VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 5TH MEETING

Chairman: Mr. ORTIZ DE ROZAS (Argentina)

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ADOPTION OF A DECLARATION ON DISARMAMENT

ADOPTION OF A PROGRAMME OF ACTION ON DISARMAMENT

REVIEW OF THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN DISARMAMENT AND OF THE INTERNATIONAL MACHINERY FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON DISARMAMENT, INCLUDING IN PARTICULAR THE QUESTION OF CONVENCING A WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE

The CHAIRMAN: The first speaker is the Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme, Mr. Bradford Morse, whom I invite to make his statement.

Mr. MORSE (Administrator, United Nations Development Programme): Mr. Chairman and representatives, I want to thank each of you for the opportunity to meet with you briefly this afternoon, for less than 24 hours ago I was in Geneva attending the annual meeting of the Governing Council of the United Nations Development Programme. But I have come here in the midst of that meeting because this special session of the United Nations General Assembly on Disarmament is dealing with problems of the greatest possible urgency and the most critical importance which are clearly and inseparably connected with the problems of disarmament that are my overriding daily concern and responsibility.

Having said that, I must add that the very fact that this session is so important and so urgent is, in a very real sense, lamentable. So too is the fact that we have so far not made nearly enough progress through development to correct this imbalance and to rectify the injustice which characterizes the world today. I say this because of my conviction that
what has been discussed here in recent days, and what has been discussed in other forums for many, many years, is something that, in a more rational world, would require very little discussion; for what we are really talking about is how to make it more difficult for human beings to destroy one another - or to acquire the means to do so - and how we might divert a part of the resources now devoted to potential destruction into building a world where everyone can live in decency and dignity. That this session has been convened is certainly encouraging. That it is necessary is tragic.

One must, however, be an optimist to serve in a Programme dedicated to dealing with the deep-rooted, long-standing and terribly stubborn problems of world poverty and world inequity. And it is in a basically optimistic vein that I should like to explore with you not only the hopeful ways in which disarmament could advance development, but the other, equally important side of the coin - how development can advance disarmament.

On the first point, I will refrain from recapitulating the details of the appalling statistics on global armaments expenditures, except to note that the word "global" must unfortunately be taken literally. The industrialized nations account for about 82 per cent of world-wide arms outlays and virtually 100 per cent of arms exports. But 18 per cent of the world's armaments spending and 65 per cent of all of the world's arms imports are in the column of the developing countries. And the first - the lower percentage, 18 per cent, is considerably higher than those for the developing countries' share of world food production, energy production, industrial production or participation in international trade. And equally sobering is the fact that we are meeting here at a time when the competitors in the arms race are running faster than ever, so that projections for the year 2,000 show global armaments expenditures, in constant 1970 dollars, more than doubling their present pace of over $1 billion a day.

Now, I will avoid restating the equation that X-number of main battle tanks, nuclear submarines or ballistic missiles built equals Y-number of unbuilt schools, unbuilt hospitals, factories or irrigation works - not only because it is a familiar statement but because, it seems, it has failed to convince the world of its compelling logic. Instead of this hypothetical reckoning of what disarmament might accomplish, I will draw on the experience of the United Nations Development Programme to give you some realistic examples.
A fisheries research and development project in Uruguay will bring catches this year alone to a level of 400 million pounds - a tenfold increase over previous yields.

A survey of Sri Lanka's Mahaweli Ganga River basin has resulted in the development of a programme which will put 900,000 acres under new cultivation; it will increase the value of agricultural production by $210 million a year and of hydropower output by $70 million; and it will create up to a million farm and factory jobs. Already, over $140 million in follow-up investment has been stimulated to carry out these schemes.

Exploration of Burundi's mineral resources has uncovered at least 300 million tons of nickel ore and promising potentials for gold, uranium and titanium mining. And these discoveries are conservatively assessed as being sufficiently valuable completely to transform the national economy.

In Tanzania, pilot experiments in irrigated rice cultivation have raised output from 1,000 pounds per acre per year to almost 5,000 pounds.

In Malawi, livestock disease control and animal husbandry research programmes have put that country solidly on the road to self-sufficiency in meat and dairy production.

A vocational training programme in Colombia has thus far prepared more than 2 million men and women for over 350 separate productive occupations.

Finally, two projects in Jordan have brought in nearly $57 million in investments to build a modern phosphate industry with excellent potentials for helping to relieve fertilizer shortages and earn development-stimulating foreign exchange.
The total cost of all these activities to the United Nations Development Programme and to the countries concerned has been less than one quarter - I repeat, less than one quarter - of the price for a single strategic bomber.

It seems strange that we must cite evidence like this to demonstrate what should be self-evident, that ploughshares are far less costly, far less hazardous and far more productive than swords. Yet the historic reluctance of the human race to advance from discussing disarmament to doing something practical about it compels the use of every sustainable argument, and material to support the thesis that armaments are damaging to development - that the effort to have both guns and butter is a self-defeating one - is certainly not hard to come by.

It is clear, for example, that development progress depends on a healthily growing global economy. Specifically, that means an economy capable of generating an adequate volume of goods and services at affordable prices and of distributing them efficiently and equitably. Yet the large-scale production of arms and the widespread commerce in weapons are demonstrably detrimental to the achievement of such an economy.

Arms production draws heavily on available natural resources, particularly energy reserves and many raw materials already in short supply. It puts an even more severe strain on technological resources, absorbing 40 per cent of the world's outlays for research and a full 50 per cent of the world's scientific and technological manpower. Military expenditures, moreover, are perhaps the single most inflationary element in the global economic mix.

Military production diminishes rather than adds to the supply of things needed for everyday living, while at the same time it expands purchasing power. The diverting of tax revenues from the mainstream of socially useful production, with the average citizen world-wide turning over the equivalent of three or four years of income during his or her lifetime to military use, certainly exacerbates the problem. All of that is a certain prescription for inflation.
Contrary to popular belief, military spending is clearly not an efficient device for the stimulation of employment. I have recently seen estimates showing that every one billion dollars spent on education creates about 30,000 more jobs than the same amount spent on defence, and similar ratios apply to spending for housing, health care, mass transit and other key public needs.

