REPORT
OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE
FOR THE SPECIAL SESSION
OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

Volume VI

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
OFFICIAL RECORDS: TENTH SPECIAL SESSION
SUPPLEMENT No. 1 (A/S-10/1)

UNITED NATIONS
REPORT
OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE
FOR THE SPECIAL SESSION
OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

Volume VI

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
OFFICIAL RECORDS: TENTH SPECIAL SESSION
SUPPLEMENT No. 1 (A/S-10/1)

UNITED NATIONS
New York, 1978
Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

The report of the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament consists of the text of the report (volume I) and its annexes, which are contained in six volumes (volumes II to VII).

Volumes II to VI contain the documents of the Preparatory Committee except the summary records which are found in volume VII.

In volumes II to VI the documents are in order of symbol and in each volume a detailed chronological list has been provided. A list of the documents, by subject, follows:

1. **Replies of Member States in response to General Assembly resolution 31/89 B**

2. **Working papers and other documents submitted by Member States**

3. **Background papers, working papers and tabulations prepared by the Secretariat at the request of the Committee**

4. **Information bulletins**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document No.</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A/32/60</td>
<td>Letter dated 1 March 1977 from the Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/32/62</td>
<td>Letter dated 23 March 1977 from the Permanent Representative of the German Democratic Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/1</td>
<td>Provisional agenda (meeting held on 26 March 1977)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/2 and Corr. 1</td>
<td>Letter dated 22 March 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/3</td>
<td>Letter dated 24 March 1977 from the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/4</td>
<td>Letter dated 29 March 1977 from the Acting Permanent Representative of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/5</td>
<td>Letter dated 31 March 1977 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/6</td>
<td>Letter dated 8 April 1977 from the Permanent Representative of the Hungarian People's Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/7</td>
<td>Letter dated 7 April 1977 from the Permanent Representative of the State of Kuwait to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/8</td>
<td>Letter dated 13 April 1977 from the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Venezuela to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/9</td>
<td>Letter dated 12 April 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/10 and Corr. 1</td>
<td>Letter dated 12 April 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/11</td>
<td>Letter dated 14 April 1977 from the Permanent Representative of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/12</td>
<td>Letter dated 15 April 1977 from the Permanent Representative of the Polish People's Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/13</td>
<td>Letter dated 14 April 1977 from the Permanent Representative of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/14</td>
<td>Letter dated 15 April 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Document No.</td>
<td>Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/15</td>
<td>Letter dated 15 April 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/16</td>
<td>Note verbale dated 19 April 1977 from the Permanent Mission of Mongolia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/17</td>
<td>Letter dated 22 April 1977 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/18</td>
<td>Note verbale dated 15 April 1977 from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/19</td>
<td>Note verbale dated 25 April 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Sweden to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/20</td>
<td>Note verbale dated 19 April 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Denmark to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/21</td>
<td>Note verbale dated 26 April 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Finland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/22</td>
<td>Note verbale dated 26 April 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Norway to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/23</td>
<td>Letter dated 25 April 1977 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/24</td>
<td>Letter dated 27 April 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Romania to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/25</td>
<td>Note verbale dated 26 April 1977 from the Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/26 and Corr. 1</td>
<td>Note verbale dated 27 April 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/27</td>
<td>Note verbale dated 25 April 1977 from the Permanent Mission of Indonesia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/28</td>
<td>Note verbale dated 27 April 1977 from the Permanent Mission of Algeria to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/29 and Corr. 1 and Add. 1</td>
<td>Disarmament resolutions adopted by the General Assembly - Background paper prepared by the Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Document No.</td>
<td>Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/30 and Corr. 1</td>
<td>Existing principles and proposals for the conduct of disarmament negotiations - Background paper prepared by the Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/30/Add.1</td>
<td>Working paper containing a preliminary draft comprehensive programme of disarmament submitted by Mexico on 23 August</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/31</td>
<td>Existing structures and machinery for disarmament negotiations - Background paper prepared by the Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/32</td>
<td>Note verbale dated 30 April 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Italy to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/33</td>
<td>Note verbale dated 25 April 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/34</td>
<td>Note verbale dated 26 April 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Mexico to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/35</td>
<td>Letter dated 29 April 1977 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/36</td>
<td>Letter dated 28 April 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Bulgaria to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/37</td>
<td>Note verbale dated 29 April 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/38</td>
<td>Note verbale dated 2 May 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/39</td>
<td>Note verbale dated 2 May 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Luxembourg to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/40</td>
<td>Note verbale dated 3 May 1977 from the Permanent Representative of New Zealand to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/41</td>
<td>Communication dated 5 May 1977 received from the Permanent Mission of Austria on the views and suggestions of the Austrian Government concerning the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/42</td>
<td>Note verbale dated 11 April 1977 from the Permanent Mission of Peru to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/43</td>
<td>Communication dated 10 May 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka to the United Nations and Chairman of the Coordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/44</td>
<td>Note verbale dated 9 May 1977 from the Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Document No. | Title
---|---
A/AC.187/45 | Note verbale dated 6 May 1977 from the Permanent Mission of Greece to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General
A/AC.187/46 | Note verbale dated 2 May 1977 from the Permanent Mission of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General
A/AC.187/47 | Note verbale dated 10 May 1977 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General
A/AC.187/48 | Letter dated 11 May 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Argentina to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General
A/AC.187/49 | Note verbale dated 11 May 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General
A/AC.187/50 | Note verbale dated 10 April 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General
A/AC.187/51 and Corr. 1 and Corr. 2 and Add. 1 | Views of Member States on the agenda and all other relevant questions relating to the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament - Background paper prepared by the Secretariat

### VOLUME IV

A/AC.187/52 | Letter dated 6 May 1977 from the Foreign Secretary of Pakistan addressed to the Secretary-General
A/AC.187/53 | Note verbale dated 16 May 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Malaysia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General
A/AC.187/54 | Draft agenda submitted by the Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka on behalf of the non-aligned members of the Preparatory Committee
A/AC.187/55 | Communication dated 18 May 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka to the United Nations and Chairman of the Coordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries addressed to the Secretary-General - Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament: Non-Aligned working document containing the draft declaration, programme of action and machinery for implementation
A/AC.187/55/Add.1 and Add.1/Corr.1 and Add.1/Corr.2 | Some fundamental principles and norms for possible inclusion in the "Declaration on Disarmament" envisaged in the draft agenda of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, approved by the Preparatory Committee on 18 May 1977 - Mexico: working paper
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document No.</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/57</td>
<td>Note verbale dated 25 May 1977 from the Permanent Mission of the Philippines to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/58</td>
<td>Letter dated 27 May 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Qatar to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/59</td>
<td>Note verbale dated 2 June 1977 from the Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of Portugal to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/60</td>
<td>Letter dated 9 June 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Mauritius to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/61</td>
<td>Note verbale dated 10 June 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Egypt to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/63</td>
<td>Note verbale dated 7 June 1977 from the Permanent Mission of Surinam to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/64</td>
<td>Note verbale dated 30 June 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/65</td>
<td>Note verbale dated 6 July 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Barbados to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/66</td>
<td>Note verbale dated 5 July 1977 from the Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/67</td>
<td>A brief synopsis of disarmament and arms limitation negotiations since 1945 - including their results - carried out within the framework of the United Nations, on a regional basis, or bilaterally, with indication, where appropriate, of the procedures followed to keep the United Nations informed - Working paper prepared by the Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/68</td>
<td>A comparative study of the scope originally proposed or aimed at in draft multilateral disarmament treaties of a universal character concluded under United Nations auspices and the scope finally fixed in those treaties, including the contemplated measures for expanding that scope - Working paper prepared by the Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/69</td>
<td>A comprehensive study of official proposals or declarations made and decisions taken by the General Assembly on the procedure of unilateral or negotiated moratoria as a provisional measure for the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, as well as their application by any State - Working paper prepared by the Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Document No.</td>
<td>Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/70</td>
<td>A synthesis of the arguments adduced for and against each of the four proposals for the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones that have been included in the General Assembly's agenda (Africa, South Asia, the Middle East and the South Pacific) and for and against the proposal for the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean, including a subject and country index  - Working paper prepared by the Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/71</td>
<td>A comprehensive study of the origin, development and present status of the various alternatives proposed for the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons  - Working paper prepared by the Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/72</td>
<td>An analytical summary of the United Nations studies describing the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, bacteriological (biological) weapons and napalm and other incendiary weapons, as well as those dealing with the reduction of military budgets, with the economic and social consequences of the arms race and disarmament and with the relationship between disarmament and development  - Working paper prepared by the Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/73</td>
<td>A comparative study of global military expenditures and development assistance since 1945 as stated in available official and unofficial sources  - Background paper prepared by the Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/76</td>
<td>Views of delegations to the Preparatory Committee on the agenda and all other relevant questions relating to the special session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament  - Background paper prepared by the Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/77</td>
<td>Declaration on disarmament  - Romania: working paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/78</td>
<td>Programme of measures and action  - Romania: working paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/80</td>
<td>Disarmament and development: proposal for a United Nations study  - Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden: working paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/81</td>
<td>Basic provisions of the declaration on disarmament  - Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, and USSR: working paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Document No.</td>
<td>Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/82</td>
<td>Basic provisions of the programme of action on disarmament - Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: working paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/83</td>
<td>Public information activities in connexion with the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament - Working paper prepared by the Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/84</td>
<td>Reply from the Government of Costa Rica to the letter from the Secretary-General of the United Nations concerning the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/85</td>
<td>Note verbale dated 19 October 1977 from the Permanent Mission of Bahamas to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/86</td>
<td>Letter dated 9 December 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/87</td>
<td>Working document containing a draft declaration on disarmament: Australia, Canada, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Turkey and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/88</td>
<td>Provisional agenda (for meeting held on 24 January 1978)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/89</td>
<td>Outline of a draft final document of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament - Mexico: working paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/90</td>
<td>Communiqué issued by the Office of the President of the French Republic, following the meeting of the Council of Ministers held on 25 January 1978, on the policy of France with regard to disarmament - France: working paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/91</td>
<td>Declaration on disarmament - Pakistan: working paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/92</td>
<td>Programme of action on disarmament - Pakistan: working paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/93/Rev.1 and Corr.1</td>
<td>Tabulation of proposals contained in the working papers submitted to the Preparatory Committee concerning the final document(s) of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament - Background paper prepared by the Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/94</td>
<td>Dissemination of information on the question of the armaments race and disarmament - Elements to be included in the preamble, the declaration and programme of action - Venezuela: working paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/95</td>
<td>Elements for inclusion in the programme of action and in the documents relating to the machinery for disarmament negotiations - Sweden: working paper</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**VOLUME VI**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document No.</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/96</td>
<td>Draft programme of action - Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: working paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/97</td>
<td>Suggestions for a disarmament programme - Italy: working paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/98</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: working paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/99</td>
<td>Note verbale dated 13 January 1978 from the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/100</td>
<td>Tabulation of proposals contained in the working papers submitted to the Preparatory Committee concerning the final document(s) of the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament - Background paper prepared by the Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/101</td>
<td>Disarmament and verification - Austria: working paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/102</td>
<td>Programme of action - Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty - Australia, Austria, Mexico, New Zealand, Sweden and Venezuela: working paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/103</td>
<td>International machinery for disarmament - Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Federal Republic of, New Zealand, Norway, and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: working document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/104</td>
<td>Tabulation of proposals contained in the working papers submitted to the Preparatory Committee concerning the final document(s) of the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament - Background paper prepared by the Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/105</td>
<td>Proposals of France for inclusion among the final draft document (declaration, programme of action, machinery for negotiations) of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/106</td>
<td>Provisional agenda (for meeting held on 4 April 1978)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/107</td>
<td>Working paper on organization and procedures of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament submitted by the members of its Group of 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/108</td>
<td>Study on the establishment of an international disarmament organization - Netherlands: working paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/109</td>
<td>Disarmament and verification - Background paper prepared by the Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/110</td>
<td>Italy: working paper on international mechanisms for disarmament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/111</td>
<td>Draft introduction - Working paper by Mexico and Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Document No.</td>
<td>Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/112</td>
<td>Statement by <strong>Poland</strong> in connexion with the completion of the work of the Preparatory Committee for the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/113</td>
<td>Statement by <strong>Yugoslavia</strong> in connexion with the completion of the work of the Preparatory Committee for the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/114</td>
<td>Statement by the <strong>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</strong> in connexion with the completion of the work of the Preparatory Committee for the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/INF.2-7</td>
<td>Lists of communications concerning disarmament received from non-governmental organizations and research institutions (to be incorporated in A/INF/S-10/1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

TABULATION OF PROPOSALS CONTAINED IN THE WORKING PAPERS SUBMITTED TO THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE CONCERNING THE FINAL DOCUMENT(S) OF THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

(Background paper prepared by the Secretariat)
INTRODUCTORY NOTE BY THE SECRETARIAT

At its twenty-first meeting on 24 January 1978, the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament requested the Secretariat to prepare a tabulation of proposals contained in the working papers submitted to the Preparatory Committee concerning the final document(s) of the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament.

The present document incorporates those parts of the working papers submitted up to 30 January 1978, which are listed below, relating to a draft resolution (preamble), an introduction and a declaration. They are tabulated in the original wording and in chronological order.

3. Working paper submitted by Mexico containing some fundamental principles and norms for possible inclusion in the "Declaration on Disarmament" (A/AC.187/56*).
4. Working paper by Mauritius containing elements to be included in the declaration on disarmament (A/AC.187/60).
5. Working paper by Romania containing a draft declaration on disarmament (A/AC.187/77).
6. Working paper containing basic provisions of the declaration on disarmament submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and USSR (A/AC.187/81).
7. Working paper by Japan containing proposal concerning the conventional arms race including, in particular, the international transfer of conventional arms and mutual limitation of conventional armaments and armed forces on the regional level (A/AC.187/86).
8. Working document containing a draft declaration on disarmament submitted by Australia, Canada, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (A/AC.187/87).
11. Working paper submitted by Venezuela on elements to be included in the preamble, the declaration and the programme of action (A/AC.187/94).
1.

DRAFT RESOLUTION: PREAMBLE

1.

Alarmed by the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons; (A/AC.187/55/Add.1)

Convinced that it is imperative to put an end to the arms race, both because it entails a threat to the very survival of mankind and because it is incompatible with the new international economic order, (A/AC.187/56 and 89)

* * *

*   *

*
2.

Convinced that global catastrophe can only be averted by arresting and reversing the arms race and by the final elimination of all nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction;
(A/AC.187/55/Add.1)

Considering the devastation visited on mankind by wars and the urgent need to make every effort to remove the scourge of war and to take measures to safeguard the security of all peoples;
(A/AC.187/87)

*   *   *

*   *

*
Noting that enormous expenditures on a world-wide scale for arms and military forces absorb material and human resources from the peaceful economic and social development of all countries;
(A/AC.187/87)
Convinced therefore that arms limitation and disarmament can make a major contribution to furthering international peace and security and to the economic and social advances of mankind; (A/AC.187/87)
Conscious that the peace of the world depends on concerted action to achieve disarmament and to eliminate the danger of war; (A/AC.187/55/Add.1)

Having resolved to lay the foundations of a new international disarmament strategy which, through co-ordinated and persevering efforts within the framework of the United Nations, can culminate in general and complete disarmament under effective international control, (A/AC.187/56 and 89)

* * *

* * *
Never since the period of prehistory has mankind faced a threat of annihilation as real as that posed by the arms race. For years the nuclear arsenals of a few States which possess those terrible instruments of mass destruction have been sufficient to wipe out, not once but many times over, every vestige of life in the world and to make the earth itself uninhabitable.

The increase in weapons, especially nuclear ones, far from helping to strengthen international security, weakens and decreases it. The enormous quantities of weapons which have been stockpiled and the constant process of qualitative and technological refinement to which unbridled competition is subjecting them pose incalculable threats to peace. (A/AC.187/56 and 89).
Convinced also that international peace as well as the security of all nations cannot be maintained on the precarious basis of mutual deterrence through an ever escalating arms race and that a true climate of peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system as provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of armaments and armed forces by mutual example and international agreement; (A/AC.187/55/Add.1)

Recalling their solemn obligation enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State;

Considering the importance of the adherence by all States to existing multilateral treaties on arms control and disarmament;

Bearing in mind the complexity and importance of the problems of disarmament which affect the vital security interests and the territorial integrity of all States;

Recognizing that all States must be concerned with the maintenance and strengthening of international security and with the essential part to be played in its enhancement by arms control and disarmament measures in the field of both nuclear and conventional weapons; (A/AC.187/87)
8.

Convinced further that the realization of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations are jeopardized by the arms race and that the vast resources now being wasted in the arms race must be channeled for the betterment of mankind through economic and social development. (A/AC.187/55/Add.1)

Military expenditures are reaching ever higher levels which until recently would have seemed inconceivable. The magnitude of the waste represented by the hundreds of billions of dollars spent annually on the manufacture or improvement of weapons is in sombre and dramatic contrast to the want and poverty in which two thirds of the world's population live.

This gigantic squandering of financial resources is even more serious in that it diverts to military activities enormous material and, in particular, technical and human resources which are essential for development. Thus, the economic and social consequences of the arms race are so detrimental that their continuation is obviously incompatible with the consolidation of the new international economic order, which should be based on co-operation, justice and equity. (A/AC.187/56 and 89).

* * *

*
Mindful of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and in the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with the provisions of the Charter and determined to strengthen that role;
(A/AC.187/55/Add.1)

*   *

*   *

Digitized by Dag Hammarskjöld Library
It can be readily noted that at the present time a large part of world public opinion has insufficient knowledge of the unusual destructive dimensions which nuclear weapons have achieved and of the impressive quantity of diverse resources devoted to the armaments race in general. This is due, inter alia, to the extraordinarily rapid progress and sophistication of nuclear weapons which have taken place in recent years and to the fact that the parallel efforts made to disseminate information on this matter have lagged or have been silenced.

In the urgent search for solutions which will help to achieve practical results in the matter of disarmament, emphasis has been placed on the need to inform the public openly of the adverse effects of the armaments race on the economic and social development of peoples, in particular, and on the security and well-being of mankind in general. If these matters were presented to the public in a direct and realistic manner it would dissipate once and for all the illusion that the world can live in security while the armaments race continues.

(A/AC.187/94)
The alarming situation whose principal aspects have been described above makes it imperative to take without delay the necessary steps to ensure that disarmament is recognized in practice, and not only in theory, for what it really is: the most important and urgent question confronting the international community today. The General Assembly has accordingly resolved solemnly to proclaim, in this final document of its first special session devoted to disarmament, the following three instruments: a Declaration on Disarmament, a Programme of Action, and Guidelines for Disarmament Negotiations. (A/AC.187/56 and 89)
II. DECLARATION

1.

In order both to formulate and to apply a programme of action which will provide for and co-ordinate the adoption of genuine disarmament measures aimed at achieving general and complete disarmament under effective international control and to define the basic rules which should serve to make disarmament negotiations more effective, it is imperative to have a clear idea of the fundamental principles and purposes meriting general acceptance in this connexion. The systematic compilation of those principles and purposes is the subject of this Declaration on Disarmament, through which it is reaffirmed or established that: (A/AC.181/89).

*   *   *

*   *
A. Review and appraisal

Mankind today is confronted with an unprecedented threat of self-extinction on account of the massive and competitive accumulation of the most destructive weapons man has ever produced. Existing arsenals of nuclear weapons alone, at the disposal of only a few States, are sufficient to destroy all life on earth several times over. Yet the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, is continuing unabated. This situation not only jeopardizes the peace and security of all States, but acts as a stimulating factor for the persistence of international tensions and conflicts in various regions of the world, aggravates existing differences among nuclear-weapons States, consolidates military alliances and brings ever nearer the threat of a nuclear confrontation for which nuclear-weapons States are in an ever-increasing stage of readiness. (A/AC.187/55/Add.1).

While fully recognizing the important role and responsibilities of great Powers with respect to peace and security, the small and medium-sized States, the developing countries and the non-aligned States, are all parties which must be involved in this time and age when the process of scientific and technological advance and democratization is producing a new form of world society. The world is in the search for a more and just acceptable world order. The positive results of this search are, however, constantly threatened by the continuing arms race. In an international environment dominated by the arms race, military and strategic considerations stand to shape the over-all relations between States affecting also all other relations and transactions. Only if we make a major progress in the field of disarmament will it be possible to create a system of world order based on collective responsibility and a climate of international confidence.

The vast arsenals already accumulated and the ongoing race to produce new arms make the peace and security of our world less stable. Stocks of nuclear weapons in the possession of the nuclear Powers have already for many years been sufficient to destroy the world many times over. Still the number of nuclear warheads have increased fivefold in the last eight years. In addition, these weapons are constantly being diversified and their performance characteristics improved. Already today we observe the development by the major Powers of new generations and types of nuclear weapons that are smaller in power but more accurate in finding their intended target. These can lead to a gradual erosion of the dividing line between the use of nuclear and conventional weapons. The danger over the spread of nuclear weapons increases with every year as the art of nuclear technology becomes more widely known. The so-called conventional weapons are becoming increasingly sophisticated and deadly. There is the real possibility of development of new, even more dangerous weapons of mass destruction which would pose additional innumerable hazards to all mankind. (A/AC.187/60).
The magnitude of the conventional and nuclear arms race and the development, diversification and accumulation of nuclear and conventional weapons, which represent in total an immense potential for mass destruction, are a matter of serious concern for all peoples. Immense human and material resources are being concentrated in the sphere of arms; new expenditures are being added to military budgets; military forces are reaching levels which cannot be justified in time of peace; the accumulation of conventional weapons and the development of the most deadly types of weapons and weapons systems are continuing; in the application of scientific and technological progress in the sphere of nuclear energy, electronics, laser technology and other fields, priority is given to the development and creation of new weapons; opposing military blocks are still maintained, as are numerous military bases and forces in the territories of other States. (A/AC.187/77).

Ending the arms race, achieving disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, and removing the threat of a world war is the most acute and urgent task of the present day. Mankind is confronted with a choice: it must halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament or else the machinery of preparation for war will continue to consume an ever-increasing proportion of resources vital to human beings, making the danger of a disastrous war ever more real. (A/AC.187/61).

Efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons have not been accompanied by complementary steps to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race, to reassure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or the threat of use of the threat of use of nuclear weapons and to ensure that all States accept and adhere to the goal of non-proliferation.

The objective of nuclear non-proliferation cannot be furthered by restrictions on the transfer and development of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes; on the contrary, such measures place needless strains on international co-operation and introduce a new element of division between the developed and developing countries.

The disproportion in the military strength and power between the industrialized and developing countries is an element in the existing inequitable world political and economic order.

The development of technology is a destabilizing factor in the so-called strategic balance. Some newly developed weapons and those that are planned, such as FGMs and RCWVs as well as developments in laser technology, will make possible the selective use of force and place in the hands of those who possess such weapons the capacity to dominate and control other states. (A/AC.187/91)
Furthermore, the arms race, which is both the cause and result of great Power rivalry, impedes the realization of the objectives of the United Nations Charter, especially those relating to the respect for sovereignty, the refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and non-interference in the internal affairs of States, and adversely affects the right of peoples to freely determine their systems of social and economic development, the struggle of peoples against colonial rule, racial or foreign domination or occupation. (A/AC.187/55/Add.1).

The continuation of the arms race is in total conflict with the new efforts to achieve détente, with the development of new international relations based on trust between States, and with measures aimed at the institution of broad international co-operation and understanding. The continuation of the arms race acts as a stimulus for imperialist policy of force and diktat and interference in the internal affairs of other peoples, and serves to perpetuate sources of tension and conflict in different regions of the world. It will be impossible to implement a genuine peace policy or to consolidate and develop international détente if the arms race is not brought to an end, if troops and military bases are maintained in the territory of other States, and if a vigorous disarmament process, dealing first of all with nuclear weapons, is not launched. It is on this basis alone that the necessary climate of confidence can be created for continuing the process of détente, that relations between States can be based truly on the principles of national independence and sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, full equality of rights, non-use of force or the threat of force, and the right of each people to decide on its own destiny. (A/AC.187/77).

Modern weapons are thousands of times as destructive as anything used in military conflicts of the past, and they pose a far more serious threat to the survival of nations than has ever been the case before. Yet, the actions of the enemies of détente and disarmament and the interests of the military-industrial complex are pushing mankind into a new and ever more dangerous and destructive spiral of the arms race. Weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems are continuing to develop with the aid of the latest achievements of science and technology while the stockpiles of weapons are steadily increasing in size. This creates an increased threat of nuclear war, particularly since under present circumstances any military conflict can develop into a nuclear cataclysm. (A/AC.187/52).

Disarmament is an integral part of the endeavour to evolve a new international order based on the principles of the U.N. Charter, especially those concerning respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of States, non-interference in their internal affairs, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and the right of peoples to self-determination and national independence. (A/AC.187/91).
Military expenditures have reached the staggering figure of about $400 billion a year, the highest percentage of which can be attributed to nuclear-weapons States and their allies, with prospects of further expansion and the danger of increasing expenditure spreading to other countries. Vast human, natural, scientific, technological and financial resources are thus wasted in the preparation for war, when these resources could be channelled to eradicate hunger, disease and other pressing economic and social problems hampering development in many parts of the world. (A/AC.187/55/Add.1)

There is an evident need to end the present trend of massive diversion to military ends of financial resources, manpower, raw materials, technical skills and development capability. There is today a greater awareness that the whole world is facing a series of urgent and important problems which will require the mobilization of all energies and resources for their solution. Chief among these questions is the problem of development and the associated task of establishing a new international economic order. There are consequently large claims on investment, research and other resources in direct competition with military demands. The arms race with its economic costs and social and political effects constitutes the single most massive obstacle to effective progress. Effective disarmament is needed to release resources for the peaceful development of all, and especially of the developing countries. Disarmament must be a vital part of our attempts to restructure the world order politically, economically and socially. The need is today greater than ever. (A/AC.187/50).

The arms race and military expenditures are a heavy burden for all peoples throughout the world; they impede economic and social progress and the development of co-operation between States and constitute an obstacle to efforts to eradicate under-development, to solve other problems on which the future of mankind depends. The arms race brings about distortions in the economic development of all States, feeds inflation and balance-of-payments deficits, erects artificial barriers to the transfer of equipment and technology and to the expansion of trade between nations, gives rise to irrational management of human resources and raw materials and contributes to the pollution of our planet and to the disturbance of the ecological balance.

Disarmament is an integral part of the process of establishing a new international economic and political order.

The new international economic and political order categorically demands the halting of the wastage represented by expenditures on arms and the utilization of these immense material and spiritual resources for the progress and well-being of all peoples and of all mankind. The achievements of science and technology applied for military purposes should be reoriented towards the needs of development. Steps must be taken to ensure that advanced nuclear energy is utilized by all States on conditions of full equality without any discrimination whatsoever.

At least 25 per cent of the funds saved in the process of disarmament should be allocated to international assistance programmes for the developing countries, with the view to reducing and ultimately eliminating the abyss which exists, from the economic point of view, between developed countries and developing countries. (A/AC.187/77)
An arms race involves an enormous waste of resources which could be used to advance the well-being of peoples. At the present time, the world is spending approximately $350 billion a year on armaments. The war machine requires ever greater human resources, diverting people from peaceful creative work. This hampers the solution of such important and pressing problems facing mankind as the eradication of disease, hunger and cultural backwardness, the development of new sources of energy, extensive exploration of the ocean and outer space, and the prevention of disastrous environmental changes. It also calls for urgent measures to curb the arms race and bring about disarmament. (A/AC.187/81).

The "opportunity cost" of the diversion of more than $1 billion a day to the arms race is incalculable. This irrational use of the world's finite resources distorts the economic development of all States, large and small, advanced and underdeveloped, contributes to the current problems of inflation, balance of payments deficits, energy shortages and has created economic and political obstacles in the way of establishing the New International Economic Order.

The enormous expenditure on armaments by States do not contribute materially to their security but on the contrary intensify the international climate of insecurity and serve further to fuel the arms race. (A/AC.187/91).
Disarmament has thus become the most urgent international objective. However, no real progress has been made in this crucial field. Agreements that have been reached so far relate only to measures of limited restraint, but have not slowed the pace of the arms race, the only genuine disarmament agreement having been the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and their Destruction. Negotiations for general and complete disarmament have been virtually abandoned for more than a decade.

(A/AC.187/55/Add.1)

Relieving the cold war atmosphere has had an important effect in relaxing the international climate, thereby diminishing the risk of an over-all nuclear war. But détente has not extended to all areas of the world and it has not yet been able to lead to a real break-through in the process of disarmament.

The disarmament efforts, since the Second World War, have produced some very modest results in the nature of arms limitation, rather than disarmament. The thrust has been on regulating competition in armaments proscribing certain developments deemed to be particularly destabilizing, costly or otherwise unacceptable rather than an attempt to substantially reduce important weapons systems. In the context of a rapidly in vative arms race such an approach is bound to fail. Technological innovations tend to outstrip the pace of negotiations. The momentum of the arms race makes it circumvent the too weak barriers that have been built to stop it. Partial and collateral measures can play a role in the cessation reversal of the arms race only if they are conceived as part of a broader programme aimed at substantial disarmament in areas of weaponry of central military significance ultimately leading to general and complete disarmament and particularly nuclear disarmament under effective international control.

Disarmament should be approached in a comprehensive manner, efforts should aim at real disarmament. Work should be resumed on the elaboration of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. (A/AC.187/60).

The fundamental interests and aspirations of mankind demand the adoption of resolute measures to put an end to this situation which has such potentially grave consequences for world peace and security. The most enlightened and far-sighted forces of human society, the movements fighting for peace and disarmament, the broad masses in all parts of the world, have declared themselves firmly opposed to war and the danger of war and to the arms race, and demand that the arms build-up should be ended, that nuclear weapons should be banned completely, and that the spectre of the incalculable destruction threatening contemporary civilization and the future of humanity should thereby be eliminated.

