VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 8TH MEETING

Chairman: Mr. ORTIZ DE ROZAS (Argentina)

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STATEMENTS BY THE FOLLOWING RESEARCH INSTITUTES:

CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION

INSTITUTE FOR WORLD ECONOMICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE USSR

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR PEACE

INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH ASSOCIATION

THE STANLEY FOUNDATION

STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE

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The meeting was called to order at 10.55 a.m.

STATEMENTS BY RESEARCH INSTITUTES

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): As agreed by the Committee, we shall this morning hear representatives from six research institutes devoted to disarmament.

The first speaker is the representative of the Center for Defense Information, Washington, D.C., Rear Admiral Gene R. La Rocque, and I now call on him.

Mr. LA ROCQUE (Center for Defense Information): It is an honour for me to address this unprecedented gathering of the world community on the most important issue of our time - survival. The United Nations special session on disarmament is taken seriously by all those who are aware of the menacing turn the arms race is taking. I congratulate those nations and individuals that persevered in bringing this session about.

Nuclear war is an unrelenting and growing threat to hundreds of millions of people. A third world war, with nuclear weapons, can happen and almost certainly will happen unless all Governments confront this most uncomfortable reality.

I am a citizen of the United States and a career military officer. I served in the Navy of my country for 31 years. I have fought in combat and held command posts at sea and on land and participated in strategic and nuclear planning. I have experienced at first hand the impact that nuclear weapons have had on military affairs.

Since retiring from active duty, I have been the director of a non-governmental research organization, the Center for Defense Information, a project of the Fund for Peace. We are a source of independent, objective analysis of military developments. Our Center is particularly active in providing factual information about the nuclear arms race and the consequences of nuclear war.

The traditional role of all the military in all countries, in case of war, is to win. The military profession, to be blunt, has always sought superiority. Military men tend to be uncomfortable with notions of military balance or
equilibrium. We military men constantly seek to strengthen the defence of our countries and maintain our advantages. I believe that the military in all countries share this impulse. We are not diplomats; we are soldiers, sailors and airmen. We feel reassured by big military establishments; we believe that the security of our people is enhanced by spending for additional war-fighting and war-winning capabilities.

There may be places in the world where warfare can occur on a limited scale without threatening wider destruction. But those areas are few and shrinking. My experience in the United States military has convinced me that nuclear weapons have changed the traditional rules of warfare. To use an American phrase, "It's a whole new ball game".
I am, of course, speaking primarily of the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union and their respective military alliances. Despite the constant friction and conflicts that have occurred over many decades, there has never been a war between our two countries. But today, as irrational as it may seem, Soviet and American leaders are planning and arming for nuclear war.

A recent top-level United States Government study concluded that, at a minimum, 140 million people in the United States, and 113 million people in the Soviet Union would be killed in a major nuclear war. Almost three quarters of the economy of each country would be destroyed. In such a conflict, the analysis concluded, "neither side could conceivably be described as a winner".

Nor would the rest of the world be safe. Radiation would poison vast stretches of the planet not directly involved in the war. And the threat of ozone damage and ecological disruption leaves us no assurance that the earth would remain habitable for life as we know it.

Despite this, the United States and the Soviet Union continue to approach the accumulation of military power in the nuclear age very much as they have in the past. Both countries constantly seek to improve their nuclear and conventional forces.

Many of us are shocked and sobered by the mad nuclear scramble of the super-Powers. It seems so obvious that they have diminished their own security in the nuclear competition. We all know that a balance of terror provides a precarious peace.

The Soviet Union and the United States are, in part, victims of modern military technology. Advances in weaponry, particularly better delivery systems, have dramatically compressed time and space. Thus, military leaders believe they must maintain large forces on a close-to-war status. In a nuclear war, each nation could destroy the other in 30 minutes. Nuclear missiles launched from submarines could land within 15 minutes. There is no defence, regardless of who strikes first.

The prospect of immediate mass destruction seems to compel high states of military readiness, and this situation inspires mutual suspicion and rhetorical harshness.
The continuation of the nuclear-arms race is also made possible by widespread apathy about the danger of nuclear war. Many people believe nuclear weapons will never be used. But as someone who has been directly involved in United States nuclear planning, I can tell representatives that my country has plans and forces for actually fighting nuclear war.

Our military field manuals detail the use of nuclear weapons. Our troops, airmen, and navy men train and practice for nuclear war. Nuclear war is an integral part of American military planning and the United States is prepared to use nuclear weapons anywhere in the world. I believe the Soviet Union is as nuclear-oriented in its military preparations as is the United States. The military in both countries see nuclear weapons as a central instrument of military power. They are prepared to use them right now in many contingencies.

As a citizen of the United States, I do not hesitate to point out that my country has generally taken the lead in the nuclear-arms race. The United States is a rich country with vast technological resources. We have been, on the average, five years ahead of the Soviet Union in introducing new nuclear weapons. We were the first to develop the atomic bomb, the hydrogen bomb, the intercontinental bomber, effective intercontinental ballistic missiles, modern nuclear-powered strategic submarines, and multiple warheads (MIRVs) for our missiles.

The United States continues to maintain, as President Carter recently asserted, a significant edge over the Soviet Union in the effectiveness of our strategic weapons as measured by such factors as missile accuracy and numbers of nuclear weapons.

In recent years, the United States has not been sitting on its hands in the nuclear competition. The United States has added more nuclear weapons to its arsenal than has the Soviet Union, going from 4,000 strategic nuclear weapons in 1970 to 9,000 in 1978. During this same period, the Soviet Union increased its strategic nuclear weapons from 1,800 to 4,500. The United States has maintained a two-to-one edge in deliverable nuclear weapons throughout the period 1970 to 1978.
This discrepancy in numbers, however, makes no sense and no difference, as each country can obliterate the entire urban and industrial complex of the other regardless of who strikes first. The United States has 35 strategic nuclear weapons for every Soviet city of over 100,000 inhabitants. The Soviet Union has 28 strategic nuclear weapons for every United States city of over 100,000 inhabitants.

The United States Secretary of Defense Harold Brown asserted in his annual report on the fiscal 1979 military budget that United States nuclear war plans include “destruction of a minimum of 200 major Soviet cities.”

The greater danger is that both countries are moving towards a first strike. Improvements in the accuracy of missiles, particularly land-based missiles, stimulate fears about the adequacy of existing nuclear forces in the Soviet Union and the United States.

If everyone, including military officials, were more conscious of the tremendous destructive potential of nuclear weapons we might stop worrying about questions of “advantage” in the nuclear-arms race. For example, just two United States Poseidon submarines which carry 320 nuclear weapons can destroy all the major Soviet cities, with the destructive potential of 1,000 Hiroshima-size weapons.

