether by consensus or by vote, in the deliberations of the Conference, subject to prior written notification to the Secretary-General of the Conference. This means that any of those signatory States shall be entitled to appoint officials to attend meetings of the Plenary and of the Main Committees; to address such meetings; to receive the documents of the Conference and to submit its views in writing to the Conference, which shall be considered as Conference documents.

2. Observers

Any other State which, in accordance with Article IX of the Treaty, has the right to become a Party thereto but which has neither signed nor ratified it may apply to the Secretary-General of the Conference for Observer status, which will be accorded on the decision of the Conference. Such a State shall be entitled to appoint officials to attend meetings of the Plenary and of the Main Committees other than those designated closed meetings, and to receive documents of the Conference. An Observer State shall also be entitled to submit documents to the participants in the Conference.

3. The United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency

The Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, or their representatives, shall be entitled to attend meetings of the Plenary and of the Main Committees and to receive the Conference documents. They shall also be entitled to submit material, both orally and in writing.

4. Specialized Agencies and Regional Intergovernmental Organizations

The Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, other regional intergovernmental organizations and any specialized agency of the United Nations may apply to the Secretary-General of the Conference for Observer Agency status which will be accorded on the decision of the Conference. An Observer Agency shall be entitled to appoint officials to attend meetings of the Plenary and of the Main Committees other than those designated closed meetings and to receive the documents of the Conference. The Conference may also invite them to submit, in writing, their views and comments on questions within their competence, which may be circulated as Conference documents.

5. Non-Governmental Organizations

Representatives of non-governmental organizations who attend meetings of the Plenary or of the Main Committee will be entitled upon request to receive the documents of the Conference.

\*/ It is understood that any such decision will be in accordance with the practice of the United Nations General Assembly.
APPENDIX
(to rule 12)

Schedule for the Division of Costs

This Schedule is based on the number of Parties to the Treaty as of the opening date of the third session of the Preparatory Committee, 3 February 1975 (Present Parties).

Costs will be divided as follows:

1. (a) The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will pay 18.56 per cent of the total; the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland will pay 9.0 per cent of the total; and the United States of America will pay 30.44 per cent of the total;

   (b) The participating developing States Parties (as listed in the attachment) will pay to the extent of their respective rate of assessment under the United Nations Scale;

   (c) The other participating States Parties will divide the balance among themselves according to the ratios of their respective United Nations scale of assessment.

2. Any developing States Parties not listed in the schedule and participating in the Review Conference will contribute to the cost of the Conference to the extent of their assessment under the United Nations scale (or an equivalent amount for those which are not members of the United Nations). Any other States Parties not listed in the schedule and participating in the Review Conference will contribute to the cost of the Conference at the rate of the United Nations scale of assessment (or an equivalent amount for those which are not members of the United Nations) pro-rated to the same degree as the States Parties in category 1(c).

3. All contributions from participating signatories and participating Parties not listed in the schedule will be equally divided between depository Parties and the non-depository developed Parties, and distributed proportionately among them, to the point where the depository States are paying 55 per cent of the total cost. Thereafter, all income from participating non-scheduled Parties and participating signatories shall accrue to the credit of non-depository developed Parties. These rebates will be divided among the developed Parties in each category according to the ratios of their initial contributions.

* The assigned contributions of States Parties not members of the United Nations will be based on estimates.
**Developing States Parties to the NPT as agreed by the Preparatory Committee**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Contribution</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Contribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>Malagasy</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>Maldives</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Rep.</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dahomey</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>Somali Republic</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>Tonga(^*)</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khmer Republic</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>Viet-Nam, South(^*)</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^*\) Not United Nations members; base contribution assigned on estimate.
RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE REVIEW CONFERENCE

Summary Records

Rule 42

Add "and of the Drafting Committee" in the second line of paragraph 1 after the words "Main Committees."
WHEREAS the spread of nuclear weapons poses an increasing threat to the peace and security of all nations; and

WHEREAS the maintenance of international stability and security would be greatly weakened, if not made impossible, in a world of many nuclear powers; and

WHEREAS it is essential that all nations of the world work urgently toward improving safeguards against the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful to weapons use; and

WHEREAS the Non-Proliferation Treaty serves to deter the further spread of nuclear weapons; and

WHEREAS, pursuant to Article VIII of that Treaty, a conference of parties commenced yesterday in Geneva to review the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that its purposes and provisions are being realized; and

WHEREAS the President of the United States, in his message to the Conference, has stated "Nuclear energy can and should promote the fortunes of nations assembled at this Conference. But its destructive potential can and must be contained:" Therefore be it

RESOLVED, that the Senate of the United States -- endorses the purpose of the Conference as stated in Article VIII of the Non-Proliferation Treaty; and commends the President's commitment to furthering the objectives of this Treaty.

***************

GE.75-65439
MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TO THE REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE
TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

This review conference offers an opportunity to focus new attention on our vital obligation to arrest the spread of nuclear weapons. It is a responsibility that confronts all nations equally and impartially. Nuclear energy can and should promote the fortunes of nations assembled at this Conference. But its destructive potential can and must be contained.

Support for the Non-Proliferation Treaty is a major tenet of American policy. Consequently, I hope that this Conference will:

-- convey the importance of non-proliferation to the security of all nations, hence to global stability;

-- promote international co-operation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy, while ensuring that it will not be misused as a means of mass destruction;

-- encourage the further development and wider application of effective safeguards and physical security measures for nuclear materials and facilities; and

-- review the considerable progress that has been made in arms control and disarmament since the Treaty was signed, and promote efforts to build on what has been achieved.

We welcome the important recent additions to the roster of parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as well as the indications that others are moving toward adherence. We recognize that the Treaty's promise is not yet fully realized, but we take satisfaction from what has been achieved. We further recognize that no treaty by itself can prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Yet we remain convinced that the Non-Proliferation Treaty is an essential means of advancing this purpose.

Although we still have a long way to go, we see in reviewing the record that the co-operative undertaking to create a more stable world community is well underway.

I take this occasion therefore to re-dedicate the United States to the support of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to the high purpose of a stable peace which animates it.
ECUADOR, GHANA, MEXICO, NIGERIA, PERU, ROMANIA, SUDAN AND ZAIRE

WORKING PAPER
CONTAINING A DRAFT ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY
ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS REGARDING
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SYSTEM OF SECURITY ASSURANCES
WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE TREATY

Introductory note

It is generally accepted that the non-nuclear-weapon States, by renouncing
their right to have their independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty
guaranteed against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

On the other hand, the acceleration of the arms race and the accumulation of
a great amount of arms during the period since the entry into force of the Treaty
have led to the increase of the degree of insecurity in the world.

Resolution 255 (1968) of the Security Council relates to the possible action
to be taken by the Security Council only when a nuclear attack has occurred. It
does not offer, therefore, appropriate assurances for the prevention of the use
or of the threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Finally, it should be borne in mind, in connexion with this matter, that the
United Nations General Assembly in its Declaration of 24 November 1961 solemnly
proclaimed that the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is contrary to the
rules of international law and to the laws of humanity.

For the above reasons the sponsoring delegations believe that they are making
a positive contribution to the work of the Conference in submitting to it the
following draft:

CE.75-65567
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL III TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The Depositary Governments of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, referred to in this Protocol as "The Treaty",

Recalling that, according to the Charter of the United Nations, the States have the obligation to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations,

Taking into account resolution 3261 G (XXIX) which considered inter alia that it is imperative for the international community to devise effective measures in order to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States,

Recognising that the effectiveness of the Treaty, its viability and universality depend, to a great extent, on its balanced character and on the existence of appropriate assurances for the States which have consented, by virtue of the Treaty, to renounce acquiring or manufacturing nuclear weapons,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1. They solemnly undertake
   a) never and under no circumstances to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty whose territories are completely free from nuclear weapons, and,
   b) to refrain from first use of nuclear weapons against any other non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty.

Article 2. They undertake to encourage negotiations initiated by any group of States Parties to the Treaty or others to establish nuclear weapon free zones in their respective territories or regions, and to respect the statute of nuclear weapon free zones established.

Article 3. In the event a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty becomes a victim of an attack with nuclear weapons or of a threat with the use of such weapons, the States Parties to this Protocol, at the request of the victim of such threat or attack, undertake to provide it immediate assistance without prejudice to their obligations under the United Nations Charter.
Article 4. This Protocol will be of the same duration as the Treaty. Nevertheless, the provisions of the latter's Article X regarding withdrawal shall apply to it.

Article 5. This Protocol shall be subject to ratification by the three Depositary States of the Treaty to which it is open for signature and shall enter into force on the date that the instruments of ratification of two of them are received by the Secretary-General of the United Nations who shall be the depositary of the Protocol.
ECUADOR, GHANA, MEXICO, NIGERIA, PERU, ROMANIA, SUDAN AND ZAIRE

WORKING PAPER
CONTAINING A DRAFT ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY
ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS REGARDING
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SYSTEM OF SECURITY ASSURANCES
WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE TREATY

Addendum

Add Yugoslavia as a co-sponsor.
ECUADOR, GHANA, MEXICO, NIGERIA, PERU, ROMANIA, SUDAN AND ZAIRE

WORKING PAPER

CONTAINING A DRAFT ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SYSTEM OF SECURITY ASSURANCES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE TREATY

Addendum

Add Bolivia as a co-sponsor.
REPORT OF COMMITTEE I

1. Pursuant to Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure, the Conference established Committee I as a Main Committee and referred to it, on the basis of a recommendation of the General Committee (NPT/CONF/16), the following items for consideration:

Item 13 Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its Article VIII(3):

A. Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament and international peace and security:
   (1) Articles I, II and III (1, 2 and 4) and Preambular paragraphs 1-5
   (2) Article VI and Preambular paragraphs 8-12
   (3) Article VII

B. Other provisions of the Treaty


Item 14 Role of the Treaty in the promotion of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and of nuclear disarmament and in strengthening international peace and security

A. Acceptance of the Treaty by States

B. Measures aimed at promoting a wider acceptance of the Treaty

2. The Committee met under the Chairmanship of Mr. B.A. Clark (Nigeria). Mr. Raiko Nikolov (Bulgaria) and Mr. Stefano D'Andrea (Italy) served as Vice-Chairmen.

3. Committee I held 14 meetings between 13 and 23 May 1975. The Committee's deliberations are summarized in documents NPT/CONF/C.1/SR.1-14. After an initial general exchange of views and reading of the provisions of Treaty and related matters allocated to the Committee, consideration was given to the documents listed in paragraphs 5 and 6 below. Exchanges of views also took place within informal working groups established by the Committee. (See paragraph 6 below).
4. The Committee had before it the following background documentation:

**NPT/CONF/5**  
Background paper on the basic facts within the framework of the United Nations in connexion with the realization of the purposes of Articles I and II of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

**NPT/CONF/6/Add.2**  
List of deposits of instruments of ratification or accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

**NPT/CONF/7** and **Add.1**  
Background paper on the basic facts within the framework of the United Nations in connexion with the realization of the purposes of Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

**NPT/CONF/8** and **Add.1**  
Background paper on the basic facts within the framework of the United Nations in connexion with the realization of the purposes of the tenth preambular paragraph of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

**NPT/CONF/9** and **Add.1**  
OPANAL's Report on the implementation of the Treaty of Tlateloico and some comments and views with respect to Article VII and other related provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty

**NPT/CONF/10** and **Add.1**  
Background paper on the basic facts within the framework of the United Nations in connexion with the realization of the purposes of Articles IV and V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

**NPT/CONF/15**  
Working paper on the final documents of the NPT Review Conference by Ghana, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Romania, Sudan, Yugoslavia and Zaire

5. The Committee had before it the following documents referred to it by the Conference:

(a) Draft Resolution by Bolivia, Ecuador, Ghana, Honduras, Jamaica, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Yugoslavia and Zaire  
**NPT/CONF/L.1 and Add.1-3**
(b) Working paper containing a draft additional protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons regarding nuclear weapon tests by Bolivia, Ecuador, Ghana, Honduras, Jamaica, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Sudan, Syria, Yugoslavia and Zaire.

(c) Working paper containing a draft additional protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons regarding the implementation of its Article VI by Bolivia, Ghana, Ecuador, Honduras, Jamaica, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Peru, Romania, Sudan, Syria, Yugoslavia and Zaire.

6. The following documents were submitted to the Committee:

(d) Working paper containing a draft additional protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons regarding the establishment of a system of security assurances within the framework of the Treaty by Bolivia, Ecuador, Ghana, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Romania, Sudan, Yugoslavia and Zaire.

(e) Draft resolution by Ghana, Nepal, Nigeria, Romania, Yugoslavia.

(f) Draft resolution on Article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by Iran.

(g) Draft resolution on Article VI by Romania.

(h) Working paper containing formulations for the final declaration (preamble) by German Democratic Republic.

(i) Working paper on draft paragraphs in a final declaration by Australia, Canada, Ireland.

(j) Working paper containing formulations for the final declaration on Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia.

(k) Working paper containing formulations for the final declaration on Article VII and security assurances by Bulgaria, Mongolia and Poland.

(l) Working paper on draft preamble of a final declaration by Italy.
(m) Working paper containing a suggested formulation on the final declaration on participation by Australia, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany

(n) Working paper on Article VI by Sweden

(o) Working paper containing amendments to draft initial paragraphs for the preamble to a general declaration (as contained in documents NPT/CONF/C.1/2, 3, 6 and 6/Corr.1) by Mexico

7. At its 11th meeting on 21 May, the Committee established two open-ended working groups in order to facilitate the consideration of the documents before it. Working Group I was allocated the following documents:

- NPT/CONF/L.1 and Add. 1-2
- NPT/CONF/C.1/2 to 9

Working Group II was allocated the following documents:

- NPT/CONF/17 and Add. 1-3
- NPT/CONF/18 and Add. 1-3
- NPT/CONF/22 and Add. 1
- NPT/CONF/C.1/L.1 to 3

The two Working Groups considered these documents at meetings held on 21 and 22 May, under the Chairmanship of Mr. R. Nikalov (Working Group I) and Mr. S. D’Andrea (Working Group II).

8. The Committee notes that the various views expressed and proposals made are fully reflected in the Summary Records of the Committee and in the documents mentioned in paragraphs 5 and 6 above and considered by the Committee. They form an integral part of the report of the Committee and are forwarded to the Conference for its consideration as such.
GHANA, MEXICO, MOROCCO, NICARAGUA, PERU, ROMANIA, SUDAN,
YUGOSLAVIA AND ZAIRE

DRAFT RESOLUTION

The Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Having reviewed the operation of the Treaty in accordance with the provisions of its article VIII,

Noting that such a review has demonstrated the necessity that effective measures be taken in order to promote the realization of the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty,

Convinced of the desirability that a second conference with the same purposes as the first be convened in five years,

Convinced further that it is necessary that the General Assembly of the United Nations have the opportunity to review every two years the implementation of the resolutions and other instruments adopted by the first Conference;

1. Requests the Secretary-General of the United Nations to include the following item in the provisional agenda of the thirty-first session of the General Assembly: "Implementation of the resolutions and other instruments adopted by the first Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons";

2. Requests also the Secretary-General of the United Nations to include the following item in the provisional agenda of the thirty-third session of the General Assembly: "Implementation of the resolutions and other instruments adopted by the first Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and establishment of a preparatory committee for the second Conference to be held in 1980 for the same purposes as the first".

*/ Re-issued for technical reasons.

GE.75-65472
ADDENDUM

GHANA, MEXICO, MOROCCO, NIGERIA, PERU, ROMANIA, SUDAN, YUGOSLAVIA
AND ZAIRE

DRAFT RESOLUTION

Add Ecuador, Honduras, Jamaica, Lebanon, Liberia, the Philippines
and Thailand as co-sponsors.
Add Nicaragua and Syrian Arab Republic as co-sponsors.
GHANA, MEXICO, MOROCCO, NIGERIA, PERU, ROMANIA, SUDAN, YUGOSLAVIA AND ZAIRE

DRAFT RESOLUTION

Addendum

Add Bolivia as a co-sponsor.
In its resolution 2373 (XXII) of 12 June 1968, the General Assembly of the United Nations expressed inter alia "the hope for the widest possible adherence to the Treaty" on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

That hope was undoubtedly based on the conviction stated in unequivocal terms in the penultimate preambular paragraph of the same resolution in which the Assembly declared itself "convinced" that "an agreement to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons must be followed as soon as possible by effective measures on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament, and that the non-proliferation treaty will contribute to this aim".

To the foregoing one must add a whole series of facts which are equally pertinent in this regard, some of the most outstanding of which are recalled here:

That the Non-Proliferation Treaty itself has reiterated in its preamble the determination, proclaimed since 1963 in the Moscow Treaty, "to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time";

That in four of its very numerous resolutions on this question, the Assembly has "condemned" with the utmost vigour all nuclear weapon tests, in whatever environment they may be conducted;

That the Assembly itself has repeatedly expressed the conviction that, "whatever may be the differences on the question of verification, there is no valid reason for delaying the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban";
That it is also the Assembly, the most representative body of the international community, which has affirmed, in its most recent resolution - 3257 (XXIX) of 3 December 1974 - on this subject, that "the continuance of nuclear weapon testing will intensify the arms race, thus increasing the danger of nuclear war";

That, as the Secretary-General of the United Nations emphatically stated more than three years ago, in his first address to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, on 20 February 1972: "All the technical and scientific aspects of the problem have been so fully explored that only a political decision is now necessary in order to achieve final agreement".

The inevitable conclusion which, in the opinion of the delegations co-sponsoring this working paper, is to be drawn from facts such as those just recalled is that one of the most effective measures for strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty and for promoting universal adherence to it would be that the three nuclear-weapon States, which are not only Parties to the Treaty but act as its depositaries as well, demonstrate their readiness to support with tangible deeds the provisions of the Treaty's preamble regarding the cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

For this reason the sponsoring delegations believe that they are making a positive contribution to the work of the Conference in submitting to it a draft "Additional Protocol I" on this subject. They are also convinced that the entry into force of the proposed instrument would in no way undermine the security of the depositary States, since the extent of the lead in nuclear war technology and the enormity of the nuclear arsenals of the USSR and the United States of America are such that, even if they were to suspend all nuclear weapon tests for half a century, it is absolutely certain that they would continue to maintain an indisputable superiority. As if this were not sufficient, the Treaty's provisions regarding withdrawal, which would apply as well to the Protocol, would give each of the Parties the right to withdraw from the Protocol, "in exercising its national sovereignty", should any of them reach the conclusion that, at a given moment, the supreme interests of its country require it.

On the other hand, it is equally certain that a Protocol such as the one proposed would constitute an incentive of particular value in order to prompt the other nuclear-weapon States to commit themselves to put an end to all of their tests with such weapons.

The text of the draft Protocol which, basing themselves on the foregoing considerations, the sponsoring delegations submit to the Conference is the following:
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The Depositary Governments of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, referred to in this Protocol as "the Treaty",

Conscious that universal, or at least the widest possible, adherence to the Treaty will contribute to avoid an increase in the danger of nuclear war,

Convinced that one of the most effective procedures for attaining such adherence would be the implementation of the provisions of the Preamble of the Treaty reiterating the determination, proclaimed since 1963 in the Moscow Treaty, to achieve "the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time",

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1. They undertake to decree the suspension of all their underground nuclear weapon tests for a period of ten years, as soon as the number of Parties to the Treaty reaches one hundred.

Article 2. They undertake also to extend by three years the moratorium contemplated in the preceding article, each time that five additional States become Parties to the Treaty.

Article 3. They undertake to transform the moratorium into a permanent cessation of all nuclear weapon tests, through the conclusion of a multilateral treaty for that purpose, as soon as the other nuclear weapon States indicate their willingness to become parties to said treaty.

Article 4. This Protocol will be of the same duration as the Treaty. Nevertheless the provisions of the latter's Article X regarding withdrawal shall apply to it.

Article 5. This Protocol shall be subject to ratification by the three Depositary States of the Treaty to which it is open for signature and shall enter into force on the date that the instruments of ratification of two of them are received by the Secretary-General of the United Nations who shall be the depositary of the Protocol.
ADDENDUM

GHANA, MEXICO, MOROCCO, NIGERIA, PERU, ROMANIA, SUDAN, YUGOSLAVIA AND ZAIRE

Working paper containing a draft additional protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons regarding nuclear weapon tests

Add Ecuador, Honduras, Jamaica, Lebanon, Liberia and the Philippines as sponsors.
ADDENDUM

GHANA, MEXICO, MOROCCO, NIGERIA, PPRU, ROMANIA, SUDAN, YUGOSLAVIA AND ZAIRE

Working paper containing a draft additional protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons regarding nuclear weapon tests

Add Nepal as a co-sponsor.
GHANA, MEXICO, MOROCCO, NIGERIA, PERU, ROMANIA, SUDAN, YUGOSLAVIA AND ZAIRE

Working paper containing a draft additional protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons regarding nuclear weapon tests

Addendum

Add Nicaragua and Syrian Arab Republic as co-sponsors.
GHANA, MEXICO, MOROCCO, NIGERIA, PERU, RUSSIAN, SUDAN, YUGOSLAVIA AND ZAIRE

Working paper containing a draft additional protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons regarding nuclear weapon tests

Addendum

Add Bolivia as a co-sponsor.
GHANA, MEXICO, MOROCCO, NIGERIA, PERU, ROMANIA, SUDAN, YUGOSLAVIA AND ZAIRE

WORKING PAPER
CONTAINING A DRAFT ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS REGARDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS ARTICLE VI

Introductory note
In its resolution 2373 (XXII) of 12 June 1968, the General Assembly of the United Nations expressed inter alia "the hope for the widest possible adherence to the Treaty" on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

That hope was undoubtedly based on the conviction stated in unequivocal terms in the penultimate preambular paragraph of the same resolution in which the Assembly declared itself "convinced" that "an agreement to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons must be followed as soon as possible by effective measures on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament, and that the non-proliferation treaty will contribute to this aim".

It was no doubt for this same reason that the Treaty itself contains an article - article VI - aimed at reaffirming the Assembly's conviction referred to by providing that:

"Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."

If, as set forth in the Treaty's article VIII, the basic objective of this Conference is to review how 'the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty' have been, and are being, realized, the inevitable conclusions to be drawn from any objective analysis of reality are, with regard to the above-mentioned article, not only extremely disappointing but truly alarming. The nuclear arms race, far from ceasing as contemplated in the Treaty's article VI, has been stepped up in such a manner that it has given rise to the situation known as overkill. Implicit in such a situation is the constant threat of a nuclear holocaust, as shown by the two grave crises which in 1962 and 1973 gave rise to a general alert.

* Re-issued for technical reasons.

GE.75-65481
The imminence of this danger appears to have begun to find its way even in the highest political levels. Thus during the last session of the General Assembly, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of one of the two most powerful nuclear-weapon States stated emphatically:

"Stable and lasting peace is incompatible with the arms race. They are antipodes. One cannot seriously think of eliminating the threat of war, while at the same time increasing military budgets and endlessly building up armaments ... The supreme interests not only of the peoples of the Soviet Union and the United States, but also of the peoples of the whole world require that the Soviet Union and the United States, possessing the colossal might of nuclear weapons, should make every effort to achieve appropriate understandings and agreements."

To date the only results which the Treaty's depositary States can point to regarding their commitment under article VI are the meagre ones obtained in the bilateral negotiations on the limitation of strategic nuclear-weapon systems (SALT) which have been going on for some years. If in the international sphere those negotiations have had some beneficial consequences of a political and psychological nature, their very modest scope as disarmament measures has in practice appeared to be of no account. This has prompted the Assembly to urge the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States repeatedly, as it did in its latest resolution in this regard—resolution 3261 C (XXIX) of 9 December 1974—to broaden the scope and accelerate the pace of their negotiations, stressing anew the necessity and urgency of reaching agreement on important qualitative limitations and substantial reductions of their strategic nuclear-weapon systems as a positive step towards nuclear disarmament.

In the light of the foregoing, it is axiomatic that one of the most effective measures for strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty and for promoting universal adherence to it would be that the two States possessing by far the largest nuclear arsenals in existence demonstrate their readiness to support with tangible deeds the provisions of the Treaty's article VI relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament.

For this reason the sponsoring delegations believe that they are making a positive contribution to the work of the Conference in submitting to it a draft "Additional Protocol II" on this subject. They are also convinced that the entry into force of the proposed instrument could not undermine the security of those two depositary States. On the one hand, the reductions suggested would in no way affect the system on which are based the proportions that they freely accepted in the Vladivostok accords. On the other hand, the extent of their lead in nuclear war technology and the enormity of their nuclear arsenals are such that, even after they had carried out the parity reductions called for in the Additional Protocol, the number of nuclear weapons and of
delivery vehicles; which each one would maintain would still be much superior to that which might be at the disposal of all of the other nuclear-weapon States taken together. As if this were not sufficient, the Treaty's provisions regarding withdrawal, which would apply as well to the Protocol, would give each of the Parties the right to withdraw from the Protocol, in exercising its national sovereignty", should either of them reach the conclusion that, at a given moment, the supreme interests of its country require it. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that a Protocol such as the one proposed would constitute an incentive of particular value in order to prompt the other nuclear-weapon States to adopt measures for reductions similar to those set forth in it.

The text of the draft Protocol which, basing themselves on the foregoing considerations, the sponsoring delegations submit to the Conference is the following:

**ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS**

The Depositary Governments of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons - referred to in this Protocol as "the Treaty" - which participate in the bilateral negotiations on the limitation of strategic nuclear-weapon systems (SALT),

Conscious that universal, or at least the widest possible, adherence to the Treaty will contribute to avoid an increase in the danger of nuclear war,

Convinced that one of the most effective procedures for attaining such adherence would be the parallel achievement of tangible results relating to nuclear disarmament,

Bearing in mind that in the accords reached at Vladivostok in November of 1974 both Governments agreed that each side would be entitled to have an aggregate maximum of 2,400 intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers, and that only 1,320 of the ballistic missiles may be equipped with multiple independently targetable warheads (MIRV's),

Have agreed as follows:

**Article 1.** They solemnly reaffirm the obligations undertaken in article VI of the Treaty to pursue "negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament".

**Article 2.** They undertake, as soon as the number of Parties to the Treaty has reached one hundred:

(a) To reduce by fifty per cent the ceiling of 2,400 nuclear strategic delivery vehicles contemplated for each side under the Vladivostok accords;

(b) To reduce likewise by fifty per cent the ceiling of 1,320 strategic ballistic missiles which, under those accords, each side may equip with multiple independently targetable warheads (MIRV's).
Article 3. They also undertake, once such reductions have been carried out, to reduce by ten per cent the ceilings of 1,200 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and of 660 strategic ballistic missiles that may be equipped with multiple independently targetable warheads (MIRV's), each time that ten additional States become Parties to the Treaty.

Article 4. This Protocol will be of the same duration as the Treaty. Nevertheless the provisions of the latter's article X regarding withdrawal shall apply to it.

Article 5. This Protocol shall be subject to ratification by the two States to which it is open for signature and shall enter into force on the date both instruments of ratification have been received by the Secretary-General of the United Nations who shall be the depositary of the Protocol.
ADDENDUM

GHANA, MEXICO, MOROCCO, NIGERIA, PERU, ROMANIA, SUDAN, YUGOSLAVIA AND ZAIRE

Working paper containing a draft additional protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons regarding the implementation of its article VI

Add Ecuador, Honduras, Jamaica, Lebanon and Liberia as co-sponsors.

GE.75-65613
ADDENDUM

GHANA, MÉXICO, MOROCCO, NIGERIA, PERU, ROMANIA, SUDAN, YUGOSLAVIA AND ZAIRE

Working paper containing a draft additional protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons regarding the implementation of its article VI

Add Bolivia and Nepal as co-sponsors.
GHANA, MEXICO, MOROCCO, NIGERIA, PERU, ROMANIA, SUDAN, YUGOSLAVIA
AND ZAIRE

Working paper containing a draft additional protocol to the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
regarding the implementation of its article VI

Addendum

Add Nicaragua and Syrian Arab Republic as co-sponsors.
ECUADOR, GHANA, MEXICO, NIGERIA, PERU, ROMANIA, SUDAN AND ZAIRE

WORKING PAPER
CONTAINING A DRAFT ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY
ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS REGARDING
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SYSTEM OF SECURITY ASSURANCES
WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE TREATY

Introductory note

It is generally accepted that the non-nuclear-weapon States, by renouncing
to acquire such weapons in accordance with Articles II and III of the Treaty, have
the right to have their independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty
guaranteed against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

On the other hand, the acceleration of the arms race and the accumulation of
a great amount of arms during the period since the entry into force of the Treaty
have led to the increase of the degree of insecurity in the world.

Resolution 255 (1968) of the Security Council relates to the possible action
to be taken by the Security Council only when a nuclear attack has occurred. It
does not offer, therefore, appropriate assurances for the prevention of the use
or of the threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Finally, it should be borne in mind, in connexion with this matter, that the
United Nations General Assembly in its Declaration of 24 November 1961 solemnly
proclaimed that the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is contrary to the
rules of international law and to the laws of humanity.

For the above reasons the sponsoring delegations believe that they are making
a positive contribution to the work of the Conference in submitting to it the
following draft:

GE.75-65567
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL III TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The Depositary Governments of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, referred to in this Protocol as "The Treaty",

Recalling that, according to the Charter of the United Nations, the States have the obligation to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations,

Taking into account resolution 3261 (XXIX) which considered inter alia that it is imperative for the international community to devise effective measures in order to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States,

Recognizing that the effectiveness of the Treaty, its viability and universality depend, to a great extent, on its balanced character and on the existence of appropriate assurances for the States which have consented, by virtue of the Treaty, to renounce acquiring or manufacturing nuclear weapons,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1. They solemnly undertake

a) never and under no circumstances to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty whose territories are completely free from nuclear weapons, and,

b) to refrain from first use of nuclear weapons against any other non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty.

Article 2. They undertake to encourage negotiations initiated by any group of States Parties to the Treaty or others to establish nuclear weapon free zones in their respective territories or regions, and to respect the statute of nuclear weapon free zones established.

Article 3. In the event a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty becomes a victim of an attack with nuclear weapons or of a threat with the use of such weapons, the States Parties to this Protocol, at the request of the victim of such threat or attack, undertake to provide it immediate assistance without prejudice to their obligations under the United Nations Charter.
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL III TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The Depositary Governments of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, referred to in this Protocol as "The Treaty",

Recalling that, according to the Charter of the United Nations, the States have the obligation to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations,

Taking into account resolution 3261 (XXIX) which considered inter alia that it is imperative for the international community to devise effective measures in order to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States,

Recognizing that the effectiveness of the Treaty, its viability and universality depend, to a great extent, on its balanced character and on the existence of appropriate assurances for the States which have consented, by virtue of the Treaty, to renounce acquiring or manufacturing nuclear weapons,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1. They solemnly undertake

a) never and under no circumstances to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty whose territories are completely free from nuclear weapons, and,

b) to refrain from first use of nuclear weapons against any other non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty.

Article 2. They undertake to encourage negotiations initiated by any group of States Parties to the Treaty or others to establish nuclear weapon free zones in their respective territories or regions, and to respect the statute of nuclear weapon free zones established.

Article 3. In the event a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty becomes a victim of an attack with nuclear weapons or of a threat with the use of such weapons, the States Parties to this Protocol, at the request of the victim of such threat or attack, undertake to provide to it immediate assistance without prejudice to their obligations under the United Nations Charter.
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL III TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The Depositary Governments of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, referred to in this Protocol as "The Treaty",

Recalling that, according to the Charter of the United Nations, the States have the obligation to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations,

Taking into account resolution 3261 C (XXIX) which considered inter alia that it is imperative for the international community to devise effective measures in order to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States,

Recognizing that the effectiveness of the Treaty, its viability and universality depend, to a great extent, on its balanced character and on the existence of appropriate assurances for the States which have consented, by virtue of the Treaty, to renounce acquiring or manufacturing nuclear weapons,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1. They solemnly undertake
a) never and under no circumstances to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty whose territories are completely free from nuclear weapons, and,
b) to refrain from first use of nuclear weapons against any other non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty.

