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REVIEW AND APPRAISAL OF THE PRESENT INTERNATIONAL SITUATION
IN THE LIGHT OF THE PRESSING NEED TO ACHIEVE SUBSTANTIAL
PROGRESS IN THE FIELD OF DISARMAMENT, THE CONTINUATION OF
THE ARMS RACE AND THE CLOSE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
DISARMAMENT, INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT

ADOPTION OF A PROGRAMME OF ACTION ON DISARMAMENT

Report of the Secretary-General

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* A/S-10/10.

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. By resolution 32/87 C, of 12 December 1977, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General "to initiate a study on the interrelationship between disarmament and international security", and further requested him "to submit a progress report thereon to the General Assembly at its special session devoted to disarmament".

2. The Secretary-General hereby transmits a progress report as requested by the General Assembly, which has been prepared by the Centre for Disarmament. In addition to the introduction, it consists of six sections. The aim of section II is to indicate in general terms the nature of the relationship between international security and disarmament. Sections III to VI contain a brief and preliminary examination of how the linkage between international security and disarmament has been approached in the United Nations thus far with a view to drawing attention to some of the main issues that have arisen in the consideration of the interrelationship between security and disarmament. An attempt is also made to explore in a tentative manner the implications of that interrelationship. Section VII seeks to indicate what might be the objectives of further study.

II. INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT

3. Disarmament and international security have been a primary concern of the United Nations throughout the entire history of the Organization. The maintenance of international peace and security was uppermost in the minds of the authors of the Charter of the United Nations as the purpose to which all the endeavours of the Organization were to contribute. The aim of disarmament figures less prominently in the Charter itself, but few other subjects have been so consistently at the centre of the deliberations and efforts of the United Nations, particularly of the General Assembly.

4. Questions of security and disarmament are intimately connected. On the one hand, progress in disarmament is a key factor on which genuine and lasting improvement of international security depends. On the other hand, problems of international security largely determine the possibility of substantial progress in the field of disarmament. This is a complex interrelationship having many facets that require more thorough and systematic consideration.

5. The importance of disarmament for the strengthening of security in all its aspects has been repeatedly emphasized in documents and resolutions of the United Nations. What is involved in this relationship can be summarized under three main headings.

6. First, the process of continuous arms acquisition has, in itself, become a major source of insecurity. The emergence of new weapons systems, the refinement of old ones and their proliferation throughout the world, while often designed to redress or restore a military balance, in fact lead to military instability, rivalry, tension and apprehension. Seen in perspective, the period since the
Second World War has been one of continuing accumulation of weapons and, concomitantly, diminishing international security. Developments now well underway in nuclear weapons, their carriers and guidance systems and in many areas of conventional weaponry indicate that, in the absence of effective steps to curb the arms race, vertically and horizontally, the hazards attendant on the arms build-up, of nuclear weapons in particular, will continue to grow.

7. Second, progress in disarmament would vastly increase the scope for international co-operation in all fields, for in an international environment dominated by the arms race there is a heightening of mistrust and confrontation between nations and their political and economic relations tend to be subordinated to military-strategic considerations. The halting and reversal of the arms race would contribute to the consolidation of a policy of détente and its expansion in functional and geographical terms and would thus tend to assure that relations among nations are conducted in accordance with the principles of national independence and sovereignty, equality of rights, non-resort to force or the threat of force and the right of every people to decide its own destiny.

8. Third, effective measures of disarmament would also facilitate the attainment of solutions to a number of problems which are not only of critical importance in their own right, but constitute some of the most important facets of the security problems facing the world. Among these are the problem of development and the related task of establishing a new international economic order. Progress towards the solution of the problems of poverty, overcrowding, injustice and frustration that afflict a large fraction of mankind would tend to create favourable conditions for order and stability and to eliminate situations conducive to conflict and disruption at the international and domestic levels.

9. All these elements are the core of the interrelation between security, disarmament and development and, viewed from the standpoint of international security, they constitute different facets of the same problem. To think of security exclusively or primarily in terms of military force leads to the diversion of vast material resources and intellectual and moral energies away from the urgent tasks on which future international security will ultimately depend.

10. Progress in disarmament is thus a basic condition for effective progress towards the strengthening of security in all its aspects, even though many of the most important determinants of international security are not in themselves military in nature. No paradox is involved in this. It is simply a consequence of the negative impact of the arms race on all aspects of national and international policy.