In spite of over three decades of negotiations, Governments have never yet applied to disarmament problems resolute and decisive measures to reduce and eliminate armaments and to save mankind from the danger of another war. Although existing treaties and conventions have helped to establish a climate of understanding, they have not proved effective in slowing down the arms race or ensuring the enforcement of effective disarmament measures and they have no effect on the very foundations of armaments, namely, nuclear weaponry. (A/AC.187/77).
Recent history shows that it is possible to curb the arms race. In the past few years, it has been possible to achieve a positive change in the development of international relations towards détente and the affirmation in international relations of the principle of peaceful coexistence between States with different social systems. Thus, favourable conditions have been established for successful negotiations on disarmament. The recently concluded agreements in this field provide tangible proof that it is possible to solve the problem of disarmament. These are but the first steps; their importance, however, is great.

They include the Soviet-United States agreements aimed at preventing nuclear war and reducing the risk of its accidental outbreak and at limiting strategic arms, as well as the Soviet-French agreement on the prevention of an accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons.

They also include such measures for limiting the nuclear arms race as the treaties on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water and on the non-emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and also the Soviet-United States treaties on the limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests and on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

An important role in curbing the arms race belongs to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and other measures agreed upon in recent years for preventing the spread of such weapons.

These steps also include the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and the Convention on the Prohibition of Action to Influence the Environment and Climate for Military and Other Hostile Purposes.

Important proposals for the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, for the prohibition of chemical weapons and for the prohibition of the development and production of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction are on the negotiating table. Negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe and on further limitation of the strategic weapons of the USSR and the United States are currently in progress. A proposal has been submitted calling upon all the participants in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe to undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other. The question of concluding a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations is under consideration.

Thus, the political and material prerequisites exist for making decisive progress towards ending the arms race and achieving disarmament. The crucial question now is to translate into practical terms the initiatives which have been taken and to proceed along the road towards binding and effective international agreements in the field of disarmament. This calls for joint efforts by all States, nuclear and non-nuclear, big and small, developed and developing.

(A/AC.187/81).
The concept of universal and collective security visualized in the Charter of the United Nations can become a reality if substantial progress is made towards the goal of General and Complete Disarmament. Despite the intense consideration of disarmament within and outside the United Nations, progress has been marginal and negligible. There are several facets and dimensions of the disarmament problem which require urgent solutions.

The greatest stimulus to the global arms race is the effort of the great powers, especially the two major nuclear powers, to maintain a strategic balance, primarily in Europe but increasingly in other parts of the world. The existence of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, continue to pose a threat to the very survival of mankind.

The creation of a global strategic balance should not be an end in itself; nor should it be allowed to recreate the concept of spheres of influence. Such policies heighten the danger of local and regional conflicts.

The achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict international control is essential to ensure universal peace and security, promote global progress and prosperity, and establish a new and stable international political and economic order.

Disarmament will be facilitated by an international climate of trust and confidence; in turn, the creation of such an international climate depends to a large extent on progress towards disarmament. (A/AC.187/91)

* * *

*
There is a direct link between disarmament and international peace and security since the latter cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry nor be sustained by military alliances and doctrines of strategic superiority or of deterrence. Furthermore, the existing nuclear arsenals and the addition of new and more sophisticated weapons of mass destruction do not ensure or strengthen national security. (A/AC.187/55/Add.1).

There is a close relationship between disarmament and international peace and security, on the one hand, and disarmament and development on the other. Nevertheless, progress in one of those spheres must not be subordinated to progress in the other or vice versa. (A/AC.187/56 and 89)

*   *   *

*   *
There is also an integral link between disarmament and development. The spiralling arms race and the resulting waste of resources are incompatible with the need for accelerated economic and social development and for the establishment of the New International Economic Order. Nevertheless progress in one of these areas should not be contingent upon progress in the other. (A/AC.187/55/Add.1).

The arms race and current global expenditures on armaments interpose significant obstacles in the way of establishing the New International Economic Order based on a rational and equitable distribution and utilization of the world's human and material resources and productive capacities.

All States, both the developed and developing countries, should commit themselves to reducing their expenditures on armaments and divert the human and material resources saved thereby to economic and social development and improving the conditions of life especially in the developing countries.

(A/AC.187/91)
It is a well-known fact that properly informed public opinion can play an important restraining and persuasive role. It is even more essential for public opinion to act in this way when it is a question of matters relating to the very survival of mankind. Venezuela supports the view that, through a systematic information campaign, it is possible to develop an international conscience, at all levels, which would condemn and repudiate the armaments race. An effective campaign implies a continuous supply of information describing the constant refinement and improvement of increasingly complex systems and mechanisms of destruction.

The United Nations has done commendable work in disseminating information on the armaments race, but further efforts are needed to enable world public opinion to play its proper role effectively in the arduous task of combating that phenomenon. It is clear that it could not do this effectively without the open and resolute co-operation and determination of States Members of the United Nations. (A/AC.187/94)

* * *

*
B. Goals and Priorities

General and complete disarmament under effective international control remains the ultimate goal of the international community. The realization of this goal should be resolutely pursued through the United Nations Organization, or under its auspices, on a bilateral or multilateral basis, or within the framework of regional or other international fora, by all States, particularly by the nuclear-weapons States. (A/AC.187/55/Add.1).

General and complete disarmament under effective international control should be the final objective of mankind. (A/AC.187/56 and 59).

The goal of negotiations is to achieve agreement on a programme which will ensure:

(a) That disarmament is general and complete and war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems; (A/AC.187/60).

In view of the serious situation which has thus arisen, the prime duty of the present generation is, more than ever before, to spare no effort, to awaken all consciences, to channel all their energies towards a single end - that of instituting resolute measures in the sphere of disarmament, chiefly measures of nuclear disarmament, of concluding a treaty of general and complete disarmament, of completely eliminating force and the threat of force from international life and of thus liberating mankind from the nightmare of atomic war.

There must be parallel negotiations aimed at universal objectives having a regional or bilateral nature but forming part of a single design to promote the objective of general disarmament and with a commitment to keep all States informed systematically, so that they may be in a position to evaluate the status of the negotiations and their implications for their own security; (A/AC.187/77).

The principal, ultimate objective of the efforts of States in this field is general and complete disarmament under strict international control; only general and complete disarmament can bring mankind, on a stable, long-term basis, the universal peace and security which are essential in order to solve the urgent problems of economic and social development on a world-wide scale. (A/AC.187/81).
The ultimate goal of disarmament negotiations is to ensure the survival of mankind and the elimination of the possibility of war through the strengthening of international peace, security and stability.

To this end agreement should be reached on a comprehensive and integrated programme of action designed to ensure that:

Disarmament is general and complete under strict and effective international control;

Negotiations on limited measures of disarmament should not preclude negotiations on a treaty of general and complete disarmament. (A/AC.187/87)

* * *

*
Progress towards this objective would require the conclusion and implementation of agreements on genuine measures of disarmament according to the Programme of Action on Disarmament, the first priority of which shall be the outlawing of nuclear war, and the elimination of nuclear weapons, which pose the greatest threat to the survival of mankind. High priority must also be given to disarmament measures relating to all types of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons. Conventional weapons which give cause for grave concern should also be the object of disarmament agreements in the context of general and complete disarmament. (A/AC.187/55/Add.1).

Gradual progress towards this objective requires the conclusion of partial agreements and authentic measures for disarmament.

The progressive reduction of nuclear weapons until their total elimination has been achieved should have the highest priority among such measures.

The reduction and elimination of the other weapons of mass destruction deserve also a high priority.

The development, production and stockpiling of napalm and other incendiary weapons must be prohibited, and those existing in the arsenals of all States should be destroyed.

The international transfer of conventional weapons should be limited and regulated.

The proliferation of nuclear weapons could endanger the security of all States and would make it even more difficult to achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international control. (A/AC.187/56 and 89)

The highest priority should be given to disarmament matters dealing with nuclear weapons.

The programme for general and complete disarmament shall ensure that States will have at their disposal only such non-nuclear armaments, forces, facilities and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens; and that States shall support and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations peace force.

The disarmament programme should be implemented in an agreed sequence, by stages, until it is completed, with each measure and stage carried out within specified time-limits. Transition to a subsequent stage in the process of disarmament should take place upon a review of the implementation of measures included in the preceding stage and upon a decision that all such measures have been implemented and verified and that any additional verification arrangements required for measures in the next stage are, when appropriate, ready to operate. (A/AC.187/60).
The most noble duty of Governments and States towards their peoples for the cause of civilization and the progress of mankind is to reveal openly the danger implicit in the continuation of the arms race and to show that, as the arms race increases, the security of States is diminished; it is their duty in no way to create the illusion that anyone can live in peace and safety while immense accumulations of the means of annihilation exist. That is why action is needed before it is too late with a view to adopting and putting into effect resolute disarmament measures, particularly nuclear disarmament measures, in order to respond to the aspirations of all nations for peace, freedom and well-being.

General and complete disarmament and, above all, nuclear disarmament has now become one of the major problems of international life. An urgent solution to this problem is vitally important if the threat of a destructive war is to be eliminated.

Disarmament negotiations should concentrate primarily on specific measures to bring about the immediate cessation of the arms race, measures which would put an end to the acquisition, production and development of armaments and to the building up of military strength.

If practical results are to be attained, now and in the future, disarmament negotiations must be governed by the following fundamental principles:

There must be an immediate halt to the arms race and to sharply rising military expenditure and the diversion of such expenditure into disarmament;

Absolute priority must be given to measures of nuclear disarmament;

The process of disarmament must start with the heavily armed major States;

Parallel negotiations must be carried on at several levels, with discussions on the conclusion of a general disarmament treaty being complemented by the adoption of partial measures, by increased mutual trust, by military disengagement and disarmament, so as to encourage progress towards the final objective;

The acceleration of the process of disarmament must be pursued so that its progress outpaces any technological research designed to replace arms destroyed or about to be eliminated; (A/AC.187/77)

Specific partial measures for limiting the arms race, reducing armaments and achieving disarmament can play an important role as stages on the way to general and complete disarmament and the establishment of stable peace. Such partial measures should involve prohibiting and destroying certain existing armaments, preventing the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, excluding certain spheres or regions from the arms race, systematically reducing the military expenditures of States, limiting armaments and achieving disarmament on a regional basis as well as other steps to prepare the way for general and complete disarmament.
All States should refrain from actions which might adversely affect efforts in the field of disarmament. An important prerequisite for the success of negotiations on limiting armaments and achieving disarmament is the willingness of States to display a constructive approach to negotiations and a political will to reach agreements.

In order to prevent a continuing arms race it is essential to put an end to qualitative improvements of arms, especially weapons of mass destruction, to the development of new means of warfare. Scientific and technological achievements must be used solely for peaceful purposes. (A/AC.187/61).

Most of the world's military expenditures are being devoted to the acquisition and maintenance of conventional military power. This absorbs essential material and human resources. All States should make all possible efforts, parallel to those in the field of nuclear disarmament, to halt this diversion of resources and to bring about concrete measures for their reallocation from military to civilian purposes.

The increasing build-up of conventional arms in many parts of the world produces a potential risk of heightening military tension and endangering international peace and security. The unabated international transfer of conventional arms should be brought under control.

Conventional arms control and disarmament, with the reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces, together with control of the development and production of new systems of sophisticated weapons with increased destructive power and strategic capability— which have blurred the classical distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons— will contribute to the achievement of general and complete disarmament. (A/AC.187/86).

Multilateral disarmament measures dealing with specific issues including those on a regional basis, should be undertaken as soon as possible as a contribution to progress, step by step, towards the ultimate objective of achieving general and complete disarmament:

No State can regard itself as immune from the tragic consequences of a global war fought with nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. The common vulnerability of States makes it essential that they should plan an effective role in the achievement of international peace and security and share in the responsibility for the achievement of effective arms control and disarmament measures. Nuclear-weapon Powers and other militarily significant States have particular responsibilities in this regard.

Eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons in the context of general and complete disarmament is the most important challenge of our time since the dangers of nuclear warfare remain a grave threat to the survival of mankind. Partial agreements on nuclear arms control and, in particular, universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty can make a vital contribution to progress towards this goal. Efforts to curb and reverse the nuclear arms race must include measures to prevent both horizontal and vertical proliferation. There must be progress in both areas in order to enhance international security.

The effective prohibition and elimination of weapons of mass destruction other than nuclear weapons, and in particular chemical weapons, and of any future weapons based on new scientific principles which have characteristics comparable in destructive effects, are of great importance.
Most of the world’s military expenditure is being devoted to the acquisition and maintenance of conventional military power. This absorbs essential material and human resources. All States should make all possible efforts parallel to those in the field of nuclear disarmament to halt this diversion of resources and to achieve concrete measures for their reallocation from military to civilian purposes. To this end it will be necessary to intensify research on how best to achieve this goal.

The increasing build-up of conventional arms in many parts of the world involves a potential risk of heightening military tension and endangering international peace and security. The unabated international transfer of conventional arms should be brought under control.

General and complete disarmament shall permit States to have at their disposal only those non-nuclear forces, armaments, facilities and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens and in order that States shall support and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations peace force. (A/AC.187/87).

Nuclear weapons pose the most immediate and all-pervasive threat to international peace and security and to the very survival of mankind. It is therefore imperative to prohibit the use of such weapons, prevent their qualitative development, reduce and ultimately eliminate the nuclear weapons and delivery systems of the nuclear weapon States and take measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The progressive and balanced reduction of conventional weapons would be facilitated by measures to resolve outstanding disputes and remove sources of tension.

The expenditure on conventional arms and the level of armed forces should be restrained and progressively reduced, in the first instance by the major powers and other militarily significant States. (A/AC.187/91).
Other measures in the field of disarmament, confidence building, and improvement of the machinery for the peaceful settlement of disputes could significantly contribute to the lessening of international tensions and to the creation of a situation conducive to the adoption of additional disarmament measures. Such measures as the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and the cessation of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes should be undertaken forthwith. Other measures, including relevant regional agreements and the progressive reduction of military expenditures should be undertaken as soon as possible. The creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace constitute one of the most effective disarmament measures within the reach of those States which do not possess nuclear weapons. Regional considerations in a particular area may require that formal procedures and arrangements to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones should be flexible and that there should be alternative ways and methods to suit the particular character of each zone. (A/AC.187/55/Add.1)

The creation of nuclear-free zones and zones of peace constitutes one of the most effective disarmament measures within the reach of those States which do not possess nuclear weapons.

(A/AC.187/56 and 89)

That such disarmament is accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. During and after the implementation of the programme of general and complete disarmament, there should be taken, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security, including the obligation of States to place at the disposal of the United Nations agreed manpower necessary for an international peace force to be equipped with agreed types of armaments. Arrangements for the use of this force should ensure that the United Nations can effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

(A/AC.187/60)
The process of disarmament should be accompanied by the elimination of sources of conflict, by the political settlement of contentious problems, by the strict application in relations among States of the rules and principles of international law and by the strengthening of institutions for the maintenance of peace and for the peaceful settlement of international disputes, in conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Concurrently with disarmament measures, specific procedures must be adopted for the settlement of disputes by peaceful means, with a view to maintaining the peace and security of all States, in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations;

(A/AC.187/77)

The relaxation of international tensions and the resulting positive political processes can be truly stable if accompanied and buttressed by measures of military détente, i.e. new concrete results in the field of limiting the arms race and of disarmament.

(A/AC.187/81)

States Members of the United Nations affirm their commitment to undertake confidence building measures for the purposes of relaxing international tensions.

Such disarmament is accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and that effective arrangements are undertaken for the maintenance of peace and security in accordance with the principle of the United Nations Charter.

The establishment under appropriate conditions of nuclear-weapon-free zones could contribute to strengthening the security of all members of such zones and to the prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons.

(A/AC.187/87)

The promotion of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace are effective instruments by which non-nuclear-weapon States can promote non-proliferation, insulate themselves from the nuclear and conventional arms race and thus enhance their security.

The goal of disarmament negotiations is to achieve agreement on a programme which will ensure:

(a) That disarmament is general and complete and war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems, and

(b) That such disarmament is accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations;  (A/AC.187/91)

* * *
The reduction of the military budgets of the permanent members of the Security Council and other militarily important States would constitute a laudable measure of disarmament. (A/AC.187/56 and 89)

The conclusion of suitable agreements and arrangements for the freezing of military expenditure and the establishment of a concrete programme of gradual step-by-step reduction of budgets, beginning with those of the major countries, would fully satisfy this objective. (A/AC.187/77)

A further goal is to release resources in order to facilitate efforts to attain a more just world order which will eliminate present inequalities in the world community and to ensure that a significant portion of the resources freed by disarmament are devoted to the satisfaction of the economic and social needs of humanity, particularly in developing countries.

Reduction of military budgets in all countries on an assured basis could provide undiminished security at a lower level of armaments, help to reduce international tensions and also lead eventually to the release of resources both nationally and internationally for economic and social development.

(A/AC.187/87)

* * *

*
The United Nations should live up to the historic mission for which it was created: to save present and succeeding generations from the scourge of a new conflagration. It is for that reason that it is essential to increase the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, in which it should exercise direct jurisdiction over negotiation, the development of disarmament measures and the monitoring of their implementation. It is necessary that the United Nations should exercise its leadership, and its evaluation, guidance and decision-making functions with regard to all disarmament problems.

Full information must be made available, through the United Nations, on the status of armaments so that all States may be able to obtain the basic data required to enable them to participate in or keep abreast of the progress of negotiations; (A/AC.187/77)
While recognizing the inalienable right of all States to develop research, production and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and to enjoy the benefits thereof, as well as the importance of strengthening international co-operation in that field, it is also essential to ensure through the application of appropriate international safeguards, in particular, those of the International Atomic Energy Agency, that the peaceful application of nuclear energy will not lead to further proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

States must ensure that the régime of non-proliferation is strengthened, as a minimum, by the application of internationally agreed controls to international transfers of nuclear material, equipment and technology. (A/AC.187/87)

The objective of harnessing nuclear technology for economic development and preventing its diversion to military purposes can and should be fully reconciled without jeopardizing the respective fuel cycle policies of various countries or international co-operation, agreements and contracts for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy which should be fulfilled in good faith in accordance with their terms and provisions. (A/AC.187/91)
Since the contradiction between the urgent necessity to curb the arms race and stagnation in disarmament efforts is becoming increasingly intolerable, it is imperative for all States to exert fresh efforts to overcome this situation and to review and improve the existing machinery for disarmament negotiations. (A/AC.187/55/Add.1).

International agreements in the field of disarmament concluded so far should become universal and all parties should fulfil all the obligations arising from these treaties. (A/AC.187/60)
C. Principles

16.

The following fundamental provisions and principles should form the basis of negotiations and decisions on the questions of curbing the arms race and achieving disarmament. (A/AC.137/81)
17.

The growing arms race and the resultant waste of resources are incompatible with the decisions of the United Nations aimed at the consolidation of a New International Economic Order based on justice and equity.

(A/AC.187/56 and 89)
The disarmament process must be organically linked with measures adopted at the world level to establish a new economic and political order aimed at ensuring international peace and security, co-operation and the economic, social and cultural progress of all States and all peoples. (A/AC.187/77)

The universal acceptance and development of the principle of the non-use of force in international relations are extremely important in terms of ensuring favourable conditions for curbing the arms race and saving mankind from the danger of war. Renunciation of the use or threat of force must become a law of international life. (A/AC.187/61)

States Members of the United Nations reaffirm their commitment to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. Of particular relevance in this context are those principles relating to their obligations concerning international collective security, peaceful means of settlement of disputes and non-intervention in the internal affairs of other States. (A/AC.187/87)
All States have the right and the duty to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament and to participate in disarmament negotiations on an equal footing. While disarmament is the responsibility of all States, the nuclear-weapons States have the primary responsibility for halting and reversing the arms race. In this context, significant unilateral initiatives should be urgently undertaken by them in order to promote reciprocal restraint and accelerate the whole process of disarmament. (A/AC.187/55/Add.1)

All the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations.

The organization and procedures of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should be subject to the modifications deemed appropriate for the participation by China and France in its work. (A/AC.187/56 and 89)

All States should have the opportunity to express their views on the substance and basic principles of such a programme and on its scope, practical ways and means of implementing it and other aspects of the programme; they should participate actively in terms of full equality in all phases of negotiations on the drafting of the programme so that it may embody the will of all peoples and give expression to their fundamental interests.

The participation of all nuclear-weapon States and of all other major military powers in the efforts to contain the nuclear arms race and to reduce and eliminate all armaments is indispensable for a full measure of success in the disarmament efforts.

States participating in the negotiations should seek to achieve and implement the widest possible agreement at the earliest possible date. Efforts should continue without interruption until agreement upon the total programme has been achieved, and efforts to ensure early agreement on and implementation of measures of disarmament should be undertaken without prejudicing progress on an agreement on the total programme and in such a way that these measures would facilitate and form part of that programme.

The feasibility of convening, in due time and after appropriate preparatory work, a world disarmament conference of all States should be thoroughly studied. (A/AC.187/60)
40.

Disarmament problems are not the concern of a limited group of States and Governments alone: they are of vital interest to all the States and peoples of the world, large or small, irrespective of their military strength and of the types of weapons they possess. It is essential that all States should participate in disarmament negotiations and in the deliberations on and adoption of measures in that sphere, ...

Disarmament negotiations should reflect the requirement for the democratization of international life and for equal participation of all States in solving international problems, and should also reflect the great changes that have occurred in international relations.

Arrangements must be made to ensure that multilateral forums for disarmament negotiations are open for participation by all States and, in the case of forums having limited participation, that non-member States are in a position to submit their point of view on the problems under discussion whenever they so request.

(A/AC.187/77)

If disarmament measures are to be effective, it is of the utmost importance that negotiations and agreements should involve the largest possible number of States, particularly nuclear Powers and States which possess the most powerful arms and armed forces. The participation of all the nuclear Powers in efforts to curb the nuclear arms race and to limit and eliminate all armaments is essential if complete success is to be achieved in this regard. The accession of all States to existing international agreements aimed at limiting the arms race and achieving disarmament is a major prerequisite of further progress in this field. A world disarmament conference must be used as an important forum for working out specific, effective measures to solve the problem of disarmament.

(A/AC.187/81)

In order to promote disarmament efforts, it is important to secure the active participation and support of all States and particularly the nuclear-weapon States, and of other militarily significant States, for disarmament negotiations.

Arms control and disarmament measures will be most effective when it is apparent to all States concerned that the measures are in their interests and represent concrete progress towards the goal of enhanced security and peace. To ensure that all parties are convinced that their vital interests have been sufficiently protected it is important that negotiations should be conducted on the basis of a consensus about the objectives of the measures and, wherever possible, the terms of any agreements eventually adopted. (A/AC.187/87)

The primary responsibility for progress towards general and complete disarmament rests on those powers with the largest nuclear and conventional military arsenals and on other militarily significant States.

(A/AC.187/91)

* * *

*
41.

20.

The adoption of disarmament measures should take place in a balanced manner, both quantitatively and qualitatively, so that no individual State or group of States obtain advantage over others. (A/AC.187/55/Add.1)

The adoption of the disarmament measures should take place in a balanced manner so as not to endanger the security of any State. (A/AC.187/56 and 89)

All measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all. (A/AC.187/60)

Equal security for all States in each phase of disarmament must be promoted; special attention must be given to the security of newly independent States having small armed forces:

... and that the right of each State to defend its legitimate security and development interests should be respected in any such negotiations. (A/AC.187/77)

Measures to curb the arms race and bring about disarmament should be based on the principle of not impairing the interests of any of the parties to an agreement; strict adherence to this principle and the abandonment of attempts to obtain unilateral advantage are the essential prerequisite for the effectiveness of negotiations and the viability of agreements once they have been worked out. (A/AC.187/81)

All measures of disarmament should be balanced to ensure that the security of all States is safeguarded and that no State or group of States can gain military advantage at any stage. The goal is undiminished security at a lower level of armaments and military forces.

This implies the graduated reduction of manpower and armaments to agreed levels, coupled with other necessary measures to ensure that an over-all balance is achieved which is judged by all parties to be satisfactory for their own security. (A/AC.187/87)
Agreements on partial measures of disarmament or non-armament will be productive only if these form an integral and sequential part of measures aimed at General and Complete Disarmament. Each measure and stage of disarmament should be carried out within specified time-limits;

Disarmament must be achieved, at each stage, in a balanced manner and ensure equal security for all States;

Reduction in the arms expenditures and armaments of States should be achieved in a balanced and equitable manner.

(A/AC.187/31)
A mutually acceptable balance of rights and obligations between nuclear weapons States and non-nuclear weapons States should be strictly observed. (A/AC.187/55/Add.1)

It is necessary to have an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations for nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States. (A/AC.187/56 and 89)

* * *

* * *
Verification forms an indispensable part of disarmament measures. A single method of verification is rarely sufficient. A combination of methods could be devised, thus providing adequate means of verification of the implementation of disarmament measures. (A/AC.187/55/Add.1)

International verification constitutes an indispensable part for many of the disarmament measures. The use of a combination of various methods of verification offers the best guarantee. (A/AC.187/56 and 89)

All disarmament measures should be implemented from beginning to end under such strict and effective international control as would provide firm assurance that all parties are honouring their obligations. During and after the implementation of general and complete disarmament, the most thorough control should be exercised, the nature and extent of such control depending on the requirements for verification of the disarmament measures being carried out in each stage. To implement control over and inspection of disarmament, an international disarmament organization including all parties to the agreement should be created within the framework of the United Nations. This international disarmament organization and its inspectors should be assured unrestricted access without veto to all places, as necessary for the purpose of effective verification. (A/AC.187/60)

Adequate monitoring must be provided for each measure so that the fulfillment by all parties of obligations assumed by them may be reliably guaranteed. (A/AC.187/77)

Agreements in the field of disarmament must provide for effective verification of disarmament measures, with the scope and nature of such verification depending on the scope, nature and specific characteristics of the concrete measures provided for in the agreements. (A/AC.187/81)

Progress in the arms control and disarmament field is dependent upon agreement on effective methods of verification. A combination of several methods of verification should be employed, including, as appropriate, international inspection and control in order to achieve the necessary assurances that a certain arms control or disarmament measure is being observed by all parties. (A/AC.187/87)

Verification should be an essential component of disarmament agreements and measures. (A/AC.187/91)
The use of nuclear weapons, under any circumstances, is indefensible and should be considered a crime against humanity;

The use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction must, as a matter of first priority, be curbed and prohibited and stockpiles and deployments of such weapons be reduced and ultimately eliminated altogether;

The non-nuclear-weapon States in particular have the need to be assured that their security will not be jeopardized by the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against them by the nuclear-weapon States;

The creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace constitute one of the most effective disarmament measures that can and should be initiated and accepted by the non-nuclear-weapon States; (A/26.187/21).
Nuclear Weapons States shall undertake by means of a legally binding international instrument to respect the statutes of nuclear weapon free zones or zones of peace. (A/AC.187/55/Add.1)

Nuclear-weapon States must fulfill faithfully the obligations which, in accordance with the definition approved by the General Assembly, they have with regard to the nuclear-free zones and the States included in such zones. (A/AC.187/56 and 89)

The nuclear weapon States must undertake binding obligations not to introduce or station nuclear weapons in nuclear weapon free zones and Zones of Peace and not to use or threat to use nuclear weapons against States which comprise these zones. (A/AC.187/91)
A substantial part of the resources released as a result of disarmament measures should be primarily devoted to social and economic development, particularly that of the developing countries. (A/AC.187/55/Add.1)

A considerable part of the resources freed by the adoption of disarmament measures should be devoted mainly to the promotion of the economic and social development of the developing countries. (A/AC.187/56 and 69)

The resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures should be used in a manner which will promote the well-being of peoples, the solution of world-wide problems facing mankind, and the economic and social progress of the developing States. (A/AC.187/61)

The financial savings and human and material resources made available through disarmament should be primarily diverted to promote economic and social development, especially in the developing countries. (A/AC.187/91)
The United Nations, in accordance with its Charter, has the primary role and responsibility in the field of disarmament. In order to effectively discharge this role, the United Nations shall be kept duly informed of all disarmament steps taken outside its aegis. (A/AC.187/55/Add.1)

In accordance with its Charter and innumerable resolutions of the General Assembly, the United Nations has a primary role and responsibility in the sphere of disarmament.

The former requires that the General Assembly be kept duly informed regarding all steps taken in the sphere of disarmament, whether unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral.

The deliberative machinery of the United Nations should be reinforced through the institutionalization of a world disarmament conference on terms acceptable for all Member States. (A/AC.187/56 and 89)

Disarmament being a matter of great concern to all States and to all peoples, there is a pressing need for all Governments and peoples to be informed about and understand the prevailing situation in the field of the arms race and disarmament and that the United Nations has a central role in this connexion in keeping with its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations.

The United Nations which bears responsibility for disarmament under the Charter should be kept informed of all unilateral, bilateral or multilateral efforts thereon. (A/AC.187/60)

The United Nations, in accordance with the Charter, has the primary responsibility to promote General and Complete Disarmament and to oversee, monitor, facilitate and encourage all measures - unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral - in this field. (A/AC.187/91)
Measures of disarmament shall not be construed in such a way as to hamper the exercise of the right of all States to develop or to acquire without any discrimination nuclear technology or nuclear materials for peaceful purposes. Access to such technology and materials should be subjected to universal, standardized and non-discriminatory safeguards agreed upon by supplier and recipient States. (A/AC.187/55/Add.1)

Access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes constitutes an inalienable right of all States which is subject only to the limitations derived from the relevant provisions incorporated in multilateral instruments designed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. (A/AC.187/56 and 89)

No disarmament or disarmament-related measure should adversely affect the scientific, technological or economic future of nations. All nations have full rights of access to all achievements of science and technology without any restrictions whatsoever. (A/AC.187/60)

All restrictions on widespread access by States, chiefly the developing countries and those having more limited economic and technological potential, to the use of advances in science and technology must be removed. (A/AC.187/77)

All States have the right to develop, acquire, transfer and use, without hindrance, nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and to determine their peaceful nuclear programmes in accordance with their priorities, needs and interests. Access to nuclear technology should be available to all States under agreed international safeguards applied through the IAEA on a non-discriminatory basis; (A/AC.187/91)
World public opinion should receive adequate information on the progress of work on disarmament, so that it may exercise its influence for the intensification of efforts aimed at obtaining positive results in this field.

