Tenth special session
AD HOC COMMITTEE OF THE TENTH
SPECIAL SESSION
Agenda item 11

ADOPTION OF A PROGRAMME OF ACTION ON DISARMAMENT

Canada: amendments to section III (Programme of Action) of the Draft Final Document

1. Add the following separate paragraph at the end of subsection C.1(a) /Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)/ on page 27:

"Agreement by the two major nuclear powers to prohibit the flight-testing of new strategic delivery vehicles could serve as one means to curb the qualitative dimension of the strategic arms race to the extent that compliance with such prohibitions can be verified by national technical means."

2. Add the following separate paragraph after the second paragraph, in subsection C.1(c) /Nuclear disarmament/ on page 27:

"An agreement should be sought by the two major nuclear powers to cease production of additional fissionable material for nuclear weapons purposes. Such an agreement would require agreement on adequate verification arrangements including the acceptance of full-scope safeguards."

3. Parallel to paragraph 2 above, the following separate paragraph should also be added to subsection C.1(g) /Non-proliferation/ on page 33:

"If an adequately verified agreement can be reached between the two major powers to cease the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, a multilateral treaty prohibiting the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices should be negotiated as soon as possible. Such a treaty, to which nuclear-weapons and non-nuclear-weapon States might adhere, would provide a common basis for the acceptance of full-scope safeguards."
4. In subsection C.4 [Reduction of military budgets and expenditure] on page 37, after the first paragraph, add the following separate paragraph:

"Limiting and then progressively reducing, on an agreed and verifiable basis, spending on new strategic nuclear weapons systems, including their research and development, by the major nuclear powers would be a further means of curbing the qualitative dimension of the nuclear arms race. Such agreements on restraint or reduction will require full openness in reporting and full effectiveness in authenticating military budgets."