SPECIAL REPORT
OF THE
CONFERENCE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

Volume II

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
OFFICIAL RECORDS: TENTH SPECIAL SESSION
SUPPLEMENT No. 2 (A/S-10/2)

UNITED NATIONS

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OF THE
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UNITED NATIONS
New York, 1978
NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament decided that its special report should be divided into two volumes as follows:

Volume I - Establishment, work and achievements (1962-1978), State of questions under consideration by CCD

Volume II - Positions of Member States and questions under consideration

Annex I, containing working papers and proposals of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, and annex II, containing a list of documents issued during the period from 1962 to 1978, will appear as an addendum to the present document (A/S-10/2/Add.1).
## INTRODUCTION

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   - (b) Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
   - (c) Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and on the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof
   - (d) Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction
   - (e) Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques

#### B. Concrete results of the Committee's work: agreements and significant expert reports achieved by the Committee or with its active participation

1. II. STATE OF QUESTIONS UNDER CONSIDERATION BY THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

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### Volume II

#### POSITIONS OF MEMBER STATES AND QUESTIONS UNDER CONSIDERATION

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POSITIONS OF MEMBER STATES ON QUESTIONS UNDER CONSIDERATION

98. This part of the report contains the substance of the positions of the member States of the Committee on the various questions under consideration. Under each heading, the positions taken by members prior to the 1978 spring session of the Committee, but which the members themselves desired to have incorporated in this report, 1/ are set forth. These positions are followed by views expressed by members during the 1978 spring session, held from 31 January to 11 May 1978.

99. All documents submitted to the Committee relating to the various questions in this report are listed by subject in annex B to the report.

A. Question of nuclear disarmament, including a comprehensive nuclear-test ban

1. General

100. On 8 April 1969, the delegation of the United States of America made a rather comprehensive proposal on a cut-off of the production of nuclear fissionable materials for weapon purposes and then suggested the essential elements of a cut-off agreement (ENDC/PV.401). After some interval of time, on 11 August 1977, the delegation of Japan took up the matter again emphasizing the importance of such a measure with regard to reducing the degree of inequality inherent in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons between the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States and thus encouraging more States to adhere to that Treaty (CCD/PV.761).

101. Romania has stressed the view that any genuine disarmament effort must start with an examination of the motive factor of the present arms race in nuclear weapons, since the accumulation and continuous technological refinement of such sapons lie at the root of the insecurity existing in the world today. The delegation has also stressed that it would continue to urge that problems of nuclear disarmament should be placed at the centre of the Committee's activities. In that respect, the delegation has presented its proposals and priorities on which the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should concentrate its work, as follows: (a) a solemn pledge by States possessing nuclear weapons not to use them or threaten to use them against States not possessing such weapons; (b) a ban on the deployment of further nuclear weapons in the territory of other States; (c) the withdrawal of nuclear arms from the territory of other States; (d) an end to the refinement,
testing and production of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery; (e) a halt to the production of the fissionable material for military uses, the use of existing materials for peaceful purposes and the transfer of a proportion of them for use by all States under arrangements for broad international co-operation; and (f) the reduction and complete destruction of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and existing means of delivering them (CCD/PV.731 and 768).

102. Over the years, the delegation of Mexico has stressed the threat posed by the vast nuclear arsenals of the two major nuclear-weapon States and the alarm aroused by their constant quantitative and, above all, qualitative development. With particular regard to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), the delegation has recalled the General Assembly resolutions regretting the absence of positive results from the talks during the past years and urging the United States and the Soviet Union to broaden the scope of their talks, and has stressed that it was important for the Committee to be kept informed of the progress of the talks and hoped that those two States could act accordingly (CCD/PV.688). In 1977, the delegation of Mexico stressed the encouraging effects that unequivocal statements of Mr. Carter, President of the United States of America, calling for the elimination of all nuclear weapons, as well as certain pronouncements of Mr. L. I. Brezhnev, General-Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which were similar to the former in some respects, might have for disarmament negotiations. It also mentioned the words of President López Portillo of Mexico, who in his inaugural address had called for an end to all genocidal weapons which threatened the survival of mankind. More specifically, it stressed the necessity that the Committee concentrate its 1977 endeavours on the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban agreement (CCD/PV.728).

103. The delegation of Yugoslavia has often noted that the arms race continues unchecked in all fields: on the ground, on the sea, on the oceans as well as in the air and in outer space, and that this applies equally to both nuclear and conventional weapons. It has stressed that particular attention is being paid today to research and development in the field of armaments. Expressing concern at such development, the delegation has expressed the hope that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament would be able to make definite progress towards the preparation of international agreements on some long-standing questions in that field which have been on its agenda for many years (CCD/PV.742). The delegation of Yugoslavia has also pointed out that development in the application of nuclear energy for military purposes, like the advancement of military technology as a whole, had by far outpaced the tempo of negotiation of the Committee on measures relating to arms limitation and disarmament and that old unsettled problems are compounded by new ones, even more complex and dangerous from the standpoint of maintaining international peace and security (CCD/PV.757).

104. The delegation of the United Kingdom has stressed the pressing need to end the nuclear arms race and to begin to reduce such arms as a first step towards their abolition in the framework of a comprehensive disarmament programme, noting that three of the nuclear Powers had assumed that obligation under article VI of the non-proliferation treaty (ibid.).
105. In India's view, the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, as established by the United Nations General Assembly in its resolution 1378 (XIV) of 20 November 1959, should be the main guiding principle in all disarmament efforts. Lasting world peace could only be achieved by total disarmament with the highest priority given to nuclear disarmament, including the elimination of all nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. India was of the firm opinion that stockpiles of all nuclear weapons must be reduced and eventually eliminated so as to arrest the danger of the proliferation of such weapons. Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, an important measure to promote an atmosphere of peace and security could be the outlawing of the use or threat of nuclear weapons for all time to come. The General Assembly of the United Nations by its resolution 1693 (XVI) of 24 November 1961 had declared that the use of nuclear weapons is contrary to the rules of international law and to the laws of humanity and that any State using nuclear weapons was to be considered as committing a crime against mankind and civilization. India was of the view that that declaration should be reaffirmed at the special session and made applicable also to the threats to use such weapons. No distinction should be made as regards the intended victims of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, for these weapons and the systems of their delivery are intercontinental in nature and would not make any distinction as to whether a particular region has been declared a nuclear-weapon-free zone or not. India would even propose a ban on the very possession of nuclear weapons, the most cruel and indiscriminate weapons in existence. In discussing nuclear disarmament, the delegation noted, it was said that nuclear weapons are necessary as a deterrent against war and that only the assurance of their existence constitutes the core of deterrence. India did not accept that view. India was of the view that the doctrine of mutual deterrence is fraught with extremely dangerous consequences. While conferring legitimacy on the possession and even the use of nuclear weapons, it had shown that levels of deterrence do not deter but in fact provoke the arms race to higher levels. A basic principle on which India insisted in disarmament negotiations was that all measures should be non-discriminatory with regard to the constraints and obligations assumed by parties to them. India would assess any future measures by the same yardstick of fair and equal access for all States without discrimination and equal obligations for all.

106. With regard to the Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone, the delegation of Mexico submitted, in 1977, a letter concerning the tenth anniversary of the opening for signature of the Treaty of Tlatelolco (CCD/525) and referred to the scope and significance of the Treaty (CCD/PV.728). The delegation of the United States, recalling that the United States had ratified Additional Protocol II of the Tlatelolco Treaty in 1971, called attention to the recent announcement of President Carter that the United States would sign and seek ratification of Protocol II of the Tlatelolco Treaty in 1971, called attention to the recent announcement of President Carter that the United States would sign and seek ratification of Protocol I of the Treaty providing for the application of the Treaty to the territories in Latin America of countries located outside the area. The delegation stated that the effect of United States adherence to Protocol I would be to ban the testing, use, storage, or deployment of nuclear weapons in United States territories in Latin America; however, it would not affect the right of United States naval vessels to call at ports in those territories or affect freedom of navigation on the high seas surrounding Latin America. The delegation
also stressed the desire of the United States to contribute towards bringing the Latin American nuclear-free zone fully into effect throughout the world and to averting the dangers of nuclear proliferation (CCD/PV.745). The delegation of Mexico welcomed the announcement of the United States and called on France, the only country concerned by Protocol I that had not acceded to it, to make the Protocol complete. It recalled that the 1967 interpretation of the Preparatory Commission for the denuclearization of Latin America concerning the absence in the Treaty of provisions relating to the question of the transit of nuclear weapons through Latin American territory. The delegation of Mexico also called on the Soviet Union to accede to Additional Protocol II of the Treaty, by which nuclear-weapon States agreed to respect the objectives of the Treaty. At the first meeting of the summer session of 1977, the delegation referred to the importance it attached to the signature by the President of the United States, on 26 May, of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty (CCD/PV.745 and 750). On 27 April 1978, the delegation of Mexico welcomed the Soviet Union’s announcement of 25 April that it would adhere to Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco (CCD/PV.785).

107. On the same subject, the delegation of Romania, recalling that in its resolution 31/70 of 10 December 1976 the General Assembly commended the attention of Governments, international organizations and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to the question of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones and requested them to examine the question further and to take steps to promote the attainment of this important goal, requested that the problem should be kept on the Committee’s agenda as a means of encouraging the efforts of States to create such zones. In that connexion, Romania reaffirmed its interest in establishing new relations of co-operation and neighbourliness between the countries of the Balkans, so that that area, like any other area in Europe and on other continents, might be transformed into a zone of peace and peaceful co-operation (CCD/PV.731).

108. In 1977, the delegation of Poland stated that the Committee on Disarmament must also be constantly alive to the concerns of the international community which manifest themselves through a desire to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world. One must not lose from the range of vision the constant desirability of safeguarding additional areas and environments from falling victim to the nuclear arms race. The delegation trusted that the forthcoming Review Conference of the Treaty on the Denuclearization of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, apart from its immediate preoccupations, will constitute an important stimulus to our search for new possibilities in that regard (CCD/PV.735). With respect to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the delegation of Poland stated in 1977 that while most crucial, the question of a comprehensive test ban was not the only angle to the larger issue of nuclear disarmament. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament would be well advised not to ignore or underestimate such problems as the ever present threat to the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The delegation stated that it must not be forgotten that the landmark achievement, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is still not universal and that a number of States with significant military and economic potential are not parties to it. Poland attaches the utmost importance to the agreements concluded between the major exporters of nuclear materials and installations. The delegation viewed them as legitimate ancillary efforts at the consolidation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (CCD/PV.735).

109. With reference to nuclear-weapon-free zones and the proposed peace zone of the Indian Ocean, the delegation of Japan maintained that a concrete and realistic way to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States of their security was to explore a solution based on the prevailing political and military conditions in each region (CCD/PV.761).
110. The delegation of Pakistan, while noting that the primary responsibility for disarmament lay with the nuclear-weapon States, held that the non-nuclear-weapon States must lend strong impetus to the disarmament process by their own collective and regional initiatives (CCD/PV.748). The delegation noted that the General Assembly had responded to the wishes of a majority of States in various regions by adopting resolutions urging the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, notably in South Asia, the Middle East and Africa. It held that non-nuclear-weapon States must take initiatives towards regional security against the nuclear threat from within or without their regions by establishing such zones and that, instead of retarding progress by setting conditions, the nuclear-weapon States should take an active part in their establishment (CCD/PV.765). The delegation of Pakistan stressed the belief that a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia would be in the common interest of all countries of the region and that the international community should continue to encourage all such regional initiatives (CCD/PV.748).

111. On the question of nuclear non-proliferation, the delegation of Japan, in 1977, made a comprehensive statement setting forth Japan’s basic policy. The delegation maintained that the obligation of the nuclear-weapon States to adopt concrete measures of nuclear disarmament and the inalienable right of non-nuclear-weapon States to develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy without discrimination were the two elements making up the very fabric of the Treaty régime; if the obligation was not fulfilled and the right guaranteed, the credibility of the non-proliferation Treaty would be jeopardized and the achievement of its universality made more difficult. Trying to freeze the legitimate rights and activities of parties to the Treaty even partially, out of the fear of nuclear proliferation, was not the right way to solve the problem; and in fact, it might be described as a case of the remedy being worse than the disease. The delegation added that, after reviewing the Treaty system and examining the central dilemma in the Treaty between the commitment to curb the spread of nuclear weapons and the equally important commitment to promote the further development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, it had concluded that it was not reasonable for the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to be unilaterally forbidden, for the purpose of nuclear non-proliferation, to operate reprocessing plants and that their operation should be allowed under certain objective conditions, for example, upon the entry into force of both the non-proliferation Treaty and a comprehensive test ban treaty, the implementation of the proposed international nuclear fuel cycle evaluation programme and extracting plutonium in a form inappropriate for the production of nuclear weapons. The delegation also proposed a variety of measures, some to be taken within the framework of the non-proliferation Treaty and others outside. Among the former were (a) positive measures to guarantee the right of the non-nuclear-weapon States to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, specifically access to a supply of natural uranium, as well as enrichment and reprocessing services, reactors and other facilities, as well as related technology, (b) stricter safeguards requirements on peaceful nuclear activities of States not parties to the non-proliferation Treaty; and (c) submission by all nuclear-weapon States of their civil nuclear activities to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and strengthening of the IAEA role.

112. The delegation of Japan stressed that among measures to be taken outside the non-proliferation Treaty framework, were (a) steps to prevent the accidental use of nuclear weapons, such as the United States/USSR agreement on notification of
missile launching tests and military exercises; (b) early conclusion of the second round of the strategic arms limitation talks; (c) conclusion of a comprehensive test ban, towards which negotiations in the Committee should start at the earliest possible date; (d) cut-off of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes; (e) strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States on the basis of solutions reflecting the prevailing political and military conditions in each region; (f) international arrangements for physical protection of nuclear materials during storage and transportation; and (g) measures in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy to control effectively sensitive technologies and materials that could lead to nuclear-weapon capability. The delegation emphasized that the latter measures should be implemented, taking into account the economic and other relevant facts, and held that Japan could not do without reprocessing and recycling of spent uranium fuel to secure stable energy supplies. It added that Japan was ready to support the international fuel cycle evaluation programme, provided it did not hamper Japan's nuclear energy programme, and urged participation in it by the greatest number of interested countries, including the so-called nuclear-threshold countries. The delegation concluded that the present task of the international community could not be accomplished by freezing the legitimate right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy of those States which had developed atomic energy solely for peaceful purposes, and that what was now required was not to establish a "philosophy of denial" but to implement the existing nuclear non-proliferation regime in a constructive manner so that the initial ideal of a programme of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, advocated by President Eisenhower as "Atoms for Peace", would be attained (CCD/PV.761).

113. With regard to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons the delegation of Pakistan has stated that the objective of strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States is of critical importance, not only for the vulnerable non-nuclear-weapon States but also for the international community as a whole in its non-proliferation and disarmament efforts; that concept, it has held, is, in the long run, in the interest of the nuclear-weapon States themselves (CCD/PV.748). The delegation has further stated that Pakistan fully shares the renewed concern about the danger of nuclear proliferation and has taken several initiatives to avert that danger. However, the approach being advocated by the so-called London Club", i.e. to place trust in the Treaty and in unilateral controls and restraints on the transfer of nuclear technology, even under the strictest international safeguards, is not likely to succeed, the delegation maintained. Pakistan has always felt that the Treaty could not be effective unless it was subscribed to by the major threshold Powers and unless the security of the non-nuclear States was effectively safeguarded. The policy of restraints and embargoes on the transfer of nuclear technology cannot be successful for several reasons, the delegation has held, and the best course is to ensure that nuclear technology is acquired under the necessary controls and safeguards. Sooner rather than later, the developing countries are bound to adopt a common position on the issue, thereby leading to further difficulties in North-South relations. The only durable solution to the problem of nuclear proliferation, the delegation has maintained, lies in building an international climate of trust and confidence in which nations would not feel the need to acquire nuclear weapons and towards that end, the world must focus its attention on the more basic tasks in the field of disarmament, i.e. preventing the further development and sophistication of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, immediately reducing the existing level of armaments,
especially nuclear armaments, and initiating methods towards their eventual destruction and complete elimination (CCD/PV.765).

114. The positions of Brazil as regards the specific problems referred to in this section, as well as the whole spectrum of questions related to disarmament that have been dealt with in this volume, have been expressed over the years in the Committee with all pertinent details. Reflections of these positions have also been expounded in document A/AC.187/49, submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament.

115. In 1977, the delegation of Italy expressed the belief that measures might be adopted to strengthen the system of nuclear non-proliferation, without ignoring the prejudicing of the right of all States to develop, acquire and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes - a right which must be safeguarded in the most effective way (CCD/PV.763).

116. In its first statement at the 1978 spring session, the Soviet delegation described three proposals put forward in late 1977 by Mr. L. I. Brezhnev, Secretary-General of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, relating to (a) the cessation of nuclear weapons, (b) the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapons tests, and (c) "mutual renunciation" of the production of neutron bombs. (The delegation's views on the first and third items are outlined in the sections on those subjects, below.)

117. The proposed production ban, the Soviet delegation explained, would apply to all nuclear weapons - "whether atomic, hydrogen or neutron bombs or missiles" - and, simultaneously, the nuclear States could undertake to initiate a gradual reduction of the existing stockpiles of such weapons leading to their complete destruction. The delegation pointed out that the proposal would put an end to the quantitative accumulation of nuclear weapons and declared the readiness of its Government to begin negotiations with all other nuclear States to work out a practical solution of the problem. It added that the Soviet Union had no objection to the participation of non-nuclear States in such negotiations in view of the universal interest in nuclear disarmament (CCD/PV.767).

118. The delegation of Mongolia, emphasizing the view that there was no alternative to nuclear disarmament, shared the view of the Soviet Union in the matter (CCD/PV.773). The delegation of Poland also stressed the significance of the new Soviet initiatives (CCD/PV.768). The delegation of Hungary, noting the concern of world opinion, held that the Committee's most important task was to conclude current negotiations before it, particularly in the nuclear field, beginning with a full test ban followed by a halt in the production of nuclear weapons and their destruction (CCD/PV.770). The delegation of Romania continued to urge that nuclear disarmament remain at the centre of the Committee's activities, noting its previous proposals for priorities in that field (CCD/PV.768). The German Democratic Republic also attached great importance to efforts to halt the nuclear-arms race and prohibit the production of any types of nuclear weapons, noting that the socialist States had submitted specific proposals in that field, such as those in the memorandum of the USSR on the arms race and disarmament and in a recent working paper (CCD/552) on a comprehensive disarmament programme (CCD/PV.781). In its concluding statement at the spring session, the Soviet delegation set forth new proposals put forward in April 1973 by Mr. L. I. Brezhnev in the field of
disarmament. These proposals provided for the following measures to be put into effect within a definite time-limit: (a) halting the production of all types of nuclear weapons; (b) halting the production of and banning all other types of weapons of mass destruction; (c) halting the development of new types of highly destructive conventional arms; (d) renouncing the expansion of armies and increases in the conventional armaments of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and of countries associated with them under military agreements. In those proposals, it was pointed out that the process of disarmament could be started with the cessation of the production of nuclear arms. It was also stressed therein that, in order to remove the peril of the use of nuclear weapons, joint efforts of all the nuclear Powers were needed. The Soviet Union was opposed to the use of nuclear weapons, it was doing and would continue to do its utmost to prevent an atomic war. That was the firm line of the USSR and it would be guided by it in its action. In line with its fundamental policy aimed at reducing the threat of a nuclear war, the Soviet Union had also decided to accede in due manner to the international Treaty banning nuclear weapons in Latin America. Thus the Soviet Union, like other nuclear-weapon Powers, would assume the obligation not to assist any Latin American States in gaining access to nuclear weapons and not to use such weapons against States parties to the Treaty (CCD/PV. 789).

119. Mongolia, emphasizing the importance of the participation of all the nuclear States in a future international agreement on a full nuclear test ban, drew attention to the need for further strengthening of the nuclear-weapon non-proliferation régime. The reinforcement of the IAEA safeguards in all possible ways would contribute to that, the delegation held. It also emphasized the importance of the measures undertaken by some nuclear States to prevent the risk of nuclear conflict, and called upon the other nuclear Powers and States of military and economic importance to assume practical obligations to assist in the prevention of a nuclear threat.

120. The delegation of the United States stressed that the United States was not seeking disarmament agreements which merely channelled competition in convenient directions, but significant disarmament. In support of this point, the delegation reiterated its willingness, as announced by President Carter in 1977, to reduce the number of nuclear weapons, on a reciprocal basis, by as much as 50 per cent (CCD/PV. 767).