Non-governmental organizations recognized by the United Nations should have at their disposal all the documentation necessary for them to carry out their complementary work effectively. (A/AC.187/56 and 89)

The increased exchanges and publications of relevant information and data should lead to greater openness, to the establishment of greater confidence among States and increased knowledge and interest in these matters among the public.

The problems of disarmament and particularly nuclear disarmament should not be a secret held by certain categories of persons, politicians and soldiers; they directly affect the security and the very lives of peoples and the peoples should know what action to take in this direction in order to be able to have their say and defend their vital interests. That is why public opinion and peoples of all countries must be fully informed and periodic reports must be issued on the current status of armaments and its consequences and on the steps to be taken to stop the arms race. (A/AC.187/60)

The advantages to be derived from each disarmament measure at the military, political and economic levels must be publicized systematically so as to keep world opinion informed of the progress of negotiations and to secure its support. (A/AC.187/77)
D. Implementation

Since prompt measures should be taken in order to arrest and reverse the arms race, Member States commit themselves to comply with the above stated principles and faithfully and thoroughly implement the following Programme of Action. (A/AC.187/55/Add.1)

These objectives and principles are hereby declared to constitute the guidelines for the Programme of Action of Disarmament. (A/AC.187/87)
Corrigendum

On Page 44 of document A/AC.187/93/Rev.1 add the following text under section 22:

"The successful implementation of arms limitation or disarmament measures depends on the degree of confidence each party has that all other parties are complying with the agreement.

In this context verification plays an important role. The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement are closely connected with the purposes of that agreement and should be determined by the objectives it is designed to meet.

For each disarmament or arms limitation proposal measures of verification, alone or in combination, should be devised in accordance with the requirement of a sufficient degree of confidence between the parties. Every Government making a disarmament proposal should therefore include in such a proposal indications about corresponding verification measures.

Just as all States should have the possibility of participation in disarmament negotiations, they should, in principle, also have the possibility to take part, directly or through the United Nations, in the verification of disarmament agreements, including the right to access to all relevant information." (A/AC.187/10...)
Dissemination of information on the question of the armaments race and disarmament.

Elements to be included in the Preamble, the Declaration and the Programme of Action.

Venezuela: working paper

It can be readily noted that at the present time a large part of world public opinion has insufficient knowledge of the unusual destructive dimensions which nuclear weapons have achieved and of the impressive quantity of diverse resources devoted to the armaments race in general. This is due, inter alia, to the extraordinarily rapid progress and sophistication of nuclear weapons which have taken place in recent years and to the fact that the parallel efforts made to disseminate information on this matter have lagged or have been silenced.

In the urgent search for solutions which will help to achieve practical results in the matter of disarmament, emphasis has been placed on the need to inform the public openly of the adverse effects of the armaments race on the economic and social development of peoples, in particular, and on the security and well-being of mankind in general. If these matters were presented to the public in a direct and realistic manner it would dissipate once and for all the illusion that the world can live in security while the armaments race continues.

It is a well-known fact that properly informed public opinion can play an important restraining and persuasive role. It is even more essential for public opinion to act in this way when it is a question of matters relating to the very survival of mankind. Venezuela supports the view that, through a systematic information campaign, it is possible to develop an international conscience, at all levels, which would condemn and repudiate the armaments race. An effective campaign implies a continuous supply of information describing the constant refinement and improvement of increasingly complex systems and mechanisms of destruction.

The United Nations has done commendable work in disseminating information on
the arms race, but further efforts are needed to enable world public opinion to play its proper role effectively in the arduous task of combating that phenomenon. It is clear that it could not do this effectively without the open and resolute co-operation and determination of States Members of the United Nations.

Accordingly, one of the primary objectives of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament must be the adoption of specific measures directed towards expanding the dissemination of information about the arms race and the efforts being made by the United Nations to contain it. In this connexion, the following measures, among others, should be considered:

(1) Governmental and non-governmental information organs and those of the United Nations and its specialized agencies should give priority, first, to the preparation and distribution of material relating to the danger represented by nuclear weapons and, second, to the disarmament negotiations which are progressing within the framework of the United Nations.

(2) The United Nations Information Centres should be more active in the dissemination of the above-mentioned material.

(3) Encouragement should be given to the preparation by the United Nations of studies and reports which would state in a succinct and clear manner the various problems and implications of the arms race in its many facets.

(4) Encouragement should also be given to the preparation and wide distribution of audio-visual material.

(5) The United Nations Centre for Disarmament should intensify its activities in the presentation of substantive information concerning the arms race and disarmament, directed principally towards government officials, academic circles and other sectors.

(6) Throughout this process of disseminating information, there should be increased participation by non-governmental organizations concerned with the matter, through closer co-ordination between them and the United Nations Centre for Disarmament.
PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE SPECIAL
SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

Elements for inclusion in the programme of action and in the
documents relating to the machinery for disarmament
negotiations

Working paper: Sweden

In order to maintain the momentum generated by the special session and its
preparations it is essential both to agree on a series of specific measures to be
implemented within a relatively short period of time and to secure an effective
follow-up of the session. For this reason, the programme of action should be
formulated in as precise terms as possible.

It is suggested that the following points, among others, be included in the
programme of action (points A-E) and in the document relating to the machinery for
disarmament negotiations (point F).

A. Second special session of the General Assembly
devoted to disarmament

The General Assembly

1. Decides to convene a second special session of the General Assembly
devoted to disarmament in 1982;

2. Further decides that a Preparatory Committee for the Second Special
Session should be established by the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session.

B. Nuclear disarmament

The General Assembly

1. (Appropriate reference to the draft treaty on a comprehensive test ban to
be submitted to the General Assembly at its special session devoted to disarmament
in accordance with General Assembly resolution 32/78);
2. Considers as a general guideline for further action that the nuclear-weapon States, and in particular the two leading nuclear-weapon States, carry the main responsibility for nuclear disarmament;

3. Concludes that negotiations should urgently be undertaken concerning measures outlined below aiming at the eventual total elimination of nuclear weapons from the arsenals of States:

   (a) Freezing of the qualitative improvement of existing nuclear weapons and delivery systems;

   (b) Cessation of the research and development of new types and new systems of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and guidance;

   (c) Cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and of fissionable material for weapon purposes;

   (d) Balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and of their delivery systems;

   (e) Prevention of proliferation of such weapons and systems;

4. Requests the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to continue with the highest priority its work in the field of nuclear disarmament;

5. Underlines the importance that the United Nations be kept fully informed on all ongoing bilateral and multilateral negotiations in the field of nuclear disarmament;

6. Expects substantial results in the area of nuclear disarmament to be reported to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

C. Disarmament and development

The General Assembly

1. Requests the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts appointed by him to initiate an expert study on the relationship between disarmament and development, the results of which to be reported to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session for subsequent action at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament;

2. Decides that the expert study should have the following terms of reference (to be inserted at the special session on the basis of the report of the ad hoc group of governmental experts appointed by the Secretary-General in accordance with General Assembly resolution _____).
D. Particularly inhuman weapons

The General Assembly,

Recommends that the 1979 United Nations Conference on Specific Conventional Weapons should seek agreement on the prohibition and restriction of use of certain conventional weapons which may cause unnecessary suffering or which may have indiscriminate effects, such as those the primary effect of which is to injure by fragments not detectable by X-ray, incendiaries, land-mines and booby-traps, certain small calibre projectiles and certain blast and fragmentation weapons.

E. Reduction of military budgets

The General Assembly

1. Requests the Secretary-General to organize a pilot test of a system for the reporting of military expenditures by States, drawing on the recommendations on a standardized reporting instrument by the group of experts on the reduction of military budgets (A/32/194) with the participation of States representing different geographical regions and, preferably, different military budgeting and accounting systems;

2. Further requests the Secretary-General to appoint an ad hoc panel of budgetary experts, under the aegis of the United Nations, to give guidance to States supplying the required data, to analyse the results of the pilot test, to further refine the system and to develop recommendations for larger-scale application of the reporting instrument;

3. Further requests the Secretary-General to submit a progress report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session.

F. Machinery for disarmament negotiations

The General Assembly

1. Invites the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to make it possible for non-members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to participate in certain meetings to be decided by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, through the submission of written and oral proposals and participation in the discussions thereon;

2. Invites the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to replace the present co-chairmanship institution by a bureau of four members, consisting of one chairman and three vice-chairmen. Two members of the bureau should be selected from the States belonging to the military blocs and the other from the group of neutral and non-aligned States in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. The chairmanship should rotate in alphabetical order on a monthly or sessional basis between all members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament;
3. Decides, in the light of the new tasks and responsibilities entrusted upon the United Nations Secretariat as a result of the programme of action, to make a corresponding increase in the resources of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament, especially in the field of studies and follow-up of disarmament agreements. (Details to be discussed at a somewhat later stage of the preparations for the session.)
I. GENERAL

The States Members of the United Nations at the eighth special session of the General Assembly solemnly affirm that their ultimate goal is general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. They recognize that this goal requires an increase in international confidence and security to remove the incentive for States to acquire weapons and to encourage them to reduce these from present levels. The States Members therefore believe that a serious worldwide disarmament strategy must be accompanied by a greater and sustained effort to eliminate the sources of tension and injustice in the world and to increase the effectiveness of international machinery in the United Nations and elsewhere for the peaceful settlement of disputes; to uphold the international rule of law; and to promote the political, civil, social and economic rights of man. This strategy should take into account not only the quantitative but also the qualitative aspect of disarmament, and should result in the release of resources for the satisfaction of the economic and social needs of humanity particularly in the developing countries.

This programme of action sets out in chapter II priority negotiations for completion over the next few years. In addition it proposes concurrent measures and studies to prepare the way for future negotiations and for progress towards general and complete disarmament. It gives practical effect to the principles set down in the Declaration on Disarmament. A prerequisite for a successful disarmament strategy is the adherence of all States to existing arms control and disarmament agreements.
II. IMMEDIATE MEASURES OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

1. In the nuclear field, in which the nuclear-weapon States have a particular responsibility, the realization of the central objectives of preventing both horizontal and vertical proliferation by:

   The halting and the reversal of the nuclear-arms race in its quantitative and qualitative dimensions; especially by a second strategic arms limitation agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, to be followed urgently by further strategic arms negotiations with the objective of reducing and eventually eliminating nuclear weapons;

   The earliest conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty banning all nuclear explosions in all environments, which should be adhered to as soon as possible by all States, particularly all nuclear-weapon States and should contain verification provisions giving maximum confidence that no party would conduct clandestine tests;

   Further measures to develop an international consensus on the strengthening and consolidation of the nuclear-non-proliferation régime, based primarily on adherence of all States to the NPT and on the system of safeguards of the IAEA. Measures to be pursued should include assistance to the IAEA in its attempts to strengthen its safeguards system; the application of IAEA safeguards on all source and special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities; agreement on adequate standards for the physical protection of nuclear materials; study and possible development of alternative and more proliferation-resistant nuclear technologies; an examination of the possibility of giving a suitable international character to appropriate nuclear-fuel-cycle operations, and to effective measures for the control of plutonium in civil nuclear programmes; and support for the work currently being undertaken in the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation. These measures should be designed to facilitate international access to the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and take account of the particular needs of the developing countries in this area, as well as to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons;

   The establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones suitable to specific conditions in the regions concerned through agreement between all the States in the region and with effective co-operation from nuclear-weapon States.

2. Assurances, as appropriate, by nuclear-weapon States designed to increase the confidence of non-nuclear-weapon States in their own security from nuclear attack.

3. Other weapons of mass destruction:

   A convention prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and regulating their destruction;

   A convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons;

   ...
Continuing review of the question of new weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles with a view to consideration of agreements on the prohibition of any new weapons which may be identified.

4. Conventional weapons and armed forces:

Agreements or other measures on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis for placing restrictions on the production, transfer and acquisition of conventional weapons;

Conventions prohibiting or limiting the future use in armed conflict of certain conventional weapons which may be indiscriminate in their effects or may cause unnecessary suffering;

Agreements or other measures on a regional basis, aiming at strengthening peace and security, in particular urgent efforts to contribute to a more stable military relationship in Europe.

5. The measures listed above should form part of a balanced programme of disarmament and provide for adequate verification including, if appropriate, the possibility of on-site inspection. Verification provisions should be so designed as to ensure the effectiveness of agreements and to enhance mutual confidence.
III. THE FURTHER STRENGTHENING OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND CONFIDENCE

In addition to undertaking the specific arms control and disarmament tasks described above, the States Members of the United Nations, in order to strengthen international confidence and deepen the dialogue between those involved in defence matters in different countries, should:

1. Support the Secretary-General in his efforts further to strengthen the expertise and capability of the United Nations to play its essential role as a catalyst in the disarmament process;

2. Encourage the further discussion and development by the CCD of a comprehensive programme for disarmament;

3. Publish detailed information about their armed forces, and the total value of their arms production and of their transfers of arms to other countries;

4. Supply full information on military budgets using the method shortly to be finalized through a pilot study by the Secretary-General for the standardized reporting of such budgets as a step toward verified and balanced reductions in military expenditure;

5. Assess the possible implications of military research and development for existing agreements as well as for further efforts in the field of arms control and disarmament;

6. Seek to restrain the world-wide build-up of conventional weapons, utilizing all means which could lead to bilateral, regional, and multilateral measures of control, limitation and balanced reduction of such armaments;

7. Accept adequate provisions of international control as appropriate to facilitate the conclusion and effectiveness of disarmament agreements;

8. Stimulate public awareness of disarmament issues by:

   Publicizing the final documents of the special session, in particular through non-governmental organizations, mass media and educational systems,

   Facilitating public access to information on disarmament questions,

   Improving mechanisms for the dissemination of relevant United Nations publications, and

   Encouraging study and research on disarmament;

9. Take the following actions to increase confidence between States bilaterally, regionally or world-wide:
To inform States, on a regional basis, and in accordance with regionally established criteria, 21 days or more in advance about their intention to carry out major military movements or manoeuvres;

To invite observers from States on a regional basis to manoeuvres and encourage military visits and exchanges of all kinds on a reciprocal basis;

To improve communications between Governments, particularly in areas of tension, by the establishment of "hot lines" and other methods of reducing the risk of conflict due to misunderstanding or miscalculation.
IV. STUDIES TO FACILITATE FURTHER MEASURES

In order to facilitate further steps in disarmament and parallel measures to promote international peace and security, the Secretary-General is requested to carry out studies relating to:

1. The strengthening of the security role of the United Nations in peacekeeping and the peaceful settlement of disputes to enable it to anticipate and resolve international crises;

2. Ways of limiting the build-up of conventional weapons, regionally and throughout the world, taking into account all relevant aspects, inter alia:
   - The international transfer of conventional weapons;
   - The possibility of reciprocal limitation of the level and types of conventional weapons;
   - The proposal for a United Nations register of weapons transfers;

3. The relationship between disarmament and development to be initiated as soon as possible after the special session. The terms of reference of this study should be on the basis of the report of the ad hoc group of governmental experts;

4. All regional aspects of disarmament, including further measures designed to increase confidence and stability as well as means of promoting disarmament on a regional basis;

5. The possible contribution to confidence-building among States of technical measures such as demilitarized zones, zones of limited forces and surveillance and early warning systems which could be used as appropriate in areas of tension; and on the use of some of these measures in the verification of arms control agreements.

V. IMPLEMENTATION

All States undertake to work toward the fulfilment of this programme, and to respect agreed measures relating to it. The General Assembly should examine its implementation, as appropriate, taking account of the recommendations on disarmament machinery made later in the final document.
Suggestions for a disarmament programme

Italy: Working paper

I. GENERAL OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES

The United Nations is, despite inevitable short-comings, an instrument for peace. In order that this role be strengthened, it is essential that the documents to be adopted at the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament state the specific goals to be achieved by the United Nations. These goals will have to be incorporated into a structural policy aimed at putting an end to the present underlying causes of instability. Beginning with this assumption, a global programme for disarmament should be based - inter alia - on the following general considerations and principles:

(1) Negotiations on disarmament are essential for peace and have widespread repercussions. Although they may be influenced by international events, they cannot fail to constitute a dynamic and positive factor in the evolution of the political situation as a whole.

(2) The great majority of States have expressed their determination to proceed along the twin paths of general and complete disarmament and adoption of specific measures. The two issues are closely linked, and the aim of future negotiations should be to combine them harmoniously.

(3) As all nations have a vital interest in the outcome of disarmament negotiations, disarmament efforts should be granted the active participation and the support of all States, and particularly of nuclear-weapon States and other military significant States, which bear, in the disarmament process, a special responsibility.

(4) Through efforts which have been continuing for over a quarter of a century, the United Nations and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament have definitely made some progress in the disarmament field by establishing
specific agreements and by adopting an important series of principles which form, so to speak, the "charter" of disarmament: for example, the principles approved on 20 December 1961 and adopted by the General Assembly in resolution 1722 (XVI).

(5) In order to prevent the disarmament process from creating imbalances or strengthening positions of privilege, it will be necessary to adopt collective security measures and to carry out the most effective and appropriate verifications.

(6) Any programme of negotiations on disarmament should be coherently and globally planned, and should be so conceived as to provide the international community with clear guidelines. The disarmament process will then be able to follow a rational course from its initial or priority stages to its final culmination: general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Such disarmament should be accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace and security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.

(7) To achieve wide acceptance, the comprehensive programme envisaged shall attempt to identify priorities and strike a balance among its various components and objectives, seeking its implementation in successive stages but without rigid time-limits. Specifically, this programme would embody the following elements:

(a) A degree of flexibility in following the time-table set forth;

(b) A balance between the measures to be taken in the various fields of disarmament - thus nuclear disarmament would parallel conventional disarmament - in order to guarantee undiminished security to all States;

(c) An appropriate co-ordination of global and regional disarmament.

(8) While pursuing the adoption of a comprehensive disarmament programme, negotiations should be carried out with new impetus and perseverance with the immediate objective of halting and then reversing the arms race by means of specific measures affecting both nuclear and conventional arsenals. Such measures should aim to facilitate the achievement of the final goal of general and complete disarmament plan and would constitute an integral part of it.

(9) Effective verification methods form an essential part of disarmament measures. A combination of several verification techniques should be applied whenever necessary, including those international means of inspection and control which would appear appropriate to ascertain that agreed disarmament obligations are being fully complied with by all Parties thereto.

(10) Measures for curbing the arms race and promoting disarmament should not prejudice the inalienable right of all States freely to accede to peaceful applications of scientific and technological discoveries.
II. MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE DISARMAMENT PROGRAMME

The following main elements should be included in a comprehensive programme for action in the disarmament field: A. Nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction; B. Conventional weapons; C. Other measures.

A.1 Nuclear weapons, including non-proliferation

(a) Conclusion, as a measure of the highest priority, of a comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTB)

To this effect ongoing tripartite consultations between the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom should be speeded up in order to make it possible for the CCD to achieve at an early date a widely acceptable treaty. All nuclear-weapon States should be urged to join in these negotiations as soon as possible.

(b) Limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons and delivery systems

It is necessary for the nuclear Powers to halt and then reverse the arms race. To this end vigorous efforts should be made to expedite the SALT negotiations. Eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons in the context of general and complete disarmament is the most important challenge of our time since the dangers of nuclear warfare remain a grave threat of the very survival of mankind.

(c) Cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes

(d) Strengthening of the non-proliferation régime

Universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty should be actively encouraged. All States should be urged to ratify the Treaty or at least to abide by its provisions and objectives. Parallel efforts should be undertaken by nuclear-weapons States with the view of honouring their obligations under article VI of the Treaty. Substantive and timely measures should be devised in order to guarantee to all States - as provided by article IV - the exercise of their inalienable right to develop - under appropriate internationally agreed safeguards and through an increased international co-operation - research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and to enjoy the benefits thereof.

(e) Nuclear-weapons-free zones

Nuclear-weapons-free zones should be viewed both as a useful complementary instrument of the non-proliferation régime and as an effective disarmament measure. Their establishment, when suitable conditions exist, should originate from the States directly concerned, on a voluntary and regional basis, and with the participation of all militarily significant States of the area.

/...
A.2 Other weapons of mass destruction

(a) Early conclusion of an international convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and of their destruction is a most urgent feature. The two major military Powers should engage in decisive efforts in view of finalizing their announced joint initiative. Simultaneously the CCD should materialize through concrete steps its commitment to the total elimination of chemical warfare agents.

(b) Efforts should be made by CCD to reach agreement on a treaty prohibiting the development, stockpiling and use of radioactive material weapons ("radiological weapons") as defined in the resolution dated August 1948 of the United Nations Commission for Conventional Armaments.

(c) Efforts should be made to avoid the development of new weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles. The CCD should keep this question under review and consider the desirability of formulating agreements on the prohibition of any specific weapon which may be identified.

B. Conventional weapons

(a) Limitation and reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces should be negotiated in parallel with nuclear disarmament progress as a part of a balanced comprehensive programme. New approaches for successful developments in this field should be sought, when appropriate, on a regional basis.

(b) Restraints on the transfer of conventional arms should proceed simultaneously with the limitation of arms and armed forces levels. In this respect, the establishment, on the basis of Article 29 of the Charter of the United Nations, of a commission divided into regional sub-commissions in which the main arms suppliers of each region would participate, should be envisaged, in view of keeping conventional armaments at the lowest possible level. To facilitate the setting up of the above-mentioned regional subsidiary organs with the consent of the parties concerned, the establishment of committees or separate parallel groups in which the purchasing countries would participate might prove advisable.

(c) States should seek agreement, on the basis of consensus, on the prohibition or limitation of use of certain specific conventional weapons.

C. Other measures

(a) Conduct of pilot studies by a group of States on a voluntary and reciprocal basis, for the purpose of devising and testing jointly an effective international system of reporting for the military expenditure with the object of reducing military budgets. Reduction of military budgets in all countries on an assured basis could provide undiminished security at a lower level of armaments, help to reduce international tensions and also lead eventually to the release
of resources both nationally and internationally for economic and social development of mankind.

(b) Publication by all States of more information about their armed forces and in particular about any kind of expenditure devoted to military purposes and a mechanism should be established under United Nations auspices to collect such information.

(c) Publication by the United Nations of all available data on the production and transfer of weapons and the development of an effective system for processing such data.

(d) Preparatory studies on the conversion of the armaments industries of the principal developed countries should be initiated with the aim of providing alternative lines of production, while maintaining the employment rate at a constant level.

(e) A United Nations expert study on the relationship between disarmament and development should be initiated as soon as possible after the special session.

(f) The CCD should proceed, in consultation with the States parties to the Sea-bed Treaty, to the consideration of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of the arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof. Parallel efforts should be made for outer space in accordance with the spirit of the 1967 Treaty.

(g) Specific measures to establish an international climate of confidence (confidence-building measures).
III. STRENGTHENING THE INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

The process towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control should be accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and in accordance with the United Nations Charter effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace and security, including renewed efforts to supplement by means of appropriate guidelines the arrangements concerning the United Nations peace-keeping operations. Studies and/or negotiations should be undertaken with a view to recruiting a permanent United Nations police force (Article 43 of the Charter) and establishing an international organ to supervise the application of disarmament agreements in force.

General and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control shall permit States to have at their disposal only those non-nuclear forces, armaments, facilities and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens and in order that States shall support and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations police force.
The Soviet delegation would like to make some observations now that the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament is about to enter a new and important stage, that of drafting the final documents of the special session. The success of the special session itself will depend on the results to be achieved at this stage.

We believe that there are good reasons to expect a successful completion of our work. A constructive and business-like atmosphere has developed in the Committee which, incidentally, was noted by many delegations at the recently concluded thirty-second session of the General Assembly.

The Preparatory Committee has before it a number of working papers concerning the future decisions of the special session. They comprise drafts submitted by socialist States, non-aligned countries, a number of States belonging to the Western European regional group as well as papers submitted by individual countries. They provide a wealth of material on the basis of which to draft mutually acceptable decisions that could not only give a powerful positive impulse to the ongoing disarmament negotiations but could also make it possible to move from negotiations to genuine action signifying the beginning of disarmament.

The working papers prepared in September 1977 by socialist countries, including the Soviet Union, contain formulations of specific proposals regarding the contents of the decisions of the special session, namely, the declaration and programme of action for disarmament. These documents have been circulated in the Committee and there is no need to go into detail again regarding their substance.

I would only recall some general observations which, in our opinion, could be taken into consideration in the work that lies ahead. The declaration on disarmament, in our view, would have to include an objective evaluation of the current situation in the disarmament area and take stock of the results already achieved, but, most importantly, it should also contain formulations of fundamental provisions or principles which could form a basis for negotiations and decisions on matters relating to curbing the arms race and to disarmament. The purpose here is,
apparently, to make those principles as universal as possible so that they maintain lasting value. They could then play a positive role in elaborating and implementing concrete disarmament measures.

In the working papers prepared both by socialist countries and by other members of the Committee, it is proposed to define the general orientation of efforts to halt the arms race as well as specific priority tasks which could be embodied in the programme of action for disarmament. The majority of them are interpreted in an identical way and this is an encouraging sign. It permits the hope that in the final analysis a programme will be drafted which will be a realistic and practical one acceptable to all States. Priorities lacking objectivity and fixing rigid time-limits for implementing certain specific tasks would hardly contribute to a successful implementation of this programme or assist the ongoing negotiations on complex disarmament issues.

Proposals are also being put forward to the effect that decisions should be taken regarding the machinery of disarmament negotiations. It seems to us that a considerable degree of care and caution should be shown here. This question should be considered closely only after general and specific tasks in the disarmament field, that is to say, substantive issues, have been determined. We see no need for abandoning or radically restructuring the existing channels for negotiations. What is needed is that existing bodies should continue to function with greater efficiency, and it is our task to make full use of their capacities.

Long experience in disarmament negotiations leaves no room for doubt that the main obstacles to the solution of disarmament problems are not the negotiating machinery but rather the powerful forces in a number of countries which seek to perpetuate the arms race and international tension.

The United Nations, as the most representative international forum, undoubtedly has an important role to play in the disarmament field, and we are entirely in favour of the United Nations becoming an even more effective instrument in the struggle for peace, security and disarmament.

The agenda for the special session also includes discussion of the World Disarmament Conference, the convening of which the Soviet Union and a number of other countries consider to be of outstanding importance. The Conference should become such a forum that will make it possible to proceed from the declarations and recommendations adopted by the General Assembly to practical action leading to agreed disarmament measures and meaningful decisions. The Conference will be able to achieve in the best possible way the goals set by the special session.

The forthcoming special session devoted to disarmament is no doubt called upon to play an important role of its own in progress towards the complete elimination of the material basis for war. It is the Soviet delegation's intention to do everything possible for its successful outcome.

It is these considerations - a desire to make the special session a constructive one and to secure the adoption of positive and mutually acceptable decisions - that are the real working point of this paper.

However, it requires careful consideration of the following.

Guidelines for the orientation of new international community. The States of the world have an important role to play in this regard.

In the working papers prepared both by socialist countries and by other members of the Committee, it is proposed to define the general orientation of efforts to halt the arms race as well as specific priority tasks which could be embodied in the programme of action for disarmament. The majority of them are interpreted in an identical way and this is an encouraging sign. It permits the hope that in the final analysis a programme will be drafted which will be a realistic and practical one acceptable to all States. Priorities lacking objectivity and fixing rigid time-limits for implementing certain specific tasks would hardly contribute to a successful implementation of this programme or assist the ongoing negotiations on complex disarmament issues.

Proposals are also being put forward to the effect that decisions should be taken regarding the machinery of disarmament negotiations. It seems to us that a considerable degree of care and caution should be shown here. This question should be considered closely only after general and specific tasks in the disarmament field, that is to say, substantive issues, have been determined. We see no need for abandoning or radically restructuring the existing channels for negotiations. What is needed is that existing bodies should continue to function with greater efficiency, and it is our task to make full use of their capacities.

Long experience in disarmament negotiations leaves no room for doubt that the main obstacles to the solution of disarmament problems are not the negotiating machinery but rather the powerful forces in a number of countries which seek to perpetuate the arms race and international tension.

The United Nations, as the most representative international forum, undoubtedly has an important role to play in the disarmament field, and we are entirely in favour of the United Nations becoming an even more effective instrument in the struggle for peace, security and disarmament.

The agenda for the special session also includes discussion of the World Disarmament Conference, the convening of which the Soviet Union and a number of other countries consider to be of outstanding importance. The Conference should become such a forum that will make it possible to proceed from the declarations and recommendations adopted by the General Assembly to practical action leading to agreed disarmament measures and meaningful decisions. The Conference will be able to achieve in the best possible way the goals set by the special session.

The forthcoming special session devoted to disarmament is no doubt called upon to play an important role of its own in progress towards the complete elimination of the material basis for war. It is the Soviet delegation's intention to do everything possible for its successful outcome.

It is these considerations - a desire to make the special session a constructive one and to secure the adoption of positive and mutually acceptable
decisions - that have guided the socialist countries in the preparation of the working papers submitted to the Preparatory Committee in September 1977.

However, life does not stand still. The task of limiting the arms race requires continuing pressure and initiatives aimed at clearing the paths leading to disarmament.

Guided by these considerations, the Soviet Union has recently taken a number of new steps that would facilitate the solution of urgent issues facing the world community. Some of these initiatives have already been put to practical use: they have been or are being discussed in various forums, including the United Nations.

In the year of its sixtieth anniversary, the Soviet State issued an appeal for agreement on the simultaneous cessation by all States of the production of nuclear weapons, whether atomic, hydrogen or neutron bombs or missiles. At the same time the nuclear Powers could undertake to begin gradually reducing their accumulated stocks of weapons, moving ahead to the point where they had been completely liquidated. This proposal was reflected in a resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-second session. We expect this specific proposal to be taken into account in the drafting of the final documents. We are convinced that the question of nuclear disarmament occupies a prominent place in the drafts being prepared.

