General Assembly

PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWENTIETH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Tuesday, 14 June 1988, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. FLORIN (German Democratic Republic)
later: Mr. NOUMIN (Vice-President) (Comoros)
later: Mr. FLORIN (President) (German Democratic Republic)

- General debate [8] (continued)

Statements were made by:

Sir Satcam Bolell (Mauritius)
Mr. Gurinovich (Byelorussian SSR)
Mr. Aziz (Iraq)
Mr. Hasburn (Bahamas)
Mr. Bierring (Denmark)
Mr. A1 Shaheen (Kuwait)

- Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations (Article 19 of the Charter) (A/S-15/18/ and Add. 1 and 2) (continued)

- Credentials of representatives to the fifteenth special session of the General Assembly [3] (continued)

(b) First report of the Credentials Committee (A/S-15/36)

This record contains the original text of speeches delivered in English and interpretations of speeches in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the General Assembly.

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88-60162/A 5284V (E)
The meeting was called to order at 10.20 a.m.

AGENDA ITEM 8 (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE

Sir Satcham BOOLELL (Mauritius): I take this opportunity to convey to you, Mr. President, my delegation's warmest congratulations on your election to preside over this very important special session. Your outstanding qualities and long and rich experience will be very valuable to us during the days to come when we start our arduous negotiations on the final document. Your election is also a deserving tribute to your country, which has made and continues to make notable contributions to the process of disarmament.

My delegation also wishes to pay a tribute to Ambassador Mansur Ahmad of Pakistan, who presided over the work of the Preparatory Committee. We thank him for charting the way ahead. The report of the Preparatory Committee gives us a good basis for the final document that we hope to adopt at the end of the month.

Many speakers who have preceded me during this debate have stressed the crucial importance of the question of disarmament in this nuclear era. They have all expressed a sense of the deep obligation upon all of us to stop and reverse the arms race, for, if we fail today, there might not be a tomorrow.

The international political context in which this special session, the third to be devoted to disarmament, is taking place, gives us cause for cautious optimism. Relations between the two super-Powers in the field of security have reached a watershed. Their strategic nuclear confrontation is now placed on a new footing. For the first time in the history of the disarmament process, we have witnessed the conclusion of a treaty which actually eliminates a whole class of nuclear weapons and not merely regulates their growth. We are also encouraged by important progress made on measures to eliminate other types of weapons of mass destruction.
Ten years ago, when we met for the first special session on disarmament, we were all filled with hope and high expectations as we adopted what was universally hailed as a landmark document. Four years later, alas, when we met again in a climate of international political tensions, the old ghosts of the cold-war era came back to haunt us as we struggled unsuccessfully to advance the areas of agreement reached in 1978. Instead, we faced the irony of a situation where the arms race, instead of slowing down, had actually intensified during the intervening four years.

Although, as we have just said, the international political climate seems to be more favourable as we embark upon this special session, we also have a much longer way to travel on the road to disarmament than in the past. Global military expenditure, which was estimated at $400 billion annually in 1978, grew to $600 billion in 1982 and stands at an astounding level of $1,000 billion today. The total number of strategic warheads in the nuclear arsenals of both super-Powers has increased by more than 7,000 since 1978, in spite of the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, which was signed in June 1979. The arms race is now on the verge of being extended to outer space. The sky is the limit when it comes to the arms race. But as rational beings we realize that we cannot continue on what appears ultimately as a suicidal course. We must now turn back.

Since the beginning of the disarmament process, we have always accorded the utmost priority to nuclear disarmament. We must continue to focus principally on this vital issue, notwithstanding the suggestion that too much emphasis on nuclear arms could divert our attention from the important question of conventional arms, which absorb 80 per cent of global military expenditure. As we all know, a nuclear weapon is not simply a bigger and more powerful conventional weapon; its nature is such that an all-out nuclear exchange would result in incalculable long-term
disastrous effects on the environment and the earth's atmosphere, leaving any survivors with only the prospect of slow and certain extinction. In this nuclear age, a global confrontation would spare no one. There would be no distinction between combatants and non-combatants, neutral and participating nations. All mankind would ultimately suffer catastrophic consequences. We welcome the recent proclamations by both super-Powers that a nuclear war cannot be won and therefore must never be fought.

Before we turn back, we must first stop. We should stop the production of all types of nuclear weapons and put a halt to the development of new ones. In this context, a treaty to prohibit all nuclear-weapon tests must be negotiated and concluded urgently to facilitate the aim of ending qualitative and quantitative improvements of nuclear weapons. We also view the conclusion of such a comprehensive test-ban treaty as a necessary complement to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In the absence of such a treaty, it requires a certain leap in logic to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to the nuclear "have-nots", while the nuclear "haves" continue to increase and improve their stockpiles. We nevertheless recognize the inherent danger of enlarging the "nuclear club" and fully support universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

We also call for the conclusion of other treaties on the elimination of other weapons of mass destruction, particularly of chemical weapons. The use of chemical weapons in warfare constitutes a throw-back to earlier and barbaric times in mankind's history. It is a profound and cruel irony that in our supposedly more civilized era, when we have developed more humane methods of animal slaughter, we should be considering the use of "that hellish poison" against our own fellow human beings.
In the field of disarmament, the regional approach is probably one of the best paths to follow. Regional peace and stability reduce the risk of super-Power confrontation by proxy, and would also help reduce the demand for conventional arms. Therefore we support the call for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world by the mutual consent of all the countries concerned in each region.
The establishment of zones of peace in various regions of the world, as noted in the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament, can also contribute to facilitating the disarmament process by strengthening the security of the regional States and international peace and security as a whole. In this context, we deeply deplore the attitude of certain States, members of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, which continue to let their strategic and security interests dictate the work of that Committee. While discussions in the Ad Hoc Committee have dragged on for more than a decade, the militarization of the region has continued to grow, to the dismay of the littoral and hinterland States. This special session must call for the implementation of the Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace without any further delay.

One of the most important results of the recent International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development was to recognize the increasing relevance of putting equal emphasis on military and non-military threats to national and international security. We must now lend the same sense of urgency to defusing the "debt bomb" as we do to stopping the ticking of the nuclear bomb. We in the developing world are confronted with the profound paradox that nowadays an average of $200 is spent annually for each person on earth on means of death, when millions of our brothers and sisters have only that amount or less a year to survive on.

It has been estimated that more than 150 armed conflicts have been fought since the end of the Second World War and that more than 20 million persons, most of them in developing countries, have died from those conflicts. All those conflicts have been fought with conventional weapons, for the most part acquired from the major industrialized arms suppliers. We recognize that it is the
sovereign right of any country to acquire the necessary means of self-defence. But it is also true that the supplier countries do little to discourage the sale of arms abroad. Both super-Powers use arms sales as a key element in attaining their respective foreign-policy objectives. The profit motive is another powerful incentive for promoting arms sales, considering that the major weapon-exporting countries sell an average of $30 billion worth of armaments annually. About 70 per cent of the total imports of major weapons is consumed by third-world countries. This huge diversion of resources by developing countries for arms acquisition stands in stark contrast with the dire need for social and economic development, for which those resources might otherwise have been used.

This unacceptable situation must be addressed urgently at both the international and the regional level. The flow of arms in a region must be regulated and the level of arms and armed forces kept to the minimum necessary for security, in consultation with both the supplier and the regional countries concerned. More stability at a lower level of military parity and equality and the undiminished security of all States must be the guiding principles of all negotiations.

A new body whose task would be to help stabilize regional tensions and also serve as a kind of alert system could be set up to diminish the risk of conflict, and hence the demand for armaments. The resulting non-armament would greatly facilitate the process of disarmament. We propose the establishment of a standing commission consisting of 10 to 15 members to work closely with the Secretary-General, who has the responsibility under Article 99 of the Charter to alert the Security Council to potential conflagration. That new standing commission would not be paralysed by the veto and might therefore be more effective in serving as mediator and perhaps reconciling disputing parties.
All efforts aimed at disarmament will not completely succeed if we fail to address the one factor that seems to drive the perpetual engine of the arms race, that is, fear. Fear is mostly irrational. Reason dictates the obvious course that we must follow in this most vital issue of disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament. And yet we have been impelled to pursue the opposite direction even if it may lead us ultimately to self-destruction. We consider that confidence-building measures can play an important role in achieving disarmament objectives. More transparency in military matters, reductions and restrictions in military deployments are some of the measures that can increase mutual trust and confidence.

