
AGENDA ITEM 10: ADOPTION OF A DECLARATION ON DISARMAMENT (continued)

AGENDA ITEM 11: ADOPTION OF A PROGRAMME OF ACTION ON DISARMAMENT (continued)

AGENDA ITEM 12: REVIEW OF THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN DISARMAMENT AND OF THE INTERNATIONAL MACHINERY FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON DISARMAMENT, INCLUDING IN PARTICULAR THE QUESTION OF CONVENING A WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE (continued)
The meeting was called to order at 3.25 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 9, 10, 11 AND 12 (continued)


ADOPTION OF A DECLARATION ON DISARMAMENT

ADOPTION OF A PROGRAMME OF ACTION ON DISARMAMENT

REVIEW OF THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN DISARMAMENT AND OF THE INTERNATIONAL MACHINERY FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON DISARMAMENT, INCLUDING IN PARTICULAR THE QUESTION OF CONVENING A WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): Before calling on the speakers on my list, I should like to draw the attention of delegations to the following documents that have been distributed:

A/S-10/AC.1/21, "Proposal by Ireland for a study of the possibility of establishing a system of incentives to promote arms control and disarmament";

A/S-10/AC.1/22, a letter addressed to the President of the General Assembly by the Chairman of the Special Committee against Apartheid;

A/S-10/AC.1/23, "Synthesis of the proposals on disarmament presented by Romania to the General Assembly at its special session devoted to disarmament";

A/S-10/AC.1/24, a note entitled "Measures to strengthen international security and build confidence", submitted by the United States of America;

A/S-10/AC.1/25, "Proposal for the establishment of a polemological agency", submitted by Uruguay;

A/S-10/AC.1/26, containing a memorandum submitted by Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, entitled "Strengthening of the security role of the United Nations in the peaceful settlement of disputes and peace-keeping";

A/S-10/AC.1/27, a note submitted by Sierra Leone, entitled "Introduction of disarmament studies in the educational institutions of all States";
A/S-10/AC.1/28, "Memorandum from the French Government concerning the establishment of an International Disarmament Fund for Development";
A/S-10/AC.1/29, a proposal submitted by Austria, Egypt, India, Mexico, Norway and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, entitled "Establishment of an advisory board of eminent persons";
A/S-10/AC.1/30, a note verbale from the Permanent Representative of the United States on the declaration by President Carter;
A/S-10/AC.1/L.6, amendments submitted by Canada to section III (Programme of Action) of the Draft Final Document;
A/S-10/AC.1/L.7, amendments submitted by China to section IV (Machinery) of the Draft Final Document;
(The Chairman)

A/S-10/AC.1/L.8, amendments submitted by China to the preamble of the draft resolution embodying a draft final document of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament;

A/S-10/AC.1/L.9, an amendment submitted by the Philippines to section III (programme of action) of the draft final document.

I should also like to announce that the Maldives have joined the sponsors of the draft resolution contained in document A/S-10/AC.1/L.1.

Mr. Newman (United States of America): At the outset, I should like to call the attention of the Committee to the statement made by Secretary of State Vance on 12 June in which he said:

"After reviewing the current status of the discussions in the United Nations special session on disarmament, and after consultations with our principal allies and on the basis of studies made in preparation for the special session, the President has decided to elaborate the United States position on the question of security assurances. His objective is to encourage support for halting the spread of nuclear weapons, to increase international security and stability and to create a more positive environment for the success of the special session. To this end the President declares:

"The United States will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or to any comparable internationally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the United States, its territories or armed forces or its allies by such a State allied to a nuclear-weapon State or associated with a nuclear-weapon State in carrying out or sustaining the attack."

"It is the President's view that this formulation preserves our security commitments and advances our collective security as well as enhancing the prospect of more effective arms control and disarmament."

