Fifteenth special session

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE NINETEENTH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Monday, 13 June 1988, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. FLORIN (German Democratic Republic)
later: Mr. SERRANO CALDERA (Vice-President) (Nicaragua)
later: Mr. FLORIN (President) (German Democratic Republic)

- General debate [8] (continued)

Statements were made by:

Mr. Al-Khussalby (Oman)
Mr. Clark (Canada)
Mr. Abdel Meguid (Egypt)
Mr. Theoun Prasith (Democratic Kampuchea)
Mr. Shultz (United States of America)
Mr. Bale (Congo)
Mr. Terzi (Palestine Liberation Organization)
Mr. Blix (International Atomic Energy Agency)

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88-60147/A 5240V (E)
The meeting was called to order at 3.20 p.m.

AGENDA ITEM 8  (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. AL-KHUSSAIBY (Oman): Allow me first of all to join the previous speakers who have congratulated you, Sir, on your election to preside over this third special session devoted to disarmament. We have every confidence that, in the light of your long experience and outstanding competence, you will guide the work of the session to its desired and successful conclusion.

This session is being held at a time of great importance. In an international climate characterized by feuds, disputes and the deterioration of relations among States, the world has now caught a glimpse of positive initiatives which are a cause for hope and reassurance. In May, both the United States and the Soviet Union ratified an agreement to eliminate medium-range and shorter-range nuclear weapons in Europe. Although that agreement will eliminate only 3 per cent of existing nuclear-weapon arsenals, there is nevertheless great political significance to be seen in the recognition that the theory of nuclear deterrence is no longer appropriate for civilized development.
The decision of the two major States possessing nuclear weapons that it is necessary to rid themselves gradually of their stocks of such weapons and to co-operate in areas of human development rather than to compete to develop means of destruction is an initiative that gives cause for optimism. Also, the emphasis placed on the leaders of those two States during the recent Moscow summit on the possibility of an agreement to reduce their strategic weapons by 50 per cent before the end of this year constitutes a successful step in the same direction. We hope that the successful outcome of the Moscow summit will provide impetus for the achievement of general and complete disarmament.

It is of utmost importance to ensure that the atmosphere engendered by the recent initiatives is not dissipated. This atmosphere must be nourished and endowed with momentum in order that the results of this special session may be commensurate with the hopes placed in it, because that will help to strengthen the linkage between multilateral and bilateral disarmament efforts. The former efforts should complement the latter with a view to ending the arms race and reversing its direction in order to prevent the consequences evoked in the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament:

"we must halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament or face annihilation."

(resolution S-10/2, para. 18)

The United Nations was created to serve the cause of peace. Since it was founded, it has considered disarmament to be a basic and decisive element in the establishment of international security. No better evidence of this can be provided than by the fact that the first resolution to be adopted in January 1946 had, as its intention, the elimination of atomic weapons and of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction.

Between that time and the present day, the United Nations has spared no effort to do everything possible to achieve general and complete disarmament. By way of
example, but without embarking on an exhaustive enumeration, we may mention the
declarations of disarmament decades, the holding of special sessions devoted to
disarmament, confidence-building measures, and so forth. These measures, although
only partial in nature, were in the final analysis intended to bring about general
and complete disarmament.

If there is any shortcoming in these United Nations disarmament efforts, it is
the lack of political determination to implement the resolutions and programmes
that have been formulated for this purpose. We believe that we must take advantage
of the opportunity provided by the convening of this special session to support the
United Nations co-ordination efforts in this field.

My country has pursued and continues to pursue a peaceful international policy
in its approaches to all regional and international issues, in accordance with its
faith in the supremacy of peace based on justice and friendship among peoples and
nations. We are therefore of the opinion that the General Assembly's meetings on
the subject of disarmament are consistent with the basic principles of Omani policy.

The Sultanate of Oman will defend and support decisions - which it hopes to
see taken - that will ensure a commitment to proceed to the conclusion of
agreements designed to prohibit the production or acquisition of nuclear weapons or
the means to make use of them. In the light of its belief in the need to increase
the effectiveness of the United Nations role in the area of disarmament, my country
also believes that the time has come to reassess the functions of the United
Nations specialized agencies in this regard with reference, first, as is natural,
to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

The Conference on Disarmament has made and continues to make a great
contribution to the achievement of progress on the road to disarmament. We believe
that we now have an opportunity to support the Conference's efforts to attain better
results. The start that has been made on application of the decision taken in 1983 to expand the Conference's membership may well constitute a useful opening for the Conference's work. My country's delegation also believes that we must examine the functions and arrangements of other subsidiary bodies, in particular with respect to rationalizing the work of the First Committee and the Disarmament Commission.

In paragraph 45 of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly, nuclear weapons were included among the list of subjects which demanded priority attention. This was also reaffirmed by the Eighth Summit Conference of the Non-Aligned Countries, held at Harrare in 1986, when it recognized that

"the greatest peril facing the world is the threat to... humanity posed by the existence of nuclear weapons. Since annihilation needs to happen only once, removing the threat of nuclear catastrophe is not one issue among many, but the most acute and urgent task of the present day." (A/41/697, para. 32)

Nevertheless, while we view with satisfaction the concern of those States which possess nuclear weapons to reach an agreement to rid themselves of nuclear arms and devices, we look with dissatisfaction at the worsening of crises and regional wars and the increase in military confrontations, in particular in the third world. As a result, third-world countries have adopted policies that promote the acquisition of nuclear weapons on the basis of a philosophy of deterrence and legitimate defence. These policies embody the threat that regional nuclear catastrophes will probably occur, in particular since those States which have made substantial progress and are contemplating entry into the nuclear club do not possess adequate means of control over such weapons. We therefore hope that States participating in the work of the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva will show sufficient political determination to adopt tangible measures to transform the world into one without nuclear weapons.
This is particularly important, given that the incidences of nuclear radiation witnessed by the world in recent times have shown that it is illusory to believe that nuclear weapons may be intended for any one country or group of countries. If these weapons are used, it will be the whole world that will suffer the consequences.

We have two choices before us. Either we continue the arms race or we proceed, promptly and decisively, to stable and balanced economic and social development in the context of a more stable international economic and political order. The international community confirmed the correctness of this observation when, by a process of consensus, it adopted the final document of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development. As is stated in that document, disarmament and development are the most urgent challenges in the world today.

More than $35 billion is spent each year on military research and modernization alone, at a time when many peoples of the world are suffering the effects of hunger, famine and desertification. Statistics indicate that 570 million human beings are currently victims of malnutrition, not to speak of the millions of others who lack the simplest necessary services for life. If only a portion of the budgets devoted to military research were to be spent for peaceful purposes, such as agricultural research, the location of water resources and the combating of epidemics, it would permit the solution of many of the problems suffered today by the nations of the world, and particularly by the developing countries. These facts should provide us with the best motive for strengthening and reaffirming the consensus achieved during the United Nations Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, as a first step towards the implementation of the programme adopted by the Conference.
Ever since it joined the Committee responsible for preparations for a United Nations Conference on Implementation of the General Assembly's Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, my country has done all within its power to advance the preparations for the Conference. Regrettably, the work of the Ad Hoc Committee has remained trapped in a never-ending circle, and postponement of the Conference from year to year has now become a palpable reality. The Sultanate of Oman hopes that this special session will see the adoption of appropriate measures to advance the work of the Ad Hoc Committee, with a view to the convening of the Indian Ocean Conference within the specified time period, that is, by the end of 1990.

Any talk about disarmament would be incomplete if no mention were made of conventional disarmament. Since the end of the Second World War, the world has witnessed 36 armed conflicts in which conventional weapons were used. More than five million people have been killed as a result of those conflicts, not to mention the enormous sums of money which have been spent on acquiring such weapons. We urge that adequate attention be devoted to this aspect of the arms race. We also believe it to be essential that all States comply with the principles of the Charter and abhor threats to or interference in the internal affairs of any State, because it is thus that States will acquire the sense of security which must exist before a start is made on any effort for disarmament.

We failed to achieve consensus at the second special session devoted to disarmament. That failure presents us with a challenge, and to avoid a recurrence of such failure at this session it is our duty to strive to redouble our efforts to lay firm foundations for peace and security. The task is not easy, but neither is it impossible if the nations of the world have the necessary political determination and each one assumes its required role. As His Majesty Sultan Qaboos Bin Said said in the course of his speech on 18 November 1982:
"The time has come for every State to assume its responsibility within the framework of the international community to activate the role of the United Nations, to promote it and to provide it with the capacity to exert a positive influence on behalf of the causes of international peace and security."

Mr. CLARK (Canada): Six years ago, at the outset of the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, the President could correctly observe that nothing had been achieved in the field of disarmament and arms control since the first special session. This year we meet in circumstances which are vastly different. The past six years have recorded progress and achievements that will have major implications for arms control and disarmament. The measure of success of this special session will be the extent to which our deliberations sustain further the spirit so essential to continued progress and achievement in international disarmament. We must, therefore, reaffirm our dedication to the success of arms control and disarmament and pledge ourselves to advance ideas which will keep hope and progress alive.

Our efforts here can only be aided by the outcome of the recent meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev. That summit meeting clearly demonstrated the degree of progress that has been made in East-West relations. It was the fourth such meeting between the two leaders in just over two and one half years, an unprecedented pace for discussion and negotiation.

I have been struck by how many observers of the summit meeting have referred to the new agreements signed in Moscow on verification and testing as "minor" arms control measures. When we gathered at previous special sessions the very notion of "minor" arms control agreements would indeed have sounded strange. We have come to have high expectations of this process.
It is in the vital Soviet-American relationship that much of the progress has been made since the last special session. Intensive negotiations between those two States in the last several years have brought new and historic achievements, most notably in the landmark agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) signed in Washington last December and the agreement in principle to reduce strategic nuclear arms by 50 per cent. Those accomplishments present this special session with both the opportunity and the stimulus to pursue other avenues leading to greater international security and stability.

The multilateral arms control process has also had significant success in the context of East-West relations. The Stockholm Agreement, which came into effect in January 1987, has brought greater openness and predictability about military activities in Europe. Anticipated new negotiations on conventional stability covering the whole of Europe between all members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact offer us the opportunity for more progress.
There has also been some movement forward in non-East-West forums but that has been much less spectacular. The Conference on Disarmament has made some progress on negotiations on a global convention to ban chemical weapons, but the repeated reports about the use of chemical weapons in the Gulf War only demonstrate how far we are from an effective agreement and the urgency of our obligations. There was also progress in last year's successful International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, in the endorsement of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons at the Third Review Conference of the Treaty, in the inclusion of conventional disarmament on the agenda of the United Nations and in the consensus report of the Disarmament Commission on verification.

In this special session it is important that we take realism as our guide and apply what we have learned from our successes and what we have learned from our failures. We have learned that arms control and disarmament cannot be viewed as ends in themselves. Both have value only if they contribute to security and well-being. Most countries accept the desirability of constraining or banning weapons systems. But we cannot aspire to the reductions we seek, or the agreements we need to sustain them, unless all States take advantage of opportunities to support those objectives.

Experience has shown that successful arms control and disarmament agreements share a number of essential qualities. The first and most obvious is enhanced security. Arms control agreements must maintain and enhance the security of all those involved in the negotiation.

There are other essential qualities as well.

(spoke in French)

One is mutual benefit. Realism in arms control demands that a successful negotiation offer something for all parties.
Negotiations must also be substantive. We must not spend our time negotiating the non-essential or the frivolous. A proliferation of arms control forums is not likely to lead to more arms control agreements unless they have clear and substantive mandates.

Arms control agreements must also be crafted to ensure that the benefits of limits on weapons are not undone by redeployment or by qualitative improvements to remaining weapons.

A fifth and related criterion is non-transferability of the threat. Arms control agreements will achieve little and are unlikely to succeed if they remove the threat from one region by increasing it in another.

Finally, an arms control agreement must be verifiable. The agreement must include not only thorough verification provisions, but the substance of the agreement must be such that compliance can be effectively demonstrated.

These essential qualities are demanding.

None the less, our experience clearly shows that while negotiation of agreements will not be easy, it is not impossible. An effective disarmament and arms control régime can meet these criteria only through measured and individual steps which see every contentious aspect settled. The issues on which we seek agreement vary much too widely and are too complex to allow us to behave otherwise.

(continued in English)

Canada sees confidence-building as essential to arms control and disarmament. We regard the concepts of openness, transparency and predictability as imperative. The establishment of agreed procedures for inspections at the Stockholm Conference in September 1986 is an accomplishment which stands as a precedent and model for other arms control negotiations at bilateral or regional levels.

The principles essential to the success of confidence-building measures should be promoted on every occasion. In this regard, we urge members of the United
Nations to comply with the General Assembly recommendation on reporting annual military expenditures. Only 20 or so countries regularly comply with this recommendation. It is a small step, but we cannot hope to take larger steps without more members of the Assembly giving effect to our own recommendations.

Indeed, one of the happy consequences of the Reagan-Gorbachev summit meetings is to broaden the responsibility for arms control. For some time, the focus of arms control discussions was to encourage the super-Powers to act. Now the super-Powers are acting and the question becomes whether other States are prepared to demonstrate themselves the leadership we have asked of the United States and the Soviet Union. It is no longer enough to advocate action by others. Whether the issue is chemical weapons or adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or fidelity to the recommendations of the General Assembly, the new climate involves new obligations for all of us.

Ultimately, neither arms control nor disarmament can succeed without a general will to make them succeed. The issue is fundamentally political, and this special session is one assembly in which political will can be cultivated and demonstrated. Increasing trust, good relations and arms reductions go together: they are mutually reinforcing.

It is not enough that the established framework of international institutions and laws must remain in place; they must as well be respected in practice by Members of the United Nations.

The strength of this institution is not the responsibility of any one group of nations; it is the responsibility of all its Members. We must all work in support of the United Nations, and not undermine it. We cannot ask it to do the impossible. We have to set realistic goals, and we have to give it the means to achieve those goals.
In that context, the frequent calls we have heard at the special session for a new fund to transfer the resources saved from disarmament to development is an example of a failure to learn from past experiences. Last year, the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development issued a Final Document stressing the multi-dimensional nature of security. The participants rejected both a direct linkage between disarmament and development and the creation of a fund. Nations like Canada already have mechanisms for providing funds for development, as does the United Nations itself, and in many developing countries there are ample existing claims upon any resources made available through disarmament.

Just as arms control and enhanced security are not a monopoly of the super-Powers, neither is disarmament linked to nuclear arms alone. The terrible consequences of military actions in the decades since the Second World War have been caused by conventional weapons, and latterly by chemical weapons. We must face this issue squarely. No conflict or arms build-up, however small, however isolated, is irrelevant or can be ignored because any of them can undermine the security of all of us.

Canada is determined to continue to play a leading role in moving the agenda forward. Our commitment and contribution to the cause of arms control and disarmament is well established. We will use the influence we have, and make available the expertise we hold to help reduce the danger of conflict and to reverse the build-up of arms.

Our first goal at the special session, therefore, should be to endorse continued adherence to a well-founded and realistic approach to arms control and disarmament.

This requires that we set clear, realistic goals and that we choose and adhere to priorities. In arms control and disarmament, priorities must be established no
less than in other areas if we are to have specific landmarks against which to measure progress. This lesson is especially true for the United Nations and its arms control activities.