But development progress requires more than a sound economic foundation. Equally essential is a secure political climate in which trade can flourish unhampered by extraneous considerations, and welfare rather than warfare attracts man's best efforts and energies. Yet here it is impossible to misread the record. The accumulation of massive arsenals does not augment security; it imperils it. It creates an atmosphere of anxiety, suspicion and competitiveness as nations feel themselves increasingly threatened by the growing military might of other nations, trapping the world community in a dangerous see-saw game of catching-up. So far as deterrence is concerned, it should be sufficient, perhaps, to recall that the Nobel Peace Prize is named after a man who honestly believed that his invention of dynamite would make war too frightful to contemplate.

In a world threatened by over-population and underproduction, a surplus of demand and a shortage of supply, it is not military preparedness but economic and social progress that will keep our real enemies from the doorstep. It is tractors rather than tanks, machine tools rather than machine guns, that give us the best hope for building true security.

We must of course be careful not to over-simplify the linkages between disarmament and development. There is, for instance, no assurance that the resources saved by disarmament among the industrialized nations would be converted into resources to support development. We do know, however, that if that happened even on a relatively modest scale, the benefits would be enormous. Similarly, a survey of what took place in 44 developing countries between 1950 and 1965 shows that those with the heaviest defence outlays generally had the most rapid growth rates, and vice-versa. But I suspect that the real reason for this is that the developing countries which invested most heavily in the military sphere were those with the strongest economic structures, so that the connexion between military expansion and development progress was coincidental rather than causative.
In any case, I am heartened by the proposals made by the Secretary-General at this special session to evolve a strategy for disarmament, by the resolution of the thirty-second session of the General Assembly which called for new efforts to pin down the relationship between disarmament and development, and by the subsequent success of an expert group in agreeing on a framework and on terms of reference for this study. That should make it possible, I believe, not only to establish the precise nature of the development/disarmament linkage, but to devise workable incentives for progressive arms reductions by all nations.

As members of this Committee are aware, two proposals for creating a disarmament dividend have already been put forward. Under the first, the dividend would come from budgetary savings realized as a result of arms control agreements negotiated by industrialized countries. Until recently, progress along those lines had been inhibited by the lack of a standardized system for measuring expenditures and other technical difficulties. However, at the thirty-first session of the General Assembly, the Secretary-General presented a specific analysis of the issues involved in defining, reporting and comparing military outlays which has generally been received as being both objective and practical. The second proposal calls for a tax on arms sales to developing nations which would be incurred by those countries that escalate the level of weapons sophistication in their regions through imports of military technology. The resulting dividend would be distributed to those countries that exercised restraint in their defence programmes.

Any realistic scheme of arms reduction must of course take into account the practical problems of conversion and restructuring which the industrialized countries would face in reorienting productive capacity from military to civilian purposes. But the experience of some of these countries in making similar adjustments at the end of the Second World War provides persuasive evidence that the job can be carried out successfully, if not altogether painlessly.
Whatever difficulties may revolve around the question of disarmament's benefits for development, there can hardly be any doubt that development is good for disarmament. The late Paul Hoffman, one of my predecessors as Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme, drawing on his earlier experience as head of the post-war European recovery programme known as the Marshall Plan, repeatedly stressed this fact. He emphasized the point that the dramatic and dynamic prosperity which Europe achieved after the war, due in considerable measure to the unprecedented, pervasive and mutually beneficial integration of the continent's national economies, not only removed what formerly had been potential causes of conflict, but made economies so dependent on one another as to virtually preclude war.

I can support this proposition from my own experience. For almost every day I see new proof that development progress necessitates, if not such a tight integration, then certainly a very high level of co-operation especially among the developing countries themselves, and between them and the industrialized nations. Development co-operation extends from the highest governmental levels to the working practitioners in the field. It is the kind of co-operation that covers every facet of their relationships, from policy-making to planning, to grassroots implementation. It is the kind of co-operation which brings together countries with diverse and often conflicting outlooks, and presents them with powerful incentives for resolving their differences peacefully. Such co-operation cannot fail to rub away rough edges of distrust and misunderstanding that stand as an obstacle to disarmament.

Furthermore, as development takes hold, as national economies become stronger and human well-being is advanced, nations acquire a positive stake in getting along with each other. Concerted, in short, becomes more profitable than confrontation, and intensified development can become a spur to the disarmament that makes it possible.

There is one final feature which is common to both development and disarmament, and it may be the most important of all. Both disarmament and development are beset with technical problems of enormous difficulty
and political problems of enormous sensitivity. But for both the problems
are also, and at their deepest roots, human problems. Technical problems
can be solved by creativity, political problems by compromise. But solving
human problems requires change, often radical change, in the way people
feel, in the way people think, in the way people look at life and the
human adventure it provides. Where development and disarmament are
concerned, this is a hurdle whose weight cannot be overstated. To surmount
it will require discarding, or at least greatly modifying, ancient attitudes
and distorted perceptions. It will mean a tempering of nationalism and, on
the basis of genuine independence and sovereignty, a willingness to accept
the imperatives of interdependence. It will mean facing up to the fact
that racial prejudice, rigid political dogmatism and gaping economic or
social disparities are intolerably outdated. In simplest terms, it will
demand that both Governments and individuals ask themselves this very simple
question: "How important is the concept of 'we' and 'they' as compared with
the concept of 'us'?"

These, I submit, are some of the underlying challenges which confront
the special session on disarmament. I am optimistic, if cautiously so,
about the possibilities for meeting them. True, the United Nations is not
a world government, nor is the General Assembly a global parliament.
True, in the present state of the world it certainly will not be easy for
this session to reach really meaningful agreements. True, whatever
agreements it does reach will not be binding. Nevertheless, the General
Assembly does command attention, and its resolutions do command respect
when it speaks out clearly and unequivocally as the collective conscience
of humankind. And what this session says to the world must be impossible
to ignore or to misinterpret. That is the only way that the message will
be heard, let alone heeded.

To that end, we must be absolutely clear in our own minds about the
nature and substance of the issues. On the surface we are talking about
disarmament and the use of the resources thus obtained for speeding the
progress of development. But at the heart of the matter, beneath all the
complexities surrounding it, lies something simpler and far more fateful. To live, the world must disarm. To live decently, it must develop. If it does not do both, the world may very well end either with a bang or with a whimper. And I am sure we agree that either is totally unacceptable.