11. Conversely, questions of security, in the narrow sense of the term, lie at the heart of disarmament problems and that relationship too is largely determined by the intensity and pervasiveness that characterizes the present arms race. Initially armaments may be a symptom of underlying political differences, but beyond a certain point the armaments programmes themselves, the apprehensions they cause in some parts of the world and the attitudes and institutions they give rise to, assume the character of independent forces propelling the arms race. In this situation, countries tend to view questions of international peace and
security chiefly in terms of relationships of force and of military safeguards against any conceivable contingency. Therein lies a major obstacle to disarmament: the arms race fosters the very attitudes and institutions which perpetuate it.

12. To break that vicious circle involves a two-fold task: the cessation of the arms race and disarmament, on the one hand, and the building up of a system of world order based on collective responsibility, on the other hand. This may require greater efforts to seek a common understanding of the causes and mechanisms that sustain the arms race and, at an appropriate stage, the development of more reliable means for the maintenance of international peace and security. There is also a need for a more thorough exploration of the way in which the processes of disarmament and of strengthening international security are linked and of the precise relationships that may exist between specific measures in these two fields.

III. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT AS ENVISAGED IN THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS

13. The maintenance of international peace and security is the primary objective of the United Nations as set forth in the Preamble of the Charter, in Articles 1 and 2 laying down the purposes and principles of the Organization and in the provisions defining the powers and responsibilities of the Security Council and the General Assembly. Most of the other purposes and principles that the Charter enumerates were explicitly linked to the overriding aim of furthering international peace and security; so were the various tasks entrusted to the Organization, such as the promotion of international co-operation in the political, economic, social, cultural, educational, and health fields and the encouragement of the progressive development and codification of international law.

14. It was noted previously that the maintenance of international security is not exclusively, or even primarily, a question of military strength. International security is critically dependent upon the satisfaction of basic human needs and aspirations and the development of international co-operation on the basis of equal rights with a view to providing all States opportunities for progress. This link is explicitly recognized in Article 55 of the Charter, which opens Chapter IX on international economic and social co-operation. According to this Article, the United Nations, with a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being, which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, is to promote a variety of goals, including conditions of economic and social progress and development, solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems, and universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.

15. Basic components of the peace and security system envisaged in the Charter are the principle that Member States are to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force (Article 2, para. 4) and its corollary that States are to settle their interational disputes by peaceful means (Article 2, para. 3). Other fundamental elements of the system are the principles
of sovereign equality and non-intervention in the domestic matters of States, on which the United Nations is based (Article 2, paras. 1 and 7).

16. In addition, the Charter sets forth a wide range of means for dealing with specific dangers to international peace and security should they arise. The Charter conferred on the Security Council the primary responsibility in this area (Article 24, para. 1) and Member States are to accept and carry out the decisions of the Council (Article 25). Chapter VI lays down the procedures to be followed for the pacific settlement of disputes, which in practice have provided opportunities for various forms of action or combinations thereof, including calls to disputing parties; the rendering of good offices, often by an individual or commission appointed for that purpose; and the establishment of subsidiary bodies to perform such functions as fact-finding, mediation and conciliation.

17. Another element of the security system envisaged by the Charter is contained in Chapter VII, which specifically assigns to the Security Council the responsibility of determining the existence of threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression, and recommending or deciding what measures should be taken to maintain or restore international peace and security.

18. Such measures may be of a non-military nature (Article 41) or, should such measures prove inadequate, may involve the use of armed force (Article 42), as decided by the Security Council with the concurrence of its five permanent members. For purposes of the adoption of military measures, all Members undertook to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security (Article 43). These special agreements have not been concluded.

19. The Charter supplements the security system envisaged in Chapter VII with the right of individual or collective self-defence against armed attack until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security (Article 51).

20. The concept of enforcing peace and imposing settlements embodied in Chapter VII has, for various reasons, not proved strictly applicable in practice.

21. To deal with complex conflict situations which endanger international peace and security, the Security Council has in certain cases instituted peace-keeping operations. These have been of two basic types: military observer missions and peace-keeping forces provided by Governments. Observer missions, composed of unarmed military officers, have generally been deployed to supervise cease-fires by observing and reporting and by using their good offices to help settle local problems in this connexion. Peace-keeping forces normally use their best efforts, by interposition or otherwise, to prevent a recurrence of fighting, and perform a variety of additional functions, such as supervising the withdrawal of troops, manning buffer or demilitarized zones and areas of limited armaments and forces, contributing to the maintenance of law and order and a return to normal conditions, supporting humanitarian relief operations etc. Peace-keeping forces function...
impartially, in co-operation with the parties; they use methods of persuasion and negotiation and avoid the use of force, except for purposes of self-defence. They are armed with defensive weapons only. Their main object is to keep dangerous situations under control and maintain peaceful conditions in which political settlements can best be sought. In conjunction with these operations, the Security Council has initiated a variety of peace-making efforts, often by entrusting good offices or mediation missions to the Secretary-General or to a special representative. These missions are intended to promote freely-negotiated, peaceful and agreed settlements of the underlying political problems.

