Twelfth special session
Agenda items 9 and 11

REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS AND DECISIONS
ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS TENTH SPECIAL SESSION

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION OF THE 1980s AS THE SECOND
DISARMAMENT DECADE AND CONSIDERATION OF INITIATIVES AND
PROPOSALS OF MEMBER STATES

Prevention of nuclear war

Report of the Secretary-General

Addendum

CONTENTS

REPLIES RECEIVED FROM GOVERNMENTS ........................................ 2

Argentina ................................................................. 2
REPLIES RECEIVED FROM GOVERNMENTS

ARGENTINA

[Original: Spanish]
[22 June 1982]

1. The qualitative difference implied by the incorporation of nuclear weapons into the arsenals of some Powers since 1945 is so great as to alter completely mankind's prospects for survival. The effects of nuclear war - whose geographical, temporal or qualitative limitation is possible only in the minds of some theorists - are so dangerous that it becomes imperative to eliminate the possibility of such war from the political and military doctrines that contemplate and admit of it.

2. Argentina believes that the only permanent and effective way to prevent a nuclear war is to eliminate nuclear weapons completely. The Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly (resolution S/10-2) so affirms and, in its paragraph 50 and other paragraphs, provides for appropriate steps to give tangible form to the negotiating process that will lead to such a final result.

3. The four years since the adoption of the Final Document by consensus in 1978 have brought no agreement on nuclear disarmament measures, so that it becomes necessary to assess the reasons for the present impasse and indicate clearly the responsibility for it, which rest particularly with the States that possess nuclear weapons.

4. The unilateral and prolonged suspension of bilateral and multilateral negotiations on nuclear problems has done significant harm both to prospects for achieving progress and to the general international climate. The insistence of some States on negotiating only when they believe they are in a position of strength and have allocated increased resources to the development of their nuclear weapons poses an obvious threat not only to their potential adversaries but also to the international community as a whole.

5. At the same time, it seems necessary to clarify the negative implications of the maintenance of nuclear deterrence as the official doctrine of certain countries. As has been repeatedly stated in numerous declarations and studies whose sources cannot be suspected of partiality, the perception that nuclear deterrence improves the security of certain States or regions is one which simultaneously means that the security of all other States and regions of the world is weakened.

6. The potential threat of the use of nuclear weapons - implicit in the very possession of such weapons - extends even beyond the strictly military field. The political motives for the determined efforts to retain nuclear weapons and increase them in all their dimensions appear to be based on an attempt to perpetuate a power structure which guarantees to its beneficiaries the maintenance of areas of domination and influence, the persistence of colonial or foreign occupation and the extension of the system of military bases and alliances to all the regions of the world.
7. At the same time, the projection of nuclear military power against the territorial integrity and sovereignty of countries which have renounced nuclear weapons - blatantly demonstrated in the recent military aggression by the United Kingdom in connexion with the possession of the Malvinas - constitutes an affront to regional and global efforts to prevent the proliferation of such weapons, since it makes manifest the militarily disadvantaged situation of those who have opted in favour of peace and development.

8. Accordingly, the Argentine Republic believes that compliance with the provisions of the Final Document of the tenth special session would be the best way to prevent nuclear war. A special and inescapable responsibility in this task rests with the nuclear-weapon Powers, which have the obligation to demonstrate by deeds the political will that will enable the rest of the world to believe in their declarations.