The special session can identify and isolate those areas which command consensus and where we can agree we should concentrate our efforts. Canada has listened with interest and attention to the statements made at the special session. We believe that a measure of agreement does exist on certain issues where Canada considers it would be worthwhile to concentrate its attention in the future.

First, deep and verifiable reductions in the arsenals of nuclear weapons must remain as the highest priority in international disarmament.

The achievement of a comprehensive test-ban treaty remains a fundamental and enduring objective for Canada. The special session should recognize the successful efforts already made in Soviet-American negotiations in this area and should endorse this full-scale, stage-by-stage negotiating procedure.

No measure demonstrates the commitment of a nation to nuclear disarmament more effectively than adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Beginning last week and throughout the session officials of the Canadian Government, on my instructions, will be calling on the Governments of all non-signatories of the Treaty strongly urging any nation that has not done so to accede to this essential arms control treaty. I hope that the special session will issue a similar call. It is no longer possible to argue, as some have, that the super-Powers must first reduce their own nuclear arsenals. If that was a condition precedent, it is being met.
The focus of attention on nuclear arms should not, however, be allowed to deflect attention from the need for reduction of conventional arms. That is urgent also. It is in this area that regional approaches to arms control and disarmament may well provide the best returns.

The negotiation of a convention prohibiting chemical weapons and eliminating their stockpiles must be regarded as a matter of paramount importance. This special session should unequivocally condemn their use. While progress has been accomplished, greater efforts must be made to conclude an effectively verifiable comprehensive ban on chemical weapons.

Until such an agreement is reached, every step must be taken to prevent the transfer to other States of chemical weapons, and to follow the example of those countries which have moved to control the export of highly toxic chemicals and to institute a warning-list procedure for others.

The prevention of an arms race in space remains a major goal of Canadian policy and a matter which concerns us all. Canada will continue to work to ensure that outer space is developed for peaceful purposes.

Verification is essential to the arms-control and disarmament process. It has been a major preoccupation for Canada and we are encouraged that so many speakers in this forum share that priority. Already, a welcome new international consensus has developed on the subject. In May last year the Disarmament Commission established a Working Group on Verification, of which Canada served as Chairman. This year the Working Group adopted a report which included 16 verification principles amplifying the provisions on verification agreed at the first special session. I would urge all Members of the United Nations to reinforce the efforts of the Disarmament Commission and subscribe fully to these principles.
To help promote the cause of multilateralism in this field, we and the Netherlands have proposed that an in-depth study be undertaken by a United Nations group of experts. Such a report will advance international understanding of verification within the United Nations framework, and help develop an appropriate role for the Organization in this field. I ask that Members of the United Nations support this proposal.

In the last six years we have shown that arms control and disarmament can work and that it can be made part of the growing fabric of our international relations. Canada stands ready to work with Member States in the pursuit of goals agreed by this special session. Let us continue to nourish further the cause of arms control and disarmament.

_Mr. AEDEL MEGUID_ (Egypt) (interpretation from Arabic): It gives me great pleasure to address the General Assembly at this special session devoted to disarmament. We are all the more pleased to see in the presidency a person with such well-known skills who comes from a friendly country with which Egypt maintains relations of cordiality and mutual understanding. I wish to stress that Egypt will spare no effort to make this special session a success, because of its conviction that the current international developments reflect the urgent need for strengthening efforts to achieve disarmament.

During the recent past the world has witnessed far-reaching international developments with consequences which could give rise to optimism and détente. The leaders of the two super-Powers have met four times in a short period, after a long absence of meetings at such a level. The Washington Summit led to the signing of an agreement between the two super-Powers to eliminate intermediate- and shorter-range nuclear missiles. A few days ago the Moscow Summit reaffirmed the determination of the two super-Powers to continue their efforts in that regard.
Those developments provide unequivocal evidence that divergencies, or even discrepancies, between the ideologies and the systems of the two Powers do not necessarily constitute an obstacle to their agreement on arrangements aimed at easing international tension and on measures to achieve disarmament. The attainment of some progress provides in itself sufficient evidence to refute the allegations by some that the arms race in all its dimensions — especially its nuclear aspect — is so complex and so intricate that it is impossible to achieve progress in this domain.

The high-level and well-prepared meetings of the two super-Powers give the clear impression that the emerging international trends, in which both the United States and the Soviet Union play a major role, should be taken seriously. We in the third world are aware that our planet is going through a decisive, historic phase in which the pattern of relationships between the two super-Powers and the two major military alliances is being remodelled. Such developments are capable of changing the security doctrines which have been advanced since the end of the second World War and which have raised armaments to a peak of unprecedented height. As a result, the whole world has to speak out in favour of disarmament and arms limitations, as an urgent matter. The world can no longer survive under the threat of such a feverish arms race, nor can détente or development policies flourish under such conditions. We are duty-bound to seize each positive opportunity and every flicker of hope to ensure a better future for our children and for succeeding generations.

The fact that we have gathered here to tackle the dangers facing us is a reaffirmation that all members of the international community are unanimous in their conviction that we share together the present and the future, that co-operation between and among ourselves for the common interest is the only
choice before us. Egypt considers that the convening of the special session at this particular time is an unequivocal statement that the countries of the world - irrespective of their military or economic power - will not be complacent about the issues of disarmament and international security.

It may be appropriate for me to dwell first upon the issue of halting the arms race and achieving nuclear disarmament. Despite the obvious repetition, I find it essential to emphasize that the most serious and urgent threat to humanity is that of a nuclear war. There are various military and scientific theories, with conflicting intentions and philosophies. However, they all agree on the impossibility of controlling any military conflict in which one party started to use nuclear weapons. That would be a situation which could destroy the entire world. Moreover, the political declaration of the leaders of the two super-Powers - the strongest nuclear Powers - at their meeting in Geneva stressed that in a nuclear war there are no victors. Is all that not enough to question the logic behind retaining such weapons? Should that not lead us to eliminate them once and for all? In that regard, Egypt appeals to the two super-Powers and other parties concerned to conclude a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty at the earliest possible date. That would be an important step towards halting the nuclear arms race and the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Egypt firmly believes that the problems of security and related measures towards disarmament are indivisible. They encompass both the international and the regional level. Stability can never be achieved unless we work simultaneously on those two levels, particularly in the fields of disarmament and nuclear arms limitations. While genuine security against the nuclear menace cannot be attained unless comprehensive international measures towards the halting of the arms race and its vertical proliferation are taken, we would be contradicting ourselves if we restricted our endeavours in this domain to international measures while overlooking the more limited and regional dimensions. In this context I wish to highlight the following points.

First, the nuclear Powers should attach more importance to finding suitable and just formulas for an agreement or arrangements that would ensure the non-use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. It is neither fair nor logical that non-nuclear-weapon States should remain threatened by nuclear weapons while at the same time they are requested not to acquire such weapons. We wish here to reiterate what we have stated before, that Security Council resolution 255 (1968) of 19 June 1968 and the unilateral declarations by nuclear States are not, in our opinion, a sufficient guarantee to non-nuclear-weapon States against the threats of nuclear weapons.

Honesty and security concerns call upon us to face this issue clearly and squarely. It is not acceptable to put in the same basket all the non-nuclear-weapon States without distinction between those which are party to security arrangements within military and political alliances, which provide a nuclear umbrella to protect them, and those countries that have refused to be party to such arrangements, namely, the non-aligned and neutral countries. If we are serious and sincere in preventing the emergence of new nuclear-weapon States and if we are in our endeavour to reach our declared objective of developing a more
effective and more universal system of non-proliferation, we have no alternative but to tackle the obvious contradictions in dealing with this issue and to provide genuine and effective guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States in order to prevent the use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons against them.

Secondly, the nuclear-weapon States, and indeed the whole world, should make sincere efforts to insulate more regions from nuclear threats.

Egypt has spared no effort at the international level to protect its people and the neighbouring areas against the threat of nuclear annihilation. Egypt has signed the non-proliferation Treaty and has adopted constructive positions in the various international forums to curb that threat.

The world testifies to Egypt's persistent efforts to safeguard Africa and the Middle East from nuclear threats. In 1964 Egypt was host to the African summit conference which issued a call to make Africa a non-nuclear-weapon continent. In this regard I cannot but express our grave concern about the policies of the apartheid régime in South Africa, which hinder the implementation of the declaration on the denuclearization of Africa. This forum must face such policies squarely and not allow their continuation, in flagrant defiance of the will of the international community.

Since 1974 Egypt has sponsored an initiative aimed at the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. That initiative has in recent years been consistently endorsed by the General Assembly, by consensus. Such a consensus should be maintained and should not be impaired as a result of the military nature of the nuclear programmes of a country in the region. The introduction of nuclear weapons into the Middle East or the threat of their introduction would lead to grave and complex consequences and create a very delicate situation.

At a time when we are striving sincerely to ease international tension and attain disarmament, I wish to state before this Assembly in all frankness that
Egypt will never allow a nuclear race in the Middle East in which one State would become superior to another, a situation which would threaten security in the area and in the world at large. Nuclear technology is not the monopoly of a few; it is accessible to all. Egypt will not remain complacent and will take all necessary measures to ensure its security once it is convinced that nuclear weapons are being introduced into the region.

From this rostrum I wish to call on Israel to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty and to place all its nuclear facilities under the system of inspection and verification of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), so that the peoples of the region may be sure that its nuclear programmes are not oriented towards military purposes. We reject the argument that the non-proliferation Treaty does not contribute to further stability and thereby to the prevention of conventional wars, nor is that argument an acceptable excuse for a State's not becoming a party to the Treaty. I must strongly caution once more against the danger of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, which would constitute a threat to the security of the whole world. I wish to call on the nuclear-weapon States in particular to shoulder their responsibilities in this regard.

Although the consensus on the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East represents an important step in the right direction we shall continue to pursue the proposal actively until it receives tangible expression. In this regard, Egypt would make the following proposals: first, that all States of the region, as well as nuclear-weapon States beyond the region, should declare that they will not introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East; secondly, that the Secretary-General should be authorized to appoint a personal representative, or a group of experts, to contact the States of the region with a view to formulating a model draft of a treaty and to evolve specific practical measures capable of creating the necessary conditions for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free
zone in the Middle East; and, thirdly, that IAEA should be invited to prepare a study, and submit specific recommendations related to the necessary verification and inspection measures which would be implemented in conjunction with the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

Before I move on to other issues I wish, in the name of the Arab Republic of Egypt, to express our appreciation of the accomplishments achieved over the past few years with regard to some regional security and disarmament arrangements. The Tlatelolco Treaty, the Treaty of Rarotonga and the outcome of the Stockholm Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe are concrete examples of such arrangements.
We believe that each region has its unique economic, social and cultural conditions and characteristics and its own political and security problems. Thus, any attempt to copy regional arrangements of one region in another is questionable and uncertain. However, it is necessary that more efforts be made at the regional level to establish security and stability and to achieve disarmament.

I should also like to emphasize that we firmly believe that the effectiveness of regional arrangements is conditional upon the abiding by and respect for such arrangements not only by the States of the respective regions, but also by other States, especially the super-Powers.

This applies more specifically to the regions which have a strategic geographical position such as the Mediterranean, which should continue to be a transit route for trade and civilization and a haven of peace and security. In this context, we wish to underscore the importance of the declaration issued by the Foreign Ministers of non-aligned Mediterranean countries at their meeting in Brioni on 3 and 4 June 1987. The declaration calls, inter alia, for agreement on specific measures aimed at establishing security and stability in the Mediterranean through special arrangements for banning nuclear weapons and reducing conventional weapons and military operations. Egypt naturally attaches great importance to that question as it is closely related to its security and the security of the whole of the Arab world. The maintenance of the security of the Middle East and the desire for it to remain a nuclear-weapon-free zone, and the maintenance of security and stability in the Mediterranean are two sides of the same coin.

Sustained efforts are being made at the current meetings of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to reach a comprehensive agreement on the elimination of chemical weapons. Egypt has been actively participating in those meetings and will continue to do so until negotiations come to fruition. We believe that the
existence of nuclear weapons in international arsenals is contrary to all norms of
morality. We equally believe that chemical weapons of particularly inhuman
characteristics should not continue to exist at a time when we are seeking to
establish new norms for a civilized human order. Therefore, Egypt urges all States
to conclude an agreement on the banning of chemical weapons at the earliest
possible time. In that regard, the Arab Republic of Egypt would like to make the
following observations.

First, the draft agreement which is being prepared by the Conference on
Disarmament contains provisions which incorporate commitments never before endorsed
by the international community. For example, reference is made to the right of
each party to oblige other parties to allow the inspection of installations in
which chemicals are produced or stored. Given the nature and scope of the draft
agreement, it is essential to provide a genuine and credible guarantee to the
parties which do not produce, or store, chemical weapons so that if one party is
subject to the use or threat of the use of chemical weapons that party will be
fully confident that there is an effective guarantee from the international
community to protect it. A Security Council resolution along the lines of Security
Council resolution 255 (1968), which accompanied the non-proliferation Treaty, will
not be sufficient. What are needed are security guarantees which are sure and
credible, and which can be implemented immediately.

Secondly, there is a need for genuine safeguards so that the principle of
prohibition may not adversely affect chemical industries in the developing
countries.

Thirdly, it is important that intensive consultations be conducted with the
non-participants in the Conference on Disarmament who do not have the opportunity
to examine the provisions of the draft agreement thoroughly and their effect on
their national security and economic development. We have listened with attention to the proposal of the Foreign Minister of Yugoslavia that an international conference be convened in 1989 for the signing of an agreement banning chemical weapons.

The purpose of this special session should not be merely to assess the past with its positive and negative aspects. Rather, our understanding of the commitment to the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament makes us anxious to seize this opportunity to consider new trends and developments that have evolved since then. Such consideration could enable us to reach agreement on additional rules or principles that would regulate the manner in which the international community has to deal with those developments and build on their positive aspects. To achieve that objective, we propose that this third special session adopt a set of additional rules and principles which would strengthen the drive towards disarmament and include, inter alia: first, a commitment not to transfer the arms race to new domains such as outer space and a commitment to keep those domains for peaceful purposes; secondly, a commitment not to develop new weapons or weapons systems which would perform the same function as weapons banned or eliminated in accordance with disarmament agreements; thirdly, Egypt calls on this special session to intensify its efforts to formulate universal principles aimed at preserving the finite resources available to mankind for peaceful purposes. In accordance with these principles, all States should commit themselves to implementing the action Programme adopted by the United Nations Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development; and fourthly, the role of the United Nations must evolve in such a way that it is not limited to information activities, training and the World Disarmament Campaign; rather, it is high time the United Nations assumed
an effective functional role in the field of disarmament in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

I wish to convey to representatives the concern of the people and Government of Egypt at attempts to limit the role of multilateral diplomacy in the field of disarmament to a marginal one. Such attempts seek to reduce the role of multilateral diplomacy to that of an interested bystander, thereby not allowing it to contribute actively to issues that pertain in the first instance to humanity at large.

The role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament cannot be questioned. We should not lose sight of Article 1 of the Charter, which specifies the maintenance of international peace and security as the main purpose of the United Nations.

