Tenth special session
AD HOC COMMITTEE OF THE TENTH SPECIAL
SESSION
Agenda items 9, 10, 11 and 12

REVIEW AND APPRAISAL OF THE PRESENT INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IN
THE LIGHT OF THE PRESSING NEED TO ACHIEVE SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS
IN THE FIELD OF DISARMAMENT, THE CONTINUATION OF THE ARMS RACE
AND THE CLOSE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DISARMAMENT,
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

ADOPTION OF A DECLARATION ON DISARMAMENT

ADOPTION OF A PROGRAMME OF ACTION ON DISARMAMENT

REVIEW OF THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN DISARMAMENT AND OF
THE INTERNATIONAL MACHINERY FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON DISARMAMENT,
INCLUDING IN PARTICULAR THE QUESTION OF CONVENING A WORLD
DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE

Letter dated 26 May 1978 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the
Secretary-General

I am transmitting to you herewith the text of the document: entitled "Practical
measures for ending the arms race: proposals of the Soviet Union".

I should be grateful if you would have the text of these proposals circulated
to the delegations of States Members of the United Nations as an official document
of the tenth special session of the General Assembly under agenda items 9, 10, 11
and 12.

(Signed) A. GROMYKO
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the USSR

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ANNEX

PRACTICAL MEASURES FOR ENDING THE ARMS RACE

Proposals of the Soviet Union

The entire course of world developments has now brought the question of ending the arms race to the centre of international politics.

The accelerating and expanding process of the development, manufacture and deployment of new types of weapons and systems of armaments is acquiring ever more dangerous features. The soaring destructive potential in the arsenals of States is already sufficient to challenge, if activated, the very existence of man on earth.

If the arms race is not halted, political détente, achieved as a result of great efforts by many States and peoples, may come to a standstill. If the threat of military confrontation starts to mount again, it will hardly be possible to maintain even the current level of international trust, without which normal relations between States are inconceivable.

The arms race, consuming as it does an ever-increasing share of the material and intellectual resources of mankind, can prevent any solution to the extremely complicated problems of economic development. If the arms race continues, it will be difficult to resolve those global and universal problems whose urgency has increased so greatly over the last few decades - the provision of food, the development of radically new sources of energy, the extensive use of the oceans and outer space, the eradication of disease and the preservation of the environment.

The bilateral and multilateral arms limitation agreements concluded in the 1960s and 1970s have undoubtedly had and continue to have a certain restraining influence on the arms race. By closing some channels for the development and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and somewhat narrowing others, those agreements have averted the worst. Yet, because of their limited nature and the fact that not all States - and, what is more, not all the nuclear Powers - have become Parties to them, they have failed to halt the arms race.

At the same time, the pace at which agreements on limiting the arms race are being achieved is slower than that at which the arms race itself is developing. Moreover, in some highly dangerous aspects of the arms race a point may be reached beyond which it will no longer be possible to conclude arms-limitation agreements based on mutual verification. Weapons systems are already being developed and are close to the production stage which do not lend themselves to such verification at all in terms of limiting their quantity and their qualitative characteristics.

History has confronted States and peoples with a choice. As L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR said recently, "International relations are now, as it were, at a crossroads, leading either to a
growth of trust and co-operation or to a growth of mutual fear, suspicion and arms stockpiling, a crossroads leading ultimately either to lasting peace or, at best, to balancing on the brink of war."

Only one choice is possible: it is essential to bring about a decisive breakthrough in the struggle to end the arms race. Time cannot be wasted — that would be fraught with extremely grave consequences. No State any longer has the right to withhold its contribution to ending the arms race. And no Government will be able to justify before its own people actions which do not promote the solution of this problem, much less those which are counterproductive.

Ending the arms race is the common task of all States, all Governments and all peoples. Dealing with this task requires a joint effort.

Accordingly, the Soviet Union, pursuing the invariable Leninist policy of peace and peaceful co-operation, addresses an appeal and a proposal to all States Members of the United Nations to take, as soon as possible, a number of urgent steps towards halting the arms race. For its part, the Soviet Union is prepared to help in every possible way to carry them out and to participate directly, where necessary, in translating them into reality.

