Tenth special session
Item 11 of the provisional agenda**

ADOPITION OF A PROGRAMME OF ACTION ON DISARMAMENT

Regional aspects of disarmament

Report of the Secretary-General

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* The present document incorporates the information contained in document A/S-9/8 of 10 March 1978, which has been cancelled as a result of the renumbering of the ninth special session.

** A/S-10/10.
II. REPLIES RECEIVED FROM GOVERNMENTS (continued)

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. By resolution 32/87 D of 12 December 1977, the General Assembly invited all States to inform the Secretary-General, not later than 15 April 1978, of their views and suggestions concerning the regional aspects of disarmament, including measures designed to increase confidence and stability as well as means of promoting disarmament on a regional basis, and requested the Secretary-General to transmit the communications received by him from Governments as official documents to the Assembly at its special session devoted to disarmament, to be held from 23 May to 28 June 1978.

2. The communications received as at 28 April 1978 are reproduced below. Communications received subsequently will be issued as addenda to the present document.
II. REPLIES RECEIVED FROM GOVERNMENTS

BELGIUM

[Original: French]
[27 February 1978]

A. Regional aspects of disarmament

1. The regional approach to disarmament is not new. It has already produced a number of studies and some significant achievements. The Antarctic Treaty 1/ was the result of such an approach, although, of course, this was a special case since its application relates to an uninhabited area. The Treaty of Tlatelolco, 2/ on the other hand, was far more significant, since its purpose was to make the South American continent a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

2. At the outset, the regional proposals made related essentially to Europe, as a region in which nuclear weapons play a decisive role in the balance of power. Subsequently, the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones was developed in a number of regions of the world.

3. Each year, the United Nations General Assembly is presented with a number of plans for the establishment of such zones. In 1975, the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones was subjected to a comprehensive study the recommendations of which were submitted to the General Assembly. 3/

4. However, the regional approach has not received such sustained attention in the other fields, particularly with regard to conventional weapons. Nevertheless, the deliberations of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, together with the suggestions made at the General Assembly and certain multilateral declarations, such as the Declaration of Ayacucho, 4/ seem to suggest that the regional approach could be particularly well suited to the field of conventional weapons.

5. Moreover, the regional approach is central to the Vienna negotiations on the mutual reduction of forces and weapons and related measures. The same was true of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Final Act of which contains provisions relating to the military aspects of security, particularly confidence-building measures.

6. All avenues leading to general and complete disarmament are worth exploring, particularly at the regional level where possibilities exist that have not been

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4/ See A/10044, annex.
sufficiently exploited. The time seems to have come, therefore, to devote more systematic attention to the regional approach as such. It would be worth while for the international community to undertake a comprehensive study of the regional aspects of disarmament, as was done with regard to the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

B. Basic conditions governing the regional approach to disarmament

7. This chapter will attempt to define the basic conditions which can play a role in the implementation of regional measures in the field of disarmament.

1. World equilibrium and regional security

8. These two concepts are closely linked, although the existence of an over-all balance between the two military super-Powers does not in itself constitute a guarantee of regional equilibrium. It might even be argued that, in a situation of over-all nuclear parity, that is to say in a situation of reciprocal neutralization of strategic arsenals, the risks of regional or peripheral destabilization tend to increase, in that the system of over-all equilibrium would not take sufficient account of the imperative needs dictated by regional factors.

9. The regional approach must therefore contribute to the establishment, maintenance or preservation of a regional equilibrium guaranteeing the security of the States concerned at as low a level of armament as possible. Moreover, such an equilibrium, based on a consensus of all the States concerned in a given region, provides those States with safeguards against the threat of outside interference.

10. The risk of a conflict into which the nuclear Powers could be drawn could arise from a disruption of equilibrium at the regional level. Consequently, the organization of security at the regional level can constitute an important contribution to international security and the maintenance of world peace.

2. Regional approach and general disarmament

11. Past efforts to achieve general and complete disarmament have demonstrated the need to adopt a step-by-step approach. Complete disarmament must be achieved in successive stages; this vertical progressivity has been on the agenda for many years and has already resulted in a number of not insignificant achievements. By the same token, horizontal progressivity in the shape of the regional approach can make an important contribution to the achievement of general disarmament.

12. This approach, while it already has some important achievements to its credit, has not been followed systematically on its own merits; it can therefore be assumed that, thus far, a number of possibilities have been overlooked.

13. Vertical and horizontal progressivity should proceed in tandem and should be mutually supportive, so as to achieve the permanent objective of general and complete disarmament as quickly and as fully as possible.

/...
14. The regional approach is therefore an element of the process of general and complete disarmament; it cannot be a substitute for it. Complete disarmament on a regional scale, that is a reduction of all military resources to the minimum level required to ensure the internal order of States, is theoretically conceivable for a region where the States are not involved in any disputes (in particular, territorial disputes) in which vital interests are at stake. However, such an undertaking involves risks to security in a larger context, in that, once the agreed complete disarmament has been achieved, the States in the region would lack the capacity for armed defence against States situated outside the region and remaining in possession of undiminished military resources. Declaratory or legal guarantees might seem to provide inadequate protection against such risks to security.

15. For this reason, the regional approach also calls for partial disarmament measures, the adoption of which would nevertheless guarantee horizontal progress towards general and complete disarmament.

16. Such progress therefore assumes a degree of harmony between any efforts made in the different regions. However, since the security situation can vary so widely from one region to another, such efforts need not be identical.

3. Right of States to take measures

17. It is for the States of the region, in the exercise of their sovereignty, to determine the appropriate conditions for ensuring their security; it is therefore only on the initiative of these States that the regional process can be set in motion.

18. It is they themselves who must determine the advisability of any measures that may be contemplated and to define the arrangements for their implementation. However, the States concerned may of course, if they deem it necessary, decide to act within the institutional framework of the United Nations or of any regional organization.

4. Composition and extent of the region

19. It does not appear practicable to attempt to give a precise definition of the concept of a region or subregion, or to lay down specific criteria in advance. Nevertheless, it is clear that, in each case, the area of application must be clearly established in accordance with international law, in particular with regard to maritime and air space.

20. In general, a region should be considered as comprising a strategically coherent unit. The participation of the major military Powers should be secured, either because, geographically, they form part of the area in question, or because they maintain military forces or installations there, for example as part of an alliance.
21. Moreover, the area encompassed will, in many cases, be determined in the light of the measures contemplated.

5. Equal apportionment of responsibilities between the States within and outside the region

22. It is for the States in the region to stipulate the undertakings which they wish to enter into. At the same time, however, the international community should be called on to respect the regional status thus defined. The States outside the region must also undertake not to contravene, by their direct action or in any other way, any regional norms or regulations that may be established. The nature and legal modalities of such an undertaking should be appropriately defined in each case. However, the general objective is to ensure that the military Powers outside the region do not take advantage of the reduction of armaments by States subscribing to regional measures.

23. As far as States outside the region are concerned, undertakings may, as appropriate, be addressed to the international community as a whole, to the nuclear States or to States with Territories or forces in the region in question. Outside States may also be parties to systems of safeguards established in the regional agreements.

6. Membership in an alliance

24. As has already been stated, membership in an alliance extending beyond the framework of the region in question, or the exercise of military responsibilities within the region by States outside it, do not in themselves present an obstacle to the adoption of regional disarmament measures, as is in fact demonstrated by the negotiations currently in progress in central Europe.

7. Political conditions

25. The adoption of regional disarmament measures entails the prior existence of favourable political conditions, but does not necessarily signify a total absence of disputes.

26. There are indisputably situations in which regional measures must necessarily be preceded, or at least accompanied, by political stability. However, the possibility that confidence-building or arms control measures may be adopted prior to the settlement of a dispute should not be ruled out. Such measures, which will have political as well as military implications, may contribute significantly to the creation of a climate of confidence favourable to dialogue, and thus help to improve political relations in the region.

/...
8. Verification

27. All disarmament measures should help to increase security and confidence. This is equally true at the regional level, where all approved arrangements must be subjected to effective verification in accordance with appropriate procedures. Consideration could be given to the possible use of special agencies, in addition to national verification procedures and measures in which the States concerned would participate. It is also conceivable that the existing regional organizations could be called on to perform a verification function, including, as appropriate, the right of on-site inspection or control. The terms of reference of special or regional agencies should be defined on an ad hoc basis.

9. Role of the United Nations and other international organizations

28. The regional approach is consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, Article 52 of which envisages the existence "of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action".

29. Subject to the right of each State to take measures, in the exercise of its sovereignty, the United Nations can play a positive role in the search for regional solutions in the area of disarmament. It could, for example, attempt to define a number of guiding principles which would provide States with a frame of reference and evaluate the possibilities presented by the regional approach. The United Nations could also provide assistance, where it is deemed useful or necessary, and use its good offices to enable the States concerned to achieve progress in their bilateral or multilateral consultations.

30. Moreover, as has already been stated in the chapter dealing with verification, it is self-evident that regional organizations or agencies provide a privileged framework for co-operation and thus constitute a useful instrument in the search for regional solutions.

C. Disarmament, regulation and confidence-building measures which might be implemented on a regional basis

31. The advantage of regional measures lies chiefly in their variety and in the flexibility with which they may be implemented and adapted to local conditions that may differ widely from one region to another. Such measures could be contemplated in isolation or on a basis of complementarity enabling a number of measures to be combined.

1. Reduction of forces and armaments

32. Such reductions could be applied to all forces, both troops and armaments. Admittedly, it may seem more difficult to devise regional solutions for strategic
arms which, by their very nature, are a global concern. However, care should be taken to ensure that no possibility is dismissed out of hand.

33. Reductions could be made, in particular, in troops on active duty, together with their armaments, or at least certain categories of them. The reductions could be made in accordance with certain criteria of selectivity relating mainly to armaments likely to inspire the greatest fears for security in the potential adversary, namely, major offensive weapons or weapons which might be used for territorial conquest. The differences in the structure of forces should lead to balanced solutions which take account of the various elements of existing forces.

