Fifteenth special session
Item 9 of the provisional agenda*

REVIEW AND APPRAISAL OF THE PRESENT INTERNATIONAL SITUATION,
ESPECIALLY IN THE LIGHT OF THE VITAL OBJECTIVE OF TERMINATING
THE ARMS RACE AND THE PRESSING NEED TO ACHIEVE SUBSTANTIAL
PROGRESS IN THE FIELD OF DISARMAMENT

Letter dated 27 May 1988 from the Permanent Representative
of Czechoslovakia to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General

I have the honour to convey to you, at the request of His Excellency
Ambassador Pak Gil Yon, Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea, a document containing the views of the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea on the regional approaches to nuclear disarmament, which the
observer delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the third
special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament wishes to have
circulated as a document of the General Assembly (see annex).

Accordingly, I would be grateful if you could have the above-mentioned
document circulated as an official document of the Fifteenth special session of the
General Assembly under item 9 of the provisional agenda.

(Signed) Evžen ZÁPOTOCKÝ
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* A/S-15/10.
ANNEX

Working paper submitted by the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on regional approaches to nuclear disarmament

I. PREAMBLE

1. Building a peaceful world secured from the danger of nuclear war has been a unanimous desire of humanity.

2. The seeds of nuclear war could be removed only by the total elimination of nuclear weapons from the Earth. With the conclusion of the treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the elimination of the intermediate- and shorter-range nuclear missiles, the theory of "reservation of nuclear weapons for deterrence" has been proved to be a sophism that has caused innumerable human and material waste over the last decades.

3. Nuclear disarmament is an objective for all of humanity to obtain. A nuclear war cannot possibly be "limited". Unlike conventional wars, nuclear catastrophe would reach any part of the globe through the atmosphere regardless of national or continental borders. Nuclear disarmament needs both political will by the nuclear-weapon States and active role, at the same time, by the mass of the non-nuclear States. Nuclear disarmament cannot be said to be in progress if development of new types of nuclear weapons to compensate for the reduction of others, shifts of nuclear weapons from one region to another or further qualitative sophistication of remaining nuclear weapons are allowed to continue.

4. Nuclear disarmament starts with the end of the nuclear arms race. Crucial to curbing the nuclear arms race would be the imposition of a comprehensive nuclear test ban and intensification of international pressure in a global scale.

5. To end the nuclear arms race, it would be of equal importance to remove the danger of conventional war. The very existence of nuclear weapons has become very likely to tempt a conventional war, once outbroken, to trigger off nuclear war. Particularly in the regions where tactical nuclear weapons are deployed within range, a military conflict by conventional forces has become almost destined to be escalated to thermo-nuclear war.

6. Removing offensive capabilities of the conventional forces in confrontation would be the only way to reduce the danger of conventional war. The simplest but practically important confidence-building measures to favour conventional arms reduction would be to renounce development and introduction of new weapons that may cause alarm to the other side and restraint on intimidating offensive military exercises.

7. The presence of foreign military bases and forces constitutes a prime source of mistrust and tension in the region. The States which maintain their own forces or military bases in foreign soils could contribute to the climate of confidence for disarmament negotiations in the region by declaring in advance to withdraw their forces and bases to encourage the efforts for arms-reduction agreements.
II. VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

8. The problem of ending the nuclear arms race has two aspects. One would be to prevent vertical proliferation, the qualitative and quantitative accumulation of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States, while the other would be to prevent horizontal proliferation, the emergence of new nuclear-weapon States.

9. They require the nuclear-weapon States to give up arms race guaranteeing the security of the non-nuclear States, and the non-proliferation Treaty to be strictly observed.

10. The question of promoting nuclear disarmament, similarly, has two aspects. One would be vertical reduction for the nuclear-weapon States to decrease their nuclear arsenal quantitatively, and the other would be horizontal reduction for the non-nuclear States to reduce the operational area of nuclear weapons geographically.

11. Both processes - vertical reduction through negotiations between the nuclear-weapon States and horizontal reduction through nuclear-weapon-expulsion movement by non-nuclear States - should complement and reinforce each other.

**Vertical reduction**

12. The nuclear-weapon States should accept primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and mutually reduce their nuclear weapons on a phased class-by-class basis.

13. Continued observance of the arms control agreements concluded between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States, and their increased serious efforts to reach further agreements should take precedence. As their political will has been proved through substantial arms reduction, other nuclear-weapon States should join the process of reduction of nuclear arsenal.

