Fifteenth special session
COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE OF THE
FIFTEENTH SPECIAL SESSION
Agenda items 12 and 15

ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS, INCLUDING QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE ASPECTS, RELEVANT TO THE DISARMAMENT PROCESS, WITH A VIEW TO THE ELABORATION OF APPROPRIATE CONCRETE AND PRACTICAL MEASURES AND, IF NECESSARY, ADDITIONAL PRINCIPLES, TAKING DULY INTO ACCOUNT THE PRINCIPLES AND PRIORITIES ESTABLISHED IN THE FINAL DOCUMENT OF THE TENTH SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, THE FIRST SPECIAL SESSION DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, IN THE LIGHT OF THE ACTION PROGRAMME ADOPTED AT THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

Report of Working Group II (Part III)

Addendum

OUTLINE FOR FOCUSING THE DISCUSSION IN WORKING GROUP II

Submitted by the Chairman of the Group

A. General elements for consideration

Compliance with the Charter of the United Nations

1. The Member States of the United Nations stress the imperative need for strict compliance with the Charter of the United Nations. In particular, they recall their obligation to maintain international peace and security and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations. At the same time, the
Member States reaffirm the obligation of States to settle their international disputes by peaceful means. These principles should continue to constitute the basis for all efforts in the field of disarmament.

Validity of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly

2. The Member States acknowledge the historic significance and continuing importance of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (resolution S-10/2), the first special session devoted to disarmament, which sets forth ideals that still inspire the international community. They recognize that the process of achieving general and complete disarmament under effective international control should take duly into account the basic principles and priorities established by the Final Document. They affirm the need to maintain and further the momentum generated by the first special session and its final document.

Bilateral, regional and multilateral approaches

3. All the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations. The United Nations has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament. It should facilitate and encourage all measures in this field. All States have a duty to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament. While disarmament is the responsibility of all States, the nuclear-weapon States have the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and, together with other militarily significant States, for halting and reversing the arms race. Bilateral, regional and multilateral approaches and measures should mutually facilitate and complement and not hinder or preclude each other.

Disarmament and international security

4. Bearing in mind the right of each State to security, the adoption of disarmament measures should take place in such an equitable and balanced manner as to enhance the security of each State and to ensure that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage. Disarmament measures should ensure that at each stage the objective should be undiminished security at the lowest level of forces based on full respect for the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.

Disarmament and development

5. A broader understanding of security should include not just the military dimension but also the political, economic, social and humanitarian dimensions. A process of disarmament that provides for undiminished security at progressively lower levels of armaments and forces could, inter alia, allow additional resources to be devoted to addressing the non-military aspects of security, and thus result in enhanced overall security. Disarmament, development and security should be looked at in their relationship in the context of the interdependence of nations, interrelationships among issues and mutuality of interests.

/...
Implications of technological developments

6. While technology as such is neutral and scientific and technical progress should not be impeded, it is recognized that the qualitative development and growing accumulation of weapons in many parts of the world add a further dimension to the arms race. Equally, it is recognized that qualitative aspects of the arms race remain closely linked to the dynamics of international security. In addition, new technologies have significant applications in arms limitations and disarmament. In order to promote international peace and security and to ensure that ultimately scientific and technological developments be used for peaceful purposes, qualitative as well as quantitative aspects must be taken into account.

B. Nuclear weapons in all their aspects

Prevention of nuclear war

7. There is today an international consensus that any war, whether nuclear or conventional, must be prevented. All the Member States agree on the continuing priority need to prevent a nuclear war, as well as situations that could lead to an escalation to nuclear war. They welcome practical measures such as the upgrading of emergency crisis communications (hotlines) between certain nuclear-weapon States, and the establishment of nuclear risk reduction centres. They also welcome the initiation of regular summit meetings between the two States with the largest nuclear arsenals to discuss the range of relevant issues, including regional problems. They consider that such steps have had a significant impact on easing international tensions and can serve as a new starting point for further steps along the road to nuclear disarmament. They encourage the continuation and deepening of this process.

Cessation of the nuclear-arms race

8. In this context, cessation of the nuclear-arms race and measures of nuclear disarmament must remain a priority issue. The Member States note the special responsibility of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in this respect as the possessors of the largest nuclear arsenals. In this process, they stress the need for effective verification of measures of nuclear disarmament, as well as the vital importance of maintaining security at lower levels of forces.

Reductions in nuclear armaments

9. The Member States welcome the agreement on the global elimination of the United States and Soviet land-based intermediate and shorter-range nuclear missiles and the agreement, in principle, of verifiable 50 per cent reductions in the strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union. The former is a historic milestone in efforts for nuclear disarmament, being the first concrete measure of nuclear disarmament undertaken so far. The Treaty's agreed provisions on stringent verification and asymmetrical reductions provide useful precedence for further agreements. This agreement should also open the way to
progress in other arms control areas. The Member States particularly urge the need to conclude at an early date the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on a 50 per cent cut in their strategic nuclear weapons.