Despite the important activities which the United Nations undertakes, to the effectiveness of which Egypt testified when it hosted a regional seminar in Cairo in 1985, it is necessary to revitalize the United Nations machinery to make optimum use of its potential, and to benefit from the capabilities of the Secretary-General and his known efficiency and wisdom in assuming a catalytic and constructive role towards promoting political conditions conducive to the adoption of effective measures in the field of disarmament, particularly in regions where political problems hinder direct consultation or negotiation.

We have before us a unique opportunity to curb the arms race with all the danger that it entails. If that opportunity is missed, it will render us accountable to the harsh judgement of history. We also have an opportunity to capitalize on the international climate which augurs well for a better future, a climate which is showing some progress in the resolution of regional political problems such as the Afghan problem.
(Mr. Abdel Meguid, Egypt)

All members of the international community should respect international legitimacy and the non-use of force in international relations as well as the resolution by peaceful means of international and regional problems and conflicts in accordance with the provisions of the Charter. Regrettably, some regional problems continue to become more complicated and arduous because of lack of respect for such norms and principles. Foremost amongst them is the question of Palestine, and the struggle of the heroic Palestinian people for self-determination and the liberation of the occupied Arab territories. In recent months the whole world witnessed the inhuman practices of the Israeli occupation forces against the legitimate Palestinian uprising in the West Bank and Gaza.
The continuation of the Iran/Iraq war, due to Iran's persistent refusal to implement resolution 598 (1987), is yet another example. We must continue to impress upon Iran the necessity to respect and take positions consistent with the will and pronouncements of the international community, as Iraq has done, particularly in view of the tragic human and vast material losses suffered by all the parties to the conflict.

In conclusion, let me call upon all representatives to come together in harmony. Let us ensure the safety of our children and grandchildren; let us work for peace; let us act together for a secure present and a better and more prosperous future.

Mr. THIOUNN (Democratic Kampuchea) (interpretation from French):

Mr. President, on behalf of the delegation of Democratic Kampuchea I wish to join all the representatives who have preceded me to this rostrum in extending our sincere congratulations to you on your unanimous election to the presidency of this important special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. We are confident that with the wisdom and skill you demonstrated during the forty-second session of the General Assembly you will be able to guide our work to a successful conclusion.

I also wish to extend to our Secretary-General, Mr. Javier Perez de Cuellar, our warm congratulations and our admiration for his tireless efforts to ensure respect for the United Nations Charter and for his important contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security.

His Royal Highness Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, President of Democratic Kampuchea, addressed to the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament a message dated 26 May 1988, which was distributed in document A/S-15/21 on 31 May 1988. It is my honour and privilege to read out that message.
"The third special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament marks a new and remarkable stage in our world Organization's tireless search for ways to halt the arms race, in accordance with its principal purpose of maintaining international peace and security. I wish to take this opportunity to express to all the participants in this important world assembly my warmest greetings and most sincere wishes that their significant work will help to establish peace and stability on our planet based on security for all, mutual trust and reciprocal respect among all States and peoples, whether large or small, powerful or weak, rich or poor.

"Since the end of the Second World War the fact that there has not been another world-wide conflagration does not mean that there has been peace and security for all. While we have gone on talking about disarmament and worrying about the apocalypse that would result from a possible nuclear war, conventional local and regional wars have continued to break out in all regions of the world, causing terrible destruction and killing tens of millions of people. Today, a number of these wars are still going on and even worsening, while new ones are breaking out. The arms race continues. The international situation remains tense. International peace and security are still being threatened.

"Our world urgently needs a concerted strategy of peace and security for all, a main pillar of which is disarmament.

"The stockpiling of weapons leads to power politics, expansionism and domination to the detriment of the smaller and weaker countries that have become victims of this policy. It undermines the efforts of peace-loving and justice-loving peoples and countries to establish a more stable new
international order. It engenders mistrust and confrontation. It consumes large amounts of considerable human, material, economic and financial resources which could have been used to improve the well-being of the people domestically and of other peoples who are now starving, undernourished, homeless and illiterate. It has become a factor in the economic, social and political destabilization both at home and for its victims.

"Meanwhile, the determined, relentless struggle of the subjected peoples, together with that of the entire international community, has demonstrated the failure of a policy based on the force of weapons and the uselessness of the frenetic arms race. Experience has shown that if one is always seeking to become stronger, there will always be someone even stronger, or at least as strong.

"The international community welcomes the signing, in December 1987, of the Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles as a first encouraging step. The Soviet Union has been forced to withdraw its invasion forces from Afghanistan by the heroic and resolute struggle of the Afghan people and its mujahedin, with the firm and constant support of the international community and the tireless efforts of the United Nations, its Secretary-General, Mr. Javier Perez de Cuellar, and his personal representative. As a result of all to these united efforts, brute force - which for all its power is senseless - is collapsing under its own weight. The policy based on the force of weapons has led to social, economic and political consequences that have been disastrous not only for the victims but also for the aggressors.

"No progress has been made, however, in the reduction of conventional weapons. Many regional conflicts, initiated and maintained by conventional weapons remain unresolved. The conventional arms race is accelerating.
(Mr. Thiounn, Democratic Kampuchea)

"Progress cannot be made in disarmament unless there is a climate of international trust. In the current world situation, where national and international security are closely interrelated, wars of aggression to satisfy colonialist and expansionist aims and the denial of the right to self-determination of peoples, wherever they occur in the world, threaten peace and security both regionally and internationally. They represent additional barriers to the disarmament process and could degenerate into a nuclear conflagration if the problems that they create are not quickly and appropriately solved.

"To eliminate all these dangers, the principles of the Charter of the United Nations must be rigorously respected, and all States Members of our Organization must work together in good faith to strengthen its role and realize its noble purposes, chief among which is 'to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace; ...",'.
"It is in this spirit that I invite the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, which initiated the war which has been ravaging my country since December 1978, only 15 months after it became a Member of the United Nations, to respect the noble purposes of the Charter by accepting a political settlement of the problem of Kampuchea on the basis of the relevant United Nations resolutions, which call for the total withdrawal of foreign (that is, Vietnamese) forces from Cambodia to allow the Cambodian people to exercise their right to self-determination.

"The rejection of these resolutions by Viet Nam and its refusal to negotiate a political settlement with the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea only reveal its duplicity and total scorn for the international community's desire for peace. They do nothing but aggravate regional and world tension, and counteract efforts to establish a true disarmament process.

"It is high time for the leaders in Hanoi, for the good of the Vietnamese people, to put an end to their expansionist and adventurist policy, their occupation of Cambodia and their ambition for an Indochinese federation, and to participate in good faith with all the other States of the region in restoring regional peace, security and stability on the basis of peaceful coexistence, equality and mutual respect.

"The international situation requires appropriate, effective and verifiable measures of nuclear, conventional, chemical and other forms of disarmament in order to maintain just and lasting peace and security for all. That can be brought about by rejecting the use of force and strictly respecting international law and the principles of the Charter which govern relations among States and peoples."
"I wish to reaffirm here the profound attachment of the people of Cambodia and its Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea to the maintenance of international peace and security based on absolute respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of each country without exception, and on equality and mutual interest. Democratic Kampuchea and its Coalition Government reaffirm their firm support for the noble and tireless efforts of the United Nations and the international community towards disarmament, progress and the maintenance of world peace." (A/S-15/21, annex)

The disarmament process is the responsibility of all countries and peoples, whether powerful or weak, rich or poor. The adoption by consensus of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament confirmed this multilateral process. The third special session on disarmament can only strengthen further that process by reaffirming the validity of that basic document, which laid down the principles and objectives for an international strategy to bring about general and complete disarmament under effective international control. It is of paramount importance because it is the fruit of multilateral negotiations within the United Nations framework and thus commits all Member States representing the entire international community.

My country, Kampuchea, which has been invaded and occupied by the Vietnamese army, attaches overriding importance to that document, which declares in particular:

"The arms race ... adversely affects the right of peoples freely to determine their systems of social and economic development, and hinders the struggle for self-determination and the elimination of colonial rule, racial or foreign domination or occupation." (General Assembly resolution A/S-10/2, para. 12)
While not underestimating the need for nuclear disarmament, my delegation attaches essential importance to conventional disarmament, for the simple reason that conventional weapons have killed and continue to kill hundreds of thousands in Kampuchea. At present Kampuchea's population is about 7 million; the occupation force totals 140,000, to which should be added tens of thousands of so-called advisers plus 700,000 Vietnamese settlers, who are actually armed-peasant soldiers; thus in the country there is one foreign occupier for every 7 inhabitants. The sophisticated conventional weapons supplied to the enemy by the Soviet Union continue to cause ruin, grief and suffering.

This man-made calamity, which has lasted for almost 10 years now against Kampuchea and its people, would not have been possible but for our aggressors' powerful army of 1.1 million men, including regular units supported by militia of 1.5 million - not counting the 3 million reservists - that is to say, 1 person out of every 23 on a war footing. The well-known fact that that army is the third most powerful in the world is possible only because of the assistance of the protecting super-Power amounting to at least $US 3 million a day. In exchange, our aggressors have yielded to their backer two important military bases - Cam Ranh and Danang - the first warm-water ports so ardently desired since the days of Tsar Peter the Great. It goes without saying that that militarist policy is expansionist in nature and constitutes a grave threat to peace, security and stability in South-East Asia and Pacific Asia.

The disastrous consequences of this policy of over-armament are well known to all. In Kampuchea, that has led to devastation, the ruination of the country and the massacre of its population; but it has failed to subjugate the people and the nation. Behind an optimistic facade, our aggressors know full well that it is impossible for them to overcome the forces of national resistance, that time is not on their side and that they are inevitably doomed to failure.
But in Viet Nam itself, over-armament is the direct cause of growing underdevelopment. The leaders in Hanoi can boast that they have the third largest army in the world, but in a region where there are dynamic nations with growth rates among the highest in the world Viet Nam holds the sorry record of being the fourth poorest country in the world in terms of per capita gross national product. Instead of a "paradise 10 times more beautiful" promised by Ho Chi Minh, founder of the so-called Indo-Chinese Federation strategy, Viet Nam's militarist policy has brought about economic and social regression, the flight of hundreds of thousands of refugees - an unending wave of "boat people" - an inflation rate of more than 1,000 per cent, hunger, several millions unemployed, the black market, trafficking in crimes of all kinds and a widespread crisis of confidence. The Vietnamese policy of over-armament to satisfy their age-old expansionist strategy on the pretext of guaranteeing Viet Nam's security has in fact created and exacerbated non-military threats and factors of destabilization. It has transformed the Vietnamese victory in the struggle for national independence into growing dependence on the Soviet Union for the military equipment necessary in order to sustain the policy, in particular the occupation of Kampuchea.
The aggression against and occupation of Kampuchea by Viet Nam, threatening as they do peace, security and stability in South-East Asia and wasting in the process tremendous quantities of human and material resources in Viet Nam and Kampuchea, represent a typical example of the relationship existing between disarmament, security and development. As long as Viet Nam continues to refuse to abide by the relevant resolutions of the United Nations on Kampuchea, as long as it will not abandon its expansionist dream and its aggression against and occupation of Kampuchea, the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam will continue to represent the sole threat to peace, security and stability in South-East Asia and in Pacific Asia and will never be able to put an end to social and economic backwardness in its own country because it will never be able to mobilize its national resources or to create an environment favourable to any national development effort.

Today the Viet Namese leaders are facing growing and insurmountable difficulties in Kampuchea, at home and in the international arena. It is high time, if only in the interests of Viet Nam and its people, that they admit that they cannot extract themselves from this mess by claiming "partial withdrawals" of Viet Namese forces from Kampuchea which are in fact only troop rotations. They must stop carrying out false diversionary manoeuvres attempting to transform their acts of aggression in Kampuchea into a civil war and to have their own heavy responsibility forgotten, they must cease promoting their campaign of disinformation in disregard of the clear facts in order to try to force the international community to recognize the puppet régime set up in Phnom Penh. It is high time that they realize that the only honourable way out for them is that offered by sincere negotiations with the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea led by His Royal Highness Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, President of
Democratic Kampuchea, on the basis of the principles set forth in relevant resolutions of the United Nations on Kampuchea.

The Soviet Union can do a great deal to bring Viet Nam to reason. It has in its hands an essential key because, without its tremendous military, economic and financial assistance, Viet Nam would be in no position to remain in Kampuchea. The development of the situation in Kampuchea and in Viet Nam has clearly shown that this assistance has not only been wasted, but has in fact harmed the interests of the Soviet people and gravely damaged the interests and prestige of the Soviet Union throughout the world. Glasnost cannot be credible, in particular in South-East Asia, unless the Soviet Union, which has all the necessary means, leads Viet Nam to disarm, to abandon its anachronistic imperialist policies, to withdraw unconditionally all its forces in Kampuchea so that the Kampuchean people may be able to exercise its right to self-determination and, finally, to learn to live in peaceful coexistence with all its neighbours and States in the region in strict respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law. As was so aptly stressed by our Secretary-General in his important address at the opening of our third special session,

"Quite obviously we cannot expect progress in the limitation and reduction of conventional weapons if a corresponding effort is not made to settle the local and regional conflicts which continue to ravage numerous areas of the world." (A/S-15/PV.1, p. 27)

The role of the United Nations in the area of disarmament is essential, as it is, indeed, in the maintenance of international peace and security.

The United Nations Charter and the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament clearly defined the essential principles of disarmament. The situation in South-East Asia would more secure and
reassuring if Viet Nam respected these principles, if in addition to rhetoric and promises it showed a true political will to put an end to its aggression and occupation of Kampuchea by unconditionally and completely withdrawing all its forces from Kampuchea so as to allow the people of Kampuchea to exercise their inalienable right to self-determination without any foreign interference.

My delegation sincerely hopes that the work of the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament attains its noble objectives. We earnestly hope that the present session will be another opportunity to stress that the commitments entered into and proclaimed are worthwhile only if they are respected, and in particular an opportunity to emphasize that the Final Document, adopted in 1978 and considered by all as the basic document for the disarmament process, has real importance only when it is implemented with due rigour. Genuine disarmament guaranteeing a safer, more stable world for everyone, must be based in the final analysis on good faith, respect for commitments and verifiable and verified acts, which are all factors needed to build mutual confidence.

Mr. SHULTZ (United States of America): Two weeks ago in Moscow, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev exchanged the instruments of ratification for the first treaty in history to reduce nuclear weapons. That treaty is a message of hope for the future.

One day earlier, the President had set forth his vision of the future in a speech to the students at Moscow State University. He saw a world where the wonders of technology, especially the technology of information, would combine with the plain practical benefits of political and economic freedom to bring increased peace and prosperity for all.
(Mr. Shultz, United States)

The work of this special session is concentrating on the weapons of war, as well it should. But we must never forget a point the President made to the students of Moscow, a point he has repeatedly made around the world:

"Nations do not distrust each other because they are armed; they are armed because they distrust each other."

To succeed in our endeavour we must pursue our visions with realism. There is no room for wishful thinking, especially thinking that technology and politics stand still. They do not.