34. It should also be noted that any measures to reduce troop or armament levels would logically entail imposing a ceiling on the remaining levels. Adequate arrangements may be called for, as appropriate, to permit effective verification, not only of the implementation of the agreed reduction measures, but also of the observance of agreed ceilings.

2. Limitation measures - freeze on numbers

35. In situations where reduction measures appear unrealistic or premature, arms limitation or freeze measures could help to strengthen confidence and lay the foundation for later reductions.

36. However, an agreement for a general freeze of troops and armaments would mean that the States parties were reasonably satisfied with the existing ratio of forces in the region. In any event, a freeze would involve a prior understanding between the parties on the levels of troops and weapons in the area.

3. Non-armament - non-deployment

37. States in a given region could reach agreement on non-armament or non-deployment measures. Nuclear-weapon-free zones, for example, would come under the "non-armament" heading.

38. At the conventional weapons level, and in so far as the over-all regional balance between the various elements is preserved, States could agree to limit the introduction into a given region or zone of certain types of increasingly powerful, sophisticated and costly weapons.

39. Where, because of its geographical configuration, the zone in question is considered to be of sufficient strategic importance, an alternative to regional non-armament could be to exclude certain types of military equipment, or even all military facilities, from clearly defined territories, such as certain frontier zones.
4. Determination of approved troop levels - structure of forces

40. In addition to any formal arms limitation or arms freeze agreement, the States in a given region could agree on approved troop or arms levels. Prior notice should be given of any change in such levels. A provision of this kind could be accompanied by selective non-deployment measures relating to all or part of the area. Such measures would obviously call for reciprocal information on the levels of forces of the States concerned. Moreover, these levels should be determined in relation to the structure of forces, which can vary very widely. In each case, therefore, account should be taken of the different elements making up the military balance in the region in question.

41. The States in the region would be called on to exchange information regularly concerning the level of their forces and any changes occurring in the structure of those forces. Apart from their stabilizing effect, such measures would also have the not inconsiderable advantage of strengthening confidence by providing better information on the military resources of both sides.

5. International arms sales and transfers

42. Once the States in a region have reached agreement on a specific level of armaments or on the prohibition of the purchase of certain types of weapons, transfers of arms into the region in question should be conducted in accordance with the agreements concluded. The States concerned would themselves determine, on a regional basis, the level of security which they deem essential. In this way, the regional approach could make a valid contribution to the control of international arms transfers.

43. Having determined the level of forces necessary to ensure their security, the States concerned could consider working together, or even uniting, for the joint purchase of the military equipment necessary to maintain their security.

44. In addition to the security benefits to be expected from control measures, this would bring the added economic advantage of strengthening the position of the buyers in negotiating contracts.

6. Confidence-building measures

45. All these measures clearly help to build mutual confidence among the States in the region. The absence or lack of such confidence seriously affects the sense of security of States, thereby fostering at their very source arms races which are both superfluous and ruinous.

46. Confidence-building measures are less complex than disarmament, and their limited geographical implementation at the regional level can facilitate their adoption.

47. What are needed in general are measures making clear the intentions actually
underlying military activities - as opposed to those which might be thought to underlie even the most benign or routine of such activities - so as to avoid misunderstandings and misinterpretations which breed mistrust.

48. The range of measures already implemented or proposed at the regional level is extensive.

(a) Prior notice of military manoeuvres and troop movements

49. States could agree to provide one another with a pre-determined period of notice of manoeuvres taking place over and above a given level. They could also agree to provide partner countries with the necessary information concerning the purpose of the manoeuvre and the arrangements for its execution.

50. Such notice may be extended to troop movements, which are even more open to misinterpretation than are manoeuvres.

51. Finally, a limitation of manoeuvres and troop movements could be negotiated when circumstances permit, and in conditions to be determined. However, such a step would no longer constitute a confidence-building measure in the strict sense, since, by its restrictive character, a limitation is necessarily akin to an arms regulation measure.

(b) Exchange of observers

52. As part of their confidence-building measures, States could also agree, on a regional basis, to invite observers to manoeuvres and to exchange military missions.

(c) Information concerning the budgets and structure of forces

53. Another category of confidence-building measures concerns information relating to the military effort in the more general sense. Parallel with the effort being made under the auspices of the United Nations Secretary-General, the States of a given region could embark on a systematic exchange of information concerning the level and nature of their military expenditures. To avoid any misunderstanding which would inevitably lead to a lack of trust, the figures should be communicated according to a standardized procedure. It might also be feasible to exchange information on the equipment programme.

(d) Improvement of regional communications and prevention of crises

54. This involves measures which, although of a more political nature, are directly related to security. States could, inter alia, agree to warn one another of any event which might provoke a crisis, or to take joint emergency action in situations of tension. The measures taken could include the setting up of direct and rapid means of communication between heads of State in the event of a crisis.
BYELORUSSIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

1. The problem of putting an end to the arms race and achieving disarmament is now the focus of world politics. The socialist countries, as in the past, are ready to agree on the most far-reaching disarmament measures, including general and complete disarmament.

2. In order to achieve practical results in the disarmament field in the form of binding international agreements, all States should unite their efforts and all channels, whether bilateral, multilateral or regional, should be used.

3. The Byelorussian SSR supports regional measures directed towards achieving genuine results in the field of arms limitation and disarmament and in the strengthening and consolidation of détente. An outbreak of war in one place can spread in a matter of hours to other continents and engulf the entire planet. Conversely, real progress in strengthening peace and good neighbourliness in one part of the world will assist in cleansing the whole international atmosphere. This applies above all to Europe, where the most destructive weapons are concentrated in especially large quantities and where opposing military and political alliances are closely juxtaposed. At the same time, in this same region, as a result of the evolution of the process of détente and the adoption of the Final Act at the Helsinki Conference, favourable political conditions are being created for further steps to be taken in the most difficult area, namely, disarmament.

4. Europe now faces a particularly urgent task - that of supplementing political détente with military détente. The socialist countries, for their part, have repeatedly put forward very specific proposals for achieving that objective.

5. They are ready to proceed to the mutual dissolution of opposing military and political groupings of States or, as a beginning, the disbandment of their military organizations. However, since the Western countries are not prepared to set about the achievement of those aims, the States of the socialist community are putting forward a number of other concrete proposals. They include those submitted by the USSR for consideration at the Belgrade meeting and contained in the programme of action for consolidating military détente in Europe. First of all, the participants in the European Conference should conclude a treaty renouncing the first use of nuclear weapons against each other. The draft of such a treaty has already been put forward by the countries members of the Warsaw Treaty. The programme of action also envisages the reaching of agreement at least not to expand the opposing military and political groupings and alliances in Europe by admitting new members.

6. Further, it is proposed that there should be consistent implementation of certain measures already provided for in the Final Act of the European Conference, such as the notification of major military manoeuvres, the invitation of observers...
to attend certain manoeuvres and the exchange of military delegations. The experience of recent years shows that such measures make a definite contribution to strengthening trust and military détente. It would now be appropriate to reach agreement not to conduct military exercises involving more than 50,000-60,000 troops.

7. The proposals contained in the programme of action could be thoroughly examined at the earliest date in special consultations held jointly by all States that participated in the Helsinki Conference, concurrently with the continuing negotiations being conducted at Vienna on the mutual reduction of forces and armaments in Central Europe.

8. An important outcome of the Belgrade meeting is the fact that the representatives of the participating States stressed the political significance of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and confirmed their Governments' determination to implement fully, on a unilateral, bilateral and multilateral basis, all the provisions of the Final Act. The stated intention at the Belgrade meeting to hold a number of meetings in the near future should assist in further consolidating the process of détente and in translating into practice the provisions of the Final Act of Helsinki.

9. The negotiations on the mutual reduction of forces and armaments in Central Europe are important for solving the problem of military détente. The Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community approach the Vienna negotiations with a high degree of responsibility and firmly uphold the principle of not impairing the security of any party. They are doing their utmost to ensure that the Vienna negotiations move forward, thus contributing to military détente on the European continent and throughout the world. Life itself calls for a constant search for ways to bring about a constructive dialogue.

10. It is important to reach agreement, as the Soviet Union proposed to the Western countries, on a mutual renunciation of the production of the neutron bomb in order to rid the world of this new, inhuman weapon of mass murder. The Byelorussian SSR therefore supports the draft Convention on the prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon, submitted by the socialist countries for consideration by the Disarmament Committee at Geneva.

11. An important measure of regional military détente would be the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace in various parts of the globe, which should help to strengthen the security of States situated in those zones as well as international security as a whole. Of special importance would be the creation of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean and the withdrawal from the Mediterranean Sea of ships and submarines carrying nuclear weapons. In proposing the creation of nuclear-free zones, the socialist countries seek to ensure that such zones will be genuinely free from nuclear weapons and that the relevant agreements contain no loopholes and are fully in keeping with the generally accepted norms of international law.

12. The Byelorussian SSR considers that the adoption of the above-mentioned measures on a regional basis would unquestionably contribute to the deepening and consolidation of détente and to the creation of favourable conditions for curbing the arms race, bringing about disarmament and cleansing the whole international atmosphere.
1. Canada was pleased to join in co-sponsoring General Assembly resolution 32/67 D because of its belief that the pursuit on a regional basis of agreements in the field of arms control and disarmament would be a useful way for States to strive to obtain the security benefits and economic savings that could be derived from such measures at the regional level. Attempts to build confidence and to enhance security, or at least to maintain it at lower levels of armaments and forces, through balanced arms limitations and reductions may be more attainable and effective if they take into account regional requirements and conditions. Such measures may not, of course, be attainable in the several regions of acute tensions or conflict, although it seems possible that agreed measures of restraint might form some part of the resolution of such conflicts.