The world has armed itself beyond all reasonable requirement, not from compulsion but from choice. The world has tolerated under-development and the persistence of hideous poverty long past the point when their eradication became possible. We can put an end to both of these self-imposed burdens. And nothing in the world, nor in the nature of man, prevents us from beginning now.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): As this Committee agreed in the organization of work, this afternoon we are going to hear a progress report from the Chairmen of both the Working Groups, A and B. Before giving the floor to the Chairmen of the Working Groups, I should like to draw the Committee's attention to the following documents which have been distributed since the Committee last met: A/S-10/AC.1/L.2, by China, amendments to section I (Introduction) of the draft Final Document; A/S-10/AC.1/L.3, again by China, amendments to section II (Declaration) of the draft Final Document; A/S-10/AC.1/L.4, by China, amendments to section III (Programme of Action) of the draft Final Document; A/S-10/AC.1/L.5, by the Federal Republic of Germany, amendment to section III (Programme of Action), subsection E; A/S-10/AC.1/9/Add.1, note verbae from the Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka; A/S-10/AC.1/15, statement made by FAO on convening of the tenth special session; A/S-10/AC.1/16 by the German Democratic Republic, concerning the preparation and celebration in that country of the International Year of the Child; A/S-10/AC.1/17, by China, concerning a working document on disarmament; A/S-10/AC.1/18, by the USSR, a proposal for inclusion in the draft Final Document; A/S-10/AC.1/19, available for the time being only in English, by Sweden, entitled "Contribution to the seismological verification of a comprehensive test ban".
Then there is document A/S-10/AC.1/20, also available for the time being only in English, from the Federal Republic of Germany.

I shall now give the floor to the Chairman of Working Group A and Vice-Chairman of this Committee, Ambassador Templeton of New Zealand.
Mr. TEMPLETON (New Zealand): I should like to make the following report to this Committee.

During the period 2-9 June, Working Group A held five meetings at which organizational and substantive matters were considered.

In regard to the organization of its work, the Working Group, taking into account the pertinent recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee, set out in Conference Room Paper No. 1, agreed to the following: first, to discuss the subjects allocated to the Working Group in the order in which they appear in the draft Final Document, that is, the Introduction, then the Declaration and then the Machinery; secondly, to hold an exchange of views on the Introduction at its second meeting and to proceed subsequently to set up a drafting group on that subject; thirdly, to devote one or two meetings to a discussion of the Declaration before establishing a drafting group on that subject; and, finally, to begin the examination of the question of machinery on Monday, 12 June. Several meetings will be allocated for that purpose, after which the Working Group might consider how to start negotiations on that subject, including the question of setting up a drafting group. The consideration of the question of machinery would not, in any case, be contingent upon the completion of the work on the Introduction and the Declaration.

After a general discussion in the Working Group, an open-ended Drafting Group on the Introduction was established on 5 June, and the Chairman of the delegation of Mexico, Ambassador Alfonso Garcia Robles, was appointed as Co-ordinator. The Drafting Group, which held two meetings, had before it amendments submitted by the delegations of China, the United Kingdom, Viet Nam, Ghana, the Soviet Union, India, Pakistan and the Philippines. An informal group is conducting consultations on the draft Introduction within the framework of the Drafting Group and under the guidance of its Co-ordinator. Although these consultations have not yet achieved all their objectives, there has been concrete and considerable progress. Agreement has been reached on several paragraphs which are essentially the same as those contained in the Report of the Preparatory Committee with some minor changes. Other texts are under discussion and alternative paragraphs are being considered to merge the formulations contained in that Report with new proposals submitted to the Drafting Group.
After a short discussion in the Working Group, another open-ended Drafting Group on the Declaration was established on 7 June and Dr. Walter Krutzsch of the German Democratic Republic was appointed as its Co-ordinator.

The Drafting Group on the Declaration has held three meetings. It has had before it amendments submitted by China, Viet Nam, Ecuador, Cuba, Mauritania, the Soviet Union, Algeria, France, Ghana and Spain. The Drafting Group started its work with a first reading of both Section A, "Review and appraisal", which is to be found on pages 18-20 of the Report of the Preparatory Committee and, except for the last paragraph, Section B, "Goals and priorities", which is on pages 20-21 of the Report of the Preparatory Committee. While it is not yet possible to report significant progress, encouraging signs of agreement on some texts have emerged. Informal contacts are being pursued among sponsors of various proposals and other interested delegations with positive results.

If I might just add a word to that formal report, which will be circulated as Conference Room Paper No. 3, I would mention that the informal contact groups are meeting at the present moment on both the Introduction and the Declaration, and if things go well I very much hope that the Drafting Group on the Introduction might complete its work on Monday. Working Group A will, in any event, take up the question of Machinery on Monday morning.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I now call on the Chairman of Working Group B and a Vice-Chairman of this Committee, the representative of Poland, Ambassador Jaroszek.

Mr. JAROSZEK (Poland): I have the honour to submit to the Ad Hoc Committee the first progress report of Working Group B.

Between 2 June, when it first met, and 9 June, Working Group B, on the Programme of Action, held five meetings covering both organizational and substantive matters.

Two meetings, on 5 and 6 June, were devoted to a general exchange of views on the draft Programme of Action to be considered by the Group.

In connexion with the organization of its work and taking into consideration the pertinent recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee in this regard contained
in Conference Room Paper No. 1 of 1 June 1978, the Working Group decided to establish two drafting groups to assist in drafting various sections of the draft Programme of Action. Drafting Group I, under the co-ordination of Ambassador Olu Adeniji of Nigeria, would deal with the nuclear disarmament section of the draft Programme of Action, from page 25 to the top of page 35 of the report of the Preparatory Committee; and Drafting Group II, under the co-ordination of Ambassador Gustaf Hamilton of Sweden, would consider conventional disarmament and the other remaining matters of the draft Programme of Action, beginning with the section entitled "Other weapons of mass destruction" on page 35 and ending on page 44. If so required, the drafting groups may, at an appropriate stage, establish subgroups or informal contact groups. The deadline for the conclusion of the work of drafting groups I and II will be 20 June 1978, while the deadline for the submission of new proposals in the drafting groups has been set for 13 June 1978.

