Fifteenth special session

LETTER DATED 6 JUNE 1988 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF TURKEY TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to attach herewith a letter dated 6 June 1988 addressed to you by Mr. Özer Koray, representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see annex).

I should be grateful if this letter and its annex were circulated as a document of the fifteenth special session of the General Assembly.

(Signed) Ilder TURKMEN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
ANNEX

Letter dated 6 June 1988 from Mr. Özer Koray to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith the text of a letter addressed to Your Excellency by His Excellency Mr. Rauf R. Denktas, President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see appendix).

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the fifteenth special session of the General Assembly.

(Signed) Özer Koray
Representative
APPENDIX

Letter dated 6 June 1988 from Mr. Rauf R. Denktas to the
Secretary-General

With reference to the views expressed by Mr. Vassiliou, the Greek Cypriot
leader, regarding the demilitarization of Cyprus, as part of his speech before the
special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament, I have the
honour to state clearly the position of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on
this issue.

I choose to do this without prejudice to our long-held view that this issue,
like every other aspect of the Cyprus question, cannot be singled out, or discussed
outside the context of the intercommunal negotiations, and even then it can only be
discussed together with the other aspects of the question as part of an "integrated
whole". As Your Excellency is fully aware, the "integrated whole" approach to the
solution of the Cyprus question, stemming from the fact that all aspects of the
question are inseparably interlinked, has been a fundamental aspect of the current
stage of the negotiating process as well as the documents you have presented to the
two sides during this process, since the Vienna Working Points of August 1984.

I believe it would be useful, for a correct evaluation of the issue, in
historical perspective, to recall that the bi-national partnership Republic of
Cyprus, established in 1960, was, to all intents and purposes, a demilitarized
state. According to the constitution of that Republic, a mixed, symbolic army of
2,000 personnel (60 per cent Greek Cypriot and 40 per cent Turkish Cypriot) was to
be established, together with a police force of the same number (70 per cent Greek
Cypriot and 30 per cent Turkish Cypriot).

Under the Treaty of Alliance, annexed to that constitution, Turkey and Greece
were given the right to station small contingents on the island: 650 and 950
strong, respectively.

This virtually demilitarized Cyprus suffered from the illegal acts of those
who unilaterally and clandestinely militarized it, the perpetrators of this
terrible act being Greece and the Greek Cypriot side. It will be recalled that,
even before the establishment of the partnership Republic, the island, in general,
and the Turkish people of Cyprus, in particular, had suffered at the hands of
clandestine, armed organizations like EOKA established jointly by Greece and the
Greek Cypriots with the purpose of annexing the island to Greece (Enosis). Even
those Greek Cypriots who dared to waver on Enosis (union of Cyprus with Greece)
were mercilessly killed by EOKA.

The history of the last 25 years in Cyprus, is the history of how the
non-aligned Republic of Cyprus was militarized, stage by stage, and how those
clandestine armaments brought suffering to Cyprus.

In 1963, only three years after the establishment of the bi-national
partnership Republic, the Greek Cypriot underground armies, which had remained

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dormant for a brief period of time thereafter, re-emerged savagely attacking the
Turkish Cypriots and effectively bringing to an end the bi-national partnership
Republic, usurping its entire machinery. In fact, the practice of forming secret
armies was so widespread that even the Greek Cypriot political parties, like Akel
and Edek, also had their paramilitary wings.

This illegal set-up was further reinforced by a secret agreement between
Archbishop Makarios and the then Prime Minister of Greece, Mr. George Papandreou.
The result of this agreement was the clandestine infiltration of 20,000 Greek
soldiers into the island in 1964 (see p. 100, "Democracy at Gunpoint" by
Mr. Andreas Papandreou and also para. 41 of the then United Nations
Secretary-General's report, S/5950 of September 1964).

As an extension and furtherance of the militarization process, the Greek
Cypriot side unconstitutionally formed, in 1965, the so-called National Guard,
commanding staff of which was almost entirely brought from Greece, and equipped it
with illegally imported arms.