2. It is evident that inadequate attention has been devoted in United Nations disarmament discussions and efforts to the possibilities for the prohibition, limitation and reduction of armaments on a regional basis; efforts by States of particular regions so far have been limited in number. The conclusion of the Treaty of Tlatelolco 5/ represented one important application of the regional approach in seeking to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to a particular region and to avoid the degradation of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States or the region that such proliferation would represent, but the regional concept need not be restricted to nuclear-weapon-free zones. Negotiations are currently being conducted to seek agreed force reductions in Central Europe, one of the regions of major military confrontation in the world, and the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, held at Helsinki, instituted a system of confidence-building measures on a regional basis.

3. In the Canadian view, it would be worth while to examine the scope afforded by the regional approach in various disarmament-related fields, including the limitation and reduction of armaments and armed forces, nuclear non-proliferation, restraints on transfers of weapons or at least on certain types of weapons, confidence-building measures, demilitarized zones and zones of limited force levels. If an expert study in this general area were carried out by the Secretary-General at an early date, it would provide useful guidelines for the States which might find it possible to undertake negotiations to these ends in particular regions.

CUBA

Original: Spanish
April 1978

1. The Government of the Republic of Cuba is of the opinion that the promotion of regional disarmament measures contributes to the achievement of general and complete disarmament and the strengthening of international peace and security, both in the region concerned and in the world as a whole.

2. For that reason Cuba has always supported all just measures aimed at creating an atmosphere of peace, confidence and security in the region, without which no disarmament initiative can be successful.

3. In this context an indispensable prerequisite for the creation of such a climate of confidence, sovereign equality, peace and security is the cessation of all hostile and aggressive acts, whether of a military, economic or political nature, against any State in the region.

4. The Government of Cuba further considers that in order to make it possible to promote effective disarmament measures, the right of self-determination, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the peoples and States of the region must be respected and colonial dependencies, unequal treaties detrimental to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States, foreign military bases and military treaties conceived for purposes of neo-colonial domination must be eliminated.

5. The Government of Cuba expresses its firm conviction that these measures would create a climate of peace and security and make it possible to promote effective disarmament measures, including the establishment of genuine zones of peace and nuclear-weapon-free zones.

6. The Government of Cuba pledges its enthusiastic contribution to any initiative that will enable real progress to be made at the regional level to the elimination of the arms race.
FINLAND

[Original: English]
[19 April 1978]

1. The Government of Finland has, in various contexts, put forth as its view that all approaches and avenues to disarmament should be explored. Although the most urgent disarmament issues are global in character, in particular the threat posed by nuclear and other mass destruction weapons, a regional approach may prove fruitful where proper politico-geographical conditions exist.

2. In view of the more general objective of a complete and general disarmament under strict international control, it would be essential to bring about a positive, dynamic interaction between regional and universal disarmament measures. At the regional level, the objective should be to ensure the security of all States at as low a level of armaments as possible by means of measures towards the reduction of military tensions, the strengthening of confidence and the limitation of armaments, as well as the peaceful settlement of disputes.

3. A regionally definable relaxation of tension seems a necessary condition for progress in regional arms control and disarmament. Most markedly, such a process of the relaxation of tension has taken place in the European continent, the area of the highest military concentration in the world. The relatively slow advance in the negotiations at Vienna on the mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe indicates, however, that the exploitation of the conditions created by a political process for purposes of regional disarmament measures may require time and effort, despite the generally recognized need to make progress in arms control and disarmament space with the relaxation of political tension. Also, the European example seems to indicate that the contribution of Powers with specifically global involvement to achieving regional arms control measures may be necessary.

4. An example of the merits of a regional approach to the control of a global issue is the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and proposals for such zones. Nuclear-weapon-free zones can be a measure to enhance the security of States participating in the zone, while at the same time being a world-wide security measure. This view is reflected in the Comprehensive Study of the Question of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in All Its Aspects. 6/

5. Conventional weapons in general would seem to lend themselves by their very nature to regional limitation measures. An issue which is particularly well suited for the regional approach is the transfer of conventional weapons and weapons technology to a region from suppliers outside the region. In such cases, arrangements calling for restraint on the part of both suppliers and recipients would be expedient. The experience gained from the existence of demilitarized zones could be helpful in devising such arrangements.

6/ A/10027/Add.1 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.76.I.7).
6. Confidence-building measures are a necessary part of measures aimed at the relaxation of military tension. A set of such measures provided for by the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe have already proved their case. The subject-matter is also on the agenda of the negotiations at Vienna on the mutual reduction of forces and armament and associated measures in Europe.

7. Recently, the concept of zones of peace has been widely endorsed. Measures leading to the establishment of such zones and zones of limited armaments should be encouraged as a contribution to the peace and security of the regions concerned.

8. The emergence of patterns of co-operation - economic, cultural and technical - encompassing States with different military-political orientation should be viewed as a development conducive to the relaxation of military tension or confrontation in the area.

9. In the opinion of the Government of Finland, a comprehensive study of all regional aspects of disarmament, as envisaged by paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 32/87 D, could be useful in analysing the particular conditions under which the regional approach would most likely yield results. Such a study should, in the view of the Government of Finland, draw on existing United Nations studies of the various aspects of regional approaches to arms control and disarmament and elaborate on the interaction between regional and global measures.
GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF

[Original: English]
[19 April 1977]

I

1. The Federal Government noted with interest the Belgian initiative during the thirty-second session of the General Assembly and in preparation for the special session of the Assembly devoted to disarmament, designed to promote regional disarmament measures. It endorsed the draft resolution that became resolution 32/L7, sponsored by Belgium, which was adopted by the Assembly on 12 December 1977.

2. The policy of the Federal Republic of Germany aims at safeguarding peace, reducing and eliminating tension and intensifying international co-operation. The Federal Government welcomes the growing endeavours towards disarmament and arms control and underlines the importance it attaches to effective international verification. The Federal Government strongly believes that international disarmament measures should be supplemented by regional arrangements which, in its view, could contribute significantly to the maintenance of international peace. The Federal Government therefore advocates, as a supplement to world-wide initiatives, the conclusion of agreements on regional measures of disarmament and arms control which take into account the security interests of the region concerned and which are endorsed by all States situated within its boundaries.

3. In the Federal Government's view, it is as important for regional disarmament and arms control measures as it is for any world-wide agreement on disarmament and arms control to present a balanced approach and to help ensure greater security and stability in the interest of all States concerned. Only then will it be possible, through such measures, to strengthen peace and to establish a basis for international co-operation in many fields for the benefit of all. The Federal Government considers it indispensable to an effective realization of these objectives that all States comply with the principle embodied in the Charter of the United Nations to refrain from the threat or use of force. The Federal Government supports endeavours towards giving effective recognition to this commitment in concrete international and regional arrangements on disarmament and arms control.

II

4. In its positive attitude towards regional arrangements of disarmament and arms control, the Federal Government is guided by the following general considerations:

(a) Regional arrangements must be based on a consensus of all States Members of the region to which they apply. Initiatives for regional arrangements should therefore come from the States situated in that particular region.

(b) The major advantage of regional disarmament and arms control arrangements is that they can be adjusted to the specific needs and peculiarities of the region concerned.

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(c) The geographical area of application of a regional arms control measure should be clearly defined, in compliance with the accepted rules of international law, especially regarding the high seas and the air space.

(d) States situated outside the region concerned should commit themselves to respect the regional arrangements. Security guarantees provided by the nuclear Powers could also help to create a climate of confidence as the necessary prerequisite to the conclusion of regional arrangements.

(e) The Federal Government welcomes, as a special case of regional arms control, the designation as nuclear-weapon-free zones of areas which have hitherto been free from nuclear weapons and whose stability might be endangered by the introduction of nuclear weapons within their boundaries. The establishment of such nuclear-weapon-free zones, however, should not distract attention from the aim of universal non-proliferation.

(f) Measures designed to strengthen mutual confidence can make a significant contribution to the preparation and implementation of regional arms control arrangements. In addition to a regular exchange of information on military manoeuvres and movements of troops and to inviting observers to military manoeuvres, the disclosure of military budgets as well as the introduction of a standardized reporting system facilitating their comparability, could help to diminish fear and distrust, the two key factors underlying the arms race.

(g) Arms control measures in the various regions should also provide for effective and adequate verification in the interest of maintaining security and confidence.

III

5. With these general considerations in mind, the Federal Republic of Germany takes an active part in arms control negotiations within the region to which it belongs through its constructive participation in the Vienna negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions. These negotiations are designed to contribute towards more stable relations and a consolidation of peace and security in Europe. The Federal Republic of Germany shares the conviction of its allies that this objective can be attained by bringing about manpower parity and by reducing the disparity in tanks currently existing in favour of the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe. In its endeavours towards this end, the Federal Republic of Germany, in concert with its allies, encourages associated stabilizing measures designed to allay distrust and diminish the danger of military confrontation between East and West.

6. During the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe in Helsinki, the Federal Government was among the proponents of an inclusion in the discussions of military aspects of security, and it also belonged to those who championed the
incorporation in the Final Act, for the first time ever, of arrangements on confidence-building measures. The Federal Government is interested in both a comprehensive implementation of the concrete provisions contained in the Final Act and positive further development of confidence-building measures in the future.

7. The Federal Government hopes that the trend towards an effective implementation of these measures will continue at an increasing scale after the 35 States participating in the follow-up conference at Belgrade have reaffirmed their intention to respect fully the provisions of the Final Act signed at Helsinki.

8. It would be desirable in the Federal Government's view to explore the possibility of whether positive experiences gained in the implementation of confidence-building measures in Europe could serve as a basis for devising comparable measures in other geographical areas of the world with the aim of preparing and supplementing regional disarmament arrangements.

9. In view of the importance of regional disarmament and arms control as a supplement to world-wide endeavours in this respect, the Federal Government endorses the proposal of the Government of Belgium to prepare a comprehensive study on regional aspects of disarmament.

GREECE

[Original: English]
[18 April 1970]

1. The regional approach to disarmament constitutes a useful step towards general and complete disarmament. In this regard, it is incumbent on the countries of a region to assume the initiative of convening regional conferences and they should, by themselves, determine, on a regional basis, the level of security considered necessary.

