Within the last 12 months, 2 major international meetings, first the NPT Review Conference, and then last Septembers World Summit at the UN have both failed to reach agreement on the twin issues of disarmament and non proliferation. Taken together with the ongoing and highly publicized efforts of the UN Security Council to deal with the Iranian nuclear issue, the apparent lack of progress on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, it has become commonplace to argue that the international nuclear non proliferation regime is in crisis.

It is worth recalling that the change in the international mood and outlook has itself been very rapid. The optimism and expectations that followed the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 and, later, from the Final Document adopted at the 2000 Review Conference have now almost entirely dissipated.

This tends already to point to the direction of factors outside the Treaty as being the determining influence. But just what have been the developments over the last ten years to bring about such a radical shift in thinking?

A short list of external factors would have to include, among others, the following as the most salient examples of the fracturing of the non-proliferation landscape.

- Nuclear tests by Pakistan and India in 1998 shook the entire NPT architecture. Together with Israel, the three countries continue to date to stand outside the regime and whose adherence to the NPT remains a distant aspiration. A prospect made even more distant by the long term ramifications of the proposed US/India nuclear deal. This could also have significant repercussions on the thinking of some countries which have thus far agreed to be bound by the bargain at the heart of the NPT itself.
The DPRK was caught pursuing a clandestine enrichment programme and responded to international pressure by restarting its plutonium production facilities, expelling IAED inspectors, and withdrawing from the NPT, claiming the possession of nuclear bomb.

Iran’s acknowledged that it has developed a uranium enrichment programme, ostensibly for civilian purposes, but it is strongly suspected as being a nuclear weapon break out capability.

A clandestine network of supply was uncovered which is known to have provided sensitive enrichment technology to the DPRK, Libya and Iran, substantially assisting their nuclear ambitions. The globalization of the flows of knowledge, goods, people has advanced so much so that the control of that flow is almost impossible.

The new threat has emerged particularly after 9/11 from non-state actors - international terrorist’s organizations and criminal groups – potentially taking the form of nuclear terrorism. This highlights the awful possibility of such use; benefiting from ease of access to information via the internet. It has also caused the scope of nuclear materials which require monitoring to be greatly expanded lest that material be used in radioactive dispersal devices - so called Dirty Bombs.

But most importantly the stake holders of NPT regime, the 5 nuclear powers, have failed to meet their disarmament obligations. This is evident particularly seen from NY where there is a wide representation of countries of the world which have foresworn the most significant option of acquiring nuclear weapons and accepted the discriminatory system in return for higher moral values of nuclear disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear materials.

Besides, we have witnessed increasing tendency of so called unilateralism which avert time consuming consensus building
in this diverse world. This has alienated smaller nations and put them on a defensive more than necessary thus fueling resentment and confrontation.

- These, and other external pressures bearing down on the effectiveness and integrity of the NPT are further complicated by additional political and diplomatic factors in the UN system;
  
  - Despite the most recent developments, efforts even to begin negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut off Treaty (FMCT) have been hopelessly deadlocked for almost a decade, with little prospect for progress.

  - The very negotiating forum for such a Treaty, the Conference on Disarmament, is still unable to agree on a work programme because of a long-standing disagreement of the competing priorities of an FMCT as against prevention of the weaponisation of Outer Space (PAROS). Yesterday the US made a new proposal for FMTC which is a welcoming sign for the US to remain in multilateralism. But at the same time it warned if the proposal is not accepted, it would withdraw from the Conference on Disarmament. I earnestly hope this would re-activate the debate in this forum leading to a successful package.

  - Progress to implement the ’13 Disarmament steps”, originally identified at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, is at best incomplete.

  - Ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has stalled and the Treaty is unlikely to enter into force in the immediate future.

  - The pressure for greater controls over the transfer of technology, equipment and facilities relating to the nuclear fuel cycle-controls have been received with suspicion by some countries because it may be a step to restrict their rights under the Treaty.
The UN bodies have been always mired with the persistent disagreement and sterile debate as to which should come first; a disarmament or non-proliferation, although the ultimate objective should be to ensure international security.

- But what overarching trend or analysis can be detected from these apparently disparate but inextricably linked issues? There are two ways to interpret the current evolution in the area of nuclear non-proliferation. The first, perhaps more reassuring analysis, is that proliferation remains associated with a small group of countries, such as Iran and North Korea and that the underlying political and technical factors supporting the nuclear non-proliferation regime remain valid for the majority of NPT State Parties.

- Another viewpoint is that we are in fact entering a new era of nuclear proliferation and that a ‘wave’ of explosive proliferation may be about to take place. Some go so far as to argue that this could extend beyond the acquisition of nuclear capabilities and bring pressure to bear also upon other WMD Treaties covering biological and even chemical weapons.

