Tenth special session
AD HOC COMMITTEE OF THE TENTH
SPECIAL SESSION
Agenda item 11

ADOPTION OF A PROGRAMME OF ACTION ON DISARMAMENT


The Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretariat of the United Nations and has the honour to submit annexed hereto a draft working paper entitled "Invitation to attend an international chemical-weapon verification workshop in the Federal Republic of Germany".

The Permanent Mission requests the Secretariat kindly to circulate the draft working paper as an official document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly under agenda item 11.
ANNEX

Invitation to attend an international chemical-weapon verification workshop in the Federal Republic of Germany

1. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany shares the concern of other nations about the dangers emanating from weapons of mass destruction not only of the nuclear, but also of the chemical variety. Consequently, in agreement with the community of States, it feels that urgent priority should be given to a convention providing for an effective, verifiable and comprehensive chemical-weapon ban - not least because it concerns an already existing and particularly insidious means of mass destruction.

2. The Federal Republic of Germany is a contracting party to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibiting the use of bacteriological (biological) and chemical weapons and, as early as 1954, unilaterally renounced the manufacture of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, the only State to have done so to date.

3. The prohibition of the development, manufacture and stockpiling of chemical weapons and measures to secure the destruction of existing stocks of such weapons has been on the agenda of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva since 1972. Experts of the Federal Republic of Germany have submitted papers with a view to clarifying the complex topics that have to be dealt with by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Members of the United Nations pass resolutions every year, the most recent being General Assembly resolution 32/77 of 12 December 1977, calling upon the Conference to give priority to negotiations on a chemical-weapon ban. Since 1974, the United States of America and the Soviet Union have been conducting bilateral talks with a view to producing a joint initiative, on the basis of which the Conference would be able to elaborate a draft agreement.

4. A convention prohibiting the development, manufacture and stockpiling of chemical weapons and providing for the destruction of remaining stocks thereof requires, apart from other confidence-building measures, above all a verification arrangement commensurate with the military significance of chemical weapons. Verification is the basis of confidence in compliance with the prohibition. United Nations resolutions on disarmament also envisage strict and effective control. On the other hand, monitoring is one of the most complex elements of a chemical-weapon ban.

5. As early as 17 February 1970, the Federal Republic of Germany submitted to the Co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva and to the States Members of the United Nations a working paper on the monitoring of a ban on biological and chemical weapons, which describes in detail the prerequisites and the machinery for monitoring. Although this question has been the subject of thorough discussions, differences of opinion still exist.
6. The Federal Republic of Germany considers it necessary to set up an international verification system with an international verification body, which would resort to different means of international control and would have to include in particular international on-site inspections.

7. The Federal Republic of Germany is convinced that an international verification system involving on-site inspections can be designed so as to rule out the disclosure of commercial and industrial secrets. This is borne out by the experience with IAEA safeguards in the nuclear field and by our own experience with specific international controls in the chemical field. This was also confirmed by the outcome of the Pugwash Workshop, held at a major chemical production plant in the Federal Republic of Germany last August, which was attended by representatives from East and West.

8. In the hope that new impulses will be given to the discussion on verification of a chemical-weapon convention and that the conclusion of such a convention will thus be facilitated, the Federal Republic of Germany invites all States Members of the United Nations to send industrial, scientific and administrative experts to visit representative German chemical plants and to see for themselves that the call for international on-site inspections within the framework of a chemical-weapon ban, as advocated by the Federal Government, can be carried out without prejudicing industrial secrets. The dates and further details of the invitation will be announced in due course.