2. Moreover, the measures to be adopted in the framework of regional disarmament must refer to (a) reduction of armaments and armed forces, (b) prohibition of acquiring certain types of weapons and (c) respect for the agreements adopted on regional disarmament by all other countries.

3. Finally, in regard to the build-up of confidence and stability among the countries in a given region, the following measures should be taken:

   (a) Prior notice should be given of military manoeuvres and troop movements;

   (b) Determination should be made of the area where such manoeuvres or troop movements are to take place;

   (c) Observers should be exchanged;

   (d) Information should be made available concerning the budgets and structure of armed forces.
HUNGARY

1. The people and Government of Hungary are convinced that favourable conditions for the building of socialism and for accomplishing their social and political objectives can only be created by lasting international peace and stable security. Hence, the Hungarian People's Republic attaches particular importance to any steps, initiatives and measures that are likely to promote international détente and co-operation among peoples. This recognition is spelled out in the declaration of programme adopted by the Eleventh Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, which stated:

"It is the vital interest of mankind in our age to safeguard peace, to avert the danger of a new world war, to save the peoples from the scourge of a nuclear war ... The institutional implementation of peaceful coexistence among countries with different social systems is at the same time a fight for the reduction and cessation of the arms race ... so that mankind can already in our time be freed forever from the danger of a new world war."

2. The main guarantee for attaining this objective is seen by the Hungarian Government in the realization of general and complete disarmament. While regional disarmament measures may form an integral part of the efforts aimed at general and complete disarmament, may facilitate and supplement such efforts, it cannot in any way substitute for its realization.

3. In its foreign policy, the Government of Hungary has supported initiatives to create nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace. In its statement of 21 July 1976 on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, it expressed its conviction that "establishment of such zones would have positive effects, especially in a longer run, on the development of international relations, first of all on relations among States in the region directly involved, but ultimately, on the strengthening of peace and security all over the world", since the prime aim of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones with the understanding of the countries involved and with due regard for the existing security systems of the region and the interests of the States forming part thereof is precisely to "strengthen the security of the participating States and, through that, regional and international security". Liquidation of the hotbeds of crisis in various parts of the world is of fundamental importance to regional disarmament measures. Whersoever they may exist, such hotbeds constitute sources of tension, which tend to render difficult or even impossible any disarmament measure on a regional basis.

4. This consideration, together with others, presents an urgent case for achieving an early liquidation of the international hotbeds of crisis in any area of the world.

5. Europe, where the prevailing political situation exerts a strong influence on other parts of the world, is a crucial area for regional disarmament initiatives.

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It is in Europe that the two military alliances are directly facing one another and the largest stockpiles of armaments have been accumulated. It is this region, therefore, where the greatest efforts for disarmament should be made.

6. At the Vienna Talks on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe, the Government of Hungary supports the constructive proposals, based on the principle of equal security, put forward by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Poland, the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia, and is convinced that their practical implementation would contribute to the reduction of tension in the area.

7. The Government of Hungary attaches great importance to measures designed to promote military détente in Europe and is convinced that the proposal made by the Political Consultative Body of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in 1976 to the effect that the States signatory to the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference should assume, under an international treaty, an obligation to refrain from being the first to use nuclear weapons against each other on land, at sea and in outer space would contribute largely to reducing the danger of a nuclear war in Europe and thereby in other areas of the world.

8. Similarly, the Government of Hungary still regards as timely the proposal of the Political Consultative Body of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, which makes clear that the States Members of that organization are ready to dissolve the Warsaw Treaty Organization concurrently with the dissolution of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and, as a first step, to dismantle their military organizations. They invite all States to refrain from any steps likely to lead to the establishment of new closed groupings and military-political alliances, or to the expansion of the existing ones.

9. The Government of Hungary, like the other States members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, attaches importance to the practical implementation of confidence-building measures as provided for in the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference. In its views, the cause of military détente would be considerably enhanced by the realization of the concrete proposals submitted by the Soviet Union and other States members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization at the Belgrade meeting.

10. The Government of Hungary is convinced that regional disarmament measures can usefully supplement the disarmament efforts being made at other international forums and may contribute to the further deepening of détente and its extension to the military field.
IRAN

I. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

1. In the 33 years since the establishment of the United Nations despite loud debates, long negotiations, diverse proposals, repeated introductions and espousals of grandiose plans, the world has not reached the beginning of arms reduction. Progress to control, limit and reduce arms has, at best, been miniscule. The expanding inventories of unimaginably powerful weapons have reached unprecedented levels and the world military spending has, amidst the continued misery of hundreds of millions whose elementary needs remain unattended, nearly $400 billion yearly. The system of security envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations has proved ineffective to hold back the weapons flood that threatens us all; the system itself is in danger of being engulfed. The deception of the hopes of 1945 has caused such an erosion of confidence in the reliability of the institutions for maintenance of international peace and security that States, both great and small, have to look to arms for their security.

2. Yet the unprecedented threat of self-extinction from massive and competitive accumulation of the most destructive weapons ever produced, the heavy drain of a sustained and self-perpetuating arms race on human and natural resources, have confronted mankind with serious dilemmas. Foremost among them are the following: how to avoid war, which could lead to destruction of all life on earth; how to control, limit and eventually reduce armaments and, as a consequence, divert enormous newly-released resources to urgent social and economic needs of mankind.

3. The need to reduce armaments is thus generally accepted. The concept that the arms race guarantees security is increasingly challenged. The general lesson of the nuclear arms race has been termed a greater insecurity at a greater price; few nations can claim more security in an era characterized by the continued nuclear and conventional arms race.

4. Against this background, the imperative of maintaining international peace and security is an obvious proposition. The absolute necessity of genuine progress towards disarmament rests as well on assumptions which do not seem necessary to justify.

II. BASIC CONDITIONS GOVERNING THE REGIONAL APPROACH TO DISARMAMENT

5. The problems of arms control are at worst intractable, and at best extremely difficult to solve. The search for agreeing on a set of approaches in treating the issues involved has proved no less difficult. There is, however, a fair measure of understanding with respect to the setting within which any disarmament and arms control effort, whatever its nature and modality, can be perceived and promoted.

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(a) The valid assertion to the effect that a nation is and should remain the basic unit of international life holds us on common ground as to the need for recognition and assured respect for legitimate security requirements of every individual State in any move towards disarmament. Yet the interdependence of the world and the advance of technology have, unlike more than any time in history, introduced an enlarged, complex and universal notion of security which can only be addressed in a globally envisaged plan for disarmament, that is, in the context of general and complete disarmament.

(b) Arms control issues are treated as separate subjects for analytical purposes, but only when they are studied within a general approach in the context both of domestic and international life, can they begin to be sufficiently understood and their significance fully analysed.

(c) The preponderance of the concept of general and complete disarmament in any arms control and disarmament measure, be it global or regional, and its link with and indeed dependence on global security considerations, require that, parallel with efforts in this direction, simultaneous steps be also taken to create an adequate international security system.

(d) Arms build-up for many small and medium-sized Powers symptomizes their fear not only of the absence of reliable international security machinery, but the lack of functional social and economic structures at global levels in which they could place a greater measure of confidence in the future. Progress in any disarmament and arms control scheme with a regional character ought not to neglect these needs.

(e) The international military situation is characterized by the presence of strong defence systems, renovated at ever shorter intervals to dispose of the most advanced military equipment available. In this setting, military balance among the great Powers, particularly in the nuclear field, is maintained through the sustenance of a progressively expanding level of armament, which is, by any stretch of imagination, many times above and over their defence needs. No meaningful regional disarmament venture, or any other type of disarmament measure for that matter, can be expected to lead to fruition unless it is preceded by tangible, significant moves in arms control and disarmament by those Powers. Their action is indispensable both as a practical and a psychological ingredient to spur serious negotiations by other States. Only can they, through their concrete actions, break the psychological cycle of mistrust and set the tone, in the long run, to replace the unfortunate yet valid logic of armament by the logic of disarmament in terms of security of nations.

III. CERTAIN FEATURES OF REGIONAL ASPECTS OF DISARMAMENT

6. Regional approaches to arms control and disarmament have been treated as logical ideas with concrete possibilities, particularly in the field of conventional arms. A single set of global rules about the regionalization of arms control, however, eludes effective analysis. Moreover, regional approaches are often as complex and difficult as the global ones. But they are in many ways
similar and organically interlinked. In attempting to discuss some features of regional disarmament, the above observation has and should be borne in mind.

7. As can be deduced from the general observations above, regional disarmament is best conceived in the context of a comprehensive approach aiming at the goal of general and complete disarmament. This applies both to the regions covered by the umbrella of nuclear deterrent and those lacking it. Regional arms control and disarmament efforts have, more often than not, been suggested to diffuse specific arms control difficulties; a cursory study of those already undertaken and the ones actually under way reveals that they have never been pursued totally outside of, or in isolation from, their global context. Regional approaches should be, therefore, steps towards global arrangements. Hence the need to keep in proper perspective the firm linkage between regional arms control and regional and global security. Regional efforts, thus perceived, have and will serve a dual purpose: they contribute to determining and guaranteeing the security and national sovereignty of the States of regions - both individually and collectively; they contribute, in the same vein, to the over-all security balance of the world.

8. It can readily be inferred, from the first set of aims cited for regional efforts, that they should emanate from or at least fully represent different arms-control-related thinking and the security perceptions of regional States. To be sure, regional disarmament negotiations will address themselves to the real or perceived linking and possible interests of outside Powers, but their outcome should basically embody the synthesis reflecting the interplay of valid interests of regional members themselves.