121. The delegation of Sweden also underlined the priority of nuclear disarmament, stressing that every country was affected by the nuclear arms race and, accordingly, by every nuclear disarmament measure or lack of such measures. That fact was one justification for a multilateral negotiating body such as the Committee on Disarmament, as well as an incentive for middle-sized and small non-nuclear-weapon States to be active in disarmament work. Moreover, nuclear disarmament was a key to real progress in other areas of disarmament, such as that of conventional arms. The delegation held, however, that prior to the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Committee could not conceivably accomplish more in the nuclear field than a total test ban and that any additional progress in the field during that period would have to be made at the bilateral SALT talks. The delegation also noted that nuclear disarmament was crucial in the battle against nuclear-weapons proliferation and that the main reason for the lack of universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was the fact that the major nuclear States had not accepted the full consequences of that Treaty (CCD/PV. 767).
122. The delegations of Nigeria (CCD/PV.769) and Hungary (CCD/PV.770) expressed similar views with respect to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, suggesting that a full test ban might be the first positive step in that direction. The Nigerian delegation further held that world opinion was now demanding direct measures of real disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, in its qualitative as well as its quantitative aspect (CCD/PV.769). The delegation of Hungary held that it would be difficult to overestimate the importance of a nuclear test ban from the point of view of the prevention of dissemination of atomic weapons and the success of future negotiations on other disarmament questions. The delegation of India cited from the communiqué recently issued by Prime Minister Desai of India and President Carter of the United States to the effect that stockpiles of nuclear weapons must be reduced and eventually eliminated and that the danger of the proliferation of such weapons must be arrested. In that connexion, the Indian delegation also stressed the importance of an international agreement not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons. Noting that, in its resolution 1653 (XVI), the General Assembly had declared such actions contrary to international law and a crime against mankind, the delegation held that the special session of the General Assembly should reaffirm that view with regard to all countries, without distinction as to whether they belonged to a nuclear-weapon-free zone or not. In fact, the delegation would support a general ban on the possession of nuclear weapons, the most cruel and indiscriminate weapons in existence (CCD/PV.771 and 786). The delegation of India added that India had set an example by unilaterally renouncing the manufacture of nuclear weapons, and called on the major nuclear-weapon States to work out some agreed immediate steps that would be taken within a reasonable time (CCD/PV.786). The delegation of Ethiopia stressed its support for the declaration of Africa and of the Indian Ocean as a nuclear-weapon-free zone and urged the nuclear States to refrain from assisting South Africa (CCD/PV.786).

123. With particular regard to the SALT talks, the delegation of the United States, noting that negotiations both at the bilateral talks and in the Committee on Disarmament were parts of a coherent whole, pointed out that the Soviet Union and the United States had recently agreed to extend the validity of the SALT I arms limitation agreements until a SALT II accord could be achieved. It added that a SALT II agreement was taking shape, which it hoped would lower the level of strategic arms on both sides, impose certain qualitative constraints on potentially destabilizing weapons development and set the stage for even more substantial limitation in a SALT III agreement (CCD/PV.767 and 781). The Federal Republic of Germany expressed the hope for both qualitative and quantitative limitations in an early SALT II agreement (CCD/PV.771).

124. The delegation of Mexico stressed the importance of General Assembly resolution 32/87 G of 12 December 1977, adopted by 134 votes, including those of the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom and France, in which the recent statements of the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union favouring broader nuclear disarmament were cited and in which the General Assembly urged those two States to implement those declarations as soon as possible (CCD/PV.767).

125. The delegation of Hungary expressed satisfaction that it had learned from the statements of the parties directly involved that SALT II offered favourable prospects and stressed the beneficial influence that a successful outcome of the talks could have on the international climate, on strengthening existing agreements.
and promoting the rapid solution of other questions (CCD/PV.770). The delegation of Mongolia stressed the importance of the successful conclusion of SALT II (CCD/PV.773). The German Democratic Republic pointed out that a successful conclusion of a SALT II agreement would contribute significantly to the consolidation of the process of international détente and also to the solution of the problems facing the Committee. The German Democratic Republic was therefore sincerely interested in achieving real progress and resolutely opposed actions by forces hostile to détente, which were designed to prevent agreements on the limitation of the arms race as well as the transition to real disarmament (CCD/PV.775). The delegation of Mongolia also stressed the importance of a successful conclusion at SALT II (CCD/PV.771).

126. Italy held, in its document CCD/548, that nuclear-weapon-free zones should be viewed both as a useful complementary instrument of the non-proliferation régime and as an effective disarmament measure. Their establishment, when suitable conditions existed, should originate from the States directly concerned, on a voluntary and regional basis, and with the participation of all militarily significant States of the area (CCD/548).

127. Referring to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the delegation of Romania pointed out that such an objective could be achieved only by eliminating the cause of the danger of proliferation and, in particular, by destroying existing nuclear weapons and at the same time taking decisive measures for nuclear disarmament. It stressed the view that some measures, while intending to prevent the danger of proliferation, were impeding to free access of States to the use of nuclear technology for development. In that respect, Romania held that any limitation or restriction of the right of States to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, particularly in a situation where the arms race was going ahead unchecked, would affect the already precarious balance between the rights and the obligations on which the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was based (CCD/PV.768 and 731).

128. Also with regard to the question of non-proliferation, the United States announced that, on 10 March 1978, President Carter had signed into law the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. The delegation stated that this was an attempt to balance concern over the dangers of nuclear proliferation with the important need for nuclear power to meet energy demands throughout the world. The delegation stated that the Act provides for a system of controls and incentives to give the world time to improve and strengthen mechanisms which will safeguard against misuse of nuclear energy technology by emphasizing the importance of fuel cycle safeguards as a condition for continued United States co-operation with non-nuclear-weapon States. One of the ways the Act does so, the delegation pointed out, is by exercising positive control - in the long term - over the retransfer and reprocessing of materials produced through any transferred sensitive nuclear exports from the United States. The United States also re-emphasized its commitment to make every reasonable effort to assure that these benefits of nuclear energy are available to all (CCD/PV.781).

2. Comprehensive nuclear-test ban

129. With particular reference to a nuclear-test ban, the delegation of Mexico has repeatedly recalled that the General Assembly has adopted 36 resolutions on the
The delegation of Mexico has emphasized that the General Assembly has also reiterated its conviction that "whatever may be the differences on the question of verification, there is no valid reason for delaying the conclusion" of a comprehensive test ban. Citing the President of the United States, the delegation, in 1977, thought conditions were right for achieving such a ban (CCD/PV.728 and 748).

130. In 1977, the delegation of Poland stated that the Polish Government had always considered the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to be one of the major international legal instruments which went a long way towards containing the threat of nuclear war, accidental or otherwise. It expressed the belief, however, that for the Treaty to be fully effective it was imperative to strengthen that instrument and to make it really universal. While supporting international co-operation in, and the promotion of, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, Poland has always consistently advocated the need for a greater measure of effectiveness of the application of IAEA safeguards in order to preclude any remote chance of pursuing such peaceful utilization of the atom as a vehicle whereby to acquire military nuclear capability. The Polish Government, therefore, welcomed an agreement reached recently by 15 States, among them Poland, which establishes strict guidelines on nuclear export safeguards, imposing important transfer limitations on nuclear materials and technology. Poland has noted with satisfaction the positive assessment of these guidelines by many non-nuclear-weapon States. The hope was expressed that this arrangement would soon gain wide support as another step towards consolidation of the non-proliferation régime and increased and equal security for all (CCD/PV.735).

131. With direct reference to the verification question, the delegation of Mexico has repeatedly urged the Committee to act in accordance with the General Assembly's reiterated conviction noted above, either by achieving a permanent agreement or through a unilateral or agreed moratorium (CCD/PV.736).

132. With reference to participation, the delegation of Japan has shared the view that the halting of all military tests by the major nuclear Powers would not jeopardize their military security, and has suggested that the Committee should work out either a draft treaty or basic principles for such a treaty and present them to the General Assembly with a request for comment, thus giving non-participants in the Committee the opportunity to express their views; that it should negotiate the final text of the treaty and have it endorsed by the General Assembly or, if that was not possible, referred back to the Committee with relevant comments; and complete the draft treaty, taking those comments into consideration, for submission at the next session of the General Assembly (CCD/PV.746).

133. In statements in 1977, the delegation of Pakistan considered it imperative to reach agreement on the cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests in the immediate future and held that the two major nuclear-weapon States should agree to an immediate suspension of such tests (CCD/PV.765). Noting that nuclear explosions for military or peaceful purposes were indistinguishable, the delegation held that the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions must be regulated in the context...
of a comprehensive test ban and that matters would be simplified by a moratorium on all peaceful nuclear explosions until agreement had been reached on that question (CCD/PV.748).

134. The delegation of Yugoslavia has pointed out that it has been repeated many times in the Committee that a comprehensive test-ban treaty is one of the most important elements in the effort to halt the arms race and prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons. The question has actually been on the agenda of the Committee for well over 10 years, that is, since 1963, when the limited test ban treaty was concluded. The sole official reason why it was not then possible to achieve a comprehensive test-ban treaty was the existence of different concepts regarding ways and means of exercising control over implementation of the obligations assumed. That problem is still an important obstacle, the delegation has held, although it is not now the only one, as others have since appeared. The delegation has further stressed that, in the meantime, the development of military nuclear technology has gone its own independent way, following its own logic and its own requirements, and that, according to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 568 nuclear tests were conducted during the period between the signing of the Moscow Agreement and the end of 1975 alone, 498 of them by the three nuclear States members of the Committee on Disarmament. The delegation of Yugoslavia has pointed out that these tests resulted in the creation of a number of new types and systems of nuclear weapons and the perfecting of existing ones (CCD/PV.757).

135. The delegation of Italy has also repeatedly stressed that it attaches the highest priority to the achievement of an agreement banning all nuclear-weapon tests. While welcoming as a positive step forward the tripartite consultations between the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, the delegation of Italy felt that the Committee should promptly start negotiations in order to recognize points of convergence in the different drafts already submitted to the Committee and to search for a broadly acceptable treaty language. The delegation also felt that the problem of verification of a comprehensive test ban deserved further study, in order to find means and methods to assure compliance with the treaty combining the exchange of teleseismic data with on-site inspection whenever needed. In that light Italy welcomed the establishment of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events and noted that two Italian scientists were taking an active part in its work (CCD/PV.728, 760 and 763).

136. In 1977, the delegation of Poland welcomed with satisfaction the trilateral statement of 16 March 1977 on the progress towards a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and a protocol covering nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Together with the unanimous report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, they were welcome manifestations of concerted action which would hopefully be crowned with the elaboration, without delay, of a comprehensive test ban as a major step towards effectively checking the nuclear arms race (CCD/PV.735).

137. The delegation of Canada has pointed out that Canada's determined opposition to all nuclear testing is well known and has often been stated. Canada has always recognized that verification was among the principal difficulties
obstructing the achievement of a comprehensive test ban. The modification in the Soviet Union's traditional position on verification in the memorandum of Mr. Gromyko presented to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session, and which has since been reflected in the updated Soviet draft CTBT, augurs well for the required compromise on this difficult question, the delegation has maintained. Meanwhile, the problem of verification, especially as regards on-site inspection, could be further eased, in the delegation's view, if the concept of the joint consultative committee advanced in the Swedish draft treaty could be accepted. Another issue, central to the difficulties experienced in arriving at a comprehensive test ban, the delegation has held, is the continuing grave concern relating to the use of nuclear explosions for so-called peaceful purposes. Unless and until some effective means can be devised to make absolutely sure that there would be no weapons-related benefits from peaceful nuclear explosions, no such explosions should be contemplated under a comprehensive test-ban treaty. That, too, was a very valid feature of the Swedish draft treaty (CCD/PV.735). The delegation has also stressed that all Committee members understand the difficulties that will remain so long as the comprehensive test-ban treaty fails to win the support of all nuclear-weapon States. Without minimizing those difficulties, Canada has continued to believe that the two major nuclear States, having in mind the stage they have reached in the development and sophistication of their respective nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility to set the trend in the right direction. Canada has repeatedly expressed confidence that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament can eventually produce a valuable comprehensive test-ban treaty. It has also noted that part of the treaty's worth will, of course, reside in how persuasive it is to the nuclear-weapon States that do not participate in the work of the Committee. To that end, Canada has expressed the belief that the treaty should have an initial duration period that would be long enough to encourage those other nuclear States to recognize that their own interests and the cause of the world peace would be served by their early accession to a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CCD/PV.760).

138. The delegation of Egypt has expressed the belief that the effectiveness of a comprehensive test-ban treaty requires the adherence to it, not only of all nuclear-weapon States, but also of potential nuclear States. The delegation has also been of the view that all non-nuclear States should benefit from peaceful nuclear explosions under a test-ban treaty, provided that effective international supervision ensures that any use of such explosions will not lead to or facilitate the acquisition by States of nuclear weapons (CCD/PV.748).

139. At the Committee's 1977 session, the delegation of Sweden expressed the hope that a comprehensive test ban could be achieved before the opening of the special session of the General Assembly on disarmament in early 1978. The delegation further suggested that a possible approach to facilitate an early agreement on an early signing of such a treaty could be to make its entry into force dependent upon the final cessation by the United States and the Soviet Union of their nuclear-weapons tests. In case transitional arrangements were needed, they could be laid down in a protocol that should be negotiated under the auspices of the Committee and that would enter into force upon signature by the two nuclear States. Another solution would be to include provisions for transitional arrangements in the treaty itself. It would be possible under both those formulas for Committee members and other States to sign and ratify the treaty before the United States and the
Soviet Union had actually terminated their tests. The treaty should also contain provisions for an international exchange of seismological data and for a verification procedure involving on-site inspections on a voluntary basis. For clarification of events pertaining to the subject-matter of the treaty, the treaty could also include provisions for the services of a consultative committee set up for that purpose. The treaty should ban nuclear-weapon tests or explosions of other nuclear devices in all environments, thus constituting an independent and comprehensive treaty not complementary to the partial test-ban treaty. It was not only desirable but, in the long term, fundamental that all nuclear-weapon States become parties to the agreement, but if the situation required, the Committee could envisage the inclusion of a provision which would make it possible for a party to withdraw from the treaty if all nuclear Powers had not adhered to it within a specified period of time (CCD/PV.729). The delegation added that, while the ultimate goal of a comprehensive test-ban agreement must obviously be universal adherence, the participation of all nuclear-weapon States should not be made a precondition and that the two major nuclear Powers, which were overwhelmingly superior in nuclear arms and which had committed themselves to a comprehensive test ban in both the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty and in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, must start the process towards achievement of the desired goal (CCD/PV.729 and 733).

In presenting its draft convention (CCD/526) to the Committee, the delegation stressed that it was comprehensive in scope, but with suggested transitional arrangements, if considered necessary, for the two major nuclear-weapon Powers and special arrangements for the conduct of peaceful nuclear explosions under international supervision, the details of which could be worked out later to be included in protocols to the treaty. With particular regard to peaceful explosions, however, the delegation held that they should be allowed, even under international control, only when they were of overriding national or international importance. Assurance of compliance with the treaty, the delegation further pointed out, was based on the concept of verification by challenge, i.e. involving the voluntary agreement of the party to be inspected. Special provisions concerning co-operation of all parties in a world-wide seismic data exchange should be included, possibly in an additional protocol to the treaty. The draft treaty also proposed the creation of a consultative committee of parties to the treaty, the functions and activities of which could also be elaborated in a protocol. An appeal to the United Nations Security Council could be the last step in the verification procedure. The delegation also pointed out that the draft provided for the immediate withdrawal of any party at a given time if all nuclear-weapon States had not adhered to the treaty by that time. The delegation formally proposed that a working group be set up as soon as possible to negotiate a comprehensive test-ban agreement (CCD/PV.733).

On the specific question of verification of a test-ban treaty, the delegation of Japan, holding that on-site inspections were generally considered indispensable, has proposed the establishment of a verification committee, consisting of experts from both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States, which would be empowered to request additional data regarding a seismic event, if required, and to decide whether or not an on-site inspection should be carried out (CCD/PV.733).
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142. In its statement on the subject of a nuclear-weapon test ban at the beginning of the Committee's 1978 spring session, the delegation of the Soviet Union, continuing to stress the importance of such a ban, cited the 1977 statement by Mr. Brezhnev to the effect that the Soviet Union was ready to agree that, together with a ban on all nuclear-weapon tests for a definite period, a moratorium should be declared on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The delegation hoped that the new position would clear the road for the conclusion of a treaty which the world eagerly awaited. Noting the ongoing trilateral negotiations on the subject, the delegation stressed that its position in those talks was based on Mr. Brezhnev's recent initiative and hoped that the negotiating partners would adopt an equally constructive approach (CCD/PV.767).

143. At the same time, the delegation of the United States, holding that the elusive goal of a comprehensive test ban at last appeared to be near, cited a recent statement of President Carter before the General Assembly advocating an end to all explosions of nuclear devices, whether for peaceful or military purposes. The delegation added the view that any treaty on the subject should be applicable to nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States alike and that, for the former, such an agreement would inevitably lead to a reduced dependency on nuclear weapons and, for the latter, it would substantially reduce the incentive to develop a technology leading to a capability to carry out nuclear explosions; for both groups, the delegation held, an agreement on a full test ban would strengthen collective non-proliferation efforts. With particular regard to the trilateral talks, the United States delegation reported progress. It noted that the complexity of the question had thwarted previous efforts to achieve such a ban, but hoped that the results of the trilateral talks could soon be presented to the Committee so that it could complete its work on a multilateral agreement which would attract the broadest possible adherence. The United States also expressed the view that a comprehensive test ban would help to bring a halt to the qualitative nuclear arms race and serve as an important measure which would support collective non-proliferation efforts (CCD/PV.767).

144. The delegation of the United Kingdom, noting the great importance the Committee placed on the quick completion of the trilateral negotiations, expressed similar views with regard to the early presentation of the results of the talks to the Committee so that it could elaborate what could prove to be an historic arms control measure (CCD/PV.768).

145. The delegation of Mexico, citing various paragraphs of General Assembly resolution 32/78, and noting that it had been supported by the three nuclear-weapon States participating in the trilateral talks, regretted that the talks had not had the desired results, thus reducing the Committee to enforced inactivity, which the delegation hoped would be only temporary (CCD/PV.767).

146. The delegations of Sweden (CCD/PV.767) and the Netherlands (CCD/PV.779) expressed views similar to those of Mexico. Sweden stressed that world opinion expected the special session of the General Assembly on disarmament to initiate a more fruitful phase in disarmament negotiations and that the Committee had a special responsibility to report substantial progress on the main issues to the special session if it was to continue to be considered a credible negotiating body. The delegation, accordingly, formally proposed that the Committee remain in permanent
session during the Spring of 1976 until it had fulfilled the request of the General Assembly. The delegation added the view, however, that a comprehensive test ban could be truly significant only in combination with other nuclear disarmament measures (CCD/PV.767).

147. The delegation of Pakistan, holding that the achievement of a chemical-weapons ban was really a question of establishing mutual confidence and that a solution would be found through a political decision, welcomed the continuing bilateral consultations and looked forward to further progress in that matter (CCD/PV.748).

148. The Romanian delegation shared the view that the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests was one of the most urgent items on the agenda of the Committee which could certainly prove to be an important step on the way to nuclear disarmament. It also stated that the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons would not in itself eliminate the danger of a nuclear war since large quantities of such weapons were accumulated in the world. Accordingly, this delegation viewed the true significance of the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests in direct relationship with other radical measures which must follow on the way to nuclear disarmament (CCD/PV.768).

149. The delegations of Poland (CCD/PV.758), Hungary (CCD/PV.770), Czechoslovakia (CCD/PV.771), Bulgaria (CCD/PV.772), Mongolia (CCD/PV.773) and the German Democratic Republic (CCD/PV.775) welcomed the reports of progress in the trilateral talks, stressing the importance of the various Soviet conciliations in making the current favourable situation possible and urging a show of equal flexibility on the part of the other two negotiating partners. While recognizing, however, that the prospective agreement of the three nuclear States was of considerable significance, most of those delegations noted that such an agreement would constitute only a further step towards a general and complete test ban with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States, including China and France. Hungary hoped that the participants in the talks would shortly be able to resolve outstanding problems and that the much desired treaty would at last be signed; such an outcome could have a beneficial influence on the international climate and on the strengthening of existing bilateral and multilateral agreements, and might promote the rapid solution of other questions. Poland stressed that the impact of such a development on the slowing down of the nuclear arms race would be dramatic, even though it was generally recognized that any long-term objectives of such a comprehensive treaty could be secured only with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States. Mongolia emphasized the view that partial solutions of the problem had led to further perfection of new weapons of mass destruction such as the neutron bomb. In presenting its views, the German Democratic Republic stressed the importance of the preliminary work already accomplished by the Committee on the subject of a nuclear-test ban.

150. The delegation of Nigeria, while encouraged by the statements of the participants in the trilateral talks, regretted the absence of a definite indication of the date when an agreed text of an agreement could be expected by the Committee. Accordingly, it supported the Swedish proposal for a permanent spring session as the only possible alternative (CCD/PV.769).

151. The delegation of India also stressed that a comprehensive test ban should not
be seen as an end in itself but only as a means towards the ultimate goal of a nuclear-free world and that such a ban without the participation of China and France could not be truly effective. It pledged itself, however, to study carefully the results of the trilateral talks and to participate actively in the Committee's efforts to elaborate a treaty acceptable to all. In this connexion, it noted India's ceaseless efforts to bring a halt to nuclear testing and its participation in the Ad Hoc Group of seismological experts (see below). It again stressed that India's nuclear energy programme was devoted exclusively to the peaceful uses of such energy and that it had not and did not intend to carry out any nuclear-weapon tests (CCD/PV.771 and 786). The delegation of India also stressed the importance India attached to the early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty acceptable to all and welcomed the current trilateral talks (CCD/PV.786).

152. The delegation of Iran, stressing the importance of presenting a comprehensive test-ban treaty to the special session, noted the temporary solution to the peaceful nuclear explosions problem provided by the new Soviet position. It was to be hoped that the negotiators in the trilateral talks, having taken responsibility for this issue, would soon submit an agreement to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament; otherwise, Iran would insist that discussion be brought to the multilateral table (CCD/PV.778).

153. The delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany (CCD/PV.771) and the delegation of Japan (CCD/PV.776) also welcomed the hopes expressed by the participants in the trilateral talks. Japan urged the early conclusion of consultations on both a test ban and chemical weapons so that the Committee could elaborate treaties on the subjects, holding that undue delay would create a general dissatisfaction that might discourage adherence to the future treaties. If unable to reach full agreement on key elements of a comprehensive test ban despite urgent efforts, the delegation suggested, the participants should declare, at the special session, a moratorium on nuclear-test explosions including peaceful explosions, at least until a comprehensive treaty was achieved. They should also make a joint declaration of intent to present the elements of such a full ban to the Committee at its summer session, at the latest. The delegation of the Netherlands held that any agreement on the subject should be of substantial duration, aiming at the cessation of tests for all time; the treaty should also be so designed as to encourage the adherence of as many non-nuclear-weapon States as possible (CCD/PV.779).

