Draft Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Twelfth Special Session

Addendum
ANNEX I

Texts for the draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament submitted by Working Group I

I. Introduction*

1. The threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race, which already in 1978 gave rise to the justified alarm of the General Assembly, far from disappearing has considerably increased during the four years that have elapsed since the celebration of its first special session devoted to disarmament. It was thus natural not to unduly delay the convening of the second special session, which, with the same purpose as the first, had been explicitly provided for in the Final Document.

2. Both in the general debate of this second special session of the Assembly, in which an impressive number of Heads of State or Government and Ministers of Foreign Affairs participated, as well as in the deliberations of the Ad Hoc Committee and the Working Groups, it became evident that there had been no erosion in the support of all fundamental conclusions of the Final Document, such as the following:

   (a) The objective of security, which is an inseparable element of peace, has always been one of the most profound aspirations of humanity. Yet the accumulation of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, today constitutes much more a threat than a protection for the future of mankind, since far from helping to strengthen international security, it on the contrary weakens it and since existing arsenals of nuclear weapons alone are sufficient to destroy all life on earth.

   (b) The arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect, runs counter to efforts to achieve further relaxation of international tension, to establish international relations based on peaceful coexistence and trust between all States, and to develop broad international co-operation and understanding. The arms race impedes the realization of the purposes, and is incompatible with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, especially respect for sovereignty, refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, the peaceful settlement of disputes and non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States. On the other hand, progress on détente and progress on disarmament mutually complement and strengthen each other.

* Draft prepared by the Chairman of Working Group I.
Military expenditures are reaching ever higher levels, the highest percentage of which can be attributed to the nuclear-weapon States and most of their allies, with prospects of further expansion and the danger of further increases in the expenditures of other countries. The hundreds of billions of dollars spent annually on the manufacture or improvement of weapons are in sombre and dramatic contrast to the want and poverty in which two thirds of the world's population live. This colossal waste of resources is even more serious in that it diverts to military purposes not only material but also technical and human resources which are urgently needed for development in all countries, particularly in the developing countries.

Enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances nor be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority. Genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces, by international agreement and mutual example, leading ultimately to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

3. It was undoubtedly for reasons like the above that, in one of the last paragraphs of the Programme of Action outlined in the Final Document, the General Assembly decided that the implementation of the priorities defined therein should lead to general and complete disarmament under effective international control, which "remains the ultimate goal of all efforts exerted in the field of disarmament". The Assembly completed this statement adding that the negotiations on general and complete disarmament shall be conducted concurrently with negotiations on partial measures of disarmament and deciding that, with this purpose in mind, the Committee on Disarmament should undertake the elaboration of a "comprehensive programme of disarmament encompassing all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated".

4. The General Assembly did not only stress several times the importance of this goal which it called the "ultimate goal" of all disarmament efforts. On more than one occasion it stated also its opinion as to which should be the "immediate goal" defining it as "the elimination of the danger of a nuclear war and the implementation of measures to halt the arms race and clear the path towards lasting peace".

5. Bearing in mind those antecedents and taking as the main basis for its deliberations the draft transmitted by the Committee on Disarmament, the General Assembly has elaborated this Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, which received the approval by consensus of all the States Members of the United Nations which participated in its second special session devoted to disarmament. In addition to the present Introduction, the Programme comprises five chapters whose titles,
clearly indicative of their contents, are the following: Objectives, Principles, Priorities, Measures and Stages of Implementation, Machinery and Procedures.

6. It has not been possible to reach agreement for the Comprehensive Programme to become a treaty, as some States would have preferred in order to make legally binding its provisions. There has been, however, unanimous support for the idea that all necessary steps must be taken to enhance the political and moral value of the Programme. It has thus been agreed that a special copy of the Programme shall be carried by a personal representative of the Secretary-General to the capitals of all States Members of the United Nations, in order to have it signed by the respective Heads of State or Government. This symbolic act will be a clear sign that this time there is the required "political will" to proceed along the road of uninterrupted good faith negotiations in the field of disarmament. Should there be some States where constitutional obstacles prevent recourse to the above procedures, alternative methods of similar significance should be employed. Thus the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, although not a treaty in itself, would indeed become a source of numerous successive treaties thanks to which mankind may start the twenty-first century in conditions totally different from those it has to endure at present with deepest concern.

II. Objectives

1. The immediate objectives of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should be to [eliminate] [avert] the danger of war, in particular nuclear war, the prevention of which remains the most acute and urgent task of the present day, to implement measures to halt and reverse the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, and to clear the path towards lasting peace. To this end, the Programme will also aim:

   - to maintain and further the momentum generated by the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament;

   - to initiate or engage in further negotiations, to expedite the halting of the arms race in all its aspects, in particular the nuclear arms race;

   - to consolidate and develop the results reflected in agreements and treaties achieved so far, relevant to the problems of disarmament;

   - to open and accelerate the process of genuine disarmament on an internationally agreed basis.

2. The ultimate objective of the Comprehensive Programme is to ensure that general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the new international economic order is fully achieved.
3. Throughout the implementation of the Programme towards the progressive reduction and final elimination of armaments and armed forces, the following objectives should be pursued:

- to strengthen international peace and security, as well as the security of individual States, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

- to contribute to the safeguarding of the sovereignty and independence of all States;

- to make, through the implementation of the Programme, an effective contribution to the economic and social development of States, in particular developing States;

- to increase international confidence and relaxation of international tension;

- to establish international relations based on peaceful coexistence and trust between all States, and to develop broad international co-operation and understanding with a view to promoting conditions favourable to the implementation of the Programme;

- [to stimulate in all countries the contribution that public opinion could make to the cause of disarmament] [to mobilize world public opinion on behalf of disarmament] [to stimulate world public opinion on behalf of disarmament through information, education and furthering understanding in all regions of the world in a balanced and objective manner] [to mobilize world public opinion on behalf of disarmament through information, education and furthering understanding in all regions of the world] [to mobilize world public opinion in all regions of the world in favour of disarmament in conformity with the above-mentioned objectives] [to mobilize world public opinion on behalf of disarmament with the objectives of informing, educating and generating understanding and support for the efforts to halt the arms race and achieve disarmament] [to mobilize world public opinion on behalf of disarmament in all regions of the world] [on a universal basis, generate public understanding of and stimulate/mobilize world-wide support for disarmament, through balanced, objective and factual information concerning armaments and through education for disarmament] [to mobilize world public opinion in favour of disarmament, through balanced, factual and objective information and education in all regions of the world, so as to generate further understanding and support for the efforts to halt the arms race and achieve disarmament].

III. Principles

1. [The Members of the United Nations are fully aware of the conviction of their peoples that [the question of general and complete disarmament is of utmost importance] and that peace, security and economic and social development are
indivisible, and they have therefore recognized that the corresponding obligations and responsibilities are universal.

Alternative proposal for paragraph 1

[The question of general and complete disarmament is of utmost importance. Peace, security and economic and social development are indivisible and the corresponding obligations and responsibilities are universal.]

Alternative proposal for paragraph 1

[The Members of the United Nations are fully aware of the conviction of their peoples that the preservation of peace through the elimination of all causes of war and through the realization of general and complete disarmament is of utmost importance and that peace, security and economic and social development are indivisible, and they have therefore recognized that the corresponding obligations and responsibilities are universal.]

2.* The ending of the arms race and the achievement of real disarmament are tasks of primary importance and urgency.

Alternative proposal for merging paragraphs 1 and 2

[The Members of the United Nations are fully aware that the conviction of their peoples that the question of general and complete disarmament is of utmost significance, that peace, security and economic and social development are indivisible and that the corresponding obligations and responsibilities are universal should guide their efforts to bring about the end of the arms race and the achievement of real disarmament, which are considered to be tasks of utmost importance and urgency.]

3.* Progress on détente and progress on disarmament mutually complement and strengthen each other.

Alternative proposals for paragraphs 1, 2 and 3

[The ending of the arms race and the achievement of real disarmament are tasks of primary importance and urgency.]

[The question of general and complete disarmament is of the utmost importance.]

[Peace, security and economic and social development are indivisible.]

* The placement of this paragraph in the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will be determined later.
4. All States Members of the United Nations reaffirm their full commitment to the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and their obligation strictly to observe its principles as well as other relevant and generally accepted principles of international law relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. They stress the special importance of refraining from the threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or against peoples under colonial or foreign domination seeking to exercise their right to self-determination and to achieve independence; non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States; the inviolability of international frontiers; and the peaceful settlement of disputes, having regard to the inherent right of States to individual and collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter.

5. In order to create favourable conditions for success in the disarmament process, all States should strictly abide by the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, refrain from actions which might adversely affect efforts in the field of disarmament, and display a constructive approach to negotiations and the political will to reach agreements.

6. (Paragraph has been deleted.)

7.* The arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect, runs counter to efforts to achieve further relaxation of international tension, to establish international relations based on peaceful coexistence and trust between all States, and to develop broad international co-operation and understanding. The arms race impedes the realization of the purposes, and is incompatible with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; especially respect for sovereignty, refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, the peaceful settlement of disputes and non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States.

8. Significant progress in disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, would be facilitated by parallel measures to strengthen the security of States and to improve the international situation in general.

9. Disarmament, relaxation of international tension, respect for the right to self-determination and national independence, the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the strengthening of international peace and security are directly related to each other. Progress in any of these spheres has a beneficial effect on all of them; in turn, failure in one sphere has negative effects on others.

10.* Enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances nor be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority. Genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces, by international agreement and mutual example, leading ultimately to general and complete disarmament under effective international
control. At the same time, the causes of the arms race and threats to peace must be reduced and to this end effective action should be taken to eliminate tensions and settle disputes by peaceful means.

11. Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.

12. Negotiations should be based on the strict observance of the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, with full recognition of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and reflecting the vital interest of all the peoples of the world in this sphere.

13. Since the process of disarmament affects the vital security interests of all States, they must all be actively concerned with and contribute to the measures of disarmament and arms limitation, which have an essential part to play in maintaining and strengthening international security.

14. All the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations. Consequently, all States have the duty to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament. All States have the right to participate in disarmament negotiations. They have the right to participate on an equal footing in those multilateral disarmament negotiations which have a direct bearing on their national security. While disarmament is the responsibility of all States, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, have the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and, together with other military significant States, for halting and reversing the arms race. It is therefore important to secure their active participation.