9. The facts of present international relations reveal the existence of great-Power security consideration in regional ventures in the field of disarmament. This phenomenon presents itself in varying degrees and in different guises. There are cases where traditional alliances and their evolution dominate the politics of regional efforts (MFR). The great Powers' motivations in these cases are highly visible and their active interest is forcefully articulated. In some other cases, the role of alliances and greater Powers is weaker. In yet others, the very concept of regional approach is intended to forge regional co-operation, in order to keep the influence of the great Powers out of an area, for example, the Indian Ocean. The relative roles of great-Power diplomacy and regional-Power diplomacy will clearly differ from case to case. The great Powers, acting as parties to regional efforts, will obviously share the attributes of the partners of these collective ventures. The exclusion - voluntary or otherwise - of great Powers from different regional disarmament endeavours would not absolve them automatically from assuming different necessary undertakings commensurate with their global responsibilities. Indeed, the legal and practical commitments of regional States envisaged in regional disarmament negotiations can be meaningful if only they are completed by appropriate complementary measures by the great Powers. The commitments the great Powers have to be invited to assume in respect to the regional disarmament arrangements vary from area to area. The nature, scope and legal modalities of these commitments have to be determined and defined according to the particular circumstances of regions and their links and connections with these Powers. Any other outside Power having sufficient interest in the region, which might benefit from or be affected by regional arrangements or whose political
and economic attitudes could influence the mechanics of an agreed regional system, should also be approached to undertake similar commitments.

IV. REGIONAL DISARMAMENT: PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS

10. Viewed against this background, the regional approach lends itself to effective arms control and disarmament arrangements in a variety of ways and in various regional settings. The underlying philosophy is that all countries have a shared responsibility for security, particularly in their own neighbourhoods; practical possibilities of the regional approach range from the various arrangements of non-proliferation, the control of nuclear weapons, the limitation of the multiple races for the production and acquisition of non-nuclear military equipment and supplies to confidence-building measures on a regional level.

11. In the field of nuclear non-proliferation, the proposal for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is the most celebrated example of the practical possibilities at the regional level. International agreements providing for the absence of nuclear weapons have already been in existence for two areas. The Antarctic Treaty of 1967 8/ demilitarized a vast area and prohibited the introduction and testing of nuclear weapons by means of a regional approach which falls more appropriately within the realm of non-armsment arrangements. Of the various proposals put forward since 1956 to keep densely populated regions free from nuclear weapons, only one has been realized to date with the signing, in 1967, of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco). 9/ The realization of a number of other zonal proposals covering the Indian Ocean, Middle East, Africa and South Asia still awaits further serious negotiations.

12. By asking the General Assembly, in 1974, to consider the question of establishing a demilitarized zone in the Middle East, Iran, subsequently joined by Egypt and a number of other countries from the region, sought to avert the dangers of rapid diffusion of nuclear technology and proliferation of nuclear weapons within the volatile political setting of the Middle East. 10/ In renewing its proposal since then, which, incidentally, enjoys a near unanimous support of the States Members of the United Nations, including all five nuclear Powers, Iran has repeatedly drawn attention to the peculiarities of the area and the necessity of tailoring the eventual nuclear-weapon-free zonal arrangements in accordance with the particular characteristics of the Middle East. Some of the basic principles applicable to any such zonal arrangement, which have also been voiced by Iran, bears repeating: the initiatives must emanate from the States concerned and the modalities should be suited to the political as well as geographical setting of the

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region; obligations relating to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones might be assumed not only by groups of States directly participating in zonal arrangements, but preferably by all States in or outside that region whose action or lack of action could affect those arrangements. The role of the nuclear-weapon States, in pledging to respect the status of the zone as a particularly indispensable factor in regional agreements, has to be fully considered, along with other important issues, such as the establishment of an effective system of verification to ensure full compliance with agreed obligations.

13. The increasing popularity of the idea of the establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zone is basically the function of global fear of further nuclear weapon proliferation. This fear derives from the rapid rise in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and the possibility that the technology could be adopted for military purposes. Given the fact that peaceful uses of nuclear energy are prompted by economic imperatives and the availability of knowledge of nuclear technology, and that of nuclear fuel in sufficient quantities is vitally important, additional efforts should be exerted, at regional and global levels, both to facilitate the rational use of nuclear energy and to allay the reasonable fears of nuclear proliferation. It is our contention that the idea of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones can be advanced through the promotion of nuclear co-operation at regional levels. It is felt that the value of the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones towards disarmament would be heightened and the creation of zones facilitated if more active regional co-operation in the development of peaceful nuclear energy could be encouraged.

14. It would be particularly fruitful to initiate such regional co-operation in areas where nuclear energy is still in its nascent form. Various degrees of collaboration could be envisaged in providing a more logical basis for promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy within the zone by facilitating the establishment of regional fuel-cycle centres with their attendant economic and physical security benefits for extracting uranium, fabricating nuclear fuel, reprocessing plutonium and handling nuclear waste.

15. A declaration of peaceful intent upon the introduction of nuclear installations might be pursued as a first step in bilateral consultations or regional conferences, depending upon the degree of cohesion in the area. Many countries are already working together at the international level on the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation and many have participated in the IAEA Study of Regional Fuel Cycle Centres. 11/ Such studies could set the stage for further communication and consultation between States in regions about the advent of peaceful nuclear energy and its non-proliferation aspects.

16. The regional approach in the area of non-nuclear weapons offers possibilities which are diverse, varied in nature and at the same time complex. Common interests

in economic and social development, preservation of national and natural resources, freedom from external intervention, prospects of more security through collective action than acting alone without assurances from neighbours in the same region, strongly bring to the fore, at least theoretically, the attractive elements of regionalization of arms control and disarmament efforts. But regional action has more often than not been hampered by the persistence of age-old mistrust, based on historical experience and typically disabled by the presence in any given geographic region of a common enemy or threat.

17. These and a host of other psychological barriers should be overcome to pave the way for concrete action. If progress in regional disarmament is to be achieved, there is a real need to identify and analyse the root causes of these fears. Comprehensive studies undertaken by appropriate institutions, preferably the United Nations, could clarify many such problems and help to facilitate understanding in regional and international levels. A series of in-depth studies on threat perceptions, security outlooks and the related problems of various nations might be first steps in this direction. On a more practical level, other more technical studies might be preferable. The United Nations could be asked to carry out the following studies:

(a) Study and analyse the specific arms control problems in any given area arising from general geopolitical situations, conflict, competitive arms transfers, growth of neighbouring arms industries;

(b) Study the possibilities of the promotion of intraregional agreements on arms, including agreed rules about indigenous production, imports and exports of modern weapon systems and military deployment;

(c) Study the range of feasible confidence-building measures in various regions/subregions, keeping in mind the necessity of security balance requirements of regions and the world as a whole.

18. In the context of progress towards a balanced programme of disarmament involving the restraint of the world-wide build-up of conventional arms, more concrete measures at the regional level are conceivable. Under appropriate conditions and without jeopardizing the security of individual States, actual reduction of the level of armed forces and armament and a host of other related issues might be seriously considered. By the same token, circumstances might arise where agreements on a general ceiling on armed forces and armaments or a freeze or even a ban on certain types of weaponry or their systems could be considered as viable possibilities.

19. It bears emphasizing that it is the prerogative of every sovereign State in every region to determine the level of security required for its national defence. In the absence of a reliable system for the maintenance of peace and security, each individual country has the right to seek access to the arms which, in its judgement, it requires for the defence of its people, their political independence and territorial integrity. However, in the event such system is instituted, or if the defence requirements of regional States are met through appropriate circumstances considered adequate by the individual members of a region, the
transfer of conventional arms or certain types of arms might well be the subject of regional disarmament consideration.

20. A fairly long list of more immediate and less complicated confidence-building measures might be elaborated on in order to facilitate and foster regional disarmament actions. Some of these measures already in application in Europe could be applied as well in other regions. For example, the requirement to inform States of intentions to carry out major military movements or manoeuvres, would help, if applied on the basis of regionally-established criteria and under appropriate circumstances, to decrease regional tensions. The hot lines are very important links between nuclear Powers; but they could also be important links between other countries in areas of tension, in preventing misinterpretation of military activities and war by accident.

21. Confidence-building measures often involve the commission of specific acts. Seen from a different point of view, they might consist of attitudes, positions and policies to be pursued over a long period of time. In other words, consistency both in the commission of certain actions or lack of them might be viewed as the key elements in the confidence-building process. The perception of insecurity and mistrust is not necessarily the function or the result of the interplay of policies of regional States. More often, this phenomenon is fed by the attitudes of outside Powers. Confidence-building measures in such cases cannot and should not be limited to the confines of geographical regions. They ought to embrace and involve policies of other countries whose attitudes have bearing on the decisions of these regions.

22. On a more positive note, mention must be made of the efforts, not falling squarely within the pales of traditional confidence-building measures, which can actually prove more conducive to the promotion of lasting confidence in any given region. A show of foresight through courageous decisions and active participation in the resolution of regional conflicts and settlement of contentious issues go a long way in this direction. Serious and genuine steps for the promotion of regional co-operation in economic, social and cultural fields can also strengthen confidence and deepen the dialogue on disarmament and security matters and, through the expansion of these efforts to other regions, a climate can be created in which countries can look forward to further reaching and more ambitious disarmament negotiations.
1. The regional approach to world issues is no less important in other areas of international concern than in the field of disarmament. It is generally accepted that the similarity of problems and commonality of interests in regions encourage co-operation and foster mutual understanding, thus promoting concerted efforts in the solution of common problems.

2. The problems of regional disarmament may not be very dissimilar to the problems of global disarmament. Both approaches are relative processes which depend on certain basic principles, including international peace and security and the degree of international understanding and co-operation. Where fear and insecurity prevail, disarmament cannot be expected to thrive. Mutual trust and confidence, co-operation and understanding are vital prerequisites to disarmament both on the regional and global levels.

3. The compartmentalization of the problems of disarmament on a regional basis would undoubtedly reduce disarmament problems to manageable proportions and to easy agreement. Historical, political and economic factors, however, may impinge on the process of disarmament in a region and retard its progress. In areas particularly of colonial history and experience, the eminence of neo-colonialism, super-Power rivalry and arms buildup cannot be excluded. The threat of a power struggle for local hegemony and dominance is always present.