As Vice-President Mondale announced in his speech to the General Assembly on 28 May, the United States is prepared to consider requests for technical monitoring devices - such as aircraft photo reconnaissance and ground-sensor detection - in situations where such measures might support disengagement agreements or other regional stabilizing measures.
Among the objectives for arms control set out by Mr. Wolfshe in his statement was the strengthening and expansion of regional arrangements and capabilities. This critical but still embryonic dimension of arms control can be important to building peace and stability and lightening the economic burden of arms competition in specific regions of the world. Since the risk is ever present in an interdependent world that local conflicts may escalate and ignite broader hostilities, regional arms control also has global significance.

Regional arms control may involve agreed reductions and limitations of forces and armaments. It may also involve exchanges of information designed to enhance openness about military matters and thus build mutual confidence. Or it may comprise measures to increase stability by restricting the activity or disposition of forces; these may function in a number of ways, such as by reducing the risk of accidental conflict, making it more difficult to achieve surprise in attack, or otherwise lessening the advantage of being the initiator of hostilities.

Measures in this last category have been called stabilizing measures and would include arrangements for the disengagement of forces following hostilities as well as measures agreed to between parties at peace. In either case, their success may depend critically upon the availability of means to verify compliance with the restrictions agreed to and to provide prompt warning in case of a breach. In facilitating verification and assuring warning, modern technology can play an important role. Although experience is limited and local situations may vary greatly, we believe the disengagement agreement in the Sinai demonstrates this potential.

The Sinai agreement established a precisely defined buffer zone separating the forces of the two sides and patrolled by the United Nations Emergency Force. Bounding this zone on each side are additional bands of territory in which forces are permitted, but with strict limitations on numbers and types of armaments, on numbers of units and men, and on new construction. Additional weapons restrictions apply beyond these areas of limitation. Within the buffer zone, each side is permitted to maintain a single strategic early-warning station using national means of surveillance.
As an integral part of these arrangements, and at the request of the parties, the United States in February 1975 established a tactical early-warning system, consisting of four unattended ground sensor fields, one at each end of the strategic Giddi and Mitla Passes of the western Sinai, three manned watch stations, and inspection posts at the entrances to the surveillance stations maintained by the parties in the buffer zone. The specific functions of the United States operation are to detect and report any movement of armed forces or any preparation for such movement into the two passes, and to verify operations at the parties' surveillance stations in order to ensure that they are in compliance with the terms of the disengagement agreement. To these functions has since been added that of detection and identification of aircraft which overfly the early-warning area.

Surveillance of the buffer zone and the areas of limited forces and armaments is also provided by roughly bi-weekly United States aerial photographic surveillance, from which both raw and interpreted products are provided to the parties within 1 to 14 days. This supplements reconnaissance flights by the parties themselves, which are permitted only up to the middle of the buffer zone.

An analogous operation on the Golan Heights is limited to aerial photo surveillance.

Each of these operations has been a success, both technically and politically. Despite high levels of tension in the region, the programme has contributed significantly to the growth of mutual confidence among the countries involved.

The United States is prepared to consider requests for similar monitoring services in other situations where they might be applicable. To the extent possible United States assistance would be provided under the auspices of the United Nations or of regional organizations but, in any event, only upon the joint request of the affected States. Requests for assistance would be examined on a case-by-case basis. Should the United States decide to provide assistance, the form it takes would necessarily be tailored to the geophysical, military and political circumstances in the affected region.
The specific services the United States would be prepared to consider providing would include the following:

First, provision of land-based sensors to monitor movements in potential invasion routes and staging areas, as well as across borders. The United States has extensive experience with a wide variety of passive and active sensors. The particular mix of devices most appropriate for a specific mission would depend primarily on the physical environment in which the equipment must work, but appropriate systems can be fashioned for most physical conditions on earth, including a wide range of terrains and climates. As a group, these land-based sensors are robust, highly sensitive and easily monitored. For maximum effectiveness, the techniques they employ require a clearly demarcated and preferably uninhabited no-man's land, as well as an international inspection team to investigate suspicious or ambiguous evidence. In particular cases, this team might be provided by the United Nations or by regional organizations. Over the long run, a limited number of on-the-spot technicians would also be required to maintain the equipment.

