REPORT
OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE
FOR THE SECOND SPECIAL SESSION
OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
OFFICIAL RECORDS: TWELFTH SPECIAL SESSION
SUPPLEMENT No. 1 (A/S-12/1)

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NOTE

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. At its thirty-third session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 33/71 of 14 December 1978, section III of which read as follows:

"The General Assembly,

..."

"Bearing in mind the decision adopted at its tenth special session to
fix, during its thirty-third session, the date of the second special session
devoted to disarmament,

"Desiring to contribute to the furthering and broadening of positive
processes initiated through the laying down of the foundations of an
international disarmament strategy at its tenth special session,

1. Decides to convene a second special session of the General Assembly
devoted to disarmament in 1982 at United Nations Headquarters in New York;

2. Decides also to set up, at its thirty-fifth session, a preparatory
committee for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to
disarmament."

2. At its thirty-fifth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 35/47 of 3 December 1980, the operative part of which read as follows:

"The General Assembly,

..."

"1. Decides to establish a Preparatory Committee for the Second Special
Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament composed of
seventy-eight Member States appointed by the President of the General Assembly
on the basis of equitable geographic distribution;

2. Requests the Preparatory Committee to prepare a draft agenda for the
special session, to examine all relevant questions relating to that session
and to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session its
recommendations thereon, including those in respect of the implementation of
the decisions and recommendations adopted by the Assembly at its tenth special
session;

3. Invites all Member States to communicate to the Secretary-General
their views on the agenda and other relevant questions relating to the second
special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament not later than
1 April 1981;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit the replies of Member
States relevant to paragraph 3 above to the Preparatory Committee and to
render to it all necessary assistance, including the provision of essential
background information, relevant documents and summary records;"
5. Requests the Preparatory Committee to meet for a short organizational session of not longer than one week before the end of the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly in order, inter alia, to set the dates for its substantive sessions;

6. Further requests the Preparatory Committee to submit its progress report to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session;

7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-sixth session an item entitled: 'Second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament: report of the Preparatory Committee for the Second Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament'.

3. In accordance with paragraph 1 of resolution 35/47, the President of the General Assembly, on the basis of consultations held in the First Committee, appointed the following States as members of the Preparatory Committee for the Second Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire and Zambia.

4. In accordance with paragraph 3 of resolution 35/47, 49 Member States have communicated to the Secretary-General their views on the agenda and other relevant questions relating to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. These replies were circulated as documents A/AC.206/2 and Add.1-9.
II. WORK OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE IN 1980 AND 1981

5. Pursuant to paragraph 5 of resolution 35/47, the Preparatory Committee met at United Nations Headquarters for a short organizational session on 4 and 5 December 1980. Two substantive sessions were held from 4 to 15 May and from 5 to 16 October 1981. During these three sessions the Committee held 29 meetings. The Committee also held a number of informal meetings. The 1st meeting of the Committee, held on 4 December 1980, was opened by the Secretary-General, who made a statement (A/AC.206/SR.1).

6. The Committee elected the following officers:

   Chairman: Mr. Olu Adeniji (Nigeria)

   Vice-Chairmen: The representatives of the following Member States:
   Australia
   Bahamas
   Bangladesh
   Benin
   Bulgaria
   German Democratic Republic
   India
   Italy
   Japan
   Mexico
   Morocco
   Peru
   Yugoslavia

   Rapporteur: Mr. Omer Braun (Turkey)

7. At its 1st meeting, on 4 December 1980, following the example of the Preparatory Committee for the first special session devoted to disarmament, the Committee decided to be governed by the relevant parts of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly. Notwithstanding that decision, it was understood that every effort should be made to ensure that decisions on matters of substance would be adopted by consensus. It was further agreed that, should it prove impossible to secure consensus, the Chairman would then duly inform the Committee, so that the relevant decisions could be adopted in accordance with the provisions of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly.

8. At the same meeting, the Committee also agreed that the representatives of States not members of the Committee would be entitled to participate in its plenary meetings without the right to vote, as decided by the Preparatory Committee for the first special session on disarmament. 1/ In accordance with that decision, Ireland

and the Holy See participated in the work of the Preparatory Committee and made statements during the Committee's meetings.

9. Also at its 1st meeting, the Committee agreed to follow the practice of the Preparatory Committee of the first special session on disarmament with respect to the participation of representatives of non-governmental organizations and peace and disarmament research institutions. Accordingly, the Committee decided that such representatives could be present at meetings of the Committee and that they should provide the Secretariat with lists of communications received from such organizations that were conducting research in the field of disarmament (A/AC.206/INF.1 and Add.1-4). At its 17th meeting, on 15 May 1981, the Committee agreed to a recommendation made by its bureau that the organizations concerned should be allowed to make oral statements at one meeting during the October session of the Preparatory Committee. With regard to the representation of those organizations, the Committee agreed that the matter would be decided by the organizations themselves and that their decision would be conveyed to the Chairman of the Committee.

10. At the same meeting, the Committee decided to invite the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and specialized agencies interested in disarmament to take part in the work of the Committee as observers. At the 22nd meeting of the Committee, the representative of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) made a statement.

11. At its 23rd meeting, on 9 October 1981, the Preparatory Committee heard statements by the representatives of the following non-governmental organizations: the Ad Hoc NGO Liaison Group of the Special NGO Committee on Disarmament at Geneva and the NGO Committee on Disarmament (at United Nations Headquarters), the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization, the International Peace Bureau, the World Federation of Democratic Youth and the World Peace Council, as well as three of the representatives who spoke on behalf of the NGO Committee on Disarmament (at United Nations Headquarters). The Committee also heard statements by the representatives of the following peace research institutions: the International Peace Research Association, the Stanley Foundation and the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies.

12. In the course of the Preparatory Committee's work, the following working papers were submitted by Member States:

(a) Working paper entitled "Principal objectives of international co-operation for speedier practical progress of disarmament negotiations", submitted by Czechoslovakia (A/AC.206/11, annex);

(b) Working paper on the implementation of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament, containing, inter alia, an assessment of the main negotiating processes and regional disarmament efforts, submitted by Finland (A/AC.206/12);

(c) Working paper containing an annotated preliminary draft provisional agenda of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, submitted by Mexico (A/AC.206/13).

13. In accordance with the Committee's request at its 3rd meeting, on 5 December 1980, the Secretariat prepared the following background papers:

(a) Draft decision on negotiation of a comprehensive legal undertaking to ban nuclear tests, (A/AC.206/L.1);

(b) Background paper on the evolution of the various proposals relating to a comprehensive test-ban treaty, (A/AC.206/L.2);

(c) Background paper on the negotiation of the comprehensive test-ban treaty, (A/AC.206/L.3);

(d) Background paper on the role of the United Nations in the process of international disarmament, (A/AC.206/L.4);

(e) Background paper on the proposal by the United Nations General Assembly regarding the establishment of a United Nations disarmament organization, (A/AC.206/L.5).

14. In accordance with the Committee's request at its 1st meeting, the Secretariat prepared the following background papers:

(a) Preliminary draft agenda of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, (A/AC.206/Para.1);

(b) An introduction to the Preparatory Committee's work, (A/AC.206/Para.2).

15. Preliminary draft agenda of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, (A/AC.206/Para.3).

16. The Committee's request at its 3rd meeting, on 5 December 1980, the Secretariat prepared the following background papers:

(a) Draft decision on negotiation of a comprehensive legal undertaking to ban nuclear tests, (A/AC.206/L.1);

(b) Background paper on the evolution of the various proposals relating to a comprehensive test-ban treaty, (A/AC.206/L.2);

(c) Background paper on the negotiation of the comprehensive test-ban treaty, (A/AC.206/L.3);

(d) Background paper on the role of the United Nations in the process of international disarmament, (A/AC.206/L.4);

(e) Background paper on the proposal by the United Nations General Assembly regarding the establishment of a United Nations disarmament organization, (A/AC.206/L.5).

17. In accordance with the Committee's request at its 1st meeting, the Secretariat prepared the following background papers:

(a) Preliminary draft agenda of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, (A/AC.206/Para.1);

(b) An introduction to the Preparatory Committee's work, (A/AC.206/Para.2).
(a) Disarmament resolutions adopted by the General Assembly (A/AC.206/3);

(b) A comprehensive study of official proposals or declarations made and decisions taken by the General Assembly on the procedure of unilateral or negotiated moratoria as a provisional measure for the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, as well as their application by any State (A/AC.206/4 and Corr.1);

(c) A comprehensive study of the origin, development and present status of the various alternatives proposed for the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons (A/AC.206/5 and Corr.1);

(d) Report on the human and materials resource available to the United Nations Secretariat for its work on disarmament and the organization of that work (A/AC.206/6);

(e) A synthesis of the arguments adduced for and against each of the four proposals for the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones that have been included in the agenda of the General Assembly (Africa, South Asia, the Middle East and the South Pacific) and for and against the proposal for the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean, including a subject and country index (A/AC.206/7 and Add.1);

(f) Summary of studies in the field of disarmament prepared by the Secretary-General with the assistance of experts during the period 1977-1980 at the request of the General Assembly (A/AC.206/9);

(g) A comparative study of the scope originally proposed or aimed at in draft multilateral disarmament treaties of a universal character concluded under United Nations auspices and the scope finally fixed in those treaties, including the contemplated measures for expanding that scope (A/AC.206/10 and Corr.1);

(h) A list of disarmament and related proposals officially submitted to the United Nations (A/AC.206/15);

(i) A brief synopsis of disarmament and arms limitation negotiations since 1978 - including their results - carried out within the framework of the United Nations on a regional basis or bilaterally, with indication, where appropriate, of the procedures followed to keep the United Nations informed (A/AC.206/16 and Corr.1).

14. In addition, at the Committee's request at its 11th meeting, on 8 May 1981, the Secretariat prepared a series of compilations of views of Member States on the agenda and other relevant questions relating to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (A/AC.206/CRP.1 and Add.1-3, A/AC.206/CRP.2 and Add.1 and 2, A/AC.206/CRP.3 and Add.1 and A/AC.206/CRP.4 and Add.1).

15. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 34/83 E of 11 December 1979, the report of the Secretary-General entitled "Study on the implications of establishing an international satellite monitoring agency" was circulated as a document of the Preparatory Committee (A/AC.206/14).

16. The proceedings of the meetings of the Preparatory Committee, including the views expressed by delegations, are contained in the summary records (A/AC.206/SR.1-29).
III. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE IN 1981

17. At its meetings, the Preparatory Committee decided by consensus to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session the recommendations set forth in paragraphs 18 to 29 below with regard to the organization of work of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and the future work of the Preparatory Committee.

A. Organization of work of the special session

1. Provisional agenda

18. The Committee recommends the following provisional agenda for the special session:


   2. Minute of silent prayer or meditation.

   3. Credentials of representatives to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament:
      (a) Appointment of the members of the Credentials Committee;
      (b) Report of the Credentials Committee.

   4. Election of the President of the General Assembly.

   5. Organization of the session.


   7. Adoption of the agenda.

   8. General debate including:
      - Review and appraisal of the present international situation in the light of the pressing need for specific generally agreed measures to eliminate the danger of war, in particular nuclear war, halt and reverse the arms race and to achieve substantial progress in the field of disarmament, especially in its nuclear aspects, taking due account of the close interrelationship between disarmament, international peace and security, as well as between disarmament and economic and social development, particularly of the developing countries.

2/ Rule 30 of the rules of procedure provides that, at the opening of each session of the General Assembly, the Chairman of that delegation from which the President of the previous session was elected shall preside until the Assembly has elected a President for the session.
9. Review of the implementation of the decisions and recommendations adopted by the General Assembly at its first special session devoted to disarmament:

- Status of negotiations on disarmament as contained in the Programme of Action and bearing in mind the priorities set out in the Programme;

- Consideration of the report of the Committee on Disarmament, in particular any draft instruments transmitted by the Committee;

- Consideration of the report of the Disarmament Commission;

- Consideration of the implementation of resolutions of the General Assembly on specific tasks, in particular studies, aimed at the realization of the Final Document and their follow-up.

10. Consideration and adoption of the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

11. Implementation of the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade as well as consideration of initiatives and proposals of Member States.

12. Enhancing the effectiveness of machinery in the field of disarmament and strengthening of the role of the United Nations in this field, including the possible convening of a World Disarmament Conference.

13. Measures to mobilize world public opinion in favour of disarmament:

- Disarmament education, seminars and training (United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament);

- World Disarmament Campaign;

- Other public information activities.

14. Adoption, in an appropriate format, of the document(s) of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

2. Date and duration

19. The special session should be held at United Nations Headquarters between 7 June and 9 July 1982.

3. President

20. The Committee considers that, following the practice of previous special sessions, the General Assembly may wish to elect the President of the thirty-sixth session as the President of the special session.
4. Vice-Presidents

21. Vice-Presidents of the special session should be the same as at the thirty-sixth regular session of the General Assembly, on the understanding that regional groups may make substitutions of Vice-Presidents allocated to each group.

5. Main Committees

22. The special session should establish a committee of the whole, a working group on the comprehensive programme of disarmament and as many open-ended groups or subsidiary organs as may be necessary. The Chairman of the committee of the whole should be elected by the General Assembly at its special session. In this connexion, the Committee recommends that at the special session the Assembly should be guided by the procedure of the tenth special session.

6. Credentials Committee

23. The Credentials Committee of the special session should be the same as that of the thirty-sixth regular session of the General Assembly.

7. General Committee

24. The General Committee of the special session should consist of the President of the special session of the General Assembly, the 21 Vice-Presidents and the Chairmen of the seven Main Committees of the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly, on the understanding that they may be substituted by members of their delegations or members of the delegations of States belonging to the same regional group, the Chairman of the committee of the whole of the special session and the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the Second Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament.

8. Rules of procedure

25. The rules of procedure of the General Assembly should apply in the special session without amendments, on the understanding that, regarding the adoption of decision by the Assembly at the special session, every effort should be made to ensure that, in so far as possible, decisions on matters of substance will be adopted by consensus.

9. Level of representation

26. It would be desirable that Member State be represented at the special session at the highest possible political level.

10. Public information activities

27. The Committee recommends the adoption of the programme of public information activities submitted by the Secretariat (A/AC.206/18) on the understanding that, in
so far as possible, such activities should be carried out within the regular budgets of the Department of Public Information and of the Centre for Disarmament of the Secretariat.