4. None the less, the Government of Liberia feels that the regional step to disarmament can be an effective approach. The success of such an approach, however, requires the active participation and genuine interest of all States in the region. Moreover, the following conditions can be essential prerequisites to effective regional disarmament:

   (a) Establishment of a regional security system with adequate safeguards for all States and Territories in the region;

   (b) A declaration of super-Power commitment to stay out of regional conflicts and eliminate their rivalry for spheres of influence in various regions;

   (c) Strict adherence by States to the universally accepted principle of non-recourse to the use of force and threat of force in the resolution of conflicts;

   (d) A solemn commitment of all States in the region to respect reverently the principle of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all States in the region;

   (e) Establishment and general recognition of zones of peace on a regional basis serving as nuclear-free areas as well as prohibited regions for the production, development, stockpiling and sales of armaments;

   (f) Initiation of regional projects as means of promoting co-operation and diverting extra resources from arms arsenal to regional development purposes.

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5. The Government of Liberia adheres to the view that the question of armaments should be considered one of management rather than one of elimination, a view which seems to be supported by the widespread idea of the reduction of arms commensurate with the legitimate security interests of all States. In this context, it is unrealistic to assume that any State would be prepared to disarm without a similar gesture on the part of other States. The problem is even more complicated if States are to determine the level of arms commensurate with their own security interests. No State may want other States to take that decision for it. In spite of these complications, we are convinced that with the political will and the co-operation of all States, particularly the super-Powers, armaments can be reduced to a level commensurate with the security interests of all States and the world as a whole. Thus, while disarmament is an essentially desirable goal, it will obviously remain a slow process and its long-term nature should be accepted, if only because it depends on a peaceful world protected by an international security system with adequate safeguards, none of which has yet been achieved.
MAURITANIA

1. The current nuclear arms race is the direct consequence of the insecurity and tension prevailing at the international level. This tension and insecurity which is currently threatening international stability has various causes, the most widely recognized of which are:

   (a) Direct or indirect interference in the internal affairs of States and the desire of certain major and minor Powers to dominate others;

   (b) The confrontation between the various political and economic systems which seek to control the world;

   (c) The colonial situations which still prevail in some parts of the world and which give rise to direct or indirect confrontations between the major Powers;

   (d) Aggression, which is increasingly being developed into a system of international relations by some major and minor Powers, and the use of mercenaries to destabilize States, destroy their economies and endanger their very existence;

   (e) The absence of an over-all, coherent movement to total and complete disarmament.

2. Although resolutions have been adopted and studies are under way within the framework of the United Nations for the purpose of finding a solution to this tension and insecurity, the various forms of interference, intimidation and coercion to which an increasing number of countries are being subjected, as well as the proliferation of atomic weapons and the growing number of countries involved as a result, represent a legitimate source of concern to the international community.

3. If, despite the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and the attempts made to limit the possession of atomic weapons, no progress has been made, it is because the nuclear Powers wished to preserve their monopoly by making atomic weapons a restricted field without giving other States adequate guarantees for their security in return.

4. Another reason is undoubtedly that some minor Powers which are as yet without atomic weapons are organizing mercenary movements within their territory so that these mercenaries can be used to threaten the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of other States. This is why all attempts made hitherto to conclude a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations have failed.

5. This is also why all the bilateral limitation agreements and the partial nuclear-test limitations recommended by the General Assembly have not prevented several States from entering the race to possess atomic weapons. All these factors have quite naturally aggravated the existing tension and insecurity.

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6. It would seem that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, which was established in order to limit the arms race and reduce international tension, has not found the most suitable ways and means of slowing down this race. The Conference's lack of success so far is unquestionably due to the fact that it is narrow in scope and not well balanced. It is open to only a few countries and could not provide the most suitable framework for the conclusion of an agreement that would offer sufficient guarantees to justify a total halt in the arms race.

7. There therefore exist serious psychological, military and political obstacles. In order to remove these obstacles, all countries must be able to give their views on all problems created by the arms race within a broader framework (particularly within the framework of the United Nations). In the opinion of Mauritania, that is the basic purpose of the forthcoming special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. This session should concentrate on setting a new course by proposing general and complete disarmament.

8. The General Assembly could draw up a programme of action comprising four elements:

   (a) The strengthening of nuclear-free zones;

   (b) Detailed policies for disarmament at the regional and global levels, including the elimination of any monopoly held by certain Powers in this field;

   (c) The use of the resources that would be released as a result in order to provide development assistance;

   (d) The establishment of effective international machinery, involving developed and developing countries, to supervise the implementation of the decisions taken at the special session.

9. This programme of action, if accepted by all States and, above all, if implemented in its entirety, could without any doubt usher in a new era in which the world would once and for all be safe from a catastrophe having incalculable consequences for the whole of mankind.

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1. The Government of the Netherlands takes in principle a positive attitude to the idea of undertaking a comprehensive study of regional aspects of disarmament. This attitude springs from the following considerations:

(a) The Netherlands Government is on the one hand fully aware of the fact that the arms race is in many respects determined by its regional context. In each particular region, the arms race has its own impulses and characteristics. In addition the circumstances and conditions vary from region to region. Therefore, it is more accurate to speak of arms races. In order to control and subsequently reverse these arms races effectively and to enhance the security of a region, a regional approach to disarmament is to be considered a most appropriate one.

(b) On the other hand, the Government of the Netherlands is also aware that a regional approach could meet certain disadvantages. In most cases directly competing States would have to be assembled around the negotiating table. Another important factor is that in most regions in the world, the security situation to a greater or less extent is also dependent on militarily important States outside these regions.

(c) The Government of the Netherlands believes, however, that regional measures of arms control and disarmament can positively contribute to national and regional security, while also constraining the arms race in general and furthering international peace and security. In this context, regional disarmament can be considered as complementary to world-wide measures of arms control and disarmament.

2. In dealing with regional aspects of disarmament, the following considerations should be taken into account:

(a) The initiative for a regional arrangement should come from within the region itself;

(b) Such an initiative should be sufficiently supported by the States in the region, at any rate by all militarily significant States among them;

(c) Regional arrangements should provide for adequate verification;

(d) States outside the region should not take advantage of such arrangements or otherwise contravene the objectives thereof.

3. The United Nations could play a stimulating role in the field of regional disarmament, for example, by requesting the Secretary-General to undertake, with the assistance of a group of experts, a comprehensive study of all the regional aspects of disarmament. Such a study should, in the view of the Government of the Netherlands, be focused in particular on the following:

...
(a) The nature and the extent of the obligations of States within a region, as well as of States outside the region, as to their respect for regional arms control arrangements;

(b) The usefulness of the regional approach for dealing with the question of conventional arms, both with respect to the production of those arms within a region and the transfer to and within a region;

(c) The usefulness and the kind of confidence-building measures which can be considered as conducive to initiating proposals for regional arrangements, as well as for making those arrangements viable;

(d) An examination of the ways and means of verifying regional arrangements;

(e) The study of the possibility of considering the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones as an appropriate step towards further arms control and disarmament measures in those zones;

(f) Elaboration of the concept of zones of peace and its possible usefulness in a regional approach of arms control and disarmament.
OMAN

[Original: Arabic]

[13 February 1978]

The Government of Oman believes that priority should be given, in the context of current international efforts, to the limitation of the production and development of nuclear weapons and to the non-proliferation of such weapons, so that real progress can be achieved on the international level. During the tenth special session of the General Assembly, therefore, efforts should be concentrated on matters relating to nuclear disarmament.

The Government of Oman considers it difficult, at the present stage, to lay down general rules concerning conventional disarmament measures applicable to all the geographical areas of the world. Each region has its own circumstances, challenges and defence needs, as determined by the States of the region. Consequently, the Government of Oman believes that this matter should be left to the States in each region for consideration in the light of their particular circumstances and needs.
POLAND

Original: English
14 April 1978

I.

1. The Government of the Polish People's Republic has repeatedly expressed its view favouring complete and general disarmament under effective international control and, at the same time, partial measures to limit the arms race, reduce armaments and achieve disarmament. The most recent exposition of this attitude appeared in the proposal for a comprehensive disarmament programme submitted by seven socialist States to the Committee of the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva in February 1978 (CCD/552).

2. In our view, the understanding of partial measures should be those which would be limited territorially, in substance or duration, including also regional and subregional projects.

3. Complementary to the existing means of general disarmament, measures for regional disarmament could pave the way towards new general solutions, thereby strengthening the effectiveness of the existing means. They could become an important factor in the strengthening of international security and the provision of propitious conditions for the development of co-operation over specific areas.

II.

4. The Government of Poland lends full support to efforts aimed at working out measures for regional disarmament and military détente. In so far as the region of Europe is concerned, it continues to take an active part in all such efforts.

5. An illustration from the more distant past are the Polish proposals to establish a nuclear-free zone, to freeze and to limit armaments in Central Europe. The more recent example is the joint proposal of Poland, the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia during the Vienna negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction and associated measures in Central Europe.

6. The fact that in this particular region four of the five permanent members of the Security Council maintain their armed forces and that it has the world's highest level of concentrated military personnel and matériel visibly shows how important it is to reduce the danger of military confrontation in this part of the world.

7. The Government of Poland will continue its efforts to see that the Vienna negotiations reach a successful conclusion by lowering the high level of military concentration in Central Europe without changing the existing balance of forces there and by leading to the reduction of armed forces and armaments. We regard these negotiations as a beginning of the process of reduction of armed forces and armaments, which will eventually spread to the whole continent of Europe.

/...
8. The Government of Poland is convinced that implementation of these measures would be beneficial for all European States and that its positive influence would go far beyond the confines of Europe, in the same way as, in the past, the idea of establishing a nuclear-free zone in Europe sparked off a broad international discussion on nuclear-free zones and on possibilities of such zones in other parts of the world.

III.