Advanced weapons technology is spreading throughout the globe. It has been used in conflicts that are under way even as I speak to you. Terrorists are making use of advanced explosives and missiles. The diffusion of nuclear- and chemical-weapon capabilities, of ballistic missile technology, even of biotechnology, is a global problem. These are not simply East/West issues; they concern every State here represented, and we must all recognize that if we are not part of the solution we are part of the problem.

The spread of these technologies coincides with the resurgence of age-old ethnic, religious and communal conflicts. These conflicts are tragedies in themselves; the misuse of new technologies of destruction only adds to the suffering and to the risk that these conflicts will expand, further threatening the peace.
So the changes we see present us with both problems and opportunities. But, whatever else changes, some basic facts do not. We are all in this together. We have a common interest in international stability and security. That common interest is as compelling now as it was over 40 years ago, when the United States and others joined together to form this great body, in the aftermath of the most devastating war the world has ever known. Turning that common interest into practical reality is always the real challenge. Sweeping statements of principle have their place, but noble words can never substitute for concrete deeds.

Six years ago, President Reagan brought to the second special session the profound wish for peace of the American people. He also described his concrete agenda for progress. As we review those six years, I think we have made remarkable progress - more than many expected. But much remains to be done. There is work aplenty for all of us.

Let me briefly review the progress of the past six years - first what we have achieved bilaterally with the Soviet Union; next, what we have done together with our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies to strengthen stability in Europe; and then our efforts to deal with disarmament challenges on a global scale.

Progress in United States-Soviet arms control has been substantial. I have already mentioned the Treaty on Intermediate-range and Shorter-Range Nuclear Forces. Over the next three years the United States and the Soviet Union will eliminate, for ever and on a global basis, all their intermediate- and shorter-range nuclear missiles. For the next 13 years we and the Soviets will verify this disarmament by means of the most extensive on-site inspection régime ever. It may be that future historians will come to judge this Treaty's breakthroughs in verification and openness to have been almost as important as the nuclear reductions themselves.
When President Reagan spoke to the second special session, negotiations on strategic weapons had just begun. As with his "zero option" for intermediate-range nuclear forces, he had proposed dramatic reductions which many thought were out of the question. Six years later we have made major progress towards a treaty to cut United States and Soviet strategic nuclear arsenals by 50 per cent. I do not know whether we shall be able to conclude such a treaty this year, but we shall make our best effort. It is the top arms control priority of the United States.

We and the Soviet Union have agreed to pursue stage-by-stage negotiations on nuclear testing. The first step is to agree on effective verification, to make it possible to ratify the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974 and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1976. At the Moscow summit meeting we agreed on the detailed procedures necessary to design and conduct a joint verification experiment at each other's test sites. And we have made progress on a new protocol to the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty.

Earlier this year we opened the nuclear risk reduction centres, in Moscow and Washington. They will further decrease the chance of war through accident or miscalculation and will play a direct role in implementing the INF Treaty. At the Moscow summit meeting we also agreed to provide 24 hours' advance notice of strategic ballistic-missile launches.

These achievements are tangible testimony to the success of the policy that President Reagan has steadily pursued to build a better relationship with the Soviet Union. It is a policy that covers a broad agenda - human rights, regional conflicts and bilateral issues, as well as arms control. It is a policy built to last, and it has stood the test of time. It is a policy which we have pursued with the full support of our NATO allies. Without the full and active support of our allies, the INF Treaty in particular could never have been achieved.
Now let me turn to multilateral East-West issues. Together with our allies, we have taken important steps in multilateral negotiations as well.

The Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe concluded successfully in September 1986. This was a major breakthrough for on-site inspection of military forces and activities. The 35 participating States agreed to specific measures to reduce the risk of war as a result of misunderstanding, miscalculation or surprise attack.

These measures have real military meaning. They require advance notice of military activities above a certain level of troops or tanks, observation of military activities above a specific level of troops, and annual forecasts of certain military activities. They also give the right to request on-site inspections to verify compliance. To date, five of the participating States have conducted a total of 10 inspections. The successful implementation of the Stockholm Accord has increased confidence and given all concerned a better understanding of military activities by other States.

We and our NATO allies have pressed for progress in conventional arms control in Europe. This is part and parcel of a balanced overall approach. Three days ago my NATO colleagues and I agreed on the need for a substantial and balanced outcome of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe follow-up meeting in Vienna, at an early date, including significant progress on human rights and human contacts, and on mandates for negotiations on conventional stability and security-building measures.

In conventional arms control, the leaders of the alliance stated our aim clearly at the March NATO summit meeting:

"To establish a situation in Europe in which force postures as well as the numbers and deployments of weapon systems no longer make surprise attack and large-scale offensive action a feasible option."
Our leaders at the NATO summit meeting were very specific about what steps must be taken: enhance stability in the whole of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals, in a way which safeguards the security of all but takes into account the particular problems facing each region; focus on the key weapon systems in seeking to eliminate the ability to conduct large-scale offensive actions; deal with stationed forces, including forward-deployed Soviet units, while taking into consideration reinforcement capabilities; concentrate on results which will eliminate the disparities that threaten stability, not on schemes for "equal reductions" which would have no such effect; redress the conventional imbalance, which can be achieved through a set of measures, including reductions, limitations and redeployments, as well as the establishment of equal ceilings; require highly asymmetrical reductions by the East, entailing, for example, the elimination from Europe of tens of thousands of Warsaw Pact weapons that could be used in a surprise attack, including tanks and artillery pieces; propose, as a concurrent element, measures to produce greater openness of military activities, and to support a rigorous monitoring and verification régime; and include in this régime the exchange of detailed data about forces and deployments, and the right to sufficient on-site inspections to be confident of compliance.

We are under no illusion that we have set ourselves an easy objective. But we have identified what we need to achieve in order to make a real contribution to a lasting peace, and we have done so in the explicit recognition, as our leaders put it, that "the military confrontation in Europe is the result, not the cause, of the painful division which burdens that continent".
All these achievements are important, and they have received their due share of attention. But that must not be allowed to obscure the fact that building a safer world is not a United States-Soviet problem alone, or even an East-West problem. It is every nation's responsibility.

Since June 1982, 21 additional States have joined the most important multilateral disarmament agreement so far achieved - the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The 1985 Third Review Conference on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty unanimously concluded that the Treaty is essential to international peace and security.

In April 1984, at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, Vice-President Bush submitted a draft treaty to ban chemical weapons. In doing so, he noted that if ever in the history of mankind there was something on which people from every single country could agree - not just government officials, but families in Vladivostok and Leningrad, Peoria and Paris, London, Caracas, and Belgrade - it is on the need to ban chemical weapons.

Since then, negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament towards a comprehensive, verifiable, and truly global ban have increasingly centred on the real issues. These include the need for concrete solutions to the problems of ensuring effective verification and undiminished security. For the treaty to have real meaning, all chemical-weapons-capable States must be part of it. Formidable obstacles remain. It serves no good purpose to minimize them. But the United States is fully committed to pressing ahead.

In 1986, the Second Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention was held. It acknowledged concerns about past Soviet non-compliance, stressed the need for all States to deal seriously with compliance issues, and emphasized that failure to strengthen compliance measures undermined the Convention and the arms control process in general.
In 1987, the United States and six other industrialized democracies formed a missile technology control régime to limit the proliferation of missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons. I might add that at the Moscow summit meeting we and the Soviet Union agreed to hold exploratory talks to exchange ideas and information about how to cope with this growing problem.

The United Nations has contributed welcome support to some essential principles of arms control. For two years in a row, the General Assembly has adopted, by consensus, resolutions calling for compliance with existing treaties, and resolutions underlining the importance of verification of arms-control agreements.

I have described how the INF Treaty and the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) process have brought greater openness to military matters. The United Nations is also playing a role. Last year the General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for "furthering openness and transparency" on military matters, including objective information on military capabilities. The United States warmly welcomed this resolution and calls on all Member States to heed it. Every country can help build the confidence on which true peace depends by publishing honest figures about defence expenditures, for all the world to see. We welcome the Soviet commitment, however hedged, to make such figures public but we think now, not some indefinite future date, is the time to do so.

So, as I review the past six years, I see a lot of forward movement. But even as we celebrate our progress, a sombre fact overshadows the special session. Proliferation is winning the race against disarmament in the technologies of destruction I described at the outset. We must all face up to this threat, and act to counter it.
Turning to chemical weapons, this threat is not an abstract one. During the same six years that we have made the progress I have outlined, bloody conflicts have been fought throughout the world. In some, chemical weapons have been employed. This is a direct and flagrant violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which bans the use of chemical weapons. But only a binding international convention banning the weapons themselves can ensure that they are never used again.

All nations have a responsibility to combat the proliferation of these terrible weapons. The General Assembly has voted to strengthen the Secretary-General's investigations of suspected use of chemical weapons. This is a limited but positive step. Whenever evidence emerges that chemical weapons are being used, all nations must step up to their responsibilities, by bringing political pressure and moral suasion to bear on offending States. States with chemical manufacturing capabilities have a special responsibility to work against proliferation. Stringent export controls for the chemicals needed to make these weapons are a good place to start.

I have described how, at the Conference on Disarmament, the difficult outstanding issues of a chemical weapons ban have been identified. All 40 participating nations must apply themselves to resolving them. In so doing, they are blazing a path which must be followed by all members of the international community.

I turn to ballistic missiles. Ballistic missile proliferation is a new and urgent challenge. It is a world-wide threat. In some cases, it involves missiles of the same sort that the INF Treaty is forever eliminating from United States and Soviet arsenals. It is an irony that countries that applaud what we and the Soviets are doing are themselves manufacturing and selling these same weapons.
The United States is especially concerned about the introduction of advanced missiles into the Persian Gulf war. This has led directly to the indiscriminate slaughter of civilians, making it even more difficult to bring that tragic conflict to an end. We are already seeing signs of a dangerous new arms race which will put at risk countries far removed from the Gulf region itself.

Surely, mutual restraint is a better way for the nations of that troubled area to see to their security. The United States is prepared to do its part, both to curb ballistic missile proliferation, and to help bring about peaceful resolutions of the conflicts in the Gulf and nearby regions.

Let me turn to nuclear weapons. Bad as the proliferation of chemical weapons and ballistic missiles is, nuclear proliferation poses an even greater threat to international stability. The United States considers nuclear proliferation the most important item on the special session's agenda.

Does anyone doubt that the spread of nuclear weapons threatens regional and global security? What State believes that, if it now acquired nuclear weapons, its rivals would not seek to do the same?

The vast majority of the countries here represented have undertaken a solemn commitment to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. One hundred thirty-six nations have freely chosen to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which celebrates its twentieth anniversary this month. There is no good reason why every nation should not make such a commitment. It is a contribution each and every State can make to a safer world.

The Tlatelolco Treaty also remains a key part of the non-proliferation régime. The United States believes all eligible States should fully adhere to it. By opening their nuclear activities to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the parties to both Treaties provide verifiable assurances that these activities are for peaceful purposes only.
Each State that has not yet made a binding commitment to nuclear non-proliferation must explain why for itself. But one pretext for not doing so is gone. The image of an endless nuclear build-up by the United States and the Soviet Union looks very false in the light of the INF Treaty.

At the very moment when the United States and USSR have agreed to reduce their nuclear arsenals, it would be tragic for other countries to pursue the capability to cross the nuclear threshold. Nuclear proliferation is one of the most direct and serious threats to regional and global stability. It is a challenge which no nation has the right to ignore.
We must be most concerned about areas where regional tensions are high, and where countries that see each other as potential rivals have not made a binding commitment to non-proliferation or opened all their nuclear activities to international inspection. Today it is in South Asia that the danger is most acute. We encourage the States of South Asia to take concrete steps to meet this urgent challenge. The United States is prepared to work with countries inside and outside the region to find a lasting solution to the danger of proliferation that satisfies all parties.

Building a constructive relationship with one's neighbours and other potential adversaries should be an element of every national security policy. Each individual country must decide the proper balance between investing in plowshares and investing in swords. In the making of such decisions, it is essential to have a clear idea of the threat. That is one good reason for openness about military budgets - and about nuclear programmes. It is also why States should talk to each other about their political differences, in order to reduce regional tensions and thus reduce the perceived need to maintain large military forces. Let me cite a few figures, without drawing any conclusions.

In the five years from 1977 to 1981, some $128 billion worth of arms were delivered to developing countries. In the following five years, ending in 1986, this figure rose to $180 billion - an increase of some 40 per cent. I repeat that these were deliveries to developing countries. The Soviet Union was by far the most significant source of arms deliveries throughout that decade. In the first five years, Warsaw Pact countries accounted for 51 per cent of the weapons shipments, while countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were responsible for 41 per cent. In the second five years these figures declined somewhat, to 50 per cent for the Warsaw Pact and 37 per cent for NATO. During the same period the developing countries themselves showed a dramatic growth as the
sources of their own weapons. In percentage terms, their share almost doubled from
the first period to the second, rising from 6 to 11 per cent. In absolute terms,
the figure went up some two and a half times. That is development of a sort, but
it is hardly disarmament.

I said at the outset that the United States recognizes the need for realism.
The United Nations Charter specifically recognizes the right of self-defence as
well as the right to form regional collective security arrangements. History has
not been kind to States that neglected their fundamental security
responsibilities. The United States does not believe in peace through weakness,
and does not recommend it to anyone else.

So it is necessary to be strong. But it is not sufficient. As the leaders of
the NATO alliance put it, at their March summit,

"Security in Europe involves not just military but also political, economic
and, above all, humanitarian factors. We look forward to a Europe undivided,
in which people of all States can freely receive ideas and information; enjoy
their fundamental human rights; and determine their own future. ... A just
and lasting peaceful order in Europe requires that all States enjoy relations
of confidence with their own citizens; trust them to make political or
economic choices of their own; and allow them to receive information from and
exchange ideas with citizens of other States".

Allied leaders went on to say that military forces should exist only to prevent war
and to ensure self-defence, not for purposes of aggression or for political or
military intimidation.

I think there is much in that vision which applies beyond the North Atlantic
area. It suggests a way for nations to build their security on a solid
foundation. The best basis on which to build a durable peace, wherever there are
areas of potential or actual conflict, is a broad one. Trying to limit dialogue to
a narrow agenda - whether on security measures or something else - not only misses important opportunities: it allows the whole relationship to be poisoned if things go wrong.

Within the broad approach I have outlined, confidence-building measures, or arms control and disarmament, should be considered on their own merits, as one way to enhance security. Doing them for any other reason can only lead to trouble.

There are challenges enough for all of us. Some tasks, such as work to reduce nuclear arsenals, must be strictly bilateral, in negotiation, verification and implementation. But others - above all, the negotiations to ban chemical weapons, and the need to control nuclear proliferation - are global problems.

As we continue these discussions, even as we exchange frank or candid opinions, let us recall the purpose of this great Organization, as set forth in the United Nations Charter:

"to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war ... to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights ... to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom ...".

In that spirit, let us get on with the job.

Mr. BALE (Congo) (interpretation from French): My delegation is happy to see you, Sir, presiding once again over the work of the General Assembly, which is now meeting to consider a question that is complex and at the same time very vital for the future of mankind. In again expressing its unanimous confidence in you, the Assembly has recognized your remarkable qualities as a diplomat - qualities which I am convinced will ensure that you will guide our work effectively and successfully.
I take this opportunity of informing Mr. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, the Secretary-General of our Organization, that in his sustained, persevering efforts to enable the United Nations to play its full role, he has the encouragement of the Head of State of the Congo, His Excellency Colonel Denis Sassou Nguesso.