Cessation of nuclear testing

10. The cessation of nuclear testing by all States within the framework of an effective nuclear disarmament process would be in the interest of mankind. It would make a significant contribution to the aim of ending the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and development of new types of such weapons and towards preventing their proliferation. The most effective way to achieve the ending of all nuclear tests in all environments for all times would be through the conclusion of a verifiable, comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty open to and attracting the adherence of all States.

11. The Conference on Disarmament should be urged to initiate substantive work on all aspects of a nuclear-test-ban treaty at the earliest possible date. States members of the Conference on Disarmament, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, and all other States should co-operate in order to facilitate and promote such work. The Member States acknowledge the valuable work on verification of a nuclear-test-ban treaty already being undertaken by the Ad Hoc Group of Seismological Experts, under the auspices of the Conference on Disarmament.

12. Pending the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, nuclear-weapon States, especially those which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, should agree to appropriately verifiable interim measures. In this regard, the Member States note the negotiations on nuclear testing taking place between the United States and the Soviet Union, which involve a stage-by-stage approach to the issues. In these negotiations the sides, as the first step, aim to agree upon effective verification measures that will make it possible to ratify existing treaties and proceed to negotiate further intermediate limitations on nuclear testing leading to the ultimate objective of the complete cessation of nuclear testing as part of an effective disarmament process. The Member States urge the early and successful conclusion of these negotiations.

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

13. It is imperative, as an integral part of the effort to halt and reverse the arms race, to strengthen the regime aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This objective involves obligations and responsibilities on the part of both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States. All States should undertake to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

14. Effective measures can and should be taken at the national level and through international agreements to minimize the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons without jeopardizing energy supplies or the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. All States should have access to and be free to acquire technology, equipment and materials for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, taking particularly into account the needs of the developing countries. International co-operation in this field should be under agreed and appropriate international
safeguards applied through the International Atomic Energy Agency on a non-discriminatory basis in order to prevent effectively the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Negative security assurances

15. Bearing in mind that a consensus exists on the need to conclude effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and noting the unilateral declarations in this respect made by all nuclear-weapon States, the Member States agree that renewed efforts should be made to reach, if possible, an agreement on a common approach, which could lead to the conclusion of an appropriate international instrument on the subject of a legally binding character.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

16. The Member States reiterate their conviction that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world can contribute effectively to the objectives of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and to nuclear disarmament. They acknowledge the valuable contribution of the existing nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco. They note the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific through the Treaty of Rarotonga. They also note proposals for the establishment of further nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world. They maintain the view that such zones should be established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the regions concerned and taking into account the characteristics of each region.

C. Chemical weapons

17. The Member States solemnly condemn the continuing use of chemical weapons and urge the strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases.

18. Determined, for the sake of all mankind, completely to exclude the future possibility of the use of chemical weapons, the Member States reaffirm their commitment to the earliest possible conclusion of a global, verifiable and effective international convention prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons that would enhance the security of all States. The Conference on Disarmament should maintain the momentum of its negotiations on the convention. The achievement of such a convention would free the world once and for all of the scourge of chemical weapons. The Member States stress that a successful outcome of these negotiations would provide an inspiration for further efforts in the field of multilateral disarmament.
D. Outer space

19. Outer space shall be the province of all mankind. Its exploration and use shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all States and in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding. All States, in particular those with major space capabilities, should contribute actively to the objective of the peaceful use of outer space and the prevention of an arms race in this environment. To this end, all effective efforts should be made both bilaterally and multilaterally.

20. Bilateral negotiations have been undertaken and should be continued to work out effective agreements on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The objective of these negotiations will be to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space. The two parties concerned are requested to continue to keep the Conference on Disarmament and the General Assembly informed of the progress made in their bilateral sessions in order to facilitate multilateral work on this subject.

21. All efforts should be made by the Conference on Disarmament in the exercise of its responsibilities as the global multilateral disarmament negotiating forum that has a primary role in the negotiation of multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

22. The Member States recall the obligation of all States to refrain from the threat of use of force in their outer space activities.

E. Conventional weapons in all their aspects

23. The Member States recognize the increasing importance of addressing issues related to conventional arms limitation and disarmament. They acknowledge the need to achieve significant reductions in conventional armaments and armed forces in various parts of the world as an important component of the process leading to general and complete disarmament. Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, negotiations should be carried out on the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in a mutually balanced and verifiable manner, based on the principle of undiminished security of the parties and with the view to promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military level, taking into account the need of all States to protect their security. States with the largest military arsenals have a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional armaments reductions. Particular attention should be given to regions where concentrations have attained the most dangerous levels.

24. Where the concentration of troops and armaments in Europe has reached an especially high level, it is necessary to strengthen strategic stability through the establishment, at a significantly lower level, of a stable, comprehensive and verifiable balance of conventional forces. The more stable situation should be achieved by agreements on appropriate and mutual reductions and limitations in the whole of Europe and on effective confidence- and security-building measures. Such
steps should ensure undiminished security of all States, with full respect for the security interest and independence of all States, including those outside military alliances. The States concerned are urged to initiate negotiations to this end in the Vienna process as soon as possible.