11. **Role of non-governmental organizations and peace and disarmament research institutions**

28. The Committee recommends that non-governmental organizations concerned with disarmament and peace and disarmament research institutions should be accorded the same facilities at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament as those which they had received at the first special session. However, in view of the importance of world public opinion for progress in disarmament, it is expected that even a greater spectrum of non-governmental organizations and their leaders will participate in the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. With regard to oral statements, the Ad Hoc NGO Liaison Group of the two NGO disarmament committees at Geneva and United Nations Headquarters would make an appropriate speakers' list of representatives of non-governmental organizations and peace and disarmament research institutions. This would be transmitted to the Preparatory Committee, through its Chairman, at its final session for appropriate recommendation to the special session.

B. **Future work of the Preparatory Committee**

29. The Preparatory Committee should hold one final session from 26 April to 14 May 1982 to continue consideration of substantive issues related to the special session, including the implementation of the decisions and recommendations adopted by the Assembly at its tenth special session, for incorporation in the document(s) to be adopted at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and any remaining organizational and procedural matters.
IV. ACTION TAKEN BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS THIRTY-SIXTH SESSION

30. Pursuant to resolution 35/47 of 3 December 1980, the Preparatory Committee submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session a report 3/ including its recommendations on questions relating to the special session. At its 91st plenary meeting, the Assembly adopted resolution 36/91 A of 9 December 1981, the operative part of which read as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"..."

"1. Endorses the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Second Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament and the recommendations contained therein for the special session, to be held between 7 June and 9 July 1982 at United Nations Headquarters in New York;

"2. Endorses also the recommendation of the Preparatory Committee to meet in New York from 26 April to 14 May 1982 in order to continue consideration of substantive issues related to the special session, including the implementation of the decisions and recommendations adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session, for incorporation in the document or documents to be adopted at the second special session devoted to disarmament, and any remaining organizational and procedural matters;

"3. Expresses its appreciation to members of the Preparatory Committee for their constructive contribution to its work;

"4. Invites Member States to submit to the Secretary-General, not later than 31 March 1982, further views on the substantive issues related to the special session, including the implementation of the decisions and recommendations adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session;

"5. Requests all Member States engaged in bilateral, regional or multilateral negotiations on disarmament issues outside the framework of the United Nations to submit appropriate information on such negotiations to the General Assembly, in accordance with paragraph 27 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 5/ the first special session devoted to disarmament, before its second special session devoted to disarmament;

"6. Requests the Secretary-General to render the Preparatory Committee all necessary assistance for the completion of its work."


4/ See para. 19 above.

5/ Resolution S-10/2.
V. WORK OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE IN 1982

31. Pursuant to paragraph 2 of General Assembly resolution 36/81 A, the Preparatory Committee held its fourth session from 26 April to 14 May 1982. During this session, the Committee held 13 meetings.

32. The proceedings of the Committee, including the views expressed by delegations, are contained in the summary records of this session (A/AC.206/SR.30-42).

33. At its 36th meeting, on 30 April, the Committee decided to establish an open-ended working group on the review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The Committee elected Mr. A. P. Venkateswaran (India) as Chairman of the Working Group. The Working Group held four meetings. It had before it a number of substantive contributions on the review presented on behalf of individual delegations or groups of delegations. The Working Group decided to set up an open-ended drafting group, which met from 6 to 11 May, to consider the working papers before it. During the short period available to it, the drafting group put together a composite working paper which incorporated all the elements contained in the different working papers submitted to the Working Group and a number of written and oral submissions, amendments, additions and reformulations offered by delegations or groups of delegations during the course of the drafting work. At its 38th meeting, on 12 May, the Preparatory Committee heard a report on the work of the Working Group presented by its Chairman and took note of the composite paper submitted to it with the understanding that the composite paper, which covered every aspect of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament, had been prepared with the aim of assisting the second special session devoted to disarmament. Thus it might be subsequently enriched by contributions from delegations during the special session itself and, consequently, did not prejudice the position of any delegation in any point. Subsequently, the Committee decided to recommend that the composite paper should be annexed to the present report (see annex I).

34. At its 36th meeting, on 30 April, the Committee decided to establish an open-ended informal working group to help prepare for the consideration of the comprehensive programme on disarmament at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The Committee elected Mr. D. L. Hepburn (Bahamas) as Chairman of the Informal Working Group. Subsequently, a contact group was established within the Informal Working Group. The Group and its contact group held a number of meetings. At the 38th meeting of the Committee, on 12 May, the Chairman of the Informal Working Group reported on the work of the Group and submitted a document entitled "Commentary of the Informal Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament". The Committee took note of that document and decided that it should be annexed to the present report (see annex II).

35. In accordance with the decision taken by the Committee at its 1st meeting (see para. 8 above), Chile, the Holy See, Ireland, Switzerland, Thailand and Viet Nam participated in the work of the Committee at its fourth session.

36. In addition, the representatives of UNESCO, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the World Health Organization (WHO) and IAEA participated in the work of the Committee at its fourth session (see para. 10 above).
VI. DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED TO THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE IN 1982

37. During the fourth session of the Preparatory Committee, in 1982, the following documents were submitted:

   (a) Revised text of a working paper entitled "Principal objectives of international co-operation for speedier practical progress of disarmament negotiations", submitted by Czechoslovakia (A/AC.206/11/Rev.1);

   (b) Report of the Secretary-General entitled "Views of Member States on the preparations for the second special session" (A/AC.206/19 and Add.1 and 2);

   (c) Working paper prepared by the Secretariat entitled "Public information activities concerning disarmament since the tenth special session of the General Assembly held in 1978" (A/AC.206/21);

   (d) Working paper entitled "International machinery for disarmament and institutional aspects thereof", submitted by Italy (A/AC.206/22).
VII. DOCUMENTATION FOR THE SECOND SPECIAL SESSION OF
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

38. At its thirty-fourth, thirty-fifth, and thirty-sixth sessions, the General
Assembly requested the Secretary-General to transmit the following documents to its
second special session devoted to disarmament:

(a) Report of the Secretary-General entitled "Study on the implications of
establishing an international satellite monitoring agency" (A/AC.206/14)
(resolution 34/83 E);

(b) General Assembly resolution 35/147, entitled "Establishment of a
nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East" (resolution 36/87 A);

(c) General Assembly resolution 36/87 B, entitled "Establishment of a
nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East" (resolution 36/87 B);

(d) Report of the Secretary-General on the World Disarmament Campaign
(A/36/458) (resolution 36/92 C);

(e) Report of the Secretary-General entitled "Study on the relationship
between disarmament and development" (A/36/356 and Corr.1) (resolution 36/92 G);

(f) Report of the Secretary-General entitled "Programme of research and
studies on disarmament" (A/36/654) (resolution 36/92 L);

(g) Report of the Secretary-General entitled "Study of the institutional
arrangements relating to the process of disarmament" (A/36/392) (resolution
36/97 D);

(h) Report of the Secretary-General entitled "Confidence-building measures"
(A/36/474 and Corr.1) (resolution 36/97 F);

(i) Report of the Secretary-General entitled "Study on all the aspects of
regional disarmament" (A/35/416) (resolution 36/97 H);

(j) Report of the Secretary-General containing the views of Member States on
the study on all aspects of regional disarmament (A/36/343 and Add.1) (resolution
36/97 H);

(k) Report of the Secretary-General entitled "Study on the relationship
between disarmament and international security" (A/36/597) (resolution 36/97 L);

(l) Report of the Secretary-General entitled "Israeli nuclear armament"
(A/36/431) (resolution 36/98).

39. In addition to the report of the Preparatory Committee, the General Assembly
at its special session will have before it the following documents:

(a) Report of the Committee on Disarmament (Supplement No. 2 (A/S-12/2));

(b) Report of the Disarmament Commission (Supplement No. 3 (A/S-12/3));

(c) Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference
(Supplement No. 4 (A/S-12/4));
(d) Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean (Supplement No. 5 (A/S-12/5));

(e) Reports of the Secretary-General:

(i) Reduction of military budgets (A/S-12/7);

(ii) Assessment of the United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament since its inception in 1979 (A/S-12/8);

(iii) Protection of nature from the pernicious effects of the arms race (A/S-12/9);

(iv) Prevention of nuclear war (A/S-12/11);

(v) Enhancement of the effectiveness of machinery in the field of disarmament and strengthening of the role of the United Nations in this field, including the possible convening of a World Disarmament Conference (A/S-12/12);

(vi) Relationship between disarmament and development (A/S-12/13);

(vii) World Disarmament Campaign (A/S-12/14);

(viii) World-wide action for collecting signatures in support of measures to prevent nuclear war, to curb the arms race and for disarmament (A/S-12/13);

(ix) Relationship between disarmament and international security (A/S-12/16);

(x) Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia (A/S-12/17).
VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE IN 1982

40. At its fourth session, the Preparatory Committee decided to submit to the General Assembly at its special session the additional recommendations set forth in paragraphs 41 to 54 below.

A. General debate

41. At its 37th meeting, on 10 May 1982, the Committee decided to recommend that the General Assembly should hold, at its special session, a general debate in the plenary from the morning of 8 June to the afternoon of 23 June.

B. Allocation of items

42. At its 39th meeting, on 12 May, the Committee decided, regarding the allocation of items on the provisional agenda, to recommend that, while items 1 to 8 and 14 would be dealt with by the General Assembly in plenary meetings, the Assembly should allocate items 9 to 13 to the committee of the whole, which would be entrusted with the task of considering all the proposals submitted during the special session and reporting to the Assembly.

C. Statements by executive heads of organizations

43. At its 31st meeting, on 27 April, the Committee decided to recommend that the Director-General of UNESCO should be invited to address the General Assembly at a plenary meeting of the special session.

44. At the same meeting, the Committee decided to recommend that the Director-General of IAEA should be invited to address the General Assembly at a plenary meeting of the special session.

45. Also at the same meeting, the Committee recommended that the Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) should address the General Assembly at a plenary meeting to present the report of the Secretary-General on the protection of nature from the pernicious effects of the arms race (A/S-12/9).

46. At its 39th meeting, on 12 May, the Committee decided to recommend that the Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme should be invited to address the General Assembly at a plenary meeting of the special session.

D. Committee of the whole

47. At its 37th meeting, on 10 May, the Committee decided to recommend to the General Assembly that the committee of the whole (see para. 22 above) should have a 15-member bureau, consisting of a chairman, 13 vice-chairmen and a rapporteur.

48. At the same meeting, the Committee decided to recommend that the committee of the whole should begin its work on 8 June to elect its vice-chairmen and rapporteur.
49. At the 39th meeting, on 12 May, the Committee decided to recommend that, in the course of the meetings of the committee of the whole, an opportunity should be given to hear statements by the representative of the Inter-Parliamentary Union and the representative of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues.

50. At its 40th meeting, on 13 May, the Committee decided to recommend that the regional groups should consider renominating the present members of the bureau of the Preparatory Committee to serve in the bureau of the committee of the whole.

E. Working groups

51. At its 39th meeting, on 12 May, the Committee decided to recommend that in addition to the Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament (see para. 22 above), another working group should be established by the special session as early as possible on the review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, with the understanding that the committee of the whole would establish additional working groups as necessary.

F. Documents to be adopted by the General Assembly

52. At its 41st meeting, on 14 May, the Committee decided to recommend that the General Assembly at the second special session should adopt two documents, one containing the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament and a second encompassing all other items on its agenda.

G. World Disarmament Campaign

53. At its 41st meeting, on 14 May, the Committee recommended that the President of the special session of the General Assembly should launch the World Disarmament Campaign at the opening meeting of the session, following a formal decision to that effect. It also recommended that the President of the General Assembly should carry out the consultations he deemed appropriate in connexion with the best modalities of pledging contributions to the Campaign. At its 38th meeting, on 12 May, the Assistant Secretary-General of the Centre for Disarmament presented a tentative outline of some of the elements of a programme for the World Disarmament Campaign to the Preparatory Committee at its request. The Committee took note of the outline and recommended that the General Assembly should request the Secretary-General to submit a programme of the Campaign for consideration and adoption by the Assembly at the second special session.

H. Non-governmental organizations and peace and disarmament research institutions

54. At its 36th meeting, on 30 April, the Committee, bearing in mind the recommendations adopted at its third session (see para. 28 above), decided to recommend that four meetings of the committee of the whole should be allocated to hear oral statements from non-governmental organizations and peace and disarmament research institutions and that the days reserved for this purpose should be the mornings and afternoons of 24 and 25 June. It was also decided that the time
allotted to each speaker representing a non-governmental organization or peace and disarmament research institution should not exceed 10 minutes, in order to ensure that the committee of the whole would hear the statements of the 56 non-governmental organizations and 23 peace and disarmament research institutions listed in annexes III and IV. In this regard, the Committee took into consideration the recommendation of the Ad Hoc Liaison Group of the two NGO disarmament committees at Geneva and United Nations Headquarters.
ANNEX I

Composite paper on the review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the General Assembly at its tenth special session, the first special session devoted to disarmament

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The tenth special session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, was an event of historic significance. The entire international community of nations achieved, for the first time in the history of disarmament negotiations, a consensus on an international disarmament strategy, whose objective is the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. [This historic consensus was rooted in a common awareness of the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race. It was also based on the recognition that, in the contemporary world, security of States could be enhanced (only) through disarmament, that is to say, through a gradual but effective process beginning with a reduction in the current level of armaments] and that progress in disarmament would contribute significantly to the pursuit of the goals of economic and social development, particularly of developing countries.] The conviction that all peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament led to the United Nations being accorded a central role and primary responsibility in the field of disarmament.

2. This consensus, which is embodied in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (General Assembly resolution 5-10/2) sought to [reverse the process of political fragmentation of disarmament negotiations] [place disarmament negotiations in a unified perspective] and [has become a most significant and integral part of the context within which negotiations on disarmament] [constitutes the bases on which disarmament negotiations] must be pursued. The session aroused legitimate expectations among the people of the world that early and significant progress would be made towards achieving the goals and objectives agreed upon in the Final Document adopted at that session. [The convening of the first special session devoted to disarmament was a response to the growing public alarm over the increasing danger of nuclear war and a vital aspect of the international disarmament strategy adopted at the session was the role of the mobilizing of world public opinion for disarmament.]

