REPORT
OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE
FOR THE SPECIAL SESSION
OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

Volume V

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
OFFICIAL RECORDS: TENTH SPECIAL SESSION
SUPPLEMENT No. 1 (A/S-10/1)

UNITED NATIONS
New York, 1978
Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

The report of the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament consists of the text of the report (volume I) and its annexes, which are contained in six volumes (volumes II to VII).

Volumes II to VI contain the documents of the Preparatory Committee except the summary records which are found in volume VII.

In volumes II to VI the documents are in order of symbol and in each volume a detailed chronological list has been provided. A list of the documents, by subject, follows:

1. Replies of Member States in response to General Assembly resolution 31/89 B


2. Working papers and other documents submitted by Member States


3. Background papers, working papers and tabulations prepared by the Secretariat at the request of the Committee


4. Information bulletins

   A/AC.187/INF.2-7.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document No.</th>
<th>Titles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A/32/60</td>
<td>Letter dated 1 March 1977 from the Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/32/62</td>
<td>Letter dated 23 March 1977 from the Permanent Representative of the German Democratic Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/1</td>
<td>Provisional agenda (meeting held on 28 March 1977)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/2</td>
<td>Letter dated 22 March 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/3</td>
<td>Letter dated 24 March 1977 from the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/4</td>
<td>Letter dated 29 March 1977 from the Acting Permanent Representative of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/5</td>
<td>Letter dated 31 March 1977 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic addressed to the Secretary-General.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/6</td>
<td>Letter dated 8 April 1977 from the Permanent Representative of the Hungarian People's Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/7</td>
<td>Letter dated 7 April 1977 from the Permanent Representative of the State of Kuwait to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/8</td>
<td>Letter dated 13 April 1977 from the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Venezuela to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/9</td>
<td>Letter dated 12 April 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/10</td>
<td>Letter dated 12 April 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/11</td>
<td>Letter dated 14 April 1977 from the Permanent Representative of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/12</td>
<td>Letter dated 15 April 1977 from the Permanent Representative of the Polish People's Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/13</td>
<td>Letter dated 14 April 1977 from the Permanent Representative of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/14</td>
<td>Letter dated 15 April 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Document No.</td>
<td>Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/15</td>
<td>Letter dated 15 April 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/16</td>
<td>Note verbale dated 19 April 1977 from the Permanent Mission of Mongolia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/17</td>
<td>Letter dated 22 April 1977 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/18</td>
<td>Note verbale dated 15 April 1977 from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/19</td>
<td>Note verbale dated 25 April 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Sweden to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/20</td>
<td>Note verbale dated 19 April 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Denmark to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/21</td>
<td>Note verbale dated 26 April 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Finland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/22</td>
<td>Note verbale dated 26 April 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Norway to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/23</td>
<td>Letter dated 25 April 1977 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/24</td>
<td>Letter dated 27 April 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Romania to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/25</td>
<td>Note verbale dated 26 April 1977 from the Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/26 and Corr. 1</td>
<td>Note verbale dated 27 April 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/27</td>
<td>Note verbale dated 25 April 1977 from the Permanent Mission of Indonesia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/28</td>
<td>Note verbale dated 27 April 1977 from the Permanent Mission of Algeria to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/29 and Corr. 1 and Add. 1</td>
<td>Disarmament resolutions adopted by the General Assembly - Background paper prepared by the Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Document No.</td>
<td>Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/30</td>
<td>VOLUME III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Corr. 1</td>
<td>Existing principles and proposals for the conduct of disarmament negotiations - Background paper prepared by the Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/30/Add.1</td>
<td>- Working paper containing a preliminary draft comprehensive programme of disarmament submitted by Mexico on 23 August</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/31</td>
<td>Existing structures and machinery for disarmament negotiations - Background paper prepared by the Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/32</td>
<td>Note verbale dated 30 April 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Italy to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/33</td>
<td>Note verbale dated 25 April 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/34</td>
<td>Note verbale dated 26 April 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Mexico to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/35</td>
<td>Letter dated 29 April 1977 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/36</td>
<td>Letter dated 28 April 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Bulgaria to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/37</td>
<td>Note verbale dated 29 April 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/38</td>
<td>Note verbale dated 2 May 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/39</td>
<td>Note verbale dated 2 May 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Luxembourg to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/40</td>
<td>Note verbale dated 3 May 1977 from the Permanent Representative of New Zealand to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/41</td>
<td>Communication dated 5 May 1977 received from the Permanent Mission of Austria on the views and suggestions of the Austrian Government concerning the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/42</td>
<td>Note verbale dated 11 April 1977 from the Permanent Mission of Peru to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/43</td>
<td>Communication dated 10 May 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka to the United Nations and Chairman of the Coordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/44</td>
<td>Note verbale dated 9 May 1977 from the Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Document No.</td>
<td>Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/45</td>
<td>Note verbale dated 6 May 1977 from the Permanent Mission of Greece to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/46</td>
<td>Note verbale dated 2 May 1977 from the Permanent Mission of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/47</td>
<td>Note verbale dated 10 May 1977 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/48</td>
<td>Letter dated 11 May 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Argentina to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/49</td>
<td>Note verbale dated 11 May 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/50</td>
<td>Note verbale dated 10 April 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/51</td>
<td>Views of Member States on the agenda and all other relevant questions relating to the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament - Background paper prepared by the Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/52</td>
<td>Letter dated 6 May 1977 from the Foreign Secretary of Pakistan addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/53</td>
<td>Note verbale dated 16 May 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Malaysia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/54</td>
<td>Draft agenda submitted by the Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka on behalf of the non-aligned members of the Preparatory Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/55</td>
<td>Communication dated 18 May 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka to the United Nations and Chairman of the Coordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/55/Add.1</td>
<td>Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament: Non-Aligned working document containing the draft declaration, programme of action and machinery for implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/56</td>
<td>Some fundamental principles and norms for possible inclusion in the &quot;Declaration on Disarmament&quot; envisaged in the draft agenda of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, approved by the Preparatory Committee on 18 May 1977 - Mexico: working paper</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A brief synopsis of disarmament and arms limitation negotiations since 1945 - including their results - carried out within the framework of the United Nations, on a regional basis, or bilaterally, with indication, where appropriate, of the procedures followed to keep the United Nations informed - Working paper prepared by the Secretariat

A comparative study of the scope originally proposed or aimed at in draft multilateral disarmament treaties of a universal character concluded under United Nations auspices and the scope finally fixed in those treaties, including the contemplated measures for expanding that scope - Working paper prepared by the Secretariat

A comprehensive study of official proposals or declarations made and decisions taken by the General Assembly on the procedure of unilateral or negotiated moratoria as a provisional measure for the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, as well as their application by any State - Working paper prepared by the Secretariat
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document No.</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/70</td>
<td>A synthesis of the arguments adduced for and against each of the four proposals for the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones that have been included in the General Assembly's agenda (Africa, South Asia, the Middle East and the South Pacific) and for and against the proposal for the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean, including a subject and country index - Working paper prepared by the Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/71</td>
<td>A comprehensive study of the origin, development and present status of the various alternatives proposed for the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons - Working paper prepared by the Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/72</td>
<td>An analytical summary of the United Nations studies describing the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, bacteriological (biological) weapons and napalm and other incendiary weapons, as well as those dealing with the reduction of military budgets, with the economic and social consequences of the arms race and disarmament and with the relationship between disarmament and development - Working paper prepared by the Secretariat</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**VOLUME V**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document No.</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/73</td>
<td>A comparative study of global military expenditures and development assistance since 1945 as stated in available official and unofficial sources - Background paper prepared by the Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/74</td>
<td>Report on the human and material resources available to the United Nations Secretariat for its work on disarmament and the organization of that work - Working paper prepared by the Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/75</td>
<td>A list of disarmament and related proposals officially submitted to the United Nations - Background paper prepared by the Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/76</td>
<td>Views of delegations to the Preparatory Committee on the agenda and all other relevant questions relating to the special session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament - Background paper prepared by the Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/77</td>
<td>Declaration on disarmament - Romania: working paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/78</td>
<td>Programme of measures and action - Romania: working paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/79</td>
<td>Negotiating machinery for disarmament problems - Romania: working paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/80</td>
<td>Disarmament and development: proposal for a United Nations study - Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden: working paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/81</td>
<td>Basic provisions of the declaration on disarmament - Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, and USSR: working paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Document No.</td>
<td>Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/82</td>
<td>Basic provisions of the programme of action on disarmament - Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: working paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/83</td>
<td>Public information activities in connexion with the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament - Working paper prepared by the Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/84</td>
<td>Reply from the Government of Costa Rica to the letter from the Secretary-General of the United Nations concerning the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/85</td>
<td>Note verbale dated 19 October 1977 from the Permanent Mission of Bahamas to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/86</td>
<td>Letter dated 9 December 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/87</td>
<td>Working document containing a draft declaration on disarmament: Australia, Canada, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Turkey and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/88</td>
<td>Provisional agenda (for meeting held on 24 January 1978)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/89 and Add.1</td>
<td>Outline of a draft final document of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament - Mexico: working paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/90</td>
<td>Communiqué issued by the Office of the President of the French Republic, following the meeting of the Council of Ministers held on 25 January 1978, on the policy of France with regard to disarmament - France: working paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/91</td>
<td>Declaration on disarmament - Pakistan: working paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/92</td>
<td>Programme of action on disarmament - Pakistan: working paper</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**VOLUME VI**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document No.</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/93/Rev.1 and Corr.1</td>
<td>Tabulation of proposals contained in the working papers submitted to the Preparatory Committee concerning the final document(s) of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament - Background paper prepared by the Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/94</td>
<td>Dissemination of information on the question of the armaments race and disarmament - Elements to be included in the preamble, the declaration and programme of action - Venezuela: working paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/95</td>
<td>Elements for inclusion in the programme of action and in the documents relating to the machinery for disarmament negotiations - Sweden: working paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Document No.</td>
<td>Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/96</td>
<td>Draft programme of action - Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: working paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/97</td>
<td>Suggestions for a disarmament programme - Italy: working paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/98</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: working paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/99</td>
<td>Note verbale dated 13 January 1978 from the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/100</td>
<td>Tabulation of proposals contained in the working papers submitted to the Preparatory Committee concerning the final document(s) of the Special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament - Background paper prepared by the Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disarmament and verification - Austria: working paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/101</td>
<td>Programme of action - Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty - Australia, Austria, Mexico, New Zealand, Sweden and Venezuela: working paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/102</td>
<td>International machinery for disarmament - Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Federal Republic of, New Zealand, Norway, and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: working document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/103</td>
<td>Tabulation of proposals contained in the working papers submitted to the Preparatory Committee concerning the final document(s) of the Special session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament - Background paper prepared by the Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/104</td>
<td>Proposals of France for inclusion among the final draft document (declaration, programme of action, machinery for negotiations) of the Special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/105</td>
<td>Provisional agenda (for meeting held on 4 April 1978)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/106</td>
<td>Working paper on organization and procedures of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament submitted by the members of its Group of 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/107</td>
<td>Study on the establishment of an international disarmament organization - Netherlands: working paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/108</td>
<td>Disarmament and verification - Background paper prepared by the Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/109</td>
<td>Italy: working paper on international mechanisms for disarmament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/110</td>
<td>Draft introduction - Working paper by Mexico and Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/111</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Digitized by Dag Hammarskjöld Library
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document No.</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/112</td>
<td>Statement by Poland in connexion with the completion of the work of the Preparatory Committee for the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/113</td>
<td>Statement by Yugoslavia in connexion with the completion of the work of the Preparatory Committee for the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/114</td>
<td>Statement by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in connexion with the completion of the work of the Preparatory Committee for the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/AC.187/INF.2-7</td>
<td>Lists of communications concerning disarmament received from non-governmental organizations and research institutions (to be incorporated in A/INF/S-10/1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A comparative study of global military expenditures and development assistance since 1945 as stated in available official and unofficial sources

(Background paper prepared by the Secretariat)

**CONTENTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Development assistance</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Military expenditures (current price figures)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Military expenditures (constant price figures)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Development assistance as percentage of military expenditures</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I. INTRODUCTION

1. By resolution 31/189 B of 21 December 1976, the General Assembly decided to convene a special session devoted to disarmament, to be held in New York in May/June 1978. It further decided to establish a Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, composed of 54 Member States appointed by the President of the Assembly on the basis of equitable geographical distribution, with the mandate of examining all relevant questions relating to the special session, including its agenda, and to submit to the Assembly at its thirty-second session appropriate recommendations thereon.

2. The General Assembly also requested the Secretary-General to render the Preparatory Committee all necessary assistance, including the provision of essential background information, relevant documents and summary records.

3. At its 14th meeting on 20 May 1977, the Preparatory Committee requested the Secretariat to prepare certain working papers. Included among them was "A comparative study of global military expenditures and development assistance since 1945 as stated in available official and unofficial documents".

4. In response to this request of the Preparatory Committee the Secretariat has prepared this paper which is, however, limited in several respects. First, it represents a compilation of data from a few official and unofficial publications that provide such information on the basis of their own evaluating systems. Consequently, those sources which mainly draw on one or the other of these systems reproducing their data are not included in this presentation. Secondly, for practical reasons of indicating the world totals year by year for each category of spending under consideration -- military expenditures and development assistance -- only figures converted into US dollars have been presented. Expenditures expressed in local currencies are not included in the tables since they cannot be totalled and compared with other aggregated expenditure series. Due to these limitations and, in particular, to the fact that the conversion methods used by the authors of the series may not be generally acceptable, data presented in the following tables should be considered with the necessary caution. To facilitate the interpretation of the data a brief description is supplied of the assumptions and computational procedures employed in constructing each of the series.

5. The paper is also limited in another respect, that is, it does not contain any descriptive analyses of the data presented and of possible interrelationship between the two -- military expenditures and development assistance. Relevant aspects of the problems involved in this relationship are discussed at length in several reports prepared by the groups of experts under the auspices of the Secretary-General in response to the request of the General Assembly. One report is entitled "Economic and
Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures”, 1/ and the other "Disarmament and Development". 2/ More recently two additional reports have been prepared in pursuance of resolutions 3462 (XXX) and 31/87. The first one on "Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures" updates the previous report, while the other one deals with the question of "Reduction of Military Budgets". Both reports will be submitted by the Secretary-General to the thirty-second session of the General Assembly.

6. Data compiled in this paper are presented in four different tables as follows: Table 1: Development assistance; Table 2: Military expenditures (current price figures); Table 3: Military expenditures (constant price figures); and Table 4: Development assistance as percentage of military expenditures.

II. Development assistance

7. Table 1 presents data on development assistance to developing countries contained in the UN Statistical Yearbook. The figures are expressed in US dollars and in current prices. The series covers a period of 21 years, i.e., from 1954 to 1975. Data for the preceding years are not available largely due to the fact that a great majority of the developing countries had not obtained their independence at the time.

8. The figures presented in Table 1 comprise official development assistance and other official flows to developing countries, bilateral and multilateral, as well as private capital assistance.

It could be pointed out that: (1) Many would regard this as a very broad definition of 'development assistance". In this case the percentage figures in Table 4 would overstate the case; (2) The aggregation over all these categories is dictated by the fact that transfers from the centrally-planned economies are not broken down. On the other hand, all transfers from these countries could be regarded as official development assistance, i.e. no private capital flows; (3) A consideration offsetting point (1) above is that flows between developing countries are excluded.

9. When considering these data for the purpose of drawing general- or specific conclusions attention should be paid to the following note in the UN Statistical Yearbook:

"The tables present estimates of flows of financial resources to the developing countries from the developed market economies and from centrally planned economies either directly (bilaterally) or through multilateral institutions (multilaterally).

"For the purpose of these tables, the developing countries include all the countries and territories in Africa, except

2/ Ibid., Sales No. E.73.IX.1."
South Africa; in America, except Canada, Greenland, Puerto Rico, the United States and the United States Virgin Islands, in Asia, except China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, Japan, Mongolia and Turkey; and in Oceania, except Australia, New Zealand and United States possessions and territories (however, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands is included in developing countries). Developed market economies comprise seventeen members of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD): Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States; and also Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal and South Africa. The centrally planned economies comprise Bulgaria, China, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the USSR.

The multilateral institutions include the World Bank Group, regional banks, financial institutions of the European Community and a number of United Nations institutions, programmes and trust funds.

The data on flows from the developed market economies to the developing countries and multilateral institutions are based, in principle, on definitions adopted by the International Monetary Fund for balance of payments presentation. However, the presentation differs in some respects from conventional balance of payments statistics by excluding some transactions and showing certain flows in more detail.

Besides distinguishing between official and private flows and between bilateral and multilateral flows, some other classifications are used. Specifically, "Official development assistance" is defined as that part of official flow from developed market economies to developing countries and to multilateral institutions, which is expressly intended for the economic and social development of developing countries and which in its financial terms is concessional in character. A threshold of 25 per cent grant element applies to all commitments signed after 1 January 1973. A very small volume of loans with a grant element of under 25 per cent is included in the data for earlier years. "Grant element" is calculated as the face value of a loan less the discounted cost to the recipient of the flow of future service payments: the discount rate used is 10 per cent.
"Owing to "pipe-line effects" and some definitional differences, there is usually in any one year a small discrepancy between flows into the multilateral institutions and flows from them to the developing countries.

"Information about the transfer of resources from the centrally planned economies to the developing countries is available only as gross commitments.

"The information on flows is provided on a "net" basis, i.e. amortisation payments of loans and repatriation of capital are deducted from gross flows to arrive at net flow. Also deducted are contributions by developing countries to the multilateral institutions. On the other hand, factor income payments (interest payments, profits and the like) made by developing countries are not deducted. Reverse flows of capital originating with residents of developing countries are not taken into account.

"Commitments of official development assistance and their financial terms are presented only for the member countries of Development Assistance Committee, and they include commitments to certain less developed countries in Europe (Cyprus, Gibraltar, Greece, Malta, Spain, Turkey, Yugoslavia). The data refer to gross commitments.

"The main source of data is the Development Assistance Committee of OECD to which in 1975 seventeen member countries reported data on their flow of resources to developing countries and multilateral institutions. A major difference between data in the Statistical Yearbook and statistics published by the Development Assistance Committee results from the inclusion by the latter of the less developed countries in Europe as recipients.

"Information about commitments by the centrally planned economies has been compiled from various official and unofficial publications.

"The tables in this chapter do not include the transfer of resources between developing countries.

"Total flows from the multilateral institutions to the developing countries have been derived from the annual reports and other documents of the institutions.

"The tables in this chapter were prepared by the United Nations Centre for Development Planning, Projections and Policies.
"Additional information about definitions, methods, sources, published statistics and differences between data reported by the United Nations and the Development Assistance Committee can be found in the United Nations 1972 Supplement to the Statistical Yearbook and Monthly Bulletin of Statistics."

TABLE 1: Development Assistance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN Statistical Yearbook*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6,823</td>
<td>3,484</td>
<td>4,015</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4,049</td>
<td>4,419</td>
<td>8,009</td>
<td>7,444</td>
<td>7,440</td>
<td>7,837</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9,804</td>
<td>9,681</td>
<td>10,668</td>
<td>12,181</td>
<td>12,705</td>
<td>14,080</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16,125</td>
<td>17,384</td>
<td>22,434</td>
<td>25,354</td>
<td>36,759</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


III. Military expenditures (current price figures)

10. Table 2 presents two series of figures on military expenditures, both expressed in US dollar and in current prices. The first series is provided by an official institution, the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) but is based on its own evaluation of military expenditures of various countries and the system of conversion. The

second series is produced by an individual scholar sponsored by several private organizations and is also based on an independent evaluation and conversion system for the aggregation of military expenditures.

11. The ACDA series covers only the period from 1966-1975. Military expenditure figures for the preceding years, produced by the same institutions, are not strictly comparable due to changes and refinements in the estimating procedure employed.

12. The World Military and Social Expenditures (WMSE) series goes back as far as 1960 and covers the period up to 1975.

13. When drawing any conclusions on the basis of the figures contained in these series attention should be paid to the methods used for their calculation.

14. The ACDA publication gives the following explanations:

"NATO country military expenditures were obtained from NATO publications and are based on NATO definitions. In summary: (a) civilian-type expenditures of the defense ministry are excluded but military-type expenditures of other ministries are included; (b) grant military assistance is included in the expenditures of the donor country; and (c) purchases of military equipment for credit are included at the time the debt is incurred, not at the time repayment is made. For other non-Communist countries, data are mostly the expenditures of the Ministry of Defense.

"For the Soviet Union, estimates are made independently of the announced Soviet defense budget data by applying dollar prices to detailed estimates of Soviet forces, weapons programs and activities. (See Hearings before the Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee (JEC), Congress of the United States: Part I, "Allocations of Resources in the Soviet Union and China - 1975," June 18 and July 21, 1975, pp. 21-36; Part II, "Allocations of Resources in the Soviet Union and China - 1976," pp. 17-25, 76-85; and CIA, A Dollar Comparison of Soviet and U.S. Defense Activities, 1965-1975, February 1976.) The resulting estimates are intended to show what it would cost in the United States, in constant dollar prices, to develop, procure, man, and operate a military force similar to that of the Soviet Union. Such estimates could have a substantial range of error.

"The dollar estimates of GNP and military "expenditures" of Warsaw Pact countries other than the USSR are based on updates of figures from Thad P. Alton, et al., in their articles in the Joint Economic Committee of Congress
The military expenditures shown here refer only to officially announced state budget expenditures on national defense. These figures understate total military expenditures in view of defense outlays by nondefense agencies of the central government, local governments, and economic enterprises.

"The dollar estimates of military expenditures were derived by calculating pay and allowances at the current full U.S. average rate for officers and at 75 percent of the average U.S. rate for lower ranks. The part of the official East European budgets for defense that remains after subtraction of armed forces pay and allowances in national currencies was converted to dollars at overall rates based on comparisons of the various countries' GNP's expressed in dollars and in national currencies. These rates are not as specific as one might desire, and when taken into account with the incomplete coverage of the published explicit defense budgets, they result in dollar estimates that must be considered subject to limitations. As in the case of the Soviet Union, these estimates are intended to show what the military programs would cost at U.S. prices. However, a basic inconsistency exists between NATO and Warsaw Pact data in that the nonpersonnel component of military assistance is not covered in the Warsaw Pact estimates.

"For the People's Republic of China, very rough estimates are derived from fragmentary information. No budgetary data have been issued by China since 1960. The estimated level of the China series in dollars has been revised upward in this edition to make it more comparable to other main sources." 4/

15. The WMSE publication gives the following explanations:

"In making international comparisons of value data, the choice of conversion rates so radically affects results that a statement on this point is owed the reader. There is at present no wholly adequate basis for converting national currencies into a common denominator such as U.S. dollars. To compare GNP and public expenditures between countries, the conversion rates should, ideally, reflect the internal purchasing power of each currency for the particular mix of goods and services in its economy.

"Although statistical work on such parity rates is underway, under international sponsorship, the availability of purchasing power parities for a large selection of countries is some distance in the future.

"Like other compilations of international statistics, this report uses annual average exchange rates for conversion from national currencies to dollars, except for those communist countries for which parities have been estimated and customarily used for this purpose. In the case of the Soviet Union, the parity assigned to the ruble in the determination of GNP (by the U.S. Department of State) has been used for all conversions. That is, the ratios of individual expenditure accounts to GNP expressed in rubles have been applied to the dollar equivalent of GNP to determine Soviet military, education, health expenditures in dollars.

"The use of a single exchange rate for all sectors is a simplifying assumption made for all countries. The procedure may distort international comparisons more in the case of the Soviet Union than in other countries. A form of subsidization of the military sector, however, is common in most countries because of below-average pay scales for army conscripts.

"Official exchange rates are subject to abrupt changes and may at times reflect temporary under- or over-valuations of currencies. In an effort to reduce the effect of such distortions, the World Bank uses a weighted average exchange rate for a three-year period for its calculations of national GNP in dollar equivalents. The choice of a single rather than multiple year exchange rate in this report was dictated largely by a need for comparability with other data which are reported in current dollars on the basis of prevailing exchange rates."

... 

"International comparisons with earlier years are affected by internal price trends as well as by changes in parities. To eliminate the impact of these fluctuations in the historical series, both military expenditures and GNP have been adjusted to the price base and exchange rates of 1974. The GNP deflators developed by the World Bank have been used for the price correction of both GNP and military expenditures." 5/ 

TABLE 2: Military Expenditures

US $ mn., Current Price Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACDA*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMSE**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>107,000</td>
<td>113,000</td>
<td>125,000</td>
<td>132,000</td>
<td>132,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACDA*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>183,990</td>
<td>204,060</td>
<td>220,420</td>
<td>233,770</td>
<td>244,660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMSE**</td>
<td>138,000</td>
<td>155,000</td>
<td>173,000</td>
<td>187,000</td>
<td>196,000</td>
<td>201,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACDA*</td>
<td>257,710</td>
<td>272,330</td>
<td>293,650</td>
<td>334,410</td>
<td>372,280</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMSE**</td>
<td>211,000</td>
<td>227,000</td>
<td>252,000</td>
<td>289,000</td>
<td>324,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


IV. Military expenditures (constant price figures)

16. Table 3 presents data on military expenditures in US dollars but in constant prices. In addition to the two previous sources, ACDA and WMSE, it also includes information taken from a third source, SIPRI, an independent non-governmental research institute. ACDA and WMSE use the same base year. The differences in the absolute figures in these two series stems primarily from the exchange rates used and differing estimates of the expenditure of some countries in their local currency. The SIPRI series uses a different base year providing an additional source of non-comparability in the absolute figures. However, all three series can be compared in terms of trends.

17. The explanatory notes covering Table 2 (paragraphs 10 - 15) also apply to Table 3, where relevant. In addition, for the SIPRI series the following note should be taken into consideration:
"In order to provide time series estimates of total world military expenditure at constant prices, two operations must be performed. First, all national expenditure must be converted into a common currency: the most widely used unit for such a purpose is the US dollar, which SIPRI has also adopted. For this purpose it is necessary to use constant exchange rates, preferably those prevailing in a "normal" year. Second, it is necessary to adjust for the effect of changes in the level of prices.

"For most countries we have used the official exchange rate in 1970 or, if this fluctuated during the year, the weighted average rate. For the Warsaw Treaty Organization countries, special purchasing power parities were used because these yielded more reasonable expenditure relationships both within the WTO and between these countries and the rest of the world. For WTO countries other than the USSR, and for Albania, purchasing power parities calculated by Benoit and Lubell were used. For the USSR, SIPRI estimates of the rouble-dollar purchasing power parity have been calculated (see SIPRI Yearbook 1974, appendix 3B).

"The adjustment for changes in prices was made by applying the consumer price index in each country. In many countries this is the only price index available: as an index of the general movement of prices, it is a reasonable one for showing the trend in the resources absorbed by the military, in constant prices. For further detail on this point, the reader is referred to the SIPRI Yearbook 1972." 6/

**TABLE 3: Military Expenditures**

US $ bn., Constant Price Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACDA (1974 Prices)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMSE (1974 Prices)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIPRI* (1970 Prices)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>67.9</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>107.0</td>
<td>137.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

### TABLE 3: Military Expenditures (con't)

US $ bn., Constant Price Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACDA (1974 Prices)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WISE (1974 Prices)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIPRI* (1970 Prices)</td>
<td>140.9</td>
<td>126.7</td>
<td>127.4</td>
<td>126.5</td>
<td>128.8</td>
<td>126.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACDA (1974 Prices)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WISE (1974 Prices)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>185.0</td>
<td>194.0</td>
<td>211.0</td>
<td>219.0</td>
<td>215.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIPRI* (1970 Prices)</td>
<td>131.7</td>
<td>130.8</td>
<td>143.7</td>
<td>157.6</td>
<td>164.1</td>
<td>162.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACDA (1974 Prices)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>278.98</td>
<td>300.56</td>
<td>310.99</td>
<td>313.59</td>
<td>311.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WISE (1974 Prices)</td>
<td>219.0</td>
<td>237.0</td>
<td>260.0</td>
<td>275.0</td>
<td>276.0</td>
<td>271.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIPRI* (1970 Prices)</td>
<td>162.2</td>
<td>178.6</td>
<td>196.9</td>
<td>209.2</td>
<td>212.9</td>
<td>209.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACDA (1974 Prices)</td>
<td>312.42</td>
<td>317.17</td>
<td>323.13</td>
<td>331.41</td>
<td>339.76</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WISE (1974 Prices)</td>
<td>269.0</td>
<td>278.0</td>
<td>283.0</td>
<td>289.0</td>
<td>293.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIPRI* (1970 Prices)</td>
<td>208.2</td>
<td>211.7</td>
<td>212.3</td>
<td>213.2</td>
<td>213.8</td>
<td>220.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Armaments and Disarmament in the Nuclear Age, SIPRI, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Stockholm, 1976.*
V. Development assistance as percentage of military expenditures

18. Table 4 contains information on development assistance as percentage of military expenditures. For this purpose the alternative series of military expenditures by ACDA and WMSE, expressed in current price figures (Table 2), have been used. The accuracy of the figures presented in the table should be treated with the same caution as the series used for this calculation for the reasons stated above.