Article 2. They undertake to encourage negotiations initiated by any group of States Parties to the Treaty or others to establish nuclear weapon free zones in their respective territories or regions, and to respect the statute of nuclear weapon free zones established.

Article 3. In the event a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty becomes a victim of an attack with nuclear weapons or of a threat with the use of such weapons, the States Parties to this Protocol, at the request of the victim of such threat or attack, undertake to provide to it immediate assistance without prejudice to their obligations under the United Nations Charter.
Article 4. This Protocol will be of the same duration as the Treaty. Nevertheless, the provisions of the latter's Article X regarding withdrawal shall apply to it.

Article 5. This Protocol shall be subject to ratification by the three Depositary States of the Treaty to which it is open for signature and shall enter into force on the date that the instruments of ratification of two of them are received by the Secretary-General of the United Nations who shall be the depositary of the Protocol.
ECUADOR, GHANA, MEXICO, NIGERIA, PERU, ROMANIA, SUDAN AND ZAIRE

WORKING PAPER
CONTAINING A DRAFT ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY
ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS REGARDING
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SYSTEM OF SECURITY ASSURANCES
WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE TREATY

Addendum

Add Yugoslavia as a co-sponsor.
ECUADOR, GHANA, MEXICO, NIGERIA, PERU, ROMANIA, SUDAN AND ZAIRE

WORKING PAPER

CONTAINING A DRAFT ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SYSTEM OF SECURITY ASSURANCES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE TREATY

Addendum

Add Bolivia as a co-sponsor.
GHANA, NEPAL, NIGERIA, ROMANIA, YUGOSLAVIA

Draft Resolution

The Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Recalling General Assembly resolution 2661 A (XXV) of 1970 by which it urged the Governments of nuclear-weapon Powers to bring about an immediate halt in the nuclear arms race and to cease all testing as well as deployment of offensive and defensive nuclear-weapon systems,

Taking into account that peace and security in the world cannot be maintained unless an immediate stop is put to the nuclear arms race followed by nuclear disarmament,

Convinced that only the nuclear-weapon States can stop vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons which would substantially contribute towards preventing their horizontal proliferation as well,

Noting with satisfaction that the non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty have been faithfully abiding by the spirit and letter of Articles II and III of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Deeply convinced that the halting of nuclear arms race and the undertaking of further measures of nuclear disarmament would significantly enhance the creation of essential conditions for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones,

1. Invites the nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty to initiate, as soon as possible but not later than the end of 1976, negotiations on the conclusion of a treaty on the withdrawal from the territories of the non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty of all nuclear-weapon delivery systems, especially tactical nuclear weapons;

2. Requests the nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty to immediately discontinue further deployment of all types of tactical and other nuclear-weapon-delivery systems within the territories of the non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and to simultaneously commence with their gradual withdrawal pending the entry into force of the aforementioned treaty;

3. Invites also the non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on whose territories, waterways or air space the nuclear-weapon delivery systems are deployed not to allow the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against other non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty.

GE 75-65665
Draft resolution on Article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Considering that article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons stresses the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories;

Recognizing that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear weapon-free zones in appropriate regions of the world on the initiative of States directly concerned represent a most effective means to curb the spread of nuclear weapons;

Recognizing in this connexion the particular value of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and its Additional Protocols;


Recalling resolution 5253 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974 of the United Nations General Assembly on the Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in the region of the Middle East;

Recalling resolution 5265 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974 of the United Nations on the Declaration and Establishment of a Nuclear-Free Zone in South Asia;

Recalling further the United Nations General Assembly resolution 3261 F (XXIX) of 9 December 1974 in which the Assembly decided to undertake a comprehensive study of the question of nuclear weapon-free zones in all its aspects;

Noting that in implementation of this decision a group of governmental experts has been set up to carry out this study under the auspices of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament,

1. Invites the Parties to the Treaty and in particular the nuclear weapon States to co-operate with the States in appropriate regions of the world which decide to establish nuclear weapon-free zones, and invites all States to take action in accordance with Article I of the Treaty, as appropriate.
nuclear weapon-free zones, under effective conditions and an adequate system of safeguards, in order to assure the total absence of such weapons in their respective territories,

2. **Urges** the nuclear weapon States to undertake a solemn obligation never to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against countries which have become Parties to and are fully bound by the provisions of such regional arrangements.
Draft resolution on Article VI submitted by Romania

THE REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Recalling the obligations assumed by each of the Parties to the Treaty under its Article VI, to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recalling further General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII) of 12 June 1968 by which it expressed, inter alia, the conviction "that an agreement to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons must be followed as soon as possible by effective measures on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament" and it requested the then existing Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and the Nuclear-Weapon States urgently to pursue negotiations to that end,

Deeply concerned that during the period since the entry into force of the Treaty the nuclear arms race has, nevertheless, continued at an accelerated pace, resulting in accumulation of a great amount of nuclear weapons in the world,

Reaffirming the role of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in the negotiation of those effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament and of a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, which have been referred to in Article VI of the Treaty,

Mindful of the importance of the co-operation of governments and all media in the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty,

1. Requests all Governments Party to the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which are members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, particularly the Depositary Governments, to bring their decisive contribution, in conformity with the obligations assumed by them under Article VI of the Treaty, to developing within the Conference the necessary conditions which would enable it to effectively deal with the measures provided in Article VI of the Treaty as follows:
(a) to offer the disarmament negotiations the required perspective in achieving the aims of Article VI of the Treaty most urgently, by a comprehensive approach to the matters relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

(b) to continuously review the operation and the methods of work of the Conference to assure that the negotiations are conducted in the most efficient manner, fully compatible with the principles of equality and the security and the interests of all States;

2. Considers it necessary that a system of retrieval and distribution as well as of assessment and analysis of information on armaments and disarmament issues be established, within the United Nations in order to keep properly informed all governments as well as the international public opinion of the progress achieved in the realization of the provisions of Article VI of the Treaty.
Working Paper Containing Formulations for the Final Declarations (Preamble) Submitted by German Democratic Republic

The States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons, who met in Genova in May 1975

- Having reviewed the operation of the Treaty to ensure that its purposes and provisions are being realized;
- Considering that the trend towards détente in relations between States provides a favourable climate within which more significant progress towards arms limitation and disarmament should be possible;
- Reaffirming the important role of the Treaty in limiting nuclear weapons and averting the danger of nuclear war, in creating the conditions necessary for the cessation of nuclear arms race, for effective measures in the direction of general complete disarmament under strict and effective international control and for facilitating co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and also in strengthening peace and international security and furthering the process of international détente;
- Noting the increasing role of the nuclear technology and the growing responsibilities of the Parties to contribute to the further development of the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in all States, especially in developing countries,
- Noting the necessity that the international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy must be carried out in a manner which will prevent nuclear proliferation;
- Reaffirming that the security of all States would be best ensured through universal adherence to the Treaty;
- Reaffirming their strong support for the Treaty, their continued dedication to its principles and objectives, and their commitment to implement fully and more effectively its provisions;

declare as follows

UN.75-65640
Working Paper submitted by Australia, Canada and Ireland

Draft paragraphs in a final declaration

PREAMBLE

The States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, having met in Geneva in May 1975 in accordance with the Treaty to review the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized,

- Recognizing the continuing importance of the main objectives of the Treaty, namely the avoidance of nuclear proliferation, the pursuit of efforts towards nuclear, as well as general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control and the fullest and widest access to equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful use of nuclear energy,

- Recognizing that the danger of nuclear war remains a major threat to the survival of mankind; and having therefore considered the need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

- Convinced that the prevention of any further proliferation of nuclear explosives capability and the control and reduction of nuclear weapons, remain vital elements in efforts to avoid nuclear war,

- Considering that the trend towards détente in relations between States provides a favourable climate within which more significant progress towards arms control and disarmament and the control of nuclear proliferation should be possible,

- Noting the increasing role that nuclear energy is expected to play in meeting the world's energy needs and the responsibilities of the Parties to contribute to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in developing countries,

- Recognizing that the accelerated spread and development of peaceful applications of nuclear energy can lower the economic and technological barriers against nuclear proliferation,
Believing that international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the international exchange of nuclear materials and technology for peaceful purposes can best be promoted in a manner consistent with international security by the widest possible application of the Treaty;

- Recognizing that in the pursuit of their common objective of a more secure world, there is a need to balance and reconcile the interests of all States Parties to the Treaty;

- Reaffirming the belief that the security of all States would be best ensured through universal adherence to the Treaty;

declare as follows:

I. PURPOSES

The States Parties to the Treaty reaffirm their strong common interest in averting the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. They reaffirm their strong support for the Treaty, their continued dedication to its principles and objectives, and their commitment to implement fully and more effectively its provisions.

They reaffirm the vital role of the Treaty in international efforts

- to avert further proliferation of nuclear weapons,

- to achieve the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament, and

- to promote co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

II. ARTICLES I AND II

The review undertaken by the Conference confirms that the obligations undertaken under Articles I and II of the Treaty have been faithfully observed by all Parties. The Conference is convinced that the continued strict observance of these Articles remains central to the shared objective of averting the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Working Paper Containing Formulations for the
Final Declaration on Article VI of the NPT
submitted by Czechoslovakia and Hungary

1. The Conference welcomes various agreements on arms limitation and disarmament, both multilateral and bilateral, which have been concluded over the last few years and acknowledges that these international instruments represent steps in the right direction contributing to the implementation of Article VI.

2. In particular, the Conference welcomes the progress achieved in recent years in negotiations on the limitations of strategic nuclear armaments.

3. The Conference notes, however, that the arms race, unprecedented in its scope, is still going on, and that, therefore, resolute efforts are still required to implement the provisions of Article VI.

4. The Conference urges all States to intensify, without delay, their concerted and concentrated efforts for effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date. The Conference considers it important that specific agreements on the reduction of military preparations by States should be elaborated.

5. The Conference calls for the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. It urges the nuclear-weapon States to undertake, at the earliest possible date, negotiations directed towards the conclusion of an appropriate international agreement for this purpose. It believes that in the meantime, till the conclusion of such an agreement, efforts will be made to limit the number of underground nuclear weapon tests to a minimum.

6. The Conference urges speedy conclusion of international agreements for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and of utilizing weather and environment modifications for military and other hostile purposes.

GE.75-65653
7. The Conference calls for the implementation of the General Assembly resolution on the reduction of military budgets by the permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and on the transfer of a part of these savings for the needs of economic development of developing countries.

8. The Conference notes that solutions to problems of disarmament require the support and co-operation of all States. It calls for the convening of the World Disarmament Conference at an early date.
Working Paper Containing Formulations for the Final Declaration on Article VI of the NPT submitted by Czechoslovakia and Hungary

Addendum

Add Mongolia as a co-sponsor.
Working Paper Containing Formulations for the Final Declaration on Article VII and Security Assurances Submitted by the Delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria and Poland

1. The Conference reaffirms the importance for ensuring the security of the Non-Nuclear Weapon States Parties to the Treaty of the United Nations Security Council resolution 255 (1968) and the Statements of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, approved by the said Resolution, about their intention to provide or support immediate assistance in accordance with the United Nations Charter to any Non-Nuclear Weapon State Party to the Treaty that is a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.

2. The Conference would welcome the adoption by the United Nations Security Council of appropriate measures binding upon all States for the full implementation of General Assembly resolution 2936 (XXVII) on renunciation of the use or threat of force in international relations and on prohibition for all time of the use of nuclear weapons.

3. The Conference is of the opinion that the security of non-nuclear weapon States would be strengthened by the creation of nuclear free zones in appropriate regions of the world under the necessary effective conditions.
Working Paper Containing Formulations for the Final Declaration on Article VII and Security Assurances Submitted by the Delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria and Poland

Addendum

Add Mongolia as a co-sponsor.
The States Parties to the Treaty on the non-Proliferation of Nuclear weapons

(1) Having met in Geneva in May 1975 in accordance with Article VIII para. 3 of the Treaty,

(2) Having reviewed the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble of the Treaty are being realized,

(3) Recognizing the continuing importance of the main objectives of the Treaty, namely the prevention of nuclear proliferation, the pursuit of efforts towards nuclear as well as general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, the fullest and widest access to equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful use of nuclear energy,

(4) Recognizing that the danger of nuclear warfare remains a grave threat to the survival of mankind, that a major factor of such a danger is the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and that the control and reduction of the development production and deployment of nuclear weapons remain vital elements in efforts to avert nuclear warfare,

(5) Considering that the trend towards detente in relations between States provides a favourable climate within which more significant progress towards arms control and disarmament and the control of nuclear proliferation should be possible,

(6) Recognizing the continuing necessity of full co-operation among the Parties to the Treaty in the enforcement of International Atomic Energy Safeguards on peaceful nuclear activity as well as the necessity of intensifying efforts to improve safeguards technique, instrumentation and implementation,
(7) Reaffirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty,

(8) Reaffirming its conviction that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

(9) Noting the increasing role that nuclear energy is expected to play in meeting the world's energy needs and the responsibilities of the Parties to contribute to the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes in all States, especially in developing countries,

(10) Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the Treaty to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of nuclear arms race, the discontinuance of nuclear test explosions of nuclear weapons, the undertaking of effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament as a first step towards the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and means of delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

(11) Recognizing that in the pursuit of their common objective of a more secure world, there is a need to balance and reconcile the interests of all States Parties to the Treaty,

(12) Reaffirming the belief that the security of all States would be best ensured through universal adherence to the Treaty; declare as follows
The States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

(1) Having met in Geneva in May 1975 in accordance with Article VII para. 3 of the Treaty,

(2) Having reviewed the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble of the Treaty are being realized,

(3) Recognizing the continuing importance of the main objectives of the Treaty, namely the prevention of nuclear proliferation, the pursuit of efforts towards nuclear as well as general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, the fullest and widest access to equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful use of nuclear energy,

(4) Recognizing that the danger of nuclear warfare remains a grave threat to the survival of mankind, that a major factor of such a danger is the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and that the control and reduction of the development, production and deployment of nuclear weapons remain vital elements in efforts to avert nuclear warfare,

(5) Considering that the trend towards detente in relations between States provides a favourable climate within which more significant progress towards arms control and disarmament and the control of nuclear proliferation should be possible,

(6) Recognizing the continuing necessity of full co-operation among the Parties to the Treaty in the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities as well as the necessity of intensifying efforts to improve safeguards techniques, instrumentation and implementation,
(7) Reaffirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty,

(8) Reaffirming its conviction that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

(9) Noting the increasing role that nuclear energy is expected to play in meeting the world's energy needs and the responsibilities of the Parties to contribute to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in all States, especially in developing countries,

(10) Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the Treaty to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race, the discontinuance of test explosions of nuclear weapons, the undertaking of effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament as a first step towards the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and means of delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

(11) Recognizing that in the pursuit of their common objective of a more secure world, there is a need to balance and reconcile the interests of all States Parties to the Treaty,

(12) Reaffirming the belief that the security of all States would be best ensured through universal adherence to the Treaty;

declare as follows
The five years that have passed since the entry into force of the Treaty have demonstrated its wide international acceptance. The Conference welcomes the recent progress towards achieving wider adherence. An impressive majority of States of the world have become parties to the Treaty. The Conference, however, notes with concern that, for varying reasons, a number of States, both nuclear and non-nuclear, have hitherto remained outside the Treaty.

The Conference reaffirms its belief that the security of all States would be best ensured through universal adherence to the Treaty. It calls on all States which are not already party to the Treaty to consider carefully whether their own national interest, as well as the interest of the security of their region, would not be best served by early accession to or ratification of the Treaty.
(1) The Conference recalls the provisions of Article VI of the Treaty under which all Parties undertook to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

While welcoming the various agreements on arms control and disarmament elaborated over the last few years, the Conference expresses its grave concern that the nuclear arms race is continuing and even accelerating. Immediate and resolute efforts are required, in particular by the Nuclear Weapon States Parties, to achieve an early implementation of Article VI of the Treaty.

(2) The Conference expresses the view that the conclusion of a Treaty banning all underground nuclear weapon test explosions for all time is an important measure to halt the nuclear arms race. Consequently it urges the Nuclear Weapon States to enter into immediate negotiations directed towards the conclusion of such an agreement. It further calls on these States, as an interim measure, to enter into an agreement to halt, for a specified time, all underground nuclear weapons tests.

(3) The Conference urges the Nuclear Weapon States Parties to the negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms to conclude before the end of 1975 the second-stage agreement that was outlined by their leaders in November 1974. The Conference further urges these States to enter immediately thereafter into negotiations to seek agreement on reductions in the levels of their strategic nuclear forces.

(4) The Conference expresses the hope that the CND will continue to work forcefully on the conclusion of agreements on subjects presently on its agenda as steps towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

(5) The Conference notes that General Assembly of the United Nations and the 1980 Second Review Conference will provide opportunities to review the results of efforts undertaken to reach a treaty banning underground nuclear weapons tests and agreements on the reduction of nuclear armaments in accordance with Article VI of the Treaty.
The States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which met at Geneva in May 1975 in order to review the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that its purposes and provisions are being realized,

Firmly convinced that, in order to strengthen the Treaty, it is necessary to promote universal accession thereto,

Convinced further that, in order to achieve that aim, it is essential that the Depositary States should see to it that the Treaty maintains an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations for nuclear and non-nuclear Powers,

Noting that such a balance necessarily entails the prohibition of any proliferation of nuclear weapons, whether horizontal or vertical,

Having established that all Parties have faithfully discharged the obligations which they assumed under articles I and II of the Treaty, and which are designed to prevent the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons,

Exploring the fact that the provisions of the tenth preambular paragraph and of article VI of the Treaty, designed to bring about the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and nuclear disarmament, have unfortunately failed to produce similar positive results,

Recognizing that this situation lays upon all States Parties to the Treaty and, in particular, the States Depositaries of the Treaty a duty to strive without delay for the adoption of tangible and effective measures to attain these objectives,

Considering that the trend towards détente in relations between States is creating a favourable climate in which to carry out this most important task,
REPORT OF COMMITTEE I

Corrigendum

Page 1, paragraph 3, last line:
"(See paragraph 6 below)" should read "(See paragraph 7 below)"

Page 4, paragraph 7, the following document numbers of the addenda should read:

NPT/CONF/17 and Add.1-4
NPT/CONF/22 and Add.1-2

Page 4, paragraph 7, penultimate line, read: "Mr. N. Nikolov".

GE.75-65874
REPORT OF COMMITTEE II

Establishment and Terms of Reference

1. Under Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure of the Conference, the Conference established Committee II as one of its two Main Committees and referred to it, upon recommendation of the General Committee, the following item for initial consideration:

   Item 13 Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its Article VIII (5):
   B. Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to peaceful applications of nuclear energy:
      (1) Article III and Article IV
      (2) Article V and Preambular paragraphs 6 and 7

In allocating this item to the Committee, the Conference decided that "In connexion with the allocation of item 13 B (1) to Committee II, discussion on Article III should not be limited to paragraph 3, as in the provisional agenda. With regard to the allocation of item 14 B to Committee I, Committee II should be free to discuss also this sub-item." 1/

Officers of the Committee

2. The Conference elected Mr. W.H. Barton (Canada) as the Committee's Chairman; Mr. A. Hidaytalla (Sudan) and Mr. Swasti Srisukh (Thailand) served as Vice-Chairmen of the Committee.

Documents before the Committee

   Background Documentation

3. The Committee had before it the following background documentation:

Article III

NPT/CONF/6/Rev.1 and Add.2 Analytical and technical report on the IAEA's activities under Article III of NPT

Article IV

NPT/CONF/10 and Add.1 Background paper on the basic facts within the framework of the United Nations in connexion with the realization of the purposes of Articles IV and V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF/11 and Add.1 Analytical and technical report on the IAEA's activities under Article IV of the NPT

1/ See NPT/CONF/16, para. VII.

GE.75-65865
Article V

NPT/CONF/10 and Add.l

Background paper on the basic facts within the framework of the United Nations in connexion with the realization of the purposes of Articles IV and V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF/12, Add.l and Corr.l

Analytical and technical report on the IAEA's activities under Article V of NPT

NPT/CONF/13

Letter dated 18 December 1974 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Chairman of the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

NPT/CONF/14

Letter dated 5 February 1975 from the Head of the Delegation of Mexico to the Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons addressed to the Chairman of the third session of the Preparatory Committee

Suggested Formulations and Draft Resolutions

4. The following documents were introduced in the Committee:

(a) Draft Resolution on Article V by Ghana, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Romania and Yugoslavia

(b) Draft Resolution on Article IV by Mexico, Nigeria and Philippines

(c) Draft Resolution on Article IV by Romania

(d) Working paper by the German Democratic Republic on the Preamble of the final declaration

(e) Working paper by Italy on the Preamble of the final declaration

(f) Suggested formulations in the final declaration on Article III by Belgium, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic and the Netherlands

(g) Suggested formulations in the final declaration on Article III by the Philippines

2/ Syria subsequently indicated that it wished to co-sponsor this draft resolution.

3/ The Republic of Korea subsequently indicated that it wished to co-sponsor this draft resolution.

4/ This paper is dealt with in the Report of Committee I.
(h) Suggested formulations in the final declaration on the physical protection of nuclear materials by the Federal Republic of Germany and Poland

(i) Suggested formulations in the final declaration on Article IV by Bulgaria, Canada and the German Democratic Republic

(j) Suggested formulations in the final declaration on Article V by Australia, Austria, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, Mongolia, Poland and the United Kingdom

(k) Amendment by Sweden to the formulations suggested by Australia, Austria, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, Mongolia, Poland and the United Kingdom in the final declaration on Article V

(l) Suggested formulation in the final declaration on Article IV by Greece, Hungary and the United States

(m) Suggested formulations in the final declaration on Article III(2) by Canada, Finland and the Netherlands

The Committee's Discussion

5. The Committee held 16 meetings from 12 May to 23 May 1975; its discussions are summarized in documents NPT/CONF/C.II/5, NPT/CONF/C.II/7 and NPT/CONF/C.II/9. After an initial general discussion of the agenda items referred to it, the Committee proceeded to a detailed consideration of the proposals and papers before it; extensive exchanges of views took place also within informal working groups. The Committee notes that the various views expressed and proposals made are fully reflected in the Summary Records of the Committee and in the documents submitted in and considered by the Committee. They form an integral part of the report of the Committee and are forwarded to the Conference for its consideration as such.5/

5/ The documents submitted are attached except for documents NPT/CONF/C.II/1, NPT/CONF/C.II/2 and Corr.1 which are dealt with in the report of Committee I. Editorial changes proposed during the Committee's discussions have been incorporated in the attached versions of documents NPT/CONF/C.II/3, 5, 8 and 10. In connexion with the changes in document NPT/CONF/C.II/8, document NPT/CONF/C.II/9 was withdrawn by its sponsor.
GHANA, MEXICO, NIGERIA, PERU, PHILIPPINES, ROMANIA AND YUGOSLAVIA

draft resolution

The Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Reaffirming the provisions of article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, according to which non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain the "potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions" under the favourable conditions described therein,

Recalling that the same article provides for the obtainment of such benefits "pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements" and that "negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force",

Taking into account the authoritative interpretation which, at the 1577th meeting of the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, held on 31 May 1968, the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America gave to the above-mentioned provisions, as evidenced in Conference document NPT/CONF/14 of 24 February 1975,

Noting that, although five years have elapsed since the Treaty entered into force, the pertinent negotiations have yet to begin,

Urges the Depositary Governments of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to initiate immediate consultations with all of the other States Party to the Treaty in order to reach agreement on the most appropriate place and date for holding a meeting of the Parties in order to conclude the basic special international agreement contemplated in article V of that Treaty.
Draft resolution proposed by Mexico, Nigeria and the Philippines

The Review Conference of the States Parties to the NPT,

CONVINCED of the common responsibilities of Parties to the Treaty for the effective implementation of the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear energy, including any technological by-products which may be derived from the development of nuclear explosive devices, shall be made available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty,

CONVINCED FURTHER that, in furtherance of the effective implementation of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty should participate in the fullest possible exchange of materials, equipment and scientific and technological information, and to contribute, through international co-operation to the further development of the application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

CONSCIOUS of the need in particular of developing countries to obtain technology of all types, including nuclear technology, at low costs and on fair terms of transfer, in order to promote their economic and social development, thus strengthening international peace and security,

TAKING NOTE of the activity so far undertaken by the International Atomic Energy Agency with a view to facilitating the international co-operation in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, provided in Article IV of the Treaty,

HOPING that the nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty would make available, through the International Atomic Energy Agency, part of the fissionable material resulting from the measures of nuclear disarmament to the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty,

1. DECIDES,

(a) that preferential treatment and concessional terms shall be provided by the Parties to the Treaty to developing non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty in the supply of equipment, material and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy which would include, inter alia, fissionable material and the related services in the nuclear fuel cycle;

GE.75-65669
(b) that a Special Fund be established for the provision of technical assistance in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to developing non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty. This Fund, which shall also be utilized for the provision of nuclear research facilities including research reactors and fuel needed for the continuing operation of research reactors in developing non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty, shall be maintained at an adequate level to meet the required needs. The Depositary States shall contribute 60 per cent of the Fund and the developed non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty shall provide the balance. The schedule for the division of costs for the present Review Conference, appropriately pro-rated, shall serve as the basis for determining the contribution to this Fund of each respective State Party to the Treaty. The International Atomic Energy Agency shall be entrusted with the administration and management of the Fund which shall not form part of the regular or operational budgets of the Agency;

(c) that a Special Nuclear Fund be established to provide financing under concessional terms for the nuclear projects in the territories of developing non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty. The Fund shall be kept at a reasonable minimum annual level and contributions to this Fund shall be assessed in the same manner as the Special Fund referred to under paragraph 1(b) above. These amounts shall be administered on an ad hoc basis by an international organization or an existing regional financing institution located in Africa, Asia or Latin America, to be designated by the donor country with the agreement of the recipient country;

2. DECIDES FURTHER that preferential treatment shall be provided by the Parties to the Treaty to developed non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty in the supply of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which would include, inter alia, the supply of uranium and enrichment and re-processing services.
Draft Resolution on Article IV of the Treaty

The Review Conference of the States Parties to the NPT:

Mindful that the obligation which has been assumed by the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices has not affected their inalienable right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, as recognized in Article IV of the Treaty,

Aware that in view of the balance which should exist between the rights and the obligations provided in the Treaty, any measure in implementing its various purposes and provisions must avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of the peaceful nuclear activities,

Recalling that according to the Treaty the States Parties in a position to do so undertook to contribute to and facilitate the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty,

Convinced of the increasing role of the nuclear energy, especially in the present economic conditions, as a very important source of energy and an essential element for the narrowing and the elimination of the economic and technological gap which separates the developing countries from the industrially developed countries,

1. Considers that the international co-operation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy among States Parties to the Treaty should be directed towards ensuring the largest possible access of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty, especially of the developing countries, to research, development, use and production of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,

2. Urges all States Parties to the Treaty in pursuing the above-mentioned objective to observe, inter alia, in their relations both bilateral and within the international organizations the following:

(a) All States Parties to the Treaty are entitled to fully benefit from peaceful applications of nuclear energy without any discrimination whatsoever;
(b) Preferential treatment and concessional terms shall be provided to developing countries in the supply of nuclear material, equipment, know-how,
scientific and technological information, for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy according to their needs;
(c) Technical assistance to the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty shall include all types of materials and information necessary for their nuclear peaceful industry;
(d) Technical assistance as provided above shall ensure on a continuous and long-term basis the normal operation of all nuclear peaceful facilities in the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty;
(e) Access of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty to nuclear technology shall also include the latest scientific and technological conquests in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy;

3. **Requests** the International Atomic Energy Agency to further develop its activities in the field of technical assistance and co-operation for peaceful applications of nuclear energy and to maintain an equitable balance between these activities and those aimed at verification provided in Article III of the Treaty.
The States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons, who met in Geneva in May 1975

- Having reviewed the operation of the Treaty to ensure that its purposes and provisions are being realized;
- Considering that the trend towards détente in relations between States provides a favourable climate within which more significant progress towards arms limitation and disarmament should be possible;
- Reaffirming the important role of the Treaty in limiting nuclear weapons and averting the danger of nuclear war, in creating the conditions necessary for the cessation of nuclear arms race, for effective measures in the direction of general complete disarmament under strict and effective international control and for facilitating co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and also in strengthening peace and international security and furthering the process of international détente;
- Noting the increasing role of the nuclear technology and the growing responsibilities of the Parties to contribute to the further development of the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in all States, especially in developing countries;
- Noting the necessity that the international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy must be carried out in a manner which will prevent nuclear proliferation;
- Reaffirming that the security of all States would be best ensured through universal adherence to the Treaty;
- Reaffirming their strong support for the Treaty, their continued dedication to its principles and objectives, and their commitment to implement fully and more effectively its provisions;

declare as follows
The States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

(1) Having met in Geneva in May 1975 in accordance with Article VIII para. 3 of the Treaty,

(2) Having reviewed the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble of the Treaty are being realized,

(3) Recognizing the continuing importance of the main objectives of the Treaty, namely the prevention of nuclear proliferation, the pursuit of efforts towards nuclear as well as general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, the fullest and widest access to equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful use of nuclear energy,

(4) Recognizing that the danger of nuclear warfare remains a grave threat to the survival of mankind, that a major factor of such a danger is the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and that the control and reduction of the development, production and deployment of nuclear weapons remain vital elements in efforts to avert nuclear warfare,

(5) Considering that the trend towards detente in relations between States provides a favourable climate within which more significant progress towards arms control and disarmament and the control of nuclear proliferation should be possible,

(6) Recognizing the continuing necessity of full cooperation among the Parties to the Treaty in the enforcement of International Atomic Energy Safeguards on peaceful nuclear activity as well as the necessity of intensifying efforts to improve safeguards technique, instrumentation and implementation,
(7) Reaffirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty,

(8) Reaffirming its conviction that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

(9) Noting the increasing role that nuclear energy is expected to play in meeting the world's energy needs and the responsibilities of the Parties to contribute to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in all States, especially in developing countries,

(10) Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the Treaty to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of nuclear arms race, the discontinuance of nuclear test explosions of nuclear weapons, the undertaking of effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament as a first step towards the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and means of delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

(11) Recognizing that in the pursuit of their common objective of a more secure world, there is a need to balance and reconcile the interests of all States Parties to the Treaty,

(12) Reaffirming the belief that the security of all States would be best ensured through universal adherence to the Treaty; declare as follows
WORKING PAPER SUBMITTED
BY ITALY

DRAFT PREAMBLE OF
A FINAL DECLARATION

PREAMBLE

Corrigendum

The States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(1) Having met in Geneva in May 1975 in accordance with Article VII para. 3 of the Treaty,
(2) Having reviewed the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble of the Treaty are being realized,
(3) Recognizing the continuing importance of the main objectives of the Treaty, namely the prevention of nuclear proliferation, the pursuit of efforts towards nuclear as well as general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, the fullest and widest access to equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful use of nuclear energy,
(4) Recognizing that the danger of nuclear warfare remains a grave threat to the survival of mankind, that a major factor of such a danger is the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and that the control and reduction of the development, production and deployment of nuclear weapons remain vital elements in efforts to avert nuclear warfare,
(5) Considering that the trend towards detente in relations between States provides a favourable climate within which more significant progress towards arms control and disarmament and the control of nuclear proliferation should be possible,
(6) Recognizing the continuing necessity of full co-operation among the Parties to the Treaty in the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities as well as the necessity of intensifying efforts to improve safeguards techniques, instrumentation and implementation,

GE.75-65719
(7) Reaffirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty,

(8) Reaffirming its conviction that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

(9) Noting the increasing role that nuclear energy is expected to play in meeting the world's energy needs and the responsibilities of the Parties to contribute to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in all States, especially in developing countries,

(10) Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the Treaty to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race, the discontinuance of test explosions of nuclear weapons, the undertaking of effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament as a first step towards the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and means of delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

(11) Recognizing that in the pursuit of their common objective of a more secure world, there is a need to balance and reconcile the interests of all States Parties to the Treaty,

(12) Reaffirming the belief that the security of all States would be best ensured through universal adherence to the Treaty;

declare as follows
BELGIUM, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AND THE NETHERLANDS

Suggested formulations in the final declaration on Article III

1. The Conference notes that the verification activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under Article III,1 of the Treaty respect the sovereign rights of States and do not hamper the economic, scientific or technological development of the Parties to the Treaty and international co-operation in peaceful nuclear activities. It urges that this situation be maintained.