Secondly, assistance with aircraft photo reconnaissance and associated photo interpretation. Where such reconnaissance is intended to verify compliance with agreed force limitations, the limitations should be defined so as to be readily monitorable. For example, tanks and artillery are easily identifiable, but verifying numbers of troops has proved more difficult in the Sinai experience. In some circumstances, it might prove desirable to establish joint facilities for locally based photo interpretation that would bring together technicians from the requesting organization or the affected States, as well as United States technical advisers. Such a programme could lower costs and increase mutual confidence. Adequate training could be provided in roughly 60 to 90 days.
Appropriate cost-sharing by concerned parties, including the United States, will be arranged on a case-by-case basis.

While the United States is ready to entertain requests for services of the sort I have described, we recognize their limitations. They are not a panacea. They cannot replace the political will and negotiating flexibility which must lie at the heart of effective arms control. Their applicability in any given situation will depend on the political-military context as well as the physical environment. Verification of arms control agreements, whether using advanced technology or not, must be designed, not abstractly, but practically, on a case-by-case basis and must, above all, be responsive to the security interests of the affected States. Given appropriate conditions, however, the United States is persuaded that technical measures can be an important ingredient in successful regional arrangements to strengthen peace and stability.

Mr. VAERMO (Norway): Having listened to the general debate here in the first three weeks of this special session, one can easily draw the conclusion that there seems to exist a general consensus that arms control and disarmament considerations should constitute an important and integral part of every country's security and foreign policy. This is an important principle which needs to be translated into concrete action.

To an increasing extent, modern technology and military research and development inject uncertainty into any future planning or arms limitations. Arms control negotiations are often overtaken by the pace of modern weapons technology. The impact of new weapons on arms control and disarmament efforts must therefore be carefully and continuously assessed. To come to grips with the arms race, stringent political control of military research and development is of paramount importance. In this connexion, the established practice of preparing statements on the arms control impact of new weapons merits attention. We believe that it would have wide-ranging, beneficial effects if many more countries would introduce procedures whereby budget requests for new weapons were accompanied by evaluations of their arms control impact, should these weapons be acquired.
In evaluating new weapons or weapons systems, their impact on already existing arms control agreements, pending agreements or other efforts at arms restraint should be examined. The consequences for arms build-up, in general, and international stability, in particular, should be considered. Furthermore, effects on national security through the stimulation of counter-weapons in other countries should be assessed against the prospects of avoiding further arms competition through international negotiations, or other forms of mutual restraint. Such evaluations would allow arms restraint and disarmament objectives to have a stronger impact on the decision-making process.

In this manner it may be possible to translate into concrete action the generally accepted principle that the problems of arms control and disarmament should be an integral part of the foreign policy of the decision-making process.

The Norwegian delegation, therefore, wishes to propose the following addition to the last paragraph of section E, "Other measures to strengthen international security and to build confidence", of the Programme of Action:

"Budget requests for major weapons and weapons systems should be accompanied by an evaluation of their impact on arms control and disarmament efforts."

For technical reasons, a working document containing this proposal is not yet available, but I understand that it will shortly be distributed to delegations.

While I have the floor, I should like to bring to the attention of this forum a different matter, pertaining to the Secretary-General's idea concerning the establishment of an advisory board on study activities within the United Nations. On behalf of the co-sponsors - Austria, Egypt, India, Mexico, the United Kingdom and Norway - I would, therefore, use this opportunity also to introduce a proposal contained in document A/S-10/AC.1/29, of 14 June 1978.
In his statement at the opening of the tenth special session the Secretary-General suggested, *inter alia*, that an advisory board be established to advise him on all aspects of studies to be made under the auspices of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and arms control. Statements made in the Preparatory Committee and also at the special session itself have shown an increasing interest in having in-depth studies carried out on a variety of subjects which will require great care in preparation and implementation. In this light, and in order to ensure the effective utilization of international expertise, the co-sponsors believe that the Secretary-General should appoint an advisory board of eminent persons to advise and assist him in the planning and execution of the studies.