**TABLE 4: Development Assistance as Percentage of Military Expenditures**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military Expenditure Series</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACDA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMSE</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military Expenditure Series</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACDA</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMSE</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL ASSEMBLY

PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

REPORT ON THE HUMAN AND MATERIAL RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT FOR ITS WORK ON DISARMAMENT AND THE ORGANIZATION OF THAT WORK

Working paper prepared by the Secretariat

CONTENTS

I. Introduction .......................................................... 2
II. Centre for Disarmament ............................................. 2
III. Financial resources .................................................. 5
IV. Co-ordination ....................................................... 7
I. INTRODUCTION

1. By resolution 31/189 B of 21 December 1976, the General Assembly decided to convene a special session devoted to disarmament, to be held in New York in May/June 1978. It further decided to establish a Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, composed of 54 Member States appointed by the President of the Assembly on the basis of equitable geographical distribution, with the mandate of examining all relevant questions relating to the special session, including its agenda, and to submit to the Assembly at its thirty-second session appropriate recommendations thereon.

2. The General Assembly also requested the Secretary-General to render the Preparatory Committee all necessary assistance, including the provision of essential background information, relevant documents and summary records.

3. At its meeting in May 1977, the Preparatory Committee requested the Secretariat to prepare certain working papers. Included among them was "A Report on the Human and Material Resources Available to the United Nations Secretariat for its work on disarmament and the organization of that work".

4. In response to this request of the Preparatory Committee, the Secretariat has prepared this paper. It should be noted that the functions and activities of the United Nations Secretariat as a whole in the field of disarmament are described in the background paper entitled "Existing Structures and Machinery for Disarmament Negotiations" (A/AC.187/31) prepared by the Secretariat and submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The present paper sets out the tasks, organization and the human and material resources of the Centre for Disarmament.

II. CENTRE FOR DISARMAMENT

5. Within the framework of the Political and Security Council Affairs Department, the Centre for Disarmament carries out the tasks entrusted to the Secretariat in the field of disarmament, pursuant to decisions of United Nations organs or on a statutory basis. This comprises functions of committee and conference services, studies on disarmament matters, compilation and dissemination of information on disarmament-related activities inside and outside the United Nations, follow-up of disarmament resolutions and agreements, and liaison with permanent missions, specialized agencies, the International Atomic Energy Agency, as well as other units of the Secretariat and non-governmental organizations concerning all disarmament activities. The Centre also ensures co-ordination of disarmament-related activities within the Secretariat and with respect to the specialized agencies and organizations of the United Nations system.

6. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 1722 (XVI) of 20 December 1961, the Centre for Disarmament provides assistance and services to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. For this purpose, as well as for other disarmament-related meetings, the Centre details staff to Geneva, as required, for an average period of five months.
7. The Centre is headed by an Assistant Secretary-General and is composed of the following organizational units: (1) Office of the Assistant Secretary-General for Disarmament, (2) Committee and Conference Services Section, (3) Information and Research Section, (4) Treaties and Resolutions Section, and (5) Geneva Unit.

8. There are 18 professional and higher level staff members, nationals of the following countries: Argentina, Austria, Canada, China, Ecuador, Hungary, Iran, Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Netherlands, Nigeria, Romania, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Cameroon, United States and Yugoslavia. Additional information is contained in document A/C.5/32/L.2.

9. From time to time the Centre also relies on the services of outside consultants in order to carry out certain specialized tasks or projects. Currently, the Centre is employing the services of consultants for the preparation of background material for the forthcoming special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. In general, consultant services are employed in connexion with the preparation of expert reports called for by the General Assembly. This year, two such reports were prepared -- one on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and of military expenditures and the other on the reduction of military budgets.

Office of the Assistant Secretary-General for Disarmament

10. Supervises and co-ordinates the planning, implementation and follow-up of the tasks in the field of disarmament; maintains the administrative and substantive files on disarmament-related questions, as well as relevant documentation and literature.

11. The following is the manning table for this office:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Grade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Secretary-General</td>
<td>D-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director and Deputy to the Assistant Secretary-General</td>
<td>P-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Political Affairs Officer</td>
<td>G-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Service</td>
<td>G-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Service</td>
<td>G-4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Committee and Conference Services Section

12. Provides secretariat services for the First Committee, the Disarmament Commission, ad hoc disarmament committees, and other bodies and conferences concerned with disarmament questions, including the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: follows, analyzes and assesses the various aspects of disarmament, including the questions of general and complete disarmament, nuclear disarmament, elimination of biological and chemical weapons, as well as conventional disarmament and collateral measures.
13. The following is the manning table for this Section:

Director-in-charge
(See paragraph 11 above)

Senior Political Affairs Officer
Senior Political Affairs Officer
Political Affairs Officer
Political Affairs Officer
General Service
General Service

Information and Research Section

14. Collects relevant information concerning disarmament, including information from news media and the literature; prepares United Nations publications on disarmament and related subjects, including the United Nations Disarmament Yearbook (and the United Nations Disarmament Bulletin if approved by the General Assembly); prepares surveys of disarmament news and digests of the disarmament literature; assists in the preparation of specialized studies on disarmament and related matters; prepares analyses and assessments concerning military technology and weapon effects, military strategy and tactics, national military developments and military alliances and the characteristics and consequences of the arms race.

15. The following is the manning table for this Section:

Principal Political Affairs Officer
Senior Political Affairs Officer
Senior Political Affairs Officer
Political Affairs Officer
Associate Political Affairs Officer
General Service
General Service
General Service

Treaties and Resolutions Section

16. Carries out work relating to the implementation of agreements, treaties and conventions on disarmament and related subjects; prepares studies for and assists conferences convened to review the operation of such instruments; carries out work required for the implementation of resolutions dealing with disarmament, as necessary; prepares and publishes a survey of the status of existing disarmament agreements; carries out liaison activities, including correspondence, with non-governmental organizations and institutions working in the field of disarmament; follows, analyses and assesses questions of international and regional security relating to disarmament.

17. The following is the manning table for this Section:
Senior Political Affairs Officer
Political Affairs Officer
Political Affairs Officer
Political Affairs Officer
General Service

Geneva Unit

18. Assists in providing secretariat services to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the drafting of the Committee's report to the General Assembly; assists the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in the carrying out of his functions; provides and co-ordinates the servicing of, and participates in, other disarmament-related meetings, as required; maintains liaison with permanent missions in Geneva, Specialized Agencies, the IAEA and non-governmental organizations in the area, as well as with Geneva-based units of the Secretariat; maintains duplicate administrative and substantive files of the Centre, as well as a collection of relevant documentation and literature.

19. The following is the manning table for this unit:

Political Affairs Officer P-4
General Service G-5

20. Notwithstanding the division of functions that the above organizational set-up involves, personnel from all units are responsible for certain programme elements due to the scope and nature of the work they entail -- for example, services to be rendered to the First Committee in connexion with the discussion of disarmament items during the regular sessions of the General Assembly, preparations for the Forthcoming Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, and the production of United Nations publications on disarmament, including the Disarmament Yearbook and the UN Yearbook.

Reference facilities

21. The Centre provides, within the limits of its financial resources, a reference facility, including substantive files on disarmament affairs, so as to increase its effectiveness in the discharge of its growing responsibilities. These files contain documents of United Nations bodies, the Specialized Agencies and the IAEA, governments and non-governmental organizations; summaries of positions expressed in UN disarmament bodies systematically arranged by country and by subject; and information collected from the professional literature and the news media, classified and filed according to indexes of substantive items.

III. FINANCIAL RESOURCES

22. The following are the financial appropriations for the activities of the Centre for the biennium 1976-1977:

1/ As from January 1978 this post is proposed to be upgraded to D-1.

2/ The information provided here is a detailed breakdown of the revised budget appropriations for the biennium 1976-1977 as approved by the General Assembly in its resolution 31/207 on 22 December 1976, at its 107th plenary meeting.
The following are the financial appropriations for servicing the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament:

- Temporary Assistance, Meetings: $244,900
- Travel to Service Meetings (Per diem - Staff from Headquarters): $62,800
- Travel to Service Meetings (Travel - Staff from Headquarters): $19,400

Total Programme/Component: $327,100

The following are the financial appropriations for the Group of Consultants on the Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures:

- Consultants: $12,000
- Ad Hoc Expert Group: $66,600

Total Programme/Component: $78,600

The following are the financial appropriations for the two Expert Groups on the Reduction of Military Budgets:

- Consultants: $7,800
- Ad Hoc Expert Groups: $82,600
- Travel to service meetings: $11,300
- External Printing and Binding: $12,000

Total Programme/Component: $113,700

b/ Allotted to Department of Conference Services
26. With respect to the financial resources available to other units of the Secretariat, mainly the Office of Public Information and the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, it is not possible to estimate the specific allotments for disarmament-related activities available to those units, since the activities in question cannot be singled out from the total appropriations assigned to the programmes of these units.

IV. CO-ORDINATION

27. While the Centre for Disarmament is the principal secretariat unit carrying out the tasks entrusted to the United Nations secretariat in the field of disarmament, other units and mainly the Office of Public Information and the Department of Economic and Social Affairs are carrying out disarmament-related activities within their competence. These activities were described in the background paper entitled "Existing structures and machinery for disarmament negotiations" (A/AC.187/31). Disarmament-related activities are carried out also by the agencies and organizations of the United Nations system and their work in this field is described in the 1976 United Nations Disarmament Yearbook. The Centre ensures the co-ordination of disarmament-related activities within the Secretariat. It maintains relations with the organizations of the United Nations system with a view to achieving co-ordination of such activities within the system.
Corrigendum

Paragraph 13

Amend the manning table to include an additional Political Affairs Officer at the P-3 level.
A list of disarmament and related proposals officially submitted to the United Nations

(Background paper prepared by the Secretariat)

CONTENTS

| I. Introduction                      | 1 |
| II. Early initiatives on nuclear disarmament, regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments | 3 |
| III. General and complete disarmament and proposals containing multiple measures in the field of disarmament | 14 |
| IV. Partial measures for the cessation of the arms race and disarmament | 31 |

1. The cessation of nuclear weapon tests | 31 |
2. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons | 39 |
3. Nuclear-weapon-free zones | 48 |
4. Preventing an arms race on the sea-bed | 53 |
5. Preventing an arms race in the outer space | 58 |
6. Chemical and biological weapons | 60 |
7. Environmental warfare | 65 |
8. New weapons of mass destruction | 67 |
9. Measures to guard against surprise attack | 69 |
10. Military budgets and related matters | 72 |
11. Elimination of foreign military bases | 74 |
12. Arms transfers | 75 |
13. Non-aggression pact | 76 |

V. World Disarmament Conference | 77 |

VI. Special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament | 78 |
| Annex I. | Agreements and other international instruments related to arms regulation, disarmament and confidence-building measures | 79 |
| Annex II. | Index of proposal by countries | 82 |
I. INTRODUCTION

1. By resolution 31/189 B of 21 December 1976, the General Assembly decided to convene a special session devoted to disarmament, to be held in New York in May/June 1978. It further decided to establish a Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, composed of 54 Member States appointed by the President of the Assembly on the basis of equitable geographical distribution, with the mandate of examining all relevant questions relating to the special session, including its agenda, and to submit to the Assembly at its thirty-second session appropriate recommendations thereon.

2. The General Assembly also requested the Secretary-General to render the Preparatory Committee all necessary assistance, including the provision of essential background information, relevant documents and summary records.

3. At its fourteenth meeting on 20 May 1977, the Preparatory Committee requested the Secretariat to prepare certain working papers. Included among them was "A list of disarmament and related proposals officially submitted to the United Nations".

4. The paper prepared in response to the request of the Preparatory Committee concentrates on the substantive disarmament proposals that were submitted to the United Nations, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and its predecessor bodies, and other relevant conferences.

5. The paper itemizes the proposals in a chronology under appropriate headings and provides the details requested by the Committee on each proposal.

6. With a view to avoiding unnecessary repetition of the resolutions of the General Assembly (which are contained in document A/AC.187/29) they have not generally been included in the present paper, nor have working papers dealing with technical aspects of the various disarmament problems. On the other hand, draft resolutions have been included when they were considered to be of special significance in the substantive development of a certain disarmament effort or where they dealt with substantive issues or contained specific proposals, but were not adopted in the form in which they were first proposed. As a general rule, views expressed but not formulated as specific proposals have not been included.

7. The follow-up of certain proposals or their development, if any, over a period of time has been included, as reflected in official United Nations documents. Where a proposal led directly to the conclusion of an international agreement, this fact has been indicated, and all such agreements are also listed separately in Annex I. An index of proposals by countries is contained in Annex II.
2.

8. References have been set out in the briefest possible form, showing simply the letter-number symbols of the United Nations documents, or, occasionally, other sources where the original documents may be found. The United Nations documents thus referred to are contained in the official records of the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Disarmament Commission or certain predecessor bodies, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament for the year in which the proposal was put forward.

9. Within the criteria indicated above, which required some selection, an attempt has been made to provide as comprehensive and illustrative a review of the proposals as is practical. An addendum to the present list, containing the proposals made after 31 August 1977, will be prepared at a later stage.

10. Finally, the list of proposals does not purport to be a complete reflection of the history of the disarmament effort in the United Nations, as contained in the two issues of the document entitled "The United Nations and Disarmament", in the United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, Vol.1:1976, or in other historical compilations of disarmament proposals.
II. EARLY INITIATIVES ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT
REGULATION, LIMITATION AND BALANCED REDUCTION OF ALL
ARMED FORCES AND ALL ARMAMENTS

1. United States
Proposal submitted in the Atomic Energy Commission: Creation of
an International Atomic Development Authority, 14 June 1946 (AEC/1/1) 1/

An International Atomic Development Authority would be created and entrusted
with all phases of the development and use of atomic energy and with power to
control, inspect and license all atomic activities. Once a system of control
was effectively operating, further production of atomic weapons would cease
and existing stocks of atomic weapons would be destroyed. The Authority
would be in possession of full information as to the production of atomic
energy.

The original proposal was developed and elaborated upon by the delegation
of the United States in several memoranda, submitted to the AEC, in which the
Authority's creation, functions and powers were further explained:

The proposal was discussed in the Committee until 1948, when General
Assembly approved the general findings and recommendations of the AEC.

2. Soviet Union
Proposal submitted in the Atomic Energy Commission: Draft International
Convention to Prohibit the Production and Employment of Weapons Based on
the Use of Atomic Energy for the Purpose of Mass Destruction, 19 June 1946
(AEC/2/2) 2/

The draft convention provided for obligations: (a) not to use atomic
weapons in any circumstances whatsoever; (b) to prohibit the production
and storage of weapons based on the use of atomic energy; (c) to destroy
within three months of its entry into force all stocks of atomic weapons.
Penalties for violation were to be provided by domestic legislation and
the conversion should be followed by other measures to control observance of
it. The need and possibilities of utilizing atomic energy for peaceful
purposes were stressed.

The proposal was supplemented later with various related proposals on
the prohibition of atomic weapons and the control of atomic energy.

1/ The General Assembly by resolution 1(I) of 24 January 1946, established
an Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), dissolved on
11 January 1952 (Resolution 502 (VI).

2/ Ibid.
4.

The draft was discussed in the Commission until 1948 when the General Assembly approved the general findings and recommendations of the AEC.

3. Soviet Union


Information would be provided regarding armed forces in non-enemy territories, and in the former enemy States, as well as information on the armaments of forces on home territory.

United Kingdom introduced amendments suggesting that the information was to include also armed forces at home.

The question was reflected in resolution 42 (I), adopted by the General Assembly on 14 December 1946.

4. Soviet Union


The draft resolution provided for a general reduction of armaments, with the prohibition of the production and use of atomic energy for military purposes as the primary objective. It proposed the establishment within the framework of the Security Council, of two commissions, one to control the reduction of armaments and one to control the prohibition of the use of atomic energy for military purposes.


5. United States

Draft resolution submitted in the First Committee on Regulation and Reduction of Armaments, 2 December 1946 (A/C.1/82).

The draft resolution provided for a general regulation and reduction of armaments; the early establishment of international control of atomic energy to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes; practical and effective safeguards in connexion with the control of atomic energy and other limitation or regulation of armaments.


3/ The Commission for Conventional Armament (CCA) was established by the Security Council on 13 February 1947 (S/268/Rev.1/Corr.1) and dissolved by the Security Council on 13 February 1952 (Resolution 502 (VI)).
6. Canada
Draft resolution submitted in the First Committee on control of atomic energy, October 1948 (A/C.1/308)

The draft resolution suggested the approval of the first, second and third reports by the Atomic Energy Commission and the establishment of an effective system of international control of atomic energy.

The proposal as amended was embodied in the resolution 191 (III), adopted by the General Assembly on 4 November 1948.

The proposal was further elaborated in working papers submitted in the Disarmament Commission as follows: United States on 5 April 1952 (DC/C.2/1) on disclosure and verification, and on 24 April 1952 (DC/C.1/1) on principles for a disarmament programme; France, United Kingdom and United States on 28 May 1952 (DC/10) on numerical limitation of all armed forces.

The proposals as amended were reflected in resolution 502 (VI).

7. Soviet Union
Draft resolution submitted in the General Assembly: Reduction of Armaments and the Prohibition of Atomic Weapons, 17 November 1948 (A/723)

The draft resolution recommended that, as a first step in the reduction of armaments and armed forces, the permanent members of the Security Council reduce by one-third, during one year, all land, naval and air forces; that atomic weapons be prohibited as weapons of aggression but not of defence; and that an international control body be established within the framework of the Security Council for the supervision of and control over the implementation of the measures for the reduction of armaments and armed forces, as well as those for the prohibition of atomic weapons.

The proposal was discussed in the Commission for Conventional Armaments but was not accepted.

8. Belgium - France
Draft resolution submitted in the First Committee of the General Assembly: Receipt, checking and publication by a control organ of full information with regard to the armed forces and conventional armaments, 1948 (A/C.1/393)

The draft resolution provided that States would have to supply each other with exact information on their conventional armaments and armed forces; to conclude conventions regarding the reductions of military forces; and establish an organ of control.

The proposal was reflected in resolution 192 (III).

9. France, the United Kingdom and the United States
Tripartite proposal submitted to the Secretary-General on reduction of armaments, 7 November 1951 (A/1943)

The proposal set out a programme of principles: the size of all armed forces would be limited, military production would be restricted; mutual agreements on national military programmes would be arrived at. The first step would be disclosure and verification. The system of verification and disclosure would have to be on a continuing basis and reveal, in successive stages, all armed forces and all armaments, including atomic.

The proposal as amended was reflected in resolution 502 (VI).
10. Soviet Union
Draft resolution submitted in the First Committee of the General Assembly: Measures to Combat the Threat of a New World War and to strengthen peace and Friendship Among the Nations, 12 January 1952 (A/C.1/698)

The proposal provided for the prohibition of atomic weapons under strict international control; the reduction of one-third of the armaments and the armed forces of the permanent members of the Security Council; the submission of all States (after the adoption of two previous measures) of complete official data on all armaments, armed forces and atomic weapons and on military bases on foreign territories; establishment of an international control organ within the framework of the Security Council; and the convocation of a world conference to consider disarmament problems; and called upon the permanent members of the Security Council to conclude a peace pact.

The proposal was reflected in General Assembly resolution 564 (VI) and referred to the Disarmament Commission.

11. Soviet Union
Draft Plan of Work submitted in the Disarmament Commission, 19 March 1952 (DC/4/Rev.1) 4/

The plan placed emphasis on: (a) prohibition of atomic weapons - prohibition and control would be put into effect simultaneously; reduction by the permanent members of the Security Council of the armaments and armed forces by one-third within a year; and information on armaments and armed forces - including atomic weapons and military bases in foreign territories; (b) prohibition of the use of bacteriological weapons; (c) a draft convention on prohibition of atomic weapons and use of those existing only for civilian purposes; and (d) establishment of an international control organ within the framework of the Security Council.

The proposal was discussed in the Disarmament Commission but was not accepted.

12. France
Plan of Work Introduced in the Disarmament Commission, 26 March 1952 (DC/5)

The plan contained the following items: disclosure and verification of all armed forces and armaments, including atomic; regulation of all armaments and armed forces including the elimination of weapons of mass destruction; procedure and timetable for giving effect to the disarmament programme. The questions of disclosure and regulation were to be studied concurrently in the first stage of the Commission's work.

The plan was adopted by the Disarmament Commission and later (on 27 August 1952) amended by Chile, France and Turkey to specifically include bacteriological weapons.

4/ The Disarmament Commission (DC) was created on 11 January 1952 by General Assembly resolution 502 (VI).
13. United States

Proposal submitted in the Disarmament Commission: Essential Principles for a Disarmament Programme, 24 April 1952 (DC/1/1)

The proposal set out essential principles of a disarmament programme including the goal and how it would be achieved through international agreements which would provide for safeguards to ensure compliance.

The proposal was discussed in the Disarmament Commission.

14. France, the United Kingdom and United States

Tripartite working paper submitted in the Disarmament Commission: Proposals for Fixing Numerical Limitation of all Armed Forces, 26 May 1952 (DC/10)

The proposal suggested that there should be fixed numerical ceilings for China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. A ceiling between 1 million and 1.5 million is suggested for the Soviet Union, the United States and China, while a ceiling between 700,000 and 800,000 is suggested for the United Kingdom and France. The proposal called for agreed maximum ceilings for all other States having substantial armed forces and envisaged reduction in armed forces.

The proposal was supplemented with a new tripartite paper submitted on 12 August 1952 (DC/12).

The question was considered by the Disarmament Commission but no agreement was reached.

15. Soviet Union

Consideration of the Question of the Impermissibility of the Use of Bacteriological Weapons, 27 August 1952 (DC/13/Rev.1)

The proposal was to have the question of bacteriological weapons included in the Commission's Programme of Work and considered immediately.

The question was included in the Commission's Plan of Work.

16. United States

Working paper submitted in the Disarmament Commission: The Bacteriological Weapons Question, 4 September 1952 (DC/15)

The paper called attention to the inclusion of bacteriological weapons as weapons of mass destruction which should be included in a comprehensive disarmament programme, and stated that safeguards had to be devised to ensure their elimination, principally through a disclosure and verification system.

The question was discussed in the Disarmament Commission.
The proposal called for the establishment of a United Nations Disarmament and Atomic Development Authority and detailed its organization, responsibilities and financing and relationships to other United Nations organs and to individual States.

It was discussed in the Sub-Committee.

18. France and United Kingdom

Memorandum submitted in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, 11 June 1954 (DC/SC.1/10)

The memorandum contained a proposal for immediate acceptance of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons except for defence. The draft treaty should include: the total prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons of mass destruction of every type; major reductions in all armed forces and conventional armaments; establishment of a control organ. The treaty should be approved by a World Disarmament Conference. The treaty would detail phases through which the disarmament programme should be carried out: first phase - overall military manpower and military expenditure should be limited to 31 December 1953 levels; second phase - one-half of the agreed reductions of conventional armaments and armed forces should take effect and on completion of it the manufacture of all kinds of nuclear and other prohibited weapons should cease; third phase - the second half of the agreed reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces should take effect and on completion of it the total prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons and all other prohibited weapons should be carried out.

The memorandum was considered in the Disarmament Commission and its provisions reflected in resolution 808 (IX).
19. Soviet Union


The draft took into account the joint French-British proposal of 11 June 1954 but with amendments. The draft provided for a first stage in which States would carry out one-half of the agreed reductions in their armaments, armed forces and military appropriations within six to twelve months; a temporary international control commission under the Security Council was envisaged. In the second stage States would carry out the remaining half of the agreed reductions within six months (or a year). Simultaneously with second-half reductions there would come into force a total prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction with a cessation of their manufacture and their total elimination from national armaments; at the second stage would be established a permanent international organ of control.

The proposal was included in resolution 538 (IX), adopted by the General Assembly on 4 November 1954.

20. Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States

Draft resolution submitted in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, 8 March 1955 (DC/SC.1/15/Rev.1)

The draft resolution outlined the provisions which should be provided for in a disarmament treaty including: (a) total prohibition of use and manufacture of nuclear weapons and conversion of existing stocks to peaceful purposes; (b) major reductions in all armed forces and conventional armaments; (c) a control organ to guarantee compliance. The disarmament programme would be carried out as follows: first phase - over-all military man-power and expenditure should be limited to agreed levels; second phase - one-half of the agreed reductions of conventional armaments and armed forces should take effect and on completion of it, the manufacture of all kinds of nuclear weapons should cease; third phase - second half of the agreed reductions of conventional armaments and armed forces should take effect and on completion of it, the total prohibition and elimination of nuclear and all other prohibited weapons should be carried out.

The proposal was discussed in the Sub-Committee.
21. **France-United Kingdom**

Memorandum submitted to the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission: Reduction of Armed Forces, 29 March 1955 (DC/SC.1/20)

France and the United Kingdom stated that they were prepared to reduce their armed forces to a ceiling of 650,000 provided that those of the other three permanent members of the Security Council would be fixed at a figure of between 1 million and 1.5 million, other States would have considerably lower ceilings, and no State would be entitled to increase its armed forces except in special cases.

In another memorandum of 19 April 1955 (DC/SC.1/24) it was agreed that the reductions in armed forces and conventional armaments should be better co-ordinated with the abolition of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, amendments to the draft resolution of 8 March 1955 were proposed.

The proposals were discussed in the Sub-Committee.

22. **Soviet Union**

Proposal submitted in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission concerning the conclusion of an international convention on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, 10 May 1955 (DC/SC.1/26/Rev.2)

The proposal called for a declaration by the General Assembly in which was included a comprehensive and detailed two-stage disarmament programme. In the first stage the permanent members of the Security Council would reduce their armed forces and armaments by 50 per cent of the difference between the specific ceilings proposed by France and the United Kingdom. Simultaneously the draft envisaged as one of the first measures, discontinuances of atomic and hydrogen weapon tests, prohibition of the use of atomic weapons, and elimination of some of the military bases in the territories of other States. During the second stage, the second half of the reductions would be carried out. When 75 per cent of the total reduction had been completed a complete prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would come into force. These weapons would be destroyed simultaneously with the last 25 per cent of the reduction of armed forces. The States should reduce their armaments and armed forces to the levels strictly necessary for maintenance of internal security and the fulfillment of the obligations under the terms of the Charter of the United Nations.

Concerning control, it was anticipated, in the first stage, creation of an international control organ which would be allowed to install control posts on a basis of reciprocity, at major ports, at railway junctions, on main highways and at airfields in the territories of all States concerned. The functions of the control organ would be extended in the second stage and would include inspection on a permanent basis.

The proposal was considered by the Sub-Committee.
23. United States
Proposal submitted in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission:
Aerial Inspection and Exchange of Military Blueprints, 30 August 1955
(DC/SC.1/31)

Under the proposed plan, the United States and the Soviet Union were to exchange information about the strength, command structure and disposition of personnel, units and equipment of all major land, sea and air forces, as well as a complete list of military plants, facilities and installations, with their positions. Verification of information was to be accompanied by ground observers as well as unrestricted, but monitored, aerial reconnaissance.

The proposal was discussed in the Sub-Committee.

24. France-United Kingdom
Working paper submitted in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission:
Proposed synthesis, 19 March 1956 (DC/SC.1/38)

This was a revised edition of the plan of 11 June 1954. The new plan provided for: significant conventional reduction to be carried out in the first stage; limitation of nuclear tests at the beginning of the second stage and total prohibition at the beginning of the third; prohibition of manufacture of nuclear weapons - the cut-off at the beginning of the third stage - and the link between the achievement of political settlements and the achievement of disarmament.

The proposal was discussed in the Sub-Committee.