3. In accordance with the provisions of the Final Document, the subsequent sessions of the General Assembly adopted a number of important resolutions aimed at [prevention of nuclear war, cessation of the arms race and an initiation of negotiations for these purposes] [advancing the objectives of disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament] [Subsequent to the first special session devoted to disarmament, efforts were undertaken by the international community to implement the decisions and recommendations of that session on a multilateral, bilateral and regional level, including action in the General Assembly and the Committee on Disarmament, and some progress was achieved on many of the specific measures contained in the Final Document.] [On 10 April 1981, the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects was opened for signature.]
Alternative paragraph

[In the past four years, tremendous and unswerving efforts have been made by many peace-loving small and medium-sized countries to safeguard international peace and security, and to achieve disarmament. But, unfortunately, the achievements were very few. There have been ever more frequent instances of use or threat of use of force against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States, military intervention, occupation, annexation and interference and the denial of the inalienable right to independence of people and nations under colonial and alien domination in flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations. The policies and actual deeds of the States with the largest military arsenals constitute the main obstacle to the progress of disarmament and the main threat to international peace and security.]

4. The second special session of the United Nations devoted to disarmament reaffirms the validity of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament, [which has a unique and irreplaceable value and possesses the highest authority because of the consensus achieved on it.] [The States Members of the United Nations solemnly declare their commitment to the principles and objectives set forth in this document, and renew their commitment to implement its provisions.] [The purpose of the conclusions of the present session, formulated on the basis of the Final Document of the first special session, is, without prejudice to the provisions of that document, to pursue their implementation. They also affirm their commitment to adhere strictly to the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, particularly the principle of non-use of force in international relations, and to resolve international conflicts and disputes through peaceful means and thereby to remove sources of tension all over the world.]

[5. Most regrettably, developments since 1978 have been in the opposite direction to these hopes and aspirations of mankind.] [Almost every objective, priority and principle endorsed by the Final Document has neither been faithfully [universally] respected nor observed.] [Despite repeated appeals by the General Assembly, negotiations on many priority items of disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament, have not been initiated. Moreover a number of important negotiations have been suspended and several important agreements have failed to come into force.] [Unfortunately, the cause of disarmament has become an important casualty of the present climate of international tension and confrontation. It must be noted with profound dismay that agreements so far concluded have not been ratified, that negotiations between the major nuclear-weapon states have, by and large, been suspended and that the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament, namely the Committee on Disarmament, has so far been prevented from effectively discharging its responsibilities especially on the items that were accorded the highest priority at the first special session.]

6. The Member States of the United Nations regret that [more] progress has not [yet] been achieved in the field of [arms control and] disarmament since the adoption of the Final Document of the first special session. [While the world-wide build-up of armaments has since continued, few concrete measures of disarmament have been agreed upon.]

[7. Despite the hopes engendered by the first special session, decisions have since been taken which are bound to lead to a further and even more dangerous spiral in the arms race, particularly in the nuclear armaments field. This is manifested, inter alia, in the considerable increase in military budgets and the development and deployment of new types of weapon systems, including in the nuclear]
field, especially by the States possessing the largest military arsenals. Global annual expenditures on armaments have increased since 1978 from [$US 300 billion to $US 600 billion] in 1981. This represents a growing and colossal waste of precious resources. Apart from the significant opportunity cost that they represent, these unproductive expenditures have contributed significantly to the current structural crisis in the economies of certain industrialized countries, including those of the major military Powers and immensely compounded the problems confronted by the developing countries in achieving economic and social development.

8. However, it is important not to simply deplore it but to examine the reasons for this lack of real progress and the remedies to be applied so that concrete progress may be speedily achieved.

9. The causes are many and varied. In addition to political and technical difficulties, which have for long hindered progress towards disarmament, there is a major negative factor, namely, the deterioration of the international situation. That situation has been marked by an increasing number of violations of Charter principles, invasions, military occupations and acts of interference in the internal affairs of countries, and by violations of human rights. All these violations create tensions in the world and threaten international security. Another reason for the slow progress is the extreme complexity of the problems which have to be solved in order to achieve the conclusion of disarmament agreements which are reliable and which respect the principle of undiminished security. [In the past four years, however, there have been ever more frequent instances of use or threat of use of force against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States, military intervention, occupation, annexation and interference and the denial of the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of peoples and nations under colonial and alien domination in flagrant violation of the Charter.] [There is also a direct causal link between the world-wide arms build-up and the existence of conflicts and disputes in various regions of the world.]

10. The international disarmament strategy elaborated at the first special session and the machinery set up for its implementation have proved sound and appropriate to the demands of the critical situation facing the world community. Yet this collective strategy has failed so far to find reflection in the policies and conduct of individual nation States, especially those possessing the largest arsenals. The major Powers continue to perceive their security in terms of their own narrow interests and concerns and those of their allies. On the other hand, the security interests of other States, specially non-aligned and neutral countries, have been further jeopardized. Nor is there sufficient recognition that disarmament relates to the very survival of mankind and not merely the security of a handful of States.

11. The rapid development of science and technology and the application of new scientific principles and technical advances to the field of armaments has continuously and relentlessly outpaced efforts to limit, reduce and eliminate armaments. And yet there has hardly been any effort to anticipate and forestall the development of new weapon systems. Negotiations on arms limitation and disarmament, whether bilateral, regional or multilateral, have been limited in scope, halting in character, interrupted in response to the vagaries of inter-State relations and thus entirely unable to cope with the dynamic range and complexity of the problem. Negotiations on arms limitation and disarmament should not themselves become “bargaining chips” in inter-State relations, nor should they be conducted on
the basis of positions of strength. The notion that the road to disarmament lies through the build-up of armaments and so-called "deterrence" must be firmly rejected. And while it is certainly true that the political environment has an impact on disarmament negotiations, a deterioration in the international situation, which could have severe consequences for peace and security, calls for an intensification of such negotiations rather than their slowing-down or suspension.}

[12. The demands of both survival and human well-being dictate that disarmament is the only path towards achieving genuine peace and security. It is high time to reaffirm that "enduring international peace and security cannot be built upon the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances nor be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority". Genuine and lasting peace can be created only through the strict observance of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and effective implementation of the security system provided therein as well as the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces, in particular nuclear armaments.]

[13. This basic and essential directive of the declaration in the Final Document of the first special session has been given insufficient consideration during the four years since the adoption of the Final Document. In consequence, the arms race has been escalating. For its effective cessation we have to look at the root causes. A main cause is the lack of alternative security to that of armaments, namely, effective, collective measures under the system of international security, as provided for in the Charter. The fact that such a system is not operative is due to the original failure of the Security Council to conclude the agreements for a United Nations force to be available to the Security Council for the due implementation of its decisions in conformity with the Charter. Only in this way can the United Nations carry out its central role in the disarmament process. An essential aspect of the Charter system of international security is the peaceful settlement of disputes within the provisions of Chapter VI. Outstanding disputes can thereby be settled on an equal footing. It is important, therefore, for the General Assembly at the special session to call on the Security Council to promote the Charter system of international security on an urgent basis, thereby essentially facilitating the peaceful settlement of disputes, so that the process of disarmament may become a reality.]

[14. The States Members of the United Nations express their confidence that disarmament is feasible and that practical steps should be taken in order to adopt measures aiming at the halting of the arms race and achieving disarmament, first of all nuclear disarmament.]

[15. The Member States strongly hope that the second special session will help to restore the trust which has been lost, to give a new impetus to disarmament efforts and to initiate a constructive and forward-looking dialogue.]

II. (PRINCIPLES) (AND PRIORITIES)

[16. In drawing up an international strategy for disarmament at the first special session devoted to disarmament, all States reaffirmed their commitment to the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and the strict observance of its principles. Likewise, the Final Document adopted at that session recognized the right of each State to security and the need to maintain undiminished security of States at a lower level of armaments. In the past four years, however, there have
been ever more frequent instances of use or threat of use of force against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States, military intervention, occupation, annexation and interference and the denial of the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of peoples and nations under colonial and alien domination in flagrant violation of the Charter. There have especially been instances of aggression and intimidation as well as political and economic coercion directed particularly against developing countries outside military alliances. There have also been violations of the principle of the inviolability of international frontiers and the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes has also not been observed. The prevailing threat to world peace and security arising from such acts of aggression, occupation, annexation and interference and the persistence and exacerbation of conflicts in various regions of the world are causes for continuing concern to the international community.

[17. The present deterioration in the international situation together with escalation in the arms race have combined to seriously aggravate the threat to the security of States, in particular the neutral, non-aligned and other developing non-nuclear-weapon States outside the two major military alliances. The security of all States has been jeopardized as a result of the growing threat of an outbreak of a nuclear war. Doctrines of nuclear deterrence are dangerous anomalies, and far from being responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, they lie at the root of the continuing escalation of the quantitative and qualitative development of nuclear armaments and lead to greater insecurity and instability in international relations. Moreover, such doctrines, which in the ultimate analysis are predicated upon the willingness to use nuclear weapons, cannot be the basis for preventing the outbreak of a nuclear war, a war which would have devastating consequences for the whole of mankind.]

[18. All peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations and a duty to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament. Unfortunately, the cause of disarmament has become an important casualty of the present climate of international tension and confrontation. It must be noted with profound dismay that agreements so far concluded have not been ratified, that negotiations between the major nuclear-weapon States have, by and large, been suspended and that the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament, namely the Committee on Disarmament, has so far been prevented from effectively discharging its responsibilities especially on the items that were accorded the highest priority at the first special session. In this situation, the central role and primary responsibility accorded to the United Nations in the field of disarmament by the General Assembly at the first special session assumes increased importance. The consensus reflected in the Final Document of that session provides the fundamental basis on which all States, in particular those possessing the largest military arsenals, should seek to promote their national security through the pursuit of the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.]

[19. No progress has been made in implementing the important principle recognized in the Final Document that, in the pursuit of disarmament, there must be an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations for nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. While the neutral, non-aligned and other developing non-nuclear-weapon States outside the two major military alliances remain committed not to manufacture and acquire nuclear weapons, there has been an upward spiral in the qualitative improvement and competitive accumulation of nuclear armaments by the nuclear-weapon States. The lack of progress in achieving nuclear disarmament,
the continued espousal of security doctrines that are predicated on the use of nuclear weapons and the imposition by certain supplier countries of unilateral and discriminatory restrictions on the flow of technology and equipment to developing countries for peaceful applications in the field of nuclear energy, are the most glaring examples of the failure to evolve an acceptable international consensus on the question of preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons both in its vertical and horizontal aspects.)

[20. In the Final Document of the first special session, the General Assembly clearly recognized that security of States must be conceived of not only in its military aspect but also in its economic and social aspects and that a close link exists between disarmament and development. Since 1978, however, the continued growth in military expenditures, especially by nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, has contributed to the deterioration in the international economic climate and adversely affected the economic development particularly of developing countries. At the same time, international developmental co-operation is being discouraged and drastically reduced and the basic developmental problems of developing countries are not the subject of international negotiations. This underlines the necessity of the pursuit of disarmament to be accompanied by concerted efforts for the establishment of the new international economic order.)

[21. The developments which have taken place since 1978 in the international situation prove that the ever-spiralling increase of the arms race, the continuous development and accumulation of new weapons have not brought to the world more stability and security, have not strengthened the security of any State. On the contrary, the continued and accelerated arms race, in particular in the nuclear field, has increased the threat of war, thus creating a serious danger for the very survival of mankind, for the peace and security of all States. The Member States reaffirm that genuine international security should be based not on the accumulation of armaments, but on ensuring a balance of forces at ever-lower levels, through gradual reductions of military forces and armaments, particularly of nuclear weapons.)

[22. Enduring international peace and security also requires the strict observance of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, in particular, respect for sovereignty and national independence, refraining from the threat or use of force, the peaceful settlement of disputes, non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States, the right of peoples to self-determination, to freely choose and develop their economic, social and political systems. International security and development of friendly relations and co-operation among States make imperative both the efforts towards disarmament and the elimination of policies of force and diktat in international relations, of consolidating and dividing zones of influence and domination.)

[23. Member States welcomed the clear and unequivocal statement in the study by the Group of Experts on the Relationship between Disarmament and International Security (A/36/597) that disarmament must proceed on the basis of undiminished, and indeed enhanced, security for all States. They also welcomed the reaffirmation of the principle that the interrelationship between disarmament and international security lies at the root of many of the problems concerning further progress in disarmament, and the consequent realization that major disarmament measures depend largely on improvements in international security.)
The assessment of the practical implementation of the principles set forth in the Final Document should deal in particular with the following principles:

(a) All the States Members of the United Nations reaffirm their adherence to the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and their obligation to abide strictly by the principles of the Charter in the process of elaboration and implementation of measures relating to arms limitation and disarmament, and, inter alia, to take into account the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

(b) Negotiations must be directed primarily towards limiting and halting the quantitative growth and qualitative improvement of arms, and in particular of weapons of mass destruction, and the development of new means of warfare, so that scientific and technological achievements may ultimately be used exclusively for peaceful ends. There is no type of weapons that could not be prohibited and abolished on a mutually agreed basis.

(c) All States are in duty bound to assist efforts in the disarmament field. This applies first and foremost to the nuclear-weapon States and other States of major military importance. The existing balance in the sphere of nuclear strength must remain undisturbed at all stages, with a constant lowering of nuclear strength levels.

(d) Side by side with the limitation and reduction of nuclear arms, reductions must be carried out in the field of conventional arms. States which possess the most important military arsenals bear a special responsibility in this process.

(e) The adoption of measures in the disarmament field must take place on a just and balanced basis so as to guarantee the right of every State to security and to ensure that no one State or group of States may acquire superiority over other States at any stage. At each stage the objective should be the non-impairment of security at the lowest possible level of arms and armed forces.

(f) The principle of equality and equal security must be strictly observed.

(g) The process of arms limitation and disarmament must be continuous.

(h) States must refrain from actions which might exercise a negative effect on efforts in the disarmament field and must adopt a constructive approach in the interests of achieving agreement.