2. The Conference notes the importance of national or regional systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material, from the standpoints both of the responsibilities of individual States and of facilitating the application of IAEA safeguards under Article III. The Conference urges all States concerned to establish and maintain effective accounting and control systems and welcomes the readiness of the IAEA to assist States in so doing.

3. The Conference expresses its strong support for effective IAEA safeguards. In this context it recommends that intensified efforts be made towards the standardization and the universality of application of IAEA safeguards, while ensuring that safeguards agreements are of adequate duration, preclude diversion to any nuclear explosive devices and contain appropriate provisions for application of safeguards on re-export.

4. The Conference recommends that more attention and fuller support be given to the improvement of safeguards techniques, instrumentation, data-handling and implementation. It notes with satisfaction the establishment by the Director General of the IAEA of a standing technical safeguards advisory group.

5. The Conference emphasizes the necessity for the States Parties to the Treaty that have not yet done so to conclude as soon as possible safeguards agreements with the IAEA.
THE PHILIPPINES

Suggested formulations in the final declaration on Article III

1. The Conference recommends that during the review of the arrangements related to the financing of safeguards in the IAEA which is to be held after 1975, the Parties to the Treaty support measures that would further reduce the share of developing countries in the safeguards costs and urge the nuclear-weapon States to reimburse the Agency, in accordance with Article XIV C of the Statute, the costs of safeguarding the peaceful nuclear activities of nuclear-weapon States submitted to safeguards.

2. The Conference recommends that the Parties to the Treaty urge the Director General of the IAEA to take fully into account the following principles in the designation of safeguards inspectors for States Party to the Treaty:

(a) Equitable geographic distribution in the inspectorate of the IAEA, and

(b) Only nationals of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, or of States which have offered to accept equivalent IAEA safeguards to any of their peaceful nuclear activities, be designated safeguards inspectors in States Party to the Treaty.
POLAND AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Suggested formulations in the final declaration on the physical protection of nuclear materials

1. The Conference, anxious that nuclear materials should be effectively protected at all times, urges that action be taken without delay to elaborate further, within the International Atomic Energy Agency, concrete guidelines and standards for the physical protection of nuclear material in use, storage and transit, including principles relating to the responsibility of States, with a view to ensuring a uniform, minimum level of effective protection for such material.

2. It calls upon all States engaging in peaceful nuclear activities to enter into such international agreements and arrangements as may be necessary to ensure such protection, and to give prompt and effective application to the Agency's guidelines and standards in the framework of their respective physical protection systems.
BULGARIA, CANADA, GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Suggested formulations in the final declaration on Article IV

1. The Conference reaffirms that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting, and notes with satisfaction that nothing in the Treaty has affected, the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of the Treaty.

2. The Conference reaffirms the undertaking by all Parties to the Treaty to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the right of all Parties to the Treaty to participate in such exchange. Noting that the Treaty constitutes a favourable framework for broadening international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the Conference is convinced that on this basis, and in conformity with the Treaty, further efforts should be made to improve the availability of benefits from peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

3. The Conference recognizes that there continues to be a need for the widest possible access to nuclear materials, equipment and technology, including up-to-date developments, on the assurance, provided by International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, that this does not in any way contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Conference reaffirms the undertaking of the Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so to co-operate in contributing, alone or together with other States or international organizations, to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world. The Conference particularly recognizes the growing needs of developing States and considers it
necessary to continue and increase assistance to them in this field bilaterally and through such multilateral channels as the International Atomic Energy Agency and the United Nations Development Programme.

4. The Conference is of the view that, in order to implement as fully as possible Article IV of the Treaty, developed States Party to the Treaty should consider taking measures, making contributions and establishing programmes, as soon as possible, for the provision of special assistance in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for developing States Party to the Treaty.

5. The Conference recommends that, in reaching decisions on the provision of equipment, materials, scientific information and technology for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, on concessional financial arrangements and on the furnishing of technical assistance in the nuclear field, developed States Party to the Treaty should give particular weight to adherence to the Treaty by recipient States. The Conference recommends, in this connexion, that any special measures of co-operation to meet the growing needs of developing States Party to the Treaty might include increased and supplemental voluntary aid provided bilaterally or through multilateral channels such as the IAEA's facilities for administering funds-in-trust and gifts-in-kind.

6. The Conference further recommends that States Party to the Treaty, in a position to do so, meet, to the fullest extent possible, technically sound requests for technical assistance, submitted to the IAEA by developing States Party to the Treaty, which the IAEA is unable to finance from its own resources, as well as such technically sound requests as may be made by developing States Party to the Treaty which are not Members of the IAEA.
AUSTRALIA, AUSTRIA, CANADA, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, MONGOLIA, POLAND AND THE UNITED KINGDOM

Suggested formulations in the final declaration on Article V

1. The Conference reaffirms the obligation on Parties to the Treaty to take appropriate measures to ensure that potential benefits from any peaceful application of nuclear explosions are made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty in full accordance with the provisions of Article V. In this connexion, the Conference also reaffirms that such services should be provided to NNWS Parties to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used should be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development.

2. The Conference considers it imperative that access to potential benefits of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes should not lead to any proliferation of nuclear explosive capability. In this connexion, it notes that any such potential benefits could be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the Treaty by way of nuclear explosion services provided by nuclear-weapon States, as defined by the Treaty, and conducted under the appropriate international observation and international procedures called for in Article V and in accordance with other applicable international obligations.

3. The Conference considers the IAEA to be the appropriate international body, referred to in Article V of the Treaty, through which potential benefits from peaceful applications of nuclear explosions could be made available to any non-nuclear-weapon State. Accordingly, the Conference urges the IAEA to commence work on the structure and contents of the special international agreement or agreements contemplated in Article V of the Treaty, taking into account the views of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the United Nations General Assembly.

4. The Conference notes that the technology of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes is still at the stage of development and study, and that there are a number of interrelated international legal and other aspects of such explosions which still need to be investigated.
5. The Conference commends the work in this field that has been carried out within the IAEA and looks forward to the continuance of such work pursuant to United Nations General Assembly resolution 3261 D (XXIX). It emphasizes that the IAEA should play the central role in matters relating to the provision of services for the application of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. It believes that the IAEA should broaden its consideration of this subject to encompass, within its area of competence, all aspects and implications of the practical applications of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. To this end it urges the IAEA to set up appropriate machinery within which intergovernmental discussion can take place and through which advice can be given on the Agency's work in this field.

6. The Conference attaches considerable importance to the consideration by the CCD, pursuant to United Nations General Assembly resolution 3261 D (XXIX) and taking due account of the views of the IAEA, of the arms control implications of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

7. The Conference notes that the thirtieth session of the United Nations General Assembly will receive reports pursuant to United Nations General Assembly resolution 3261 D (XXIX) and will provide an opportunity for States to discuss questions related to the application of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The Conference further notes that the results of discussion in the United Nations General Assembly at its thirtieth session will be available to be taken into account by the IAEA and the CCD for their further consideration.
Amendment to the formulations suggested in the final declaration, by Australia, Austria, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, Mongolia, Poland and the United Kingdom on Article V

Replace the last sentence of paragraph 7 by:

"The Conference further notes that the results of discussion in the United Nations General Assembly at its thirtieth session will be available to serve as guidance to the IAEA and the CDD for their further consideration of the matter."
1. The Conference recognizes that regional or multinational nuclear fuel cycle centres may be an advantageous way to satisfy, safely and economically, the needs of many countries in the course of initiating or expanding nuclear power programmes, while at the same time facilitating physical protection and the application of IAEA safeguards, and contributing to common non-proliferation goals.

2. The Conference welcomes the IAEA's studies in this area, and recommends that they be continued as expeditiously as possible. It considers that such studies should include among other aspects, identification of the complex practical and organizational difficulties which will need to be dealt with in connexion with such projects.

3. The Conference urges all NPT Parties in a position to do so to co-operate in these studies, particularly by providing to the IAEA where possible economic data concerning construction and operation of facilities such as chemical reprocessing plants, plutonium fuel fabrication plants, waste management installations, and longer-term spent fuel storage, and by assistance to the IAEA to enable it to undertake feasibility studies concerning the establishment of regional nuclear fuel cycle centres in specific geographic regions.

4. The Conference hopes that in the event these studies lead to positive findings, and if the establishment of regional or multinational nuclear fuel cycle centres is undertaken, Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so, will co-operate in, and provide assistance for, the elaboration and realization of such projects.
Suggested formulations in the final declaration on Article III(2)

1. With regard to the implementation of Article III, 2 of the Treaty, the Conference notes that a number of States suppliers of nuclear material or equipment have adopted certain minimum, standard requirements for IAEA safeguards in connexion with their exports of certain such items to non-nuclear-weapon States not Party to the Treaty*. The Conference attaches particular importance to the condition of an undertaking of non-diversion to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as included in the said requirements.

2. The Conference urges that:
   (a) in all achievable ways, common export safeguards requirements be strengthened, in particular by extending the application of safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities in importing countries not Party to the Treaty;
   (b) such common requirements be accorded the widest possible measure of acceptance among all suppliers and recipients;
   (c) all NPT Parties should actively pursue their efforts to these ends.

3. The Conference takes note of
   (a) the considered view of many Parties to the Treaty that the safeguards required under Article III, 2 should extend to all peaceful nuclear activities in importing countries;
   (b) (i) the suggestion, intended to strengthen the NPT, that the importing countries Party to the NPT should consider importing nuclear material and equipment only from States which are Parties to the Treaty or which have otherwise shown that they act in their supply policies as if they were Parties thereto;

* IAEA document INFCIRC/209 and Addenda
(ii) the legal and other obstacles to the implementation of this suggestion.

(c) the suggestion that it is desirable, if possible, to arrange for common safeguards requirements in respect of nuclear material used, processed or produced by the use of scientific and technological information transferred in tangible form to non-nuclear-weapon States not Party to the Treaty; and the hope that this aspect of safeguards could be further examined.
Revised Schedule for the Division of Costs

In accordance with the principles included in the Schedule for the Division of Costs which appear in the Appendix to Rule 12 of the Rules of Procedure of the Review Conference (NPT/CONF/20), the following is the final schedule which reflects the actual participation of Party and Signatory States in the Review Conference.

The percentages indicated hereafter represent shares of participation of States in the estimated cost of the Conference (US$45,000) which remains unchanged.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>4.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czecho'slovakia</td>
<td>1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
<td>1.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany, Federal Republic of</td>
<td>9.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holy See</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GE.75-65878</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parties</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>4.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea, Republic of</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Marino</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian Arab Republic</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republic</td>
<td>17.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland</td>
<td>8.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>28.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Parties (cont'd.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaïre</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Signatories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>7.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Revised Schedule for the Division of Costs

In accordance with the principles included in the Schedule for the Division of Costs which appear in the Appendix to Rule 12 of the Rules of Procedure of the Review Conference (NPT/CONF/20), the following is the final schedule which reflects the actual participation of Party and Signatory States in the Review Conference.

The percentages indicated hereafter represent shares of participation of States in the estimated cost of the Conference ($645,000) which remains unchanged.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>4.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>1.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
<td>1.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany, Federal Republic of</td>
<td>9.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holy See</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Revised according to correction made in the contribution of Switzerland.

GE.75-65913
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties (cont'd.)</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>4.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea, Republic of</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Marino</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian Arab Republic</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
<td>17.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland</td>
<td>8.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>28.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parties (cont'd.)</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaïre</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Signatories</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>7.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
STATEMENT BY MRS. INGA THORSSON,
PRESIDENT OF THE REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE
TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS,
AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE GENERAL DEBATE

12 May 1975

This concludes the general debate. Through its main committees, the Conference now goes into the difficult and complex substance of the task for the fulfilment of which it has been convened.

Before I hand over the responsibility for the running activities to the Chairmen of the main committees, however, I should like to convey to you, very briefly, my preliminary views of what the general debate has brought to the work of the Conference. In giving these views I recognize, of course, that there are delegates in this hall who do not necessarily agree with everything I am going to say, as the general debate has, as was expected, revealed some divergent views on the subject matter before the Conference.

First, I would like to associate myself with those who have expressed, publicly and privately, the view that we have had a good general debate. We have listened to 46 statements, reflecting knowledge, experience and firm notions of the problems facing us. The debate has been constructive and forward-looking. It bodes well for the continuation of our work.

Second, the debate has indicated, very clearly, the main direction of the work ahead of us. Having listened attentively to and afterwards examined anew the statements made, I should like to share with you my impressions of what, in the view of the delegations participating in the Conference, are the main problems that we have to solve.

No one would, I think, dispute the view, that the two categories of States which are parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) each have pledged certain obligations under the Treaty. States parties which up to 1 January 1967 did not possess nuclear weapons have undertaken not to manufacture or otherwise acquire such weapons. States parties which at that date possessed nuclear weapons have committed themselves to carrying on negotiations in good faith, with the intention to arrive, at an early date, at a cessation of the nuclear arms race, and to continue towards nuclear disarmament.
While everyone has agreed on the success of the NPT, in that no non-nuclear-weapon State adhering to the Treaty has got possession of nuclear weapons, the general view among a majority of the non-nuclear-weapon States, as emerging from their statements is very clearly that the nuclear-weapon States have not achieved results to the satisfaction of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties in efforts towards genuine nuclear disarmament. It seems to me that an enlightened world opinion, reflected, in this case, in statements by non-nuclear-weapon States, rather impatiently awaits concrete and binding results of on-going bilateral negotiations, aiming at ending the quantitative and qualitative arms race, and reducing substantially the levels of nuclear armaments. Many have referred to the need for a time-table for results to be achieved through these negotiations. The agreement on a comprehensive test ban is clearly recognized as a most decisive element in these efforts. A least common denominator is apparent in the statements: Article VI must be implemented, in letter and in spirit. I believe that this implies the existence of a strong moral pressure on the nuclear-weapon States to prove to the world, not only their genuine will, but also their capacity for disarmament.

Likewise I have interpreted the numerous references to the matter of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States in a world still armed with nuclear weapons as a recognition of the inadequacy of Security Council resolution 255 (1968). There seems to be a close to unanimous feeling among non-nuclear-weapon States that a way should be found for the nuclear weapon States to pledge, as a legally binding commitment, the non-use of nuclear weapons or threat of nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty. Some delegations have linked such a pledge to the establishing of nuclear-free zones, but I have felt a rather general recognition of the need for increased safety measures against nuclear attacks, or threats of nuclear attacks, on the part of those non-nuclear-weapon States which have through adherence to the Treaty foreclosed their nuclear options.

This leads me to some thoughts on what impressions the general debate has conveyed about the feelings of non-nuclear-weapon States parties towards the provisions in the Treaty in relation to the control mechanisms to block diversion of nuclear material from peaceful to military purposes. In this connexion the well-deserved praise given to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) by all delegations for the way in which the Agency has performed its safeguards duties, should be put on record. There seems to be a rather widely spread opinion that Article III should, in some way or other be used to apply the same kind of safeguards to all States, whether non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear weapon States, whether parties to the Treaty or not. In the latter case, a firm agreement among all countries suppliers of equipment, source of fissionable material to adhere to such stringent regulations is of course recognized as the necessary prerequisite.

I have furthermore a clear feeling of the importance that States parties to the Treaty, particularly in the developing world, attach to the access to the necessary resources and know-how, enabling them to use nuclear energy in their efforts towards economic and social development. Much has been said in the general debate about the need to strengthen the resources of the international community, particularly through the IAEA, to assist the developing countries parties to the Treaty in this respect.

As a natural consequence, considerable attention has, and quite naturally so, been given by many delegations to the problem dealt with in Article V of the Treaty. While there has been a general recognition of the difficulty, not to say the impossibility to distinguish, technically, between nuclear explosions for military or for peaceful purposes, very few delegations seem ready to exclude, completely
and finally, some potential benefits to be derived from peaceful nuclear explosions. In conformity with Articles I and II therefore, and under Article V, most speakers on this subject have requested the establishment of the international peaceful nuclear explosion regime referred to in that article. I believe it to be significant that, judging from the statements made in the general debate, this request seems to reflect a rather general recognition that no individual country should, on its own, carry out peaceful nuclear explosions. Some delegations have indicated, quite clearly, that this should apply also to nuclear-weapon States.

I consider it part of the growing understanding, in every part of the world, of the many problematic side-effects of the expansion of nuclear energy programmes that such an emphasis has been placed on the need for arrangements, in one way or another, providing physical security of nuclear reactors as well as storage and transport of fissionable material. This is, of course, a matter outside the framework of the Treaty itself. Requests have been made by many delegations that this Conference should put on record the need for an international Convention to this end. In the view of some delegations, this should be but the first step towards a general recognition of the urgent international character of these problems, and the need to solve them through international co-operation.

I would like, furthermore, to recognize the request of numerous delegations that a decision be taken now to ensure a continuous follow-up of this first review of the NPT and its implementation.

Distinguished delegates, though I am quite aware of a divergence of opinions with regard to many aspects of the NPT and its implementations, it is quite obvious to me that there exist some points on which all delegations have convergent views. We are agreed that the NPT is a vital ingredient in disarmament efforts in a nuclear world. We are agreed that the widest possible adherence to the Treaty, and the fullest implementation possible of all its articles, are of vital importance to future efforts in our search for a world without nuclear arms. We are agreed that a political will to reach universal understanding for the urgent necessity of these efforts must be mobilized.

I am convinced that the work now to begin in the main committees will result in a common determination not to part from Geneva without concrete evidence that we are united in our search for a denuclearized world.
REPORT OF THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE

1. On 5 May 1975, at its first meeting, the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, convened in Geneva, elected Mr. Hortencio J. Brillantes (Philippines) as Chairman of the Credentials Committee.

2. On 8 May 1975, at its seventh meeting, the Conference elected Mr. P. Noterdaeme (Belgium) and Mr. I. Hulinsky (Czechoslovakia) as Vice-Chairmen of the Credentials Committee.

3. At the same meeting, the Conference appointed the following members of the Committee on the proposal of the President of the Conference: Gabon, Ghana, Jamaica, Jordan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America.

4. The Credentials Committee met on 27 May 1975.

5. The Committee had before it a memorandum by the Secretary General of the Conference dated 27 May 1975 which read as follows:

"a) As of 27 May 1975, 57 States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons are participating in the Conference.

b) As of 27 May 1975, formal credentials in due form under rule 2 of the rules of procedure were received by the Secretary General of the Conference from the following 47 States:

Australia
Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Canada
Cyprus
Czechoslovakia
Denmark
Ethiopia
Finland
German Democratic Republic
Germany, Federal Republic of
Ghana
Greece
Holy See

Honduras
Hungary
Iceland
Iran
Ireland
Italy
Jamaica
Korea, Republic of
Lebanon
Luxembourg
Mauritius
Mexico
Mongolia
Morocco
Nepal
Netherlands
New Zealand

Nigeria
Norway
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Romania
San Marino
Sudan
Sweden
Syrian Arab Republic
Thailand
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
United States of America
Uruguay
Yugoslavia"
"c) The list of representatives of the following 8 States were communicated to the Secretary General by note verbale or letter:

Bolivia
Ecuador
Gabon
Jordan
Nicaragua
Senegal
Tunisia
Zaire
d) The credentials of the representatives of Liberia and the United Kingdom were communicated to the Secretary-General in the form of cables by the Foreign Minister."

6. The Committee examined and found acceptable the credentials submitted by the Governments listed in paragraph b) of the memorandum.

7. The Chairman proposed that, as an exceptional measure in order to avoid having to hold another meeting, the Committee should accept, subject to later validation, the communications of those Governments listed in paragraphs c) and d) of the memorandum in lieu of formal credentials.

8. The Committee adopted the Chairman's proposal without objection.
WORKING PAPER SUBMITTED BY THE UNITED STATES ON ARTICLE VI

1. The Conference welcomed the various agreements on arms control and disarmament, both multilateral and bilateral, which have been elaborated over the last few years, and acknowledged that these instruments represent steps in the right direction as contributing to the implementation of Article VI. On the other hand, resolute efforts are still required to implement the provisions of Article VI.

2. The Conference welcomes particularly the progress so far achieved in negotiations on the limitations of strategic nuclear armaments. It urges the nuclear-weapon States Parties to intensify their efforts to achieve a cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date.

3. The Conference urges all States to intensify their efforts towards the earliest fulfilment of the provisions of Article VI of the Treaty under which each of the Parties undertook to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. In particular it further expresses the hope that the nuclear-weapon States Parties to the negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms will soon successfully conclude the second-stage agreement that was outlined by their leaders in November 1974, and looks forward to the commencement of follow-on negotiations on further limitations and reductions in the level of strategic arms as soon as possible following the conclusion of such an agreement.

4. The Conference calls for the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. It urges the nuclear-weapon States to pursue negotiations directed towards the conclusion of an effective comprehensive test ban agreement.

GE.75-6923
ITALY

Proposal on the follow-up of the Conference

The Conference, considering that paragraph 3 of Article VIII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons provides that "at intervals of five years" after the first review conference contemplated in that paragraph, "a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the ... objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty",

Considering that review conferences are an important instrument in the endeavour to assure "that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized" in that they ensure a continuity in the evaluation of the actions severally and jointly undertaken or pursued by the Parties in order fully to comply with the obligations incumbent upon them under the Treaty,

Considering that the results of the Conference demonstrate that a second review conference should be held, within the framework of paragraph 3 of Article VIII, at the earliest possible time in view of the necessity that a further assessment of the implementation of the Treaty be made at an early date,

Considering that Delegations to the Conference have expressed a firm belief in the necessity of such a second review conference,

Urge all the Parties to the Treaty to submit to the Depositary Governments at the earliest possible time a proposal for a new review conference to be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in the year 1980, in accordance with Article VIII, paragraph 3 of the Treaty and for the purposes indicated therein.
FINAL DECLARATION OF THE REVIEW CONFERENCE OF PARTIES TO THE
TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

PREAMBLE

The States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which met in Geneva in May 1975, in accordance with the Treaty, to review the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized,

1. Recognizing the continuing importance of the objectives of the Treaty,
2. Affirming the belief that universal adherence to the Treaty would greatly strengthen international peace and enhance the security of all States,
3. Firmly convinced that, in order to achieve this aim, it is important to maintain, in the implementation of the Treaty, an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of all States Parties to the Treaty, nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States,
4. Recognizing that the danger of nuclear warfare remains a grave threat to the survival of mankind,
5. Convinced that the prevention of any further proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices remain vital elements in efforts to avert nuclear warfare,
6. Convinced that the promotion of this objective will be furthered by more rapid progress towards the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the limitation and reduction of existing nuclear weapons, with a view to the eventual elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons,
7. Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time,
8. Considering that the trend towards détente in relations between States provides a favourable climate within which more significant progress should be possible towards the cessation of the nuclear arms race,
9. Noting the important role which nuclear energy can, particularly in present economic circumstances, play in power production and in contributing to the progressive elimination of the economic and technological gap between developing and developed states,

10. Recognizing that the accelerated spread and development of peaceful applications of nuclear-energy will, in the absence of effective safeguards, contribute to further proliferation of nuclear explosive capability,

11. Recognizing the continuing necessity of full co-operation in the application and improvement of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

12. Recalling that all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

13. Reaffirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty,

14. Recognizing that all States Parties have a duty to strive for the adoption of tangible and effective measures to attain the objectives of the Treaty,

Declare as follows:

PURPOSES

The States Parties to the Treaty reaffirm their strong common interest in averting the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. They reaffirm their strong support for the Treaty, their continued dedication to its principles and objectives, and their commitment to implement fully and more effectively its provisions.

They reaffirm the vital role of the Treaty in international efforts
- to avert further proliferation of nuclear weapons
- to achieve the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament, and
- to promote co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
REVIEW OF ARTICLES I AND II

The review undertaken by the Conference confirms that the obligations undertaken under Articles I and II of the Treaty have been faithfully observed by all Parties. The Conference is convinced that the continued strict observance of these Articles remains central to the shared objective of averting the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

REVIEW OF ARTICLE III

The Conference notes that the verification activities of the IAEA under Article III, 1 of the Treaty respect the sovereign rights of States and do not hamper the economic, scientific or technological development of the Parties to the Treaty and international co-operation in peaceful nuclear activities. It urges that this situation be maintained. The Conference attaches considerable importance to the continued application of safeguards under Article III, 1, on a non-discriminatory basis, for the equal benefit of all States Party to the Treaty.

The Conference notes the importance of systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material, from the standpoints both of the responsibilities of States Party to the Treaty and of co-operation with the IAEA in order to facilitate the implementation of the safeguards provided for in Article III, 1. The Conference expresses the hope that all States having peaceful nuclear activities will establish and maintain effective accounting and control systems and welcomes the readiness of the IAEA to assist States in so doing.

The Conference expresses its strong support for effective IAEA safeguards. In this context it recommends that intensified efforts be made towards the standardization and the universality of application of IAEA safeguards, while ensuring that safeguards agreements with non-nuclear-weapon States not Party to the Treaty are of adequate duration, preclude diversion to any nuclear explosive devices and contain appropriate provisions for the continuance of the application of safeguards upon re-export.

The Conference recommends that more attention and fuller support be given to the improvement of safeguards techniques, instrumentation, data-handling and implementation in order, among other things, to ensure optimum cost-effectiveness. It notes with satisfaction the establishment by the Director-General of the IAEA of a standing advisory group on safeguards implementation.

The Conference emphasises the necessity for the States Party to the Treaty that have not yet done so to conclude as soon as possible safeguards agreements with the IAEA.
With regard to the implementation of Article III, 2 of the Treaty, the Conference notes that a number of States suppliers of nuclear material or equipment have adopted certain minimum, standard requirements for IAEA safeguards in connexion with their exports of certain such items to non-nuclear-weapon States not Party to the Treaty (IAEA document INFCIRC/209 and Addenda). The Conference attaches particular importance to the condition, established by those States, of an undertaking of non-diversion to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as included in the said requirements.

The Conference urges that:

(a) in all achievable ways, common export requirements relating to safeguards be strengthened, in particular by extending the application of safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities in importing States not Party to the Treaty;

(b) such common requirements be accorded the widest possible measure of acceptance among all suppliers and recipients;

(c) all Parties to the Treaty should actively pursue their efforts to these ends.

The Conference takes note of:

(a) the considered view of many Parties to the Treaty that the safeguards required under Article III, 2 should extend to all peaceful nuclear activities in importing States;

(b) (i) the suggestion that it is desirable to arrange for common safeguards requirements in respect of nuclear material processed, used or produced by the use of scientific and technological information transferred in tangible form to non-nuclear-weapon States not Party to the Treaty;

(ii) the hope that this aspect of safeguards could be further examined.

The Conference recommends that, during the review of the arrangements relating to the financing of safeguards in the IAEA which is to be undertaken by its Board of Governors at an appropriate time after 1975, the less favourable financial situation of the developing countries be fully taken into account. It recommends further that, on that occasion, the Parties to the Treaty concerned seek measures that would restrict within appropriate limits the respective shares of developing countries in safeguards costs.
The Conference attaches considerable importance, so far as safeguards inspectors are concerned, to adherence by the IAEA to Article VII.D of its Statute, prescribing, among other things, that "due regard shall be paid ... to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible"; it also recommends that safeguards training be made available to personnel from all geographic regions.

The Conference, convinced that nuclear materials should be effectively protected at all times, urges that action be pursued to elaborate further, within the IAEA, concrete recommendations for the physical protection of nuclear material in use, storage and transit, including principles relating to the responsibility of States, with a view to ensuring a uniform, minimum level of effective protection for such material.

It calls upon all States engaging in peaceful nuclear activities (i) to enter into such international agreements and arrangements as may be necessary to ensure such protection; and (ii) in the framework of their respective physical protection systems, to give the earliest possible effective application to the IAEA's recommendations.

REVIEW OF ARTICLE IV

The Conference reiterates, in the framework of Article IV, that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting, and notes with satisfaction that nothing in the Treaty has been identified as affecting, the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of the Treaty.

The Conference reaffirms, in the framework of Article IV, the undertaking by all Parties to the Treaty to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the right of all Parties to the Treaty to participate in such exchange and welcomes the efforts made towards that end. Noting that the Treaty constitutes a favourable framework for broadening international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the Conference is convinced that on this basis, and in conformity with the Treaty, further efforts should be made to ensure that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology should be available to all Parties to the Treaty.

The Conference recognizes that there continues to be a need for the fullest possible exchange of nuclear materials, equipment and technology, including up-to-date developments, consistent with the objectives and safeguards requirements of the Treaty. The Conference reaffirms the undertaking of the Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so to co-operate in contributing, alone or together with other States or international organizations, to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with particular consideration for the energy needs of the developing areas of the world. Recognizing, in the context of Article IV,2, those growing needs of developing States the Conference considers it necessary to continue and increase assistance to them in this field bilaterally and through such multilateral channels as the IAEA and the United Nations Development Programme.

The Conference is of the view that, in order to implement as fully as possible Article IV of the Treaty, developed States Party to the Treaty should consider taking measures, making contributions and establishing programmes, as soon as possible, for the provision of special assistance in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for developing States Party to the Treaty.

The Conference recommends that, in reaching decisions on the provision of equipment, materials, services and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, on concessional and other appropriate financial arrangements and on the furnishing of technical assistance in the nuclear field, including co-operation related to the continuous operation of peaceful nuclear facilities, States Party to the Treaty should give particular weight to adherence to the Treaty by recipient States. The Conference recommends, in this connexion, that any special measures of co-operation to meet the growing needs of developing States Party to the Treaty might include increased and supplemental voluntary aid provided bilaterally or through multilateral channels such as the IAEA's facilities for administering funds-in-trust and gifts-in-kind.

The Conference further recommends that States Party to the Treaty in a position to do so, meet, to the fullest extent possible, technically sound requests for technical assistance, submitted to the IAEA by developing States Party to the Treaty, which the IAEA is unable to finance from its own resources, as well as such technically sound requests as may be made by developing States Party to the Treaty which are not Members of the IAEA.

The Conference recognizes that regional or multinational nuclear fuel cycle centres may be an advantageous way to satisfy, safely and economically, the needs of many States in the course of initiating or expanding nuclear power programmes, while at the same time facilitating physical protection and the application of IAEA safeguards, and contributing to the goals of the Treaty.

The Conference welcomes the IAEA's studies in this area, and recommends that they be continued as expeditiously as possible. It considers that such studies should include, among other aspects, identification of the complex practical and organizational difficulties which will need to be dealt with in connexion with such projects.
The Conference urges all Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so to co-operate in these studies, particularly by providing to the IAEA where possible economic data concerning construction and operation of facilities such as chemical reprocessing plants, plutonium fuel fabrication plants, waste management installations, and longer-term spent fuel storage, and by assistance to the IAEA to enable it to undertake feasibility studies concerning the establishment of regional nuclear fuel cycle centres in specific geographic regions.

The Conference hopes that, if these studies lead to positive findings, and if the establishment of regional or multinational nuclear fuel cycle centres is undertaken, Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so, will co-operate in, and provide assistance for, the elaboration and realization of such projects.

**REVIEW OF ARTICLE V**

The Conference reaffirms the obligation of Parties to the Treaty to take appropriate measures to ensure that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions are made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty in full accordance with the provisions of Article V and other applicable international obligations. In this connexion, the Conference also reaffirms that such services should be provided to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used should be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development.

The Conference notes that any potential benefits could be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States not Party to the Treaty by way of nuclear explosion services provided by nuclear-weapon States, as defined by the Treaty, and conducted under the appropriate international observation and international procedures called for in Article V and in accordance with other applicable international obligations. The Conference considers it imperative that access to potential benefits of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes not lead to any proliferation of nuclear explosive capability.