15.-16. In a world of finite resources, there is a close relationship between expenditure on armaments and economic and social development. The continuation of the arms race is detrimental to and incompatible with the implementation of the new international economic order based on justice, equity and co-operation. Consequently, there is a close relationship between disarmament and development. Progress in the former would help greatly in the realization of the latter and resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures should be devoted to the economic and social development of all nations and contribute to the bridging of the economic gap between developed and developing countries.

17. Disarmament and arms limitation, particularly in the nuclear field, are essential for the prevention of the danger of nuclear war and the strengthening of international peace and security and for the economic and social advancement of all peoples, thus facilitating the achievement of the new international economic order.

18.* Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization.
19. [The process of arms limitation and disarmament must be carried out without interruptions and proceed at a rapid pace, so as to outstrip the qualitative development and build-up of weapons which are the subject of the negotiations and, where possible, prevent the development of new types and systems of weapons, particularly weapons of mass destruction.]

20. [The implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should be in accordance with the [fundamental principles enshrined in] [relevant provisions of] the Final Document and should be carried out in such a balanced and equitable manner as to ensure the right of each State to security through the adoption of appropriate measures, taking into account the importance of nuclear disarmament and conventional disarmament, the special responsibility of the States with the largest military arsenals, the specific requirements of regional situations and the necessity for adequate measures of verification. At each stage, the objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces.]

21. The adoption of disarmament measures should take place in such an equitable and balanced manner as to ensure the right of each State to security and to ensure that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage, taking into account the existing situation regarding armaments of different kinds, and in particular the situation of nuclear and conventional armaments, in order to avoid destabilizing effects. At each stage the objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces. [In the negotiations between parties approximately equal militarily the principle of equality and equal security must be strictly observed.]

Alternative proposal for merging paragraphs 20 and 21

[The implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should be in accordance with the fundamental principles enshrined in the Final Document and should be carried out in such a balanced and equitable manner as to ensure the right of each State to security through the adoption of appropriate measures, taking into account the importance of nuclear disarmament and conventional disarmament, the special responsibility of the States with the largest military arsenals, the specific requirements of regional situations and the necessity for adequate measures of verification. This process should ensure that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage. It should take into account the over-all existing situation regarding armaments of all kinds, and in particular, the situation of nuclear and conventional armaments, in order to avoid destabilizing effects. At each stage the objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces.]

22. In accordance with the Charter, the United Nations has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament. In order effectively to discharge this role and facilitate and encourage all measures in this field, the United Nations should be kept appropriately informed of all steps in this field,
whether unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral, without prejudice to the progress of negotiations.

23. (Paragraph has been deleted.)

24. The process of nuclear disarmament should be carried out in such a way, and requires measures to ensure, that the security of all States is guaranteed at progressively lower levels of nuclear armaments, taking into account the relative qualitative and quantitative importance of the existing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States and other States concerned.

25. Significant progress in nuclear disarmament would be facilitated both by parallel political or international legal measures to strengthen the security of States and by progress in the limitation and reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments of the nuclear-weapon States and other States in the regions concerned.

26. Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be resolutely pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament. States with the largest military arsenals have a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional armaments reductions. [The negotiations on the [balanced] reduction of armed forces and of conventional armaments should be conducted with particular emphasis on armed forces and conventional weapons of nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant countries.]

**Alternative proposal for paragraph 26**

[Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be resolutely pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament. Nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, in particular those which possess the largest military arsenals, have a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional armaments reductions.]

**Alternative proposal for paragraph 26**

[Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be resolutely pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament. It is therefore urgent to initiate or engage in appropriate negotiating processes, bilateral, regional or multilateral, especially in areas with a high concentration of armaments. States with the largest military arsenals, whether they be nuclear-weapon States or non-nuclear-weapon States, have a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional armaments reductions.]

/...
Alternative proposal for paragraph 26

[Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, negotiations should be carried out on the balanced reduction of armed forces and of conventional armaments, based on the principle of undiminished security of the parties with a view to promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military level, taking into account the need of all States to protect their security. These negotiations should be conducted with particular emphasis on armed forces and conventional weapons of nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant countries. States with the largest military arsenals have a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional armaments reductions.]

Alternative proposal for paragraph 26

[Together with negotiations on nuclear measures, the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be resolutely pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament. The negotiations on the balanced reduction of armed forces and of conventional armaments should be conducted with particular emphasis on armed forces and conventional weapons of nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant countries. States with the largest military arsenals have a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional armaments reductions.]

27. [States with the largest military arsenals have the primary responsibility for disarmament. They should immediately halt their arms race and take the lead in reducing their nuclear and conventional armaments. After they have substantially reduced their armaments, the other nuclear-weapon States and militarily significant States should join them in reducing armaments.]

28. An acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations for nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States should be strictly observed.

29. Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all parties. The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement. Agreements should provide for the participation of parties directly or through the United Nations system in the verification process. Where appropriate, a combination of several methods of verification as well as other compliance procedures should be employed. Every effort should be made to develop appropriate methods and procedures which are non-discriminatory and which do not unduly interfere with the internal affairs of other States or jeopardize their economic and social development or prejudice their security. [All arms control and disarmament agreements must provide for effective International verification, in order to create the necessary confidence between States and ensure that the agreements are being observed by all parties.]
Alternative proposal for merging the fourth and last sentences of paragraph 29

[Where appropriate, a combination of several methods of verification, national and international, as well as other compliance procedures should be employed, in order to create the necessary confidence between States and ensure that the agreements are being observed by all parties.]

Alternative proposal for paragraph 29

[Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all parties. The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement. Agreements should provide for the participation of parties directly or through the United Nations system in the verification process. Where appropriate, a combination of several methods of verification, national and international, as well as other compliance procedures should be employed, in order to create the necessary confidence between States and ensure that the agreements are being observed by all parties. Every effort should be made to develop appropriate methods and procedures which are non-discriminatory and which do not unduly interfere with the internal affairs of other States or jeopardize their economic and social development or prejudice their security. Questions relating to monitoring should be considered and decided upon simultaneously and in a manner organically linked with the consideration of specific disarmament problems rather than separately from them.]

Alternative proposal for paragraph 29

[Disarmament and arms limitation agreements must provide for adequate and effective measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all parties. The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement. As appropriate, a combination of several methods of verification, including national and international measures, as well as other compliance procedures should be employed. Agreements should provide for the participation of parties directly or through the United Nations system in the verification process. Every effort should be made to develop appropriate methods and procedures which are non-discriminatory and which do not unduly interfere with the internal affairs of other States or jeopardize their economic and social development or prejudice their security.]

30. Negotiations on partial measures of disarmament should be conducted concurrently with negotiations on more comprehensive measures and should be followed by negotiations leading to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

/...
31. Qualitative and quantitative disarmament measures are both important for halting the arms race. Efforts to that end must include negotiations on the limitation and cessation of the qualitative improvement of armaments, especially weapons of mass destruction and the development of new means of warfare so that ultimately scientific and technological achievements may be used solely for peaceful purposes.

32. Universality of disarmament agreements helps create confidence among States. When multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament are negotiated, every effort should be made to ensure that they are universally acceptable. The full compliance of all parties with the provisions contained in such agreements would contribute to the attainment of that goal.

33. All States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, should consider various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, and the prevention of nuclear war. In this context, while noting the declarations made by nuclear-weapon States, effective arrangements, as appropriate, to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons could strengthen the security of those States and international peace and security.

34.* The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of agreements or arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the zone concerned and the full compliance with those agreements or arrangements, thus ensuring that the zones are genuinely free from nuclear weapons, and respect for such zones by nuclear-weapon States constitute an important disarmament measure.

35. (Paragraph has been deleted.)

36. (Paragraph has been deleted.)

37. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is a matter of universal concern. Measures of disarmament must be consistent with the inalienable right of all States, without discrimination, to develop, acquire and use nuclear technology, equipment and materials for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to determine their peaceful nuclear programmes in accordance with their national priorities, needs and interests, bearing in mind the need to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. International co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be conducted under agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied on a non-discriminatory basis.

38.* Full implementation of all the provisions of existing instruments on non-proliferation, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and/or the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) by States parties to those instruments will be an important contribution. Adherence to such instruments has increased in recent years and the hope has been expressed by the parties that this trend might continue.
* (Paragraph 68 of Final Document)

Non-proliferation measures should not jeopardize the full exercise of the inalienable rights of all States to apply and develop their programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development in conformity with their priorities, interests and needs. All States should also have access to and be free to acquire technology, equipment and materials for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, taking into account the particular needs of the developing countries. International co-operation in this field should be under agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied through the International Atomic Energy Agency on a non-discriminatory basis in order to prevent effectively the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

* (Paragraph 69 of Final Document)

Each country's choices and decisions in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing their respective fuel-cycle policies or international co-operation, agreements and contracts for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, provided that the agreed safeguard measures mentioned above are applied.

39. As security and stability should be assured in all regions taking into account the specific needs and requirements of their respective situation, bilateral and regional disarmament negotiations may also play an important role and could facilitate negotiations of multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament.

40. Agreements or other measures should be resolutely pursued on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis with the aim of strengthening peace and security at a lower level of forces, by the limitation and reduction of armed forces and of conventional weapons, taking into account the need of States to protect their security, bearing in mind the inherent right of self-defence embodied in the Charter of the United Nations and without prejudice to the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in accordance with the Charter, and the need to ensure balance at each stage and undiminished security of all States.

41. Bilateral, regional and multilateral consultations and conferences should be held where appropriate conditions exist with the participation of all the countries concerned for the consideration of different aspects of conventional disarmament, such as the initiative envisaged in the Declaration of Ayacucho subscribed to by eight Latin American countries on 9 December 1974.

42.* It is essential that not only Governments but also the peoples of the world recognize and understand the dangers in the present situation. In order that an international conscience may develop and that world public opinion may exercise a positive influence, the United Nations should increase the dissemination of information on the armaments race and disarmament with the full co-operation of Member States.
43.* Draft multilateral disarmament conventions should be subjected to the normal procedures applicable in the law of treaties. Those submitted to the General Assembly for its commendation should be subject to full review by the Assembly.

44. Collateral measures in both the nuclear and conventional fields, together with other measures specifically designed to build confidence, should be undertaken in order to contribute to the creation of favourable conditions for the adoption of additional disarmament measures and to further the relaxation of international tension.