Man has always aspired to peace and security - aspirations based on the predominant instinct for survival. Similarly, security has the highest priority for all States, whose duty it is to maintain their sovereignty and territorial integrity.*

* Mr. Serrano Caldera (Nicaragua), Vice-President, took the Chair.
Our modern world, twice confronted with the grim reality of war, 43 years ago founded an organization - the United Nations - designed to promote peaceful coexistence by collective measures and to avert all threats to international peace and security. The efforts of the United Nations to check the unbridled arms race began from the very moment the Organization was founded. The years that followed, strangely enough, saw the victorious Powers engaging, on the pretext of ensuring their own security, in a veritable arms race. Exacerbated by the proliferation of nuclear weapons, that arms race subsequently generated tension and mutual distrust between the two super-Powers and their allies, divided into antagonistic blocs. Thus military security was given the highest priority. Those tensions and that distrust soon spread to the countries of the third world, which often became the scene of ideological confrontations. They in their turn were involved in the infernal cycle of security based on the acquisition of a growing number of weapons, of ever greater sophistication. In the face of that dangerous trend the non-aligned countries, in Belgrade in 1961, put forward the idea of convening a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The first special session devoted to disarmament, held in 1978, enabled Member States to reach agreement on a global and common strategy on disarmament. At the end of the decade devoted to that strategy the magnitude of the arms race has made the objective sought by Member States even more remote, although there has been some progress.

This session is being held at a time of particular significance for global peace and security. The signing of the historic Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles gives us grounds for hoping that other agreements will soon be forthcoming, in particular a total prohibition of nuclear tests, a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons - a convention on which
is being worked out - the opening of talks on the reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe, a 50 per cent reduction in the strategic offensive weapons of the Soviet Union and the United States of America, the prohibition of arms in space and so on. The conclusion of agreements on those important areas would thus herald the real beginning of general and complete disarmament.

Since 1945 there has been no conflict that has disturbed peace and security in the countries devastated by the two world wars. We must, however, note that 150 local wars have broken out since that time in the countries of the third world. The study recently published by the American Institute, "World Priorities", shows that 25 regional conflicts are still going on. The conclusion of those conflicts by force of arms has cost the lives of 3 million people, four fifths of whom were among the civilian population. Naturally, the continuation of these wars entails the growing acquisition of weapons, which most developing countries do not themselves manufacture, thus making profits for the merchants of death while activities devoted to economic and social development are slowing down.

The peace process started by the Soviet Union and the United States seems to have created a positive political momentum which is replacing arms by negotiations in the settlement of conflicts. But let us not underestimate the true dimensions of peace. Peace cannot be limited to the mere absence of war or to the dialogue among the great Powers only. It must be pointed out that the nuclear threat affects all States, great and small. Thus, while we recognize the necessity for bilateral disarmament negotiations, we must stress the central role of the United Nations as an international forum where all can take part in the dialogue on the search for common solutions to the problems facing mankind.
With regard to the subject of true peace I would point out that the Development Decade solemnly proclaimed by the United Nations, on which the developing countries reposed their hope for a new, more just and more equitable order, has remained a dead letter. The Decade, which will be ending in two years' time, has by no means borne the fruit expected of it. Throughout this time insecurity, compounded by anxiety about an uncertain morrow, has become a chronic part of the life of developing countries. Peace, of which security is an indissociable element, is also to be defined by the capacity and ability of our countries and our economies to meet the elementary needs of our peoples.

The economic situation of developing countries is alarming. It is being aggravated by an international economic environment marked by a sharp drop in commodity prices, the primary source of income for our countries, the inverse flow of finance and protectionism in industrialized countries. All that has a serious effect on the prospects for development, which have in any case been darkened by a debt crisis, true solutions to which are still far out of range. In spite of the efforts at rigorous economic reform, the combined and cumulative effects of the adverse trends of the external economic environment continue to keep the developing countries in a state of insecurity and instability.

In Africa, where the countries have undertaken to implement the United Nations Programme of Action for the Rehabilitation and Recovery of Africa, these reforms are often brought about at a very high political and social cost. One cannot conceive of global security in a world of inequality, where something like a billion human beings live below the absolute poverty threshold and vast sums of money are swallowed up in the arms race, thus every day accentuating the growing gulf between military expenditures and the huge economic needs which are not being satisfied.
The International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, held in August 1987, confirmed the vital relationship which had long been established between disarmament and development. It is important, therefore, that particular attention be paid to going more deeply into this question in order to produce concrete measures to make possible the implementation of the action programme adopted at that Conference.

Many previous speakers have stressed the need to strengthen the role of the United Nations in the disarmament process and in this regard to encourage subregional and regional co-operation. In that context I should like to stress the importance of regional peace and disarmament centres in this process. The important thing is to ensure that they function more efficiently. For Africa the regional centre at Lomé merits particular attention.

My country was associated in the preparation of the African document with a view to the Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development and took an active part in the Conference on the promoting of trust, security and development within the framework of the Economic Community of Central African States, held from 15 to 19 February 1988 in Lomé. The continuation of this effort will undoubtedly provide further momentum for the process of economic integration and subregional co-operation, which is the only guarantee of security and development in central Africa. But what is needed also is for the political and economic international climate to promote this process. In a world of growing interdependence, regional initiatives cannot, in our view, be isolated from the overall situation. The pace of this process can make itself felt only by the impact of the situation prevailing on the continent and throughout the world.
(Mr. Bale, Congo)

The risk of a nuclear war, no matter how small, cannot be eliminated in a climate in which the commitment to nuclear weapons is becoming even stronger. The adoption of a global disarmament programme requires the elimination of the danger of nuclear weapons. The establishment of denuclearized zones in certain parts of the world integrates this process, which ultimately aims at the denuclearization of the whole world. The Declaration on the denuclearization of Africa in this regard reflects the determination of the African countries to make of the African continent a nuclear-weapon-free zone. This determination common to us all unfortunately has been compromised by the proven acquisition of nuclear capacity by South Africa, which has made racism into a system of government.

Apartheid constitutes a threat to international peace and security. The determination of the racist régime of South Africa to keep its neighbours in a permanent state of siege by undeclared wars of aggression and its policy of destabilization as well as its illegal occupation of Namibia has created a real climate of insecurity. This situation forces the front-line countries to divert their scanty resources to purposes of legitimate defence of their sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The People's Republic of the Congo reiterates its vigorous condemnation of apartheid and calls upon all States which assist South Africa in its efforts in the nuclear field as well as in other areas of armaments to halt all forms of co-operation with that régime.

Furthermore, the racist régime in Pretoria must agree to place its nuclear facilities under the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The banning of the activities of peaceful anti-apartheid organizations, followed a few days ago by a prolongation of the state of emergency, can leave us in no doubt whatsoever as to the real long-term intentions of the South African Government. The lack of hope of any prospect of change in South Africa, which is
(Mr. Bale, Congo)

maintained by the selfish interests of certain countries, should now make it possible for the Security Council unanimously to undertake obligatory measures to constrain South Africa to abide by international decisions.

Durable global peace and international security can only be established on our planet when all the peoples of the world are free to determine their own destiny, when artificial barriers of race and other forms of discrimination are torn down. Peace and security in southern Africa mean that there must be independence for Namibia and there must be democracy in South Africa.

The pronounced tendency towards the relaxation of tension between the United States and the USSR led to the conclusion of the INF Treaty, which the international community has so warmly welcomed. But that historic step taken in the process of disarmament results from collective political will, a decisive factor for peace. We hope that this signal will mark the beginning of the freeing of man from the servitude of the arms race and will see the establishment of a new order based on peace, collective security and human solidarity.

The President (interpretation from Spanish): In accordance with the decision taken by the General Assembly at its fifth plenary meeting, I now call on the Observer of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

Mr. TERZI (Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)): Permit me to extend to the President our warm and heartfelt felicitations on his election as President of this special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

As victims of the constant and continuous supply of arms, arms which are to be vindictively and criminally used by a racist régime which is bent on expansion, expropriation and elimination of others, the Palestinian people have high hopes that under the President's experienced and prudent stewardship this special session will achieve its aim. However the special session would have been better designated as the human race versus the arms race.
During the past two weeks we have listened attentively and with high expectations to wise and in many cases positive suggestions most reassuring for the survival of the human race. Yet in some cases, albeit the minority, malice and hypocrisy were very clearly discerned. Sermonizing and pontificating are just a cover up of ill intentions.

The well-intentioned agreement on a 50 per cent reduction in nuclear weapons gives us hope that the zero limit will not be just a hopeful target but a realizable fact. The human race cannot be 50 per cent dead while the other 50 per cent are striving to achieve and ensure life. So once again we wish to express our great appreciation to the two super-Powers for having gone half the way and we reiterate our hope and trust that they will go all the way.

It is not a question of confidence or confidence-building; it is political will and political determination that guide us in our behaviour. For what confidence in the abstract do we Palestinians have to show while Israel keeps 30 per cent of its prime age population constantly under arms, and all Israeli males up to the age of 55 years must undergo active military service in the rank of the reserves for a period of 62 days annually? What confidence is recommended when 25 per cent of those employed in Israel are employed in the military-industrial complex? What confidence can we have when out of the $3,621 million donated by the United States Administration to Israel $1,722 million are earmarked for military aid? What confidence is sought when the United States Administration donates to Israel a per capita donation for every Israeli citizen of $872.50 each year, while the total aid to the rest of the world, that is to friends and allies of the United States outside of the Middle East region, is nowhere near that amount? What confidence can we Palestinians have when not a single friend or ally of the United States gets 10 per cent of the per capita amount given to Israel or even 1 per cent
of donations to Israel? And in addition to funding from the coffer of the United States taxpayers an additional $1 billion is channelled every year from private sources.*

* The President returned to the Chair.
Out of all the friends and allies of the United States, Israel receives the amount in a lump sum; for those on Wall Street and in the finance industry this fact adds an additional $50 million dollars a year in interest costs charged against the United States deficit - again out of the pockets of United States taxpayers.

What is the confidence-building process suggested, when billions, nay trillions, of dollars are earmarked for an adventure commonly known as Star Wars - or the strategic defense initiative (SDI) - 84 per cent of which is assured of failure? Where is room for confidence-building when chemical weapons, specifically lethal CS or CN tear-gas, is supplied by the United States to the occupying Power, Israel? Israel's use of this lethal gas has caused dozens of pregnant Palestinian women to miscarry as a consequence of inhaling that gas.

What confidence do we as Palestinians entertain as "grasshoppers" or "fleas" - that is how the Israelis refer to us - when the declared policy of the Zionists and of Israel is "to transfer" - read to eliminate - the Palestinians from their homeland into the wilderness.

Unashamedly, the Prime Minister of Israel told this august Assembly at this special session, that

"The Government of Israel maintains the deep conviction that the use of chemical weapons is a most odious method of destruction of human life."

(A/S-15/PV.11, p. 81)

This august Assembly in special session is charged with exposing the truth and condemning the criminals, and should convict Israel of committing such an "odious method of destruction of human life" - a crime against humanity. The Assembly cannot be indifferent or selective to the use of chemical weapons based on the label they carry. We know that tear-gas is composed of lethal chemicals. Israel's
use of such chemical weapons is yet another threat to the peace in our Palestine and in our region.

Israel is not content with possessing the possibility of producing and using nuclear weaponry. Israel's joint venture with the racist régime in South Africa on the development of nuclear weapons is common knowledge. What is developed in Dimona, in the Naqab, is tested in occupied Namibian territory, and even offshore at the southern tip of Africa.

It is Israel that has refused and still refuses to participate in efforts to establish a nuclear-free zone in the eastern Mediterranean. Mr. Shamir does not believe in the need to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty - at least that is our understanding of what he announced in this Assembly on 7 June 1988. In its usually twisted argument, Israel is more concerned about the "more real and immediate danger in the region - the prospect of conventional war". (ibid., p. 77)

While the allocation of governmental budgets for defence purposes in the world is generally less than 15 per cent, Israel's annual military budget of $4,550 million, represents more than 25 per cent of its gross national product (GNP). While Shamir expresses concern about the prospect of conventional war in the region, let us not forget that the United States Government has made virtually all its most advanced weaponry and technology - meaning the best fighter aircraft, missiles, radar, armour, and artillery - available to Israel. This technology transfer was set out in the so-called Master Development Data Exchange Agreement signed between the United States and Israel in December 1970. The United States Administration has provided Israel, most generously, with an unspecified but substantial number of complete technical data packages at no charge or at nominal prices. Before making his address to the General Assembly and expressing concern
over the prospect of conventional war in the region, Mr. Shamir, according to the

\textit{Jerusalem Post}, early in June 1988 was

"eyeing artillery shells during a tour of the Soltam weapons plant in Israel,
which recently won a multimillion dollar Pentagon supply contract which saved
it from closure."

I wonder whether the Secretary of State, Mr. Shultz, kept that in mind when he was
telling us about military exports.

The Strategic Alliance Agreement between the United States and Israel, renewed
recently, is only one aspect of the collusion and collaboration between Washington
and Tel Aviv to increase the threat and prospect of a conventional war in the
region. According to Senator Alan Cranston,

"Israel is the most powerful military force in the region. It is of vital
importance for our country" - that is, the United States - "to keep them that
way, and I would say that our relationship with Israel is wholesome."

We fully agree with Senator Cranston, since Israel serves the purpose of a
launching pad for joint United States-Israeli acts of aggression against the
Palestinian people and the Arab nation.

But has this alliance served its purpose? For seven months now more
sophisticated weaponry has fallen into the hands of the Palestinian people under
Israeli military occupation. Not all of the sophisticated conventional weaponry of
the United States in the hands of the troops of the occupying Power, Israel, could
offset and overcome the will and determination of those heroes, the Palestinian
people, whose weaponry is mother nature - the "sacred stones" of the Holy Land.
The use of bullets, conventional as well as equally lethal rubber and plastic
bullets, with steel or aluminium, or the breaking of bones and smashing of skulls,
has proved to be ineffective against the will and determination of the Palestinian
people to achieve peace in the Holy Land.
"Intifadah", the glorious uprising of our people, is the teacher to those who wish to learn the message of peace and respect for human rights.

The Scriptures were quoted. To those who recall the Scriptures let me say that Ahab had to humble himself and admit to having robbed Naboth of the inheritance of his fathers (The Holy Bible, Kings I:21). And Jezebel will not be permitted to stone the Palestinians to death!

In very ancient times we were taught that brother killed brother, an act described as the first act of genocide. Then, 50 per cent of the human species was eliminated and Cain survived Abel. He was not his brother's keeper, he said. We also learned of tribe eliminating tribe, and nation defeating nation. We had learned of holocausts as

"Joshua smote all the country of the hills, and of the south, and of the vale, and of the springs, and all their kings: he left none remaining, but utterly destroyed all that breathed". (The Holy Bible, Joshua X:40)

According to that story 31 kings were smitten and were utterly destroyed. We were to remember these so-called facts of history by heart. And so devastation and elimination became the landmarks of history. Accounts of greed, expansionism, and war after war were told unendingly.
Then we learned of invasions under such guises as civilization and crusades; and such labels as colonizers and imperialists; and the arsenals of destruction and war machinery underwent development and sophistication. But in all cases cannon fodder, in the form of human life, was abundant. In our lifetime we are witnesses of yet another holocaust: millions of human beings of different ethnic groups and races have perished, and the proponents of a so-called superior pure master race exterminating what they label "sub-races", as is the case of the apartheid régime of Pretoria and the Zionist régime of Tel Aviv. Next came the means of mass destruction: the development and use of the atomic and hydrogen bombs - nuclear weapons.