The establishment of an advisory board is a logical organizational response to a multitude of requirements. The board would facilitate the United Nations study activities in the field of disarmament, *inter alia* by putting them into an integrated and operative frame, taking due account of the various political, socio-economic and regional considerations involved.

With those introductory remarks, I would, on behalf of the co-sponsors, commend the following paragraph for insertion in the 'machinery' section of the final document:

>'The General Assembly requests the Secretary-General to set up an advisory board of eminent persons to advise him on various aspects of studies to be made under the auspices of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and arms limitation, particularly:

’(1) To propose and periodically to review a programme of studies;

’(2) To give advice on the framework and content of subjects to be studied.'
Mr. SCHELTENA (Netherlands): During the last meeting of the Preparatory Committee for this Assembly, my country suggested that a first step be taken towards the establishment of an international disarmament organization. The Netherlands Foreign Minister then formalized his proposal in the general debate on 2 June. In a working document of the Preparatory Committee (A/AC.187/108) more details were given on the Netherlands idea. For the convenience of representatives, it will be distributed again.

In the Preparatory Committee our idea found support from several countries. Four countries - Italy, Austria, Sweden and we ourselves - introduced together language to be included in the programme of action. Language concerning the international disarmament organization can be found at the top of page 39 of the English version of the report of the Preparatory Committee.

It would seem useful to explain again the purpose of our proposal, to clarify some questions raised and to discuss the relationship of our idea with some other proposals made during this special session.
We are approaching the conclusion of a number of important disarmament treaties - such as a chemical weapons ban and a comprehensive test ban - which require rather elaborate permanent machinery for consultations between parties and for substantial implementation and verification tasks. Only one such multilateral treaty is in existence at the moment, the Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, when that treaty was concluded, an organization existed which could take upon itself the necessary verification functions: the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). No such organization exists with respect to, for example, a chemical weapons ban.

My Government considers that an international disarmament organization could be given the necessary functions to assist in the verification of disarmament treaties and to provide a framework for consultations between parties to the agreements involved. Such an organization could also be entrusted with organizing review conferences provided for in disarmament treaties.

The organization would thus make it possible to streamline the implementation of arms control and disarmament agreements. In this way one could avoid, as far as possible, the setting up of different kinds of consultative commissions and international structures, all perhaps differently organized. In the organization various types of information necessary for the verification of agreements could be combined. For example, the organization could make use of information supplied by observation satellites, information which could have been provided by national Governments and/or by an international agency in this field, as proposed by France. In this way, most effective use could be made of all types of information.

We see the international disarmament organization strictly as a type of service agency. Obviously, it is the right of countries negotiating on disarmament agreements to decide on the scope and nature of verification provisions they deem necessary to include in a specific disarmament treaty. The international disarmament organization, as we see it, has no role to play in this negotiating process, but it can be allotted certain functions in the implementation of the agreed verification provisions, once the treaty has entered into force.
Some arguments have been expressed that one could not expect States to accept that verification measures would be implemented by an organization in which also non-parties would participate. We see no particular problems since the organization would only be involved in tasks specifically given to it by parties to a treaty. There is an important precedent in this field: the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This Treaty is verified by an organization, the IAEA, which has in its membership non-parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, yes even in its Board of Governors. As far as we know, this has never created any particular problem. However, one could imagine that in the governing bodies of the organization, voting on measures on a specific treaty would be restricted to parties only.

The Netherlands proposal has found support among many countries in this special session. Moreover, several proposals have been made which are close to our thinking or which have a certain relationship with our proposal. It is perhaps useful to give some views on the handling of these different proposals by the special session. We all realize that this is a complex matter which has to be studied very carefully. Our proposal is therefore a very modest one, namely, that the Secretary-General would seek the views of Governments on an international disarmament organization before the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly. Because of other proposals made, we think it wise to use the thirty-fourth session as a kind of focal point for further discussions on the implementation and verification machinery needed for the future.

