Fifteenth special session
COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE OF THE
FIFTEENTH SPECIAL SESSION
Agenda items 12 and 15

ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS, INCLUDING QUALITATIVE AND
QUANTITATIVE ASPECTS, RELEVANT TO THE DISARMAMENT PROCESS, WITH
A VIEW TO THE ELABORATION OF APPROPRIATE CONCRETE AND PRACTICAL
MEASURES AND, IF NECESSARY, ADDITIONAL PRINCIPLES, TAKING DULY
INTO ACCOUNT THE PRINCIPLES AND PRIORITIES ESTABLISHED IN THE
FINAL DOCUMENT OF THE TENTH SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY, THE FIRST SPECIAL SESSION DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, IN THE LIGHT OF
THE ACTION PROGRAMME ADOPTED AT THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

Report of Working Group II (Part II)

Addendum

Draft text prepared by the Chairman of the Working Group

I. ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS

1. Since the twelfth special session of the General Assembly, in 1982, a number
of new developments and trends, of both a conceptual and a more practical nature,
have evolved. In some cases they are judged to have rendered or be apt to render
the problems of maintaining and strengthening international peace and security more
complex; in others, they are perceived as significant contributions to a process
aimed at fully realizing the objectives of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. Major developments and trends:

(a) There is, on a global scale, a growing awareness of the interdependence
of States as well as regions in security and other matters. It is widely
recognized that the devastating effects of a nuclear war would threaten the very
survival of mankind. At the same time, the increasing lethality of non-nuclear weapons has furthered the insight that war of any kind should no longer be countenanced as an instrument to resolve political differences. A more comprehensive approach to disarmament issues therefore demands the renewed and invigorated attention of the international community.

(b) There is widespread concern that the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects has not yet been effectively halted, let alone reversed. While noting that in its quantitative aspect the nuclear-arms race seems to have slowed down, the qualitative aspect has recently attracted increased attention. It is generally recognized that it is not so much technology or science per se that present difficulties, but their application to the development of new classes of nuclear and other weapons.

(c) As the awareness of the multidimensional character of security has constantly increased, so has the perception of the importance of its non-military dimensions, be they of a political, economic, social, humanitarian or environmental nature. It has been recognized that disarmament and development are distinct processes that are two of the most urgent challenges facing the world today, and that each should be pursued vigorously regardless of the pace of progress in the other. It has been assessed that this close and multidimensional relationship, in which security plays a crucial role, is derived in part from the fact that the continuing global arms race and development compete for the same finite resources at both the national and international levels.

(d) In the field of non-military threats to security, a number of other factors that negatively affect international peace and security command significant attention; among them are colonial domination, policies of apartheid and all forms of racial discrimination, external intervention, violation of territorial integrity, of national sovereignty, of the right to self-determination and the encroachment on the right of all nations to pursue their economic and social development free from outside interference.

(e) A growing concern has been voiced in the international community over the repeated use, in violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, of chemical weapons and over reports on their emergence in an increasing number of national arsenals. The demand for the earliest possible conclusion of a global, verifiable and effective international convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction has become universal. The General Assembly welcomes the progress made by the Conference on Disarmament over the last few years towards the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention.

(f) There is widespread apprehension about an extension of military competition into outer space. While the awareness of the potentially stabilizing role of space activities has been sharpened, on the basis of recent advances in science and technology the perception prevails in the international community that an unlimited exploitation of outer space could lead to a renewed upsurge of the arms race. Such a development would run contrary to the objectives of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding.
(g) There is agreement on the fact that, while the nuclear-weapon States, especially those with the largest nuclear arsenals, have the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and, together with other militarily significant States, for halting and reversing the arms race, disarmament is the responsibility of all States. Therefore bilateral, regional, multilateral and global approaches are needed in harness to address and fulfil the vital desire of all the peoples of the world for success in disarmament negotiations.

(h) Notwithstanding the negative aspects of these trends, there have also been some promising developments. In this context, it is noted that the recently concluded Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles has for the first time opened up the perspective of real and even asymmetric reductions in the process of nuclear disarmament, accompanied by stringent verification provisions. Important groundwork has thus been laid for an agreement between the two major nuclear Powers on a 50 per cent reduction in their strategic nuclear arsenals.

(i) Similarly, the negotiated reduction of tensions and building of confidence, in a region where the concentration of armaments and armed forces at the dividing line of groups of States with different political and social systems is very high, has led to an improved relationship between those States. These improvements have enlarged the basis for their dialogue and are thus facilitating an atmosphere more conducive to disarmament and arms limitation on a broader scale than previously existed.

(j) Furthermore, it is noted that a reduction of the potential for conflict has also been achieved in some regions where existing tensions cannot primarily be attributed to what is commonly known as the East-West conflict. It is felt that such positive examples of confidence-building could significantly contribute to furthering progress in the field of disarmament.