Thereafter man heralded the hope for salvation - we the peoples of the world determined to save the human race from the scourge of war - through the creation of this Organization, the United Nations, and the aspirations of the world were enshrined in its Charter, which opens with the following in its Preamble:

"We the peoples of the United Nations determined

"to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and

"to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and

"to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained..."

The Charter was proclaimed but, unfortunately, it has not really been honoured. Although it had become a part of the supreme law of some lands,
notwithstanding that fact some States violate those principles despite their obligations under the Charter. One case in point is the Government of the United States of America. Yes, it was a hope, but it proved to be a mirage, a false hope.

Some have held firmly to the methods of Joshua and refuse to take note of the teachings of Micah. Nor do they take cognizance of the principles of the United Nations Charter and the other norms of civilized behaviour. I am referring now to the governing junta of Israel in the 1980s.

It is peace in the land of peace — in Palestine — and in the region that we are struggling for. It is respect for the lofty principles of the United Nations Charter and all other international conventions. It is our political will that stimulates our resistance. We have the desire, the will and the determination to persist along the road to peace — a peace based on justice, recognition of, and respect for, human rights and human dignity, and the sovereignty of the Palestinian people in its own State, on Palestinian soil.

On many occasions we have been reminded of the words of a prophet — Isaiah — who lived in Palestine and who, after recalling cases of slaughter and mischief, articulated the vision of peace and disarmament. But let me say to Mr. Shamir:

"Thy tongue deviseth mischiefs; like a sharp razor, working deceitfully.

"Thou lovest evil more than good; and lying rather than to speak righteousness.

"Thou lovest all devouring words, O thou deceitful tongue." (The Holy Bible, Psalm 52:2-4)

Development needs peace, if the intention is the well-being and welfare of the human race. The international community has been endeavouring to achieve a comprehensive and just peace in the region based on redressing the injustices inflicted upon the Palestinian people, and to achieve a just solution to the
(Mr. Terzi, PLO)

problem. Such a solution can be just only when the fundamental inalienable rights of the Palestinian people are recognized and respected: the right to self-determination without external interference, the right to return home and live in peace with our neighbours, and the right to independence and sovereignty. For developments for peace there are some prerequisites.

Only a few days ago, at the Summit Conference in Algiers, the Arab Heads of State reaffirmed the Arab Peace Plan adopted at Fez in 1982 and reiterated the call for the convening of the international peace conference, in conformity with the relevant United Nations resolutions. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) is a full member of that Conference of the Arab Heads of State.

This special session may recommend that a minimal part of the funds used in the arms race be allocated to finance the presence of an international force mandated by the Security Council to provide immediate protection to the Palestinian people from the repressive and brutal policies and methods practised by the occupying Power, Israel. Allocate such funds to the international organ that will administer the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem, after the total and complete withdrawal of Israel and in preparation for the exercise of self-determination by the Palestinian people on Palestinian territory.

We know that this calls for courage on the part of Israel. Israel and its guardians cannot and should not entertain any false hopes that they can achieve peace through Israel's neighbours. The principal party to the conflict is the victim, the Palestinian people, and thus it is by necessity the principal party to peace. Will they heed the call for, and join in, the international peace conference on the Middle East?
The President: The last speaker for this meeting is the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mr. Hans Blix. In accordance with the decision taken at our 1st plenary meeting, I call on him.

Mr. Blix (International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)): The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) does not deal directly with disarmament, but it does play a key role in helping to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to more countries. For over 25 years the Agency has administered the world's first international on-site inspection system, the safeguards system, verifying that nuclear installations and fissionable material submitted to Agency control are used only for peaceful purposes.

As the Secretary-General has indicated in his statement to this special session on disarmament, some verification will certainly remain bilateral, but agreements at the multilateral level for arms limitation and reduction will require multilateral verification. Many delegations have also stressed the importance of multilateral verification. It is for this reason that I consider it important to present some of the special experience gained by IAEA in administering the safeguards verification system. First, however, I propose to focus for a moment on the issue of non-proliferation, for which the safeguards system has been set up.

It is generally recognized that the world would become an even more dangerous place than it is today if still more countries were to acquire nuclear weapons. Efforts are needed at many levels to avoid such development. Perhaps the most important ones are those in the sphere of foreign policy, seeking détente and reduction of tensions world-wide and regionally. Where tension is low there is little perceived need for nuclear or, indeed, other weapons. The present international climate is encouraging from this viewpoint, although long-standing regional frictions and conflicts remain in several areas.
While the risk of a spread of nuclear weapons to further countries certainly remains, it should be acknowledged that so far the world has been remarkably successful in containing it. The Tlatelolco Treaty of 1967 has 23 parties and the non-proliferation Treaty of 1968, which will have its twentieth anniversary in just over two weeks' time, has 137 parties. This vast adherence shows that possession of nuclear weapons is widely perceived not only as a danger to the community of nations, but also as useless or dangerous to the individual State. This optimistic note must be supplemented, however, by recognition that several of those States which have so far chosen not to commit themselves to these treaties have felt that the continued production of nuclear weapons by a few States and the retention by these States of huge arsenals do not convey the conviction that these weapons are useless. Moreover, among the States which have become parties to these treaties many have voiced impatience about the fact that their forgoing of the nuclear option has not yet helped to bring about substantive nuclear disarmament measures, as anticipated in Article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty. If the nuclear-weapon States, in particular the super-Powers, were to reduce very significantly their arsenals of nuclear weapons and thus show by their action that these weapons play a declining role as instruments of national policy, one might anticipate that non-nuclear-weapon States would increasingly regard such weapons as an ineffective and doubtful means of national defence.

The recent conclusion and ratification of the agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States of America on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF) is hailed as a very constructive step if followed by further substantive nuclear disarmament measures, not only to reduce tensions and dangers between the super-Powers, but also to strengthen support for and encourage adherence to the treaties on
non-proliferation. This is of particular importance as we approach the time when
the extension of the duration of the non-proliferation Treaty is to be discussed.

In some quarters it is often asserted that there is an inevitable link between
civilian nuclear power and nuclear weapons - that the two are Siamese twins. I
reject this contention. The facts are that all the acknowledged nuclear-weapon
States had nuclear weapons first and developed their civilian nuclear power
thereafter, and that no State that has developed civilian nuclear power has so far
used it to develop nuclear weapons. Thus, while such a link is possible, the
rationality of non-proliferation has so far prevailed. The central idea of the
Atoms for Peace Plan and of the non-proliferation Treaty, namely, a generous
transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes combined with binding
commitments to non-proliferation, is an important part of this rationality. This
approach has also prompted the birth of the world's first on-site inspection
system. It would be incorrect to say that the safeguards verification requirement
is based on distrust of the sincerity of the non-proliferation pledges. Rather it
is important both to the suppliers of nuclear technology and material and to the
recipient countries to demonstrate to neighbours and the world that no weapons use
is made of technology or material transferred. For that reason pledges to that
effect are supplemented by verification. The system is thus based on the now
world-famous proverb, "Trust, but verify".

I turn now to the issue of verification. I shall discuss the IAEA's
experience in some detail, first, because it has practical relevance to what this
special session is discussing and, secondly, because it is not widely known.

Before discussing the lessons that may be drawn from over 25 years of
safeguards application, I should explain that the system consists of three major
components: first, accountancy, that is to say, reporting by States on the
whereabouts of the fissionable material under their control, on stocks of fuel and of spent fuel, on the processing and reprocessing of nuclear materials, and so forth; secondly, containment and surveillance techniques, such as seals which will allow conclusions that no material has disappeared; film and television cameras that will record any action occurring in a particular area of a nuclear installation; and, thirdly, inspection by agency inspectors, checking instruments and seals installed, verifying books, confirming physical inventories of fuel or spent fuel.

The system as a whole should not be compared with a police investigatory system but rather with bank accountancy and independent audits. It is instituted not out of distrust, but to create confidence. It uses the accounts kept by the inspected party and checks them. Lastly, it verifies that the materials reported on in the accounts really are there. Discrepancies and inconsistencies are routinely found, pursued — and resolved.

In 1987 the Agency carried out 2,133 inspections. In the course of the same year 631 installations in 56 countries were inspected, and to do this 195 inspectors were used. By comparison, 10 years earlier, in 1977, the Agency carried out only 706 inspections on 471 installations in 45 States using 52 inspectors.

A basic feature of safeguards is that verification can take place only on the basis of an agreement with the State in which the inspection is to occur. The IAEA is not a supranational organization with powers to impose its inspection on any State. Acceptance of safeguards is a voluntary act. The State is not giving up anything. It is issuing an invitation to inspection that it finds to be in its own interest.

A non-nuclear-weapon State that does not wish to accept IAEA safeguards and inspection over all its nuclear activities will not join the Non-Proliferation Treaty or the Tlatelolco Treaty, which would entail the conclusion of such an
agreement. While such a policy would likely make acquisition of nuclear technology and material in the world market more difficult, States are free to pursue this policy, and some do. However, once a State has made an agreement with the IAEA accepting safeguards, it cannot arbitrarily renounce it. The Agency has acquired the right - and duty - to safeguard in that State. A renunciation of the agreement, a violation of the agreement or even a less than loyal acceptance of inspection would lead to consequences in the State's relations with the Agency and with the community of States. To put it differently, sanctions against possible disregard of safeguards obligations lie chiefly in the reactions of other members of the community. IAEA inspectors are not nuclear policemen with a mission to intervene against any diversion of fissionable material or misuse of nuclear installations, but international observers with a duty to report.

The same will be true of other inspection systems that may be created. They are observation systems, alarm bells that can trigger a variety of actions by international and national organs.

A great many of the IAEA agreements on safeguards envisage Agency verification of all present and future fissionable material in the State. They are referred to as "full-scope" safeguards agreements. Under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Tlatelolco and Rarotonga Treaties, the States are obliged to conclude agreements of this scope with the Agency. Other safeguards agreements are concluded to cover individual nuclear installations or individual quantities of fissionable material, normally as a result of an agreement between a supplier and a recipient State.

Lastly, safeguards agreements have been worked out between the IAEA and all five nuclear-weapon States under which the latter invite the Agency to apply safeguards to peaceful installations in their territory - all or some of them. At the end of 1987 there were 166 safeguards agreements in force with 97 States, covering some 95 per cent of all nuclear installations in non-nuclear-weapon States.
A second basic feature to note in the IAEA safeguards system is its multilateral nature. Inspection of the peaceful use of nuclear facilities and material was not always performed by a multilateral institution. In the early days of nuclear power, various supply agreements provided for inspection by the supplier State. As more States acquired nuclear technology and material and as more supplier States appeared, this bilateral approach became less practical. Rights to bilateral inspection were therefore transferred to the multilateral organ. It should be noted that one of the great services that the safeguards system has rendered is to have accustomed Governments to inspection. Visits and inspections that might have been perceived as novel and intrusive 25 years ago are now routine and almost trivial.
The first question asked about the safeguards system is usually: how reliable is it? And the first question Ministers of Finance will ask is how cost-effective is the system? As the same questions are likely to be asked of any verification system for disarmament agreements, I shall offer some comments.

The system must be designed for a high degree of reliability. A weak system might be worse than no system at all, for it might lull the participants into a false feeling of confidence and might tempt a party bent on cheating to do so. On the other hand, a verification system that would discover every conceivable deliberate diversion or unintentional error with 100 per cent reliability is hardly achievable. The higher we want the probability of discovery to be, the more cumbersome, intrusive and expensive the system will be. Like a fire alarm system set to be extremely sensitive, it would also sound a great many false alarms, perhaps gradually reducing our reactions to alarms.

After much discussion, Governments in IAEA have agreed on a system aimed at discovering significant diversions with 90 to 95 per cent probability. Any Government bent on disregarding a safeguards non-proliferation pledge would thus have to anticipate a very high risk of discovery through the safeguards system and the consequent reactions of the community of States.

The reliability of the safeguards system has come in for a good deal of criticism from individuals, groups and sometimes the media. On the other hand, Governments, which created the system and which are vitally dependent upon it for their policies, and which are the most informed of its results and difficulties, support the system and rely on it.

Much - but not all - of the criticism comes from people who are against the use of nuclear power and who are convinced that the peaceful use of nuclear power must inevitably lead to a spread of nuclear weapons, and that the IAEA system would not be capable of detecting signs thereof. This year such criticism has been based
on selective readings of the Agency's Safeguards Implementation Report for 1986. This report by the Secretariat, submitted each year to the Board of Governors at its June session, describes the different safeguards activities and their results and is designed to enable the competent units of member Governments to be fully informed of the actual strength of the system of verification. Should they find unacceptable weaknesses they can suggest modifications; should they find unnecessary, redundant activities, they can propose streamlining. The report manifests the transparency to member Governments that a verification system must evince if it is to give these Governments the confidence they need. Read by persons with a spotty understanding of how different components of the system support each other and with a vested interest in concluding weaknesses, the report, which is a restricted document, can be and is being misused by various groups and media. It would be regrettable if sensationalist allegations or ill-informed criticism of safeguards were to cast doubts on the system or, indeed, on the possibilities of effective verification in general.

Last week the Board of Governors of IAEA took note, with confidence, of the Safeguards Implementation Report for 1987, which stated as in previous years that the Agency had "detected no anomaly which would indicate the diversion of a significant amount of material" and that "it was reasonable to conclude that nuclear material under Agency safeguards in 1987 remained in peaceful nuclear activities". I may add that during the more than 25 years that safeguards verification has taken place not one case has come to light of diversion of material or use of safeguarded installations for non-peaceful purposes.

Although Governments, fully informed about the safeguards system, express their confidence in it, the system is not so perfect that it could not be made more effective and more efficient. Informed criticism must be welcomed. I should mention that in addition to member Governments' examination of the Safeguards
Implementation Reports, a special Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI), consisting of 12 national experts in the field of safeguards, continuously advises the Agency on the further development, strengthening and management of the safeguards system. Such a group also gives Governments further insight into the system and helps to bring about modifications that are needed to improve reliability or efficiency or to adapt the system to new exigencies.

What, then, are the problems in this verification system which we recognize as real and how do we tackle them?

A limitation that must be noted in any verification system, including IAEA safeguards, is that, like a radar beam scanning the horizon, it can only verify the absence here and now of any violations. It cannot read the minds and intentions of people. The same will be true of any verification system set up, and Governments will, therefore, always supplement their information from a verification system by information from other sources.

Another limitation on safeguards operations is that they only have regard to declared facilities. Considering all the information that the accounting system gives and the data that member States obtain through satellites, however, the absence of a right to verify that there are no undeclared installations may not be a serious problem. However, perhaps a verification system designed today would have included such a right.