Austria is proposing a study on verification questions. I could imagine that the report of that study would be ready in time for the thirty-fourth session.

France has proposed the establishment of an agency for the application of one particular verification method which can be used for different kinds of disarmament agreements, that is, an observation satellite agency. France has now proposed the setting up of a technical committee to study this idea. A report, or a progress report, could perhaps also be presented to the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly.
To sum up, what would we have at the thirty-fourth session? We would have a study on verification problems in general, we would have an expert study on one particular important verification method, and we would have the views of Governments on the more institutional arrangements of an organization to be allotted implementation functions of disarmament treaties. At the thirty-fourth session we would thus have a clear picture of these interrelated matters, making it possible to draw conclusions on how to proceed.

Sri Lanka has proposed an international disarmament authority. The President of Sri Lanka has explained that this authority should gradually acquire more functions, starting from the collection and dissemination of information and the implementation of disarmament agreements. The representative of Sri Lanka also thought that this authority would get more functions in the distant future.

The Netherlands delegation has great sympathy for the proposal made by the President of Sri Lanka. However, it seems to us more practical to make a strict functional separation between the different bodies involved in the disarmament process. The separation could perhaps be described as follows: first, providing the background information for disarmament negotiations; secondly, negotiating on disarmament agreements; thirdly, verifying the implementation of agreements.

Background information on disarmament matters can be supplied by the United Nations system and by outside sources. An important part has to be played, in our view, by the United Nations Secretariat.

The negotiating process has to be done by the most appropriate bodies - multilateral, regional and bilateral - depending on the issues involved.

The implementation process has been done on an ad hoc basis but could be streamlined in an international disarmament organization as described earlier.

I hope that my statement has clarified some matters, thus making it easier to take decisions at this special session on how to proceed in the complicated but essential disarmament process.
Sir Derek ASHE (United Kingdom): I should like to draw the attention of this Committee to document A/S-10/AC.1/26 in which my own delegation, together with the delegations of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and the United States of America, have put on record their views on the strengthening of the security role of the United Nations in the peaceful settlement of disputes and peace keeping in the light of the relationship of these activities to progress in disarmament.
(Mr. Ashe, United Kingdom)

The pursuit of disarmament over the years has brought with it a realization that one cannot simply remove the means on which States currently rely for their security, that is to say, the possession of arms and the establishment of alliances, without replacing them with a different system for the maintenance of the security of States. It is our belief that the United Nations has a role of fundamental importance in creating the framework of this new system. In fact one of the primary functions, if not the principal function, for which the United Nations was created was the maintenance of peace and security. The activities necessary to the discharge of that function include the anticipation of crises in different parts of the world and the peaceful settlement of disputes as well as the more traditional military peace-keeping role.

The special session on disarmament provides an opportunity for Member States to emphasize the crucial importance of the role of the United Nations in the peaceful settlement of disputes and peace-keeping, and to give thought to ways of strengthening the Organization's role in the future. To that end, the special session should emphasize the importance of studying the existing facilities and mechanisms for the promotion of peace, and possible ways in which the United Nations capacity might be strengthened and Member States encouraged and assisted to fulfil their Charter obligations.

Vigorous action in those areas of study will serve to focus the attention of Member States on the potential of the United Nations in the matter of peaceful settlement of disputes and peace-keeping, and would provide a basis for progress towards an effective collective security system which anticipates crises, is actively engaged in settling disputes and is capable of expeditious and effective peace-keeping when all else fails. Progress in those areas will promote a climate of international confidence conducive to disarmament.

I should perhaps make it clear that we are not proposing, when we talk of "areas of study", that the Secretariat - which is likely to be severely overburdened in any case following this special session - should convene yet another group of experts to produce yet another report. No, we are proposing that the special session should call for urgent action in those United Nations bodies which are already seized of those problems and should refer any necessary follow-up to the regular sessions of the General Assembly.
Our views are set out in detail in the memorandum which we have presented, and there is no need for me to repeat them here. I would merely urge my colleagues to read the memorandum with the care which its sponsors believe it deserves and to support our call for a suitable reference in the section of the Programme of Action entitled "Other measures to strengthen international security and to build confidence". My delegation has already proposed appropriate language in the relevant drafting group.

