Twelfth special session
Items 9 and 11 of the provisional agenda*

REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS AND DECISIONS
ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS TENTH SPECIAL SESSION

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION OF THE 1980s AS THE SECOND
DISARMAMENT DECADE AND CONSIDERATION OF INITIATIVES AND
PROPOSALS OF MEMBER STATES

Prevention of nuclear war

Report of the Secretary-General

Addendum

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* A/S-12/10.
REPLIES RECEIVED FROM GOVERNMENTS

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

[Original: English]
[14 May 1982]

1. The German Democratic Republic shares the concern of States about the great threat of nuclear war resulting from the policy of confrontation and all-out armaments efforts pursued by the most aggressive imperialist circles. Like the overwhelming majority of States it is convinced that agreement on effective measures to halt the nuclear arms race and proceed to nuclear disarmament represents the way to reduce and avert the danger of nuclear war. These realizations determine also the foreign policy of the German Democratic Republic.

2. In accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, measures towards nuclear disarmament have top priority. It is imperative to preclude that nuclear weapons are ever used. The Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe (resolution 36/100), concerning the non-first use of nuclear weapons, adopted, at the initiative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, by the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session, marks an important step in this direction. The German Democratic Republic hopes that the other nuclear Powers join that resolution.

3. International peace and security are seriously jeopardized by attempts to achieve military superiority, to create a "first-strike capability" and by doctrines envisaging a "limited use of nuclear weapons". These doctrines serve to step up the arms race in the nuclear field and aggravate the international situation, for they prepare the ground ideologically for nuclear war. It is therefore a task of top priority that States should demonstrate their political will for the non-first use of nuclear weapons and immediately proceed to substantive negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

4. The socialist States have prepared a comprehensive, constructive and realistic programme for nuclear disarmament which, pursuant to paragraph 50 of the Final Document, is aimed at completely liquidating nuclear weapons. Concrete ideas are, inter alia, embodied in the socialist States' proposals for a comprehensive programme of disarmament (CD/245 dated 19 February 1982):

"Cessation of the manufacture of all types of nuclear weapons and gradual reduction of their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed, and the immediate start, towards those ends, of appropriate negotiations with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States. As stated in proposals submitted previously by the socialist countries, the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons should cover the cessation of manufacture of means of delivery and fissionable materials for the purposes of weapon development; as a first step, a discussion should be held concerning the possible stages of nuclear disarmament and the approximate contents of those stages, particularly that of
the first stage; measures within that stage should include the cessation of
the development and deployment of new types and new systems of nuclear
weapons; parallel with the above, measures should be taken to strengthen the
political and international legal guarantees of the security of States."

5. It also includes the following measures:
   (a) Further limitation of strategic arms;
   (b) Comprehensive prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests;
   (c) Prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon;
   (d) Strengthening of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;
   (e) Strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States;
   (f) Non-deployment of nuclear weapons on territories where there are no such
       weapons at present, and renunciation by nuclear-weapon States of further action
       related to the deployment of nuclear weapons in other States;
   (g) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

6. Concrete proposals of the socialist States on nuclear disarmament, which have
   been actively supported by the German Democratic Republic, are contained in
documents of the Committee on Disarmament. We wish to recall especially documents
and CD/259 (March 1982).

7. The German Democratic Republic considers a ban on the nuclear neutron weapon
   imperative and calls for the implementation of General Assembly resolution
36/92 K. Together with other socialist States it has launched relevant initiatives
in the Committee on Disarmament. Mention should be made of the proposed convention
on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear
neutron weapons (CCD/559, March 1978), and the statement of the socialist States on
the necessity of establishing an ad hoc working group for drafting such a
convention (CD/219, August 1981).

8. The demand for a prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon is a fundamental
   concern of the majority of States and of the international public.

9. A prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon would be a positive step towards
   the general cessation of the qualitative arms race in the nuclear field, and help
   to avert the danger of nuclear war.