25. Soviet Union
Proposal introduced in the Disarmament Sub-Committee: Draft Agreement on the Reduction of Conventional Armaments and Armed Forces, 27 March 1956
(DC/SC.1/41)

The proposal contained three different partial disarmament approaches: of the limitation and reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces to the specific levels of 1 million to 1.5 million men for the United States, the Soviet Union and China, and 650,000 for France and the United Kingdom, within two years, with an international control organ to be established and to be in position to carry out inspections before reductions commenced; (b) a European zone of limitation and inspection of armaments; (c) discontinuance of tests of thermonuclear weapons, independently of disarmament; banning of atomic weapons on German soil; and a 15 per cent reduction of military budgets.

The proposals were considered by the Sub-Committee and the Disarmament Commission.
26. **Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States**  
   **Draft resolution submitted in the Disarmament Commission, 3 July 1956 (DC/87)**

By the draft resolution, the Sub-Committee would continue to search for agreement guided by certain principles including: proceeding by stages, with each dependent on satisfactory completion of the previous stage; effective international control; and, under safeguards, cessation of build-up of nuclear weapons and devotion of production of fissionable materials to peaceful uses.

The draft was discussed in the Disarmament Commission.

27. **Yugoslavia**  
   **Draft resolution submitted in the Disarmament Commission: Partial Disarmament Measures, 10 July 1956 (DC/32)**

The draft resolution urged the members of the Sub-Committee to reach agreement on general disarmament; to seek an early agreement on and implementation of such initial disarmament measures as are feasible, more particularly, a reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces as well as of military expenditure; the cessation of experimental explosions of nuclear weapons.

The draft was taken into account in considering the matter in the Sub-Committee.

28. **United States**  
   **Memorandum submitted to the First Committee of the General Assembly: 12 January 1957 (A/C.1/783)**

The memorandum contained proposals: to use fissionable materials only for non-weapon purposes; the first stage reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces, using as a basis of measurement the figures 2.5 million for the Soviet Union and the United States, and 750,000 for France and the United Kingdom; progressive installation of inspection systems which would provide against the possibility of real surprise attack.

The proposals were considered in the First Committee.
29. Soviet Union
Memorandum submitted in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission: Implementation of partial disarmament measures, 30 April 1957 (DC/SC.1/55)

The memorandum contained proposals which envisaged: acceptance of the proposal to reduce the armed forces of the United States, the Soviet Union and China to 2.5 million men and of France and the United Kingdom to 750,000 men each, as a first step towards further reductions in the armed forces respectively to 1 - 1.5 million men and 650,000 men; reduction of the military budgets during the first period by 15 per cent; creation of an appropriate international control organ under the Security Council; establishment of control posts on the territory of States; renunciation of the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons; discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests; liquidation of foreign bases; aerial inspection within certain areas in Europe and the Far East; ending of war propaganda.

The proposals were considered by the Sub-Committee.

30. Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States
Working paper submitted in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission: Proposals for partial measures of disarmament, 29 August 1957 (DC/SC.1/66)

The working paper contained proposals on limitation and reduction of armed forces and armaments; military expenditures; non-use of nuclear weapons except in self defence; control of fissionable material; nuclear weapons testing, control of objects entering outer space, and safeguards against the possibility of surprise attack. Part of the proposal, which was intended as a package proposal, would be the setting-up of an international control organization.

The proposals were discussed in the Sub-Committee.

31. Soviet Union
Proposal submitted to the First Committee of the General Assembly:
Memorandum on Partial Measures in the Field of Disarmament, 20 September 1957 (A/C.1/753)

The memorandum proposed, inter alia, reduction of armed forces, reduction of armaments and military budgets, prohibition of atomic weapons and discontinuance of nuclear weapon testing, prohibition of the transfer of these weapons to other States and the establishment of aerial photography zones in Europe and the Far East.

The proposal was elaborated in another memorandum of 18 September 1958 (A/3929), which contained a proposal for a ban on the use of outer space for military purposes and for international co-operation in the study of outer space.

The proposals were discussed in the Sub-Committee.
III. GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT AND PROPOSALS CONTAINING
MULTIPLE MEASURES IN THE FIELD OF DISARMAMENT

32. Soviet Union
Proposal submitted to the General Assembly: Declaration on
General and Complete Disarmament, 19 September 1959 (A/4219)

The declaration contained the text of a three-stage programme which
provided for: first stage - reduction of armed forces and armaments to
agreed levels; second stage - completion of the disbandment of the armed
forces and elimination of the foreign military bases; third stage -
destruction of all types of nuclear weapons and missiles, as well as air
force equipment; prohibition on the production, possession and storage
of means of chemical and bacteriological warfare and their destruction.
An international control organ would be established to verify the
implementation of the disarmament measures. At the end of the disarma­
ment process, States would retain only strictly limited and agreed con­
tingents of police (militia) equipped with light firearms.

The USSR also submitted a plan for partial measures, proposing the
establishment of a control and inspection zone in Europe; establishment
of an atom-free zone in Central Europe; abolition of foreign military
bases; and conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the Member States
of NATO and of the Warsaw Treaty.

By resolution 1378 (XIV) the General Assembly considering that the question
of general and complete disarmament is the most important one facing the
world today, and calling upon Governments to make every effort to achieve
a constructive solution of this problem, transmitted to the Ten-Nation
Disarmament Committee for thorough consideration, the declaration and
other proposals made.

33. Canada, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States
Paper submitted in the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament: A Plan
for General and Complete Disarmament in a Free and Peaceful World,
16 March 1960 (TNCD/3)

The three-stage plan, in the first stage, provided for the establishment
of an international disarmament organization to carry out studies and
furnish data designed to facilitat: enforcement, as well as for initial
reductions. The second-stage measures included a ban on placing weapons
of mass destruction in outer space; an agreement to stop production of
fissionable material for use in weapons; measures to prevent surprise
attacks; and further reductions in armed forces. In the third stage,
final reductions were to take place, and an international law enforce­
ment capability to preserve world peace was to be established. The final
goal was general and complete disarmament with inspection and control
carried out by the international disarmament organization.

The proposal was considered in the TNDC.
15.

34. Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union:
Proposal submitted in the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament:
Basic Principles of General and Complete Disarmament, 8 April 1960
(TNCD/4)

The proposal outlined the principles on which the implementation of
general and complete disarmament should be based, including disbandment
of all armed forces, liquidation of all armaments and all foreign mili­
tary bases, prohibition of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction,
and cessation of their production; proceeding by stages with a fixed
time-table; establishment of an international control organ and forces
remaining at the end of the process. The principles would be implemented
through an international instrument.

The proposal was discussed in the TNDC.

35. Canada, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States:
Proposal submitted in the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament:
Principles and Conditions for General and Complete Disarmament Under
Effective International Control, 26 April 1960 (TNCD/5)

The sponsors stated that any general and complete disarmament agreement
would have to fulfil certain conditions, namely, (a) be carried out by
stages, but without a fixed timetable, (b) to balance nuclear and con­
ventional measures so that equal security for all would be maintained,
(c) be controlled by an international disarmament organization, and
(d) be negotiated progressively according to the possibility of early
implementation and effective control of measures.

The proposal was considered in the TNDC.

36. Soviet Union:
Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament,
2 June 1960 (TNCD/6/Rev.1: A/4374/Rev.1)

The basic provisions of the draft treaty were: in the first stage
(18 months) all means of delivery of nuclear weapons would be destroyed
and their manufacture prohibited, all foreign military bases would
eliminated and all troops would be withdrawn from foreign territories,
all rockets launched for peaceful purposes would be subject to inspection,
and dissemination of nuclear weapons would be prohibited. In the second
stage, there would be complete prohibition of nuclear, chemical, biological
and other weapons of mass destruction, and reduction of armed forces to
fixed levels. The third stage would complete the process of general and
complete disarmament. An international control organization would verify
the implementation of the provisions of the treaty by stages and without
hindrance. Measures for preserving peace and security would be carried
out under the United Nations Charter with the Security Council having
contingents of militia at its disposal.

The draft was supplemented with several new provisions on 23 September
1960 (A/4505).

The proposals were discussed in the TNDC.
37. United States:

Paper submitted in the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament:
Programme for General and Complete Disarmament Under Effective International Control, 27 June 1960 (TNCD/7)

The paper outlined the goal and the controlling principles by which general and complete disarmament could be achieved and briefly described a three-stage programme. The first stage would include prohibition of placing in orbit vehicles carrying weapons of mass destruction; taking measures to guard against surprise attack; initial reductions in armed forces and armaments; and cessation of production of fissionable material. The second stage would include further reduction of armed forces; reduction of all weapons including atomic; and creation of an international peace force within the United Nations. The third stage would complete force reductions to levels required for maintaining internal order and for the international peace force. An international disarmament organization would verify that each stage was initiated simultaneously and upon completion of the necessary preparatory studies.

The proposal was further elaborated on by a declaration on 25 September 1961 (A/4891).

The proposals were discussed in the TNDC.

38. United States and Soviet Union:


As a result of an exchange of views on questions relating to disarmament and the resumption of negotiations, the Soviet Union and the United States agreed on and recommended 8 principles as a basis for future disarmament negotiation, as follows: (a) the final goal would be general and complete disarmament; (b) the programme would ensure that States would have at their disposal only such non-nuclear armaments and forces as necessary to maintain internal order and a United Nations peace force; (c) there would be provision for the disbanding of armed forces, the elimination of the military institutions, the discontinuance of military expenditures, etc. (d) the disarmament programme should be implemented by stages; (e) all measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced, so that no State or group of States could at any time gain military advantage; (f) international control; (g) measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace should be agreed; and (h) all States should seek to achieve and implement the widest possible agreement at the earliest possible date.

In exchanged letters on the question of control, the United States maintained that verification must assure that agreed levels of forces were not exceeded, while the USSR maintained that it was strongly advocating effective control over disarmament, but was at the same time opposed to the establishment of control over armaments.

By resolution 1722 (XVI) the General Assembly recommended negotiations based on the principles that had been set out by the Soviet Union and the United States, and agreed on the composition of a negotiating body, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC).
39. **Soviet Union:**

Memorandum submitted in the General Assembly: Measures to Ease International Tension, Strengthen Confidence Among States and Contribute to General and Complete Disarmament, 26 September 1961 (A/4892)

The memorandum contained proposals on freezing military budgets, prohibition of nuclear weapons; prohibition of war propaganda; non-aggression pact between NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries, withdrawal of troops from foreign territory, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, nuclear-weapon-free zones, and decrease of danger of surprise attack.

The proposed measures were discussed in the ENDC.

40. **Non-Aligned States:**


The Declaration stated, *inter alia*, that disarmament was an imperative need and the most urgent task of mankind; a radical solution of this problem could be achieved only by means of a general, complete and strictly internationally controlled disarmament; measures for general and complete disarmament were suggested; the States would undertake to use the outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes; conclusion of an agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests was considered essential; the non-aligned nations should be represented at all future conferences on disarmament; all discussions on disarmament should be held under the auspices of the United Nations.

The proposals were subsequently considered in the context of the disarmament debate in the First Committee.

41. **Ceylon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Indonesia, Liberia, Libya, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, Togo and Tunisia:**

Draft resolution submitted in the General Assembly: Non-use of Nuclear and Thermonuclear Weapons, October 1961 (A/4942/Add.1-3)

The draft resolution declared that the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons is contrary to the spirit, letter and aims of the United Nations and, as such, a direct violation of the Charter of the United Nations, and requested the Secretary-General to conduct an enquiry into the possibility of convening a conference to sign a convention on the prohibition of the use of these weapons.

The proposal was adopted as resolution 1653 (XVI), and was reflected in resolutions 1801 (XVII) and 1909 (XVIII). The question was referred to the ENDC.

42. **Soviet Union:**


The draft treaty set forth measures which would lead within a short time to elimination of the military machinery of the States. The disarmament process would take place in three stages within a fixed, short period of time (five years). The reduction of armed forces and armament would proceed to agreed levels parallel to the reduction in the production of conventional armaments. The total elimination of all foreign military bases would take place in the first stage. The complete elimination of vehicles for delivering nuclear weapons and the cessation of the production of such vehicles as well as the obligation not to transfer control of nuclear weapons or information on their production to non-nuclear States was also envisaged in the first stage.
The total elimination of nuclear weapons and fissionable material for weapons purposes and the discontinuance of their production would take place during the second stage. All types of chemical, biological and radiological weapons would be eliminated from the arsenals and destroyed.

At the third stage, all armed forces would be fully disbanded and the elimination of the military machinery of States would be completed.

The draft provided for strict international control over what was being reduced, destroyed or converted to peaceful uses, as well as over the cessation of arms production.

It further provided that during and following the disarmament process, contingents without nuclear weapons would be made available to the Security Council, under article 43 of the Charter.

An international disarmament organization within the framework of the United Nations Charter would establish procedures for the settlement of international disputes, and the role of the Security Council as the organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security would be stressed.

The draft treaty was later amended and revised as follows: 16 July 1962 (ENDC/2/Add.1), 22 September 1962 (A/C.1/367 or ENDC/2/Rev.1) and 4 February 1964 (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1).

The General Assembly by Resolution 1767 (XVII) noted the draft treaty. The draft was extensively discussed in the ENDC and in the General Assembly.

43. United States:

The plan outlined a disarmament process which would take place in three stages. Beginning with a freeze, disarmament was to be gradual as confidence developed; the military establishment would be eliminated.

The first two stages were to be of three years each, and the third would be completed within an agreed period of time, as promptly as possible. The armed forces and all major armaments, nuclear as well as conventional, would be gradually reduced.

The draft provided in the first stage for the nuclear Powers to halt production of fissionable materials for weapons; not to transfer control of nuclear weapons or information on their production to non-nuclear States as well as to transfer, for peaceful uses, agreed quantities of such material. The number of nuclear delivery vehicles and nuclear weapons would be reduced by an agreed percentage during the second stage and their production would halt and nuclear weapons reduced in the light of the steps taken in stages I and II. The plan envisaged a system of inspection and control to verify the disarmament process and, in addition, to verify remaining quantities of armaments and forces. It also proposed measures to keep and reinforce peace during and after the disarmament process.
A United Nations peace observation corps and peace force would be established. The question of whether the peace force should be equipped with nuclear weapons was to be left open for future decision. The international disarmament organization would be placed within the framework of the United Nations and its administrator would consult with the Secretary-General, providing that the decisions would be taken by the organization's control council. Parties would refrain from use of force of any type contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, and would settle disputes in accordance with Charter procedures.

The draft treaty was later amended as follows: 6 August 1962 (ENDC/30/Add.1); 8 August 1962 (ENDC/30/Add.2); 10 December 1962 (ENDC/69); 14 August 1963 (ENDC/30/Add.3 and ENDC/109).

The General Assembly by Resolution 1767 (XVII) noted the draft treaty. The draft was extensively discussed in the ENDC and in the General Assembly.

44. Soviet Union:
Memorandum submitted in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee: Measures for Slowing Down the Armaments Race and Relaxing International Tension, 28 January 1964 (ENDC/123)

The memorandum contained proposals on withdrawal of troops from foreign territories, reductions of armed forces, reduction of military budgets, non-aggression pact between NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries, nuclear-weapon-free zones, nuclear non-proliferation, measures to prevent surprise attack, elimination of bomber aircraft, and prohibition of underground nuclear tests.

The proposals were considered by the ENDC.

45. United States:

The proposal outlined the requirements for inspection of nuclear power under a cut-off of fissionable material production for use in weapons. IAEA safeguards were envisaged.

The proposal was discussed in the ENDC.

46. Non-Aligned States:
Proposals on disarmament submitted at the General Assembly: Programme for Peace and International Co-operation (Chapter VII) adopted at the Second Non-Aligned Summit Conference, Cairo, 5-10 October 1964 (A/5763 and A/AC.187/30 and Corr.1)

The programme suggested various measures of disarmament including: general and complete disarmament; peaceful use of atomic energy; prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests; establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones; prevention of dissemination of nuclear weapons; abolition of all nuclear weapons; convening of a world disarmament conference.

The proposals were considered by the General Assembly and reflected in resolution 2030 (XX), adopted by the General Assembly on 29 November 1965.
47. **Soviet Union:**

*Memorandum by the USSR Government on Measures for the Further Reduction of International Tension and Limitation of the Arms Race, 7 December 1964 (A/5827)*

The memorandum contained proposals on reduction of military budgets, foreign troops in alien territories, foreign military bases, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, prohibition of use of nuclear weapons, nuclear-weapon-free zones, destruction of bombers, prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests, non-aggression pact between NATO and Warsaw Treaty States, prevention of surprise attack, and reduction of total forces.

The proposals were discussed in the ENDC.

48. **United States:**

*Draft resolution submitted in the Disarmament Commission, 10 June 1965 (DC/220/Rev.1)*

By the draft resolution the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee would, inter alia, resume negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, undertake the drafting of an international agreement on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, conclude an agreement to halt all production of fissionable material for weapons and transfer agreed quantities of such material to non-weapons use, and explore a freeze on strategic nuclear vehicles with a view to their early reduction.

The question was considered in the ENDC.
49. United States:

Working paper submitted to the Eighteen-National Disarmament Committee: Transfer of Plutonium Obtained by the Destruction of Nuclear Weapons, 8 March 1956 (ENDC/1/2)

The paper suggested that the United States and the Soviet Union would each agree to transfer highly enriched uranium and plutonium obtained from nuclear weapons destroyed for that purpose. The materials obtained through the destruction process would be transferred under IAEA safeguards and the weapons themselves would be disassembled under appropriate observation arrangements.

The paper was discussed in the ENDC.

50. Soviet Union:


By the proposal, which included a draft convention consisting of a preamble and five articles, the Parties would solemnly undertake to refrain from using nuclear weapons, from threatening to use them and from inciting other States to use them. Agreement would also be sought on destruction of stockpiles in conformity with a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

The General Assembly by resolution 2289 (XXII) of 8 December 1967, reaffirmed its conviction for the need to sign such a convention and urged all States to examine the proposed draft.

51. Canada, India, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Norway, Poland, Sweden and United Arab Republic


The draft requested the Secretary-General to prepare a concise report on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons.

The draft as amended was adopted by the General Assembly as resolution 2162 A. In accordance with this resolution a group of consultant experts prepared a report entitled "Effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons".

52. Afghanistan, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland, Hungary, Iceland, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Mongolia, Nigeria, Norway, Poland, Sweden, the United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia:


The draft resolution reaffirmed that General and Complete Disarmament should continue to be recognized as the ultimate goal and called on the ENDC to resume consideration of this question.

The draft was adopted by the General Assembly as resolution 2342 B (XXII).
Soviet Union:
Memorandum by the Government on Some Urgent Measures for Stopping the Arms Race and for Disarmament, 16 July 1968 (ENDC/227)

The memorandum contained proposals on prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, stopping manufacture and destroying stockpiles of nuclear weapons, limitation and reduction of means of delivery of strategic weapons, limitations on nuclear-weapon-carrying bomber flights and navigation zones for rocket-carrying submarines, ban on underground nuclear-weapon tests, prohibition of use of chemical and bacteriological weapons, elimination of foreign military bases, measures for regional disarmament, and peaceful uses of the sea-bed and ocean floor.

The General Assembly by Resolution 2454 B (XXIII) noted the memorandum and other proposals for collateral measures submitted at the ENDC. The proposed measures were discussed in the ENDC.

Romania:

The proposal suggested that such a declaration could enable a disarmament programme to be harmonized with the second development decade, thus promoting progress in disarmament and ensuring peace.

The suggestion was taken up by the Secretary-General in his annual report on the work of the Organization for 1968-1969. In his proposal the Secretary-General expressed the hope that a specific programme and timetable would be established.

This proposal was endorsed by resolution 2499 (XXIV), adopted by the General Assembly on 31 October 1969.

Ireland and Japan
Draft resolution submitted in the First Committee: Disarmament Decade and the Elaboration of a Comprehensive Programme for Cessation of the Arms Race, 8 December 1969 (A/7902)

The draft resolution proposed that the decade of the 1970s be declared as a Disarmament Decade. The Governments would intensify their concerted efforts for effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race, to nuclear disarmament and for a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control; the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament would work at a comprehensive programme dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament; a substantial part of the resources freed by measures in the field of disarmament would be channelled to promote the economic development of developing countries; the Secretary-General and Governments would publicize the Disarmament Decade by all appropriate means.

The proposal as amended was embodied in resolution 2602 E (XXIV), adopted by the General Assembly on 16 December 1969, and has subsequently been the subject of resolutions 3261 A (XXIX), 3470 (XXX) and 31/68.
56. Malta:
Draft resolution submitted in the General Assembly:
Danger of radiological warfare either through maximizing radioactive effects of nuclear explosions or independent use of radioactive agents, 1 December 1969
(A/C.1/L.493/Rev.1)

By the draft, the Assembly would invite the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to consider control methods against the subject means of warfare.

The proposal was adopted as resolution 2602 C (XXIV), and was considered by the CCD.

57. Malta:
Draft resolution submitted in the General Assembly:
Consideration of the rapid development of laser technology and its increasing importance in civilian and military fields, 1 December 1969 (A/C.1/L.493/Rev.1)

By the draft, the Assembly would recommend that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament consider the possible military applications of laser technology.

The proposal was adopted as resolution 2602 D (XXIV), and was considered by the CCD.

58. Netherlands:
Working paper containing some Introductory Remarks or Steps Toward a Comprehensive Disarmament Programme, 24 February 1970 (CCD/276)

In the working paper, an approach towards general and complete disarmament was suggested; by that approach, efforts would be undertaken foremost in the field of collateral measures. It was held that negotiations on real disarmament measures could only start fruitfully when the preparatory phase of partial measures and confidence-building had been successful. The paper also mentioned an alternative approach that would be to start with the examination of the characteristics of the final stage, and to try to trace a route to that stage.

By resolution 2661 C (XXV), the General Assembly expressed its appreciation for the working paper. The proposals were considered by the CCD.

59. Italy:

The working paper contained the views of a number of delegations which had been consulted. Both the Agreed Principles (USSR-USA) and resolution 2602 E (XXIV) had recognized that negotiations should continue with a view to reaching agreements on partial or collateral measures, facilitating and forming part of a programme of general and complete disarmament. A number of considerations and measures were envisaged for increasing international confidence and implementing disarmament, perhaps through a series of agreements.

By resolution 2661 C (XXV), the General Assembly expressed its appreciation for the working paper. The proposals were considered by the CCD.
60. Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia:
Proposal submitted in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament:
Draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, 27 August 1970 (C/D/313)

The joint draft programme contained principles and proposals regarding
elements and phases of a comprehensive programme, as well as procedures
for its implementation in order to achieve the goal of general and
complete disarmament under effective international control. The programme
enumerated 12 principles which should guide disarmament efforts, including
among them those calling for priority to disarmament measures dealing with
nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, preservation of balance in
carrying out various measures of disarmament and for verification as an
indispensable part of such measures. With regard to elements and phases
of the programme it suggested, as the first phase, the prevention and
limitation of armaments to be followed by a reduction of all armaments, armed
forces and military expenditures, and in the final stage by the elimination
of armaments. The programme also stressed close interrelationship among
disarmament, international security, peaceful settlement of disputes and
a climate of confidence.

By resolution 2661 C (XXV) the General Assembly expressed its
appreciation of the draft programme. The programme was discussed in
the CCD.

61. Non-Aligned States:
Proposals on disarmament:
Resolution on Disarmament, adopted at the Third Non-Aligned Summit
Conference, Lusaka, 8-10 October 1970 (A/36/L.141 and A/AC.187/90 and
Corr.1)

The resolution stated that general and complete disarmament under effective
international control was the most imperative and urgent need of the inter-
national community; welcomed the designation of the 1970s as the "Disarma-
ment Decade". It was suggested that a comprehensive programme of dis-
armament would be drawn up within the following general order of priorities:
measures in the field of nuclear disarmament; other measures on disarmament;
non-arms or confidence-building measures. Convening of a World Dis-
armament Conference was envisaged as well as an international agreement
not to resort to force and not to intervene in any manner in the internal
affairs of other States.

The proposals were subsequently considered in the context of a
disarmament debate in the First Committee.

62. Ireland, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Sweden and Yugoslavia:
Draft resolution on a comprehensive programme of disarmament,
18 November 1970 (A/8191)

The draft resolution included, as an annex, a comprehensive programme of
disarmament similar in substance to the tripartite proposal.

In the programme reference was made to a number of resolutions and
procedural proposals advocating a comprehensive programme of disarmament
to ensure proper co-ordination and ordering of priorities in working
for disarmament.
The programme outlined not only objectives and principles, but also components and stages of such a programme and the procedure by which progress would be urged and measured. The highest priority would be given to disarmament measures dealing with nuclear and chemical weapons. The components and stages included disarmament treaties in force or in preparation and other disarmament measures. The close relationship between disarmament and international security was emphasized.

Procedure for implementation of the programme was suggested.

By resolution 2661 C (XXV) the General Assembly expressed its appreciation of the comprehensive programme, and recommended to the CCD that it take into account in its further work the programme as well as other disarmament suggestions presented or to be presented in the future.

63. Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Sweden, the United Arab Republic, and Yugoslavia: Draft resolution submitted in the General Assembly: Proposal concerning the bilateral negotiations (SALT) of the nuclear weapon Powers and urging a halt to the nuclear arms race and the cessation of testing and deployment of offensive and defensive nuclear-weapon systems
13 November 1970 (A/C.1/L.532)

By the draft resolution the General Assembly would urge the Governments of the nuclear-weapon Powers to immediately halt the nuclear arms race, with particular reference to offensive and defensive systems through bilateral (SALT) negotiations.

The proposal was adopted as resolution 2661 A (XXV).

The question has subsequently been the subject of resolutions 2932 B (XXVII), 3184 A (XXVIII), 3261 (XXIX), 3484 C (XXX) and 31/189 A.

64. Romania
Item submitted for inclusion in the agenda of the General Assembly: Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on international peace and security, 13 July 1970, (A/794)

By the proposal, which noted that disarmament would ensure the economic and social development of developing countries, the Secretary-General, with consultant experts, would prepare a report on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and of military expenditures.

The proposal was adopted as resolution 2667 (XXV). Also, the Assembly adopted resolution 2685 (XXV) on the basis of a proposal before the Second Committee which would establish a link between the Development Decade and the Disarmament Decade.

The question has subsequently been the subject of resolutions 2831 (X), 3075 (XXVII), 3176 (XXVIII) and 3462 (XXX).
65. Central African Republic, Colombia, Cyprus, the Philippines:
Draft resolution submitted in the Second Committee on the Economic
and Social Consequences of Disarmament, 23 November 1970 (A/C.2/1114/Rev.1)

The draft resolution requested the Secretary-General, in consultation with
such advisers as he deemed necessary (a) to formulate suggestions for the
guidance of Member States and the specialized agencies and other organiza-
tions of the United Nations system, with a view to establishing the desired
link between disarmament and development; and (b) to propose measures for
the mobilization of world public opinion in support of this goal.

The proposal was embodied in resolution 2685 (XXV), adopted by the
General Assembly.

The advisers appointed by the Secretary-General were known as the Group
of Experts on the Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament. Their
report entitled "Disarmament and Development" was submitted to the Secretary-

66. Burundi, Ceylon, India, Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Somalia, Swaziland, Uganda,
United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Yugoslavia and Zambia:
Draft resolution submitted in the First Committee: Declaration of the
Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, 10 December 1971 (A/C.1/L.590/Rev.1,2
and A/8492)

The draft resolution suggested that the General Assembly would declare
that the Indian Ocean, within limits to be determined, together with the
air space above and the ocean floor subjacent thereto, was designated
for all time as a zone of peace, and called upon the littoral and hinter-
land States of the Indian Ocean, the permanent members of the Security
Council and other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean, to enter
into consultations with a view to the implementation of the declaration.

The proposal was embodied in resolution 2832 (XXVI), and adopted by the
General Assembly. By resolution 2992 (XXVII), a 15-member Ad Hoc Com-
mittee on the Indian Ocean was established to study the implications of
the declaration and to report to the General Assembly. The matter was
further subject to resolutions 3080 (XXVIII), 3259 A (XXIX), 3486 (XXX)
and 31/88.

67. Afghanistan, Barbados, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Cuba, Cyprus,
Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan,
Liberia, Mauritius, Mongolia, Nigeria, Poland, Sierra Leone, Somalia,
Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, USSR and Yemen:
Draft resolution submitted to the General Assembly on: Non-use of force
in international relations and permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear
weapons, 26 September 1972 (A/8793 and A/L.676/Rev.1 and Add.1-2)

The draft resolution proposed that the General Assembly would declare the
renunciation of the use or threat of force in all its forms and manifesta-
tions in international relations and the permanent prohibition of the
use of nuclear weapons. It recommends that the Security Council should
take appropriate measures for the full implementation of this declaration.