In drafting the documents for the session, the Preparatory Committee cannot lose sight of such a crucial problem as prevention of the threat of nuclear war. The importance of practical steps in this regard hardly needs any detailed clarification. At the Soviet Union's initiative, this subject was discussed in connexion with the Declaration on the Deepening and Consolidation of International Détente adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-second session. In the discussions during that session many delegations spoke in favour of continuing the consideration of the item in the Preparatory Committee.

An important step forward was recently taken in the critical and urgent issue of halting nuclear weapon tests. The Soviet Union, as one of the participants in the current tripartite talks at Geneva, expressed its readiness to agree that a moratorium on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes should be declared together with a ban for a limited period on all nuclear weapon tests. This proposal, in effect, opens the way to the speedy elaboration of a treaty imposing a complete and general ban on nuclear weapon tests.

Unfortunately, in recent months we have witnessed developments which may lead to the start of a new and dangerous spiral in the arms race, and here I have in mind the plans to develop and deploy neutron nuclear weapons. It appears to us that the documents which we shall prepare should impress upon States the need to avert this danger. It may be recalled that on 24 December, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and President of the USSR Supreme Soviet, proposed on behalf of the USSR, to the Western States to agree on a mutual renunciation of the
production of the neutron bomb in order to rid the world of this new, inhuman weapon of mass murder.

Among efforts to avert a new war, especially a nuclear war, the supplementing of political détente in Europe by military détente is of special importance. In recent years there have been some changes for the better on this continent. The Soviet Union considers itself in duty bound to protect, consolidate and follow up these achievements.

In October 1977, in an effort to strengthen security on the European continent, the Soviet Union submitted constructive proposals forming a programme of action for consolidating military détente in Europe. These proposals were officially submitted by the Soviet delegation at the Belgrade meeting of representatives of the States participating in the European Conference.

They envisage the conclusion by the participants in the European Conference of a treaty renouncing the first use of nuclear weapons against each other; the reaching of agreement at least not to expand the opposing military and political groupings and alliances in Europe by admitting new members; consistent implementation of the confidence-building measures provided for in the Final Act; and the reaching of agreement not to conduct military exercises involving more than, say, 50,000-60,000 men.

These are some additional observations which the Soviet delegation deems it necessary to make now that the Committee is about to enter an important stage in its work, that of drafting the final documents.
The Permanent Representative of the Republic of Senegal to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and, with reference to paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution A/189 B, in which the Assembly invited Member States to communicate to the Secretary-General their views on the agenda and all other relevant questions relating to the special session devoted to disarmament, has the honour to transmit to him the views of the Government of Senegal on that question.
VIEWS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SENEGAL ON THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

The Government of Senegal has for many years, whenever the opportunity presented itself, consistently expressed its concern and anxiety about the growing peril to mankind posed by the frenzied arms race, the enormous waste of non-renewable resources which it entails, and above all the growing insecurity which it creates and maintains.

Today, the arms race, which primarily takes the form of the expansion of nuclear arsenals, has augmented to a hitherto unprecedented degree the risk of the accidental self-destruction of mankind as a result of a defect in the weapon systems, an accident or a simple mistake.

Furthermore, it diverts vast resources to activities aimed at destruction and extermination. Compared with the $300 billion spent annually for military purposes throughout the world, the sum of about $15 billion devoted, grudgingly to development assistance seems very paltry. The means of destruction are becoming increasingly sophisticated, while the living conditions of two thirds of mankind continue to deteriorate.

However, the most serious feature of the arms race is the fact that it is inadequate to its purpose. Instead of ensuring the security of those who participate in it, it increases their insecurity. It is progressively undermining the concept of mutual dissuasion on which the nuclear peace of recent years is based, as a result of the efforts to achieve military superiority.

The arms-control measures adopted in recent years constitute an admission of failure which shows that extreme armaments policies can provide only temporary security. Moreover, they help to conceal the need for genuine disarmament, which involves reducing and destroying weapons and not simply freezing or limiting their number. Such policies thus prolong the impasse in the current disarmament negotiations by preventing the very time-worn conception which equates security with weapons from being replaced by a conception better adapted to the nuclear age, which would associate security with co-operation and dialogue.

The time has therefore come to ponder the question of disarmament and to revise the traditional conceptions which seem to stem from the reflexes of another era rather than from a sound analysis of the contemporary situation. In this connexion, it is necessary to study the causes of the arms race, stressing its close links with the policies of hegemony and spheres of influence, the existence of an unjust international economic order, the lack of collective security, the non-existence of effective machinery for settling disputes between States and the violation of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of States and intervention in their internal affairs. The Government of Senegal believes that disarmament should be regarded as a coherent set of gradual and complementary measures under international control, whose ultimate objective would be the establishment of a new international order based on co-operation, equality of States, economic and social justice and the peaceful settlement of disputes between States.
In view of the negligible progress made since 1945, the special session of the General Assembly should give a new impetus to the disarmament negotiations by defining the principles and machinery which would permit the conclusion of specific disarmament agreements. The Government of Senegal believes that this is the ultimate goal of the special session, which could be attained by achieving the following objectives:

1. Evaluation of the current situation as regards disarmament, and definition of the causes of the current impasse and of the limitations and weaknesses of existing approaches to disarmament.

2. Reaffirmation of the responsibility of the United Nations in this sphere and of the need for it to participate in all efforts relating to disarmament.

3. Creation in participating States of the political will that could give fresh momentum to the disarmament negotiations.

4. Awakening of public interest and moulding of public opinion by provision of complete and detailed information on the question.

5. Formulation and adoption of disarmament guidelines and objectives. In this connexion, it is important that the links between disarmament, international security, economic development and machinery for the settlement of disputes should be emphasized.

6. Formulation and adoption of a programme of action on the basis of which negotiations would be carried out in a balanced and integrated manner with a view to achieving general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

It is at this level that the immediate impact of possible future disarmament negotiations or conferences should be evaluated. It would be unrealistic to assume that the stockpiles of weapons held by the main Powers could be destroyed in a short space of time.

In our opinion, what could be envisaged in the short term is practical action following three basic courses:

- Gradual and progressive reduction in the number of nuclear weapons;
- Measures to prevent any increase in their degree of sophistication;
- Energetic measures to halt transfers of weapons which threaten the stability of each region.

The eventual agreement in which the three foregoing points would be embodied should be based on parity of arms levels achieved by means of over-all ceilings for each Power.
On the other hand, the agreement should not create an imbalance in favour of one Power, which would jeopardize the general equilibrium of the world as a whole.

Thus the mutual, balanced and progressive reduction in the number of weapons would be viewed as the means of achieving collective security and not as the means of obtaining a unilateral military advantage.

However, the Government of Senegal believes that as regards the first two courses, priority should be given to measures prohibiting the development or manufacture of new weapon systems over measures aimed at the gradual reduction or limitation of stockpiles of weapons, because for the big Powers reducing the quantity of existing weapons has always meant destroying stockpiles of obsolete weapons in order to produce more highly-developed weapons.

Moreover, the concept of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has enabled those Powers to monopolize the possession of such weapons, whose development remains prohibited to other States.

We therefore believe that emphasis should be placed first on the most important aspect of disarmament, namely non-armament, and subsequently on the progressive reduction and complete elimination of existing weapons, for there will be no genuine disarmament so long as the big Powers are in a position to produce new weapons.

Lastly, it is essential that the special session reach a universal consensus involving all the nuclear Powers, including the People's Republic of China and France, which at present are not participating in the principal disarmament negotiations.

The current forums for disarmament negotiations, whether multilateral (United Nations, Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, CCD, ICRC), regional (talks on the mutual reduction of forces and weapons and related measures in central Europe), or bilateral (SALT), are either unsuited to promoting real disarmament or independent of the United Nations, i.e., they are under no control and do not have the clearly affirmed objective of general and complete disarmament.

Measures designed to increase their effectiveness are needed in order to enable these bodies to promote the conclusion of disarmament agreements taking into account the nature, scope and specificity of the problems posed by the arms race.

The work of these bodies should be supervised and co-ordinated by the United Nations, which will define the general political approach to disarmament.

The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should be restructured so as to include all the nuclear Powers and should have a number of sub-committees in which negotiations would be held on specific agreements relating to different aspects of disarmament.
PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

TABULATION OF PROPOSALS CONTAINED IN THE WORKING PAPERS SUBMITTED TO THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE CONCERNING THE FINAL DOCUMENT(S) OF THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

(Background paper prepared by the Secretariat)
INTRODUCTORY NOTE BY THE SECRETARIAT

At its twenty-first meeting on 24 January 1978, the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament requested the Secretariat to prepare a tabulation of proposals contained in the working papers submitted to the Preparatory Committee concerning the final document(s) of the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament.

The present document incorporates those parts of the working papers submitted up to 2 February 1978, which are listed below, relating to a programme of action. They are tabulated in the original wording and in chronological order.


3. Working paper submitted by Mauritius containing some views on the content of the final document(s) of the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament (A/AC.187/60).


9. Working paper submitted by Venezuela on elements to be included in the Preamble, the Declaration and the Programme of Action (A/AC.187/94).

10. Working paper submitted by Sweden on elements for inclusion in the programme of action and in the documents relating to the machinery for disarmament negotiations (A/AC.187/95).


I. OBJECTIVES

II. APPROACH AND PRIORITIES

III. MEASURES

IV. STUDIES TO FACILITATE FURTHER MEASURES
The Programme of Action contains priorities and measures in the field of disarmament that States should undertake as a matter of urgency with a view to halting the arms race and starting the process of genuine disarmament leading towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Principles for disarmament negotiations

8. The goal of negotiations is to achieve agreement on a programme which will ensure:

(a) That disarmament in general and complete and war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems;

(b) That such disarmament is accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

The General Assembly has laid down that disarmament negotiations carried on under the auspices of the United Nations are to be based on a programme of measures and action comprising the following elements in order of priority:

A. The negotiation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Such negotiations should be carried on without interruption in a form especially designated for that purpose, preferably within the framework of the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

Guided by the purposes and principles set forth in the Declaration on Disarmament, it is essential to seek appropriate international agreements in the following principal areas:

A/AC.181/55/Add.1
A/AC.181/60
A/AC.181/70
A/AC.181/80
I. Objectives

Programme of Action

This Programme of Action has a twofold purpose. First of all, it enumerates a series of specific disarmament measures which have been adopted because there is a consensus on the need and advisability of making every possible effort to implement them within a period of not more than three years, it being felt that, realistically and objectively, there is a reasonable likelihood that such efforts will succeed. Secondly, the Programme of Action seeks to establish suitable procedures for monitoring compliance with the commitment thus made and for conducting various negotiations on the preparation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. In the light of the foregoing, the States participating in the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament undertook to do everything in their power, in good faith, to ensure the implementation, during the period from June 1978 to May 1981, of the measures set forth in the following three-year Disarmament Plan:

The General Assembly, considering that progress towards the goal of general and complete disarmament can be achieved through the implementation of a programme of measures for disarmament, in accordance with the principles and guidelines established in the Declaration on Disarmament, adopts the following Programme of Action:

[The text continues with the details of the Programme of Action, including specific measures and implementation periods.]
I. GENERAL

The United Nations, the world's supreme institution, is faced with the task of ensuring that the post-war world is not merely a repetition of the pre-war world, but is truly a new world of peace and justice. The United Nations is, despite inevitable short-comings, an instrument of world peace. In order that this goal may be achieved, it is essential that the United Nations be strengthened, so that it may effectively contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security.

The United Nations is, despite inevitable short-comings, an instrument of world peace. In order that this goal may be achieved, it is essential that the United Nations be strengthened, so that it may effectively contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security.

In order to achieve this goal, the United Nations must be strengthened in several respects:

1. The United Nations must have a more effective machinery for collective security, so that it may be able to act more quickly and effectively in the event of an armed attack.

2. The United Nations must have a more effective machinery for the peaceful settlement of disputes, so that it may be able to prevent and stop conflicts before they escalate into armed conflict.

3. The United Nations must have a more effective machinery for the promotion of economic and social progress, so that it may be able to address the root causes of poverty and inequality.

4. The United Nations must have a more effective machinery for the protection of human rights, so that it may be able to prevent and stop human rights violations.

5. The United Nations must have a more effective machinery for the promotion of cultural and scientific cooperation, so that it may be able to promote understanding and cooperation among peoples.

6. The United Nations must have a more effective machinery for the promotion of peaceful coexistence, so that it may be able to prevent and stop wars of aggression.
(7) To achieve wide acceptance, the comprehensive programs envisaged shall attempt to identify priorities and strike a balance among its various components and objectives, seeking its implementing in successive stages but without rigid time-limits. Specifically, this program would embody the following elements:

(a) A degree of flexibility in following the time-table set forth;

(b) A balance between the measures to be taken in the various fields of disarmament - thus nuclear disarmament would parallel conventional disarmament - in order to guarantee unaltered security to all States;

(c) An appropriate co-ordination of global and regional disarmament.

(8) While pursuing the adoption of a comprehensive disarmament program, negotiations should be carried out with new impetus and perseverance with the immediate objective of halting and then reversing the arms race by means of specific measures affecting both nuclear and conventional armaments. Such measures should aim to facilitate the achievement of the final goal of general and complete disarmament plan and would constitute an integral part of it.

(9) Effective verification methods form an essential part of disarmament measure. A combination of several verification techniques should be applied whenever necessary, including those international means of inspection and control which would appear appropriate to ascertain that agreed disarmament obligations are being fully complied with by all Parties thereto.

(10) Measures for curbing the arms race and promoting disarmament should not prejudice the inalienable right of all States freely to accede to peaceful applications of scientific and technological discoveries.

The process towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control should be accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and in accordance with the United Nations Charter effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace and security, including renewed efforts to supplement by means of appropriate guidelines the arrangements concerning the United Nations peace-keeping operations. Studies and/or negotiations should be undertaken with a view to recruiting a permanent United Nations police force (Article 43 of the Charter) and establishing an international organ to supervise the application of disarmament agreements in force.

General and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control shall permit States to have at their disposal only those non-nuclear forces, armaments, facilities and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens and in order that States shall support and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations police force.
(1) PRIORITIES IN THE FIELD
OF DISARMAMENT

The order of priorities in disarmament negotiations shall be as follows:

1. Nuclear weapons
2. Chemical weapons
3. Incendiary weapons
4. Other weapons of mass destruction
5. Conventional weapons
6. Reduction of armed forces

9. The highest priority should be given to disarmament matters dealing with nuclear weapons.

18. The disarmament programme should be implemented in an agreed sequence, by stages, until it is completed, with each measure and stage carried out within specified time-limits. Transition to a subsequent stage in the process of disarmament should take place upon a review of the implementation of measures included in the preceding stage and upon a decision that all such measures have been implemented and verified and that any additional verification arrangements required for measures in the next stage are, when appropriate, ready to operate.
In order to maintain the momentum generated by the special session and its preparations it is essential both to agree on a series of specific measures to be implemented within a relatively short period of time and to secure an effective follow-up of the session. For this reason, the programme of action should be formulated in as precise terms as possible.

It is suggested that the following points, among others, be included in the programme of action.

This programme of action sets out in chapter II priority negotiations for completion over the next few years. In addition it proposes concurrent measures and studies to prepare the way for future negotiations and for progress towards general and complete disarmament. It gives practical effect to the principles set down in the Declaration on Disarmament. A prerequisite for a successful disarmament strategy is the adherence of all States to existing arms control and disarmament agreements.

II. MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE DISARMAMENT PROGRAMME

The following main elements should be included in a comprehensive programme for action in the disarmament field: A. Nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction; B. Conventional weapons; C. Other measures.
1. Nuclear weapons

(a) Prohibition of the use and as a first step, renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons against States which have no nuclear weapons on their territories.

(b) Renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons.

(c) The reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery leading to their complete elimination constitutes an indispensable step towards avoidance of the danger of nuclear war and the settling of the problem of the progressive and complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

(d) The immediate conclusion of a treaty on the complete ban of nuclear-weapons States and their means of delivery.

(e) The immediate cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and of fissionable material for weapon purposes.

(f) Urgent steps also are:

- cessation of research and development of new types and systems of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and guidance,
- freezing of the qualitative improvement of existing nuclear weapons and delivery systems,
- prevention of proliferation of such weapons and systems.

The two leading nuclear-weapons States bear a particular responsibility with respect to the elimination of the above measures, while the other nuclear-weapons States, as well as militarily significant States should contribute towards the attainment of these objectives.

(g) Other measures:

(i) Establishment of nuclear-weapons-free zones and zones of peace in various regions of the world on the basis of arrangements among States of the region respecting the statutory framework set by the United Nations and international instruments that include the obligation to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States included in such zones. The process of establishing such zones should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons.

(ii) The status of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace should be assured by all States, particularly by nuclear-weapons States and the major maritime powers. In addition, it would be desirable to create zones of peace in the region of the Mediterranean and wherever feasible.

B. With regard to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the achievement of nuclear disarmament:

- A solemn undertaking by all States not to use nuclear weapons;
- Prohibition of the deployment of new nuclear weapons and delivery systems in the territory of other States;
- The withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the territory of other States;
- Cessation of the development, testing and production of nuclear weapons and of the means of delivering them;
- Cessation of the production of fissile materials for military purposes; peaceful use of existing materials and the transfer of a quota of such materials for use by all States within the framework of broad international co-operation;
- The creation of nuclear-weapons-free zones of peace and co-operation in different regions of the world;
- The reduction and total destruction of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and existing means of delivering them;
- Total prohibition of nuclear weapons;
- Guaranteed unilateral rights and opportunities for all States to make peaceful use of nuclear energy on an equal basis and without discrimination; guarantees of the expansion of research in this area with a view to achieving the aims of nuclear science in the development of all countries.

C. Measures to reduce the danger of nuclear war. Measures to reduce the danger of nuclear war should be taken in the interests of achieving disarmament and maintaining confidence in the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which, if used, would also pose a major threat to peoples, should be carried out with due regard for security and international peace.

Complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapons testing. The test ban and the Proliferation of nuclear weapons used by the two leading nuclear-weapons States should be made more effective and truly universal, the LAD system of safeguards should be strengthened in every possible way, broad international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which plays an important role in the development of the nuclear energy of States, should not be permitted to become a channel for the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

Establishment of nuclear-weapons-free zones and zones of peace. The establishment of nuclear-weapons-free zones and zones of peace in various parts of the world as an essential measure of regional military detente, it should contribute to strengthening the security of States within such zones and international security as a whole. Specifically, it would be of great importance to establish a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean, to withdraw ships and submarines carrying nuclear weapons from the Mediterranean area and to establish nuclear-free zones in various regions of the world.

Complete demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor. The preservation and use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor should be the ultimate goal of States in this field. It would be a major contribution to the achievement of this goal if all the parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Employment of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof were to strictly comply with their obligations. If the number of parties to this Treaty was enlarged and if a new agreement on complete demilitarization of the sea-bed was worked out at an early date.
The nuclear arms problem. It is the nuclear arms problem. Disarmament. The nuclear arms problem is not the only problem. It is a problem of a much wider scope. It is a problem of a much wider scope. It is a problem of a much wider scope.

1. Resuming the broadest possible application of the treaty on the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests which presumably will have been opened for signature by the end of the special session.

2. The formulation of a joint declaration (or similar unilateral declarations) in which nuclear-weapons States would undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against States which do not possess nuclear weapons and refuse to admit them to their territory.

3. The formulation of a joint declaration (or similar unilateral declarations) in which nuclear-weapons States would undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against States which do not possess nuclear weapons and refuse to admit them to their territory.

4. The establishment of at least one new nuclear-weapons-free zone of the type created by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco).

5. The signature and ratification of Additional Protocols I and II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco by States entitled to become parties to those instruments although they have not yet done so.

6. The formulation of a joint declaration (or similar unilateral declarations) by nuclear-weapons States in which they would undertake not to embark on new installations of nuclear weapons in the territory of other States.

7. The convening of an international conference under the auspices of the United Nations to ensure that the status of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace is respected by all States, especially by nuclear-weapons States and the principal maritime users of the Indian Ocean.

8. The formulation of a joint declaration (or similar unilateral declarations) by the two major nuclear-weapons States which would establish a moratorium on the testing of new nuclear-weapon-launching systems.

9. The conclusion of an agreement or treaty between the two major nuclear-weapons States which would- in the first place towards the elimination of nuclear weapons, a balanced 50 per cent reduction in their strategic nuclear-weapon systems and a further agreement on any qualitative improvement of such systems.

10. The formulation of a joint declaration (or similar unilateral declarations) by all nuclear-weapons States, or at any rate by the two major nuclear-weapons States, in which they would undertake to halt production of transferable materials for all-weapon purposes.

11. An international agreement should be reached on measures to prevent the diversion of the results of scientific research and development (A and B) to war-like purposes.

12. Negotiations should be initiated among all the nuclear-weapons States for a general agreement to limit, reduce and ultimately eliminate all nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.

The danger of war is to spread the or should be taken achieving the abolition of nuclear weapons. The danger of war is to spread the or should be taken achieving the abolition of nuclear weapons. The danger of war is to spread the or should be taken achieving the abolition of nuclear weapons.
I. Nuclear Disarmament

The General Assembly

1. (Appropriate reference to the draft treaty on a comprehensive test ban to be submitted to the General Assembly at its special session devoted to disarmament in accordance with General Assembly resolution 38/170)

2. Considers as a general principle that in particular the two leading nuclear-weapon states, and in particular the two leading nuclear-weapon States, in particular the two leading nuclear-weapon States, carry the main responsibility for nuclear disarmament;

3. Concludes that negotiations should urgently be undertaken concerning measures outlined below aiming at the eventual total cessation of nuclear weapons from the arsenals of States;

(a) Preserving of the qualitative improvement of existing nuclear weapons and delivery systems;

(b) Cessation of the research and development of new types and new systems of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and guidance;

(c) Cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and of fissionable material for weapon purposes;

(d) Balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and of their delivery systems;

(e) Prevention of proliferation of such weapons and systems;

4. Requests the Conference of the Committee of Disarmament to report to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament;

5. Understanding the importance that the United Nations be kept fully informed on all ongoing bilateral and multilateral negotiations in the field of nuclear disarmament;

6. Requests substantial results in the area of nuclear disarmament to be reported to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

II. Immediate Measures of Arms Control and Disarmament

1. In the nuclear field, in which the nuclear-weapon States have a particular responsibility, the realization of the central objective of taking to due account both horizontal and vertical proliferation by:

(a) The halting and the reversal of the nuclear-arms race in its quantitative and qualitative dimensions, especially by a second strategic arms limitation agreement between the United States of America and the Soviet Union, to be followed urgently by further strategic arms negotiations with the objective of reducing and eventually eliminating nuclear weapons;

(b) The earliest conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty banning all nuclear explosions in all environments, which should be adhered to as soon as possible by all States, particularly all nuclear-weapon States and should contain verification provisions giving maximum confidence that no party would conduct clandestine tests;

(c) Further measures to develop an international consensus on the strengthening and consolidation of the nuclear-proliferation regime, based primarily on adherence of all States to the NPT and to the system of safeguards of the IAEA. Measures to be pursued should include adherence to the IAEA in its efforts to strengthen its safeguards system; the application of IAEA safeguards on all source and special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities; agreement on adequate standards for the physical protection of nuclear materials; study and possible development of alternative and more proliferation-resistant nuclear technologies; an examination of the possibility of giving a suitable international character to appropriate nuclear-fuel-cycle operations, and use effective measures for the control of plutonium in civil nuclear programmes; and support for the work currently being undertaken in the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation. These measures should be designed to facilitate international access to the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and take account of the particular needs of the developing countries in this area, as well as to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons;

(d) The establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones suitable to specific conditions in the regions concerned through agreement between all the States in the region and with effective cooperation from nuclear-weapon States.

II. Nuclear Weapons, Including Non-Proliferation

A. Nuclear Weapons, Including Non-Proliferation

1. Conclusion, as a Measure of the Highest Priority, of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty

To this effect ongoing trilateral negotiations between the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom should be speeded up in order to make it possible for the CSP to achieve at an early date a widely acceptable treaty. All nuclear-weapon States should be urged to join in these negotiations as soon as possible.

2. Limitation and Reduction of Nuclear Weapons and Delivery Systems

It is necessary for the nuclear powers to halt and then reverse the arms race. To this end vigorous efforts should be made to expedite the SALT negotiations. Practical accomplishment of all nuclear weapons in the context of general and complete disarmament is the most important challenge of our time since the dangers of nuclear warfare remain a grave threat to the very survival of mankind.

3. Cessation of the Production of Fissile Materials for Military Purposes

Universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty should be actively encouraged. All States should be urged to ratify the Treaty or at least to abide by its provisions and objectives. Parallel efforts should be undertaken by nuclear-weapon States with the view of ensuring their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty. Substantive and timely measures should be devised in order to guarantee to all States - as provided by Article VI - the exercise of their inalienable right to develop - under appropriate internationally agreed safeguards and through an increased international co-operation - research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and to enjoy the benefits thereof.

4. Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zones

Nuclear-weapons-free zones should be viewed both as a useful complementary instrument of the non-proliferation regime and as an effective disarmament measure. Their establishment, when suitable conditions exist, should originate from the States directly concerned, on a voluntary and regional basis, and with the participation of all militarily significant States of the area.

B. Assurances, as Appropriate, by Nuclear-Weapon States Design to Increase the Confidence of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States in Their Own Security from Nuclear Attack.
(iii) The formulation of an international convention on the non-use of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, pending their final elimination.
III. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

1. Immediate steps should be taken to ensure that nuclear facilities which are not presently subject to IAEA safeguards are brought under international inspection and control.

2. International safeguards should be applied by the IAEA to supplies of nuclear equipment, materials, technology and facilities on a universal and non-discriminatory basis.

IV. Promotion of nuclear technology for economic development, especially of developing countries

1. An international programme should be adopted, under United Nations auspices, for the promotion of the transfer and utilisation of nuclear technology for economic and social development, especially by the developing countries in accordance with the principles approved in the United Nations General Assembly resolution 30/38.

V. Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones

1. The nuclear-weapon States which have not ratified Protocols I and II of the Treaty Prohibiting Nuclear Weapons in Latin America should do so without delay.

2. All States and parties in the regions of Africa, the Middle East and South Asia and the South Pacific should take steps to implement the objectives of demilitarising their respective regions.

3. In the meantime, no action should be taken which would retard the establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zones in these regions.

4. All States and parties in these regions should accept the application of IAEA safeguards over their nuclear facilities on a non-discriminatory basis.

5. The United Nations should continue to encourage measures to establish the nuclear-weapon-free zones in these regions.

VI. Creation of zones of peace in the Indian Ocean and other regions

1. The littoral and interested States of the Indian Ocean should reach agreement at their forthcoming meeting on measures, such as a commitment to settle outstanding disputes by peaceful means, the renunciation of nuclear weapons and the maintenance of a reasonable military balance among themselves, in order to promote conditions of security within the Indian Ocean region.

2. The great powers should, for their part, agree at an early date to eliminate altogether their presence and rivalry from the region.

3. Consultations regarding all aspects of the proposal to create a peace zone in the Indian Ocean should take place in the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean with the participation of all the States concerned and lead, if early consultations on the Conference on the Indian Ocean.

4. Efforts should be made to encourage the creation of zones of peace in other regions, such as the Mediterranean.
4. **Chemical weapons**

The complete prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction represents one of the most urgent measures of collective security. Consequently, conclusion of a treaty on the effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and of their destruction is one of the most urgent tasks of multilateral negotiations.

---

**Prohibition of the use, possession of the production, elimination of military arsenals and the outlawing of all existing or planned weapons of mass destruction (chemical, bacteriological, biological or of any other type)**

---

**Prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons disarmament.** The elimination of this type of weapons of mass destruction is long overdue. Measures to ban the most dangerous types of chemical weapons can be taken as the first step towards a radical resolution of the entire problem.**
2. Ensuring the broadest possible application of the convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction (in this case, too, it is assumed that the convention will have been opened for signature by the end of the special session).

VII. Other weapons of mass destruction

(1) The 1925 Geneva Protocol on Asphyxiating Substances should be adhered to universally.

(2) The Biological Weapons Convention, adopted by the General Assembly, should be ratified by all States.

(3) Early agreement should be reached by the United States and the USSR in their negotiations for a chemical weapons treaty so that the CDD can finalize the treaty at an early date. The absence of completely foolproof verification measures should not be allowed to prevent the conclusion of the treaty.
3. Other weapons of mass destruction.

A convention prohibiting the
development, production and
stockpiling of chemical weapons
and regulating their
destruction;

A.2 Other weapons of mass
destruction

(b) Early conclusion of an
international convention on the
prohibition of the development,
production and stockpiling of all
chemical weapons and of their
destruction is a most urgent feature.

The major military Powers should
engage in decisive efforts in view of
realizing their announced plan
initiative. Simultaneously the CDE
should materialize through concrete
steps its commitment to the total
elimination of chemical warfare agents.
13. The conclusion of a treaty or convention on the prohibition of the use of specific conventional weapons, including those which may be considered to be excessively harmful or to have indiscriminate effects, is in the light of humanitarian and military considerations.

(3) An international convention should be adopted by 1979 to prohibit the use of incendiary and certain other conventional weapons deemed to have extremely injurious or indiscriminate effects.
3. Incendiary weapons and other specific conventional weapons with especially efficacious effects

The reaching of agreement on the prohibition or limitation of the use of incendiary weapons, as well as use of specific types of conventional weapons which are deemed to be excessively injurious or to have inhuman effects, constitutes an urgent task. All States are called upon to contribute towards carrying out this task as provided for in the General Assembly resolution convening the United Nations Conference in 1979.
D. **Particularly Inhuman Weapons**

**The General Assembly,**

Recommends that the 1979 United
Nations Conference on Specific
Conventional Weapons should seek
agreement on the prohibition and
restriction of use of certain
conventional weapons which may cause
unnecessary suffering or which may
have indiscriminate effects, such as the
primary effect of which is to injure by
fragments not detectable by X-ray,
Lasers, infrareds and body-scans, certain
small calibre projectiles and certain
blast and fragmentation weapons.