Verification by technical and human means is an important complement of confidence-building measures to ensure that treaties are being adhered to by all the parties. We welcome and support the proposal made by the leaders of the Six-Nation Initiative earlier in this session for a United Nations multilateral verification system to be set up. This capability will certainly strengthen the role of the world Organization in the disarmament process.

In a nuclear world where disarmament has become synonymous with survival, our instinct for self-preservation should impel us to disarm or die. The first step back has already been made. The return journey is an arduous one because we have chosen to travel along the road of peril for so long. Let us not allow history to judge this session harshly for failing to move decisively away from the abyss.

Mr. GURINOVICH (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (interpretation from Russian): I should like most cordially to congratulate you, Sir, on your unanimous election as President of the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament and to wish you success in your work.
Special sessions of the General Assembly provide a means for focusing the attention of the world public on the most pressing global issues and serve as an instrument for internationalizing and concentrating efforts on the search for mutually acceptable solutions to these problems. The third special session on disarmament is particularly important because it is faced with the task of dealing with the most pressing problem confronting mankind, a problem which has a direct bearing on its future survival.

The international situation in which the current special session is taking place is favourable on the whole. Influenced by the new political thinking and bold initiatives, there is emerging a positive trend in international relations, one that has already yielded tangible results.
The Soviet-United States summit meetings in Geneva, Reykjavik, Washington and Moscow and their results have substantially changed the world situation by making the threat of nuclear war recede and opening the way for the achievement of mutually acceptable agreements based on realism, accommodation of mutual and universal human interests, reason and political good will. In Moscow the Soviet Union and the United States not only solemnly reiterated their resolve to prevent any war between them, whether nuclear or conventional, and their renunciation of any intention to achieve military supremacy, but also took an historic step towards a nuclear-free world. The entry into force of the Treaty between the Soviet Union and the United States on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (the INF Treaty) has been welcomed with tremendous satisfaction throughout the world, and this has been borne out also by the statements of heads of delegations made from this very rostrum. On our agenda now is the task of scrupulously implementing history's first measure of real nuclear disarmament as envisaged by the Treaty.

The world community has welcomed the intensive work done in Moscow to prepare an agreement on a 50 per cent reduction in strategic offensive weapons of the Soviet Union and the United States and to draft an agreement for the preservation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. A serious step forward towards confidence-building and the reaching of further accords was the signing of the Soviet-United States agreements on notification of launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, as well as the conducting of a joint experiment to verify the yield of nuclear explosions. Co-operation between the Soviet Union and the United States in other spheres also is to be expanded.

It should also be noted that the mandate for negotiations on reductions in armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe is shortly to be finalized in
Vienna. Efforts to eliminate regional conflicts are yielding the first results. A treaty has been concluded on the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the southern Pacific, and bilateral and multilateral co-operation among States continues to develop. Thus, as has been justly emphasized in many previous statements, there now exists a favourable situation. What is important now is to ensure that the special session also has a positive effect on further progress in improving the international situation and bringing about disarmament. One of its main tasks, as we see it, is to take advantage of the momentum imparted by progress in bilateral and regional fields and apply it to multilateral efforts.

It would be no exaggeration to say that in the recent past the United Nations has been forced to remain for some time on the sidelines of practical disarmament measures. It would be wrong, however, to see only the negative side in the assessment of the United Nations role. Among its positive achievements is the production of important and, we would even say, fundamental conclusions and concepts in the field of strengthening peace and achieving disarmament. These include the need to ensure comprehensive and equal security for all; recognition of the importance of disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament, in building such security; the need to conduct parallel negotiations in all areas of disarmament; the responsibility for disarmament of all States without exception, with particular emphasis on the special role of nuclear and other militarily significant States; efforts to build confidence and openness and to ensure strict and effective international verification with a view to achieving disarmament goals; the interrelationship between disarmament and development and the use of resources thus released for economic and social progress, including assistance to developing countries; the importance of public anti-war activities; and, finally, the central role of the United Nations in this process and the need to strengthen it.
In addition to laying such a conceptual foundation, the United Nations has taken a significant number of decisions outlining specific practical steps and determining both the character of and conditions for their implementation. Taken together, these decisions, whose nucleus was the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, make up a comprehensive disarmament programme. This is a kind of disarmament charter, which undoubtedly preserves its relevance and significance. It can guide us towards the achievement of positive results.

It is our view that the current task is precisely to preserve and make effective use of the powerful potential that has been built up and, by comparing approaches that have been worked out with the current requirements of nuclear and space realities, to chart a well-considered and bold programme of concrete action for tomorrow, one that must be adequate to meet the challenges of our times which have been confronting humanity with a difficult dilemma, namely, survival or extinction, peaceful coexistence or non-existence.

The solution, which appears to us both desirable and realistic - and ultimately the only possible one - is to be found in continuous and steady progress towards a nuclear-free world, a world without violence, wars or weapons. Such a course is consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and is entirely compatible with the desire for general and complete disarmament.

Advancing along this road is not a matter of idealistic dreams. It is an entirely feasible undertaking. In recent years all the necessary conditions have been created for it. They are based on an awareness of the absolutely catastrophic and unacceptable consequences of nuclear confrontation. Incidentally, it should be pointed out that it is the United Nations which deserves the credit for the broad international recognition of this fact.

How can we avoid a fatal confrontation?
The concept whereby a nuclear catastrophe can be prevented only by a policy of strength and nuclear deterrence smacks of the logic of the absurd and from the moral standpoint it smacks of amorality. To imperil - every day, every second - the lives of billions of children and adults and all living things on this planet and to hold the future of civilization hostage to an accident is, I am sure delegations will agree, something that is not in keeping with the morality worthy of the supreme creation of nature. Furthermore, this concept is in fact something that cannot be regarded as inevitable.

There is a different, sound logic: the logic of total nuclear disarmament on a reciprocal and verifiable basis, disarmament that can be achieved even before the end of this very century. A serious practical achievement, such as the INF Treaty, proves that achievement of this goal is entirely feasible. Herein lies the global significance of this Treaty. This major advance has become possible, not as a result of a policy of strength - for otherwise approaches based on force and confrontation would long since have produced a whole system of agreements in the area of practical disarmament - it has become possible because of the triumph of common sense, realism, regard for mutual interests, the increasing injection of the elements of new political thinking into the fabric of relations among States, and the anti-war solidarity of the general public in various countries. The public voice has played an essential role in the efforts of the peoples to achieve a common goal - a truly safe world for all rather than just for a select few.

Now our task is to ensure further steady development towards disarmament, and in this regard there are several points to which I should like to draw attention.

What is the meaning of the process of disarmament? Clearly it is to phase out certain categories of weapons with the ultimate goal of eliminating them completely. It is certainly not to replace disarmament measures with the building up of armaments in other places or in contiguous categories.
Yet this is precisely what constitutes the subtext of the plans for so-called compensation and modernization, which have been so vigorously promoted since the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles took tangible form. This is anti-disarmament logic. Such plans, in essence, are designed to neutralize the process of disarmament, to reduce not missiles but disarmament itself to the zero option, and to repair the breach in nuclear arsenals that has been effected with so much difficulty, as a result of the new thinking and new approaches. One of the most important objectives of concerted efforts by the entire world community should be to make disarmament irreversible.

We must advance from the Treaty abolishing the first two classes of nuclear missiles to major reductions, and ultimately to the total elimination of all nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons. We must prevent the arms race from taking off into outer space on any pretext whatsoever, including the one of alleged defence. We must forgo development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, undertake steady reductions in conventional arms and armed forces down to the limits of reasonable sufficiency, and work together towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Undoubtedly, a stage will be reached when the focus of nuclear disarmament will have to be expanded to incorporate all States possessing nuclear potential and the process of disarmament should involve all militarily significant States, and subsequently other countries too. Preparations for such a stage, which does not appear to be that far off, should begin now. From the standpoint of both common sense, and particularly the new thinking, such preparations should not mean building up military potential. These build-up plans cause extreme concern and should be abandoned.
The realities of the disarmament process demand that it be comprehensive. This requires a political will and a bold approach based on the realism of all the negotiating parties, a search for a balance of interest and, in the final analysis, on the principle that it should be good for everyone, rather than for one alone. Of major importance here is also the idea of abandoning the "enemy complex" with regard to other States and to acknowledge the right of every nation to live and develop according to its own choice rather than by outside coercion.