The proposal was embodied in resolution 2936 (XXVII) adopted by the
General Assembly on 29 November 1972.

The declaration noted the concern of the Conference that the continuing flow of conventional arms to non-nuclear States was a threat to the security of the non-aligned countries; declared itself in favour of general and complete disarmament, and especially a ban on the use of nuclear weapons and the manufacture of such weapons and warheads and the total destruction of existing stocks, as well as the total cessation of all nuclear tests, and the banning of all existing chemical and bacteriological weapons. The convening of a World Disarmament Conference was demanded. The Conference emphasized the benefits to the well-being of all peoples and to the social and economic development of developing countries which could ensue from the peaceful use of nuclear technology and the releasing of resources resulting from disarmament.

The proposals were considered in conjunction with other disarmament measures in the First Committee.

Argentina, Brazil, Ghana, India, Liberia, Mexico, Nigeria, Romania, Senegal, Sweden, Yugoslavia and Zaire: Draft resolution submitted to the General Assembly: Mid-term review of the Disarmament Decade, 12 November 1974 (A/C.1/L.687)

The draft resolution proposed re-affirming the purposes and objectives of the Disarmament Decade, requested the Secretary-General and Governments to report to the Assembly at its thirtieth session on the steps which they had taken in order to acquaint the general public with these purposes and objectives, and on measures adopted in that connexion, on item "Mid-term review of the Disarmament Decade".

The proposal was included in resolution 3261 A (XXIX) adopted by the General Assembly. During the 1976 summer meetings of the CCD, three plenary meetings were devoted to a discussion of the mid-term review of the Disarmament Decade.

Pakistan: Draft resolution submitted in the General Assembly: Strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, 21 November 1974 (A/C.1/L.702)

By the draft, the Assembly would declare its support for the independence and integrity of non-nuclear-weapon States and recommend that Member States consider, in all appropriate forums, the question of strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.

The proposal was adopted as resolution 3261 (XXIX).

The question was considered at the Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT in 1975 and has subsequently been the subject of resolution 31/189 C, also initiated by Pakistan.
71. Romania:
Memorandum submitted in the First Committee of the General Assembly on the problem of disarmament, and particularly nuclear disarmament, and establishment of lasting peace, 30 October 1975 (A/C.1/1066)

In explaining its position, Romania called for a number of measuresincluding cessation of the arms race through the immediate freezing and reduction of military budgets, with the highest priority overall being assigned to nuclear disarmament. It provided for undertakings to refrain from the use of nuclear weapons; banning introduction of new nuclear weapons into the territory of other States; cessation of development, testing and production of nuclear weapons and delivery means, and reduction and liquidation of stockpiles and a total ban; creation of nuclear-free zones; certain partial measures of disarmament and disengagement including withdrawal of foreign based troops, and the dismantling of foreign bases; conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament; enhancing the United Nations role and convening a special session of the Assembly on disarmament; banning war propaganda; and the wider informing of the public on the arms race and its consequences.

The proposals were discussed in the CCD and in the First Committee.

72. New Zealand, the Philippines, Romania, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Tunisia and Venezuela:
Draft resolution submitted in the First Committee on the strengthening of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, 26 November 1975 (A/C.1/L.732)

The draft resolution stressed the urgent need to strengthen the role of the United Nations in the common search for disarmament. It was proposed to establish an Ad Hoc Committee of the General Assembly on the review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, open to the participation of all Member States; the States would communicate their views on the strengthening of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament; the review would focus its attention: on new approaches for achieving more effective procedures and organization of work of the United Nations in the field of disarmament; on the role of the United Nations in the field of information; on the role of the Secretariat to assist Governments on their request to follow-up existing disarmament agreements.

The proposal, as revised, was adopted as resolution 3484 (XXX). The Ad Hoc Committee met on 26 January 1976 and subsequently in June and September 1976. As the basis for its discussions, the Committee accepted a working paper submitted by Sweden (A/AC.181/L.5), and submitted to the General Assembly agreed proposals contained in its report (A/31/36). The agreed proposals were endorsed by the General Assembly in resolution 31/90 subsequent to resolution 3484 (XXX).
Non-Aligned States:

Proposals on disarmament submitted in the General Assembly:
Political Declaration (Chapter XVII), adopted at the Fifth Non-Aligned Summit Conference, Colombo, 16–19 August 1976, 8 September 1976 (A/31/197 and A/AC.187/30 and Corr.1)

The Declaration stressed the conviction of the Conference that universal peace and security could be assured only by general and complete disarmament, in particular, nuclear disarmament, under effective international control and that essential measures to that end should include the complete cessation of all nuclear weapon tests pending the conclusion of a test ban treaty, renunciation of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons as well as chemical, bacteriological and other weapons of mass destruction and the elimination of arsenals of all such weapons. The Conference declared that the arms race was inconsistent with efforts aimed at achieving the New International Economic Order. It reiterated the urgent need for convening of a World Disarmament Conference, and recommended in the meantime, the holding of a Special Session of the General Assembly.

The proposals were considered by the General Assembly and reflected in resolution 31/189B.

74. Soviet Union:
Memorandum submitted in the General Assembly on questions of ending the arms race and disarmament, 26 September 1976 (A/31/232)

The memorandum contained proposals which were considered by the Soviet Union to be the main areas for co-ordinated action: (a) cessation of the nuclear arms race and reduction and subsequent elimination of nuclear weapons; (b) prohibition of nuclear weapon tests; (c) consolidation of the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; (d) prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons; (e) prohibition of the development of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction; (f) reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments, (g) zones of peace in the Indian Ocean and other regions; (h) reduction of military budgets; and negotiations on halting the arms race and on disarmament, particularly in a universal forum such as a world disarmament conference.

The proposals were discussed in the First Committee and in the CCD.

75. Austria, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Finland, India, Kenya, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, the Philippines, Romania, Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago, the United Republic of Cameroon and Yugoslavia

The draft resolution expressed deep concern over the continuing arms race and the increased danger for world peace and security; it considered that the ever spiralling arms race is not compatible with the efforts aimed at promoting international peace and security as well as establishing a new international economic order; stressed the importance of stimulating public interest in disarmament, requested the Secretary-General to ensure a proper co-ordination of disarmament and development activities within the United Nations system.

The proposal was adopted by the General Assembly as resolution 31/68.
76. Soviet Union:


By the draft treaty, which consisted of a preamble and 8 articles, the parties would abide by an undertaking not to use force or threat of force against any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations; and would refrain from use of armed forces involving weapons including weapons of mass destruction, and would agree not to assist in such activities. They would settle disputes by peaceful means, and make all possible efforts to work towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

The proposal was discussed in the First Committee. By resolution 31/9 the General Assembly requested Member States to communicate to the Secretary-General their views and suggestions on that subject not later than 1 June 1977.

77. Mexico:

Working paper submitted in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament containing a preliminary Draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, 23 August 1977 (CCD/545)

This working paper includes an introduction and five principal sections:

(a) Introduction: Reference is made to the resolutions of the General Assembly which requested the CCD to work out a comprehensive programme dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. It is also stated that the programme should include procedures to co-ordinate all disarmament negotiations.

(b) Objective: The paper defines the aim of the comprehensive programme as the achievement of tangible progress towards the goal of general and complete disarmament.

(c) Principles: It is proposed that the measures provided for in the comprehensive programme should be carried out in accordance with a number of principles, including those already agreed for disarmament negotiations, the relationship between the programme and international peace and security, the link between disarmament and development, the establishment of the New International Economic Order and institutional arrangements.

(d) Components and Stages of the Programme: This section contains proposals relating to disarmament treaties in force or in preparation, as well as to other disarmament measures. The latter include measures concerning both nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and conventional armaments and armed forces. The final stage consists of the elimination of armaments.

(e) The maintenance of peace and security: The paper suggests parallel negotiations on machinery and procedures for peaceful settlement and peace-keeping within the United Nations.

(f) Procedure: Provisions are included for both the implementation of the programme and the periodical evaluation of its results.

At its 765th meeting, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament took note of the consensus reached among its members that, at the beginning of 1978, an Ad Hoc Working Group would be established to discuss and elaborate a draft comprehensive programme of disarmament.
IV. PARTIAL MEASURES FOR THE CESSION OF THE ARMS RACE
AND DISARMAMENT

1. The cessation of nuclear-weapon tests

78. India:
Proposal introduced in a letter to the Secretary-General on
8 April 1954 (DC/44 and Corr. 1 and DC/71)

The letter drew attention to a statement of the Indian Prime Minister
proposing "some sort of standstill agreement" in respect of nuclear
weapon explosions and certain related measures, even in the absence of
agreements to discontinue the production and stockpiling of such weapons,
and requested that the proposals be placed before the Disarmament Com-
mission and its Sub-Committee. Since the proposals were not discussed
at the 1954 meetings of the Commission and its Sub-Committee, India
requested that they be communicated to the General Assembly by the Com-
mission's report.

At the 9th session of the General Assembly, India recalled those
proposals but did not propose any specific action in the matter. At the
10th session, India proposed consideration of the question of dissemina-
tion of information on the effects of nuclear weapon explosions
(A/2949 and Add.1), an idea that was reflected in General Assembly resolu-
tion 913 (X) creating the Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic
radiation.

79. Soviet Union:
Proposal submitted in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission
concerning the conclusion of an international convention on the
reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, 10 May 1955
(DC/SC.1/20/Rev.2)

The general proposal included a specific proposal that, as one of the
first measures, States possessing nuclear weapons should discontinue tests
of such weapons and that supervision of compliance should be entrusted to
an international commission which would report to the Security Council
and the General Assembly.

The proposal was discussed in the Sub-Committee and was reflected in
a proposal submitted by the Soviet Prime Minister, on 21 July 1955, to
the Geneva Summit Conference.

80. Soviet Union:
Proposal submitted to the First Committee of the General Assembly
that nuclear-weapon States continue their efforts towards reaching
agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, December 1955
(A/C.1/L.140)

The proposal was submitted as an amendment to a draft resolution adopted
as 913 (X), setting up the Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic
Radiation, but was rejected in the First Committee.
81. **Soviet Union:**
Proposal submitted in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission: Execution of Partial Measures in the Field of Disarmament, 27 March 1956 (DC/SC.1/41; DC/83)

The proposal contained, inter alia, a provision for the immediate discontinuance of tests of thermo-nuclear weapons.

It was discussed in the Sub-Committee.

82. **India:**
Proposal introduced in the Disarmament Commission calling for the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, 13 July 1956 (DC/98)

The proposal called formally for the cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

It was considered in the Disarmament Commission.

83. **United States:**
Memorandum submitted in the First Committee of the General Assembly, 12 January 1957 (A/C.1/732)

It was proposed, inter alia, that after a cut-off on the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, nuclear test explosions should be limited and ultimately prohibited, and that arrangements should be worked out for advance notice and registration and limited international observation of such tests.

The proposal was considered in the First Committee of the General Assembly, and the general concepts were reflected in a draft resolution submitted by Canada, Japan and Norway (A/C.1/L.162 and Rev.1) but not put to a vote.

84. **Soviet Union:**

The draft resolution constituted a call upon states conducting atomic and hydrogen weapons tests to discontinue them forthwith.

It was considered in the First Committee, but not put to a vote.

85. **Soviet Union:**
Memorandum submitted in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission: Implementation of Partial Disarmament Measures, 30 April 1957 (DC/SC.1/55; DC/112)

The extensive memorandum referred to the urgency of the problem of discontinuing tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons and advocated that it be dealt with without delay, independently of any other disarmament measures.

It was discussed in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission.
86. **Soviet Union:**
Proposal submitted to the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission for the immediate cessation of all nuclear weapon tests for a period of two or three years, 14 June 1957 (DC/SC.1/62)

The proposal also provided for the establishment of an international commission to supervise compliance with the agreement.

It was discussed in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission.

87. **Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States:**
Working Paper submitted in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, 29 August 1957 (DC/SC.1/66; DC/113)

The working paper contained a proposal for a 12-month, verified, renewable suspension of nuclear weapon testing.

It was considered in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission.

88. **Japan:**
Draft resolution submitted in the First Committee of the General Assembly: Suspension of Nuclear Test Explosions, 23 September 1957 (A/C.1/L.174)

By the draft resolution the General Assembly would call upon the States concerned to suspend all test explosions, once they had agreed in principle on the need for a verification system.

It was considered in the First Committee of the General Assembly but was not adopted.

89. **India:**
Draft resolution introduced in the First Committee of the General Assembly: Suspension of Nuclear Weapon Tests, 1 November 1957 (A/C.1/L.176 and Rev.1,2,4)

By the proposal, a commission of experts would supervise and ensure the effectiveness of suspension without delay of tests of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons.

The proposal was considered in the First Committee of the General Assembly and underwent several revisions, but was not adopted in the Committee.

90. **Soviet Union:**
Draft resolution introduced in the First Committee of the General Assembly: Suspension of nuclear test explosions, 9 October 1958 (A/C.1/L.203)

By the proposal the General Assembly would call upon all States carrying out nuclear weapon tests to stop such tests immediately and enter into negotiations to conclude an appropriate agreement.

The proposal was considered in the First Committee but was not pressed to a vote.
By the proposal, the General Assembly would, inter alia, call for the immediate discontinuance of nuclear weapon testing until agreement was reached by the States concerned on control arrangements, and would request the parties to the tripartite Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests to report to the General Assembly on the agreement reached.

The proposal was considered in the First Committee, but was not adopted.

Soviet Union:


The proposal constituted a draft treaty which provided for the three nuclear powers to cease all tests of nuclear weapons.

The draft was discussed at the Geneva Conference.

United Kingdom and United States:


The draft treaty provided for the parties to prohibit nuclear tests anywhere under their jurisdiction and refrain from encouraging or participating in such tests anywhere. The prohibitions would exempt underground explosions recorded as seismic events or less than magnitude 4.75. It also set forth new positions on the verification problem.

The draft was considered by the Conference, and the two Powers proposed some modifications to it on 28 August 1961.

The draft was further considered by a Sub-Committee of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference, which first met on 21 March 1962 (ENDC/9).

Soviet Union:


The draft treaty provided for the parties to prohibit all nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space or under water, using national means of verification, and to refrain from underground tests until a control over such tests had been developed as part of a system of control over general and complete disarmament.

The draft treaty was considered by the Conference, which adjourned, sine die, on 29 January 1962 without agreement in the matter.

The draft was further considered by a Sub-Committee of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, which first met on 21 March 1962 (ENDC/11).
Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic:
Joint Memorandum submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee:
Cessation of Nuclear Weapon Tests, 16 April 1962 (ENDC/28)

In the memorandum the sponsors proposed that the nuclear powers might establish a control system on a scientific, non-political basis, and that data obtained from the system could be processed and reported upon by an international commission.

The proposal was discussed in the ENDC.

In its resolution 1762 A (XVII), the General Assembly expressed the view that the memorandum represented an adequate and fair basis for eliminating differences on the question of control.

United Kingdom and the United States:
Proposals submitted in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee:
Draft Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in all Environments, 27 August 1962 (ENDC/58 and 59)

The proposals consisted of two alternative draft treaties -- one a comprehensive treaty, with unspecified reductions in the previously proposed number of on-site inspections and changes in the manning of control posts, and the other contemplating a ban restricted to the atmosphere, outer space and under water without international verification.

The proposals were considered in the ENDC.

Ethiopia, Nigeria and the United Arab Republic:
Joint Memorandum submitted in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee:
Question of the Cessation of Nuclear Weapon Tests, 10 June 1963 (ENDC/94)

In the memorandum the sponsors suggested, inter alia, that the nuclear powers should accept a reasonable compromise quota of on-site inspections contingent upon adequate and effective modalities of inspection.

It was considered in the ENDC.
98. **Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, India, Italy, Mexico, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Sweden, the USSR, the United Arab Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States:**

Draft resolution submitted in the First Committee on the question of suspension of nuclear weapon tests, 30 October 1963, (A/C.1/L.326 and Add.1)

By the draft resolution, the General Assembly would call upon all States to become parties to the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water, signed on 5 August 1963 by the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States and request the ENDC to continue negotiations to achieve the discontinuance of all nuclear weapon tests.

The draft resolution was considered in the First Committee and in the Plenary of the General Assembly, where it was adopted on 27 November 1963 as resolution 1910 (XVIII).

99. **Sweden:**

Memorandum submitted in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on international co-operation for the detection of underground nuclear explosions, 2 September 1965 (ENDC/154)

The memorandum constituted a formal proposal for international co-operation in the detection of underground explosions through the exchange of seismic data ("the detection club").

It was considered in the ENDC.

100. **Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic:**

Joint Memorandum submitted in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on a comprehensive test ban treaty, 15 September 1965 (ENDC/159)

In the memorandum, the eight countries, urging immediate steps to ban all nuclear weapon tests, suggested that agreement could be facilitated by the exchange of scientific and other information between the nuclear Powers or by improvements in verification techniques.

The memorandum was discussed in the ENDC, and in its resolution 2032 (XX), the General Assembly noted the memorandum with satisfaction.
101. **Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic:**

*Joint Memorandum submitted in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 17 August 1968 (ENDC/232)*

In a memorandum the eight countries expressed their concern over the lack of progress on an underground test ban, stressed the dangers of continued atmospheric and underground testing and set out various suggestions for verification.

The memorandum was discussed in the ENDC, and in its resolution 2163 (XXI), the General Assembly recalled it and in particular, the concrete suggestions contained therein.

102. **United Kingdom:**


The paper proposed the establishment of a committee of seven members, including the three nuclear powers, to consider evidence of possible infringement of the treaty and to carry out on-site inspections if strong evidence was produced of clandestine testing. It also proposed an agreed annual quota of underground test explosions over a period of four to five years.

The proposals were discussed in the ENDC.

103. **Sweden:**


The draft treaty would require each state party to undertake to prohibit, to prevent and not to carry out any underground nuclear weapon test explosion and, to refrain from causing, encouraging or in any way participating in the carrying out of any such explosion. Parties would also undertake to co-operate in good faith in any effective international exchange of seismological data in order to facilitate the detection, identification and location of underground events. A separate international agreement would be negotiated to regulate the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

The proposal was revised on 2 September 1971 (CCD/348) to include, *inter alia*, the concept of a phasing out of tests over a period of time.

104. **Nigeria:**


It was suggested that the special committee to carry out on-site inspections envisaged in the working paper submitted by the United Kingdom (ENDC/232) should be composed exclusively of non-aligned countries which possessed the technological know-how to cope with such inspections.

The suggestion was considered in the ENDC.
105. Soviet Union:

Under a new agenda item proposed by the Soviet Union, entitled "Conclusion of a treaty on a complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests", the Soviet Union submitted a draft treaty prohibiting all nuclear weapon tests anywhere in all environments, to be negotiated by all nuclear-weapons States. The draft also provided for verification by national means, combined with international exchange of seismic data. It also stipulated that the treaty should not apply to any underground nuclear explosions conducted by nuclear-weapon States for peaceful purposes.

The draft treaty was annexed to a draft resolution, subsequently adopted by the General Assembly as 3478 (XXX), which called, inter alia, for all nuclear-weapon States, as well as some 25 to 30 non-nuclear-weapon States, to enter into negotiations with a view to reaching agreement.

On 22 November 1976, the Soviet Union transmitted to the Secretary-General the text of a revised draft treaty, which included a more flexible position on the question of verification of suspected violations of the agreement. On 22 February 1977, a revised draft was submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD/523), where it was considered at the 1977 session.

106. Sweden:
Proposal submitted in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Draft Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Test Explosions in All Environments, 1 March 1977 (CCD/526 and Rev.1)

The draft treaty provided, in principle, for a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapon tests, but suggested possible transitional arrangements for the two major nuclear-weapon States and special arrangements for the conduct of peaceful nuclear explosions under international supervision applicable to all parties. Compliance with the agreement was based principally on co-operation in the international exchange of seismological data and verification by challenge, with the assistance of an international consultative committee.

The draft treaty was considered in the CCD at its 1977 session.
2. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

107. Ireland:

By draft resolution an Ad Hoc Committee would be established to study the dangers inherent in the further dissemination of nuclear weapons and recommend appropriate measures to the General Assembly.

In 1960, the Irish proposal was reflected in Resolution 1576 (XV), and a further development of it, concerning transfer of information on the manufacture of nuclear weapons, was reflected in Resolution 1665 (XVI).

108. Soviet Union:
Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament, 2 June 1960 (A/4374/Rev.1)

The proposal, inter alia, provided that nuclear weapon States would undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons, or to transmit information necessary for their manufacture to non-nuclear States. Non-nuclear States would undertake to refrain from manufacturing nuclear weapons. It was considered in the First Committee of the General Assembly.

The proposal was adopted as resolution 1664 (XVI). Sixty-two Governments responded to the inquiry. The requirement for reciprocity was the condition most frequently mentioned.

109. Sweden:
Draft resolution submitted in the First Committee: Inquiry concerning conditions under which countries not possessing nuclear weapons would undertake to refrain from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring such weapons, 17 November 1961 (A/C.1/L.297)

The proposal was aimed at extension of the concept of an atom-free zone in Central Europe and envisaged the possibility of different rules for atom-free zones in various parts of the world. A report on the results of the inquiry would be submitted to the Disarmament Commission.

The proposal was adopted as resolution 1664 (XVI). Sixty-two Governments responded to the inquiry. The requirement for reciprocity was the condition most frequently mentioned.

110. Soviet Union:
Draft Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament Under Strict International Control, 15 March 1962 (ENDC/2)

The draft treaty contained provisions among the first stage measures to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons; prohibit States which possess nuclear weapons to transfer control over nuclear weapons and transmit information necessary for their production to States not possessing them; prohibit the States not possessing nuclear weapons to produce or otherwise obtain nuclear weapons; the States not possessing nuclear weapons should refuse to admit the nuclear weapons of any other States into their territories.

It was discussed in the ENDC and General Assembly.
111. United States:
Proposal submitted in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee:
Draft Treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, 17 August 1965
(ENDC/152)

The draft treaty would prohibit nuclear Powers from transferring nuclear weapons into the national control of any non-nuclear State, either directly through a military alliance; prohibit nuclear Powers from taking any other action which would cause an increase in the total number of States or other organizations having independent power to use nuclear weapons; and prohibit nuclear Powers from assisting any non-nuclear State in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Non-nuclear weapon States would undertake corresponding obligations not to manufacture, to seek or to receive nuclear weapons.

The draft treaty was amended by the United States on 21 March 1966 (ENDC/152/Add.1) and discussed in the ENDC.

112. Italy:
Proposal submitted in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee:
Draft of Unilateral Non-Acquisition Declaration, 14 September 1965 (ENDC/157)

The proposal provided for States to unilaterally undertake, for an agreed period of time, not to manufacture or acquire national control over nuclear weapons; not to seek or receive assistance from other States in manufacturing such weapons; and to accept application of the IAEA or equivalent international safeguards on nuclear activities.

It was considered in the ENDC.

113. Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic:
Joint Memorandum submitted in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 15 September 1965 (ENDC/158)

The eight non-aligned members of the ENDC held that a treaty on non-proliferation was not an end in itself, but only a means to achieve disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament. They proposed that measures to prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons had to be coupled with or followed by tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms race and to limit, reduce and eliminate the stocks of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery.

It was considered in the ENDC.
114. **Soviet Union:**
*Proposal submitted in the General Assembly: Draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 24 September 1965 (A/5976; ENDC/164)*

The draft treaty would prohibit nuclear Powers from transferring nuclear weapons directly, or indirectly through groupings of States, into the ownership or disposal of States or groups of States not possessing nuclear weapons or from granting the aforesaid States or groups of States the right to participate in the ownership, control or use of nuclear weapons; prohibit such Powers from giving nuclear weapons and control over them and over their location to units or to individual members of the armed forces of States not possessing nuclear weapons; and require Powers not possessing nuclear weapons to undertake not to create, manufacture or prepare to manufacture nuclear weapons either independently or jointly with other States.

It was discussed in the ENDC and the General Assembly.

115. **Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, the United Arab Republic:**
*Joint Memorandum submitted in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 28 November 1965 (A/6079)*

The sponsors proposed, *inter alia*, that the ENDC give urgent consideration to the question of non-proliferation, based on five principles: the treaty should be void of any loop-holes which might permit direct responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers; should be a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament; should contain acceptable and workable provisions to ensure its effectiveness; and should permit States to retain their rights to conclude regional treaties for the total absence of nuclear weapons in their territories.

It was considered in the ENDC.

116. **Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic:**
*Joint Memorandum submitted in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 19 August 1966 (ENDC/178)*

In the memorandum, which referred to the United States and Soviet draft treaties (ENDC/15; and ENDC/64) the sponsors gave their views on the problems associated with achieving a viable non-proliferation treaty and reviewed several suggestions which might assist towards that end, including, particularly that it should be coupled with other steps of nuclear disarmament, and assurance of assistance to developing countries peaceful nuclear energy programmes.

It was considered in the ENDC.
117. Jamaica, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Somalia:

The draft proposed the convening of a conference of non-nuclear-weapon States, not later than June 1967, to consider the following questions: how the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States could best be assured; how they might co-operate among themselves in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons; and how nuclear devices might be used for exclusively peaceful purposes. A preparatory committee was to be set up.

The proposal was embodied in resolution 2153 B (XXI). The Conference was convened in Geneva on 29 August 1968. Ninety-six countries, including four nuclear Powers (France, Soviet Union, United Kingdom and United States - as observers) attended the Conference. The adopted decisions were incorporated into a "Final Document of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States" (A/7277) and submitted to the Secretary-General. The General Assembly, by resolution 2456 A (XXIII), called upon the Secretary-General to transmit the Final Document of the Conference to the Governments of Member States, to the specialized and other agencies of the United Nations system, for careful consideration. Resolutions 2456 B, C and D (XXIII) contained specific requests for implementation of the decisions of the Conference.

118. Soviet Union and United States:

The two Powers submitted identical but separate drafts of a non-proliferation treaty, superseding the earlier separate and different Soviet and United States drafts.

The new identical texts provided for the obligations of nuclear and non-nuclear States; the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the context of non-proliferation; amendment and review of Treaty operations; entry into force and accession; duration and withdrawal; and deposit.

The identical drafts were extensively discussed in the ENDC and subjected to amendments and additions.

119. Sweden:
Proposal submitted in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Draft Text of an Article on International Control to be inserted in the Draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 30 August 1967 (ENDC/195)

The proposed article would ensure that Parties would undertake not to permit transfer of nuclear materials except under IAEA safeguards, and would accept IAEA safeguards over the nuclear activities and materials in their territories or under their jurisdiction.

The proposal was discussed in the ENDC.
120. Mexico:

The paper consisted of the Mexican suggestions pertaining to article IV of the draft treaty covering peaceful uses of nuclear energy, peaceful nuclear explosions, nuclear-weapon-free zones and negotiation towards further nuclear and general disarmament.

It was discussed in the ENDC.

121. United Arab Republic:
Working Paper submitted in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee containing the formulation of certain suggestions for incorporation in the Draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 26 September 1967 (ENDC/197)

In the paper it was proposed, among other things, that the language of articles I and II of the draft treaty be strengthened to preclude transfers of nuclear weapons in any form whatsoever, including gifts and partial ownership. It also called on the nuclear Powers to offer security guarantees to the non-nuclear signatories.

The paper was considered in the ENDC.

122. Romania:
Working Paper submitted in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee containing amendments and additions to the Draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 19 October 1967 (ENDC/199)

The paper contained, inter alia, suggestions that the nuclear Powers commit themselves, in a separate article, to adopt specific measures with a view to a halt in the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the reduction of stocks and the final destruction of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. It also proposed security guarantees in the form of a commitment by the nuclear Powers never to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against signatory States undertaking never to acquire such weapons.

The paper was discussed in the ENDC.
123. Italy:

By the proposal the treaty would have a definite duration and would be renewed automatically for any party not giving notice of withdrawal six months before the expiry date of the treaty.

The proposal was discussed in the ENDC.

124. Brazil:

The proposal included, inter alia, that the treaty should specify the right of all parties to develop nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes and include a firm undertaking on the part of the nuclear Powers party to the treaty to halt the nuclear arms race.

The proposal was considered by the ENDC.

125. Nigeria:

The proposal concerned provision for the sharing of scientific and technological information pertaining to peaceful nuclear explosions, security guarantees, reporting to IAEA, and duration and withdrawal.

The paper was considered in the ENDC.