Today the United States, with 41 strategic submarines, has more than 21 such submarines at sea constantly. The United States now maintains round-the-clock some 3,000 strategic nuclear weapons at sea in submarines off the coast of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union, normally deploying far fewer strategic submarines at sea, keeps a formidable force of approximately 200 sea-based nuclear weapons constantly targeted on the United States.

The United States is now deploying a more powerful warhead, the Mark 12A, on its Minuteman III land-based missiles. Just one of these missiles will contain the destructive power of 80 Hiroshima-size weapons. Individual Soviet missiles contain an even larger destructive potential.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union are now stepping up their nuclear weapons developments. The Soviet Union, following the path of the United States, is substantially increasing its intercontinental nuclear weapons by putting more than one nuclear weapon on its strategic missiles.
Under the present United States Administration, funding for the production of new nuclear warheads has risen 70 per cent to produce warheads for Trident missiles, Minuteman III missiles, air-launched cruise missiles, artillery shells and other nuclear weapons. Military secrecy in the Soviet Union prevents us from knowing the new weapons that may be planned in that country.

The recital of the details of the nuclear competition could go on endlessly. It can be numbing. It is certainly depressing. However, no serious disarmament measures can take place in the absence of full information about military forces. There is widespread ignorance on the part both of citizens and of Government officials about world military activity. I have often been struck by the lack of awareness even on the part of military officers of the enormous size of nuclear arsenals.

This matter of information brings me to the suggestions which I would offer for consideration at this special session. What should be done?
I cannot offer a broad-scale programme of action or a magic key to the nuclear maze, but I do have a few thoughts about practical steps that can be taken.

First, the role of the United Nations as a repository of information on world military activity should be strengthened. All Governments should submit a report each year on their military spending and force levels and the United Nations should publish that information in an annual military yearbook. The United Nations Centre for Disarmament Studies could be an appropriate agency to collect and publish that material.

Article 47 of the United Nations Charter charges the United Nations Military Staff Committee to:

"... advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to ... the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament."

The Military Staff Committee, with a more representative membership, could serve as a source of information and analysis of disarmament efforts. As a beginning, that Committee should report to this year's session of the General Assembly on its performance to date in fulfilling the Charter's charge.

Secondly, both the United States and the Soviet Union should adopt measures crucial to the control of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is essential for the survival of the United States and the Soviet Union. It has been estimated that in 20 years a hundred countries will possess the materials and the knowledge necessary to produce nuclear weapons. By the year 2000, the total amount of plutonium produced as a by-product of global nuclear power will be the equivalent of a million nuclear bombs.

Both countries should pledge themselves never to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States — I really wish they would pledge themselves never to use nuclear weapons at all. I can think of no military utility, though, in the use of nuclear weapons by the super-Powers against non-nuclear countries.
Stopping production of fissionable materials for weapons has been proposed by previous United States administrations and is more feasible today than ever before. The United States and the Soviet Union have enormous stocks of nuclear weapons and weapons material and have no military need to continue the production of fissionable material. They now have more than they will ever need. The halting of production could be followed by a complete moratorium on all manufacture of nuclear weapons, since both the United States and the Soviet Union now have more weapons than they will ever need.

The ending of all nuclear-weapons testing also is feasible right now. The United States has tested more than 600 nuclear weapons; the Soviet Union has tested more than 350. Both should now have learnt all that is necessary. This special session should urge all nations to stop producing fissionable material, stop making nuclear weapons and stop testing nuclear weapons.

Thirdly, without significantly reducing their military capabilities the United States and the Soviet Union could eliminate most, if not all, nuclear weapons from their naval surface ships. With the ships of both navies roaming the far reaches of the world's oceans, the potential for nuclear war arising out of naval incidents increases. Both navies are extensively nuclearized, with several thousand nuclear weapons aboard surface ships of the United States Navy.

Fourthly, a start should be made on the reduction of the huge nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union by the dismantling, over a five-year period, of all land-based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). The United States has about 1,000 ICBMs and the Soviet Union about 1,400. The scrapping of ICBMs would solve many of the problems that at present preoccupy the military and the press, particularly in the United States. Both the United States and the Soviet Union are becoming increasingly worried about the vulnerability of their ICBMs. I consider the attacks they fear to be unlikely in the extreme, but giving up the traditional attachment to ICBMs would make both countries feel safer.
The elimination of ICBMs would be easier for the United States than for the Soviet Union, since the Soviet Union today has a much smaller proportion of its strategic weapons on bombers and on submarines. However, it is expected that the Soviet Union will shortly begin to put multiple warheads on its many sea-based missiles and become much less reliant on ICBMs. Nuclear deterrence can be accomplished without ICBMs.

In conclusion, this special session devoted to disarmament, with 149 countries present, demonstrates the realization on the part of all countries that their territory could provide the spark that could ignite nuclear war. Knowledgeable military men are aware that there would be world-wide consequences from a nuclear war. There is no defence, nowhere to hide.

The Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union have carelessly let their relations deteriorate to an alarming extent. Political leaders must take control of events and not permit the military, or technology, to control them. The non-nuclear countries can act as the burr under the saddle to push the nuclear Powers in the direction of reason. If we are to survive on this planet, the arms race must be slowed, stopped and reversed, and the time to start is now.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): The next speaker will be the representative of the Institute for World Economics and International Relations, Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union, Mr. Oleg Bykov.

Mr. BYKOV (Institute for World Economics and International Relations, Academy of Sciences of the USSR) (interpretation from Russian): It is a great honour for me to address such an important international forum on behalf of the Institute for World Economics and International Relations, Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union. One of the major areas of research of our Institute is comprehensive scientific work on topical problems of curbing the arms race and bringing about genuine disarmament. There is really no need in such an authoritative body to describe in detail how difficult and
complex those problems are and how difficult it is to find solutions for them. The tremendous danger and heavy burden of the arms race which is engulfing the world are sufficiently clear in any case. Mankind is faced with the choice either to stop stockpiling the means of self-destruction or to subject its very existence to the most serious threat, but the tempo of the arms race is not only not slowing down but even accelerating. There continues to be a qualitative refinement in weapons of mass destruction, incorporating the latest advances in science and technology, and their quantity is being ceaselessly increased.

There is an increase in the number of States which are becoming involved in competition in the stockpiling of weapons. Following in the footsteps of the major Powers in amassing considerable military arsenals we find many medium-sized and small countries, even developing countries. Is there a way out of this situation? We are firmly convinced that there is.