9. The Government of Poland believes that, in taking account of the various aspects of regional disarmament, attention should be given to the following elements:

(a) Efforts should be continued to break new ground for regional disarmament, such as a gradual process to contain and eliminate regional conflicts, focal points of tension and the threat of war; creation of propitious conditions to overcome mutual hostility and distrust as much as to normalize relations between States of a given region; regional commitments to refrain from the threat or use of force as a contribution to a world treaty; avoidance of any action which would have a destabilizing effect on the political and military situation in a given region; non-intervention in internal affairs of other States; promotion of political and economic co-operation, which should be conducive to détente and should eliminate focal points of regional tension;

(b) The same fundamental principles should be applied to regional disarmament as to disarmament in general, namely, undiminished adherence by any party to the agreements, abstention from action aimed at gaining unilateral military advantages, equality of rights and duties, application of scientific and technological achievements for peaceful purposes only, fulfilment in good faith of undertaken obligations, effective control over disarmament measures, non-use of action causing harm to disarmament measures, diversion of means released as a result of disarmament measures to the solution of pressing problems of the contemporary world and so forth;

(c) Efforts to seek measures of regional disarmament should focus as a matter of first priority on such regions where the accumulation of armaments is the highest, where the probability of reciprocal confrontation is particularly high or where the danger of confrontation continues to grow;

(d) Measures of regional disarmament should pay due regard to conditions prevailing in a region for which they are proposed;

(e) The right of equal and reciprocal participation in elaborating measures of regional/subregional disarmament should be ensured to all States of a given region/subregion which, on the other hand, should not refrain from taking part in ongoing talks or from adhering to concluded agreements;

(f) In no way should measures of regional disarmament diminish or cause other harmful effects to the security of States lying outside a given region; such States should not encumber agreement on measures of regional disarmament;
(g) Bilateral and multilateral efforts to achieve disarmament on a global scale should not be impeded by measures of regional disarmament as supplying experiences which could be used with advantage to measures of universal disarmament; this applies specifically to the problem of verification of disarmament agreements, because adoption of safeguards may be more feasible on a regional scale than world-wide.

IV.

10. When it comes to concrete measures of regional disarmament, the following steps might be taken into consideration:

(a) Freezing, limitation and reduction of armed forces, conventional arms and nuclear weapons;

(b) Prohibition of the production, transfer and acquisition of new types or systems of weapons of mass destruction;

(c) Prevention of territorial proliferation, including new types or systems of weapons of mass destruction, and limitation of the qualitative arms race;

(d) Implementation on a regional scale of existing agreements, including, as a matter of first priority, efforts to achieve universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 12/ by means of regional obligations, enhancement of the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons through forms of regional co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, reinforcement of the system of IAEA safeguards towards their wider applicability and restraint from using the territory of a State in a given region to make nuclear weapons accessible to another State from outside this region;

(e) Withdrawal or elimination of definite types of existing weapons on land, on the sea and in the air;

(f) Reduction of military budgets;

(g) Restriction on transfers of conventional arms;

(h) Establishment of nuclear-free zones and zones of peace and demilitarization of specified zones;

(i) Dismantling of military bases on foreign territories, especially those belonging to States outside a given region, and withdrawal of foreign armed forces.

12/ General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII).

/...
V.

11. An important role could be played also by projects which are not senso stricto disarmament measures in themselves, but which could provide favourable political conditions for regional disarmament. This refers to regional projects aimed at lessening the threat of war, especially of a nuclear war, including regional agreements on the prevention of nuclear war and measures designed to build mutual confidence and increase stabilization.

12. In this context, it is appropriate to recall the following proposals made by the Warsaw Treaty member States in November 1976 (A/31/431-S/12255, annexes):

(a) Conclusion of an agreement by the States signatories to the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe on the non-first use of nuclear weapons;

(b) Obligation not to widen the political and military blocs existing in Europe and not to create new ones as a beginning to the process of dissolution of these blocs or, as a first step, elimination of their military structures.

13. It is worth while to recall at this juncture the Soviet proposal, according to which no military manoeuvres with a force exceeding 50,000 to 60,000 troops should be conducted in the area encompassed by the confidence-building measures of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

14. The confidence-building measures worked out by the Conference and put forward in its Final Act, with their practical follow-up action, could become an essential element in the strengthening of confidence in a given region.

VI.

15. The Government of Poland holds the view that general problems of regional disarmament could be discussed during the special session of the General Assembly, while concrete projects of regional disarmament should be worked out by the States concerned.

16. Convocation of a world disarmament conference in the not too distant future would bring about greater progress in the field of regional disarmament. In accordance with the proposal of the socialist States, the world disarmament conference would review ways and means to achieve general and complete disarmament along with partial measures, while discussion on more concrete projects could take place, in the first place, among those States which consider that their interests are directly involved in such concrete issues.

/...
I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Spanish Government is extremely interested in studying the possibilities offered by a regional approach to disarmament. To that end, it supports the measures provided for in General Assembly resolution 32/87 D.

2. The forthcoming special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament will provide an excellent opportunity for Member States to consider this question thoroughly.

3. The possibility, provided for in the above-mentioned resolution, of drawing closer to general and complete disarmament through a regional, step-by-step approach now offers real potential since the regional approach to security has provided examples which should be taken into account and whose possibilities have not yet been adequately analysed or systematized.

4. In this connexion, it is important to make a distinction between, on the one hand, certain basic principles which, if ignored, would rule out the possibility of obtaining positive results in this field and, on the other hand, procedural problems which in this case are extremely complex.

II. BASIC PRINCIPLES

5. The basic principles are as follows:

(a) The initiative in conducting negotiations on disarmament at the regional level must necessarily be taken by the countries concerned.

(b) It would seem impossible to exclude from negotiations any country in the area covered by the negotiations.

(c) The nuclear Powers, whether or not they have interests in the region, cannot remain aloof from such work and must eventually co-operate in the implementation of the agreed measures.

(d) The objectives of any negotiations of this type must be realistic, limited and specific, since this is the only way in which the negotiations can produce positive results.

(e) Any agreement at the regional level must be seen as a step towards general and complete disarmament, which is the final goal of all work in this field.

(f) With the exception of nuclear-free zones, it would seem that disarmament measures at the regional level must inevitably be devoted to non-nuclear issues such as the limitation of conventional arsenals, the prohibition of the use and possession of particularly lethal weapons, the reduction of military forces, and agreements on commitments designed to prevent tension that might lead to war.
III. PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS

6. The procedural problems are as follows:

(a) The boundaries of zones that might be covered by regional agreements on disarmament will always be difficult to define, particularly since many countries operate in various strategic sectors and their concerns with regard to security are therefore complex. Accordingly, the first step to be taken when negotiations begin is to define the area concerned.

(b) The participation of regional international bodies is also important to negotiations of this type.

(c) It is also necessary to provide for machinery to ensure and supervise the implementation of agreements reached in this field.

(d) The appropriate United Nations bodies should use the means at their disposal to contribute to the initiation and development of negotiations of this kind.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

7. The Spanish Government considers that the above points are not exhaustive. It also considers that regional negotiations on matters relating to disarmament are governed, on the one hand, by extremely varied objectives and, on the other hand, by the size and geopolitical complexity of the international community. It is therefore difficult to establish uniform principles or rules, since each case requires a different approach.
1. Experience has shown the usefulness and practicality of a step-by-step approach in furthering the goal of general and complete disarmament. The regional approach, both nuclear and non-nuclear initiatives, is a complement to global efforts to curb the arms race and can therefore contribute to the achievement of general disarmament. Such an approach to disarmament has already produced some significant achievements in certain geographical areas, although limited with regard to the types of weapons banned and to the confidence-building and stabilization measures stipulated.

2. The regional approach to disarmament, through the confidence and stability that it will promote in the region, will offer the States involved the possibility of relocating funds and resources released from armaments to other and more urgent needs, such as economic development. Moreover, further adoption of adequate confidence-building measures at the regional level will make it possible for the countries in the region to proceed with reductions both in troops and armaments. As a logical consequence of confidence and stability in the region, it will also help to create a similar atmosphere in the adjacent regions. The world has witnessed too many instances when the reverse process took place.

3. Certain criteria and conditions should be met in dealing with arms control and disarmament measures on a regional basis:

   (a) The boundaries of the area of application must be clearly defined.

   (b) The initiative should come from the countries of the region, which should take part in the relevant negotiations on an equal footing.

   (c) No State should gain military advantages through arrangements resulting from the regional approach. This approach should ensure undiminished security conditions for all the States of the region.

   (d) All nuclear Powers and other militarily significant States adjacent to the region should undertake to respect the common endeavours and decisions of the regional States.

   (e) Any concrete regional disarmament arrangements already arrived at should not be jeopardized by new initiatives. Existing international agreements with disarmament implications should be adhered to in good faith. Action should be taken to ensure that areas covered by such agreements revert to their previous status if unilateral violations have occurred.

   (f) Measures to be adopted as a result of regional approach should provide for adequate verification systems.
4. Turkey at present takes part in two major regional efforts: the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and, indirectly, the negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions at Vienna. The development and universal adoption and application of the principles and confidence-building measures stipulated in the Final Act signed in Helsinki will promote confidence and stability in the world.
1. The Ukrainian SSR has consistently favoured action to avert the danger of nuclear war, halt the arms race and move towards genuine disarmament, including general and complete disarmament under strict international control. In the opinion of the Ukrainian SSR, international détente and the concomitant positive developments can be truly lasting if they are accompanied and reinforced by measures of military détente, that is, by concrete new results in the limitation of the arms race and disarmament. An important role in the process leading to a radical solution to the problem of disarmament can be played by partial measures. These include regional measures for arms limitation and disarmament.

2. The Ukrainian SSR believes that regional measures can make a substantial contribution to the limitation of the arms race and to disarmament, especially in those regions where military confrontations are particularly serious. For historical and geographical reasons, the Ukrainian SSR attaches particular importance to regional measures of military détente and disarmament in Europe.

3. Backing up political détente with military détente is at present particularly important in Europe, where the positive trends resulting from the conclusion of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe continue to be felt, as was rightly emphasized in the final document of the meeting in Belgrade.