126. United Kingdom:

The amendment specified that the review conference, five years after entry into force of the treaty, would be to assure that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the treaty were being realized.

The proposal was discussed in the ENDC.
127. Soviet Union and United States:  
Proposal submitted in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee:  
Revised Draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,  
18 January 1968 (ENDC/192/Rev.1 and 193/Rev.1)  
The two Powers submitted identical revised drafts, incorporating a  
number of views and proposals presented by other States. They contained  
an article on international safeguards (Article III). The principal  
additional changes included the insertion of three new articles which  
concerned (a) the availability of potential benefits of peaceful nuclear  
explosions to all parties; (b) an undertaking to pursue negotiations in  
good faith on disarmament and ending the nuclear arms race; and (c) the  
right of groups of States to conclude agreements on nuclear-weapon-free  
zones.  
By the terms of the new article III, non-nuclear-weapon parties  
to the treaty were to negotiate with the IAEA for the application of its  
safeguards system for the exclusive purpose of verifying the fulfilment  
of the treaty obligations, without affecting the economic and technolo­  
gical development of the non-nuclear signatories or international  
co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities.  
These were discussed in the ENDC and General Assembly.  

128. Sweden:  
Working Papers submitted in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee  
with suggestions in regard to the Draft Treaty on Non-Proliferation of  
Nuclear Weapons, 8 and 13 February 1968 (ENDC/215 and 216)  
By the amendments there would be a preambular reference concerning  
the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons, and  
article VI on negotiations towards nuclear disarmament would be  
strengthened. It also sought to remove the provisions in article V  
concerning bilateral arrangements for peaceful nuclear explosions.  
The papers were considered by the ENDC.  

129. Italy:  
Working Paper submitted in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee  
containing additions and amendments to Articles IV, VIII and X of  
the Draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,  
20 February 1968 (ENDC/218)  
The proposal contained an amendment which would guarantee supplies of  
nuclear materials to the non-nuclear-weapon States signatories. Proce­  
dural provisions concerning review conferences, duration, renewal,  
etc., were also included.  
The paper was considered by the ENDC.
130. **Nigeria:**


The proposal contained amendments that would strengthen the obligations of nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States parties in respect of security assurances, peaceful uses of nuclear energy, etc. It also suggested a revised article X on withdrawal.

The proposal was discussed in the ENDC.

131. **Soviet Union, United Kingdom and United States:**


The three nuclear Powers introduced in the ENDC a draft resolution on security assurances, which they undertook to submit in the Security Council in connexion with the non-proliferation treaty. By that resolution, the Security Council would recognize that aggression with nuclear weapons, or threat thereof against a non-nuclear-weapon State would create a new situation in which the nuclear-weapon States permanent members of the Security Council would have to act immediately through the Council to take measures necessary to counter such aggression or to remove the threat of aggression in accordance with their obligation under the Charter.

The proposal was adopted as Security Council resolution 257 (1968) on 19 June 1968. It provides a form of security guarantee to non-nuclear-weapon States against nuclear threat or aggression, whereby the three sponsors would seek authorization of the Council to assist victims of such threat or aggression.

132. **Romania:**

*Proposal submitted in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Amendments to the Draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 8 March 1968 (ENDC/223 and Rev. 1)*

The amendments related, *inter alia*, to safeguards and certain measures of disarmament, as well as to security assurances and provisions concerning operation and withdrawal.

The proposal was considered in the ENDC.

The joint revised draft treaty incorporated some of the further suggestions made by the non-nuclear-weapon States. This draft treaty was submitted to the General Assembly as part of the ENDC report.

The General Assembly commended the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and expressed hope for the widest adherence to it - resolution 2373 (XXII), 12 June 1968. The Non-Proliferation Treaty was opened for signature on 1 July 1968. The Treaty entered into force on 5 March 1970.

134. Sweden supported by Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Finland, Ghana, Hungary, Ireland, Lebanon, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, New Zealand, Poland, Romania, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Yugoslavia:

Draft resolution submitted in the General Assembly: Convening of a conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to review the operation of the Treaty, 21 November 1973 (A/C.1/L.665)

By the draft, the Assembly would express hope for the widest possible adherence to the Treaty, take note of the formation of a preparatory committee for the subject conference, and request the Secretary-General to render such assistance and services as might be required for the conference and its preparation.

The proposal was adopted as resolution 3184 B (XXVIII). Subsequent resolution 3273 (XXIX), inter alia, also called for widest possible adherence to the Treaty.

135. Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Proposals contained in the Final Document of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 30 May 1975 (NPT/CONF/55/1, 2 and 3)

The Final Document contained a final declaration which called for various measures in the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty. It also contained an interpretative statement in connexion with the final declaration and proposed draft additional protocols to the Treaty put forward by many States parties, which proposed to strengthen the non-proliferation régime in several areas including recognition of nuclear-weapon-free zones, security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States, nuclear disarmament and nuclear testing.
3. Nuclear-weapon-free zones

136. Soviet Union:
Proposal introduced in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission: Draft Agreement on the Reduction of Conventional Armaments and Armed Forces, 27 March 1956 (DC/SC.1/41)

The proposal suggested, inter alia, creation in Europe of a zone of limitation and inspection of armaments.

The agreement establishing this zone would among other things provide for the prohibition of the stationing of atomic military formations and the location of atomic and hydrogen weapons of any kind in it.

137. Poland:
Memorandum on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Europe, 14 February 1958 (DC/83) and DC/SC.1/41

By the memorandum, Poland proposed that the nuclear-weapon-free zone might be established in two stages, commencing with a ban on production and restrictions on equipping forces, then proceeding to a complete prohibition in conjunction with reductions of forces; both stages would involve control measures. It outlined further the obligations which might be involved, control methods, etc., and suggested how it might be implemented.

The proposal was considered in the Sub-Committee.

138. Soviet Union:
Declaration on General and Complete Disarmament, 19 September 1959 (A/4219)

A plan for partial measures attached to the Declaration contained, inter alia, a proposal for the establishment of an atom-free zone in Central Europe.

The proposal was discussed in the ENDC.

139. Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria and United Arab Republic:

By the draft resolution all States would be requested to refrain from nuclear or ballistic weapons tests and to eliminate and refrain from establishing bases and launching sites for such weapons in Africa, and would be invited to respect the continent as a nuclear-free zone.
The draft was not put to a vote.

The proposal was further elaborated and reflected in resolutions: 1652 (XVI); 2033 (XX); 3261 (XXIX); 3471 (XXX) and 31/69, adopted by the General Assembly.

140. **Poland:**

Memorandum submitted in the Committee of the Whole of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee: Plan for Denuclearized and Limited Armaments Zone in Europe, 28 March 1962 (END/C.1/1)

The proposal, agreed to also by Czechoslovakia, outlined in some detail the rights and obligations of States throughout the two stages of implementation of the plan, as well as the control arrangements.

The proposal was considered by the ENDC.

141. **Bolivia, Brazil, Chile and Ecuador:**

Draft resolution submitted in the First Committee of the General Assembly: Latin American Denuclearized Zone, 15 November 1962 (A/C.1/L.312/Add.1)

By the draft resolution, the General Assembly would recommend that the Latin American countries, through appropriate means, would negotiate an agreement not to manufacture, receive, store, or test nuclear weapons, to dispose of any such weapons in their territory and provide for verification of the agreement reached. All States would be called upon to co-operate and respect the denuclearized zone.

The draft was not put to a vote.

142. **Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Mexico:**

Declaration on the Denuclearization of Latin America, 29 April 1963 (A/5415/Rev.1)

By the declaration the Presidents of the five States announced that they were prepared to sign a multilateral agreement whereby their countries would undertake not to manufacture, receive, store or test nuclear weapons or launching devices; expressed the hope that other Latin American Governments would accede to the declaration, and would work towards having the denuclearized zone recognized as soon as possible.

The declaration was reflected in resolution 1911 (XVIII).

By the draft resolution, the General Assembly, inter alia, welcomed with satisfaction the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, called upon all States to give full co-operation to ensure that the regime laid down in the Treaty enjoyed universal observance, referred to the contemplated signatures of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty and invited Powers possessing nuclear weapons to sign and ratify Additional Protocol II of the Treaty. The draft resolution was adopted as resolution 2289 (XXII). Treaty entered into force in June 1959.

The recommendations for the signature and ratification of Additional Protocols I and II were also reflected in the following resolutions: 2426 B (XXII); 2556 (XXV); 2580 (XXV); 2639 (XXVII); 3079 (XXVIII); 3254 (XXIX); 3262 (XXIX); 3467 (XXX); 3473 (XXX); and 31/67.

Draft resolution submitted in the First Committee: Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in South Asia, 28 October 1974 (A/C.1/L.651)

By the draft, the General Assembly would express the view that initiative for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region should come from the States of the region concerned.

The proposal was adopted as resolution 3265 A (XXIX) and reflected in resolution 3476 A (XXX).

Draft resolution submitted in the First Committee: Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in South Asia, 28 October 1974 (A/C.1/L.682)

By the draft, the General Assembly would, inter alia, endorse in principle the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and invite the States of the region to initiate necessary consultations with a view to achieving the proposed objective.

The proposal was adopted as resolution 3265 B (XXIX) and reflected also in resolutions 3476 B (XXX) and 31/73.
146. Finland:
Draft resolution submitted in the First Committee of the General Assembly:
A comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all
its aspects, 18 November 1974 (A/C.1/L.701 and Corr.1)

The study was to be conducted by a group of governmental experts under the
auspices of the CCD.

The proposal was adopted as resolution 3261 F (XXIX). The resultant
study was submitted to the CCD on 18 August 1975 and to the General Assembly
as a special report of the CCD, document A/10027/Add.1.

147. Egypt and Iran:
Draft resolution submitted in the First Committee: Establishment
of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East, 20 November 1974
(A/C.1/L.700)

The draft requested, inter alia, the Secretary-General to ascertain
the views of the parties concerned.

The proposal was adopted as resolution 3263 (XXIX) and further
elaborated in resolutions 3474 (XXX) and 31/71.

148. Mexico:
Working Paper submitted in the Conference of the Committee on Dis-
armament: Draft Definition of a "Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone" and of
the Principal Obligations of Nuclear-Weapon States in respect of
Such Zones, 20 August 1975 (CCD/470)

The paper set out a definition of the term "nuclear-weapon-free zone"
and outlined the obligations of nuclear-weapon states towards such zones.
The latter would be embodied in binding international instrument.

The paper was considered by the CCD.

149. Fiji and New Zealand:
Draft resolution submitted in the First Committee: Establishment of
a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the South Pacific, 20 November 1975,
(A/C.1/L.719)

The draft endorsed the idea of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-
free zone in the South Pacific and invited the countries concerned to
carry forward consultations for realizing that objective.

The proposal was adopted as resolution 3477 (XXX).
The general concept of this paper was endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution 2827 B (XXVI).

150. **Morocco:**

*Working paper submitted in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on Drafts CCD/337 and CCD/338 on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, 24 August 1971 (CCD/347)*

The paper contained several suggested amendments, including one for addition of a new article which would commit States party to assist States exposed to biological warfare agents and one by which States would nullify their reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

The amendments were discussed in the CCD.

151. **Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Italy, Mongolia, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Soviet Union, United Kingdom and the United States:**

*Proposal submitted in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, 28 September 1971 (CCD/353)*

The revised draft contained a number of changes including some broadening of both the prohibitions and the definition of toxins. The draft was annexed to the report of the CCD to the General Assembly, which commended it and requested its opening for signature and ratification in resolution 2826 (XXVI).

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction was opened for signature on 10 April 1972 and entered into force on 26 March 1975.

152. **Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden and Yugoslavia:**

*Joint Memorandum submitted in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, 28 September 1971 (CCD/352).*

In the memorandum the 12 sponsors stressed the urgency of reaching an agreement on chemical weapons, and proposed nine elements upon which negotiations towards a comprehensive ban on such weapons should be based.

In its resolution 2827 A (XXVI) the General Assembly asked the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to take the memorandum into account in its further work on chemical weapons.
4. Preventing an arms race on the sea-bed

153. Soviet Union
Memorandum on Some Urgent Measures for Stopping the Arms Race and for Disarmament, 16 July 1968 (ENDC/227)

In the memorandum it was suggested that the sea-bed beyond territorial waters should be used solely for peaceful purposes, and that would involve the prohibition of the establishment of fixed military installations on the sea-bed, as well as prohibition of other military activities.

General Assembly resolution 2454 (XXIII) noted the Soviet Union's memorandum and called for urgent efforts to negotiate collaborative measures of disarmament. The proposal was considered in the ENDC.

154. Soviet Union

The draft treaty, consisting of a preamble and 5 articles, would prohibit the use for military purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof beyond the 12-mile zone. Prohibitions would include all weapons of mass destruction as well as bases, structures, installations, fortifications and other objects of a military nature.

The draft treaty was discussed in the ENDC.

155. Nigeria

By the amendment, two States having overlapping 12-mile zones would both waive their rights with regard to the use of such zones for military purposes.

The question was considered in the ENDC.

156. United States

The draft treaty, consisting of a preamble and 6 articles, would prohibit the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction or associated fixed launching platforms on, within or beneath the sea-bed.
and ocean floor beyond a defined coastal limit. Verification would be by observation without interference with activities.

The draft treaty was discussed in the ENDC.

157. Brazil


The paper outlined the requirement that the sovereign rights of coastal States to develop the resources of their continental shelves without interference not be jeopardized by a control system incorporated in any sea-bed treaty.

The question was considered by the ENDC.

158. Soviet Union and United States

Proposal submitted in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Draft Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, 7 October 1969 (CCD/269) and 30 October 1969 (CCD/269/Rev.1)

The draft treaty, consisting of a preamble and 6 articles, called for the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction and their associated facilities, rather than complete demilitarization, and provided for verification by observation without interference with activities.

The General Assembly later adopted resolution 2602 F (XXIV) welcoming the revised draft treaty and related proposals and calling on the CCD to take the matter into account in preparing a final text.

159. Canada


In the paper a proposal for a staged verification procedure was outlined, proceeding from consultation and co-operation to recourse to the Security Council.

The proposal was considered by the CCD.
160. **Sweden:**

Proposal submitted in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Suggestion for an Article to be added to the Draft Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Sub-soil Thereof, 16 October 1969 (CCD/271)

By the proposed additional article, the parties to the treaty would undertake to continue negotiations towards a more comprehensive prohibition of the use of the sea-bed for military purposes.

The proposal was considered by the CCD.

161. **United Kingdom**

Proposal to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: suggested amendments to the Joint draft treaty, 27 October 1969 (ENDC/IV.444)

The paper proposed various changes and amendments for consideration in respect of the 12-mile zone.

The proposals were discussed in the CCD.

162. **Mexico**


In the paper a procedure to improve the draft treaty was suggested and some new and revised articles were proposed, such as a commitment by parties to negotiate towards more comprehensive prohibitions.

The proposals were considered by the CCD.

163. **Argentina**


The revised articles concerned the basic prohibitions of the Treaty, the zone of application, and its relationship with the 1958 Convention on territorial sea and contiguous zone.

The proposals were discussed in the CCD.
The revised "draft" was considered in the CCD.

In the working paper further amendments were proposed to Article III of the revised draft treaty in order to clarify it to ensure that it would not adversely affect agreements already reached in respect of nuclear-weapon-free zones, specifically, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America.

The proposals were discussed in the CCD.

In the working paper further amendments were proposed to Article III of the revised draft treaty and it was suggested that a new article be added to commit the parties to negotiate towards more comprehensive prohibition of military use of the sea-bed.

The proposals were discussed in the CCD.

This revised version incorporated most of the numerous suggestions put forward by many States, or compromises based thereon. It was submitted to the General Assembly as part of the Committee's report.

The revised draft treaty, as amended, was commended by the General Assembly in its resolution 2660 F (XXV) of 17 December 1970 and opened for signature on 11 February 1971. It entered into force on 18 May 1972.
Denmark, Finland, India, Japan, Romania, Sweden and Yugoslavia: Draft resolution submitted in the General Assembly: Convening of a conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof to review the operation of the Treaty, 4 December 1975 (A/C.1/L.750)

By the draft, the Assembly would note the requirement to arrange a preparatory committee for the subject conference and request the Secretary-General to render such assistance and services as might be required for the conference and its preparation.

The proposal was adopted as resolution 3484 E (XXX). The review conference took place 20 June - 1 July 1977.

The Final Document contained a final declaration which, inter alia, affirmed the commitment by the Parties to continue negotiations in good faith concerning further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and called upon the States that have not yet become Parties particularly those possessing nuclear weapons to do so at the earliest possible date. (UN, CM 25/25)
50.

5. Preventing an arms race in outer space

169. United States:
Memorandum submitted to the First Committee of the General
Assembly, 12 January 1957 (A/17831

The memorandum included, inter alia, a proposal to bring the testing of
space objects under international inspection and participation as the
first step towards assuring that future space developments would be
devoted exclusively to scientific and peaceful purposes.

By resolution 1011 (XI) the General Assembly recommended that the
Disarmament Commission give prompt attention to this proposal, together
with other documents submitted to it by Member States.

170. Soviet Union:
Proposal on the Question of the Banning of the Use of Cosmic Space for
Military Purposes, the Elimination of Foreign Military Bases on the
Territories of Other Countries, and International Co-operation in the
Study of Cosmic Space, 15 March 1958 (A/3878)

Under the proposal there would be a ban on the use of space for military
purposes and rockets would only be launched into cosmic space under an
agreed international programme. Control would be under the United Nations
and there would be a United Nations agency for co-operation in the study of
cosmic space.

The debate on this and other proposals ultimately led to the adoption
of resolution 1348 (XIII) of the General Assembly.

171. Soviet Union:
Memorandum on Measures in the Field of Disarmament,
18 September 1958 (A/3929)

The memorandum contained, inter alia, a proposal for a ban on the use of
outer space for military purposes and for international co-operation in the
study of outer space.

By resolution 1378 (XIV), the General Assembly transmitted the Soviet
memorandum and other proposals to the United Nations Disarmament Commission,
as well as the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee.
172. Mexico:


The draft treaty, consisting of a preamble and 12 articles called for the exclusive use for peaceful purposes of outer space and the celestial bodies. Enforcement would be through exchange of information and scientific personnel. There would be mutual consultation in the event of disengagement.

The working paper was discussed in the ENDC and also in the General Assembly, giving impetus to negotiations concerning the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

173. Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, India, Italy, Mexico, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Sweden, the Soviet Union, the United Arab Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States:

Draft resolution submitted in the First Committee on a Ban of Nuclear and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction from Outer Space, 15 October 1963 (A/C.1/L.324)

The draft resolution called upon all States to refrain from placing in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kind of weapons of mass destruction, installing such weapons on celestial bodies, or stationing them in outer space.

The proposal was included in resolution 1884 (XVIII) adopted by the General Assembly.

174. Soviet Union and United States:

Draft Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 1966 (A/6352/Rev.1 and A/6392)

The text of the draft treaty, inter alia, provided for: an undertaking by States Parties not to place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kind of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner; a prohibition of all military activity on the moon and other celestial bodies.

The General Assembly commended the treaty in resolution 2222 (XXI) of 14 December 1966.

The Treaty was opened for signature on 27 January 1967 and entered into force on 10 October 1967.
6. Chemical and biological weapons

175. Hungary:
Draft resolution submitted in the First Committee: Chemical and bacteriological weapons, 22 November 1966 (A/6529 and A/C.1/L.374/Rev.1)

By the draft the General Assembly would demand strict and absolute compliance by all States with the principles and norms established by the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925, condemned any action aimed at the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons, and declare that the use of such weapons constituted an international crime.

The proposal as amended was reflected in resolution 2162 B (XXI), adopted by the General Assembly on 5 December 1966.

176. United Kingdom:
Proposal submitted in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee:
Draft Convention on Biological Warfare and accompanying Draft Security Council Resolution, 10 July 1969 (ENDC/225)

The draft convention consisted of a preamble and 10 articles, and called for an undertaking by parties never to use microbial or biological agents under any circumstances; not to produce or conduct research concerning such agents. Enforcement was to be through a procedure of complaint to the United Nations which was outlined in the draft Security Council resolution concerning that procedure.

The draft convention was revised on 26 August 1969 (ENDC/225/Rev.1), and on 18 August 1970 (CCD/255/Rev.2). The General Assembly took note of the draft conventions in resolutions 2603 B (XXIV) and 2662 (XXV).

177. Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden, United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia: Working paper submitted in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on Proposed General Assembly Declaration Regarding Prohibition of the Use of Chemical and Biological Methods of Warfare, 26 August 1969 (ENDC/265)

The working paper suggested a draft resolution by which the General Assembly would condemn and declare the use of any chemical and biological agents in warfare as contrary to international law.

The paper was considered by ENDC in further discussion.

178. Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Ukrainian SSR and the Soviet Union:

The draft convention, consisting of a preamble and 9 articles, provided for a comprehensive prohibition of development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and their subsequent destruction. Each State party would be internationally responsible for compliance.

4/ Proposals prior to 1966 and others not listed were either concerned with the use of such weapons or were embodied in various proposals for general and complete disarmament, listed above.
The General Assembly took note of the draft convention in resolution 2603 B (XXIV) and 2662 (XXV).

179. Hungary, Mongolia and Poland:

The paper consisted of a new article by which complaints concerning compliance would be submitted to the Security Council. It also contained a related draft Security Council resolution on investigative action.

The paper was indirectly noted in General Assembly resolution 2662 (XXV).

180. Sweden:
Working paper submitted in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on a comprehensive agreement prohibiting chemical and biological weapons, 16 March 1971 (CCD/322)

The paper outlined a model for a comprehensive agreement on the subject, proposing, inter alia, that the agreement should not include rules against the use of such weapons, what had already been dealt with in the 1925 Geneva Protocol, but should contain obligations not to develop, test, produce, stockpile or transfer such weapons or agents. The paper also suggested a complaints procedure upon which verification of compliance with the agreement would be based.

The paper was considered by the CCD.

181. Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Ukrainian SSR and the Soviet Union:
Proposal submitted in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and Toxins and on Their Destruction, 30 March 1971 (CCD/325)

The draft convention, consisting of a preamble and 14 articles, provided for a comprehensive prohibition of development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) weapons and the destruction of existing stocks within three months after its entry into force. Parties would be internationally responsible for compliance.

The draft was considered in the CCD.

182. United Arab Republic:
Working paper submitted in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament with suggestions in regard to the Draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and Toxins and on Their Destruction (CCD/325), 24 June (CCD/328)

The paper contained suggested amendments to several articles to the draft treaty contained in document CCD/325 (see foregoing item).

The amendments were discussed in the CCD.
183. Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Ukrainian SSR and the Soviet Union:
Proposal submitted in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament:
Revised Draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, 5 August 1971 (CCD/337)

The paper constituted a revision of the 30 March 1971 draft text which was agreed upon in consultation with the United States. Except for the word "revised" in its title, the paper was identical to CCD/338, described in the following item.

The revised version was discussed in the CCD.

184. United States:
Proposal submitted in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament:
Draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, 5 August 1971 (CCD/338)

The two documents CCD/337 and CCD/338 contained separate but identical draft texts of a convention on the prohibition of bacteriological (biological) weapons which was comprised of a preamble and 14 articles. Compliance was to be by consultation and co-operation with recourse to the Security Council for verification.

The revised draft was discussed in the CCD.

185. Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden, the United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia:
Proposal paper submitted in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament containing suggestions on desirable changes to the Revised Draft Convention (CCD/337) and the Draft Convention (CCD/338) on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, 17 August 1971 (CCD/331)

The suggestions were intended primarily to ensure a solid link between the banning of chemical weapons and the banning of biological weapons. There were also suggestions made concerning co-operation in the implementation of the convention and in peaceful application of bacteriological and biological discoveries.

The proposals were considered by the CCD.

186. Mexico:
Working paper submitted in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament containing a proposal for the inclusion of an additional article in the Revised Draft Convention (CCD/337) and the Draft Convention (CCD/338) on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, 24 August 1971 (CCD/334)

In the paper it was proposed that the convention on prohibition of biological weapons should commit States parties to refrain from further development, production or stockpiling of the most lethal chemical weapons pending agreement thereon.
187. **Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Ukrainian SSR and the Soviet Union:**
Proposal submitted in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament:

By the draft, which consisted of a preamble and 14 articles, the ban would include all chemical agents of types and quantities having no justification for peaceful purposes. The draft provided for both national and international forms of control including recourse to and investigation by the Security Council.

The General Assembly noted the draft convention in its resolutions 2933 (XXVII) and 3077 (XXVIII) and referred to it indirectly in its resolutions 3256 (XIX) and 31/65.

188. **Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Sweden and Yugoslavia:**
Working paper submitted in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, 26 April 1973 (CCD/400)

The paper contained proposals concerning an agreement banning chemical weapons under four headings: general provisions, scope of the prohibition, verification and system of control (national and international measures) and complaints procedure.

The paper was noted in General Assembly resolution 3077 (XXVIII) and referred to indirectly in 3256 (XIX) and 31/65.

189. **Japan:**
Working paper submitted in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Main Points of International Agreement on the Prohibition of Development, Production and Stockpiling of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, 21 August 1973 (CCD/413)

The paper contained suggestions providing for a gradual approach towards a comprehensive ban as a means of facilitating progress on the chemical weapons question. It outlined the general provisions that might be incorporated in an agreement, as well as the scope of the prohibition and verification procedures.

The General Assembly noted the working paper in its resolution 3077 (XXVIII) and referred to it indirectly in its 31/65.

190. **Japan:**
Proposal submitted in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament:

By the draft convention, which consisted of a preamble, 20 articles and three blank annexes, contain less toxic chemical agents, to be listed in an annex, might be temporarily excluded from the comprehensive ban, with subsequent negotiations for their elimination. The process would be implemented through an international verification agency which would be established and function in accordance with procedures set out in the convention.
The draft convention was referred to indirectly in General Assembly resolutions 3256 (XIX) and 31/65.

The draft convention was modified on 8 April 1975 (CCD/452).

191. **United Kingdom:**


The draft convention, consisting of a preamble and 17 articles, incorporated aspects of various earlier proposals. By the draft, all lethal chemical agents as well as those causing long-term physiological harm would be banned in three phases, ending with the destruction of stockpiles of the prohibited agents. Verification of compliance would involve an international verification agency and on-site inspections in certain instances.

The draft convention was indirectly noted in General Assembly resolution 31/65.
Inclusion of the item on the agenda was requested by the Soviet letter of 7 August 1974. By the draft convention, which consisted of a pre­amble and 12 articles, parties would refrain, under all circumstances, from the use of man-made means of influencing the environment for mili­tary and certain other purposes. Examples of the types of activities to be prohibited were included in the draft.

In resolution 3264 (XXIX), the General Assembly took note of the draft convention and requested the CCD to proceed towards agreement on the text of such a convention.

Soviet Union and United States:
Proposal submitted in the Conference on Disarmament:
Draft Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, 21 August 1975 (CCD/471 and CCD/472)

By the identical drafts, which consisted of a pre­amble and 9 articles, States parties would undertake not to engage in military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects, or to encourage such activities. Problems concerning application of the convention would be dealt with through consultation and co-operation.

The CCD established in 1976 a working group for the purpose of con­sidering any modifications to the identical drafts that any delegation might propose, and of facilitating the negotiation of the text of an agreement.

After extensive negotiations in the working group, resulting in broad agreement on the text of a draft convention, the CCD transmitted the report to the group, with the text as elaborated, to the General Assembly as an annex to the Committee's report. In the Assembly, a draft resolution was submitted in the First Committee by twenty-nine States, by which the General Assembly would, inter alia, refer the draft Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques to all States for their consideration, signature and ratification and request the Secretary-General to open it for signature and ratification at the earliest possible date. That draft resolution was adopted by the General Assembly on 10 December 1976 as resolution 31/72, and the Treaty was opened for signature and ratification on 18 May 1977.
In the paper, Mexico said that the identical joint drafts would legitimize certain activities provided only that they did not have widespread, long-lasting or severe effects, and proposed a new Article 1, by which States would undertake not to engage in any military or other hostile use of environmental modification techniques. The position was reflected in a draft resolution submitted in the First Committee of the General Assembly on 9 November 1976 by Mexico, with the co-sponsorship of Argentina, Cyprus, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, Mauritius, Panama, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela. As ultimately revised, the General Assembly, by that draft, would request the Secretary-General to transmit the text of the draft convention to all States and invite their views and suggestions. The General Assembly decided, however, not to put that draft to a vote after it had adopted its resolution 31/72.