The Conference considers the IAEA to be the appropriate international body, referred to in Article V of the Treaty, through which potential benefits from peaceful applications of nuclear explosions could be made available to any non-nuclear-weapon State. Accordingly, the Conference urges the IAEA to expedite work on identifying and examining the important legal issues involved in, and to commence consideration of the structure and content of the special international agreement or agreements contemplated in Article V of the Treaty, taking into account the views of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the United Nations General Assembly and affording an opportunity to States Party to the Treaty but not Members of the IAEA to participate in such work.
The Conference notes that the technology of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes is still at the stage of development and study and that there are a number of interrelated international legal and other aspects of such explosions which still need to be investigated.

The Conference commends the work in this field that has been carried out within the IAEA and looks forward to the continuance of such work pursuant to United Nations General Assembly resolution 3261 D (XXIX). It emphasizes that the IAEA should play the central role in matters relating to the provision of services for the application of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. It believes that the IAEA should broaden its consideration of this subject to encompass, within its area of competence, all aspects and implications of the practical applications of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. To this end it urges the IAEA to set up appropriate machinery within which intergovernmental discussion can take place and through which advice can be given on the Agency's work in this field.

The Conference attaches considerable importance to the consideration by the CCD, pursuant to United Nations General Assembly resolution 3261 D (XXIX) and taking due account of the views of the IAEA, of the arms control implications of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

The Conference notes that the thirtieth session of the United Nations General Assembly will receive reports pursuant to United Nations General Assembly resolution 3261 D (XXIX) and will provide an opportunity for States to discuss questions related to the application of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The Conference further notes that the results of discussion in the United Nations General Assembly at its thirtieth session will be available to be taken into account by the IAEA and the CCD for their further consideration.

**REVIEW OF ARTICLE VI**

The Conference recalls the provisions of Article VI of the Treaty under which all Parties undertook to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating
- to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and
- to nuclear disarmament and
- to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

While welcoming the various agreements on arms limitation and disarmament elaborated and concluded over the last few years as steps contributing to the implementation of Article VI of the Treaty, the Conference expresses its serious concern that the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, is continuing unabated.
The Conference therefore urges constant and resolute efforts by each of the Parties to the Treaty, in particular by the nuclear-weapon States, to achieve an early and effective implementation of Article VI of the Treaty.

The Conference affirms the determination expressed in the preamble to the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty and reiterated in the preamble to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. The Conference expresses the view that the conclusion of a treaty banning all nuclear weapon tests is one of the most important measures to halt the nuclear arms race. It expresses the hope that the nuclear weapon States Party to the Treaty will reach an early solution of their technical and political differences on this issue. It appeals to these States to make every effort to reach agreement on the conclusion of an effective comprehensive test ban. To this end, the desire was expressed at the Conference that the nuclear weapon States Parties to the Treaty should as soon as possible enter into an agreement open to all states, and containing appropriate provisions to ensure its effectiveness, to halt all nuclear weapons tests of adhering states for a specified time, whereupon the terms of such an agreement would be reviewed in the light of the opportunity, at that time, to achieve a universal and permanent cessation of all nuclear weapons tests. The Conference calls upon the nuclear weapon States Parties to the agreement on partial limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests, meanwhile, to fulfil their agreement to limit the number of their underground nuclear weapon tests to a minimum. The Conference believes that such steps would constitute an incentive of particular value to prompt the other nuclear-weapon States to enter into negotiations for the conclusion of a treaty banning all nuclear weapon test explosions for all time.

The Conference appeals to the nuclear-weapon States Parties to the negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms to endeavour to conclude at the earliest possible date the new agreement that was outlined by their leaders in November 1974. The Conference looks forward to the commencement of follow-on negotiations on further limitations of, and significant reductions in, their nuclear weapons systems as soon as possible following the conclusion of such an agreement.
The Conference notes that, notwithstanding earlier progress, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) has recently been unable to reach agreement on new substantive measures to advance the objectives of Article VI of the Treaty. It urges, therefore, all members of the CCD party to the Treaty, in particular the Nuclear Weapons States Parties, to increase their efforts to achieve effective disarmament agreements on all subjects on the agenda of the CCD.

The Conference expresses the hope that all States party to the Treaty, through the United Nations and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and other negotiations in which they participate, will work with determination towards the conclusion of arms limitation and disarmament agreements which will contribute to the goal of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

The Conference expresses the view that, disarmament being a matter of general concern, the provision of information to all governments and peoples on the situation in the field of the arms race and disarmament is of great importance for the attainment of the aims of Article VI. The Conference therefore invites the United Nations to consider ways and means of improving its existing facilities for the collection, compilation and dissemination of information on disarmament issues, in order to keep all governments as well as world public opinion properly informed on progress achieved in the realization of the provisions of Article VI of the Treaty.

REVIEW OF ARTICLE VII AND THE SECURITY OF NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES

Recognizing that all States have need to ensure their independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty, the Conference emphasizes the particular importance of assuring and strengthening the security of non-nuclear weapon States parties which have renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons. It acknowledges that States parties find themselves in different security situations and therefore that various appropriate means are necessary to meet the security concerns of States parties.

The Conference underlines the importance of adherence to the Treaty by non-nuclear weapon States as the best means of reassuring one another of their renunciation of nuclear weapons and as one of the effective means of strengthening their mutual security.
The Conference takes note of the reaffirmation by the Depositary States of their statements, welcomed by United Nations Security Council Resolution 255(1968) that, to ensure the security of the non-nuclear weapon States party to the Treaty, they will provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear weapon State party to the Treaty which is a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.

The Conference, bearing in mind Article VII of the Treaty, considers that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the initiative and with the agreement of the directly concerned States of the zone, represent an effective means of curbing the spread of nuclear weapons, and could contribute significantly to the security of those States. It welcomes the steps which have been taken toward the establishment of such zones.

The Conference recognizes that for the maxim effectiveness of any Treaty arrangements for establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone the co-operation of the nuclear-weapon State is necessary. At the Conference it was urged that nuclear-weapon States should provide, in an appropriate manner, binding security assurances to those States which become fully bound by the provisions of such regional arrangements.

At the Conference it was also urged that determined efforts at general application must be made especially by the nuclear weapon States party to the Treaty to ensure the security of all non-nuclear weapon States parties. To this end the Conference urges all States, both nuclear weapon States and non-nuclear weapon States to refrain, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, from the threat or the use of force in relations between States, involving either nuclear or non-nuclear weapons. Additionally, it stresses the responsibility of all parties to the Treaty and especially the nuclear weapon States, to take effective steps to strengthen the security of non-nuclear weapon States and to promote in all appropriate fora the consideration of all practical means to this end, taking into account the views expressed at this Conference.

**REVIEW OF ARTICLE VIII**

The Conference requests the Secretary-General of the United Nations to include the following item in the provisional agenda of the thirty-first session of the General Assembly: "Implementation of the conclusions of the first Review Conference to the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons".
In conformity with Article VIII, paragraph 3 of the Treaty, the States parties participating in the Conference propose to the Depositary Governments that a second Conference to review the operation of the Treaty be convened in 1980.

The Conference accordingly request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to include the following item in the provisional agenda of the thirty-third session of the General Assembly: "Implementation of the conclusions of the First Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and establishment of a preparatory committee for the second Conference."

**REVIEW OF ARTICLE IX**

The five years that have passed since the entry into force of the Treaty have demonstrated its wide international acceptance. The Conference welcomes the recent progress towards achieving wider adherence. An impressive majority of States of the world have become parties to the Treaty. The Conference, however, notes with concern that, for varying reasons, a number of States, both nuclear and non-nuclear, have hitherto remained outside the Treaty.

The Conference reaffirms its belief that the security of all States would be best ensured through universal adherence to the Treaty. It calls on all States which are not already party to the Treaty to consider carefully whether their own national interest, as well as the interest of the security of their region, would not be best served by early accession to or ratification of the Treaty.

**Conclusion**

The Conference commends to the attention of all States and of the United Nations General Assembly the text of this declaration and the appended resolutions adopted by the Conference.
PREAMBLE

The States Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which met in Geneva in May 1975, in accordance with the Treaty, to review the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized,

Recognizing the continuing importance of the objectives of the Treaty,

Affirming the belief that universal adherence to the Treaty would greatly strengthen international peace and enhance the security of all States,

Firmly convinced that, in order to achieve this aim, it is essential to maintain, in the implementation of the Treaty, an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of all States Party to the Treaty, nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States,

Recognizing that the danger of nuclear warfare remains a grave threat to the survival of mankind,

Convinced that the prevention of any further proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices remains a vital element in efforts to avert nuclear warfare, and that the promotion of this objective will be furthered by more rapid progress towards the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the limitation and reduction of existing nuclear weapons, with a view to the eventual elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons, pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time,

Considering that the trend towards détente in relations between States provides a favourable climate within which more significant progress should be possible towards the cessation of the nuclear arms race,

Noting the important role which nuclear energy can, particularly in changing economic circumstances, play in power production and in contributing to the progressive elimination of the economic and technological gap between developing and developed States,
Recognizing that the accelerated spread and development of peaceful applications of nuclear energy will, in the absence of effective safeguards, contribute to further proliferation of nuclear explosive capability,

Recognizing the continuing necessity of full co-operation in the application and improvement of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Recalling that all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Reaffirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, and

Recognizing that all States Parties have a duty to strive for the adoption of tangible and effective measures to attain the objectives of the Treaty,

Declare as follows:

PURPOSES

The States Party to the Treaty reaffirm their strong common interest in averting the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. They reaffirm their strong support for the Treaty, their continued dedication to its principles and objectives, and their commitment to implement fully and more effectively its provisions.

They reaffirm the vital role of the Treaty in international efforts

- to avert further proliferation of nuclear weapons
- to achieve the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament, and
- to promote co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under adequate safeguards.

REVIEW OF ARTICLES I AND II

The review undertaken by the Conference confirms that the obligations undertaken under Articles I and II of the Treaty have been faithfully observed by all Parties. The Conference is convinced that the continued strict observance of these Articles remains central to the shared objective of averting the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.
REVIEW OF ARTICLE III

The Conference notes that the verification activities of the IAEA under Article III, 1 of the Treaty respect the sovereign rights of States and do not hamper the economic, scientific or technological development of the Parties to the Treaty or international co-operation in peaceful nuclear activities. It urges that this situation be maintained. The Conference attaches considerable importance to the continued application of safeguards under Article III, 1, on a non-discriminatory basis, for the equal benefit of all States Party to the Treaty.

The Conference notes the importance of systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material, from the standpoints both of the responsibilities of States Party to the Treaty and of co-operation with the IAEA in order to facilitate the implementation of the safeguards provided for in Article III, 1. The Conference expresses the hope that all States having peaceful nuclear activities will establish and maintain effective accounting and control systems and welcomes the readiness of the IAEA to assist States in so doing.

The Conference expresses its strong support for effective IAEA safeguards. In this context it recommends that intensified efforts be made towards the standardization and the universality of application of IAEA safeguards, while ensuring that safeguards agreements with non-nuclear-weapon States not Party to the Treaty are of adequate duration, preclude diversion to any nuclear explosive devices and contain appropriate provisions for the continuance of the application of safeguards upon re-export.

The Conference recommends that more attention and fuller support be given to the improvement of safeguards techniques, instrumentation, data-handling and implementation in order, among other things, to ensure optimum cost-effectiveness. It notes with satisfaction the establishment by the Director General of the IAEA of a standing advisory group on safeguards implementation.

The Conference emphasises the necessity for the States Party to the Treaty that have not yet done so to conclude as soon as possible safeguards agreements with the IAEA.

With regard to the implementation of Article III, 2 of the Treaty, the Conference notes that a number of States suppliers of nuclear material or equipment have adopted certain minimum, standard requirements for IAEA safeguards in connexion with their exports of certain such items to non-nuclear-weapon States not Party to the Treaty (IAEA document INFCIRC/209 and Addenda). The Conference attaches particular importance to the condition, established by those States, of an undertaking of non-diversion to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as included in the said requirements.
The Conference urges that:

(a) in all achievable ways, common export requirements relating to safeguards be strengthened, in particular by extending the application of safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities in importing States not Party to the Treaty;

(b) such common requirements be accorded the widest possible measure of acceptance among all suppliers and recipients;

(c) all Parties to the Treaty should actively pursue their efforts to these ends.

The Conference takes note of:

(a) the considered view of many Parties to the Treaty that the safeguards required under Article III, 2 should extend to all peaceful nuclear activities in importing States;

(b) (i) the suggestion that it is desirable to arrange for common safeguards requirements in respect of nuclear material processed, used or produced by the use of scientific and technological information transferred in tangible form to non-nuclear-weapons States not Party to the Treaty;

(ii) the hope that this aspect of safeguards could be further examined.

The Conference recommends that, during the review of the arrangements relating to the financing of safeguards-in the IAEA which is to be undertaken by its Board of Governors at an appropriate time after 1975, the less favourable financial situation of the developing countries be fully taken into account. It recommends further that, on that occasion, the Parties to the Treaty concerned seek measures that would restrict within appropriate limits the respective shares of developing countries in safeguards costs.

The Conference attaches considerable importance, so far as safeguards inspectors are concerned, to adherence by the IAEA to Article VII.D of its Statute, prescribing, among other things, that "due regard shall be paid ... to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible"; it also recommends that safeguards training be made available to personnel from all geographic regions.

The Conference, convinced that nuclear materials should be effectively protected at all times, urges that action be pursued to elaborate further, within the IAEA, concrete recommendations for the physical protection of nuclear material in use, storage and transit, including principles relating to the responsibility of States, with a view to ensuring a uniform, minimum level of effective protection for such material.
It calls upon all States engaging in peaceful nuclear activities (i) to enter into such international agreements and arrangements as may be necessary to ensure such protection; and (ii) in the framework of their respective physical protection systems, to give the earliest possible effective application to the IAEA's recommendations.

REVIEW OF ARTICLE IV

The Conference reaffirms, in the framework of Article IV,1, that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting, and notes with satisfaction that nothing in the Treaty has been identified as affecting, the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of the Treaty.

The Conference reaffirms, in the framework of Article IV,2, the undertaking by all Parties to the Treaty to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the right of all Parties to the Treaty to participate in such exchange and welcomes the efforts made towards that end. Noting that the Treaty constitutes a favourable framework for broadening international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the Conference is convinced that on this basis, and in conformity with the Treaty, further efforts should be made to ensure that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology should be available to all Parties to the Treaty.

The Conference recognizes that there continues to be a need for the fullest possible exchange of nuclear materials, equipment and technology, including up-to-date developments, consistent with the objectives and safeguards requirements of the Treaty. The Conference reaffirms the undertaking of the Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so to co-operate in contributing, alone or together with other States or international organizations, to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world. Recognizing, in the context of Article IV,2, those growing needs of developing States the Conference considers it necessary to continue and increase assistance to them in this field bilaterally and through such multilateral channels as the IAEA and the United Nations Development Programme.

The Conference is of the view that, in order to implement as fully as possible Article IV of the Treaty, developed States Party to the Treaty should consider taking measures, making contributions and establishing programmes, as soon as possible, for the provision of special assistance in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for developing States Party to the Treaty.

The Conference recommends that, in reaching decisions on the provision of equipment, materials, services and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, on concessional and other appropriate financial arrangements and on the furnishing of technical assistance in the nuclear field, including co-operation related to the continuous operation of peaceful nuclear facilities, States Party to the Treaty should give weight to adherence to the Treaty by recipient States. The Conference recommends, in this connexion, that any special measures of co-operation to meet the growing needs of developing States Party to the Treaty might include increased and supplemental voluntary aid provided bilaterally or through multilateral channels such as the IAEA's facilities for administering funds-in-trust and gifts-in-kind.
The Conference further recommends that States Party to the Treaty in a position to do so, meet, to the fullest extent possible, "technically sound" requests for technical assistance, submitted to the IAEA by developing States Party to the Treaty, which the IAEA is unable to finance from its own resources, as well as such "technically sound" requests as may be made by developing States Party to the Treaty which are not Members of the IAEA.

The Conference recognizes that regional or multinational nuclear fuel cycle centres may be an advantageous way to satisfy, safely and economically, the needs of many States in the course of initiating or expanding nuclear power programmes, while at the same time facilitating physical protection and the application of IAEA safeguards, and contributing to the goals of the Treaty.

The Conference welcomes the IAEA's studies in this area, and recommends that they be continued as expeditiously as possible. It considers that such studies should include, among other aspects, identification of the complex practical and organizational difficulties which will need to be dealt with in connexion with such projects.

The Conference urges all Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so to co-operate in these studies, particularly by providing to the IAEA where possible economic data concerning construction and operation of facilities such as chemical reprocessing plants, plutonium fuel fabrication plants, waste management installations, and longer-term spent fuel storage, and by assistance to the IAEA to enable it to undertake feasibility studies concerning the establishment of regional nuclear fuel cycle centres in specific geographic regions.

The Conference hopes that, if these studies lead to positive findings, and if the establishment of regional or multinational nuclear fuel cycle centres is undertaken, Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so, will co-operate in, and provide assistance for, the elaboration and realization of such projects.

**REVIEW OF ARTICLE V**

The Conference reaffirms the obligation of Parties to the Treaty to take appropriate measures to ensure that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions are made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty in full accordance with the provisions of Article V and other applicable international obligations. In this connexion, the Conference also reaffirms that such services should be provided to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used should be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development.

The Conference notes that any potential benefits could be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States not Party to the Treaty by way of nuclear explosion services provided by nuclear-weapon States, as defined by the Treaty, and conducted under the appropriate international observation and international procedures called for in Article V and in accordance with other applicable international obligations. The Conference considers it imperative that access to potential benefits of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes not lead to any proliferation of nuclear explosive capability.

The Conference considers the IAEA to be the appropriate international body, referred to in Article V of the Treaty, through which potential benefits from peaceful applications of nuclear explosions could be made available to any non-nuclear-weapon State. Accordingly, the Conference urges the IAEA to expedite work on identifying and
examining the important legal issues involved in, and to commence consideration of, the structure and content of the special international agreement or agreements contemplated in Article V of the Treaty, taking into account the views of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (COD) and the United Nations General Assembly and affording an opportunity to States Party to the Treaty but not Members of the IAEA to participate in such work.

The Conference notes that the technology of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes is still at the stage of development and study and that there are a number of interrelated international legal and other aspects of such explosions which still need to be investigated.

The Conference commends the work in this field that has been carried out within the IAEA and looks forward to the continuance of such work pursuant to United Nations General Assembly resolution 3261 D (XXIX). It emphasizes that the IAEA should play the central role in matters relating to the provision of services for the application of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. It believes that the IAEA should broaden its consideration of this subject to encompass, within its area of competence, all aspects and implications of the practical applications of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. To this end it urges the IAEA to set up appropriate machinery within which intergovernmental discussion can take place and through which advice can be given on the Agency's work in this field.

The Conference attaches considerable importance to the consideration by the CCD, pursuant to United Nations General Assembly resolution 3261 D (XXIX) and taking due account of the views of the IAEA, of the arms control implications of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

The Conference notes that the thirtieth session of the United Nations General Assembly will receive reports pursuant to United Nations General Assembly resolution 3261 D (XXIX) and will provide an opportunity for States to discuss questions related to the application of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The Conference further notes that the results of discussion in the United Nations General Assembly at its thirtieth session will be available to be taken into account by the IAEA and the CCD for their further consideration.

**REVIEW OF ARTICLE VI**

The Conference recalls the provisions of Article VI of the Treaty under which all Parties undertook to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating

- to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and
- to nuclear disarmament and
- to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

While welcoming the various agreements on arms limitation and disarmament elaborated and concluded over the last few years as steps contributing to the implementation of Article VI of the Treaty, the Conference expresses its serious concern that the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, is continuing unabated.
The Conference therefore urges constant and resolute efforts by each of the Parties to the Treaty, in particular by the nuclear-weapon States, to achieve an early and effective implementation of Article VI of the Treaty.

The Conference affirms the determination expressed in the preamble to the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty and reiterated in the preamble to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. The Conference expresses the view that the conclusion of a treaty banning all nuclear weapons tests is one of the most important measures to halt the nuclear arms race. It expresses the hope that the nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty will take the lead in reaching an early solution of the technical and political difficulties on this issue. It appeals to these States to make every effort to reach agreement on the conclusion of an effective comprehensive test ban. To this end, the desire was expressed by a considerable number of delegations at the Conference that the nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty should as soon as possible enter into an agreement, open to all States and containing appropriate provisions to ensure its effectiveness, to halt all nuclear weapons tests of adhering States for a specified time, whereupon the terms of such an agreement would be reviewed in the light of the opportunity, at that time, to achieve a universal and permanent cessation of all nuclear weapons tests. The Conference calls upon the nuclear-weapon States signatories of the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapons tests, meanwhile, to limit the number of their underground nuclear weapons tests to a minimum. The Conference believes that such steps would constitute an incentive of particular value to negotiations for the conclusion of a treaty banning all nuclear weapons test explosions for all time.

The Conference appeals to the nuclear-weapon States parties to the negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms to endeavour to conclude at the earliest possible date the new agreement that was outlined by their leaders in November 1974. The Conference looks forward to the commencement of follow-on negotiations on further limitations of, and significant reductions in, their nuclear weapons systems as soon as possible following the conclusion of such an agreement.

The Conference notes that, notwithstanding earlier progress, the CCD has recently been unable to reach agreement on new substantive measures to advance the objectives of Article VI of the Treaty. It urges, therefore, all members of the CCD Party to the Treaty, in particular the nuclear-weapon States Party, to increase their efforts to achieve effective disarmament agreements on all subjects on the agenda of the CCD.

The Conference expresses the hope that all States Party to the Treaty, through the United Nations and the CCD and other negotiations in which they participate, will work with determination towards the conclusion of arms limitation and disarmament agreements which will contribute to the goal of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

The Conference expresses the view that, disarmament being a matter of general concern, the provision of information to all governments and peoples on the situation in the field of the arms race and disarmament is of great importance for the attainment of the aims of Article VI. The Conference therefore invites the United Nations to consider ways and means of improving its existing facilities for the collection, compilation and dissemination of information on disarmament issues, in order to keep all governments as well as world public opinion properly informed on progress achieved in the realization of the provisions of Article VI of the Treaty.
Recognizing that all States have need to ensure their independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty, the Conference emphasizes the particular importance of assuring and strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties which have renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons. It acknowledges that States Parties find themselves in different security situations and therefore that various appropriate means are necessary to meet the security concerns of States Parties.

The Conference underlines the importance of adherence to the Treaty by non-nuclear-weapon States as the best means of reassuring one another of their renunciation of nuclear weapons and as one of the effective means of strengthening their mutual security.

The Conference takes note of the continued determination of the Depositary States to honour their statements, which were welcomed by the United Nations Security Council in resolution 255(1968), that, to ensure the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, they will provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty which is a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.

The Conference, bearing in mind Article VII of the Treaty, considers that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the initiative and with the agreement of the directly concerned States of the zone, represents an effective means of curbing the spread of nuclear weapons, and could contribute significantly to the security of those States. It welcomes the steps which have been taken toward the establishment of such zones.

The Conference recognizes that for the maximum effectiveness of any Treaty arrangements for establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone the co-operation of the nuclear-weapon States is necessary. At the Conference it was urged by a considerable number of delegations that nuclear-weapon States should provide, in an appropriate manner, binding security assurances to those States which become fully bound by the provisions of such regional arrangements.

At the Conference it was also urged that determined efforts at general application must be made especially by the nuclear weapon States Party to the Treaty, to ensure the security of all non-nuclear-weapon States Parties. To this end the Conference urges all States, both nuclear weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States to refrain, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, from the threat or the use of force in relations between States, involving either nuclear or non-nuclear weapons. Additionally, it stresses the responsibility of all Parties to the Treaty and especially the nuclear-weapon States, to take effective steps to strengthen the security of non-nuclear-weapon States and to promote in all appropriate fora the consideration of all practical means to this end, taking into account the views expressed at this Conference.

The Conference invites States Party to the Treaty which are Members of the United Nations to request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to include the following item in the provisional agenda of the thirty-first session of the
General Assembly: "Implementation of the conclusions of the first Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons".

The States Party to the Treaty participating in the Conference propose to the Depositary Governments that a second Conference to review the operation of the Treaty be convened in 1980.

The Conference accordingly invites States Party to the Treaty which are Members of the United Nations to request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to include the following item in the provisional agenda of the thirty-third session of the General Assembly: "Implementation of the conclusions of the first Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and establishment of a preparatory committee for the second Conference."

REVIEW OF ARTICLE IX

The five years that have passed since the entry into force of the Treaty have demonstrated its wide international acceptance. The Conference welcomes the recent progress towards achieving wider adherence. At the same time, the Conference notes with concern that the Treaty has not as yet achieved universal adherence. Therefore, the Conference expresses the hope that States that have not already joined the Treaty should do so at the earliest possible date.
REPORT OF THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE

1. In accordance with Rule 36 of the Rules of Procedure, the Conference established a Drafting Committee composed of representatives of the States represented on the General Committee, that is, Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Federal Republic of Germany, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Ireland, Honduras, Hungary, Lebanon, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Yugoslavia and Zaire.

2. The Committee met under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Eugeniusz Wyzner (Poland). Ambassador Mario Carias (Honduras) and Mr. A.K. Fiajoe (Ghana) served as Vice-Chairmen.

3. The Committee held an organizational meeting on 14 May. Subsequently it held meetings between 26 and 29 May. In accordance with the mandate given to it by the General Committee, the Drafting Committee also held a number of informal meetings between 20 and 26 May, to deal with the Preamble of a draft declaration by the Conference.

4. At its twelfth plenary meeting, on 26 May, the Conference decided to transmit to the Drafting Committee for its consideration the reports of Main Committees I and II with all the documents attached to those reports (NPT/CONF/23 and Corr.1 and NPT/CONF/24, respectively). In addition, the Committee considered the following documents:

   NPT/CONF/L.2 Draft resolution by Bolivia, Ecuador, Ghana, Honduras, Jamaica, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Sudan, Syria, Yugoslavia and Zaire.

   NPT/CONF/L.3 Draft resolution by Bolivia, Ecuador, Ghana, Honduras, Jamaica, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Peru, Romania, Sudan, Syria, Yugoslavia and Zaire.

GE.75-66050
5. At its meeting on 26 May, the Committee decided to establish three working groups. Working Group A was to deal with questions relating to the Preamble and Articles I and II of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Working Group B was to deal with the proposals related to Articles VI and VII of the Treaty, security guarantees, and the question of follow-up to the Conference. Working Group C would deal with proposals relating to Articles III, IV and V of the Treaty.

6. The three working groups held a number of meetings between 26 and 29 May. Group A met under the Chairmanship of Ambassador R.W. Furlonger (Australia); Working Group B under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Harald Rose (German Democratic Republic); and Working Group C under the Chairmanship of Mr. D.L. Siazon, Jr. (Philippines).

7. As a basis for its work, each Working Group had before it the documents relevant to its work among those referred to in paragraph 4 above and, in addition, a number of informal draft proposals. Although each Working Group was responsible for the area of work assigned to it, each one was entitled to consider documents or proposals falling within the competence of the other two if they were relevant to its own work.

8. On 29 May, the Drafting Committee reviewed the progress achieved by the three Working Groups. In spite of the very short time the Working Groups had had at their disposal, they had made progress in reconciling the various proposals before them. Because of lack of time the Drafting Committee was not able to complete its work.

9. However, a number of texts, to be included in the Declaration were agreed upon and these are reflected in Annex I. On the other hand, a number of texts have been amalgamated, although with some divergences of views persisting, which are reflected either by square brackets or alternative formulations. These texts appear in Annex II.
REPORT OF THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE

Corrigendum

The title of NPT/CONF/31 should read: "Draft Report of the Drafting Committee".
REPORT OF THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE

1. In accordance with Rule 36 of the Rules of Procedure, the Conference established a Drafting Committee composed of representatives of the States represented on the General Committee, that is, Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, German Democratic Republic, Germany (Federal Republic of), Ghana, Ireland, Honduras, Hungary, Lebanon, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Yugoslavia and Zaire.

2. The Committee met under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Eugeniusz Wyzner (Poland). Ambassador Mario Carias (Honduras) and Mr. A. K. Fiajtoe (Ghana) served as Vice-Chairmen.

3. The Committee held an organizational meeting on 14 May. Subsequently it held five meetings between 26 and 29 May. In accordance with the mandate given to it by the General Committee, the Drafting Committee also held a number of informal meetings between 20 and 26 May, to deal with the Preamble of a draft declaration by the Conference.

4. At its twelfth plenary meeting, on 26 May, the Conference decided to transmit to the Drafting Committee for its consideration the reports of Main Committees I and II with all the documents attached to those reports (NPT/CONF/23 and Corr.1 and NPT/CONF/24, respectively). The Committee considered all these documents and, in addition, the following documents submitted to the Conference subsequently:

- NPT/CONF/L.2 Draft resolution by Bolivia, Ecuador, Ghana, Honduras, Jamaica, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Sudan, Syria, Yugoslavia and Zaire

- NPT/CONF/L.3 Draft resolution by Bolivia, Ecuador, Ghana, Honduras, Jamaica, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Peru, Romania, Sudan, Syria, Yugoslavia and Zaire

GE.75-66063
Draft resolution by Bolivia, Ecuador, Ghana, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Romania, Sudan, Yugoslavia and Zaire.

Working Paper on Article VI by the United States.

Proposal on the follow-up of the Conference by Italy.

5. At its meeting on 26 May, the Committee decided to establish three working groups. Working Group A was to deal with questions relating to the Preamble and Articles I and II of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Working Group B was to deal with the proposals related to Articles VI and VII of the Treaty, security guarantees, and the question of follow-up to the Conference. Working Group C would deal with proposals relating to Articles III, IV and V of the Treaty.

6. The three working groups held a number of meetings between 26 and 29 May. Group A met under the Chairmanship of Ambassador R. W. Furlonger (Australia); Working Group B under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Harald Rose (German Democratic Republic); and Working Group C under the Chairmanship of Mr. D. L. Sison, Jr. (Philippines).

7. As a basis for its work, each Working Group had before it the documents relevant to its work among those referred to in paragraph 4 above and, in addition, a number of informal draft proposals. Although each Working Group was responsible for the area of work assigned to it, each one was entitled to consider documents or proposals falling within the competence of the other two if they were relevant to its own work. In spite of the very short time the Working Groups had at their disposal, they made progress in reconciling the various proposals before them.

8. On 29 May, the Drafting Committee reviewed the progress achieved by the three Working Groups. Because of lack of time, the Drafting Committee was not able to complete its work, but held itself ready to meet again, if required by the Plenary. The documents mentioned in paragraph 4 above are attached to this report as Annex I.
ANNEX I
REPORT OF COMMITTEE I

1. Pursuant to Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure, the Conference established Committee I as a Main Committee and referred to it, on the basis of a recommendation of the General Committee (NPT/CONF/16), the following items for consideration:

Item 13 Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its Article VIII(3):

A. Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament and international peace and security:
   (1) Articles I, II and III (1, 2 and 4) and Preambular paragraphs 1-5
   (2) Article VI and Preambular paragraphs 8-12
   (3) Article VII

C. Other provisions of the Treaty


Item 14 Role of the Treaty in the promotion of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and of nuclear disarmament and in strengthening international peace and security

A. Acceptance of the Treaty by States

B. Measures aimed at promoting a wider acceptance of the Treaty

2. The Committee met under the Chairmanship of Mr. B.A. Clark (Nigeria). Mr. Raiko Nikolov (Bulgaria) and Mr. Stefano D'Andrea (Italy) served as Vice-Chairmen.