45. [In order to facilitate the process of disarmament, it is necessary to take measures and pursue policies to strengthen international peace and security and to build confidence among States. Commitment to confidence-building measures could significantly contribute to preparing for further progress in disarmament.]

Alternative proposal for merging paragraphs 44 and 45

[Collateral measures in both the nuclear and conventional fields, together with other measures specifically designed to build confidence, should be undertaken in order to strengthen international peace and security, to build confidence among States, to contribute to the creation of favourable conditions for the adoption of additional disarmament measures, and to further the relaxation of international tension. Commitment to confidence-building measures would significantly contribute to preparing for further progress in disarmament.]

46. [Taking further steps in the field of disarmament and other measures aimed at promoting international peace and security would be facilitated by carrying out studies by the Secretary-General in this field with appropriate assistance from governmental or consultant experts.]

Alternative proposal for paragraph 46

[In taking further steps in the field of disarmament and other measures aimed at promoting international peace and security the input by studies carried out by the Secretary-General in the field of disarmament with appropriate assistance from governmental or consultant experts should be taken into account.]

47.* In particular, publicity should be given to the decisions of the special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

48. [Since prompt measures should be taken in order to halt and reverse the arms race, States hereby declare that they will respect the principles stated above [and make every effort faithfully to carry out the Programme in strict adherence to them] [in full implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament].]
V. Measures and stages of implementation

First stage

DISARMAMENT MEASURES

A. Nuclear weapons*

1.** Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization. It is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons. The ultimate goal in this context is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

In the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility.

The process of nuclear disarmament should be carried out in such a way, and requires measures to ensure, that the security of all States is guaranteed at progressively lower levels of nuclear armaments, taking into account the relative qualitative and quantitative importance of the existing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States and other States concerned.

2.*** The achievement of nuclear disarmament will require urgent negotiation of agreements at appropriate stages and with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to the States concerned for:

(a) cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems;

(b) cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;

(c) a comprehensive, phased programme with agreed time-frames, whenever feasible, for progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time.

* Nos. 1 to 8 as per the structure proposed by the Co-ordinator of Drafting Group C.

** Paras. 47, 48 and 49 of the Final Document.

*** Para. 50 of the Final Document.
Consideration can be given in the course of the negotiations to mutual and agreed limitation or prohibition, without prejudice to the security of any State, of any types of nuclear armaments.

Proposed insertion in paragraph 2 (b), line 2:

"... production of fissionable [and fusionable] material ..."

3. Nuclear test ban:

Text of the Co-ordinator of Drafting Group C:

[Conclusion of a multilateral treaty on a nuclear test ban [with the participation of all the nuclear-weapon States] [[within the framework of] [as a measure relating to] an effective nuclear disarmament process]. [All possible efforts should be made to achieve this objective.]]

Proposed alternative to the Co-ordinator's text:

[The immediate conclusion of a Nuclear Test Ban Treaty would make a significant contribution to the aim of ending the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of such weapons and of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

(i) The Committee on Disarmament should undertake without further delay multilateral negotiations on a Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Such a treaty should aim at the general and complete cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons by all States in all environments for all time to come. It should be equitable and non-discriminatory and thus be able to attract universal adherence. The treaty should include a verification system also negotiated in the Committee on Disarmament and to which all States will have access.

(ii) The parties who have been engaged in trilateral negotiations on a "treaty prohibiting nuclear weapon tests and a protocol covering peaceful nuclear explosions which would be an integral part of the treaty" should immediately resume and intensify their negotiations and submit full information on the progress of their talks to the Committee on Disarmament, so as to contribute to and assist multilateral negotiations on the treaty.]

4. Pending the conclusion of further agreements relating to nuclear disarmament, the United States and the USSR should, on a reciprocal basis, continue to refrain from actions which would undercut existing strategic arms agreements concluded between them.

5. Proposed texts concerning a "freeze"/halt in qualitative development etc., by USSR-United States pending negotiations:
[As a starting point for the negotiations on reductions of nuclear arms, the two States which possess the most important nuclear arsenals should consider without delay the possibility of agreeing to a freeze in qualitative and quantitative terms of their nuclear arsenals and the number of delivery vehicles at the present level.]

[In the first stage there should be a freeze on nuclear weapons which would inter alia consist of two inseparable elements, namely (i) a complete cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and (ii) a cut-off in the production of fissionable [and fusionable] materials for weapons purposes. Such a step would enable an effective and economical safeguards system which could be devised on the basis of objective, scientific and non-discriminatory criteria to be applied to nuclear facilities in all States.]

[The USSR and the United States should agree not to introduce any further strategic nuclear weapons or delivery vehicles for an initial period of two years, during which time negotiations on reductions of nuclear arms should be pursued vigorously. There should also be an undertaking to renew this agreement for further periods of two years if progress is being made in the negotiations.]

[Mutual freeze of nuclear arsenals, as a first step towards their reduction and, eventually, their complete elimination.]

6. (The USSR and the United States undertook to consult on text.)

*Bilateral negotiations between the USSR and the United States on [[intermediate] [medium] range nuclear forces and strategic arms [limitations and] reductions] [nuclear disarmament].

Urgent and vigorous pursuit to a successful conclusion of the bilateral negotiations already under way or about to be initiated with a view to [reaching a more stable and verifiable global balance of] [achieving [limitations and] significant reductions in] the nuclear arsenals of the [United States and USSR] [two sides] at progressively lower levels [of delivery systems and/or warheads] [on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security].

Specifically,

- early initiation of negotiations designed to achieve, [in a progressive, verifiable and balanced manner,] an agreement between the USSR and the United States for [substantial] [significant] quantitative reductions and [verifiable] qualitative constraints on their stockpiles of nuclear intercontinental strategic weapons and means of delivery.

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* Proposal for consolidating Nos. 6 and 7 with amendments.

/...
within the above referred framework, pursuit between the negotiating States of the current endeavours aiming at the limitation and reduction of [their] [intermediate] [medium] range nuclear [missiles] [weapons] [capable of striking targets in Europe].]

7. (The USSR and the United States undertook to consult on text)

Texts proposed in connexion with INF/limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons in Europe:

[Limitations and reductions of nuclear weapons systems in Europe]

Pursuit of the bilateral negotiations already begun on medium and intermediate range nuclear forces in Europe with a view to the early conclusion of an agreement on substantial reductions of such and analogous systems.

Initiation of negotiations aimed at the limitation and reduction of all tactical nuclear weapons systems in Europe. These negotiations should be carried out within the framework of the bilateral Geneva negotiations or in some other suitable context.

[As the negotiations on nuclear weapons in Europe concern the security interests of all nations of that continent, all European States should be given the possibility to participate, in an appropriate manner, and to bring their constructive contribution to an urgent and successful conclusion of these negotiations.]

8. Multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament:

Text of the Co-ordinator of Drafting Group C:

[The urgent initiation of multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations is of vital interest to the nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States. The conclusion of multilateral disarmament agreements would be facilitated by substantial progress in the bilateral negotiations in this area between the States which possess the most important arsenals and have a special responsibility in the field of nuclear disarmament. Also, multilateral negotiations are particularly important to achieve significant and universal progress toward the achievement of nuclear disarmament. This will require negotiation of agreements at appropriate stages, taking due account of the relative quantitative and qualitative importance of existing arsenals and the necessity of maintaining the undiminished security of all States, nuclear and non-nuclear, at each stage, and with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned, for the cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapon systems, for the cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their delivery system and for the reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.]

/...
In the course of such negotiations, a combination of the measures as detailed below, or a combination of different elements of such measures, could be considered:

(i) Cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapons systems through negotiations on proposals [such as those relating to: new types and new systems of nuclear weapons, flight-testing of new delivery vehicles, anti-satellite weapons systems, anti-ballistic missile systems, "neutron" weapons, etc.];

(ii) Cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, accompanied by appropriate declarations and verification procedures;

(iii) The elaboration of a comprehensive, phased programme with agreed time-frames, whenever feasible, for progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time.

The over-all objective of the measures for nuclear disarmament outlined in the preceding paragraphs for negotiation during the first stage of the Comprehensive Programme, and of those included in subsequent Stages, would be to achieve qualitative and quantitative limitations on and significant reductions of the nuclear weapons arsenals existing at the beginning of the stage.

Proposed amendments to Co-ordinator’s text:

(a) Replace the first two sentences by the following text:

[ multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations are of vital interest to the nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States. Such negotiations would be greatly facilitated by substantial results in the bilateral negotiations between the States which possess the largest nuclear arsenals and therefore, have a special responsibility in the field of nuclear disarmament.]

(b) Replace the second and third sentences by the following text:

[The conclusion of multilateral disarmament agreements would be facilitated by substantial progress in the bilateral negotiations in this area. Also multilateral negotiations with the participation of all the nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States are particularly important to achieve significant and universal progress towards the achievement of nuclear disarmament.]

(c) Replace the third sentence by the following text:
[Progress on measures of nuclear disarmament in the multilateral context would have a beneficial effect on such negotiations.]

(d) In subparagraph (i), last line, delete: "neutron' weapons".

(e) In subparagraph (i), add: "proposals on limitations on the numbers of nuclear warheads consistent with stability".

(f) Subparagraph (ii), line 2 should read:

"... fissible and fusible material ..."

(g) In subparagraph (ii), line 3, the word "declarations" should be replaced by "accounting".

(h) In subparagraph (iii), line 1, delete the words "The elaboration of".

(i) Last paragraph should be included at the beginning of the section on Nuclear weapons.

Proposed alternatives to the Co-ordinator's text:

[Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament]

The Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race in all its aspects and substantial progress towards the achievement of Nuclear Disarmament would constitute important measures during the first stage of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. In the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility. The process of nuclear disarmament should be carried out in such a way, and requires measures to ensure, that the security of all States is guaranteed at progressively lower levels of nuclear armaments, taking into account the relative qualitative and quantitative importance of the existing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States and other States concerned. The prevention of the outbreak of a nuclear war should also be considered as a matter of utmost priority in the first stage.

(i) Cessation of the Qualitative Improvement and Development of Nuclear Weapon Systems:

Negotiations, during the first stage of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, to achieve an agreement or agreements, for the prohibition of:

(a) the development, production, deployment and stockpiling of multiple independently retargetable vehicles and on the complete destruction of their stockpiles;
(b) the research, development and testing of new nuclear weapons systems, covering all categories of nuclear warheads and their delivery systems;

(c) the replacement of nuclear weapons systems currently deployed, by new and modernized versions of such systems;

(d) the development, testing and deployment of anti-satellite weapons systems;

(e) the development, testing and deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems.