A draft convention derived from the identical Soviet Union and United States drafts, but including a number of changes suggested in the working group of the CCD, particularly the establishment of a consultative committee of experts to deal with problems relating to the objectives of, or to the application of, the provisions of the Convention, was submitted to the General Assembly. The Assembly referred it to all States for their consideration, signature and ratification.

The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques was opened for signature on 18 May 1977.
8. New weapons of mass destruction

195a Soviet Union:
Letter requesting inclusion of an item entitled Prohibition of development of mass destruction and new system of such weapons in the agenda of the Assembly, 23 September 1975 (A/10343), and draft resolution of 1 December 1975 (A/C.1/L.711/Rev.1)

By the proposal, which included a draft agreement on the matter as an annex, the Assembly would adopt a decision favouring the idea of the conclusion of an international agreement outlawing development of such new weapons and systems. By the draft resolution the Assembly would consider such an agreement necessary, would take note of the annexed draft agreement, and would request the CCD to work out such an agreement.

The proposal was adopted as resolution 3479 (XXX) and has subsequently been considered extensively in the CCD sessions of 1976 and 1977, as well as in the thirty-first and thirty-second sessions of the General Assembly. At the former session, the Assembly adopted resolution 31/74, requesting the CCD to continue negotiations on the subject with a view to working out the text of an agreement at its next session. The Soviet Union and the United States reported at the 1977 session of the CCD that they were conducting bilateral consultations on the subject at a possible joint initiative dealing with a ban on radiological weapons and that considerable progress had been made.

196. Soviet Union:

The proposal in the CCD consisted of a draft treaty containing a preamble and 9 articles, by which parties would undertake not to develop or manufacture new types of weapons of mass destruction or new systems of such weapons. The draft contained provision for listing the weapons and systems to be included. Enforcement would be through consultation and co-operation, with recourse to the Security Council, which would initiate investigations.

The proposal was discussed in the CCD.
197. Soviet Union:

Paper submitted in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament:
On definitions of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, 10 August 1976 (CCD/514)

The paper proposed draft definitions for new types of weapons of mass destruction and for new systems of weapons of mass destruction, which should include types of weapons which were based on qualitatively new principles of action and systems of weapons which assume the character of weapons of mass destruction as a result of the use of new technical elements in their strike or logistic devices.

The proposed definitions have been extensively considered in the CCD, particularly in informal meetings with the participation of experts from a number of Member States.

198. Soviet Union:

Proposal submitted in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament:

By the revised draft the basic prohibitions were indicated more clearly by including a specific statement of the meaning of the term "new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction", and showing the items to be included in an annex which would be supplemented as necessary.

The revised draft is now being considered by the General Assembly.
69.

9. Measures to guard against surprise attack

199. Soviet Union
Proposal submitted in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament
Commission concerning the Conclusion of an International Conven-
tion on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic
weapons, 10 May 1955 (DC/SC.1/26/Rev.2)

The plan proposed, inter alia, the creation of an international agency,
linked to the Security Council, which would be allowed to instal con-
trol posts on a basis of reciprocity, at major ports, at railway
junctions, on main highways and at airfields in the territories of all
States concerned.

It was reflected in General Assembly resolution 914 (X) and
1011 (XI). The proposal was considered in the Sub-Committee.

200. United States
Outline Plan for the Implementation of Aerial Inspection Proposal,
submitted in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission,
30 August 1955 (DC/SC.1/31)

The plan provided for the exchange of information between the USSR and
the USA about the strength, command structure and disposition of person-
nel, units and equipment of all major land, sea and air forces, as well
as a complete list of military plants, facilities and installations.
Verification was to be made by aerial reconnaissance and ground observers.

After discussion in the Sub-Committee, the proposal was transmitted
to the General Assembly at its tenth session. It was reflected in
General Assembly resolution 914 (X), 1017 (XI) and 1114 (XII).

The plan was discussed in the Sub-Committee.

201. United States
Memorandum supplementing the Outline Plan for the Implementation
of "Aerial Inspection Proposal", submitted in the Sub-Committee of
the Disarmament Commission, 7 October 1955 (DC/SC.1/36)

In the memorandum the importance of inspection and control were reiterated.
Actions were considered necessary in respect of the accountability of
nuclear materials and to guard against the possibility of surprise attack.
The United States desire for reduction of armaments was stated.

The proposals were supplemented in working papers on Technical
Exchange Mission (DC/SC.1/39 of 21 March 1956) and on Demonstration
Test Area (DC/SC.1/40 of 21 March 1956).

The proposals were discussed in the Sub-Committee.
202. **Soviet Union**
Memorandum submitted in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission: Implementation of partial disarmament measures, 30 April 1957 (DC/SC.1/55)

The memorandum proposed, *inter alia*, the establishing of control posts on the territory of States; liquidation of foreign bases; aerial inspection.

The proposal was discussed in the Sub-Committee.

203. **Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States**
Working paper submitted in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission: System of Inspection to Safeguard Against the Possibility of Surprise Attack, 2 August 1957 (DC/SC.1/63/Rev.1)

By the proposal, either the whole territories of the United States, Alaska, Canada and the USSR, or more limited areas which might be agreed upon, would be open to inspection. Inspection would include aerial methods and various agreed ground observation posts.

The paper was considered in the Sub-Committee.

204. **Soviet Union**
Declaration submitted at the Geneva Surprise Attack Conference: Measures for Preventing Surprise Attack, 26 November 1958 (GEN/SA/7/Rev.1)

By the proposal, measures would be based on the creation of ground control posts and aerial photography in certain regions. Other steps which would have to be taken to ensure the effectiveness of the measures would include reductions of forces and removal of nuclear weapons from German territory.

The proposals were considered by the Disarmament Sub-Committee.

205. **Albania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union**

By this proposal, ground control posts and aerial photography procedures would be established in certain zones. The tasks and functions of both components of the system were outlined. The system would be supervised by an international body consisting of representatives of member States of the NATO and WTO alliances.

The proposals were discussed in the Disarmament Sub-Committee.
206. Canada, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States Disarmament Plan submitted in the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament, 16 March 1960 (ENDC/3)

The plan proposed, inter alia, measures to prevent surprise attack. The paper was discussed in the TNDC.

207. United States Programme for general and complete disarmament submitted in the Disarmament Commission, 27 June 1960 (DC/154)

The programme proposed, inter alia, the creation of zones of inspection against surprise attack.

The proposals were discussed in the Disarmament Commission.

208. United States Working paper submitted in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee: Reduction of the Risk of War through Accident, Miscalculation or Failure of Communication, 12 December 1962 (ENDC/70)

In this working paper, inter alia, advance notification of major military movements, observation posts, exchanges of military missions and communications in respect of military emergencies were proposed.

The proposal was considered by the ENDC.

209. Soviet Union Memorandum on collateral disarmament measures submitted in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, 28 January 1964 (ENDC/123)

The memorandum contained, inter alia, support for effective measures to prevent surprise attack through the creation of observation posts in the territories of the two groups of European States, if accompanied by certain other measures.

The proposals were considered by the ENDC.

210. United Kingdom Paper submitted in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee: Observation Posts, 26 March 1964 (ENDC/130)

The proposal set out some basic details of a system of observation posts including its organization and operation, supervision and manning, methods of observation and communication.

The proposal was discussed in the ENDC.
10. Military budgets and related matters

21. France:
Memorandum submitted in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission: Draft Agreement on the Financial Supervision of Disarmament and the Allocation for Peaceful Purposes of the Funds Made Available, 29 August 1955 (DC/SC.1/27)

The paper constituted a draft agreement and proposed specifically that the possibility of a link between disarmament and development be investigated. It went on to discuss how collection and distribution of financial resources transferred from military expenditure might be administered.

The General Assembly, in its resolution 914 (X), called upon all States to study the proposals of France.

212. Soviet Union:
Memorandum submitted in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission: Implementation of partial disarmament measures, 30 April 1957 (DC/SC.1/55)

The memorandum proposed, inter alia, reduction of military budgets by 15 per cent.

3. Soviet Union:
Draft resolution submitted in the First Committee of the General Assembly: Reduction of the Soviet, American, British and French Military Budgets by 10 to 15 per cent and the Use of Part of the Savings So Effected for Assistance to the Underdeveloped Countries, 10 October 1958 (A/C.1/L.204)

By the draft resolution, the Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United States and France would reduce their military budgets by at least 10 to 15 per cent and would allocate some of the funds thus released for projects in developing countries.

The draft was discussed in the First Committee.

4. Soviet Union:
Proposal submitted in the Second Committee of the General Assembly: Draft Declaration Concerning the Conversion to Peaceful Uses of the Resources Released by Disarmament, 1 October 1962 (A/C.2/L.646)

By the draft declaration the General Assembly would draw widespread attention to the economic aspects of disarmament, and, in that light, the Secretary-General would hold consultations with pertinent governments concerning an international programme of assistance which would utilize part of the resources released through disarmament to assist economic development.

The proposal was reflected in resolution 1837 (XVII), adopted by the General Assembly on 18 December 1962.

* See also document A/AC.187/72 and A/AC.187/73 of Preparatory committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.
215. **Brazil:**


In the paper it was proposed that all Governments carry out reductions in their military budgets and apply the resources thus released towards an economy of peace and social and economic development projects. At least 20 per cent of the funds released would be credited to a fund to be established for such projects.

216. **Soviet Union:**

*Draft resolution submitted in the General Assembly: Reduction of Military Budgets, 9 October 1973 (A/L.701)*

By the draft resolution the General Assembly would recommend that the permanent members of the Security Council should reduce their military budgets by 10 per cent during the following financial year and allot 10 per cent of the funds thus released for assistance to developing countries. It would also encourage other States with major military or economic potential to take similar action, and would establish a committee to distribute the funds released.

The draft was adopted as resolution 3093 A (XXVIII). At the same session of the General Assembly, *Mexico* submitted a draft resolution, subsequently adopted as resolution 3093 B, requesting the Secretary-General to prepare, with the assistance of experts, a report on the general subject, which was submitted to the twenty-ninth session (A/9770). At that session, the General Assembly adopted a resolution 3254 (XXIX), *inter alia*, requesting wide distribution for the report; inviting all States to communicate to the Secretary-General their views and suggestions on all points deemed pertinent, including the meaning and scope of the term "military budgets", possible procedures for establishing a system of standardized military budgets and the percentage reduction of budgets that should be applied to the various groups of advanced military States; and requesting the Secretary-General to report those views. The report requested was submitted to the General Assembly (A/10165 and Add. 1 and 2), which adopted resolution 3463 (XXX), *inter alia*, appealing to all States to strive to reach agreed reductions and requesting the Secretary-General to prepare a report on several technical aspects of the question, including a definition of military expenditures. The report requested was submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session, and the General Assembly adopted resolution 31/87 *inter alia*, requesting wide distribution of the report and inviting all States to give their views on it for reporting to the thirty-second General Assembly.
II. Elimination of foreign military bases*

Draft resolution submitted in the First Committee of the General Assembly: Elimination of Foreign Military Bases in the Countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, 23 September 1966 (A/6392)

By the draft resolution the General Assembly would invite States with military bases in independent States or dependent territories in the areas mentioned to eliminate such bases. The fulfilment of the terms of the resolution would be supervised by the United Nations.

The proposal was not voted upon, but the Assembly adopted a resolution by which the question was referred to the ENDC. It was not discussed extensively in the ENDC, but was referred by the Assembly to the ENDC again in 1967, and proposed again in a Soviet memorandum in 1968 (see Chapter III, item 53, above). Although the idea has continued to receive significant support, no substantive action has taken place.

* For early proposals containing measures on foreign bases, see Chapter II, items 17, 24 and 31, and Chapter III, items 34, 36, 38, 41, 43, 45 and 47.
12. Arms transfers

218. Malta:

By the draft resolution the General Assembly would invite the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to consider the arms trade with a view to making proposals to the Assembly concerning a system of publicity on the matter. The sponsor did not press the resolution to a vote.

219. United States:
Statement made in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, 19 April 1966 (ENDC/PV.257)

In the statement the United States proposed 6 main principles regarding agreements to control the transfer of arms, as follows: countries should not acquire, from any source, the types of armaments to be regulated under such agreements; the initiative should be from within the region concerned; the arrangements should include all States in the region; suppliers should respect the regional arrangements; the arrangements should contribute to security and stability; and provision should be made for assurance that the arrangement would be respected.

220. Denmark, Iceland, Japan, Malta and Norway:
Draft resolution introduced in the First Committee of the General Assembly: Arms Transfers, 21 November 1968 (A/C.1/L.446)

By the draft resolution, the General Assembly would request the Secretary-General to obtain views of States concerning registration and publishing of information on the arms trade and to report on the results of the enquiry to the Assembly at its subsequent session. The sponsors did not press the resolution to a vote.

221. United States:
Working paper submitted in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Regional Arms Agreements, 12 August 1970 (CCD/307)

The proposal reconfirmed the 6 principles put forward previously (see above), and added that unilateral decisions might be taken regarding transfers of certain types of arms, with co-operation from within a region and from outside, and that countries might unilaterally undertake to supply pertinent information concerning their arms trade.

222. Bolivia, Colombia, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ghana, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Liberia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Paraguay, the Philippines, Singapore, Venezuela and the United Republic of Cameroon:
Draft resolution submitted in the First Committee of the General Assembly, 22 November 1976 (A/C.1/31/L.20)

By the draft resolution, the General Assembly would request all Member States to communicate their views on the subject to the Secretary-General and request the Secretary-General, with the assistance of experts, to make a factual study of the question. A motion put forward by opponents of the draft resolution to adjourn debate on the question was adopted.
13. Non-aggression pact

223. Soviet Union:
Memorandum submitted in the General Assembly: Measures to Ease International Tension, Strengthen Confidence Among States and Contribute to General and Complete Disarmament, 26 September 1961 (A/1482)

The memorandum proposed, inter alia, conclusion of a non-aggression pact between NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries.

224. Soviet Union:

By the draft treaty, which consisted of a preamble and 6 articles, the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and to the North Atlantic Treaty would solemnly undertake to refrain from attack and the threat or use of force against one another, in any manner inconsistent with the principles of the United Nations Charter, and to settle disputes by peaceful means only.
V. WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE*

225. Burma, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroun, the Central African Republic, Ceylon, the Congo (Brazzaville), Cyprus, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Malawi, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, the Sudan, Syria, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, the United Arab Republic, the United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Yugoslavia and Zambia:
Draft resolution submitted to the Disarmament Commission on Convening of a World Disarmament Conference, 3 June 1965 (DC/221/Rev.1)

The resolution recommended that the General Assembly give urgent consideration to the proposal for the convening of a world disarmament conference which had been suggested by the Second Conference of Non-Aligned Countries held in Cairo in 1964.

The proposal was embodied in resolution 2030 (XX), adopted by the General Assembly on 29 November 1965.

226. Soviet Union:
Letter to the Secretary-General: World Disarmament Conference, 6 September 1971 (A/8491; A/L.651)

The letter stressed that in recent years some arms limitation agreements had been reached, which had to some extent limited the dimension of the arms race, but fundamental progress towards controlling the dangerous practice of stockpiling and improving armaments had yet to be made. It was most desirable to encourage more active efforts on the part of all countries of the world, both nuclear and non-nuclear, to solve the problems relating to disarmament. Such a goal in the opinion of the Soviet Government could be served by the calling of a world disarmament conference. The conference could become a forum where all countries of the world without exception could jointly discuss the problems of disarmament in all their ramifications and attempt to find feasible and generally acceptable means of solving those problems. Such a conference must be truly universal and all countries should be represented at it on the basis of equality. It was believed that a world disarmament conference could consider the whole complex of problems relating to disarmament with regard to both nuclear and conventional armaments.

The proposal has been reflected in resolutions 2833 (XXVI), 2930 (XXVII), 3183 (XXVIII), 3260 (XXIX), 3469 (XXX) and 31/90 since its introduction.

An Ad Hoc Committee was set up to study the views of States and to report to the General Assembly.

* See also Parts II and III. Proposals prior to 1964 not listed, were embodied in various proposals for general and complete disarmament or other multiple disarmament measures, listed above.
VI. SPECIAL SESSION

227. **Non-Aligned States:**

By the proposal, the non-aligned countries, inter alia, recommended that the General Assembly adopt a decision on the convening either of a special session of the Assembly devoted to disarmament, or on the convening of a world disarmament conference.

228. **Non-Aligned States:**
Proposal contained in the Declaration of the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries held at Lima from 25 to 30 August 1975, 5 September (A/10217)

By the proposal, the non-aligned countries, inter alia, supported the convening of a world disarmament conference, and proposed that, if it was not possible, a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament issues should be convened.

The part of the proposal concerning the special session was discussed by the General Assembly at its 30th session.

229. **Soviet Union:**
Proposal contained in the memorandum submitted in the General Assembly on questions of ending the arms race and disarmament, 28 September 1976 (A/31/232)

By the proposal it was considered that a special session of the United Nations General Assembly could be an appropriate forum for discussing disarmament questions in all their scope, but the holding of a special session of the General Assembly should not put aside the question of a World Disarmament Conference.

The proposal was subsequently discussed in the First Committee and the CCD.

230. **Seventy-two Nations:**
Draft resolution submitted in the First Committee: Convening of a Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, 29 November 1976 (A/C.1/L.7/Rev.2)

The draft proposed the convening of a special session to be held in New York in May/June 1978; the establishment of a Preparatory Committee composed of fifty-four Member States, etc.

The proposal was adopted by the General Assembly as Resolution 31/189 B on 21 December 1976.
ANNEX I

Agreements and Other International Instruments Related to Arms
Limitation, Disarmament and Confidence-Building Measures

A. Multilateral agreements

1. Protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare (Geneva Protocol).
   Signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925
   Entered into force: for each signatory power as from date of deposit of its ratification
   The depositary government: France

2. Antarctic Treaty
   Signed at Washington on 1 December 1959
   Entered into force on 23 June 1961
   The depositary government: USA

   Signed at Moscow on 5 August 1963
   Entered into force on 10 October 1963
   The depositary governments: USSR, UK, USA

   Signed at London, Moscow and Washington on 27 January 1967
   Entered into force on 10 October 1967
   The depositary governments: USSR, UK, USA

5. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco).
   Signed at Mexico City on 14 February 1967
   Entered into force: for each State that has ratified it when the requirements specified in the treaty have been met.
   The depositary government: Mexico

6. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty - NPT)
   Signed at London, Moscow and Washington on 1 July 1968
   Entered into force on 5 March 1970
   The depositary governments: USSR, UK, USA
   Signed at London, Moscow and Washington on 11 February 1971
   Entered into force on 18 May 1972
   The depositary governments: USSR, UK, USA

8. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BW Convention)
   Signed at London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972
   Entered into force on 26 March 1975
   The depositary governments: USSR, UK, USA

9. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD Convention)
   Opened for signature at Geneva on 18 May 1977
   The depositary: UN Secretary-General

B. Bilateral agreements

1. USSR-USA Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of a Direct Communications Link ("Hot Line" Agreement)
   Signed at Geneva on 20 June 1963
   Entered into force on 20 June 1963

2. USSR-UK Agreement on the Establishment of a Direct Communications Line
   Signed at London on 25 August 1967
   Entered into force on 27 October 1967

3. Agreement on Measures to Improve the USA-USSR Direct Communications Link ("Hot Line" Modernization Agreement)
   Signed at Washington on 30 September 1971
   Entered into force on 30 September 1971

4. Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the USSR and the USA (Nuclear Accidents Agreement)
   Signed at Washington on 30 September 1971
   Entered into force on 30 September 1971

5. USSR-USA Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and Over the High Seas
   Signed at Moscow on 25 May 1972
   Entered into force on 25 May 1972

6. USSR-USA Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (SALT ABM Treaty)
   Signed at Moscow on 26 May 1972
   Entered into force on 3 October 1972
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agreement Description</th>
<th>Signing Location(s)</th>
<th>Signing Date(s)</th>
<th>Entry into Force Date(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>USSR-USA Interim Agreement on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT Interim Agreement)</td>
<td>Signed at Moscow on 26 May 1972</td>
<td>Entered into force on 3 October 1972</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Protocol to the US-Soviet Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas</td>
<td>Signed at Washington on 22 May 1973</td>
<td>Entered into force on 22 May 1973</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>USSR-USA Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War</td>
<td>Signed at Washington on 22 June 1973</td>
<td>Entered into force on 22 June 1973</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>USSR-UK Joint Declaration on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons</td>
<td>Signed at Moscow on 17 February 1975</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>France-USSR Agreement on the Prevention of the Accidental or Unauthorized Use of Nuclear Weapons</td>
<td>The agreement was concluded through an exchange of letters between the Foreign Ministers of France and the USSR, of 16 July 1976</td>
<td>Entered into force on 16 July 1976.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX II

Index of proposals by countries
The numbers given indicate serial numbers under which the proposals are listed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>52, 67, 91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>63, 69, 143, 152, 163, 177, 188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>75, 134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>141, 142, 143, 222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>52, 63, 69, 95, 98, 100, 101, 113, 115, 116, 124, 141, 142, 143, 152, 157, 173, 177, 185, 188, 215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>34, 52, 67, 98, 134, 151, 173, 178, 181, 183, 187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>52, 63, 91, 95, 98, 100, 101, 113, 115, 116, 152, 166, 173, 177, 185, 188, 225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>66, 225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Byelorussian SSR</td>
<td>67, 178, 181, 183, 187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>91, 225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>6, 20, 26, 30, 33, 35, 51, 52, 87, 98, 134, 151, 159, 173, 203, 206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>65, 225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>12, 52, 141, 142, 143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>52, 65, 143, 222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo (Brazzaville)</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>134, 143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Pages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>65, 67, 225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>34, 52, 67, 98, 134, 151, 173, 178, 181, 183, 187, 205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Yemen</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>52, 168, 220, 222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>141, 142, 143, 222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt/UAR</td>
<td>51, 52, 63, 91, 95, 97, 98, 100, 101, 113, 115, 116, 121, 139, 147, 152, 166, 173, 177, 182, 185, 188, 225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>143, 222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>41, 52, 63, 75, 91, 95, 97, 98, 100, 101, 113, 115, 116, 134, 139, 152, 166, 173, 177, 185, 188, 225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>52, 75, 134, 146, 168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>8, 9, 12, 14, 18, 20, 21, 24, 26, 30, 35, 39, 41, 52, 63, 75, 91, 95, 97, 98, 100, 101, 113, 115, 116, 134, 139, 152, 166, 173, 177, 185, 188, 225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>41, 69, 91, 134, 139, 222, 225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>41, 139, 225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>52, 67, 134, 151, 173, 178, 179, 181, 183, 187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>52, 220, 222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>51, 52, 63, 66, 69, 75, 78, 82, 89, 91, 95, 98, 101, 113, 115, 116, 144, 152, 166, 173, 177, 185, 225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>41, 67, 91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>66, 67, 147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>66, 91, 225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>55, 62, 107, 134, 222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>33, 35, 52, 55, 59, 98, 112, 123, 129, 151, 173, 206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Page Numbers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>51, 52, 55, 88, 168, 188, 190, 220, 222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>67, 225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>66, 75, 225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>134, 225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>41, 67, 69, 222, 225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>31, 117, 225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>56, 57, 218, 220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>51, 52, 60, 62, 63, 69, 75, 77, 95, 98, 100, 101, 113, 115, 116, 120, 134, 142, 143, 148, 152, 162, 165, 166, 172, 173, 177, 185, 186, 194, 216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>52, 67, 134, 151, 178, 179, 181, 183, 187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>62, 63, 75, 91, 134, 139, 150, 152, 166, 177, 185, 225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>91, 225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>58, 151, 222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>72, 134, 149, 222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>41, 51, 52, 63, 67, 69, 75, 95, 97, 98, 100, 101, 104, 113, 115, 116, 125, 130, 139, 152, 155, 166, 173, 177, 185, 225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>51, 52, 220, 222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>62, 63, 70, 145, 152, 166, 177, 185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>143, 222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>63, 143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>65, 72, 75, 222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Pages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>34, 51, 52, 67, 98, 134, 137, 140, 151, 173, 178, 179, 181, 183, 187, 205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>34, 54, 64, 69, 71, 72, 75, 98, 122, 132, 134, 151, 168, 173, 178, 181, 183, 187, 205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>117, 225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>41, 66, 67, 117, 225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka/Ceylon</td>
<td>41, 66, 72, 91, 225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>41, 225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toro</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>75, 143, 225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>41, 72, 225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>66, 67, 225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian SSR</td>
<td>67, 178, 181, 183, 187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Republics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of Soviet</td>
<td>3, 9, 14, 18, 20, 21, 24, 26, 30, 33, 35, 87, 92, 96, 98, 102, 126, 131, 134, 151, 161, 173, 176, 191, 203, 206, 210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Republic of</td>
<td>75, 222, 225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Pages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Republic of Tanzania</td>
<td>66, 225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>1, 5, 9, 13, 14, 16, 17, 20, 23, 26, 28, 30, 33, 35, 37, 38, 43, 45, 48, 49, 83, 87, 92, 96, 98, 111, 118, 127, 131, 133, 134, 151, 156, 158, 164, 167, 169, 173, 174, 184, 193, 200, 201, 203, 206, 207, 208, 219, 221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>72, 143, 222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>66, 67, 91, 225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>27, 52, 60, 62, 63, 66, 69, 75, 134, 152, 166, 168, 177, 185, 225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>66, 225</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Aligned States</td>
<td>40, 46, 61, 68, 73, 227, 228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seventy-two Nations - Special Session</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parties to NPT Review Conference</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A list of disarmament and related proposals officially submitted to the United Nations

1. On page 3, II. 1, first line in the third paragraph. Write Commission instead of Committee.

2. Insert page 52 after page 62. Renumber pages 53 to 62 and item numbers 153 to 186 accordingly.

77-28555
A list of disarmament and related proposals officially submitted to the United Nations

(Background paper prepared by the Secretariat)

Corrigendum

1. Page 3, item 2, first paragraph, sixth line
   For conversion read convention

2. Page 11, item 25
   The title should read
   Proposal introduced in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission: ...

3. Page 41, item 115, first paragraph, third line
   Delete directly and insert
   nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate nuclear weapons;
   should embody an acceptable balance of mutual

4. Page 58, item 170, title, last line
   For (A/3878) read (A/3818)

5. Page 67, item 195, title, first line
   After development of insert new weapons of

78-02040
# UNITED NATIONS
## GENERAL ASSEMBLY

PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

Views of delegations to the Preparatory Committee on the agenda and all other relevant questions relating to the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament

*(Background paper prepared by the Secretariat)*

## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. General remarks</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Objectives of the Special Session</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Preparatory work for the Special Session</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Agenda</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Organization of work of the Special Session</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. Principal document or documents of the Special Session</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. Role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

77-15372
INTRODUCTION

At its sixth meeting on 11 May 1977, the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament requested the Secretariat to prepare a document classifying, under various headings, the replies received from Governments pursuant to operative paragraph 3 of resolution 31/189 B (XXXI) of the General Assembly.

At its seventh meeting on 12 May 1977, the Preparatory Committee approved a list of headings to be used by the Secretariat in fulfilling the task assigned to it. At the request of a number of delegations, it was announced by the Chairman that the opinions expressed by delegations during the general debate held by the Committee would be included in a subsequent document.

The present document incorporates, under the various headings, the views of delegations on the agenda and all other relevant questions relating to the Special Session of the General Assembly, as reflected in the summary records of the Committee.
## I. GENERAL REMARKS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany, Federal Republic of</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republic</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I. GENERAL REMARKS

AUSTRALIA

"... said that the special session of the General Assembly on disarmament provided a unique opportunity to secure progress in arms control and disarmament. It should not be regarded merely as a stepping-stone for the establishment of new disarmament machinery, but should be used as a vehicle for appraising developments to date. It was important that delegations, when identifying the factors which had obstructed disarmament, should be less concerned about apportioning blame to any State or group of States than about making a concerted effort to overcome those obstacles." (A/AC.187/SR.10, p. 2)

AUSTRIA

"... recalled that, in the introduction to his report on the work of the Organization in 1975, the Secretary-General of the United Nations had deplored the fact that it had not proved possible to halt or limit the arms race in a world increasingly preoccupied with the problems of social justice, hunger, poverty, development and an equitable sharing of resources. Today, that assessment was even more valid. The policy of détente, of which the Austrian Government was a firm advocate, would have credibility only if it produced tangible results in the field of disarmament. It was with those considerations in mind that the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, at the thirty-first session of the General Assembly, had expressed Austria's full support for the convening of a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament." (A/AC.187/SR.7, p.2)

BELGIUM

"... The past 20 years had witnessed the growth of the role of the non-aligned world in international affairs. It was satisfactory to note in that connexion that the non-aligned countries had originated the idea of convening a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament." (A/AC.187/SR.10, p.9)

BRAZIL

"... stated that, throughout the years, Brazil had shown its readiness to participate in efforts aimed at promoting the objective of..."
general and complete disarmament under effective international control, not only in the General Assembly but also in CCD and in other international bodies. Brazil had co-sponsored resolution 31/189 B which had been adopted by the General Assembly by consensus.