154. With particular regard to the treatment of the question of peaceful nuclear explosions in the context of a weapons-test ban, the delegation of Japan, holding that peaceful explosive devices were indistinguishable from nuclear devices used for military purposes, proposed that any comprehensive nuclear-test ban contain a provision to the effect that no State party should conduct peaceful explosions until agreement had been reached on appropriate international controls (CCD/PV.776). As noted above, the United States continued to advocate the prohibition of all nuclear-explosive devices. The Netherlands also believed that the treaty should prohibit nuclear-explosion activities for any purpose (CCD/PV.779).

155. With regard to the drafts of test-ban treaties submitted to the Committee by the Soviet Union (CCD/523) and Sweden (CCD/526/Rev.1), several socialist States members mentioned the Soviet draft as one of the principal contributions to a solution of the problem, while Sweden and several other countries referred, in particular, to the verification provisions of the Swedish draft.
156. On 16 March 1978, the delegation of the United Kingdom, speaking on behalf of all three States participating in the trilateral talks, reported to the Committee that substantial progress had been made towards agreement on a treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests and a protocol covering nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes which would be an integral part of the treaty; a number of important points had already been agreed; and on some outstanding issues, the differences between the positions of the participants had narrowed. The three nuclear-weapon States were keenly aware of the great importance that the Members of the General Assembly and the Committee on Disarmament attached to the earliest possible conclusion of a treaty and would continue their best efforts to complete the tripartite negotiations as soon as possible (CCD/PV.780). (For tripartite views on the report of the Ad Hoc Group, see para. 169 below.)

157. The delegation of the United States, noting that the joint statement had been cautiously worded because of the critical stage of the negotiations, assured the Committee that the United States, for its part, was pressing strongly for an early test-ban agreement and believed its two negotiating partners were doing the same; it hoped, accordingly, to reach a point soon where the Committee could play an important role in the consideration of the agreement (CCD/PV.781). Similarly, the Soviet Union assured the Committee that the three participants were keenly aware of the great importance that the General Assembly and the Committee attached to the earliest possible conclusion of a test-ban treaty and that they would continue to exert their best efforts to that end (ibid.).

158. The delegation of the German Democratic Republic welcomed the news that substantial progress had been achieved in the trilateral negotiations on the comprehensive and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. An early successful conclusion of a treaty on the subject would considerably help to reduce the threat of nuclear war, and the security of all States would thus be strengthened. The delegation therefore hoped for such a conclusion, which should be followed by further agreements on a complete halt to the production of nuclear weapons (CCD/PV.781).

159. The delegation of Canada, noting its satisfaction with the progress achieved in the trilateral talks, stressed the importance of the Committee's contribution to the common tasks (CCD/PV.782).

160. The delegation of Sweden, noting that the statements of various representatives of the three Powers participating in the trilateral talks had been somewhat encouraging, but at the same time inadequate, stressed that the non-nuclear States had good reason to be impatient in the light of the continuing arms race and their experience with the past history of disarmament negotiation, as well as their insight into the test-ban problem. Again reminding the three States of General Assembly resolution 32/78, adopted with their support, the delegation queried whether the political will expressed in that resolution still existed. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden had recently stated that the three States had the responsibility to conclude their test-ban negotiations in time for the Committee on Disarmament to elaborate a draft treaty for submission to the General Assembly at its special session. That view was shared by many other Governments and the three States concerned must be aware that a full test ban was long overdue (CCD/PV.783). The delegation of Ethiopia, noting its long-standing position to help achieve
general and complete disarmament under effective international control and welcoming
the five treaties and conventions which had resulted from the work of the Conference
of the Committee on Disarmament and the important negotiations being undertaken,
stressed that much remained to be done to achieve a comprehensive test ban
(CCD/PV.786).

161. The Soviet delegation noted with satisfaction that certain progress had been
recently achieved in the negotiations on the question of concluding a treaty on the
complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, the negotiations which are
being conducted at present in Geneva by the USSR, United States of America and
United Kingdom. It expressed the hope that the matter would be brought to completion
and that a corresponding treaty would be signed in the near future and this would be
an appreciable achievement in the struggle for peace and security. The delegation
also expressed the hope that the group of scientific seismic experts would fulfil
successfully also the new task entrusted to it, the task of studying scientific and
methodological principles of a possible testing of the global network of seismic
stations which could be set up in the future for the purpose of international
exchange of seismic data under a treaty banning all nuclear-weapon tests
(CCD/PV.789).

162. In the discussion of the question preceding the submission of the report of the
Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts set up in 1976 to consider international co-operative
measures to detect and identify seismic events, the delegation of Sweden continued
to stress the need for an international system consisting of a network of selected
seismological stations, a communications network and international data centres, in
order to facilitate the early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. In
that connexion, the Swedish Government declared its readiness to operate and finance
such an international data centre. Noting that the Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts
would soon submit its report to the Committee, the Swedish delegation urged an early
Committee decision concerning the continuation of efforts to establish an
international data exchange system. It welcomed an earlier suggestion by Japan that
an "experimental exercise" might be carried out, but cautioned that such an exercise
should not delay the establishment of the international system, which should be fully
operative by the time a comprehensive test-ban treaty entered into force. The
degulation believed further that verification by non-seismic means, such as by
on-site inspections or by satellite observation, should also be carried out with
genuine international participation, such as the consultative committee proposed in
the Swedish draft treaty on the subject. The consultative committee would play an
advisory role, should meet fairly regularly and should maintain a close liaison
with the international seismic data system, the delegation added (CCD/PV.767).

163. The delegation of Czechoslovakia expressed similar views on the importance of
establishing, through close co-operation among selected national seismic stations
a world seismic network capable of contributing effectively to the verification of a
nuclear-weapon test-ban agreement (CCD/PV.771). The delegation of the Federal
Republic of Germany also considered the establishment of such a system as a necessary
precondition for the elaboration of an effective treaty verification procedure
(ibid.).

164. The delegation of Japan also held that the organization of international data
exchanges would be the most important and valuable contribution that the Committee
could make towards facilitating the early conclusion of a comprehensive test ban and
praised the Ad Hoc Group for its intensive work. The delegation urged a continuation of the work of the Group through the conduct of experimental exercises and offered to host informal technical meetings of the experts to make preparations for such exercises. While recognizing that the possible creation of an international verification organ, such as the consultative committee proposed by Sweden, might have to await the results of the trilateral negotiations on a test ban, the delegation stressed that preparations could be made now for the operation of the international data exchange system and that the proposed exercises could be carried out simultaneously with the trilateral talks so that the desired exchange system might become operative whenever the required political and legal decisions were made. In this way, the delegation concluded, the Committee would make a great contribution to the process of achieving a comprehensive test ban, and the data exchange system would also be useful for the supervision of a moratorium on nuclear tests (CCD/PV.776).

165. On the more general aspects of verification, the delegation of Mongolia continued to maintain that national detection devices, supplemented by international co-operation in an exchange of seismological data, should be sufficiently effective, particularly when also supplemented by the possibility of on-site verification, as proposed by the Soviet Union (CCD/PV.773).

166. The delegation of India was of the view that verification should not be rigid. Insistence on only one type of verification or a set of verification methods would only reduce the credibility of the principle of verification. Verification should be a judicious combination of national and international means. India's active participation in international co-operation in detection of seismic events, the delegation of India noted, dated back to as early as 1958. In the deliberations of the Ad Hoc Group of scientific experts to consider international means to detect and identify seismic events set up in 1976, India had taken an active part (CCD/PV.786).

167. During formal consideration of the Ad Hoc Group's report after its submission to the Committee, the delegation of Sweden reminded the Committee of its willingness to finance, establish and operate in Sweden an international data centre of the type proposed by the Group. The delegation added that it envisaged that, as part of the continued work of the Group, one data centre would be established and operated on a temporary basis, and Sweden was prepared to put such a temporary centre into operation in the course of 1978 at its own cost, assuming that the anticipated test-ban agreement involved a monitoring system. The delegation considered such experiments indispensable for the further elaboration of a monitoring system under a comprehensive test-ban treaty that would ensure full access to all relevant data to all parties to the treaty. The delegation also considered the report of the Group a valuable contribution to efforts to establish a monitoring system acceptable to all and expressed its appreciation for the work of all participants in the Group, both members of the Committee and non-members (CCD/PV.779). Sweden also submitted a working paper (CCD/562) containing suggested terms of reference for the continued work of the Group.

168. The delegation of the Netherlands, sharing the Swedish view that treaty negotiations must be carried out by the international community as a whole, considered the results of the Ad Hoc Group not only satisfactory, but in a sense
Clontinuation... might have been rigid. The United Kingdom added that the United States would continue to support the proposal that the international seismic system should be flexible, as it was considered that the system would be useful in the event of a test-ban agreement being reached (CCD/PV.779).

169. In reporting to the Committee on the status of the trilateral negotiations, the United Kingdom delegation noted that the United Kingdom, still speaking for all three participants, added that they shared the widely held view that an international exchange of seismic data would play a major role in verification of compliance with the treaty. They considered that all parties to the treaty should have the right to participate and to receive seismic data provided by the international exchange, whether or not they contributed seismic stations to the global network. The three negotiating partners had actively participated in the work of the Ad Hoc Group of seismological experts of the Committee on Disarmament and had carefully studied the report, to which experts from a substantial number of States had made valuable contributions. They agreed that the guidelines for setting up and running the international seismic exchange should be laid down in an annex to the treaty, and that the detailed organizational and procedural arrangements for implementing the international exchange should be worked out after the entry into force of the treaty, drawing on the recommendations contained in the report of the Ad Hoc Group.

Speaking for the United Kingdom alone, the delegation also supported the Swedish proposal to continue the work of the Group in order to carry out its experimental exercise (CCD/PV.780).

170. The delegation of the Soviet Union hoped the Group's report would be valuable and useful and, while agreeing in principle to the conduct of an experimental exercise, considered it obvious that since the international network of seismographic stations was being set up in connexion with the tasks of verifying compliance with the treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, the exercise could in practice be carried out only after that treaty had been concluded and when it was known which principal States Parties would decide on the exercise and place their seismographic stations at the disposal of the global network. However, it might be useful to start preparatory work for such an exercise even before the treaty entered into force and that work could be undertaken by the Ad Hoc Group. The Committee might therefore consider the prolongation of the Group's work and the definition of a mandate in terms of principles and methods to be used for the experimental exercise (ibid.).

171. The delegation of the United States commended the report and supported its recommendations to conduct an experimental exercise, as well as remandating the Group to carry out preliminary preparations for such an exercise. It noted, however, that the Group's current mandate did not permit assessments of the adequacy of any

unique in that it proposed for the first time a system of international verification measures primarily directed towards nuclear-weapon States. The delegation hoped that more countries in the southern hemisphere would participate in the seismic system. It also wondered what kind of arrangements with the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) were necessary in order to use the WMO telecommunications system. The delegation of the Netherlands also noted with great interest Sweden's offer to set up an international data centre, adding that the establishment of an international seismic system could bring additional benefits, such as observations of earthquakes to assist the Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator and for scientific work. Expressing appreciation for the Group's work, the delegation also supported the Swedish proposal that the Group be given a new mandate and that a decision be taken by the Committee to plan the recommended tests so that the system could become operational as soon as possible, after a test-ban agreement was reached (CCD/PV.779).
system of international seismic data exchange. With particular regard to the statement of the Soviet delegation (see preceding para.), the delegation stated that the tripartite agreement should not be interpreted as implying that the recommendation of the Group that they be authorized to carry out an experimental exercise should not be carried out now. The United States, for its part, would be prepared to extend the Group's mandate and join with others in the proposed exercise (ibid., 739 and 779).

172. The delegations of Egypt (CCD/PV.782), the Federal Republic of Germany (CCD/PV.779), India (ibid.) and Italy (ibid.) also welcomed the report. The Federal Republic of Germany also supported the proposal to extend the Group's mandate and noted that its seismological centre in Graefenburg had proved its capability to co-operate in international seismic experiments. The delegation of India was particularly impressed that experts from 23 countries had reached consensus on the report and considered the timing opportune, as it came in the midst of the very active tripartite negotiations on a test-ban treaty and its significance had been recognized by the three participants. The delegation also observed that the report had rightly noted the weakness of the southern hemisphere in numbers of seismic stations. India was happy that it had several such stations. That fact clearly brought out the active participation that India had always had in the test-ban field from 1958, when the first group of seismic experts met in Geneva (CCD/PV.780). The Italian delegation expressed the view that the Group's report had the merit of bringing out in a clear light a number of questions fundamental to the solution of the problem of verification. Italy supported the idea of planning an experimental exercise on the basic elements of the system of international co-operation to detect and to identify seismic events proposed by the Ad Hoc Group (ibid.). The delegation of Egypt welcomed the report of the Ad Hoc Group of Experts on seismic events, particularly in so far as the Group found evidence of prospects for a further reduction of uncertainties and for narrowing the remaining areas of differences (CCD/PV.782).

173. The delegation of Japan, urging early conclusion of a test-ban agreement, with negotiations in the Committee not later than the 1978 summer session, held that further work in the seismic field could constitute an accelerating factor in that process if the Committee proceeded promptly with the technical establishment of the recommended seismic data exchange system. To that end, the experimental exercise should be conducted, purely on a technical basis, even before the treaty came into force. If the exercise was delayed until after the entry into force of the treaty, as proposed by the Soviet Union, a complete verification system would not be able to function until over a year after that date, a delay which caused Japan real concern. Moreover, the delegation continued, since the Ad Hoc Group had not been able to assess the adequacy of any proposed system, such adequacy would be assessed only by the parties to the treaty after its entry into force, and the experimental exercise would provide the necessary data for working out arrangements for a later international exchange of seismic data. As a possible compromise to meet the position of the Soviet Union, the delegation suggested that the Ad Hoc Group first be requested to submit to the Committee a report on the preparatory stage of the proposed exercise, including a detailed programme of experimental testing. The Committee could then decide whether such testing could be carried out without giving rise to political difficulties and, if so, could request the Group to proceed with a second stage, which would in turn be approved by the Committee before the final evaluation. Lastly, the delegation confirmed its readiness to host an informal technical meeting of experts in Tokyo during 1978 (CCD/PV.781).
174. The delegation of Canada, observing that it fully supported the report of the Ad Hoc Group, felt confident that an international exchange of seismic data could play an important role in a future test-ban treaty and saw a need to create a network for such an exchange, which the Group had indicated was technically feasible. Although all countries did not have an equal capacity to monitor seismic events, an international network would put all parties on an equivalent footing in terms of the availability of data (CCD/PV.782).

175. The delegation of Egypt, also welcoming the Group's report as a helpful contribution towards a verifiable test ban, supported the conduct of the proposed experimental exercise and the draft terms of reference for the Group's future work submitted by Sweden. At the same time, the delegation observed that, however important agreements on verification procedures might be, it was important that negotiations on the treaty itself should not be allowed to drag on indefinitely (CCD/PV.782).

176. The delegation of Sweden expressed satisfaction that the three States participating in the trilateral talks had made clear that they agreed that an international seismic data exchange would play a major role in verifying compliance with a nuclear test-ban treaty and that all parties to the treaty could have equal rights to participate and receive the data provided. Confirming its support for the report of the Ad Hoc Group, the delegation held that the next obvious step was to obtain practical experience in setting up such a system and, to that end, Sweden had proposed a new mandate for the Group (CCD/562) and hoped for an early decision so that the Group could resume its work at the beginning of the Committee's summer session. Noting that Canada, Egypt, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States of America had expressed support for the new mandate, the delegation shared the concern expressed by the Japanese delegation over the position of the Soviet Union that parties to the treaty should decide whether to conduct experimental testing. Holding that such a decision would mean that the treaty would lack its main instrument of verification for one year, the delegation also suggested that the proposed further work of the Group be carried out in two phases, beginning with a preparatory phase after which the Committee would consider the desirability of carrying out the actual experimental exercise. The delegation concluded that the outcome of the test-ban negotiations, including the renewal of the seismic Group's mandate, would affect the possibilities for a multilateral negotiating body such as the Disarmament Committee to function constructively in the future (CCD/PV.783).

3. "Nuclear neutron weapon" or "Reduced blast/enhanced radiation weapon"

177. Early in the Committee's 1978 spring session, the USSR and other socialist States members proposed the specific prohibition of the "neutron bomb" as a particularly inhumane weapon of mass destruction. The United States and a number of other members did not accept the definition of that weapon as a new weapon of mass destruction.

178. In proposing the mutual renunciation of production of such bombs, the delegation of the Soviet Union held that the cause of world peace was threatened by the emergence of the new and inhumane weapon and that it was particularly dangerous because it was being described as a "tactical" and "harmless" weapon.
Such a position tended to efface the dividing line between conventional and nuclear weapons, making use of the latter weapons more likely. The delegation stated that the position of the Soviet Union on that matter had been clearly expressed as follows by Mr. L. I. Brezhnev, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR:

"The Soviet Union is decisively against the development of a neutron bomb ... but if this bomb is developed in the West - developed against us, which no one even attempts to conceal - then it should be clearly understood that the USSR will not stand by as a passive observer. We shall be faced with the necessity of meeting this challenge in order to ensure the security of the Soviet people and its allies and friends. In the last analysis all this will raise the arms race to an even more dangerous level. We do not wish this to happen and therefore we propose that agreement be reached on the mutual renunciation of the production of the neutron bomb so as to save the world from the emergence of this new weapon of mass destruction of human beings. Such is our sincere desire, such is our proposal to the Western Powers."

The delegation urged the Western countries to treat the Soviet proposal with all seriousness and responsibility (CCD/PV.767). The Soviet position on banning the neutron bomb was strongly supported by Poland (CCD/PV.768 and 783), Hungary (CCD/PV.770 and 783), Czechoslovakia (CCD/PV.771), Bulgaria (CCD/PV.772), Mongolia (CCD/PV.773) and the German Democratic Republic (CCD/PV.775 and 783). India believed it is equally urgent to ban development and deployment of new weapons or systems based on existing and available knowledge and principles of science and technology. Thus India believed that the development and deployment of the new weapon called the "neutron bomb" or the "reduced blast and enhanced radiation" bomb should be banned. Any development which would lower the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons should be strongly resisted (CCD/PV.771). The delegation of Ethiopia thought that, unless measures were taken to avert the trend towards production and deployment of the neutron bomb, the arms race might be intensified and the ongoing disarmament negotiations jeopardized. It was in that vein that the delegation viewed the concern expressed by many delegations in connexion with the production and deployment of the neutron bomb (CCD/PV.786).

179. Among the principal arguments put forward in favour of such a ban by the socialist States were the following: (a) the neutron was an indiscriminate and particularly cruel weapon of mass destruction, which could be used offensively as well as defensively and, eventually, strategically as well as tactically; (b) deployment of such weapons in Europe would be incompatible with détente and the spirit of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and would impede disarmament negotiations in other forums; (c) its development and deployment would result in countermeasures, thus escalating the arms race to a new and more dangerous level without any military or security advantages to either side; (d) the deployment in Europe of supposedly "clean" tactical nuclear weapons would lower the threshold of nuclear conflict; (e) the neutron bomb was not "clean" and, on the contrary, would produce persistent radio-active fallout; and (f) introduction of the bomb would have a destabilizing effect on the current politico-military situation and on disarmament negotiations. Mongolia spoke of the special responsibility of all members of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and called for more action in the matter of the neutron bomb by certain States of Western Europe so as not to violate the principle of equal security and alter the existing military and strategic balance.
180. In introducing their draft text (CCD/559) of an international agreement on the production, deployment and stockpiling of nuclear neutron weapons in March 1973, the Soviet Union stressed the view that the neutron bomb was on a par with such cruel and barbaric weapons as biological and chemical weapons, but that its true nature was being concealed. The explosion of one neutron bomb, it maintained, was equivalent in destructive power and unfavourable genetic effects to some dozens of traditional nuclear weapons of a similar yield. The delegation again emphasized that it was easier to prevent emergence of a new weapon than to ban it once it was in the arsenals of the States and held that a decision to produce and deploy neutron bombs would be as significant as the earlier decision to develop the hydrogen bomb. With particular regard to the draft agreement, the delegation urged immediate joint work on the preparation of an agreed text as another major contribution towards limiting nuclear arms and saving mankind from the threat of nuclear war (CCD/PV.778 and 782).

181. In rejecting the Soviet draft treaty banning nuclear neutron weapons, the delegation of the United States charged the USSR with engaging in a propaganda campaign which focused on a single aspect of the dangerous confrontation of conventional forces and nuclear weapons deployed in Europe and with attempting to divert the Committee's attention from serious attempts to develop arms control agreements that would contribute to international security. The United States delegation explained, in plain talk, that the reduced blast/enhanced radiation weapon was a nuclear weapon and, as such, a weapon of mass destruction specifically mentioned in the United Nations 1948 definition of mass destruction weapons. Neither the scientific principles underlying the reduced blast/enhanced radiation weapon nor the concepts of their application were new, the delegation pointed out, and, therefore, it should be discussed in the context of limitations on nuclear weapons, not new weapons of mass destruction. The delegation also explained that, in light of the three-to-one tank advantage enjoyed by the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe, the reduced blast/enhanced radiation weapon was being considered as defence against a possible massive tank attack in that theatre. It was pointed out, however, that no decision has as yet been made regarding either the production or deployment of the weapon. The delegation reiterated the hope expressed by the President of the United States of America that the Soviets would agree to begin addressing the question of tactical, or theatre, nuclear weapons, including reduced blast/enhanced radiation weapons and the SS-20. Several thousand tactical nuclear weapons were already deployed in Central Europe on both sides, the delegation pointed out, and it was only appropriate to address this issue in its entirety rather than one weapon at a time (CCD/PV.778).