22. In the field of disarmament there is nothing in the Charter comparable to the fairly detailed system provided for in the field of security. The Security Council was entrusted the responsibility of formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee, plans for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments, in order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources (Article 26). The General Assembly was empowered to consider the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments and to make recommendations with regard to such principles to Member States or to the Security Council (Article 11). In the course of the years, the initiative on disarmament matters moved from the Security Council, or bodies under it, to the General Assembly and subsidiary organs of the Assembly.

23. To affirm that there is an interrelationship between questions of disarmament and questions of security is to affirm, among other things, that the choice of a certain system for the preservation of security affects the options available in the field of disarmament and, conversely, that specific disarmament principles and plans, to be practicable, call for a security system satisfying certain requirements.

24. Regarding the implications of the security system of the Charter for disarmament, two points seem particularly important. In section I, it was noted that the arms race plays a crucial role in determining the particular way in which problems of disarmament and problems of security are linked. In the present section, it has been indicated that the right of self-defence in case of armed attack has a place in the Charter security system. Therefore, it seems that in considering questions of disarmament from the standpoint of their interrelationship with questions of international security, it would be useful, while retaining the emphasis on general and complete disarmament as the ultimate goal, to distinguish, at least for purposes of analysis, two tasks which are, from the point of view of their security implications, quite different: the cessation of the arms race and the substantial reduction of levels of armaments on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the achievement of general and complete disarmament.

25. The first could be described as a programme for the regulation and reduction of armaments, in the sense of a cessation of the arms race and of effective major cuts in arms. The security requirements of such a programme can be met by the Charter system of international peace and security. Undoubtedly, the development of the capacity and strength of the United Nations in this field could facilitate the programme's implementation. Thus, within the framework of the present system,
there is room for far-reaching disarmament measures, for example, agreed ceilings on armaments, particularly on nuclear weapons, far below present levels and, concomitantly, diminished reliance on armed forces and major redirection of resources to social and economic development - all of which would contribute to the realization of the system of peace, security, progress and arms regulation envisaged in the Charter.

26. The other task is that of achieving the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament to which Member States have repeatedly committed themselves. A programme of general and complete disarmament raises delicate and complex issues regarding the arrangements and institutions to be associated with the disarmament process to ensure the security of States and the maintenance of international peace, for instance, the type of forces to be placed at the disposal of the United Nations and the principles governing the use of such forces. A related question concerns the nature, size and purpose of remaining national forces, a question that has obvious implications for the right of self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter. Closer consideration of plans for general and complete disarmament ought to cast further light on these points.
IV. GENERAL REGULATION AND REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS AND 
ARMED FORCES AND GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

27. From the very beginning of the United Nations, the General Assembly and the 
Security Council, spurred to a great extent by the awesome threat posed by nuclear 
weapons and the possibility of a nuclear arms race, devoted their attention to 
questions of disarmament and the regulation of armaments. Early efforts were 
mainly concerned with the control of nuclear energy to ensure its use only for 
peaceful purposes and with the general regulation and reduction of armaments and 
armed forces. The discussions on atomic energy took place under conditions not 
comparable to those prevailing today, but, in the consideration of the question 
of the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces, a number 
of problems were recognized and a number of principles were accepted, many of 
which have lost none of their importance. By the end of the decade of the 1950s, 
attention turned to general and complete disarmament which, in 1959, was adopted 
by the General Assembly as the basic goal of the United Nations in the field of 
disarmament. Since the early 1960s, partial measures of disarmament and/or arms 
limitation have been the focus of attention and action, general and complete 
disarmament remaining the ultimate goal to which disarmament efforts should lead.

28. In the early period, the General Assembly adopted a number of resolutions 
that in one way or another recognized the interrelationship between problems of 
disarmament and security and touched upon issues concerning the arrangements and 
institutions that should accompany the process of disarmament to ensure the 
security of States and the maintenance of international peace. 1/

29. General Assembly resolution 41 (I) is of particular importance in this 
connexion. By this resolution, the Assembly recognized the necessity of an early 
general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces, and recognized the 
close connexion between the problems of security and disarmament. The resolution 
contained three main points relating to this latter question. First, the 
provision of practical and effective safeguards by way of inspection and other 
means against the hazards of violations and evasions was recognized as essential 
to the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces. Second, it 
was recommended that the placing at the Security Council's disposal of the armed 
forces mentioned in Article 43 of the Charter should be accelerated as much as 
possible. Third, the resolution recommended the progressive and balanced 
withdrawal of forces stationed in ex-enemy territories. It further recommended 
a corresponding reduction of national armed forces and a general progressive and 
balanced reduction of national armed forces.