10. Situated as it is in the heart of Europe, the German Democratic Republic turns
    against the planned deployment of new American medium-range nuclear weapons in
    Western Europe. These plans are bound to increase the danger of Europe becoming
    the theatre of nuclear warfare that would inescapably spread to all parts of the
    world. The Geneva negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and
the United States of America will be successful if they are conducted on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security. The proposal submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 9 February 1982 envisages a considerable and gradual reduction by both sides of their medium-range nuclear weapons, which may finally lead to a Europe free of nuclear weapons. The decision unilaterally taken by the Soviet Union in March 1982 regarding a moratorium on the deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons and their possible reduction, furnishes yet another proof of the seriousness and constructiveness of the endeavours made by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to yield results that would head off the danger of nuclear war. A similarly constructive approach taken by the other side could produce agreement on measures that would correspond not only to the vital interests of the European peoples but of mankind as a whole.

LIBERIA

[Original: English]
[25 May 1982]

1. It is reassuring to the Government of Liberia to note that the United Nations has already outlived the life-span of the League of Nations by 17 years, yet upon reflection it is also alarming to note that it has not learned or taken seriously the lesson it should have learned that caused the demise of the League. The heart of that lesson was the inability of the Powers to be to provide for an effective peace-keeping machinery and one that would also monitor and serve as a referee between conflicting military alliances. At the second special session devote to disarmament, the disarmament negotiations should give serious attention to finding solutions to those deeply imbedded psychological factors that cause man to distrust and fear his neighbours, because the production and development of nuclear armaments are the visible results of those invisible psychological factors.

2. Furthermore, it is the understanding of the Government of Liberia that the business and industry of developing andperfecting nuclear armaments is not a lukewarm, haphazard lackadaisical activity but an activity engaging the full resources and talents of those who advocate the nuclear-arms race, and are busy at it 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, year in, year out.

3. The Government of Liberia feels that this is the kind of challenge and time-table our disarmament efforts at the United Nations are faced with, and which should equally engage constructive means, plans and programmes, and activities to counteract the achievements of the agents of death and destruction.

4. Furthermore, upon serious contemplation, it would appear that man does not after all love the earth he inhabits and is bent on its destruction. Every civilization, we are told, contains within it the seed of its own destruction so that process must be quickened it seems by some. Who really wants such immortality from history? Man must be taught to find the proper balance in nature, or else the artificial world which modern science and technology has created will lead us all only further on the path of death and destruction than towards a renewal of this good earth. The Government of Liberia therefore calls for open-ended, perennial,
permanent working groups on disarmament. The Government of Liberia will contribute to the success of the second special session devote to disarmament in designing ways and means to beat the swords into ploughshares in the very furnaces that produce those swords.

5. The following programme of action is accordingly recommended:

(a) Setting aside a day annually to be solemnly observed as World Disarmament Day;

(b) Special solemn oath taken at a ceremony during the annual session of the General Assembly with each delegate taking the podium to read an oath and sign a peace and disarmament pledge or communiqué;

(c) Issue of world disarmament stamps and posters;

(d) Contract with pharmaceutical industries to produce anti-radiation drugs for immunization against radiation and other ill effects from nuclear fallout;

(e) Vigilant inspection quarterly of nuclear establishments where they exist;

(f) The teaching of disarmament in the schools and universities and by religious leaders;

(g) Annual messages sent by the Heads of Governments to the Security Council reaffirming their commitment to disarmament.

SWEDEN

[Original: English]
[17 May 1982]

1. Only general and complete nuclear disarmament provides real protection against the threat of nuclear war. Until this goal has been reached it is, however, important to take various measures designed to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war. Such measures should not be considered as substitutes for nuclear disarmament and they do not in any way diminish the responsibility of the Nuclear Powers to reduce and eventually to eliminate their nuclear arsenals.

2. As long as nuclear weapons exist every effort should be exerted in order to prevent a nuclear catastrophe. Obviously, such efforts can become successful only with the support and the participation of those States who possess and control nuclear weapons. It is essential that these States take concrete measures in order to generally de-emphasize the importance of nuclear arms in their defence systems. A continued nuclear-arms race is susceptible to increase the risk for further proliferation of nuclear-weapon capability.