It is the view of the Soviet Union, as L. I. Brezhnev recently stated, that the time has come to give thought to ending completely any further quantitative and qualitative build-up of arms and armed forces of States with a large military potential, thus creating conditions for their subsequent reduction. Specifically, the Soviet Union is calling for discussion of a programme for the implementation of the following measures within a specified limited period:

- Cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons;
- Cessation of the production of, and prohibition of, all other types of weapons of mass destruction;
- Cessation of the development of new types of conventional armaments of great destructive capability;
- Renunciation by the permanent members of the Security Council, and by countries which have military agreements with them of the expansion of their armies and the build-up of their conventional armaments.

Of course, it will not be easy to reach agreement on such matters.

A start should be made, therefore, with the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons.

At the same time, the Soviet Union for its part declares in no uncertain terms that it is against the use of nuclear weapons; only extraordinary circumstances, aggression against the Soviet Union or its allies by another nuclear Power, can compel it to resort to this extreme means of self-defence.

/.../
1. Since the main danger is generated by the accelerating nuclear arms race, efforts of States should be focused on measures to halt the arms race in this area and subsequently to reverse it.

There is no doubt that it would have been much easier to solve this problem at the stage when nuclear weapons had just emerged. That was precisely what the Soviet Union proposed at the time— to ban nuclear weapons once and for all. However, its proposal was not accepted. Now that States are armed with a wide range of nuclear weapons systems and now that the nuclear factor dominates the military reality of today and is basic to strategic planning, the problem has become immeasurably more difficult.

Nevertheless, it would be a grave error to believe that it has now become altogether impossible to reverse the course of events in the field of nuclear armaments. In the political and social fields, States and peoples have been confronted with no less difficult challenges, but they have proved equal to them. Statesmanship, an honest and objective approach to the core of the problem, an awareness of the historic responsibility for the success of the entire cause, purposefulness and perseverance can provide ways of solving this highly complex problem as well.

The Soviet Union firmly advocates early action to this end. L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, has put forward proposals for ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed. What we are proposing now is a discussion of the question of how to proceed to appropriate negotiations.

We believe that all the nuclear Powers should take part in the negotiations and that failure by any of them to do so would place a heavy burden on its policy. It would also seem useful to have a certain number of non-nuclear States involved in these negotiations. The specific formula for participation in the negotiations could be agreed upon through diplomatic channels, or within the framework of an appropriate preparatory committee. The same procedure could be applied in order to reach agreement on the agenda for the negotiations and to determine the items to be considered and acted upon.

No one should have any illusions—this is a vast and extremely complex area. It includes the questions of how to achieve the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and proceed to a gradual reduction in their accumulated stockpiles; questions relating to stages or phases of progress in this direction; questions pertaining to the extent to which individual nuclear Powers should become involved in this process at each stage, taking into account differences in the level of their military nuclear potential; questions as to how to leave the existing balance in the sphere of nuclear might undisturbed, while at the same time constantly lowering its level.

Of course, the formulation and implementation of measures to end the production of nuclear weapons and gradually destroy their stockpiles should run parallel to, and be inseparable from, the consolidation of political and international legal
guarantees for the security of States. The conclusion of a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations would be a major step in that direction. The proposals of the Soviet Union to that effect are well known. Furthermore, there is the decision of the General Assembly on the non-use of force in international relations and the permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

Talks on these subjects will require much effort and hard work. But what is needed now, first of all, is to start the negotiations and put the matter on a practical plane.

To this end, the Soviet Union proposes that the current special session of the General Assembly should adopt a decision of principle on the need to start negotiations on nuclear disarmament and on the non-use of force, determine the procedure for their preparation, and set a specific date for their beginning. Setting the date would emphasize that States are firm in their intent to relieve mankind once and for all from the threat of nuclear war.

2. One of the most important objectives of ending the arms race is undoubtedly the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons. In the last 10 years, since the conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, substantial progress has been made towards the solution of that problem. Nevertheless, not everything necessary has been done and further efforts are required now.

