Fifteenth special session
Agenda item 10

ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECISIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS
TENTH AND TWELFTH SPECIAL SESSIONS

Objective information on military matters

Report of the Secretary-General

Addendum

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1. The German Democratic Republic is in favour of a comprehensive approach to questions of openness in military matters. Relevant steps are to be taken to reduce mistrust in international relations and, instead, create an atmosphere of predictability, thus paving the road to greater security in a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world. This being the prime objective, the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament also is called upon to encourage efforts towards more openness in the military sphere for the sake of practical disarmament measures.

2. The historic treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles proves that the political will to achieve genuine disarmament must, of necessity, be accompanied by military openness if reliably verifiable disarmament measures are to be agreed upon.

Regarding the inspections agreed upon to verify compliance with the INF Treaty, the German Democratic Republic has undertaken far-reaching international legal commitments. The early withdrawal from its territory of Soviet missiles covered by the Treaty was a major contribution to the speedy ratification of the Treaty; it enhanced confidence and improved the atmosphere for further disarmament steps. Objective information on these steps by international mass media was facilitated through proper arrangements by the German Democratic Republic.

Such measures concur with the letter and spirit of General Assembly resolution 42/38 I and should encourage the other side to act accordingly.

3. The States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty have explained the principles of their defence-oriented military doctrine, because they consider extremely important the correct understanding of the military aims and intentions fixed in the military doctrines of States and military-political alliances. The consultations they proposed to hold with the NATO States are designed to compare the military doctrines of the two alliances, analyse their nature and jointly consider their future orientation. Thus, mutual suspicion, which has increased over the years, and mistrust could be diminished and a better understanding of each other's intentions achieved. Also, it could be guaranteed that the military concepts and doctrines of the two military blocs and their parties are based on defensive principles.

The German Democratic Republic was satisfied to note that the issue of military doctrines was also dealt with when the defence ministers of the Soviet Union and the United States met at Berne. It supports the earliest possible commencement of a dialogue on that topic between the two military alliances.

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In order to build military doctrines on defensive principles, it is of major importance to renounce the first use of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union and China have already made solemn declarations to that effect. The German Democratic Republic hopes that the Western nuclear-weapon States will respond constructively to the expectations expressed in a number of pertinent United Nations resolutions and will make similar declarations or participate in the elaboration of an international instrument of a legally binding character laying down the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

4. An indispensable element of disarmament measures is effective verification. This is ensured by a combination of national means and international procedures, including appropriate international organs, the exchange of relevant information and on-site inspections, and presupposes readiness for co-operation and openness on military matters.

Socialist States have launched a great number of relevant initiatives, particularly with regard to the chemical-weapons ban, a comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapons tests, the prevention of an arms ban in outer space and conventional disarmament.

The German Democratic Republic has advanced detailed ideas on verification in connection with nuclear- and chemical-weapon-free zones in Central Europe, and it has actively participated in the discussions on effective verification measures during the Vienna talks on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe, at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, and the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva.

5. Openness and confidence-building gain increasing importance in the negotiations of the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva on a complete ban on chemical weapons. This goes, in particular, for the multilateral exchange of data on the possession or non-possession of chemical weapons, as well as on the production of such chemicals which are covered by the convention, up to trial inspections. Confidence thus strengthened and experience gained in the process would be conducive to the speedy completion of the convention and help solve questions concerning its translation into practice.

Whereas the Soviet Union was the sole chemical-weapon State to disclose the size of its stocks of these weapons, other Powers have, regretfully, not yet been ready to follow suit. The production of a new type of chemical weapon, i.e., the binary weapon, which has been commenced by one State and planned by another, adversely affects confidence in international relations and puts the negotiations at jeopardy. Another impediment is an obstinate refusal to abandon positions which are in contrast to the declared objective of the complete ban on chemical weapons.

The positive international response to the visits of experts to facilities at Shikhan, Tooele, Munster and The Hague clearly demonstrated the effectiveness of relevant confidence-building measures. They stimulated the negotiations considerably. In March 1987, a seminar of the Pugwash movement was held in the German Democratic Republic on the issue of chemical weapons. The participants also visited a chemical enterprise. Thus, the specialists gained a concrete idea of the...
management and work of socialist combines. Both the visit and the ensuing discussions on the spot have been a contribution to advancing further the concepts on verification relative to the non-production of chemical weapons in the civil industry.

6. The Stockholm document adopted in 1986 proved that concrete and verifiable agreements aimed at lessening military confrontation in Europe and reducing mistrust in the sensitive field of military security can be achieved.

Implementation of the document has already led to more openness and predictability in this field.

Subject-related contacts between military representatives of States with different social systems are expanding, thus serving the reduction of mistrust, suspicion and misunderstanding.

