Text submitted by Drafting Group C

V. Measures and stages of implementation

First stage

DISARMAMENT MEASURES

A. Nuclear weapons*

1.** Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization. It is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons. The ultimate goal in this context is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

In the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility.

The process of nuclear disarmament should be carried out in such a way, and requires measures to ensure, that the security of all States is guaranteed at progressively lower levels of nuclear armaments, taking into account the relative qualitative and quantitative importance of the existing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States and other States concerned.

* Nos. 1 to 8 as per the structure proposed by the Chairman.

** Paragraphs 47, 48 and 49 of the Final Document.
2. * The achievement of nuclear disarmament will require urgent negotiation of agreements at appropriate stages and with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to the States concerned for:

   (a) cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems;

   (b) cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;

   (c) a comprehensive, phased programme with agreed time-frames, whenever feasible, for progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time.

   Consideration can be given in the course of the negotiations to mutual and agreed limitation or prohibition, without prejudice to the security of any State, of any types of nuclear armaments.

3. **Nuclear test ban**

   (Text pending)

4. Pending the conclusion of further agreements relating to nuclear disarmament, the United States and the USSR should, on a reciprocal basis, continue to refrain from actions which would undercut existing strategic arms agreements concluded between them.

5. Proposed texts concerning a "freeze"/halt in qualitative development etc., by USSR-United States pending negotiations:

   [As a starting point for the negotiations on reductions of nuclear arms, the two States which possess the most important nuclear arsenals should consider without delay the possibility of agreeing to a freeze in qualitative and quantitative terms of their nuclear arsenals and the number of delivery vehicles at the present level.] (Sweden)

   [In the first stage there should be a freeze on nuclear weapons which would inter alia consist of two inseparable elements, namely (i) a complete cessation of the manufacture of nuclear-weapons and (ii) a cut-off in the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. Such a step would enable an effective and economical safeguards system which could be devised on the basis of objective, scientific and non-discriminatory criteria to be applied to nuclear facilities in all states.] (India)

* Paragraph 50 of the Final Document.
[The USSR and the United States should agree not to introduce any further strategic nuclear weapons or delivery vehicles for an initial period of two years, during which time negotiations on reductions of nuclear arms should be pursued vigorously. There should also be an undertaking to renew this agreement for further periods of two years if progress is being made in the negotiations.) (Ireland)

6. (The USSR and the United States undertook to consult on text.)

*[Bilateral negotiations between the USSR and the United States on [[intermediate] [medium] range nuclear forces and strategic arms [limitations and reductions] [nuclear disarmament].

Urgent and vigorous pursuit to a successful conclusion of the bilateral negotiations already under way or about to be initiated with a view to [reaching a more stable and verifiable global balance of] [achieving [limitations and significant reductions in] the nuclear arsenals of the [United States and USSR] [two sides] at progressively lower levels of delivery systems and/or warheads] [on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security].

Specifically,

- early initiation of negotiations designed to achieve, [in a progressive, verifiable and balanced manner,] an agreement between the USSR and the United States for [substantial] [significant] quantitative reductions and [verifiable] qualitative constraints on their stockpiles of nuclear intercontinental strategic weapons and means of delivery.

- within the above referred framework, pursuit between the negotiating States of the current endeavours aiming at the limitation and reduction of [their] [intermediate] [medium] range nuclear [missiles] [weapons] [capable of striking targets in Europe].]

7. (The USSR and the United States undertook to consult on text)

Texts proposed in connexion with INF/limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons in Europe:

[Limitations and reductions of nuclear weapons systems in Europe

Pursuit of the bilateral negotiations already begun on medium and intermediate range nuclear forces in Europe with a view to the early conclusion of an agreement on substantial reductions of such and analogous systems.