A very real problem for the safeguards system is the growing complexity and sophistication of peaceful nuclear installations. The system was established to cope with the facilities existing years ago. It must continuously develop and adapt in order to deal with new closed, remotely controlled and automatized systems. No sooner is a verification system worked out for centrifuge enrichment plants than laser enrichment appears as a promising alternative technique.
(Mr. Blix, IAEA)

However, the long technical lead times for such developments help to allow safeguards techniques and instrumentation to keep abreast of the techniques to be safeguarded. Governments might consider requiring that any new nuclear technology developed should have as an integral and concomitant part the necessary techniques for safeguards verification.

Laser enrichment plants are not the only future problem. Safeguards techniques will have to be developed to deal with the problems connected with wastes and decommissioning of plants which have processed nuclear material. Another result of the industry growing older will be the increase in the quantity of separated plutonium under safeguards. In 1977 the total quantity of plutonium under safeguards was 18 tonnes; in 1987 it was 179.6 tonnes. Our forecast five to seven years into the future is 430 tonnes. Plutonium is a direct-use material and, like highly enriched uranium, requires more intensive safeguarding than other forms of nuclear material. The growth in the quantity of plutonium and the increasing use of mixed oxide fuels will increase the demands on the Agency's safeguards resources. The similar expected growth in the amount of stored spent fuel containing plutonium will also increase the workload of the Agency.

What I have said underscores the need for research and development of verification techniques. For the IAEA safeguards programme, most of this activity is undertaken by national laboratories that have large resources at their disposal. Although more and more techniques become available for automatic control and verification, as they do for automatic operation of nuclear activities, I submit to this Assembly the Agency's view that the use of the experienced on-site inspector will remain valuable.

Another problem IAEA faces is the increase in numbers of facilities and quantities of fissionable material to be safeguarded. In the next five years we expect the number of installations under safeguards to grow from 906 to 950. This
figure would further increase if some or several of the States which have nuclear power programmes but have not yet accepted full-scope safeguards were to do so. There would be a dramatic further increase if, as the 1985 Review Conference of Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons suggested, the principle of universal application of IAEA safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities in all States, including nuclear-weapon States, were pursued. Although this recommendation of the Review Conference has not been followed up by detailed proposals in IAEA, it might be that at some stage a nuclear disarmament process would make it desirable or necessary that all civil nuclear installations in nuclear-weapon States be placed under safeguards to give assurance that the civil programmes are not used to expand the supply of material to remaining weapon programmes.

The cost of verification may well be a much greater problem in a multilaterally-administered system than in a bilateral one, where presumably each party pays for its own activities and is responsible for their effectiveness and efficiency. In a multilateral organization, as experience shows, the sharing of costs among Governments can be as intractable a problem as some of the most difficult political questions these organizations face. The financing of the safeguards system is a case in point.
During the last five years 45 new nuclear facilities have been added to those that have to be inspected and the quantity of materials under safeguards has - as I mentioned - increased significantly. Yet, during the same period, owing to the difficult financial situations of member Governments, the Agency has been obliged to maintain its safeguards budget at essentially zero growth in real terms, or at around $50 million per year. The declarations made at the summit meetings of Geneva, Washington and most recently in Moscow, contain explicit support for IAEA and a determination to strengthen safeguards. This has not, however, led to a strengthened budget. The Agency, never criticized for wasteful administration, remains with the dilemma of meeting a dynamic reality with a zero real growth budget.

Verification - like development assistance - requires adequate, predictable and dependable financing. The world has to get used to and accept the costs of verification, whether bilateral or multilateral. It would be somewhat paradoxical if we were to succeed in solving political and security problems of arms control and disarmament agreements and find that we cannot reach consensus on how adequately to finance the verification systems we set up.

In a bilateral verification system the nationality of the inspectors is not a problem. In a multilateral system performing inspection in many countries, the inspectorate must reflect the multinational character of the system. Although the inspectors are international civil servants and must act as such, Member States will feel that they are more actively participating in the verification activities and they will have more confidence in it, if the inspectorate is drawn from many nationalities.

While the recruitment and training of a multinational inspectorate does not raise serious difficulties, the daily activities and relations of inspectors with the countries and installations in which they perform their activities raise many
practical problems. First, there are limits as to how many days one can send an inspector travelling abroad on inspection per year and retain him or her as a well-functioning and stable person. Inspectors must maintain cordial and correct but not cosy relations with the host countries and installations where they perform their duties. It is, of course, of vital importance that operators of inspected installations be fully aware of the purpose of the verification and of the needs of inspectors. A measure of co-operation between the two is needed, in addition to clear rules, to avoid unnecessary friction.

Numerous practical problems have to be coped with in the organization and operation of inspections and IAEA has a rich experience in facing and solving them. Visas must be obtained, travel delays are encountered, health problems occur. Inspectors who need to bring instruments and equipment for their inspections and to ship samples may run into customs obstacles and other problems. I submit that any new system of verification that may be set up should study such practical matters very closely to avoid friction, unnecessary cost and impediments to inspection. Perhaps the time will soon be ripe to consider a special United Nations Inspector Passport which at identified national entry points would require no visa and would be sufficient to ensure the passage through customs of an inspector's equipment and samples.

Let me lastly for a moment discuss another problem which relates to the use of inspectors. I am referring to the right of a State under the safeguards system to be consulted before any inspector is designated to visit that State. The right to consultation implies the right of refusal, and some of our Member States make use of that right of refusal explicitly; others do so implicitly by failing to reply to our proposals. Refusals are based upon political objections to a particular nationality, sometimes upon language qualifications. Sometimes objections are based upon the inspector's possession of too much experience, which leads to fears
of industrial espionage, sometimes upon his having too little experience leading to fears of safety risks. Any new system of verification, I would suggest, should attempt to work out a more effective system of inspector designation than the system that the Agency operates and that involves extra costs through delays in the deployment of inspectors. A modernized system of international inspection should recognize and act upon the international character and qualifications of the inspector. National origin and native language should be irrelevant.

I do not propose to summarize the points that I have made. They are already summaries of the vast experience that IAEA has gained in over 25 years of operation of the safeguards system. It was revolutionary when it started. It has helped the world, including the nuclear-weapon States, to get used to on-site inspection and to understand the very tangible advantages that flow from it in the field of confidence. The world should build further on this experience and create even better systems underpinning and securing disarmament and peace.

The President (interpretation from Russian): I shall now call on those representatives who wish to speak in exercise of the right of reply.

May I remind members that, in accordance with General Assembly decision 34/401, statements in exercise of the right of reply are limited to 10 minutes for the first intervention and to five minutes for the second and should be made by delegations from their seats.

Mr. Butler (Australia): I have sought to speak today in order to exercise Australia's right of reply to certain remarks made by the Foreign Minister of France in the Assembly on 2 June. Those remarks constituted a critique of the South Pacific nuclear-free zone which was established by the Treaty of Rarotonga. Mr. Dumas made the following assertions which, we regret, seriously misrepresented
that Treaty. First he said:

"... plainly the Treaty in question is aimed at one of the States in the region ..." (A/S-15/PV.4, p. 46)

The State he had in mind, of course, was France.

What he said is not the case. The fact is that the Treaty of Rarotonga is addressed to all States, and in particular to the five nuclear-weapon States, all of whom, by definition, possess the capability of violating the nuclear-free status of the zone. This is evidenced by the fact that all nuclear-weapon States are enjoined to sign protocols 2 and 3 of the Treaty.

If France does feel singled out, as the Foreign Minister indicated it does, it cannot be because of the provisions of the Treaty. They are non-discriminatory. Surely it is for another reason, and that is because France alone continues to test nuclear explosive devices within the South Pacific nuclear-free zone, in violation of that zone and in defiance of the wishes of the peoples of the South Pacific. Australia condemns that nuclear testing and continues to call for its cessation.

The second assertion made by the Foreign Minister was that the Treaty was ambiguous with respect to navigation and ports of call. He went on to say:

"If it jeopardizes freedom of navigation, denuclearization can never be legitimate." (ibid.)
(Mr. Butler, Australia)

As one of the 14 authors of the Treaty, Australia can - and does - state that no such ambiguity exists.

Let me quote directly from article 2, paragraph 2 of the Treaty, which deals with the issue of navigation;

"Nothing in this Treaty shall prejudice or in any way affect the rights, or the exercise of the rights, of any State under international law with regard to freedom of the seas". (A/40/27 and Corr.1, annex II (CD/633))

Clearly that article is unambiguous - and it was intended to be so.

The Foreign Minister said that France "has always favoured the establishment of such zones" (A/S-15/PV.4, p. 43-45) and that France hopes to pursue dialogue with South Pacific countries. We welcome that statement and hope that such a dialogue will contribute to the removal of remaining obstacles to full respect for the South Pacific nuclear-free zone.

The Treaty of Rarotonga is a significant measure of nuclear arms control and disarmament. That fact has been emphasized by many speakers in our general debate. Thus it is appropriate that it should be referred to at this special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. But any such reference should be factually correct. My statement today has recorded the facts.

Mr. Ghaure Khan (India): It is regrettable that in order to divert attention from its own covert programme to develop nuclear weapons Pakistan continues to indulge in all sorts of propaganda ploys. The fact is that Pakistan is very close to acquiring nuclear weapons, if it has not done so already. And countries which are in a position to know are fully aware of it.

It is not India which has indulged in clandestine acquisition of design data, equipment and components for its nuclear programme. It is not Indian nationals who have been arrested - and convicted - in Western countries for endeavouring to
acquire illegally krytron switches, maraging steel, beryllium, and so forth, in a feverish quest for nuclear weapons.

As for the so-called proposals made by Pakistan, they are only meant to conceal reality.

The Pakistan delegation in its statement this morning referred to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Since 1968 India's position with regard to the NPT has been consistent and based on the principle of non-discrimination and equal treatment. That has been well recognized and understood by all. Pakistan's position is that if India signs the NPT, Pakistan will also sign. What is the principle in that?

Nuclear non-proliferation cannot be a bilateral matter between India and Pakistan, when the whole neighbourhood is bristling with nuclear weapons. It is a global problem.

India's nuclear programme is entirely for peaceful purposes. India's record speaks for itself. An integrated programme up to the year 2000 for the generation of nuclear power has been debated in the Indian Parliament. Its records are there for all to see. India's nuclear programme does not function under any shroud of secrecy.

India has been in the forefront of the movement for nuclear disarmament. I would bring to the notice of the Assembly the comprehensive and integrated action plan on nuclear disarmament set out by my Prime Minister on the 9th of this month. If the Pakistani delegation was serious in its concerns, we would have hoped that it would address itself in all earnestness to that plan instead of engaging in futile propaganda gimmicks.
Mr. NISSIM-ISSACHAROFF (Israel): My delegation wishes to speak in
exercise of its right of reply in relation to the statement made by the
representative of Syria in the Assembly last Friday.

First, in the context of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the
Middle East, my delegation rejects the attempt by the Syrian representative to
attribute to Israel policies and activities to which my Government does not
subscribe. Israel's policy in this regard was clearly elaborated by
Prime Minister Shamir last Tuesday in this general debate. The objective of
non-proliferation in our region can best be served through the establishment of a
nuclear-weapon-free zone by direct negotiations between the States concerned and,
thus, the attainment of this objective is not contingent on Israel alone.
Accordingly, my delegation strongly opposes and objects to this type of
name-calling and singling out of Israel in this context.

Secondly, regarding South Africa I should like to state clearly, in no
uncertain terms, that it is Israel's adamant policy to have no relations with South
Africa in the nuclear field. The fact that the Syrian representative alluded to
this matter almost five times in his speech - indeed, I lost count of the number of
times - does not lend any substance to this myth.

Thirdly, my delegation rejects in their entirety the assertions of the Syrian
representative regarding the production and use of a new type of tear gas by my
country. Israel has used for riot-control purposes, where necessary, exactly the
same type of non-toxic tear gas which is used by police forces and armies
throughout the world and which, I might add, is not manufactured in Israel. I
should like to emphasize that this tear gas is non-lethal and not prohibited under
international law, and has never been used in the ways stated by the Syrian
representative.
(Mr. Nissim-Issacharoff, Israel)

It is very apparent that the Syrian representative has been completely misinformed on this matter. Now that is hardly surprising when it comes to Israel, but I was frankly struck by the fact that the Syrian representative also appears to be misinformed in relation to his own country, Syria. Indeed, I believe that he stated that his country was against the manufacture, production and use of chemical weapons. I would have thought that the Syrian representative would know what other very informed sources know - namely, that Syria possesses the most advanced chemical warfare capability in the Arab world. Over the past few years Syria has built production lines for the nerve gas Sarin in particular, and has developed air bombs and ground-to-ground missile warheads for the delivery of this nerve gas. If anything should be investigated by the United Nations, it is clearly Syria's activity in this field.

Mr. MASHHADI (Islamic Republic of Iran): The Foreign Minister of Egypt, in continuation of his Government's military and material support for Iraq, came here today to trumpet Egypt's one-sided, biased and unjust backing for the aggressor. In his speech, which was full of contradictions, he referred to "respect [for] international legitimacy and the non-use of force in international relations". (supra, p. 35)

Where was that respect when 22,000 square kilometres of our territory were occupied in less than two weeks, in an act of open aggression? Was not that use of force against international law? Why did Egypt say nothing? Why did not the Egyptian Foreign Minister condemn the use of chemical weapons by Iraq? Why was Egypt silent when, on only one day, over 5,000 innocent civilians were poisoned to death in Halabja? Why was nothing said regarding the repeated violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol as well as customary law?
In his statement the Egyptian Foreign Minister made the following reference:
"due to Iran's persistent refusal to implement resolution 598 (1987)" (supra,
p. 36) and Iraq's acceptance. To set the record straight I should say here that
the Security Council has entrusted the Secretary-General with the implementation of
the resolution. We have given a positive response to the Secretary-General to
implement his plan. Is the resolution not for implementation? If the response is
positive, then why does Egypt's Foreign Minister not ask the Iraqis the reason for
their refusal of the implementation plan? Even now that the Iraqi Foreign Minister
is here in New York, he is refusing outright the implementation plan. If that is
not the case, the Iraqi representative can announce his Government's positive
response to the Secretary-General's implementation plan.

Not only have the efforts of the Secretary-General been stonewalled and
sabotaged but also the dimensions of Iraq's crimes have been expanded. The Halabja
holocaust is a vivid example. That atrocity has even been continued following the
adoption of Security Council resolution 612 (1988). Egypt is in fact an accomplice
in those crimes through all kinds of support it has given to warmongers.

A large number of Egyptian mercenaries have been captured during the course of
the war. Some of them were handed over to some Islamic-Egyptian theologians who
visited Tehran some time ago. Egypt's concern should be to get its prisoners back
and not to preach what it does not itself practise.

Mr. KAMAL (Pakistan): The representative of India, in exercising his
right of reply, made certain allegations in a manner which serves once again to
highlight the legitimate fears of smaller States. He made his remarks in this
Assembly, where, fortunately, all States are represented on the basis of sovereign
equality, irrespective of national power projections.
The regional approach to disarmament is not a new philosophy. It is a reflection of the increasing threat which most countries confront in their respective region and which has propelled them to seek regional approaches to security and disarmament without in any way detracting from the global approach to general and complete disarmament. The Secretary-General of the United Nations last year drew attention to such regional approaches and pointed out that they merited much attention.