3. Recent discussions of nuclear doctrines have raised considerable public anxiety as regards the possible consequences if those doctrines were to be
implemented in a crisis situation. In particular, alarming speculations have been made about the possibilities of conducting limited nuclear wars and about the prospects of "winning" a nuclear war. There is need to clarify the real purpose of the nuclear doctrines with respect to their significance for the level of the so-called nuclear threshold. The criteria for the possible use of nuclear arms is a matter of concern for all States and it is the responsibility of the nuclear Powers to impose on themselves maximum restraint in order to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war.

4. It should be noted that some efforts have been made to reduce such risks, i.e., the establishment of direct communications links (hot line), measures to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war (accident measures), the agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on prevention of nuclear war and certain provisions of the SALT agreements.

5. In the absence of tangible results in nuclear disarmament the non-nuclear-weapon States have a right to expect that the non-nuclear-weapon States should use the opportunity offered by the special session to declare what further steps they are prepared to take in order to reduce the risk of nuclear war. All nuclear-weapon States should thus comply with the resolution on this matter adopted by consensus by the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session (resolution 36/81 B).

UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

[Original: English]
[28 May 1982]

1. Following the tragic experience of the Second World War, successive British Governments have considered it their duty to maintain forces sufficient to cause unacceptable damage to any State contemplating an attack on Britain. For the better defence of the country and the preservation of the way of life freely chosen by its people, Britain entered into collective defence arrangements founded on the principle of deterrence. These arrangements and this policy, which the British Government continues to support, have maintained the peace in Europe for more than a generation and serve the purpose of preventing war, whether nuclear or conventional. In the view of the British Government, nuclear war is neither likely nor imminent. The arrangements made between nuclear-weapon States for the prevention of accidental acts which could lead to war are effective.

2. Nuclear disarmament cannot be considered from the problem of security, or the balance of conventional forces in Europe, which is weighted against Western countries. The United Kingdom seeks a mutual and balanced reduction of conventional force levels in Europe in parallel with moves to achieve nuclear disarmament. It may be recalled that most of the 50 million people who perished in the course of the Second World War were killed by so-called conventional weapons.

3. It has been calculated that a further 10 million deaths have resulted from the use of conventional weapons in 140 conflicts that have occurred since 1945. The
destructive capability of conventional weapons is today of course much greater than it was in the Second World War.

4. It remains the earnest wish of the British Government to take full advantage of the opportunities that arise to conclude international agreements on specific measures which, in a balanced and verifiable manner, will reduce arsenals of nuclear weapons and enhance security. The role of the United Kingdom in the achievement of the partial test ban treaty of 1963; as a depository Power of the non-proliferation treaty of 1976; the assurances the British Government has given to non-nuclear States that they do not lie under threat from United Kingdom nuclear weapons; and the agreement concluded with the Soviet Union on the prevention of accidental nuclear war — all are actions which testify to the role which Britain has played in the search for such agreements.

5. The North Atlantic Alliance, of which the United Kingdom is a member, has declared that it will never use weapons, nuclear or conventional, except in response to an attack upon a Member State. Regrettably, the British Government notes that the actions of others, as demonstrated by the invasion of Afghanistan, the pressures exerted on Poland and the recent invasion of the Falkland Islands, afford ample proof that the disposition to avoid the use of force, save in self-defence, is not universal. As a result, confidence between States is undermined and the search for new measures of arms control and disarmament impeded. That search is further hindered by the resistance of some parties to adequate measures of verification on which the restoration of confidence depends.

6. The Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland avails himself of this opportunity to present his compliments to the Secretary-General and to assure him that the United Kingdom will play a full and active part in the special session. The United Kingdom will lend its support to all efforts to negotiate equitable, balanced and verifiable arms control agreements, so that international security may be maintained at lower levels of cost and armament.