(ii) Cessation of the Production of all types of Nuclear Weapons and their Means of Delivery, and the Production of Fissionable Material for Weapons Purposes:

Along with measures to halt the technological arms race in nuclear weapons, steps should be taken to halt the production of such weapons and their means of delivery along with a cessation of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes.

Commencement of Negotiations on an agreement to bring about a cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery along with an agreement to halt the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. Such an agreement could be negotiated in the following step-by-step manner:

(a) Declarations by all nuclear-weapon States, at a mutually agreed date, of their existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and of their existing and proposed facilities for the production of nuclear weapons, delivery systems of such weapons and for fissionable material for weapons purposes to be submitted to the United Nations Secretary-General.

(b) Negotiations on measures of verification, both by national technical means and international measures, including on-site inspection to establish the base on which the treaty prohibiting the production of nuclear weapons, their means of delivery and the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, would be implemented.

(c) Negotiations on the general and complete prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, along with a cessation of production of nuclear weapons involving the application of international safeguards to all nuclear facilities in all States to prevent the diversion of fissionable material for weapons purposes. Such international safeguards would be applied on a universal and non-discriminatory basis to all States.)
[Negotiations on this subject should be oriented towards elaboration, adoption and stage-by-stage implementation of a nuclear disarmament programme. Such a programme could include:

- cessation of the development of new systems of nuclear weapons;
- cessation of the production of fissile materials for the purposes of manufacturing various types of nuclear weapons;
- cessation of the production of all types of nuclear munitions and of their delivery vehicles;
- gradual reduction of the accumulated stockpiles of nuclear weapons, including their delivery vehicles;
- total elimination of nuclear weapons.]

9. Avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war:
(Introduction as contained on page 83 of draft CPD)*

[A binding international instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States, [that are committed to a non-nuclear status,] without any conditions, qualifications or restrictions, against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.] [Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.] [The conclusion of a convention on strengthening guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, and, as a first step, the issuance by nuclear-weapon Powers of declarations of similar contents undertaking to refrain from the use of nuclear weapons against those States which renounce the manufacture and acquisition of nuclear weapons and which have no such weapons on their territories, with approval of such declarations by the Security Council.]

[An international instrument [or binding unilateral declarations by the nuclear-weapon States] on the basis of an agreed common formula assuring, without any conditions, qualifications or restrictions, the non-nuclear-weapon States [, that are committed by international law to a non-nuclear-weapon status,] against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.]

(a bis) [Measures to strengthen the commitment of all States to renounce the use or threat of use of force in international relations should be taken in order to make more effective the security guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.]

* There was a proposal for the inclusion of para. 56 of the Final Document.
(b) (As in draft CPD)

c) (As in draft CPD)

(d) Proposed alternative to text in draft CPD:

[(d) Expanded measures to enhance mutual confidence and to improve communication between Governments in both time of peace and time of crisis. These measures should include:

(i) maintenance of hot lines;

(ii) measures to reduce nuclear accidents;

(iii) notification of missile test launches;

(iv) notification of strategic exercises;

(v) exchange of strategic forces data.]

In this regard, the respective roles of nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States in the prevention of the outbreak of a nuclear war, especially through accident, miscalculation or failure of communications should be clarified.

(Text on notification to the Secretary-General to be provided by India.)

10. [Nuclear non-proliferation] [Further steps to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 65 to 71 of the Final Document]:

The nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States should jointly take further steps to develop an international consensus of ways and means, on a universal and non-discriminatory basis, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons as an integral part of the efforts to halt and reverse the arms race. The goal of nuclear non-proliferation is on the one hand to prevent the emergence of any additional nuclear-weapon States besides the existing five nuclear-weapon States [---(horizontal proliferation)---] and on the other, progressively to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons altogether [---(vertical proliferation)]. The pursuit of measures on nuclear non-proliferation requires, in the first instance, the elimination of the existing inequitable and discriminatory situation as between nuclear-weapon States [and their alliance systems], on the one hand, and non-nuclear-weapon States on the other, as well as the need to avoid disincentives for the reduction and eventual elimination of the existing nuclear-weapon arsenals.] The international consensus on nuclear non-proliferation should include effective measures at the national level and through international agreements to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons without jeopardizing energy supplies or the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Such measures should include:

/...
- [measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament mentioned above;]

- [the full exercise of the inalienable rights of all States to apply and develop their programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development in conformity with their priorities, interests and needs [under agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied through the International Atomic Energy Agency on a non-discriminatory basis in order to effectively prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons];]

- [universal adherence to and full implementation of all the provisions of existing instruments on non-proliferation, in particular the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; universal adherence to and full implementation of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material;]

- [adoption of further measures for the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and, to that end, the achievement of universal participation of States in the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, with the development of international co-operation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy;]

- [adoption of further measures for the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons including the full implementation and strengthening of agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied through the International Atomic Energy Agency on a non-discriminatory basis;]

- [(unhindered] access for all States to nuclear technology, including its latest achievements, equipment and materials for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, taking into account the particular needs of developing countries [, under agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied through the IAEA];]

- [respect for each country's choices and decisions in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy without jeopardizing their respective fuel-cycle policies or international co-operation, agreements or contracts for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy [provided that agreed safeguard measures mentioned above are applied. In this context the Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS) should be developed as a potentially valuable instrument for improved arrangements which would permit nuclear trade to flow more freely under reliable and equitable non-proliferation arrangements;]

- [agreed measures of verification applied on a universal and non-discriminatory basis;]

- [The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones at the initiative of States which intend to become part of the zone.]

11. Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones:

Proposed alternative to the introduction in draft CPD:
[The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of agreements or arrangements freely arrived at among States of the region concerned and with the commitment by the nuclear-weapon States outside the region to fully respect the non-nuclearized status of the zone constitute[s] an important measure in the field of disarmament and should be encouraged in order to achieve full assurance for the States of the zone against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons [and to contribute to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons] with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons, taking into account the characteristics of each region. The States participating in such zones and the nuclear-weapon States should comply fully with the [spirit] objectives, purposes and principles of the agreements or arrangements establishing the zones [and ensuring that they are genuinely free from nuclear weapons].

The nuclear-weapon States [must] [are called to] give undertakings, the modalities of which are to be negotiated, in particular: (i) to respect strictly the status of the nuclear-weapon-free zones; (ii) to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of the zone.]

Proposed additions to the introduction in draft CPD:

[In order to be realistic, the setting up of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world must be pursued within the framework of and integrated with an effective nuclear disarmament process. The establishment of such zones would have no meaning if the accumulation and refinement of nuclear weapons in other parts of the world continues at an accelerated pace. [The consideration of this question must also deal with] the problem posed by the possible existence of clandestine nuclear-weapon arsenals in certain regions of the world [could be resolved through mutual acceptance of international safeguards by the States of the region concerned].]

[Such zones would contribute to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons as well as facilitate international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in regional contexts.]

(a) Proposed alternative to the text in draft CPD:

[Adoption by the States concerned of all relevant measures to ensure the [full observance of the spirit and full application of the letter] [Full application] of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Tlatelolco), taking into account the views expressed on the adherence to it at the tenth special session of the General Assembly, the General Conference of OPANAL and other relevant forums and including ratification of Additional Protocol I by all States concerned.]

(b) (As in draft CPD)
(c) (As in draft CPD)

(d) (As in draft CPD)

Proposed text merging (e) and (f):

[Efforts aimed at the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions of the world [, including in various parts of Europe,] at the initiative of States which intend to become part of the zone, taking into account the specific security conditions of those regions.]

(g) (As in draft CPD)

12. (As No. 8 in draft CPD, p. 85)

B. Other weapons of mass destruction

1. [[Promotion of] universal adherence to and strict compliance with] [Strict compliance with and promotion of universal adherence to] [State Parties should [, in accordance with the general principles of international law,] strictly comply with, and all States which have not yet done so should [consider adhering] [adhere] to the following international instruments in order to achieve universal acceptance for them]:

   (a) the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed in Geneva on 17 June 1925; and

   (b) the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and on their Destruction.

2. (a) (As in 3 (a) in draft CPD)

   (b) Proposed alternatives to 3 (b) in draft CPD:

   Conclusion of an international convention [on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction] [on the prohibition of chemical weapons] [for the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons] [on chemical weapons] [on the complete and effective prohibition of all types of chemical weapons].

3. [or 3 (a)] Conclusion of an international treaty on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological [weapons] [warfare] [and the use of radioactive materials for hostile purposes] [, including the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities] [, bearing in mind the negotiations initiated in the Committee on Disarmament and all related proposals made in the course of those negotiations].
4. [or 3 (b)] [The conclusion of an international instrument which would comprehensively prohibit attacks against nuclear facilities [, from which inter alia, mass destruction effects would emanate].] (Pakistan plus FRG) [Negotiations with a view to [elaborating] [strengthening] international measures aimed at the prevention of attacks against [civilian] nuclear facilities [in an appropriate context].]

5. Commencement of negotiations [, when appropriate,] with a view to an early conclusion of a [comprehensive] agreement or specific agreements on [the prevention of the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons [of mass destruction which may be identified], taking into account recent developments in science and technology.

Proposed alternatives:

[Commencement of negotiations, when appropriate, with a view to the conclusion of specific agreements on such weapons of mass destruction which may be identified ...]

[Commencement of negotiations with a view to an early conclusion of a comprehensive agreement or specific agreements on the prevention of the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons based on new scientific principles and achievements.]

[As a first step towards the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement, the permanent members of the Security Council and other States of military importance should make similar declarations of renunciation of the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction; those declarations would be approved by a decision of the Security Council.]

Proposed alternative:

[As a first step towards the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement, the States with the largest arsenals of sophisticated weapons of mass destruction should make similar declarations to renounce the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction.]

Proposed alternative text of the Co-ordinator of Drafting Group C:

1. All States should adhere to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925.

2. All States which have not yet done so should consider adhering to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.

3. [States Parties to these international instruments should strictly comply with their provisions.]
4 (b). Conclusion of an international convention [on] [providing for] the complete and effective prohibition and elimination of all types of chemical weapons.