Needless to say, nuclear weapons in the hands of States situated in areas of conflict and tension would be particularly dangerous. A nuclear conflict, should it flare up in any such region, could trigger an all-out nuclear clash. It is precisely for this reason that the plans to develop nuclear weapons in South Africa and Israel, which have come to light, cause such profound concern. These plans should not be allowed to materialize; sharply increased instability and tension in the regions in question would escalate the nuclear danger for all mankind.

Obviously, there is a need to secure the more active participation of a large number of States, including non-nuclear States, in the consolidation of the non-proliferation régime. Therefore, the wishes they express in this connexion should be given close attention.

It will be recalled that what they want above all is stronger security guarantees for non-nuclear States. At present, such guarantees exist in the form of the obligation assumed by the USSR, the United States of America and the United Kingdom in the Security Council to undertake certain actions to provide support for the victim of nuclear aggression. This is an important obligation. But many non-nuclear States would like the nuclear Powers to take yet another step - to undertake not to use nuclear weapons against them.

The Soviet Union declares that it will never use nuclear weapons against those States which renounce the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons and have no nuclear weapons on their territories. We are ready to conclude special agreements
to that effect with any such non-nuclear State.† We call upon all other nuclear Powers to follow our example and assume similar obligations.

The establishment of nuclear-free zones in various regions of the world can help to reduce the threat of nuclear war and consolidate the régime of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Proceeding from its fundamental position of support for the desire of States in any given region not to allow nuclear weapons on their territories, the Soviet Union has decided to sign Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), thus assuming an obligation to respect the denuclearization of that continent. Of course, this obligation on our part will remain valid only if the other nuclear Powers also respect the status of that zone and if the parties to it guarantee a truly denuclearized régime there.

Progress in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is undoubtedly one of the promising ways to solve the energy problem, and the Soviet Union favours broader international co-operation in this area, provided, of course, that it is carried out under conditions which rule out its use to increase possibilities for the development of nuclear weapons. At the same time, looking ahead, it can be said with confidence that nuclear energy, however important, is not the only key for solving the energy problem.

Alternative approaches are emerging today which do not lead to greater nuclear risk. They are thermonuclear synthesis, the use of solar and geothermal energy, and a number of other sources of energy, all of which may prove to be highly promising. Their development also promises cheaper energy than nuclear energy.

The Soviet Union is prepared to co-operate on a constructive basis with other States in research activities concerning new sources and types of energy. We have recently stated our readiness to take part, together with the United States of America, the European countries, Japan and other States, in the "Tokamak" international project - a thermonuclear reactor designed to produce a controlled thermonuclear reaction with a release of energy higher than the energy input.

It will be recalled that the Soviet Union is already providing services to a number of countries which are having their natural uranium enriched at Soviet enrichment facilities. To promote a broad use of the peaceful atom to solve energy problems, the Soviet Union is prepared to go on rendering such services under appropriate international guarantees.

3. The strengthening of the régime of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is directly linked to another, no less pressing issue, that of the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present. This issue must be resolved as well.

Speaking in practical terms, no nuclear weapons should be stationed in the future, either in the form of deployed combat nuclear systems or in the form of stockpiles of nuclear warheads, bombs, shells and mines, on the territories of those States where there are no nuclear weapons today. Once agreement is reached on this matter, a process which could have dangerous consequences, such as the destabilization of the existing strategic situation, will be halted.
It is obvious that the solution of this problem depends to a large degree on those non-nuclear States where there are at present no nuclear weapons. Some of them have already made statements to the effect that they will not allow nuclear weapons on their territories. It would be desirable for other non-nuclear States in a similar situation to adopt the same attitude.

As in the case of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, however, a great deal depends on the nuclear Powers, especially if we take into account the means at their disposal for exerting political influence through allied and other channels. The nuclear Powers could take a major positive step if they assumed a clear and plain obligation not to station nuclear weapons in those countries where there are no such weapons at present. Naturally, such an obligation should be universal in character, that is to say, it should be applicable to any non-nuclear State on whose territory there are no nuclear weapons, regardless of whether any particular nuclear Power is or is not an ally of that State.