The drafting groups, in co-operation with the Secretariat, would, on a weekly basis, prepare for the attention of the Working Group as a whole conference room papers showing the state of progress of the drafting groups' work, including the status of the texts being considered by each drafting group. The first of such conference room papers prepared by Drafting Group I, on nuclear disarmament, which held four meetings between 6 and 8 June, has been issued as an addendum to this first progress report of Working Group B and it is now being distributed as Conference Room Paper No. 4. As may be noted from the progress report of Drafting Group I, it has completed the first reading of the draft text assigned to it.

Drafting Group II on conventional disarmament and other matters, held its first meeting on Friday morning, 9 June, and started the first reading of the part of the text allotted to it.
With the Chairman's permission, I should like to add a word of personal comment. The task before us is tremendous. If we are to work out a substantive and meaningful draft final document of the special session, it is necessary for all States represented here at this session to demonstrate the maximum of good political will, and for delegations to exert great efforts, with a good deal of flexibility and open-mindedness and in a spirit of mutual understanding and accommodation on the only realistic and lasting basis, namely, that of a consensus.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I thank the Chairman of Working Group B, Vice-Chairman of this Committee, for the progress report he has just given us. The reports presented by the Chairmen of both Working Groups A and B can be found in Conference Room Papers 3 and 4 which have been distributed to delegations.

Mr. LAI Ya-li (China) (interpretation from Chinese): In accordance with the agreed working procedure, the Chinese delegation would like to propose the following concrete amendments to the preamble of the draft resolution embodying the final document.

First, everyone admits that nuclear weapons are highly destructive, but it is obvious that the super-Powers are doing their utmost to play up nuclear horror out of ulterior motives. The super-Powers make a practice of using nuclear weapons as a means of military threat and political blackmail against non-nuclear countries. Therefore, in order to give a more accurate description of the current state of affairs, we propose that the first part of the first preambular paragraph of the draft resolution be amended to read:

"Mindful of the unprecedentedly grave destruction to mankind that will be brought by nuclear war,"

The generalized reference to "the devastation inflicted by all wars", contained in the latter phrase of this same paragraph, might be exploited by the super-Powers to oppose the armed struggle waged by the colonial and semi-colonial peoples for national independence and liberation or to oppose the struggle for national defence waged by the many small and medium-sized countries to safeguard their
independence and sovereignty against aggression. In order to avoid such defects, we propose to rephrase this phrase as:

"... recalling the serious devastation inflicted by the two world wars,"

The amended paragraph would then read:

"Mindful of the unprecedentedly grave destruction to mankind that will be brought by nuclear war, and recalling the serious devastation inflicted by the two world wars,"

Second, no reference is made in the preamble as to whence comes the threat to international peace and security. In order to make up such a defect, we propose to add a new paragraph after the above-mentioned paragraph, which reads:

"Noting the intensified rivalry between the super-Powers for world hegemony and their increasingly grave threat to international peace and security,"

Third, the wording in the original second preambular paragraph about the role and assessment of the struggle for disarmament and its relationship to the struggles in other fields is too general and inaccurate. Many representatives, and the representative of China have made a number of concrete observations in this regard. In the light of these views, we propose that the original second preambular paragraph become the third paragraph and be amended to read:

"Convinced that the struggle for disarmament, including nuclear and conventional disarmament, combined with the struggle for the defence of national independence and sovereignty and against super-Power hegemonism and policies of war, will be conducive to putting off a world war, though unable to prevent it, and to strengthening international peace and security, thus facilitating the economic and social advancement of all peoples and the achievement of the new international economic order."

Fourth, the original third preambular paragraph should become the fourth paragraph, and after "a more effective role, aims" add:

"first of all, at the reduction of the armaments of the two Powers which possess the largest arsenals and then gradually"
to be followed by the original wording in the draft:

"at general and concrete disarmament under effective international control."

We hope that the aforesaid views will be given serious consideration and adopted by the Ad Hoc Committee and its drafting team.

In conclusion, after having listened to the reports of the Chairmen of Working Groups A and B on the progress of work of their respective Groups, the Chinese delegation would like to offer some suggestions on the procedure of work of the session. Namely, after the drafting groups submit the relevant parts of the revised final document to the Working Groups, the Working Groups should promptly distribute the texts of the revised draft to delegations, so that they will have adequate time to study them and to submit suggestions, for the tenth special session of the General Assembly distinguishes itself precisely in that on questions of disarmament which concern the important questions of war and peace the good ideas of delegations should be fully taken into account and super-Power control must be removed. A proof of this can be found in the general debate which is to be closed this afternoon, where over 120 delegations have made statements in which the small and medium-sized countries, particularly the third world countries, have set forth many relevant and cogent ideas. According to the same reasons, when Working Groups A and B submit the relevant parts of the revised final document to this Committee of the Whole for its consideration, this Committee should distribute the drafts in time to delegations, to afford them adequate time to study and consider these drafts. The two Working Groups have been established by this Committee and therefore are accountable to this Committee. They are each responsible for revising parts of the draft of the final document and therefore they are relatively restricted in their work. Therefore, only in this Committee can the draft be considered in a more comprehensive way and on the level of principles so that a better final draft could be produced.
Mr. PFEIFFER (Federal Republic of Germany): In his address to the special session of the General Assembly on 26 May, Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt called for a confidence-building offensive. He expressed the conviction of the Federal Government that confidence-building measures in all parts of the world are required and even an essential condition in order to improve the political climate and to create the conditions for concrete disarmament steps.

Regional considerations should, of course, be taken into account. Conditions should be laid down and provisions should be made, for example for the notification of military exercises and the invitation, on a reciprocal basis, of observers to participate in those exercises. Such regional agreements could lead to a world-wide convention on confidence-building measures.

My delegation has welcomed the fact that speakers in the general debate have underlined the importance of confidence-building measures as a precondition for more progress in disarmament. It is in line with those remarks that my delegation submits to the Committee today a working paper concerning zones of confidence-building measures as a first step towards the preparation of a world-wide convention on confidence-building measures for its further consideration.