A comprehensive analysis of world development today has led research workers in our Institute to the scientific and well-founded conclusion that the necessary objective possibilities exist for halting the arms race and bringing about disarmament. Primarily, there has been a perceptible change in the socio-political picture of the world. There has been a strengthening of the world positions of socialism and other progressive forces which have a vital interest in averting a universal military conflict. There is an increase in the role in international affairs of the developing countries and the non-aligned States. There is an intensification of their positive influence on the solution of the problems of disarmament, and clear evidence of that, of course, is the holding of this special session. The effectiveness of the efforts of all peace-loving States and peoples aimed at disarmament depends on those efforts being organically incorporated in the historic process of the consistent limitation and subsequent total elimination of the very possibility of military solutions of controversial international problems.
This policy of stopping the arms race is in keeping with the interests of the whole of mankind. The general course of contemporary international events makes the whole problem of war and peace a different one. Gone for ever are the times when military solutions to international problems were quite often viewed from the standpoint of obtaining specific advantages or of losing certain positions. In our nuclear age global military conflict gambles with the lives of hundreds of millions of people and with the fates of whole countries, to a large extent, with the whole future of mankind.

It is vain to suppose that it is possible to provoke the outbreak of a world conflagration and then stand aside and warm one's hands at the fire. We are convinced that the collective political will of the peoples and States of the world, the vital interests of the whole human species, should be able to prevail over the selfish calculations of those amateurs of military adventures.

A new and important factor in international development in the 1970s has been the positive change in the world situation. The advent of détente has opened up favourable political prospects for progress in disarmament, and the first, but very modest, measures in limiting arms have served as a stimulus for the further improvement of the political climate in the world. The arms race has begun to lose one of its sources of momentum; I refer to tension in relations between States with opposing social systems. An important objective prerequisite for the conclusion of agreements on the reduction of armaments is the current approximate balance of forces between the USSR and the United States of America and between the Warsaw Pact countries and the North Atlantic Alliance. This is one of the major realities of contemporary international relations, and consistent progress towards disarmament can be brought about only by taking it into account and, of course, by observing strictly the principle of equality and safeguarding the security of all parties.

Of course, the balance of military power, particularly the balance of terror, is no substitute for sound and solid international security. This would be true,
even given a gradual reduction, instead of an increase, in the level of this balance. In the contemporary world, in the final analysis, the expansion of military arsenals does not strengthen, but actually weakens, general security. At the same time the strategic balance which has developed is the only possible starting point for a consistent, stage-by-stage process of reducing armaments, right up to, and including, their elimination. These objective factors of the contemporary international scene should also include recognition of the urgent need to resolve, by concerted efforts on the part of the whole of mankind, the most important global problems of the last quarter of the twentieth century.

Much has been said at this special session about the arms race putting a brake, throughout the world, on the solution of these problems. Studies undertaken by our Institute have produced convincing evidence that it will hardly be possible to solve such global problems as the need to provide the whole population of the planet with food, medical care and housing, to provide industry with raw materials and energy, and to preserve the natural environment, if we continue to spend such colossal sums of money for military purposes.

Furthermore, the arms race poisons the political climate in the world and makes more difficult the broad international co-operation which is so necessary to the solution of the global problems of our time. The Institute for World Economics and International Relations is doing a great deal of research work in its attempts to find real possibilities for constructive international co-operation. We see a restraint of the arms race as providing encouraging prospects for the solution of general human problems, for the equitable restructuring of international economic relations, for the earmarking of the funds saved for the purpose of meeting the needs of third world development, and for converting military industries to peaceful production. According to our calculations such a transfer would restrain, rather than fuel, inflation and reduce unemployment in Western countries.

While speaking of the objective factors which, in the final analysis, will determine the solution to the disarmament problems I should point out that we cannot fail to notice that to a considerable extent the process is hindered by inertia and by the accelerating pace of the armaments-producing machines. It
is impossible to stop that machine overnight. It is not easy, even during the initial stages of the development of systems of modern weapons, to devise large-scale long-term programmes to slow down and restrict their development, and it is even more difficult at later stages. Differences between the existing structures of military forces have an effect, as has the parties’ lack of synchronization in the development of various types of new weapons. When it comes to proposing specific ideas for the limitation of armaments and for disarmament, all of this must be given due weight. However, it is not because of these difficulties that it has not been possible, so far, to stop the military preparations which are under way. The pattern of technological development in the production of weapons, and the political-strategic realities of our time do not constitute the major hindrance to military détente. The real hindrance lies in the narrow, selfish interests and subjective attitudes of those who bank on the continuation and intensification of the arms race. The cause of disarmament cannot advance if it continues to be guided by the political stereotypes of the past. It will be impossible to stop the arms race if stopping it is linked with the aim of obtaining one-sided advantages, detrimental to the interests of others and detrimental to peaceful international co-operation. History has demonstrated cogently the ineffectiveness of attempts to halt the impetuous development of the social progress of mankind by force of arms. Yet there remain in the West politicians and strategists who think in terms of curbing the social and national liberation of the peoples of other countries, and that leads inevitably to a complication of the international situation, and whips up the arms race. Of course, there are other people who hinder the curbing of the arms race. I refer to those who preach the inevitability of world nuclear war and who approach the problem of disarmament in a neolithic fashion. They replace the concept of real disarmament - that is the disarmament of all States, without exception - with their formula of disarmament on the part only of the two so-called super-Powers. Despite all their words about the desirability of disarmament they call openly for a stepping up of the armaments and military preparations of other States, primarily themselves.
Let us suppose for a moment that, instead of making concerted efforts to curb the arms race as a whole, we achieved disarmament only of the two major Powers. Who would stand to win? Obviously it would be only those who refused to associate themselves with any practical disarmament measures and who developed major military potential, intending to use it to implement their expansionist policies. If the arms race is to be limited it is necessary to have political realism and to take fully into account the objective realities of our time. All States must always be ready to attempt to arrive at mutually acceptable and effective decisions that are not detrimental to the security of any of them, and will strengthen international security. The Soviet Union has always been, and remains, a staunch champion of disarmament. The purpose of its proposals is to achieve a merging of political détente with military détente, and to start all-embracing talks on disarmament, including nuclear disarmament. Speaking recently in Prague, Mr. Brezhnev, General-Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, provided confirmation of the serious and conscientious attitude of the Soviet Union to talks aimed at curbing the arms race. He said:

"There is no kind of weapons which the USSR would not be ready to limit, to ban, on a reciprocal basis upon agreement with other States. The only thing which is important is that everything should be done without detriment to the security of any party, on conditions of total reciprocity of States possessing the relevant armaments. It is important that the desire to halt the arms race should be sincere and not just for show."
The breadth and constructiveness which distinguishes the policy of the Soviet Union in curbing the arms race is obvious. In that policy the primary, most topical problems are linked with long-term prospects for general and complete disarmament.