Such an approach appears to enjoy practically universal support, as has become clear in the course of the general debate. There have been quite a few specific proposals dictated by the desire for a safe and disarmed world. Many of these proposals have already been put forward and some have been embodied in United Nations resolutions, but there are quite a few new suggestions.

For its part, the Byelorussian SSR takes a positive view of other countries' proposals and deems it essential that the final document reflect a collective outline of ways to achieve the following goals: to ensure a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world; to create zones of peace and zones free from weapons of mass destruction or offensive arms; to pursue disarmament in such a way as to contribute to a comprehensive and equitable settlement of conflict situations; to prevent the militarization of outer space with proper verification and to preserve it for peaceful exploration and uses, to cleanse near-Earth space of pollution, and to ensure safety for peaceful space flights; to establish a complete ban on nuclear testing; to conclude, as soon as possible, and strictly to comply with a truly global convention on the total elimination of chemical weapons, and to ensure the most stringent universal compliance with the goals and principles of the 1925 Geneva Protocol; to embark on a process of reductions in conventional arms and armed forces, and to ensure a transition to a non-offensive structure of armaments.
and armed forces at a lower level; to create conditions for non-aligned and
developing nations to halt the build-up of their military potential and to set
about reducing it to a reasonable level, and to focus their efforts on economic and
social progress; to reduce substantially sales of arms and to eliminate completely
the black market in weapons, to prevent the proliferation of the most destructive
types of weapons; to restrict naval activities and armaments, to extend
confidence-building measures to the seas and oceans, and to work out verification
procedures that would permit the limitation of the nuclear threat from the sea; to
reduce and eliminate entirely by the year 2000 foreign military presence on the
territories of other countries, including the dismantling of foreign military
bases, coupled with appropriate verification procedures, particularly through the
United Nations; to ban the use of scientific and technological discoveries and
achievements for military purposes; to observe conscientiously existing agreements
on limiting the arms race and on disarmament and to expand participation in these
agreements; to establish confidence as an indispensable component of relations
among States; to keep the public in various countries informed about the status of
disarmament and to take their views into account.

Practical work in the United Nations on the criteria of the defensive
character of military doctrines and the defensive structure of armed forces could
constitute an important element which would enhance predictability and trust in the
military area.

It is certainly not easy to put into effect major disarmament measures. There
are objective technical difficulties which are further compounded by political
complications, particularly in situations where great efforts are being made to
break up the log-jams of confrontation, enmity, suspicion and mistrust, which have
been piling up over many decades. In this setting it would be totally
counter-productive to raise artificial obstacles, to invent technical catches, and so on. It is high time to clean this Augean stable thoroughly.

As the disarmament process gains in scope and depth, the significance of verification is also increasing. It should become comprehensive, stringent and effective. It should operate on a reciprocal basis and cover arms limitation and disarmament measures on land, at sea and in outer space. The goals set at the present stage in the area of disarmament highlight the desirability of creating, under the auspices of the United Nations, machinery for international verification and monitoring of compliance with disarmament agreements. In this regard, the well-known proposals of the Delhi Six appear to be interesting and are worthy of careful consideration. There is an urgent need to raise to a qualitatively new level the standards of confidence, scope and depth of mutual verification and control over the obligations entered into.

The realities of the nuclear and space age call for persistent and concerted efforts by all States of the United Nations to ensure the transition to an integrated system that would embrace measures to build equal security for all, to reach disarmament objectives, to consolidate confidence, and to establish effective international control on a broad scale which would apply both to disarmament and the settlement and prevention of armed conflicts.
Those are all major, formidable tasks. They are simply too big for a small
group of countries to cope with. For the processes of building genuine security
and of disarmament can indeed become irreversible only if they acquire a global,
universal nature. It is not realistic to have separate oases of confidence and
security in a vast scorching desert of confrontation. Such oases can become
mirages.

The United Nations, as the universal organization in terms of its membership,
is the natural instrument and channel for joint productive work to move towards a
safe world. We see a great potential for strengthening and drastically increasing
its role in all aspects of disarmament and confidence-building, whether conceptual,
negotiation or verification. For its part, the Byelorussian SSR will do its
utmost, in co-operation with other States, to strengthen the United Nations as a
genuine centre for harmonizing the actions of States and as a guarantor of
comprehensive security.

Many millenia ago the evolution of life created *homo sapiens* - the reasoning man. In the world of today the evolution of political thinking should lead to the
creation of *humanitas sapiens* - reasoning mankind. It is the task of the United Nations to become its embodiment.

*Mr. Aziz* (Iraq) (interpretation from Arabic): I am very pleased to convey to you, Sir, on behalf of the delegation of the Republic of Iraq and on my own behalf, our sincerest congratulations on your election as President of the General Assembly at its fifteenth special session, the third special session devoted to disarmament. I wish to assure you of our delegation's full readiness to co-operate with you in order to achieve the great objectives of this session and to fulfil the high hopes placed in it.
We should first recall the general welcome given by Member States to the Final Document and the programme of action for limiting the arms race as a prelude to achieving the ultimate objective of comprehensive disarmament, which were adopted in 1978 by the General Assembly during its tenth special session - the first special session devoted to disarmament. The Republic of Iraq welcomed the important results achieved during that session, which Iraq viewed as an expression of the unanimous international political will to take practical and balanced steps towards eliminating the threat of total annihilation and replacing the policies of stockpiling nuclear arms and developing their destructive power by more rational policies based on dialogue, the promotion of international co-operation and the strengthening of trust, while not violating the security and safety of States or adversely affecting their legitimate right to defend themselves or to acquire the means necessary to exercise that right.

The course of events since 1978, however, has not proved to be consonant with the optimistic atmosphere in which the first session was held or with the hopes and expectations placed by the international community in its goals. That has been particularly evident in the clear failure at all regional and international levels to attain those goals. The reality of the international situation is that the Second Review Conference of the 1980 Non-Proliferation Treaty failed to achieve any success worth mentioning towards agreement on a final act. Another reality of the international situation was the failure of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in 1982, to widen international consensus in this field.

We must, however, welcome the ongoing dialogue of the two super-Powers and their conclusion of the Treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF). We should welcome such an agreement not only because it is the first to bring about
the destruction of actually existing nuclear weapons, but also because it is an important event that will lead to the strengthening of trust, will help improve the chances of reaching further agreements and will provide concrete evidence that insistence on serious negotiations does indeed lead to new agreements on the reduction or elimination of other weapons. We feel, none the less, that such agreements, however important, cannot be truly effective in eliminating the threat of nuclear catastrophe and increasing the sense of security and peace in the world unless efforts are intensified to conclude a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

All the peoples of the world have a genuine interest in the success of disarmament negotiations. All countries are therefore entitled to participate in multilateral negotiations, particularly those that have a direct impact on their national security. We are not alone in holding that view. Indeed, there is unanimous international agreement on it, and this is reflected in the Final Document of the first special session of the Assembly devoted to disarmament. Yet the doors of the Conference on Disarmament have remained closed to many countries as a result of an erroneous interpretation of the rules of procedure — an interpretation consonant with the short-sighted interests of certain parties, which they place before the greater objective for which the Conference was originally established — and as a result of the desire of those parties to use their membership of the Conference to push matters of special interest to them. We hereby call for this aberrant state of affairs to be redressed without delay, either by increasing the membership of the Conference or by placing no other condition on the participation of States than their own desire to participate in the discussion of issues of concern to them.

In our view, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the world strengthens the atmosphere of confidence and contributes to the creation of
conditions more suitable to and favourable for negotiations on the limitation and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. For those reasons, Iraq has supported the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. To that end, Iraq has called upon all countries in the region that have not yet declared that they renounce the possession of nuclear weapons to do so and to get rid of any such weapons actually on their soil. Iraq has called upon those countries to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to place all their nuclear installations under the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). We would regard such a declaration as an essential expression of goodwill. In addition, all the countries in the nuclear-weapon-free zone would be expected neither to enter into military alliances with any nuclear-weapon countries nor to allow any bases for nuclear weapons to be established on their territories.