I should like to take this opportunity to introduce two sentences dealing with confidence-building measures for inclusion in the final document. These sentences should be included in the Programme of Action, section E, "Other measures to strengthen international security and to build confidence", after the first paragraph, and should read as follows:

"Commitment to confidence-building measures on a clearly defined regional basis and agreed to by all States of a region could significantly contribute to enhancing stability and preparing for further progress in disarmament and arms control. Agreement on such measures in various regions in the world could prepare the ground for a world-wide convention on confidence-building measures."
Mr. FERNANDO (Sri Lanka): I have asked to be allowed to speak to place before this Committee the proposal for a world disarmament authority — a proposal which was first made by my President, His Excellency Mr. J.R. Jayewardene, when he addressed a meeting of the Commonwealth Heads of State or Government of the Asian and Pacific Region in Sydney, Australia, last February. Subsequently he thought it appropriate to convey his thinking and ideas on this matter to all the Heads of State and Government of the countries participating in this special session, and in these terms he has addressed a letter to them.

When the Foreign Minister of Sri Lanka addressed the General Assembly at this special session on disarmament on 25 May he sought to place this proposal so that this special session could also take it into consideration, together with other proposals that are being examined. I might add here that my Foreign Minister brought this proposal to the attention of the members of the Co-ordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement during their meeting in Havana last month. They took note of the proposal and expressed the conviction that the non-aligned countries would give the proposal serious and careful consideration. This same view was unanimously endorsed by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and leaders of delegations of the non-aligned group of countries when they met in an extraordinary session in New York on 29 May of this year.

In order that the proposal receive the consideration of this Committee and of the special session we have spelt out the proposal in greater detail, and that has now been issued as document A/S-10/AC.1/9/Add.1, which is before this Committee. As we have set out in that working paper, our proposal is designed with a view to reasserting the primary role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. We believe that a satisfactory solution to general and complete disarmament could be found only within the United Nations system. As we have tried to point out in that working paper, one of the reasons for the inadequacy or shortcomings in the realization of disarmament has been the existence of undefined areas and the absence of co-ordination among the existing organs and machinery within the United Nations system. Our proposal is in part intended to make good that omission. This proposal involves the various organs of the United Nations agencies in this venture to obtain the general and widely accepted goals of disarmament. If this is accepted, in principle, the world disarmament authority could make the United Nations much more effective and make the Charter realistic.
As the working paper explains, we have no desire whatsoever to encroach upon or diminish the functions and powers of any existing organ or machinery in the United Nations system. We are only too well aware of the sensitivities of Member States and the delicate balance of powers and functions which make possible the functioning of existing organs and institutions. But, as I have stated earlier, we do believe and I do think that the need for harmonizing and co-ordinating the process of disarmament is shared by other delegations which have participated in this special session.

If I may address particularly those Members which have a major responsibility for disarmament, may I say that we do not conceive of a world disarmament authority as one that must go into action forthwith in all its manifestations. We see the proposal as one that has to mature in its various facets in the context of the universally accepted goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. However, that does not mean that we should postpone it for an indefinite future, as the people of the world desire that we embark on this project with a clear view of its ultimate objectives.

If the connotations of the word "authority" would create doubts about the proposal, my delegation does not think it beyond the capacity of this Committee to propose some other acceptable term.

Nevertheless, we think that a beginning must be made; and if the proposal in its totality is more than what this special session could contemplate, there are elements - and those elements are not insignificant - to which we could address ourselves now. We suggest this because in proposing consideration and acceptance of those elements we believe that they have been given expression to and proposed by other delegations in the course of the general debate and followed up in the form of new proposals.
For example, the first task of the authority which we envisage would be the collection and collation of existing information relating to armaments, their production, distribution, transfer and application. This, may I say, is not an entirely new area, in that those subjects have been considered and reported upon under earlier resolutions of the United Nations. Our working paper refers to what is already being done, partly in the United Nations Disarmament Centre; to the proposal of the Secretary-General for an advisory board; and to the parallel work being undertaken by national research and scientific organizations. Is it beyond our capability to bring all those separate endeavours under the aegis of the United Nations, to benefit from the valuable contributions being made by national research and scientific organizations?

The other function which the authority could undertake is the monitoring of existing disarmament measures and those to be negotiated in the future. I venture to think that we are not alone in proposing such a measure. Other delegations have placed before the Committee similar proposals with similar objectives. Some have offered their own facilities. Again may I ask, is it too early to reach an appropriate understanding as to how this objective can be realized? At least in those two respects we believe that our proposal should be acceptable in principle with the modalities to be worked out during the current special session. In making this suggestion I do not underestimate the enormous tasks before this Committee and the limited time at its disposal but we should like to think that the ultimate objectives were feasible.

If our proposal could secure acceptance thus far, the knowledge and experience which it would accumulate would enable it to make a significant contribution in an even more important area, namely, the development of realistic proposals and programmes for disarmament. We are not unaware that this is a particularly sensitive area, in which existing organizations are already engaged. To some, perhaps to many, at the present time this may seem an area in which one should tread carefully. We recognize that, and nothing could be further from our minds than to seek what might be described as instant implementation. But that does not exclude the need for this to be
considered. The authority which we have in mind could in the meantime help
many countries, and here I include the great majority of countries, with the
specialized knowledge which is now available almost exclusively to a limited
few. It is the lack of that specialized knowledge that is hampering the
widest active participation, which we constantly proclaim and espouse.

The last element in our proposal is that which envisages the authority's
being entrusted with the responsibility of controlling and regulating the
production and distribution of armaments and determining the purposes for
which such armaments are required. In giving effect to decisions of the
Security Council and other United Nations bodies it would be the truest
manifestation of the United Nations and its peace-keeping role. That peace-
keeping role has already been undertaken by the United Nations, despite
its limitations. We envisage such a role for the authority in the future
context of general and complete disarmament and, again, that is not something
for instant implementation. My delegation recognizes the implications of
this in terms of national sovereignty and, of course, the powers and functions
of the existing United Nations organs. At the present time it may seem too
idealistic to achieve, but it is not premature to talk about it or even
to exchange views on it. In so doing we shall be by no means the first,
because others have indeed expressed their thoughts and their hopes.
My delegation believes that this first special session devoted to
disarmament is the most appropriate occasion at least to initiate such an
exchange of views.

Our working paper has specifically set out that our proposal is not
intended in any way to restrict access to arms indispensable for the liberation
of territories under colonial rule or illegally occupied by an aggressor.
We believe that that caveat must be specifically incorporated in our proposal,
especially at this time when considerable areas are still under colonial
rule or illegally occupied - a situation which is even now occupying the
attention of the United Nations.
May I express the hope that with this working paper, which I have elaborated upon, the members of the Committee will be in a position to consider our proposal, or at least to decide to make it the subject of further study. We do not in any way attribute to it the quality of perfection and we shall more than welcome any suggestion for its improvement.