The realistic nature of the Soviet proposals as they are constantly being developed takes into account both the new political, strategic and military-technical elements and also the constructive initiatives of other countries.

At the present special session of the General Assembly, the Soviet Union, as we know, has introduced a whole series of concrete proposals designed to ensure a decisive breakthrough in the struggle for the cessation of the arms race.

No one, of course, can claim a monopoly in putting forward proposals on disarmament. All initiatives are good, no matter where they come from. The only important thing is that they should be constructive in character and should be conceived in a sincere desire to spare the world the threat of military disaster. At this special session the General Assembly which, for the first time in the history of the United Nations is discussing in such a broad way the whole problem of disarmament, may indicate the major approaches of principle to the solution of this cardinal problem of the day.

We would like to express to the participants in this special session the hope that their work will be successful and that they will take decisions which will help to liberate mankind from the burden of armaments and the threat of nuclear catastrophe, and to strengthen the security of peoples. The members of the Institute for World Economics and International Relations have entrusted me with the task of expressing our readiness to make available to the United Nations material and the results of our research work on the problems of disarmament, and our readiness to take part in joint work on these problems which are of such vital importance for the whole of mankind and for universal peace.
The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I now call on the representative of the International Institute for Peace from Vienna, Mr. Gerhard Kade.

Mr. KADE (International Institute for Peace): It is a pleasure and at the same time a great honour for me to speak to you in the name of the International Institute for Peace, Vienna. May I express my gratitude for the privilege given me to address the United Nations special session on disarmament which we all consider to be of utmost importance for the world-wide struggle to end the arms race.

For nearly 10 years now, the International Institute for Peace, Vienna, has made the endeavour to analyse and debate the essential problems of political and military détente, the problems of peaceful coexistence and questions of economic and scientific-technological co-operation with the participation of scientists from East and West. The papers presented at the symposia of the Institute, as well as the contributions in the discussion, have been published and thus made available to the public.

If I enumerate only a few significant topics of our symposia, it will be obvious that problems of arms limitation and disarmament have always been at the very centre of our concern. Such topics are:

"The mechanism of security and disarmament problems in Europe", the subject of a symposium in 1974;

"Problems of disarmament under the conditions of international détente", in 1975;

"Europe after the Helsinki Conference, problems of security and of disarmament under global and regional aspects", in 1976; and, finally,

"Possible ways and means to reach a general ban of the development and production of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction", in the beginning of 1978.

We have always considered it the most important obligation of the Institute to accompany the endeavours for progress in political and military détente - the Helsinki and the Belgrade Conferences, the disarmament
negotiations in Geneva and in Vienna, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks especially, and the world-wide dispute over the production and deployment of the neutron bomb - by discussions between scholars of different ideological background, since we have always been convinced that such an exchange of ideas may have an important impact on the political negotiations on arms limitations as well as on the opinions of the general public devoted to the cause of peace.

The exchange of ideas during all our symposia has been based on the realistic hypothesis that scientists wherever they deal with problems of international relations - with problems of security and peace, with peaceful coexistence and with questions of disarmament - should frankly expose the ideological differences. We have found that it is the role of the scientists to discuss quite frankly those problems which have been controversial in most of the political endeavours to end the arms race and thus contribute to the progress of political disarmament negotiations.

We are convinced, after all this experience of nearly a decade of scientific dialogue, that the work of the Institute has been fruitful and will continue to be so, in relation to the political disarmament negotiations and at the same time with respect to the general public.

May I, while submitting to you collectively in the name of the members of the International Institute for Peace - which are leading peace research institutes in the East and the West - best wishes for a successful ending of the special session on disarmament, present to you some of the essential results of our work:

First, there is no reasonable alternative to the policy of détente at a time where the arms race has reached a global dimension. The process of political détente which has received a remarkable impetus from the Helsinki Conference can only be stable and permanent if supplemented by military détente, precisely in the sense of the commitments which the 35 signatory States of the Final Act have undertaken. War must for all time be eliminated as a means of solving international conflicts. It is fundamentally erroneous to believe that peace and security can only be guaranteed by a continuation
of the arms race. With the arms potential at present available, the idea of the balance of terror which is from time to time presented by the politicians and the military is nothing but an apologetic argument which is put forward in order to conceal the real interests of the military-industrial complex.

Secondly, military détente cannot be restricted to arms control. It is not a problem which concerns the super-Powers alone and it is not restricted to the European continent. The accumulation of weapons of mass destruction, above all the voluminous nuclear arsenals - according to a figure presented by the General Secretary of the United Nations, a nuclear potential of more than 1.3 million Hiroshima bombs - is a tremendous threat to all mankind and to future generations.

Military détente must be seen as a process which begins with arms limitations and proceeds via the reduction of troops and arms to the final goal of general and complete disarmament. Every solution which follows the pattern of "all or nothing", repeatedly suggested by many participants in the disarmament debate, is totally unrealistic and is liable to produce attitudes of pessimism and resignation. Starting from the present level, the process of military détente can only follow a piecemeal pattern; disarmament will proceed step by step, however, with the final target of general and complete disarmament as a guiding post. It is a dangerous illusion to believe that the process of military détente can be combined with the continuation of the arms race, following the well-known theory of deterrence. The only realistic criterion for evaluating concrete measures of disarmament is the principle of mutual and undiminished security.
Thirdly, the arms limitation agreements which have been reached so far show the path along which we shall have to proceed in order to reach the final objective of general and complete disarmament.

The first step must be to get rid of the most dangerous weapons of mass destruction and prevent the development and production of new, even more dangerous weapons of mass destruction. According to the pattern which was followed when the Convention banning biological weapons was concluded in 1972 the total prohibition of chemical weapons and eventually of all nuclear weapons must be achieved. A realistic step-by-step procedure is absolutely necessary in this context.

May I remind the Committee that on the occasion of a symposium on the problems of weapons of mass destruction held by the Vienna Institute in January this year the Vienna appeal for a pledge by all States to refrain from the first use of nuclear weapons was signed by the participants and, together with more than 100 signatures of leading scientists in the Federal Republic of Germany, was sent to the Governments of the 35 States of the Helsinki Conference and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations to be presented to the special session on disarmament.