III. PROGRAMME OF ACTION

25. In the section entitled "Programme of Action" in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (see General Assembly resolution 8-10/2, sect. III), specific measures of disarmament which were to be implemented over the next few years were enumerated. Among these measures, clear-cut priorities were established. These priorities were to be: nuclear weapons; other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons; conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects; and reduction of armed forces.
[26. In particular, in a situation where nuclear armaments and conventional armaments contribute to the balance that is necessary for the security of the States concerned, the negotiations should cover both types of armaments, so that that balance may be respected. Nothing should preclude States from conducting negotiations on all priority items concurrently.

127. Subsequently, in the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade (General Assembly resolution 35/46) the Committee on Disarmament was charged with the responsibility of submitting agreed texts, where possible, before the second special session devoted to disarmament on:

(a) a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty;

(b) a treaty on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction;

(c) a treaty on the prohibition of the development, production and use of radiological weapons;

(d) effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, taking into account all proposals and suggestions that have been made in this regard.

[Nuclear disarmament]

[28. The priority provisions devoted to nuclear disarmament in the Final Document reflect the concern of the international community about the dangers which such weapon systems represent.]

[29. The Committee on Disarmament placed the question of nuclear disarmament on its agenda from its very first session. It has not established any working group for negotiations on this question, but it has held substantive discussions on the subject.]

[30. In the Final Document, it was categorically stated that effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority in disarmament negotiations. General agreement was reached at the first special session regarding the need to promote the cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems, the cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and a comprehensive, phased programme for progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time. At that session, the General Assembly also called for the urgent conclusion of a treaty on a nuclear-test ban as a matter of priority. The conclusion of the SALT II Agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America was to be followed promptly by further strategic arms limitation negotiations between the two parties, leading to agreed significant reductions of and qualitative limitations on strategic arms.]

[31. Since 1978, there has been a dramatic increase in the size of nuclear-weapon arsenals deployed by the major nuclear-weapon States. In parallel with the further refinement and the qualitative development of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapon systems, credence has been given to the acceptability of so-called limited nuclear war and increasing reliance placed on dangerous doctrines of nuclear deterrence. As a consequence, the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war has become immediate.]
The very existence of nuclear weapons presents the greatest menace for the existence of mankind. It is therefore of paramount importance to take resolute measures in order to eliminate the danger of a nuclear war.}

Although the SALT II Agreement has not entered into force, the States welcomed the intention of the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to continue negotiations on an agreement providing not only for limitations but also for substantial reductions of strategic weapons.

They also welcomed the current negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States concerning intermediate-range nuclear weapons, which are being conducted in the framework of the negotiations on strategic nuclear weapons.

Success in these negotiations would make a fundamental contribution to enhancing peace and security and constitute an important step in the direction of nuclear disarmament and ultimately of establishing a world free of such weapons.

At its session in 1979, the Committee on Disarmament adopted as the first item on its agenda the question of a nuclear-test ban. Subsequently, at its 1980 and 1981 sessions, the Committee was unable to reach consensus on the establishment of a working group to deal with the question of the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The Committee received reports in 1979-1980 concerning the trilateral negotiations which were in progress between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States.

At its 1982 spring session the Committee established an ad hoc working group with a precise mandate. "Considering that discussion of specific issues in the first instance may facilitate progress toward negotiation of a nuclear-test ban", the Committee requested the ad hoc working group "to discuss and define, through substantive examination, issues relating to verification and compliance with a view to making further progress toward a nuclear-test ban."

The establishment of this working group, which was favourably received, will allow a thorough examination to be made of certain verification aspects in connexion with negotiations on the cessation of tests within the framework of an effective process of nuclear disarmament.

The testing of nuclear weapons has continued unabated since 1978. Since the conclusion of the first special session more than 200 nuclear-weapon tests have been conducted. This has happened even while restricted negotiations among the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States were under way. These negotiations were suspended in September 1980 without having been successfully concluded. At the same time, the Committee on Disarmament has been prevented from undertaking multilateral negotiations on a treaty on a nuclear-test ban as a result of the opposition of some nuclear-weapon States, which have endeavoured to overturn the priorities established for negotiations on nuclear disarmament, by relegating the nuclear-test ban as a long-term objective which must be dealt with as part and parcel of the whole range of nuclear issues. This is clearly contrary to both the letter and spirit of the Final Document.

Negotiations on the text of a multilateral treaty on a nuclear-test ban must commence without further delay in the Committee on Disarmament. Such a treaty should aim at the cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons in all environments
by all States for all time and include agreed measures of verification applied on a
universal and non-discriminatory basis. Any additional delay in the conclusion of
such a treaty would further erode the value of a nuclear-test ban as a measure to
halt the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and for the prevention of
nuclear proliferation.)

41. International arms control and disarmament agreements must include
international verification measures which give States parties to the agreement the
right and the possibility to participate in the verification process. As to the
question of verification of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, the seismic expert
group working under the auspices of the Committee on Disarmament is well under way
in developing an international system for the seismic monitoring of a comprehensive
test ban. Likewise it is possible to identify certain nuclear explosions by
analysing samples of airborne radioactivity. Such analyses are carried out at a
number of stations around the world. It would be a useful complement to other
verification methods to organize existing and future stations in an international
system for the detection of airborne radioactivity from nuclear explosions.

[42. Even though it was designed for the management of nuclear-weapon competition
rather than the limitation and reduction of strategic arms, the conclusion of the
SALT II Agreement gave rise to some optimism. However, SALT II has not been
ratified as yet and at present no negotiations on strategic armaments called for by
the Final Document are taking place in any forum. The Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and the United States of America should resume without delay further
strategic arms limitation negotiations leading to agreed significant reductions of
and qualitative limitations on strategic arms. This would constitute an important
step in the direction of nuclear disarmament and ultimately of the establishment of
a world free of such weapons.)

[43. Negotiations concerning nuclear weapons currently taking place are those
between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at
Geneva on intermediate nuclear forces. While these are to be welcomed,
negotiations should cover all categories of nuclear weapons, wherever they may be
deployed and not limited merely to intermediate nuclear forces in the European
theatre.)

[44. A particular effort should be made to start negotiations on tactical nuclear
weapons in Europe with the aim of initially reducing the existing manifestly
oversized arsenals and ultimately bringing about their elimination.)

[45. A deep concern is engendered by the situation in Europe, where huge arsenals
of armaments, both nuclear and conventional, are concentrated. The deployment and
development of new medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe is seriously aggravating
the danger of nuclear war and is heightening the tension existing in this region.
Such an evolution can only exacerbate the arms race and have a negative impact on
international peace and security. The negotiations started at Geneva between the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States are most welcome and
should lead to urgent concrete agreements on the cessation of deployment and
development of new nuclear weapons, on the withdrawal of the existing medium-range
nuclear missiles from Europe and on their complete destruction. The ultimate goal
should be the elimination of all nuclear weapons from this continent.]
[46. As the security of every European State is directly threatened by these nuclear weapons, it is in the vital interest of all European States to participate in an appropriate framework, thus bringing their contribution to a successful conclusion of these negotiations.]

[47. The very existence of nuclear weapons directly and fundamentally jeopardizes the security interest of all States, in particular non-nuclear-weapon States, and therefore negotiations on the limitation and reduction of such weapons should not be hostage to the state of relations between the major nuclear-weapon States and their allies. Non-nuclear-weapon States have a right to participate in multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament. However, the Committee on Disarmament has been prevented from effectively discharging its responsibility in the field of nuclear disarmament. The proposal of the Group of 21 for the setting-up of an ad hoc working group of the Committee on item 2 of its agenda for 1982 entitled "The cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament", has been opposed by some nuclear-weapon States. The Committee which is the single multilateral body for negotiations on disarmament, must not be reduced to a body for mere debate on nuclear issues.]

[48. At present, when there is an impasse in the negotiations between the major nuclear-weapon States and at a time when a climate of confrontation and suspicion characterizes their mutual relations, it is all the more necessary that the Committee on Disarmament should open substantive negotiations with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States on questions relating to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament in conformity with and to achieve the objectives specified in paragraph 50 of the Final Document. Bilateral and regional negotiations, especially with regard to specific areas where the concentration of nuclear armaments increases the danger of confrontation, are useful and should be intensified, but multilateral negotiations on questions of vital interest to nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States alike should be initiated without delay in the Committee on Disarmament, the only multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament.]

[49. It is recommended that the Committee on Disarmament should set up without further delay an ad hoc working group with a mandate to elaborate on paragraph 50 of the Final Document and to identify substantive issues for multilateral negotiations such as:

(a) The elaboration and clarification of the stages of nuclear disarmament envisaged in paragraph 50 of the Final Document, including identification of the responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States and the role of the non-nuclear-weapon States in the process of achieving nuclear disarmament;

(b) Clarification of the issues involved in prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, pending nuclear disarmament, and in the prevention of nuclear war;

(c) Clarification of the issues involved in eliminating reliance on doctrines of nuclear deterrence;

(d) Measures to ensure an effective discharge by the Committee on Disarmament of its role as the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament and in this context its relationship with negotiations relating to nuclear disarmament conducted in bilateral, regional and other restricted forums.]

[50. At its 113th meeting the Committee noted the commitments of the parties to the safeguards agreements, as well as the guarantees given by the non-nuclear-weapon States in the 1968 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and concluded, like the majority of States against nuclear weapons, that multilateral negotiations were the only approach leading to success.

[51. Since the 70th session of the Committee in March 1978 at the request of the 21 non-nuclear-weapon States an ad hoc working group was set up under the chairmanship of Mr. John F. Swift, who stated in his report:...]

[52. The demonstration of the futility of traditional arms races is critical to the success of negotiations on nuclear disarmament. The formula on the limitation of nuclear arsenals, which has so far succeeded in reducing the number of nuclear weapons may not be used as a model for non-nuclear-weapon States in their negotiations on nuclear disarmament for their own purposes.

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[55. All nuclear-weapon States should contribute to the reduction of nuclear weapons, including those that are not subject to the Non-Proliferation Treaty but possess nuclear weapons, in keeping with the aims of the Final Document of the Conference on Disarmament on the existence of a world free of nuclear weapons, and in the interests of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

[56. All States to which the Non-Proliferation Treaty is subject shall ensure that the parties to that Treaty undertake, as a condition of the non-nuclear-weapon States being permitted to exercise their right of self-defense, that the nuclear-weapon States will progressively reduce and eliminate their nuclear weapon arsenals.

[57. The safety and security of the United Nations and of all States, and the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States in particular, would be undermined if the nuclear-weapon States were not to weaponize their nuclear weapons. The non-nuclear-weapon States have a right to be assured of security in the nuclear field. The Security Council should neither succumb to the pressure of the nuclear-weapon States nor be a mere forum for the discussion of nuclear issues.]

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(d) Measures to ensure an effective discharge by the Committee on Disarmament of its role as the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament and in this context its relationship with negotiations relating to nuclear disarmament conducted in bilateral, regional and other restricted forums.]
[50. At its first special session devoted to disarmament, the General Assembly noted the declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States concerning security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States and urged them to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of such weapons.]

[51. Since the first special session, thorough discussions have taken place on this important question in a working group established by the Committee on Disarmament, whose mandate has been renewed annually since 1979.]

[52. The discussions have focused on the search for a common approach or a common formula suitable for incorporation in a binding legal instrument. They have not succeeded in overcoming the divergences of perception of certain nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States or the complexity of the issues involved. Intermediate solutions have been proposed but have not been found acceptable.]

[53. The Member States regret that the discussions in the Committee on negative security assurances have produced no results.]

[54. The Final Document had called upon all States and in particular nuclear-weapon States to consider various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, prevention of nuclear war and effective assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, three years of negotiations have produced no progress. The unilateral declarations of some nuclear-weapon States do not offer credible assurance to neutral, non-aligned and other developing non-nuclear-weapon States that they would not be threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons. These declarations are based on the doctrine of nuclear deterrence and contain conditions, limitations and exceptions which, taken together, have the effect of severely restricting such positive features as may be contained in them. These nuclear-weapon States appear to be more concerned about projecting their own narrow security perceptions in these negotiations rather than fulfilling their obligation to guarantee non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or the threat of use of the nuclear weapons.]

[55. All non-nuclear-weapon States should receive effective assurances from the nuclear-weapon States that they will never and under no circumstances become victims of the use or of the threat of use of nuclear weapons, or of the use of force in general.]

[56. Any further progress on this vital question demands that the nuclear-weapon States concerned should review their policies and present revised positions on the subject to the second special session, which fully take into account the position of the neutral, non-aligned and other developing non-nuclear-weapon States outside major military alliances. This would facilitate the task of elaborating an agreed international instrument on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.]

[57. The General Assembly, in several of its resolutions, has consistently reiterated that the use of nuclear weapons would constitute a crime against humanity and a violation of the Charter of the United Nations. In the present international circumstances, when the threat of a nuclear war has become immediate and the security of all States is jeopardized, it is all the more vital to have a
positive response from the nuclear-weapon States to the proposal of the non-aligned countries for the conclusion of an agreement on the complete prohibition of the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons, pending nuclear disarmament.

[58. The only existing measures for the prevention of the outbreak of nuclear war are limited agreements among some of the nuclear-weapon States to reduce the risk of a nuclear war which may take place by accident, miscalculation or failure of communication. However, several instances in the recent past involving the failure of the control and safeguard systems for nuclear weapons demonstrate the need for further urgent action in this area. As the technical and technological complexity of weapon systems increases, the risk of technical failure or human error would no doubt increase. In this regard, nuclear-weapon States are called upon to submit before the second special session, their views, suggestions and proposals for the prevention of nuclear war in response to General Assembly resolution 36/81 B of 9 December 1981, which was adopted by consensus.]

[59. The highest priority should be given to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race, by freezing the nuclear arsenals at the present levels and starting immediately negotiations for substantive reductions of the existing stocks, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination. The use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should be completely prohibited; measures should be taken to prevent the danger of a nuclear war by accident, lack of communication or miscalculation.]

[60. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is a matter of universal concern. States noted with satisfaction that the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, held at Geneva from 11 August to 7 September 1980, confirmed the full validity of the Treaty. It is, however, regrettable that the Conference did not reach consensus on a final document.]

[61. States recognized the important work of IAEA in applying the relevant provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and of the international treaties, conventions and agreements designed to achieve the same objectives.]