182. The delegation of the United Kingdom stated that the United Kingdom Government considered that the highest priority should be given to nuclear disarmament. The draft Programme of Action (CCD/549), of which the United Kingdom was a sponsor, called for the halting and reversal of the nuclear arms race. The delegation therefore regretted that the Soviet Union had made a one-sided propaganda attack on enhanced radiation weapons whilst going ahead with the deployment of devastating new weapons systems of their own. The delegation considered that the reputation of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament as a serious expert body should be carefully preserved. The delegation hoped that instead of hearing any more of the draft treaty proposed by the Soviet Union and its allies the Committee would be getting from them serious proposals for balanced and realistic steps towards the control of the nuclear arms race (CCD/PV.779).
183. The delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany expressed similar views, stressing that the Soviet Union, while mounting a propaganda attack against enhanced radiation weapons, was going ahead with the deployment of its far more deadly SS-20; the delegation also held that the new bomb had been developed for defence use against military targets, such as tank forces, that only an aggressor would have to fear its use and that it could not accept the singling out of one weapon in a one-sided manner without putting it in its proper context of the East-West balance of military forces.

184. The draft convention to prohibit the bomb was vigorously supported by Mongolia (CCD/PV.773 and 783), Bulgaria (CCD/PV.774), the German Democratic Republic (CCD/PV.781), Hungary (CCD/PV.783), Poland (ibid.), and Czechoslovakia (CCD/PV.775 and 785). In addition to arguments previously put forward against deployment of the bomb, Bulgaria held that the draft convention was in accordance with the spirit of General Assembly decisions on the prohibition of new weapons of mass destruction and with world opinion. The German Democratic Republic held that the draft convention provided for equal obligations for all parties with no unilateral advantages for anyone. In reply to charges that the Soviet Union possessed more dangerous weapons, the delegation maintained that there was an approximate military balance in Europe and the deployment of the neutron bomb represented an attempt to upset that balance to the unilateral advantage of the West. Quoting Professor Burhop, President of the World Federation of Scientists, the German Democratic Republic delegation pointed out that the neutron nuclear weapon was a weapon par excellence for the aggressor who had the intention to conquer intact towns and industrial centres of another country. It also stressed that deploying that cruel weapon in the European States of NATO, including a neighbouring State of the German Democratic Republic would constitute an open threat to the physical existence of the German Democratic Republic people (CCD/PV.775). Mongolia emphasized that in submitting the draft convention, the socialist States members of the Committee were guided by a sincere desire to contribute to the halting of the arms race, particularly in the field of means of mass destruction of people, for they were deeply aware of the danger which nuclear neutron weapons present to peace and international security (CCD/PV.783).

185. Hungary held that the declared aim of deployment of the bomb was to change the balance of conventional forces in Europe and that its deployment would be an attempt to create a direct link between the conventional and the nuclear phases of military conflict. Hungary believed that criticism of the slow progress of nuclear disarmament in accordance with article VI of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons might increase if the neutron bomb was deployed and that near-nuclear States might be tempted to develop such a usable nuclear weapon.

186. Poland agreed that such deployment might have an impact on the non-proliferation régime. Bulgaria and Poland stressed that the Committee on Disarmament was the appropriate place to discuss the problem. Poland added that the neutron bomb could not be considered as a "bargaining chip" in another disarmament forum. Bulgaria urged that Committee discussions on the question begin without delay so that a new disarmament measure, filling a threatening gap in the field might be submitted to the special session of the General Assembly on disarmament. Hungary expressed the view that besides the harmful and dangerous consequences of the eventual deployment of the neutron weapon, it had also become clear that the weapon would not offer lasting advantages for those who were
pressing for a decision on its production and deployment. There was, therefore, no doubt that attempts would be made to use the weapon as a "bargaining chip" at arms limitation and disarmament talks and to increase economic and political pressure on other countries. For those reasons, the Committee should conduct urgent negotiations on the mutual prohibition of the neutron weapon. Poland observed that, whether or not the neutron bomb was based on a new scientific principle, it was a new weapon of mass destruction and the Committee was duty bound to seek to prevent its emergence, as it had banned the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the sea-bed and the hostile use of environmental modification techniques. Czechoslovakia pointed out several characteristics of the neutron weapon, clearly indicating that it was a new weapon of mass destruction and an offensive weapon that might be used especially for the suppression of national liberation movements in local conflicts in any part of the world (CCD/PV.705).

187. The delegation of Egypt also referred favourably to the draft convention of the socialist States members, holding that recent developments in the production of new weapons of mass destruction had already cast a shadow over the Committee's present session, as well as over arms control negotiations outside the Committee. The delegation considered those developments particularly alarming since they had taken place after the Committee had begun serious efforts to achieve a ban on all weapons of mass destruction (CCD/PV.782).

188. The delegation of the Netherlands said that its Government shared many of the concerns and doubts which had been expressed with respect to the enhanced-radiation, reduced-blast weapon, also called the neutron bomb. The debate on the weapon could be welcomed in so far as it focused the Committee's attention again on the place and role of nuclear weapons in the security system. The Committee should, however, accept the facts as they really are and not indulge in disregarding the complexities of the problems involved. The Netherlands Government would whole-heartedly welcome a situation in which it would be possible to prevent the introduction of the enhanced-radiation, reduced-blast weapon. That implied that all aspects of the balance of forces should be taken into account, the Netherlands delegation concluded (CCD/PV.783).

189. Later in the course of the spring session, the delegation of the Soviet Union stated that, should this new major initiative be implemented, all States of the world would be on the winning side. The delegation decisively rejected attempts aimed at justifying the development and deployment of neutron weapons based on references to changes in the military balance of forces in Europe. Those efforts, the Soviet delegation stressed, are groundless because, as it has been recently clarified once again at the most authoritative level in the Soviet Union, the USSR has not been enlarging its armed forces in Central Europe for a long time and does not intend to increase them in the future by a single soldier or by a single tank. Having noted the statement by the United States to the effect that it had put off a decision on the manufacture of nuclear neutron weapons, the Soviet delegation noted that, in that connexion, the Soviet Union has also expressed its intention not to begin production of neutron weapons if the United States did not produce it. It also held that this created the necessary prerequisites for the fruitful examination of the question of the prohibition of nuclear neutron weapons in the Committee (CCD/PV.789).
190. The delegation of Yugoslavia stressed that it had always determinedly upheld the prohibition of all types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, including the "nuclear neutron weapon" or reduced blast/enhanced radiation weapon. The production of such a weapon could only give added impetus to the nuclear arms race and thus take the world even further from the ultimate goal it was striving for: general and complete disarmament under strict international control. In the opinion of the Yugoslav delegation the solution of problems concerning the maintenance of international peace and security on a durable basis could not be sought by creating new types and systems of weapons for mass destruction, but primarily by taking vigorous measures for disarmament, particularly nuclear weapons (CCD/PV.789).

B. Question of the prohibition of chemical weapons

191. The delegation of Yugoslavia has pointed out that it speaks from the standpoint of a country not possessing chemical weapons, and on whose territory there are no such weapons. It has stressed that it is possible that some of the different attitudes to certain questions concerning the banning of chemical weapons arise precisely from the fact that not all States are in the same position regarding possession of chemical weapons. In the view of the Yugoslav delegation, chemical weapons represent a particular danger for smaller countries, perhaps even more than for bigger ones, because they do not usually possess an arsenal of different kinds of highly potent weapons: in addition, most of those countries do not possess the appropriate capacity for chemical and medical defence against such weapons. Past experience has seemed to confirm that view. Chemical warfare agents, the delegation has held, were used during the post-Second World War period only against those armies which did not possess them; and for that reason, in future discussions about chemical weapons, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should pay due attention to the security problems of all States and not, as has been the case so far, in the opinion of the delegation, consider the problem primarily from the standpoint of the security and mutual relationships of countries possessing chemical weapons. The delegation has further considered that a comprehensive ban would be the only lasting solution, but has not opposed a phased approach to such a ban if each step of the process towards the desired goal is strictly defined and linked to a time-limit. Otherwise, the delegation has concluded, a partial solution should in fact help to preserve the present situation and postpone the solution of the problem ad infinitum.

192. In early 1977, the delegation of Poland stated that, as was well known, Poland and other socialist countries opted for a comprehensive elimination of all chemical weapons, even if eventually reached through successive partial stages. The delegation was of the opinion that the ultimate prospect of a final solution would have a catalytic effect upon the pace of our efforts towards that goal. Much more complex and challenging, admittedly, the question of a generally acceptable verification system was the eventual compromise formula and would inevitably have to reflect the fact that chemical weapons production characteristics, and the corresponding verification system, had more in common with biological weapons than with nuclear ones. It also stood to reason that a widely acceptable verification mechanism in a future agreement on the elimination of chemical weapons must take due account of the following three considerations: (a) the existence and the general acceptance of the 1925 Geneva Protocol; (b) the degree of uncertainty as to
the size and character of the existing stockpiles of C weapons; and (c) the specifics of the chemical industry and its close relationship to the growth of national economies of States. The Polish delegation was confident that a satisfactory agreement could be worked out on all outstanding and difficult questions, if the flexible position of the Soviet Government on the elimination of chemical weapons, displayed in its recent memorandum (CCD/522), was matched with equal flexibility and goodwill on the part of other parties. Poland was prepared to join in a constructive search for such common ground in an effort to see chemical weapons eliminated for ever from the armories of all States (CCD/PV.735).

193. On the verification question, the delegation of Yugoslavia has considered that a unified system of national and international control measures would be one of the possible ways of organizing the verification process, with particular emphasis on the prevention of proliferation. The delegation has added the view that countries not possessing chemical weapons should have no particular difficulty in accepting on-site inspection in certain cases, provided all States parties were equally liable to such inspections. Finally, the delegation has stressed that verification should ensure: (a) controlled destruction of existing stockpiles of chemical weapons, (b) efficient supervision to ensure that the ban on development and production is respected and (c) prevention of the proliferation of chemical weapons and technology (CCD/PV.742).

194. In 1976, the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany emphasized that its country, which in 1954 had pledged itself under international law to manufacture neither nuclear, biological nor chemical weapons, attached great importance to the progress being achieved in the deliberations concerning a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The delegation supported the renewed request addressed to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament by the General Assembly to accord high priority to that question. Although during the last year the Committee had failed to produce any visible progress towards a prohibition, the delegation did not think the work carried out had been in vain. In 1975, five countries had presented working papers dealing chiefly with the exceedingly complex questions of definition and verification. The paper presented by the Federal Republic of Germany on the definition and classification of chemical warfare agents (CCD/458) attempted to develop, on the basis of objective criteria, a practicable method of distinguishing between warfare agents and other toxic substances, which were not to be considered as such. In the delegation's view, the submission of so many working papers testified to the continuing determination of many countries not to relax the efforts to secure the prohibition of chemical weapons (CCD/696).

195. With regard to verification, the delegation held that the question was without doubt the most important and the most difficult of the problems still unresolved, and that it was also the reason for the modest progress made so far towards a convention. The effectiveness of a verification system, the delegation held, depended on a combination of different means, and there was no doubt that the evaluation of statistics and a centralized information exchange system would be useful in this respect. However, the value of these elements should not be overrated, the delegation held, for in the final analysis, the system would not be sufficiently effective without international on-site inspections. Such inspections should, as a rule, be of a routine nature, the delegation believed. In other words it should be possible to carry them out without having to give any special reasons.
Inspections on challenge, or invitation, which would have to be based on suspicion, should play a merely supplementary role. Also, the regularity of inspections would be a key factor in confidence-building, whereas restriction of the system mainly to inspections based on suspicion could spread distrust and place a strain on relations between States. The delegation noted further that some countries had expressed concern that international verification systems, especially on-site inspections, would ultimately mean the surrender of commercial and military secrets. The Federal Republic, however, was convinced that a verification system could be designed that would ensure the protection of secrets, at least to the extent that they were legitimate within the meaning of the convention. It had already been said, the delegation concluded, that the same concern was expressed when the IAEA safeguards system was first discussed, but that it had since proved to be unfounded. Today IAEA safeguards were being applied in many parts of the world and there had been no complaints about attempted espionage (CCD/PV.765).

196. Czechoslovakia welcomed progress in so far as positions regarding the scope of the ban were concerned and noticed that there seemed to be more support for the view that all chemical weapons should be banned which - as was known - was the original view of the socialist countries (CCD/PV.742). The delegation shared the view that the question of control could quite reliably be solved by means of a system of national means of control combined with the necessary international procedures (CCD/PV.747a d 759).

197. The delegation of Romania has supported the prohibition of the development and production of all chemical weapons and the destruction of the existing stockpiles. In its view, a global approach would best satisfy the criteria for a genuine disarmament measure. It would also create the confidence necessary to stimulate other priority measures in the field of disarmament. Emphasizing that the Committee had at its disposal an exhaustive technical expertise, Romania has supported the idea of setting up a working group to consider a synthesis of the various ideas expressed on the basic provisions of such a treaty.

198. In the Romanian delegation's view, the draft treaty should be drawn up in accordance with the following criteria: (a) the scope of the treaty should be as broad as possible; (b) the purpose of the treaty should be clear and must have the same weight for all States parties, large or small, developed or less developed; (c) the treaty should help to increase confidence among States parties; (d) any partial treaty should lay the groundwork for the continuation of efforts to adopt measures prohibiting agents not yet covered by the treaty; and (e) the treaty must not hamper research in chemistry and its application for peaceful purposes.

199. The Romanian delegation regarded the prohibition of the production of chemical weapons as a stage in the process of eliminating all weapons of mass destruction. Efforts to eliminate chemical weapons must therefore be regarded as directly linked to efforts to eliminate other arms from the arsenals of States.

200. On the particular issue of verification, the Romanian delegation, recognizing the importance of the problem, stated that it had no preconceived ideas concerning the methods to be used. Regardless of whether the methods in question were
national or international, the system of verification could always prove to be a very difficult problem to solve if control was separated from the concept of international co-operation. In the opinion of the delegation, it was essential that the verification system envisaged should be based on a number of principles, namely respect for the equality and sovereignty of States parties, non-interference in their internal affairs and the desire for sincere co-operation in order to achieve disarmament. Those principles would provide all the conditions for a verification system corresponding to international law and capable of increasing confidence among the parties to the treaty. The delegation has attached importance to the proposal that the verification system should include, together with technical methods, a certain institutional framework. As not all States were able to pursue rapid development in the field of chemistry, such institutional framework would give to the less-advanced States an opportunity for direct and effective participation in the verification activities (CCD/PV.743).

201. The delegation of India noted that India had supported the General Assembly resolutions which in successive sessions accorded highest priority in the disarmament field to weapons of mass destruction and, accordingly, listed chemical weapons as the second priority item after nuclear items. India was therefore pleased to learn that the bilateral negotiations between the USSR and the United States on the chemical weapons question had reached a promising stage. It recognized that a chemical weapons agreement involved complex and protracted negotiations and hoped that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament would be able to start negotiations at the earliest time. India had always called for a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons so that all chemical agents having the capacity to act as chemical weapons could be wiped out once and for all. India had no chemical weapons and had no intention of acquiring them, the delegation added.

202. The delegation of Japan has maintained that the prevailing view is that a ban on chemical weapons should cover not only super-toxic compounds, but also other lethal agents and that the ban should be based on the general purpose criterion, supplemented by a toxicity criterion, such as the LD 50 spectrum criterion suggested by Japan in 1976. The delegation, considering the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (as amended) as a useful model for defining the scope of the ban, has suggested that banned agents be listed in three annexed lists rather than attempting to ban a category of weapon. The first list, the delegation has explained, would cover single-purpose super-toxic agents, the second would cover dual-purpose agents and the third would be for other chemical substances that had the dangerous characteristics of chemical weapon agents or that were precursors of binary weapons. Parties to the agreement should give notification of their activities with regard to the substances on the third list but, if it was felt necessary to control them strictly, they could be transferred either to the first or second lists following a periodic review. The delegation has also suggested a procedure for determining the agents to be included on the lists, as well as time-tables for the destruction of stocks on the two primary lists. Finally, the delegation has suggested that paragraph (b) of article I of the United Kingdom draft, concerning a ban on munitions, equipment or systems designed to deliver chemical agents for hostile purposes, should be modified to read: "munitions, equipment or systems designed to fill up, install or deliver such agents specified in the preceding paragraph (a), or chemical substances which are to show the same effect as those agents specified in paragraph (a) when the fired munitions reach their targets." In that connexion, the delegation has presented a working
paper (CCD/529) entitled 'Some thoughts on the international control of chemical weapons'. Concerning the destruction of stockpiles, the delegation of Japan has held that all single-purpose super-toxic agents (to be included in suggested list one) should be destroyed within five years, for example, with on-site verification, and that dual-purpose agents (to be included in the second list) should also be controlled to ascertain that their amounts did not exceed a State party's requirements for peaceful purposes. On the question of verification, the delegation of Japan has held that the prevailing view was that international verification, including on-site inspection, was necessary and that such inspections could supplement national means without unjustifiable intrusion (CCD/PV.739).

203. The delegation of Mexico has advocated the elimination of all chemical weapons. It had repeatedly expressed regret that the joint initiative on an international agreement prohibiting the most dangerous lethal means of chemical warfare, which the United States and the Soviet Union, in 1974, had agreed to consider, has not yet materialized. With regard to the general prospects for the achievement of a broadly acceptable ban, the delegation noted in 1977 the many proposals already before the Committee that might help to overcome the obstacles to agreement (CCD/PV.728).

204. The Canadian position, as outlined by its delegation, is that bilateral discussions between the USSR and the United States should lead very soon to the point where the Committee on Disarmament will be able to take up this important subject in a more meaningful way than is now possible. In the interim, Canada was giving further thought to the helpful United Kingdom draft and to the several thought-provoking comments that it has stimulated (CCD/PV.760). Canada had pointed out that to be effective any prohibition on the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and any agreement on their destruction must include concrete measures for effective verification of these provisions. For its own part, Canada had publicly renounced the first use of chemical weapons, and had also reported that it had destroyed its stocks of Second World War mustard gas. It would be useful for those countries which had not yet done so also to announce their current national policies with respect to chemical weapons issues. Canada has also suggested that all States should agree to prohibit the production and development of agents, munitions and delivery systems, while those States having chemical weapons stocks would agree to the destruction of an agreed quantity of their stocks within a fixed period. In the Canadian view, such a phased approach should lead, in agreed and verified stages, to an eventual total ban on all lethal chemical weapons agents and munitions, including stockpiles, which would be used for hostile purposes (CCD/PV.740).

205. In 1977, the delegation of the German Democratic Republic, noting that it supported the continuation of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament efforts to reach an understanding on the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, held that the absence of a ban on the development and production of chemical weapons in recent years had favoured the emergence of new chemical weapons. The development of binary chemical warfare agents had confronted the world with new problems and had not facilitated chemical weapons agreement. Moreover, new means of delivery had added to the dangers inherent in that terrible weapon of mass destruction, and it was therefore necessary to agree upon the prohibition and destruction of all chemical warfare agents without delay. With regard to the draft conventions of Japan and the United Kingdom, the
The delegation stressed that those documents showed how difficult and complicated it was to find a generally acceptable partial delimitation of means of warfare: and the ideas and solutions presented in those documents could not be regarded as satisfactory and provided no solution for the prohibition of binary chemical warfare agents, the effective prohibition of which was essential. In the view of the delegation, the draft convention tabled by the socialist States members in 1972 provided a solution to that problem, among others. Its comprehensive character guaranteed a radical prohibition of chemical weapons and the purpose criterion upon which it was based would ensure that no chemical industry would produce any chemical warfare agents in the future. The delegation also held that a comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons would entail the same advantages for all States. Articles II and III of the United Kingdom draft convention caused the delegation serious concern. It did not share the opinions that the obligation of parties to the convention to supply information on their chemical weapons before the coming into force of the convention was acceptable. Such an arrangement would injure the principle of equal security, with the consequence that a State possessing chemical weapons might give information on them without having the guarantee that other States would follow suit (CCD/PV.747).

206. With regard to the verification of compliance with a ban on chemical weapons, the German Democratic Republic delegation fully agreeing with the proposals contained in working paper CCD/403 and with the explanations given by the USSR was against the establishment of an international control organ with far-reaching control powers, because such an organ would legitimize interference in the internal affairs of other States and lead to the discovery of military and commercial secrets. In the delegation's view, a balanced combination of national means of control and of international procedures fully ensured the verification of compliance with a treaty prohibiting chemical weapons. The German Democratic Republic also attached great importance to the realization of the announced joint initiative of the Soviet Union and the United States. An agreement on the prohibition of the most dangerous, lethal chemical weapons might be an important step towards a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. Such an agreement should, however, contain provisions to ensure that the prohibition of the most dangerous, lethal chemical weapons would be but an initial phase to be followed by an all-embracing ban on chemical weapons. Along these lines, the delegation was ready to play an active and constructive part in working out an appropriate convention (CCD/PV.747).

207. The delegation of Egypt has emphasized the need for a provision in the text of a draft convention on chemical weapons to ensure that timely and effective assistance, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, could be rendered to a country victim of aggression through the use of such weapons. The delegation supported the idea that possible collective action could be taken by other countries in such a case. The delegation has also stressed the following positions with regard to a chemical weapons ban: (a) obligations emanating from a treaty on the subject should start, in principle, upon ratification, while measures for destroying the stockpiles could be effective upon signature; (b) the ban should cover the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons, their equipment and means of delivery, as well as the destruction of existing stocks; (c) the danger of a chemical weapon should not be measured by the degree of its toxicity alone, but also by the availability of protection against it, as well as by the kind of means of delivery; (d) the general purpose criterion for defining
the scope of the prohibition should be recognized, but more detailed provisions should be elaborated in the annexes to the treaty: such provisions should be revised and updated periodically; and (e) effective implementation of the prohibition should be ensured by a combination of national and international measures which would complement and supplement each other, thereby providing an acceptable verification system.