Initiation of negotiations aimed at the limitation and reduction of all tactical nuclear weapons systems in Europe. These negotiations should be carried out within the framework of the bilateral Geneva negotiations or in some other suitable context.) (Sweden)

* French text consolidating Nos. 6 and 7 with proposed amendments.
[As the negotiations on nuclear-weapons in Europe concern the security interests of all nations of that continent, all European States should be given the possibility to participate, in an appropriate manner, and to bring their constructive contribution to an urgent and successful conclusion of these negotiations.] (Romania)

8. Multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament:

(Text pending)

9. Avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war:
(Introduction as contained on page 83 of draft CFD) *

(a) [An international instrument [or binding unilateral declarations by the nuclear-weapon States] on the basis of an agreed common formula assuring, without any conditions, qualifications or restrictions, the non-nuclear-weapon States [, that are committed by international law to a non-nuclear-weapon status,] against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.] (Sweden with proposed amendments)

[Urgent conclusion of an international instrument of a legally binding character to effectively assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The nuclear-weapon States should demonstrate their commitment to this objective, inter alia, by making a positive contribution to further negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament to evolve a uniform obligation to be undertaken by them in an international instrument which is clear and credible and responds to the legitimate security concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States, [especially the neutral, non-aligned and developing countries outside the two major military alliances] [, as well as of such non-nuclear-weapon States participants in military alliances that have no nuclear weapons on their territory].] (Pakistan with proposed amendments)

(a bis) [Measures to strengthen the commitment of all States to renounce the use of threat of use of force in international relations should be taken in order to make more effective the security guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.] (Romania)

(b) (As in draft CFD)

(c) (As in draft CFD)

(d) Proposed alternative to text in draft CFD:

[(d) Expanded measures to enhance mutual confidence and to improve communication between governments in both time of peace and time of crisis. These measures should include:

* France proposed inclusion of para. 56 of the Final Document.

/.../
(i) maintenance of hot lines;

(ii) measures to reduce nuclear accidents;

(iii) notification of missile test launches;

(iv) notification of strategic exercises;

(v) exchange of strategic forces data.] (United States)

[In this regard, the respective roles of nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States in the prevention of the outbreak of a nuclear war, especially through accident, miscalculation or failure of communications should be clarified.] (India)

(Text on notification to the Secretary-General to be provided by India.)

10. [Nuclear non-proliferation] [Further steps to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 65 to 71 of the Final Document]:

The nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States should jointly take further steps to develop an international consensus of ways and means, on a universal and non-discriminatory basis, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons as an integral part of the efforts to halt and reverse the arms race. The goal of nuclear non-proliferation is on the one hand to prevent the emergence of any additional nuclear-weapon States besides the existing five nuclear-weapon States [horizontal proliferation] and on the other, progressively to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons altogether [vertical proliferation]. [The pursuit of measures on nuclear non-proliferation requires, in the first instance, the elimination of the existing inequitable and discriminatory situation as between nuclear-weapon States [and their alliance systems], on the one hand, and non-nuclear-weapon States on the other, as well as the need to avoid disincentives for the reduction and eventual elimination of the existing nuclear-weapon arsenals.] The international consensus on nuclear non-proliferation should include effective measures at the national level and through international agreements to prevent the proliferation of nuclear-weapons without jeopardizing energy supplies or the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Such measures should include:

- [measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament mentioned above]

- [the full exercise of the inalienable rights of all States to apply and develop their programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development in conformity with their priorities, interests and needs [under agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied through the International Atomic Energy Agency on a non-discriminatory basis in order to effectively prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons]]
- [universal adherence to and full implementation of all the provisions of existing instruments on non-proliferation, in particular the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; universal adherence to and full implementation of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material;]

- [adoption of further measures for the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and, to that end, the achievement of universal participation of States in the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, with the development of international co-operation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy;]

- [adoption of further measures for the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons including the full implementation and strengthening of agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied through the International Atomic Energy Agency on a non-discriminatory basis;]

- [unhindered] access for all States to nuclear technology, including its latest achievements, equipment and materials for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, taking into account the particular needs of developing countries [, under agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied through the IAEA];