(k) With regard to the continuing process of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones the useful contribution of such zones is emphasized. Depending upon the specific circumstances of each region they can either promote nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons or enhance and strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation régime.

(l) There is a growing awareness that effective verification is a fundamental element of the disarmament process as a complement to the obligation of strict compliance with all provisions of arms limitation and disarmament agreements. Effective verification and strict compliance create an essential degree of confidence among parties to an agreement, as well as in the international community as a whole, that stimulates the process of arms limitation and disarmament to proceed.

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II. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

3. The need for strict compliance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations is of primary importance. In particular, Member States should be mindful of their obligation to maintain international peace and security and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations. At the same time, Member States should reaffirm the obligation of States to settle their international disputes by peaceful means.

4. The United Nations has a central role and primary responsibility in the field of disarmament and should facilitate and encourage appropriate measures in this regard. All States have the right and the duty to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament. While disarmament is the responsibility of all States, the nuclear-weapon States have the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and, together with other militarily significant States, for halting and reversing the arms race. Bilateral, regional and multilateral approaches and measures of disarmament should proceed in a constructive parallelism so that they facilitate and complement each other. In order to discharge the responsibilities of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, the General Assembly should be kept duly informed about ongoing processes of negotiations and deliberations at the different levels.

5. Scientific and technological progress for the benefit of humanity should not be impeded. At the same time, it is recognized that the application of new technologies to the development of new weapons and weapon-systems can add a further dimension to the arms race and that qualitative aspects of the arms race affect the dynamics of international security. However, it is also recognized that new and emerging technologies can have significant applications in arms limitation and disarmament. In order to strengthen international peace and security and to promote the use of scientific and technological developments for peaceful purposes, Member States should exercise self-restraint in research and development directed at new weapons. Resources should be allocated to the development and application of new technologies for military purposes only in a manner consistent with the need to maintain and strengthen international peace and security in its military and non-military dimensions. At the same time, greater openness and transparency in disseminating information concerning the potential of new technological developments and their application should be encouraged.

6. All Member States agree on the continuing priority need to prevent war, in particular nuclear war, as well as situations that could lead to an escalation to the latter. They welcome practical measures such as the upgrading of emergency crisis communications between certain nuclear-weapon States, the establishment of nuclear risk reduction centres, as well as the holding of regular meetings at the summit level between the two States with the largest nuclear arsenals. They consider that such steps have a significant impact on easing international tensions and can serve as a new starting point for further steps along the road to disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament. They encourage the continuation and deepening of this process. At the same time they note that no progress has been made so far in the Conference on Disarmament concerning its agenda item "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters".

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7. Pending the achievement of the ultimate goal of their complete elimination, the early and significant reduction of nuclear armaments remains of critical importance to international peace and security. In this context the agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States on the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles is welcomed as a milestone in efforts for nuclear disarmament, being the first concrete negotiated measure of nuclear disarmament undertaken so far. The Treaty's provisions provide useful precedents for further agreements. This agreement should also open the way to progress in other areas of arms limitation and disarmament. At the same time the agreement, in principle, to negotiate verifiable 50 per cent reductions in the strategic nuclear arsenals of the Soviet Union and the United States should be welcomed.

8. The cessation of nuclear-testing by all States as part of an effective nuclear disarmament process, paying due account to the objective of undiminished security, will be in the interest of humanity. It would make a significant contribution to the achievement of the aim of ending the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of such weapons. It would also be of great value in efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Every effort should continue to be made to achieve, at the earliest practicable date, an effective, verifiable and comprehensive treaty banning all nuclear tests open to and attracting the adherence of all States. The Conference on Disarmament should be urged to initiate substantive work on all aspects of a nuclear-test-ban treaty at the earliest possible date. In this context the valuable work already being undertaken by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts under the auspices of the Conference on Disarmament on developing a global seismological system to assist in the verification of a nuclear-test ban should be acknowledged. Member States call upon the Soviet Union and the United States to accelerate their ongoing, full-scale, stage-by-stage negotiations leading within an effective disarmament process to the ultimate objective of the complete cessation of nuclear testing. The opportunities arising from progress in their negotiations should be fully utilized by the multilateral forum.

9. All States should undertake to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The necessity of attaining at the earliest possible date universality in respect of existing international instruments related to this end has been strongly urged. An effective international non-proliferation régime is indispensable for international co-operation with regard to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The availability on a predictable, non-discriminatory and long-term basis of nuclear materials, equipment and technology should be assured under adequate safeguard commitments.

10. Renewed efforts should be made to reach agreement on a common approach and to conclude an appropriate international instrument of a legally binding character to secure the objective of assuring non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

11. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world can contribute effectively to the objectives of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and to nuclear disarmament. Such zones, established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States of the regions concerned, would promote regional and international security and stability. In the process of establishing such zones, the characteristics of each region should be taken into account.
12. The Conference on Disarmament should be urged as a matter of highest priority to intensify and to reinforce its efforts with a view to the final conclusion of a universal, verifiable convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production, and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. All States members of the Conference on Disarmament are called upon to make all efforts towards the solution of the remaining problems at the earliest possible date. After the conclusion of the Convention all States should ensure its application through early signature and ratification.