14. The order of sequence would be of importance in the vertical reduction of nuclear weapons. Priorities could be given to the following:

- Nuclear weapons and weapon systems, the strategic and tactical capability of which is most likely to trigger inadvertent nuclear war;
- Nuclear weapons the confirmation of quantity and verification of reduction of which are simpler;
- Nuclear weapons and delivery systems deployed in face-to-face confrontation.

15. With the priorities thus considered, the phase of reduction could be envisaged as follows:

(a) Elimination of ground-based intermediate- and shorter-range missiles;
(b) A 50 per cent reduction of strategic offensive weapons;
(c) Elimination of ground-based tactical and field nuclear weapons;
(d) Freeze on sea-launched missiles;
(e) Reduction of sea-launched cruise missiles and strategic bombers;
(f) Elimination of submarine-launched ballistic missiles;
(g) Elimination of mobile-ground-launched missiles;
(h) Total elimination of nuclear weapons and delivery systems.

Horizonal reduction

16. The non-nuclear States have a decisive role to play in the geographical reduction of the operational area of nuclear weapons. Increased control over and restriction of manoeuvres of nuclear weapons all over the world would be essential to reduce the capabilities and strategic importance of nuclear weapons, to help cool down the heat of nuclear arms race.

17. By ridding themselves of nuclear weapons as a first step, the non-nuclear States could in fact make a substantial contribution to nuclear disarmament.

18. At the present time when the survival of mankind itself has become an issue, reconsideration of their security policy is needed in close relation with the global safety by the non-nuclear States which have allowed deployment and transit of nuclear weapons in and through their territories. Not to be overlooked is the fact that nuclear weapons deployed or manoeuvrable in a non-nuclear State would rather leave the very State more vulnerable to pre-emptive or retaliative nuclear attack than enhance its security under such circumstances that nuclear strategy is drawn on a global basis. The first step towards the reduction of their nuclear arsenal jointly taken by the Soviet Union and the United States indicates that the non-nuclear States will have to come out of the obsolete suicidal "nuclear umbrella" to seek their security based on equality and independence in a world free of nuclear weapons.

19. At the same time, the nuclear-weapon States, if they have serious political will for disarmament, should commit themselves, through an internationally binding agreement, not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons in any case against the non-nuclear States or nuclear-weapon-free zones which would prohibit nuclear weapons thereinto.

20. The key to the horizontal reduction of nuclear weapons would be to create and expand nuclear-weapon-free zones. Nuclear-weapon-free zones would not only enhance the security of the regions concerned but constrain the nuclear arms race and accelerate nuclear disarmament through restrictions on the deployment and operations of nuclear weapons and their delivery means, test facilities and guidance systems.
21. Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones should especially be encouraged in an attempt to create geographical disengagement from one another of the major nuclear Powers.

22. International measures could be searched to create a huge nuclear-weapon-free corridor to disengage the Soviet and United States nuclear forces from each other in the future. Sequential linkage of the proposed nuclear-weapon-free zones beginning with the Nordic Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, through the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Corridor in central Europe, the Balkan Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, the Middle East Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, the Zone of Peace in the Indian Ocean, the South Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, the South-East Asian Zone of Peace and Co-operation in a line ending up with the North-East Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, could make such a global corridor.

23. International measures should be studied to encourage the efforts to realize each proposed nuclear-weapon-free zone and to attract the rest of non-nuclear States to be interested in such a zone.

24. Measures could be taken, for instance, to charge additional taxes on nuclear weapons to transit through or stay in the seaports and airports, territorial air and waters of non-nuclear States as well as important international canals and straits aimed at eventual denuclearization of these areas, which would be of great significance in curbing the naval arms race.

25. International attention should be drawn to the withdrawal of nuclear forces and bases from foreign States. To dismantle nuclear weapons and bases would need more pressure and collective efforts on an international basis than denuclearization of a region which has no permanent deployment of nuclear weapons.

III. NORTH-EAST ASIA AS A NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE

26. The nuclear peril in the Asia Pacific is concentrated on North-East Asia, the powder-keg of the Far East. The intensified forward deployment of the nuclear forces of the United States in the region, the main component of which is the naval nuclear forces, makes the danger of the nuclear arms race and conflict as critical as in Europe.