- [respect for each country's choices and decisions in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy without jeopardizing their respective fuel-cycle policies or international co-operation, agreements or contracts for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy [provided that agreed safeguard measures mentioned above are applied. In this context the Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS) should be developed as a potentially valuable instrument for improved arrangements which would permit nuclear trade to flow more freely under reliable and equitable non-proliferation arrangements];]

- [agreed measures of verification applied on a universal and non-discriminatory basis];

- [The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones at the initiative of States which intend to become part of the zone.] [Finland]

11. Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones:

Proposed alternative to the introduction in draft CFD:

[The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of agreements or arrangements freely arrived at among States of the region concerned and with the commitment by the nuclear-weapon States outside the region to fully respect the denuclearized status of the zone constitute[s] an important measure in the field of disarmament and should be encouraged in order to achieve full assurance for the States of the zone against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons [and to contribute to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons] with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons, taking into account the characteristics of each region. The States participating in such zones and the nuclear-weapon States should comply fully with the [spirit[,] objectives, purposes and principles of the agreements or arrangements establishing the zones [, thus ensuring that they are genuinely free from nuclear weapons].
The nuclear-weapon States [must] [are called to] give undertakings, the modalities of which are to be negotiated, in particular: (i) to respect strictly the status of the nuclear-weapon-free zones; (ii) to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of the zone.] (Venezuela with proposed amendments)

Proposed additions to the introduction in draft CPD:

[In order to be realistic, the setting up of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world must be pursued within the framework of and integrated with an effective nuclear disarmament process. The establishment of such zones would have no meaning if the accumulation and refinement of nuclear weapons in other parts of the world continues at an accelerated pace. [The consideration of this question must also deal with] the problem posed by the possible existence of clandestine nuclear-weapon arsenals in certain regions of the world [could be resolved through mutual acceptance of international safeguards by the States of the region concerned].] (India with proposed amendments)

[Such zones would contribute to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons as well as facilitate international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in regional contexts.] (Finland)

(a) Proposed alternative to the text in draft CPD:

[Adoption by the States concerned of all relevant measures to ensure the [full observance of the spirit and full application of the letter] [Full application] of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), taking into account the views expressed on the adherence to it at the tenth special session of the General Assembly, the General Conference of OPANAL and other relevant forums and including ratification of Additional Protocol I by all States concerned.] (Venezuela with proposed amendments)

(b) (Text pending – consultations between Senegal and United States)

(c) (As in draft CPD)

(d) (As in draft CPD)

Proposed text merging (e) and (f):

[Efforts aimed at the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions of the world [, including in various parts of Europe,] at the initiative of States which intend to become part of the zone, taking into account the specific security conditions of those regions.] (Yugoslavia)

(g) (As in draft CPD)

12. (As No. 8 in draft CPD, p. 85)

/...
B. Other weapons of mass destruction

1. [[Promotion of] universal adherence to and strict compliance with] [Strict compliance with and promotion of universal adherence to] [State Parties should [, in accordance with the general principles of international law,] strictly comply with, and all States which have not yet done so should [consider adhering] [adhere] to the following international instruments in order to achieve universal acceptance for them]:

   (a) the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed in Geneva on 17 June 1925; and

   (b) the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and on their Destruction.

2. (a) (Text pending - United Kingdom to provide alternative to 3 (a) in draft CPD)

   (b) Proposed alternatives to 3 (b) in draft CPD:

   Conclusion of an international convention [on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction] [on the prohibition of chemical weapons] [for the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons] [on chemical weapons] [on the complete and effective prohibition of all types of chemical weapons].

3. [or 3 (a)] Conclusion of an international treaty on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological [weapons] [warfare] [and the use of radioactive materials for hostile purposes] [, including the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities] [, bearing in mind the negotiations initiated in the Committee on Disarmament and all related proposals made in the course of those negotiations].