1/ See, for instance, General Assembly resolution 41 (I) of 14 December 1946; 
resolution 192 (III) of 19 November 1948; resolution 300 (IV) of 5 December 1949; 
resolution 496 (V) of 13 December 1950; resolution 502 (VI) of 11 January 1952; 
resolution 704 (VII) of 8 April 1953; resolution 715 (VIII) of 28 November 1953; 
resolution 808 (IX) of 4 November 1954; resolution 914 (X) of 16 December 1955; 
resolution 1011 (XI) of 14 February 1957; resolution 1148 (XII) of 14 November 1957; 
resolution 1378 (XIV) of 20 November 1959; and resolution 1722 (XVI) of 20 December 1961, by which the Assembly welcomed the joint USSR-USA statement of 
agreed principles for disarmament negotiations and recommended that negotiations 
on general and complete disarmament be based on those principles.
30. Mention might also be made of a resolution adopted in August 1948 by the Commission for Conventional Armaments (S/C.3/32/Rev.1). The resolution laid particular stress on the necessity of an atmosphere of international confidence and security for a system of regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces to be put into effect. The latter, in turn, might be expected to increase confidence and thus justify further measures of regulation and reduction. The resolution cited as examples of conditions necessary for such confidence and security the implementation of Article 3 of the Charter as an essential step in establishing a system of collective security and the establishment of international control of atomic energy. As regards the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces, the resolution reiterated the need for an agreed system of international supervision and stipulated that provision must be made for effective enforcement action in the event of violations. Owing to differences of view, particularly on the question of nuclear energy, the resolution did not command unanimous support.

31. The question of the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces continued to be under discussion until 1959. Thereafter, the focus shifted towards general and complete disarmament and, as a result, the deliberations partly took a new direction. At the same time, it was stressed that this comprehensive approach was not incompatible with efforts aimed at the adoption of more limited measures and that, indeed, early agreement on and implementation of the latter could facilitate the former. 2/

32. Questions concerning the relationship between disarmament and security were dealt with in the 1961 joint United States-USSR statement of agreed principles to serve as a basis of multilateral negotiations on disarmament. 3/ It was agreed first, that all measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage in the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage and that security was ensured equally for all. Second, it was agreed that all disarmament measures should be implemented from beginning to end under such strict and effective international control as would provide firm assurance that all parties were honouring their obligations. To implement control over the inspection of disarmament, an international disarmament organization, including all parties to the agreement, should be created within the

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2/ As noted in para 27 above, in the early 1950s partial measures rather than general and complete disarmament became the object of active consideration. A number of General Assembly resolutions have been adopted, however, that address the question of general and complete disarmament in various contexts, among them the Disarmament Decade and a comprehensive programme of disarmament. See, for instance, General Assembly resolution 2602 E (XXIV) of 16 December 1969; resolution 2661 C (XXV) of 7 December 1970; resolution 2825 B and C (XXVI) of 16 December 1971; resolution 3104 C (XXVIII) of 18 December 1973; resolution 3261 A (XXIX) of 9 December 1974; resolution 3470 (XXX) of 11 December 1975; resolution 31/68 of 10 December 1976; and resolution 32/80 of 12 December 1977.

framework of the United Nations. This international disarmament organization and its inspectors should be assured unrestricted access without veto to all places as necessary for the purpose of effective verification. Third, it was agreed that progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. The measures to be taken should include the obligation of States to place at the disposal of the United Nations agreed manpower necessary for an international peace force to be equipped with agreed types of armaments. Arrangements for the use of this force should ensure that the United Nations could effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations. On several points, particularly on the question of control, the joint statement went beyond a formulation of principles and provided guidelines concerning institutions and procedures to implement measures of general and complete disarmament.