4. The Ukrainian SSR considers that the following measures could be taken in Europe: the conclusion by the participants in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe of a treaty renouncing the first use of nuclear weapons against each other; the conclusion of an agreement at least not to expand existing military and political groupings and alliances by admitting new members; the consistent application of measures provided for in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, such as notification of major military manoeuvres, the invitation of observers to attend certain manoeuvres, exchanges of military delegations and the conclusion of an agreement not to conduct military manoeuvres involving more than 50,000 to 60,000 men. The military confidence-building measures provided for in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe could be extended to include southern Mediterranean countries, if those countries so wish.

5. The Ukrainian SSR considers that the primary basis for military détente in Europe continues to be the talks taking place in Vienna on the reduction of forces and armaments in Central Europe. The successful conduct and completion of those talks are conditional upon strict observance of the principle of not impairing the security of any party, the maintenance of the established balance of forces in the region, which is being discussed in the talks at Vienna, and the renunciation of unilateral military advantages or benefits at the expense of one's partners.

6. One of the regional measures to which the Ukrainian SSR attaches importance is the establishment of nuclear-free zones, including zones in various parts of Europe. The Ukrainian SSR also favours such regional measures as the transformation of the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace.
7. Particular attention must be paid to measures of regional disarmament in areas of international conflict. A comprehensive political settlement of the Middle East conflict could, for example, include an agreement on measures to halt the arms race in that region. However, in the opinion of the Ukrainian SSR, regional measures of disarmament must not present obstacles to peoples which are waging a struggle against aggression and the colonial yoke.

8. These are a few comments and suggestions which the Ukrainian SSR would like to present in connexion with the regional aspects of disarmament.
1. The Soviet Union's position of principle on the question of regional measures of military détente and disarmament was set out in its memorandum on questions related to the halting of the arms race and disarmament, which reflected the basic approaches that can be taken in dealing with these problems at the regional level.

2. The Soviet Union considers that regional measures of military détente and disarmament can make a substantial contribution to the limitation of the arms race and disarmament, especially in those regions where military confrontations are particularly serious.

3. The practical implementation of measures of military détente and disarmament in Europe would be of particular significance. The Soviet Union attaches great importance to the talks currently being conducted in Vienna on the mutual reduction of forces and armaments in Central Europe, the purpose of which is to back up political détente with military détente; it is making every effort to ensure the success of those talks. It is convinced that progress in Vienna is possible if no one tries to secure unilateral advantages for himself and if all parties adhere strictly to the fundamental principle of not impairing the security of any party.

4. The Soviet Union has put forward a programme of action designed to consolidate military détente in Europe. Among other things, this programme provides for the conclusion by the participants in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe of a treaty renouncing the first use of nuclear weapons against each other; the conclusion of an agreement at least not to expand the opposing military and political groupings and alliances in Europe by admitting new members; the consistent application of measures such as notification of major military manoeuvres, the invitation of observers to attend certain manoeuvres and exchanges of military delegations, already provided for in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, and the conclusion of an agreement not to conduct manoeuvres involving more than 50,000 to 60,000 men.

5. The Mediterranean is another region where it is now important to take regional measures of military détente. In order to reduce military tension in the Mediterranean, the USSR proposed to the United States that they should agree on the withdrawal from that region of Soviet and United States ships and submarines carrying nuclear weapons. The implementation of this proposal would be in the interests of all States in the region. The Soviet Union would also respond sympathetically if the southern Mediterranean countries asked that the military confidence-building measures provided for in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe should be extended to include this region which adjoins Europe.
6. The Soviet Union supports the idea of the countries fronting on the Indian Ocean concerning the latter's transformation into a zone of peace. It considers that the solution to this problem lies in the elimination of existing foreign military bases in the region and the prohibition of new bases. The Soviet Union is also prepared to work with other Powers to seek ways of bringing about mutual reductions in the military activities of States not adjoining the Indian Ocean. This is the approach taken by the Soviet Union in talks with the United States on the question of the Indian Ocean.

7. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones has an important role to play among regional measures of military détente and disarmament. Proposals concerning the establishment of such zones in different parts of the world are being put forward by interested States in an effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and to reduce the threat of nuclear war. The Soviet Union supports such proposals and is prepared to co-operate in their implementation, taking due account, of course, of the possibilities of the region where the nuclear-free zone is to be established. It is important that nuclear-free zones should be genuinely free of nuclear weapons and that the relevant agreements should contain no loop-holes in this regard and should fully comply with the generally recognized rules of international law.
1. Her Majesty's Government believe that regional arms control measures can make a valuable contribution to the improvement of international relations, the strengthening of international peace and security and to progress towards general and complete disarmament.

2. Agreement may be possible among regional States on arms control measures where world-wide agreement is not yet attainable. Regional measures can be adapted for the different conditions prevailing in each area. Thus measures which might be unbalanced or destabilizing if applied to one area, could be effective in another area in achieving equal or greater security for the regional States at a reduced level of armed forces and military expenditure. Regional measures should be undertaken at the initiative of the States in the region, which are in the best position to resolve any existing disputes and to take measures which are consistent with their security. Such regional arrangements could include confidence-building measures to help reduce tensions between neighbouring States, prevent misunderstanding of military activities and reduce the risk of miscalculation.

The Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco has shown the usefulness of the regional approach to disarmament, although Her Majesty's Government are concerned that the zone is not yet in force for a large part of that continent. The European countries have already made a major effort to improve relations between them through the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Moreover, member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact are pursuing negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction in Central Europe, where Her Majesty's Government hope there will be early progress towards an agreement.

Her Majesty's Government support the proposal for a United Nations study of regional aspects of disarmament, to be undertaken with the collaboration of governmental experts. Such a study should identify measures of disarmament which could appropriately and fruitfully be applied on a regional basis. The study might consider, by way of illustration, possible future actions in reducing military budgets and limiting conventional forces and armaments on a regional basis. It should examine the merits of the idea, which has been put forward in the course of preparations for the special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, of regional conferences on disarmament issues. It should take into account all the relevant recommendations of the General Assembly made at the special session.

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1. In considering the question of international stability and confidence, it seems clear to the Government of the United States of America that for the great majority of nations the need for military preparedness is primarily based on relationships with neighbouring countries and with other countries of the same general area. Thus, regional approaches to disarmament could be of exceptional value, since reliable arms control measures agreed on by the countries of a given region can be counted on to enhance the security of all.

2. Like all other co-operative endeavours affecting international peace and security, however, regional disarmament measures require the consent of the countries concerned and bind only those countries which consent. Particular measures cannot be imposed by one country or group of countries in a region, acting against another country or group of countries; neither can they be imposed by pressures emanating from outside the region. Nor can a regional group of countries, addressing areas not within their sovereign jurisdiction, adopt measures which restrict or regulate the rights of other nations under international law.

3. Foremost among existing regional initiatives is the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco. For its part, the United States Government ratified Protocol II to the Treaty in 1971 and has announced its intention to proceed towards the ratification of Protocol I. Further, the United States Government hopes that the countries concerned will soon take all the other actions which are required for the Treaty's entry into full force, and that nations of other regions will devise appropriate nuclear-weapon-free zone arrangements of their own. In this connexion, the United States Government would welcome the beginning of consultations necessary to create such zones in Africa, in South Asia and in the Middle East, as called for in a number of resolutions of the General Assembly.

4. The regional approach can have particular value in the negotiation of force-reduction agreements. In particular, the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction negotiations in Vienna are a prime example of efforts to conclude such accords.

5. As a prelude to force reductions, regional negotiations can be useful in concluding agreements to stabilize military forces. Stabilization measures can also be worth while in regulating certain kinds of military actions, for example, manoeuvres involving more than a specified number of participants or conducted within a certain distance of international boundaries, which are sometimes considered to give cause for concern.

6. Practical experience during the interval since the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe suggests that confidence-building measures are also well suited to the regional approach. Appropriate confidence-building measures can include prior notification of military manoeuvres, troop movements and the presence...
of observers, exchanges of military personnel designed to promote mutual understanding and publication of relevant military information. In the short run, such measures increase understanding of the nature and purposes of military activity in neighbouring countries; in the long run, such measures can build a sense of mutual confidence leading to reductions in the size of regional military forces or expenditures.

7. Although it would be unwise to prejudge the outcome of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, regional arrangements with respect to the nuclear fuel cycle may prove desirable. Such arrangements could ensure appropriate access to nuclear material for use in power-generating reactors, and could also be effective in alleviating the concerns of the international community with regard to the possible proliferation of nuclear arms to additional countries. The United States Government would hope that these possibilities will receive appropriate consideration in the studies conducted as part of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation.

8. Limitations on the international transfer of conventional arms seem particularly well suited to regional approaches. In formulating such limitations, it will be important for the nations of the world to be guided by two broad principles:

(a) All States have legitimate security requirements and these must be met;

(b) Progress in developing agreements to regulate international arms transfers should be a mutual concern of both producer and purchaser nations, and successful solutions must reflect the ideas and interests of both groups.

9. With these guidelines in mind, the United States Government would be receptive to the creation of regional associations of purchaser nations, which would operate in co-operation with supplier nations and which would seek to reduce the resources devoted to unnecessary competition in purchasing arms.

10. Another opportunity for increasing international confidence and stability would be to conclude regional agreements limiting military expenditures of participating States. Given the prospect of reliable means for measuring and reporting military expenditures, flowing from the work of several ad hoc groups of budgetary experts that have reported to the Secretary-General, it will be possible for countries in a region to enter into budget-limitation agreements, which enhance international security and which also augment the resources available to Governments for the purpose of promoting increased economic growth.

11. But it is in the area of reducing tensions - of replacing fear with confidence, replacing ancient animosities with a new cordiality - that regional approaches show their particular merit. For it is necessary for all States, not just the permanent members of the Security Council, to participate in the process of balancing their desires for security through armaments against the advantages of mutual restraints. And the policy-makers of all nations must energetically strive to turn away from the possibility of armed conflict in seeking to resolve international disputes, towards the more intensive and more fruitful use of peaceful means. All types of regional disarmament accords favour these ends, for they enhance the ties of friendship and co-operation among neighbours, reducing the disposition to strike out in anger.