4. [or 3 (b)] [The conclusion of an international instrument which would comprehensively prohibit attacks against nuclear facilities [, from which [inter alia,] mass destruction effects would emanate].] (Pakistan plus PRG) [Negotiations with a view to [elaborating] [strengthening] international measures aimed at the prevention of attacks against [civilian] nuclear facilities [in an appropriate context].] (USSR with proposed amendments)

5. Commencement of negotiations [, when appropriate,] with a view to an early conclusion of a [comprehensive] agreement or specific agreements on [the prevention of the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of] such weapons [of mass destruction which may be identified], taking into account recent developments in science and technology. (Draft CPD)
Proposed alternatives:

[Commencement of negotiations, when appropriate, with a view to the conclusion of specific agreements on such weapons of mass destruction which may be identified ...] (United States)

[Commencement of negotiations with a view to an early conclusion of a comprehensive agreement or specific agreements on the prevention of the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons based on new scientific principles and achievements.] (GDR)

[As a first step towards the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement, the permanent members of the Security Council and other States of military importance should make similar declarations of renunciation of the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, those declarations would be approved by a decision of the Security Council.] (Draft CPD)

Proposed alternative:

[As a first step towards the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement, the States with the largest arsenals of sophisticated weapons of mass destruction should make similar declarations to renounce the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction.] (China)

C. Conventional weapons and armed forces

[Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, negotiations should be carried out on the balanced reduction of armed forces and of conventional armaments, based on the principle of undiminished security of the parties with a view to promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military level, taking into account the need of all States to protect their security. These negotiations should be conducted with particular emphasis on armed forces and conventional weapons of nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant countries. Agreements and other measures on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis relating to the limitation and reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be achieved throughout the Programme, taking into account the right of all States to protect their security, bearing in mind the inherent right of self-defence embodied in the Charter of the United Nations and without prejudice to the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in accordance with the Charter and the need to ensure balance at each stage and undiminished security of all States.

[1. As a first step towards a subsequent reduction of their armed forces and conventional armaments the permanent members of the Security Council and the countries which have military agreements with them shall exercise restraint in the conventional field and resolve not to increase their armed forces and conventional armaments, effective from an agreed date.] (GDR)

2. (As No. 1 in draft CPD)
3. (As No. 2 in draft CFD)

Proposed alternative to 2 and 3:

[The States with the largest military arsenals have a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional arms reduction and disarmament and, accordingly, the USSR and the United States should negotiate to reduce significantly their conventional armaments and armed forces. After such reduction by the USSR and the United States, other militarily significant States should negotiate to undertake an agreed reduction in the levels of their conventional armaments and armed forces.] (China)

[3. (a) In the course of the process of conventional disarmament emphasis should be placed on the reduction of the armed forces [and conventional armaments] which are predominantly for offensive purposes, primarily [tanks, airplanes, as well as] airborne assault forces, amphibious forces and rapid deployment forces.]

4. [In the course of the above-mentioned process, a more stable and secure situation in Europe at a lower level of armed forces and armaments on the basis of approximate equality and parity should be achieved.

This objective should be pursued in particular through:

- Ongoing negotiations on the mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe;

- Convening of a conference on confidence and security building measures and disarmament in Europe as a substantial [and integral] part of the multilateral process initiated by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.*] (Finland with proposal amendments)

4. bis. [The above-mentioned measures of conventional weapons disarmament will involve:

(a) The demobilization of personnel and withdrawal of forces from foreign territories and the dismantling of foreign military bases;

(b) the destruction of agreed categories of conventional armaments and other military equipment, especially weapons of great destructive capacity;

(c) measures for confidence building and security including restrictions on mobility of forces.]

* The placement of this subparagraph in the chapter related to conventional weapons and armed forces should in no way prejudice the character and subject to be considered at the Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe.
5. The above-mentioned measures should also include, as appropriate, agreements for a gradual reduction in the production of conventional weapons, taking into account the reduction in armed forces and conventional weapons agreed upon.