- These interpretations are of course not mutually exclusive, but whichever is correct, it is clear that an important threshold has been crossed in the evolution of nuclear proliferation. The testimony of this was the black market network of supply that developed during the 1990’s.

- I believe that this serves to emphasize both the seriousness of the current situation and the high price of failure if the international community does not act successfully in its handling of both Iran and North Korea and in stemming the activities of the ‘network’-with its evident implications for the possibility of nuclear terrorism.

- There are however a few other factors which further complicate this picture and which one must also take into full account, as they
contribute to the difficulty of resolving the non-proliferation conundrum.

- We all know that ‘the War against Terrorism’ demand immediate attention and a priority item. But Nuclear Weapon States have privileges and obligations. If they tend to forget the Noblesse Oblige, then we would start to see revolts, if not revolution.

- There is also a paradox. The Nuclear Weapon States perceive the nuclear deterrent as the most important element of their security. Why should others not wish to emulate them? At the same time, nuclear weapons are increasingly seen as the only possible means of ‘standing up’ to the super power or actively opposing its policy objectives. From this tension stems a great deal of the current international instability.

- What is to be feared is not so much the imminent collapse of the non-proliferation regime but rather a wider and more gradual erosion of its strength, unless the whole international society would resolutely take remedial measures. Of course if there were to be a second withdrawal-for example by Iran- and such threats have certainly been made by them in recent weeks, then, many believe that there is a good chance that by 2015 we might have not less than 10 new nuclear or quasi-nuclear nations.

- It would be most definitely a profound crisis of multilateral diplomacy, if not the beginning of an era of unilateral steps. Reports of the NPT’s demise are perhaps premature. The Treaty continues to command wider adherence than any other arms control treaty of its kind because the nations believe after all there is no other alternatives than NPT.

- But we should not be complacent. There is an urgent need to take more drastic steps and demonstrate political will to restore the credibility of the Treaty especially as there is widespread international concern about an imminent proliferation risk.
Although the world leaders failed to address the serious concerns about nuclear proliferation at the September 2005 World Summit. I strongly believe there is an urgent need to address the following issues;

- Reaffirmation of the commitment for nuclear disarmament under Article 6 of the NPT and demonstrable steps in that direction.
- A commitment to upholding the moratorium on nuclear test explosions pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, whilst we should pursue vigorously the universality of that Treaty.
- Agreement to start the negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty and to bring them to an early conclusion. I welcome the US initiative.
- Adoption of the Additional Protocol as the global standard for verifying compliance with the NPT.
- Exploration of multilateral options for improved controls over the sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle, consistent with the NPT principles of the right to peaceful uses and the obligations for non-proliferation.
- As the two most salient long term challenges are DPRK and Iran, it would be of the utmost importance to lend full support to the respective diplomatic initiatives which are aiming to resolve both crisis. In both cases time is crucial issue since the delay of agreements may mean advance in acquiring technology and its products.
- The measures to curb proliferation of WMD should be strengthened. In this sense, the full implementation of the work led by the 1540 Committee on Non Proliferation of WMD is
There are many measures which remain to be taken to establish domestic laws and regulations to criminalize activities concerning proliferation of WMD to non-state actors and to establish and tighten export and border controls. Also the Proliferation Security Initiative and export control regimes such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group play important role and their works should be strengthened.

- IAEA remains the pre-eminent forum for discussion and investigation of NPT implementation. The Agency’s proposal on Multilateral Nuclear Approaches to control proliferation of sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle while preserving assurances of supply and services for peaceful nuclear energy exploitation would serve as useful bases for discussion. The link between IAEA and the Security Council should be strengthened. There should not be any hesitation to bring to the attention of the Security Council on the matter of nuclear proliferation.

- In conclusion, I believe that it will be important to draw the correct lessons from the setbacks undoubtedly suffered thus far. We should uphold the NPT regime as long as possible. We should not undermine the treaty principles, which is tantamount to the opening of Pandora’s Box. Nevertheless I must stress that the essential bargain of the NPT is under increasing strain and that the Nuclear Weapon States, in particular, ignore this at their peril - with consequences for the long term global security of us all.

- The current political climate for such efforts at strengthening the regime may not necessarily be receptive one. However moments of deep crisis in international relations are also moments of great opportunity.

- The Secretary General in a major Disarmament speech in Tokyo two days ago on May 18 said the following; ‘We owe it to future generations to breathe new life into all the forums dealing with disarmament and non-proliferation. No one wants to live in a world of permanent and fearful instability where nuclear weapons are the commonplace currency of international relations. Alternative paths
that can bring peace, stability and prosperity are within our reach. All members of the international community must show the necessary spirit of compromise and imagination to grasp those solutions before it is too late’

- Thank you