3. Committee I held 14 meetings between 13 and 23 May 1975. The Committee's deliberations are summarized in documents NPT/CONF/C.1/SR.1-14. After an initial general exchange of views and reading of the provisions of Treaty and related matters allocated to the Committee, consideration was given to the documents listed in paragraphs 5 and 6 below. Exchanges of views also took place within informal working groups established by the Committee. (See paragraph 6 below).
4. The Committee had before it the following background documentation:

**NPT/CONF/5**
Background paper on the basic facts within the framework of the United Nations in connexion with the realization of the purposes of Articles I and II of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

**NPT/CONF/6/Add.2**
List of deposits of instruments of ratification or accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

**NPT/CONF/7 and Add.1**
Background paper on the basic facts within the framework of the United Nations in connexion with the realization of the purposes of Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

**NPT/CONF/8 and Add.1**
Background paper on the basic facts within the framework of the United Nations in connexion with the realization of the purposes of the tenth preambular paragraph of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

**NPT/CONF/9 and Add.1**
OPANAL's Report on the implementation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and some comments and views with respect to Article VII and other related provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty

**NPT/CONF/10 and Add.1**
Background paper on the basic facts within the framework of the United Nations in connexion with the realization of the purposes of Articles IV and of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

**NPT/CONF/15**
Working paper on the final documents of the NPT Review Conference by Ghana, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Romania, Sudan, Yugoslavia and Zaire

5. The Committee had before it the following documents referred to it by the Conference:

(a) Draft Resolution by Bolivia, Ecuador, Ghana, Honduras, Jamaica, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Yugoslavia and Zaire

**NPT/CONF/L.1 and Add.1-3**
(b) Working paper containing a draft additional protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons regarding nuclear weapon tests by Bolivia, Ecuador, Ghana, Honduras, Jamaica, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Sudan, Syria, Yugoslavia and Zaire

(c) Working paper containing a draft additional protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons regarding the implementation of its Article VI by Bolivia, Ghana, Ecuador, Honduras, Jamaica, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Peru, Romania, Sudan, Syria, Yugoslavia and Zaire

6. The following documents were submitted to the Committee:

(d) Working paper containing a draft additional protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons regarding the establishment of a system of security assurances within the framework of the Treaty by Bolivia, Ecuador, Ghana, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Romania, Sudan, Yugoslavia and Zaire

(e) Draft resolution by Ghana, Nepal, Nigeria, Romania, Yugoslavia

(f) Draft resolution on Article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by Iran

(g) Draft resolution on Article VI by Romania

(h) Working paper containing formulations for the final declaration (preamble) by German Democratic Republic

(i) Working paper on draft paragraphs in a final declaration by Australia, Canada, Ireland

(j) Working paper containing formulations for the final declaration on Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia

(k) Working paper containing formulations for the final declaration on Article VII and security assurances by Bulgaria, Mongolia and Poland

(l) Working paper on draft preamble of a final declaration by Italy
(m) Working paper containing a suggested formulation on the final declaration on participation by Australia, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany

(n) Working paper on Article VI by Sweden

(o) Working paper containing amendments to draft initial paragraphs for the preamble to a general declaration (as contained in documents NPT/CONF/C.I/2, 3, 6 and 6/Corr.1) by Mexico

7. At its 11th meeting on 21 May, the Committee established two open-ended working groups in order to facilitate the consideration of the documents before it. Working Group I was allocated the following documents:

NPT/CONF/L.1 and Add. 1-2
NPT/CONF/C.I/2 to 9

Working Group II was allocated the following documents:

NPT/CONF/17 and Add. 1-3
NPT/CONF/18 and Add. 1-3
NPT/CONF/22 and Add. 1
NPT/CONF/C.I/L.1 to 3

The two Working Groups considered these documents at meetings held on 21 and 22 May, under the Chairmanship of Mr. R. Nikalov (Working Group I) and Mr. S. D'Andrea (Working Group II).

8. The Committee notes that the various views expressed and proposals made are fully reflected in the Summary Records of the Committee and in the documents mentioned in paragraphs 5 and 6 above and considered by the Committee. They form an integral part of the report of the Committee and are forwarded to the Conference for its consideration as such.
The Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Having reviewed the operation of the Treaty in accordance with the provisions of its article VIII,

Noting that such a review has demonstrated the necessity that effective measures be taken in order to promote the realization of the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty,

Convinced of the desirability that a second conference with the same purposes as the first be convened in five years,

Convinced further that it is necessary that the General Assembly of the United Nations have the opportunity to review every two years the implementation of the resolutions and other instruments adopted by the first Conference,

1. Requests the Secretary-General of the United Nations to include the following item in the provisional agenda of the thirty-first session of the General Assembly: "Implementation of the resolutions and other instruments adopted by the first Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons";

2. Requests also the Secretary-General of the United Nations to include the following item in the provisional agenda of the thirty-third session of the General Assembly: "Implementation of the resolutions and other instruments adopted by the first Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and establishment of a preparatory committee for the second Conference to be held in 1980 for the same purposes as the first".

Re-issued for technical reasons.

GE.75-65472
ADDENDUM

GHANA, MEXICO, MOROCCO, NIGERIA, PERU, ROMANIA, SUDAN, YUGOSLAVIA
AND ZAIRE

DRAFT RESOLUTION

Add Ecuador, Honduras, Jamaica, Lebanon, Liberia, the Philippines
and Thailand as co-sponsors.
GHANA, MEXICO, MOROCCO, NIGERIA, PERU, ROMANIA, SUDAN, YUGOSLAVIA AND ZAIRE

DRAFT RESOLUTION

Addendum

Add Nicaragua and Syrian Arab Republic as co-sponsors.
GHANA, MEXICO, MOROCCO, NIGERIA, PERU, ROMANIA, SUDAN, YUGOSLAVIA AND ZAIRE

DRAFT RESOLUTION

Addendum

Add Bolivia as a co-sponsor.
Introductory note

In its resolution 2373 (XXII) of 12 June 1968, the General Assembly of the United Nations expressed inter alia "the hope for the widest possible adherence to the Treaty" on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. That hope was undeniably based on the conviction stated in unequivocal terms in the penultimate preambular paragraph of the same resolution in which the Assembly declared itself "convinced" that "an agreement to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons must be followed as soon as possible by effective measures on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament, and that the non-proliferation treaty will contribute to this aim".

To the foregoing one must add a whole series of facts which are equally pertinent in this regard, some of the most outstanding of which are recalled here:

That the Non-Proliferation Treaty itself has reiterated in its preamble the determination, proclaimed since 1963 in the Moscow Treaty, "to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time";

That in four of its very numerous resolutions on this question, the Assembly has "condemned" with the utmost vigour all nuclear weapon tests, in whatever environment they may be conducted;

That the Assembly itself has repeatedly expressed the conviction that, "whatever may be the differences on the question of verification, there is no valid reason for delaying the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban";

* Re-issued for technical reasons

GE.75-65476
That it is also the Assembly, the most representative body of the international community, which has affirmed, in its most recent resolution - 3257 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974 - on this subject, that "the continuance of nuclear weapon testing will intensify the arms race, thus increasing the danger of nuclear war";

That, as the Secretary-General of the United Nations emphatically stated more than three years ago, in his first address to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, on 20 February 1972: "All the technical and scientific aspects of the problem have been so fully explored that only a political decision is now necessary in order to achieve final agreement".

The inevitable conclusion which, in the opinion of the delegations co-sponsoring this working paper, is to be drawn from facts such as those just recalled is that one of the most effective measures for strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty and for promoting universal adherence to it would be that the three nuclear-weapon States, which are not only Parties to the Treaty but act as its depositaries as well, demonstrate their readiness to support with tangible deeds the provisions of the Treaty's preamble regarding the cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

For this reason the sponsoring delegations believe that they are making a positive contribution to the work of the Conference in submitting to it a draft "Additional Protocol I" on this subject. They are also convinced that the entry into force of the proposed instrument would in no way undermine the security of the depositary States, since the extent of the lead in nuclear war technology and the enormity of the nuclear arsenals of the USSR and the United States of America are such that, even if they were to suspend all nuclear weapon tests for half a century, it is absolutely certain that they would continue to maintain an indisputable superiority. As if this were not sufficient, the Treaty's provisions regarding withdrawal, which would apply as well to the Protocol, would give each of the Parties the right to withdraw from the Protocol, "in exercising its national sovereignty", should any of them reach the conclusion that, at a given moment, the supreme interests of its country require it.

On the other hand, it is equally certain that a Protocol such as the one proposed would constitute an incentive of particular value in order to prompt the other nuclear-weapon States to commit themselves to put an end to all of their tests with such weapons.

The text of the draft Protocol which, basing themselves on the foregoing considerations, the sponsoring delegations submit to the Conference is the following:
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The Depositary Governments of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, referred to in this Protocol as "the Treaty",

Conscious that universal, or at least the widest possible, adherence to the Treaty will contribute to avoid an increase in the danger of nuclear war,

Convinced that one of the most effective procedures for attaining such adherence would be the implementation of the provisions of the Preamble of the Treaty reiterating the determination, proclaimed since 1963 in the Moscow Treaty, to achieve "the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time",

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1. They undertake to decree the suspension of all their underground nuclear weapon tests for a period of ten years, as soon as the number of Parties to the Treaty reaches one hundred.

Article 2. They undertake also to extend by three years the moratorium contemplated in the preceding article, each time that five additional States become Parties to the Treaty.

Article 3. They undertake to transform the moratorium into a permanent cessation of all nuclear weapon tests, through the conclusion of a multilateral treaty for that purpose, as soon as the other nuclear weapon States indicate their willingness to become parties to said treaty.

Article 4. This Protocol will be of the same duration as the Treaty.
Nevertheless the provisions of the latter's Article X regarding withdrawal shall apply to it.

Article 5. This Protocol shall be subject to ratification by the three Depositary States of the Treaty to which it is open for signature and shall enter into force on the date that the instruments of ratification of two of them are received by the Secretary-General of the United Nations who shall be the depositary of the Protocol.
ADDENDUM

GHANA, MEXICO, MOROCCO, NIGERIA, PERU, ROMANIA, SUDAN, YUGOSLAVIA AND ZAIRE

Working paper containing a draft additional protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons regarding nuclear weapon tests

Add Ecuador, Honduras, Jamaica, Lebanon, Liberia and the Philippines as sponsors.
ADDENDUM

GHANA, MEXICO, MOROCCO, NIGERIA, PARU, ROMANIA, SUDAN, YUGOSLAVIA AND ZAIRE

Working paper containing a draft additional protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons regarding nuclear weapon tests

Add Nepal as a co-sponsor.
GHANA, MEXICO, MOROCCO, NIGERIA, PERU, ROMANIA, SUDAN, YUGOSLAVIA
AND ZAIRE

Working paper containing a draft additional protocol to the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
regarding nuclear weapon tests

Addendum

Add Nicaragua and Syrian Arab Republic as co-sponsors.
Working paper containing a draft additional protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons regarding nuclear weapon tests

Addendum

Add Bolivia as a co-sponsor.
GHANA, MEXICO, MOROCCO, NIGERIA, PERU, ROMANIA, SUDAN, YUGOSLAVIA AND ZAIRE

WORKING PAPER

CONTAINING A DRAFT ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS REGARDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS ARTICLE VI

Introductory note

In its resolution 2373 (XXII) of 12 June 1968, the General Assembly of the United Nations expressed *inter alia* "the hope for the widest possible adherence to the Treaty" on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

That hope was undoubtedly based on the conviction stated in unequivocal terms in the penultimate preambular paragraph of the same resolution in which the Assembly declared itself "convinced" that "an agreement to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons must be followed as soon as possible by effective measures on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament, and that the non-proliferation treaty will contribute to this aim".

It was no doubt for this same reason that the Treaty itself contains an article - article VI - aimed at reaffirming the Assembly's conviction referred to by providing that:

"Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."

If, as set forth in the Treaty's article VIII, the basic objective of this Conference is to review how 'the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty' have been, and are being, realized, the inevitable conclusions to be drawn from any objective analysis of reality are, with regard to the above-mentioned article, not only extremely disappointing but truly alarming. The nuclear arms race, far from ceasing as contemplated in the Treaty's article VI, has been stepped up in such a manner that it has given rise to the situation known as overkill. Implicit in such a situation is the constant threat of a nuclear holocaust, as shown by the two grave crises which in 1962 and 1973 gave rise to a general alert.

* Re-issued for technical reasons.

GE.75-65481
The imminence of this danger appears to have begun to find its way even in the highest political levels. Thus during the last session of the General Assembly, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of one of the so most powerful nuclear-weapon States stated emphatically:

"Stable and lasting peace is incompatible with the arms race. They are antipodes. One cannot seriously think of eliminating the threat of war, while at the same time increasing military budgets and endlessly building up armaments .... The supreme interests not only of the peoples of the Soviet Union and the United States, but also of the peoples of the whole world require that the Soviet Union and the United States, possessing the colossal might of nuclear weapons, should make every effort to achieve appropriate understandings and agreements".

To date the only results which the Treaty's depositary States can point to regarding their commitment under article VI are the meagre ones obtained in the bilateral negotiations on the limitation of strategic nuclear-weapon systems (SALT) which have been going on for some years. If in the international sphere those negotiations have had some beneficial consequences of a political and psychological nature, their very modest scope as disarmament measures has in practice appeared to be of no account. This has prompted the Assembly to urge the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States repeatedly, as it did in its latest resolution in this regard - resolution 3261 C (XXIX) of 9 December 1974 - to broaden the scope and accelerate the pace of their negotiations, stressing anew the necessity and urgency of reaching agreement on important qualitative limitations and substantial reductions of their strategic nuclear-weapon systems as a positive step towards nuclear disarmament".

In the light of the foregoing, it is axiomatic that one of the most effective measures for strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty and for promoting universal adherence to it would be that the two States possessing by far the largest nuclear arsenals in existence demonstrate their readiness to support with tangible deeds the provisions of the Treaty's article VI relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament.

For this reason the sponsoring delegations believe that they are making a positive contribution to the work of the Conference in submitting to it a draft "Additional Protocol II" on this subject. They are also convinced that the entry into force of the proposed instrument could not undermine the security of those two depositary States. On the one hand, the reductions suggested would in no way affect the system on which are based the proportions that they freely accepted in the Vladivostok accords. On the other hand, the extent of their lead in nuclear war technology and the enormity of their nuclear arsenals are such that, even after they had carried out the parity reductions called for in the Additional Protocol, the number of nuclear weapons and of
delivery vehicles which each one would maintain would still be much superior to that which might be at the disposal of all of the other nuclear-weapon States taken together. As if this were not sufficient, the Treaty's provisions regarding withdrawal, which would apply as well to the Protocol, would give each of the Parties the right to withdraw from the Protocol, in exercising its national sovereignty", should either of them reach the conclusion that, at a given moment, the supreme interests of its country require it. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that a Protocol such as the one proposed would constitute an incentive of particular value in order to prompt the other nuclear-weapon States to adopt measures for reductions similar to those set forth in it.

The text of the draft Protocol which, basing themselves on the foregoing considerations, the sponsoring delegations submit to the Conference is the following:

**ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS**

The Depositary Governments of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons — referred to in this Protocol as "the Treaty" — which participate in the bilateral negotiations on the limitation of strategic nuclear-weapon systems (SALT), Conscious that universal, or at least the widest possible, adherence to the Treaty will contribute to avoid an increase in the danger of nuclear war, Convinced that one of the most effective procedures for attaining such adherence would be the parallel achievement of tangible results relating to nuclear disarmament, Bearing in mind that in the accords reached at Vladivostok in November of 1974 both Governments agreed that each side would be entitled to have an aggregate maximum of 2,400 intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers, and that only 1,320 of the ballistic missiles may be equipped with multiple independently targetable warheads (MIRV's), Have agreed as follows:

**Article 1.** They solemnly reaffirm the obligations undertaken in article VI of the Treaty to pursue "negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament".

**Article 2.** They undertake, as soon as the number of Parties to the Treaty has reached one hundred:

(a) To reduce by fifty per cent the ceiling of 2,400 nuclear strategic delivery vehicles contemplated for each side under the Vladivostok accords;

(b) To reduce likewise by fifty per cent the ceiling of 1,320 strategic ballistic missiles which, under those accords, each side may equip with multiple independently targetable warheads (MIRV's).
Article 3. They also undertake, once such reductions have been carried out, to reduce by ten per cent the ceilings of 1,200 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and of 660 strategic ballistic missiles that may be equipped with multiple independently targetable warheads (MIRV's), each time that ten additional States become Parties to the Treaty.

Article 4. This Protocol will be of the same duration as the Treaty. Nevertheless the provisions of the latter's article X regarding withdrawal shall apply to it.

Article 5. This Protocol shall be subject to ratification by the two States to which it is open for signature and shall enter into force on the date both instruments of ratification have been received by the Secretary-General of the United Nations who shall be the depositary of the Protocol.
ADDENDUM

GHANA, MEXICO, MOROCCO, NIGERIA, PERU, ROMANIA, SUDAN, YUGOSLAVIA
AND ZAIRE

Working paper containing a draft additional protocol to the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
regarding the implementation of its article VI

add Ecuador, Honduras, Jamaica, Lebanon and Liberia as co-sponsors.
ADDENDUM

GHANA, MEXICO, MOROCCO, NIGERIA, PERU, ROMANIA, SUDAN, YUGOSLAVIA AND ZAIRE

Working paper containing a draft additional protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons regarding the implementation of its article VI

Add Bolivia and Nepal as co-sponsors.
GHANA, MEXICO, MOROCCO, NIGERIA, PERU, ROMANIA, SUDAN, YUGOSLAVIA AND ZAIRE

Working paper containing a draft additional protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons regarding the implementation of its article VI

Addendum

Add Nicaragua and Syrian Arab Republic as co-sponsors.
ECUADOR, GHANA, MEXICO, NIGERIA, PERU, ROMANIA, SUDAN AND ZAIRE

WORKING PAPER
CONTAINING A DRAFT ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY
ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS REGARDING
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SYSTEM OF SECURITY ASSURANCES
WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE TREATY

Introductory note

It is generally accepted that the non-nuclear-weapon States, by renouncing
to acquire such weapons in accordance with Articles II and III of the Treaty, have
the right to have their independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty
guaranteed against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

On the other hand, the acceleration of the arms race and the accumulation of
a great amount of arms during the period since the entry into force of the Treaty
have led to the increase of the degree of insecurity in the world.

Resolution 255 (1968) of the Security Council relates to the possible action
to be taken by the Security Council only when a nuclear attack has occurred. It
does not offer, therefore, appropriate assurances for the prevention of the use
or of the threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Finally, it should be borne in mind, in connexion with this matter, that the
United Nations General Assembly in its Declaration of 24 November 1961 solemnly
proclaimed that the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is contrary to the
rules of international law and to the laws of humanity.

For the above reasons the sponsoring delegations believe that they are making
a positive contribution to the work of the Conference in submitting to it the
following draft:

GB.75-65567
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL III TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The Depositary Governments of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, referred to in this Protocol as "The Treaty",

Recalling that, according to the Charter of the United Nations, the States have the obligation to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations,

Taking into account resolution 3261 G (XXIX) which considered inter alia that it is imperative for the international community to devise effective measures in order to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States,

Recognizing that the effectiveness of the Treaty, its viability and universality depend, to a great extent, on its balanced character and on the existence of appropriate assurances for the States which have consented, by virtue of the Treaty, to renounce acquiring or manufacturing nuclear weapons,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1. They solemnly undertake

a) never and under no circumstances to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty whose territories are completely free from nuclear weapons, and,

b) to refrain from first use of nuclear weapons against any other non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty.

Article 2. They undertake to encourage negotiations initiated by any group of States Parties to the Treaty or others to establish nuclear weapon free zones in their respective territories or regions, and to respect the statute of nuclear weapon free zones established.

Article 3. In the event a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty becomes a victim of an attack with nuclear weapons or of a threat with the use of such weapons, the States Parties to this Protocol, at the request of the victim of such threat or attack, undertake to provide it immediate assistance without prejudice to their obligations under the United Nations Charter.
Article 4. This Protocol will be of the same duration as the Treaty. Nevertheless, the provisions of the latter's Article X regarding withdrawal shall apply to it.

Article 5. This Protocol shall be subject to ratification by the three Depositary States of the Treaty to which it is open for signature and shall enter into force on the date that the instruments of ratification of two of them are received by the Secretary-General of the United Nations who shall be the depositary of the Protocol.
ECUADOR, GHANA, MEXICO, NIGERIA, PERU, ROMANIA, SUDAN AND ZAIRE

WORKING PAPER
CONTAINING A DRAFT ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY
ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS REGARDING
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SYSTEM OF SECURITY ASSURANCES
WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE TREATY

Addendum

Add Yugoslavia as a co-sponsor.
ECUADOR, GHANA, MEXICO, NIGERIA, PERU, ROMANIA, SUDAN AND ZAIRE

WORKING PAPER

CONTAINING A DRAFT ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SYSTEM OF SECURITY ASSURANCES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE TREATY

Addendum

Add Bolivia as a co-sponsor.
Draft Resolution

The Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Recalling General Assembly resolution 2661 A (XXV) of 1970 by which it urged the Governments of nuclear-weapon Powers to bring about an immediate halt in the nuclear arms race and to cease all testing as well as deployment of offensive and defensive nuclear-weapon systems,

Taking into account that peace and security in the world cannot be maintained unless an immediate stop is put to the nuclear arms race followed by nuclear disarmament,

Convinced that only the nuclear-weapon States can stop vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons which would substantially contribute towards preventing their horizontal proliferation as well,

Noting with satisfaction that the non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty have been faithfully abiding by the spirit and letter of Articles II and III of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Deeply convinced that the halting of nuclear arms race and the undertaking of further measures of nuclear disarmament would significantly enhance the creation of essential conditions for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones,

1. Invites the nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty to initiate, as soon as possible but not later than the end of 1976, negotiations on the conclusion of a treaty on the withdrawal from the territories of the non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty of all nuclear-weapon delivery systems, especially tactical nuclear weapons;

2. Requests the nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty to immediately discontinue further deployment of all types of tactical and other nuclear-weapon-delivery systems within the territories of the non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and to simultaneously commence with their gradual withdrawal pending the entry into force of the aforementioned treaty;

3. Invites also the non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on whose territories, waterways or air space the nuclear-weapon delivery systems are deployed not to allow the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against other non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty.

GE.75-65665
IRAQ

Draft resolution on Article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Considering that article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons stresses the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories;

Recognizing that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear weapon-free zones in appropriate regions of the world on the initiative of States directly concerned represent a most effective means to curb the spread of nuclear weapons;

Recognizing in this connexion the particular value of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and its Additional Protocols;


Recalling resolution 3261 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974 of the United Nations General Assembly on the Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in the region of the Middle East;

Recalling resolution 3265 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974 of the United Nations on the Declaration and Establishment of a Nuclear-Free Zone in South Asia;

Recalling further the United Nations General Assembly resolution 3261 F (XXIX) of 9 December 1974 in which the Assembly decided to undertake a comprehensive study of the question of nuclear weapon-free zones in all its aspects;

Noting that in implementation of this decision a group of governmental experts has been set up to carry out this study under the auspices of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament;

1. Invites the Parties to the Treaty and in particular the nuclear weapon States to co-operate with the States in appropriate regions of the world which decide to establish
nuclear weapon-free zones, under effective conditions and an adequate system of safeguards, in order to assure the total absence of such weapons in their respective territories,

2. **Urges** the nuclear weapon States to undertake a solemn obligation never to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against countries which have become Parties to and are fully bound by the provisions of such regional arrangements.
Draft resolution on Article VI submitted by Romania

THE REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Recalling the obligations assumed by each of the Parties to the Treaty under its Article VI, to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recalling further General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII) of 12 June 1968 by which it expressed, inter alia, the conviction that an agreement to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons must be followed as soon as possible by effective measures on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament" and it requested the then existing Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and the Nuclear-Weapon States urgently to pursue negotiations to that end,

Deeply concerned that during the period since the entry into force of the Treaty the nuclear arms race has, nevertheless, continued at an accelerated pace, resulting in accumulation of a great amount of nuclear weapons in the world,

Reaffirming the role of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in the negotiation of those effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament and of a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, which have been referred to in Article VI of the Treaty,

Mindful of the importance of the co-operation of governments and all media in the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty,

1. Requests all Governments Party to the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which are members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, particularly the Depositary Governments, to bring their decisive contribution, in conformity with the obligations assumed by then under Article VI of the Treaty, to developing within the Conference the necessary conditions which would enable it to effectively deal with the measures provided in Article VI of the Treaty as follows:

GE.75-65707
(a) to offer the disarmament negotiations the required perspective in achieving the aims of Article VI of the Treaty most urgently, by a comprehensive approach to the matters relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

(b) to continuously review the operation and the methods of work of the Conference to assure that the negotiations are conducted in the most efficient manner, fully compatible with the principles of equality and the security and the interests of all States;

2. Considers it necessary that a system of retrieval and distribution as well as of assessment and analysis of information on armaments and disarmament issues be established, within the United Nations in order to keep properly informed all governments as well as the international public opinion of the progress achieved in the realization of the provisions of Article VI of the Treaty.
Working Paper Containing Formulations for the Final Declarations (Preamble) Submitted by German Democratic Republic

The States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons, who met in Genova in May 1975

- Having reviewed the operation of the Treaty to ensure that its purposes and provisions are being realized;
- Considering that the trend towards détente in relations between States provides a favourable climate within which more significant progress towards arms limitation and disarmament should be possible;
- Reaffirming the important role of the Treaty in limiting nuclear weapons and averting the danger of nuclear war, in creating the conditions necessary for the cessation of nuclear arms race, for effective measures in the direction of general complete disarmament under strict and effective international control and for facilitating co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and also in strengthening peace and international security and furthering the process of international détente;
- Noting the increasing role of the nuclear technology and the growing responsibilities of the Parties to contribute to the further development of the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in all States, especially in developing countries;
- Noting the necessity that the international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy must be carried out in a manner which will prevent nuclear proliferation;
- Reaffirming that the security of all States would be best ensured through universal adherence to the Treaty;
- Reaffirming their strong support for the Treaty, their continued dedication to its principles and objectives, and their commitment to implement fully and more effectively its provisions;

declare as follows

GE.75-65640
Working Paper submitted by Australia, Canada and Ireland
Draft paragraphs in a final declaration

PREAMBLE

The States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, having met in Geneva in May 1975 in accordance with the Treaty to review the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized,

- Recognizing the continuing importance of the main objectives of the Treaty, namely the avoidance of nuclear proliferation, the pursuit of efforts towards nuclear, as well as general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control and the fullest and widest access to equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful use of nuclear energy,
- Recognizing that the danger of nuclear war remains a major threat to the survival of mankind; and having therefore considered the need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,
- Convinced that the prevention of any further proliferation of nuclear explosives capability and the control and reduction of nuclear weapons, remain vital elements in efforts to avoid nuclear war,
- Considering that the trend towards détente in relations between States provides a favourable climate within which more significant progress towards arms control and disarmament and the control of nuclear proliferation should be possible,
- Noting the increasing role that nuclear energy is expected to play in meeting the world's energy needs and the responsibilities of the Parties to contribute to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in developing countries,
- Recognizing that the accelerated spread and development of peaceful applications of nuclear energy can lower the economic and technological barriers against nuclear proliferation,
Believing that international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the international exchange of nuclear materials and technology for peaceful purposes can best be promoted in a manner consistent with international security by the widest possible application of the Treaty;

- Recognizing that in the pursuit of their common objective of a more secure world, there is a need to balance and reconcile the interests of all States Parties to the Treaty;
- Reaffirming the belief that the security of all States would be best ensured through universal adherence to the Treaty;

declare as follows:

I. PURPOSES

The States Parties to the Treaty reaffirm their strong common interest in averting the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. They reaffirm their strong support for the Treaty, their continued dedication to its principles and objectives, and their commitment to implement fully and more effectively its provisions.

They reaffirm the vital role of the Treaty in international efforts
- to avert further proliferation of nuclear weapons,
- to achieve the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament, and
- to promote co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

II. ARTICLES I AND II

The review undertaken by the Conference confirms that the obligations undertaken under Articles I and II of the Treaty have been faithfully observed by all Parties. The Conference is convinced that the continued strict observance of these Articles remains central to the shared objective of averting the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Working Paper Containing Formulations for the
Final Declaration on Article VI of the NPT
submitted by Czechoslovakia and Hungary

1. The Conference welcomes various agreements on arms limitation and disarmament, both multilateral and bilateral, which have been concluded over the last few years and acknowledges that these international instruments represent steps in the right direction contributing to the implementation of Article VI.

2. In particular, the Conference welcomes the progress achieved in recent years in negotiations on the limitations of strategic nuclear armaments.

3. The Conference notes, however, that the arms race, unprecedented in its scope, is still going on, and that, therefore, resolute efforts are still required to implement the provisions of Article VI.

4. The Conference urges all States to intensify, without delay, their concerted and concentrated efforts for effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date. The Conference considers it important that specific agreements on the reduction of military preparations by States should be elaborated.

5. The Conference calls for the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. It urges the nuclear-weapon States to undertake, at the earliest possible date, negotiations directed towards the conclusion of an appropriate international agreement for this purpose. It believes that in the meantime, till the conclusion of such an agreement, efforts will be made to limit the number of underground nuclear weapon tests to a minimum.

6. The Conference urges speedy conclusion of international agreements for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and of utilizing weather and environment modifications for military and other hostile purposes.

GE.75-65653
7. The Conference calls for the implementation of the General Assembly resolution on the reduction of military budgets by the permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and on the transfer of a part of these savings for the needs of economic development of developing countries.

8. The Conference notes that solutions to problems of disarmament require the support and co-operation of all States. It calls for the convening of the World Disarmament Conference at an early date.
Working Paper Containing Formulations for the Final Declaration on Article VI of the NPT submitted by Czechoslovakia and Hungary

Addendum

Add Mongolia as a co-sponsor.
1. The Conference reaffirms the importance for ensuring the security of the Non-Nuclear Weapon States Parties to the Treaty of the United Nations Security Council resolution 255 (1968) and the Statements of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, approved by the said Resolution, about their intention to provide or support immediate assistance in accordance with the United Nations Charter to any Non-Nuclear Weapon State Party to the Treaty that is a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.

2. The Conference would welcome the adoption by the United Nations Security Council of appropriate measures binding upon all States for the full implementation of General Assembly resolution 2936 (XXVII) on renunciation of the use or threat of force in international relations and on prohibition for all time of the use of nuclear weapons.

3. The Conference is of the opinion that the security of non-nuclear weapon States would be strengthened by the creation of nuclear free zones in appropriate regions of the world under the necessary effective conditions.
Working Paper Containing Formulations for the Final Declaration on Article VII and Security Assurances Submitted by the Delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria and Poland

Addendum

Add Mongolia as a co-sponsor.
The States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

(1) Having met in Geneva in May 1975 in accordance with Article VIII para. 3 of the Treaty,

(2) Having reviewed the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble of the Treaty are being realized,

(3) Recognizing the continuing importance of the main objectives of the Treaty, namely the prevention of nuclear proliferation, the pursuit of efforts towards nuclear as well as general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, the fullest and widest access to equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful use of nuclear energy,

(4) Recognizing that the danger of nuclear warfare remains a grave threat to the survival of mankind, that a major factor of such a danger is the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and that the control and reduction of the development, production and deployment of nuclear weapons remain vital elements in efforts to avert nuclear warfare,

(5) Considering that the trend towards detente in relations between States provides a favourable climate within which more significant progress towards arms control and disarmament and the control of nuclear proliferation should be possible,

(6) Recognizing the continuing necessity of full co-operation among the Parties to the Treaty in the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities as well as the necessity of intensifying efforts to improve safeguards techniques, instrumentation and implementation,
(7) Reaffirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty,

(8) Reaffirming its conviction that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

(9) Noting the increasing role that nuclear energy is expected to play in meeting the world's energy needs and the responsibilities of the Parties to contribute to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in all States, especially in developing countries,

(10) Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the Treaty to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race, the discontinuance of test explosions of nuclear weapons, the undertaking of effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament as a first step towards the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and means of delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

(11) Recognizing that in the pursuit of their common objective of a more secure world, there is a need to balance and reconcile the interests of all States Parties to the Treaty,

(12) Reaffirming the belief that the security of all States would be best ensured through universal adherence to the Treaty; declare as follows
Working Paper containing a suggested formulation in the final declaration on "Participation" submitted by Federal Republic of Germany, Australia, and Canada.