6. During the first stage, [consultations and conferences should also be held [and, as appropriate, negotiations initiated] at the bilateral, regional and multilateral level, among States for the consideration of various initiatives and proposals for confidence building and for the control, restraint or reduction of conventional armaments [, particularly in regions of arms concentration, areas of tension [and minority domination], etc.], In particular, States in regions of arms concentration or areas of tension have a special responsibility to pursue discussions and negotiations leading to substantial, militarily significant, and verifiable reductions of conventional armed forces and weapons] [appropriate negotiating processes, bilateral, regional or multilateral, should be initiated or pursued, especially in areas with a high concentration of armaments].

[In this context,] account should be taken of the right of each State to safeguard its security, the necessity of maintaining a military balance, especially in regions of tension, and the need to ensure the undiminished security of States at each stage.] (Pakistan)

[In this context,] consultations should also be held among [major] arms suppliers and recipient countries with a view to the conclusion of agreements on the limitation of all types of international transfer of conventional weapons [, including provisions aimed at preventing the acquisition of these weapons by unlawful clandestine entities. Such consultations should be conducted] on the basis in particular of the principle of undiminished security of the parties with a view to promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military level, taking into account the need of all States to protect their security as well as the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of peoples under colonial or foreign domination and the obligations of States to respect that right, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States.

[Further efforts to this end should be pursued on bilateral, regional or multilateral levels.] (USSR)

7. (As No. 6 in draft CPD with brackets around subparagraph (iii) deleted)

8. Proposed alternative to texts in No. 7 in draft CPD:

[An agreement or agreements for the limitation and cessation of the qualitative improvement of conventional armaments, in particular of the development, production and deployment of new types of highly destructive conventional weapons.] (GDR)
D. **Military Expenditures**

Reduction of military expenditures

(Text pending - consultations among Bulgaria, Romania, Sweden, United States and Yugoslavia)

E. **Related measures**

1. (As in draft CPD)

2. Further steps to prevent an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof:

   [Elaboration [and adoption]] [Consideration] of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof in order to promote the peaceful use of, and to avoid an arms race in that environment [, taking into account the emerging régime under the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea [, taking into account the recently adopted provisions on the law of the sea].

3. Further steps to prevent an arms race in outer space:

   In order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies. [Negotiations should be undertaken during the first stage on an international agreement [or agreements] prohibiting States from [developing, testing and deploying weapons [of any kind] [including] [in particular] [anti-satellite weapons systems] in outer space.] [Negotiations should be undertaken during the first stage on a verifiable international agreement prohibiting States from developing, testing and deploying weapons of any kind for use in outer space.]

   Proposed alternatives:

   [Further steps to prevent an arms race in outer space:

   (a) The Committee on Disarmament should consider the question of negotiating effective and verifiable agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space, taking into account all existing and future proposals designed to meet their objective;

   (b) Measures should be pursued to promote international co-operation for the peaceful exploration and use of outer space.] (United States)
[Further steps to prevent an arms race in outer space:

(a) In order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies.

(b) All States in particular those with major space capabilities, should contribute actively to the goal of preventing an arms race and refrain from any action contrary to that aim.

(c) The Committee on Disarmament should consider the question of negotiating effective and verifiable agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space, in particular, and as a matter of priority, an agreement to prohibit anti-satellite systems.

(d) Measures should be implemented to promote international co-operation for the peaceful exploration and use of outer space.] (Italy)

4. The establishment of zones of peace, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Final Document:

(a) The Indian Ocean

(Text pending - consultations among Australia, Sri Lanka and USSR)

(b) South-East Asia

(Text pending - consultations between Indonesia and Viet Nam)

Proposed alternative to text in draft CFD:

(c) [To take positive steps towards lessening tensions and towards exerting efforts of all parties concerned, in order to find just, viable and lasting solutions through peaceful means to the outstanding problems, crises and conflicts in the Mediterranean, as well as, in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, to refrain from intervention, interference and threat or use of force in this region, so as to increase confidence and security and to transform the Mediterranean region into a zone of peace and co-operation.] (Yugoslavia)

5. (As in draft CFD)