Mr. JAY (Canada): The Prime Minister of Canada, in his statement of 26 May 1978, advocated the pursuit of four specific measures for seeking to curb the strategic nuclear arms race between the major nuclear Powers, particularly in its qualitative dimension. As Prime Minister Trudeau suggested, they would in combination represent "a strategy of suffocation" that might prove to be "the best way of arresting the dynamic of the nuclear arms race". (A/S-10/PV.6, p. 12)

The Canadian delegation is submitting a document which outlines, for consideration and inclusion in the draft programme of action, three of those measures. I am not certain whether at this exact moment our document has yet reached the distribution centre but I am told that it will not be long delayed.

The first measure we have proposed relates to an agreement by the two major nuclear Powers to prohibit the flight-testing of new strategic delivery vehicles. It could serve as one means of curbing the qualitative dimension of the strategic arms race.

It might be helpful to explain the meaning of the term "new", as used in the Canadian proposal with reference to strategic delivery vehicles. What we ourselves have in mind is a functional definition relating to the observable performance of strategic delivery vehicles when being flight-tested - that is, whether they are significantly different in such performance characteristics from those flight-tested previously. Of course, the specific scope of such a measure would be a subject of negotiation and should be related to verification capabilities.
The second measure is that an agreement should be sought by the two major nuclear Powers to cease production of additional fissionable material for nuclear weapon purposes. In the Canadian view, in order to be effective such an agreement would require agreement on adequate verification arrangements, including the acceptance of full-scope safeguards, that is, comprehensive safeguards. Such a measure could be pursued initially between the two major nuclear Powers to curb the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. It could also, as a multilateral treaty open to accession by all States, strengthen the existing system to prevent the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. For that reason it would be appropriate, in our view, to refer to this measure in both the respective sections of the draft programme of action dealing with nuclear disarmament measures on the one hand and non-proliferation on the other.
A third measure is for limiting and then progressively reducing, on an agreed and verifiable basis, spending on new strategic nuclear weapons systems, including their research and development, by the major nuclear Powers. This would be a further means of curbing the qualitative dimension of the nuclear arms race. Such agreements on restraint or reduction will require full openness in reporting and full effectiveness in authenticating military budgets.

A fourth measure suggested by the Canadian Prime Minister relates to the early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The Canadian delegation believes that it is already adequately dealt with in the draft programme of action, and we are confident that it will be carried through to the final document.

In commending these Canadian proposals for the consideration of this Committee, I should like to note that the text we have submitted suggests, by way of illustration, where each of our separate proposals might best fit into the programme of action.

Mr. ELLIOTT (Belgium) (interpretation from French): In his general statement to the plenary Assembly, the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs recalled, among other things, my country's interest in the regional aspects of disarmament and the control of arms. That interest led us to propose during the thirty-second regular session of the General Assembly a draft resolution which was adopted as resolution 32/87 D on 12 December 1977. In accordance with that resolution we transmitted a report to the Secretary-General. Other countries did the same, and the complete set of documents compiled to date was transmitted to the special session under the symbol A/S-10/8 and Add.1.

We welcome the international community's interest in the regional approach, an interest that has become more and more manifest during the work of this special session. A number of proposals have already been made in the nuclear and conventional fields, whether in terms of measures to reduce or limit forces or measures calculated to increase confidence. The advantage of the regional approach lies precisely in the fact that it makes it possible to take account of the diversity of security situations in the world. It therefore offers multiple possibilities, which are deserving of systematic study.
During the preparatory work, the Belgian delegation with its Western partners, submitted a proposal for a study which has been retained in the draft programme of action submitted by the Preparatory Committee to the special session for its consideration and approval. If, as I would hope, the special session endorses the principle of such a study, the Secretariat should begin without delay to compile a preparatory dossier designed to bring together all the documents and contributions relevant in one way or another to the regional approach, and in particular all the relevant recommendations and decisions adopted by the special session. In accordance with the resolution that I have already mentioned, 32/87 D, it will be for the thirty-third session of the General Assembly to decide on the ways and means by which the study should be carried out and on the terms of reference of the proposed group of governmental experts.

Mr. HOVEYDA (Iran) (interpretation from French): A number of our colleagues have just introduced proposals which, at first sight, seem quite interesting but which require further study. I asked to be allowed to speak to make comments not on those proposals but on the reports of the Chairmen of Working Groups A and B. I am rather concerned about those reports. Of course I should like at the outset to thank the two Chairmen, the members of the Drafting Groups and those responsible for co-ordination for their excellent work. But none the less time is short, and on the many proposals before us and on the texts transmitted to us by the Preparatory Committee it seems to me that we are making very slow progress.

Furthermore, I cannot fail to note that there is a dichotomy between what I hear in the plenary Assembly and what is happening in the basement of this building. The Ministers, Heads of State, Prime Ministers and heads of delegation who have spoken during the general debate have all expressed their intention of seeing this special General Assembly session crowned with success. If we wish to follow the path that they have prescribed in the general debate, we must weigh a little the procedures we are following because at the rate at which we are going we run the risk of reaching the end of this session without having completed consideration of the documents and proposals submitted to the special session.
I believe we should begin by disarming ourselves in our work, and avoid the proliferation of speeches, amendments and brackets. We should follow more flexible procedures and try perhaps to find ways of speeding up our work. I say this without wishing to be critical but merely to remind my colleagues that time is short and that we must race against time if the wishes expressed by the heads of delegation in the general debate are to bear fruit.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): The Chair fully shares the legitimate concern expressed by the representative of Iran. What he has said is particularly relevant and valuable, as he has experience of the seventh special session. Those of us who took part in that session remember very well the abnormal conditions of work in which we had to complete our tasks at the last minute. We even had to have meetings at night to complete our work in time.
I hope that the comments made by the representative of Iran will not fall on deaf ears. I endorse what he has said, and I feel that all delegations should endeavour to see that we make better progress in our work. By the same token, I echo the appeal made by the Chairman of Working Group B towards the end of his statement. Indeed, as I have already mentioned on two previous occasions, there is a need for a spirit of mutual understanding and flexibility in the search for compromise approaches in our work. We are trying to draft a final document which would secure a consensus in the plenary of the Assembly. By definition, this implies readiness by all delegations to make reciprocal concessions. What we are drawing up here is a draft final document; hence, I think that delegations should proceed with a measure of good will and discretion, and not object or raise difficulties over every word or every comma in the text, unless — and I want to stress this — it really feels it essential to their own interest.