Conventions prohibiting or limiting
the future use in armed
conflict of certain conventional weapons which may be
indiscriminate in their effects
or may cause unnecessary
suffering:

(a) States should seek agreement,
on the basis of consensus, on the
prohibition or limitation of use of
certain specific conventional weapons.
b. Other weapons of mass destruction

Conclusion of a treaty on the comprehensive prohibition of the development and production of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.

Prohibition of research, planning and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.

Prohibition of the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. The solution of this problem is very urgently needed as a means of curbing the most dangerous aspects of a continued arms race and preventing the use of scientific and technological achievements for the purpose of destroying human beings.
(5) The negotiations for a treaty prohibiting the development of all new kinds of weapons of mass destruction should be intensified in the CCD with a view to reaching agreement in the next two years.
Continuing review of the
question of new weapons of
mass destruction based on new
scientific principles with a
view to consideration of agree-
ments on the prohibition of
such new weapons which may be
identified.

(e) Efforts should be made to
avoid the development of any weapon
of mass destruction based on new
scientific principles. The CC should
keep this question under review and
consider the desirability of formulat-
ing agreements on the prohibition
of any specific weapon which may be
identified.
Total prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques.
19. The report of the Convention on environmental warfare in order to prohibit the use of all scientific or technological techniques to modify the environment for military or other hostile purposes. (3) The Convention on Environmental Modification Techniques should be ratified by States as widely as possible.
(6) Separate agreements should be simultaneously reached on identified weapons of mass destruction, e.g. radiological weapons.
A convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons;

(b) Efforts should be made by the CND to reach agreement on a treaty prohibiting the development, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons ("radiological weapons") as defined in the resolution adopted by the United Nations Commission for Conventional Arms in August 1980.
5. Conventional weapons

(a) Prohibition of the development, production and deployment of new types of conventional weapons and new systems of such weapons;

(b) The limitation and gradual reduction of conventional weapons on a global basis should be absolutely pursued in the context of general and complete disarmament. The limitation and reduction of armaments and armed forces in Europe would constitute a significant step for the attainment of that goal. The States participating in negotiations on such measures in central Europe should therefore exert all efforts for the purpose of concluding, as soon as possible, an agreement on the limitation and reduction of armaments and armed forces in this region.

Limitation and reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons. Military conflicts involving the use of conventional weapons lead to the simple and often most destruction of human lives and of the material values created by man. Accordingly, practical steps should be taken to limit and reduce aircrafts, artillery, tank forces and other modern types of conventional weapons as well as armed forces equipped with them. Foreign military bases in foreign territories should be dismantled; foreign troops should be withdrawn from such territories.
(1) As initial and preliminary steps:

A. Comprehensive studies of conventional arms control and disarmament from all aspects, to be undertaken by a qualified group of experts on, Inter alia:

(a) The international transfer of conventional weapons;

(b) The possibility of mutual limitation of the level and types of conventional arms and the number of armed forces, according to regions.

B. Preliminary measures parallel to the comprehensive studies:

(a) A request by the United Nations General Assembly to the major arms-supplying countries, in particular, the United States and the USSR, to start consultations on voluntary restraint measures with due regard to the security of recipient countries;

(b) On the initiative of the States of the region, the convening of regional conferences for the prevention and limitation of armaments, provided that there exist appropriate conditions;

(c) A request to the Secretary-General or a watch-dog committee, to follow (i) the current state of affairs of the international transfer of conventional weapons and (ii) the development of the consultations of the major arms-supplying countries envisaged in (a) above or in the regional conferences, envisaged in (b) above, and to keep the United Nations General Assembly informed on these matters.

(2) As to future steps:

After a certain period of time a review of the implementation of the initial and preliminary steps should be conducted. After this review further measures should be worked out and agreed upon according to paragraph 4 of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles during a transition period leading to the final stage of general and complete disarmament.

8. A decision on appropriate measures to implement the initial steps should be taken at the special session devoted to disarmament.

VIII. Reduction and limitation of conventional weapons

(1) The major Powers should reach an agreement to progressively reduce their military budgets and level of conventional armed forces.

(2) Other militarily significant States should also join in co-ordinated reductions in their military budgets and armed forces.
Conventional weapons and armed forces

Agreements or other measures on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis for placing restrictions on the production, transfer and acquisition of conventional weapons;

Agreements or other measures on a regional basis, aiming at strengthening peace and security, in particular urgent efforts to contribute to a more stable military relationship in Europe.

3. Conventional weapons

(a) Limitation and reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces should be negotiated in parallel with nuclear disarmament progress as a part of a balanced comprehensive programme. New approaches for successful developments in this field should be sought, where appropriate, on a regional basis.

(b) Negotiations on the transfer of conventional arms should proceed simultaneously with the limitation of arms and armed forces levels. In this respect, the establishment, on the basis of Article 109 of the Charter of the United Nations, of a commission divided into regional sub-commissions in which the main arms suppliers of each region would participate, should be envisaged, in view of keeping conventional armaments at the lowest possible level. To facilitate the setting up of the above-mentioned regional subsidiary organs with the consent of the parties concerned, the establishment of committees or separate parallel groups in which the purchasing countries would participate might prove advisable.
6. Reduction of armed forces

The reduction of armed forces of States to levels necessary for the maintenance of internal order and fulfillment of obligations of States with regard to the safeguarding of international peace shall take place within the context of general and complete disarmament.
Implementation of these priorities should lead to general and complete disarmament, under effective international control, which remains the ultimate goal of all efforts asserted in the field of disarmament. Negotiations on general and complete disarmament shall be conducted concurrently with negotiations on partial measures of disarmament. With this purpose in mind, the following measures shall be taken as a matter of urgency:

(a) Elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament measures which would lead to the attainment of general and complete disarmament;

(b) Establishment of a special committee of the United Nations for the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament measures to be submitted to the thirty-fifth regular session of the General Assembly in 1980 at the latest.

20. All disarmament measures should be implemented from beginning to end under such strict and effective international control as would provide firm assurance that all parties are honouring their obligations. During and after the implementation of general and complete disarmament, the most thorough control should be exercised, the nature and extent of such control depending on the requirements for verification of the disarmament measures being carried out at each stage. To implement control over and inspection of disarmament, an international disarmament organization including all parties to the agreement should be created within the framework of the United Nations. The international disarmament organization and its inspectors should be assured unrestricted access without veto to all places, as necessary for the purpose of effective verification.

21. States participating in the negotiations should seek to achieve and implement the widest possible agreement at the earliest possible date. Efforts should continue without interruption until agreement upon the total programme has been achieved, and efforts to secure early agreement on and implementation of measures of disarmament should be undertaken without prejudicing progress on an agreement on the total programme and in such a way that these measures would facilitate and form part of that programme.
The measures listed above should
turn part of a balanced program of
disarmament and provide for adequate
verification including, if appropriate,
the possibility of on-site inspection.
Verification provisions should be so
designed as to ensure the effectiveness
sense of agreements and to enhance
mutual confidence.
(II) CONFIDENTIAL BUILDING MEASURES

2. Nations pledge by States to strictly observe the principles of non-use of force or threat of force in any form against the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of States, to create a climate of confidence among States, and the States should be accompanied by measures such as:

(a) Prohibition of the establishment of new foreign military bases and stationing of troops in foreign territories;

(b) Withdrawal of foreign troops and dismantling of foreign military bases;

(c) Freezing and gradual reduction of military budgets of States, particularly those of nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States;

(d) Submission of reports to the United Nations by States of their military expenditure on a standardized basis.

Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. During and after the implementation of the programme of general and complete disarmament, there should be taken, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security, including the obligation of States to place at the disposal of the United Nations agreed manpower necessary for an international peace force to be equipped with agreed types of arms. Arrangements for the use of this force should ensure that the United Nations can effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of force in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

With regard to the adoption of collateral measures:

- A freeze on and gradual reduction of military budgets in accordance with a definite programme. To start with, the military budgets of all States should be reduced by at least 10 per cent and half of the resources thus saved should be transferred, unconditionally, to a United Nations development fund to be set up to support development efforts, particularly in countries with a national income of less than $100 per capita.

By the end of a decade, that reduction should be at the order of 25-30 per cent of the original level of military budgets, and armed forces and armaments should have been reduced by the same proportion.

- The withdrawal behind national frontiers of foreign troops, their armaments and other combat equipment, and the demobilization of the troops withdrawn;

- The dismantlement of military bases situated in foreign territories;

- The gradual reduction of troops and armaments in the service of national armies by means of international agreements guaranteeing strict fulfilment of the undertakings entered into. To be effective, such reductions must not be of a token nature and, in a first stage, troops and armaments must be reduced by at least 10 to 15 per cent and by even more in large countries with powerful armies;

- An undertaking not to carry out military manoeuvres, particularly those of a multinational nature, near the frontiers or within the territories of other States, or to concentrate troops or make waves of strength against other States;

- The prevention of attacks which take place by accident, misidentification or communications failure;

- Measures to reduce military activity effectively on the ground, in the air and on the seas and oceans;

- The dissolution of military blocs.
III. THE NATIONS INTEREES IN THE

In addition to undertaking the specific arms control and disarmament measures described above, the States Members of the United Nations, in order to strengthen international confidence and prompt the dialogue between those involved in defence matters in different countries, should:

1. Support the Secretary-General in his efforts further to strengthen the expertise and capability of the United Nations to play its essential role as a catalyst in the disarmament process;

2. Encourage the further discussion and development by the CSID of a comprehensive programme for disarmament;

3. Publish detailed information about their armed forces and the total value of their arms production and of their arms transfers to other countries;

4. Supply full information on military budgets using the method shortly to be finalised through a pilot study by the Secretary-General for the standardised reporting of such budgets as a step toward verified and balanced reductions in military expenditure;

5. Assess the possible implications of military research and development for existing agreements as well as for further efforts in the field of arms control and disarmament;

6. Work to restrain the worldwide build-up of conventional weapons, utilising all means which could lead to bilateral, regional, and multilateral measures of control, limitation and balanced reduction of such armaments;

7. Accept adequate provisions of international control as appropriate to facilitate the conclusion and effectiveness of disarmament agreements;

8. Stimulate public awareness of disarmament issues by:

   - Publishing the final documents of the special session, in particular through non-governmental organisations, mass media and educational systems,
   - Facilitating public access to information on disarmament questions,
   - Improving mechanisms for the dissemination of relevant United Nations publications, and
   - Encouraging study and research on disarmament;

9. Take the following actions to increase confidence between States bilaterally, regionally or worldwide:

   - To inform States, on a regional basis, and in accordance with regionally established criteria, 21 days or more in advance about their intention to carry out major military manoeuvres or manoeuvres;
   - To invite observers from States on a regional basis to manoeuvres and encourage military visits and exchanges of all kinds on a reciprocal basis;
   - To improve communications between Governments, particularly in areas of tension, by the establishment of "hot lines" and other mechanisms of reducing the risk of conflict due to misunderstanding or miscommunication.
(140) Reducing of military budgets. This measure is one of the most effective means of curtailing the arms race. The resources thus released would be used to promote the economic and social progress of peoples and for assistance to developing countries. The question of reducing military appropriations should be made the subject of concrete, bilateral negotiations among States, and a start should be made on their systematic reduction.
11. The establishment by the General Assembly, at its thirty-third session, of a committee in which the two major nuclear-weapon States and other States engaged in substantial military expenditure would participate, with a view to the committee's submitting to the General Assembly, no later than the thirty-fifth session, a report containing a data-presentation system which would allow a minimum of uniformity in the measurement of military budgets.

12. The formulation of a joint declaration (or similar separate declarations) by the two major nuclear-weapon States in which they would undertake, as soon as the Assembly had approved the report proposed in the preceding paragraph, to reduce by 20 per cent their military expenditure and to devote 25 per cent of the savings to the promotion of the economic and social development of the developing countries.
2. Reduction of military
    budgets.

   The General Assembly.

   1. Recommend the Secretary-
      General to organize a pilot test of a
      system for the reporting of military
      expenditures by States, drawing on
      the recommendations of a standardised
      reporting instrument by the group of
      experts on the reduction of military
      budgets (A/30/19) with the
      participation of States representing
      different geographical regions and,
      preferably, different military
      budgeting and accounting systems;

   2. Further request the
      Secretary-General to appoint an ad
      hoc panel of budgetary experts, under
      the aegis of the United Nations, to give
      guidance to States supplying the
      required data, to analyze the
      results of the pilot test, to further
      refine the system and to develop
      recommendations for large-scale
      application of the reporting
      instrument;

   3. Further request the
      Secretary-General to submit a progress
      report to the General Assembly at its
      thirty-fourth session.
15. The preparation of the study provided for in resolution 4/90 A concerning the relationship between disarmament and development.
C. Measurement and development

The General Assembly:

1. Recommends the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts appointed by him, to initiate an expert study on the relationship between disarmament and development, the results of which to be reported to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session for subsequent action at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament;

2. Decides that the expert study should have the following terms of reference (to be inserted at the special session on the basis of the report of the ad hoc group of governmental experts appointed by the Secretary-General in accordance with General Assembly resolution ______).
24. The practice of requesting the Secretary-General to prepare, with the assistance of expert consultants, authoritative studies on concrete questions relating to the arms race and disarmament should be continued.

25. The advisability of carrying out studies by qualified groups of experts on specific problems of disarmament, which warrant it, should be carefully explored in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

26. There should be more conferences and scientific exchanges among scientists and experts from various countries on the problem of the arms race and disarmament.

27. Universities and academic institutes should be encouraged to establish continuing courses and seminars to study problems of the arms race, military expenditure and disarmament.

28. The increased exchanges and publications of relevant information and data should lead to greater openness, to the establishment of greater confidence among States and increased knowledge and interest in these matters among the public.
Accordingly, one of the primary objectives of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament must be the adoption of specific measures directed towards expanding the dissemination of information about the arms race and the efforts being made by the United Nations to contain it. In this connection, the following measures, among others, should be considered:

(1) Governmental and non-governmental information organs and those of the United Nations and its specialized agencies should give priority, first, to the preparation and distribution of material relating to the danger represented by nuclear weapons and, second, to the disarmament negotiations which are progressing within the framework of the United Nations.

(2) The United Nations Information Centres should be more active in the dissemination of the above-mentioned material.

(3) Encouragement should be given to the preparation by the United Nations of studies and reports which would state in a succinct and clear manner the various problems and implications of the arms race in its many facets.

(4) Encouragement should also be given to the preparation and wide distribution of audio-visual material.

(5) The United Nations Centre for Disarmament should intensify its activities in the presentation of substantive information concerning the arms race and disarmament, directed principally towards government officials, academic circles and other sectors.

(6) Throughout this process of disseminating information, there should be increased participation by non-governmental organizations concerned with the matter, through closer co-ordination between them and the United Nations Centre for Disarmament.
IV. STUDIES TO FACILITATE FURTHER MEASURES

In order to facilitate further steps in disarmament and parallel measures to promote international peace and security, the Secretary-General is requested to carry out further studies relating to:

1. The strengthening of the security role of the United Nations in peacekeeping and the peaceful settlement of disputes to enable it to anticipate and resolve international crises;

2. Ways of limiting the build-up of conventional weapons, regionally and throughout the world, taking into account all relevant aspects, including:
   - the international transfer of conventional weapons;
   - the possibility of reciprocal limitation of the level and types of conventional weapons;
   - the proposal for a United Nations register of weapons transfers;

3. The relationship between disarmament and development to be initiated as soon as possible after the special session. The terms of reference of this study should be on the basis of the report of the ad hoc group of governmental experts;

4. All regional aspects of disarmament, including further measures designed to increase confidence and stability as well as means of promoting disarmament on a regional basis;

5. The possible contribution to confidence-building among States of technical measures such as decelerated zones, zones of limited forces and surveillance and early warning systems which could be used as appropriate in areas of tension and to the use of some of these measures in the verification of arms control agreements.

C. Other measures

(a) Conduct of pilot studies by a group of States on a voluntary and reciprocal basis, for the purpose of devising and testing jointly an effective international system of reporting for the military expenditure with the object of reducing military budgets. Reductions of military budgets in all countries on an assured basis could provide unimpaired security at a lower level of armaments, help to reduce international tensions and also lead eventually to the release of resources both nationally and internationally for economic and social development of mankind.

(b) Publication by all States of more information about their armed forces in particular about expenditure devoted to military purposes and a mechanism should be established under United Nations auspices to collect such information.

(c) Publication by the United Nations of all available data on the production and transfer of weapons and the development of an effective system for processing such data.

(d) Preparatory studies on the conversion of armaments industries of the principal developed countries should be initiated with the aim of providing alternative lines of production, while maintaining the employment rate at a constant level.

(e) A United Nations expert study on the relationship between disarmament and development should be initiated as soon as possible after the special session.

(f) The OAU should proceed, in consultation with the States parties to the 1967 Treaty, to the consideration of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of the arms race in the African continent and the Middle East. Parallel efforts should be made for outer space in accordance with the spirit of the 1967 Treaty.

(g) Specific measures to establish an international climate of confidence (confidence-building measures).
7. The General Assembly should consider annually the progress made in the implementation of the comprehensive programme. Every three years, the General Assembly should review the comprehensive programme and revise it as warranted. This will entail an evaluation of the over-all situation in the field of disarmament and a comparison between the development in regard to armaments and disarmament. The Disarmament Commission might be reactivated and entrusted with part of this task.

10. All States should have the opportunity to express their views on the substance and basic principles of such a programme and on its scope, practical ways and means of implementing it and other aspects of the programme; they should participate actively in terms of full equality in all phases of negotiations on the drafting of the programme so that it may embody the will of all peoples and give expression to their fundamental interests.

11. The participation of all nuclear-weapon States and of all other major military Powers in the efforts to contain the nuclear arms race and to reduce and eliminate all armaments is indispensable for a full measure of success in the disarmament efforts.

12. Disarmament being a matter of great concern to all States and to all peoples, there is a pressing need for all Governments and peoples to be informed about and understand the prevailing situation in the field of the arms race and disarmament and that the United Nations has a central role in this connection in keeping with its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations. The problems of disarmament and particularly nuclear disarmament should not be a secret held by certain categories of persons, politicians and soldiers; they directly affect the security and the very lives of peoples and the peoples should know what action to take in this direction in order to be able to have their say and defend their vital interests.

That is why public opinion and peoples of all countries must be fully informed and periodic reports must be based on the current status of armaments and its consequences and on the steps to be taken to stop the arms race.

13. The United Nations which bears responsibility for disarmament under the Charter should be kept informed of all unilateral, bilateral or multilateral efforts therein.

14. No disarmament or disarmament-related measure should adversely affect the scientific, technological or economic future of nations. All nations have full rights of access to all achievements of science and technology without any restrictions whatsoever.

Other elements

E. Although negotiated and adopted separately, all these partial measures relating to nuclear and non-nuclear weapons should be made an organic part of the programme for implementing the treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

All these measures must be implemented subject to suitable control, with the participation both of States which possess nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and of States without such weapons. Such control must be strict and effective and must be exercised in such a way as to offer genuine guarantees that the agreements reached and the measures adopted will be effectively applied.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION

1. The agenda for the thirty-first, thirty-second and thirty-third regular sessions of the General Assembly should include an item permitting the Assembly to revise the manner in which the Three-Year Disarmament Plan is being carried out and to make any appropriate recommendations resulting from that review.

XX. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, as soon as it has undergone the process envisaged in the Guidelines comprising section IV of this Final Document, will undertake the preparation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament encompassing all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated. The comprehensive programme should contain appropriate procedures for facilitating the co-ordination of all disarmament negotiations, regardless of where and in what form they are conducted, and for ensuring that the General Assembly is kept fully informed of the progress of the negotiations so that it can properly perform its functions, including an appraisal of the situation when appropriate and, in particular, a continuing review of the implementation of the programme. The said programme should be completed by 1 March 1981.

XXX. A second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament will open at the end of May 1981, its main objective being to consider and adopt the comprehensive programme of disarmament prepared in accordance with the provisions of the preceding paragraph.
A. Second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament

The General Assembly

1. Decide to convene a second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1962.

2. Park a decision that a Preparatory Committee for the Second Special Session should be established by the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session.

All States undertake to work toward the fulfillment of this programme, and to respect agreed measures relating to it. The General Assembly should examine its implementation, as appropriate, taking account of the recommendations on disarmament machinery made later in the final document.

establishing an international group to supervise the application of disarmament agreements in force.
On page 17 of document A/AC.187/100, after the last column bearing the symbol A/AC.187/98 add a column reading as follows:

**A/AC.187/101**

"The Secretary-General is requested to carry out a study on all aspects of verification and control of arms limitation and disarmament measures on the basis of terms of reference to be specified by /an appropriate disarmament organ/ (depending on the relevant decision(s) of the special session concerning machinery for disarmament negotiations)."
Disarmament and verification

Austria: working paper

I

The successful implementation of arms limitation or disarmament measures depends on the degree of confidence each party has that all other parties are complying with the agreement.

In this context verification plays an important role. In most of the agreements so far concluded or currently under consideration, verification is an essential element. The inability to reach agreement on specific texts may, to a large extent, be attributed to a divergence in views on this subject.

The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement are closely connected with the purpose of that agreement and should be determined by the objectives it is designed to meet.

It is, therefore, essential to have clarity, in the discussion on verification in respect of any given disarmament agreement, on the precise purposes of that verification. This clarity does not always exist and has in the past led to problems of definition. Likewise, in the various papers that have been presented to the Preparatory Committee, mention is made of "control", "verification", "inspection" and "monitoring", accompanied by adjectives such as "strict", "effective", "international", "adequate" and so on.

In view, further, of the use of verification to instill a sufficient degree of confidence conducive to adherence to agreements, it is not surprising that in virtually all these papers verification is described as an "indispensable", "essential", "necessary" part of disarmament.

It is precisely because of the far-reaching significance of this problem that Austria feels it should be examined more closely in the course of the preparations for the special session.
A first step in arriving at some agreed understanding on an approach to verification might be the presentation of a background paper prepared by the Secretariat which could help to pinpoint different problem areas and possible ways of approaching them. Austria therefore proposes that the Preparatory Committee entrust the Secretariat with the preparation of such a background paper.

This background paper could, _inter alia_, contain the following elements:

- proposals for commonly agreed definitions;
- a listing of different functions of verification measures and a discussion of the corresponding requirements for verification measures;
- the concept of adequacy of verification;
- verification as a confidence-building measure;
- a survey of various means, methods and types of verification followed by an indication of their potential usefulness in correspondence to different disarmament agreements;
- the impact of modern technology on verification.

In a second stage, the Committee might wish to propose an in-depth study of these questions. Thus, in addition to the paragraphs on control and verification in the part on principles guiding disarmament negotiations - which in the view of the Austrian Government should be more detailed than those which have been included in the existing proposals - we could include in the draft programme of action a proposal for such a study. In this connexion the expertise of the IAEA on some aspects of the question could also be utilized.
II

In trying to illustrate the areas where, on the basis of such a study, principles concerning verification could be formulated, one could mention the following:

- the necessity of at least some verification measures in all internationally agreed disarmament measures;
- a listing of possible measures of verification which might be applied, alone or in combination, to different disarmament agreements;
- a clearer definition of the concept of adequacy of verification, i.e., which degree of assurance about the compliance with an agreement can be regarded as reasonable;
- the striking of a balance between the scope of a disarmament measure (partial or comprehensive) and the cost of verification (in monetary and/or political terms);
- the requirement for every Government making a disarmament proposal to also propose corresponding verification measures;
- the possibility, in principle, for all countries to participate directly or through the United Nations in the verification of disarmament agreements including the right to access to all relevant information;
- the body or authority responsible for the verification and the role of the United Nations.

III

(a) Austria would propose the following paragraphs to be included in the draft declaration (p. 44 of document A/AC.187/93/Rev.1):

"The successful implementation of arms limitation or disarmament measures depends on the degree of confidence each party has that all other parties are complying with the agreement.

In this context verification plays an important role. The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement are closely connected with the purposes of that agreement and should be determined by the objectives it is designed to meet.

For each disarmament or arms limitation proposal measure of verification, alone or in combination, should be devised in accordance with the requirement of a sufficient degree of confidence between the parties. Every Government making a disarmament proposal should therefore include in such a proposal indications about corresponding verification measures."
Just as all States should have the possibility of participation in disarmament negotiations, they should, in principle, also have the possibility to take part, directly or through the United Nations, in the verification of disarmament agreements, including the right to access to all relevant information."

(b) For the elaboration of the draft programme of action, Austria would propose the following paragraph to be included in the appropriate section concerning studies to be carried out in order to facilitate future disarmament negotiations:

"The Secretary-General is requested to carry out a study on all aspects of verification and control of arms limitation and disarmament measures on the basis of terms of reference to be specified by [an appropriate disarmament organ]" (depending on the relevant decision(s) of the special session concerning machinery for disarmament negotiations).
In its resolution 32/78 of 12 December 1977 the General Assembly declared that the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests and its opening for signature would be the best possible augury for the success of the special session. The General Assembly urged the three nuclear-weapon States which had begun negotiations to expedite these negotiations with a view to bringing them to a positive conclusion as soon as possible and to use their best endeavours to transmit the results for full consideration by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) by the beginning of its spring session. The Assembly further requested the CCD to take up the agreed text resulting from these negotiations with the utmost urgency, with a view to the submission of a draft treaty to the special session.

The General Assembly has therefore accorded the highest priority to the conclusion of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTB), a measure for which it has been calling with increasing urgency for a number of years, by the time of the special session. Reflected in resolution 32/78, which received the overwhelming support of the General Assembly, including the three negotiating nuclear-weapon States, is the deep conviction that the conclusion of a CTB would be a major step towards controlling the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons and that the opening of a treaty for signature at the special session would generate maximum pressure for its early ratification. There is a clear expectation that negotiations will continue at a heightened pace with a view to the submission by the CCD of a draft treaty to the Assembly at its special session. This unmistakable expectation expressed by the General Assembly is not sufficiently taken care of in all the formulations of the programme of action submitted to the Preparatory Committee to date.
In the light of this expectation, the Preparatory Committee should not imply, in submitting a draft programme of action to the special session, that mere agreement on the text of a CTB treaty is one of the objectives to be attained within the time-frame of the programme. Rather it should state as its objective the ratification of a treaty by the maximum number of States and its entry into force at the earliest possible date.

The following formulation for inclusion in the programme of action is therefore suggested for consideration by the Preparatory Committee:

"Ensuring the broadest possible application of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty through its early signature and ratification by as many States as possible."
A large number of countries have expressed themselves in favour of greater involvement by the United Nations in the work on disarmament. Although the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States have a special responsibility in regard to the disarmament process, all other countries also have a responsibility and a role to play. The United Nations special session on disarmament is in part a response to this sentiment, since it provides all States with an opportunity to participate in establishing guidelines, priorities and goals for further progress in the field of disarmament and arms control, including the presentation of views on the international negotiating machinery on disarmament questions.

The special session devoted to disarmament will establish a programme of action for disarmament over the next few years. International machinery will need to be strengthened to enable implementation of this programme and permit the United Nations to fulfil its role to the satisfaction of all Member States.

There is a need for a single multilateral negotiating forum for disarmament questions. However, owing to the very nature of the international society and the uneven distribution of power among its members, some problems are not easily solved through multilateral negotiating processes. Some important questions can better be handled on a bilateral or regional basis.

The following guidelines are therefore proposed:
II. General Assembly machinery

1. A deliberative body comprising all United Nations Members and meeting annually is necessary to consider the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments.

2. The First Committee should in future deal exclusively with disarmament and related questions.

3. The recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Review of the Role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament should be promptly implemented.

4. To follow up the programme of action, a new item entitled "Review and implementation of the programme of action adopted at the eighth special session" should be placed on the agenda of the thirty-third and subsequent sessions of the General Assembly and, in addition, the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session should consider the question of convening a further special session devoted to disarmament.

5. Ad hoc committees of the General Assembly to consider specific disarmament proposals should continue to be established as necessary.

III. Negotiating machinery

The CCD should continue to exercise its full functions as the principal multilateral negotiating body under the auspices of and reporting to the United Nations. Its consensus procedures should remain unchanged. The CCD's structure, procedures and functions, should be improved by providing for such measures as:

1. The participation of all nuclear-weapon States;

2. Further participation of other States Members of the United Nations in its work by considering:

   (i) A limited increase in its size, bearing in mind the need for the negotiating body to remain suitably small;

   (ii) Arrangements for non-CCD member States to observe plenary meetings, and to participate fully in other meetings when their particular concerns are under discussion or when they have submitted proposals or working documents;

   (iii) Other arrangements for interested non-CCD member States to participate.

3. Strengthening of the link between CCD and the United Nations by inter alia granting the Secretary-General's representative authority to bring relevant matters to the attention of CCD;

4. Improved opportunities for the public to follow CCD's work.
IV. Role of the United Nations Secretariat

The Disarmament Centre should be so strengthened and reorganized that it can carry out the tasks allocated to it under the programme of action.

The Disarmament Centre should also be provided with sufficient capacity to enable it to carry out, inter alia, the following tasks:

1. To prepare reports and expert studies in accordance with the programme of action;

2. To produce information and material related to continuing negotiations and topical disarmament questions;

3. To increase contacts with the member countries, non-governmental organizations and research institutions.
PRERARTORY COMMITTEE FOR THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

TABULATION OF PROPOSALS CONTAINED IN THE WORKING PAPERS Submitted TO THE PRERARTORY COMMITTEE CONCERNING THE FINAL DOCUMENT(S) OF THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

(Background paper prepared by the Secretariat)
INTRODUCTORY NOTE BY THE SECRETARIAT

At its twenty-first meeting on 24 January 1978, the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament requested the Secretariat to prepare a tabulation of proposals contained in the working papers submitted to the Preparatory Committee concerning the final document(s) of the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament.