The Soviet Union declares its readiness to assume such an obligation and calls upon all the other nuclear Powers to follow suit. Agreement in principle among nuclear Powers in this regard would make it possible for them to hold an exchange of views on the form that such an obligation should take.

4. The prohibition of the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction figures prominently among international priorities. It is the view of the Soviet Union that this problem could have been solved several years ago when it was raised for the first time. Unfortunately, its solution has been stalled because of the attitude adopted by certain States. It is all the more important to multiply efforts in this direction now when rapid development of scientific research in the most diverse fields is perceptibly increasing the danger that new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction will see the light of day.

International action is urgently required to rule out, once and for all, the emergence and deployment of neutron weapons. The question of banning such weapons has been discussed in recent months at various inter-State levels, including the top levels, as well as by the world public and the most eminent representatives of the contemporary scientific community. As a result of these discussions, it can be stated with confidence that:

- Neutron weapons are an especially inhuman means of mass destruction of people;

- Neutron weapons will inevitably lower the threshold of a nuclear war and consequently will increase the probability of such a war;

- The introduction of neutron weapons by one group of States will inevitably lead to similar action on the part of another group of countries, and this will open up a new channel for the nuclear arms race, just as happened in the 1940s with atomic, and in the 1950s with thermonuclear, weapons;

- The emergence of any one type of neutron weapons could mark but a start of this race: the first type will inevitably be followed by other types with even...
greater destructive capability, designed to attain objectives broader than those currently conceived, including objectives which go beyond the confines of a single continent.

These are the immutable facts that induced certain States, including the Soviet Union, to submit to the Committee on Disarmament a draft international convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons.

In view of the fact that the United States Government has postponed its final decision to begin the production of neutron weapons, the Soviet Union will not begin their production either as long as the United States does the same. However, the Soviet Union remains an advocate of the complete prohibition of neutron weapons.

If the interests of the security of the peoples are to be taken into account, consideration of the proposal concerning the prohibition of neutron weapons should be accorded high priority in the work of the Committee on Disarmament, while the thirty-third session of the General Assembly could sum up the results of the work accomplished.

There is still time to block the advance of the neutron death and not allow it to materialize. Prompt action is required, however, and the Soviet Union once again urges all States to take such action.

5. Ending the arms race requires the early and successful completion of the talks already under way to this end at the bilateral, regional and international levels. In a number of cases, the talks have identified ways which can lead to agreement, and a considerable, perhaps even the main, part of the work has already been accomplished. Final success can be achieved by multiplying these efforts and making them even more purposeful.

This is primarily true of the Soviet-United States talks on the limitation of strategic offensive arms, designed to limit the deployment of the most dangerous and destructive armaments, the use of which would be tantamount to unleashing a nuclear world war.

Serious difficulties are known to have arisen on several occasions at the talks on the limitation of strategic offensive arms. Many of the difficulties have now been overcome and there are fairly good possibilities for the solution of remaining problems. It is extremely important not to allow new obstacles, new problems, to arise in the way of a successful completion of the talks. The agreement can and must be concluded in the very near future.

After an agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms has been concluded, efforts in that direction should be continued without delay. They should lead to a substantial decrease in the levels of strategic offensive arms and to a further limitation of their qualitative improvement - naturally on the basis of the principle of equal security for both sides and with due account for all the related factors. The Soviet Union will be prepared to conduct serious and business-like talks on all these questions.
There is a real opportunity to bring the talks on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests to a prompt and successful conclusion. The peoples of the world have been awaiting this opportunity for the past 15 years, since the conclusion of the Treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water.

In order to clear the path towards constructive agreement on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, the Soviet Union, as is known, has recently taken a number of steps in the areas where the main difficulties were encountered. We have agreed to verification on a voluntary basis, to a moratorium on peaceful nuclear explosions, and to the entry into force of the Treaty even if initially only three of the five nuclear Powers - the USSR, the United States of America and the United Kingdom - become Parties to it. We are in favour of the early completion of the drafting of the treaty and its signing.