Mr. KENNEDY (Ireland): May I say at the very outset how much I appreciate the sense of unease and concern that has just been voiced by the representative of Iran, and supported so eloquently by the Chairman. Not only do we appreciate it and understand the concern which has been so well expressed; we share it. I feel that all representatives here will wish to take account of what has been so well said here this afternoon on that point.

In his address to the General Assembly on 25 May the Prime Minister of Ireland, Mr. Jack Lynch, said, among other things, that:

"... if we are serious ... about the long-term goal of ... disarmament which we have set ourselves, we might begin to think of voluntarily adopting at international level a target figure setting a limit to the percentage of gross national product which each of us would devote to national defence. Clearly, of course, the defence needs of different countries vary greatly and not everybody could keep to whatever target
might be set. But we have now voluntarily adopted at international level a target for the percentage of the gross national product which the developed countries feel they should devote to development aid. Could we perhaps also begin to think, by analogy with this, of adopting voluntarily a percentage limit for our military expenditure even if for particular reasons not all could hold to it? It seems to me that at least we might include this idea as one worth studying in future disarmament negotiations." (A/S-10/PV.4, p. 36)

In order to give more concrete expression to the idea expressed by my Prime Minister, the delegation of Ireland wishes to propose that a study should be undertaken of the possibility of working out a system of targets and incentives to encourage progress in arms control and disarmament. Such a study would be carried out by the Secretary-General with the appropriate assistance of governmental experts.

The study might consider, among other possibilities, whether it would be feasible to set maximum ceilings for national defence expenditures which States would be encouraged to observe. This might be done by fixing, by agreement, as a voluntary target figure, an upper limit for the maximum proportion of its gross national product - or, alternatively, gross domestic product - which a State should devote to military expenditure.

In making this proposal we are conscious of the fact that there are considerable differences in the circumstances of different States in what they consider to be their vital security needs. Accordingly, it would seem best to maintain the idea that while the target or ceiling, expressed as a percentage of GNP - or GDP - should be a matter for general agreement, a decision as to how far it could keep to the target set would be a matter for each State to take on a voluntary basis and without constraint. However, the setting of a general target figure, even on such a voluntary basis, could encourage progress towards disarmament and have considerable moral force, since it would help over a period to win wider and more general acceptance for the idea of specific and agreed limits to be observed by all States, on arms expenditure and armaments of all kinds - conventional as well as nuclear.
The ceiling to be set by general agreement might be a global one, in the sense that a single target figure expressed as a percentage of GNP – or GDP – would be proposed for voluntary adoption by all States Members of the General Assembly prepared to accept it. Alternatively, separate targets might be set for particular regions by agreement among the States of the region.

If progress is to be made towards disarmament, it might be possible to envisage that the targets set could be steadily revised downward, at suitable intervals. In the course of the study, some consideration might also be given to the possibility of an arrangement which would encourage States to devote some or all of any consequent savings on armaments to increasing the funds available for development.

It is recognized that the development of a system of voluntary ceilings and incentives will need to be compatible with, and co-ordinated with, current efforts in the United Nations towards the standardization of military budget statistics, as well as with studies on the relationship between disarmament and development. It is also recognized that the effective implementation of such an incentive system would be facilitated if an appropriate United Nations agency were to be given responsibility for the necessary studies and recommendations.

The Government of Ireland considers that, as a first step, it would be useful to begin now to examine these ideas, and it accordingly proposes that the current special session of the General Assembly should consider the inclusion of the following language in the final document of the special session, in the section relating to studies in the draft Programme of Action. And I am quoting now the language we would suggest:

"The possibility of establishing a system of targets and incentives to promote and encourage progress in arms control and disarmament and, in particular, the possibility of proposing for general adoption a voluntary ceiling (or ceilings) on national defence expenditures, expressed as a proportion of gross national or domestic product, which States would be encouraged to observe."
The text which I have just read has already been transmitted to the Secretariat, together with an explanatory memorandum, with a request that it be circulated as a document of the special session.

The delegation of Ireland would be grateful if, in due course, when the Committee comes to discuss the relevant chapter of the programme of action, consideration could be given to the inclusion of the paragraph which I have just suggested in the studies section, G, of the programme of action (A/S-10/1, vol. I). It would seem to my delegation that an appropriate place for the inclusion of this language, if it is agreed, would be in page 41 of the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament immediately after the subparagraph relating to regional aspects of disarmament.

Mrs. THORSSON (Sweden): I asked to speak this afternoon to express the thanks of the Swedish delegation to the two Vice-Chairmen of this Committee and Chairmen of Working Groups A and B for the first progress reports, which we received this afternoon. However, I have to say that these reports do not appear to be very reassuring and therefore I should like to give the support of the Swedish delegation to the views expressed by the Vice-Chairman of this Committee and Chairman of Working Group B, Ambassador Jaroszek of Poland by the Vice-Chairman of this Committee, Ambassador Hoveyda of Iran, and those expressed by you, Mr. Chairman, concerning the situation in which we find ourselves at present in regard to the work to be carried out, and consequently also to give its support to the direct appeal made to all of us.

Sweden finds itself among the many countries which are firmly committed to the recommendation of the Preparatory Committee that we should do our utmost to reach a consensus on the final document. The time that remains available to us during this tenth special session of the General Assembly is very short indeed. The progress reports that we have just received show that in the week that has passed since we established the two Working Groups there has been no progress in our work.
Instead, during that week additions have been made to the number of brackets in the draft document, adding to our difficulties in achieving a meeting of minds. I think that all of us must increase our awareness of the shortness of time and of the urgent need for a solution of these difficulties through accommodation and constructive compromise.