The views of the Brazilian Government on the subject of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament were set forth in document A/AC.187/49 dated 11 May 1977.** (A/AC.187/SR.9, p.4)

**Bulgaria**

**said that the People's Republic of Bulgaria attached great importance to efforts to curb the arms race with the ultimate aim of achieving general and complete disarmament under strict international control. In conjunction with other socialist countries, Bulgaria was doing everything in its power to overcome the obstacles to disarmament in order to achieve decisive results in that area and to bring about the same relaxation of tension in the military field as had been achieved in the political field. Bulgaria would always speak out decisively in favour of the control of the arms race and disarmament.**

In recent years, as a result of a process of relaxation of international tension and as a result of international and bilateral agreements, a number of measures had been taken to bring the arms race within established limits. Important negotiations were currently in progress on the adoption of new measures to limit armaments and bring about disarmament. However, although progress had been made towards reducing the danger of a new world conflict, there had been no slowing down of the arms race, which continued to be an obstacle to world peace and security, consumed enormous material resources and adversely affected world economic progress. For those reasons, the limitation of the arms race was a legitimate cause for concern for all nations and peoples and one of the most urgent tasks of the contemporary world. In that connexion, he referred to the proposal of the representative of the USSR concerning the convening of a world disarmament conference. That proposal had received the support of the majority of States Members of the United Nations and also of the Fifth Conference of Non-Aligned Countries. In a forum of that size, Governments could, with some hope of success, undertake an examination of all aspects of disarmament questions and take effective measures. Unfortunately, in spite of the numerous General Assembly resolutions supporting the world disarmament conference, it had not been possible to hold the conference thus far, for reasons which were well known.** (A/AC.187/SR.10, p.10)
COLOMBIA

said it must be remembered that the forthcoming special session devoted to disarmament had been the solution found by the General Assembly to try to remedy the resounding failure of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and the failure of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, which had not yet produced any positive results that might benefit mankind. (A/AC.187/SR.7, p.7)

No matter how hard the General Assembly tried to achieve positive results in the field of disarmament, its efforts would be futile unless the countries responsible for the tragedy of the arms race throughout the world showed a will to co-operate.

In its letter addressed to the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 31/189 B, the Government of Colombia stated that disarmament was in no way dependent on the will of the Organization as such, or even on that of the vast majority of its Members; it depended solely on the will of the countries that manufactured weapons, that had been stockpiling them, that traded in them and that derived both military and political power and enormous financial profit from that lethal industry. So long as those countries were unwilling to disarm, to reduce the rate of weapons production or to place the interests of mankind in general above their own interests and hunger for power, nothing would be gained, no matter how many special sessions of the General Assembly or how many world conferences on disarmament were held. (A/AC.187/SR.7, p.8)

CUBA

said that the great majority of mankind had always yearned eagerly for general and complete disarmament. The growth of the arms race, which drained away huge resources that should be used to improve the living conditions of all peoples, was arousing justified alarm throughout the world. Never before had arms had such destructive power nor had the risk of the destruction of the human race been so real, for the currently existing nuclear stockpiles had the potential to destroy the planet earth several times over.

In 1973, the international community had spent $30 million an hour on armies and weapons, i.e. more than $300 billion a year. The funds thus wasted in four days could have fed, for a whole year, 200 million children who were the victims of poverty in various parts of the world. Nevertheless, the arms race continued while hundreds of millions of human beings lacked the bare essentials of life. That apparent paradox was inexplicable if one forgot that war and the threat of war had
been and were a fabulous business for powerful imperialist monopolies. The latter were the worst enemies of world peace; they had introduced gross distortions into the economies of a number of capitalist countries, which could apparently find no outlet but in promoting international tension and conflict. Accordingly, universal disarmament could not be achieved without establishing a system of international relations that was based on equality and respect for the rights of all peoples, that excluded all manifestations of a policy of aggression, domination and interference, and that enabled all States, large and small, to develop peacefully, independently and safely.

The present situation called for prompt action. The process of détente should be extended to the military field. In that connexion, Cuba reiterated its support for the proposals contained in the memorandum of 28 September 1976 addressed to the Secretary-General by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR. (A/AC.187/SR.13, pp. 5-6)

"His Government attached the greatest importance to the prompt convening of the world disarmament conference, which had been consistently advocated by the non-aligned countries since their first summit conference held in 1961 in Belgrade. The conference, with the participation of all States, could examine the agenda in proper perspective, giving due attention to all the factors involved. His delegation therefore felt that the world disarmament conference should be given high priority as a separate item on the agenda of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. However, the special session should not be regarded as a substitute for the world conference but should rather be a gateway leading to its early convocation.

The international community could thus advance towards general and complete disarmament in conditions which guaranteed the independence, territorial integrity and legitimate rights of all countries and which strengthened the process of international détente, making it irreversible and world-wide." (A/AC.187/SR.13, p.6)

CYPRUS

"recalled that there was a close relationship between disarmament and international security. However, for many years the disarmament effort had been kept isolated, with no parallel effort for international security. That isolation had deprived negotiations of the necessary background of international security and of the resulting climate of confidence. The United Nations Charter, particularly Articles 11, 26 and 47, showed the close relationship between disarmament and security. Furthermore, the first resolution adopted by the
United Nations in 1946 had been devoted to disarmament and linked to the question of security. In another early resolution (41 (1)), the General Assembly had asserted that the problem of security was closely connected with that of disarmament. However, subsequent General Assembly resolutions on disarmament in the 1950s had made no mention of international security. The many rounds of negotiations that had followed had yielded no results. High hopes had been raised in 1961 by the McCloy-Zorin joint statement of agreed principles on general and complete disarmament. In the long disarmament negotiations over many years, attention had been focused on the mechanics of disarmament proposals without any parallel effort towards international security. Yet, the joint statement of agreed principles, in article 7, had clearly provided that progress in disarmament should be accompanied by necessary measures to maintain international peace and security, including the obligation of States to place at the disposal of the United Nations agreed manpower necessary for an international peace force to be equipped with agreed types of armaments.

At the current stage of disarmament discussions, it must be accepted that the progress on disarmament could not be achieved outside the political context of the world. Effective progress on the problem of the arms race and disarmament would continue to be hampered so long as there was no means of ensuring the security of nations other than dependence on armaments. The functions of the United Nations, and more particularly of the Security Council, for the maintenance of international peace and security would have to come into play.

Co-operative efforts in a climate of confidence were pre-eminently needed in the disarmament endeavour. Such a climate required a framework less antagonistic than that of the outworn concept of balance of power, which was but the extreme of mistrust - short of war. Regrettably, during all those years of disarmament efforts there had been no diminution of the arms race. The stockpiling of nuclear megatonnage had gone from 6,000 in 1960 to 320,000 in 1968, and it continued to escalate. According to expert opinion, no more than 12,000 megatons in terms of radio-activity alone would be enough to destroy all human life on the American continent and beyond. Thus, the existing stockpiles of hundreds of thousands of megatons could destroy not only all life on the planet but the atmospheric environment that made life possible. (A/AC.187/SR.13, pp. 6-7)

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

"His delegation was convinced that the special session would demonstrate the readiness of States to put an end to the arms race and would thus represent a concrete step towards general and complete disarmament, which was the goal of all realistic, sensible nations of the world." (A/AC.187/SR.11, p.7)
It was difficult to achieve disarmament without a climate of trust in the world; in that respect the progress registered in disarmament was a barometer indicating the level of mutual international confidence, which would be enhanced if States permitted international control and effective verification when undertaking commitments for disarmament. The world had to become a place where the force of argument replaced the argument of force. (A/AC.187/SR.10, p.5)

FRANCE

said that his Government's criticisms of disarmament efforts, as currently conceived and conducted, were well known. However, criticism was not sufficient. That was why his Government - which, as the French Minister for Foreign Affairs had stated in the General Assembly, was prepared to support any proposal aimed at genuine disarmament, i.e. the effective destruction of all types of weapons, both nuclear and conventional, at a reasonable rate of speed and under effective international control - welcomed the convening of a special session devoted to disarmament. (A/AC.187/SR.13, p.2)

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

said that the most vital task facing the international community at the present time was to remove the danger of another world war. In the Bucharest Declaration adopted in November 1976, his country, together with the other Warsaw Pact countries, had restated its readiness to co-operate actively with other States to remove that danger. The General Assembly, at its thirty-first session, had adopted a number of important decisions on disarmament and arms control and it was now up to the Preparatory Committee to ensure that efforts to implement those decisions were successful.

His country would do all it could to help guarantee the success of the special session of the General Assembly in creating the conditions for fuller and more effective disarmament and arms control. Political détente had made it possible to adopt international agreements on that subject, and those agreements must now be used to prevent further preparations for war, to promote international peace and security, and to free countries from the expenditure involved in participation in the arms race. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of his country had already described his Government's precise position on that issue in a letter addressed to the Secretary-General on 18 March 1977. (A/AC.187/SR.3, p.2)

said that the German Democratic Republic was striving for general and complete disarmament and was ready to exert
the greatest efforts to that end. Now that the necessity of halting the arms race and making a start on disarmament was apparent, there was a more favourable climate for the adoption of concrete measures to that end. The United Nations had a special responsibility for maintaining international peace and security by implementing the decisions of its various organs. (A/AC.187/SR.8, p.5)

"It was a fact that the first partial results in the area of arms limitation and disarmament already existed in the form of bilateral and multilateral agreements. On the other hand, the arms race continued to an increasing extent and the danger of a world war was not eliminated.

The German Democratic Republic had always linked consideration of the problem of arms limitation and disarmament with that of many other questions of world-wide importance, since all were closely bound up with the security of States, and their solution was therefore very complex. (A/AC.187/SR.8, pp.5-6)

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF

See II.

HUNGARY

" said that Hungary's support for the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament was not a matter of subjective decision, but followed from its social system. In every international forum, Hungary had supported attempts aimed at enhancing the cause of disarmament. (A/AC.187/SR.7, p.6)

INDIA

" said that the United Nations had been established to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war and that fulfilment of the other purposes of the Charter depended on ability to guarantee world peace. The purpose of the first resolution of the General Assembly, adopted in January 1946, had been the elimination of atomic weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. Despite that, military expenditure was currently of the order of $350 billion, involving a criminal waste of precious natural resources and brain power in a world experiencing hunger and need. Politicians and generals were seriously discussing whether a pre-emptive nuclear strike was not a blessing in disguise. In that game of war, which had developed its own inexorable logic, the chief protagonists displayed a terrifying indifference to the condition of the rest of humanity. Never before in the history of evolution had man possessed the means of destroying all life on earth and the mad logic to justify it. That was not a political question; it was essentially a moral problem.
It was not the first time that India was playing an active role in disarmament questions, for its experience in the matter dated back to the early days of the United Nations. In 1949, India had submitted a draft resolution proposing a Declaration on the duties of States and individuals in respect of the development of atomic energy in such a manner as to ensure the elimination of atomic weapons from national arsenals. In 1950, India had proposed a draft resolution on the establishment of a United Nations fund for reconstruction and development, to be formed of resources released through disarmament measures. In 1960, India had introduced a draft resolution outlining the principles for disarmament negotiations which were incorporated the following year in the McCloy-Zorin Agreement. Since 1962, India had participated continuously and actively in all disarmament organs. (A/AC.187/SR.9, p.10)

IRAQ

It said that Iraq attached the greatest importance to the question of disarmament, believing that it should be one of the fundamental goals of the United Nations since it was linked with the problem of maintaining international peace and security and could create a suitable atmosphere for promoting international co-operation and accelerating the process of social and economic development, particularly in the developing countries. It was deplorable that, while millions of people were suffering from malnutrition, huge sums of money and tremendous efforts were being wasted on the manufacture of nuclear and other types of destructive weapons. Those resources could and should be used for world economic and social development, especially in the developing countries where they were most needed.

His delegation believed that the United Nations should be at the heart of that process and had therefore joined with other non-aligned countries in sponsoring the resolution calling for the convening of a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. An appeal for the convening of a special session had been made at the Colombo Summit Conference, and he felt that the proposals made at that time by the non-aligned countries could serve as a fruitful basis for a successful session. He also wished to emphasize that the convening of a special session devoted to disarmament should in no sense represent an alternative to a world disarmament conference.

He observed that the aspirations of the international community for peace and security could not be attained in a vacuum. The granting of independence to peoples under foreign domination, the elimination of racism and colonialism, respect for the sovereignty of States and non-interference in their internal affairs would eliminate some of the factors which had led to the resort to arms. Genuine peace and security...
could not be achieved unless the strategies aimed at acquiring spheres of influence and world hegemony were eradicated." (A/AC.187/SR.11, pp. 7-8)

ITALY

"said that disarmament depended primarily on the capacity of the international community gradually to eradicate the suspicion, mistrust and lack of understanding which undermined relations between countries. His Government had always done its utmost to improve its relations with the rest of the world and intended to continue that policy and, if possible, to expand it in the field of disarmament. In that spirit, it had from the outset supported the initiative to convene a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and had co-sponsored the resolution on the subject."

(A/AC.187/SR.10, pp. 3-4)

JAPAN

"said that if the special session was to achieve its objective - general and complete disarmament - all participating States must remember that political confrontations were counterproductive and that the special session represented a constructive opportunity for deliberations which would lead to concrete disarmament measures."

(A/AC.187/SR.13, p.3)

Although a number of significant agreements on arms control and disarmament had been concluded in the past two decades, mainly as a result of the efforts of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, the measures adopted thus far did not seem to have produced sufficient progress. That was due to the fact that, in the past, disarmament negotiations had tended to give priority to preventive and peripheral measures. Accordingly, his Government earnestly hoped that the special session would devote itself to deliberations on crucial and central issues which would lead to the final goal of general and complete disarmament."

(MONGOLIA

"said that the views of the Mongolian People's Republic on the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament were contained in document A/AC.187/16. As could be seen from that document, the Mongolian People's Republic attached great importance to the special session, which would deal with the urgent problems of halting the arms race and bringing about disarmament.

Determined efforts to control the arms race and achieve general and complete disarmament occupied a prominent place in his country's foreign policy. The
Mongolian People's Republic had sponsored many constructive initiatives and proposals aimed at disarmament. As a member of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, it had played an active part in the preparation of various conventions in the field of disarmament. The arms race had led to the present disturbing situation in which huge stockpiles of nuclear weapons were threatening the very existence of all mankind and technological advances were moving towards the manufacture of increasingly deadly and destructive weapons. Such prospects were inevitably disturbing to all the peoples of the world. The movement for peace and general and complete disarmament had thus assumed international proportions, as could be seen from the World Assembly of peace-loving forces which had been held in Warsaw in May 1977 and in which representatives of 125 countries and more than 50 international organizations had taken part. Representatives of States Members of the United Nations should heed the voice of world opinion, which called for the adoption of effective general measures to lay the foundations of lasting world peace in accordance with the principles of the Charter.

In the opinion of his delegation there was an urgent need to eliminate the danger of a new world war. To that end, maximum use must be made of all positive conditions for the preparation and implementation of effective measures aimed at the reduction and prohibition of the arms race and at disarmament. (A/AC.187/SR.9, p.8)

NEPAL

Nepal said the fact that the General Assembly resolution convening a special session devoted to disarmament had been adopted by consensus was an indication of the growing willingness of States to participate in disarmament negotiations in a broader forum. The existing bilateral and multilateral fora, for negotiations had been unable to achieve any significant results in the field of disarmament, and as a consequence the world was armed to the teeth with the most lethal array of weapons imaginable.

Sensing the urgency and seriousness of the problem, the non-aligned countries had taken a positive step at their fifth summit meeting in Colombo in 1976 and had adopted a resolution calling on the United Nations to convene a special session devoted to disarmament. The General Assembly of the United Nations had subsequently adopted, at its thirty-first session, a resolution to convene a special session devoted to disarmament. (A/AC.187/SR.8, pp.3-4)

In conclusion, he wished to point out that many non-governmental organizations had been actively associated for many years with questions relating to disarmament; their knowledge and experience should be utilized and they should be encouraged to continue their useful work. (A/AC.187/SR.8, p.5)
11.

NETHERLANDS

"said that his Government's reply to the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 31/189 B on the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament showed that the Netherlands attached great importance to the problem of disarmament in both the nuclear and the conventional fields. In the United Nations, the Netherlands participated, in CCD and other bodies, in negotiations to bring about a limitation of the arms race, the ultimate goal being general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The special session would provide an opportunity to focus the attention of world public opinion on that question." (A/AC.187/SR.11, p.3)

NEW ZEALAND

"said that his country's support for the convening of a special session was a direct reflection of its concern at the lack of substantive progress on disarmament. The continued proliferation, both vertical and horizontal, of nuclear weapons jeopardized the relaxation of international tension. It was clear that the production and refinement of nuclear weapons could not be halted by bilateral negotiations between super-Powers. The problem was not simply one of maintaining a balance of terror among the leading military Powers. The economic burden of armaments at their present level could not be supported by either the developed or the developing countries." (A/AC.187/SR.11, p.4)

NIGERIA

"said that as a result of the endeavours of the founding members of the non-aligned movement to make known the objectives and perspectives of the group, Africa had remained relatively safe from atomic blasts. Paradoxically, nationalism had recently been increasing at a time when the most serious issues facing mankind could only be resolved through recognition of interdependence. As Mrs. Bandaranaike, the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, had said at the thirty-first session of the General Assembly, the polarization of the world around two power centres, which was the case until recently, was neither conducive to world security and peace nor even beneficial to the national or regional interests of the countries which had been parties to the military alliances of the immediate post-war period.

His delegation was pleased to note that the principles to which he had referred had gained support even outside the ambit of the group and it hoped that the non-aligned movement would become a melting-pot of nationalities. He expressed his appreciation to the delegations of Austria, Sweden, Pakistan, Romania,
Czechoslovakia, and many other countries, which had indicated their willingness to support the movement, and to the many non-governmental organizations which had pledged their unflinching support to the common endeavour to safeguard mankind.

In welcoming any assistance offered to the non-aligned group, he wished to make it clear that the group had never aspired to be a monolith and that, to the extent that circumstances permitted, its members could have reservations with respect to the group's official working paper or other working papers, which did not pretend to be an immutable blue print, but rather guidelines leading to agreement by consensus. (A/AC.187/SR.14, p.2)

**NORWAY**

... said that the forthcoming special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament offered a valuable opportunity for focusing global attention on a complex of problems which urgently required re-evaluation, fresh thoughts and, above all, political action. Not only did the arms race represent a threat to peace and to the security of all nations; it also involved an unacceptable waste of resources in a world of poverty and distress. The special session would contribute to a greater understanding and awareness on the part of the public of issues which to an increasing extent were becoming technical questions only fully understood by experts. In that connexion, the non-governmental organizations had an important function to perform. (A/AC.187/SR.8, pp.2-3)

**PAKISTAN**

... Consideration of the record of the past 30 years led to the inescapable conclusion that, although a number of noteworthy measures had been taken in the field of disarmament, they had failed to bring the world anywhere near the goal of an international order based on collective security as envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations. Indeed, 17 years after the General Assembly had formally declared general and complete disarmament as the goal of the United Nations, military expenditures continued to grow, both qualitatively and quantitatively.

Weapons of extreme precision had been added to weapons of mass destruction. Technological developments had given the arms race, particularly between the super-Powers, a self-increasing character. The spiral could only be broken by simultaneous endeavours aimed at bringing about a relaxation of tension and disarmament. The real danger facing mankind stemmed from the existence of huge nuclear arsenals and the possibility of their use. The complete prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and the eventual destruction of stockpiles should be the primary goal of action in the field of disarmament. (A/AC.187/SR.10, p.7)
recalled that on many occasions in the course of the history of mankind attempts had been made to abandon the possession and use of arms. With the increasing sophistication of weapons, the situation had become more alarming and, since the middle of the previous century, efforts to limit and control weapons had multiplied. In that connexion, mention should be made of the three Hague Conferences, the references to the question contained in Wilson's 14 Points and in the Treaty of Versailles, and the initiatives taken by the League of Nations. Both the League's Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments and other subsequent attempts had failed dismally.

Since its earliest days, the United Nations had been preoccupied with the question, and the determination of the peoples of the United Nations to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war had found expression in the preamble to the Charter. Although since then much had been said and written about the subject in the Organization, the results were frankly disappointing. It was unquestionably an almost impossible task, given the number of political and economic interests involved. Nevertheless, despite the frustrations and the deceit of those who spoke of disarmament while secretly manufacturing weapons, despite the fact that the arms trade was excellent business, and despite the lack of trust and the fear that lay at the heart of the situation, general and complete disarmament would ultimately have to come about.

The day was not far distant when third world Governments, aware of the global threat of the arms race and the fact that the astronomical amounts being spent on the production of, trade in and purchase of weapons could otherwise be used to meet the most basic needs of their peoples, would rebel against that state of affairs and impose an international boycott on arms suppliers.

The arms race was repugnant to the conscience of the world because, in addition to threatening the very existence of mankind, it enabled certain powerfully armed States to establish military bases in other countries and to maintain troops in their territory in violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter. It kept non-weapons-producing countries in a state of humiliating dependence. In many parts of the world, colonial enclaves and racist régimes maintained themselves by force and the use of arms against the will of indigenous majorities, and the same could perhaps be said with regard to the 14 military bases maintained by one great Power in the Panama Canal Zone. The arms race was often promoted by those who manufactured and traded in arms for profit or by Governments desirous of expanding their sphere of influence or pursuing neo-colonialist interests. Nor should it be forgotten that the manufacture, stockpiling and transport of certain types of arms had an adverse effect on the environment.
He suggested that it might be advisable to have the great Powers provide films on the weapons currently included in their stockpiles for projection during the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Such a "document" would be more convincing than many speeches, studies and statistics.

His delegation wished to express its appreciation to those delegations which year after year had worked for the cause of disarmament and, particularly, to the Mexican delegation for its untiring efforts and concrete contributions to that cause. (A/AC.187/SR.13, pp.4-5)

POLAND

said that the Government of Poland had already stated its well-substantiated position on the preparations and agenda for the special session in document A/AC.187/12, submitted in response to the note from the Secretary-General. That position was based on three inseparable political components: first, that the most important and pressing task of the international community was to put an end to the armaments race and achieve effective disarmament agreements; secondly, that the imperative need for disarmament was necessitated by considerations of strengthening world security and eliminating the threat of a new world war, and that it represented the basic foundation for ensuring irreversibility of the processes of political détente; thirdly, that progress in limiting the armaments race and in disarmament could truly and effectively serve the establishment of a new international economic order. That position derived from the genuine conviction that international relations in the present-day world could only be based on détente and co-operation and that the trends in that direction would continue to develop and take firmer root. It was therefore both feasible and necessary to promote the processes of détente so that they extended to all nations, which implied the elimination of sources of tension and conflict, and so that those processes also extended to new spheres of international endeavour, including, in the first place, the military sphere, which necessarily implied efforts to limit the armaments race and achieve progress in disarmament. (A/AC.187/SR.5, p.7)

ROMANIA

said that the holding of a General Assembly session on disarmament was of special importance, not only because it was the first time in the history of the Organization that Member States would be considering the question of disarmament at a special session but also because the session would be prepared and held at a time when the whole world was endeavouring to institute a new international economic order.

The United Nations was far from having accomplished the mission entrusted to it during its formative years from the onset of the atomic arms race. It did not do any more than convene a new session or prolong the armaments race, it was the opposite. The United Nations was many years ago charged with the preservation of peace and the maintenance of international security, the primary purpose of the United Nations, and it was charged with the prevention, suppression, and elimination of sources of tension and conflict, and in the present-day world such a charge was of even greater importance. This was a charge for which the United Nations had been set up, for which it had been established by Charter. It was well to remember that the Secretary-General in his recent report had emphasized the necessity for disarmament and the imperative need for disarmament in the interests of world peace and the preservation of world security. If the United Nations was to remain a viable institution it must respond to what the Secretary-General had said and join the great Powers in the task of preventing a second world war.

With the world in a situation such as ours, with a superpower in a situation such as ours, a situation of confrontation and tension, we on the subcontinent believed it was the duty of every nation to contribute to the establishment of a world of peace and security. On the subcontinent we believed that the weapons of mass destruction must be taken away, that there must be a cessation of the arms race, that there must be a development of joint venture in the interest of the welfare of all mankind.
it on the subject of disarmament, although it had been dealing with the problem since its establishment. Negotiations on disarmament had gradually drifted away from the United Nations and those that were still being conducted under its auspices had, in actual fact, lost their original content. Three decades had elapsed since its foundation and the United Nations was still not exercising direct competence in the matter of negotiations on military disengagement and disarmament. Furthermore, Governments had not taken resolute action to reduce or do away with armaments and make mankind safe from another war. The international conventions and treaties concluded thus far had certainly helped to create a climate of greater understanding, but had not succeeded in curbing the armaments race or ensuring the application of effective disarmament measures. In the present circumstances, which were characterized by immobility in disarmament negotiations, the armaments race had intensified, as had the development, diversification and the stockpiling of nuclear and conventional arsenals. While billions of dollars were being spent on armaments, problems of under-development and economic inequality were worsening. It was clear that the strategy, measures, proposals, approaches, rules and procedures applied so far were not yielding the desired results. " (A/AC.187/SR.5, p.5)

SRI LANKA

recalled that the idea of holding such a session had first arisen at Belgrade in 1961 during the First Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries. The Fifth Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Colombo in 1976, had revived that proposal because of its deep dissatisfaction and disillusionment at the failure of the various negotiations on disarmament and its conviction that one of the factors contributing to that failure was that such negotiations took place in an exclusive forum. For those reasons, the Conference had felt that it was appropriate to urge the convening of a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and had welcomed with great satisfaction the adoption by consensus of General Assembly resolution 31/189 B. " (A/AC.187/SR.5, p.9)

SWEDEN

emphasized the urgent need for the special session devoted to disarmament and her Government's determination to make an active contribution to it. The session should be a starting point for a new phase of joint disarmament efforts aimed at the gradual solution of specific problems within a reasonable time-frame. Sweden had repeatedly stated that the two super-Powers had a special responsibility for the future of the world since their combined armaments amounted to 60 per cent of the world total. Accordingly, substantial early progress in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the United States and the Soviet Union was one of the fundamental ingredients of
world disarmament efforts. As in the case of SALT, progress towards a comprehensive nuclear-weapon test-ban agreement and towards the prohibition of chemical weapons depended ultimately on the mobilization of the necessary political will. Disarmament was a matter of serious concern to every nation, and efforts towards that goal must necessarily be multilateral. Sweden had from the very beginning attached the highest importance to the multilateral disarmament negotiations being conducted within the framework of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva." (A/AC.187/SR.5, p.2)

**TUNISIA**

said that, since the end of the Second World War and the establishment of the United Nations, disarmament had been one if not the main concern of the international community. Every year for the past 30 years the General Assembly had reiterated its conviction that the arms race constituted a danger the consequences of which would be catastrophic for all peoples without exception. For many years that concern - it might almost be called obsession - had found expression in many statements, and many solutions to the complex problem of the arms race had been proposed, unfortunately to no great avail. In certain sectors, the negotiations conducted in recent decades had yielded some partial and limited results which fell far short of the objectives the United Nations had set itself.

It had long been said that it was for the nuclear Powers alone to solve the disarmament question and that the achievement of agreement on objectives and on methods of limiting or completely eliminating the danger threatening everyone depended on those Powers alone. In view of the present complexity of the problem, however, and of the interdependence of the interests of peoples, it was vitally important to involve all members of the international community in the search for an effective solution to the arms race, since all had to suffer its consequences." (A/AC.187/SR.11, p.2)

**UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS**

At the thirty-first session of the General Assembly, the Soviet Union had submitted a memorandum on questions of ending the arms race and disarmament in which it had made specific proposals calling, *inter alia*, for nuclear disarmament, the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, consolidation of the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the destruction of chemical weapons, prohibition of the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction and the reduction of military budgets. His delegation was pleased to note that most of the replies from States drew attention to the need for a prompt solution to all those problems. However, it would be unrealistic to expect complex, deep-seated problems like the
the constructive nature of the debates and considered that the exchange of ideas would guarantee the success of the preparations for the special session. The adoption of an acceptable draft agenda marked an important achievement of the current session and would lead to positive results. The next step would be to consider the opinions expressed by the various Governments and the nature of the decisions the General Assembly would have to adopt at the special session. In the documents adopted, emphasis would have to be placed on the pressing need to halt the arms race, the need to avoid a third world war, and the dangers inherent in the arms race, which absorbed resources that could be used for other constructive purposes.