25. The Stockholm Agreement of 1986 on a set of confidence- and security-building measures represents a new step of great political importance. Its full implementation will reduce the dangers of armed conflict and all misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities in that region. The agreed measures are of military significance and politically binding and are provided with adequate forms of verification that correspond to their content. Their implementation will further the process of confidence-building and improving security, making an important contribution to developing co-operation in Europe, thereby contributing to international peace and security in the world as a whole.

26. In other regions, agreements or other measures relating to conventional disarmament should be resolutely pursued on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis, with the aim of strengthening peace and security at a lower level of forces, by the limitation and reduction of armed forces and of conventional weapons, taking into account the need of States to protect their security, bearing in mind the inherent right of self-defence embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, and without prejudice to the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in accordance with the Charter, and the need to ensure balance at each stage and undiminished security of all States. Bilateral, regional and multilateral consultations and conferences should be held where appropriate conditions exist, with the participation of all the countries concerned, for the consideration of differing aspects of conventional disarmament, such as the initiative envisaged in the Declaration of Ayacucho subscribed to by eight Latin American countries in 1974.

27. Consultations should be carried out among major arms suppliers and recipient countries on the limitation of all types of international transfer of conventional weapons, based in particular on the principle of undiminished security of all the parties, with a view to promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military level, taking into account the need of all States to protect their security as well as the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of peoples under colonial or foreign domination and the obligation of States to respect that right, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States. Measures should also be taken to strengthen prohibitions on the illicit trade in arms.

28. Further measures in this area should also be considered, as well as the strict observance of existing prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons, including those which may cause unnecessary suffering or which may have indiscriminate effects.
F. Verification and compliance

29. The Member States recognize that verification is a fundamental element of the disarmament process and that disarmament and arms limitation agreements must provide for effective measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed strictly by all parties. In this respect, they endorse the statement of principles of verification and provisions and techniques of verification drawn up by the Disarmament Commission and urge all Member States to take them fully into account in negotiations on disarmament and arms control measures in which they are engaged. They note the possibility of following up consideration of this subject under the auspices of the United Nations.

Compliance

30. Strict observance of all provisions of arms limitation and disarmament agreements is a fundamental prerequisite to create confidence among States and to induce them to attempt further arms limitation and disarmament measures. Only full compliance by all parties to such agreements would create the confidence necessary to proceed further in the process of arms limitation and disarmament. Any violation of such agreements, on the other hand, not only adversely affects the security of States parties but can also create security risks for other States relying on the constraints and commitments stipulated in those agreements. Effective provisions for the resolution of non-compliance questions that might arise with regard to agreements on arms limitation and disarmament would contribute to better relations among States and to the strengthening of world peace and security.

G. Confidence-building measures

Potential of confidence-building measures

31. Collateral measures in the nuclear, chemical and conventional fields, together with other measures specifically designed to build confidence, should be undertaken in order to further the relaxation of international tension and thus create favourable conditions for the adoption of additional disarmament measures.

32. In order to facilitate the process of disarmament, it is necessary to take measures and pursue policies to strengthen international peace and security and to build confidence among States. Commitment to confidence-building measures could significantly contribute to preparing for further progress in disarmament.

33. In this context, the Member States endorse the guidelines drawn up by the Disarmament Commission and invite all States to apply them to their own particular situations as appropriate.
Openness and transparency

34. All States should promote a better flow of objective information on military capabilities in order to contribute to the building of confidence among States on a global, regional or subregional level and in order to facilitate the conclusion of concrete disarmament agreements, which in turn would enhance international peace and security. All States should consider implementing additional measures based on the principles of openness and transparency, such as, for example, the international system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures, with the aim of achieving a realistic comparison of military budgets, facilitating the availability of objective information on, as well as objective assessment of, military capabilities and contributing to the process of disarmament. They request the Disarmament Commission to study the matter with a view to drawing up guidelines and principles in this regard.

H. Naval arms race and disarmament

35. There is common recognition that the high seas should be preserved for peaceful purposes and that the traditional principle of freedom of navigation must be upheld. As naval forces are not independent of other military forces, disarmament measures in the maritime domain should be considered in their general military context, taking into account that independent naval balance or parity do not exist. Any effort directed towards arms limitation, disarmament and confidence-building measures at sea should proceed as an integral part of the overall objective of halting and reversing the arms race in general. Disarmament measures in the maritime field should be balanced in their general military context and should not diminish the security of any State.

I. Zones of peace

36. The establishment of zones of peace in various regions of the world under appropriate conditions, to be clearly defined and determined freely by the States concerned in the zone, taking into account the characteristics of the zone and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and in conformity with international law, can contribute to strengthening the security of States within such zones and to international peace and security as a whole. In this regard the Member States note the proposal for the establishment of a zone of peace in the South Atlantic, as well as proposals for other such zones in various regions of the world.

K. Disarmament and development

37. With a view to fostering an interrelated perspective on disarmament, development and security as constituting a trial of peace, the Member States reaffirm the international commitment to allocate a portion of the resources released through disarmament for purposes of socio-economic development, particularly in developing countries, taking due account of existing capabilities of the United Nations system.