Practical talks are also under way on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. But here progress has been extremely slow, and this state of affairs cannot be considered normal. Although certain difficulties have arisen in the course of the talks and consultations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, mainly in connexion with the problem of control, they are not insurmountable. The problem of control over the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction can be solved on the basis of national means of verification supplemented by well-considered international procedures.

For its part, the Soviet Union has made and will continue to make efforts to bring about the successful completion of the talks on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Similar efforts, however, are required on the part of the other participants in the talks.

An advanced stage has been reached in the preparation of an agreement banning another type of weapon of mass destruction - radiological weapons, that is to say, weapons which affect living organisms by radiation resulting from the non-explosive disintegration of radio-active material. The draft convention banning the development, production and use of radiological weapons has already been partly agreed between the participants in the talks. The Soviet Union considers that this work should be completed without unnecessary delay.

There is also a possibility of placing on a practical footing the solution of the question concerning the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments. The Soviet Union has consistently and continuously favoured meaningful measures to this end. On various occasions, such measures have been the subject of exchanges of views, consultations and negotiations, both on a bilateral basis and at international forums.

The time has now come to proceed from general discussions to actual work, to concrete talks, in accordance with the programme of practical measures which the Soviet Union is now submitting for the consideration of States Members of the United Nations.
It is high time to make headway in the negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. Here the issue under discussion involves the reduction of military tension in an area where such tension is particularly high, and where the confrontation of the armies of the two military-political alliances is especially dangerous.

Success in these negotiations would be an important contribution to the improvement of the over-all international situation, and would serve as an example and a model for practical steps to reduce armed forces and armaments in other parts of Europe, as well as in other regions of the world.

The reason why there has been no progress for a number of years in the negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe is that the Western participants in the negotiations insist, without any grounds, on the so-called asymmetrical reduction of the armed forces and armaments of both sides, to the detriment of the security of the socialist States. Although the somewhat revised proposals submitted by the Western countries in mid-April of this year are to a significant degree also one-sided, the Soviet Union is ready to do everything in its power to reach mutually acceptable solutions at the Vienna talks.

Unlike the NATO countries, the Soviet Union has long ceased to build up its armed forces in Central Europe and does not intend to increase them in the future by a single soldier or a single tank.

Military détente on the European continent also requires other steps recently proposed by the socialist States - above all an undertaking by the States participating in the European Conference not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other. The purport and significance of this proposal are evident. Clearly, its implementation would considerably facilitate an agreement on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. The proposal has been made, enough time has been allowed for its preliminary study, and it is time now to begin discussing it jointly at an appropriate international forum.

The Soviet-United States talks on the limitation and subsequent reduction of military activities in the Indian Ocean can well be concluded in a matter of months. Both the participants directly involved in the talks and the numerous littoral States of the Indian Ocean concerned with the strengthening of their own security, have an equal stake in their success. The degree of progress achieved at the talks, about which the United Nations is regularly kept informed by both sides through the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, attests to the feasibility of full agreement. To achieve this, the talks must be intensified and unjustifiably prolonged recesses, which only delay their completion, must be avoided.

Immediately following the conclusion of an agreement on the "freezing" or "stabilization" of military activities in the Indian Ocean at the present levels, talks should be held on the drastic reduction of such activities, including the dismantling of foreign military bases. Thus, the idea advocated by many States, and above all by the littoral States, that the Indian Ocean should be turned into a zone of peace would be largely implemented.
Progress is possible in the recently initiated Soviet-United States consultations on the limitation of the international trade in and transfers of conventional armaments. This is an urgent problem which needs to be solved. This can be accomplished in the general context of international détente, the consolidation of international peace, the elimination of existing war danger points and the prevention of the emergence of new such danger points.

This means that reasonable and precise political and international legal criteria should be formulated in order to determine in which situations and in regard to which recipients arms transfers are justified and permissible, and in which they must be prohibited or drastically limited. Such criteria should be based on the Charter of the United Nations, the definition of aggression, and the decisions of the United Nations concerning the granting of material and moral support to peoples fighting for their liberation from colonial and racist oppression.