33. Subsequently, in 1962, both the Soviet Union and the United States of America submitted plans for general and complete disarmament. Concerning arrangements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control 4/ adopted the system provided for in the United Nations Charter. States were to conclude agreements with the Security Council by which they would undertake to make available to the latter armed forces and facilities, as envisaged in Article 43. Such forces would be used by the Council pursuant to the terms of Article 42. The ‘Outline of basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world’, submitted by the United States, 5/ contemplated a variety of measures to strengthen arrangements for keeping the peace during and after the disarmament process and placed great emphasis on the need for prior agreement on peace-keeping machinery. It was proposed that, in the first stage of disarmament, a peace observation corps should be created and that a peace force should be established in the second stage and fully developed in the third stage. In the first stage, a range of measures to promote confidence and reduce the risk of war were to be implemented. In the second stage, States Parties were to undertake to accept without reservations the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice to decide legal disputes and measures were to be adopted against indirect aggression and subversion. On a number of points, such as the codification of rules of international conduct related to disarmament and measures to make existing arrangements for the peaceful settlement of international disputes, whether legal or political in nature, more effective, the draft, instead of indicating specific measures, called for studies to be undertaken in the first stage with a view to the implementation of their recommendations in subsequent stages.

34. Past discussions on general and complete disarmament clearly reveal awareness that peace-keeping in its widest sense assumes central importance during and after the implementation of the disarmament plan. It was stressed that in a disarmed or

5/ Ibid., sect. F.
disarming world, special peace and security problems, distinct from those associated with limited disarmament measures, must be resolved.

35. In addition to the question of the nature, size and purpose of the forces that States would be permitted to retain at different stages in the disarmament process, at issue were such matters as institutions and procedures for verification of compliance with disarmament obligations; arrangements for the maintenance of international peace and security, including the type of forces to be made available to the United Nations and decision-making structures and procedures governing the use of such forces; and peaceful settlement machinery.

36. Those discussions indicate that, despite considerable identity of views on many fundamental points, there are significant disagreements. Further exploration of the interrelationship between international security and disarmament under conditions of general and complete disarmament could cast greater light on the underlying issues and their implications for the security system provided for in the Charter and could assist in the building of a consensus on what peace and security arrangements are needed and could be translated into concrete measures and institutions. A point to be borne in mind is that, as the disarmament process progresses towards the goal of general and complete disarmament, bringing with it a cessation of the arms race, substantial disarmament in areas of military significance and, concomitantly, decreasing reliance on military force, there may be significant changes in the political conditions and attitudes prevailing in the context of the arms race and many difficulties that today seem insuperable may lose their importance or become more amenable to solution.
V. MEASURES OF DISARMAMENT, ARMS LIMITATION AND MILITARY RESTRANST

37. As noted above, since the early 1960s, the focus in disarmament negotiations turned to partial measures of disarmament and/or arms limitation, such as the discontinuance of nuclear-weapons tests, the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons, the limitation of strategic arms and the banning of chemical and biological means of warfare. Efforts in these areas produced a number of agreements among them, the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water; 6/ the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (resolution 2373 (XXII)); the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (resolution 2026 (XXVI)); the agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States on the limitation of strategic weapons and the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests (A/31/125). Agreements were also concluded with a view to preventing the extension of the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, to certain areas or environments and to proscribing certain undesirable developments. These agreements include the Antarctic Treaty; 7/ the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (resolution 2222 (XXI)); the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America; 8/ the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (resolution 2660 (XXV)); and the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (resolution 3. 72).

38. There have also been discussions and negotiations with a view to the adoption of disarmament and/or arms limitation measures at the regional level. In this context, agreements have been concluded concerning the reduction of tensions and the building of confidence. In addition, consideration has been given to measures to prevent incidents and to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war. Bilateral agreements on such measures have been concluded by the Soviet Union and the United States, the Soviet Union and France and the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom.

39. As the value of partial measures of arms limitation and disarmament is obvious, there is no need to elaborate on it. What may be underlined is the desirability of co-ordinating different partial measures to assure the effective cessation of the arms race and the achievement of continued progress in the disarmament process. In addition, it may be noted that partial measures of disarmament and arms limitation, to the extent that they curb significant military capabilities and/or proscribe developments which, in the absence of such measures, countries would be unlikely to forego, have important security implications and, therefore, raise questions concerning the steps that should be taken to meet the security requirements of different countries or groups of countries. These are among the reasons why countries have increasingly come to stress that partial measures of arms limitation and disarmament must be conceived as parts of a comprehensive disarmament programme.

7/ Ibid., vol. 402, No. 5778, p. 72.
8/ Ibid., vol. 634, No. 9068, p. 281.
40. A comprehensive programme of disarmament would provide a framework within which partial disarmament measures could be co-ordinated with other such measures and with arrangements aimed at balancing security interests of all. Hence the value of a closer study of the interrelationship between questions of disarmament and security.