5 (and 6). Conclusion of an international treaty on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons, bearing in mind the negotiations initiated in the Committee on Disarmament and all related proposals made in the course of those negotiations [including consideration of the possibility of elaborating [further] international measures to prevent attacks against nuclear facilities [in this context or separately].]

7. Effective measures should be taken to avoid the danger and prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and achievements. Efforts should be appropriately pursued aiming at the prohibition of such weapons including consideration [and early conclusion] of an international [comprehensive] agreement [or agreements] on this question. Specific agreements could be concluded on particular types of new weapons of mass destruction which may be identified. This question should be kept under continuing review. [The possibility of appropriate declarations on the renunciation of the development of such weapons may be considered also.]]

Proposed alternative to paragraph 5 of the Co-ordinator's text:

[In order to help prevent a qualitative arms race and so that scientific and technological achievements may ultimately be used solely for peaceful purposes, effective measures should be taken to avoid the danger and prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and achievements. Efforts should be appropriately pursued aiming at the prohibition of such new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction. Specific agreements could be concluded on particular types of new weapons of mass destruction which may be identified. This question should be kept under continuing review.]

C. Conventional weapons and armed forces

Proposed alternatives to the introduction in the draft CPD:

[Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, negotiations should be carried out on the balanced reduction of armed forces and of conventional armaments, based on the principle of undiminished security of the parties with a view to promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military level, taking into account the need of all States to protect their security. These negotiations should be conducted with particular emphasis on armed forces and conventional weapons of nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant countries.] Agreements and other measures on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis relating to the limitation and reduction of

/...
armed forces and conventional weapons should be achieved throughout the Programme, taking into account the right of all States to protect their security, bearing in mind the inherent right of self-defence embodied in the Charter of the United Nations and without prejudice to the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in accordance with the Charter and the need to ensure balance at each stage and undiminished security of all States.

[Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be resolutely pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament. All States share a general responsibility for the limitation and reduction of conventional weapons. States with the largest military arsenals have a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional armaments reductions.]

Proposed addition to the introduction:

[Conventional disarmament, both in the regional and global context, would be facilitated through the elimination and renunciation of the confrontation and conflict between opposing military alliances in various regions of the world and the recognition of non-alignment as a critical factor for stability and peace in the world as a whole.]

[1. As a first step towards a subsequent reduction of their armed forces and conventional armaments the permanent members of the Security Council and the countries which have military agreements with them shall exercise restraint in the conventional field and resolve not to increase their armed forces and conventional armaments, effective from an agreed date.]

2. (As No. 1 in draft CPD)

3. (As No. 2 in draft CPD)

Proposed alternative to 2 and 3:

[The States with the largest military arsenals have a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional arms reduction and disarmament and, accordingly, the USSR and the United States should negotiate to reduce significantly their conventional armaments and armed forces. After such reduction by the USSR and the United States, other militarily significant States should negotiate to undertake an agreed reduction in the levels of their conventional armaments and armed forces.]

[3. (a) In the course of the process of conventional disarmament emphasis should be placed on the reduction of the armed forces [and conventional armaments] which are predominantly for offensive purposes, primarily [tanks, airplanes, as well as] airborne assault forces, amphibious forces and rapid deployment forces.]

/...
4. [In the course of the above-mentioned process, a more stable and secure situation in Europe at a lower level of armed forces and armaments on the basis of approximate equality and parity should be achieved.]

This objective should be pursued in particular through:

- Ongoing negotiations on the mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe;

- Convening of a conference on confidence and security building measures and disarmament in Europe as a substantial [and integral] part of the multilateral process initiated by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.*]

4. bis. [The above-mentioned measures of conventional weapons disarmament will involve:

(a) the demobilization of personnel and withdrawal of forces from foreign territories and the dismantling of foreign military bases;

(b) the destruction of agreed categories of conventional armaments and other military equipment, especially weapons of great destructive capacity;

(c) measures for confidence-building and security including restrictions on mobility of forces.]

5. The above-mentioned measures should also include, as appropriate, agreements for a gradual reduction in the production of conventional weapons, taking into account the reduction in armed forces and conventional weapons agreed upon.

6. During the first stage, [consultations and conferences should also be held [and, as appropriate, negotiations initiated] at the bilateral, regional and multilateral level, [among States] [where appropriate conditions exist with the participation of all the countries concerned] for the consideration of various initiatives and proposals for confidence-building and for the control, restraint or reduction of conventional armaments [, particularly in regions of arms concentration, areas of tension [and minority domination], etc.] [. In particular, States in regions of arms concentration or areas of tension have a special responsibility to pursue discussions and negotiations leading to substantial, militarily significant, and verifiable reductions of conventional armed forces and weapons] [appropriate negotiating processes, bilateral, regional or multilateral, should be initiated or pursued, especially in areas with a high concentration of armaments].

* The mentioning of the Vienna talks and the European Conference under the heading "Conventional Weapons and Armed Forces" is without prejudice to the content of the negotiations in those forums.

/...
[In this context,] account should be taken of the right of each State to safeguard its security, the necessity of maintaining a military balance, especially in regions of tension, and the need to ensure the undiminished security of States at each stage.]

[In this context,] consultations should also be held among [major] arms suppliers and recipient countries with a view to the conclusion of agreements on the limitation of all types of international transfer of conventional weapons [], including provisions aimed at preventing the acquisition of these weapons by unlawful clandestine entities. Such consultations should be conducted on the basis in particular of the principle of undiminished security of the parties with a view to promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military level, taking into account the need of all States to protect their security as well as the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of peoples under colonial or foreign domination and the obligations of States to respect that right, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States.

Further efforts to this end should be pursued on bilateral, regional or multilateral levels.

7.  (As No. 6 in draft CPD with brackets around subparagraph (iii) deleted)

8.  Proposed alternative to texts in No. 7 in draft CPD:

[An agreement or agreements for the limitation and cessation of the qualitative improvement of conventional armaments, in particular of the development, production and deployment of new types of highly destructive conventional weapons.]

D. Military expenditures

Reduction of military [expenditures] [budgets]

1. Gradual reduction of military budgets on a mutually agreed basis, for example, in absolute figures or in terms of percentage points, particularly by nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, would be a measure that would contribute to the curbing of the arms race and would increase the possibilities of reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries.

The basis for implementing this measure will have to be agreed by all participating States and will require ways and means of its implementation acceptable to all of them, taking account of the problems involved in assessing the relative significance of reductions as among different States and with due regard to the proposals of States on all the aspects of reduction of military budgets.

/...
2. During the first stage

[Alternative 1]

the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States should start to negotiate [verifiable] [mutually acceptable] agreements to freeze, reduce or otherwise restrain their military [expenditures] [budgets] with the aim of concluding such agreements before the end of the first stage. Other States may also freeze, reduce or otherwise restrain their military [expenditures] [budgets] in the context of bilateral, regional or multilateral disarmament.

[Alternative 2]

States, particularly those with the largest military arsenals, should make reductions in their military [expenditures] [budgets] taking into account their reductions of nuclear, conventional and other weapons, reductions in the production of such weapons, reductions in their armed forces and any dismantling of military facilities, bases, etc. Such reductions should be verifiable, gradual, balanced on a mutually agreed basis.

3. Measures to freeze, reduce or otherwise restrain military [expenditures] [budgets] should be without prejudice to the right of all States to undiminished security, self-defence and sovereignty.

4. In order to [achieve] [facilitate progress towards the achievement of] the above-mentioned measures further efforts should be made to harmonize the views [, to promote political will] and to create confidence among States. To this effect the activities [within the United Nations] in the field of reduction of military budgets [in particular the consideration of this issue in the Disarmament Commission] [in particular those relating to the comparability and verifiability of [expenditures] [budgets]] should be continued and intensified.

5. [Alternative 1]

All States and in particular the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States should endeavour to use the reporting instrument or to provide by other means the necessary elements for measuring their military [expenditures] [budgets].

[Alternative 2]

The positive political will of States, particularly, nuclear-weapon and other militarily significant States, is the main prerequisite for an early conclusion of agreements on freezing and reducing their military budgets. The achievement of concrete results to this end may be rendered impossible, if it is made conditional on the implementation of preliminary measures affecting security of States. The introduction of abstract or irrelevant issues in the consideration of problems relating to the reduction of military budgets may further contribute to an indefinite delay of the beginning of process of defining the concrete dimensions of actual reduction of military budgets.]
[Alternative 3]

As an essential first step toward the balanced reduction on a multilateral level of military [expenditures] [budgets], States should seek to achieve greater openness in military postures. Such openness could be facilitated by broader participation in a standardized reporting system for military [expenditures][budgets], enabling their comparison between different periods of time and between different countries. This system should include as an integral part, provision for verification satisfactory to all parties. To achieve this objective the following steps should be taken. All States and in particular the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States should make use of the reporting instrument as contained in document A/35/479. An international conference should be convened to review implementation of the United Nations reporting system, further refine reporting to facilitate comparability, and to consider means of data verification.]

6. In the process of [any] future negotiations the Parties should be prepared to make available to each other [the] [official] statistical data [necessary for measuring and comparing their military [expenditures] [budgets]] [relating to military budgets].

7. Pending the achievement of the above-mentioned measures all States, in particular the [most heavily armed States] [permanent members of the Security Council and other militarily significant States], should exercise self-restraint in their military [expenditures] [budgets] with a view to reallocating the funds thus saved to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of developing countries.

E. Related Measures

1. (As in draft CPD)

2. Further steps to prevent an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof:

[Elaboration [and adoption] [Consideration] of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof in order to promote the peaceful use of, and to avoid an arms race in that environment [, taking into account [the recently adopted provision on] the law of the sea].

3. (As in draft CPD)

Proposed alternatives:

[Further steps to prevent an arms race in outer space:}
(a) The Committee on Disarmament should consider the question of negotiating effective and verifiable agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space, taking into account all existing and future proposals designed to meet their objective;

(b) Measures should be pursued to promote international co-operation for the peaceful exploration and use of outer space.

Further steps to prevent an arms race in outer space:

(a) In order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies.

(b) All States in particular those with major space capabilities, should contribute actively to the goal of preventing an arms race and refrain from any action contrary to that aim.

(c) The Committee on Disarmament should consider [negotiations on] the question of [negotiating] [effective and verifiable] [an] agreement[s] aimed at preventing an arms race [in outer space, [including] in particular, [and as a matter of priority,] an agreement to prohibit anti-satellite systems [and the development of anti-ballistic systems ] [, in particular the stationing of anti-satellite systems, in outer space].