The five years that have passed since the entry into force of the Treaty have demonstrated its wide international acceptance. The Conference welcomes the recent progress towards achieving wider adherence. An impressive majority of States of the world have become parties to the Treaty. The Conference, however, notes with concern that, for varying reasons, a number of States, both nuclear and non-nuclear, have hitherto remained outside the Treaty.

The Conference reaffirms its belief that the security of all States would be best ensured through universal adherence to the Treaty. It calls on all States which are not already party to the Treaty to consider carefully whether their own national interest, as well as the interest of the security of their region, would not be best served by early accession to or ratification of the Treaty.
Working paper submitted by Sweden on Article VI

(1) The Conference recalls the provisions of Article VI of the Treaty under which all Parties undertook to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating—
- to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and
- to nuclear disarmament and
- on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

While welcoming the various agreements on arms control and disarmament elaborated over the last few years, the Conference expresses its grave concern that the nuclear arms race is continuing and even accelerating. Immediate and resolute efforts are required, in particular by the Nuclear Weapon States Parties, to achieve an early implementation of Article VI of the Treaty.

(2) The Conference expresses the view that the conclusion of a Treaty banning all underground nuclear weapon test explosions for all time is an important measure to halt the nuclear arms race. Consequently it urges the Nuclear Weapon States to enter into immediate negotiations directed towards the conclusion of such an agreement. It further calls on these States, as an interim measure, to enter into an agreement to halt, for a specified time, all underground nuclear weapons tests.

(3) The Conference urges the Nuclear Weapon States Parties to the negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms to conclude before the end of 1975 the second-stage agreement that was outlined by their leaders in November 1974. The Conference further urges these States to enter immediately thereafter into negotiations to seek agreement on reductions in the levels of their strategic nuclear forces.

(4) The Conference expresses the hope that the OCP will continue to work forcefully on the conclusion of agreements on subjects presently on its agenda as steps towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

(5) The Conference notes that General Assembly of the United Nations and the 1980 Second Review Conference will provide opportunities to review the results of efforts undertaken to reach a treaty banning underground nuclear weapons tests and agreements on the reduction of nuclear armaments in accordance with Article VI of the Treaty.

GE.75-65681
NEXICO

Working Paper containing amendments to draft initial paragraphs for the preamble to a general declaration (as contained in document NPT/CONF/C.I/2, 3, 6 and 6/Corr.1)

The States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which met at Geneva in May 1975 in order to review the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that its purposes and provisions are being realized,

Firmly convinced that, in order to strengthen the Treaty, it is necessary to promote universal accession thereto,

Convinced further that, in order to achieve that aim, it is essential that the Depositary States should see to it that the Treaty maintains an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations for nuclear and non-nuclear Powers,

Noting that such a balance necessarily entails the prohibition of any proliferation of nuclear weapons, whether horizontal or vertical,

Having established that all Parties have faithfully discharged the obligations which they assumed under articles I and II of the Treaty, and which are designed to prevent the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons,

Deploring the fact that the provisions of the tenth preambular paragraph and of article VI of the Treaty, designed to bring about the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and nuclear disarmament, have unfortunately failed to produce similar positive results,

Recognizing that this situation lays upon all States Parties to the Treaty and, in particular, the States Depositaries of the Treaty a duty to strive without delay for the adoption of tangible and effective measures to attain these objectives,

Considering that the trend towards détente in relations between States is creating a favourable climate in which to carry out this most important task,
REPORT OF COMMITTEE I

Corrigendum

Page 1, paragraph 3, last line:
"(See paragraph 6 below)" should read "(See paragraph 7 below)"

Page 4, paragraph 7, the following document numbers of the addenda should read:
NPT/CONF/17 and Add.1-4
NPT/CONF/22 and Add.1-2

Page 4, paragraph 7, penultimate line, read: "Mr. R. Nikolov".

GE.75-65874
REPORT OF COMMITTEE II

Establishment and Terms of Reference

1. Under Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure of the Conference, the Conference established Committee II as one of its two Main Committees and referred to it, upon recommendation of the General Committee, the following item for initial consideration:

Item 13 Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its Article VIII (3):
   B. Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to peaceful applications of nuclear energy:
      (1) Article III and Article IV
      (2) Article V and Preambular paragraphs 6 and 7

In allocating this item to the Committee, the Conference decided that "In connexion with the allocation of item 13 B (1) to Committee II, discussion on Article III should not be limited to paragraph 3, as in the provisional agenda. With regard to the allocation of item 14 B to Committee I, Committee II should be free to discuss also this sub-item." 1/

Officers of the Committee

2. The Conference elected Mr. W.H. Barton (Canada) as the Committee's Chairman; Mr. A. Hidayatalla (Sudan) and Mr. Swasti Srisukh (Thailand) served as Vice-Chairmen of the Committee.

Documents before the Committee

Background Documentation

3. The Committee had before it the following background documentation:

Article III

NPT/CONF/6/Rev.1 and Add.2 Analytical and technical report on the IAEA's activities under Article III of NPT

Article IV

NPT/CONF/10 and Add.1 Background paper on the basic facts within the framework of the United Nations in connexion with the realization of the purposes of Articles IV and V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF/11 and Add.1 Analytical and technical report on the IAEA's activities under Article IV of the NPT

1/ See NPT/CONF/16, para. VII.

GE.75-65665
Article V

NPT/CONF/10 and Add.1
Background paper on the basic facts within the framework of the United Nations in connexion with the realization of the purposes of Articles IV and V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF/12, Add.1 and Corr.1
Analytical and technical report on the IAEA's activities under Article V of NPT

NPT/CONF/13
Letter dated 18 December 1974 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Chairman of the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

NPT/CONF/14
Letter dated 5 February 1975 from the Head of the Delegation of Mexico to the Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons addressed to the Chairman of the third session of the Preparatory Committee

Suggested Formulations and Draft Resolutions

4. The following documents were introduced in the Committee:

(a) Draft Resolution on Article V by Ghana, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Romania and Yugoslavia

(b) Draft Resolution on Article IV by Mexico, Nigeria and Philippines

(c) Draft Resolution on Article IV by Romania

(d) Working paper by the German Democratic Republic on the Preamble of the final declaration

(e) Working paper by Italy on the Preamble of the final declaration

(f) Suggested formulations in the final declaration on Article III by Belgium, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic and the Netherlands

(g) Suggested formulations in the final declaration on Article III by the Philippines

2/ Syria subsequently indicated that it wished to co-sponsor this draft resolution.

3/ The Republic of Korea subsequently indicated that it wished to co-sponsor this draft resolution.

4/ This paper is dealt with in the Report of Committee I,
The Committee's Discussion

5. The Committee held 16 meetings from 12 May to 23 May 1975; its discussions are summarized in documents NPT/CONF/C.II/SR.1-16. After an initial general discussion of the agenda items referred to it, the Committee proceeded to a detailed consideration of the proposals and papers before it; extensive exchanges of views took place also within informal working groups. The Committee notes that the various views expressed and proposals made are fully reflected in the Summary Records of the Committee and in the documents submitted in and considered by the Committee. They form an integral part of the report of the Committee and are forwarded to the Conference for its consideration as such.5/

5/ The documents submitted are attached except for documents NPT/CONF/C.II/1, NPT/CONF/C.II/2 and Corr.1 which are dealt with in the report of Committee I. Editorial changes proposed during the Committee's discussions have been incorporated in the attached versions of documents NPT/CONF/C.II/3, 5, 8 and 10. In connexion with the changes in document NPT/CONF/C.II/8, document NPT/CONF/C.II/9 was withdrawn by its sponsor.
The Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Reaffirming the provisions of article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, according to which non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain the "potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions" under the favourable conditions described therein,

Recalling that the same article provides for the obtainment of such benefits "pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements" and that "negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force",

Taking into account the authoritative interpretation which, at the 1577th meeting of the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, held on 31 May 1968, the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America gave to the above-mentioned provisions, as evidenced in Conference document NPT/CONF/14 of 24 February 1975,

Noting that, although five years have elapsed since the Treaty entered into force, the pertinent negotiations have yet to begin,

Urges the Depositary Governments of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to initiate immediate consultations with all of the other States Party to the Treaty in order to reach agreement on the most appropriate place and date for holding a meeting of the Parties in order to conclude the basic special international agreement contemplated in article V of that Treaty.
Draft resolution proposed by
Mexico, Nigeria and the Philippines

The Review Conference of the States Parties to the NPT,

Convinced of the common responsibilities of Parties to the Treaty for the effective implementation of the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear energy, including any technological by-products which may be derived from the development of nuclear explosive devices, shall be made available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty,

Convinced further that, in furtherance of the effective implementation of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty should participate in the fullest possible exchange of materials, equipment and scientific and technological information, and to contribute, through international co-operation to the further development of the application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Conscious of the need in particular of developing countries to obtain technology of all types, including nuclear technology, at low costs and on fair terms of transfer, in order to promote their economic and social development, thus strengthening international peace and security,

Taking note of the activity so far undertaken by the International Atomic Energy Agency with a view to facilitating the international co-operation in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, provided in Article IV of the Treaty,

Hoping that the nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty would make available, through the International Atomic Energy Agency, part of the fissionable material resulting from the measures of nuclear disarmament to the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty,

1. Decides,
   (a) that preferential treatment and concessional terms shall be provided by the Parties to the Treaty to developing non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty in the supply of equipment, material and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy which would include, inter alia, fissionable material and the related services in the nuclear fuel cycle;
(b) that a Special Fund be established for the provision of technical assistance in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to developing non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty. This Fund, which shall also be utilized for the provision of nuclear research facilities including research reactors and fuel needed for the continuing operation of research reactors in developing non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty, shall be maintained at an adequate level to meet the required needs. The Depositary States shall contribute 60 per cent of the Fund and the developed non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty shall provide the balance. The schedule for the division of costs for the present Review Conference, appropriately pro-rated, shall serve as the basis for determining the contribution to this Fund of each respective State Party to the Treaty. The International Atomic Energy Agency shall be entrusted with the administration and management of the Fund which shall not form part of the regular or operational budgets of the Agency;

(c) that a Special Nuclear Fund be established to provide financing under concessional terms for the nuclear projects in the territories of developing non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty. The Fund shall be kept at a reasonable minimum annual level and contributions to this Fund shall be assessed in the same manner as the Special Fund referred to under paragraph 1(b) above. These amounts shall be administered on an ad hoc basis by an international organization or an existing regional financing institution located in Africa, Asia or Latin America, to be designated by the donor country with the agreement of the recipient country;

2. **Decides further** that preferential treatment shall be provided by the Parties to the Treaty to developed non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty in the supply of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which would include, **inter alia**, the supply of uranium and enrichment and re-processing services.
ROJ:rlAl!lU

Draft Resolution on Article IV of the Treaty

The Review Conference of the States Parties to the NPT:

Mindful that the obligation which has been assumed by the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices has not affected their inalienable right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, as recognized in Article IV of the Treaty,

Aware that in view of the balance which should exist between the rights and the obligations provided in the Treaty, any measure in implementing its various purposes and provisions must avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of the peaceful nuclear activities,

Recalling that according to the Treaty the States Parties in a position to do so undertook to contribute to and facilitate the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty,

Convinced of the increasing role of the nuclear energy, especially in the present economic conditions, as a very important source of energy and an essential element for the narrowing and the elimination of the economic and technological gap which separates the developing countries from the industrially developed countries,

1. Considers that the international co-operation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy among States Parties to the Treaty should be directed towards ensuring the largest possible access of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty, especially of the developing countries, to research, development, use and production of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,

2. Urges all States Parties to the Treaty in pursuing the above-mentioned objective to observe, inter alia, in their relations both bilateral and within the international organizations the following:

(a) All States Parties to the Treaty are entitled to fully benefit from peaceful applications of nuclear energy without any discrimination whatsoever;

(b) Preferential treatment and concessional terms shall be provided to developing countries in the supply of nuclear material, equipment, know-how,
scientific and technological information, for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy according to their needs;

(c) Technical assistance to the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty shall include all types of materials and information necessary for their nuclear peaceful industry;

(d) Technical assistance as provided above shall ensure on a continuous and long-term basis the normal operation of all nuclear peaceful facilities in the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty;

(e) Access of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty to nuclear technology shall also include the latest scientific and technological conquests in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy;

3. Requests the International Atomic Energy Agency to further develop its activities in the field of technical assistance and co-operation for peaceful applications of nuclear energy and to maintain an equitable balance between these activities and those aimed at verification provided in Article III of the Treaty.
Working Paper Containing Formulations for the
Final Declarations (Preamble) Submitted by
German Democratic Republic

The States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons, who met in Geneva in May 1975

- Having reviewed the operation of the Treaty to ensure that its purposes and provisions are being realized;
- Considering that the trend towards détente in relations between States provides a favourable climate within which more significant progress towards arms limitation and disarmament should be possible;
- Reaffirming the important role of the Treaty in limiting nuclear weapons and averting the danger of nuclear war, in creating the conditions necessary for the cessation of nuclear arms race, for effective measures in the direction of general complete disarmament under strict and effective international control and for facilitating co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and also in strengthening peace and international security and furthering the process of international détente;
- Noting the increasing role of the nuclear technology and the growing responsibilities of the Parties to contribute to the further development of the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in all States, especially in developing countries;
- Noting the necessity that the international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy must be carried out in a manner which will prevent nuclear proliferation;
- Reaffirming that the security of all States would be best ensured through universal adherence to the Treaty;
- Reaffirming their strong support for the Treaty, their continued dedication to its principles and objectives, and their commitment to implement fully and more effectively its provisions;

declare as follows
The States Parties to the Treaty on the non-Proliferation of Nuclear weapons

(1) Having met in Genova in May 1975 in accordance with Article VIII para. 3 of the Treaty,

(2) Having reviewed the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble of the Treaty are being realized,

(3) Recognizing the continuing importance of the main objectives of the Treaty, namely the prevention of nuclear proliferation, the pursuit of efforts towards nuclear as well as general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, the fullest and widest access to equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful use of nuclear energy,

(4) Recognizing that the danger of nuclear warfare remains a grave threat to the survival of mankind, that a major factor of such a danger is the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and that the control and reduction of the development production and deployment of nuclear weapons remain vital elements in efforts to avert nuclear warfare,

(5) Considering that the trend towards detente in relations between States provides a favourable climate within which more significant progress towards arms control and disarmament and the control of nuclear proliferation should be possible,

(6) Recognizing the continuing necessity of full co-operation among the Parties to the Treaty in the enforcement of International Atomic Energy Safeguards on peaceful nuclear activity as well as the necessity of intensifying efforts to improve safeguards technique, instrumentation and implementation,
(7) Reaffirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty,

(8) Reaffirming its conviction that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

(9) Noting the increasing role that nuclear energy is expected to play in meeting the world's energy needs and the responsibilities of the Parties to contribute to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in all States, especially in developing countries,

(10) Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the Treaty to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of nuclear arms race, the discontinuance of nuclear test explosions of nuclear weapons, the undertaking of effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament as a first step towards the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and means of delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

(11) Recognizing that in the pursuit of their common objective of a more secure world, there is a need to balance and reconcile the interests of all States Parties to the Treaty,

(12) Reaffirming the belief that the security of all States would be best ensured through universal adherence to the Treaty; declare as follows
The States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

(1) Having met in Geneva in May 1975 in accordance with Article VIII para. 3 of the Treaty,

(2) Having reviewed the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble of the Treaty are being realized,

(3) Recognizing the continuing importance of the main objectives of the Treaty, namely the prevention of nuclear proliferation, the pursuit of efforts towards nuclear as well as general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, the fullest and widest access to equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful use of nuclear energy,

(4) Recognizing that the danger of nuclear warfare remains a grave threat to the survival of mankind, that a major factor of such a danger is the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and that the control and reduction of the development, production and deployment of nuclear weapons remain vital elements in efforts to avert nuclear warfare,

(5) Considering that the trend towards detente in relations between States provides a favourable climate within which more significant progress towards arms control and disarmament and the control of nuclear proliferation should be possible,

(6) Recognizing the continuing necessity of full co-operation among the Parties to the Treaty in the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities as well as the necessity of intensifying efforts to improve safeguards techniques, instrumentation and implementation,
(7) Reaffirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty,

(8) Reaffirming its conviction that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

(9) Noting the increasing role that nuclear energy is expected to play in meeting the world's energy needs and the responsibilities of the Parties to contribute to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in all States, especially in developing countries,

(10) Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the Treaty to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race, the discontinuance of test explosions of nuclear weapons, the undertaking of effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament as a first step towards the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and means of delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

(11) Recognizing that in the pursuit of their common objective of a more secure world, there is a need to balance and reconcile the interests of all States Parties to the Treaty,

(12) Reaffirming the belief that the security of all States would be best ensured through universal adherence to the Treaty; declare as follows.
Suggested formulations in the final declaration on Article III

1. The Conference notes that the verification activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under Article III,1 of the Treaty respect the sovereign rights of States and do not hamper the economic, scientific or technological development of the Parties to the Treaty and international co-operation in peaceful nuclear activities. It urges that this situation be maintained.

2. The Conference notes the importance of national or regional systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material, from the standpoints both of the responsibilities of individual States and of facilitating the application of IAEA safeguards under Article III. The Conference urges all States concerned to establish and maintain effective accounting and control systems and welcomes the readiness of the IAEA to assist States in so doing.

3. The Conference expresses its strong support for effective IAEA safeguards. In this context it recommends that intensified efforts be made towards the standardization and the universality of application of IAEA safeguards, while ensuring that safeguards agreements are of adequate duration, preclude diversion to any nuclear explosive devices and contain appropriate provisions for application of safeguards on re-export.

4. The Conference recommends that more attention and fuller support be given to the improvement of safeguards techniques, instrumentation, data-handling and implementation. It notes with satisfaction the establishment by the Director General of the IAEA of a standing technical safeguards advisory group.

5. The Conference emphasizes the necessity for the States Parties to the Treaty that have not yet done so to conclude as soon as possible safeguards agreements with the IAEA.
THE PHILIPPINES

Suggested formulations in the final declaration on Article III

1. The Conference recommends that during the review of the arrangements related to the financing of safeguards in the IAEA which is to be held after 1975, the Parties to the Treaty support measures that would further reduce the share of developing countries in the safeguards costs and urge the nuclear-weapon States to reimburse the Agency, in accordance with Article XIV C of the Statute, the costs of safeguarding the peaceful nuclear activities of nuclear-weapon States submitted to safeguards.

2. The Conference recommends that the Parties to the Treaty urge the Director General of the IAEA to take fully into account the following principles in the designation of safeguards inspectors for States Party to the Treaty:
   (a) Equitable geographic distribution in the inspectorate of the IAEA, and
   (b) Only nationals of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, or of States which have offered to accept equivalent IAEA safeguards to any of their peaceful nuclear activities, be designated safeguards inspectors in States Party to the Treaty.
POLAND AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Suggested formulations in the final declaration on the physical protection of nuclear materials

1. The Conference, anxious that nuclear materials should be effectively protected at all times, urges that action be taken without delay to elaborate further, within the International Atomic Energy Agency, concrete guidelines and standards for the physical protection of nuclear material in use, storage and transit, including principles relating to the responsibility of States, with a view to ensuring a uniform, minimum level of effective protection for such material.

2. It calls upon all States engaging in peaceful nuclear activities to enter into such international agreements and arrangements as may be necessary to ensure such protection, and to give prompt and effective application to the Agency's guidelines and standards in the framework of their respective physical protection systems.
DULCARIA, CANADA, GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Suggested formulations in the final declaration on Article IV

1. The Conference reaffirms that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting, and notes with satisfaction that nothing in the Treaty has affected, the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of the Treaty.

2. The Conference reaffirms the undertaking by all Parties to the Treaty to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the right of all Parties to the Treaty to participate in such exchange. Noting that the Treaty constitutes a favourable framework for broadening international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the Conference is convinced that on this basis, and in conformity with the Treaty, further efforts should be made to improve the availability of benefits from peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

3. The Conference recognizes that there continues to be a need for the widest possible access to nuclear materials, equipment and technology, including up-to-date developments, on the assurance, provided by International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, that this does not in any way contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Conference reaffirms the undertaking of the Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so to co-operate in contributing, alone or together with other States or international organizations, to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world. The Conference particularly recognizes the growing needs of developing States and considers it
necessary to continue and increase assistance to them in this field bilaterally and
through such multilateral channels as the International Atomic Energy Agency and the
United Nations Development Programme.

4. The Conference is of the view that, in order to implement as fully as possible
Article IV of the Treaty, developed States Party to the Treaty should consider taking
measures, making contributions and establishing programmes, as soon as possible, for
the provision of special assistance in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for
developing States Party to the Treaty.

5. The Conference recommends that, in reaching decisions on the provision of
equipment, materials, scientific information and technology for the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy, on concessional financial arrangements and on the furnishing of
technical assistance in the nuclear field, developed States Party to the Treaty should
give particular weight to adherence to the Treaty by recipient States. The Conference
recommends, in this connection, that any special measures of co-operation to meet the
growing needs of developing States Party to the Treaty might include increased and
supplemental voluntary aid provided bilaterally or through multilateral channels such
as the IAEA's facilities for administering funds-in-trust and gifts-in-kind.

6. The Conference further recommends that States Party to the Treaty in a position
to do so meet, to the fullest extent possible, technically sound requests for technical
assistance, submitted to the IAEA by developing States Party to the Treaty, which the
IAEA is unable to finance from its own resources, as well as such technically sound
requests as may be made by developing States Party to the Treaty which are not Members
of the IAEA.
1. The Conference reaffirms the obligation on Parties to the Treaty to take appropriate measures to ensure that potential benefits from any peaceful application of nuclear explosions are made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty in full accordance with the provisions of Article V. In this connexion, the Conference also reaffirms that such services should be provided to NNWS Parties to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used should be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development.

2. The Conference considers it imperative that access to potential benefits of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes should not lead to any proliferation of nuclear explosive capability. In this connexion, it notes that any such potential benefits could be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the Treaty by way of nuclear explosion services provided by nuclear-weapon States, as defined by the Treaty, and conducted under the appropriate international observation and international procedures called for in Article V and in accordance with other applicable international obligations.

3. The Conference considers the IAEA to be the appropriate international body, referred to in Article V of the Treaty, through which potential benefits from peaceful applications of nuclear explosions could be made available to any non-nuclear-weapon State. Accordingly, the Conference urges the IAEA to commence work on the structure and contents of the special international agreement or agreements contemplated in Article V of the Treaty, taking into account the views of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the United Nations General Assembly.

4. The Conference notes that the technology of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes is still at the stage of development and study, and that there are a number of interrelated international legal and other aspects of such explosions which still need to be investigated.
5. The Conference commends the work in this field that has been carried out within the IAEA and looks forward to the continuance of such work pursuant to United Nations General Assembly resolution 3261 D (XXIX). It emphasizes that the IAEA should play the central role in matters relating to the provision of services for the application of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. It believes that the IAEA should broaden its consideration of this subject to encompass, within its area of competence, all aspects and implications of the practical applications of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. To this end it urges the IAEA to set up appropriate machinery within which intergovernmental discussion can take place and through which advice can be given on the Agency's work in this field.

6. The Conference attaches considerable importance to the consideration by the CCD, pursuant to United Nations General Assembly resolution 3261 D (XXIX) and taking due account of the views of the IAEA, of the arms control implications of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

7. The Conference notes that the thirtieth session of the United Nations General Assembly will receive reports pursuant to United Nations General Assembly resolution 3261 D (XXIX) and will provide an opportunity for States to discuss questions related to the application of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The Conference further notes that the results of discussion in the United Nations General Assembly at its thirtieth session will be available to be taken into account by the IAEA and the CCD for their further consideration.
Amendment to the formulations suggested in the final declaration, by Australia, Austria, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, Mongolia, Poland and the United Kingdom on Article V

Replace the last sentence of paragraph 7 by:

"The Conference further notes that the results of discussion in the United Nations General Assembly at its thirtieth session will be available to serve as guidance to the IAEA and the CCD for their further consideration of the matter."
GREECE, HUNGARY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Suggested formulation in the final declaration on Article IV

1. The Conference recognizes that regional or multinational nuclear fuel cycle centres may be an advantageous way to satisfy, safely and economically, the needs of many countries in the course of initiating or expanding nuclear power programmes, while at the same time facilitating physical protection and the application of IAEA safeguards, and contributing to common non-proliferation goals.

2. The Conference welcomes the IAEA's studies in this area, and recommends that they be continued as expeditiously as possible. It considers that such studies should include among other aspects, identification of the complex practical and organizational difficulties which will need to be dealt with in connexion with such projects.

3. The Conference urges all NPT Parties in a position to do so to co-operate in these studies, particularly by providing to the IAEA where possible economic data concerning construction and operation of facilities such as chemical reprocessing plants, plutonium fuel fabrication plants, waste management installations, and longer-term spent fuel storage, and by assistance to the IAEA to enable it to undertake feasibility studies concerning the establishment of regional nuclear fuel cycle centres in specific geographic regions.

4. The Conference hopes that in the event these studies lead to positive findings, and if the establishment of regional or multinational nuclear fuel cycle centres is undertaken, Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so, will co-operate in, and provide assistance for, the elaboration and realization of such projects.
Suggested formulations in the final declaration on Article III(2)

1. With regard to the implementation of Article III, 2 of the Treaty, the Conference notes that a number of States suppliers of nuclear material or equipment have adopted certain minimum, standard requirements for IAEA safeguards in connexion with their exports of certain such items to non-nuclear-weapon States not Party to the Treaty*. The Conference attaches particular importance to the condition of an undertaking of non-diversion to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as included in the said requirements.

2. The Conference urges that:
   (a) in all achievable ways, common export safeguards requirements be strengthened, in particular by extending the application of safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities in importing countries not Party to the Treaty;
   (b) such common requirements be accorded the widest possible measure of acceptance among all suppliers and recipients;
   (c) all NPT Parties should actively pursue their efforts to these ends.

3. The Conference takes note of
   (a) the considered view of many Parties to the Treaty that the safeguards required under Article III, 2 should extend to all peaceful nuclear activities in importing countries;
   (b) (i) the suggestion, intended to strengthen the NPT, that the importing countries Party to the NPT should consider importing nuclear material and equipment only from States which are Parties to the Treaty or which have otherwise shown that they act in their supply policies as if they were Parties thereto;

*/ IAEA document INFCIRC/209 and Addenda
(ii) the legal and other obstacles to the implementation of this suggestion.

(c) the suggestion that it is desirable, if possible, to arrange for common safeguards requirements in respect of nuclear material used, processed or produced by the use of scientific and technological information transferred in tangible form to non-nuclear-weapon States not Party to the Treaty; and the hope that this aspect of safeguards could be further examined.
Draft Resolution

The Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Noting the reiteration in the preamble of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of the determination proclaimed since 1963 in the Partial Test Ban Treaty to "achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time",

Convinced that one of the most effective measures for strengthening the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and promoting universal adherence to it would be to put into practice that determination,

Taking into account that the delegations of Bolivia, Ecuador, Ghana, Honduras, Jamaica, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Sudan, Syria, Yugoslavia and Zaire have submitted to the Conference working paper NPT/CONF/17\*, annexed to the present resolution, containing a draft additional protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons concerning nuclear weapon tests, with a view to establishing procedures which, in the opinion of its co-sponsors, would facilitate the attainment of the permanent cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons,

Noting that it would be desirable that all States Party to the Treaty may examine this proposal and that over one third of them have been unable to send representatives to the Conference,

1. Endorses the aims pursued by the draft additional protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons contained in working paper NPT/CONF/17\* annexed to this resolution;

2. Requests the President of the Conference to transmit, through its Secretary-General, the present resolution with its annex to all States Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in order that they may give it due consideration;

GE.75-65932
3. **Recommends** to those States to bear in mind the conclusions they may reach as a result of such consideration when they examine, at the thirty-first session of the General Assembly, the item: "Implementation of the decisions adopted by the first Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons".

**ANNEX**

**WORKING PAPER CONTAINING A DRAFT ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS REGARDING NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS**

**Introductory note**

In its resolution 2373 (XXII) .................................................................

................................................................................................................

................................................................................................................
Draft Resolution

The Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Recalling the provisions of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons whereby each of the Parties to the Treaty has undertaken inter alia "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament",

Convinced that one of the most effective measures for strengthening the Treaty and promoting universal adherence to it would be the achievement of tangible results in the field of nuclear disarmament,

Taking into account that the delegations of Bolivia, Ecuador, Ghana, Honduras, Jamaica, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Peru, Romania, Sudan, Syria, Yugoslavia and Zaire have submitted to the Conference working paper NPT/CONF/18*, annexed to the present resolution, containing a draft additional protocol to the Treaty concerning nuclear disarmament, with a view to establishing procedures which, in the opinion of its co-sponsors, would facilitate the achievement at an early date of some important measures of nuclear disarmament,

Noting that it would be desirable that all States Party to the Treaty may examine this proposal and that over one third of them have been unable to send representatives to the Conference,

1. Endorses the aims pursued by the draft additional protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons contained in working paper NPT/CONF/18* annexed to this resolution;

2. Requests the President of the Conference to transmit, through its Secretary-General, the present resolution with its annex to all States Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in order that they may give it due consideration;

GE.75-65936
3. **Recommends** to those States to bear in mind the conclusions they may reach as a result of such consideration when they examine, at the thirty-first session of the General Assembly, the item: "Implementation of the decisions adopted by the first Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons".

**ANNEX**

**WORKING PAPER CONTAINING A DRAFT ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS REGARDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS ARTICLE VI**

**Introductory note**

In its resolution 2373 (XXII) .................................................................

.................................................................
Draft Resolution

The Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Reiterating the provisions of the first preambular paragraph of the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons to the effect that every effort should be made in order to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Taking into account the resolution 3261 (XXIX) adopted unanimously by the United Nations General Assembly which considered that it is imperative for the international community to devise effective measures in order to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States and recommend inter alia to Member States to consider in all appropriate forums, without loss of time, the question of strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States,

Convinced that one of the most effective measures for strengthening the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and promoting universal adherence to it would be to establish a system of security assurances within the framework of the Treaty,

Taking into account that the delegations of Bolivia, Ecuador, Ghana, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Romania, Sudan, Yugoslavia and Zaïre have submitted to the Conference Working Paper NPT/CONF/22, annexed to the present resolution, containing a draft additional protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons regarding the establishment of a system of security assurances within the framework of the Treaty,

Noting that it would be desirable that all States Party to the Treaty may examine this proposal and that over a third of them have been unable to send representatives to the Conference,

1. Endorses the aims pursued by the draft additional protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons contained in Working Paper NPT/CONF/22* annexed to this resolution;

2. Requests the President of the Conference to transmit, through its Secretary-General, the present resolution with its annex to all States Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in order that they may give it due consideration;
3. Recommends to those States to bear in mind the conclusions they may reach as a result of such consideration when they examine, at the thirty-first session of the General Assembly, the item: "Implementation of the decisions adopted by the first Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons".

ANNEX

WORKING PAPER CONTAINING A DRAFT ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SYSTEM OF SECURITY ASSURANCES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE TREATY

Introductory Note

It is generally accepted that the ..........
WORKING PAPER SUBMITTED BY THE UNITED STATES ON ARTICLE VI

1. The Conference welcomed the various agreements on arms control and disarmament, both multilateral and bilateral, which have been elaborated over the last few years, and acknowledged that these instruments represent steps in the right direction as contributing to the implementation of Article VI. On the other hand, resolute efforts are still required to implement the provisions of Article VI.

2. The Conference welcomes particularly the progress so far achieved in negotiations on the limitations of strategic nuclear armaments. It urges the nuclear-weapon States Parties to intensify their efforts to achieve a cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date.