The present document incorporates those parts of the working papers submitted up to 15 February 1978, which are listed below, relating to machinery. They are tabulated in the original wording and in chronological order.


5. Working paper submitted by Romania containing a Declaration on Disarmament (A/AC.187/77).


8. Working paper submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics containing some basic provisions of the declaration on disarmament (A/AC.187/81).


10. Working document submitted by Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland containing a draft declaration on disarmament (A/AC.187/87).


13. Working paper submitted by Venezuela on elements to be included in the Preamble, the Declaration and the Programme of Action (A/AC.187/94).


15. Working paper submitted by Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on a draft programme of action (A/AC.187/96).


18. Working paper submitted by Austria on disarmament and verification (A/AC.187/101)

All States have the right and the duty to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament and to participate in disarmament negotiations on an equal footing. While disarmament is a reciprocal restraint and acceleration of the process of disarmament, the primary responsibility for halting and reversing the arms race lies with the nuclear-weapons States, which possess the most powerful arms and armed forces. The participation of all the nuclear powers in efforts to curb the arms race and to limit and eliminate all arms is essential if complete success is to be achieved in this regard. The accession of all States to existing international agreements aimed at limiting the arms race and achieving disarmament is a major prerequisite for further progress in this field. A world disarmament conference must be used as an important forum for working out specific, effective measures to solve the problem of disarmament.

Disarmament negotiations should reflect the requirement for the generalization of international life and for equal participation of all States in solving international problems, and should also reflect the great changes that have occurred in international relations.

Disarmament negotiations should reflect the requirement for generalization of international life and for equal participation of all States in solving international problems, and should also reflect the great changes that have occurred in international relations.

Arrangements must be made to ensure that multilateral forums for disarmament negotiations are open for participation by all States and, in the case of forums having limited participation, that non-nuclear States are in a position to submit their point of view on the problems under discussion whenever they so request;

Disarmament negotiations should reflect the requirement for the generalization of international life and for equal participation of all States in solving international problems, and should also reflect the great changes that have occurred in international relations.

If disarmament measures are to be effective, it is of utmost importance that negotiations and agreements should involve the largest possible number of States, particularly nuclear powers, and States which possess the most powerful arms and armed forces. The participation of all the nuclear powers in efforts to curb the arms race and to limit and eliminate all arms is essential if complete success is to be achieved in this regard. The

Disarmament negotiations should reflect the requirement for the generalization of international life and for equal participation of all States in solving international problems, and should also reflect the great changes that have occurred in international relations.

The participation of all nuclear-weapons States and of all other major military powers in the efforts to contain the arms race and to reduce and eliminate all arms is indispensable for a full measure of success in the disarmament efforts.

States participating in the negotiations seek to achieve and implement the widest possible agreement at the earliest possible date. Efforts should continue without interruption until agreement upon the total programme has been achieved, and efforts to secure early agreement on and implementation of measures of disarmament should be undertaken without prejudicing progress on an agreement of the total programme and in such a way that these measures will facilitate and form part of that programme.

All disarmament measures should be practicable, viable from the beginning and under such strict and effective international control as would provide firm assurance that all parties are assuming their obligations. During and after the implementation of general and complete disarmament, the most thorough control should be exercised, the nature and extent of such control depending on the requirements for verification of the disarmament measures being carried out in each stage. To implement control over and inspection of disarmament, an international disarmament organisation including all parties to the agreement should be created within the framework of the United Nations. This international disarmament organization and its inspectors should be assured unrestricted access without veto to all places, as necessary for the purpose of effective verification.

All disarmament measures are not the concern of a limited group of States and Governments alone; they are of vital interest to all the peoples of the world, large or small, irrespective of their military strength and of the types of weapons they possess. It is essential that all States should participate in disarmament negotiations and in the deliberations on and adoption of measures in that sphere, ...
In order to promote disarmament efforts, it is important to secure the active participation and support of all States, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, and of other militarily significant States, for disarmament negotiations.

Area control and disarmament measures will be most effective when they are in the interests of the States concerned and when they are consistent with the goals of enhanced security and peace. To ensure that all parties are convinced that their interests have been sufficiently protected, it is important that negotiations be conducted on the basis of a consensus about the objectives of the measures and, wherever possible, the terms of any agreements eventually adopted.

(A/AC.101/91)

A large number of countries have expressed themselves in favour of greater involvement by the United Nations in work on disarmament. Although the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States have a special responsibility in regard to the disarmament process, all other countries also have a responsibility and a role to play. The United Nations Special Session on Disarmament is in part a response to this sentiment, since it provides all States with an opportunity to participate in establishing guidelines, priorities and goals for further progress in the field of disarmament and area control, including the presentation of views on the international negotiating machinery on disarmament questions.

The Special Session devoted to disarmament will establish a Programme of Action for disarmament over the next few years. International machinery will need to be strengthened to ensure implementation of this Programme and permit the United Nations to fulfill its role to the satisfaction of all Member States.

There is a need for a single multilateral negotiating forum for disarmament questions. However, owing to the very nature of the intergovernmental society and the uneven distribution of power among its members, some problems are not easily solved through multilateral negotiations. Some important questions can be handled on a bilateral or regional basis. (A/AC.101/33)

All the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations.

(A/AC.101/55 and 56)

1. The experience gained since the establishment of the United Nations shows that, for maximum effectiveness, two kinds of bodies are required for disarmament negotiations - deliberative and negotiating. The largest possible number of States should be represented on the former, whereas the latter, for the sake of convenience, should have a relatively small membership. (A/AC.101/89)
(3) As all nations have a vital interest in the outcome of disarmament negotiations, disarmament efforts should be granted the active participation and the support of all States, and particularly of nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, which bear, in the disarmament process, a special responsibility. (A/AC.187/97)

... establishing an international organ to supervise the implementation of disarmament agreements in force. (A/AC.187/97)

Proposals are also being put forward to the effect that decisions should be taken regarding the machinery of disarmament negotiations. It seems to us that a considerable degree of care and caution should be shown here. This question should be considered closely only after general and specific tasks in the disarmament field, that is to say, substantive issues, have been determined. We see no need for abandonning or radically restructuring the existing channels for negotiations. What is needed is that existing bodies should continue to function with greater efficiency, and it is our task to make full use of their capacities.

Long experience in disarmament negotiations leaves no room for doubt that the main obstacle to the solution of disarmament problems are not the negotiating machinery but rather the powerful forces in a number of countries which seek to perpetuate the arms race and international tension. (A/AC.187/98)

The forthcoming special session devoted to disarmament is no doubt called upon to play an important role of its own in progress towards the complete elimination of the material basis for war. It is the Soviet delegation's intention to do everything possible for its successful outcome. (A/AC.187/98)
General and complete disarmament under effective international control remains the ultimate goal of the international community. The realization of this goal should be resolutely pursued through the United Nations Organization, or under its auspices, on a bilateral or multilateral basis, or within the framework of regional or other international fora, by all States, particularly by the nuclear-weapon States.

(A/AC.107/55/Add.1)

The United Nations, in accordance with the Charter, has the primary role and responsibility in the field of disarmament. In order to effectively discharge this role, the United Nations shall be kept fully informed of all disarmament steps taken outside its auspices. (A/AC.107/55/Add.1)

(b) Specific measures of the Program of Action shall be implemented by individual States or groups of States which may conduct, for this purpose, bilateral or multilateral negotiations and shall inform the United Nations of the results thereof. (A/AC.107/55/Add.1)

The United Nations has, under the Charter, a primary role and responsibility in the field of disarmament. Accordingly the General Assembly should exert utmost efforts to ensure the observance of the principles embodied in the Declaration on Disarmament and the full implementation of the Program of Action on Disarmament. (A/AC.107/55/Add.1)

Disarmament being a matter of great concern to all States and to all peoples, there is a pressing need for all Governments and peoples to be informed about and understand the prevailing situations in the field of disarmament and, when the United Nations has a central role in this connection in keeping with the obligations under the Charter of the United Nations.

The United Nations which bears responsibility for disarmament under the Charter should be kept informed of all unilateral, bilateral or multilateral efforts therein. (A/AC.107/60)

The problem of disarmament and particularly nuclear disarmament should not be a secret held by certain categories of persons, politicians and officials to their direct or indirect benefit. The lives of peoples and the peoples themselves have vital interests, which in the face of public opinion and peoples of all countries must be fully informed and protected. Reports must be kept on the current status of armaments and the consequences and on the steps to be taken to stop the arms race. (A/AC.107/60)

The United Nations should seek up to the historic chance for which it was created to ensure that the United Nations should ensure the United Nations should assure the ultimate goal of the United Nations, in accordance with the Charter, has the primary role and responsibility in the field of disarmament. In order to effectively discharge this role, the United Nations shall be kept fully informed of all disarmament steps taken outside its auspices. (A/AC.107/55/Add.1)

(c) Specific measures of the Program of Action shall be implemented by individual States or groups of States which may conduct, for this purpose, bilateral or multilateral negotiations and shall inform the United Nations of the results thereof. (A/AC.107/55/Add.1)

The United Nations has, under the Charter, a primary role and responsibility in the field of disarmament. Accordingly the General Assembly should exert utmost efforts to ensure the observance of the principles embodied in the Declaration on Disarmament and the full implementation of the Program of Action on Disarmament. (A/AC.107/55/Add.1)
II. ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

In accordance with its Charter and innumerable resolutions of the General Assembly, the United Nations has a primary role and responsibility in the sphere of disarmament. (A/AC.187/86 and 89)

The United Nations, in accordance with the Charter, has the primary responsibility to promote general and complete disarmament and to oversee, monitor, facilitate and encourage all measures - unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral - in this field. (A/AC.187/82)

III. SPECIAL SESSIONS

... and, in addition, the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session should consider the question of the convening of a further special session devoted to disarmament. (A/AC.187/103)

Where the deliberative function is concerned, it is undeniable that the General Assembly, at its regular sessions, cannot deal adequately with the numerous disarmament items which are always included in its agenda. Accordingly, until such time as a consensus is reached on convening and institutionalizing a world disarmament conference - which could play the same role in its own sphere as the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development plays with regard to economic and social matters - it seems desirable to hold regular special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. (A/AC.187/89)

A second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament will open at the end of May 1981, its main objective being to consider and adopt the comprehensive programme of disarmament prepared in accordance with the provisions of the preceding paragraph. (A/AC.187/89)
The United Nations, as the most representative international forum, undoubtedly has an important role to play in the disarmament field, and we are entirely in favor of the United Nations becoming an even more effective instrument in the struggle for peace, security and disarmament. (A/AC.187/98)

The General Assembly

1. Decides to convene a second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1982;

2. Further decides that a Preparatory Committee for the Second Special Session should be established by the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session. (A/AC.187/95)
The General Assembly should consider annually the progress made in the implementation of the comprehensive programme. Every three years, the General Assembly should review the comprehensive programme and revise it as warranted. This will entail an evaluation of the overall situation in the field of disarmament and a comparison between the development in regard to arms control and disarmament.

The strengthening of the role of the United Nations in this field requires the direct exercise by the General Assembly of its competence with respect to negotiation and the prevention and monitoring of the implementation of disarmament measures. The General Assembly should organize in-depth discussions on the current situation, based on the principles which form the general disarmament.

Accordingly, the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly should concern itself exclusively with the problems of disarmament and security. (A/AC.181/79)

The negotiation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Such negotiations should be carried on without interruption in a forum especially designated for that purpose, preferably within the framework of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. (A/AC.181/79)

The United Nations Disarmament Commission should resume its activity and proceed to an examination of the entire range of disarmament problems and the development of efforts undertaken in this field.

The United Nations Disarmament Commission, comprising all the Members of the Organization, will be able to concentrate all disarmament negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations. It will be able to negotiate the disarmament problems entrusted to it by the General Assembly and exercise supervisory functions with respect to the implementation of international agreements in the field of disarmament.

(A/AC.181/79)
All States undertake to work toward the fulfilment of this programme, and to respect agreed measures relating to it. The General Assembly should examine its implementation, as appropriate, taking account of the recommendations on disarmament machinery made later in the final document. (A/AC.187/96)

A deliberative body comprising all United Nations Members and meeting annually is necessary to consider the principles governing disarmament and the reconstitution of armaments.

To follow up the Programme of Action, a new item entitled "Review and Implementation of the Programme of Action adopted at the Eighth Special Session" should be placed on the agenda of the thirty-third and the subsequent session of the United Nations General Assembly.

Ad hoc committees of the General Assembly to consider specific disarmament proposals should continue to be established as necessary. (A/AC.187/103)

The former requires that the General Assembly be kept duly informed regarding all steps taken in the sphere of disarmament, whether unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral. (A/AC.187/56 and 69)

The agendas for the thirty-third, thirty-fourth and thirty-fifth sessions of the General Assembly should include an item permitting the Assembly to review the manner in which the Three-year Disarmament Plan is being carried out and to make any appropriate recommendations resulting from that review. (A/AC.187/89 and Add.1)

The First Committee should in future deal exclusively with disarmament and related questions.

The recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Review of the Role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament should be promptly implemented. (A/AC.187/129)
[c] An organic link be established between the General Assembly and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, currently the main body for multilateral negotiations on disarmament. For this purpose it is necessary that:

(i) All Member States of the United Nations may submit directly proposals on measures of disarmament that are the subject of deliberations in the CC: the attending members of the working groups thereof, whenever such a proposal or amendment is considered;

(ii) The representative of the Secretary-General and the Centre for disarmament of the United Nations be assigned an observed role in the CC;

(iii) The review of the present composition of the CC and the creation of the necessary conditions for the participation of all nuclear-weapons States in the work thereof be made:

(a) The CC be presided by a chairman on the basis of rotation;

(b) The CC adopt its rules of procedure. (A/C.3/538/Dec.1)
2. Encourage the further discussion and development by the CCD of a comprehensive programme for disarmament. (A/AC.107/96)

Negotiating Machinery

The CCD should continue to exercise its full functions as the principal multilateral negotiating body under the aegis of and reporting to the United Nations. Its consensus procedures should remain unchanged. The CCD's structure, procedures and functions should be improved by providing for such measures as:

1. the participation of all nuclear weapon States;
2. further participation of other Chamber States in its work by considering:
   (i) a limited increase in its size, bearing in mind the need for the negotiating body to remain suitably small;
   (ii) arrangements for non-nuclear States to observe, discuss, and to participate fully in other meetings when their particular concerns are under discussion or when they have submitted proposals or working documents;
   (iii) other arrangements for interested non-CCP member States to participate;
3. Strengthening of the link between the CCD and the United Nations by inter alia
   granting the Secretary-General's representative authority to bring relevant matters to the attention of the CCD;
4. Improved opportunities for the public to follow the CCD's work. (A/AC.107/49)

VII. CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

The organisation and procedures of the Conference of the Committee on disarmament should be subject to the modifications deemed appropriate for the participation by China and France in its work. (A/AC.107/96 and 99)

3. With regard to the negotiating body which functions within the framework of the United Nations, namely, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, it is obvious that it too has not been in a position to fulfill the extremely important task required of it in its own field of competence. Among the reforms necessary to increase its effectiveness, priority ought to be given to the following: the chairmanship system should be replaced by a chairmanship to be held on a monthly rotation basis by non-nuclear-weapon States represented in CCD, thereby helping to make it easier for China and France to participate in its work; a standing sub-committee of the whole should be established; and appropriate steps should be taken to ensure that, without prejudice to its limited membership, CCD can receive such co-operation as all States, or at least all members of the United Nations, may wish to extend to it.

XI. States members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament which have not yet established in Geneva adequately staffed permanent delegations to the Committee should endeavor to do so as soon as possible. (A/AC.107/89)

XX. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, as soon as it has undergone the reforms announced in the Guidelines comprising section IV of this Final Document, will undertake the preparation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament encompassing all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated. The comprehensive programme should contain appropriate procedures for facilitating the co-ordination of all disarmament negotiations, regardless of where and in what form they are conducted, and for ensuring that the General Assembly is kept fully informed of the progress of the negotiations so that it can properly perform its functions, including an appraisal of the situation when appropriate and, in particular, a continuing review of the implementation of the programme. The said programme should be completed by 1 March 1981 at the latest and should immediately thereupon be submitted, as a draft, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations so that he may transmit it to Member States and to the General Assembly at the latter's second special session devoted to disarmament. (A/AC.107/89)
The General Assembly

1. Invites the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to make it possible for non-members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to participate in certain meetings to be decided by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, through the submission of written and oral proposals and participation in the discussions thereof;

2. Invites the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to replace the present co-chairmanship institution by a bureau of four members, consisting of one chairman and three vice-chairmen. Two members of the bureau should be selected from the States belonging to the military bloc, and the other from the group of neutral and non-aligned States in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. The chairmanship should rotate in alphabetical order on a monthly or sessional basis between all members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament; (A/AC.107/95)

(f) The CCU should proceed, in consultation with the States parties to the Sea-bed Treaty, to the consideration of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of the arms race on the Sea-bed and the ocean floor and the Antarctic Ocean. Parallel efforts should be made for other areas in accordance with the spirit of the 1967 Treaty. (A/AC.107/97)
The feasibility of convening, in due time and after appropriate preparatory work, a world disarmament conference of all States should be thoroughly studied. (A/AC.187/60)

Disarmament negotiations, under the firm direction and control of the United Nations and carried out in bodies with clearly defined agendas and priorities, should be compartmentalized in various categories of activity, such as the consideration of all problems relating to the creation of the nuclear arms race and the conclusion of agreements on the prohibition, reduction and elimination of nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction, the negotiation of measures to reduce armed forces and conventional weapons at the world and regional levels; discussion of the problem of the freezing and gradual reduction by stages of the military budgets of States; the adoption of unilateral measures of military disarmament and disarmament.

Within this framework a decision can also be adopted concerning the convening of a World Disarmament Conference with the participation of all States and all nuclear-weapon Powers. (A/AC.107/79).

A breakthrough in solving the problem of disarmament, which affects the interests of all countries without exception, requires that this problem should be considered in the broadest and most authoritative international forum - a World Disarmament Conference. Such a truly universal forum could consider with expertise and in sufficient depth the totality of disarmament questions, if properly organized and with working bodies available to ensure a thorough preparation and practical agreement in taking appropriate decisions with due regard for the interests of all States, a World Disarmament Conference could work out specific, effective measures aimed at curbing the arms race and achieving disarmament.

A World Disarmament Conference should be convened in ... A preparatory committee is being set up for its practical preparation. (A/AC.187/60)

24. The practice of requesting the Secretary-General to prepare, with the assistance of expert consultants, authoritative studies on concrete questions relating to the arms race and disarmament should be continued.

25. The advisability of carrying out studies by qualified groups of experts on specific problems of disarmament, which warrant it, should be carefully considered in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. (A/AC.107/60)

Full information must be made available, through the United Nations, on the status of arms so that all States may be able to obtain the basic data required to enable them to participate in or keep abreast of the progress of negotiations. (A/AC.107/77)

Digitized by Dag Hammarskjöld Library
II. UNITED NATIONS INFORMATION CENTRES

The United Nations has done considerable work in disseminating information on the arms race, but further efforts are needed to enable world public opinion to play its proper role effectively in the arduous task of combating that phenomenon. It is clear that it could not do this effectively without the open and resolute co-operation and determination of States Members of the United Nations.

Accordingly, one of the primary objectives of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament must be the adoption of specific measures directed towards extending the dissemination of information about the arms race and the efforts being made by the United Nations to contain it. In this connection, the following measures, among others, should be considered:

1. Governmental and non-governmental information sources and those of the United Nations and its specialized agencies should give priority, first, to the preparation and distribution of material relating to the dangers represented by nuclear weapons and, second, to the disarmament negotiations which are progressing within the framework of the United Nations.

2. The United Nations Information Centres should be more active in the dissemination of the above-mentioned material.

3. Encouragement should be given to the preparation and wide distribution of audio-visual material.
C. Disarmament and development

The General Assembly,

1. Requests the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts appointed by him, to initiate an expert study on the relationship between disarmament and development. The results of which will be reported to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session for subsequent action at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament;

2. Decides that the expert study should have the following terms of reference (to be inserted at the special session on the basis of the report of the ad hoc group of governmental experts appointed by the Secretary-General in accordance with General Assembly resolution...):

(a) Publication by the United Nations of all available data on the production and transfer of weapons and the development of an effective system for processing such data. (A/AC.101/97)

(b) A United Nations expert study on the relationship between disarmament and development should be initiated as soon as possible after the special session. (A/AC.101/97)

(c) The Secretary-General is requested to carry out a study on all aspects of verification and control of disarmament agreements. The results of the study shall be submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session for subsequent action at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

(A/AC.101/97)
In addition to undertaking the specific arms control and disarmament tasks described above, the States Members of the United Nations, in order to strengthen international confidence and deepen the dialogue between those involved in defence matters in different countries, should:

1. Support the Secretary-General in his efforts further to strengthen the exercise and capability of the United Nations to play its essential role as a catalyst in the disarmament process; (A/AC.107/7C)

2. Supply full information on military budgets using the method shortly to be finalized through a pilot study by the Secretary-General for the standardized recording of such data as a step toward verified and balanced reductions in military expenditure. (A/AC.107/7E)

The Disarmament Centre should be strengthened and reconceived so that it can carry out the tasks allocated to it under the Programme of Action.

The Disarmament Centre should also be provided with sufficient capacity to enable it to carry out, inter alia, the following tasks:

1. Prepare reports and expert studies in accordance with the Programme of Action;

2. Produce information and material related to continuous negotiations and topical disarmament questions;

3. Increase contacts with the member countries, non-governmental organizations and research institutions. (A/AC.107/101)

In Addition to undertaking the specific arms control and disarmament tasks described above, the States Members of the United Nations, in order to strengthen international confidence and deepen the dialogue between those involved in defence matters in different countries, should:

1. Support the Secretary-General in his efforts further to strengthen the exercise and capability of the United Nations to play its essential role as a catalyst in the disarmament process; (A/AC.107/7C)

2. Supply full information on military budgets using the method shortly to be finalized through a pilot study by the Secretary-General for the standardized recording of such data as a step toward verified and balanced reductions in military expenditure. (A/AC.107/7E)

The Disarmament Centre should be strengthened and reconceived so that it can carry out the tasks allocated to it under the Programme of Action.

The Disarmament Centre should also be provided with sufficient capacity to enable it to carry out, inter alia, the following tasks:

1. Prepare reports and expert studies in accordance with the Programme of Action;

2. Produce information and material related to continuous negotiations and topical disarmament questions;

3. Increase contacts with the member countries, non-governmental organizations and research institutions. (A/AC.107/101)
Proposals of France for inclusion among the final draft documents (declaration, programme of action, machinery for negotiations) of the special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament

The special session of the General Assembly which is to meet in New York next May will be an important milestone in the efforts of the international community to make real progress towards disarmament. The many proposals before the Committee bear witness to the great interest in its preparation which is felt by all concerned.

France, for its part, intends to associate itself actively with the work of this session. It hopes that the work of the session will succeed in setting the international community on the road to genuine disarmament. The Permanent Mission of France has already had occasion to make known to the members of the Preparatory Committee the statements in which the President of the Republic indicated the essential lines of French policy on disarmament and suggested a number of initiatives which could be taken in specific fields. It would like today to submit for consideration by the Preparatory Committee a number of proposals the essential aspects of which are set forth below.

(Declaration)

France is not renouncing the ideal of general and complete disarmament, which should continue to be the ultimate goal. However, it believes that this purpose can be achieved only if the world is considered as it is and the right of each nation to security is respected. It proposes a pragmatic approach in accordance with which efforts would be focused on the factors of instability which give rise to distrust, to the arms race and, finally, to conflicts.

In the matter of eliminating factors of instability, it considers that the priorities are very different in the case of the zones where nuclear deterrent prevails and in other cases. The problem of nuclear weapons concerns all mankind; it does not present itself in the same terms in zones where nuclear weapons are an element of the general equilibrium and in zones where its introduction would
constitute a dramatic factor of imbalance. Therefore, while the principles of disarmament are everywhere the same, their practical application should be adapted to the diversity of specific situations and the variety of regional contexts.

Yet it is at the world level that France feels it is essential to affirm the fact that disarmament is the concern of all, in other words, that it should be achieved with the help, under the control and for the benefit of all.

In this spirit, France submits the following proposals to the Committee:

(Machinery)

A. Reform of the machinery for negotiations

The United Nations constitutes the natural framework for the debates of the international community on disarmament.

Suggestions have come from various quarters for remedying the unsuitability of the existing structures, to which the French Government has frequently drawn attention. The essential objective of a reform in this field should be to reaffirm the authority and responsibility of the United Nations and, in addition, to enable all the members of the international community to make their voices heard in the general debates on disarmament.

This means that all States Members of the United Nations should participate on a footing of equality in a deliberating body which would be the direct creation of the General Assembly. France proposes that this deliberating body should be the First Committee, sitting as a Disarmament Commission.

This presupposes, moreover, that the present CCD should be replaced by a new negotiating body responsible to the Disarmament Commission. The new body (which could be called the Disarmament Committee) would have from 30 to 40 members, including the States having a particular interest in questions of disarmament and representing in a balanced way all the regions of the world, including the countries which are members of the Security Council because of the responsibilities devolving upon that body. The Committee should have a Chairman, elected, for example, for two years from among the participating States, excluding the permanent members of the Security Council. The mandate of the Disarmament Committee, whose decisions would be taken by consensus, would include negotiating disarmament agreements stemming from the recommendations of the Disarmament Commission, to which it would report, and co-ordinating the implementation of regional measures. The States which were not members of the Committee would be admitted to participation in its deliberations as observers.

(Programme of action)

B. Establishment of an observation satellite agency

At present, two countries have military observation satellites which provide them with information gathered in the territory of all the States which are Members of the United Nations.
France considers that the international disarmament effort should benefit from the progress made in the technology of observation by satellite. Information useful for the strengthening of security and trust which can be obtained in this way should be placed at the disposal of the interested States, in accordance with political, legal and technical modalities to be agreed upon by consensus by the international community.

It therefore proposes the establishment of an International Observation Satellite Agency. The Agency, which would be directly responsible to the United Nations, would have as its task the collection (by means which it might possess in its own right as well as others), the organization and the dissemination of data obtained by satellite in fields directly affecting security and the control of disarmament agreements.

The study of the regulations, rules of operation and financing of the Agency should be carried out by the appropriate United Nations bodies.

C. Establishment of an international fund for disarmament for development

The disproportion between the sums allocated for expenditure on armaments and the sums devoted to aid to developing countries is regarded by States in general as indicative of an unacceptable situation. It can scarcely be denied that the situation in which the world finds itself today is one of over-armament. The most heavily armed States have a particular responsibility in this regard.

The desire to allocate for the economic and social development of the poorest countries at least a part of the funds spent for the acquisition of military equipment has given rise, over many years, to a variety of proposals which unfortunately have not so far been able to produce results because of the difficulty, inter alia, of determining a basis of assessment which would not be subject to challenge.

Despite these obstacles, which it does not consider insurmountable, France believes that the decision to establish a development fund, to provide for its immediate financing and to decide upon the conditions of its long-term financing would constitute an important and significant contribution of the special session devoted to disarmament.

Initially the fund could be financed to the amount, for example, of $1 billion by voluntary contributions calculated in accordance with simple criteria. The financing could be provided to the extent of 50 per cent by the nuclear-weapon countries, in proportion to the quantity of means of delivery they possess, and to the extent of 50 per cent by countries which both are rich and have large supplies of weapons, in accordance with criteria to be agreed upon. These countries would signify their willingness to devote to the purposes of peace and progress a growing proportion of the considerable resources which they have deemed it necessary to devote to military expenditures.

The next step would be to show that the process of disarmament should make it possible to achieve real economies for the benefit of all mankind and first of all the most disadvantaged States.
Contributions to the fund would be counted in calculating the 0.7 per cent of GNP fixed as the target for public aid to development.

D. International Institute for Research on Disarmament

France proposes the establishment of an organization whose purpose would be to make available to the international community technical studies on problems of disarmament. This body, or "International Institute for Research on Disarmament", would be responsible to the United Nations, which would nominate its Governing Council and would provide its financing, but it would have complete autonomy at the scientific level.

In submitting the proposals enumerated above for consideration by the countries which are members of the Preparatory Committee, France is seeking to provide not a disarmament "plan" but a contribution to an undertaking the scope and complexity of which it fully appreciates. It hopes that these proposals can be studied and discussed in the appropriate bodies of the Preparatory Committee, if necessary through the establishment of specialized subgroups, in the interests of the preparations for the special session.
PROVISIONAL AGENDA

for the meeting to be held in Conference Room 4, at Headquarters on Tuesday, 4 April 1978, at 10.30 a.m.

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. Organization of work
3. Principal document(s) of the special session
4. Final report of the Preparatory Committee to the special session
5. Other business
Working paper on organization and procedures of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament submitted by the members of its Group of 15*

The Group of 15, which has for some time been concerned with the question of organization and procedures of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, is convinced that the CCD should be the subject of such changes as to increase its effectiveness and to create the necessary conditions for the participation in its work of all nuclear-weapon States.

To this effect, the Group believes - without prejudice to any decision which the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament may adopt - that the following modifications deserve the highest priority:

1. Strengthening of the existing link between the General Assembly and the CCD. For this purpose it is necessary that:

   (a) All Member States of the United Nations may submit directly proposals on measures of disarmament that are the subject of negotiations in the CCD and participate in its proceedings as well as in those of the working bodies in which such a proposal or proposals are examined;

   (b) The Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Centre for Disarmament of the United Nations should be assigned an appropriate enhanced role in the CCD.