(d) Measures should be implemented to promote international co-operation for the peaceful exploration and use of outer space.

4. [The establishment of zones of peace, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Final Document [, in particular paragraph 64]:

The establishment of zones of peace in various regions of the world on the basis of agreements or arrangements freely arrived at by the States concerned should be encouraged as such steps can contribute positively to [the elimination of military presence of outside powers] from the respective regions, lessening of tension, strengthening the security of States concerned, peaceful settlement of disputes and to international peace and security as a whole.

(a) The Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace

[The establishment of conditions of peace and security in the Indian Ocean area is of the utmost importance]. All States should take urgent action for the achievement of the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace [to ensure conditions of peace and security in the Indian Ocean area].
In this connexion, steps should be taken immediately to create necessary conditions to facilitate preparations for the convening of the Conference on the Indian Ocean scheduled to take place in Colombo [not later than the first half of 1983] [in accordance with decisions taken by the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean].]

(b) South-East Asia

(Text pending – consultations between Indonesia and Viet Nam)

Proposed alternative to text in draft CPD:

(c) [To take positive steps towards lessening tensions and towards exerting efforts of all parties concerned, in order to find just, viable and lasting solutions through peaceful means to the outstanding problems, crises and conflicts in the Mediterranean, as well as, in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, to refrain from intervention, interference and threat or use of force in this region, so as to increase confidence and security and to transform the Mediterranean region into a zone of peace and co-operation.]

5. (As in draft CPD)
OTHER MEASURES

1. Confidence- [and security-] building measures

(a) While strictly observing the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and fulfilling in good faith the obligations under existing agreements on disarmament, all States, especially the militarily significant States, shall undertake confidence-building [and security] measures such as the following and other measures yet to be agreed upon, as a contribution to preparing for further progress in disarmament:

- measures relating to the improvement of communications between Governments, particularly in areas of tension, by the establishment of "hot lines" on the basis of mutual agreement and other methods of reducing the risks of conflict with a view to prevent attacks which take place by accident, miscalculation or communications failure;

- other measures relating to the prevention of a possibility of surprise attack;

- assessment of the possible implications of military research and development [and of disarmament proposals] for existing agreements and further efforts in the field of disarmament;

- promotion of economic co-operation bilaterally, regionally as well as globally.

(b) States shall seek to reach agreement on [effective] confidence-building measures at a global and regional level, especially in regions of arms concentration and where international tensions and disputes exist, taking into account the right of all States to undiminished security, as well as the specific needs and the situation of the region, such as the following:

- publication [and exchange] of information on military and security-related matters, including those related to the process of disarmament;

- regular bilateral and/or regional consultations of governmental representatives on such security-related matters;

- provisions of scholarships in military schools for the military personnel of other States;

- exchange of military delegations and military attachés;

- [provision] of information on scope and extent of specific military activities like manoeuvres, specified movements according to pre-established procedures;

- notification well in advance of major military ground manoeuvres involving a substantial portion of the State's ground forces independently or combined with amphibious and airborne components. Each State would notify the United Nations /...
Secretary-General of each reportable manoeuvre at the same time the neighbouring States are notified;

- invitation to [appropriate foreign experts to observe notifiable] [military observers in connexion with] military manoeuvres;

[- annual universal reporting to the Secretary-General of national military expenditures [according to the established United Nations reporting system;]]

- limitations [and exclusions] of certain military activities;

[- renunciation of military manoeuvres and demonstrations, particularly those with the participation of several States, near the national borders of other States;]

[- disengagement of armed forces deployed or stationed on international borders;]

[- the development of [effective] confidence and security building measures on the basis of the relevant provisions of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, in particular by achievement of an agreement on the convening of a Conference on Confidence and Security building measures and Disarmament in Europe [as an integral part of the process initiated by the CSCE] [as a substantial and integral part of the multilateral process initiated by the CSCE.] [The measures to be negotiated within the scope of the Conference would be of military significance and politically binding, and would be provided with adequate forums of verification which correspond to their content;]

[- the extension to the Mediterranean Sea area of confidence-building measures in the military sphere, agreed reduction of armed forces, the withdrawal of warships carrying nuclear weapons, the renunciation of the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territories of non-nuclear Mediterranean countries, the renunciation by nuclear-weapon States of the use of nuclear weapons against any Mediterranean country which does not permit the stationing of such weapons on its territory;]

[- application of confidence-building measures adopted by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe to the Mediterranean Sea area, particularly the extension of those measures to major military-naval activities, in accordance with the provisions and goals set by the Final Act of the Conference and relevant recommendations in the context of the follow-up process of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe;]

[- efforts aimed at achieving agreed reduction of armed forces, the withdrawal of warships carrying nuclear weapons, the renunciation of the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territories of non-nuclear Mediterranean countries, the renunciation by nuclear-weapon States of the use of nuclear weapons against any Mediterranean country which does not permit the stationing of such weapons on its territory.]

[- development of confidence-building measures in the Far East and the holding of negotiations to that end among all interested countries;]
[c. Unilateral measures such as reduction of armaments, military forces or military expenditure, especially when they are followed by similar measures adopted by other States on the basis of mutual example, could contribute to strengthen the confidence among States.] The exercise of self-restraint by all States, particularly by the most heavily armed States, in their military expenditure could also have a positive influence in strengthening the confidence among nations.

In adopting such confidence-building measures, States will bear in mind comprehensive study on the subject prepared by the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts.

2. Measures aimed at achieving relaxation of international tension

In addition to measures aimed at the strengthening of international peace and security at lower levels of forces by the limitation and reduction of armed forces and armaments, the following measures, which would contribute to the relaxation of international tension, should be undertaken during the first stage:

(a) Withdrawal of all foreign [occupation] [aggression] forces from the territories of other States [and dismantling foreign military bases] in accordance with the relevant United Nations [Security Council] resolutions and the purposes and principles and provisions of the United Nations Charter [and the definition of aggression contained in resolution 3314 (XXIX)].

[ The urgent settlement of international disputes and conflicts by peaceful means in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter and through full implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions.]

A Declaration of the United Nations General Assembly on the peaceful settlement of disputes between States should be adopted in order to strengthen the commitment of States to solve all their disputes by peaceful means. [Efforts should be made to encourage States to make full use of the United Nations machinery for peaceful settlements of international disputes between them [and to further enhance the effectiveness of this machinery.]

[(b) International agreements for the dismantling of foreign military bases and the elimination of the military presence [and rivalry] [and confrontation] among foreign powers in various regions of the world, [as the situation in specific regions may allow] [including in particular the withdrawal of foreign occupation forces from the territories of other States] [including the sea areas in particular the Indian Ocean, the Atlantic Ocean, the Pacific Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea and the region of the Persian Gulf.]]

(c) [Mutually agreed limitation and reduction of naval activities by member States of military alliances, particularly in areas where military conflicts are most likely to arise; mutually agreed withdrawal of missile submarines from their present extensive patrol areas and restriction of missile submarine patrol areas. Extension of confidence-building measures to the seas and oceans, especially to areas with major shipping lanes.]
(d) [An undertaking not to enlarge existing [or to establish new] military alliances.]

(e) [The ending of the division of Europe into military-political alliances and, as a first step, the abolition of the military organizations of both groupings, starting with mutual reduction of military activities.]

(f) [Conclusion of a convention on mutual non-aggression and non-use of force between States of Asia and the Pacific Ocean.]

(f) [In order to ensure that war is no longer an instrument for settling international disputes and that the use and the threat of force are eliminated from international life, as provided for in the Charter of the United Nations, States are called upon to strictly abide by the Charter and to pursue efforts [to avert aggression and particularly bring about a complete withdrawal of all foreign occupation troops to facilitate the reaching of agreement on the prevention of the use and the threat of use of force] on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis to reach agreements to that end.]

(g) [Adoption by the Security Council of a decision forbidding any co-operation [and collusion] in the nuclear field which would assist the apartheid régime of South Africa to manufacture nuclear weapons.]

(h) [To reduce secrecy and ambiguity with respect to strategic nuclear forces; nuclear-weapon States should take steps to expand the exchange of strategic forces data and provide notification of strategic exercises and test missile launches.]

3. Preventing the use of force in international relations

(a) Strict adherence to and effective compliance with all the principles and purposes embodied in the United Nations Charter, [in particular Article 2, para. 4] which imposes on member States the obligation to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State [or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.]

(b) In order to facilitate the full implementation of the above-mentioned provisions, States shall settle their disputes through peaceful means. In this context the following measures should be adopted:

- Full implementation of all procedures and mechanisms, referred to in Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter, for the peaceful settlement of disputes.

- Strengthening of the role of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security, in particular by enhancing the effectiveness of the Security Council for prompt action according to Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

- Resort to regional arrangements or agencies, in conformity with Chapter VIII
of the Charter, for dealing with matters relating to international peace and
security.

[Conclusion of a world treaty on the non-use of force in international
relations.]

[Conclusion among all States participants in the European Conference of a
treaty, all parties to which would undertake not to be the first to use either
nuclear or conventional weapons against one another.]

4. [Mobilization [Activation] of world public opinion in favour of disarmament]
   [Promotion of public awareness of disarmament]*

[(a) In order to [mobilize] [activate] world public opinion in favour of
disarmament, the specific measures set forth below, designed to increase the
dissemination of information about the armaments race and the efforts to halt and
reverse it, should be adopted in all regions of the world in a balanced, factual
and objective manner.

(b) With a view to contributing to a greater understanding and awareness of the
problems created by the armaments race and of the need for disarmament, Governments
and governmental and non-governmental international organizations are urged to take
steps to develop programmes of education for disarmament and peace studies at all
levels.

(c) It is important to show the disastrous consequences for mankind to which war,
in particular nuclear war, would lead. It is equally imperative to demonstrate the
necessity of averting a nuclear [or conventional] catastrophe, [inter alia by the
establishment of an authoritative international committee.] To that end, throughout the implementation of the Programme, governmental and non-governmental
information organs of Member States and those of the United Nations and its
specialized agencies as well as non-governmental organizations should, as
appropriate, undertake further programmes of information relating to the danger of
the armaments race as well as to disarmament efforts and negotiations and their
results, particularly by means of annual activities conducted in connexion with
Disarmament Week. These actions should constitute a programme to further alert
world opinion to the danger of war in general and nuclear war in particular. [The
holding of a world disarmament campaign, world-wide action for collecting
signatures in support of measures to prevent nuclear war, to curb the arms race and
for disarmament, and the implementation of the principles of the Declaration on the
Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace would also be of great significance in
this respect.] [All Governments should take steps to prohibit war propaganda in
any form.]