[62. They underlined the importance of further progress in strengthening the non-proliferation regime.]

[63. They recalled the provisions of the Final Document concerning the inalienable rights of all States to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and expressed the hope that the Conference to be held for that purpose in 1983 would achieve positive results.]

[64. The neutral, non-aligned and other developing non-nuclear-weapon States endorse the objective recognized in the Final Document of preventing the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. Since 1978, unfortunately, the nuclear-arms race has escalated at an ever-increasing pace and plans have been announced to add further to the already oversaturated arsenals of nuclear weapons. This is clearly contrary to the objective of progressively reducing and eventually eliminating nuclear weapons altogether, which is an integral aspect of the goal of nuclear non-proliferation.]

[65. In the Final Document, the paragraphs relevant to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and to the inalienable rights of all States to the benefits of the peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear technology, called upon the nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States to take further measures to develop an international basis, to increase access to technology. These resources for peaceful purposes in particular should be subjected to further measures. These measures may be called for at the Conference of 1983 which will meet in 1983.]

[66. An important conclusion of the Conference of 1983 will be to maintain nuclear non-proliferation.

(a) Disarmament

(b) States that seek access to technologies for peaceful purposes

(c) States that seek access to technology for peaceful purposes

(d) States that seek access to technologies for peaceful purposes

(e) States that seek access to technology for peaceful purposes]

[67. Since an additional conference is expected to give adequate attention to the risks of nuclear energy and nuclear technology, States that seek access to technology for peaceful purposes will be expected to discuss and agree on the terms and conditions for the transfer of such technologies.]

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international consensus of ways and means, on a universal and non-discriminatory basis, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Since 1978, non-nuclear-weapon States have faced increasingly restrictive barriers in gaining access to technology and material for peaceful applications of nuclear energy. These restrictions which have been imposed unilaterally by some of the supplier countries have had an adverse impact on the economic and social development, particularly of developing countries. Some developing countries have been subjected to external pressure and coercion designed to hamper their peaceful nuclear programmes. Indeed, the peaceful nuclear facilities of one developing country have been subjected to an unprovoked military attack. At the same time, further measures in order to develop an international consensus on this subject, as called for in the Final Document, have yet to be undertaken. It is hoped that the Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy which is scheduled to be held in 1983 will, among other issues, address this very important question.

[66. An international consensus of ways and means to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons must include the following elements:

(a) Measures for the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament;

(b) Measures to enable the full exercise of the inalienable rights of all States to apply and develop their programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development in conformity with their priorities, interests and needs;

(c) Measures to ensure unhindered access for all States to nuclear technology, including its latest achievements, equipment and materials for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, taking into account the particular needs of the developing countries;

(d) Respect for each country's choices and decisions in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy without jeopardizing their respective fuel cycle policies or international co-operation, reeements or contracts for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy;

(e) Agreed measures of verification applied on a universal and non-discriminatory basis.]

[67. Since the first special session, developments related to the possibility that additional States may have acquired or may be pursuing nuclear-weapon capability give added urgency to international non-proliferation efforts. At the same time, risks of proliferation are hampering international co-operation for the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Rather than adding to the security of any State, the achievement of nuclear-explosive capability by additional States may be expected to lead to regional and international destabilization and tension.]
[Nuclear-weapon-free zones]

[68. In accordance with the relevant provisions of the Final Document, non-nuclear-weapon States in several regions of the world have actively pursued proposals for the setting-up of nuclear-weapon-free zones as an important disarmament measure and the first such zone has already been in existence in Latin America for the past several years. With regard to the proposal to establish a Nuclear-Weapon-Free zone in the Middle East, a resolution was adopted by consensus at the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly (resolution 35/147). In Africa, where the growing threat of South Africa's nuclear capability continuously poses serious dangers to the security of that region as well as to international peace and security, the Security Council and indeed, all States have been called upon by the General Assembly to take effective measures to prevent the frustration of the objective of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa. a/ All States in the region of South Asia have expressed their determination to keep their countries free of nuclear weapons. No action should be taken by them which might deviate from that objective. In this context, the question of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia has been dealt with in several resolutions of the General Assembly, which is keeping the subject under consideration.]

[69. The setting-up of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world on the basis of principles set forth in the Final Document of the first special session should be pursued with greater vigour. In particular, efforts should be made through mutual consultations to remove any existing divergence and to harmonize views of the States concerned. The setting-up of such zones should also be encouraged in areas where nuclear weapons are deployed at present, so that the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons becomes a reality.]

[70. The Member States recalled the provisions of the Final Document relative to the principles and conditions for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace. They reviewed progress and prospects for establishing such zones and recognized that these questions should be kept under review.]

[71. The creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones or zones of peace in different parts of the continent, such as Northern Europe and the Balkans would have a positive effect on the relaxation of tension in Europe and would constitute an important contribution to disarmament in this region.]

[Zones of peace]

[72. The Final Document contained proposals for the establishment of zones of peace, inter alia, in the Indian Ocean and in South-East Asia. However, progress in the implementation of these proposals has been extremely slow. The Indian Ocean has become a region of growing build-up of great-Power military presence, and military activity in all forms and manifestations of the great Powers have intensified, leading to a marked deterioration in the climate of peace and security in the area. The area is witnessing a renewed search for new military and naval bases by outside Powers. This further underlines the need for an early convening

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a/ Adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its first ordinary session, held at Cairo from 17 to 21 July 1964 (Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes, agenda item 105, document A/5975).
of the Conference on the Indian Ocean. Regrettably, the Conference, originally scheduled for 1981, could not be held as a result of the negative attitude adopted by certain States and has now been rescheduled for 1983. It is recommended that a firm decision should be taken at the second special session on the convening of the Conference in the first half of 1983 and the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean can be enabled to complete its preparatory work before that date. In the meantime, concrete action should be taken urgently to ensure conditions of peace and security within the region, in particular with a view to the elimination of foreign military bases and foreign military presence in the region.

[73. The countries of South-East Asia have proposed the establishment of a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in their region. Steps should be taken by the States concerned to further elaborate this concept with a view to concluding an early agreement on its establishment.]

[Other weapons of mass destruction, chemical weapons (and biological weapons)]

[74. In the Final Document of the first special session, the General Assembly stated that the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction represents one of the most urgent tasks of multilateral negotiations. During the two years of its existence, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons of the Committee on Disarmament has made considerable progress in identifying some of the major draft elements which would be included in a future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. While certain important areas of convergence of views have been identified, divergences of views persist on certain key elements. However, the general optimism concerning the work of the Committee with respect to the prohibition of chemical weapons has been considerably marred by recent evidence that the world may be on the brink of a new and potentially alarming chemical weapons race. The political climate within which such negotiations are taking place has also been vitiated by the recent allegations concerning the use of chemical and biological weapons in certain regions of the world.]

[75. The Committee on Disarmament should commence work without further delay on the actual text of a chemical weapons convention. The basis for such a drafting exercise exists in the work on the draft elements that has already been undertaken.]

[76. There has been progress in one of the most urgent fields of disarmament, namely, the complete, effective and verifiable prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction. The United States-Soviet negotiations, begun in 1974, continued until 1980. Since 1980, an ad hoc working group of the Committee on Disarmament has been set up to define issues to be dealt with in the negotiation of a convention. In 1982, this group was endowed with a mandate to elaborate such a convention. Its discussions and negotiations were structured according to the agreed headings "scope", "verification" and "other matters". Common understanding has been reached on several points, and the process of resolving those differences of view which still exist has been continuing intensively. Although the scope of the convention has yet to be agreed upon, the main difficulty standing in the way of a speedy conclusion of these negotiations is the disagreement on the inclusion in the convention of provisions for effective and binding international verification measures. It is to be hoped that States will soon join in the emerging consensus on the régime necessary to create and maintain the requisite confidence that the
provisions of a future convention are being complied with by all parties. Such a regime is all the more important in the light of disturbing reports regarding the alleged use of chemical weapons in certain regions of the world.]

[77. The Committee on Disarmament undertook a periodic review of questions that could result from any development of new weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles. It was agreed that this review would be continued at regular intervals in order to identify cases in which appropriate measures should be taken to prevent the development of such weapons.]

[78. Further consideration of the question of the adequacy of the complaints procedure of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and Toxin Weapons and their Destruction (General Assembly resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex) desired. As reaffirmed by the General Assembly in resolution 2662 (XXV) of 7 December 1970, an effective mechanism should be based on a combination of national and international measures, which would complement and supplement each other to provide a system that would ensure the effective implementation of the convention. The depositary States of the Convention are invited to convene a special conference as soon as possible to establish a permanently available, objective and non-discriminatory verification and complaints procedure applicable to the Convention and the conference so convened is invited to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session on the results achieved.]

[Radiological weapons]

(79. In the Final Document, the General Assembly had also called for the conclusion of a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons. Negotiations on such a draft convention have taken place in the Committee on Disarmament since the middle of 1980. It has been recommended that radiological weapons should be defined in a manner which does not contain an exclusion clause with respect to nuclear weapons. The future convention must also contain an explicit commitment to the urgent pursuit of the goal of nuclear disarmament. It has been further recommended that the future convention should seek to strengthen international co-operation in the peaceful uses of radioactive material and sources of radiation and reaffirm the inalienable rights of all States to develop and apply their programmes for the peaceful uses of radioactive material and sources of radiation. The future convention should not be looked upon as merely of a preventive character. Since there exists a very real risk of mass destruction from the dissemination of radioactive substances through attacks on nuclear facilities, serious consideration should be given to the inclusion of a provision prohibiting attacks on nuclear facilities.]

[80. The Committee on Disarmament has engaged in negotiations on a convention on radiological weapons since 1980, basing itself, among other things, on a joint proposal by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States on major elements of a convention on radiological weapons. While it has not been possible to conclude negotiations in time for the second special session devoted to disarmament, progress has been made. There are now compromise formulations available for a number of pending issues. Among the problems still to be resolved are: the wording of an article defining radiological weapons; the precise formulation of an appropriately balanced article regulating peaceful uses of radioactive materials outside of the scope of prohibition, including a commitment by future States parties to promote such peaceful uses and to strengthen
international co-operation; the precise configuration of the verification régime to be set up; and the problem whether commitments by the nuclear-weapon States to urgently engage in nuclear disarmament should be referred to. The proposal has been made to incorporate in the convention on radiological weapons an undertaking not to attack, or to deliberately damage, nuclear facilities. Objections were expressed about the examination of this question in connexion with such a convention. However, it was agreed that consideration of relevant issues could take place in the working group as a separate item. Basic divergences appeared among the proponents of a ban on attacks of nuclear facilities as to the scope of facilities thus to be protected. This issue remains to be resolved.

[81. Progress towards conclusion of negotiations has been held up precisely because there is a reluctance on the part of certain States to consider various proposals put forward during the course of negotiations which are not included in the draft elements presented jointly by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In essence, the lack of progress on a radiological weapons convention can be traced to the reluctance on the part of certain members of the Committee on Disarmament to fully acknowledge and implement the principle of multilateral negotiations.

[New weapons of mass destruction]

[Other weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles]

[82. The Final Document recommended the adoption of effective measures to avoid the danger and prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and achievements. It called for efforts to be pursued aiming at the prohibition of such new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction, including specific agreements on particular types of new weapons of mass destruction which may be identified.

[83. Negotiations on concrete measures in this regard have yet to begin. Members of the Group of 21 in the Committee on Disarmament have approached this problem in a flexible manner and have shown a willingness to consider various alternative approaches. They have proceeded from the fact that the disarmament problem can be made manageable only if the application of scientific and technological achievements in the field of armaments is effectively prevented. Otherwise, disarmament negotiations, which are by their very nature slow and painstaking in character, cannot keep up with the rapid pace of scientific and technological developments in the field of armaments.

[84. In dealing with this problem, several alternative approaches are possible. The Committee on Disarmament could set up an ad hoc working group to explore in the first instance ways and means of dealing with this question. Delegations could be assisted by scientific and technical experts in carrying out this initial exercise. It is also possible to set up an ad hoc group of governmental experts under the aegis of the Committee to study all the aspects of this problem and recommend to the Committee specific ways of dealing with it. Consideration may also be given to the convening of a group of scientific and technical experts under the aegis of the United Nations to prepare a report on the subject and recommend specific courses of action. The General Assembly at its second special session could consider all these alternatives and recommend a mutually agreed approach to the problem of preventing the emergence of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction.]
[Conventional weapons and armed forces]

[Conventional disarmament]

[85. The General Assembly in the Final Document of the first special session recommended that, together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be resolutely pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament. It was also stated that States with the largest military arsenals had a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional armaments reduction. The achievement of a more stable situation in Europe at a lower level of military potential was given special emphasis. The Programme of Action contained in the Final Document also called for bilateral, regional and multilateral consultations and conferences, where appropriate conditions exist, with the participation of all the countries concerned for the consideration of different aspects of conventional disarmament. The Final Document also envisaged consultations among major arms suppliers and recipient countries on the limitation of all types of international transfer of conventional weapons.]

[86. Since 1978, there has been rapid accumulation of conventional armaments and their further qualitative development, especially by States possessing the largest military arsenals. It is these States which develop, produce, stockpile and sell by far the largest proportion of the world's conventional armaments. Europe, which is the region of the highest concentration of both nuclear and conventional weapons and armed forces continues to be the theatre of further and more rapid deployment of such weapons. While talks are still in progress at Vienna on the mutual balanced force reductions in Central Europe, no progress has been made towards the actual reduction of forces in this region.]

[87. With respect to conventional weapons, only one agreement has been reached so far since 1978. This was the conclusion in 1980 of a Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (see A/CONF.95/15 and Corr.2). While this agreement is of a limited character, it is nevertheless an important achievement in advancing the humanitarian cause.]

[88. Simultaneously with the negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, the limitation and progressive reduction of armed forces and of conventional weapons should be resolutely pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament. In particular, in a situation where nuclear armaments and conventional armaments contribute to the balance that is necessary for the security of the States concerned, the negotiations should cover both types of armaments, so that that balance may be respected.]