27. The disarmament issue of the region, however, has often failed to attract the due attention of the international community causing an underestimation of its importance. That could be attributable to the lack of vast pressure against the nuclear weapons in the region and sufficient flow of information on the arms race which are enjoyed in Europe since the non-nuclear States are fewer in the region and the question of naval disarmament has been paid little attention until recently. The disarmament question of the region thus deserves more international concerns and concerted efforts than any other region. The global nature of nuclear war underlines that the efforts to defuse it in a region would not be confined to the interest of security of the particular region only.

28. The most preferential and practical approach to nuclear disarmament in the
regional perspective, the prime target of which is manoeuvrable intermediate and tactical and field nuclear weapons, could find itself in a nuclear-weapon-free zone throughout the region.

29. For north-east Asia to be a nuclear-free zone, the United States aircraft carriers, Tomahawk-armed warships, F-16 and B-52 bombers and other tactical and field nuclear weapons aiming at the Soviet Union or the north of the Korean peninsula should withdraw 2,500 kilometres from the targets, while the Soviet Union, too, would have to take measures to take away its nuclear weapons correspondingly out of the range within which they might be assumed a direct threat to Alaska or Japan.

30. From the nature of the region, the North-East Asian Nuclear-Free Zone should be a nuclear-free, non-interventional zone of peace. A nuclear-free zone, its objective containing reduction of the naval nuclear forces at the same time, should exclude nuclear weapons and their delivery means as well as all offensive and interventional forces and their forward bases as a whole, to nullify the "principle" of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons in naval vessels.

31. The process of the North-East Asian Nuclear-Free Zone should start with denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and its vicinity.

32. The possible outbreak of war on the Korean peninsula would be likely to prompt immediate United States nuclear attack that would spill over into Soviet Union-United States nuclear exchanges in the seas of Korean East and Okhotsk, triggering an all-out thermo-nuclear war.

33. Defusing the nuclear time-bomb on the Korean peninsula requires reducing tensions between the north and south to eliminate the pretext of the United States nuclear attack on the north. In fact, the United States could by no means be justified to keep its nuclear bases in south Korea against the north that has no corresponding capabilities. Backdropped by such a pressing need for a détente is the proposal by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 1/ to effect a phased, mutual reduction of forces to remove their offensive capabilities on both sides of the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) of the Korean peninsula calling upon the United States to match with withdrawal of its own nuclear and conventional forces.

34. The proposed multinational arms reduction talks would lead to joint commitment of mutual non-aggression between the north and south, and as actual reduction of forces has been in progress, the Armistice Agreement could be replaced by a peace agreement. Complete elimination of tension and mistrust and thus the danger of war on the Korean peninsula would become a reality at the stage when the forces on both sides have been reduced to less than 100,000 troops respectively and the United States forces and nuclear weapons have gone.

35. Take-off of the process of turning the Korean peninsula into a denuclearized and neutralized buffer zone would need, at least, initial exchange of confidence-building measures between both sides of the MDL, so that a dialogue may become possible. As a foreseeable step to blow off the distrust between the north

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and south, neutral third parties could be invited to take over the control over the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and to verify the arms reduction, the related matters of which could be elaborated at an authoritative talks like the proposed north-south joint conference.

36. In an effort to favour such a dialogue, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has taken unilateral measures to build confidence—a moratorium on large-scale military exercises since 1 February 1986, 2/ and reduction of 100,000 troops of its own over four months from July 1987—3/ expecting positive response from the parties concerned.

37. Denuclearization and neutralization of the Korean peninsula would substantially reduce the risk of nuclear war in North-East Asia. As long as the buildup of the confronted naval nuclear forces continues unabated in its vicinity, however, neither the status of the Korean Nuclear-free Zone and its neutrality would perfectly be secured nor the danger of an inadvertent outbreak of nuclear war be removed.

38. Measures thus would be needed to prohibit surface nuclear capable warships from being operational in the area adjacent to the Korean and Soviet coastlines, to turn the Korean East and West Seas into a naval nuclear disengagement zone.

39. Mutual respect for this zone would help build sufficient confidence between the parties concerned to premise negotiations on withdrawal of nuclear submarines and forward bases from the area.

40. Such a development would increase the interests of other regional Powers in a broader nuclear-free zone in North-East Asia leading to multilaterally concerted efforts that will bring about firm prospects for the region as a whole to be eventually turned into a nuclear-free zone.

Notes

1/ S/19017.


3/ S/19345.