The Israeli entity has always ignored that call and, instead, has continued to strengthen its nuclear military capability - and there is now abundant documented information confirming the fact that that entity possesses nuclear weapons. We cannot overlook the grave threat posed by Israeli nuclear armament to peace and security in the region and in the world at large. Nor can we overlook the dangerous challenge it poses to the nuclear-non-proliferation system to which all the other countries in the region are committed. The Assembly no doubt remembers the Zionist aggression committed against my country on 7 June 1981, when the Zionist entity attempted to destroy our Tammuz nuclear reactor, which was devoted to peaceful purposes and had been placed under the IAEA system of safeguards and inspection.
(Mr. Aziz, Iraq)

Although the international community was unanimous in its condemnation of that act of aggression as a flagrant breach of the Charter and international law, as a violation of Iraq's sovereignty and inalienable and undisputed right to the use of science and technology, including peaceful nuclear technology, in its development programmes and according to its own needs and priorities, and as a direct assault on the International Atomic Energy Agency and its safeguards system - despite that condemnation - the international organizations concerned, particularly the Security Council, failed to take the measures needed to deter the Israeli entity and force it to place its own nuclear installations under international control as demanded by the resolution adopted by the Security Council itself. Those international organizations concerned also failed to provide effective guarantees against the repetition of such aggression.

Among the facts that have now become common knowledge in the international community is the strong link between the issue of armament and that of preserving international peace and security.

The Assembly is no doubt aware that the Concluding Document of the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, held in 1982, stressed that link.

Common realization, however, of this inherent link will not in itself be sufficient to ensure an atmosphere of peace and security in the world; nor, for that matter, will the achievement of some concrete results towards limiting nuclear armaments suffice. It is essential that international conduct be based on credibility and goodwill while working for the achievement of the common objectives and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. That cannot possibly be done without compliance by the Member States, particularly the permanent members of the Security Council to which the Charter entrusted a special
responsibility in this respect, with the resolutions adopted by this Organization on the issues of international peace and security.

We are raising this point in particular because we feel deeply that it is a matter which deserves special attention in our debates at this special session and because reality is the criterion by which peoples assess the credibility of the resolutions adopted.

Our region has in fact been witnessing a great increase in the use of force, armed aggression, occupation, expansion at the expense of others and interference in their internal affairs. The region has also been witnessing an ominous departure from the Charter, international law and the principle of respect for the resolutions adopted by competent bodies, particularly mandatory resolutions. Nowhere is this better illustrated than in the war of aggression and expansion that the Iranian régime has been incessantly waging against my country since 4 September 1980 and in the Israeli aggression against the Arab people of Palestine and other Arab States. The phenomenon I have referred to is very evident in both these situations.

Since the beginning of the Iranian aggression against Iraq and throughout the years of that conflict, Iraq has recognized the competence of the Security Council over the conflict and called on many occasions for a peaceful, just and comprehensive settlement of the dispute. Iraq has also accepted all the resolutions adopted by the Security Council and expressed its full readiness to implement them in good faith. For its part the Iranian régime, whose own constitution and ideology confirm how alien in nature it is to the whole contemporary system of the international community, has refused to recognize both the competence of the Security Council over the dispute and the contemporary agreements, principles and bases agreed upon for resolving disputes.
After eight years of hostilities that fundamental fact has remained unchanged. In 1987, having identified the dangers of the conflict and having seen them exacerbated to such an extent that they constituted a grave threat to peace and security not only in the region but also in the world at large, the international community was determined to bring the war to an end.

The Security Council adopted resolution 598 (1987) on 20 July 1987, as a mandatory resolution containing the elements of a comprehensive settlement. That important and unique resolution generated a sense of optimism in the region and in the world and was regarded as a major step not only towards ending the war but also towards consolidating the role of our international Organization in dealing with regional disputes seriously and decisively. As Iraq wanted peace, recognized the competence of the Security Council and believed in the Charter, it accepted the resolution in an official and documented manner when I came here only three days later and handed the Secretary-General a letter to that effect.

As for Iran, which has never recognized the competence of the Security Council or abided by the Charter or international law, it has failed to comply with that mandatory resolution. The Iranian régime has pursued a course of manoeuvering, mendacity, deception and prevarication in order to prevent the Council from moving on to the stage of imposing sanctions against it for having failed to comply with the resolution.

Along with all the peoples of the region that have suffered the ravages of war, we had expected a serious and firm stand on the question of compliance with resolution 598 (1987). Yet 11 months have now been wasted on a series of manoeuvres and futile attempts that have left one painful fact untouched: Iran's insistence on war and persistence in threatening the security and stability of the region, as well as peace and security in the world at large.
At this point I should like to ask how long should the Security Council wait for a Member State to take a political decision regarding war and peace on the basis of a mandatory resolution unanimously adopted by the Council itself.

The question that inevitably forces itself upon us now is, what do we do now? We believe that the issue is not one of playing a game of manoeuvres or diplomatic rhetoric, because such a course could create a very dangerous illusion. The war will continue, and so will its threat to world peace, while the illusion that something or other is being done to end the war will persist when in point of fact nothing of the sort is being done at all.

The issue is one of a political decision to be taken by the member States of the Security Council, particularly the permanent members. Those States are required to spell out, in unequivocal terms, their political options.

Are they ready to pursue the course charted by the mandatory resolution, as they gave us to understand when they voted for that resolution 598 (1987), or are they dealing with it as a mere proposal, subject to give-and-take or to bargaining?

An undeniable fact in this respect is that Iran has failed to implement the resolution and has, as has been made abundantly clear by its highest officials, insisted on continuing the war. How long will this ambiguous situation prevail in the Security Council? How long will operative paragraph 10 of the resolution remain unimplemented? Such a state of affairs is a grave threat to the credibility of the Council and indeed of the whole of this international Organization.

This forum has once again listened to another representative of the Iranian Government shedding crocodile tears over international agreements and over certain details pertaining to the course of the conflict which Iran insists upon perpetuating. It is to be noted, however, that not even once did the Iranian official make reference to the position of the Iranian régime on the question of
(Mr. Aziz, Iraq)

peace under the Security Council's mandatory resolution 598 (1987), which embodies the unanimous will of the body entrusted by this world Organization with the task of resolving questions of war and peace. Why should he fail to make such a reference? The answer is well known. As already mentioned, Iran takes the view that acceptance of the resolution and its implementation in good faith would establish peace between Iraq and Iran and restore security to the region, something which Iran has all along refused to allow to happen.
The Iranian Minister has focused on a single agreement from among the
countless international agreements making up the body of international law. This
selective approach to the implementation of international law is by no means a new
phenomenon to the Iranian régime. We have tried repeatedly, in this and other
international forums, to draw attention to the deceptive way in which the Iranian
régime aims, in the first place, to continue its war of aggression and to achieve
its expansionist programme by calling for the implementation of such agreements as
would allow it to carry on the war, while failing to show any readiness to comply
with any legal provision accepted by the international community that runs counter
to its own policies.

Working for peace and the safeguarding of human values entails respect for all
international agreements, notably the Charter of the United Nations. Has the
Iranian régime complied, for example, with the Third Geneva Convention of 1949
relating to the protection of prisoners of war? The method by which the Iranian
régime deals with the tragic plight of prisoners of war is a most abhorrent and
disgraceful crime. The Iranian régime mistreats prisoners of war, subjects them to
the ugliest forms of physical and mental torture, practises brainwashing on them in
order to make them change their political and religious beliefs, physically
eliminating those who fail to respond, and denies them the protection of the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). All these practices are aimed at
turning Iraqi prisoners of war into a source of political and military pressure on
their homeland. These crimes are documented in the records of the ICRC and have
been the subject of numerous statements issued by the Committee.

Let us now look into other issues which are by no means less criminal in
nature than the acts committed by the Iranian régime against prisoners of war. The
Iranian régime has been throwing children into the furnaces of war and employing
them as human mine-sweepers. This fact is well known to all. How can such a barbaric régime - a régime responsible for the death of millions of people - dare to speak of human values and humanitarian considerations?

In March 1988 we called upon the Secretary-General of the United Nations to dispatch a special team to look into the conditions of the prisoners of war, but our request has remained unanswered to date. The fate of thousands of human beings who have been suffering under appalling conditions over many years calls for the immediate and utmost attention of the Secretariat, the Security Council and the international community.