   *
   * This text has as yet not been negotiated.
As part of the process of facilitating the consideration of issues in the field of disarmament, studies on specific questions should be undertaken on the decision of the General Assembly, when necessary for preparing the ground for negotiations or reaching agreement. [Also, studies pursued under the auspices of the United Nations, in particular by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research established by Assembly resolution 34/83 M of 11 December 1979 within the framework of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research could bring a useful contribution to the knowledge and exploration of disarmament problems, especially in the long term.]

DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT

Introduction

[There is a close interrelationship between disarmament and development, that is, between balanced measures to reduce military expenditure and improve the way of life of all peoples, particularly those in developing countries.

Although the development and implementation of the new international economic order cannot depend on disarmament,] The process of disarmament can and should make an effective contribution to economic and social progress. At national level, converting resources now used for military purposes into productive use in the civilian sector. At international level, channelling some of those liberated resources to the co-operation with the developing countries. Agreement on the existence of such possibilities can be a strong incentive to move vigorously on disarmament negotiations, and can help create the public and political will to take positive steps to reduce military expenditure.

In a world of finite resources there is a close relationship between expenditure on armaments and economic and social development. Military expenditures are reaching ever higher levels, the highest percentage of which can be attributed to the nuclear-weapon States and most of their allies, with prospects of further expansion and the danger of further increases in the expenditures of other countries. The hundreds of billions of dollars spent annually on the manufacture or improvement of weapons are in sombre and dramatic contrast to the want and poverty in which two thirds of the world's population live. This colossal waste of resources is even more serious in that it diverts to military purposes not only material but also technical and human resources which are urgently needed for development in all countries, particularly in the developing countries. Thus, the economic and social consequences of the arms race are so detrimental that its continuation is obviously incompatible with the implementation of the new international economic order based on justice, equity and co-operation. Consequently, resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures should be used in a manner which will help to promote the well-being of all peoples and to improve the economic conditions of the developing countries.]

1. There is a close interrelationship between disarmament and development.
2. [Progress in disarmament would greatly help in the realization of development. Mankind today is confronted with an unprecedented threat of annihilation due to vigorous arms race which threatens the vital security of all States.] Security has not only military and political aspects, but also involves the active promotion of the economic and social development of all States in particular of the developing countries.

3. Disarmament would contribute over the long term to the effective economic and social development of all States in particular developing States by removing obstacles to the [required] restructuring of the international economic system on the basis of justice, equity and co-operation. An [immediate] contribution could be made to economic and social development, both nationally and internationally, by the release of resources from military purposes [through disarmament measures]. This would be of particular benefit to developing countries.

3. Disarmament would contribute over the long term to the effective economic and social development of all States, in particular developing countries, within the framework of an international system based on justice, equity and co-operation. A contribution could be made to this end, both nationally and internationally, by the release of resources from military purposes. This would be of particular benefit to developing countries.

[3. The economic and social development of all nations, especially the developing countries, requires fundamental changes in the present inequitable structure of international economic relations, with the objective of establishing the new international economic order. Disarmament could contribute to the achievement of this objective. In the short-term, resources released from the military expenditure of the most heavily armed States should be transferred primarily as additional assistance to the developing countries. [However, the efforts to be undertaken in favour of development [in particular] of the developing countries as well as the establishment and the implementation of the new international economic order should not in any way be made dependent on progress in the field of disarmament.]]

4. A comprehensive programme of disarmament can make an effective contribution to economic and social development of all States in particular of the developing countries through the implementation of the following measures, inter alia, with the co-operation and contributions of appropriate organs of the United Nations.

5. In this context, it is of particular significance that substantial progress should be made in disarmament [by the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States] by the [two most heavily armed States] [Five permanent members of the Security Council, countries associated with them by military agreements], [Major armed race participants] so that [inter alia] funds could be released from the [huge] military expenditure for the benefit of all countries in particular the developing countries.]
Measures:

6. Against this background and bearing in mind the United Nations study on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development (Doc. A/36/356), effective follow-up on the disarmament-development perspective should be undertaken at different levels so that national and United Nations activities may reinforce each other.

7. [The economic and social consequences [at national and international levels] of the military spending of all States in particular of all militarily significant States, should be assessed nationally and internationally and their public be informed about them. States have a special responsibility in this matter as regards to their own military spending.]

8. The Secretary-General, assisted by qualified experts, should up-date periodically the Study on the Economic and Social Consequences of the arms race and of military expenditure.

9. [In pursuit of] [During the consideration of] the conversion of defence industries to civilian production [of the most heavily armed States] during the process of disarmament taking into account the specific internal impacts of such measures [and the importance of international exchange of data on this issue], the following measures could be pursued:

   (a) The creation [inter alia] by Member States in conjunction with the progress of disarmament measures of the necessary prerequisites to facilitate the conversion of resources freed through disarmament measures to civilian purposes including planning.

   [(b) International exchange of conversion experiences [inter alia through the submission of reports by Member States] [through appropriate channels] from time to time on possible solutions to conversion problems]

   (c) [The Secretary-General should explore methods for collection, reporting and dissemination of national information on experiences in conversion.]

   (d) [The Secretary-General should take] appropriate action for identification and analysis of the possible benefits of conversion in the field of economic and social development.

   (e) The matter of conversion should be included in the periodic review of the Comprehensive Programme on Disarmament.

10. All States [especially those with the largest military arsenals] should facilitate the development and implementation, at the national level, of methods for identifying and analysing the benefits that could be derived from the reallocation of military resources, following disarmament measures, to address economic and social problems at the national level and to contribute towards reducing the economic disparities between developed and developing countries and
establishing [a] [the] new international economic order based on justice, equity and co-operation. [Studies could be conducted in this field].

11. [All Member States, especially the militarily significant States, should make public data on their utilization of human and material resources for military purposes [and military transfers and participate in the United Nations reporting instrument for military budgets].

12. The Secretary-General should take appropriate action to promote and co-ordinate the incorporation in concrete and practical ways of the disarmament and development perspective in the appropriate programmes and activities of the United Nations system. In this regard, the Centre for Disarmament should be given a major role. 1/ This paragraph should also be considered in the chapter on machinery.

13. (a) [Bearing in mind the urgent need for increased flows of resources to promote the development [in particular] of developing countries, there exists several practical measures by which disarmament could contribute to the process. To embody the relationship and channel resources flows, there have been proposals for special funds, special accounts, special Committee, armament levies and voluntary contributions. Taking into account the capabilities and needs of the agencies and institutions currently responsible for the international transfers of resources, further consideration should be given, as an integral part of the Comprehensive Programme on Disarmament, and in its review process, to the administrative and technical modalities of establishing a special account or an international disarmament fund for development. In the first stage of a CPD such a new facility could be based on voluntary contributions, with further funding possibilities being considered as progress in disarmament permits. The methods adopted for generating such resources should encourage the disarmament process and the resulting funds should be allocated on a just and non-discriminatory basis [in particular] among developing countries.]

13. (b) [The allocation of funds set aside for the benefit of developing countries as a result of disarmament measures should be carried out on a just basis, taking into account the most urgent needs and requirements of the developing countries, and without any discrimination. A special Committee should be set up for the allocation of such funds.]

13. (c) [Immediately after the adoption of the CPD, a separate account should be established under an appropriate United Nations agency such as UNDP, to receive voluntary contributions from Member States, particularly the most heavily armed States and utilize these for the purposes of economic and social development of the developing countries. Study on the modalities and practical aspects of establishing a special United Nations Disarmament Fund for Development on the basis of proposals submitted on this subject should be undertaken, including the question of taxation on the military expenditure of the most heavily armed States.]

14. States should endeavour when possible to transfer to the purposes of internal and international development, all resources released by disarmament measures rather than transfer them from one type of military expenditures to another.
DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

1. Disarmament and international security are directly related to each other. Together they constitute the fundamental elements of the system for the maintenance of international peace and security contained in the Charter of the United Nations. All States are fully committed to the purposes of the United Nations Charter and to the observance of its principles as well as of other relevant and generally accepted principles of international law relating to the maintenance of international peace and security.

2. Enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances nor be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority. Genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces, by international agreement and mutual example, leading ultimately to general and complete disarmament under effective international control. At the same time, the causes of the arms race and the threats to peace must be reduced and to this end effective action should be taken to eliminate tensions and settle disputes by peaceful means.

3. Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. During and after the implementation of the programme of general and complete disarmament, there should be taken, in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security, including the obligation of States to place at the disposal of the United Nations agreed manpower necessary for an international peace force to be equipped with agreed types of armaments. Arrangements for the use of this force should ensure that the United Nations can effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

4. In view of the interrelationship between disarmament and international security, the adoption of disarmament measures should take place in such an equitable and balanced manner as to ensure the right of each State to security and to ensure that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage. At each stage, the objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and armed forces. [In the negotiations [between States with equal levels of armaments and armed forces] the principle of equality and equal security must be strictly observed.]

5. Progress in disarmament has a beneficial effect on the strengthening of international security and would also help to enhance the security of States; at the same time, the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations, including the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means, would facilitate the adoption of measures of disarmament. Failure in one sphere has negative effects on the other. Progress in disarmament and in the strengthening of international security should thus be pursued on a parallel course.

/...
In the elaboration of measures in this field, the conclusion of the United Nations study on the relationship between disarmament and international security should be borne in mind.

- In particular, in the pursuit of security, States should take urgent measures to halt the arms race, particularly in the nuclear field, and to avert any kind of military conflict, in particular a nuclear war. With the same intention, the issue of conventional disarmament should be resolutely pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament.

At the same time it is imperative to pursue in parallel the following measures:

- States shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

- States should urgently settle their disputes through the strict implementation of the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with the generally accepted principles of international law and in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.

- In order to improve the capability of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security, all States should support the strengthening of the role of the United Nations, in particular by enhancing its effectiveness in accordance with Chapters VI and VII of the Charter of the United Nations, [particularly art. 43] in the following areas:

  - action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression;

  - pacific settlement of disputes as well as in international co-operation in the widest possible range of spheres.