Mr. MISTRAL (France) (interpretation from French): In order to provide a practical solution to the problems created by the blatant disproportion between the resources now being applied to military expenditure and those devoted to development assistance, France proposes that an international disarmament fund for development be established. The statute of the fund would be that of a United Nations specialized agency. The establishment of that fund is the subject of a memorandum in document A/S-10/AC.1/28.

I should like briefly to present the main features of the French proposal and the main characteristics of the transitory arrangements to be made in order to enable the fund to function as expeditiously as possible. The international disarmament fund for development would have as its main goal that of giving loans or grants to developing countries or appropriate intergovernmental organizations out of the resources released by disarmament. Its structure and rules for decision making would be governed by a system in which a balance would be struck between beneficiary and contributing countries. Its management expenditure would be strictly limited, in particular by calling on the services of international agencies for the consideration of projects and for the administration of loans. The mechanism for building up the fund presupposes the determination, within the framework of a regional or world approach, of an optimum security threshold among States to make it possible to determine the excess expenditures likely to finance contributions for development assistance.

If the fund is to be established promptly, provision must be made for a transitory régime, one based on an initial endowment of, say, $1 billion. Contributions would be based on objective data
which might be, in the sphere of nuclear weapons, the number of vehicles; and in that of conventional weapons, the quantities of certain war equipment the possession of which can be considered as representative of military effort. The contributors would thus be the wealthiest and most heavily armed States.

France proposes that a group of experts be established to consider all questions related to the establishment of the fund. We shall supplement our proposals in that group.

Mr. TEMPLETON (New Zealand): My delegation has listened with interest to the statement made by the representative of the Netherlands concerning the proposal that the Secretary-General should be requested to seek the views of Member States on the functions and organization of a possible international disarmament organization. We have also studied the details of the Netherlands proposal contained in its working paper A/AC.187/108. My delegation recognizes that the issues raised in the working paper touch on some particularly complex and sensitive areas. The elaboration, in individual disarmament and arms control agreements, of measures for their implementation and supervision, for consultation among parties or for periodic review poses difficult political issues.

However, my delegation considers that an important aspect of all arms control and disarmament agreements is the climate of confidence which they create and the encouragement which this gives to as many States as possible
to become parties. In New Zealand's view it is unsatisfactory to leave the total responsibility for verification of general multilateral disarmament and arms control agreements to a very few national Governments.

Over the years various forms of verification, both national and international, have been devised. My delegation is inclined to agree with the view expressed in the recent Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) publication, "Arms Control: A Survey and Appraisal of Multilateral Agreements" that "... in spite of elaborate provisions, the verification procedures, as embodied in most existing treaties, suffer from a lack of internal consistency".

Furthermore, it now seems that several new multilateral agreements in the field of arms control and disarmament may include procedures for verification, some of which are likely to require rather elaborate implementation machinery, including ad hoc bodies and consultative staffs. The delegation of the Netherlands has suggested that it might be possible to find a way of streamlining these various functions in one organization. My delegation has noted that the organization envisaged in the Netherlands proposal would perform only those functions specifically entrusted to it by the parties to particular international agreements.

New Zealand believes that these are questions which will require very careful study. We also think that such studies could proceed even as the international community increases its experience of particular verification systems in treaties at present being negotiated. A number of related proposals connected with the supervision of international arms control and disarmament agreements have been put forward at this special session. One of these is the very interesting proposal made by the President of France that consideration should be given to the establishment of an international agency for satellite observation which could collect data for use in the verification of arms control and disarmament agreements. My delegation sees a clear link between this idea and the concept of an international disarmament organization as envisaged by the Netherlands.
My Government believes that these various proposals merit intensive study over the next few years and that, as a first step, it would be useful for Member States to make their views on them known to the Secretary-General. My delegation would therefore like to give its support to the proposal to this effect put forward by the representative of the Netherlands.