[89. The importance of conventional disarmament must be emphasized. Conventional weapons, which have been the only weapons used in all conflicts since the end of the Second World War, absorb the preponderant share of military expenditures. For these reasons and in view of the priority which the Final Document accords to conventional disarmament, the limitation and progressive reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be resolutely pursued in the context of progress towards general and complete disarmament.]
[90. The United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, held in 1979 and 1980, reached agreement on a Convention and three Protocols relating to the use of three categories of conventional weaponry: non-detectable fragments; mines, booby traps and other devices; and incendiary weapons.]

[91. Limited though it was, this agreement constitutes important progress, particularly from the point of view of international humanitarian law, but also to some extent as a contribution to arms control and disarmament. All States should proceed rapidly to ratify and accede to the Convention, which deals with particularly inhumane weapons. Continued action in this field should be undertaken in order to further limit or prohibit the use of such weapons as may be deemed to be indiscriminate and excessively injurious.]

[92. The adoption on 10 October 1980 by the Conference of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, together with three annexed Protocols, is welcomed.]

[93. These results represent an important development of humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts. This successful outcome of long and difficult negotiations represents a considerable encouragement for the continuing efforts to implement the Final Document of the first special session.]

[94. These international instruments should enter into force as soon as possible and be scrupulously observed.]

[95. Consideration of the question of establishing adequate machinery for investigating any violations of the Convention should be pursued. Such machinery would greatly contribute to strict and effective observance of the provisions.]

[96. The following negotiations have been continued since 1978:

(a) Negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions, which are aimed at establishing a more stable situation in Europe at a progressively lower level of military forces in central Europe while ensuring an approximate equality and parity and the maintenance of the undiminished security of all the States concerned, have not advanced significantly. In particular, the parties to these negotiations have not yet been able to agree on a number of key questions, such as the real determination of the Warsaw Pact forces in the reduction zone and the related verification measures.

(b) In Europe, the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, held at Helsinki, b, although not containing provisions on arms control and disarmament, provides for the implementation of confidence-building measures.

(c) Attempts made in recent years to develop new measures of this type in Europe have not succeeded because of the deterioration in the international situation, characterized in particular by violations of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference.]
(d) Member States hope that, when the work of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe resumes next November, progress can be made towards a balanced result including, in particular, a clear and unambiguous mandate to convene a conference on disarmament in Europe which, at the outset, would seek agreement on binding and verifiable confidence-building and security measures of military significance, covering the entire European continent from the Atlantic to the Ural.

[97. Measures for conventional disarmament should be based on the principle that States with the largest military arsenals have a special responsibility in this regard. In the initial phase of conventional disarmament, the States with the largest conventional arsenals together with other militarily significant States should undertake a balanced reduction in the level of their conventional armaments and armed forces. During this phase, steps should also be taken to achieve significant reductions in the conventional armaments and armed forces deployed by the two opposing military alliances in Europe through the ongoing negotiations in Vienna or at an appropriate European conference on security, disarmament and confidence-building measures. The process of conventional disarmament would also require the progressive withdrawal of military forces from foreign territories and the dismantling of foreign military bases. In parallel with the reductions carried out in conventional weapons and armed forces, there should be an agreed proportionate reduction by the States concerned of the production of conventional armaments. Consideration may also be given to the negotiation of a multilateral agreement for the cessation of the qualitative development of all types and systems of conventional weapons.]

[98. The States with the largest conventional arsenals shall first substantially reduce their conventional weapons and equipments. When significant progress has been made in this regard, the other militarily significant States shall join them in reducing conventional armaments according to reasonable ratios.]

[99. The problem of the limitation of international transfers of conventional weapons has not yet been solved satisfactorily. It would be appropriate to hold thorough exchanges of views in order to examine this question in depth and develop the necessary practical measures. In this respect, favourable consideration should be given to any initiative coming from the States concerned - both supplying States and acquiring States - and looking at the problem first in a regional context, which would permit progress in this direction without, however, jeopardizing the right of each State to determine quite independently ways and means of assuring its own security. It would be desirable for the General Assembly at the second special session to give particular attention to any proposal aimed at implementing paragraph 85 of the Final Document of the first special session.]

[100. The international trade in armaments constitutes a fraction of the total production of conventional weapons. Most of the trade in armaments takes place between members of the two major alliance systems and should be restrained through their bilateral and regional negotiations. The flow of armaments to developing countries is still a small proportion of the world trade in armaments and is directly related to the existence of conflicts and disputes in various regions of the world. Most developing countries do not possess the capacity to produce armaments and are thus dependent on the purchase of weapons to acquire the means for self-defence. The consideration of the question of international transfer of conventional weapons must take this fully into account.]
[101. The General Assembly has adopted resolutions concerning the carrying out of a United Nations study on conventional disarmament. The group of experts will shortly begin its work on this very important study which should help to clarify issues on conventional disarmament and make a major contribution to the achievement of practical results.]

[Military utilization of the sea-bed]

[102. The question of the military utilization of the sea-bed should be considered, and appropriate recommendations for the convening of the second Review Conference of the Parties to the Sea-Bed Treaty should be formulated. The major military powers are the most advanced in ocean technology and therefore have a special responsibility to contribute to a review of such technological developments as affect the operation of the Treaty. Such a survey would provide background for an evaluation whether developments of new technologies already present, or might be expected to present, increased risks for an arms race on the sea-bed, be it nuclear or conventional. In consultation with States parties to the Treaty, the Committee on Disarmament should consider examining relevant technological developments with the assistance of experts.]

[Outer space]

[103. Among other important measures identified in the Programme of Action contained in the Final Document of the first special session, further measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space deserve special attention. Since 1978, rapid development of science and technology has brought closer the danger of the extension of the arms race into outer space. Research and development on weapons that may be based in space, as also on anti-satellite weapon systems, have created the possibility that outer space will become the new arena for military confrontation among the major powers. The item has been inscribed on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament for its current session and initial consideration has begun in informal meetings. The non-aligned and neutral countries represented in the Committee on Disarmament favour a comprehensive approach to this problem in keeping with the recommendation in the Final Document. This implies that all types of weapons must be covered (the prohibition as also all types of activities relating to the development, production, stockpiling, deployment and use of any kind of weapons in outer space.]

[104. Further steps to prevent an arms race in outer space should be without prejudice to the right of all States to pursue peaceful research and exploration of outer space. The exploration of outer space has an important bearing on the economic and social development of all States, including developing countries. Negotiations on this subject should, therefore, not only take this important factor into account but should also provide for international co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space.]

[105. It is recommended that in the light of its existing priorities, the Committee on Disarmament should set up an ad hoc working group to undertake multilateral negotiations on this subject. Pending the conclusion of an agreement, all States, in particular those possessing advanced space technology, should refrain from actions that may complicate negotiations.]
[108. In the Final Document of the first special session, the General Assembly stated that gradual reduction of military budgets on a mutually agreed basis, for example, in absolute figures or in terms of percentage points, particularly by nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, would be a measure that would contribute to the curbing of the arms race and would increase the possibilities of reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries. The Final Document also contained a recommendation that the General Assembly should continue to consider what concrete steps should be taken to facilitate the reduction of military budgets, bearing in mind the relevant proposals and documents of the United Nations on this question.]

[109. Since 1978, according to reliable sources, the world's total military expenditures have shown a steady increase and have now reached an estimated value of about $US 600 billion, representing a heavy burden for the economies of all nations and having extremely harmful effects on international peace and security. This colossal waste of resources is in dramatic contrast to the situation of

poverty and hunger that is diverting urgently needed resources from the people of other countries.]

[110. The United Nations' emphasis on disarmament and non-proliferation since 1980 has led to further reductions in military expenditures and concluded this document.

[111. The United Nations, since 1980, has been actively contributing to the reduction of military budgets.

[112. The United Nations should resume its role as a forum for reducing military expenditures, with the objective of preventing the arms race and facilitating the reduction of military budgets to a mutually agreed level, for example, by

[113. In this context, it is necessary to emphasize the importance of international cooperation and coordination in the field of disarmament.

[114. Bearing in mind that the United Nations has been working on the disarmament

[115. Disarmament and non-proliferation are key issues in international relations and are fundamental to peace and security.

[116. There is an urgent need for the United Nations to take a stronger role in the disarmament process, ensuring that the goals of peace and security are achieved.]

[Pressing and reduction of military budgets]

[106. It was with satisfaction that Member States took note of the decision of the Committee on Disarmament to include in its agenda, in accordance with the request by the General Assembly, the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The task of the Committee on Disarmament is to institute, as a matter of urgency, the negotiation of effective and verifiable agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space, focusing primarily on the prohibition of anti-satellite systems. Such systems, which are the only ones currently deployed, because of their destabilizing effects pose a particularly grave threat to international peace and security.]

[107. The peaceful uses of outer space are already, 25 years after the start of the space age, manifold, and bring great benefits in areas such as communications, navigation, meteorology, remote sensing of the earth and others. Simultaneously, however, military applications for the same or other purposes have assumed increasing importance. In fact, the vast majority of satellites launched in the last two decades have had a military mission. Satellites are increasingly becoming integral parts of the total terrestrial, naval and aerial warfare capability of the space Powers. On one hand, these satellites enhance their military capability, but, on the other, they also make them more dependent on space-based systems for a variety of purposes and more suspicious about the space potential and intentions of the adversary. This may lead to a wasteful and futile arms race in outer space, which could easily become unmanageable. Effective measures should be taken urgently to prevent an arms race in outer space. All Member States, in particular those with major space capabilities, should actively contribute to the goal of preventing an arms race in outer space and to refrain from any action contrary to that aim. The leading space Powers should be invited to resume their bilateral talks on the matter with a view to concluding appropriate agreements. The international community and the space Powers themselves should make a determined effort to forestall a development in this field through the conclusion of one or more agreements with a view to further limiting the military use of outer space and banning anti-satellite (ASAT) and anti-ballistic-missile (ABM) warfare. Multilateral negotiations, within the Committee on Disarmament or other appropriate forums, should complement such bilateral action through the conclusion of corresponding international agreements.]
poverty and underdevelopment in which two thirds of the world's population live and is diverting to military purposes important material and human resources which are urgently needed for development in all countries, particularly in the developing countries.]

[110. The military expenditures are detrimental to the establishment of a new international economic order based on justice, equity and co-operation. Consequently, resources released as a result of the reduction of military budgets and of disarmament measures should be used so as to promote the well-being of all peoples and improve the economic conditions of the developing countries.]

[111. The Disarmament Commission has examined the reduction of military budgets since 1980 and has started the consideration of the principles which should govern further action of States in the field of freezing and reduction of military expenditures, keeping in mind the possibility of embodying such principles into a suitable document at an appropriate stage.]

[112. The States emphasize the importance which they attach to ways of ensuring the transparency of military expenditures, especially with a view to the negotiation and conclusion of verifiable agreements aimed at the reduction of military budgets. In this context, it is particularly important that the common reporting instrument developed in the United Nations framework and designed to enhance comparability should be completed universally, as requested in successive General Assembly resolutions.]

[Confidence-building measures]

[113. In the Final Document, the General Assembly stressed throughout that disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they were being observed by all parties. Effective international control is a prerequisite without which general and complete disarmament cannot be achieved.]

[114. Bearing in mind the principles spelt out in the Final Document, particularly in paragraphs 31, 91 and 92, disarmament and arms control negotiations carried on since 1978, especially in the Committee on Disarmament, have placed a major emphasis on the elaboration of international verification regimes and the gradual development and refinement of verification techniques. Substantial progress has been achieved by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, and a great number of working papers on the issues relating to a ban on chemical weapons, reflecting considerable research, have shed light on the problems to be solved in that regard.]

[115. Disarmament negotiations since 1978 have clearly confirmed that effective verification is of paramount importance for progress in disarmament and arms control and for the maintenance of the undiminished security of States.]

[116. There is no value in any arms control and disarmament agreement which cannot be adequately verified so as to give all parties confidence in the compliance of the others. In negotiating such agreements, a combination of several methods of verification as well as other compliance procedures should be employed, including on-site inspection.]
The international community may, moreover, be called upon to exercise its own responsibilities in so far as the verification of compliance with disarmament and arms control agreements is concerned. In this regard, mention should be made of the proposal to establish a satellite monitoring agency, which has been the subject of a study prepared by a group of experts and submitted as a document of the second special session (A/AC.206/14).

It was stated in the Final Document that, in order to facilitate the process of disarmament, it was necessary to take measures and pursue policies to strengthen international peace and security and to build confidence among States. Commitment to confidence-building measures could significantly contribute to preparing for further progress in disarmament.

The implementation of the confidence-building measures agreed upon in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe has continued since 1978. Efforts have been made to further develop and extend binding, militarily significant and verifiable confidence-building measures in Europe. It is to be regretted that, since 1978, the international situation has deteriorated and that confidence among States has consequently been undermined. This development has, however, made the elaboration of principles for and the application of confidence-building measures more urgent.

A comprehensive study on confidence-building measures has been prepared by the Secretary-General (A/36/474 and Corr.1). The study, which the General Assembly took note of in its resolution 36/97 F, adopted by consensus, underlined that the principal goal of confidence-building measures is to contribute to reducing or eliminating the underlying causes of mistrust, fear, tensions and hostilities. Foremost among these causes is a mutual misperception resulting from a lack of reliable information on the military potentials and the political objectives of other States. Elements of fear and speculation must therefore be reduced in order progressively to achieve a more accurate and more reliable reciprocal assessment of both the capabilities and the perceptions determining security relations between States.

It is to be hoped that the second special session devoted to disarmament will provide a new impetus to universally implement existing confidence-building measures and elaborate and apply new ones.

Confidence-building measures play a very significant role in promoting and achieving disarmament. They contribute to overcoming fear, apprehension and mistrust between States and create and improve conditions conducive to negotiations on measures of disarmament.

Therefore, all States are invited to consider, at the special session the possible introduction of confidence-building measures in their regions and where possible to negotiate on them in keeping with the particular conditions and requirements prevailing in their respective regions.

In the Final Document, the General Assembly encouraged the quest for agreements or other measures on a regional basis aimed at strengthening peace and security at lower force levels.
[125. As security factors, and consequently disarmament conditions, are associated in many cases with regional conditions, the regional approach has been recognized as one able to offer real and encouraging possibilities. It was the subject of a study in the context of work conducted by the United Nations (A/35/416); the study was approved by consensus by General Assembly resolution 36/97 H, and should serve as a basis for a more exhaustive consideration of these possibilities.]