13. The continuing use, in violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, of chemical weapons is strongly condemned. Pending the conclusion of and the universal adherence to a chemical weapons convention, all States are called upon to observe strictly the provisions of the Protocol. All States that have not become party to it should promptly accede to and ratify this Protocol. All efforts should be made to prevent effectively the proliferation of chemical weapons.

14. The Secretary-General should be requested to carry out without delay as thorough as possible investigations in response to reports that may be brought to his attention by any Member State concerning the alleged use of chemical, bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons in violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol or other relevant rules of positive or customary international law. The urgent need for further technical guidelines and procedures available to him for the timely and efficient investigation of such reports is stressed.

15. In order to ensure the continued exploration and use of outer space for the benefit and in the interest of mankind and in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding, all States, in particular those with major space capabilities, should contribute actively to the objective of the prevention of an arms race in that environment. Vigorous efforts should be made to this end, both bilaterally and multilaterally. Bilateral negotiations have been undertaken between the Soviet Union and the United States with the declared objective of working out effective agreements aimed, inter alia, at preventing an arms race in outer space. The two parties concerned are urged to continue and intensify their efforts in this regard. All efforts should be made by the Conference on Disarmament in the exercise of its responsibilities as the global multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, as appropriate, for the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

16. The need to achieve significant reductions in conventional armaments and armed forces in various parts of the world as an important component of the disarmament process is acknowledged. Particular efforts should be made by States in regions where concentrations of weapons and armed forces have attained the most dangerous levels and where disproportionately high levels of social and economic resources are devoted to military ends. In Europe, where the concentration of conventional forces and armaments has reached an especially high level, the objective of negotiations should be to strengthen stability and security through the establishment of a stable and secure balance of conventional forces, which include conventional armaments and equipment, at lower levels; through the elimination of disparities prejudicial to stability and security; and through the elimination, as a matter of priority, of the capability for launching surprise attack and for
initiating large-scale offensive action. The development and expansion, at the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, of the confidence-building measures adopted at the first stage of its work will be of high importance.

17. In other regions, agreements or other measures relating to conventional disarmament should be resolutely pursued on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis to strengthen stability and security by the limitation and reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons to the lowest possible level, taking duly into account the characteristics of the respective regions. Consultations should be carried out among major arms suppliers and recipient countries on the limitation of all types of international transfer of conventional weapons; in this context, special attention should be given to their effects in areas of tension. The Secretary-General should be requested to submit to the General Assembly proposals for encouraging greater openness on all types of international transfers of conventional weapons, including the concept of an arms transfer register.

18. It is recognized that arms limitation and disarmament agreements must provide for adequate and effective measures of verification satisfactory to the States party to such agreements in order to create the necessary confidence that they are being strictly observed by all parties. In this regard the principles of verification drawn up by the Disarmament Commission should be endorsed; all Member States are urged to take them fully into account in the negotiation of arms limitation and disarmament measures. The need for follow-up consideration of this subject under the auspices of the United Nations is recognized.

19. Collateral measures in the nuclear, chemical and conventional fields together with other measures specifically designed to build confidence should be undertaken in order to contribute to diminishing mistrust, misunderstanding and miscalculation and to further the relaxation of international tension, thus creating favourable conditions for the adoption of additional disarmament measures. In this regard the guidelines drawn up by the Disarmament Commission should be endorsed and all States invited to apply them to their own particular situations as appropriate, taking into account the specific characteristics or requirements of a particular region.

20. All States should promote a better flow of objective information on military capabilities in order to contribute to the building of confidence among States on a global, regional or subregional level and in order to facilitate the conclusion of concrete disarmament agreements, which in turn would enhance international peace and security. They should consider implementing additional measures based on the concepts of openness and transparency, such as, for example, the international system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures. The Disarmament Commission should be requested to study this matter with a view to drawing up guidelines and principles.

21. It is commonly recognized that the high seas are open to navigation by all and that the traditional principle of freedom of navigation must be upheld. As naval forces are not independent of other military forces, they should be viewed in their general military context, taking into account that an independent naval balance or parity does not exist. Efforts directed towards arms limitation, disarmament and
confidence-building measures at sea should proceed as an integral part of the overall objective of halting and reversing the arms race in general. In this context, appropriate naval confidence-building measures could contribute to enhancing security and stability at sea.

22. With a view to fostering an interrelated perspective on disarmament, development and security as constituting a triad of peace, the Member States participants of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development reaffirm their international commitment to allocate a portion of the resources released through disarmament for purposes of socio-economic development, particularly in developing countries. Accordingly they stress the need for the implementation of the Final Document of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development.