Mr. DATCU (Romania) (interpretation from French): I have asked to speak today in order to draw attention to a new Romanian document, A/S-10/AC.1/23, which represents a synthesis of the proposals made by my country at the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The presentation of this new document which in 10 sections brings together our main proposals, is intended to facilitate the process of negotiation which is now under way, with the participation of all and on an equal footing, in order to produce a final document of the special session.

As the Prime Minister of Romania stressed in his statement to the General Assembly, we envisage the process of negotiation taking place in a constructive and flexible way so that in a businesslike spirit and by mutual accommodation we should be able within the short space of the 10 days of work which still remain to agree on a final document which will be generally acceptable and will meet the hopes of the world's public.

The Romanian delegation believes that at this stage of our work we should intensify the work of drafting in all the groups set up by the Ad Hoc Committee and attach equal importance to all the sections of the final document. Formal or informal consultations, contacts and discussions must first and foremost serve to facilitate that process. The difficulties which may arise in the drafting of any given section should not be allowed to serve as a pretext for holding up the completion of work on the content of other sections. So that we may finish in time we should avoid that kind of vicious circle.

As concerns the negotiating machinery, the section in regard to which unfortunately we are more behindhand than we are with the other sections of the final document, the Romanian delegation wishes to stress that the solution to that problem is of particular importance. Its importance is that of principle. It is directly connected with the principles of the
democratization of the process of negotiation and the enhancement of the role of the United Nations in the solution of the disarmament problem. On the basis of the need to adapt the negotiating machinery to the new realities, the Romanian document that has just been circulated stresses that at the special session the Assembly has the duty and the competence to make recommendations

"... which would ensure that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva would focus its activity on the essential problems of disarmament, on the democratization of the organization and conduct of its debates, on the abolition of the system of co-chairmanship, on the participation on an equal footing of all States interested in the negotiations and on the open character of debates so that they might be subject to the control of public opinion." (A/S-10/AC.1/23, annex, para. 17)
The proposals and suggestions resulting from the very valuable initiative presented by Heads of State or Government, Foreign Ministers and other dignitaries in the general debate should, if brought together in a compendium, in our view be submitted to the future deliberating and negotiating machinery for study, evaluation and recommendation.

We hope that our constructive proposals, along with the numerous proposals made by other delegations, will help to encourage a spirit of co-operation in the drafting and working groups so that at the end of our work we shall be able to set the seal on the success of the first session of the General Assembly devoted wholly to disarmament.

Finally, permit me to say just a few words about the oft-spoken concept of political will. We are now very close to the end of this special session, which we should like to be able to call historic. The opportunity is present for us all to demonstrate the political will to succeed. It is an opportunity we should not let slip.

Mrs. THORSSON (Sweden): I have asked to speak in order to draw the attention of this Committee to an annex to document A/S-10/AC.1/19, which contains a working paper submitted by Sweden on contributions to the seismological verification of a comprehensive test ban.

Like practically all Governments, the Swedish Government considers a comprehensive test-ban treaty a vital first step on the road towards nuclear disarmament. I should like again, as the Swedish Prime Minister did in his statement to the plenary Assembly, to express our deep regrets that this special session does not have before it a draft from the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament for a draft comprehensive test-ban treaty.

I would also express my hope, and, indeed, my conviction, that we shall soon arrive at the stage at which the on-going tripartite negotiations between three nuclear-weapon States on that treaty are transformed into multilateral negotiations at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

We all recognize the need for effective verification of accession to a comprehensive test-ban treaty. As a result of work being done in Geneva by a group of seismic experts, there is recognition that one of the main parts of a verification system under this treaty should be an effective international exchange of seismological data through a global network of seismological stations.
One aspect of this system we should particularly like to emphasize is that all parties to a comprehensive test-ban treaty should have the right of full access to relevant data, which is of vital importance. Thus also those States that have limited resources as regards detection seismology should be enabled to make an independent assessment of globally collected and pre-analysed data, and in order to achieve this there will need to be established an international system consisting of a network of selected seismological stations, a communications network and international data centres.