[126. The close relationship between disarmament and development was strongly stressed in the Final Document and, as a consequence, examined in an as detailed and as complete as possible way in a study conducted by a group of experts under the auspices of the Secretary-General (A/36/356 and Corr.1). While there are some controversial elements, the study contains a number of important points and conclusions. They deserve to be further considered and, as appropriate, acted upon in view of the huge interest that the question of the release of resources for economical and social development generates in all countries, particularly developing countries.]

[127. States underlined the importance which they attach both to the free and unrestricted access of peoples of all States to differing positions and opinions in the field of disarmament and their right freely to express their views on the subject.]

[World public opinion and disarmament]

[128. The Governments of Member States are willing to encourage any initiative capable of providing public opinion with impartial and objective information free from any spirit of propaganda. The United Nations Centre for Disarmament could make a positive contribution in the context of an appropriate and carefully studied mandate.]

[129. The Member States at the special session welcome the movements for peace and disarmament throughout the world. These movements reflect the increase of the consciousness of peoples towards the grave danger posed by the existence of the nuclear weapons, of their high responsibility for the fate of international peace and security.]

[130. The peoples, public opinion, should have an essential role in promoting and intensifying the efforts aimed at halting and reversing the arms race, particularly the nuclear-arms race, and at achieving the objective of disarmament.]

[131. A significant contribution is made in this field by scientists and their organizations.]

[132. It is of great importance that the views of the scientists and their organizations should be duly taken into account by Governments, by the United Nations and all other disarmament forums.]

[133. In accordance with the provisions of the Final Document, specific measures aimed at mobilizing world public opinion were adopted by governmental and non-governmental organs, the United Nations and its specialized agencies. Among such measures, the week devoted to fostering the objectives of disarmament has become an important instrument for linking the efforts of the United Nations with the struggle of world public opinion for peace and disarmament (see para. 102 of the Final Document).]
[134. It is important to show the disastrous consequences for mankind to which a
nuclear war would lead. To that end, an authoritative international committee
should be set up which would demonstrate the necessity of averting a nuclear
catastrophe. The holding of a world disarmament campaign, the collection of
signatures in support of measures for the prevention of nuclear war, the limitation
of the arms race and disarmament, and the implementation of the principles of the Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace (General Assembly
resolution 33/73) would also be of great significance in this respect. All
Governments should take steps to prohibit war propaganda in any form.]

[135. The collection of signatures in support of measures for the prevention of nuclear war, the limitation of the arms race and for disarmament (see General Assembly resolution 36/92 J) could become a part and one of the concrete dimensions of a world disarmament campaign. An expression of the will of peoples in the form of the collection of signatures would give the world campaign greater impact, would permit the involvement of broad masses of people in various countries in the fight
for the limitation of the arms race and for disarmament.]

[136. For the success of this action it would be advisable to work out the text of
a short appeal which could be prepared on the basis of the United Nations documents already adopted concerning the problem of the prevention of nuclear war, the
limitation of the arms race and disarmament. Such an appeal, when adopted at the
second special session, could be recommended for distribution in the countries
Members of the United Nations and the collection of signatures under the text of
such an appeal could be carried out.]

[137. The specialized information effort undertaken in the framework of the United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament is of the greatest importance to
the training of specialists on behalf of Member States, in particular developing
countries, and must be resolutely continued.]

IV. [MACHINERY]

[138. In the Final Document of the first special session, the General Assembly
underlined the central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in the
sphere of Disarmament. The First Committee of the General Assembly and the
Disarmament Commission, in which all members of the United Nations are represented, became the main deliberative organs for disarmament matters. The Committee on Disarmament with a relatively small membership became the sole multilateral
negotiating body in the field of disarmament, with its own rules of procedure and
the participation for the first time of all nuclear-weapon States.]

[139. The review of the membership and working methods of the negotiating body that has been meeting since 1962 as well as other institutional arrangements
accomplished during the first special session constitute a turning point in the
history of institutional framework devoted to disarmament. The participation by
five nuclear-weapon States in the single multilateral negotiating body was a big
step forward. Moreover, detailed dispositions contained in paragraph 120 of the
Final Document laid down the necessary organizational and procedural elements for
furthering disarmament efforts. However, the experience so far gained demonstrates
a clear need for giving a new impetus through further improvements.]
[140. A fair assessment based on this experience, of the effectiveness resulting from the framework established by the Final Document is by now timely and necessary and will help in devising and adopting a future course of action.]

[141. The First Committee of the General Assembly has been performing the role of reviewing progress in arms limitation and disarmament efforts. It continues to provide a forum where the entire membership of the United Nations is able to exchange views and make recommendations on a whole range of disarmament issues. Similarly, the Disarmament Commission has played a useful role in the discussion and definition of various issues in the field of disarmament. In 1979, it formulated the draft elements of a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament to be elaborated by the Committee on Disarmament. It also formulated the various goals to be pursued within the Second Disarmament Decade.]

[142. The growing number of resolutions and decisions adopted by the deliberative bodies reflects the entire international community's collective awareness of and growing involvement in the situation with respect to international security and disarmament. The recommendations of these bodies reflect the growing awareness and alarm arising from the continued arms race, specially in its nuclear aspect, and the sense of urgency attached by the international community to efforts for progress in disarmament. These documents also reflect the vast increase in the membership of the United Nations since its inception and also the growing range and complexity of disarmament and security-related issues.]

[143. Efforts should continue to be made to improve the functioning of the deliberative organs, which play a key role in disarmament affairs. Efforts should also be made to avoid a multiplicity of United Nations resolutions, including through the more effective application of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly and through greater harmonization of views among member delegations. There could be a more efficient use of the time available to the deliberative bodies, particularly through greater opportunities for consultations among delegations and groups of delegations and through avoidance of extended general debates.]

[144. The increasing number of resolutions adopted each year should not overshadow the very fact that the working methods and procedures of the First Committee need to be improved substantially.]

[145. Draft resolutions should be submitted early enough to allow sufficient time for reflection and negotiation between submission and voting and every attempt should be made to devote more time for the negotiation of the wording of draft resolutions. The time allocated to general debate should be fully utilized.]

[146. The Bureau of the First Committee or a special ad hoc group formed by the Chairman should attempt to harmonize similar drafts on the same subject and repetitive initiatives should be limited to the minimum.]

[147. The First Committee should continue to deal only with issues of disarmament and related international security questions.]

[148. It is necessary for States, especially those which have the primary responsibility for disarmament, to respect the central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and to
scrupulously observe and implement the solemn resolutions and decisions adopted by the United Nations. This would enhance the credibility and authority of the deliberative organs, which represent the entire membership of the United Nations.

[149. Although consensus on all important and substantive issues is to be welcomed, the pursuit of consensus should not become a pretext for inaction or a means to dilute, or worse, to overturn the principles, objectives and priorities in the field of disarmament, which have long been accepted and endorsed by the international community. In order to safeguard and promote the interest of all States and thereby the cause of international peace and security, the rules of procedure of the General Assembly ought to be used in the most efficient manner possible.]

[150. There should be an organic link between the First Committee and the Disarmament Commission. The Commission should focus on a very limited number of items on which eventual consensus following a detailed examination may reasonably be expected by virtue of deliberations conducted in the First Committee.]

[151. The Disarmament Commission should, through the clearer definition and elaboration of measures of disarmament, play a more active role in preparing the ground for the subsequent negotiation of concrete agreements. It could, for example, carry out in-depth consideration of the reports of the various study groups set up under the aegis of the United Nations in order to identify areas for future negotiations. It could play a valuable role in the review and appraisal of the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, particularly in the interval between review conferences. This could include the further elaboration of measures of disarmament belonging to the later stages of the Programme. The Disarmament Commission could also assist the General Assembly in making its own assessment of the progress in the implementation of the Programme.]

[152. The Committee on Disarmament has, since its inception in 1979, been engaged in intense activity and with respect to negotiations on some items on its agenda, modest results have been achieved. The Committee has been unable to discharge its mandate for the conduct of multilateral negotiations on items of the highest priority on its agenda, although ad hoc working groups have been set up to undertake structured negotiations on other specific items. This has been due to the fact that some major Powers have proved unwilling to entrust the Committee on Disarmament with the task of multilateral negotiations and are reluctant to bring to the Committee concrete proposals and initiatives, particularly with respect to issues relating to nuclear weapons. Even where the principle of multilateral negotiations has been reluctantly accepted, for example, with respect to chemical weapons, attempts have been made to restrict the Committee's work within narrow limits and sufficient information regarding restricted negotiations conducted outside the Committee has not been made available so as to contribute to the success of multilateral negotiations.]

[153. In order to function more effectively and produce concrete results, the Committee on Disarmament must function as a negotiating body and not as a forum for debate. The negotiating potentialities of such a forum have yet to be fully explored. This requires, first and foremost, the unqualified acceptance of the Committee's responsibility and mandate by the major Powers and their allies.]
[154. The role and the responsibility of the Committee on Disarmament as the single multilateral negotiationg body should be reaffirmed and the need for increasing its effectiveness by appropriate organizational arrangements should be fulfilled. In this context, the first review of the membership of the Committee will be completed during the second special session (see General Assembly resolution 36/97 J). Interested States should be permitted to become full members on the basis of criteria set forth in paragraph 28 of the Final Document. (The possible modalities of this review are to be elaborated subsequently.)]

[155. Positive developments, such as the establishment of special working groups and the practice of creating ad hoc informal contact groups on specific topics, should be complemented by standing organizational measures, which will avoid the loss of valuable time each year for procedural matters. The plenary meetings should focus on specific topics dealt with by the working groups and debates having a general character should be left as a prerogative of the deliberative bodies.]

[156. The great interest demonstrated by several non-members in the work of the Committee should be appreciated. All efforts should be exerted to promote more effective participation by non-members in the work of the Committee, in particular through their contribution to negotiations which are conducted in the subsidiary bodies of the Committee. The rules of procedure should facilitate the participation of any State Member of the United Nations which expresses an interest in the work of the Committee.]

[157. At the second special session, the performance of the disarmament machinery set up at the first special session will be reviewed. The failure to achieve results cannot be ascribed to any structural shortcomings in this machinery but rather to the failure on the part of certain States to display the requisite political will and commitment to the principles, priorities and Program of Action set forth in the Final Document of the first special session.]

[158. The United Nations Centre for Disarmament has provided valuable support to activities in the field of disarmament as envisaged at the first special session. It has helped members of the United Nations by providing information on disarmament, supporting research and studies on various aspects of disarmament and providing the necessary secretarial services whenever required. The dramatic increase in activities related to disarmament, however, has not been matched by an increase in the limited resources available to the United Nations Centre for Disarmament. Therefore, its further strengthening and status should properly reflect the central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in the field of disarmament.]

[159. In spite of the wide-ranging difficulties and the limited means available to it, the United Nations Disarmament Centre has been successful during the last four years in accomplishing the additional tasks entrusted to it at the first special session.]

[160. To discharge the further additional responsibilities during the period to follow the second special session, this organ should be strengthened substantially.]
[161. First, its present status within the United Nations Secretariat should be upgraded. Secondly, its staff as well as its financial means should be increased. Thirdly, the Centre should be enabled to act as the main monitoring unit responsible for the co-ordination of all other United Nations institutions with an interest in matters of disarmament.]

[162. The performance of the Advisory Board on disarmament studies needs to be assessed on the basis of a cost/benefit analysis and its role should be precisely defined. In this context and in order to ensure better co-ordination and avoid duplication, the Board may serve as a "Governing Council" of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR).]

[163. The relationship between the United Nations Centre for Disarmament and UNIDIR should be defined, taking into account the enhanced status of the Centre as the monitoring and co-ordinating unit in the field of disarmament.]

[164. The establishment of a United Nations Disarmament Agency is recommended in principle and the Secretary-General is requested to work out a concrete proposal on the practical implementation, organization, staffing, etc. of such an agency, bearing in mind, inter alia, that the agency should have sufficient resources, that it should have an independent position within the United Nations system, that it should have a governing body elected by the General Assembly and adequate regular funding to be able to undertake the work requested by Member States, and that it should report directly to the Assembly.]

[165. As part of the efforts to promote public awareness and expertise in the field of disarmament, the United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament was established at the first special session. The programme has become one of the more concrete results of that session. It has already introduced to the complex issues of disarmament 59 fellows from Member States. Judging from the progressively increasing number of applicants from Member States for the programme, the view already expressed by several delegates as far back as 1980 that the number of fellows be increased should be given serious consideration.]

[166. The Final Document of the first special session reaffirmed the "central role and primary responsibility" of the United Nations in the field of disarmament.]

[167. The institutional machinery set up on that occasion was designed to enable the United Nations to fully discharge this role.]

[168. The Disarmament Commission, a deliberative and subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, has made an important contribution to the disarmament efforts by defining the elements of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament and preparing the draft text of the Declaration on the Second Disarmament Decade. The role of this organ could be strengthened if it undertakes a detailed examination of the major disarmament problems, primarily on the basis of the studies undertaken at the request of the General Assembly and conducted under the auspices of the United Nations. It could also be entrusted with the task of assessing, on a regular basis, the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.]

[169. The Committee on Disarmament has accomplished considerable work of high quality. If the results of the negotiations which have been held since 1978 seem limited, the institution or its methods are not to be blamed.]
[170. The membership of the Committee must be examined during the second special session. An increase in the number of its members could be envisaged on that occasion within limits compatible with demands deriving from the responsibilities of the Committee, the only multilateral negotiating body on disarmament.]
non-aligned and neutral countries, have been further jeopardized. Nor is there sufficient recognition that disarmament relates to the very survival of mankind and not merely the security of a handful of States.

[178. The rapid development of science and technology and the application of new scientific principles and technical advances to the field of armaments has continuously and relentlessly outpaced efforts to limit, reduce and eliminate armaments. And yet there has hardly been any effort to anticipate and forestall the development of new weapon-systems. Negotiations on arms limitation and disarmament, whether bilateral, regional or multilateral, have been limited in scope, halting in character, interrupted in response to the vagaries of inter-State relations and thus entirely unable to cope with the dynamic range and complexity of the problem. Negotiations on arms limitation and disarmament should not themselves become "bargaining chips" in inter-State relations, nor should they be conducted on the basis of positions of "strength. The notion that the road to disarmament lies through the build-up of armaments and so-called "deterrence" must be firmly rejected. And while it is certainly true that the political environment has an impact on disarmament negotiations, a deterioration in the international situation, which could have severe consequences for peace and security, calls for an intensification of such negotiations rather than their slowing-down or suspension.