Agreements on nuclear-free zones, the universal acceptance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the eventual total cessation of the production of all nuclear weapons could be important steps on the way to a complete ban on all weapons of mass destruction. In this context, the draft convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron warheads presented by the Soviet Union to the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is of the utmost importance. The neutron bomb is not just one nuclear weapon among others. The essential problem related to the neutron warheads is that the illusion which was buried long ago of a limited nuclear war has been revitalized. In addition, the neutron bomb demonstrates the direction of the perversion of the human mind at a time when every fourth member of the scientific community of the world is employed on military research and development. The neutron bomb,
which is usually presented as a clean nuclear weapon, in fact has essential qualities of a biological weapon, and its production is liable to undermine disarmament agreements that have already been reached.

It was for this reason that I suggested during the Amsterdam Forum "Stop the neutron bomb", which was held in March this year, that some Governments should appeal to the International Court at The Hague to find out whether the production of the neutron bomb was a violation of the 1972 Convention banning biological weapons.

Fourthly, the process of military détente is the necessary precondition of the solution of the present social and economic problems in the world - in the developed industrial countries as well as in the countries of the third world. The arms race creates unemployment, undermines the process of economic growth and development and endangers the system of social security. But, above all, the continuance of the arms race will obstruct any effective solution of the most striking problems in the world, the problems of starvation, illiteracy and the establishment of humane living conditions in the countries of the third world, and will thus contribute to the development of new hot-beds of tension.

Looking at the essential points on the agenda of the special session on disarmament, may I be permitted finally to present to the Committee some of the hopes and expectations which are shared by all the scientists who, despite all ideological differences, have collaborated for nearly 10 years in the International Institute for Peace in Vienna and who take their responsibility in the cause of peace very seriously indeed.

As regards the first substantive item on the session's agenda, "Review and appraisal of the present international situation ...", I have provided four brief statements which may indicate that all our endeavours have been concentrated on the analysis of the complex international situation with respect to political and military détente.

All our expectations are centred on the declaration on disarmament and the question of convening a world disarmament conference. With respect to the declaration, we feel that a catalogue of concrete steps of arms limitation is of the utmost importance. Many important suggestions have been made in the
course of the first part of the special session. May I stress, for example, the Belgian proposal concerning a comprehensive ban on all nuclear tests, the commitment by Canada to renounce nuclear weapons and, last but by no means least, the detailed list of proposals presented to the special session by the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko.

The declaration of a world disarmament day, as suggested by a number of non-governmental organizations and others - for instance, on 17 June, as suggested by the Christian Peace Conference - would be a very suitable way of establishing the idea of disarmament in the mind of the general public in all countries.

The most important impact on the process of military détente would be made, however, by a recommendation by the special session that a United Nations world disarmament conference be convened as a meeting of the highest authority at which agreements binding all participants could be reached.

For the first time in the history of mankind there are favourable conditions for securing peace for us and coming generations. Scientists and scholars all over the world have begun to realize their tremendous responsibility. May I assure you, Mr. Chairman, that the scholars collaborating in the International Institute for Peace in Vienna are fully aware of the role they have to play in promoting political and military détente, and that we will consider the results of this important special session with great care in our future symposia and publications.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I call now on the representative of the International Peace Research Association, Mr. Raimo Väyrynen.

Mr. VÄYRYNEN (International Peace Research Association): I should like on this occasion to express the gratitude of the International Peace Research Association (IFRA) for the opportunity given us to address this Committee.
My organization appreciates the favourable comments on peace and disarmament research made during the first weeks of the special session. Bearing this in mind, and with the invitation to speak at this rostrum, I am convinced that this session will greatly add to the motivation of researchers to work towards a world less shaped and dominated by the instruments of war.

The views and recommendations of IPRA, an organization representing peace researchers all over the world, have been forwarded to the Secretariat and as these have been made available to representatives I can confine my remarks to the elaboration of some of the pressing problems and possible solutions for them.

The great majority of Governments have urged that priority be given to efforts to curb and eliminate the means of mass destruction, first and foremost nuclear weapons. The present course of the nuclear arms race and, in particular, its technological advances, justify this priority. The balance of terror threatens to evolve into terror without stability or balance. Nuclear arsenals are being improved continuously, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons may soon lead to nuclear anarchy, unless major corrective action is taken.
Essentially, the arms race has become a race in technology, the rhythm of technological discovery outstripping the pace of arms control negotiations. The mainstay of military growth - the perfection of arms and the increase in their destructive power - lies today in the realm of the huge military research and development network which operates in an atmosphere of secrecy, independent of ongoing arms control negotiations. This new dynamic, centred on technological innovation, has fundamentally transformed the international military environment in recent years.

A failure in controlling the spread of nuclear weapons would increase the risks of an all-out war. Such a failure is not to be tolerated. The lack of progress in the efforts to curb nuclear proliferation is detrimental to the international community, to each and all. Seen within the context of the over-all problem of nuclear proliferation, it is definitely also in the best security interests of the major Powers to take effective measures towards arms restraints and disarmament.

Nuclear weapons, once seen as the ultimate deterrent never to be used, have reached a level of usability which makes their application ever more thinkable for general staffs. A credible and effective non-proliferation policy implies that the steady sophistication of nuclear arsenals is turned into real nuclear disarmament in conformity with the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It also implies that declaratory policies should be changed to de-emphasize the military and political relevance of nuclear weapons. Care should be taken in the nuclear debate not to create a breeding ground for further proliferation by promoting myths about the usability and significance of nuclear weapons.

Problems of nuclear proliferation cannot be separated from the development and spread of delivery vehicles. Out of the various developments that tend to spur nuclear proliferation, it is hard to conceive of any more effective stimulant than the cruise missile. The spread of cruise missiles could bring strategic nuclear forces within the reach of many more nations, thus drastically altering the present military environment.
The greatest civilian catalyst of nuclear proliferation is the spread of national fuel cycle programmes. In the long run, the spread of such programmes can best be avoided in an atmosphere of international trust. This implies that present dependence must be reduced, that the conditions of international nuclear transactions must be made more stable and predictable, that the long-term viability of nuclear reactor programmes must be guaranteed through a combination of national and multinational measures at both the front and the back end of the fuel cycle, and that discrimination must be halted. Discrimination within the category of non-nuclear-weapon States - across the boundaries of adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) - is most likely to prove counterproductive. It remains a paradox that non-parties to the NPT are sometimes subject to less adequate safeguards than are parties to the Treaty.