Iraq has called in the past, and calls now, for respect for all international agreements, in the forefront of which is the Charter of the United Nations. If the allegations of the Iranian régime are true and well founded, why does it not accept this challenge? The international community is now called upon to make a correct assessment of the barbaric and aggressive Iranian régime, a régime that has refused to recognize the competence of this international Organization and which has spurned its Charter. The international community should also, without hesitation, take the necessary steps to deprive that régime of all the means of war and aggression, since dealing with the régime or listening to its deceptive lies has absolutely no moral justification.

Lastly, I must point out that during this session the General Assembly has heard statements delivered by the representatives of certain States which claim neutrality and concern for human values, notwithstanding evidence, published in their own press, of their wilful involvement in the secret sale of weapons to Iran. Those States must realize that the scandals about their involvement in such sales are well known to the world, and their representatives should put their own houses in order before coming here to talk to others, from this podium, about morality and humanitarian considerations.
If the tragedy of the war of aggression and expansion continually waged by the Iranian régime against Iraq and the international efforts made to put an end to it through the implementation of Security Council resolution 598 (1987) are a major concern to the Arab nation, the Palestinian question is another unfolding tragedy that has waited a long time for words to regain their credibility through the implementation of resolutions.

The courageous popular uprising of the Arab Palestinian people on the occupied lands is of historic significance. It has come 20 years after the aggression of 1967, a period during which all sorts of policies of terror and territorial annexation have been perpetrated. It has come as a stern and courageous historic response to foreign occupation. The uprising offers eloquent and glaring proof of the vitality of the Palestinian people, their profound faith in freedom and their genuine desire for self-determination. It also provides irrefutable proof that the policies of aggression, brute force, military occupation and suppression cannot withstand the firm attachment of the oppressed peoples to their rights.

The uprising of the Arab Palestinian people has led to the adoption of important international stands and resolutions which have unequivocally condemned the policies imposed by Israel on the occupied Arab lands and exposed the racist and inhumane nature of foreign occupation. Motivated by the letter and spirit of the Arab summit meeting held in Amman in November 1987, the Arab States have exerted strenuous efforts at the international level to muster support for the just cause of the Arab Palestinian people. The Arab States have set up a seven-man committee to follow up the developments of the Palestinian uprising and to make contacts with the States members of the Security Council. The Council has adopted resolutions 605 (1987), 607 (1988) and 608 (1988) on the conditions prevailing in the occupied Arab territories. Despite those resolutions and all international stands in support of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination,
Israel has continued to defy the will of the international community for peace based on discontinuance of the military occupation and on recognition of the legitimate rights of the Arab Palestinian people.

The international community has a duty to support the steadfastness of the Palestinian people, as manifested in their popular uprising, by drawing the right conclusions from the lesson of the uprising. Foremost of these lessons is that proving the futility of the illusions entertained by oppressive Powers that policies of force, suppression and terror can change the course of history. The international community is called upon to support the aspirations of the Arab Palestinian people under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization, their sole, legitimate representative, to achieve their legitimate rights. Foremost among those rights is their right to self-determination and to the establishment of an independent Palestinian State.

The major issue for which this special session has been convened is highly important in so far as the achievement of international peace and security is concerned. However, the direct reality of the grave situation we are witnessing in our region as a result of the policies of force, aggression, occupation and interference in internal affairs makes it incumbent upon us to address the situation because of its close link to that goal.

The achievement of international peace and security and their protection against threats and violations is the common objective for which this Organization was established in order to function according to the collective security system provided for in its Charter. This objective cannot be achieved unless our collective international endeavour becomes sufficiently comprehensive to attain it, nor can it be achieved without commitment to the credibility needed to ensure the implementation of the resolutions adopted in accordance with the Charter.
Otherwise, we shall all be responsible for entrenching the feeling that this Organization has only a peripheral role to play in international relations, which is incompatible with the high hopes placed on it by humanity on the day of its inception.
Mr. HEPBURN (Bahamas): There can be no doubt that the climate is auspicious for the international community to pay serious attention to the question of arms limitation and general and complete disarmament. If we compare the present with 1978, when the first special session took place, we can say without hesitation that very serious efforts have been made to reduce the threat of a nuclear holocaust. On the other hand, more nations have increased their military spending, in part because they are not certain about the efficacy of a disarmed world.

Another factor is that when milestones are reached in particular areas of concern it is very tempting for participants to divert their attention from other matters that are of equal importance and hold potential danger.

The historic signing of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF) in December 1987, was one such milestone. Who would have thought in the early 1980s that this, the first nuclear-arms-reduction agreement in history, would be signed? But what does this act mean? It is still a fact that the antiballistic-missile Treaty signed in 1972 by the United States and the Soviet Union has not been implemented. It is in fact an area of major disagreement between the two Powers, with the United States contending that the Treaty permits strategic defence initiative (SDI) deployment and the Soviet Union maintaining that it forbids deployment. The Soviets are also insisting on the need for limits on the deployment of sea-launched cruise missiles. Perhaps these differences may have lessened at the recent summit meeting held in Moscow.

These facts notwithstanding, this signing can easily be regarded as the most positive step to date in the field of disarmament, as it is an actual disarmament measure as opposed to an arms-control agreement. Never before have two world Powers agreed to eliminate an entire category of weapons, whether they be bombers, battleships or ballistic missiles.
This Treaty, although bilateral in nature, together with its materialization and impact, lift a significant element of threat from citizens of Western Europe and Asia within range of those missiles. No matter how it is regarded, the elimination of this class of nuclear weapons is a significant step towards general and complete disarmament.

Yet the security benefit of this agreement should not be seen as its only outcome. Indeed, the positive example set by those two countries of how it is possible to solve long-term problems that once seemed intractable, should be regarded as an equally important legacy of the Treaty. Nevertheless, examples are only useful in so far as they are followed. It is the expressed hope of my delegation that the same spirit of conciliation which prevailed at that time will continue during the bilateral and multilateral negotiations of this third special session devoted to disarmament.

The confidence-building aspect of the Treaty is tangible evidence of the capability to scale down military confrontation and to diminish the danger of nuclear war. This effect is corroborated by the accord concerning verification and in this respect it can be concluded that new ground has also been broken, for it will be the first time that international verification will be applied to the obligation to abolish two categories of nuclear weapons and to guarantee at the same time that they will not be produced and deployed again. This aspect is of great importance as well for the drafting of future bilateral regional and global disarmament accords. Indeed it could signify that the basic conflict over verification and disarmament agreements is finished once and for all. While the verification issue has finally lost its function as a political and ideological instrument for potential confrontation and preventing disarmament measures, verification is now gaining importance as an element of constructive co-operation. It stands to reason that verification and arms limitation are co-operative
activities in the same way as confidence-building measures and verification are related.*

The prevailing atmosphere in the disarmament field provides an excellent augury for future disarmament negotiations. It cannot but have a positive impact on the deliberations of this special session and indeed on the prevention of horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this same vein, my delegation sees the establishment of zones of peace and co-operation and nuclear-weapon-free zones as major steps towards general and complete disarmament. Similarly, regional disarmament is an equally important facet of general and complete disarmament. It is to be hoped and desired that these issues will receive just consideration during our deliberations.

During the period leading up to the signing of the Treaty and frequently since, there has been much talk about glasnost and perestroika. My delegation would warmly welcome during these deliberations an attitude which demonstrated a perestroika which would allow that: first, a country’s worth can be measured in terms other than its military and/or economic power; second, due import be given to the area where the largest amount of resources is spent, namely conventional weapons; third, the broad interests represented in multilateral forums receive as much attention and focus as the pursuit of bilateral super-Power disarmament agreements; fourth, both overarmament and underarmament, instead of guaranteeing international peace and security, are threats to it; fifth, there is indeed a relationship between disarmament and development; sixth, security can be assured with a very low level of armaments as long as a balance is maintained; seventh, nuclear proliferation is a global problem which can only be addressed through the application by all States of the requisite constraints and regulations; eighth,

* Mr. Moumin (Comoros), Vice-President, took the Chair.
conventional disarmament is necessary to avoid rearmament; ninth, confidence-building measures cannot replace disarmament but must come out of it; and, tenth, nuclear weapons are weapons of mass destruction and not weapons of war.