I believe that we must start immediately, certainly not to cease from, but to show restraint in, adding, new proposals and, as appears subsequently, new brackets, to the draft text. We must begin soon the process of not insisting until midnight on 26 June on our own individual formulas, but of yielding to views that it is perceived are shared by the predominant majority of delegations. That applies equally to all of us, small countries, great Powers and super-Powers alike.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I should like to thank the representative of Sweden for her valuable contribution to our work. It goes without saying that apart from what has been said by the Chairmen of the Working Groups along the same lines, I fully share the observations and the appeals made to bring our work forward along the lines of progress that we should like to see in the draft of the final document.

Mr. YOUNG (United States of America): Ten years ago this month, the General Assembly took a significant step towards halting the spread of nuclear weapons by adopting resolution 2373 (XXII) commending the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and requesting that the depository Governments open it for signature. Non-nuclear-weapon States parties to this Treaty are under an obligation not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear explosive devices and to accept the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Non-Proliferation Treaty also puts obligations on nuclear-weapon States to share the peaceful benefits of nuclear energy with non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to move towards
nuclear disarmament. More than 100 countries have become parties to this milestone Treaty, which has contributed significantly to the maintenance and strengthening of international security since its entry into force in 1970. Ten additional States have signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty but have not yet ratified it. The Non-Proliferation Treaty stands as a truly international effort to avoid the increased dangers we would all face should additional nations acquire nuclear explosives.

Support for the Non-Proliferation Treaty cuts across regional and ideological boundaries and includes more than 70 non-aligned countries. Considerable progress towards universal adherence has been sustained over the past few years, a number of countries with advanced nuclear power programmes having joined since 1970. We welcome the statements made by the representatives of Indonesia and Turkey at this special session announcing their intention to ratify the Treaty.

Many States have been strong proponents of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and we welcome the continuation of that support. We urge all parties to promote additional adherence, particularly within their own region, as a means of ensuring against a future characterized by competition in the development of nuclear weapons. We urge non-parties once again to consider the real benefits of accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, particularly as a framework within which we may all move towards a world truly free of nuclear weapons.

Strong support for the Non-Proliferation Treaty has been one of the integral elements of United States non-proliferation policy for the past 10 years. President Carter has encouraged universal accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and, while signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, he declared that that goal is central to the objectives of that legislation.

The United States recognizes that the ultimate success of this endeavour depends to some extent on the ability of the existing nuclear-weapon States to limit and ultimately to reduce their own nuclear arsenals. Vice-President Mondale acknowledged this special responsibility, which is also embodied in Article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and emphasized the United States commitment to seek substantial reductions, following SALT II. President Carter has placed nuclear arms control as an item of high priority on the United States
foreign policy agenda and has pledged to work - in the words of his inaugural address - towards "the elimination of all nuclear weapons from this earth".

The United States commitment to share the peaceful benefits of the atom is strong and irrevocable. This policy has been constant for many years and the United States has a record second to none in providing that assistance. Since the 1950s the United States has co-operated with over 40 countries on a bilateral basis and has provided substantial assistance through the International Atomic Energy Agency, of which there are now 110 States members.

We are confident that the recently enacted legislation provides a framework for making the United States a reliable nuclear supplier by bringing more stability and predictability into the nuclear export licensing process. That will help us to discharge our obligations in pursuance of Article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to facilitate peaceful nuclear co-operation with due consideration for the developing countries.

Recipient States should understand the heavy responsibility the United States assumes as a supplier State in ensuring that its exports are not misused. The very real contribution of the peaceful applications of nuclear energy to human development would be severely damaged by instances of diversion to military uses. Supplier and recipient States alike would suffer as a result. The United States believes that there is no incompatibility between its efforts to restrain the spread of certain sensitive nuclear technologies and its continued willingness to contribute to the peaceful nuclear development of other countries.
As further evidence of United States willingness to assist actively in sharing the peaceful uses of the atom, Vice-President Mondale announced that the President would be proposing an expanded programme of peaceful nuclear assistance. As a follow-up, on the occasion of this reaffirmation of United States support for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, it is fitting to place before this body the details of this initiative, particularly since in a major portion of this programme preference will be given to developing countries that are party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Since the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in 1975, the United States has been granting such preference in a portion of its assistance through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). With the establishment of the following programme, we will be expanding this policy and acknowledging the significant contribution that parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty have made to international non-proliferation efforts. We call on other States in a position to do so to consider establishing similar programmes.

Congressional approval will be sought for the following measures:

1. The establishment of a "trust" programme under the International Atomic Energy Agency that would authorize up to $1 million annually for five years and be exclusively for developing countries parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty;

2. Similar authorization of $5 million over five years to provide 20 per cent enriched uranium fuel for research reactors through the International Atomic Energy Agency with a preference given to developing countries parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty; and

3. Provision of up to $1 million annually in "fuel cycle" services for research reactors, principally for the purpose of fuel fabrication services where it would assist countries in the use of lower enrichment levels in research reactors.

These latter two proposals are aimed at an objective we all can share: that is, minimizing the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in research reactors. This material is readily usable in nuclear weapons, and if seized by irresponsible Governments or terrorists could pose a serious danger to the security of all nations.
In addition, the United States strongly reaffirms its willingness to finance, through the Export-Import Bank, appropriate projects in the nuclear field, while limiting such financing to those countries which meet our non-proliferation requirements, with preference given to the parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Through such policies as those just announced, we are continuing to strengthen our commitment to nuclear co-operation while recognizing the important relationship of such a policy to our mutual efforts at avoiding the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): Before adjourning the meeting, and as no other delegation wishes to take the floor at this stage of our work, I should like to make a few announcements.

This Committee had decided in principle to hear progress reports from the Chairmen of both Working Groups on Monday afternoon. Taking account of the fact that we have just heard the first progress report today and that on Monday we will be hearing statements by the non-governmental organizations, I suggest that the next progress reports be submitted to us by both Chairmen at our meeting next Friday.

Similarly, I should like to remind the members of the Committee that on Monday, 12 June, as agreed by this Committee, we shall hear, at the morning and afternoon meetings, representatives of non-governmental organizations. Each of them have been given a 12 minute time-limit and we have to hear 25 organizations. I particularly urge delegations to arrive at 10.30 a.m. sharp to hear those statements. The meetings will be held in the General Assembly hall next Monday, 12 June, at 10.30 a.m. and 3 p.m. I request the members of the Committee to be punctual.

The meeting rose at 5.55 p.m.