208. The delegation of Italy has noted on many occasions that the problem of the prohibition of chemical weapons is one of the priority tasks facing the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. While acknowledging the diversity of views subsisting on two of the key elements of an agreement, namely the scope and the verification system, the Italian delegation felt that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament had before it material enough to achieve substantial progress before the special session of the United Nations devoted to disarmament. Italy supported the draft convention submitted by the United Kingdom, considering it as a constructive and realistic "step-by-step" approach. The delegation proposed the establishment of an ad hoc working group, with the participation of experts, in order to elaborate the basic principles and the main elements of a future agreement (CCD/PV.728, 741 and 760). The latter Italian proposal was supported by many delegations.

209. In July 1977, the delegation of the United Kingdom expressed its gratitude to all the delegations which had commented on the draft chemical weapons convention it had tabled in 1976, and made some further explanations regarding its position on points of detail. The United Kingdom believed that the scope of the treaty should be as wide as possible. Defoliants, however, were better dealt with in a "use" convention such as that banning military or other hostile use of environmental modification techniques. Nor did the United Kingdom believe that a chemical weapons convention should ban irritants used for crowd control. Any convention should cover binary weapons. Detailed supplementary criteria for delineating the scope of a convention might usefully be put into a protocol. The United Kingdom believed that many of the fears expressed about the verification measures proposed in the draft were unfounded. Similar fears had been expressed about IAEA safeguards and had not proved justified. The United Kingdom welcomed the bilateral consultations in progress between the United States and the USSR and hoped they would proceed rapidly and constructively (CCD/PV.752).

210. At the 1977 session of the Committee, the delegation of Pakistan, holding that the achievement of a chemical weapons ban was really a question of establishing mutual confidence and that a solution would be found through a political decision, welcomed the continuing bilateral consultations and looked forward to further progress in the matter (CCD/PV.748).

211. Poland expressed the view that the ultimate goal of deliberations of the Committee on chemical disarmament was the strengthening of the ban of the use of chemical weapons as laid down in the Geneva Protocol of 1925 in order to preclude any possibility of chemical warfare. In practical terms that meant that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament must start to work towards a régime which, inter alia, would render irrelevant the reservations that a number of States parties made with regard to the option of retaliating in kind. In that respect the most effective and credible arrangement, the delegation held, would be a ban on the production and development of "C" weapons and the elimination of all
provisions should be included in the treaty providing for verification of compliance with, and for the implementation of, any arms-limitation or disarmament agreement. The delegation considered that verification must be tailored specifically to each and every arms-limitation or disarmament agreement negotiated. The delegation also welcomed the new round of the intensive Soviet-American talks which aimed at the formulation of a joint initiative as a first step towards a comprehensive ban. With respect to verification, Poland held that, to be really effective, a verification system must be tailored specifically to each and every arms-limitation or disarmament agreement negotiated. The delegation was satisfied that national means of control over compliance with a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons, combined - as suggested in the memorandum of the USSR on questions of ending the arms race and disarmament (CCD/522) - with certain supplementary control procedures with regard to the verification of the destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons, would be quite adequate. The delegation was also of the view that a comprehensive chemical weapons convention must provide either for the dismantling or for the conversion to peaceful civilian uses of all chemical weapons manufacturing facilities. No matter how sophisticated and fail-safe the non-intrusive method employed to verify that declared "C" weapons plants had stopped production, the delegation maintained, without actually being dismantled, the mere moth-balling of such plants would tend to breed suspicion as to the credibility of such a convention. Such a solution, moreover, might suggest, even against the best intentions of the parties, that the ban was of a provisional and tentative character (CCD/PV.764).

212. In the discussions at the Committee's 1978 spring session, both the Soviet Union and the United States recognized the primary importance attached by all countries to the question of prohibiting chemical weapons. The Soviet Union reminded the Committee that it had long advocated a complete and radical solution of the problem of both biological and chemical weapons. It advocated that an agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons should provide simultaneously for the renunciation of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, as well as for the destruction of all stockpiles of such weapons; only such a fundamental solution of the problem could finally and entirely eliminate the threat of the use of chemical means of warfare and place on an equal footing all countries, whether or not they possessed that type of weapon.

213. Both the Soviet Union and the United States also noted that bilateral negotiations on the subject were continuing, with a view to the elaboration of a joint initiative to be submitted to the Committee on Disarmament. Both countries also reported that some progress had been achieved in those talks, both with regard to the scope of the agreement and to its verification, but that several important questions still remained to be resolved. The Soviet Union stressed that the problem was a complex one and that time would be needed for its solution, while the United States conceded that it could not predict with certainty when the joint initiative might be completed. The United States assured the Committee, however, that it was continuing to make every effort to reach a prompt agreement on such an initiative, to be followed by the elaboration in the Committee of an agreement eliminating all chemical weapons (CCD/PV.767).
214. The United States further stated its belief that a chemical weapons convention would directly engage any country with a modern chemical industry and pose new challenges in the area of verification. These challenges, the delegation said, create an opportunity to work out innovative forms of international co-operation which, in turn, could build the confidence of States parties that the future convention is being fully complied with by others and lead to further general confidence which would enable active pursuit of broader multilateral disarmament measures in the years ahead. The United States provided assurance that it was making every effort to reach agreement on a joint initiative at an early date (CCD/PV.767).

215. The delegations of Poland (CCD/PV.768), Hungary (CCD/PV.770), Czechoslovakia (CCD/PV.771) and India (ibid.) specifically welcomed the information on the progress of the bilateral talks and hoped for an early agreement on the remaining points of the joint draft to be submitted to the Committee for elaboration. Poland believed that the fact that the two Powers had been able to register a large measure of understanding on such difficult questions as the scope of the ban, the elimination of stocks and the dismantling of manufacturing facilities, as well as on certain verification issues, augured well for an eventual broad-range agreement. Hungary, noting that its basic position was still that reflected in the draft convention submitted by the socialist States members in 1972, was pleased to learn that the joint draft under preparation provided for the broadest possible ban on chemical weapons. Czechoslovakia also expressed particular satisfaction that agreement had been reached that the ban would be comprehensive in scope, prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and the destruction of stocks. The delegation of Mongolia also reaffirmed its interest in a comprehensive solution of the problem and urged other participants in the discussions on the subject to make more constructive efforts to achieve that goal, which would be a genuine manoeuvre of disarmament (CCD/PV.773). The delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany also considered that a comprehensive approach to the subject was now possible and hoped the joint initiative would soon be forthcoming (CCD/PV.771). The delegation of India, stressing the high importance that the General Assembly attached to the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction, also expressed satisfaction that the bilateral talks on chemical weapons had reached a promising stage and urged every effort to bring the talks to a successful conclusion. Recognizing that negotiations on a chemical weapons agreement would be complex, it urged that the Committee be enabled to begin its work at an early date. The delegation further noted that India had always favoured a comprehensive ban on all chemical weapons and affirmed that it had no intention of acquiring such weapons (ibid.).

216. The delegation of Japan stated that if general agreement had already been reached between the United States and the Soviet Union on the scope of the chemical agents to be named in a chemical weapons agreement, Japan urged those two States to present those key elements of agreement to the Committee; if no agreement had been reached, at least the basic positions of the two States should be explained to the Committee (CCD/PV.776).

217. The delegation of Iran, in welcoming the news of progress at the bilateral talks, stressed the note of doubt it had detected concerning prospects for overcoming the remaining differences. The delegation had hoped that the joint
The delegation would be easier to realize than a full-scope treaty but if this proved not to be the case, the advantages of focusing on a first-step approach might be lost. The issue was vital to future disarmament talks, was highly political and technical and involved potentially more countries than most measures discussed previously; therefore, work on the issue must be pursued in the Committee pending the results of the bilateral talks (CCD/PV.778).

218. Late in the spring session, the delegation of the United States again stated that considerable progress had been made towards a United States/USSR joint initiative in the matter and that the pace of the bilateral work was being accelerated, but that there were still major issues to be resolved, particularly with respect to verification of compliance with a treaty (CCD/PV.781).

219. In summing up the current situation, the Soviet Union pointed out that very useful and extensive preparatory work on the prohibition of chemical weapons had been carried out in the Committee. The delegation mentioned in that connexion the great number of working documents submitted on the subject by member States as well as non-members, and the three draft conventions on the subject now before the Committee. It further stressed that the Committee had not only persistently pursued the goal of chemical weapons ban, but had intensified its efforts to achieve progress. The delegation concluded that the necessary prerequisites for the Committee's further productive work had been created in the current bilateral United States/USSR negotiations aimed at preparing a joint initiative on the subject (CCD/PV.781). The delegation of Ethiopia observed that much remained to be done to achieve a ban on chemical weapons (CCD/PV.786).

220. The delegation of the Soviet Union stated that during the work of the spring session of the Committee on Disarmament, there were continued negotiations on questions related to developing a joint USSR/United States initiative in the Committee on Disarmament on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Delegations of the USSR and United States in their joint statement have already informed the Committee that, in the course of the negotiations, further progress was achieved, particularly from the viewpoint of reaching agreement on the scope of the prohibition and on all related questions. The area of mutual understanding became broader also on verification problems pertaining to a very difficult and complicated sphere which is so sensitive for States. The Soviet delegation expressed its conviction that on some still outstanding aspects of those questions there could be found a solution of the kind which, while ensuring a reliable fulfilment of all obligations of States parties assumed under the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, would not, at the same time, infringe upon the sovereign rights of those States and would not lead to disclosing state or industrial secrets of one kind or another (CCD/PV.789).

221. The delegation of Sweden reminded the Committee that the acquisition of chemical agents, weapons and delivery systems was not the only decisive factor involved in achieving an offensive chemical warfare capability, because it was equally important to acquire the necessary training, planning and organization to enable operational use of those weapons. Therefore, any international convention on the subject should not only prohibit the development, production and stockpiling of such weapons but also other preparations for offensive chemical warfare (CCD/PV.785).
222. The delegation of Ethiopia stated that it would give full support to the joint declaration of the Soviet Union and the United States to assist the Committee in achieving early agreement on a prohibition of all chemical weapons. The delegation observed that having once been a victim of the horrors of chemical weapons, Ethiopia attached special importance to the urgency of an agreement on the subject (CCD/PV.786).

223. The delegation of Czechoslovakia held that the only suitable solution of the verification problem lay in a combination of national and international procedures as proposed in a variety of documents, including the 1972 draft convention of the socialist countries. The delegation added the view that on-site inspections would be technically immensely demanding and could not be carried out without negative consequences for the sovereign rights of contracting parties (CCD/PV.771). The delegation of India held that verification procedures for all disarmament agreements should be flexible. Insistence on only one type of verification method would only reduce the credibility of the principle of verification. At the same time, verification should not be used as a pretext for affecting security or other interests of States (ibid.).

224. The delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany stressed that the experience it had gained with international controls, connected with the ban it had accepted on the production of chemical weapons, had not hampered development of the German chemical industry and that it wished to share that experience to help develop a control system for a multilateral chemical weapons ban (CCD/PV.777).

C. Question of the prohibition of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction

225. The delegation of Romania has declared its support for the conclusion of an agreement in the field of new weapons of mass destruction that would prove to be both possible and useful. The purpose of the agreement would be to express, in an international instrument, the political will of States not to direct certain achievements of science and technology towards military purposes. The basic conclusion which emerged from the debates in the Committee, the delegation has maintained, is that new types of weapons of mass destruction are already on the point of entering into the arms race. The role of the Committee is therefore to mobilize political will in order to prevent the extension of military rivalry in that new field. Once that political will has been consolidated, the technical aspects of the problem, even though they seemed complex could, as in so many other cases, be solved. The delegation has further stated that the negotiation of such a new agreement should take into account some basic requirements, as follows: (a) the consideration of the question of new types of weapons of mass destruction must not divert the attention of the Committee from its responsibility to work for the adoption of effective disarmament measures related to the already existing weapons of mass destruction in the military arsenals of States and, first and foremost, nuclear weapons; (b) as a step intended to create greater confidence, the agreement must occupy a clearly defined place in the context of disarmament negotiations and at the same time stimulate further efforts in that direction; (c) as the agreement would be preventive in character, it must satisfy...
two particularly important conditions. On the one hand, it must not in any way or on any pretext hamper technological and scientific research for peaceful purposes or its application in the interest of the economic development of peoples, particularly of the developing countries. On the other hand, the coverage of the agreement, which concerns a field that is changing constantly, must be subject to periodic review in the light of the advances in science and technology. The viability of the agreement, the delegation concluded, would doubtless depend on the balance between the rights and obligations stipulated for the States parties (CCD/PV.743).

226. Canada has expressed the belief that, as has been demonstrated by the thorough and lengthy discussions on the Soviet proposal, there is no justification for the belief that new weapons of mass destruction based on new applications or new principles of science threaten to appear in the foreseeable future, let alone in the near term. If the possibility of any such development were to become in any way a tangible prospect, the delegation believes, the Committee on Disarmament had the means to give immediate international attention to the danger; the delegation has held, however, that there is nothing in the record of the Committee's lengthy and broad consideration of the Soviet initiative to suggest to Canada that anything like an "umbrella" agreement could be of any practical value, even if one could be worked out. The delegation has further held that experience has shown that each type of weapon possesses its own special set of problems, and not only with respect to verification. The requirement is always, therefore, to understand the precise problem and to devise a specific agreement to meet the particular need and to encourage the broadest possible international adherence. The delegation has also maintained that, until something more tangible came into view on which it could focus in a practical way, it would support the commonsense approach suggested by the United Kingdom delegation, that the Committee should seek "a firm condemnation by the world community of the development of new weapons of mass destruction, coupled with a request to this Conference to keep the matter under review".

227. In 1977, the delegation of the United Kingdom stated that, while supporting the aim of preventing the development of new weapons of mass destruction, it believed that a single treaty on the subject would have to be so general in its scope and so vague in its definitions that it would not be effective. A more fruitful approach, it held, would be a firm condemnation by the world community of the development of such weapons coupled with a request to the Committee to keep the matter under review (CCD/PV.757).

228. The delegation of Italy held that the question of the prohibition and development of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons should be dealt with bearing in mind the 1948 United Nations resolution, which contained suitable criteria likely to ascertain the actual emergence of new types of such weapons that scientific and technological progress might foster. This complex problem - of a fundamentally preventive nature - had to be carefully studied and kept under review by the Committee, without, however, diverting attention from the priority issues (CCD/PV.760).

229. In 1977, the Swedish delegation said that Sweden had welcomed the initiative to try to put a definite obstacle to potentially disastrous developments, but had concluded that it was unfortunately not possible to achieve an omnibus agreement to ban new weapons once and for all time. In the delegation's view, the most appropriate way to prevent the development of such weapons would be
to engage the Committee on Disarmament in a procedural review of the pertinent areas to detect future dangerous signs and, if such were detected, to conclude rapidly agreements on the particular new types of weapons involved. Accordingly it supported the United Kingdom proposal for a firm general condemnation by the world community, coupled with a request to the Committee to keep the matter under review (CCD/PV.764).

230. The United States believed the most effective approach to dealing with new weapons of mass destruction is by negotiating individual agreements on specific new types of such weapons as they were identified. Linking negotiations on specific agreements to conclusion of an omnibus treaty covering all new types of weapons of mass destruction in general, in the United States view, threatened to obstruct scientific development in areas where it would neither be necessary nor advisable. Furthermore, dealing with principles not currently understood or relationships among known principles that have not as yet been conceived, would prevent dealing in a well-considered manner with the problem of bringing weapons of mass destruction, based on new principles or new relationships, under control. The United States believed the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should keep this issue under continuing review, as it currently did in its informal meetings on the subject, with a view toward negotiating individual agreements on specific new types of weapons of mass destruction as they were identified (CCD/PV.761).

231. In 1977, the delegation of Poland stated that it was somewhat disappointing to listen to some delegations dismissing out of hand as irrelevant certain areas of science and technology where there was good reason to fear potential new weapons of mass destruction, such as the use of acoustic or electromagnetic waves to affect human targets. At a time when technology, especially weapons-related technology, was developing by leaps and bounds it was hardly possible to deny the realism of warnings against a breakthrough that might well doom many thousands of people. In that connexion, the delegation noted that, when leading scientists first grasped the potential destructiveness of nuclear energy, some of their contemporaries labelled their discovery as "sheer fantasy". The Polish delegation considered it significant and timely that, apart from requesting the Committee on Disarmament to continue negotiations, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, on the prohibition of the development of new weapons of mass destruction, the General Assembly deemed it also proper to urge all States "to refrain from any action which would impede international talks aimed at working out an agreement or agreements to prevent the use of scientific and technological progress for the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons".

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232. At its 1978 spring session, the Committee continued to keep the question under active discussion. From the beginning of the session the Soviet Union, noting that 110 States had supported General Assembly resolution 32/84 A, urged a comprehensive ban on all new weapons and systems of mass destruction on the basis of its revised draft agreement (CCD/PV.767 and 781). The Soviet position was strongly supported by the delegations of Poland (CCD/PV.768 and 783), Hungary (CCD/PV.770), Czechoslovakia (CCD/PV.771), the German Democratic Republic (CCD/PV.775 and 783), Mongolia (CCD/PV.773). For example, the German Democratic Republic noted that the NATO countries seemed ready to negotiate a ban on a new weapon of mass destruction only when the development of such a weapon could be
clearly identified and wondered if that position meant that negotiations in the field could begin only after such weapons had been developed and were already in the arsenals of States. It specifically opposed such a position, holding that the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, which were likely to be misused as an instrument to change the military balance, must be prohibited from the very beginning by a comprehensive and preventive agreement.

233. India also supported the Soviet initiative to ban the development and production of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction in conformity with its principled opposition to all weapons of mass destruction including those in the arsenals of nations today. India was of the view that it is important that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should lend its support to all efforts which would nip in the bud the development of future generation of weapons and systems of mass destruction. India also believed it would not be enough to prevent the development and deployment of weapons and systems based on new scientific principles and that it was equally urgent to ban the development and deployment of new weapons or systems based on existing and available knowledge and principles of science and technology; otherwise, the exercise of banning new weapons and systems of mass destruction would become meaningless.

234. Czechoslovakia held that research and technological development belonged, at the present stage, among the main factors of the arms race. The delegation believed that a comprehensive ban of development and manufacture of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction would be the best way to avoid the possibility of military misuse of scientific discoveries for creating new weapons of mass destruction (CCD/PV.775).

235. In direct response to the view of the Western countries that it was difficult to reach a comprehensive agreement on the matter because the possible areas of development of new weapons of mass destruction could not be foreseen, the Soviet Union stressed that it could not accept such a view, since it was precisely an agreement in principle that was needed, to be followed, when necessary, by additional specific agreements to ban particular types of weapons. The revised draft convention of the Soviet Union (CCD/511/Rev.1) fully met that need, the delegation maintained (CCD/PV.782). The delegations of Hungary (CCD/PV.783) and Poland (ibid.) also stressed that a comprehensive agreement on the subject would not preclude the possibility of future agreements to ban specific types of weapons. A number of socialist States members also stressed that the General Assembly, in its resolutions 32/84 A and B, had given a clear and unmistakable mandate to the Committee for achieving a ban on new weapons of mass destruction. The delegation of Egypt also referred to the two resolutions and stressed that it looked forward to meaningful discussions of the problem in the Committee (CCD/PV.782).

236. The Hungarian delegation maintained that the appearance of new sophisticated weapons, among others the cruise missile and the neutron weapon, testified to the expansion of a concept that each weapon made possible by scientific and technological progress should be developed and deployed. It emphasized that new achievements were at the threshold of military application and that, in these conditions, the tendency of a technological race would inevitably lead to a qualitatively new phase in the arms race. The foreseeable dangers of this coming phase for peace and stability and for disarmament were substantially greater than before, the delegation held. In the delegation's view, another example was the
development of weapons which, by the manner of their deployment, were difficult or impossible to verify with means and devices used for the verification of existing arms limitations agreements. Efforts to halt and reverse the arms race would inevitably fail if disarmament forums did not follow closely developments of that type (CCD/PV.783).

237. The Mongolian delegation, in reaffirming its position, stressed the urgent need to place a reliable barrier in the way of the technological arms race, which today was becoming more real than ever before (CCD/PV.783).

238. The Soviet Union noted that the general question of the prohibition of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction and of radiological weapons was being examined bilaterally by the Soviet Union and the United States (CCD/PV.767, 781 and 782).

239. The Federal Republic of Germany recalled resolution 32/84 B on mass destruction weapons "based on new scientific principles" which was sponsored by 10 countries, including the Federal Republic of Germany, in the General Assembly at its thirty-second session and adopted on 12 December 1977 with a majority of more than 100 votes. The invitation to the Committee on Disarmament contained in paragraph 5 of that resolution, reading "while taking into account its existing priorities, to keep under review the question of the development of new weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and to consider the desirability of formulating agreements on the prohibition of any specific new weapons which may be identified", was a good basis for further intensive discussion (CCD/PV.771).