3. The Conference urges all States to intensify their efforts towards the earliest fulfilment of the provisions of Article VI of the Treaty under which each of the Parties undertook to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. In particular it further expresses the hope that the nuclear-weapon States Parties to the negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms will soon successfully conclude the second-stage agreement that was outlined by their leaders in November 1974, and looks forward to the commencement of follow-on negotiations on further limitations and reductions in the level of strategic arms as soon as possible following the conclusion of such an agreement.

4. The Conference calls for the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. It urges the nuclear-weapon States to pursue negotiations directed towards the conclusion of an effective comprehensive test ban agreement.

GE.75-65923
ITALY

Proposal on the follow-up of the Conference

The Conference, considering that paragraph 3 of Article VIII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons provides that "at intervals of five years" after the first review conference contemplated in that paragraph, "a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the ... objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty", Considering that review conferences are an important instrument in the endeavour to assure "that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realised" in that they ensure a continuity in the evaluation of the actions severally and jointly undertaken or pursued by the Parties in order fully to comply with the obligations incumbent upon them under the Treaty, Considering that the results of the Conference demonstrate that a second review conference should be held, within the framework of paragraph 3 of Article VIII, at the earliest possible time in view of the necessity that a further assessment of the implementation of the Treaty be made at an early date, Considering that Delegations to the Conference have expressed a firm belief in the necessity of such a second review conference, Urges all the Parties to the Treaty to submit to the Depositary Governments at the earliest possible time a proposal for a new review conference to be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in the year 1980, in accordance with Article VIII, paragraph 3 of the Treaty and for the purposes indicated therein.
I. ORGANIZATION AND WORK OF THE CONFERENCE

1. Introduction

1. Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which entered into force on 5 March 1970, provides that:

"Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized ...".

2. At the twenty-eighth session, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted resolution 3184B (XXVIII). In the preamble, the General Assembly recalled resolution 2373 (XXII) of 12 June 1968, in which it had commended the Treaty, noted paragraph 3 of Article VIII of the Treaty, and expressed the expectation that the review conference would take place soon after the date of 5 March 1975, the fifth anniversary of the entry into force of the Treaty. The operative part of resolution 3184B (XXVII) read as follows:

"1. Notes that, following appropriate consultation, a preparatory committee has been formed of Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons serving on the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency or represented at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament;

2. Requests the Secretary-General to render the necessary assistance and to provide such services, including summary records, as may be required for the review conference and its preparation."

3. The Preparatory Committee was thus composed, at its first and second sessions, of the following 26 members: Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Hungary, Ireland, Lebanon, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco,
Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Sudan, Sweden, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States and Yugoslavia. At its third session, the following States Parties to the Treaty, having become members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) or of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), were included in the Committee: German Democratic Republic, Iran, Iraq, Thailand, Uruguay and Zaire.

4. The Committee held three sessions at Geneva: the first from 1 to 8 April 1974; the second from 26 August to 6 September 1974; and the third from 3 to 14 February 1975. Progress reports on the first two sessions of the Committee (NPT/PC.I/13 and NPT/PC.II/23) and the final report of the Committee (NPT/CONF/3) were circulated to the States Parties.

5. At the first meeting, on 1 April 1974, the Committee agreed that Ambassador W.R. Barton of Canada would serve as Chairman of the first session, Ambassador E. Wyzner of Poland as Chairman of the second session, and Ambassador L. Eckerberg of Sweden as Chairman of the third session, the three together constituting the Bureau and the two not serving as Chairman at any given session to serve as Vice-Chairmen of that session. The Committee decided that the Chairman of the third session should open the Review Conference.

6. The Committee decided to issue as pre-session Conference documents working papers (NPT/CONF/6 to 10) pertaining to the implementation of various provisions of the Treaty, submitted to the Committee by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, by the Director-General of the IAEA and by the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America in response to invitation from the Committee and subsequently updated and revised, as follows:

(a) by the Secretariat of the United Nations:
- Working Paper on the basic facts within the framework of the United Nations in connexion with the realization of the purposes of the tenth paragraph of the Preamble of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. (NPT/CONF/8 and Add.1)
- Working Paper on basic facts within the framework of the United Nations in connexion with the realization of the purposes of Articles I and II of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. (NPT/CONF/5)
Working Paper on basic facts within the framework of the United Nations in connexion with realization of the purposes of Articles IV and V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. (NPT/CONF/10 and Add.1)

Working Paper on basic facts within the framework of the United Nations in connexion with the realization of the purposes of Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. (NPT/CONF/7 and Add.1)

(b) by the International Atomic Energy Agency:

- Analytical and Technical Report on the IAEA's activities under Article III of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. (NPT/CONF/6/Rev.1, NPT/CONF/6 Annex 9, NPT/CONF/6/Add.2)

- IAEA's Activities under Article IV of the NPT. (NPT/CONF/11 and Add.1)

- IAEA's Activities under Article V of the NPT. (NPT/CONF/12 and Corr.1 and Add.1)

(c) by the Agency on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America "OPANAL":

- Report on the implementation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and some comments and views with respect to Article VII and other related provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. (NPT/CONF/9 and Add.1)

7. The following additional documents were issued as official documents of the Conference prior to the opening of the Conference:

- NPT/CONF/1 Provisional agenda
- NPT/CONF/2 Draft rules of procedure
- NPT/CONF/3 Final Report of the Preparatory Committee
- NPT/CONF/4 Arrangements for meeting the costs of the Conference:
  A. Rule 12 of the draft rules of procedure
  B. Revised statement on financial implications of the Conference
- NPT/CONF/13 Letter dated 18 December 1974 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Chairman of the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
Organization of the Conference

8. In accordance with the decision of the Preparatory Committee, the Conference was convened on 5 May 1975 at the Palais des Nations in Geneva for a period of up to four weeks. After the opening of the Conference by Ambassador L. Eckerberg of Sweden, Chairman of the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee, the Conference elected by acclamation as its President Mrs. Inga Thorsson, Under-Secretary of State of Sweden.

9. At the opening session of the Conference Mr. Kurt Waldheim, Secretary-General of the United Nations and Mr. Sigvard Eklund, Director-General of the IAEA, addressed the Conference.

10. At the same meeting, the Conference adopted the draft rules of procedure recommended by the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF/2) without change except for an increase in the number of Vice-Presidents to 26 from the recommended 24 (NPT/CONF/20). The rules of procedure established (a) two Main Committees; (b) a General Committee, chaired by the President of the Conference and composed of the Chairmen of the Conference's two Main Committees, its Drafting Committee and its Credentials Committee, as well as the 26 Vice-Presidents of the Conference; (c) a Drafting Committee, composed of representatives of the same 31 States Parties represented on the General Committee; (d) a Credentials Committee, composed of a Chairman and two Vice-Chairmen elected by the Conference, and six other members appointed by the Conference on the proposal of the President.
11. The Conference elected by acclamation, at the same meeting, Chairmen of the two Main Committees, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee, as follows:

Main Committee I: Mr. B. Akporode Clark (Nigeria);
Main Committee II: Mr. William H. Barton (Canada);
Drafting Committee: Mr. Eugeniusz Wyzner (Poland); and
Credentials Committee: Mr. Hortencio J. Brillantes (Philippines)

The Conference also elected twenty-six Vice-Presidents from the following States Parties:

Australia
Czechoslovakia
Denmark
Ecuador
German Democratic Republic
Germany, Federal Republic of
Ghana
Ireland
Honduras
Hungary
Lebanon
Mauritius
Mexico

Mongolia
Morocco
Netherlands
Peru
Romania
Syria
Thailand
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
United Kingdom
United States of America
Uruguay
Yugoslavia
Zaire

The Conference unanimously confirmed the nomination of Mr. Ilkka Pastinen as Secretary-General of the Conference. The nomination had been made by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, following an invitation by the Preparatory Committee.
12. At its seventh meeting, on 8 May, the Conference completed the election of its officers by electing by acclamation the following: two Vice-Chairmen of Main Committee I - Mr. Raliko Nikolov (Bulgaria) and Mr. Stefano d’Andrea (Italy); two Vice Chairmen of Main Committee II - Mr. Abdalla Hidaytalla (Sudan) and Mr. Swasti Srisukh (Thailand); two Vice Chairmen of the Drafting Committee - Mr. Mario Carías (Honduras) and Mr. A.K. Pliadjos (Ghana); and two Vice Chairmen of the Credentials Committee - Mr. P. Noterdaeme (Belgium) and Mr. Ilja Hulinsky (Czechoslovakia). The Conference also appointed the following six States Parties as members of the Credentials Committee on the proposal of the President: Gabon, Ghana, Jamaica, Jordan, the USSR, and the United States of America.

Participation at the Conference

13. Fifty-eight States Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty participated in the Conference, as follows: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Germany (Federal Republic of), Ghana; Greece, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Iran, Iraq */, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, San Marino, Senegal, Sudan, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Tunisia, USSR, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Yugoslavia and Zaire.

14. In addition, seven States which have signed the Treaty but have not yet ratified participated in the Conference without taking part in its decisions, as provided in paragraph 1 of Rule 44 of the Rules of Procedure: Egypt, Japan, Panama, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey and Venezuela.

15. Seven additional States, neither Parties nor Signatories of the Treaty, applied for Observer status in accordance with paragraph 2 of Rule 44: Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Israel, South Africa and Spain. At the eleventh meeting of the Conference, such Observer status was accorded to these seven countries.

16. At the same meeting, two regional organizations, the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) and the League of Arab States, were granted Observer Agency status under paragraph 4 of Rule 44.

17. The United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency participated in the Conference under paragraph 3 of Rule 44.

*/* Iraq, a party to the Treaty, attended the Conference as an observer at its own request.
18. Several Non-Governmental Organizations attended the Conference under paragraph 5 of Rule 44.

19. A list of all delegations to the Conference, including States Parties, Signatories, Observer States, the United Nations, the IAEA, Observer Agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations is contained in the annexed document NPT/CONF/Inf. 5 (Annex I).

20. The Credentials Committee met on 27 May and reported on the credentials of States Parties (NPT/CONF/27). At its thirteenth plenary meeting, the Conference took note of the report.

Financial Arrangements

21. At its twelfth meeting the Conference, taking into account the principles included in the Schedule for the Division of Costs appearing in Appendix to Rule 12 of the Rules of Procedure, adopted the final schedule for the division of costs, based on the actual participation of Party and Signatory States in the Review Conference. (NPT/CONF/25/Rev. 1*)

Work of the Conference

22. The Conference held 14 plenary meetings between 5 and 30 May, when it concluded its work.

23. The General Committee, at its first meeting on 5 May, recommended that the provisional agenda by the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF/1) be adopted without change and allocated items to the two Main Committees, as follows, the remaining items to be considered by the plenary:

(a) to Committee I:
- item 13 "Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its Article VIII(3):
  A. Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament and international peace and security:
    (1) Articles I, II and III (1, 2 and 4) and Preambular paragraphs 1-5
    (2) Article VI and Preambular paragraphs 8-12
    (3) Article VII
  C. Other provisions of the Treaty
item 14 "Role of the Treaty in the promotion of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and of nuclear disarmament and in strengthening international peace and security:
A. Acceptance of the Treaty by States
B. Measures aimed at promoting a wider acceptance of the Treaty."

(b) to Committee II:
item 13 "Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its Article VIII(3):
B. Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to peaceful applications of nuclear energy:
   (1) Article III and Article IV
   (2) Article V and Preambular paragraphs 6 and 7."

These recommendations were adopted by the plenary at its fourth session on 7 May.

24. The general debate in plenary, in which 46 States Parties and Signatories made statements, took place from 6 to 12 May.

25. Committee I held 14 meetings from 13 to 23 May. Its report (NPT/CONF/23) was submitted to the Conference at its twelfth plenary meeting on 26 May. Committee II held 16 meetings from 12 to 23 May, and its report (NPT/CONF/24) was also submitted to the Conference at its twelfth plenary meeting on 26 May. At the same meeting the Conference decided to transmit the two reports with all the annexed documents to the Drafting Committee.

26. The Drafting Committee held 5 meetings from 26 May to 29 May and submitted its report to the Conference on the latter date (NPT/CONF/32).

Documentation
27. A list of the documents of the Conference is attached as Annex ....

General Assembly resolution 3261D (XXIX)

28. The Conference considered the role of peaceful nuclear explosions as provided for in the Treaty, in connexion with its general review of the operation of the Treaty. The subject was discussed, in particular, as part of the review of the operation of Article V and Preambular paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Treaty, also keeping in mind General Assembly resolution 3261D (XXIX). The results of the deliberations of the Conference on the subject are reflected in the Declaration of the Conference below.
STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF TURKEY

We are sure our silence during the initial plenary meetings has not been construed by any delegation as a lack of interest on our part. On the contrary, we came to the Conference with a keen interest to follow closely the deliberations.

On the other hand, Turkey is one of the early signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Moreover, we have a safeguards agreement with the IAEA since 1968.

Our megawatt research reactor and the fissionable material used in this reactor are under this safeguards agreement. These are, I believe, the best proofs of our alliance with the cause of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

However, it can not be denied that the NPT is far from perfection. As it would be superfluous for me to repeat here all the arguments already stressed by various delegations, I would limit myself to the following comments:

First, NPT is mainly an idealistic approach to the problem of how to prevent a nuclear war. For this purpose, non-nuclear States parties to the Treaty have renounced voluntarily to the use of nuclear energy for military purposes. However, they wished to keep their right to participate to the fullest exchange of scientific information for the further development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and to the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including those deriving from the development of nuclear explosive devices.

In other words, this renunciation of the non-nuclear States should not constitute a handicap in their struggle for progress and should not be used against them as an excuse to perpetuate their underdeveloped status.

Can we say that under the provisions of the Treaty or as a result of the Review Conference the way to progress is wide open to developing non-nuclear States?

Second, the Treaty should promote an atmosphere of undiminished security among all the members of the world community, without hindering the validity of the existing mutual security arrangements. Only then we may talk about non-proliferation of the nuclear weapons on a world-wide basis.

Would the Treaty itself and the documents to come out from this Conference be enough to promote this sense of undiminished security for all?

Third, the distinction between the States parties and non-parties to the Treaty should not be exaggerated to the point of undermining the chances of the non-parties to join the Treaty. Unnecessary pressure could only lead them to a clear separation.
Furthermore, this distinction is rather a very simplicist approach. In reality there is more than two kinds of States when you compare the accession to NPT with membership to IAEA together with the existence of a safeguards agreement. The position of each Party, Signatory or Non-Party to the Treaty should be considered and weighted according to its own merits.

If the aim is to make NPT universal, there is a need for a better understanding during the interim period. In other words, as a contrast to the process of elimination, we see a great merit in the search of common denominators between States before they all become parties to NPT.

In the final analysis, we hope the conclusion to emanate from this Conference would convince the Turkish Parliament to ratify the Treaty.
GHANA, MEXICO, MOROCCO, NIGERIA, PERU, ROMANIA, SUDAN, YUGOSLAVIA AND ZAIRE

DRAFT RESOLUTION

The Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Having reviewed the operation of the Treaty in accordance with the provisions of its article VIII,

Noting that such a review has demonstrated the necessity that effective measures be taken in order to promote the realization of the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty,

Convinced of the desirability that a second conference with the same purposes as the first be convened in five years,

Convinced further that it is necessary that the General Assembly of the United Nations have the opportunity to review every two years the implementation of the resolutions and other instruments adopted by the first Conference,

1. Requests the Secretary-General of the United Nations to include the following item in the provisional agenda of the thirty-first session of the General Assembly: "Implementation of the resolutions and other instruments adopted by the first Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons";

2. Requests also the Secretary-General of the United Nations to include the following item in the provisional agenda of the thirty-third session of the General Assembly: "Implementation of the resolutions and other instruments adopted by the first Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and establishment of a preparatory committee for the second Conference to be held in 1980 for the same purposes as the first".

*/ Re-issued for technical reasons.

GE.75-65472
ADDEdIQUh
NPT/CONF/L.l*/Add.l
16 May 1975
ENGLISH
Original: ENGLISH/SPANISH

AUDENDUM

GHANA, MEXICO, MOROCCO, NIGERIA, PERU, ROMANIA, SUDAN, YUGOSLAVIA
AND ZAIRE

DRAFT RESOLUTION

Add Ecuador, Honduras, Jamaica, Lebanon, Liberia, the Philippines
and Thailand as co-sponsors.
GHANA, MEXICO, MOROCCO, NIGERIA, PERU, ROMANIA, SUDAN, YUGOSLAVIA AND ZAIRE

DRAFT RESOLUTION

Addendum

Add Nicaragua and Syrian Arab Republic as co-sponsors.
GHANA, MEXICO, MOROCCO, NIGERIA, PERU, ROMANIA, SUDAN, YUGOSLAVIA AND ZAIRE

DRAFT RESOLUTION

Addendum

Add Bolivia as a co-sponsor.
DRAFT RESOLUTION

Addendum

Add Senegal as a co-sponsor.
BOLIVIA, ECUADOR, GHANA, HONDURAS, JAMAICA, LEBANON, LIBERIA, MEXICO, MOROCCO, NEPAL, NICARAGUA, NIGERIA, PERU, PHILIPPINES, ROMANIA, SUDAN, SYRIA, YUGOSLAVIA AND ZAIRE

Draft Resolution

The Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Noting the reiteration in the preamble of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of the determination proclaimed since 1963 in the Partial Test Ban Treaty to "achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time",

Convinced that one of the most effective measures for strengthening the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and promoting universal adherence to it would be to put into practice that determination,

Taking into account that the delegations of Bolivia, Ecuador, Ghana, Honduras, Jamaica, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Sudan, Syria, Yugoslavia and Zaire have submitted to the Conference working paper NPT/CONF/17*, annexed to the present resolution, containing a draft additional protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons concerning nuclear weapon tests, with a view to establishing procedures which, in the opinion of its co-sponsors, would facilitate the attainment of the permanent cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons,

Noting that it would be desirable that all States Party to the Treaty may examine this proposal and that over one third of them have been unable to send representatives to the Conference,

1. Endorses the aims pursued by the draft additional protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons contained in working paper NPT/CONF/17* annexed to this resolution;

2. Requests the President of the Conference to transmit, through its Secretary-General, the present resolution with its annex to all States Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in order that they may give it due consideration;

GE.75-65932
3. **Recommends** to those States to bear in mind the conclusions they may reach as a result of such consideration when they examine, at the thirty-first session of the General Assembly, the item: "Implementation of the decisions adopted by the first Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons".

ANNEX

WORKING PAPER CONTAINING A DRAFT ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS REGARDING NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS

**Introductory note**

In its resolution 2373 (XXII) ..............................................................................................................................
BOLIVIA, ECUADOR, GHANA, HONDURAS, JAMAICA, LEBANON, LIBERIA, MEXICO, MOROCCO, NEPAL, NICARAGUA, NIGERIA, PERU, PHILIPPINES, ROMANIA, SUDAN, SYRIA, YUGOSLAVIA AND ZAIRE

Draft Resolution

Addendum

Add Senegal as a co-sponsor.
Draft Resolution

The Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Noting the reiteration in the preamble of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of the determination proclaimed since 1963 in the Partial Test Ban Treaty to "achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time",

Convinced that one of the most effective measures for strengthening the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and promoting universal adherence to it would be to put into practice that determination,

Taking into account that the delegations of Bolivia, Ecuador, Ghana, Honduras, Jamaica, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Sudan, Syria, Yugoslavia and Zaire have submitted to the Conference working paper NPT/CONF/17*, annexed to the present resolution, containing a draft additional protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons concerning nuclear weapon tests, with a view to establishing procedures which, in the opinion of its co-sponsors, would facilitate the attainment of the permanent cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons,

Noting that it would be desirable that all States Party to the Treaty may examine this proposal and that over one third of them have been unable to send representatives to the Conference,

1. Endorses the aim of contributing to the attainment of the permanent cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons pursued by the draft additional protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons contained in working paper NPT/CONF/17* annexed to this resolution;

2. Requests the President of the Conference to transmit, through its Secretary-General, the present resolution with its annex to all States Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in order that they may give it due consideration;

GE.75-66112
3. **Recommends** to those States to bear in mind the conclusions they may reach as a result of such consideration when they examine, at the thirty-first session of the General Assembly, the item: "Implementation of the decisions adopted by the first Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons".

**ANNEX**

**WORKING PAPER CONTAINING A DRAFT ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS REGARDING NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS**

**Introductory note**

In its resolution 2373 (XXII) .............................................................

.................................................................................................
The Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Recalling the provisions of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons whereby each of the Parties to the Treaty has undertaken inter alia "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament",

Convinced that one of the most effective measures for strengthening the Treaty and promoting universal adherence to it would be the achievement of tangible results in the field of nuclear disarmament,

Taking into account that the delegations of Bolivia, Ecuador, Ghana, Honduras, Jamaica, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Peru, Romania, Sudan, Syria, Yugoslavia and Zaire have submitted to the Conference working paper NPT/CONF/18, annexed to the present resolution, containing a draft additional protocol to the Treaty concerning nuclear disarmament, with a view to establishing procedures which, in the opinion of its co-sponsors, would facilitate the achievement at an early date of some important measures of nuclear disarmament,

Noting that it would be desirable that all States Party to the Treaty may examine this proposal and that over one third of them have been unable to send representatives to the Conference,

1. Endorses the aims pursued by the draft additional protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons contained in working paper NPT/CONF/18 annexed to this resolution;

2. Requests the President of the Conference to transmit, through its Secretary-General, the present resolution with its annex to all States Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in order that they may give it due consideration;

GE.75-65936
3. Recommends to those States to bear in mind the conclusions they may reach as a result of such consideration when they examine, at the thirty-first session of the General Assembly, the item: "Implementation of the decisions adopted by the first Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons".

ANNEX

WORKING PAPER CONTAINING A DRAFT ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS REGARDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS ARTICLE VI

Introductory note

In its resolution 2373 (XXII) .................................................................

........................................................................................................

........................................................................................................
BOLIVIA, ECUADOR, GHANA, HONDURAS, JAMAICA, LEBANON, LIBERIA, MEXICO, MOROCCO, NEPAL, NICARAGUA, NIGERIA, PERU, ROMANIA, SUDAN, SYRIA, YUGOSLAVIA AND ZAIRE

Draft Resolution

Addendum

Add Senegal as a co-sponsor.
BOLIVIA, ECUADOR, GHANA, HONDURAS, JAMAICA, LEBANON, LIBERIA, 
MEXICO, MOROCCO, NEPAL, NICARAGUA, NIGERIA, PERU, ROMANIA, 
SUDAN, SYRIA, YUGOSLAVIA AND ZAIRE

Draft Resolution

The Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Recalling the provisions of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons whereby each of the Parties to the Treaty has undertaken inter alia "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament",

Convinced that one of the most effective measures for strengthening the Treaty and promoting universal adherence to it would be the achievement of tangible results in the field of nuclear disarmament,

Taking into account that the delegations of Bolivia, Ecuador, Ghana, Honduras, Jamaica, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Peru, Romania, Sudan, Syria, Yugoslavia and Zaire have submitted to the Conference working paper NPT/CONF/18*, annexed to the present resolution, containing a draft additional protocol to the Treaty concerning nuclear disarmament, with a view to establishing procedures which, in the opinion of its co-sponsors, would facilitate the achievement at an early date of some important measures of nuclear disarmament,

Noting that it would be desirable that all States Party to the Treaty may examine this proposal and that over one third of them have been unable to send representatives to the Conference,

1. Endorses the aim of contributing to the attainment of effective measures towards the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament pursued by the draft additional protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons contained in working paper NPT/CONF/18* annexed to this resolution;

2. Requests the President of the Conference to transmit, through its Secretary-General, the present resolution with its annex to all States Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in order that they may give it due consideration;

GE.75-66116
3. Recommends to those States to bear in mind the conclusions they may reach as a result of such consideration when they examine, at the thirty-first session of the General Assembly, the item: "Implementation of the decisions adopted by the first Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons".

ANNEX

WORKING PAPER CONTAINING A DRAFT ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS REGARDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS ARTICLE VI

Introductory note

In its resolution 2373 (XXII) ..........................................................

........................................................................................................
BOLIVIA, ECUADOR, GHANA, MEXICO, NIGERIA, PERU, ROMANIA, SUDAN, YUGOSLAVIA AND ZAIRE

Draft Resolution

The Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Reiterating the provisions of the first preambular paragraph of the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons to the effect that every effort should be made in order to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Taking into account the resolution 3261 G (XXIX) adopted unanimously by the United Nations General Assembly which considered that it is imperative for the international community to devise effective measures in order to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States and recommend inter alia to Member States to consider in all appropriate forums, without loss of time, the question of strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States,

Convinced that one of the most effective measures for strengthening the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and promoting universal adherence to it would be to establish a system of security assurances within the framework of the Treaty,

Taking into account that the delegations of Bolivia, Ecuador, Ghana, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Romania, Sudan, Yugoslavia and Zaire have submitted to the Conference Working Paper NPT/CONF/22, annexed to the present resolution, containing a draft additional protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons regarding the establishment of a system of security assurances within the framework of the Treaty,

Noting that it would be desirable that all States Party to the Treaty may examine this proposal and that over a third of them have been unable to send representatives to the Conference,

1. Endorses the aims pursued by the draft additional protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons contained in Working Paper NPT/CONF/22, annexed to this resolution;

2. Requests the President of the Conference to transmit, through its Secretary-General, the present resolution with its annex to all States Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in order that they may give it due consideration;
3. Recommends to those States to bear in mind the conclusions they may reach as a result of such consideration when they examine, at the thirty-first session of the General Assembly, the item: "Implementation of the decisions adopted by the first Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons".

ANNEX

WORKING PAPER CONTAINING A DRAFT ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SYSTEM OF SECURITY ASSURANCES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE TREATY

Introductory Note

It is generally accepted that the ...........
BOLIVIA, ECUADOR, GHANA, MEXICO, NIGERIA, PERU, ROMANIA, BUDAN, YUGOSLAVIA AND ZAIRE

Draft Resolution

Addendum

Add Senegal as a co-sponsor.
The Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Reiterating the provisions of the first preambular paragraph of the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons to the effect that every effort should be made in order to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Taking into account the resolution 5261 G (XXIX) adopted unanimously by the United Nations General Assembly which considered that it is imperative for the international community to devise effective measures in order to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States and recommend inter alia to Member States to consider in all appropriate forums, without loss of time, the question of strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States,

Convinced that one of the most effective measures for strengthening the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and promoting universal adherence to it would be to establish a system of security assurances within the framework of the Treaty,

Taking into account that the delegations of Bolivia, Ecuador, Ghana, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Romania, Sudan, Yugoslavia and Zaire have submitted to the Conference Working Paper NPT/CONF/22, annexed to the present resolution, containing a draft additional protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which in the opinion of its co-sponsors, would facilitate the establishment of a system of security assurances within the framework of the Treaty,

Noting that it would be desirable that all States Party to the Treaty may examine this proposal and that over a third of them have been unable to send representatives to the Conference,

1. Endorses the aim of contributing to the ensuring and strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty in the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which have renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons pursued by the draft additional protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons contained in Working Paper NPT/CONF/22* annexed to this resolution;
2. Requests the President of the Conference to transmit, through its Secretary-General, the present resolution with its annex to all States Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in order that they may give it due consideration;

3. Recommends to those States to bear in mind the conclusions they may reach as a result of such consideration when they examine, at the thirty-first session of the General Assembly, the item: "Implementation of the decisions adopted by the first Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons".

ANNEX

WORKING PAPER CONTAINING A DRAFT ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SYSTEM OF SECURITY ASSURANCES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE TREATY

Introductory Note

It is generally accepted that the .........
Items of the agenda of the Review Conference  
allocated to Committee II  
at the 4th Plenary Meeting on 7 May 1975

Item 13  Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for  
in its Article VIII(3):  
A. Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating  
to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament  
and international peace and security:  
(1) Articles I, II and III (1, 2 and 4) and  
Preambular paragraphs 1-5  
(2) Article VI and Preambular paragraphs 8-12  
(3) Article VII  
C. Other provisions of the Treaty  
D. Resolution 255 (1968) of the United Nations Security  
Council.

Item 14  Role of the Treaty in the promotion of non-proliferation  
of nuclear weapons and of nuclear disarmament and in  
strengthening international peace and security:  
A. Acceptance of the Treaty by States  
B. Measures aimed at promoting a wider acceptance of  
the Treaty.
The States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons, who met in Geneva in May 1975

- Having reviewed the operation of the Treaty to ensure that its purposes and provisions are being realized;
- Considering that the trend towards détente in relations between States provides a favourable climate within which more significant progress towards arms limitation and disarmament should be possible;
- Reaffirming the important role of the Treaty in limiting nuclear weapons and averting the danger of nuclear war, in creating the conditions necessary for the cessation of nuclear arms race, for effective measures in the direction of general complete disarmament under strict and effective international control and for facilitating co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and also in strengthening peace and international security and furthering the process of international détente;
- Noting the increasing role of the nuclear technology and the growing responsibilities of the Parties to contribute to the further development of the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in all States, especially in developing countries;
- Noting the necessity that the international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy must be carried out in a manner which will prevent nuclear proliferation;
- Reaffirming that the security of all States would be best ensured through universal adherence to the Treaty;
- Reaffirming their strong support for the Treaty, their continued dedication to its principles and objectives, and their commitment to implement fully and more effectively its provisions;

declare as follows
Working Paper submitted by Australia, Canada and Ireland

Draft paragraphs in a final declaration

PREAMBLE

The States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, having met in Geneva in May 1975 in accordance with the Treaty to review the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized,

- Recognizing the continuing importance of the main objectives of the Treaty, namely the avoidance of nuclear proliferation, the pursuit of efforts towards nuclear, as well as general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control and the fullest and widest access to equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful use of nuclear energy,

- Recognizing that the danger of nuclear war remains a major threat to the survival of mankind; and having therefore considered the need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

- Convinced that the prevention of any further proliferation of nuclear explosives capability and the control and reduction of nuclear weapons, remain vital elements in efforts to avoid nuclear war,

- Considering that the trend towards détente in relations between States provides a favourable climate within which more significant progress towards arms control and disarmament and the control of nuclear proliferation should be possible,

- Noting the increasing role that nuclear energy is expected to play in meeting the world's energy needs and the responsibilities of the Parties to contribute to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in developing countries,

- Recognizing that the accelerated spread and development of peaceful applications of nuclear energy can lower the economic and technological barriers against nuclear proliferation,
Believing that international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the international exchange of nuclear materials and technology for peaceful purposes can best be promoted in a manner consistent with international security by the widest possible application of the Treaty;

Recognizing that in the pursuit of their common objective of a more secure world, there is a need to balance and reconcile the interests of all States Parties to the Treaty;

Reaffirming the belief that the security of all States would be best ensured through universal adherence to the Treaty;

declare as follows:

I. PURPOSES

The States Parties to the Treaty reaffirm their strong common interest in averting the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. They reaffirm their strong support for the Treaty, their continued dedication to its principles and objectives, and their commitment to implement fully and more effectively its provisions.

They reaffirm the vital role of the Treaty in international efforts to:
- avert further proliferation of nuclear weapons,
- achieve the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament, and
- promote co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

II. ARTICLES I AND II

The review undertaken by the Conference confirms that the obligations undertaken under Articles I and II of the Treaty have been faithfully observed by all Parties. The Conference is convinced that the continued strict observance of these Articles remains central to the shared objective of averting the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Working Paper Containing Formulations for the 
Final Declaration on Article VI of the NPT 
submitted by Czechoslovakia and Hungary

1. The Conference welcomes various agreements on arms limitation and disarmament, both multilateral and bilateral, which have been concluded over the last few years and acknowledges that these international instruments represent steps in the right direction contributing to the implementation of Article VI.

2. In particular, the Conference welcomes the progress achieved in recent years in negotiations on the limitations of strategic nuclear armaments.

3. The Conference notes, however, that the arms race, unprecedented in its scope, is still going on, and that, therefore, resolute efforts are still required to implement the provisions of Article VI.

4. The Conference urges all States to intensify, without delay, their concerted and concentrated efforts for effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date. The Conference considers it important that specific agreements on the reduction of military preparations by States should be elaborated.