The German Democratic Republic has conscientiously lived up to the obligations contained in the Stockholm document. In 1986 and 1987, it submitted in good time its annual calendars of military manoeuvres subject to notification to all States of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. In 1987, observers from 22 of those States have witnessed on three occasions that manoeuvres on the territory of the German Democratic Republic are of a non-threatening nature and that this country is in favour of more openness in the military sphere. An inspection carried out on territory of the German Democratic Republic under the terms of the Stockholm document led to the conclusion that the country translated into real action the spirit of this document.

The German Democratic Republic expects that the Vienna follow-up Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe will decide as soon as possible upon the start of negotiations on conventional disarmament in Europe. The Warsaw Treaty States, striving for agreement on concrete disarmament steps, have proposed to present military data which will be sufficiently detailed to allow a comparison of the individual force potentials involved, as well as effective verification. As for the continuation of the discussion on confidence- and security-building measures in Europe with all 35 States of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe participating, the German Democratic Republic stands up for agreement on farther-reaching or even new measures.

7. An important result of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development has been the understanding that further consideration is to be given "to the importance of greater openness, transparency and confidence among nations with a view to facilitating progress in both disarmament and development". The reduction of military expenditures is an issue that plays a major part in the implementation of the principle of disarmament for development.

In States with differing social systems, price structures and price-fixing mechanisms for the procurement of arms and equipment for their armed forces are widely varying. Thus, a comparison of their military budgets is complicated. The German Democratic Republic is prepared to contribute constructively to efforts for...
a realistic comparison of these budgets, while adhering to the objective to start as soon as possible substantive negotiations on the reduction of military spending.

8. The German Democratic Republic holds that consideration should be given at the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament to the close relationship between military openness, confidence-building and disarmament. In the final document of the session, it should be taken into account that openness on military matters before and during negotiations on arms limitation and disarmament can be of great importance for the achievement of relevant agreements.

HUNGARY

[Original: English]

[8 June 1988]

1. The Government of the Hungarian People's Republic attaches paramount importance to the promotion of better understanding among peoples as well as of peaceful inter-State co-operation based on mutual benefit, which are definitely conditional on mutual confidence in all spheres of life. Confidence however can only be based and developed on mutual acquaintance with one another, the predictability of the parties' intentions and the transparency of their actions. All this holds particularly true for military potentials, or the limitation and reduction of military potentials, and disarmament.

2. Recent years have witnessed favourable developments in respect to greater understanding and confidence among States, but suspicions and distrust of decades cannot be done away with overnight. Firm resolve and consistent action are needed. Therefore, Hungary deems it highly important for States, particularly the militarily significant ones, to provide regular information of a widening scope on their respective military potentials. Information should naturally be correct, objective, regular and continuous.

3. The leading military Powers have already started to exchange certain military data, a practice which the Hungarian Government endorses and welcomes by all means. However, it deems it equally necessary for the exchange of data to widen in scope, which may allow States to contribute voluntarily to reducing and ultimately eliminating distrust observed in the military-political field, which constitute a major cause of international tension.

4. By furnishing objective information on military matters, States can give proof of their genuine commitment to and readiness for arms limitation and reduction as well as disarmament. Strengthening of confidence in this way is bound to extend in time to other areas, increasing the reliability and prestige of the particular country in other spheres of life such as economic and trade relations. Accordingly, regular and objective information is, the Hungarian Government believes, one of the most effective confidence-building measures, which may serve to prevent the spread of unfounded, false and ill-intentioned information, the
tendentious misapprehension of a State's intention and action, the sowing of seeds of distrust and the poisoning of international relations.

5. If well-grounded, well-constructed and regularly confirmed, objectivity and reliability and openness in the military field may encourage further disarmament measures and result in agreements. In an atmosphere of trust so established, it will be easier to realize well-intentioned initiatives and to implement the measures agreed upon.

6. Finally, objective information on military matters may greatly promote and facilitate verification of compliance with treaty obligations, which would again have a favourable influence on further efforts at strengthening confidence and would encourage additional moves in that direction.

7. This line of development is regarded by the Government of Hungary as a desirable prospect for the future. The possibilities are at hand, and some States have already taken the first steps in that direction. The Hungarian Government is seeking to promote this trend of development. It is convinced that to strengthen confidence and to work for disarmament are not only a responsibility and a duty of the greaty military Powers, but are tasks which all countries can and should contribute to performing.