From 1963 onwards, as a direct result of these developments, the security of
the Turkish people of Cyprus had come under severe threat. Vice President Kucuk's
appeal to all nations was to "give their support, both material and moral, to the
Turkish Cypriot Community in their struggle for survival against very heavy odds".
The years between 1963 and 1974 were a period of complete lack of security for the
Turkish Cypriots. During those tragic years, intermittent armed attacks were
launched on the Turkish Cypriot people coupled with acts of mass-murder,
harassment, intimidation and oppression. The dispatching of UNFICYP to the island
in 1964 was not sufficient to restore security of life for the Turkish Cypriot
people and hence this violence, harassment and denial of human rights continued
until 1974.

The coup d'état of 15 July 1974 was the culmination of this very process of
arming and militarization of the island, the object of which was, as it has always
been, to annex Cyprus to Greece. It remained for Turkey, as one of the guarantors,
to intervene and prevent the realization of this illegal aim.

The irony of the situation is that, the side which, as seen above, illegally
and for illegal aims, had militarized the island and destroyed a bi-national State
by force of arms, is now paying lip service to demilitarization. If this ironical
situation had signalled a change of heart and mind on the part of the Greek Cypriot
side, one would have taken it more seriously.

Their recent record, however, as well as their current arming campaign,
indicate otherwise. It is a well known fact that the Greek Cypriot side, using all
means at its disposal, has been engaged in a multi-faceted military build-up both
in terms of manpower, infrastructure as well as arms and equipment.

On the other hand, the Greek Cypriot side continues to reject every set of
proposal submitted by the United Nations Secretary-General for a negotiated
solution of the Cyprus question. In this vein, the Greek Cypriot side refuses to
accept the latest document of the United Nations Secretary-General, the Draft
Framework Agreement of 29 March 1986, which is still on the table. Meanwhile, the Greek Cypriot side, continues to claim sovereignty over the whole of the island and uses various tactics in order to extend that imagined sovereignty into the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

As I have stated above, the security of the Turkish people of Cyprus is a vital aspect of the question of Cyprus, the safeguarding of which is sine qua non for a peaceful coexistence in Cyprus.

The aim of demilitarization should be to increase rather than decrease security. However, the aim of the Greek Cypriot side in treating this subject in the manner that it is, is to deprive the Turkish Cypriot people of their only effective means of security, namely, the presence of the Turkish Peace Force in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. It is clear that if this force is removed prior to a political settlement and without effective and adequate guarantees, the Greek Cypriots, with sheer numerical superiority and their ever-present potential of putting into action their paramilitary forces, could easily pose a grave threat for the Turkish Cypriot people. Concrete past experience has clearly demonstrated how and by whom the security of the Turkish Cypriot people could be effectively quarantined. As it is also clear from concrete past events, no similar threat has ever been posed for the Greek Cypriot people.

In the light of the above, the correct approach with regard to demilitarization is to consider this matter as part and parcel of a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus question and to desist from attempts at singling it out. This issue, therefore, cannot be dissociated from the question of my people's security, which itself can only be dealt with as part of an overall settlement between the two sides. Hence Mr. Vassiliou's approach to the problem and his statement on it cannot be binding on Cyprus as a whole because he lacks the legal and moral right to represent the whole of Cyprus on this or on any other issue.

At a time when negotiations have not even started aiming at such a settlement and there is an absolute lack of trust and confidence between the two peoples of the island it would seem unrealistic, to say the least, as well as counter-productive to dwell upon this point, obviously for propaganda purposes.

I need not stress that it will serve no useful purpose to try to decouple demilitarization from its interrelated aspects and to use it as a ploy to focus undue attention on the legitimate presence of the Turkish Peace Force within the territory of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus: a presence which ensured peace and mutual security on the island for the last 14 years, by providing a deterrent balance against the overwhelming military superiority of the Greek Cypriot side.

In the circumstances, it would be more realistic and sincere, if the Greek Cypriot side were to respond positively to the Turkish Cypriot proposal of signing a non-aggression agreement with us and agreeing to negotiate with the Turkish Cypriot side on the basis of the 29 March 1986 document put on the table by the United Nations Secretary-General after strenuous negotiations with both sides. It is at such negotiations that Mr. Vassiliou's remarks on demilitarization will be...
treated as relevant and the issue will be decided on by the two sides in the light of the Turkish Cypriot views on the issue. This would also facilitate the creation of an atmosphere of trust and confidence, which is the prerequisite of a comprehensive solution.

I would be grateful if this letter is circulated as a document of the fifteenth special session of the General Assembly.

Rauf R. DENKTAS
President