240. Later in the session, the Soviet Union stated that it would continue to urge the need for further efforts to achieve a comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. Together with a comprehensive agreement, the Soviet Union also advocated the conclusion of special agreements on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of particular new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. In that connexion, it drew attention to the new initiative of the socialist countries concerning the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear and neutron weapons. In the opinion of the Soviet Union, the urgency of the problem of the earliest possible conclusion of such a comprehensive agreement and of such special agreements had recently not only not diminished but, on the contrary, increased. The course of modern scientific and technological progress witnessed to the fact that, by reason of the latest successes in the fundamental sciences and the high level of technology, the probability of the emergence of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction was increasing. All that was causing growing concern in the world over the danger of the creation of new types of weapons of mass destruction. In order to make more purposeful and thorough the Committee's work of establishing the agreed text of a comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, and particularly its work on the definition of the prohibition's scope, a group of qualified governmental experts should be established under the auspices of the Committee to consider the question of possible areas of development of new types of weapons of mass destruction to be included in the initial list of the types of such weapons to be prohibited under a comprehensive agreement.
241. To that end, the delegation submitted a draft decision (CCD/564) for the Committee's consideration, noting its belief that the setting up of such a group would meet the wishes of the General Assembly in the matter and also narrow the divergences of views on the subject in the Committee (CCD/PV.782). The Soviet proposal was supported by Czechoslovakia (CCD/PV.775 and 785), the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland (CCD/PV.783) and Mongolia (ibid.). The delegation of Egypt thought that meaningful discussion might lead to the establishment of a working group with the task of elaborating an agreement or agreements on the subject (CCD/PV.782).

242. The delegation of Ethiopia stated that, in keeping with its view to come closer to the goal of genuine disarmament, the nuclear Powers should take concrete steps to avoid the development and production of increasing numbers and more devastating types and systems of weapons of mass destruction (CCD/PV.786).

243. The delegation of the United States of America, on the last day of the spring session, reiterated its conviction that the most effective approach to the issue of new weapons of mass destruction was by negotiating individual agreements on specific new types of such weapons as they were identified. Dealing in a loose, even vague manner, the delegation said, with principles not clearly understood or relationships among known principles that had not yet been conceived would merely create the illusion of having dealt with the problem of new weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, it pointed out, the omnibus treaty approach supported by some members of the Committee would inevitably lead to continuous haggling over the designation of new weapons as new weapons of mass destruction. The United States believed the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should keep the issue under continuing review in the course of its informal meetings on the subject and opposed establishment of an ad hoc working group to consider the question as proposed by the delegation of the USSR.

D. Question of the prohibition of radiological weapons

244. The United States stated that considerable progress had been made towards a joint initiative on radiological weapons, holding that such a ban, while relatively less significant than a comprehensive test ban or a chemical weapons convention, would be a logical step to fill a gap in the panoply of existing arms control measures and to head off possible development of hitherto untried weapons of mass destruction mentioned in the 1948 United Nations definition. The delegation believed the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament could consider a comprehensive prohibition on radiological weapons without interfering with higher priority issues before it, and thus effectively guard against this potential threat by acting promptly and dealing with such weapons before rather than after they were in the arsenals of States. The negotiations of such a ban would be an appropriate task for the Committee (CCD/PV.767 and 781). Most delegations welcomed the bilateral talks on the subject and hoped for early results. The delegation also held that it should be possible to elaborate a convention that would save mankind from developing new types of mass destruction weapons in that sphere (CCD/PV.771).

245. The Soviet Union emphasized that it is difficult to remove weapons of one kind or another, which have already been developed, from the arsenals of States,
and that, consequently, it is much more reasonable, advisable and correct to prevent their emergence in advance (CCD/PV.721) and called upon the Committee on Disarmament to take into consideration that circumstance (CCD/PV.736). In that connexion, it stressed the possibility and need for concluding specific agreements on the prohibition of specific types of weapons which are not yet in the arsenals of States but which can be developed and produced, in cases when the danger of the development of such weapons becomes clear. The Soviet Union pointed out that radiological weapons, the prohibition of which is being now negotiated between the USSR and the United States of America, is precisely such a specific case. It clarified that it meant the prohibition of the development of weapons on the basis of the use of the spent fuel of atomic reactors and of other radioactive materials designed to injure human beings through radioactive emissions and to contaminate terrain, water, military hardware and military and civilian targets (CCD/PV.760).

246. At the last meeting of the spring session, the delegation of the United States reported that the two sides were close to full agreement on a possible joint initiative for the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, but stressed that the United States shared the view that work on a possible radiological weapons convention should in no way interfere with work on the Committee's other tasks (CCD/PV.789).

E. Question of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control

1. General

247. The Italian delegation, in 1977, stressed the importance of a patient and conscientious search for initiatives and solutions which would make it possible to achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The delegation thought that the pursuit of that ultimate objective called for the removal of a number of obstacles which could be eliminated only by a process of patience and gradual rapprochement, during which initiatives aimed at strengthening confidence would be undertaken simultaneously with realistic disarmament measures, accompanied by appropriate guarantees. Italy also remained convinced of the need to undertake a programme of systematic and general disarmament in accordance with consistent and coherent general criteria (CCD/PV.728).

248. The delegation of Yugoslavia has held that, in order to make real progress toward fundamental disarmament agreements, simultaneous action should be taken in the following three directions: (a) the acceleration of negotiations and the conclusion of international agreements on those problems of disarmament which have been discussed in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament for several years; (b) the undertaking of the most serious efforts and urgent measures aimed at halting the unabated arms race at its source, which now represents one of the basic obstacles to achieving progress on disarmament; (c) the implementation, consistently and fully, of all the objectives and provisions of international agreements in the field of disarmament and not just those selected by individual preference. In the absence of a broader and agreed programme of action and simultaneous progress in these three fields, the delegation has further maintained the treaties concluded so far have failed to provide an important contribution to the solution of the substantial problems of disarmament. The delegation has added that if these treaties are not followed very soon by new agreements and by positive development with regard to halting the arms race at its source, they will lose their validity if only because of the fast technological development in the field of armaments, which is making the arms race increasingly dangerous and complex (CCD/PV.742).
249. The delegation of Ethiopia thought that, on the whole, negotiations in certain most important fields were slow in coming. At the same time, far too many technical and financial resources which should have been devoted to combating poverty and promoting economic and social development for developing member countries were diverted to the arms race (CCD/PV.786).

250. At the last meeting of the spring session, the representative of Mexico, Mr. Alfonso García Robles, made a statement in which he recalled that at the opening meeting of the Committee, on 14 March 1962, the representative of the Secretary-General had stressed the importance of both the work which was about to begin and the contribution which Members of the United Nations, whether militarily powerful or not, could make to that work, as well as the need to achieve concrete results. The representative of Mexico stated that the words "concrete results" should serve as the basis for the assessment of the situation to be made at the forthcoming special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. For the reason that the delegation of Mexico, together with that of Sweden, had submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session a draft of an introduction to the final document which begins as follows:

"The Disarmament Decade solemnly declared in 1969 is coming to an end. Unfortunately", the objectives established on that occasion by the General Assembly appear to be as far away today as they were then, or even further. No 'effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament' have materialized, and still less has there been any progress that might lead to the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Neither has it been possible to free, for the purposes of economic development, any amount, however modest, of the enormous resources and energy, both material and human, that are squandered on the unproductive and wasteful arms race, which places a great burden on both the developing and developed countries."

The representative of Mexico concluded by stating that the two texts which he had quoted had to be kept very much in mind in order to obtain a balanced and objective idea of what the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament had achieved and what the special session should accomplish (CCD/PV.789).

251. Regarding the question of conventional arms, in 1966 the delegation of the United States presented six principles which could be used as a basis for regional agreements in the conventional arms field. In 1970, they recommended three additional steps that States could take unilaterally which in their cumulative effect, even without formal binding agreements, could constitute reliable arms limitations on a regional basis (CCD/PV.487). In 1975, they suggested that it would be useful for the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to identify and discuss principles of conduct that could be applicable on a world-wide basis to the acquisition or transfer of conventional arms. The United States suggested four principles as follows: (a) States to judge whether the supply or acquisition of arms will have adverse effects on regional or international security; (b) consultations among interested States on the possible effects of arms acquisitions; (c) States to limit their acquisition of arms to those deemed indispensable for their security so as not to divert resources unnecessarily from economic and social development; and (d) States to consider applying the same criteria to the export of equipment and technology for arms production as they apply when authorizing the export of arms (CCD/PV.665). In 1976, the delegation of
In 1977, the United Kingdom delegation once more urged discussion of the possible arrangements for multilateral restraint in conventional arms transfers and welcomed the initiatives in that field taken by the United States, and in the United Nations by the Government of Japan (CCD/PV.757).

252. At the Committee's 1978 spring session, the delegation of the United States, in pointing out that the danger posed by nuclear weapons was most likely to result from escalation of a military conflict initiated with conventional weapons, expressed its belief that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should devote some of its energies to dealing with the problems associated with conventional arms. The United States was of the view that much more should be said and done about the massive diversion of resources to the accumulation of conventional arms and that the responsibility of curbing the horizontal spread of conventional weapons must be shared between suppliers and recipients as well. In the United States delegation's view, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament possessed both the expertise and political representation to consider and develop measures in this area which would increase stability in a number of regions in the world and contribute significantly to the advancement of ultimate disarmament objectives (CCD/PV.781).

253. With regard to the particular problem of conventional arms, the delegation of Italy expressed the view that in parallel with nuclear disarmament, urgent measures of cooperation should be promoted in view of bringing to a halt the conventional arms race. To that end, Italy envisaged the establishment, under Article 29 of the Charter of the United Nations, of a commission divided into regional sub-commissions, entrusted with the task of controlling the international transfer of conventional weapons (CCD/PV.760; see also CCD/568).

254. With more direct reference to European regional disarmament, the delegation of Romania has pointed out the urgency being increasingly felt in Europe for adopting practical measures of disarmament and military disengagement. On that continent, more than in any other part of the world, there was an unprecedented concentration of armed forces and modern armaments, including nuclear weapons and, there, the two military blocs confronted one another. The delegation has added that the strengthening of peace and security in the world could not be divorced from the development of the situation in Europe. To the extent that the Committee, as a multilateral disarmament negotiating body, wished to make a genuine and lasting contribution to disarmament, it must also devote special attention to the continent of Europe (CCD/PV.731).

255. India took the position that while it was not opposed to a discussion of the question of conventional weapons in the context of general and complete disarmament, it would oppose any attempt to divert attention from the highest priority items that could only be discussed on a global basis. Furthermore, India could not accept the proposition that nuclear weapons and conventional weapons should be weighed in the same scale (CCD/PV.771).

256. The delegation of Ethiopia also thought that conventional arms control should be carried out in the framework of general and complete disarmament and should not divert attention from priority issues of nuclear disarmament (CCD/PV.786).

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257. At the 1978 spring session of the Committee, virtually all delegations have continued to recognize general and complete disarmament as the ultimate goal of all disarmament efforts. Specific comments, however, were made largely in the context of the elaboration of a comprehensive disarmament programme.

258. The Italian delegation, in joining the consensus in the adoption of the final report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to the General Assembly at its special session devoted to disarmament, regretted that, owing to the opposition of a delegation, it had not been possible to regroup the statements made by various delegations on the problem of conventional weapons under a separate heading entitled "questions of conventional arms and regional disarmament" (CCD/PV.789).

2. Comprehensive programme of disarmament

259. Early in 1977, the delegation of Mexico, referring to the General Assembly's request in resolution 31/68, proposed that the Committee take as a basis for its discussion on a comprehensive programme of disarmament contained in document A/8191 and Corr.1 which should be revised in the light of developments since its submission to the General Assembly in 1970. Later in the summer session of 1977, noting it appeared that the Committee would begin consideration of the question of such a programme at the outset of its 1978 session, the delegation introduced, as a contribution to that task, a preliminary draft comprehensive programme (CCD/545 and Corr.1) which, the delegation said, largely reproduced the contents of document A/8191 and Corr.1, with certain changes, including one serving to draw attention to the degree of responsibility to be borne by the principal nuclear-weapons States in implementing various measures (CCD/PV.765).

260. Early in its 1978 spring session, the Committee decided to establish an ad hoc group to elaborate a comprehensive programme of disarmament. The group would use as its basic working texts all Committee documents on the subject, beginning with the 1961 Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for disarmament negotiations and taking into account other documents submitted to the Committee during the course of its work by members or non-members of the Committee.

261. During the discussions, the following new documents on the subject were submitted to the Committee: (a) working paper on the question of the drafting of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, submitted by Italy (CCD/548); (b) working paper on the comprehensive programme of disarmament, submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the USSR (CCD/552); (c) working paper on the subject of a comprehensive programme of disarmament submitted by Romania (CCD/553); (d) working paper containing suggestions for inclusion in a comprehensive programme, submitted by Nigeria (CCD/555); and (e) study on the establishment of an international disarmament organization, submitted by the Netherlands (CCD/565).

262. In addition, a number of delegations submitted documents reproducing working papers or other views on the same general subject that they had already submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session Devoted to Disarmament. Among these were: (a) draft programme of action for the special session, submitted by the United Kingdom and also sponsored by Canada, Germany, Federal Republic of,
263. In submitting its document CCD/548, the delegation of Italy stated that it offered a realistic contribution to the framing of an orderly and articulated set of guidelines for future disarmament negotiations in appropriate forums, but stressed that it was not intended to counter any other formal working document already before the Committee. The first part, the delegation pointed out, dealt with basic principles for such negotiations such as the observance of a degree of flexibility, the maintenance of a balance between nuclear and conventional measures, the co-ordination of global and regional initiatives, the acceptance of a step-by-step approach to prevent destabilizing effects and facilitate agreement on effective verification measures; the second part offered a suggested set of priority measures, involving in the first instance nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, but including conventional weapons (CCD/PV.767). The delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany welcomed CCD/548, which it believed contained good suggestions for a comprehensive disarmament programme to be drawn up by the Committee; such a programme, by its nature, had to be conceived as a long-term instrument (CCD/PV.771).

264. In introducing its paper on international mechanisms for disarmament (CCD/568), the Italian delegation pointed out that the first part of the paper dealing with the role of the United Nations in disarmament, suggested that the First Committee of the General Assembly concentrate its future efforts in the main on problems of disarmament and international security; the paper also suggested that, in connexion with the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the role of the Security Council under Article 26 of the Charter of the United Nations should be reviewed and that the Council itself consider creating, under Article 29, subsidiary organs charged with specific tasks in the field of arms control, particularly a committee, divided into regional sub-committees, entrusted with control of international conventional arms transfers (CCD/PV.784). (The Italian delegation made additional observations on the parts of CCD/568 concerning organization and procedures of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and possible international verification machinery, which are noted under section G and section E.3 below.)

265. Introducing document CCD/549, the delegation of the United Kingdom stated that, while it did not wish to duplicate discussions taking place in the Preparatory Committee in New York, it thought it would be useful to circulate in the Committee the document submitted to the Preparatory Committee, to be taken into account together with other relevant documentation such as the Mexican paper (CCD/545) and the Italian paper (CCD/548).
266. In introducing document CCD/552 on behalf of seven socialist States members, the Soviet Union confirmed the continued relevance to the problem of its 1977 memorandum and noted that the new working paper was based on proposals presented by the same sponsors to the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session, as well as proposals, particularly in the field of nuclear disarmament, that had recently been put forward (see sect. A above). The sponsors of the paper, the delegation added, proceeded from the premise that a comprehensive disarmament programme should define fundamental purposes and principles, which should include such principles as that of not impairing the interests of any of the parties to an agreement, the abandonment of attempts to obtain unilateral advantages, the universal affirmation and development of the principle of the non-use of force in international relations the principle that negotiations and agreements should involve the largest possible number of States, particularly the nuclear Powers and States possessing the most powerful weapons and armed forces, together with such other principles as should be used for guidance in matters of disarmament. The programme should then propose specific disarmament measures in all possible areas and, finally, put forward basic provisions dealing with forms of negotiations and the negotiating machinery to be used (CCD/PV.773). Mongolia (CCD/PV.773) and the German Democratic Republic (CCD/PV.775) made similar statements in explanation of the document. Mongolia stated that it proceeded from the premise that the programme of action on disarmament should include the main areas in which efforts must be made to achieve the elaboration of suitable international agreements. At the same time, it was extremely important to define the fundamental provisions and principles which should underlie negotiations on, and the solution to, questions relating to the curbing of the arms race and to disarmament (CCD/PV.773).

267. Introducing its document CCD/553, the delegation of Romania, holding that the need for a comprehensive disarmament programme arose from the growing anxiety of the international community concerning the unprecedented accumulation of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, noted that the need had become more urgent as a result of the preparations for a special session of the General Assembly on disarmament. Arms control measures achieved so far, the delegation held, had had no perceptible impact on the dynamics of the arms race and, accordingly, one of the basic objectives of the special session was the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament capable of leading to general disarmament. Such a programme (a) must place disarmament negotiations in perspective once again, creating a real impetus to reverse the escalation of arms and gradually to reduce and eliminate the factors responsible for such escalation; (b) must consist of a systematically organized combination of measures leading up to major objectives and to the final goal of general and complete disarmament, with each specific measure opening the way for other measures in the framework of the general pattern; (c) must be comprehensive in order to mobilize the political will of States, with the various measures in the programme negotiated concurrently as organic parts of a single effort; (d) must meet the interests of all States and be carried out with the participation of all, with global, regional and bilateral measures all incorporated into a unitary concept; and (e) must not simply represent a plan of efforts to achieve the objective within a reasonable time period but also suggest ways and means of achieving the desired goal (CCD/PV.774).

268. Introducing document CCD/554, the delegation of Sweden noted that it contained some key elements of a programme of action for disarmament and the machinery for negotiations to that end. It was focused on subjects in which Sweden had long taken a special interest, such as nuclear disarmament, the prohibition of particularly inhumane weapons, the reduction of military budgets, the reorganization
of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the strengthening of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament; it also proposed that a second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament should be convened in 1982 (CCD/PV.774).

269. In introducing documents CCD/556 and 557, the delegation of Pakistan noted that they had already been submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session and that their submittal to the Committee was a formality. The papers represented an attempt to focus on issues which, in the view of Pakistan, deserved increasing attention and were of particular concern to developing countries (CCD/PV.778).

270. Introducing documents CCD/560 and 561 and Add.1, the delegation of Mexico noted that the papers were self-explanatory supplements to its paper CCD/545 and gave the following principal reasons for presenting them to the Committee for consideration in its work on a comprehensive disarmament programme: (a) regarding document CCD/560, Mexico was convinced that the programme to be prepared by the Committee must, like the comprehensive programme of 1970, contain a section defining the fundamental principles for implementation of the programme, and the Mexican document set forth 25 such principles, including affirmations that the final objective should be general and complete disarmament, that the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons should have the highest priority and that the United Nations has a primordial role in disarmament; (b) regarding document CCD/561, the paragraph of most use to the Committee was undoubtedly the one to the effect that the Committee should undertake preparation of a comprehensive programme as soon as it had undergone the reforms envisaged in the draft final document of the Conference and that the programme should contain procedures for facilitating the co-ordination of all disarmament negotiations and ensuring that the General Assembly was kept fully informed; (c) lastly, document CCD/561/Add.1 contained an additional 15 illustrative measures which might be included in the Committee’s comprehensive programme of disarmament if they were not included in the short-term programme of action that might be adopted by the special session (CCD/PV.780).

271. Introducing document CCD/550, in the name of its seven sponsors, the delegation of Egypt stressed the following three main aspects of the question of a disarmament programme: (a) such a programme was an urgent matter in light of the continuing accumulation of arms, particularly nuclear arms and weapons of mass destruction; (b) priority should be given to nuclear, chemical, incendiary weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, in that order, while regional conflicts should be ended by eliminating their causes, thus bringing about the limitation and reduction of conventional weapons on both the regional and global level; and (c) confidence-building measures should be completely observed by all States and the principle of the non-use of force or threat of force in any form against any State would constitute such a measure. The delegation also expressed satisfaction that an ad hoc working group had been set up to elaborate a comprehensive programme (CCD/PV.782).

272. In commenting on document A/AC.187/55, India held that a comprehensive programme of disarmament should be elaborated at a United Nations deliberative body, as had been proposed in that document. The measures of a comprehensive programme of disarmament had been correctly defined as a middle road between the current step-by-step approach and the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament. India was of the view that although eight years of the Disarmament Decade had passed very little progress in regard to the comprehensive programme has been achieved. Therefore, the time had come to consider specifically the setting up of a body entrusted with the task of elaborating such measures within a specified time frame.
273. The delegation of Iran, stating that consideration of a comprehensive disarmament programme was especially appropriate now to plan future disarmament measures, agreed that such a programme need in no way depend on or conflict with the action programme to be decided by the special session, as the latter would presumably focus on more immediately achievable goals while the former would fit those goals into the framework of a larger process to extend over a longer time period. The delegation commented, however, that discussion of a comprehensive programme could not be a substitute for the negotiation of disarmament measures (CCD/PV.778).

274. The United States also pointed out that there were limitations to what could be accomplished by a comprehensive programme, particularly since it was not possible to set binding deadlines for negotiations that were, by their very nature, consensual. The delegation also hoped that the working group would consider not only proposals now before the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, but those that might be submitted in the future (CCD/PV.767).

275. In 1977, the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany, addressing itself to the question of the armament balance in different regions of the world, stressed the importance of the question of conventional arms. The world-wide expenditure for the procurement of arms was high and the question was complex. While hoping for progress in the important talks between the United States and the Soviet Union, the delegation also drew attention to certain developments influencing the regional balance of armaments. A regional approach to partial measures of disarmament would certainly not only raise the level of security and confidence in those regions, the delegation held, but also set free resources that were indispensable for development and increase the level of the autonomous efforts of developing countries in those regions. It went without saying, the delegation held, that such an approach would, in most cases, concentrate more on conventional arms, and it hoped that that subject would find more attention in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD/PV.715).

3. Question of establishing an international disarmament organization

276. The question of establishing some type of international disarmament agency has been raised from time to time in the Committee, particularly in recent years, mainly by Sweden, the Netherlands and Japan. Often the suggestion was linked to the question of a ban on chemical weapons, with delegations suggesting that an international organization could, as a first task, assume the role of assisting in the verification procedures of any future agreement in that field.