The session should, in the opinion of my organization, urge elaboration of international solutions to these problems. Internationally agreed solutions - such as multinational fuel cycle centres, an international fuel bank, international management of plutonium stores and waste disposal centres - can reduce uncomfortable dependence, ensure long-term supplies and provide fuel cycle services on a non-discriminatory basis.

Pending the outcome of the international nuclear fuel cycle evaluation, all nations involved ought to restrain further developments towards a plutonium economy. For the time being, the embargos on the transfer of sensitive fuel cycle technologies therefore seem appropriate. In the long run, however, we believe that the fullest possible exchange of nuclear materials and technology as originally envisaged by article IV of the NPT would best serve the cause of non-proliferation.

Regardless of the future of nuclear power, however, the dissemination of nuclear technology is likely to continue. This means that to avoid further proliferation there is no substitute for measures devaluing the military and political utility of nuclear weapons.

Among such measures are negative security guarantees - assurances of non-use of nuclear weapons. States abiding by the option not to acquire nuclear weapons are widely recognized to be entitled to security guarantees on
the part of Powers which possess such weapons. We conceive of such assurances as a first step to be followed up by "no-first-use" agreements involving all nuclear-weapon States. All efforts must be made to strengthen the de facto precedent of more than 30 years of non-use, by supplementing the Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibiting the use of biological and chemical weapons with a ban on the use of atomic weapons as well, so as to establish an "ABC" ban.

We have therefore noted with satisfaction the formulations used in the general debate by a number of nuclear-weapon States concerning negative security guarantees. The issues involved are political rather than technical, and are therefore well suited for consideration at this session. We sincerely hope that the progress achieved so far will be adequately reflected and enhanced through commonly acceptable language in the programme of action.

While appreciating unilateral declarations of non-use, we believe that the formulations introduced so far should be followed up by the negotiation of an international instrument banning the use of nuclear weapons. To the extent that agreement can be reached, guidelines for elaboration of the guarantees should be established as soon as possible. This requires a major international effort. In this connexion the International Peace Research Association (IPRA), on its part, is prepared to participate in the study of issues needing further clarification. New emerging from the research and development laboratories are new conventional weapons whose destructiveness approaches and may even surpass that of the smaller nuclear weapons. Conventional warfare capabilities have increased immensely - and the suffering and destruction caused by modern means of conventional warfare has been drastic. To ensure that real progress will be made in halting these developments, a comprehensive strategy must be developed. Efforts should be made to arrive at international agreements on production, transfer and acquisition of conventional arms. To come to grips with the complexities of the problem, something similar to the NPT in the nuclear field might be considered.
In the view of IPRA, disarmament is a major peace strategy which should not be seen in isolation from other main issues of international relations. Structurally it has to be linked with the abolition of injustice, domination, force and economic depletion. For a long time, military means and heavy accumulation of armaments have enjoyed priority in the endeavours for peace and security. Today, there is a growing awareness that political and social problems are no longer to be solved by military means but by peaceful settlement. A large part of the tools of confrontation remain without justification in the development of international relations. On the contrary, armaments and militarization distort the socio-political process to the detriment of public welfare.

It is difficult indeed to imagine how the hungry can be fed, the economy improved, the environment conserved, peace established, and war avoided with the arms race running its present course, and without decisive steps being taken for genuine and effective disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I now call on the President of the Stanley Foundation, Mr. Maxwell Stanley.
Mr. STANLEY (Stanley Foundation): My remarks will be directed more to
the management of the disarmament process, namely, United Nations procedures and
mechanisms, than to the specific disarmament measures that the other speakers
who have preceded me this morning have discussed in detail before this Committee.

For more than 20 years the Stanley Foundation, of which I am President,
has been involved in the study of arms control and disarmament and the
strengthening of the United Nations. Mrs. Stanley and I, having a basic
confidence in the decency and brotherhood of mankind, established this private
operating foundation as a vehicle to contribute to the search for a secure peace
with freedom and justice. Our interest in world organization and in disarmament
developed from a mounting conviction that the United Nations would be unable
to fulfill its fundamental objective of maintaining international peace and
security. Our interests were further stimulated by our then college-age son,
who persuaded me to get involved in world peace and security issues.

The Stanley Foundation's unique method of examination, complemented by the
work of our professional research staff, brings together knowledgeable and concerned
diplomats, governmental officials and scholars for round-table discussions. The
conclusions and recommendations of conference participants are published and
distributed to a world-wide audience, including all United Nations Member States.
Four of our recent conferences have focused upon this special session on
disarmament.

The special session is being held at an opportune moment when mankind's long
quest for a world without war is blocked by the failure of nation-States to reduce
reliance upon armed force. The spiralling arms race, with its own powerful
growth thrust, leads nations to spend some $US 400 billion annually on military
establishments. Mounting domestic needs of nations go unsatisfied. Vital
research and technology are short-changed. How will nations cope with shortages
of energy and food? How will nations enhance their environments? How will
nations accelerate economic and social development? Mounting reliance upon
military preparedness and power separates peoples by strengthening fears,
prejudices and hatreds. The frustrations posed by questions such as these
are common to all present; that is one reason why we are here.

As delegates of the world's nations, you have the opportunity to make
this session a historic turning point. You will draft a ringing declaration,
challenging the international community to substitute arms reduction for arms control and limitation. You are charged with developing a programme of action and machinery assuring ongoing and increasing attention to disarmament. You can, if you will, give the dormant disarmament movement a boost, a shot in the arm, lest it falter hopelessly. To do these things, however, you must look beyond narrow national self-interest to the broader common concerns and aspirations of the world's people - 4.5 billion of them. However inarticulate they may be, they yearn for a world without war. People want the current heavy burdens of excessive military establishments lifted.

The proceedings of this special session so far are not - at least, to an outsider - encouraging; strong omens of success are not evident. Despite sincere, determined and lengthy efforts, the Preparatory Committee was unable to overcome rigid national differences and agree on programmes of action and machinery.

The United States and the Soviet Union, the world's most over-armed nations, appear to have treated the special session as a perfunctory operation of secondary priority. How tragic it is that they are exchanging polemics and accusations and straining the fragile constraints of détente rather than providing leadership here. Other nations, too, have injected peripheral issues into the general debate. As is often the case, the news media has chosen to emphasize the controversies among the family of nations rather than the many serious proposals offered as steps to accelerate disarmament progress.

Must this special session be recorded in history as futile along with previous disarmament efforts? Unless this session generates a vibrant determination among nations to make things happen, its forthcoming documents will do little more than gather dust in archives. Action, not material for future research, is called for: deeds capable of giving life to the documents.