2. Replacement of the system of co-chairmanship by a system to be agreed upon.

---

* Circulated as a document of the Preparatory Committee at the request of Mexico.
Among the various suggestions made in this respect, it is worthwhile recalling for illustrative purposes the following:

(a) The CCD should be presided by a chairman on the basis of monthly rotation (CCD/550);

(b) Monthly rotation between all non-nuclear-weapon States members of the CCD (CCD/PV.762 and CCD/561);

(c) The present co-chairmanship institution should be replaced by a bureau of four members, consisting of one chairman and three vice-chairman. Two members of the bureau should be selected from the States belonging to the military blocs and the other two from the group of neutral and non-aligned States in the CCD. The chairmanship should rotate in alphabetical order on a monthly or sessional basis between all members of the CCD (CCD/554).

3. Adoption by the CCD of its own rules of procedure.

4. Examination of relevant procedures to improve the effectiveness of the CCD including inter alia the establishment of a standing sub-committee of the whole as envisaged in document CCD/530.

5. The plenary meetings of the CCD should be public.
The Netherlands: working paper

Proposal

In the opinion of the Netherlands, a number of recent developments in the field of disarmament as well as the international situation warrant a reconsideration of the idea of an international disarmament organization. With more and possibly more complicated multilateral disarmament treaties, a need seems to arise for a permanent organization to streamline the consultations and the implementation measures.

Therefore, the Netherlands proposes that an international disarmament organization be established.

To that effect the Netherlands suggests that in the final document of the special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations on disarmament an invitation should be included to seek the views of all member States on such an international disarmament organization.

Introduction

In the past, several suggestions and proposals have been made to establish a standing disarmament organ or an international disarmament organization, e.g. in 1973 both Sweden 1/ and the Netherlands 2/ expressed detailed views on this subject in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. The standing disarmament organ, as proposed by the Netherlands, would firstly be entrusted with the verification of a treaty banning chemical weapons. However, it was envisaged from the beginning that such an organ could take upon itself other tasks, such as the verification of other arms-control and disarmament treaties as well as


78-07050
the organization of review conferences provided for such treaties. In the absence of prospects, at that time, for substantial multilateral disarmament agreements as well as for other reasons, the ideas put forward by Sweden and the Netherlands were not pursued to any further degree. At present, the international situation seems to be more responsive to a reconsideration of these ideas. Indeed, several countries suggested the establishment of such an organ during the preparations of the special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations on disarmament or made proposals which are relevant for a discussion on this subject.

Possible functions of an international disarmament organization

In this working paper an international disarmament organization is envisaged as the operational framework for the implementation of international arms control and disarmament treaties, with functions mainly in the field of verification. In addition it is thought that such an organization could be instrumental to the preparation and organization of review conferences already provided for in several disarmament treaties and could serve as a clearing house for information on disarmament.

The idea takes into account the following considerations and ongoing developments:

(a) A convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction seems within reach in the foreseeable future. It seems probable that such a convention will provide for rather extensive consultations between parties, in particular technical discussions on the precise agents to be banned or restricted and on implementation measures. The treaty would probably provide for rather extensive notification and verification procedures. Besides regular political and technical discussions between parties, a permanent staff seems necessary for the implementation of the convention;

(b) A treaty banning nuclear tests seems also within reach. An international seismic system will in all probability be established to exchange and process seismic data. A consultative organ of parties to the treaty seems necessary, both with respect to solving technical and organizational problems of the seismic system - including the administration of international seismic data centre - as to discuss other matters with respect to the implementation of the treaty, such as working out procedures for on-site inspections and the actual carrying out of such inspections;

(c) Also for other existing and future multilateral disarmament agreements there may be a need for consultations between interested countries, in particular by the parties to these treaties, as well as for implementation measures. With more and more complicated multilateral disarmament treaties, a need seems to arise for a permanent organization to streamline the consultations and the implementation measures. Otherwise, a substantial number of consultative commissions, some of them with permanent staffs, seems required, all perhaps differently organized;
(d) The proposal by France to establish an international agency for satellite observation commands particular attention. The Netherlands shares the view of France that the present situation that information which can be obtained by satellite is in the hands of only a few countries is undesirable, in particular in cases where such information is a prerequisite for the verification of multilateral treaties. The Netherlands recognizes, however, the practical problems to establish an international satellite agency. It is also of the view that observation by satellite cannot provide all information necessary to verify present and future arms control treaties. For example satellites cannot provide most or all verification functions with respect to a ban on underground nuclear tests or chemical disarmament. It would therefore be necessary not to concentrate on satellite observation only but to combine different verification tasks and methods in one agency, which would be the international disarmament organization.

(e) Several disarmament treaties now provide for more or less regular review conferences. An international disarmament organization as proposed could provide the operational framework for the organization of review conferences. Preparations and proceedings of review conferences could thus be streamlined. The existence of permanent consultative machinery could also facilitate the organization of review conferences, thereby rendering them more efficient.

(f) Relevant information with respect to the implementation of arms control and disarmament agreements could be combined in one organization. Data on various disarmament measures, such as for instance stockpile-destruction, seismic data, results of inspections and fact-finding missions could be stored with one organization which would act as a clearing house for information on all implementation efforts in the field of disarmament.

A possible approach

In the view of the Netherlands the international disarmament organization could be set up initially for the implementation of a particular disarmament treaty, and could then gradually be given more functions dependent on emerging needs and taking into account experience gained. The existence of a permanent disarmament organization would make it possible during negotiations on other disarmament measures to allow certain functions to the organization and thus avoid creating new bodies. The agency would, of course, only perform functions which are specifically given to it by the parties to particular arms control and disarmament treaties. A link with the United Nations seems also desirable.

Structure of the organization

The organization could be constructed along the familiar pattern of many international organizations, such as a plenary conference, a board, and a secretariat. Membership of the conference would pose no problem if the organization would function in the context of one arms control or disarmament treaty only since the members of the conference would be the parties to the treaty. As a nucleus for a disarmament organization having more functions, the conference would have to be open-ended. Rights and duties of individual members would then have to be determined by their adherence to the treaties under consideration.
While the conference, as a rule, would only meet at certain intervals, the board would have to be so organized as to be able to function continuously. Members of the board would be elected by the conference. Its main functions could be envisaged as providing practical guidance to the work of the organization on the basis of guidelines to be given by the conference.

The secretariat, headed by an administrator, would consist of a permanent staff and such additional panels of experts as may be required for the performance of ad hoc or highly specialized activities, such as special investigations or technical studies.

Summary and conclusion

Above some preliminary views are given by the Netherlands. It is recognized, of course, that careful study and consideration is necessary before the international community can decide on the establishment of a new international organ. Also, results of ongoing disarmament negotiations, in particular with respect to chemical weapons and the comprehensive test ban, would have an influence on the subject. The Netherlands proposes therefore a number of steps which could ultimately lead to the establishment of an international disarmament organization if and when the world community considers it opportune.

As a first step, the Secretary-General of the United Nations would seek the views of Governments on this question, in particular on the functions to be given to an international disarmament organization, its structure and its link with the United Nations. Answers could be expected by Governments before the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General could make an analysis of the different ideas and opinions expressed by Member States. A next step could be that the General Assembly, if the answers warrant such a step, decide to establish a committee which would further negotiate on the structure and fields of a possible disarmament organization. The last step could be the actual establishment of such an organization, for example at a second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament. Consequently, the Netherlands proposes the following wording to be included in the final document of the special session:

"The Secretary-General is requested to seek the views of Member States with respect to the functions and organization of a possible international disarmament organization and to submit these views and an analysis thereof to the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly."
## UNITED NATIONS

**GENERAL ASSEMBLY**

**PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT**

### DISARMAMENT AND VERIFICATION

**Background paper prepared by the Secretariat**

**Contents**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraphs</th>
<th>Contents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 - 7</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - 12</td>
<td>A. Existing agreements in the field of disarmament and arms limitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 - 21</td>
<td>B. Some aspects of verification</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Digitized by Dag Hammarskjöld Library
Introduction

1. At its 27th meeting, on 8 February 1978, the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament requested the Secretariat to prepare a background paper on the subject of verification. This decision followed the submission by Austria of working paper A/AC.187/101, in which it was pointed out, inter alia, that it was essential to have clarity in the discussion on verification in respect of any given disarmament agreement on the precise purposes of that verification. The working paper stated that "a first step in arriving at some agreed understanding on an approach to verification might be the presentation of a background paper prepared by the Secretariat which could help to pinpoint different problem areas and possible ways of approaching them". Austria, therefore, proposed that the Preparatory Committee entrust the Secretariat with the preparation of such a background paper.

2. The present paper is written in pursuance to the request of the Preparatory Committee. It identifies some aspects of verification in connexion with disarmament agreements on the basis of texts of existing agreements and of discussions and working papers on the subject. The paper is conceived as a brief, initial examination of the subject.

3. The decision whether and how provision for verification should be made in a given agreement on disarmament or arms limitation must be based on the scope of that agreement. The nature of the agreement sets the terms of reference for decisions concerning the kind and degree of verification to be provided for and for the examination of the technical requirements for verification as well as the means available to carry it out. An essential element in this decision-making process is the assessment by the prospective parties of the balance of benefits and risks involved in the conclusion of the agreement.

4. This paper addresses itself merely to the concept of verification and its use in agreements, without going into the political process referred to above. It recognizes that, since the choice of verification provisions will depend on the political context of the agreement concerned and the technical factors involved, such provisions may vary from one agreement to another. On the other hand, there are problems of a general and recurring nature.

5. In the preparation of this paper, use is made of texts of existing agreements in the field of disarmament and arms limitation, statements made during discussions in the framework of the United Nations, working papers and information on the application of verification measures, in particular the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency. For ease of reference, relevant provisions in existing agreements are reproduced in part A of this paper.

6. The concept of verification is extremely complex. An effort has been made to clarify the subject by providing as much factual and background information as possible. No attempt has been made to draw conclusions from the facts or to suggest solutions.

7. The Secretariat will give the matter further consideration, as appropriate, within the limits of its own competence.
A. Existing agreements in the field of disarmament and arms limitation

Provisions regarding verification

1. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (1925):

No provision for verification.


Article VII:

1. In order to promote the objectives and ensure the observance of the provisions of the present Treaty, each Contracting Party whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings referred to in Article IX of the Treaty shall have the right to designate observers to carry out any inspection provided for by the present Article. Observers shall be nationals of the Contracting Parties which designate them. The names of observers shall be communicated to every other Contracting Party having the right to designate observers, and like notice shall be given of the termination of their appointment.

2. Each observer designated in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article shall have complete freedom of access at any time to any or all areas of Antarctica.

3. All areas of Antarctica, including all stations, installations and equipment within those areas, and all ships and aircraft at points of discharging or embarking cargoes or personnel in Antarctica, shall be open at all times to inspection by any observers designated in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.

4. Aerial observation may be carried out at any time over any or all areas of Antarctica by any of the Contracting Parties having the right to designate observers.

5. Each Contracting Party shall, at the time when the present Treaty enters into force for it, inform the other Contracting Parties, and thereafter shall give them notice in advance, of

(a) all expeditions to and within Antarctica, on the part of its ships or nationals, and all expeditions to Antarctica organized in or proceeding from its territory;

(b) all stations in Antarctica occupied by its nationals; and

1/ Agreements are listed in chronological order.
(c) any military personnel or equipment intended to be introduced by it into Antarctica subject to the conditions prescribed in paragraph 2 of Article I of the present Treaty.

Article IX, paragraph 1, provides that:

Representatives of the Contracting Parties named in the preamble to the present Treaty shall meet at the City of Canberra within two months after the date of entry into force of the Treaty, and thereafter at suitable intervals and places, for the purpose of exchanging information, consulting together on matters of common interest pertaining to Antarctica, and formulating and considering and recommending to their Governments, measures in furtherance of the principles and objectives of the Treaty, including measures regarding, inter alia, facilitation of the exercise of the rights of inspection provided for in Article VII of the Treaty.

3. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (1963): since it was envisaged that verification under this Treaty would be carried out by national means only, no provisions for verification were included in the text.

4. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (1967):

Article X:

In order to promote international co-operation in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, in conformity with the purposes of this Treaty, the States Parties to the Treaty shall consider on a basis of equality any requests by other States Parties to the Treaty to be afforded an opportunity to observe the flight of space objects launched by those States.

The nature of such an opportunity for observation and the conditions under which it could be afforded shall be determined by agreement between the States concerned.

Article XII:

All stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles on the moon and other celestial bodies shall be open to representatives of other States Parties to the Treaty on a basis of reciprocity. Such representatives shall give reasonable advance notice of a projected visit, in order that appropriate consultations may be held and that maximum precautions may be taken to assure safety and to avoid interference with normal operations in the facility to be visited.

Articles 12-16:

1. For the purpose of verifying compliance with the obligations entered into by the Contracting Parties in accordance with article 1, a control system shall be established which shall be put into effect in accordance with the provisions of articles 13-18 of this Treaty.

2. The control system shall be used in particular for the purpose of verifying:

(a) That devices, services and facilities intended for peaceful uses of nuclear energy are not used in the testing or manufacture of nuclear weapons,

(b) That none of the activities prohibited in article 1 of this Treaty are carried out in the territory of the Contracting Parties with nuclear materials or weapons introduced from abroad, and

(c) That explosions for peaceful purposes are compatible with article 18 of this Treaty.

Each Contracting Party shall negotiate multilateral or bilateral agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of its safeguards to its nuclear activities. Each Contracting Party shall initiate negotiations within a period of 180 days after the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification of this Treaty. These agreements shall enter into force, for each Party, not later than eighteen months after the date of the initiation of such negotiations except in case of unforeseen circumstances or force majeure.

1. The Contracting Parties shall submit to the Agency and to the International Atomic Energy Agency, for their information, semi-annual reports stating that no activity prohibited under this Treaty has occurred in their respective territories.

2. The Contracting Parties shall simultaneously transmit to the Agency a copy of any report they may submit to the International Atomic Energy Agency which relates to matters that are the subject of this Treaty and to the application of safeguards.

3. The Contracting Parties shall also transmit to the Organization of American States, for its information, any reports that may be of interest to it, in accordance with the obligations established by the Inter-American System.

2/ Nineteen agreements for the application of safeguards pursuant to this Treaty are in force or being negotiated. These also cover the obligations of the States concerned under the NPT.
1. With the authorization of the Council, the General Secretary may request any of the Contracting Parties to provide the Agency with complementary or supplementary information regarding any event or circumstance connected with compliance with this Treaty, explaining his reasons. The Contracting Parties undertake to co-operate promptly and fully with the General Secretary.

2. The General Secretary shall inform the Council and the Contracting Parties forthwith of such requests and of the respective replies.

1. The International Atomic Energy Agency and the Council established by this Treaty have the power of carrying out special inspections in the following cases:

(a) In the case of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in accordance with the agreements referred to in article 13 of this Treaty;

(b) In the case of the Council:

(i) When so requested, the reasons for the request being stated, by any Party which suspects that some activity prohibited by this Treaty has been carried out or is about to be carried out, either in the territory of any other Party or in any other place on such latter Party's behalf, the Council shall immediately arrange for such an inspection in accordance with article 10, paragraph 5.

(ii) When requested by any Party which has been suspected of or charged with having violated this Treaty, the Council shall immediately arrange for the special inspection requested in accordance with article 10, paragraph 5.

The above requests will be made to the Council through the General Secretary.

2. The costs and expenses of any special inspection carried out under paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (b), sections (i) and (ii) of this article shall be borne by the requesting Party or Parties, except where the Council concludes on the basis of the report on the special inspection that, in view of the circumstances existing in the case, such costs and expenses should be borne by the Agency.

3. The General Conference shall formulate the procedures for the organization and execution of the special inspections carried out in accordance with paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (b), sections (i) and (ii) of this article.

4. The Contracting Parties undertake to grant the inspectors carrying out such special inspections full and free access to all places and all information which may be necessary for the performance of their duties and
which are directly and intimately connected with the suspicion of violation of this Treaty. If so requested by the authorities of the Contracting Party in whose territory the inspection is carried out, the inspectors designated by the General Conference shall be accompanied by representatives of said authorities, provided that this does not in any way delay or hinder the work of the inspectors.

5. The Council shall immediately transmit to all the Parties, through the General Secretary, a copy of any report resulting from special inspections.

6. Similarly, the Council shall send through the General Secretary to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, for transmission to the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly, and to the Council of the Organization of American States, for its information, a copy of any report resulting from any special inspection carried out in accordance with paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (b), sections (i) and (ii) of this article.

7. The Council may decide, or any Contracting Party may request, the convening of a special session of the General Conference for the purpose of considering the reports resulting from any special inspection. In such a case, the General Secretary shall take immediate steps to convene the special session requested.

8. The General Conference, convened in special session under this article, may make recommendations to the Contracting Parties and submit reports to the Secretary-General of the United Nations to be transmitted to the United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly.

Article 20:

1. The General Conference shall take note of all cases in which, in its opinion, any Contracting Party is not complying fully with its obligations under this Treaty and shall draw the matter to the attention of the Party concerned, making such recommendations as it deems appropriate.

2. If, in its opinion, such non-compliance constitutes a violation of this Treaty, which might endanger peace and security, the General Conference shall report thereon simultaneously to the United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and to the Council of the Organization of American States. The General Conference shall likewise report to the International Atomic Energy Agency for such purposes as are relevant in accordance with its Statute.


3/ By end 1977, 54 agreements for the application of safeguards pursuant to the NPT were in force. The text which forms the basis for all these agreements is contained in IAEA document INFCIRC/153.
Article III:

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide:
   (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article.

3. The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

Article III:

1. In order to promote the objectives of and assure compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each State Party to the Treaty shall have the right to verify through observation the activities of other States Parties to the Treaty on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof beyond the zone referred to in article I, provided that observation does not interfere with such activities.

2. If after such observation reasonable doubts remain concerning the fulfilment of the obligations assumed under the Treaty, the State Party having such doubts and the State Party that is responsible for the activities giving rise to the doubts shall consult with a view to removing the doubts. If the doubts persist, the State Party having such doubts shall notify the other States Parties, and the Parties concerned shall co-operate on such further procedures for verification as may be agreed, including appropriate inspection of objects, structures, installations or other facilities that reasonably may be expected to be of a kind described in article I. The Parties in the region of the activities, including any coastal State, and any other Party so requesting, shall be entitled to participate in such consultation and co-operation. After completion of the further procedures for verification, an appropriate report shall be circulated to other Parties by the Party that initiated such procedures.

3. If the State responsible for the activities giving rise to the reasonable doubts is not identifiable by observation of the object, structure, installation or other facility, the State Party having such doubts shall notify and make appropriate inquiries of States Parties in the region of the activities and of any other State Party. If it is ascertained through these inquiries that a particular State Party is responsible for the activities, that State Party shall consult and co-operate with other Parties as provided in paragraph 2 of this article. If the identity of the State responsible for the activities cannot be ascertained through these inquiries, then further verification procedures, including inspection, may be undertaken by the inquiring State Party, which shall invite the participation of the Parties in the region of the activities, including any coastal State, and of any other Party desiring to co-operate.

4. If consultation and co-operation pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article have not removed the doubts concerning the activities and there remains a serious question concerning fulfilment of the obligations assumed under this Treaty, a State Party may, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, refer the matter to the Security Council, which may take action in accordance with the Charter.

5. Verification pursuant to this article may be undertaken by any State Party using its own means, or with the full or partial assistance of any other State Party, or through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter.
6. Verification activities pursuant to this Treaty shall not interfere with activities of other States Parties and shall be conducted with due regard for rights recognized under international law, including the freedoms of the high seas and the rights of coastal States with respect to the exploration and exploitation of their continental shelves.

8. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (1972):

   Article V:

   The States Parties to this Convention undertake to consult one another and to co-operate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention. Consultation and co-operation pursuant to this article may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter.

   Article VI:

   (1) Any State Party to this Convention which finds that any other State Party is acting in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of the Convention may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such a complaint should include all possible evidence confirming its validity, as well as a request for its consideration by the Security Council.

   (2) Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to co-operate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the complaint received by the Council. The Security Council shall inform the States Parties to the Convention of the results of the investigation.


   Article XII:

   1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

   2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.
3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.

Article XIII, paragraph 1, provides that:

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties shall establish promptly a Standing Consultative Commission, within the framework of which they will, inter alia,

(a) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous;

(b) provide on a voluntary basis such information as either Party considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed;

(c) consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical means of verification;


Article II:

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.

3. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty the Parties shall, as necessary, consult with each other, make inquiries and furnish information in response to such inquiries.


Article IV:

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall:

(a) use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law; and
(b) provide to the other Party information and access to sites of explosions and furnish assistance in accordance with the provisions set forth in the Protocol to this Treaty.

2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1(a) of this article, or with the implementation of the provisions of paragraph 1(b) of this article.

Article V:

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties shall establish promptly a Joint Consultative Commission within the framework of which they will:

   (a) consult with each other, make inquiries and furnish information in response to such inquiries, to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed;

   (b) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous;

   (c) consider questions involving unintended interference with the means for assuring compliance with the provisions of this Treaty;

   (d) consider changes in technology or other new circumstances which have a bearing on the provisions of this Treaty; and

   (e) consider possible amendments to provisions governing underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

2. The Parties through consultation shall establish, and may amend as appropriate, Regulations for the Joint Consultative Commission governing procedures, composition and other relevant matters.

The protocol spells out the procedures to be followed during the observation process, including such specifics as the number of observers, the geographical extent of their access, and the provision of certain information such as maps of the area of the explosion, to assist in the planning of their activities. In addition, the protocol provides for certain necessary privileges and immunities to be granted to observer personnel and their equipment, and for housing and working facilities to assure their freedom to carry out their rights and functions effectively.


   Article V:

   1. The States Parties to this Convention undertake to consult one another and to co-operate in solving any problems which may arise
in relation to the objectives of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention. Consultation and co-operation pursuant to this article may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter. These international procedures may include the services of appropriate international organizations, as well as of a consultative committee of experts as provided for in paragraph 2 of this article.

2. For the purposes set forth in paragraph 1 of this article, the Depositary shall, within one month of the receipt of a request from any State Party, convene a consultative committee of experts. Any State Party may appoint an expert to this committee whose functions and rules of procedure are set out in the annex, which constitutes an integral part of this Convention. The committee shall transmit to the Depositary a summary of its findings of fact, incorporating all views and information presented to the committee during its proceedings. The Depositary shall distribute the summary to all States Parties.

3. Any State Party to this Convention which has reasons to believe that any other State Party is acting in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of the Convention may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such a complaint should include all relevant information as well as all possible evidence supporting its validity.

4. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to cooperate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the complaint received by the Council. The Security Council shall inform the States Parties to the Convention of the results of the investigation.

5. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to provide or support assistance, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, to any Party to the Convention which so requests, if the Security Council decides that such Party has been harmed or is likely to be harmed as a result of violation of the Convention.

Annex to the Convention:

1. The Consultative Committee of Experts shall undertake to make appropriate findings of fact and provide expert views relevant to any problem raised pursuant to paragraph 1 of article V of this Convention by the State Party requesting the convening of the Committee.

2. The work of the Consultative Committee of Experts shall be organized in such a way as to permit it to perform the functions set forth in paragraph 1 of this annex. The Committee shall decide procedural questions relative to the organization of its work, where possible by consensus, but otherwise by a majority of those present and voting. There shall be no voting on matters of substance.
3. The Depositary or his representative shall serve as the Chairman of the Committee.

4. Each expert may be assisted at meetings by one or more advisers.

5. Each expert shall have the right, through the Chairman, to request from States, and from international organizations, such information and assistance as the expert considers desirable for the accomplishment of the Committee's work.
B. Some aspects of verification

13. Verification as discussed in this paper is the process of ascertaining that a commitment laid down in a particular agreement in the field of disarmament or arms limitation is being met. Thus, verification may comprise several steps, including the gathering of information, the checking of records, inspection to assure that the actual situation corresponds to the information obtained, the examination and evaluation of the information gathered and a determination about compliance. Verification, therefore, is a process of gathering and analysing information, permitting a conclusion.

14. The international discussions and negotiations reveal various opinions about the purposes of verification. An analysis of statements made on the subject in international deliberations would, however, seem to justify the conclusion that all approaches to the concept of verification share the view that its basic purpose is to serve as a factor in making the initial and continued adherence of States to a disarmament agreement possible, by ascertaining compliance with the agreement and giving assurances to that end.

Depending on the nature of the agreement, one or another aspect of this basic purpose may be emphasized as follows:

(a) The protection of the security of the parties to the agreement.

Example: it has been stated that "the essential aim of verification (is) to obtain assurance that, notwithstanding the restriction or limitation to be adopted, national security would not be jeopardized by a significant but unnoticed and, therefore, unilaterally advantageous breach of the agreement by other parties". 1/.

(b) The deterrent aspect of verification.

Example: in the agreements concluded by the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connexion with the NPT, the objective of such safeguards is described, in part, as the deterrence of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material by the risk of early detection. 2/.

(c) The ability to evoke a response in the case of non-compliance.

Example: the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, provides in Article VI, that a Party


2/ See IAEA document INFCIRC/153, para. 28. This aspect of verification was specifically stressed by the representative of the United States of America in the CCD on 2 August 1973. See CCD/PV.618, p. 6.
which finds that another Party is acting in breach of its obligations under the Convention may lodge a complaint with the Security Council. 6/

(d) The ability of States to demonstrate their own compliance to the agreement.

Example: a provision to meet this specific purpose is made in the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Tlatelolco Treaty). Article 16, para. 1 (b) (ii) provides that special inspections shall be made upon the request by any Party which has been suspected of or charged with having violated the treaty.

These approaches are largely interrelated.

15. The objective of verification is the event or situation of which it is intended to ascertain either the occurrence or existence or, conversely, the non-occurrence or non-existence. This objective which determines the technical parameters of the verification is directly related to the scope of the agreement providing for the verification. In order to ensure that the verification system adopted is appropriate to the objective of the verification, this objective should be clear from the relevant disarmament agreement or from the agreements concluded pursuant to it to specify the verification measures to be applied.

Examples:

The objective of the safeguards applied pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown. 7/

The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America provides in article 16, para. 1 (b) (i), that a Party which suspects that some activity prohibited by the Treaty has been carried out or is about to be carried out may ask for a special inspection. In the case of such a request, the objective of the special inspection would have to be specified.

In the case of an agreement providing for the destruction of stockpiles of weapons or weapon components, the objective of the verification might be to ascertain that this destruction has actually been or is being carried out.

In an agreement prohibiting the production of particular weapons or weapon components, the objective of the verification might be to ensure that such

6/ The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD) contains a similar provision. See also the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (Sea-Bed Treaty), art. 11 (4).

items are not being produced in installations declared to be intended for other purposes.

16. Texts of various agreements in the field of disarmament and arms limitation, as well as the international discussions and the published literature, employ a variety of terms which, for ease of reference are subsumed in this paper under the general heading of "verification". Among these are "monitoring", 8/ "inspection", 9/ "on-site inspection", 10/ "on-site ascertaining of relevant circumstances", 11/ "control", 12/ "oversee the working", 13/ "make appropriate findings of fact" 14/ and "investigations". 15/ The terminology employed in various contexts denote different modes and degrees of verification. The terms would all seem to contain the elements of information gathering, analysis and the determination of compliance, which are the essential components of verification.

17. As indicated in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Introduction to this paper, decisions on the means of the verification to be adopted are taken within the over-all context of the particular agreement under discussion. The means of verification chosen will depend both on the scope and nature of the agreement and on technological factors. Depending on the conditions agreed upon the application of verification may take place wherever technical means permit meaningful information to be gathered. It may be applied outside the State concerned (extraterritorially), including from outer space. It may also take place within the territory of the State in question, at various agreed locations, including sites where certain weapons or materials are disposed of, at production sites, or at other specifically agreed locales.

8/ See working paper of the USSR on "Some methods of monitoring compliance with an agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons", CCD/538, 3 August 1977.

9/ Joint Statement by the USSR and the United States of America in document A/4879 and Antarctic Treaty, art. VII.

10/ Draft programme of action for the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, submitted by Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom, A/AC.187/96, 1 February 1978.

11/ Memorandum by the USSR on questions of ending the arms race and disarmament, A/31/232, 28 September 1976.

12/ Draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control, submitted by the USSR, ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1, 15 March 1962.

13/ United Kingdom draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, CCD/512, 6 August 1976.

14/ See the annex to the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques.

15/ Ibid., art. v.4.
Verification may be a one-time exercise carried out, for instance, with the objective of ascertaining that stocks of a particular material or certain weapons have been destroyed or disposed of. It may also be an ongoing process, to ensure that a particular industrial activity is not used in a proscribed manner or for purposes unknown. It may be a combination of these two activities, in that, after the fulfilment of an obligation to dispose of stocks of specified items has been verified, there is continuing verification that no new stocks of such items are created.

The means of verification adopted to meet the objective of that verification may be chosen, depending on the specific case at hand, from a wide range of possibilities. In the area of information gathering, verification may comprise, for example, the submission of reports or of other relevant data, specifically prepared for the purpose or available in published form. Information may also be collected at first hand through various modes of inspection, including optical surveillance and other technical methods, applied on-site or at a distance. Inspection may also involve, for instance, examination and auditing of records and stocks, measurements, sampling, the use of seals to contain a given situation and make sure that no unrecorded movements take place of the items covered by the verification, and the use of various on- and off-site monitoring devices. The analysis of the information gathered by such means and the subsequent evaluation of the data analysed are indispensable elements in the process of verification, leading to a determination on compliance.

18. Verification may be applied through national or international means or by a combination of both. The term verification by national means has been used to denote a system whereby national authorities collect and digest information on activities carried out, in their own country, and present such information to other Parties to the agreement, directly or through an international organization. The term is also used in connexion with verification systems under which one State uses its means to verify occurrences or situations in another State. 16/ These two uses of the same term should be clearly distinguished. International verification is most generally used when States together or through an appropriate international framework ascertain events or occurrences in the context of a given agreement within the territory of one or more States. 17/ Under a mixed system of verification an international organization may make use of the findings of a national authority made available to it, while also carrying out some degree of verification itself. 18/

19. In deliberations on the subject of verification, various requirements have

16/ Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, art. XII. See also the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear-Weapon Tests, art. II.

17/ See Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, art. 12.