41. The desirability of placing partial measures of disarmament and arms limitation in the wider context of their relationship with other partial measures and their security implications is illustrated by the issues raised by certain aspects of the problem of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

42. For instance, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons explicitly recognizes the link between the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, as evidenced by the undertaking of the States Parties to the Treaty to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. Indeed, many non-nuclear-weapon States have stressed the need for progress towards nuclear disarmament to assure the success of efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

43. From another perspective, the problem of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons raises the question of the need for an acceptable balance of obligations between the parties with respect to the adoption of disarmament measures. This question has come to the fore in connexion with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, particularly during the negotiations leading to the conclusion of the Treaty and at the 1975 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (A/10215, annex), and it has been emphasized that to maintain an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States, there has to be movement towards nuclear disarmament, such as the discontinuance of nuclear-weapons testing and the achievement of substantial progress in the bilateral negotiations on strategic arms limitation between the United States and the Soviet Union.

44. Questions of security have arisen in connexion with a variety of proposals for the non-use of nuclear weapons, particularly against non-nuclear-weapon States, and for security guarantees to such States. There have been proposals for an unconditional prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, for non-first use pledges from those nuclear-weapon States that have not yet made such pledges, for guarantees from the nuclear-weapon States that nuclear-weapon-free countries will under no circumstances be attacked with nuclear weapons (negative guarantees) and for assurances on the part of nuclear-weapon States that they will provide assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to non-nuclear-weapon States victims of an act or objects of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used (positive guarantees).

45. These questions of security guarantees, negative and positive, and of universal or regional non-use or non-first-use pledges are evidently complex. On the one hand, there are implications for existing security arrangements in some parts of the world and for the security of countries to whose defence the nuclear-weapon States are committed in one form or another. On the other hand, there is the preoccupation of countries renouncing the acquisition of nuclear weapons about the protection of their security against nuclear threats or attacks.

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46. The lack of adequate balancing of the security and disarmament aspects of particular proposals can take many different forms. For example, progress in disarmament may be hampered by a concern with the security implications of possible violations which is out of proportion with the military importance of the measures envisaged.

47. The adoption of partial measures in important areas of the field of disarmament requires that the relationship between security and disarmament be dealt with. Indeed, a major merit of a closer study of that relationship may be precisely that it focuses attention on measures and combinations of measures that, because they explicitly recognize and address security problems, will include significant disarmament measures. Furthermore, the likelihood of contemplated prohibitions or restrictions of a significant nature being weakened in the negotiating process would be reduced if both the benefits for international security that the disarmament measures in question are meant to provide and the security risks they may entail for particular countries, in the absence of other measures, are kept in mind.
VI. MEASURES TO DEVELOP FRIENDLY RELATIONS AMONG NATIONS,
TO REDUCE TENSIONS AND TO INSTITUTE A LEGAL ORDER AS
A BASIS FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

48. The maintenance of international peace and security has been the object of continuous efforts by the Security Council and the General Assembly throughout the years. The Security Council, in accordance with its mandate under the Charter, has dealt with situations deemed to involve a danger to international peace and security on a case-by-case basis. The General Assembly, in the discharge of the responsibilities entrusted to it by the Charter, has devoted considerable time to the consideration of the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security and has made recommendations thereon. Some of the resolutions and declarations adopted seek to define the scope and clarify the implications of the general provisions and principles regarding the strengthening of international peace and security contained in the Charter. Others aim at promoting the development and codification of principles of international law in order to secure their more effective application. Still others call for the implementation, or fuller implementation, of specific provisions of the Charter, such as those of Chapters VI and VII, and call upon Member States to abide by the general principles of non-use of force, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-interference in the internal affairs of States and self-determination. Finally, some list measures to strengthen international security and others assess the progress achieved in their implementation. Altogether, these efforts relate to three parallel tasks.

49. First, there is the task of promoting international co-operation in the political field and encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codification, entrusted to the General Assembly by Article 13 of the Charter. This involves the elaboration of norms of conduct for States in matters affecting international security, including the definition of the exact scope and legal implications of these norms and of the general purposes and principles embodied in the Charter, the translation of such norms into binding and precise obligations and their consolidation by appropriate and effective measures and institutions.

50. The second task is one of strengthening the institutions and machinery for the peaceful settlement of disputes and the maintenance of international peace and security, developing the rules governing their use and securing their effective functioning in cases likely to endanger international peace and security. These are tasks in which both the Security Council and the General Assembly are involved.

