Twelfth special session
AD HOC COMMITTEE OF THE
TWELFTH SPECIAL SESSION
Agenda item 9

REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS AND
DECISIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS TENTH
SPECIAL SESSION

Note verbale dated 25 June 1982 from the Permanent Representative
of Japan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

The Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations presents his
compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to
transmit herewith a working paper concerning the strengthening of the role of the
United Nations in the field of verification and requests that it be distributed as
a document of the twelfth special session of the General Assembly under agenda
item 9.
ANNEX

Strengthening of the role of the United Nations in the field of verification

Working paper

1. The Government of Japan has consistently stressed the importance of taking, step by step, such concrete measures as are feasible under the current international situation, with a view to achieving the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Needless to say, such concrete measures as are feasible will not contribute to genuine disarmament and arms control unless they are equitable, mutual and accompanied by appropriate verification measures. Verification measures are important in that they assure the effectiveness of disarmament and arms control agreements, and build confidence among the parties concerned.

2. Paragraphs 91 and 92 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly state as follows:

"91. In order to facilitate the conclusion and effective implementation of disarmament agreements and to create confidence, States, should accept appropriate provisions for verification in such agreements.

92. In the context of international disarmament negotiations, the problem of verification should be further examined and adequate methods and procedures in this field be considered. Every effort should be made to develop appropriate methods and procedures which are non-discriminatory and which do not unduly interfere with the internal affairs of the other States or jeopardize their economic and social developments."

3. Until now, disarmament agreements have contained as a general rule verification systems of their own. However, some agreements have had inadequate verification provisions, or none at all. In the field of disarmament agreements, the United Nations has played an important role. For example, the Secretary-General has acted as a depository of disarmament agreements, and the United Nations has also rendered services for their review conferences. Bearing in mind the importance of verification in the field of disarmament agreements, and in view of the central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament, the role of the United Nations in the domain of verification of disarmament agreements should be strengthened.

4. As referred to in the statement made by Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki on 9 June 1982 at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Government of Japan holds it desirable in the long run to form an international verification unit within the framework of the United Nations, which is recognized as a universal international organization with impartial authority.

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As a first step toward this long-term objective, the Government of Japan suggests that the following arrangements be implemented by the United Nations Centre for Disarmament.

(a) The establishment of a special division responsible for collecting information concerning compliance with and verification of disarmament agreements. The information of the kind envisaged here would be obtained as a result of activities in which the United Nations is engaged (for example, when it serves as the secretariat for review conferences). Alternatively, a resolution could be adopted calling for a report on verification and other related matters, pursuant to paragraph 27 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, which states as follows:

"27. In accordance with the Charter, the United Nations has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament. In order effectively to discharge this role and facilitate and encourage all measures in this field, the United Nations should be kept appropriately informed of all steps in this field, whether unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral, without prejudice to the progress of negotiations."

(b) The preparation of lists of experts in order to develop and maintain the capabilities of the United Nations to offer technical assistance, especially in the area of fact-finding.

(c) Examination of the possibility of investing the Secretary-General with the power to mediate and arbitrate, if and when necessary, in consultation with States concerning problems which may arise in the application of provisions of agreements.

(d) A study on ways of assuring compliance with provisions of those existing agreements that lack provisions of verification, such as the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, and the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, as well as those agreements with inadequate provisions for verification, such as the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.