Every success in the bilateral disarmament negotiations spotlights the role and effectiveness of multilateral arms limitation and disarmament efforts which focus on reaching global solutions.

It is clear that all States and peoples have an interest in seeing international peace and security strengthened. Their right, duty and desire to co-operate to this end is evidenced by the representation in this Hall. To use to the full the great policy potential of a multilateral mechanism such as the United Nations is not just an imperative of international democracy but also an increasingly urgent matter if practical results in the disarmament process are to be achieved. That some 25 Heads of State or Government have decided to afford to disarmament sufficient importance to warrant their presence goes a long way towards the promotion of the kind of spirit that will lend itself to compromise, conciliation and considerable progress.
For many years, particularly since 1984, negotiations towards a global ban on chemical weapons have continued at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. France, Iraq, the Soviet Union and the United States are the only countries whose possession of chemical weapons is confirmed, but at least 11 other States are believed to possess them. The Conference on Disarmament is in broad agreement on prohibiting the possession of chemical weapons, on destroying existing stocks and facilities over 10 years and on verifying prohibited as well as permitted activities, including some form of on-site inspection. Only last year the Soviet Union agreed to mandatory on-site inspection without a right of refusal. Therefore, although the conclusion of a global convention remains a distant project, it is reasonable to expect that some further progress will be made during the next few weeks.

The Final Document of the 1978 special session on disarmament points out:

"In the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility" (resolution S-10/2, para. 48).

That the two major nuclear Powers should be the forerunners in concrete action to halt the nuclear-arms race is further borne out by the fact that they possess 95 per cent of the world's total nuclear weapons. Encouragingly enough, this is beginning to be realized and recognized by them, as the joint communiqué of 21 November 1985 at the Geneva summit meeting states: "a nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought". Further, the Treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces can be seen as the most significant indication of the acceptance of this responsibility by these Powers.
This reality notwithstanding, the super-Powers alone cannot effect general and complete disarmament. It is no secret that virtually all the wars that have been fought since the Second World War have been fought in developing countries with the use of conventional weapons. The super-Powers have cleared the way for progress on all aspects of the arms race. This great opportunity afforded us should and must be taken advantage of. General and complete disarmament is the desire of all States and a goal towards which all States can contribute, even if only at the level of facilitating negotiations between those who are actually in a position to effect change.

It is very tempting for militarily insignificant States to assume the attitude of "This is not my war", but in The Bahamas we have first-hand experience of what it means to be caught in the middle, being a transit State in the drug route of drug transshipment between Latin America and North America. The whole Bahamian society has suffered greatly both locally and internationally as a result. The problems between the consumers and the producers have now become our concerns. No longer can we stand back and say, "Let them work it out." Bahamians have had to wise up and play their part in the war against drugs in their own national interest. We are now called upon to fight a war which landed on our doorsteps uninvited, unprovoked and certainly unwanted.

The activities of The Bahamas in the field of disarmament have always been characterized by an attitude of granting assistance wherever possible to the maintenance of international peace and security, thereby encouraging others into action. It is this attitude which characterized our activities in the chairmanship of the recent session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, and it is in this same role of facilitator that my delegation will perform during this special session.
Mr. BIERRING (Denmark): First of all I wish to express the pleasure of my delegation at the election of Mr. Florin of the German Democratic Republic as President of the third special session devoted to disarmament. We feel confident that, under his able guidance and with the competent assistance of the other officers of the Assembly, the session will lead to fruitful results.

The Vice-Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany has already spoken on behalf of the twelve member States of the European Community. Denmark, of course, fully shares the views expressed in that statement.

Denmark welcomes this opportunity for the international community to address itself at a high political level to the vital questions of disarmament. The third special session on disarmament is taking place at a very propitious moment which offers better prospects for disarmament and arms limitation than perhaps ever before. When the second special session on disarmament was held in 1982 the international sky was clouded, and it proved impossible to bring the session to a successful conclusion. In the period preceding this session we have witnessed important progress in bilateral nuclear-arms limitation and disarmament negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as a general improvement in East-West relations.

The Treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces constitutes a historic breakthrough, eliminating a whole class of nuclear weapons. Its unprecedented provisions for reductions - and, furthermore, for asymmetrical reductions - as well as for verification procedures that seemed highly unrealistic a few years ago, have consequences far beyond the scope of the Treaty. The Treaty is thus a most significant first step towards further progress in arms limitation and disarmament. We also welcome the important progress that has been made in the strategic arms reduction negotiations and hope that it will soon be possible to conclude an agreement on a 50 per cent reduction of the United States and Soviet
strategic nuclear arsenals. While negotiations proceed, there must be continued compliance with existing arms control agreements in spirit as well as in letter. My Government attaches particular importance to the preservation and continued observance of the anti-ballistic-missile Treaty.

The final goal must be the total abolition of nuclear arms, but in the meantime it is - in the words of Foreign Minister Genscher - "essential to reduce the reliance on nuclear deterrence through a co-operative security policy".

The world-wide arms race is a symptom of mutual lack of confidence rather than its cause. Fortunately, it is now increasingly recognized that arms control and disarmament cannot be considered in a vacuum, but that measures to remove mistrust and create confidence are essential ingredients in the disarmament process. Arms limitation, disarmament and confidence-building are processes that mutually reinforce one another. It is, therefore, of particular importance that the United States and the Soviet Union have initiated a sustained dialogue at all levels and on a wide range of issues, not only in the arms limitation and disarmament field but also covering regional conflicts, human rights and co-operation in general. This offers prospects for an era in which we shall finally be able to move on from what some have termed peaceful coexistence to peaceful co-operation.*

However, progress has not only been made in the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. In Europe the process initiated by the Helsinki conference in 1975 has brought new results. The Stockholm conference made a valuable contribution to the establishment of a system of confidence- and security-building measures in Europe.

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* The President returned to the Chair.
It is hoped that the follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) in Vienna will soon be able to register further steps towards the gradual dismantling of the artificial barrier between East and West in Europe. We are also looking forward to the establishment within the framework of the CSCE process of a specific forum for negotiations on furthering conventional stability in Europe. The aim is the establishment of a secure and stable balance at lower levels of armament, the removal of disparities prejudicial to stability and security and, as a matter of high priority, the elimination of the capability of launching surprise attacks and initiating large-scale offensive action. We earnestly hope that these negotiations will start later this year.

The positive bilateral and regional developments I have described should act as an inspiration for our work in this third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (SSOD III). The situation offers a unique opportunity for a positive and constructive contribution to the world debate through the United Nations multilateral system, and thereby for a revitalization of the United Nations role in disarmament. It is hoped that SSOD III will be able to meet this challenge.

The first special session devoted to disarmament adopted a Final Document, which contains the most comprehensive set of principles and guidelines for disarmament ever worked out by the international community. That Final Document still provides an important basis for our deliberations and should be recognized as such. However, our deliberations should first and foremost be forward-looking. An evaluation of developments since 1978-1982 brings certain disarmament aspects into focus. It would be natural for SSOD III to register and acknowledge the greater emphasis and importance of conventional disarmament, verification, confidence-building measures, openness in military matters, and regional initiatives.
The primary responsibility for disarmament rests with the major military Powers. However, all States, individually and through multilateral co-operation, have responsibilities in the disarmament field.

It is a source of great concern that the multilateral disarmament machinery has been able to show relatively few results in the past decade.

The negotiations in Geneva on the global elimination of chemical weapons are one of the more encouraging developments. Denmark welcomes the progress made in recent years. Chemical weapons are cheap, relatively easy to produce, highly mobile and easy to hide. The effects of chemical weapons are abhorrent, and reports of their proliferation thus give rise to great concern. Despite the prohibition of their use contained in the 1925 Protocol, the international community has witnessed repeated use of these weapons in recent years. This has underlined the urgency of reaching an agreement on a global convention completely banning chemical weapons from the face of the Earth. In the meantime, any use of chemical weapons must be unequivocally condemned.

The negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament have shown the participants' growing readiness to work towards a verifiable ban. It is important that all sides take an active part in these negotiations. Although a number of major difficulties still remain unsolved, the outstanding problems do not seem insurmountable. It is important, however, to preserve the momentum in the negotiations. Given the necessary political will, it must be possible to reach agreement on the outstanding problems. A convention must be effectively verifiable; however, we should not aim at unrealistic levels of certainty. It is possible to reach a degree of effectiveness that makes the remaining danger of non-compliance so small that it is no threat to security.
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), to which more
than 130 States are now parties, remains one of the most important arms-control
agreements reached to date. The non-proliferation régime has made a significant
contribution to world stability. The successful outcome of the Third NPT Review
Conference in 1985 confirmed the commitment to non-proliferation by the parties to
the Treaty. Since the Treaty's entry into force no non-nuclear-weapon State party
to the NPT has acquired nuclear weapons. The NPT régime - and strong international
support for it - should see to it that the nuclear option will never become an
attractive solution to perceived security needs. Any introduction of new
nuclear-weapon States is bound to have extremely destabilizing effects, triggering
unforeseeable developments. Reports of the nuclear ambitions of certain countries
in different parts of the world are extremely worrying. The positive effect of the
NPT on international peace and security has benefited all States. We welcome
recent accessions to the Treaty, and urge those who still stand outside the NPT to
recognize their responsibility and join it.

In July we can celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the signing of the
Treaty. The third special session on disarmament should mark that occasion by
contributing to the further strengthening of the NPT régime. Denmark, together
with the other Nordic countries, has prepared a working paper on the NPT. We shall
seek the inclusion in the final document of SSOD III of appropriate language on the
importance of preserving and enhancing the NPT régime.

The creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world could
be an important contribution to non-proliferation and the disarmament process in
general, especially in areas where not all countries have acceded to the NPT. In
accordance with the Final Document of SSOD I, nuclear-weapon-free zones must be
based on arrangements freely arrived at among all the States of the regions
concerned and taking into account the characteristics of each region.
The conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty also remains a vital issue on the international arms-control and disarmament agenda. While not an end in itself, a comprehensive test-ban treaty would be an important step towards nuclear disarmament and enhance the NPT régime's attractiveness for non-nuclear-weapon States.

Denmark welcomes the bilateral talks between the United States of America and the Soviet Union on all aspects of nuclear tests. We are encouraged by recent developments and look forward to the ratification of the Threshold Test-Ban Treaty and the Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions as a first step towards a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Over the years Denmark has urged the earliest possible conclusion of a treaty banning all nuclear tests, in all environments, by all States, and for all times.

It is regrettable that the Conference on Disarmament again this year was unable to agree on a mandate for an ad hoc committee on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. The role of the Conference on Disarmament in negotiating an effective and verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test ban is important and complementary to any bilateral negotiations or understandings on the matter. The international community must continue to call for a ban on nuclear testing. Maximalist positions, however, may be counter-productive to strengthening the multilateral role that the Conference can play towards a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

This session also addresses the question of verification. The necessity of adequate and reliable verification in arms control and disarmament has gained widespread recognition over past years.
(Mr. Bierring, Denmark)

SSOD III should reaffirm this recognition. Verification procedures are first and foremost treaty-specific. There is, however, scope for an important supplementary multilateral role in verification given the consent of all parties involved in an agreement. The role of the United Nations would primarily be to provide a data and service base. The question should be, as has been suggested, the subject of an expert study on existing and possible United Nations activities in verification of multilateral arms control and disarmament agreements.

Naval armaments and disarmament have recently gained attention. As a maritime nation, Denmark must defend freedom of navigation on the high seas. However, confidence-building, openness and transparency are important concepts for naval as well as for other disarmament areas. The role of naval forces must be examined in an overall military and political context since they represent an important element in the global strategic balance.

Multilateral disarmament deliberations since the last special session have been characterized by a growing awareness and increasing concern over the conventional arms race. The burden of the conventional arms race in terms of the diversion of resources from economic and social purposes is an urgent problem in a large number of countries and is often a serious obstacle to social and economic development. There is an urgent need for all States to explore what each can do to initiate or facilitate efforts aimed at conventional arms limitation and disarmament.

We regret that no progress could be registered with regard to conventional disarmament during the Disarmament Commission session a few weeks ago. We are, however, encouraged by the interest in conventional disarmament and problems related to conventional weapons which has been manifest during the general debate of this session. We also noted that reference to conventional disarmament
constituted a substantial part of the Secretary-General's opening statement. The concern of the Secretary-General has been expressed on many occasions. We welcome his very pertinent remarks, which we hope will contribute to keeping the issue of conventional disarmament at the forefront of the multilateral debate on disarmament in the United Nations. The United Nations should be capable of addressing the complex issues of conventional disarmament systematically, substantially and with vigour. We believe that the third special session offers an opportunity for the international community to expand the area of consensus in the field of conventional disarmament as well.

There are thus encouraging, though still inconclusive, signs that we may finally have reached a turning point in our efforts to come to grips with the senseless arms race that has harassed our globe for decades. Bilateral and regional initiatives have shown the way, while the multilateral process of arms limitation and disarmament in the framework of our world Organization has lagged behind.

What is not lagging behind, however, is technological innovation and sophistication. It is therefore imperative that the negotiation process catch up and keeps pace with man's ingenuity in science and technology.

**Mr. AL SHAHEEN** (Kuwait) (interpretation from Arabic): My country's delegation is extremely pleased to see you, Sir, presiding over the meetings of the third special session on disarmament after the steady success you achieved in chairing the affairs of the forty-second session of the General Assembly and the resumed sessions imposed by subsequent circumstances. We are confident that by virtue of your prudence and excellent conduct of the affairs of these meetings, this third special session will realize its purposes.
Although all international acts concerning disarmament acquire absolute significance in view of the undeniable fact that nuclear weapons constitute the greatest danger to mankind and its survival, this third special session convened by the United Nations on the question of disarmament is of special importance because it is being held following the United States-Soviet summit in Moscow. It may also be viewed as a part of an integral series complementing this phase in which the significance of disarmament measures is related to the achievement of world security and the reduction of intense international and regional conflicts. The conclusion of the Treaty on intermediate-range nuclear weapons has opened a door leading towards halting the nuclear-arms race and achieving nuclear disarmament. Although the world community welcomed the progress attained in bilateral negotiations, such bilateral negotiations should be complemented by multilateral negotiations, since every State in the world has a vital interest in negotiations on nuclear disarmament. The existence of these destructive weapons in the arsenals of a small group of States does not mean that their effect would be confined within those States. Rather, the quantitative and qualitative development of such weapons exposes the vital security interests of the States of the world, whether they be nuclear-weapon States or not, to sudden danger.

We concur with many who think that the present holds opportunities unprecedented since the Second World War as a result of the great dynamism ensuing from the active resumption of East-West dialogue. Thus, participants at this crucial session are under an obligation to utilize this new international climate and translate it into effective and positive moves and steps to promote the mechanism of multilateral negotiations.

We may all have seen or known about the demonstrations, with hundreds of thousands of people representing different peoples expressing their dismay over
the repeated use of this nuclear weapon, that took off from the area surrounding the United Nations buildings to march through the streets of New York City.

Similar marches also took place in many other countries, all of them directed towards a simple goal expressing a simple desire - the complete elimination of the terrible spectre that dominates the world.

World public opinion, clearly reflected in the gathering at this special session, has resolved that incompetent official policies with regard to halting conflicts and the race towards destruction can no longer be tolerated and that the persistence of differences of opinion and conflicts over supremacy are the cause of the permanent absence of a common denominator that would unite all sectors of the world community and direct their energies towards lasting peace and security based on the norms and morals governing mankind through messages revealed from heaven over untold centuries.

While our world spends about $2 million each minute on the arms race, by comparison 50 per cent of our children in the third world use polluted water which exacerbates their wretchedness and suffering. Yet the annual armaments budget in the world equals the total income of 2.6 billion people living in the 44 poorest countries.
There is no doubt that all the countries of our universe are obliged to exert every possible effort to reach the goal of eliminating nuclear arms. Regional arrangements to limit weapons can contribute to the international efforts to reverse the nuclear-armaments race. Hence, there have been the noble attempts of those who are conscientiously working in mankind's common interest to keep the different parts of the globe free from nuclear arms and who have attempted to give the subject priority at United Nations discussions since the 1950s.