51. The third task consists of measures to assist in the settlement of specific disputes or to forestall such disputes. There is both a general and a specific aspect to this task. The general aspect is illustrated by the measures adopted by the General Assembly on such questions as decolonization, racism, development and the establishment of a new international economic order. The specific aspect is exemplified by the actions that have been taken, mostly by the Security Council, in cases endangering the maintenance of international peace and security.

52. General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV) is of particular importance as a contribution to the progressive development and codification of principles of
international law with a view to promoting the rule of law and peaceful relations among nations. Adopted by consensus on 24 October 1970, the resolution contains the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, which was approved by the Assembly. The declaration embodies and elaborates a number of principles and specifies their implications. Among the principles included figure the non-use of force, the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means, non-intervention in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, the duty of States to co-operate with one another in accordance with the Charter, and the principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and of sovereign equality of States. The declaration stipulates, inter alia, that all States shall pursue in good faith negotiations for the early conclusion of a universal treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

53. As regards the principle of non-use of force embodied in the Charter, there have been sustained efforts since the early years of the Organization to specify more precisely what this principle involves. An important document on the subject is the Definition of Aggression, annexed to General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974. This definition was adopted with the conviction that it ought to have the effect of deterring a potential aggressor, it would simplify the determination of acts of aggression and the implementation of measures to suppress them, and it would also facilitate the protection of the rights and lawful interests of, and the rendering of assistance to, the victim. The definition enumerates, in a non-exhaustive way, acts that qualify as acts of aggression or constitute prima facie evidence of an act of aggression and spells out the legal implications of such acts. The resolution itself approves the definition, calls upon all States to refrain from acts of aggression and recommends that the Security Council should, as appropriate, take account of the definition in the performance of its functions.

54. The General Assembly has also adopted resolutions regarding the prohibition of the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, reaffirming this principle and specifying its implications in different contexts. Thus Assembly resolution 2160 (XXI), of 30 November 1966, deals with this principle in relation to the exercise of the right of self-determination of peoples under colonial rule and to the use of force to deprive peoples of their national identity.

55. More recently, consideration has been given to the question of the conclusion of a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations, at the initiative of the Soviet Union, which submitted a draft treaty to this effect at the thirty-first session of the General Assembly. By resolution 31/9, of 8 November 1976, the Assembly invited Member States to examine further the draft Treaty presented by the Soviet Union as well as other proposals and statements made during the consideration of the item, requested them to communicate their views and suggestions on the subject to the Secretary-General and requested him to report to the Assembly on the communications received. The Assembly at its thirty-second session adopted, on 19 December 1977, resolution 32/150, by which it established a Special Committee on Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle
of Non-Use of Force in International Relations and gave it the broader task of
drafting a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations as well
as the peaceful settlement of disputes, or making such other recommendations
as the Committee deemed appropriate.

56. Reference might also be made to the Draft Code of Offences Against the
Peace and Security of Mankind, adopted by the International Law Commission in
1954, 9/ which is now again on the agenda of the General Assembly. Although
the matter is still in a preliminary stage of development, it bears mention
because it provides an example of the interrelationship between security and
disarmament. Indeed, article 2, paragraph 7, of the draft elaborated by the
International Law Commission includes among offences against the peace and
security of mankind "acts by the authorities of a State in violation of its
obligations under a treaty which is designed to ensure international peace and
security by means of restrictions or limitations on armaments, or on military
training, or on fortifications, or of other restrictions of the same character".

57. It is to be noted that on each of these questions there has been disagreement
not only regarding substantive issues, but also on whether general definitions
were possible and desirable in view of the fact that situations involving acts of
aggression and the use of force in contravention of the Charter must ultimately
be considered in the light of each particular case.

58. The Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, adopted by
consensus as General Assembly resolution 2734 (XXV), is of a different kind. Its
chief purpose is not to formulate norms of conduct for States, but to develop
a framework for action to strengthen international security. Among the concrete
measures recommended in the Declaration are agreement on guidelines for more
effective peace-keeping operations, implementation of Article 43 of the Charter
in order fully to develop the capacity of the Security Council for enforcement
action, and the establishment, whenever appropriate and necessary, of subsidiary
organs on an ad hoc basis to assist the Council in the performance of its
functions. The Declaration recognizes the close connexion between the
strengthening of international security, disarmament and economic development
and, consequently, urges concerted efforts in the fields of disarmament,
development and human rights and fundamental freedoms as steps essential to the
strengthening of international security. The Assembly annually reviews progress
and short-comings in the implementation of the Declaration and this enhances its
importance.