We know that in our region our two countries have a long history of mutual distrust, suspicions and tensions. However, that does not mean that we must perpetuate the sufferings of the past into the future. Pakistan has long recognized the need for normal and co-operative relations with India. We are unequivocally committed to the establishment of tension-free and good-neighbourly relations with our neighbour. That would not only serve the best interests of the two countries but also usher in an era of peace and stability in South Asia. Such an evolution is crucial to the amelioration of the quality of life of our peoples.

We regret that India has alleged that Pakistan's proposals to eliminate once and for all the threat of the production and deployment of nuclear weapons from the South Asian region are "propaganda ploys". It has also alleged that Pakistan's peaceful nuclear programme is geared to acquiring nuclear-weapons capability. We have specifically and repeatedly denied that, most recently this morning in this very forum. There is no truth whatsoever in the allegation.

I should like to quote here from The New York Times of Saturday, 7 May 1988. In an article by Mr. Steven Weisman on India's nuclear programme, it is stated:

"Despite the controversy over the heavy water, nuclear proliferation experts say they are much more concerned about India's large accumulation of plutonium that does not fall under international safeguards or inspections. Experts say it takes only five to eight kilograms of plutonium for one nuclear
bom. Dr. Srinavasan, Chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, said that India's stockpile of plutonium outside international safeguards was expected to be thousands of kilograms in the next 10 years but he declined to say how much plutonium is on hand at present.

"According to a task force report published in the United States this year by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, India could have accumulated a stockpile of 100 to 200 kilograms of plutonium by mid-1987, which it said was enough for 12 to 14 weapons. Dhitendra Sharm, a leading Indian scholar at Jawahareal Nehru University, has estimated that enough plutonium exists for 50 to 100 bombs being stockpiled."

Indian representatives have generally stated that their massive acquisition of plutonium was meant to fuel the reactors that India was expecting to build over the next several years. We do not understand why thousands of kilograms of plutonium is required now when, according to the Chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, the new plants which would use plutonium "are not expected to be functioning until well into the next century".

It is, of course, easy to trade allegations and counter-allegations. We would not like to recall the history of India's diversions from the Cirus reactor in exploding its first nuclear device in 1974, or the recent disclosure of the disappearance of 15 tons of heavy water in 1983.

Pakistan, for its part, has never dismissed India's professions of peaceful intent in the nuclear field. We have welcomed such Indian statements. It is now necessary to convert those professions into solemn treaty obligations. Such legally binding instruments would provide the necessary verification and transparency to allay the suspicion and mistrust which each side harbours.
As I have already stated, Pakistan is committed to the establishment of
tension-free and good-neighbourly relations with India, and we shall continue to
pursue this objective in all sincerity and seriousness.

Mr. AL-AMIN (Iraq) (interpretation from Arabic): We have got used to
listening to various falsifications by Iranian representatives to cover up their
country's opposition to the will of the international community and the resolutions

Iraq's attitude is clear, vis-à-vis the war and vis-à-vis that resolution in
particular. Our position is also clear concerning the Secretary-General's
implementation plan. Only three days after the adoption of Security Council
resolution 598 (1987) on 20 July 1987, the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign
Minister of Iraq delivered an official Iraqi letter to the Secretary-General
confirming Iraq's agreement and its willingness to implement resolution
598 (1987). So far Iran has manoeuvred here and there. It is trying to cover up
while Khomeini and Rafsanjani and the other ayatollahs in Tehran beat the drums of
war.
(Mr. Al Masri, Syrian Arab Republic)

As for his justification of the non-accession by his Government to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), that is designed only to divert attention from Israel's defiance of the international community's will and its challenge to international peace and security, especially to peace and security in the Middle East. Israel's persistence in acquiring nuclear weapons and developing its nuclear capability is a direct threat to the Middle East region and an obstruction to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone there; it is also a direct threat in general to international peace and security.

The President (interpretation from Russian): Before I adjourn the meeting, I wish to draw attention to the fact that I intend to pass on to consideration of the first report of the Credentials Committee tomorrow, at the end of the morning meeting.

The meeting rose at 7.15 p.m.
Yesterday the irresponsible Iranian régime launched an unsuccessful attack against my country. This attack was repelled by our courageous soldiers, sustained by our strong belief in the sanctity of our national soil. Iran started the war and Iran persists in it. During the eight years of this destructive war Iran has wreaked havoc on all norms of international law and other humane principles.

The last mission of the Secretary-General proved Iran's use of chemical weapons against Iraq. The Iranian representative has tried in vain to cover up the nature of its backward régime and its aggression not only against Iraq and Egypt, not only against Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, but against the Arab region in its entirety and the world at large.

Mr. ELARABY (Egypt): I have asked for the floor to reply to some of the points just made by the representative of Iran. He chose to say that the statement made this afternoon by the Foreign Minister of Egypt contained some contradictions. I should like first of all to make it quite clear that the statement made by the Foreign Minister of Egypt was within the context of the special session devoted to disarmament. At a certain point he was referring to regional problems in our area, one of which is the Iraq-Iran war. In this connection the Foreign Minister confined himself to referring to the importance of complying with the relevant resolutions of the competent United Nations organ, namely the Security Council.

Another point which my delegation believe should be addressed in the light of what the representative of Iran said concerns Egyptian prisoners of war in Iran. The representative of Iran described them as mercenaries. We should like to challenge and reject that point. The Egyptians who have been imprisoned by Iran are workers living in Iraq. There are about a million of them. Some of them have been drafted, which is within the rights of Iraq as a sovereign country. They have been fighting death under Iraq's orders and instructions, and they are an integral
part of the Iraqi army and should be treated as such in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Geneva Conventions. Unfortunately, Iran refuses to treat them as such and calls them mercenaries, which is not the case.

Mr. AL-MASRI (Syrian Arab Republic) (interpretation from Arabic): There is an Arab proverb that you cannot cover the sun with the palm of your hand. As is customary, the Israeli representative tried to throw sand in our eyes. However, this does not blind us from seeing the truth. The clear truth is that Israel owns nuclear weapons and chemical weapons, and it also owns poisonous gases. It has used such weapons as tear gas against the inhabitants of the occupied Arab territories and it has also used such weapons in its wars of aggression against the Arabs on the other.

I should like to recall in this body that Israel in its wars of aggression in 1967 and in 1973 used chemical weapons the effects of which are still felt by the Arab inhabitants to this day.

In 1974 Syria had the honour to take the initiative of proposing a draft resolution in the General Assembly condemning the use of napalm and similar weapons and prohibiting their production and stockpiling. The General Assembly adopted that resolution by a majority. However, the Israeli delegation was among the very few delegations which abstained from voting for the resolution. This clearly shows Israel's persistence in the use of incendiary and chemical weapons against the Arabs.

During the present heroic uprising of the Arab Palestinian people in the occupied Arab territories the inhabitants of those and of other Arab territories have all been subjected to the use of tear gas by Israel, which has led to deaths, asphyxiation and miscarriages among pregnant women. The representative of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) made a clear statement to that effect. The Washington Post published
details of the press release. So it is not we who are saying this but the United Nations.

Israel's accusation that Syria owns and has acquired poisonous gases and chemical weapons is simply a fabrication to divert attention from Israeli use of such weapons. Syria has not acquired such weapons and has repeatedly condemned the production, stockpiling and processing of such weapons.

The attempt by Israel to distort the facts cannot change the reality that Israel has introduced into the Middle East chemical weapons and poisonous gases and that Israel persists in its use of such weapons. Moreover, Israel opposes and even challenges the international community by refusing to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty. Also, in total defiance of the will of the international community, Israel refuses to submit its nuclear installations to the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency. This position in itself is an accusation against Israel concerning its persistence in acquiring such weapons and its defiance of the will of the international community.

Syria condemns the Israeli attitude and it condemns the use of chemical weapons and poisonous gases. We have frequently condemned it. We have said that we have not acquired such weapons, and the fact that Israel accuses us of having done so does not change the fact that Israel possesses such weapons.
The PRESIDENT: I now call on the representative of India, who wishes to speak a second time in exercise of the right of reply.

Mr. GHAREKHAN (India): I sympathize with the delegation of Pakistan in its desperate and totally unconvincing attempt somehow to justify its clandestine programme. The Pakistan delegation tried to introduce a new concept in the context of small States. I am not sure how our friends in the Middle East will react to the concept of a small State occupying territories of its bigger neighbours.

As I said in my first intervention, India's nuclear-energy programme is an open book. It is administered by a civilian ministry, unlike the programme in Pakistan. We have nothing to hide. We have heavy-water plants of our own. One of them has been functioning from as early as 1962 and we will build more heavy-water plants as required. I suggest that the Pakistan delegation should familiarize itself with the use of heavy water. Heavy water is not used in making bombs. It is used as a moderator in a nuclear-energy power reactor which produces electricity and which uses natural uranium as the fuel. Most of India's nuclear energy programme uses natural uranium so we must have heavy water. We do not need to engage in unlawful procurement abroad of anything. Whatever heavy water we have bought is under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. We have enough stocks of heavy water not only for our current needs but also for our future programmes.

The remark of the representative of Pakistan is a mere reproduction of misleading newspaper reports that cannot be substantiated, as contrasted with the fact that there were procurements by Pakistan which were clandestine and illegal, as has been established in the courts of law of several countries and for which its nationals have been prosecuted and convicted.

Professions of friendship sound somewhat hollow in the light of interference in India's internal affairs across the border. India has offered a comprehensive
treaty of peace and friendship but Pakistan has not yet responded to it positively.

The PRESIDENT: I now call on the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, who wishes to speak a second time in exercise of the right of reply.

Mr. MASHHADI (Islamic Republic of Iran): In response to the Egyptian representative I should like to ask a question: According to what international law can Egyptian citizens become drafted into the Iraqi army and be sent to the war fronts? On the other hand as I said, on humanitarian grounds a large number of these Egyptians have been handed over. The point I should like to stress here is that a party which is part of the problem cannot contribute to solving the problem. According to what the representative of Egypt said, Egyptian citizens were captured at the war front.

In response to Iraq I would like to say that if Security Council resolution 598 (1987) is going to be implemented we have accepted the implementation plan; if it is just an instrument of pressure we are not going to yield to any pressure. How can we have started a war and within less than two weeks have 22,000 square kilometres of our territory under occupation? Those who did not condemn the Iraqi aggression on 22 September 1980 are accomplices of the Iraqi crime and those responsible for the continuation of the war.

Lastly, Security Council documents and reports of the missions dispatched by the United Nations Secretary-General to the areas afflicted by chemical weapons vividly show which side has used chemical weapons. In fact, the Iraqis have said that they use and resort to every means, including chemical weapons, against us. That is what Tariq Aziz, Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs, has said.
The PRESIDENT: I now call on the representative of Israel, who wishes to speak a second time in exercise of the right of reply.

Mr. NISSIM-ISSACHAROFF (Israel): I am sorry to speak again but I should like to make three quick points to the representative of Syria. The first one is in relation to the non-proliferation Treaty. I am sure the Syrian representative will recall that when Syria acceded to that Treaty his Government made an express reservation that Syrian accession would not imply or entail any recognition of or relations with Israel and, therefore, presumably no obligations vis-à-vis Israel. It is for this reason in particular that Israel believes that a freely negotiated nuclear-weapon-free zone entailing bilateral and reciprocal commitments is a most suitable way in which to accomplish the aim of non-proliferation in the region as has been done in Latin America and the South Pacific.

The second point I should like to make is that I intimated in my earlier statement that chemical weapons are being produced by Syria. Obviously I did not convince the Syrian representative. Perhaps he would care to ask the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre in Damascus, which is the institute involved in research and development of weapons and military equipment for the Syrian Army, including research, development, pilot-planting and production of chemical weapons. I am sure they will be kind enough to bring him up to date.

The third point, regarding the rest of the fabrications and historical inaccuracies in the Syrian representative's statement, I see no point in getting into at this stage. History will not be rewritten at this late hour.

The PRESIDENT: I now call on the representative of Pakistan, who wishes to speak a second time in exercise of the right of reply.
Mr. KAMAL (Pakistan): Despite the repetition of Indian allegations, my delegation would like categorically to state again from this rostrum that Pakistan's nuclear programme is emphatically and exclusively for peaceful purposes. That is why we are prepared for reciprocal inspection, a proposal which India has rejected. As for the allegation that professions of friendship sound hollow, may we suggest that India try to put them to the test nevertheless. At this special session devoted to disarmament Pakistan does not wish to enter into acrimonious debate with India, but since a new idea of interference has now been injected into the debate let me say that it is easy to find external bogeys for internal problems. Pakistan has never interfered in the internal affairs of India and it legitimately expects India fully to reciprocate this policy.

The PRESIDENT: I now call on the representative of Iraq, who wishes to speak a second time in exercise of the right of reply.

Mr. AL-AMIN (Iraq) (interpretation from Arabic): I am sorry to speak once again, especially given the lateness of the hour. However, I shall be very brief. The Iranian representative should know that Iran is not fighting Iraq alone: it is fighting the entire Arab nation. No wonder then that Iraq is being provided with full support from all quarters of the Arab world. It is no wonder also that the position of the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt is in support of Iraq.
No wonder we find among the defenders of Iraq's independence and sovereignty citizens from Egypt, Sudan, Yemen, Jordan, Palestine and Morocco. Iraq's independence and sovereignty are part of the independence and sovereignty of the entire Arab nation; and they are defending Iraq against the racist attack by the regressive Iranian régime.

Mr. ELARABY (Egypt): A question was raised about Egyptian prisoners of war in Iran and the representative of Iran inquired under what rule of international law they were fighting there.

The question of whether someone is a prisoner of war has nothing to do with why he is there. The representative of Iraq has already expressed his point of view and I do not need to repeat that. What I wish to say very briefly to the representative of Iran is that any prisoner of war should be considered and treated as such in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Geneva convention. The distinction as to whether someone is a prisoner of war or a mercenary is established in accordance with the Geneva convention. When someone is fighting with a regular army and under the instructions of that army, he should be treated as a prisoner of war, and all the provisions of the relevant Geneva convention apply to him.

Mr. AL-MASRI (Syrian Arab Republic) (interpretation from Arabic): Once again the Israeli representative has resorted to falsifications and fabrications, which are no secret to anyone. However, he did not deny the fact that chemical weapons are in the hands of Israelis and have been used against the Arabs. The effects of such use can be plainly seen. The World Health Organization (WHO) has been carrying out investigations with regard to the poisonous gas used by Israel. Those are facts which the Israeli representative and his fabrications cannot change.
(Mr. Al Masri, Syrian Arab Republic)

As for his justification of the non-accession by his Government to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), that is designed only to divert attention from Israel's defiance of the international community's will and its challenge to international peace and security, especially to peace and security in the Middle East. Israel's persistence in acquiring nuclear weapons and developing its nuclear capability is a direct threat to the Middle East region and an obstruction to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone there; it is also a direct threat in general to international peace and security.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Russian): Before I adjourn the meeting, I wish to draw attention to the fact that I intend to pass on to consideration of the first report of the Credentials Committee tomorrow, at the end of the morning meeting.

The meeting rose at 7.15 p.m.