Since those pioneering efforts were crowned with the first Treaty on the establishment of a nuclear-free region in Antarctica, signed in 1959 by 35 States, the symbols of mature human awareness have continued their sublime struggle to broaden the bases of these treaties to include all parts of our globe. Despite their inability to do so in other areas, they have concluded two other Treaties, one in Latin America in 1967, and the other in the South Pacific - which, by itself, constitutes one sixth of the globe's area - in 1986. Each of these Treaties was a gigantic stride in the international and regional march towards the prevention of nuclear arms proliferation.

We, therefore, cannot afford at this time not to stress the necessity for the achievement of such treaties on the practical, actual and implementational level in regions of such strategic importance and weight as the Middle East and Africa, if the world community wants to maintain its collective security and ward off the dangers of human annihilation. But whenever one addresses that question in those two regions one is confronted with the racist entities in Israel and South Africa, bent on the stockpiling of nuclear arsenals, which they use to blackmail and terrorize the indigenous peoples of the area and to impose their dominance, hegemony and regional expansion on them.
The Israeli nuclear capability has become one of the menacing and negative factors of the security balance in the Middle East area. While the Israeli entity allows itself to bombard an Iraqi nuclear reactor serving peaceful purposes, as indicated by the consensus of all international resolutions, we find that its nuclear ambitions extend to its associate racist entity in South Africa, where Israel continues its shameful co-operation with the apartheid régime in Pretoria in the field of nuclear armament, notwithstanding the international condemnation of and protest at this blatant armaments collaboration.

May I be allowed to reiterate what I referred to on a previous occasion, namely, that it is a noble thing to think seriously of those who might be killed by nuclear arms in the future. But, it is also very important that we make a greater effort to put an end to the suffering of the victims of human atrocities who are currently being killed and maimed by conventional arms.

The Second World War might have been the last human calamity in Europe, but we have to be aware that since 1960 about 81 wars have broken out between the peoples and countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America, whose toll has surpassed 12 1/2 million people.

In our area, in particular, we have suffered from six wars over the last 20 years, among them the Iran-Iraq war which has been raging for eight years, in close proximity to my country, Kuwait. Its destructive effects and enormous dangers extend to the security of the Arabian Gulf, a vital international economic artery, and to the Arab region. Its complications have an impact on all States of the world that have common interests with us.

While the Kuwaiti delegation lauds the consistently positive Iraqi stance towards all just and peaceful solutions, as currently embodied in Security Council resolution 598 (1987), we equally add our voice and effort to the entire world's sincere appeal to Iran to respond seriously to international efforts to restore
peace, security and stability in the area, in a manner that serves the interests of all.

Kuwait considers that it is imperative to establish a total prohibition of nuclear tests as the most effective single measure in restricting the nuclear-arms race. If unjustifiable obstacles still impede defining the role of the United Nations in the prohibition of nuclear tests, we are of the view that General Assembly resolutions 26/42 and 27/42 contain the elements that might constitute a clear basis for this definition.

We also urge continued consideration of the issue of the security of States that do not have nuclear arms. It is the issue for which the Third Review Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was convened in 1985. We re-emphasize the importance of conventional disarmament and regret the lack of concrete progress in this field, as was recently openly recognized by the co-ordinator of the concerned working group in the Committee on Disarmament at the Organization.

We look forward to the participation of the Conference on Disarmament in the final stages of the preparation of a draft treaty on chemical weapons, which cannot be accomplished without the co-operation and political will of some Governments.

I am also pleased to express on this occasion the full support of my country for the initiative taken by the leaders of the Six States who expressed their willingness in the Stockholm Declaration to present a common proposal at this session aimed at mandating the United Nations to promote the establishment of an appropriate multilateral system to ascertain the compliance of States with the regulations concerning nuclear non-proliferation and to ensure that the system not be confined to the countries possessing advanced military technology. We also support them in focusing on achieving a treaty on a comprehensive prohibition of
(Mr. Al-Shaheen, Kuwait)

nuclear tests and we appreciate their initiative in offering their assistance to monitor any halting of those experiments.

The Charter has given all Member States the right to individual and collective self-defence, which does not mean that some States have the right to hold the future of mankind and its survival hostage to their nuclear policies.

As responsible representatives of the peoples of the world, our efforts should not be restricted only to making sketchy and marginal amendments to the existing nuclear framework, or partial or temporary reductions in the armaments race; we must rather endeavour to create an effective framework for world security. The super-Powers have to be convinced of the fact that nuclear war cannot be won and it is in the interests of all humanity that they demonstrate their understanding of this truth through the reduction of their military budgets and the execution of the work programme adopted by the International Conference on Disarmament and Development.

In conclusion, I should like to underscore the importance of the United Nations central role and major responsibility in the sphere of disarmament, and its role as an effective mechanism in verifying disarmament and the compliance of States with relevant agreements. Moreover, the roles of the Secretary-General, the Security Council, the First Committee, the Disarmament Commission, the Conference on Disarmament, and all relevant organs within the Organization should be enhanced in a way that befits the principal role of the world Organization in maintaining world peace and security and its function as an international forum with a strong impact on international public opinion.

The President (interpretation from Russian): I wish to draw the General Assembly's attention to document A/S-15/18/Add.2, which contains a letter addressed to me by the Secretary-General in which he informs me that further to his letter of 2 June 1988 (A/S-15/18/Add.1), Dominica has made the necessary payment to reduce its arrears below the amount specified in Article 19 of the Charter.

May I take it that the General Assembly duly takes note of that information?

It was so decided.

AGENDA ITEM 3 (continued)

CREDENTIALS OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE FIFTEENTH SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

(b) FIRST REPORT OF THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE (A/S-15/36)

The President (interpretation from Russian): I shall now call on the representative of Iraq, who wishes to explain his position on the recommendation of the Credentials Committee contained in its report in document A/S-15/36.

May I remind delegations that, in accordance with General Assembly decision 34/401, such explanations are limited to 10 minutes and should be made by delegations from their seats.

Mr. Sumaida (Iraq) (interpretation from Arabic): On behalf of the Group of Arab States, I have the honour of informing the General Assembly of our objection to the credentials of Israel's delegation to the third special session devoted to disarmament. Our reasons for this objection are as follows:

First, Israel's failure to comply with Security Council resolutions relating to the question of Palestine, the situation in the Middle East and related matters, thereby violating Article 25 of the Charter.
Second, Israel's failure to implement General Assembly resolutions relating to the question of Palestine and the situation in the Middle East which call for the restoration of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, including the right to return, the right to self-determination and the right to establish its own independent State in Palestine. Those resolutions also emphasize the need to end the Israeli occupation of Arab territories, in accordance with the principle that acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible, as well as the need to ensure Israel's withdrawal from all the territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem and the Syrian Arab Golan.

Third, Israel's failure to implement resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on other items related to the question of Palestine and the situation in the Middle East.

Fourth, Israel's violation of human rights in the occupied Palestinian territories and the other occupied Arab territories, and in particular its violation of the provisions of the fourth Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949.

Fifth, Israel's continued annexation of Palestinian and other Arab territories, including Jerusalem and the Syrian Arab Golan, thereby violating the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the rules of international law.

Sixth, Israel's continued aggression against Arab States and the extension of its aggression to Lebanon, Iraq and Tunisia.

Seventh, Israel's continued co-operation with the racist régime of South Africa, particularly in the nuclear and economic fields.

Eighth, the fact that the credentials of the Israeli delegation to the third special session devoted to disarmament were issued in the occupied city of Jerusalem, in violation of Security Council resolutions, and particularly resolution 478 (1980), and related General Assembly resolutions, particularly resolution 35/169 E of 15 December 1980.
Ninth, Israel's refusal to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and failure to comply with the provisions of United Nations resolutions calling upon Israel to place all its nuclear facilities under the international system of safeguards and control.

The Group of Arab States has submitted a formal letter on this subject and has requested that it be circulated as an official document (A/S-15/41) of the General Assembly, under agenda item 3.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Russian): I invite members to turn their attention to the draft resolution recommended by the Credentials Committee in paragraph 18 of its report (A/S-15/36). In the Credentials Committee, that draft resolution was adopted without a vote.

May I take it that the General Assembly wishes to adopt the draft resolution?

The draft resolution was adopted (resolution S-15/1).

The meeting rose at 12.25 p.m.