277. At the 1978 spring session of the Committee, the delegation of Italy stated that the establishment of an international organization to supervise the implementation of disarmament agreements would be of great value (CCD/PV.778). Subsequently, the question was raised again by the Netherlands in a more concrete form, and the delegation submitted a document on the subject, entitled "Study on the establishment of an international disarmament agency" (CCD/565), proposing the creation of such an agency "to streamline" disarmament consultations and implementation measures and suggesting that the special session of the General Assembly, in its final document, include an invitation to all Member States to submit their views on such an agency.
In introducing the document to the Committee, the 
delegation of the Netherlands stressed that several 
countries, including Italy, had recently shown 
interest in a disarmament organization because a number of 
important disarmament agreements now approaching 
conclusion would require rather elaborate permanent 
machinery for consultations between parties and for 
substantial implementation and verification tasks. The only 
existing Treaty of such a complicated nature was the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and it had 
used the existing International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
to carry out its verification requirements; but no such 
organization existed to carry out such needs for a 
chemical weapons ban or a nuclear test ban, for example. Such an organization 
could also be entrusted with organizing review conferences for various treaties 
and, as it gained experience, could be given other appropriate functions. As more 
disarmament measures were achieved, it would be important, the delegation held, 
to have an impartial body, for example under United Nations auspices, which could 
contribute to the implementation of such agreements. In that connection, the 
delegation expressed support for the premise of a recent French proposal to 
establish an international observation satellite agency, because 
internationalization of satellite information seemed essential in the long run; 
however, satellites could not perform all verification functions - as was clear 
from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, a comprehensive 
test ban or a chemical weapons ban - and it therefore seemed better to combine 
the French proposal with the idea of the Netherlands for an international organization 
so as to make it possible to combine all sorts of implementation functions. The 
delegation realized that much more careful consideration would be required before 
any final decision in the matter could be taken and therefore proposed only that 
the views of States Members of the United Nations be sought on the matter. If 
further steps proved warranted by the responses received, the Committee on 
Disarmament or an ad hoc committee might be given the task of working out the 
modalities of such an agency and the second special session of the General Assembly 
on disarmament could take a decision on its establishment (CCW/183).

The delegation of Italy also submitted a working paper (CCD/568) suggesting 
that the United Nations consider establishing machinery to verify multilateral 
disarmament agreements. In introducing the paper, the delegation expressed the 
view that the document of the Netherlands (CCD/561) contained ideas worthy of 
being discussed, studied in depth and elaborated. Italy felt that the problem of 
verification of compliance with disarmament measures as a whole should be 
reconsidered with a view to tackling it and, if possible, solving it by reference 
to uniform and coherent criteria in an appropriate international context. It was 
of the opinion that the international organ of verification suggested in working 
document CCD/568 should employ whatever technological and scientific means - such 
as sensing, sampling, recording, communicating and interpreting devices - might be 
usefully applied toward an effective verification of disarmament measures 
(CCD/FV.784).

F. Question of further measures to prevent an arms race 
on the sea-bed

With regard to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear 
Weapons on the Sea-Bed and on the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, the 
delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated that, in June 1977,
the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty had reaffirmed the commitment undertaken by the parties to the Treaty in Article V to continue negotiations in good faith concerning the demilitarization of the sea-bed, and it requested the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, in consultation with the States parties to the Treaty, to proceed without delay to the examination of further measures aimed at preventing the arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof. The delegation also noted that the General Assembly at its thirty-second session had adopted an appropriate resolution on the subject. The Soviet Union was an advocate of the complete demilitarization of the sea-bed. Proceeding from this, it supported the Conference's decision and was ready to begin consultations with other States members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament concerning the procedure for starting, in the Committee, the discussion of the problem of the demilitarization of the sea-bed (CCD/PV.767).

281. The delegation added that the Treaty, to which over 60 States were parties, should be regarded as a link in the chain of international limitations restraining the nuclear arms race, since it limited the possibilities of deployment of nuclear weapons in an environment which constituted most of the surface area of our planet. At the same time, it created the prerequisites for the complete exclusion of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof from the sphere of the arms race by committing States parties to continue negotiations on the further demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor (CCD/PV.781).

282. The delegation of Poland, referring to the sea-bed treaty and to General Assembly resolution 32/87 A, wished to alert the Committee to the fact that under the terms of that resolution the Committee was expected to proceed promptly with the consideration of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race in the vast sea-bed and ocean floor environment. In presenting the draft of that resolution to the First Committee of the General Assembly, Poland had stressed that what actually was at stake was a blueprint for the Committee's further crucial new step towards full demilitarization of the sea-bed. In Poland's opinion, any comprehensive programme of disarmament the Committee on Disarmament might elaborate in the future must provide for early and constructive efforts to discharge the responsibility resting on the Committee in that regard. The delegation expressed the hope that the readiness of the Soviet Union to begin consultations with other States on the most effective implementation of the request of the General Assembly would soon be emulated by other States members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and States parties to the sea-bed treaty (CCD/PV.758). Similarly the delegation of Mongolia said it presumed that, in accordance with the General Assembly resolution on the subject, the Committee would proceed promptly with consideration of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor (CCD/PV.773).

283. The delegation of the United States expressed the view that the sea-bed arms control treaty had not only achieved its primary purpose, but had also played a broader role in preventing the emergence of an arms race on the sea-bed. The United States stated that it had seen no evidence of an arms race on the sea-bed to date, and saw little prospect for one in the future. In light of that fact, the delegation stated, it did not believe that it was necessary for the Committee,
or any other fora, to consider further disarmament measures in this area at the present time; however, it believed that this subject should be kept under careful review (CCD/PV.789).

G. Organization and procedures of the Committee

284. The delegation of Romania has emphasized the ever greater and more urgent responsibility incumbent on the Committee to take firm action to adopt effective disarmament measures within the terms of reference assigned to it. The meagre result achieved during the 15 years of its existence has in no way affected the arms race which is continuing unchecked at an ever faster rate. It is evident that the required new course for the Committee's activity would not be reached through disparate, incoherent approaches, however important the problems might be. This delegation has further pointed out that firm action to pull the negotiations out of deadlock and focus them on the adoption of practical and effective measures of disarmament is an important political problem. Such actions could be taken first of all by mobilizing the political will of all States, primarily of those States which bear the main responsibility for disarmament. In those circumstances, the setting in which action is to take place assumes particular importance. It is obvious that the disarmament negotiations could not be revitalized without a steady improvement in the way the Committee functioned. The attention which Romania has always devoted to the organization of the Committee's activities is based on the fact that disarmament negotiations should reflect the requirements of the democratization of international life and participation by all States, on an equal footing, in solving international problems. The delegation has also held that the General Assembly, at its special session devoted to disarmament, would closely examine the activity of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and its role and place in disarmament negotiations. The delegation has asked the Committee to lay down its programme of work for that session in accordance with the decision taken in 1975 and has emphasized the necessity to set up the procedure and the organizational framework for considering and deciding on proposals aimed at a thorough improvement of the Committee's function (CCD/PV.731).

285. In 1977, the United Kingdom drew attention to lessons which could be learned from the negotiation of the convention on environmental warfare. In order to reduce the problem that many Members of the United Nations not members of the Committee had not been able to provide any input to the negotiating process and had had insufficient time to consider a treaty text before being asked to give their approval at the General Assembly, the delegation suggested that, when the Committee decided to set up an ad hoc working group for the negotiation of a treaty, a period of notice of not less than one month might be given to all States Members of the United Nations not members of the Committee. Such States might be invited to contribute to the negotiating process by submitting either written or oral statements, according to their preference, and they might also be offered an invitation to participate more fully in the Committee's negotiations; when the Committee completed its work on a treaty, notification might be sent, together with the treaty text, to all States Members of the United Nations which had not participated in the working group, preferably at least three weeks in advance of discussion of the text in the General Assembly (CCD/PV.729).
The delegation of Yugoslavia has held that the Committee, in order to fulfil its mandate, should endeavour to improve and promote the substance and methods of its work. It should not be satisfied with the status of a quasi negotiating body, without taking initiatives and actions of its own. In addition it should not be permitted that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, as the only organ of its kind in the field of disarmament negotiations, should simply wait for ready-made solutions to be presented from outside and only then start acting as a negotiating body. In particular the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should not be a body to which final solutions are offered, as that was no way for an international forum to perform its tasks and rise to its challenges. The delegation has also stressed that the Committee should initiate appropriate actions, actively participate in all phases of negotiations, influence decisions being taken in the disarmament field and orient its negotiations in accordance with scientific and technological developments in the field of armaments, bearing in mind the real needs of the international community in this field. If this was not done, the delegation believed, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament would remain as ineffective as it has been so far and would not be able to adjust to the requirements and the conditions of the present-day world. The delegation of Yugoslavia has also supported changes in the methods of the Committee's work in order to strengthen its capacity to negotiate on a basis of democracy and equality, holding that the Committee, established outside the United Nations framework, reflected the circumstances and conditions of that time but that, since then, many things have changed in the international community. The delegation has also held that, at the present time, a large number of member countries are supporting appropriate changes in the methods and character of the work of the Committee, or the way it is managed, and doing so in the best interests of the Committee itself, deeply convinced that the Committee must reflect the needs of its time, rather than to be overthrown by them, and must promote its efficiency as a negotiating body (CCD/PV.742). The delegation of Yugoslavia has further held that as long as the results of the Committee's negotiations failed to keep abreast of technological developments, the Committee would continue to revolve in a vicious circle. The fact that disarmament problems are exceedingly complicated, and that the political will of all members of the international community is needed if they are to be solved, should not be used to justify the meagre results being achieved or the lagging tempo of negotiations, the delegation has maintained. It has further held that in the 15 years of its existence, the Committee has still not become a negotiating body in the full sense of the word, as it should be, but became such a body only when its two Co-Chairmen submitted for its consideration the agreed texts of an international agreement. In 1977, the delegation stated that the Committee as a whole would have had much material for negotiation during 1977 but, regrettably, that possibility had been reduced to a minimum by the Committee's engagement in the direct negotiating process being made dependent on the outcome of bilateral and trilateral consultations, a procedure which did not help it to achieve the best results. The delegation expressed regret at cases of circumvention of the Committee, the conduct of negotiations outside its framework, and failure to inform it of the course and results of bilateral and trilateral talks. It stressed that the Committee as a whole should take active part in all stages of the negotiation of the international agreements that they are supposed to prepare and held that, instead of constantly striving to create conditions enabling other States that are not members of the Committee to make a useful contribution to its work, the Committee was continuing to narrow its own frameworks and to curtail its own abilities. The delegation argued further that all countries, regardless of their size or military power, were equally
interested in disarmament questions which have the most direct bearing on the
security of each State. It stated that for that very reason, the international
agreements in the field of disarmament rest on respect for the basic interests of
all members of the world community and that they should be the product of the joint
efforts of States for, only if they are, can they win general support. The
delegation of Yugoslavia expressed the view that this is still not always the case
with the present treaties and that this fact in itself should act as a warning
(CCD/PV.757).

287. On the question of the Committee's organization and procedures, the delegation
of Mexico noted its previous recommendations in favour of a calendar of work,
preparation of the annual report by the Secretariat, replacement of the
co-chairmanship and establishment of a permanent sub-committee. With more specific
regard to the co-chairmanship, the delegation proposed (a) that nuclear-weapon
States not be permitted to hold the chairmanship; (b) that, beginning in 1978, the
three groups represented in the Committee each designate one of the group for a
three-year term as members of the Committee's "bureau", with each member holding the
chairmanship for one of the years 1978-1980 while the other two would serve as vice­
chairmen; (c) that the same procedure be repeated at the 1981 session and every three
years thereafter; and (d) that the present rotation of the chairmanship be abolished
(CCD/PV.721). The delegation has repeatedly reiterated its view that replacement
of the institution of the co-chairmanship would be indispensable to create
conditions favourable for the participation of France and China in the Committee
(CCD/PV.746). The delegation of Mexico also stated in 1977 that the failure
to establish an ad hoc working group on a comprehensive test ban or a chemical­
wepons ban had rendered virtually impossible any substantive contributions by the
non-nuclear-weapon States members of the Committee to negotiations on those items
during 1977. It added, in that connexion, that the contribution of the members of
the group of 15 could prove to be most useful, precisely in a situation where there
were no "identical drafts" of the United States and the Soviet Union. With more
particular reference to the question of organization and procedures of the
Committee, the delegation quoted from the opinions of a number of Member States of
the United Nations regarding the special session of the General Assembly devoted to
disarmament; in the delegation's view, the majority of those opinions reflected an
impatience with the paucity of the results of the Committee's endeavours, which in
large measure derived from its inadequate organization and procedures and which
should not be ignored. The delegation then referred to two previous proposals aimed
at improving the Committee's organization and procedures: the establishment of a
standing sub-committee of the whole to negotiate specific drafts and the substitution
of the co-chairmanship by a system more in keeping with United Nations practice and
with the principle of the sovereign equality of States. The decisive argument for
carrying out the latter, the delegation held, was the indisputable need for the
participation of the other two nuclear-weapon States in the Committee's work, which
the present system understandably precluded; in that connexion, the delegation also
pointed out that a number of opinions it had quoted had emphasized the need to
associate all nuclear-weapon States with disarmament negotiations and that several
had referred specifically to the prerequisites of changing the system of
co-chairmanship. As an alternative to the co-chairmanship, the delegation recalled
its proposal for a monthly rotating chairmanship among the non-weapon States members
of the Committee, holding that such a system would in no way detract from the role
played by the present Co-Chairmen of the Committee. The delegation hoped that it would prove possible for the Committee to achieve tangible negotiating results, as well as changes in its structure, before the special session of the General Assembly (CCD/PV.762).

288. The delegation of India has held the view that the Committee on Disarmament with all its inadequacies and imperfections has been a useful forum and that it can continue to function even more effectively if some essential changes in its structure and working procedures are made. The delegation has noted as positive developments the fact that the reports of the Committee to the General Assembly sessions are now far more substantive and meaningful, that the records of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament discussions are now available to all the Members of the United Nations and to the public at large, and that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament's working programme now follows an agreed calendar of work. As regards the institution of co-chairmanship, India was of the view that it should be altered not because a change by itself would make it easier for China and France to participate in its work, but because India felt that all the members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, or for that matter any international forum, should have the same rights and responsibility. India preferred the basis of monthly rotation among all members. As regards the suggestion to establish a standing sub-committee of the whole, India would like to examine this proposal further. India also supported the suggestion that States, not members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, should have the right to submit proposals or views they might have on measures of disarmament under negotiations in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and to attend meetings whenever such proposals were examined. As a rule the plenary sessions of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should not be closed but should be opened to the press and to the others who wished to attend them. In addition to the report that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament submits to the General Assembly at the beginning of the Assembly session, it should also submit periodic reports (CCD/PV.771).

289. The delegation of Canada has stressed that, whatever changes may be made, Canada believed that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should continue to adhere to the procedure of consensus. It would be an improvement, the delegation believed, if some means could be found to involve interested United Nations Members, not members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, in the process of negotiation at a suitable stage in the development of a text, but it would be counterproductive if new departures in that direction were seriously to undermine the business-like advantages that derive from the limited membership of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Concerning the co-chairmanship, Canada has stated that any advantage of its modification in the context of persuading all nuclear Powers to be associated in a constructive way in the negotiations of international agreements of increasing significance in the field of arms control and disarmament should be objectively evaluated. If the co-chairmanship were to be set aside, the Canadian delegation would prefer to see each individual country treated as an equal, individual sovereign State and not as a member of a group. It would object to being arbitrarily and unjustifiably defined by a group label that may have some validity elsewhere in some United Nations circumstances but could have no part in matters of peace and security. Canada would, therefore, not wish to see a future rotational system for the chairmanship based on grouping, as such a system would not do justice to the fact that members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament participate in its work as individual States (CCD/PV.731).
The United States, in 1977, stated its belief that the Committee should retain a flexible attitude toward its procedures and organization, but stressed the importance of retaining the characteristics which make the Committee a viable negotiating forum rather than a place for political posturing. The delegation emphasized that, if the Committee were to continue as an effective multilateral disarmament negotiating body, it was essential that the Committee continue to operate on the principle of consensus and that it maintain limited, but representative, membership. The United States also stated that it was prepared to consider organizational changes, but cautioned against discarding methods proven to be effective just for the "sake of change" (CCD/PV.767).

At the 1978 spring sessions, as in the past, many delegations commenting on the question of specific modifications in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament organizational procedures also commented in a general way on the performance of the Committee as a whole. In the following paragraphs, such general views are first presented, followed by the views of various delegations on specific proposals for further organization and procedural changes in the Committee.

The delegation of the Soviet Union stressed the significance of the Committee as an authoritative and effective international negotiating body and hoped other members would contribute to a solution of the common problems so that it could achieve further concrete results (CCD/PV.767). The delegation also stated that the Committee had become increasingly active, particularly in recent years and had been intensifying its work, going deeper into problems and concentrating its attention increasingly on the main areas of disarmament (CCD/PV.781). The delegation of Hungary held that the Committee, as the sole organ for multilateral disarmament negotiations, had a well-defined place in the machinery of such negotiations and that it was generally recognized that it would continue to be needed in the future (CCD/PV.770). The delegation of Bulgaria, stressing the significance of the five treaties and conventions worked out as a result of the Committee's efforts, expressed amazement at various negative assessments of the Committee's work, which it considered prejudicial and unwarranted (CCD/PV.772). The delegation of the United Kingdom also stressed that the Committee had not only achieved several treaties but had made a substantial contribution to the general improvement in the international atmosphere and had increased understanding of the problems of disarmament and the ways of overcoming them (CCD/PV.786).

The delegation of India held that, with all its inadequacies, the Committee had been a useful forum. It would function even more effectively with some changes in its structure and working procedures, but India did not agree that it should be replaced by some other negotiating body (CCD/PV.771 and 786). The delegation added the view that effective mechanisms were important not only for making progress in negotiations but also to help generate political will (CCD/PV.786).

The delegation of Japan supported the idea that the Committee on Disarmament should modify parts of its organization and procedures so as to introduce measures for improvement, with a view to strengthening its function while reflecting the voices and opinions of the countries which were not members of the Committee, as well as strengthening its ties to the United Nations General Assembly. However, it
was firmly convinced that the Committee had been effectively discharging its responsibility as a forum for negotiations, and that it was undoubtedly the most appropriate organ for further negotiations, and hence that it should continue to be an indispensable negotiating body in the future (CCD/PV.776).

295. The delegation of Italy, noting that the Committee had played a leading role in the elaboration of most of the treaties so far concluded, held that while it was not perfect, radical changes should not be made or existing bodies dismantled without any real necessity. The Committee had irreplaceable skills and experience and had recently adjusted its methods of work to meet the changing needs; it should continue to function as the main multilateral negotiating body (CCD/PV.778). The delegation of the United Kingdom considered the Committee to be one of the most important international bodies in the world, since it was the principal multilateral disarmament negotiating forum and disarmament was one of the most important world tasks (CCD/PV.779).

296. On more specific matters, the delegation of Mexico, stressing the view that there was widespread support for improving the structure and methods of work of the Committee and specifically for changing without delay the present system of co-chairmanship, urged the Committee to reconsider the proposal previously put forward by Mexico and others to set up a standing sub-committee of the whole and to abolish the co-chairmanship. Reminding the Committee that the group of 15 had unanimously supported the proposal to establish a sub-committee contained in working paper CCD/530 of 1977, the delegation quoted extensively from that document concerning the advantages of establishing the sub-committee and suggested that the document be used as a basis for further consideration of the matter. With regard to the co-chairmanship, the delegation proposed that the many previous suggestions of Mexico on the subject, the latest of which recommended a monthly rotation of the chair among all non-nuclear-weapon States members of the Committee, might be used as a basis for a resumption of consideration of the matter. Mexico's reasons for not including nuclear-weapon States in the suggested rotation was the same as that for excluding such States from the presidency of the General Assembly, the delegation said (CCD/PV.767).

297. The delegation of Sweden also continued to support the elimination of the co-chairmanship on the grounds that the world of 1978 was considerably different from that of 1962, when the institution was established. The delegation suggested that a Committee "bureau" be established consisting of four members, one Chairman and three Vice-Chairmen, two of which would be chosen from the States belonging to the military blocs and two from the group of neutral or non-aligned States; under that arrangement, the chairmanship of Committee meetings could rotate among all Committee members on a monthly or sessional basis. Sweden also recommended that the formal meetings of the Committee be made public unless decided otherwise and that all United Nations Members who submitted proposals to the Committee should be entitled to address the Committee during the discussions of such proposals in the plenary meetings (CCD/PV.767).

298. The delegation of Romania continued to expect changes in the Committee's activities that were urgently demanded by the large majority of States (CCD/PV.768). The delegation of Nigeria, calling for a realistic examination of the Committee by
its members, stated that an effective negotiating forum should ensure the participation of all nuclear-weapon States, should not be unduly restrictive, should have a democratic structure and should take into account the many changes that had taken place in the world since 1961 (CCD/PV.769).

299. The delegation of India noted that, as a result of recent discussions on organization and procedures, the annual reports were now more substantive and meaningful, the records of the Committee were not made available to all United Nations Members and to the public and the work programme followed an agreed calendar ensuring the orderly conduct of business. A change should be made, however, in the institution of the co-chairmanship, the delegation believed, not because such a change would make it easier for China and France to participate in the Committee, however desirable that might be, but because all members of an international forum should have the same rights and responsibilities. For the same reason, however, the delegation saw no reason to deny the nuclear-weapon States the right to act as chairman and preferred a procedure of monthly rotation among all members. The proposal to establish a standing sub-committee should also be carefully studied. India also supported the suggestion that non-members should have the right to submit proposals or views on measures under negotiation in the Committee and to attend meetings when such measures were examined. It also believed that the plenary meeting should not, as a rule, be closed to the press and public particularly since the verbatim records of those meetings were now being made available to the public. Lastly, the delegation believed that, in addition to its annual report to the General Assembly, the Committee should submit periodic reports (CCD/PV.771).