5. The Conference calls for the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. It urges the nuclear-weapon States to undertake, at the earliest possible date, negotiations directed towards the conclusion of an appropriate international agreement for this purpose. It believes that in the meantime, till the conclusion of such an agreement, efforts will be made to limit the number of underground nuclear weapon tests to a minimum.

6. The Conference urges speedy conclusion of international agreements for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and of utilizing weather and environment modifications for military and other hostile purposes.
7. The Conference calls for the implementation of the General Assembly resolution on the reduction of military budgets by the permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and in the transfer of a part of these savings for the needs of economic development of developing countries.

8. The Conference notes that solutions to problems of disarmament require the support and co-operation of all States. It calls for the convening of the World Disarmament Conference at an early date.
Working Paper Containing Formulations for the Final Declaration on Article VI of the NPT submitted by Czechoslovakia and Hungary

Addendum

Add Mongolia as a co-sponsor.
Working Paper Containing Formulations for the Final Declaration on Article VII and Security Assurances Submitted by the Delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria and Poland

1. The Conference reaffirms the importance for ensuring the security of the Non-Nuclear Weapon States Parties to the Treaty of the United Nations Security Council resolution 255 (1968) and the Statements of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, approved by the said Resolution, about their intention to provide or support immediate assistance in accordance with the United Nations Charter to any Non-Nuclear Weapon State Party to the Treaty that is a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.

2. The Conference would welcome the adoption by the United Nations Security Council of appropriate measures binding upon all States for the full implementation of General Assembly resolution 2936 (XXVII) on renunciation of the use or threat of force in international relations and on prohibition for all time of the use of nuclear weapons.

3. The Conference is of the opinion that the security of non-nuclear weapon States would be strengthened by the creation of nuclear free zones in appropriate regions of the world under the necessary effective conditions.
Working Paper Containing Formulations for the Final Declaration on Article VII and Security Assurances Submitted by the Delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria and Poland

Addendum

Add Mongolia as a co-sponsor.
The States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

(1) Having met in Geneva in May 1975 in accordance with Article VIII para. 3 of the Treaty,

(2) Having reviewed the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble of the Treaty are being realized,

(3) Recognizing the continuing importance of the main objectives of the Treaty, namely the prevention of nuclear proliferation, the pursuit of efforts towards nuclear as well as general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, the fullest and widest access to equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful use of nuclear energy,

(4) Recognizing that the danger of nuclear warfare remains a grave threat to the survival of mankind, that a major factor of such a danger is the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and that the control and reduction of the development production and deployment of nuclear weapons remain vital elements in efforts to avert nuclear warfare,

(5) Considering that the trend towards detente in relations between States provides a favourable climate within which more significant progress towards arms control and disarmament and the control of nuclear proliferation should be possible,

(6) Recognizing the continuing necessity of full co-operation among the Parties to the Treaty in the enforcement of International Atomic Energy Safeguards on peaceful nuclear activity as well as the necessity of intensifying efforts to improve safeguards technique, instrumentation and implementation,
(7) Reaffirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty,

(8) Reaffirming its conviction that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

(9) Noting the increasing role that nuclear energy is expected to play in meeting the world's energy needs and the responsibilities of the Parties to contribute to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in all States, especially in developing countries,

(10) Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the Treaty to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of nuclear arms race, the discontinuance of nuclear test explosions of nuclear weapons, the undertaking of effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament as a first step towards the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and means of delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

(11) Recognizing that in the pursuit of their common objective of a more secure world, there is a need to balance and reconcile the interests of all States Parties to the Treaty,

(12) Reaffirming the belief that the security of all States would be best ensured through universal adherence to the Treaty; declare as follows
The States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

(1) Having met in Geneva in May 1975 in accordance with Article VIII para. 3 of the Treaty,
(2) Having reviewed the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble of the Treaty are being realized,
(3) Recognizing the continuing importance of the main objectives of the Treaty, namely the prevention of nuclear proliferation, the pursuit of efforts towards nuclear as well as general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, the fullest and widest access to equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful use of nuclear energy,
(4) Recognizing that the danger of nuclear warfare remains a grave threat to the survival of mankind, that a major factor of such a danger is the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and that the control and reduction of the development, production and deployment of nuclear weapons remain vital elements in efforts to avert nuclear warfare,
(5) Considering that the trend towards detente in relations between States provides a favourable climate within which more significant progress towards arms control and disarmament and the control of nuclear proliferation should be possible,
(6) Recognizing the continuing necessity of full co-operation among the Parties to the Treaty in the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities as well as the necessity of intensifying efforts to improve safeguards techniques, instrumentation and implementation,
(7) Reaffirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty,

(8) Reaffirming its conviction that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

(9) Noting the increasing role that nuclear energy is expected to play in meeting the world's energy needs and the responsibilities of the Parties to contribute to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in all States, especially in developing countries,

(10) Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the Treaty to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race, the discontinuance of test explosions of nuclear weapons, the undertaking of effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament as a first step towards the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and means of delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

(11) Recognizing that in the pursuit of their common objective of a more secure world, there is a need to balance and reconcile the interests of all States Parties to the Treaty,

(12) Reaffirming the belief that the security of all States would be best ensured through universal adherence to the Treaty; declare as follows
Working Paper containing a suggested formulation in the final declaration on "Participation" submitted by Federal Republic of Germany, Australia, and Canada

The five years that have passed since the entry into force of the Treaty have demonstrated its wide international acceptance. The Conference welcomes the recent progress towards achieving wider adherence. An impressive majority of States of the world have become parties to the Treaty. The Conference, however, notes with concern that, for varying reasons, a number of States, both nuclear and non-nuclear, have hitherto remained outside the Treaty.

The Conference reaffirms its belief that the security of all States would be best ensured through universal adherence to the Treaty. It calls on all States which are not already party to the Treaty to consider carefully whether their own national interest, as well as the interest of the security of their region, would not be best served by early accession to or ratification of the Treaty.
Working paper submitted by Sweden on Article VI

(1) The Conference recalls the provisions of Article VI of the Treaty under which all Parties undertook to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating
- to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and
- to nuclear disarmament and
- on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

While welcoming the various agreements on arms control and disarmament elaborated over the last few years, the Conference expresses its grave concern that the nuclear arms race is continuing and even accelerating. Immediate and resolute efforts are required, in particular by the Nuclear Weapon States Parties, to achieve an early implementation of Article VI of the Treaty.

(2) The Conference expresses the view that the conclusion of a Treaty banning all underground nuclear weapon test explosions for all time is an important measure to halt the nuclear arms race. Consequently it urges the Nuclear Weapon States to enter into immediate negotiations directed towards the conclusion of such an agreement. It further calls on those States, as an interim measure, to enter into an agreement to halt, for a specified time, all underground nuclear weapons tests.

(3) The Conference urges the Nuclear Weapon States Parties to the negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms to conclude before the end of 1975 the second-stage agreement that was outlined by their leaders in November 1974. The Conference further urges these States to enter immediately thereafter into negotiations to seek agreement on reductions in the levels of their strategic nuclear forces.

(4) The Conference expresses the hope that the CCD will continue to work forcefully on the conclusion of agreements on subjects presently on its agenda as steps towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

(5) The Conference notes that General Assembly of the United Nations and the 1980 Second Review Conference will provide opportunities to review the results of efforts undertaken to reach a treaty banning underground nuclear weapons tests and agreements on the reduction of nuclear armaments in accordance with Article VI of the Treaty.
The States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which met at Geneva in May 1975 in order to review the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that its purposes and provisions are being realized,

Firmly convinced that, in order to strengthen the Treaty, it is necessary to promote universal accession thereto,

Convinced further that, in order to achieve that aim, it is essential that the Depositary States should see to it that the Treaty maintains an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations for nuclear and non-nuclear Powers,

Noting that such a balance necessarily entails the prohibition of any proliferation of nuclear weapons, whether horizontal or vertical,

Having established that all Parties have faithfully discharged the obligations which they assumed under articles I and II of the Treaty, and which are designed to prevent the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons,

Deploring the fact that the provisions of the tenth preambular paragraph and of article VI of the Treaty, designed to bring about the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and nuclear disarmament, have unfortunately failed to produce similar positive results,

Recognizing that this situation lays upon all States Parties to the Treaty and, in particular, the States Depositaries of the Treaty a duty to strive without delay for the adoption of tangible and effective measures to attain these objectives,

Considering that the trend towards détente in relations between States is creating a favourable climate in which to carry out this most important task,
GHANA, NEPAL, NIGERIA, ROMANIA, YUGOSLAVIA

Draft Resolution

The Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Recalling General Assembly resolution 2661 A (XXV) of 1970 by which it urged the Governments of nuclear-weapon Powers to bring about an immediate halt in the nuclear arms race and to cease all testing as well as deployment of offensive and defensive nuclear-weapon systems,

Taking into account that peace and security in the world cannot be maintained unless an immediate stop is put to the nuclear arms race followed by nuclear disarmament,

Convinced that only the nuclear-weapon States can stop vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons which would substantially contribute towards preventing their horizontal proliferation as well,

Noting with satisfaction that the non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty have been faithfully abiding by the spirit and letter of Articles II and III of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Deeply convinced that the halting of nuclear arms race and the undertaking of further measures of nuclear disarmament would significantly enhance the creation of essential conditions for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones,

1. Invites the nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty to initiate, as soon as possible but not later than the end of 1976, negotiations on the conclusion of a treaty on the withdrawal from the territories of the non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty of all nuclear-weapon delivery systems, especially tactical nuclear weapons;
2. Requests the nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty to immediately discontinue further deployment of all types of tactical and other nuclear-weapon-delivery systems within the territories of the non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and to simultaneously commence with their gradual withdrawal pending the entry into force of the aforementioned treaty;
3. Invites also the non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on whose territories, waterways or air space the nuclear-weapon delivery systems are deployed not to allow the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against other non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty.

GE.75-65665
Draft resolution on Article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Considering that article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons stresses the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories;

Recognizing that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear weapon-free zones in appropriate regions of the world on the initiative of States directly concerned represent a most effective means to curb the spread of nuclear weapons;

Recognizing in this connexion the particular value of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and its Additional Protocols;


Recalling resolution 3265 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974 of the United Nations General Assembly on the Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in the region of the Middle East;

Recalling resolution 3265 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974 of the United Nations on the Declaration and Establishment of a Nuclear-Free Zone in South Asia;

Recalling further the United Nations General Assembly resolution 3261 F (XXIX) of 9 December 1974 in which the Assembly decided to undertake a comprehensive study of the question of nuclear weapon-free zones in all its aspects;

Noting that in implementation of this decision a group of governmental experts has been set up to carry out this study under the auspices of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament,

1. Invites the Parties to the Treaty and in particular the nuclear weapon States to co-operate with the States in appropriate regions of the world which decide to establish
nuclear weapon-free zones, under effective conditions and an adequate system of safeguards, in order to assure the total absence of such weapons in their respective territories,

2. Urges the nuclear weapon States to undertake a solemn obligation never to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against countries which have become Parties to and are fully bound by the provisions of such regional arrangements.
Draft resolution on Article VI submitted by Romania

THE REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Recalling the obligations assumed by each of the Parties to the Treaty under its Article VI, to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recalling further General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII) of 12 June 1968 by which it expressed, inter alia, the conviction "that an agreement to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons must be followed as soon as possible by effective measures on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament" and it requested the then existing Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and the Nuclear-Weapon States urgently to pursue negotiations to that end,

Deeply concerned that during the period since the entry into force of the Treaty the nuclear arms race has, nevertheless, continued at an accelerated pace, resulting in accumulation of a great amount of nuclear weapons in the world,

Reaffirming the role of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in the negotiation of those effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament and of a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, which have been referred to in Article VI of the Treaty,

Mindful of the importance of the co-operation of governments and all media in the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty,

1. Requests all Governments Party to the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which are members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, particularly the Depositary Governments, to bring their decisive contribution, in conformity with the obligations assumed by them under Article VI of the Treaty, to developing within the Conference the necessary conditions which would enable it to effectively deal with the measures provided in Article VI of the Treaty as follows:

GE.75-65707
(a) to offer the disarmament negotiations the required perspective in achieving the aims of Article VI of the Treaty most urgently, by a comprehensive approach to the matters relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

(b) to continuously review the operation and the methods of work of the Conference to assure that the negotiations are conducted in the most efficient manner, fully compatible with the principles of equality and the security and the interests of all States;

2. **Considers it necessary** that a system of retrieval and distribution as well as of assessment and analysis of information on armaments and disarmament issues be established, within the United Nations in order to keep properly informed all governments as well as the international public opinion of the progress achieved in the realization of the provisions of Article VI of the Treaty.
Working Paper Containing Formulations for the Final Declarations (Preamble) Submitted by German Democratic Republic

The States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons, who met in Geneva in May 1975

- Having reviewed the operation of the Treaty to ensure that its purposes and provisions are being realized;
- Considering that the trend towards détente in relations between States provides a favourable climate within which more significant progress towards arms limitation and disarmament should be possible;
- Reaffirming the important role of the Treaty in limiting nuclear weapons and averting the danger of nuclear war, in creating the conditions necessary for the cessation of nuclear arms race, for effective measures in the direction of general complete disarmament under strict and effective international control and for facilitating co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and also in strengthening peace and international security and furthering the process of international détente;
- Noting the increasing role of the nuclear technology and the growing responsibilities of the Parties to contribute to the further development of the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in all States, especially in developing countries;
- Noting the necessity that the international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy must be carried out in a manner which will prevent nuclear proliferation;
- Reaffirming that the security of all States would be best ensured through universal adherence to the Treaty;
- Reaffirming their strong support for the Treaty, their continued dedication to its principles and objectives, and their commitment to implement fully and more effectively its provisions;

declare as follows

GE.75-65640
The States Parties to the Treaty on the non-Proliferation of Nuclear weapons

(1) Having met in Geneva in May 1975 in accordance with Article VIII para. 3 of the Treaty,

(2) Having reviewed the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble of the Treaty are being realized,

(3) Recognizing the continuing importance of the main objectives of the Treaty, namely the prevention of nuclear proliferation, the pursuit of efforts towards nuclear as well as general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, the fullest and widest access to equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful use of nuclear energy,

(4) Recognizing that the danger of nuclear warfare remains a grave threat to the survival of mankind, that a major factor of such a danger is the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and that the control and reduction of the development production and deployment of nuclear weapons remain vital elements in efforts to avert nuclear warfare,

(5) Considering that the trend towards detente in relations between States provides a favourable climate within which more significant progress towards arms control and disarmament and the control of nuclear proliferation should be possible,

(6) Recognizing the continuing necessity of full co-operation among the Parties to the Treaty in the enforcement of International Atomic Energy Safeguards on peaceful nuclear activity as well as the necessity of intensifying efforts to improve safeguards technique, instrumentation and implementation,
(7) Reaffirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty,

(8) Reaffirming its conviction that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

(9) Noting the increasing role that nuclear energy is expected to play in meeting the world’s energy needs and the responsibilities of the Parties to contribute to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in all States, especially in developing countries,

(10) Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the Treaty to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of nuclear arms race, the discontinuance of nuclear test explosions of nuclear weapons, the undertaking of effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament as a first step towards the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and means of delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

(11) Recognizing that in the pursuit of their common objective of a more secure world, there is a need to balance and reconcile the interests of all States Parties to the Treaty,

(12) Reaffirming the belief that the security of all States would be best ensured through universal adherence to the Treaty; declare as follows
The States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

(1) Having met in Geneva in May 1975 in accordance with Article VIII para. 3 of the Treaty,

(2) Having reviewed the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble of the Treaty are being realized,

(3) Recognizing the continuing importance of the main objectives of the Treaty, namely the prevention of nuclear proliferation, the pursuit of efforts towards nuclear as well as general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, the fullest and widest access to equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful use of nuclear energy,

(4) Recognizing that the danger of nuclear warfare remains a grave threat to the survival of mankind, that a major factor of such a danger is the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and that the control and reduction of the development, production and deployment of nuclear weapons remain vital elements in efforts to avert nuclear warfare,

(5) Considering that the trend towards detente in relations between States provides a favourable climate within which more significant progress towards arms control and disarmament and the control of nuclear proliferation should be possible,

(6) Recognizing the continuing necessity of full co-operation among the Parties to the Treaty in the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities as well as the necessity of intensifying efforts to improve safeguards techniques, instrumentation and implementation,

GE.75-65719
(7) Reaffirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty,

(8) Reaffirming its conviction that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

(9) Noting the increasing role that nuclear energy is expected to play in meeting the world's energy needs and the responsibilities of the Parties to contribute to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in all States, especially in developing countries,

(10) Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the Treaty to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race, the discontinuance of test explosions of nuclear weapons, the undertaking of effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament as a first step towards the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and means of delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

(11) Recognizing that in the pursuit of their common objective of a more secure world, there is a need to balance and reconcile the interests of all States Parties to the Treaty,

(12) Reaffirming the belief that the security of all States would be best ensured through universal adherence to the Treaty; declare as follows
Suggested formulations in the final declaration on Article III

1. The Conference notes that the verification activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under Article III,1 of the Treaty respect the sovereign rights of States and do not hamper the economic, scientific or technological development of the Parties to the Treaty and international co-operation in peaceful nuclear activities. It urges that this situation be maintained.

2. The Conference notes the importance of national or regional systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material, from the standpoints both of the responsibilities of individual States and of facilitating the application of IAEA safeguards under Article III. The Conference urges all States concerned to establish and maintain effective systems and welcomes the readiness of the IAEA to assist States in such efforts.

3. The Conference expresses its strong support for effective IAEA safeguards. In this context it recommends that intensified efforts be made to increase the standardization and the universality of application of IAEA safeguards, while ensuring that safeguards agreements are of adequate duration, preclude diversion to any nuclear explosive devices and contain appropriate provisions on re-export.

4. The Conference recommends that more work and fuller support be given to the improvement of safeguards techniques, instrumentation, data-handling and implementation. It notes with satisfaction the establishment by the Director General of the IAEA of a standing technical safeguards advisory group.

5. The Conference emphasizes the necessity for the States parties to the Treaty that have not yet done so to conclude as soon as possible safeguards agreements with the IAEA.
Suggested formulations in the final declaration on Article III

1. The Conference recommends that during the review of the arrangements related to the financing of safeguards in the IAEA which is to be held after 1975, the Parties to the Treaty support measures that would further reduce the share of developing countries in the safeguards costs and urge the nuclear-weapon States to reimburse the Agency, in accordance with Article XIV C of the Statute, the costs of safeguarding the peaceful nuclear activities of nuclear-weapon States submitted to safeguards.

2. The Conference recommends that the Parties to the Treaty urge the Director General of the IAEA to take fully into account the following principles in the designation of safeguards inspectors for States Party to the Treaty:

(a) Equitable geographic distribution in the inspectorate of the IAEA, and

(b) Only nationals of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, or of States which have offered to accept equivalent IAEA safeguards to any of their peaceful nuclear activities, be designated safeguards inspectors in States Party to the Treaty.
Suggested formulations in the final declaration on the physical protection of nuclear materials

1. The Conference, anxious that nuclear materials should be carefully protected at all times, urges that action be taken without delay to elaborate further, within the International Atomic Energy Agency, concrete guidelines and standards for the physical protection of nuclear material in use, storage and transit, including principles relating to the responsibility of States, with a view to ensuring a uniform, minimum level of effective protection for such material.

2. It calls upon all States engaging in peaceful nuclear activities to enter into such international agreements and arrangements as may be necessary to ensure such protection, and to give prompt and effective application to the Agency's guidelines and standards in the framework of their respective physical protection systems.
ROMANIA

Draft Resolution on Article IV of the Treaty

The Review Conference of the States Parties to the NPT:

Mindful that the obligation which has been assumed by the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices has not affected their inalienable right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, as recognized in Article IV of the Treaty,

Aware that in view of the balance which should exist between the rights and the obligations provided in the Treaty, any measure in implementing its various purposes and provisions must avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of the peaceful nuclear activities,

Recalling that according to the Treaty the States Parties in a position to do so undertook to contribute to and facilitate the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty,

Convinced of the increasing role of the nuclear energy, especially in the present economic conditions, as a very important source of energy and an essential element for the narrowing and the elimination of the economic and technological gap which separates the developing countries from the industrially developed countries,

1. Considers that the international co-operation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy among States Parties to the Treaty should be directed towards ensuring the largest possible access of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty, especially of the developing countries, to research, development, use and production of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,

2. Urges all States Parties to the Treaty in pursuing the above-mentioned objective to observe, inter alia, in their relations both bilateral and within the international organizations the following:

   (a) All States Parties to the Treaty are entitled to fully benefit from peaceful applications of nuclear energy without any discrimination whatsoever;
   (b) Preferential treatment and concessional terms shall be provided to developing countries in the supply of nuclear material, equipment, know-how,
scientific and technological information, for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy according to their needs;
(c) Technical assistance to the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty shall include all types of materials and information necessary for their nuclear peaceful industry;
(d) Technical assistance as provided above shall ensure on a continuous and long-term basis the normal operation of all nuclear peaceful facilities in the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty;
(e) Access of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty to nuclear technology shall also include the latest scientific and technological conquests in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy;
3. Requests the International Atomic Energy Agency to further develop its activities in the field of technical assistance and co-operation for peaceful applications of nuclear energy and to maintain an equitable balance between these activities and those aimed at verification provided in Article III of the Treaty.
BULGARIA, CANADA, GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Suggested formulations in the final declaration on Article IV

1. The Conference reaffirms that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting, and notes with satisfaction that nothing in the Treaty has affected, the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of the Treaty.

2. The Conference reaffirms the undertaking by all Parties to the Treaty to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the right of all Parties to the Treaty to participate in such exchange. Noting that the Treaty constitutes a favourable framework for broadening international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the Conference is convinced that on this basis, and in conformity with the Treaty, further efforts should be made to improve the availability of benefits from peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

3. The Conference recognizes that there continues to be a need for the widest possible access to nuclear materials, equipment and technology, including up-to-date developments, on the assurance, provided by International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, that this does not in any way contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Conference reaffirms the undertaking of the Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so to cooperate in contributing, alone or together with other States or international organizations, to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world. The Conference particularly recognizes the growing needs of developing States and considers it necessary.
to continue and increase assistance to them in this field bilaterally and through such multilateral channels as the International Atomic Energy Agency and the United Nations Development Programme.

4. The Conference is of the view that, in order to implement as fully as possible Article IV of the Treaty, developed States Party to the Treaty should consider taking measures, making contributions and establishing programmes, as soon as possible, for the provision of special assistance in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for developing States Party to the Treaty.

5. The Conference recommends that, in reaching decisions on the provision of equipment, materials, scientific information and technology for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, on concessional financial arrangements and on the furnishing of technical assistance in the nuclear field, developed States Party to the Treaty should give particular weight to adherence to the Treaty by recipient States. The Conference recommends, in this connection, that any special measures of co-operation to meet the growing needs of developing States Party to the Treaty might include increased and supplemental voluntary aid provided bilaterally or through multilateral channels such as the IAEA's facilities for administering funds-in-trust and gifts-in-kind.

6. The Conference further recommends that States Party to the Treaty in a position to do so meet, to the fullest extent possible, technically sound requests for technical assistance, submitted to the IAEA by developing States Party to the Treaty, which the IAEA is unable to finance from its own resources, as well as such technically sound requests as may be made by developing States Party to the Treaty which are not Members of the IAEA.
AUSTRALIA, AUSTRIA, CANADA, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, MONGOLIA, POLAND AND THE UNITED KINGDOM

Suggested formulations in the final declaration on Article V

1. The Conference reaffirms the obligation on Parties to the Treaty to take appropriate measures to ensure that potential benefits from any peaceful application of nuclear explosions are made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty in full accordance with the provisions of Article V. In this connexion, the Conference also reaffirms that such services should be provided to NNWS Parties to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used should be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development.

2. The Conference considers it imperative that access to potential benefits of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes should not lead to any proliferation of nuclear explosive capability. In this connexion, it notes that any such potential benefits could be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the Treaty by way of nuclear explosion services provided by nuclear-weapon States, as defined by the Treaty, and conducted under the appropriate international observation and international procedures called for in Article V and in accordance with other applicable international obligations.

3. The Conference considers the IAEA to be the appropriate international body, referred to in Article V of the Treaty, through which potential benefits from peaceful applications of nuclear explosions could be made available to any non-nuclear-weapon State. Accordingly, the Conference urges the IAEA to commence work on the structure and contents of the special international agreement or agreements contemplated in Article V of the Treaty, taking into account the views of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the United Nations General Assembly.

4. The Conference notes that the technology of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes is still at the stage of development and study, and that there are a number of interrelated international legal and other aspects of such explosions which still need to be investigated.
5. The Conference commends the work in this field that has been carried out within the IAEA and looks forward to the continuance of such work pursuant to United Nations General Assembly resolution 3261 D (XXIX). It emphasizes that the IAEA should play the central role in matters relating to the provision of services for the application of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. It believes that the IAEA should broaden its consideration of this subject to encompass, within its area of competence, all aspects and implications of the practical applications of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. To this end it urges the IAEA to set up appropriate machinery within which intergovernmental discussion can take place and through which advice can be given on the Agency's work in this field.

6. The Conference attaches considerable importance to the consideration by the CCD, pursuant to United Nations General Assembly resolution 3261 D (XXIX) and taking due account of the views of the IAEA, of the arms control implications of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

7. The Conference notes that the thirtieth session of the United Nations General Assembly will receive reports pursuant to United Nations General Assembly resolution 3261 D (XXIX) and will provide an opportunity for States to discuss questions related to the application of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The Conference further notes that the results of discussion in the United Nations General Assembly will be available to the IAEA and the CCD for their further consideration.
Amendment to the formulations suggested in the final declaration, by Australia, Austria, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, Mongolia, Poland and the United Kingdom on Article V

Replace the last sentence of paragraph 7 by:

"The Conference further notes that the results of discussion in the United Nations General Assembly at its thirtieth session will be available to serve as guidance to the IAEA and the CCD for their further consideration of the matter."
1. The Conference recognizes that regional or multinational nuclear fuel cycle centres may be an advantageous way to satisfy, safely and economically, the needs of many countries in the course of initiating or expanding nuclear power programmes, while at the same time facilitating physical protection and the application of IAEA safeguards, contributing to common non-proliferation goals.

2. The Conference welcomes the IAEA's studies in this area, and recommends that they be continued as expeditiously as possible. It considers that such studies should include among other aspects, identification of the complex practical and organizational difficulties which will need to be dealt with in connexion with such projects.

3. The Conference urges all NPT Parties in a position to do so to cooperate in these studies, particularly by providing to the IAEA where possible economic data concerning construction and operation of facilities such as chemical reprocessing plants, plutonium fuel fabrication plants, waste management installations, and longer-term fuel storage, and by assistance to the IAEA to enable it to undertake feasibility studies concerning the establishment of regional nuclear fuel cycle centres in specific geographic regions.

4. The Conference hopes that in the event these studies lead to positive findings, and if the establishment of regional or multinational nuclear fuel cycle centres is undertaken, Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so, will cooperate in, and provide assistance for, the elaboration and realization of such projects.
Suggested formulations in the final declaration on Article III(2)

1. With regard to the implementation of Article III, 2 of the Treaty, the Conference notes that a number of States suppliers of nuclear material or equipment have adopted certain minimum, standard requirements for IAEA safeguards in connection with their exports of certain such items to non-nuclear-weapon States not Party to the Treaty*. The Conference attaches particular importance to the condition of an undertaking of non-diversion to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as included in the said requirements.

2. The Conference urges that:
   (a) in all achievable ways, common export safeguards requirements be strengthened, in particular by extending the application of safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities in importing countries not Party to the Treaty;
   (b) such common requirements be accorded the widest possible measure of acceptance among all suppliers and recipients;
   (c) all NPT Parties should actively pursue their efforts to these ends.

3. The Conference takes note of
   (a) the considered view of many Parties to the Treaty that the safeguards required under Article III, 2 should extend to all peaceful nuclear activities in importing countries;
   (b) (i) the suggestion, intended to strengthen the NPT, that the importing countries Party to the NPT should consider importing nuclear material and equipment only from States which are Parties to the Treaty or which have otherwise shown that they act in their supply policies as if they were Parties thereto;

* IAEA document INFCIRC/209 and Addenda
(ii) the legal and other obstacles to the implementation of this suggestion. 

(c) the suggestion that it is desirable, if possible, to arrange for common safeguards requirements in respect of nuclear material used, processed or produced by the use of scientific and technological information transferred in tangible form to non-nuclear-weapon States not Party to the Treaty; and the hope that this aspect of safeguards could be further examined.
GHANA, MEXICO, NIGERIA, PERU, PHILIPPINES, ROMANIA AND YUGOSLAVIA

Draft resolution

The Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Reaffirming the provisions of article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, according to which non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain the "potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions" under the favourable conditions described therein,

Recalling that the same article provides for the obtainment of such benefits "pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements" and that "negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force",

Taking into account the authoritative interpretation which, at the 1577th meeting of the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, held on 31 May 1968, the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America gave to the above-mentioned provisions, as evidenced in Conference document NPT/CONF/14 of 24 February 1975,

Noting that, although five years have elapsed since the Treaty entered into force, the pertinent negotiations have yet to begin,

Urges the Depositary Governments of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to initiate immediate consultations with all of the other States Party to the Treaty in order to reach agreement on the most appropriate place and date for holding a meeting of the Parties in order to conclude the basic special international agreement contemplated in article V of that Treaty.
GHANA, MEXICO, NIGERIA, PERU, PHILIPPINES, ROMANIA AND YUGOSLAVIA

draft resolution

Addendum

Add the Syrian Arab Republic.
The Review Conference of the States Parties to the NPT,

Convinced of the common responsibilities of Parties to the Treaty for the effective implementation of the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear energy, including any technological by-products which may be derived from the development of nuclear explosive devices, shall be made available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty,

Convinced further that, in furtherance of the effective implementation of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty should participate in the fullest possible exchange of materials, equipment and scientific and technological information, and to contribute, through international co-operation to the further development of the application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Conscious of the need in particular of developing countries to obtain technology of all types, including nuclear technology, at low costs and on fair terms of transfer, in order to promote their economic and social development, thus strengthening international peace and security,

Taking note of the activity so far undertaken by the International Atomic Energy Agency with a view to facilitating the international co-operation in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, provided in Article IV of the Treaty,

Hoping that the nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty would make available, through the International Atomic Energy Agency, part of the fissionable material resulting from the measures of nuclear disarmament to the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty,

1. Decides,

(a) that preferential treatment and concessional terms shall be provided by the Parties to the Treaty to developing non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty in the supply of equipment, material and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy which would include, inter alia, fissionable material and the related services in the nuclear fuel cycle;
(b) that a Special Fund be established for the provision of technical assistance in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to developing non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty. This Fund, which shall also be utilized for the provision of nuclear research facilities including research reactors and fuel needed for the continuing operation of research reactors in developing non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty, shall be maintained at an adequate level to meet the required needs. The Depositary States shall contribute 60 per cent of the Fund and the developed non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty shall provide the balance. The schedule for the division of costs for the present Review Conference, appropriately pro-rated, shall serve as the basis for determining the contribution to this Fund of each respective State Party to the Treaty. The International Atomic Energy Agency shall be entrusted with the administration and management of the Fund which shall not form part of the regular or operational budgets of the Agency;

(c) that a Special Nuclear Fund be established to provide financing under concessional terms for the nuclear projects in the territories of developing non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty. The Fund shall be kept at a reasonable minimum annual level and contributions to this Fund shall be assessed in the same manner as the Special Fund referred to under paragraph 1(b) above. These amounts shall be administered on an ad hoc basis by an international organization or an existing regional financing institution located in Africa, Asia or Latin America, to be designated by the donor country with the agreement of the recipient country;

2. Decides further that preferential treatment shall be provided by the Parties to the Treaty to developed non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty in the supply of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which would include, inter alia, the supply of uranium and enrichment and re-processing services.
Draft resolution proposed by Mexico, Nigeria and the Philippines

Addendum

Add the Republic of Korea as a co-sponsor.