OPENING REMARKS

By

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Advancing Cooperative Security in Space

Meeting Hosted by the Global Security Institute
New York
9 February 2007
I am grateful for this opportunity to open this meeting today on “Advancing Cooperative Security in Space”. Before proceeding, allow me to thank the Global Security Institute, and its President Jonathan Granoff, for organizing such an event.

Our meeting is timely indeed, as this year marks the fiftieth anniversary of the launching of Sputnik. This year also marks the fortieth anniversary of the entry into force of the Outer Space Treaty – still most relevant after 40 years. The year has begun, however, with the destruction of a satellite by a Chinese anti-satellite weapon – a sharp reminder of the many challenges that lie ahead in further extending the rule of law into outer space.

There are three particular issues I would like to touch on today. First, the significance of space in the age of the “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA).

The Gulf War in 1991 demonstrated to the world the overwhelming power of the US military, a power increasingly dependent upon on the full use of RMA, based largely on satellite networks. The “system of systems” that the US military built and effectively used in that war gave a valuable lesson to many militaries in the world, ushering in a global race towards how to build such a system in outer space and to defend it. The recent Chinese test of an anti-satellite missile may well foreshadow other such developments in the years ahead, providing further evidence of an emerging arms race in outer space. Such events indicate clearly that one has to take into account a possibility that your adversary would utilize the very system you have developed. The “Global Positioning System” or GPS is a case in point. Thus since the 1990s, the world entered into a new era in which outer space might become a battlefield.

Secondly, I would like to point to the dual-use nature of technologies used in outer space. Compared to the high seas, outer space has in the past been developed more for military purposes. But many of the spin-off technologies from military applications turned out to be gifts making our lives more comfortable and convenient. To name a few examples of such applications -- weather forecasting, GPS, navigation, and communications are all areas where outer space technologies have enriched our lives.

Furthermore, this dual aspect of outer space technologies has a significant bearing on weaponization of outer space. I don’t believe the space shuttle as currently operated would constitute such a weapon. But the civil technology could be diverted readily to military uses. We have had long debates about what type of technologies or modes of operations are for peaceful purposes and what are for military or for weapon purposes. Some countries argue that “self-defence” is the operation for a peaceful purpose and not a military one. Others would argue GPS is a weapon because it is operated by the military.
These are almost theological differences unless we examine concrete cases one by one. By studying these cases, however, we come to the conclusion that it is difficult to differentiate dual-use technologies. Such difficulty has led to inconclusive results of ASAT negotiations and the stalemate of PAROS in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). Space technology is constantly evolving. Together with the advancement of technologies and their application to civil purposes, we have to examine realistic definitions of those terms, or even their needs, as well as the practical scope for regulations of these technologies in the disarmament debates.

Now let me touch on the debates in the CD. We have a deadlock in the negotiation on a fissile-material control treaty (FMCT) even after the new US proposal. This year, the CD kicked off with a more solid framework of debates and a positive tone. I hope this year would see some advances in the negotiations. The largest single stumbling block for this negotiation is how to deal with FMCT in relation to other agenda items, such as the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), which Russia and China have steadfastly insisted upon discussing, if not negotiating, within the CD.

It is true that we already have an impressive array of treaties, agreements, declarations, General Assembly resolutions, and other such instruments that together comprise an evolving body of international norms for the peaceful uses of outer space. We have for example -- the Outer Space Treaty; the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques; the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects; the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space; and the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, among other agreements.

In particular, Article 4 of the Outer Space Treaty – which prohibits the orbiting of weapons of mass destruction -- has remained the most relevant. Together, these treaties and conventions cover a wide range of activities in the Outer Space.

The more difficult challenge – my third issue today -- will be to fill in some important gaps in these existing laws, especially with respect to the development, testing, deployment, or use of all types of weapons in outer space. Achieving that goal, however, will not be easy. But at least it is worthy of discussions within the CD. It is particularly important if the return of this mild gesture is to get going on the FMCT. I hope this year will offer all states an occasion not so much to celebrate anniversaries of past accomplishments, but to chart the course ahead toward a safer and more secure world for all. As I now open this meeting, let us start this process today.