300. The delegation of Iran said it would consider changes in the Committee's organization and procedures that would advance the ultimate goal of achieving substantial measures of arms limitations, in particular any modifications that would bring all the nuclear-weapon States into the negotiations. With reference to the co-chairmanship, the delegation held that any remedy for the present situation must also uphold the principle of the sovereign equality of States and, therefore, the best solution would be to rotate the chairmanship among all Committee members without excluding any State or group of States (CCD/PV.778).

301. The delegation of Italy believed that while a good negotiating structure could not remedy a lack of political will, the latter could be stimulated by, and gradually originated from, a better understanding through constructive discussions in an appropriate body. With particular regard to suggestions that the Committee should again be enlarged, Italy considered a limited forum to be essential for the efficient conduct of business and, although it would consider a small increase in the Committee's size, it believed that careful attention should be given to the capability of new members to contribute to disarmament negotiations. As an alternative, Committee meetings might be opened to other States Members of the United Nations under appropriate conditions, possibly as observers. Other United Nations Members might also be allowed to submit written proposals for consideration as official documents and participate in the discussions of those proposals. With regard to strengthening the link with the United Nations, the Committee should maintain the degree of autonomy essential for creativity and productiveness, as well as the principle of consensus so essential in a body where the security interests of all States were involved. The Committee should, however, prepare
periodic reports to the General Assembly after its annual spring session, as well as special reports or particular topics. The Committee should, at the beginning of each annual session, also agree on the work to be accomplished and on a methodical programme of negotiations. It should also seek agreement on setting up without delay functional working groups to negotiate draft treaties or to give informal considerations to specific items, when necessary with the participation of experts. With regard to the argument that the abolishment of the co-chairmanship would make the Committee more attractive to the nuclear-weapon Powers not now participating in it, Italy believed that, in a body taking decisions by consensus, elimination of the co-chairmanship would not affect the substance of the prerogatives of the Soviet Union and the United States, both of which played a crucial role in the disarmament process and had a special responsibility for its promotion: on the other hand, if renunciation of the co-chairmanship would result in the participation of China and France, such a renunciation would be a gesture of goodwill highly appreciated by the international community (CCD/PV.778).

302. The delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany favoured improvements in the Committee's procedures and composition provided such changes would improve the Committee's efficiency (CCD/PV.771). The delegation of Japan supported the idea of improving the Committee's organization and procedures with a view to enhancing its role, reflecting the views of non-members and strengthening the Committee's ties to the General Assembly (CCD/PV.776).

303. The delegations of Hungary (CCD/PV.770), Czechoslovakia (CCD/PV.771), Bulgaria (CCD/PV.772), Mongolia (CCD/PV.773) and the German Democratic Republic (CCD/PV.775) directly rebutted a number of the proposals outlined above for additional changes in the Committee's organization and procedures, in particular the proposal to eliminate the co-chairmanship. Speaking generally, the delegation of Czechoslovakia considered the recently revised organization and procedures of the Committee, including maintenance of co-chairmanship, to be well-suited to the needs of the Committee's work; while the delegation was willing to consider any further meaningful and justified changes on their merit, it did not believe changes should be made hastily without due consideration. The delegation of Hungary pointed out that the Committee had already taken a number of decisions to strengthen or modify its practices, and held that in view of the urgent problems of halting the arms race, the Committee should set secondary matters aside and concentrate all its energies on the main tasks before it. Similarly, the German Democratic Republic stressed that the Committee had discussed all procedural questions freely and regularly over the years, which had resulted in important changes in the Committee's composition, as well as the adoption of a number of procedural changes as recently as 1977. All States Members of the United Nations were now fully informed of the Committee's work and could participate in that work under various arrangements. Such flexibility should continue, the delegation held, on the basis of consensus and the equality of States, and no bureaucratic machinery should be established, for example in the form of a standing sub-committee.
304. The delegation of Mongolia stated that it regarded the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament as an independent, multilateral negotiating body with solid working experience, and that the question which was now being raised repeatedly in the Committee with the clear aim of achieving a fundamental reorganization of its structure should be approached with all due seriousness (CCD/PV.773).

305. On the particular question of the co-chairmanship, the delegation of Hungary, pointing out that all countries recognized the reality of the important role played by the Soviet Union and the United States in world problems and in the maintenance of peace and international security, held that it followed that the unity of views and common initiative of those two States was essential for any important and lasting arrangement on disarmament. That fact justified the institution of the co-chairmanship in the Committee on Disarmament. The delegation added that it doubted that the abolition of the co-chairmanship would appreciably influence the attitude of those Powers that were so far not inclined to participate in disarmament negotiations. The key to the solution of major disarmament problems, the delegation concluded, lay neither in the continuous reorganization of the Committee nor in the abolition of the co-chairmanship, but in much deeper considerations.

306. The delegation of Bulgaria pointed out that there had never been a single instance of high-handedness in the Committee on the part of the co-Chairmen and that all members were equal, each chairing the Committee meetings in alphabetical order. Each member could not only present documents and proposals, but also oppose Committee decisions, all of which must be taken by consensus. The efficiency of the Committee's procedures had been amply demonstrated, and the Committee should be grateful to the co-Chairmen for their hard work both in the Committee and outside it; there could be few results in the disarmament field without their active bilateral efforts. For those reasons, the delegation urged the Committee to concentrate its entire attention mainly on the most pressing problems of disarmament instead of diverting it to non-substantive matters. The delegation of Mongolia also held that the institution of the co-chairmanship involved the very principles on which the Committee was based.

307. Similarly, the delegation of the German Democratic Republic held that the existence of the co-chairmanship had never prevented equality in reaching Committee decisions; on the contrary, the close collaboration of the two co-Chairmen had saved the Committee from lengthy discussions of matters which were the special responsibility of those two Powers. The delegation added that attempts to transfer the structure of other international bodies to the Committee on Disarmament could only harm the Committee. Its failure to achieve a greater degree of success was not due to its procedures, and changing its procedures would not significantly accelerate its work. The German Democratic Republic also referred to the question of the Committee's composition, noting that it had grown dynamically over the 16 years of the Committee's existence and holding that the present composition met essential requirements and should be maintained in principle.

308. On 17 March 1978, the group of 15 in the Committee submitted a working paper (CCD/PV.563) on organization and procedures of the Committee. The paper stated that the following five changes deserved the highest priority: (a) strengthening the existing link between the General Assembly and the Committee by permitting all
States Members of the United Nations to submit disarmament proposals on questions under the Committee's consideration and to participate in the Committee and its working bodies when such proposals were examined and by enhancing the role in
the Committee of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Centre for Disarmament of the United Nations; (b) replacement of the
co-chairmanship by a new system to be agreed upon based on existing proposals;
(c) adoption of rules of procedures for the Committee; (a) examination of other
procedures to improve the Committee's effectiveness, including the establishment
of a standing sub-committee of the whole; and (e) opening the Committee's plenary
meetings to the public.

309. In introducing the document on behalf of the 15 sponsors, the delegation of
Mexico stressed the additional points that renunciation of the co-chairmanship
could not prejudice the powers or legitimate interests of the Soviet Union and
the United States, since all decisions were taken by consensus and that, on the
contrary, such a gesture of renunciation would considerably enhance the moral
stature of the two Powers; and that the rules of procedure to be adopted would
incorporate all the customs and usages that had been gradually developed over the
16 years of the Committee's existence (CCD/PV.781).

310. In supporting the document, the delegation of Egypt emphasized that the
co-chairmanship should be altered to satisfy the need for a change felt by
Committee members, perhaps by monthly rotation, and that an organic link should
be established between the Committee and the United Nations General Assembly
(CCD/PV.782).

311. The delegation of the Soviet Union again noted that the Committee was the
basic multilateral disarmament negotiating body and that it had actively
participated and contributed to the elaboration of five disarmament agreements
which, together with bilateral arms control agreements between the Soviet Union
and the United States, constituted the most essential part of international
agreements in the disarmament field. The delegation also affirmed that the
practical results achieved by the Committee could have been more significant if
the Committee's efforts had had the political and practical support of all States,
and in particular the nuclear-weapon Powers. Despite such objective difficulties,
however, the Committee had proved itself to be a dynamic mechanism for conducting
multilateral negotiations on disarmament, a mechanism which was constantly
improving the forms of its organization and procedure. In that connexion the
Soviet delegation made additional comments on various specific aspects of the
Committee's work and organization. On the question of the Committee's composition,
the delegation stressed that, over the years, the Committee had made dynamic
changes in membership reflecting the changes that had taken place in the world
since its establishment. The present ratio of membership, with one half divided
in equal numbers between the socialist countries and the Western countries and
the other half comprised of developing and non-aligned countries, reflected
existing realities and took into account the interests of all States. The present
Committee membership thus ensured the required representation while being
reasonably limited to enable the Committee to act effectively and flexibly. On
the question of the forms and methods of the Committee's work, the delegation
pointed out (a) that the chairmanship of formal meetings was rotated in turn among
all members in alphabetical order; (b) that informal meetings were regularly held
on various questions to permit a more free exchange of views and the participation
of technical experts if required; (c) that ad hoc working groups could be
established for detailed scrutiny of draft agreements, for study of special
questions and for seeking solutions to various problems; (d) that bilateral and multilateral negotiations and consultations were conducted for various purposes, including the preparation of specific proposals; (e) that all decisions were taken on the basis of consensus, thus putting all Committee members on an equal footing; and (f) that the Co-Chairmen were increasingly assuming difficult tasks and responsibilities for the preparation of initiatives to solve various topical questions, playing an important organizational role without hampering in any way, but rather encouraging, initiative on the part of other members, and providing the specific knowledge of the subject matter under discussion which, unlike the case in certain United Nations bodies, was of particular importance in a working body having the more narrow task of elaborating draft disarmament agreements.

While the delegation proceeded from the premise that improvements in the form and methods of work were both possible and desirable, as evidenced by the decisions in the matter taken at the 1976 and 1977 sessions of the Committee, reforms should not be an end in themselves and not made merely for the sake of reform, but should actually result in greater effectiveness to achieve greater results (CCD/PV.781).

312. The delegation of the United States, while understanding the impatience and concern of some Committee members that important matters were being discussed on a bilateral or trilateral basis, urged the Committee to bear in mind that the Committee had played an important substantive role in elaborating five arms control treaties, all of which were time consuming and required extensive bilateral or trilateral consultations. As examples, the delegation mentioned negotiations on the partial test ban from 1958 to 1963 - with continuing and promising negotiations continuing to the present day on a full test ban - and on the non-proliferation treaty from 1962 to 1968. As a final word on the future of the Committee, which would be discussed at the upcoming special session of the General Assembly, the delegation reiterated its view that the Committee was a useful negotiating forum and should be retained as such with a size commensurate to its tasks; it also believed that its organization and procedures were operating effectively, although the United States would be prepared to accept structural changes if it appeared that a positive advantage would be gained thereby (CCD/PV.781 and 789).

313. The delegation of Poland stressed the view that, with many formidable new and old tasks, the Committee should be careful that the ultimate interests of disarmament did not suffer through a desire to reform existing mechanisms. In that connexion, the delegation associated itself with the views expressed by Italy concerning its reluctance to make radical changes and dismantle existing bodies without any real necessity. The delegation also emphasized that the two enlargements of the Committee's membership, in 1969 and in 1975, had reflected the growing interest in disarmament negotiations and had resulted, among other things, in a better political and geographical representation without turning the Committee into a mere debating forum. With regard to the method of work, the last few years had shown that the annual reviews or organizational procedures resulted in satisfactory procedural adjustments, such as the method of preparation of the Committee's annual reports, the new press release format and the variety of ways in which the Committee was now handling its work. Unacceptable additional demands, the delegation believed, might seriously strain the constructive spirit of accommodation now prevailing in the Committee and undermine its foundation as a viable and effective multilateral disarmament negotiating body, based on the essential principle of consensus. Specifically, the delegation was not persuaded that the institution of the co-chairmanship

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should be replaced, particularly since it saw no tangible proof that the
institution stood in the way of other nuclear-weapon Powers joining in the common
efforts. Sharing the view that the treaties and conventions that the
Committee had already helped to conclude represented the most essential part of
the international achievements in the field, the delegation held that the list
was unsurpassed in the history of multilateral disarmament negotiations, even
though the Committee should not be overly satisfied so long as the arms race had
not been stopped or reversed (CCD/PV. 783).

314. The delegation of the Netherlands, summarizing the situation with regard to
the Committee's organization and procedures as the delegation saw it, held that
it would be too easy to pretend that something was wrong with the Committee
because of some understandable disappointments over the allegedly meagre results
of its negotiations. Disarmament was a difficult and complex problem touching
on the security of States and must be considered in various forums depending on
the subject matter. The Committee on Disarmament had been created to meet the
absolute necessity of having a world-wide forum to conclude agreements that would
find world-wide acceptance, and it had accomplished important work and had other
important work before it. There seemed to be a general feeling that such a body
should have a restricted membership to make possible effective negotiations on
complicated disarmament questions, and the delegation did not believe that
suggestions for a rotating membership were practical. On the other hand,
countries not members of the Committee should be permitted, even more than in
the past, to circulate working documents and participate in special working groups,
such as had occurred in the cases of the nuclear-weapon-free-zone group and the
seismic group. It must be kept in mind, however, that the detailed negotiation
of a particular treaty was a key Committee activity that did not require the
participation of many countries. The delegation also feared that making the
Committee meetings public might encourage propaganda exercises for the press.
It suggested that the role of non-members in achieving agreements might be
enhanced by giving the First Committee of the General Assembly ample time to
consider the results of the Committee's work each year and to refer matters back
to the Committee for further consideration if the First Committee did not consider
the results satisfactory.

315. With regard to the position of the Soviet Union and the United States in
the Committee, the delegation of the Netherlands held that it was obvious that
no disarmament agreement could be concluded without their consent and active
participation in its elaboration, but there was no need for the two Powers to
have the special status of Co-Chairmen to make that position clear. The main
objective should be to maintain the Committee as a serious and viable forum
attractive to all nuclear-weapon States, since the agreement of the two principal
nuclear-weapon States, while vital for any real disarmament measure, was not the
only factor in world relations. The delegation had no strong feelings with
regard to the establishment of a Committee "bureau" or steering committee,
provided that it would be a tool to accelerate Committee work efficiently and
democratically and not become a kind of "inner circle". In conclusion, the
delegation again stressed the importance it attached to the Committee, to its
flexible procedures, to its restricted membership with substantial know-how and
to its rule of consensus. The delegation considered the Committee basically
sound and, while not opposing useful adaptations, as already indicated, believed
there was no need for a fundamentally different forum. It hoped the Committee
would make that position clear in its special report to the special session of
the General Assembly (ibid.).
The delegation of Italy, in introducing its working paper CCD/568 on international mechanisms for disarmament, confirmed its high regard for the work of the Committee, despite some disappointments, and stressed that Italy still considered it the most qualified body for the negotiation of international disarmament measures at the multilateral level and on the basis of consensus. The delegation pointed out, however, that its paper suggested that the Committee might: (a) accept a limited increase in its present membership; (b) permit a broader participation of interested non-member States as observers with the right to present written proposals and to take part in the discussion of such proposals; (c) maintain a closer liaison with the United Nations by submitting progress reports after each spring session, as well as periodic reports on particular topics; (d) establish a methodical schedule of negotiations for its sessions at the beginning of each year's work; (e) establish functional working groups to negotiate draft treaties or to study specific items in depth with the assistance of experts; and (f) consider opening its plenary meetings to the public. The delegation further noted that its Government had not deemed it appropriate to formulate suggestions regarding the Committee co-chairmanship in a general and tentative working document because of the delicate and complex nature of the question, but confirmed the views it had expressed earlier on the subject and said it was prepared to accept any solution conforming to generally recognized international practices (CCD/PV.784).

The delegation of Romania held that the attention being given at the spring session to the role of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in the framework of disarmament negotiations was justified by the unsatisfactory results achieved by the Committee so far and by the upcoming special session on disarmament. Quoting from a number of documents on the subject submitted by Romania in the past to show its constant interest in the adoption of measures to improve and enhance the role of the United Nations and the Committee, the delegation stated that the views it was now presenting to the Committee on the subject of the Committee's organization and procedures were based on the recent Romanian document submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session (A/AC.187/71), affirming that the United Nations should exercise direct authority in the disarmament field concerning negotiations, the elaboration of draft agreements and the verification of implementation of agreements. The basic reason for the Committee's inactivity was a lack of political will of States, in contradiction to commitments undertaken by them in the United Nations Charter, and the role of any disarmament mechanism should be that of mobilizing and harmonizing such political will. In carrying out such a role, the organization and procedures under which negotiations were carried out could be decisive, particularly in a multilateral negotiating body such as the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Committee reform was therefore not a case of change for the sake of change, but a means of increasing the Committee's efficiency and output; the positions of the various members towards procedural reform reflected their attitude on the degree of authority and competence the Committee should be given. The delegation listed five considerations that it considered indispensable for efficient Committee work: (a) the extension of the authority of the United Nations over the Committee's work; (b) democratization of Committee work and procedures; (c) the taking into consideration of the proposals and views of all member States on an equal footing; (d) the creation of conditions for the direct participation of all members in all phases of discussions and negotiations, as well as for the free access to the Committee of all other interested States; and (e) the use of open diplomacy within the Committee and the provision of accurate information to the public concerning the consequences of the arms race and the
progress of disarmament negotiations. In expressing Romania's support for document CCD/563 submitted by the group of 15, as well as for other proposals aimed at Committee organization and procedures, the delegation concluded that a substantial majority of Committee members now stood for such changes. On the specific point of the co-chairmanship the delegation of Romania expressed its strong preference that the Committee should be presided by all delegations in an alphabetical order. It also stated that no chairmanship formula based on the representation of military alliances would be acceptable. Changes in organization and procedures were a basic requirement for adjustment to the basic changes in international relations since the Committee's creation and not a matter to be directly linked with the question of participation of all nuclear-weapon Powers in the Committee's work (CCD/PV.785).

318. The delegation of the United Kingdom, reaffirming its view of the value of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament as an institution, called attention to the gradual expansion of disarmament committees over the years, which reflected a growth of interest in the subject of disarmament. There had been a conflict between the desire to keep the negotiating committee small enough to facilitate the progress of the negotiations and the desire to contain as many States and points of view as possible. Because of this, there could be no ideal size for a negotiating body but there was a strong case for bringing certain major Powers into the negotiating of disarmament treaties and there should be arrangements to allow non-members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to participate on issues in which they had a particular interest. Considerable improvements in the working procedures of the Committee had been made over the years, the delegation held, and the use of ad hoc working groups had proved valuable (CCD/PV.786).

319. The delegation of Ethiopia said it would support genuine measures which would enable the Committee to function more effectively and to continue as the main international negotiating forum on disarmament. It recognized the special responsibilities devolving upon the nuclear-weapon States and the need for maintaining the delicate balance in the Committee's membership, but measures should be sought to improve the working mechanism of that important negotiating machinery and at the same time to enable all nuclear-weapon States to participate in its work. It was with that understanding that the Ethiopian delegation supported working paper CCD/563 submitted by the group of 15.

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320. At the closing meeting of the spring session, the delegation of India, speaking on behalf of the group of 15, stated the views of the group on the concluding chapter entitled "Tasks Ahead" which the group had proposed to be added to the special report. From the beginning of the discussion in the Committee on the structure of the special report, a number of members of the group of 15 had stressed the need to have a final chapter to the special report, had suggested the title "Tasks Ahead", although they would not have objected to calling it "Conclusions", and had clearly stated the group's position in that regard on 27 April 1978. The group strongly believed that such a chapter was relevant because, under it, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament could affirm its commitment to look ahead and to pursue negotiations towards general and complete disarmament and could also indicate some of its specific plans for the near future. In addition, with a short, concluding chapter the structure of
the report would be complete and not end abruptly. With this in mind, the group of 15 had presented to the Committee at its informal meeting on 10 May a brief text for such a chapter for the consideration of the Committee, as follows:

"Ever since the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament was established as the principal forum for multilateral disarmament negotiations, its primary objective has remained general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. But at the same time, the Committee has attempted to reach agreements on partial measures of disarmament. Over the years, the efforts of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament have fructified in several treaties and conventions. In the field of disarmament, where vital security interests of States are involved, progress on important issues is often not as quick as expected. The Committee would continue to discharge the tasks of finding solutions to the disarmament issues of foremost priority, i.e. a comprehensive test ban and a ban on chemical weapons. More recently, negotiations on a comprehensive test ban and chemical weapons have been carried out in forums outside the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. While not denying the importance of preliminary negotiations among the militarily significant States, inasmuch as this could facilitate mutual understanding, the Committee expects to have the opportunity soon to engage in actual negotiations on these most important issues. The Committee feels successful negotiation of these priority issues will constitute significant steps towards the achievement of its goal of general and complete disarmament under strict and international control. To this end, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has a duty and an important task ahead."

The group had explained that it was flexible as regards the contents, the length and even the title of this chapter and had presented the text with the view that a commonly acceptable formulation could be worked out. The group had further clarified that this brief position could be placed at the end of section II of volume I. In view of the lack of consensus for the proposal of the group of 15, the group finally decided not to press it further. The group would, however, propose that the text of the proposal and the views of the group on its proposal regarding the concluding chapter be included in volume II of the special report.

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321. The present report is transmitted by the Co-Chairmen on behalf of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

(Signed) V. I. LIKHACHEV
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

(Signed) Adrian S. FISHER
United States of America