8. In the recent past, the Hungarian Government has had two occasions to give proof that it not only stands for the above considerations in principle, but also follows them in practice. The first occasion is related to an international agreement already in force, namely, to the implementation of the recommendations as formulated in the Final Declaration of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. Although Hungary has no facilities on which it should provide information according to the established criteria, the Hungarian Government has deemed it necessary to report to the other Member States, through the United Nations, the activities of two institutes which specialize in activities involving pathogenic micro-organisms that may have relevance to the implementation of the Convention. It did so to contribute to removing and preventing any doubt and suspicion in this respect, to strengthening confidence among States, and to extending scientific co-operation for peaceful purposes.

9. The Hungarian Government was likewise guided by the above considerations on the second occasion when, in his statement before the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, on 4 February 1988, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Hungary officially declared Hungary's chemical-weapon-free status. His statement and later that of the head of the Hungarian delegation released data on the Hungarian chemical industry which testify to its demilitarized nature as well as to the sincere endeavour and readiness of Hungary to work towards the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons and, indirectly, the solution of other disarmament issues.
1. In keeping with the provisions of resolution 42/38 I of the General Assembly entitled "Objective information on military matters", the Government of the Polish People's Republic has the honour to present the following.

2. The Government of Poland notes with satisfaction that the international situation which arose after the signing of the Soviet-American Treaty on the elimination of medium and shorter-range nuclear missiles, as well as the announcement of a successive summit meeting and the possibility of signing an agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 50-per-cent reduction of strategic nuclear weapons have created favourable conditions for overall disarmament efforts, including further steps in the sphere of access to objective military information which constitutes an integral part of the disarmament process.

3. Poland, together with other socialist States, has repeatedly expressed conviction that objective information on military matters is one of the fundamental factors in activities designed to ease international tensions, enhance mutual confidence and regional as well as global stability.

4. Poland, along with other Warsaw Treaty member States, put forward in April 1987 a proposal of a moratorium on military expenses, emphasizing also in the communiqué from the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty member States the need of an effective monitoring system commensurate with the contents of the disarmament process. We are open to the questions of use of national as well as international means for obtaining information.

5. Poland made an important contribution to a broadly conceived question of the consolidation of security, confidence and peace, submitting in May 1987 the Jaruzelski Plan on decreasing armaments and increasing confidence in Central Europe, in which the problems of agreeing mechanisms of strict verification of disarmament commitments undertaken in this region, including military information, are given high importance. Noteworthy is the openness of the Plan, both with respect to its territorial scope, negotiating forum and the substance. Its aim, from the military point of view, is to reduce offensive elements of military potentials through a gradual reduction of weapons mutually recognized as particularly dangerous. This openness has been confirmed, among other things, by the proposal contained in the Memorandum of the Government of the Polish People's Republic of 17 July 1987 stating that all parties exchange the lists of weapons which they consider particularly dangerous, and which also proposed forms of control (notifications, observations, monitoring points). This plan, together with the initiatives of other socialist States, is a part of the initiative submitted to the General Assembly to create a comprehensive system of peace and international security, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
6. Additional elements of Poland’s position taken with regard to confidence and security in Central Europe are contained in a joint statement issued by the Polish United Workers’ Party and the Social Democratic Party of Germany on criteria and means of creating the structures of mutual confidence and security in this region. It points, among other things, to the proposal of establishing the European Confidence-building Council, which could serve as a forum of dialogue on military aspects of decreasing tensions in the above-mentioned region (this statement has been transmitted to the United Nations Secretariat).

7. Poland’s stand was also declared in a joint communiqué from the session of the Committee of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Treaty, at Sofia, on 30 March 1988, which expressed the will to carry out appropriate measures in arms reduction – “on the basis of exchange of necessary data with the use of appropriate system of monitoring and verification”.

8. The data concerning the Polish defence budget are published in official government publications (The Law Journal, The Statistical Yearbook) and also in the periodical press publications.

9. Poland participates actively in the process of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, fully abiding by the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, as well as the Stockholm Document on confidence- and security-building measures, including notification of military exercises and invitation of observers. Poland is in favour of developing further confidence- and security-building measures, such as, inter alia, the limitation of size and intensity of certain military activities, covering independent activities of air and sea forces by confidence-building measures, establishment of procedures for prompt clarification of situations raising concern of any party, as well as other measures contained in the above-mentioned Memorandum.

10. The Government of Poland is convinced that objective military information is not an end in itself. It should serve the implementation of the supreme goals: reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons, cessation of nuclear-weapons tests, non-militarization of outer space, a chemical-weapons ban and the reduction of conventional weapons. These goals were also served by a declaration made by Poland at the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva that Poland would not export components which could be used for the production of chemical weapons.

11. Striving to implement important decisions of the first special session devoted to disarmament, recognizing the United Nations Organization as an important forum for initiating and promoting disarmament processes beneficial for all humanity, Poland is in favour of the broadest possible activities in the sphere of disarmament, also taking into account the importance of objective information on military matters.