18/ See for instance IAEA safeguards in connexion with the NPT, document INFCIRC/153, para. 7.
been advanced, both in regard to its adequacy and to its acceptability. For example, the Commission for Conventional Armaments mentioned, in 1948, that, besides being technically feasible and practical, verification should be capable of detecting promptly the occurrence of violations and should cause the minimum interference with, and impose the minimum burden on any aspect of life of individual nations. 19/ The requirement of adequacy of verification is reflected in the use, of such qualifying adjectives as "strict", "effective", "necessary", "valid" and "most thorough", in addition to "adequate" itself. 20/ These qualifications, as may be seen from present discussions regarding the safeguards applied pursuant to the NPT, may refer both to the verification system itself and to the way in which it is applied. No matter how strict the system as provided for in or pursuant to a measure of disarmament or arms regulation, its effectiveness will largely depend on the adequacy of its application. Periodic review may be desired for this purpose and provision therefore may be included in the agreements concerned. 21/ The following remarks pertain to the adequacy of the verification provisions rather than to their application. The term "adequacy" as used here covers such other terms as "effective", "strict" and "thorough".

The use of the term "adequacy" in respect of the system of verification provided is taken to mean that this system should meet an agreed standard. This standard would then be determined on the basis of agreement on the technical objective to be met by the verification and the means parties consider it appropriate to provide for this purpose. Thus, consideration of the concept of adequacy will involve political as well as technical factors, and also financial ones.

In cases of agreements (for instance, those prohibiting particular uses of certain substances or calling for the destruction or disposal of specified numbers of items or quantities of materials) a purely technical decision regarding adequacy would presume the objective of the verification to be precisely quantifiable. Thus, in the system of nuclear safeguards designed to detect diversion of "significant quantities" of nuclear material, 22/ the objective


20/ See, for instance the joint statement by the USSR and the United States of America, the USSR Draft treaty on general and complete disarmament in EMDC/2/Rev.l/Add.1, Outline of basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world, submitted by the United States, EMDC/30/Add.5, 18 April 1962; Comprehensive programme of disarmament submitted by Ireland, et al., A/8191; Non-aligned working document containing the draft declaration, programme of action and machinery for implementation, for the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, A/AC.187/55/Add.1, 24 January 1978; Working paper A/AC.187/96 (see foot-note 8) and the working paper of France, A/AC.187/90, 26 January 1978.

21/ CCD/400, para. 15.

22/ See IAEA document INFCIRC/153, para. 28.
requires the quantity considered significant to be specified and the means of verification should be such as to permit at a given moment, a statement at a predetermined level of confidence, that no more than that quantity has been diverted, taking into account a certain limit of error. This quantity would be established in the light of the technical parameters.

It may not always be possible, however, to quantify a situation entirely on the basis of technical factors. Even so, it might be desirable for the purpose of reaching defensible conclusions to establish to the extent possible the confidence level that may be achieved by the verification, i.e. the degree of confidence with which it is able to make a statement as to whether an act of non-compliance has taken place. Such a determination would involve a judgement of the amount and kind of assurance verification should generate (acceptable risks), the technical complexity of the situation to be verified and the means available for verification. 23/

Although this choice would presumably depend on the specific measure under discussion, more thorough study may lead to an enumeration of the factors that will have to be taken into account in the adoption of the verification means. Such consideration might also cover the question of cost effectiveness, i.e., the relationship between the probable effect of a given verification measure and its costs. The question whether a given verification activity is warranted from the point of view of cost effectiveness may also be considered in the light of the relative importance of the disarmament measure involved and, therefore, of the risk that parties are willing to accept. This question also requires thorough analysis.

The question of avoiding interference, which is an aspect of the "acceptability" requirement, has been the subject of much discussion, in connexion with the NPT. The standard agreements concluded by the IAEA for the application of safeguards pursuant to that treaty 24/ as well as in other contexts, 25/ contain provisions limiting the intrusiveness of that kind of verification. IAEA experience shows that where verification measures demand active co-operation by industrial personnel and involve the presence of outside inspectors, on-site verification should be so applied as to reduce interference to the minimum necessary to achieve the objective.

23/ This concept was discussed by the representative of the United States of America in the CCD, who gave as one criteria for adequacy of verification its ability to detect a "significant violation". See CCD/PV.502, p. 22, 1 March 1971; the representative of Argentina to the CCD has stated that a verification system need not be perfect, i.e., offer 100 per cent certainty, but should, to be adequate, offer "reasonable certainty" that the obligation assumed would be fulfilled. CCD/PV.576, pp. 11 and 12, 10 August 1972; see also a further statement by the United States representative, on 24 August 1972, referring to an "acceptable level of risk", CCD/PV.580, p. 33; see also a statement by the representative of Sweden on 3 March 1973 pointing out that no verification system can give an absolute guarantee that every violation will be detected, CCD/PV.590, p. 10.

24/ See INFCIRC/153, para. 4.

25/ See INFCIRC/66, paras. 9-11.
Within this minimum, 26/ however, the verifying body should have the authority to carry out the verification measures agreed upon.

20. The texts of various agreements and the discussions on the subject show various approaches to the function of verification in respect of the response that may be given to a finding of non-compliance. To a large extent, these approaches are connected with the emphasis laid on one or the other aspects of the purpose of verification. 27/ Thus, for example, such a finding might lead to:

(a) Withdrawal, termination or denunciation of the agreement.

A number of agreements provide for the right of a party to withdraw if the party decides that "extraordinary events related to the subject-matter of (the) Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country". 28/

(b) International action.

In connexion, for instance, with IAEA safeguard agreements, which provide for reports on non-compliance to be transmitted, inter alia, to the Security Council, in accordance with article XII of the Agency's statute, increasing attention is being given to the question of other international action that might be taken in response to a violation of such an agreement. 29/

(c) The loss of treaty benefits.

The function is connected with the one discussed under the previous point. Sanctions, in the form of curtailment or suspension of nuclear supplies may be applied pursuant to the statute of the IAEA in the case of non-compliance with certain safeguards agreements. 30/

26/ See, for instance, Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, art. 4, para. 4, and Joint statement by the USSR and the United States of America in document A/4879.

27/ See para. 14 above.

28/ See NPT, art. V, Sea-bed Treaty, art. VIII, Biological Weapons Convention, art. XIII. Under art. 30 of the Telcelco Treaty, any party may denounce the treaty if in its opinion there have arisen or may arise circumstances connected with the content of the treaty or its protocols which affect the State's supreme interests or the peace and security of one or more contracting parties.

29/ See, for instance, statement by the USSR during the twenty-first regular session of the IAEA, General Conference (XXI)/OR.194.

30/ IAEA statute, art. VII, para. c.
In addition, if it were found that one party to an agreement did not comply with the undertaking, it could be imagined that other parties would consider acting similarly. For example, if a State were found in default of its obligation to destroy stocks of a certain material, other States might also stop destroying their stocks of such material. In this respect, verification might be viewed as a means to trigger counteraction.

21. There are many ways in which technology may have an impact on verification. Thus, while the technical nature of the items or processes subject to the verification may help determine the means and mode of verification, the technology available for the verification may in its turn be an important factor. Technological considerations are likely to vary from case to case and would seem to require specific consideration in respect of each instance on the basis of technical competence relating thereto.

Verification may involve the use of technical devices to yield or check information. Such devices might range from simple seals or cameras to remote sensing devices in orbiting satellites. The IAEA has provision in its 1978 budget of $791,000 for "scientific supplies and equipment" for safeguards, including the purchase of various inspection devices and $750,000 is earmarked for "laboratory services", including the analysis of safeguards samples. 31/ While the safeguards devices the IAEA is using are still relatively simple and cheap, and its analytical programme is limited in size, and the amounts involved may, therefore, not be indicative of the costs of more complicated verification schemes, they might provide some basis of comparison for the cost that might be involved in such other schemes.

31/ See IAEA document GC(XXI)/582, table K.1.
The special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament provides an important opportunity to consider and to evaluate existing multilateral mechanisms and to make suggestions and recommendations for their improvement.

In a review of the adequacy of international disarmament machinery, the following elements should be considered:

1. The vital interest of all nations in the outcome of disarmament negotiations and the need for a more conscious and direct participation of all States in disarmament endeavours;

2. The special responsibility incumbent upon nuclear-weapon Powers and other militarily significant States and their primary role in effective progress toward disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament;

3. The desirability of a better co-ordination among bilateral, regional and multilateral efforts, with a view to over-all achievements toward the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament;

4. The necessity for a parallel strengthening of the international security system and of the establishment of adequate verification mechanisms in order to assure the effective implementation and the strict fulfilment of agreed disarmament measures.

* * *

Against this background, Italy believes that the special session should focus its attention on the following main components of the international disarmament machinery:

78-08347
A. United Nations General Assembly

The General Assembly provides the natural and most appropriate forum for the consideration, on a universal basis and with the participation of all Member States, of the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments.

In view of rationalizing debates and rendering decision-making more effective, all disarmament items should be allocated to the First Committee, which should mainly concentrate its activity on disarmament and international security matters.

To this end, any other suitable revision of the procedures should be readily envisaged, bearing in mind the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Review of the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament.

Ad Hoc committees of the General Assembly could be set up to deal with issues deserving special consideration.

While the General Assembly should remain the regular forum for the annual review of disarmament problems, it might be appropriate to convene, in due course, a further special session for the specific purpose of:

(a) appraising the implementation of the programme of action;

(b) identifying guidelines for the next sequence of negotiations;

(c) considering and possibly adopting a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

B. Security Council

Consideration should be given to the specific contribution which the Security Council could make to disarmament progress.

To this effect, it is suggested that the Security Council should review the implementation of its responsibilities in the field of the regulation of armaments under Article 26 of the Charter.

Furthermore, the Security Council might consider the advisability of establishing, under Article 29 of the Charter, subsidiary organs for specific disarmament purposes, beginning with a Committee, divided into regional Sub-Committees, to control the international transfer of conventional weapons.

C. Machinery of negotiation: the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD)

Because of their very complex nature, effective disarmament negotiations at the multilateral level can be undertaken only within a body of limited dimensions, operating by consensus.

/...
The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) has proved to be the most qualified forum for the achievement of substantive disarmament measures intended to have universal application.

The CCD should continue to function as the main multilateral negotiating body in the field of arms control and to carry out all of its responsibilities in the pursuit of effective agreements relating to the cessation of the arms race and to disarmament. The CCD should, inter alia, intensify its efforts in view of the elaboration of a comprehensive programme for disarmament negotiations.

It is widely recognized that the role of the CCD would be consistently enhanced by the association of those nuclear-weapon States which do not yet participate in its deliberations.

In addition, the CCD might be recommended to review its structures and methods of work in view of:

(a) Envisaging a limited increase in its membership which would ensure a greater geographical and political balance in its composition;

(b) Opening its meetings, under appropriate circumstances, to all interested United Nations Member States. Such States could participate as observers in plenary meetings, being allowed to submit written proposals and to take part in their discussion before the Committee. The same proposals would be circulated as official documents of the CCD.

While the present degree of autonomy and flexibility of the CCD should be maintained as an essential condition of the effectiveness of the negotiation process, a closer liaison between the CCD and the United Nations might be secured by requesting the CCD to address to the General Assembly a progress report following the spring session and periodic special reports on particular topics, as appropriate.

It could also be suggested that the Committee, at the beginning of its activities every year, should seek to reach a broad agreement on the work to be accomplished during its two sessions and to establish a methodical schedule of negotiations to be conducted within the period considered.

The work of the CCD could be further improved by the establishment - as soon as it is deemed appropriate by a sufficient convergence of views among the members - of functional working groups which would negotiate draft treaties or accord consideration, informally and in depth, to specific items, with the assistance of experts.

Finally, the CCD might be invited to consider the possibility of opening its plenary meetings to the public.
D. Machinery for verification

While strengthening the world security system, on a parallel with progress made in the field of disarmament, the United Nations should consider the establishment of a permanent international organ for verification of multilateral disarmament measures.

Such a body, to be instituted by international agreement following appropriate studies and consultations, would operate in the framework of the United Nations. It would be designed to supervise, from both the technical and legal viewpoints, the implementation of treaties in force, so as to ensure full compliance with their provisions.

To this effect, the organ of verification should employ whatever technological and scientific means - such as sensing, sampling, recording, communicating and interpreting devices - might be usefully applied toward an effective verification of disarmament measures.

E. United Nations Centre for Disarmament

The organization and functioning of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament should be carefully assessed with the aim of improving its effectiveness and capability, in order that it may:

(a) Carry out, with the necessary expertise, studies and research as needed for the clarification of specific disarmament issues; and

(b) Provide broader information and stimulate a greater awareness on the part of international public opinion regarding disarmament problems.
The Disarmament Decade solemnly declared in 1969 is coming to an end.

Unfortunately the objectives established on that occasion by the General Assembly appear to be as far away today as they were then, or even further. No "effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament" have materialized, and still less has there been any progress that might lead to the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Neither has it been possible to free, for the purposes of economic development, any amount, however modest, of the enormous resources and energy, both material and human, that are squandered on the unproductive and wasteful arms race, which "places a great burden on both the developing and the developed countries".

Attainment of the objective of security has always been one of the most profound aspirations of humanity. States, like individuals, have for a long time sought to maintain their security through the possession of arms. Admittedly, their survival, in certain cases, effectively depended on whether they could count on appropriate means of defence. Yet the accumulation of nuclear and conventional weapons today constitutes much more a threat than a protection for the future of humanity. The time has therefore come to put an end to this situation and to seek security in disarmament, that is to say, through a gradual but effective process beginning with a reduction in the present level of armaments.

The Members of the United Nations could not remain deaf to the outcry of their peoples, who for nearly 20 years have been expressing their conviction that the question of general and complete disarmament is the most important one facing the world of today; and who have repeatedly declared their conviction that peace and security and development are indivisible and have therefore recognized that the corresponding obligations and responsibilities are universal.

Thus a powerful current of opinion has formed, little by little, leading
to the convening of what will go down in the annals of the United Nations as the first special session of the General Assembly devoted entirely to disarmament.

The outcome of this special session, whose deliberations have to a large extent been facilitated by the five sessions of the Preparatory Committee which preceded it, is the present Final Document, to which this introduction serves as a preface and which also comprises, in the following three sections, a Declaration, a Programme of Action and a brief set of recommendations concerning the international machinery for disarmament negotiations.

In adopting a comprehensive approach to the whole problem of disarmament, it was necessary at least to emphasize that what is at stake is, in the final analysis, the very survival of humanity; and to state that, while the final objective of the efforts of the international community should continue to be general and complete disarmament under effective international control, the immediate goal must be that of averting all danger of a nuclear war and of reiterating emphatically both the undertaking strictly to observe the fundamental principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the powers which rest with the Organization in the field of disarmament in accordance with the Charter, and the vital interest of all the peoples of the world in that question. That is the aim of the Declaration.

If - as is imperative - the purposes and principles of the Declaration are to be upheld by corresponding actions, it was essential to draw up a series of specific disarmament measures, selected by common accord as being those on which there is a consensus that their implementation in the short-term appears to be feasible. There was also a need to establish procedures for watching over the fulfilment of the obligations thus assumed, on the one hand, and, on the other, for ensuring the preparation, painstakingly negotiated, of a comprehensive disarmament programme which, passing through all the necessary stages, should culminate in general and complete disarmament under effective international control. That is the purpose of the Programme of Action.

Although the decisive factor for achieving real measures of disarmament is what it is customary to call the "political will" of States, and especially of those possessing nuclear weapons, a role that is in no way insignificant can also be played in this matter through the existence and effective functioning of an appropriate international mechanism or machinery. Consequently, the two kinds of organs required to that end, the deliberative and the negotiating organs, which the United Nations already has or could establish, should have whatever organization and procedures are most appropriate in order to obtain from them the constructive results sought. The fourth and last section of this document has been prepared with that end in view.
When the decision to hold the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament was taken in 1976 and we were entrusted with the preparations for it, we all realized the magnitude of the task before us. Today, when the fifth and last session of the Preparatory Committee is about to be concluded, I believe it is appropriate to say that behind us is a serious and time-consuming effort of amalgamating ideas and proposals contained in numerous working papers jointly or individually submitted by different States in search for a highest common denominator of our respective positions. We have succeeded in agreeing upon a number of significant issues, also with regard to the ultimate objective of all our endeavours - general and complete disarmament under effective control, as well as concerning the basic priorities and important principles which should guide negotiations and decisions in the field of disarmament. These principles, when adopted and strictly adhered to by all States, may greatly facilitate the process of disarmament negotiations.

We have also succeeded in reaching agreement on a number of questions of organizational and procedural nature.

At the same time, however, we have encountered difficulties in drafting some parts of the final document, particularly those concerning certain specific measures on arms limitation and disarmament as well as on ways and means of their implementation. This will have to be resolved at the special session itself.

Apart from the results we have achieved so far, one of the most valuable assets of our work has been strict adherence to the principle of consensus as the only acceptable and effective method of taking decisions on disarmament, since
the latter relate directly to the most sensitive sphere of national security, where nothing can be imposed against the will of States involved and every undertaking, in order to work, has to be mutually agreed.

Acceptance of this principle is, in our opinion, the determining factor of success of the special session. We therefore rest convinced that in order to live up to the expectations linked with the forthcoming General Assembly on disarmament, every effort has to be made at the special session to find generally acceptable solutions of the remaining problems. For as we have pointed out time and again, it is only general agreement that can secure the viability of disarmament measures and ensure their practical implementation.

Another significant prerequisite for the success of the special session is respect for the principles agreed upon in the draft Declaration on Disarmament, notably the principle of undiminished security and not seeking unilateral advantages by any party to disarmament negotiations.

Judging by experience gained in different fora of disarmament negotiations, in which Poland has always taken an active part, the paramount condition for progress in this field is the political will of States to reach agreement. We understand and fully share ourselves the impatience felt by those delegates who in the course of our deliberations and outside them indicated that the pace of disarmament negotiations lags far behind the growth rate of armaments and, particularly, of the technological arms race, which is one of the most dangerous phenomena of our time. We profoundly believe, however, that the pace of negotiations can indeed be accelerated and more tangible results can be obtained by further strengthening and making more effective use of the existing organs of disarmament negotiations, first of all of the CCD.

In our view, therefore, one should be very cautious about undertaking changes in the existing structure and procedures of the CCD, which could undermine its effective functioning as a valuable forum of multilateral negotiations in the field of disarmament. By the same token, neither proliferation of organs dealing with disarmament can add momentum to the disarmament process; it can only result in undue duplication and dispersion of efforts, whereas what we need is their concentration on most crucial and urgent issues.

Poland, together with other socialist States, has always been consistently and actively involved in efforts towards ending the arms race and promoting disarmament. We have advanced numerous constructive initiatives of our own and lent support to other realistic proposals which, in our judgement, could best contribute to complementing political détente with that in the military field.

We believe that the necessary conditions exist today for bringing about quicker and more substantial progress in the field of disarmament. We strongly hope that the forthcoming special session of the General Assembly will significantly contribute to facilitating such progress. On our part we shall make every endeavour to ensure its successful outcome.
However, if these hopes are to become a reality, it is necessary for all States to show a constructive approach to the negotiations and refrain from actions which may in any way be detrimental to efforts in the field of disarmament. To create favourable conditions for disarmament negotiations implies an imperative that all States refrain from developing new weapons of mass destruction which could trigger off another spiral of technological arms race with grave consequences for world peace. In this context, it is of primary importance that the plans to develop, produce and deploy nuclear neutron weapons be finally and unequivocally abandoned.

In conclusion, we express our appreciation and deep gratitude for the excellent way you have presided over our deliberations. We also address similar sentiments to our hard-working Rapporteur and the staff members of the Secretariat at all levels and posts, so ably headed by Dr. Rolf Björnerstedt.

It is our profound hope that the constructive atmosphere which has prevailed during the consecutive sessions of this Committee, will also characterize the climate of the special session and that the latter will have a lasting and positive impact upon the disarmament process.
Statement by Yugoslavia in connexion with the completion of the work of the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament

We have come to the end of the fifth session of the Preparatory Committee and the time has come to assess what has been achieved and what is still to be done with regard to the elaboration of the draft Final Document of the Special Session Devoted to Disarmament.

I must say, at the very outset, that my delegation has been both satisfied by the results achieved so far and concerned about the difficulties that have arisen with regard to the harmonization of positions on the remaining parts of the draft on which no agreement has been reached. We have been impressed by the active participation of a large number of delegations in the discussions on questions raised during the work of the Preparatory Committee, by their dedication and efforts to find compromise solutions - which is not always easy, by the atmosphere that has prevailed in the work of the Preparatory Committee, and by the fact that all decisions have been adopted by consensus.

However, what has been lacking is more active involvement on the part of some delegations and their failure to reply in time to a number of questions put to them during the negotiations. However, such co-operation is indispensable and is a prerequisite for laying down the foundation for the elaboration of a balanced programme to be adopted by consensus.

We welcome the increased interest shown by all countries both in the preparations for, and in participation in the work of the special session itself. All this shows that the idea of the special session has not only been accepted, but that there is also a broadly-held view that this session can and should play an important role in creating the conditions necessary for changing the existing, unsatisfactory state of affairs in the field of disarmament.

* Circulated at the request of the Chairman.

78-09419
A glance at the various parts of the Final Document will show that progress has been achieved with respect to the elaboration of the draft resolution and Declaration on Disarmament. True, there are still a number of controversial formulations in the Declaration, some of them being less and others more important. I feel that - with some additional effort - most of the differences could be overcome with relative rapidity. However, what we should have avoided is putting already agreed formulations into brackets and to dilute the assessments concerning the danger posed by the very existence of nuclear weapons and the continuation of the arms race.

Some progress has also been achieved in the part of the Final Document dealing with machinery. The problems that have still remained enclosed in brackets are very important and deserve serious attention. It is essential that the special session should create all the necessary conditions that will enable the international community to have confidence in such machinery, which will confirm and promote the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and help all nuclear Powers and other militarily important countries take an active part in disarmament negotiations. Should the special session - owing to different resistances, lack of understanding or desire to perpetuate the existing privileged positions of some countries - fail to create such conditions, it would, I am certain, have a negative impact on the over-all efforts that are being exerted in the field of disarmament.

Work on the Action Programme, which expresses the broadest aspirations for setting in motion the process of disarmament, has proved to be arduous and the delegations drafting the Programme have encountered great difficulties.

We believe that it is still premature to draw definitive conclusions concerning the results achieved by the Working Group for drafting of the Action Programme. This does not prevent us, however, to make some preliminary observations, bearing in mind the fact that the special session will convene in less than a month's time.

Although the results achieved in drafting the Action Programme should not be underestimated - all the more so as this task has not yet been completed - we are nevertheless concerned about the fact that no greater measure of agreement has been achieved both with regard to individual disarmament measures and with respect to the interdependence of such measures. Too much time has been wasted in defending the existing state of affairs and in trying to prove that it was impossible to depart from fixed positions, while very little has been devoted for finding solutions which would amount to a turning-point and provide new and fresh impulses for the adoption of genuine disarmament measures.

On the other hand, it has become apparent that, in most cases, it was not possible to find acceptable solutions because of too much insistence on adoption of detailed formulations for various disarmament measures. The elaboration of such formulations should take place at the time of concrete negotiations on various agreements.
The fact that some parts of the Action Programme are enclosed in a number of brackets and that some other parts have not been studied adequately shows that the special session will be faced with serious tasks. We believe, however, that it will be possible to find a way out of the present difficulties, provided a spirit of co-operation and understanding prevails at the special session and provided joint efforts are made in the search for the necessary solutions.
Statement by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in connexion with the completion of the work of the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament*

In connexion with the completion of the final stage of the work of the Preparatory Committee, the Soviet delegation would like first of all to express its appreciation to you, to the members of the Bureau and to the Rapporteur of the Preparatory Committee for your efforts in organizing and guiding the complex work of the Committee in the preparation of the draft final document of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and in seeking solutions on the whole range of questions connected with the organization of the special session. The delegation of the USSR notes that both you and the other members of the Bureau have in full measure shown a spirit of co-operation and mutual understanding and have endeavoured to take all views into account in this extremely complex sphere of international relations. The Soviet delegation also expresses its appreciation to the staff of the United Nations Secretariat which has ensured the efficient progress of the work of the Preparatory Committee.

Since the adoption by the General Assembly at its thirty-first session of the decision to convene a special session devoted to disarmament, one and a half years have elapsed and the Preparatory Committee has held five sessions. Each of those sessions has testified to a serious and responsible attitude towards the question of convening the special session on the part of Member States. This is reflected in the many documents and proposals submitted by States which have been considered in detail and in a comprehensive manner by the Preparatory Committee and the working groups. These documents and proposals have served to provide an initial indication of the various approaches to the question of what should form the basis of the final document of the session.

The Soviet delegation is convinced that the search for mutually acceptable solutions both on the Declaration and on the Programme of Action, based on

* Circulated at the request of the Chairman.
consideration of the political realities of the present day, will not only make a positive contribution to the current disarmament talks but will also help the international community to progress from disarmament talks to real achievements in the field of disarmament.

The draft final document establishes the positions of States on a whole range of disarmament problems and on the machinery for talks. It has not yet been possible to reach agreement on formulations for various sections of the final document; there are still passages in square brackets which contain concealed substantial differences of position. During the drafting of the document, the Soviet delegation repeatedly emphasized the need for the formulation of universal fundamental provisions which could in the future be used as a basis for concrete measures to curb the armaments race and bring about disarmament. This approach would make it possible to preserve the value of the principles which have been worked out over an extended period of time. This important aim can, in our view, be achieved only if the greatest realism is shown in the search for specific formulations for the final document.

Such a sober and practical approach would be in the interests of all States. Unfortunately, it has not always been adopted and not on all matters. There has not always and on all matters appeared to be a clear awareness of the fact that the problem of limiting the armaments race and achieving disarmament involves extremely complex questions regarding the security of States and the alignment of forces in the world - questions which call for a delicate and patient approach. Disarmament depends on the goodwill and efforts of all States; not only all nuclear-weapon States, but also all militarily important States, without exception, are called upon to participate in it. Proposals which do not take this fact into account will only impede progress towards the elimination of the material basis of war.

The goal of limiting the armaments race demands continuous drive and initiative directed towards clearing the way for disarmament. At the same time, the international instruments in force - treaties, conventions and agreements on various aspects of the limitation of the armaments race - cannot be ignored. It is impossible to agree with the proposition which is developed at times that everything that has been achieved in the field of the limitation of the armaments race, on which there is agreement among the overwhelming majority of States in the world, is of no value. Such a negative and nihilistic approach cannot serve as a starting point for disarmament talks. It is not the cancelling out of what has been achieved, but the reinforcement by all possible means and the recognition of the universal character of existing international treaties which will help to bring about progress in the sphere of disarmament, strengthen the climate of trust, and enable the experience accumulated in the drafting of new international treaties and agreements to be utilized.

In the course of the work of the Preparatory Committee, there has also appeared to be a desire, if not to demolish, at least to carry out a reform of the machinery for disarmament talks which is not called for by considerations of substance. It should not be forgotten that agreement in the field of the limitation of the armaments race and of disarmament depends above all on the political will of States, on their determination to participate in achieving
agreement. It would hardly be correct, in the field of disarmament, too, to follow the practice which is widespread in the United Nations, whereby efforts to solve complex problems are replaced by the creation of new organs which make no progress towards the solution of problems of substance but only give the appearance of activity.

The delegation of the USSR supports the views expressed in the Committee that the work of the special session of the General Assembly will be constructive and the special session will adopt mutually acceptable and genuinely important decisions only if there is general agreement among the participants in the session. The principle of consensus must remain the basic principle in the drafting and adoption of the final document.

In order to ensure the success of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, there are complex tasks to be solved. In the first place, agreement must be reached on the negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures. Such measures include the simultaneous cessation by all States of the production of nuclear weapons and the obligation of the nuclear Powers to proceed with the gradual reduction of their stockpiles until they have been completely eliminated. The development and production of nuclear weapons, including the so-called neutron bomb, must cease. The session cannot ignore such a crucial problem as the prevention of the danger of a nuclear war; that would make a real contribution to the limitation of the armaments race and the achievement of disarmament, the strengthening of trust among peoples, the strengthening of political détente, and the achievement also of military détente.

The attitude of the Soviet Union towards the special session of the General Assembly was expressed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Mr. Gromyko, on 7 April 1975 at the solemn meeting held in Helsinki to commemorate the thirtieth anniversary of the signing of the Soviet-Finnish Treaty of friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance. Mr. Gromyko stated: "The Soviet Union will go to that session with concrete proposals and with a desire to achieve concrete results. We hope that the special session will mark an important stage towards the convening of the World Disarmament Conference, the need for which has been agreed upon among States and decided upon by the United Nations."

The Soviet delegation reaffirms that the Soviet Union will make the maximum effort to ensure that the special session achieves the aims for which it has been convened and arrives at positive and practical results which will facilitate the solution of disarmament problems.
A/AC.187/INF.2-7

Lists of communications concerning disarmament received from non-governmental organizations and research institutions

[Documents A/AC.187/INF.2-7 will be incorporated in A/INF/S-10/1]
HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS

United Nations publications may be obtained from bookstores and distributors throughout the world. Consult your bookstore or write to: United Nations, Sales Section, New York or Geneva.

COMMENT SE PROCUREZ LES PUBLICATIONS DES NATIONS UNIES


КАК ПОЛУЧИТЬ ИЗДАНИЯ ОРГАНИЗАЦИИ ОБЪЕДИНЕННЫХ НАЦИЙ

Издания Организации Объединенных Наций можно купить в книжных магазинах и агентствах во всех районах мира. Напишите в издательство или в книжный магазин по адресу: Организация Объединенных Наций, Секция по продаже изданий, Нью-Йорк или Женева.

COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS

Las publicaciones de las Naciones Unidas están en venta en librerías y casas distribuidoras en todas partes del mundo. Consulte a su librero o diríjase a: Naciones Unidas, Sección de Ventas, Nueva York o Ginebra.