[179. All armed intervention and aggression should be stopped and occupation troops be withdrawn from abroad, so as to create an atmosphere of confidence, which is needed for the progress of disarmament.

[180. The continuing arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect, and the growing danger of a nuclear war underlines the need for urgent progress being made in the field of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament. The experience of recent years has confirmed that disarmament is too vital a task to be left exclusively to the major nuclear-weapon States and the alliances headed by them. It is in this context that it has now become necessary that multilateral negotiations on all issues relating to disarmament should be the rule rather than the exception. The experience with such negotiations, to the extent that they have been permitted, has confirmed the validity and viability of the multilateral principle. It is also through such negotiations that agreements can be concluded that would attract universal adherence and be truly nondiscriminatory in character. Restricted negotiations in bilateral or regional forums should contribute to the success of multilateral negotiations rather than be a pretext for preventing them. It must be recognized that disarmament can be pursued successfully only within the larger context of safeguarding global peace and security rather than within the narrow confines of great-Power rivalry and confrontation. It is only through multilateral negotiation that such a larger context can be kept in focus.

[181. There exists a close link between disarmament and development. The pursuit of economic and social development cannot be sustained in parallel with the arms race. As the United Nations study on the relationship between disarmament and development points out, either continue to pursue the arms race with characteristic vigour or move consciously and with deliberate speed towards a more stable and balanced social and economic development within a more sustainable international economic and political order. It cannot do both." (A/36/356 and Corr.)]
[182. The nine recommendations contained in paragraph 426 of the study should represent guidelines for the short-term and long-term work of Member States and the United Nations in the field of disarmament and development.]

[183. Action should be taken by the General Assembly, as an effective follow-up to the recommendations contained in the study, in particular:

(a) To establish fuller and more systematic information on the military use of human and material resources, on the economic and social costs of military expenditures, and on the benefits, particularly for developing countries, that would be derived from disarmament;

(b) To include the matter of conversion from military to civilian production in the agenda of the General Assembly every three or four years, starting with the fortieth session in 1985. In preparation for the Assembly’s deliberation, the Centre for Disarmament/UNIDIR should be given the task of exploring methods for the collection, reporting and dissemination of information on experiences in conversion;

(c) To bring about a more thorough and effective integration of the disarmament/development perspective in the activities of the United Nations system and its incorporation in the working programme of the United Nations specialized agencies and organs;

(d) To carry out studies on possible institutional arrangements for the transfer of resources, freed through disarmament, to social and economic development in developing countries in the light of the capabilities of existing international institutions for transfer of financial resources for development.]

[184. The time has come to implement the international strategy for disarmament adopted at the first special session without further delay. Partial, limited and regional measures for arms limitation and disarmament should be pursued within the over-all context of achieving general and complete disarmament under effective international control otherwise it would be difficult to maintain a proper interrelationship among the various measures, taking into account agreed principles, priorities and objectives. It is for this reason that the adoption of a self-contained Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament at the second special session assumes special importance. Apart from including concrete and specific measures to be implemented over clearly defined stages, the Programme should have an indicative time-frame for its completion. It should also incorporate a credible commitment on the part of States to implement the Programme. Without these essential features, the Programme would fail to serve as an agreed framework within which the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control would be pursued.]

[Recommendations]

[185. The present international situation, which is marked by growing confrontation and tension in inter-State relations, particularly among the major nuclear-weapon States and their allies, and the dangerous escalation in the arms race, underlines the need for a renewed and unequivocal reaffirmation by all States of the solemn commitments they collectively assumed at the first special session. This should be the first order of business at the second special session. At the same time, States Members of the United Nations should unequivocally reaffirm their
commitment to the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, in particular the principle of non-use of force. The session should also be an occasion for States Members of the United Nations to reaffirm their resolve to settle conflicts through peaceful means and remove sources of tension all over the globe.

[186. The second special session should focus attention on the growing threat of a nuclear war and adopt urgent measures for the prevention of nuclear war. In this regard, there are several proposals that could be considered at the session, for example:

(a) A complete prohibition on the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

(b) A joint or individual declaration by the nuclear-weapon States not to be the first to use nuclear weapons;

(c) The immediate convening of the Security Council to consider practical and urgent steps to avert the danger of nuclear war, especially through improvements in communications and reducing the risk of war through accident or miscalculation.

This is an illustrative list only and is without prejudice to the positions of delegations and their priorities. It is hoped that other proposals will be put forward in this regard at the second special session in particular by the nuclear-weapon States themselves.

[187. The second special session should mark the initiation of new negotiations and the intensification of ongoing negotiations on urgent measures of disarmament, in bilateral, regional and multilateral forums. Pending the conclusion of concrete agreements, the General Assembly, at the second special session, may consider adoption, inter alia, of the following possible immediate measures, which would not only serve to halt the dangerous spiral in armaments, particularly nuclear armaments, but also lead to a building-up of mutual confidence and trust among States and thereby set the stage for concrete measures of reduction and elimination of armaments:

[(a) All States to declare their commitment to refrain from the testing of nuclear weapons pending the conclusion of a treaty on a nuclear-test ban. The States with the largest nuclear arsenals which have conducted the most nuclear tests should stop their nuclear tests immediately.]

[(b) A complete freeze on the development, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery together with a cut-off in the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. This would be followed by the application of universal and non-discriminatory safeguards on all nuclear facilities of all States.]

[(c) The States with the largest nuclear arsenals should stop their nuclear-arms race, cease all activities aimed at improving the quality and increasing the quantity of their nuclear weapons and begin to reduce and destroy their nuclear weapons by stages. After they have substantially reduced their nuclear arsenals, the other nuclear-weapon States should join them in reducing and destroying nuclear weapons.]
[d) A joint declaration or individual declarations by nuclear-weapon States that they would neither use nor threaten to use nuclear weapons against members of the non-aligned movement, neutral countries and other non-nuclear-weapon States outside the two major military alliances.]

[(e) An immediate suspension in the development, production and deployment of new chemical weapons pending the conclusion of a chemical-weapons ban.]

[(f) Adoption of a declaration by all States declaring outer space "a common heritage of mankind" to be used for peaceful purposes only.]

[(g) Adoption of a decision to hold a conference on the Indian Ocean for establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean region, at Colombo, not later than the first half of 1983.]

[(h) A recommendation that the Disarmament Commission should finalize the elaboration of these principles and that other efforts should be continued in order to facilitate progress towards the conclusion of agreements on freezing and reducing military expenditures, containing adequate measures of verification, satisfactory to all parties.]

[(i) An appeal to all States, in particular the most heavily armed States, pending the conclusion of agreements on the reduction of military expenditures, to freeze their military expenditures at the level of 1982 and to start in the following years substantial reductions and to reallocate the funds thus saved to economic and social development, particularly for developing countries.]

[(j) The initiation of a World Disarmament Campaign. In view of the absence of any significant results in the sphere of disarmament because the lack of political will of those States that have the primary responsibility for disarmament, the mobilization of world public opinion for disarmament has assumed decisive importance. At the second special session, the Secretariat should submit to the Assembly a draft programme of the pertinent activities, to be carried out in all regions of the world in a balanced, factual and objective manner, paying particular attention to certain groups and professions - such as non-governmental organizations, parliamentarians, religious leaders, physicians, educators, journalists, media representatives and public relations experts - which, as pointed out by the United Nations experts, exercise special influence and multiplier effects in society. In order to provide sufficient resources for the World Disarmament Campaign, a pledging conference should be convened during the first part of the second special session. Current military expenditures are roughly estimated at US$ 600,000 million. Consequently, were each Member of the United Nations to pledge an average of one dollar for every $10,000 of their military expenditures, the pledging conference would produce an initial fund for the Campaign of $60 million. If the pledge average were only one dollar for each $100,000 the fund thus constituted would nevertheless reach the not negligible total of $6 million.]

[188. Studies on certain important aspects of the arms race could also be initiated at the second special session. An illustrative list of topics to be covered could be the following:

(a) A study on new weapons of mass destruction and systems of such weapons.

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(b) A study on the consequences of nuclear war on non-nuclear-weapon States outside the two major military alliances. While the effects of a nuclear exchange on Europe and on the two major nuclear-weapon States have been studied in terms of direct or indirect radioactive contamination, social and economic consequences through a rupture of communications, transport, trade and economic linkages remain vague and uncertain.

(c) A study on military research and development and its impact on the arms race, with particular regard to the consideration of concrete measures for the prevention of the further use of science and technology for military purposes.

(d) A study on the setting-up of zones of peace.

(e) The principles and guidelines for conventional disarmament which are contained in the Final Document need to be translated into a practical programme of action for achieving conventional disarmament. This may be done either in the study on the conventional arms race which is being undertaken under the aegis of the United Nations or in a separate study.

(189) The naval arms race has attracted relatively little attention in disarmament negotiations and only a few measures have been agreed upon since the Second World War. At the same time, new technologies for naval warfare are being developed. Among measures that could, inter alia, be studied are:

(a) Establishment of sanctuaries for submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) submarines;

(b) Application of confidence-building measures within agreed sea areas;

(c) Limitation of surface-ship forces, amphibious forces and special military transportation vessels;

(d) Multilateralization of the bilateral Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (A/9293, annex I).

(190) These recommendations relate only to certain urgent measures which may be considered for adoption at the second special session. They are not an end in themselves, but need to be considered as part and parcel of an entire programme of action designed to achieve progress towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Decisions on these measures would supplement and contribute to the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament which would be adopted at the session. At the same time appropriate means of strengthening the Secretariat in view of the central role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament should be considered.

(191) Finally, a decision should be taken at the second special session on the holding, in June 1987, of a third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which would, among other things, review the implementation of the measures included in the first stage of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.
1. The Informal Working Group was established to help prepare for the consideration of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, it being understood that the examination of outstanding issues should not in any way interfere with the results of the work of the Committee on Disarmament as reflected in the draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament that the Committee has agreed to submit to the General Assembly at the special session.

2. The Informal Working Group had a useful exchange of views that benefited greatly from the contributions of many delegations that had not participated in the work of the Committee on Disarmament on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. The following conclusions emerged from the discussions of the Informal Working Group:

(a) The elaboration of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, as called for in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, is one of the central tasks of the second special session, and of efforts towards disarmament generally.

(b) In consequence, it is necessary that no effort should be spared to reach agreement on the text of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament at the special session.

(c) Among the outstanding substantive issues, there are three main problem areas:

(i) Questions relating to measures;

(ii) Time-frames;

(iii) Nature of the Programme.

The successful outcome of the negotiations on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will greatly depend on the resolution of these problems.

(d) The Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament to be established at the special session should begin its work at the earliest possible time in order to discharge its responsibility of presenting an agreed text for adoption by the General Assembly.

3. Despite the persistence of divergent views, efforts should be made to harmonize the different positions during the special session of the General Assembly.

ANNEX VI

Commentary on the Informal Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament

1. The Informal Working Group was established to help prepare for the consideration of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, it being understood that the examination of outstanding issues should not in any way interfere with the results of the work of the Committee on Disarmament as reflected in the draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament that the Committee has agreed to submit to the General Assembly at the special session.

2. The Informal Working Group had a useful exchange of views that benefited greatly from the contributions of many delegations that had not participated in the work of the Committee on Disarmament on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. The following conclusions emerged from the discussions of the Informal Working Group:

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ANNEX III

Non-governmental organizations

1. Action Reconciliation
2. Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization
3. All African Students Union
4. Asian Buddhist Conference for Peace
5. Baha'i International Community
6. Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
7. Christian Peace Conference
8. Commission of the Churches on International Affairs of the World Council of Churches
9. Continental Organization of Latin American Students
10. Friends of the Earth
11. Friends World Committee for Consultation
12. General Union of Arab Students
13. Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation/Nagasaki Atomic Casualty Council
14. Inter-Church Peace Council
15. International Association for Religious Freedom
16. International Association for the Work of Dr. Albert Schweitzer
17. International Association of Democratic Lawyers
18. International Committee for European Security and Co-operation
19. International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
20. International Co-operative Alliance
21. International Fellowship of Reconciliation
22. International Organization of Journalists
23. International Peace Bureau
24. International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War
25. International Union of Students
26. International Youth and Student Movement for the United Nations
27. National Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign
28. Pacific Concerns Resource Center
29. Parliamentarians for World Order
30. Pax Christi International
31. Project Ploughshares
32. Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
33. Russian Orthodox Church
34. Soviet Peace Fund/Soviet Liaison Committee of Peace Forces
35. SSD II National Liaison Committee for Nuclear and General Disarmament
36. Swedish Peoples Parliament for Disarmament
37. Union of Arab Jurists
38. United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America
39. War Resisters International
40. Women for Peace
41. Women's International Democratic Federation
42. Women's International League for Peace and Freedom
43. World Association of World Federalists
44. World Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Profession
45. World Conference on Religion and Peace
46. World Federation of Democratic Youth
47. World Federation of Scientific Workers
48. World Federation of Teachers' Unions
49. World Federation of Trade Unions
50. World Federation of United Nations Associations
51. World Jewish Congress
52. World Muslim Congress
53. World Peace Council
54. World Union of Catholic Women's Organizations
55. World Veterans Federation
56. Yugoslav League for Peace, Independence and Equality of Peoples
ANNEX IV

Peace and disarmament research institutions

1. Center for Conflict Studies
2. Center for Defense Information
3. Council for Arms Control
4. Foundation for the Study of National Defense/French Institute of Polemology
5. French Institute of International Relations
6. Gandhi Peace Foundation
7. Heritage Foundation
8. Hungarian Institute of International Relations
9. Institute for Peace Research
10. Institute for Peace Science
11. Institute for Strategic Studies
12. Institute of Defense Studies and Analyses
13. Institute of World Economy and International Relations
14. International Institute for Peace
15. International Peace Academy
16. International Peace Research Association
17. Israel Institute for the Study of International Affairs
18. Nigerian Institute of International Affairs
19. Peace Research Institute
20. Romanian National Committee of Scientists for Peace
21. Stanley Foundation
22. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
23. Tampere Peace Research Institute
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