To create the necessary basis for such co-operation between States we should all be prepared to participate in the data exchange by providing data for the detection and identification of seismic events. On 31 January 1978 in the CCJ Sweden declared that - and this was reiterated by the Prime Minister of Sweden in his statement in the general debate - Sweden is ready to take a further step in order to contribute to the establishment of an adequate international monitoring system. If satisfactory arrangements can be made, the Swedish Government is prepared to establish, to operate and to finance an international seismological data centre.

I should now like to say a few words on a different subject. Earlier this week this ad hoc committee held three meetings which gave us the opportunity to listen to statements by 25 non-governmental organizations and six peace research institutes. I think that, as the Chairman so eloquently said at the end of those three meetings, we all felt we had benefited greatly from that experience, which provided us with the first opportunity in United Nations history to listen to statements from such organizations on the subject of disarmament. In the Swedish delegation we feel that that should not be a unique experience. We should in the future also continue to benefit from hearing views and proposals from bodies of that kind, and therefore the Swedish delegation has proposed an amendment to the programme of action that would be inserted in section IV, "Machinery". It would read as follows:

"The role of non-governmental organizations and research institutions in the field of disarmament in the United Nations system should be encouraged and regularized so that there will be a close continuing exchange of views and proposals among the United Nations, non-governmental organizations and research institutions and world public opinion."
Like the speaker who preceded me, the representative of Romania, I should like to draw attention to the absolutely urgent need to mobilize the so much looked for political will of Governments finally to do something of decisive importance in the field of disarmament. It is our firm conviction that by establishing links between the United Nations, non-governmental organizations and research institutes we should have the possibility of mobilizing to a far greater extent than before world public opinion to exert pressure on Governments so that finally this political will will be forthcoming.

Mr. Diaz (Chile) (interpretation from Spanish): My delegation listened with great interest to the statements of the representative of the United States. In this regard we should like to state before the delegations present here that the Government of Chile believes that the proposals contained in both the statement of Vice-President Mondale and that of the representative of the United States here this afternoon constitute an important contribution towards the betterment of international relations because the early warning system envisaged by the United States could constitute an important step towards the security of our continent and other regions of the world. The Chilean delegation is very pleased to have heard this afternoon confirmation of that intention of the United States Government.

We should also like to express our satisfaction that further details were given in today's statement. The United States has declared its willingness to co-operate at the request of concerned States and to study such requests on a case-by-case basis. The Government of Chile strongly supports that proposal and is of the view that a concrete proposal such as this one should be duly reflected in the documents of this special session.
The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): Before adjourning the meeting, I should like to touch on an aspect of the development of our work which I feel is of particular importance.

At the outset of the deliberations of this Ad Hoc Committee I made a very earnest appeal to representatives not to reopen discussions on those aspects of the final draft document on which agreement had been reached. A reasonable period of time has elapsed during all the drafting of the document in the Preparatory Committee and those delegations which, not being members of the Preparatory Committee, did not have an opportunity of expressing their views there, have now had sufficient time in which to do so, either at the meetings of this Ad Hoc Committee or in the meetings of the working groups.

We are now in the final stages of this special session and it is essential, particularly in drafting committees where the final texts are being negotiated, that questions which have already received general approval should not be reopened. If we continue with this practice, we shall not be ready by midnight on 28 June; we shall not even have decided upon the title of the final document. That is why I must insist once again on this matter and appeal to representatives to concentrate on the wording within brackets, that is to say, on which agreement has not been reached, so that texts may be finalized by consensus, through negotiation and consultation. Above all, we must not reopen discussion on aspects on which we are already agreed in principle.

The Ad Hoc Committee will meet again in the morning of Friday, 16 June and, as decided previously, it will listen to the reports of the Chairmen of the Working Groups and the statements of any delegations that wish to present their views on any aspect of the work of the Committee.

The meeting rose at 4.35 p.m.