Obviously, not only the USSR and the United States of America, but also other States that supply such arms, should take part in solving the question of the limitation of international trade in and transfers of conventional armaments.

6. It is essential to strengthen those international treaties and agreements in force which are designed to limit the arms race and to ensure their universality and the participation in them of all States without exception.

A whole network of such treaties and agreements has been built up by now. It includes: the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water; the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space; the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor; the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction; the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques.

In view of the fact that there are 149 States Members of the United Nations, it is impossible to regard as normal a situation in which only 106 States are Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the three environments, 102 States to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 73 States to the Convention banning bacteriological weapons, 65 States to the Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and about the same number of States to other treaties and agreements.

Why do one third or even half of all States avoid participating in these important international treaties and agreements? Neither national interests, nor the desire for more far-reaching measures in the field of disarmament, nor references to the fact that a given State does not have at its disposal the types of weapons which are limited or banned under these agreements, can be an obstacle to accession to them. At the same time, it is quite evident that universal participation in these treaties and agreements will enhance their effectiveness and political prestige.

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The United Nations General Assembly has repeatedly urged all States to become parties to the treaties and agreements in force on the limitation of the arms race. The present state of affairs demands that such appeals should at last elicit a universal positive response, reflecting the unity of all the States of the world in their desire to put a stop to the arms race.

7. There is apparently a broad measure of agreement that, in our age, economic development is inseparable from the solution of the problem of ending the arms race and bringing about disarmament. The resources which would be released as a result of practical action by States to this end would constitute a very important source for the improvement of the well-being of countries and peoples, and would be a significant reserve for the expansion of development assistance. The more radical the appropriate measures, the deeper and farther they would reach, and the more additional material resources could be diverted towards those objectives.

There is also another approach which would make it possible, directly and immediately, even before important measures in the field of disarmament are carried out, to combine both aspects of the matter: the imposition of material limitations on the arms race and the release of certain additional resources for peaceful purposes. This approach is the reduction of military budgets.

The General Assembly has repeatedly expressed itself in favour of the implementation of that measure, and the use of part of the funds thus released to provide assistance to developing countries. The intention at that time was first of all to reduce the military budgets of the permanent members of the Security Council by the same percentages in the case of all the States concerned. That decision has not yet been implemented because certain States, including some permanent members of the Security Council, refuse to work towards reaching practical agreement, invoking, inter alia, the argument that the military budgets of States are not comparable.

The Soviet Union, seeking to facilitate a solution to this question, is now proposing that States with a large economic and military potential, including all the permanent members of the Security Council, should agree on specific reductions in their own military budgets not in terms of percentage points but in absolute figures. Such agreement might cover, for instance, a period of three years, beginning with the budget of the next financial year.

At the same time, agreement could be reached on specific amounts which each State that reduced its military budget would allocate for increased aid to developing countries. In such a case, it would be desirable to set up machinery within the framework of the United Nations for the distribution of such funds among the States receiving aid.

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In submitting the above ideas on practical ways of ending the arms race, for the consideration of this special session of the General Assembly, the Soviet Union believes that the steps proposed are a bare minimum. Without their implementation the arms race will not be halted.
At the same time, the steps proposed are substantial. Their implementation would actually mark a turning-point in the entire course of international development: from the arms race and military tension to military détente, and a radical lessening of the threat of war.

Moreover, all these steps are feasible. All of them take into account the existing balance of forces would result in no unilateral advantages or benefits whatsoever for anybody to the detriment of the security interests of others. On most of them, talks are already in progress and in many cases are nearing completion. With regard to other steps, such talks could be started in the near future.

Willingness to move ahead decisively and political will are essential if the arms race is to be ended. The responsibility of each State for the present and the future of the peoples is so great that a State which failed to co-operate in meeting this historic challenge would be committing a crime against humanity.

This special session of the United Nations General Assembly has the necessary authority and power to make a real contribution towards progress in ending the arms race. This is its duty and it must live up to it. In discharging its task, the General Assembly will lay the foundation for the convening and success of the World Disarmament Conference. Having taken effective steps to end the arms race, States would be able to proceed to a radical solution of the disarmament problem, including general and complete disarmament.