59. Many of the questions relating to the Declaration on the Strengthening of
International Security, particularly those relating to means, methods and procedures
for the maintenance of international peace and security and for the peaceful
settlement of disputes, have been dealt with in other contexts, most recently
in the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the
Strengthening of the Role of the Organization. In this context, a variety of

9/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Ninth Session,
Supplement No. 9 (A/2693), chap. III.
views and suggestions have been put forward concerning, among other things, constitutional and procedural aspects and means and measures of implementation. 10/ Many of the points raised in the Special Committee are of key importance with respect to the strengthening of the peace-making and peace-keeping capabilities of the Organization, but it is still too early to determine what may be the results of its work. At a later stage, a study of the interrelationship between disarmament and international security might benefit from a closer examination of the work of the Special Committee.

60. Finally, in its resolution 32/155, containing the Declaration on the Deepening and Consolidation of International Détente, adopted by consensus on 19 December 1977, the General Assembly gave expression to the general principles underlying détente. The Member States declared their determination to consider taking new and meaningful steps towards a cessation of the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, at an early stage and towards disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament; to facilitate the peaceful and speedy settlement of outstanding international problems; to reinforce the peace-making and peace-keeping capabilities of the United Nations; to refrain from the threat or use of force and to abide by the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, non-intervention and non-interference in internal affairs; to ensure the free exercise of the right of peoples under colonial and alien domination to self-determination; to promote just and balanced economic relations among States and to strive to narrow the gap between developed and developing countries; to encourage and promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; and to foster mutual understanding and trust among peoples by promoting and facilitating cultural exchanges, freer movements and contacts among them.

61. The importance of such declarations of intent, which by being universally accepted become, in effect, affirmations of international norms, is evident. That importance would be further enhanced by the elaboration of the specific commitments and obligations they imply and by the adoption of measures to monitor and secure their effective application.

62. All of the above measures to codify the general principles of law regarding the non-use of force and friendly relations and co-operation among nations, to establish and strengthen means and procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes, to improve confidence and to expand and consolidate détente are achievements for the establishment of a climate of confidence and security. Apart from their obvious intrinsic importance, such measures are also significant in that they improve the prospects for disarmament.

63. While recognizing the importance of these achievements, the limitations inherent in this approach must also be underlined. If these measures of relaxation of tension are not accompanied by corresponding measures aimed at halting the arms race and disarmament, there will be a constant risk of relapse into tension, suspicion, isolation and confrontation. Genuine and lasting détente and the strengthening of confidence among States beyond a rather limited point is incompatible with the continued build up of arms.

64. A characteristic feature of the resolutions and declarations on the subject of international security which have been considered above is that, although the importance of the link between international security and disarmament is recognized and stressed, that link is only established in general terms.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

65. The question of the interrelationship between disarmament and international security is an element of several of the most important tasks of the United Nations. In the course of the work of the Organization, it has therefore been touched upon in a variety of contexts.

66. In view of the fundamental importance of this interrelationship, it merits more thorough and systematic consideration within the United Nations.

67. The complexity of the problems and the difficulties involved are obvious for no other question impinges so directly on the problem of harmonizing the most fundamental and sensitive national preoccupations with the most vital long-term interests of the international community. A study of the subject could promote the clarification and understanding of the issues at stake, identify areas of agreement and even help to extend the limits of consensus.

68. The crux of the problems of security and disarmament is the cessation of the arms race. In the context of the arms race, security comes to be so closely tied to armaments as to make disarmament and the strengthening of security particularly difficult. The cessation of the arms race and progress towards disarmament in areas of military significance would greatly contribute to the international order envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations and thus to the strengthening of security in all its aspects, in that it would create conditions conducive to international confidence and to the consolidation and expansion of co-operative relations among States, and would facilitate the adoption and implementation of the programmes needed for the solution of the pressing economic and social problems that the world faces today.

69. There is a need not only to examine the deleterious consequences of the arms race, as has been done in several reports, but also to study more closely its causes and the forces and mechanisms which drive it along, and to seek some common understanding of the phenomenon itself and some unity of view of the central problems involved in a way that can inform and guide action.

70. An examination of the issues underlying the link between security and disarmament would be of value in connexion with a comprehensive programme of disarmament inasmuch as at an advanced stage in the disarmament process the adoption of further disarmament measures will become interwoven with the task of establishing and developing adequate machinery and procedures for keeping the peace and for settling disputes by peaceful means.

71. A closer study of the interrelationship between disarmament and international security might therefore be of assistance to efforts to translate over-all principles and priorities into a coherent, effective and realistic strategy and might point to areas where the twofold process of disarmament and strengthening international security could be accelerated.