Will it happen? Are you and your nations serious about checking and reversing the arms race? The very need to ask these questions dramatizes the collective failure of nation-States to rise above prejudice, fear and lethargy in response to common long-term self-interest. World community attitudes are paradoxical. No responsible national leader wants to be involved in war. Few really believe the ongoing arms race ensures national security. All have pressing domestic and development needs for the resources the arms race consumes. Yet,
responsible leaders, including many who forward instructions to you delegates at this special session, are allowing pride and near-term national interests to smother the unco-ordinated pleas of people who want a secure world without war.

The success of this special session on disarmament is dependent upon how serious nation-States - large and small, powerful and weak - are about arms reduction and disarmament. Please allow me to offer several suggestions regarding your deliberations.

First, you must recognize and emphasize that the special session is not an end in itself, but a unique opportunity to take a step along the rugged path to the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament. No swords will be beaten into ploughshares here, no spears into pruning hooks. No major disarmament treaties will be negotiated during this five-week session. Disarmament is far too complex a subject and the Assembly is far too large a body for this to occur.

More than recognition of the continuing nature of the disarmament process is required, however. Recognition must be supported by ongoing programmes, improved procedures and mechanisms and prescheduled future gatherings to review and monitor progress. The special session's impact will be quickly lost without provisions for such continuity.

Secondly, you need to establish sensible priorities. The session's programme of action certainly will contain numerous worth-while proposals for advancing arms reduction and disarmament. Some proposals should serve as stepping stones to near-term action; others should relate to longer-range measures. The process of compromise - removing the brackets, if you will - may produce some marginal or duplicative proposals. A "shopping list" of recommendations, however meritorious, may be counter-productive. A composite list of frightening magnitude can diminish initiative because total achievement seems improbable. Or, because some proposals are controversial or of doubtful validity, nations may be tempted to reject the whole or debate to death the relative merits of specific items.

The usefulness of the programme as an action instrument will depend upon your ability to distinguish between the less dramatic steps subject to early achievement and the more comprehensive ones and to place them in proper order. Top priority should be given to a few carefully selected programmes that can be successfully accomplished within a few years, by the time another special session or a world disarmament conference may be convened. Carefully selected achievable near-term programmes can increase the chances of solid accomplishment. Disarmament efforts need early successes.
Thirdly, the machinery must be improved. Strengthening United Nations disarmament machinery is perhaps the most important task that the General Assembly faces. Indeed, the session will be tolerably successful if it does nothing more than provide adequate machinery to increase effectiveness, involve more nations, and assure continuing action. These needed changes seem to be recognized. The session's task is to force agreement from among the various alternatives.

To be effective the United Nations needs two kinds of forums working on disarmament: a large deliberative body and a smaller negotiating body or bodies. The United Nations General Assembly, with its Committees, is the logical deliberative body, and numerous opportunities are available to streamline and improve its procedures. To stimulate continuity of disarmament activities, a second special session on disarmament - or, alternatively, a world disarmament conference - should, in three or four years, review arms reduction progress and advance new proposals.

The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament now functions as a negotiating body. It should be modified or replaced in order to encourage the participation of France and China, allow a limited increase in membership, provide more effective liaison with the General Assembly, and improve operating procedures. Various opportunities for improving a negotiating forum exist; the task is to select those most likely to assure participation of all nuclear-weapon Powers.

In addition, the United Nations Centre for Disarmament should have expanded capability better to serve the General Assembly and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

Note should be taken of the relationship between machinery and national will. Stronger national will to make machinery work is vital, but the best conceptual programmes will go astray without good management. Proper institutions and machinery can provide continuity, encourage research, produce proposals, and, by so doing, stimulate the will of nations to act.
Fourthly, the disarmament constituency must be broadened. Broader understanding and concern about disarmament objectives is essential. More nations must be involved; stronger world opinion must be focused upon arms reduction. Like the nuclear weapons the General Assembly seeks to shackle, a certain critical mass is needed to fuel efforts to reduce armaments. Currently, no more than 15 or 20 nations are effectively involved in disarmament matters. If this number were doubled, a larger and stronger coalition for action would emerge; its collective outreach would enlarge exponentially. Other nations would be more easily persuaded that they have a major stake in disarmament.

Every nation accepting membership in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament - or its replacement - should be encouraged to establish an internal disarmament unit. Study and research should be initiated and competent diplomats and experts should be assigned on a continuing basis. Such action, even on a modest scale, is a prerequisite to contributing intelligently to disarmament decision making. Strong special session recommendations for expanded non-governmental organization activities will aid the disarmament progress. Non-governmental organizations, universities, and research centres can conduct valuable research, raise public awareness, and mobilize public opinion in support of disarmament.

Fifthly, leadership must be stimulated. Challenging declarations, comprehensive action programme and improved machinery however essential, will not bring arms reduction and disarmament without determined and imaginative leadership.

Whence will this leadership come? Who will step forward to speak for the peoples of this globe whose hopes for peace and aspirations for economic and social growth transcend national boundaries? Who will challenge nations, one and all, to shift emphasis from preparation for war to concerted attack upon the world's serious economic, environmental, social, and human rights problems? Who will loudly and clearly articulate that the time has come to check and reverse the arms race and move forward towards meaningful arms reduction?
The major nuclear-weapon States have the greatest responsibility to provide such leadership; it would be completely consistent with their long-term self-interests. By acting positively upon a comprehensive test ban and SALT II, the Soviet Union and the United States could provide an invaluable stimulus to disarmament progress. These two nuclear Powers could not only remove the stigma their stale exhortations and retreaded proposals have given the special session but also lead the way towards removing the threat of nuclear holocaust.

The rest of the world, however, has held back too long, awaiting USSR and United States leadership. This has given these two nations a veto power over disarmament progress. The special session should emphasize that the opportunities for leadership are not limited to nuclear giants. A coalition of like-minded nations - Eastern, non-aligned, and Western - represented by dedicated and able leaders, is needed to provide continuing leadership after the special session adjourns. Such a coalition, with articulate, able, and forceful individual spokesmen, is needed to keep disarmament action alive, to challenge the nuclear giants, and to stimulate public support.

In conclusion, I issue a strong challenge to the representatives at this special session to reach consensus on specific near-term action proposals to be implemented immediately following the special session. I exhort representatives and their countries to participate in vigorous efforts to check the arms race and initiate the process of arms reduction. I beseech representatives to provide leadership in mankind's long struggle to gain one of the most fundamental of all human rights - a world in which people may live without fear of war.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I now call on the last speaker this morning, the Director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Mr. Frank Barnaby.
Mr. BARNABY (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute): The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) was founded in 1966 by the Swedish Parliament to commemorate Sweden's 150 years of unbroken peace. Its funds are provided by the Swedish Parliament. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute is an independent institute, its operations being the responsibility of an international governing board. The staff is also international and includes researchers from different social and political backgrounds. Both natural and social sciences are represented.