VI. Machinery and procedures*

[1. In conformity with its central role in the field of disarmament, the United Nations should assume the primary responsibility in the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme on Disarmament including [its review and subsequent modifications and adjustments as necessary] [through negotiations relating to specific measures included in the comprehensive programme as well as the review of the implementation of the programme and subsequent modifications and adjustments as necessary.]}

* This text is tentative.
[1. In conformity with a central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament, the United Nations should play a more active role in this field and make every effort to facilitate the implementation of the disarmament measures included in the CPD, its review and subsequent modifications and adjustments as necessary.]

2. Negotiations on the various disarmament measures that are susceptible to multilateral negotiations and specified in the comprehensive programme should, as a rule, be conducted within the Committee on Disarmament, the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament. Immediately after the adoption of the programme, the Committee on Disarmament is called upon to initiate [as appropriate] negotiations on such measures pertaining to the first stage of the programme.

3. Bilateral and regional disarmament negotiations may also play an important role and could facilitate negotiations of multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament. [The States involved in such negotiations should undertake to provide at regular intervals full information on the status and details of such negotiations to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and to the Committee on Disarmament.] [Wherever feasible and appropriate, the United Nations should be invited as an observer to such negotiations and could be requested to assist these negotiations by providing objective information and advice and such other support as may be required.]

4. As a general rule, the Secretary-General of the United Nations could be designated as the depositary of international agreements negotiated within the framework of the Comprehensive Programme.

[5. In order to assure continued progress towards the full realization of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, a special session of the General Assembly shall be convened ......... to review its implementation. [The first special session devoted to the review of the Programme's implementation shall be held in ...............] [Such special sessions of the General Assembly] shall assess the implementation of the measures included in the stage under review. Should the assessment reveal that the full implementation of those measures has not been achieved, consideration would be given to the re-adjustments that need to be made to the steps that are necessary to stimulate progress in the implementation of the Programme. In addition, the review shall also serve the purpose of elaborating in more concrete terms, the measures to be implemented in Stages [II, III and IV] of the Programme, taking into account the existing situation, including developments in science and technology.]

6. In addition to the periodic reviews to be carried out [at the end of each stage] of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, there should be an annual review of the implementation of the Programme. Therefore, an item entitled "Review of the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament" should be annually included on the agenda of the regular session of the General Assembly. To facilitate the work of the Assembly in this regard, the Secretary-General should
annually submit a report to the General Assembly on progress in the implementation of the Programme.

7. During its annual review, or [at its periodic special session] to review the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, the General Assembly may, as appropriate, provide for further measures and procedures to enhance the implementation of the Programme.

8. The Disarmament Commission should play an active role in preparing the ground for subsequent negotiations on concrete agreements [including through the in-depth consideration of various expert studies in the field of disarmament prepared under the aegis of the United Nations.] It could also assist the General Assembly in the review and appraisal of the implementation of the comprehensive programme, particularly in the interval between review conferences [including by further elaborating as appropriate the disarmament measures belonging to the later stages of the Programme.]

9. As part of the process of facilitating the consideration of issues in the field of disarmament, studies on specific questions should be undertaken [either through ad hoc groups of experts or relevant institutions of the United Nations family, including as appropriate, UNIDIR] on the decision of the General Assembly, when necessary for preparing the ground for negotiations or reaching agreement. Whenever feasible, studies should contain concrete proposals and suggestions for negotiations or other steps to be taken.

9a. In the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme on Disarmament, the United Nations should make use of the necessary technical expertise of scientists. As it may deem appropriate, the United Nations could request scientists to provide it with information on technical questions.

[10. Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all parties. The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement. Agreements should provide for the participation of parties directly or through the United Nations system in the verification process. Where appropriate, a combination of several methods of verification as well as other compliance procedures should be employed.]

[11. Wherever feasible, the United Nations should be entrusted with the primary responsibility of monitoring the implementation of and compliance with disarmament agreements reached within the framework of the Comprehensive Programme. In this context, the United Nations should gradually develop the necessary organizational capacity and expertise required for a co-ordinated and effective and equitable international verification system designed to monitor and ensure compliance with various international, regional and bilateral disarmament agreements. As a first step, necessary arrangements should be made within the United Nations so as to enable it to co-ordinate information and data concerning verification of various]
disarmament agreements and to discharge such responsibilities as may be entrusted to it in the field of verification under agreements reached on the disarmament measures included in the Comprehensive Programme.]

11. [The United Nations machinery for disarmament should be appropriately strengthened in order to enable the United Nations to carry out its role in contributing to and carrying out a review of the implementation of the CPD. In particular, the Centre for Disarmament should be provided with the resources and personnel necessary to strengthen its functions relating to (i) support and assistance to multilateral negotiations, (ii) dissemination and co-ordination of information relating to disarmament matters and (iii) research studies with respect to specific areas of disarmament.]

[12. An independent unit should be established within the United Nations Secretariat in order, inter alia, to assist in the negotiation of the disarmament measures included in the Comprehensive Programme, monitoring progress in such negotiations, co-ordinating verification and compliance procedures provided for in disarmament agreements, and providing such other support, advice or information as may be required by States or intergovernmental organs. This unit should be provided with adequate staff and resources and should be headed by an official at the appropriately senior level.]

[12. In order to expand and strengthen the United Nations disarmament machinery, as has been done up to now, in a gradual manner, the next step should be to change the existing "United Nations Centre for Disarmament" into a "Department for Disarmament Affairs", to be headed by an Under-Secretary-General. The Department would report directly to the Secretary-General and would be at the same level as the other Departments, such as the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs and the Department of International Economic and Social Affairs.]

12. [With regard to specific measures of disarmament, parties engaged in negotiations on such measures should, as appropriate, in accordance with the central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, provide for the fullest possible utilization of United Nations machinery and procedures in ensuring compliance with specific agreements. Necessary arrangements should be made within the United Nations to enable it to discharge such responsibilities as may be entrusted to it in the field of verification under agreements reached on the disarmament measures included in the CPD.]

[13. An international disarmament organization under United Nations auspices should be established, charged, inter alia, with the following tasks with respect to existing and future arms control and disarmament agreements:

- implementation
- verification, including fact finding
- organization of review and amendment conferences
- provision of information]
[13. The General Assembly decides in particular to establish a United Nations Disarmament Agency. The Secretary-General shall submit a concrete proposal to the thirty-eighth session regarding the practical implementation, organization and staffing of such an agency, bearing in mind, inter alia, that the agency should have sufficient resources, that it should have an independent position within the United Nations system, that it should have a governing body elected by the General Assembly and adequate regular funding to be able to undertake the work requested by Member States, and that it should report directly to the Assembly.

As a first step towards an independent disarmament agency within the United Nations framework the Centre for Disarmament shall be transformed into a Department for Disarmament Affairs within the United Nations Secretariat.]

[VII. VERIFICATION]

1. Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all parties. Verification measures should be designed to not only ensure that specific agreements are being complied with, but also to contribute to confidence among States. [Disarmament measures concern the vital security interests of the States involved, and the implementation of these measures must provide for the maintenance of undiminished security of States during the disarmament process.] For this to happen, States must be assured that obligations contained in disarmament agreements are being fulfilled. [Effective verification must, therefore, in practice be reflected by the inclusion of necessary and appropriate verification measures and arrangements in specific disarmament and arms limitation agreements.]

2. In the context of international disarmament negotiations, the problem of verification should be further examined and adequate methods and procedures in this field be considered. Adequate and effective verification and means to ensure compliance with disarmament agreements are significant factors in making progress towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control [and a key factor to ensure undiminished security to the Parties involved. The importance of adequate and effective verification in the process of general and complete disarmament is twofold: as one of the essential principles upon which progress towards disarmament is based; and as an indispensable part of specific agreements to be negotiated in the implementation of the comprehensive programme of disarmament.]

[3. In order to facilitate the conclusion and effective implementation of disarmament agreements and to create confidence, States should accept appropriate provisions for verification in such agreements. States should take a positive approach to the development of the necessary and appropriate measures of verification for each particular agreement and show a willingness to accept such measures. [without exaggerating difficulties involved in their implementation.]

[A most important [pre-condition] [element] for the application of specific agreed measures in the field of arms limitation and disarmament is the political will of /...
Governments: references to technical difficulties of monitoring should not be used as a pretext for refusing to reach agreement [on verification measures] [on such measures and] on measures for halting the arms race.]

4. The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement. In the negotiation of specific agreements, where the scope of the agreement and verification measures have reciprocal influence, questions of scope and verification should be taken up and negotiated concurrently. [Questions relating to verification should be considered and decided upon simultaneously and in a manner organically linked with the consideration of specific disarmament problems rather than separately from them.]

Where appropriate, a combination of several methods of verification as well as other compliance procedures [should] [may] be employed. Every effort should be made to develop appropriate methods and procedures of verification that are non-discriminatory in nature and which do not [unduly] interfere with the internal affairs of other States or jeopardize their economic and social development. Such methods and procedures [may] [should] encompass, as appropriate, both national and international means and include provisions as necessary [and appropriate] for on-site inspection. Consideration should also be given to experience gained to date in the development and implementation of agreements in the field of arms limitation and disarmament. [National technical means constitute the most reliable form of verification of compliance with agreements concluded thus far. However, different methods of verification can be envisaged for carrying out, on voluntary basis, depending on the purposes, scope and nature of specific agreements.]

[5. In the implementation of the comprehensive programme on disarmament, multilateral disarmament negotiations will play an important role and experience has increasingly demonstrated the need for closer attention to the development by parties to multilateral agreements of appropriate, equitable, and non-discriminatory machinery and procedures to ensure verification of and compliance with multilateral agreements. Since many States may not possess a national capability to effectively make national evaluations of compliance with agreements to which they may be a party, such agreements should provide for the participation of parties directly or through the United Nations system in the verification process. The United Nations should therefore play an appropriate role in monitoring and implementation of and compliance with multilateral agreements reached within the comprehensive programme. In this context the United Nations should gradually develop the necessary organizational capacity and expertise in the light of the increased responsibilities that may devolve upon it as a result of the conclusion of multilateral disarmament agreements. [In particular negotiations should be pursued with a view to the conclusion of an agreement for the creation of an international satellite monitoring agency.] [Also, the establishment of an [international disarmament organization [international verification agency] under United Nations auspices would be of great significance in this respect.] Necessary arrangements should be made within the United Nations so as to enable it to co-ordinate information and data regarding various disarmament agreements.]