The Institute's policy is to study problems of peace and conflict pragmatically, selecting topics important to decision makers in current international politics. To date, SIPRI has concentrated mainly on the problems of armaments and disarmament. This has entailed major studies on such topics as the resources spent for military activities, arms production, arms trade and new military technologies, chemical and biological warfare, regional conflict areas, the impact of the military on the environment, the nuclear arms race and nuclear proliferation. International efforts to bring about disarmament in these fields have been followed and analysed.

The conclusion of the partial test-ban Treaty on 5 August 1963 can be regarded as a turning point in post-Second World War disarmament negotiations. Although its arms control value is low, the Treaty has been interpreted as the first proof, after years of the cold war, that restrictions on the military activities of States can be agreed upon. It is fitting, therefore, to match the post-1963 developments in armaments against the hopes held at that time that the arms race would be brought under control. Moreover, by 1963, most of the large colonies had become independent and could themselves decide on their future military activities.
Since 1963 world military expenditures have increased in real terms by about 40 per cent, to reach the current figure of about $400 billion a year. The third-world share of the total has increased from about 4 per cent in 1963 to about 15 per cent today.

In the past 15 years the world's armed forces have increased by nearly 30 per cent, to about 26 million persons. An even more serious waste of resources may be the waste of talent. Many of those engaged in military activities are highly skilled technicians and scientists.

Militarization has assumed a global character mainly due to the arms trade. Since 1963 the trade in major weapons - aircraft, missiles, armoured vehicles and ships - has increased more than five fold. The bulk of these weapons were sold to third-world countries. And, since 1973, the arms trade has escalated, increasing at the unprecedented annual rate of 15 per cent.

More and more countries are producing their own weapons. Fifteen years ago only a handful of industrialized countries were weapon producers. Today about 50 countries - of which about one-half are in the third world - are producing major weapons. Thus a constantly increasing number of nations are investing large amounts of resources in domestic arms industries at the expense of the civilian sectors of their economies.

Although about 80 per cent of military money is spent on conventional armaments and forces, the greatest single threat to mankind is that of nuclear war. In 1963 the nuclear arsenals contained about 4,000 relatively primitive warheads. These were enough to destroy our civilization. But today nuclear arsenals contain tens of thousands of sophisticated nuclear weapons, with a total explosive power equivalent to that of about 1 million Hiroshima bombs.

Qualitative improvements in nuclear weapons continue virtually without restraint. Between the signing of the partial test-ban Treaty and the end of 1977, 629 nuclear explosions were carried out, mainly to improve the efficiency of nuclear weapons. The nuclear-weapon Powers party to the Treaty are responsible for 86 per cent of these explosions. The rate of testing has been much higher since the Treaty than before it - 45 per year as against 25 per year, on average.
The capacity to produce nuclear weapons is spreading worldwide through peaceful nuclear programmes. In 1963 only nine countries had significant peaceful nuclear programmes. Today the number is nearly 30.

Militarization does not stop with the earth's land mass. The oceans and outer space are becoming increasingly militarized. Since 1963, 1,392 satellites serving military purposes and representing an important part of the qualitative arms race have been launched into space. This number is about 75 per cent of all satellites launched. So far as the marine environment is concerned, in 1963 less than a dozen nuclear-powered submarines, for example, were operated by the world's navies. Today there are more than 250 such submarines.

The adverse effects of warfare and other military activities on the human environment are generally incidental to the many activities associated with maintaining armies. In some wars, however, they can be an intentional and integral component of the military strategy being used. There is a noticeable trend for modern warfare to become increasingly destructive of the environment. Man may soon be able to manipulate certain forces of nature. If these abilities were to be employed for hostile purposes, their environmental impact could be disastrous.

No one can be sure that mankind would in the long term survive a general nuclear war. Disarmament is therefore the most urgent international problem.

The arms control Treaties now in force have had little or no effect on the military potential of States. The choice of measures adopted has been haphazard. In several cases the outlawed activities have never even been seriously considered as methods of war. It is now obvious that the method of negotiating small, unrelated steps cannot produce meaningful arms reductions. Insignificant restraints are bound to lag behind the rising levels of armaments and advances in military technology. SIPRI is convinced that a new approach is required.

We have in mind an integrated approach to disarmament, as opposed to piecemeal arms control. Large packages of measures — comprising quantitative reductions and qualitative restrictions to be carried out simultaneously — should be negotiated. This would allow a margin for any trade-offs necessary
to take into account the different security needs of States. The wider
the range of weapons covered, the greater would be the value of each
package. Nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction -
particularly chemical warfare agents - must obviously have top priority.
But it seems important to us that conventional disarmament should
proceed in parallel - not only because conventional armaments account for
the bulk of world military expenditures but also because the very possession
of nuclear weapons has been justified by a perceived need to deter
aggression started with conventional weapons. Indeed, conventional armed
conflict might well escalate into a nuclear war.

Quantitative reductions and qualitative limitations should be
accompanied by restrictions on the production, deployment and transfer of
weapons. The significance of arms control packages would be further
enhanced if they provided for prohibitions of certain specific categories
of weapons. Undertakings not to use certain means of warfare might also
usefully be included, since there is less incentive to develop or maintain
weapons with an uncertain future. Cuts in military budgets could be linked
to cuts in arms manufacture or other military activities.

The integrated approach places the main emphasis on multilateral
negotiations involving all militarily important States, and all participants
should be prepared to make certain equitably balanced contributions to
disarmament. We hope that any forum which this Assembly may create will
be sufficiently representative to cope with this task. The integrated
approach is not incompatible with bilateral talks dealing with the United States-
Soviet arms race or with regional disarmament negotiations, which should be
encouraged.

The use of force in international relations should be abolished by
eliminating the instruments of war. But complete world-wide disarmament would
require an adequate international security system - a workable machinery for
the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective peace-keeping arrangements.
Our integrated approach dealing as it does with restrictions of a wide range
of military activities would facilitate the creation of such a security system.
The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I should like to express the appreciation of the Ad Hoc Committee to the six speakers who have participated in our work this morning for the extremely interesting statements. We have all benefited from their comments, very timely suggestions and proposals, and they certainly deserve our most sincere thanks.

I should also like to extend to them our appreciation for the continuing contributions that their organizations have been making to the United Nations, in particular in the field of disarmament.

The meeting rose at 12.35 p.m.