Although the concrete results so far achieved were unsatisfactory, it must be acknowledged that some of the conditions necessary for halting the arms race existed. In that context, the relaxation of tension and peaceful coexistence of recent years were conducive to the holding of fruitful discussions. Referring to statements made by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, Mr. Brezhnev, he said that the negotiations would have a favourable outcome to the extent that the participants demonstrated a genuine desire to consolidate peace and were prepared to reach decisions that would not endanger the interests of some countries or give unilateral advantages to others. The Soviet Union was acting on the basis of those criteria." (A/AC.187/SR.14, pp.3-4)

VENEZUELA

...said that the arms race endangered not only the competing Powers but the whole of mankind. Suffice it to say, as Dr. Alva Myrdal warned, that the plutonium deposits in the hands of the Powers had become a source...
of insecurity to the very countries which possessed them. The arms race affected the entire international community, not only because more than $300 billion were spent on it annually, while most people were denied the opportunity to enjoy the advances of science and technology, but also because of the crisis in ideals and constructive proposals which it revealed.‖ (A/AC.187/SR.10, p.3)

**YUGOSLAVIA**

pledged his delegation's full co-operation in the work of preparing for the special session devoted to disarmament, which, as the Secretary-General had stated in his opening statement, represented a landmark in the search for international peace and understanding. In proposing the convening of a special session, the non-aligned countries had believed that they were expressing the general interest of the entire international community in ending the arms race and in involving all Member States in the search for solutions and agreements which would mark the beginning of the end of the arms race and open the way to general and complete disarmament.‖ (A/AC.187/SR.3, pp.3-4)

‖The results of negotiations held so far had related in general to the control of armaments and not to disarmament itself. Furthermore, the existence of the Treaty banning Nuclear-weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water while underground tests were permitted to continue, and the refusal to conclude a treaty on the complete prohibition of all nuclear tests for military purposes, in spite of obligations embodied in the earlier Treaty, pointed to a lack of political readiness on the part of the nuclear Powers to take effective measures to put a stop to the nuclear arms race.

Although Yugoslavia welcomed the efforts exerted by the two leading military Powers and the agreements concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union on the control of strategic armaments, such agreements did not amount to disarmament measures but merely regulated the nuclear arms race, since the conventional weapons race still continued.

Although the conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons constituted an attempt to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to new countries, that action had not met with success, which was hardly surprising in view of the fact that the leading nuclear Powers had continued to improve and augment the quantity of their nuclear weapons, the number of which had increased fivefold." (A/AC.187/SR.4, pp.3-4)
II. OBJECTIVES OF THE SPECIAL SESSION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany, Federal Republic of</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republic</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
II. OBJECTIVES OF THE SPECIAL SESSION

AUSTRALIA

One of the principal goals of the special session should be the elaboration of a framework within which arms control and disarmament issues could be examined and negotiations conducted. To that end, it was necessary to set out fundamental normative principles. However, those principles should be founded on political reality. For example, States would not be prepared to negotiate disarmament measures unless they felt militarily secure. Another major goal would be the identification of a consensus on the priority measures of arms control and disarmament and the issues of contention within those priority areas. (A/AC.187/SR.10, p.2)

AUSTRIA

The Austrian Government was aware that genuine disarmament could be achieved only through the political will of States, which in turn depended on the existence of a climate of mutual confidence and understanding between States and on the active concern of world public opinion. It hoped that the special session would make a real contribution to building up such confidence and would ensure that the problems of disarmament were seen in the proper perspective of the over-all political, social and economic situation. The problems of development and disarmament were closely related, and the two tasks must therefore succeed together or fail together. (A/AC.187/SR.7, p.2)

BANGLADESH

considered that the escalating global budget for the maintenance and expansion of the means of destruction, in a world where countless millions of people barely managed to subsist, was sufficient justification for the convening of the special session devoted to disarmament. In the opinion of his Government, the special session afforded a vital opportunity for tackling anew the fundamental problems concerning disarmament, on the basis of equal participation by all States. The most important objective of the special session must be to marshall the political will of all countries, big or small, to give new impetus and stimulus to the disarmament process. A critical element for the success of that catalytic endeavour was education of world public opinion regarding the magnitude and dangers of the arms race and the efforts required to halt it. Success would also depend on the ability of all States to create the necessary climate of mutual confidence and understanding, backed by objective facts and studies that could provide a positive framework and time-phased programme for future action. (A/AC.187/SR.9, p.2)
BELGIUM

"said that the special session should provide the opportunity to implement a comprehensive disarmament programme under which all States, without distinction, would agree to participate in the implementation of recommended measures. The arms race, with its risks of destabilization and its impact on the economic development of States, was currently affecting all regions of the world. Disarmament was becoming an increasingly important matter of concern to all States, although some States, because of the weapons they possessed, had to assume special responsibilities." (A/AC.187/SR.10, p.9)

BRAZIL

See I.

BULGARIA

"At the thirty-first session of the General Assembly, most delegations, including his own, had supported the resolution on the convening of a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, on the understanding that that session was not to take the place of the world disarmament conference but was to be an important stage in the preparation of such a conference.

His delegation's views on the special session were clearly stated in the reply of the People's Republic of Bulgaria to the Secretary-General of the United Nations contained in document A/AC.187/36." (A/AC.187/SR.10, pp.10-11)

COLOMBIA

See I.

CUBA

See IV.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

"The convening of the special session was fully in keeping with the preparations for the world disarmament conference and would represent an important stage on the road towards its realization. That position did not conflict with the views expressed by that country with regard to the disarmament programme having the direct impact on the economic development of States, which were constantly adverse to the release of resources for development. Disarmament was imperatively needed in order. The question of distribution of the new resources to the most backward developed countries was a matter of direct interest to the People's Republic of Bulgaria, aware of the conditions of development which were critical in the country in question. The programme, therefore, included a mutually agreed limitation of armaments, both bilateral and non-bilateral.

At the thirty-first session of the General Assembly, the People's Republic of Bulgaria had supported the resolution on the convening of a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, on the understanding that that session was not to take the place of the world disarmament conference but was to be an important stage in the preparation of such a conference." (A/AC.187/SR.10, pp.10-11)
expressed regarding the possibility of holding repeated special sessions on disarmament or with the emphasis placed on the need to prepare for the world disarmament conference, which his Government regarded as the only universal platform having the necessary authority to adopt concrete, effective disarmament measures."

(A/AC.187/SR.11, p.7)

**DENMARK**

"said that the special session represented a valuable means of directing international attention to the arms race and making public opinion aware of the opportunities which existed for disarmament as well as the difficulties involved. Moreover, the session should serve as a catalyst for arms control and disarmament negotiations and encourage further negotiations at the global, regional or bilateral level.

At the same time the special session would inevitably focus public attention on the adverse effects which massive arms expenditure had on the economic and social development of nations. Substantial progress in the field of disarmament could lead to the release, for more constructive uses, of vast material and human resources which were currently being devoured for military purposes. The Danish Government included a minister without portfolio, who would devote much of her attention to disarmament while at the same time having the responsibility for development aid."

(A/AC.187/SR.10, p.5)

**FINLAND**

"said that two simple principles should be kept constantly in mind. Firstly, as an essential element of détente, arms control and disarmament were imperative for the security of nations. Secondly, disarmament was imperative for the realization of the goals of a new international economic order. The Members of the United Nations had pledged themselves to the creation of that new international economic order. A number of causes of underdevelopment had been identified and agreement had been reached on the structuring of a more equitable world. However, the continued diversion of scarce human and material resources to military ends was seriously threatening the attainment of the goals of development. The special session should reflect an awareness of the organic link between disarmament and security and the necessity of disarmament for development."

(A/AC.187/SR.7, p.5)

**FRANCE**

"At its September session, the Preparatory Committee would examine the question of a declaration of principles and a programme of action. His delegation
would participate actively in that work, and it wished to emphasize now that one of the main objectives of the special session should be a thorough study of disarmament procedures and structures leading to the establishment of an effective negotiating body which would work in close co-operation with the United Nations. Secondly, although there was obviously a need for nuclear disarmament - and it should be emphasized that that was a problem separate from the cessation of nuclear tests - the fact that nuclear disarmament could not be achieved without parallel progress in conventional disarmament should not be overlooked. Only if there was parallelism between the two spheres would it be possible to avoid the disruption of the strategic balance and the insecurity which might arise during the gradual development of the stages which should characterize such a delicate undertaking.

(A/AC.187/SR.13,p.2)

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

The resolution on the World Disarmament Conference had been adopted in 1971 and had been confirmed at all subsequent sessions of the General Assembly. A World Disarmament Conference, with the participation of all States, would be a proper representative forum in which broad measures for disarmament could be discussed. The Government of the German Democratic Republic believed that such a conference would have the necessary authority to achieve real progress on the question of disarmament. A session of the General Assembly, or a special session, could not replace a world conference. In the view of the German Democratic Republic, the link between a special session devoted to disarmament and the World Disarmament Conference was that the special session could and should be made an important step in the process of convening a World Disarmament Conference. That position was in keeping with the Colombo Declaration, and he regretted the attempts which had been made to ignore the basic document of the Colombo Conference on so important a question. (A/AC.187/SR.8, p.5)

"Like the other States of the socialist community, the German Democratic Republic felt that the special session should contribute to the solution of disarmament problems." (A/AC.187/SR.8, p.6)

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF

recalled that his country had co-sponsored the draft resolution whereby it had been decided to hold the special session devoted to disarmament, because it considered that what had so far been achieved in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament was only a beginning. The multilateral negotiations concerning disarmament and arms control on a world-wide basis were concentrated in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. That
organ was responsible for negotiating draft treaties on the subject, and it was to be hoped that progress would be achieved in Geneva in important areas before the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The objectives of the special session should be viewed against the background of those ongoing efforts. His delegation believed that the special session devoted to disarmament should be held in an atmosphere of co-operation and mutual trust, in order to demonstrate the credibility of world-wide endeavours towards disarmament and arms control.

It was important that the special session should help to make international disarmament negotiations more effective, particularly in order to achieve the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. In that connexion, the special session could provide a positive impetus for the achievement of international stability and security through balanced measures of disarmament and arms control. (A/AC.187/SR.6, p.2)

**HUNGARY**

"Hungary was convinced that the elimination of the arms race required the common effort of all States, and considered that the best framework for that was a World Disarmament Conference. Some maintained that the holding of that Conference would not be a realistic solution because of the opposition of certain Powers. Recent history has provided many examples of the achievement of goals which had seemed unrealistic a few years earlier. When a number of countries proposed holding a European Conference on Security and Co-operation, for some the proposal had also seemed to be unrealistic; later, however, it was possible to hold the conference. It should be pointed out that the political climate in Europe had improved considerably in recent times and that any progress achieved in the field of disarmament would surely accelerate the process of détente. The World Disarmament Conference would be a new approach in international disarmament negotiations, and Hungary considered it very important that the special session should devote due attention to it and include it as a separate item in the agenda." (A/AC.187/SR.7, p.6)

"His delegation hoped that the special session would contribute to the improvement of the political climate, which would in turn be reflected in greater progress in the existing disarmament forums." (A/AC.187/SR.7, p.7)

**INDIA**

"The special session should deal with nuclear disarmament as a matter of high priority rather than attempt to find answers to all questions. The special session might not be able to do more than stimulate action in certain positive
directions. Depending on its outcome, it might become necessary to hold a series of such special sessions culminating in a world disarmament conference.  
(A/AC.187/SR.9, p.10)

**IRAN**

The multitude of replies received so far contained numerous ideas and proposals relating to the objectives of the special session; although they were all important, it would be unrealistic to project all of them as goals for the session. It was imperative to determine by a process of selection those areas where there was a reasonable chance of obtaining results. The main objectives of the special session could best be elaborated by taking account of the following current trends: an unrestrained arms race and the growth of nuclear arsenals to an unbelievable level capable of destroying the whole world many times over had made disarmament more than ever an urgent and truly global problem in which the entire world had a vital stake; multilateral and bilateral treaties and agreements in the field of arms limitation and control had been of marginal value and had not resulted in the elimination of a single nuclear weapon; there was thus a need for a reassessment of the effects of the arms race on the economic development of all nations, especially the non-nuclear countries and those without significant military power.  
(A/AC.187/SR.5, p.4)

**IRAQ**

See I.

**ITALY**

"Considering the diversity of the proposals on the objectives of the special session, it was essential to identify those proposals on which agreement was possible and concentrate on the search for a common basic position on those issues. At the same time, while identifying priority objectives for immediate action, the General Assembly should not ignore the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament or the general principles already established by the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament. Pearing that in mind, the Italian Government had repeatedly stressed the need for a coherent and comprehensive programme of complete disarmament, and considered that the special session should endeavour to elaborate a far-reaching plan for gradually achieving the total elimination of arms in order to create a world based on détente, understanding, co-operation and on an international security system."  
(A/AC.187/SR.10, p.4)

"One should not lose sight of the final goal, namely, the establishment of a new collective international security system within the framework of the United Nations, which was a prerequisite for a more just and equitable political and economic order. What the world community needed for its development was economic and social reform, as well as a better distribution of those human and material resources which currently were absorbed to a disproportionate extent by the arms race."  
(A/AC.187/SR.10, p.5)
25.

JAPAN

See I.

MEXICO

"... said there seemed to be a consensus that the Assembly should not allow the work of the special session to become a repetition of the debates in the First Committee that the special session was not an appropriate forum for negotiating specific agreements or trying to draw up draft treaties and that it was necessary to strengthen the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament." (A/AC.187/SR.9, p.6)

MONGOLIA

See I.

NEPAL

"Problems relating to disarmament could not be solved in one or two special sessions of the General Assembly. Everyone knew that the problems were too complex and myriad in nature. But the time had come to tackle the issues squarely rather than to avoid them simply because they were too numerous and complicated. The special session would provide an unprecedented opportunity and a suitable framework for all endeavours to that end." (A/AC.187/SR.8, p.4)

"Disarmament must be linked with economic development. However unpalatable it might be to a few, the truth remained that disarmament could contribute to real development in a great number of countries and benefit the vast majority of mankind while at the same time imparting a sense of international peace and security.

The special session should take up other important questions like the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and the non-proliferation treaty, the concept of the nuclear-weapon-free zone and the creation of zones of peace. One of the most alarming features of the current situation was the phenomenal growth in conventional arms. The production and development of conventional weapons at present accounted for four fifths of the entire expenditure on armaments. That problem therefore required study, as did the effect of international trade in arms on the growth of conventional arms." (A/AC.187/SR.8, p.4)
NORWAY

See I.

PAKISTAN

\(\footnote{\text{\textbf{Netherlands}}}\)

\(\footnote{\text{\textbf{Norway}}}\)

\(\footnote{\text{\textbf{Pakistan}}}\)

His delegation reiterated its support for the proposal of the Colombo Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries calling for the convening of a world disarmament conference or a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament; it supported, in general, all measures favouring the holding of the special session, which should make an important contribution to the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. At the special session, the General Assembly would have to take decisions on such concrete steps as convening a world disarmament conference and demanding that the great powers destroy their nuclear arsenals under safe and responsible international control. \(\footnote{(A/AC.187/SR.13, p.5)}\)

PERU

\(\footnote{\text{His government believed that, although all States had a responsibility in the task of disarmament, some States had a greater responsibility than others, and that the failure of the claim that the arms race contributed to increased security must be borne in mind in all thinking on the subject.}}\)
considered that the work of the special session must not be allowed to become merely a repetition of the work of the First Committee; attention should therefore be concentrated on general and complete disarmament under effective international control. In that respect, it must be acknowledged that the progress made by the United Nations in the field of disarmament related almost exclusively to side issues. (A/AC.187/SR.7, p.4)

SWEDEN

emphasized the urgent need for the special session devoted to disarmament and her Government's determination to make an active contribution to it. The session should be a starting point for a new phase of joint disarmament efforts aimed at the gradual solution of specific problems within a reasonable time-frame. Sweden had repeatedly stated that the two super-Powers had a special responsibility for the future of the world since their combined armaments amounted to 60 per cent of the world total. Accordingly, substantial early progress in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the United States and the Soviet Union was one of the fundamental ingredients of world disarmament efforts. As in the case of SALT, progress towards a comprehensive nuclear-weapon test-ban agreement and towards the prohibition of chemical weapons depended ultimately on the mobilization of the necessary political will. Disarmament was a matter of serious concern to every nation, and efforts towards that goal must necessarily be multilateral. Sweden had from the very beginning attached the highest importance to the multilateral disarmament negotiations being conducted within the framework of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva. (A/AC.187/SR.5, p.2)

TUNISIA

In the opinion of his delegation, the convening of a special session devoted to disarmament would make it possible to remedy the inadequacies of the methods adopted in recent years. One of the main tasks of the special session was to secure and define a common political will, which alone would make it possible to establish a new international strategy with universal participation. That was why Tunisia supported the idea of the adoption of a declaration on disarmament. That document should not only embody the political undertaking of all Member States to take effective action for disarmament but should also establish the objectives to be achieved and the guiding principles to be followed. The endeavour would succeed only if account was taken of the interests of all, particularly those who had not had an opportunity to express their opinion on that serious matter. (A/AC.187/SR.11, p.2)
TURKEY

" said that his delegation fully shared the views of those Governments which considered that the goal of the special session devoted to disarmament was not to negotiate arms control agreements or to resolve outstanding questions immediately, but rather to produce guidelines for future bilateral, multilateral and regional negotiations. His delegation believed that the special session would give significant impetus to those negotiations and would promote and accelerate efforts towards the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. It could also generate greater support for disarmament efforts through a better understanding of the questions relating to disarmament." (A/AC.187/SR.10, p.6)

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

" said that the Soviet Union supported the idea of a special session devoted to disarmament because it believed that, if suitably prepared, the session could contribute substantially to the solution of disarmament problems. It was necessary to end the absurd competition regarding armaments, and the Soviet Union for its part was prepared to take all necessary measures to that end, provided that the other parties to the negotiations were also prepared to make their contribution.

Disarmament problems had been discussed at various multilateral and bilateral meetings. In a number of important areas, notable success had been achieved in the reduction of the arms race and effective agreements had been concluded. In general, however, there was no slowing down in the arms race, involving increasingly sophisticated weapons, and the number of States participating in that process was still growing. The special session of the General Assembly should provide a useful international forum for consideration of the existing situation with regard to disarmament. Views could be exchanged and the principal trends could be outlined, and the session could conclude with the adoption of a final political declaration setting out agreed views on the question of disarmament. The adoption of such a document would undoubtedly be an important contribution to the task of disarmament. (A/AC.187/SR.6, pp. 3-4)

UNITED KINGDOM

(On behalf of the nine members of the European Community)

" In view of the diversity of approaches to disarmament, the special session could hardly be expected to produce instant solutions, but it did offer a unique opportunity for the international community to develop a co-operative approach to the problem, and the nine delegations of the European Community pledged themselves to help ensure that that opportunity was used in a constructive and positive manner." (A/AC.187/SR.2, p.2)
... in the reply sent to the Secretary-General in compliance with resolution 31/189 B, the United Kingdom Government had expressed the view that a special session could enhance the prospects for disarmament, provided that it was thoroughly prepared and widely attended, particularly by all significant military Powers. (A/AC.187/SR.8, p.8)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

...Although the agenda approved would probably serve as a useful framework for the work of the special session and the future organization and direction of preparatory work, it must be recognized that it represented only a small fraction of the immense task facing not only members of the Committee but also those countries willing to contribute to the success of the special session. In the coming months it would be necessary to clarify and consolidate objectives, determine the main areas to be examined and reach agreement on the best means of seizing the opportunity provided by the special session to give a strong impetus to disarmament negotiations. That would require intensive preparations at the national level and a broad and sustained pattern of consultations. For its part, the United States would continue its endeavours to identify ways in which the special session could lead to an acceleration and broadening of the disarmament process in the light of the pressing need for substantial progress in the field of disarmament. (A/AC.187/SR.14, p.3)

YUGOSLAVIA

...said that the decision to convene a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament had been well received and approved by the whole international community, which had considered it an indispensable step towards the cessation of the arms race and, ultimately, general and complete disarmament. (A/AC.187/SR.4, p.3)

Instead of concentrating on solving major problems, namely, how to prevent "qualitative sophistication and territorial spread of nuclear weapons, new tendencies had emerged aimed at limiting the right of all peoples to make use of nuclear energy and technology for the development of their productive forces." In his delegation's view, one of the main tasks of the special session should be to reach political agreement on how to prevent the sophistication and spread of nuclear weapons and how to ensure the free transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes under effective international control. His delegation was fully aware of the difficulties arising out of the delicate and complex character of that matter. It had been precisely those aspects of the disarmament issue that had prompted the non-aligned countries to propose the convening of a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. (A/AC.187/SR.4, p.4)
### III. PREPARATORY WORK FOR THE SPECIAL SESSION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany, Federal Republic of</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republic</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
III. PREPARATORY WORK FOR THE SPECIAL SESSION

ALGERIA

"The second phase of the Committee's preparatory work involved the preparation of a declaration of principles on disarmament and of a programme of action. The non-aligned members of the Committee had prepared a working paper which, he hoped, would form the basis for informal talks as a prelude to negotiations. His delegation agreed that the talks should be informal during the period between the end of the current session and 31 August, when the third session was due to start. He regretted that he did not share the views of those delegations which had suggested that the third session should take place after the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament had finished its work. It had to be remembered that the dates of the third session had been set by the Committee at the beginning of its first session and that the majority of the Committee members were not members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament; most delegations would also be busy with the ad hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference, which was scheduled to meet between 12 and 15 September next. Furthermore, he could not accept the idea of the Preparatory Committee becoming a kind of subsidiary organ of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and having to modify its programme of work accordingly. It should also be remembered that the documentation approved by the General Assembly on the basis of the work done by the Ad Hoc Committee on the Review of the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament included a recommendation that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should submit an annual report to the General Assembly in sufficient time to enable Member States to examine it. He therefore considered that the dates originally set for the third session of the Preparatory Committee should be maintained.

He also considered that, during that session, the Preparatory Committee should concentrate on preparing its provisional report for submission to the General Assembly at its next session." (A/AC.187/SR.13, pp. 8-9).

AUSTRALIA

"The task of the current session of the Preparatory Committee was to establish the framework within which the General Assembly could approach its tasks at the special session and to take initial steps which would facilitate the efficient and timely completion of the necessary preparatory work. His delegation was ready to co-operate fully in the discussions and in the drafting of the essential documents." (A/AC.187/SR.10, p. 3)
31.

**AUSTRIA**

Agreement on the agenda would make it possible to reach an understanding on the format and character of the final documents of the special session. As its next step, the Committee should try to agree on the broad outlines of the contents of the final documents, perhaps in the form of an annotated agenda, which could then be submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session. During that work, the Committee should make optimum use of the services of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament and should request the Secretariat to provide it with the background information it would need to carry out its task. The expertise of non-governmental organizations and internationally recognized research organizations could also contribute to an understanding of the problems facing the Committee. (A/AC.187/SR.7, p.3)

**BANGLADESH**

See IV.

**BELGIUM**

"Belgium had always believed that one of the main reasons why international efforts had come to a standstill was the lack of communication among nuclear States, whose responsibility to the international community should motivate them to seek ways of establishing a dialogue among themselves. It was to be hoped that the special session would help to bring about the conditions - particularly the institutional conditions - which would enable such a dialogue to begin. The Preparatory Committee should bear that objective in mind and prepare documentation which would enable all States to attend and participate in the special session." (A/AC.187/SR.10, p.9)

"For its part, the General Assembly should endeavour to broaden the scope of the measures which could contribute to disarmament. In that connexion, the question of the transfer of conventional weapons should receive closer attention from all States. Similarly, the United States suggestions concerning measures designed to improve the climate of international confidence and to reduce tension should be reflected in the agenda. The Assembly might also consider new working and negotiating methods which had scarcely been tried thus far. In that connexion, his delegation had already drawn attention at the thirty-first session of the General Assembly, to the possibilities afforded by a regional approach to disarmament. It was not a question of a regional approach as opposed to a global approach. All such approaches, like any potential bilateral measures, were complementary. It should be
borne in mind that the prospects for agreement on certain aspects of disarmament could vary from one region to another. His delegation intended to propose at the thirty-second session of the General Assembly that a global study of the regional aspects of disarmament should be undertaken.

"Meanwhile, the Committee should develop the topic of the regional aspects of disarmament in the documents which it was to prepare for the special session." (A/AC.187/SR.10, p.9)

As far as the organization of work was concerned, his delegation could agree to an extension of the third session of the Committee, which should soon address itself, in a practical manner, to the substantive questions to be included in the agenda of the special session. With regard to the studies to be undertaken by the Secretariat, as referred to in particular in Mexico's reply to the Secretary-General, the Committee should, in the light of the large volume of documentation already existing on disarmament questions, draw up precise terms of reference which would meet practical considerations and not place an undue burden on the Secretariat. If the Committee carried out its preparatory work adequately, the objectives of the special session might be achieved in a shorter time than that indicated by the representative of Mexico. (A/AC.187/SR.10, p.10)

See also VI.

BRAZIL

"With regard to preparations for the special session, he welcomed the preparation by the Secretariat of the background papers in documents A/AC.187/29, 30 and 31, and looked forward to the prompt distribution of the comparative analysis of the comments received pursuant to resolution 31/189 B. However, the Preparatory Committee should not overburden the Secretariat with new requests until it was agreed, after careful study, that the preparation of a new document would clearly serve an immediate purpose in its deliberations." (A/AC.187/SR.9, pp.5-6)

BULGARIA

"His delegation wished to point out that, in setting up the Preparatory Committee, the socialist countries of Eastern Europe, whose active work in the area of disarmament was well known, had not been done justice. It was to be hoped that, at the thirty-second session, the General Assembly would remedy that state of affairs and would enable the remaining socialist countries of Eastern Europe to take part in the deliberations of that important body as full members. Bulgaria had participated in the work of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva since..."
since its inception and was a member of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference. He expressed the hope that the Preparatory Committee would include a recommendation on that question in its report to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session.\(^\text{8}\) (A/AC.187/SR.10, p.11)

\[\text{CUBA}\]

The members of the Preparatory Committee could make an important contributions to the cause of disarmament by ensuring that the forthcoming special session of the General Assembly did not become just another exercise in rhetoric but rather a framework for promoting practical results. To that end, it was essential to observe the principle of consensus in the adoption of decisions and to ensure the equitable participation of all ideologies and groups of States in the preparatory process for the special session. In that connexion, his delegation supported an increase in the representation of the socialist States in the Preparatory Committee and trusted that the General Assembly would take the necessary decisions to put an end to the existing imbalance, which was unfair to that group of States.\(^\text{9}\) (A/AC.187/SR.13, p.6)

\[\text{CYPRUS}\]

As reported in 1961, world military spending had stood at $120 billion annually. By 1970 it had risen to $200 billion - an increase of $80 billion in 10 years. In 1975-1976, it had risen to $300 billion. Expenditure at the present time was estimated at $400 billion, representing a sudden increase of almost $100 billion in one year. Such a tremendous waste of valuable resources, which were needed for the preservation and development of human life but which instead were diverted towards its destruction, in itself represented an economic problem of vast dimensions and linked development directly with disarmament. The arms race and military spending were formidable obstacles to solving development problems. Disarmament, development and international security must be examined together in a highly interdependent world. His delegation therefore proposed formally that the Secretary-General, with the help of consultant experts, should undertake a study on the interrelationship between these three factors.

So that generally acceptable solutions could be reached, all States must participate in consultations which would take into account their views and suggestions. It was therefore essential that formal and informal consultations on the content and drafting of the documents to be adopted by the special session should be conducted on the basis of studies and papers concerning a new approach.

What was needed above all was a return to a modicum of legal order, which ironically had never before fallen to such a low point as at present, in the United Nations era. The road to world legal order lay through international security, which would become a reality only when decisions of the Security Council
were effectively enforced. The interest of Cyprus in legal order and international security was not related only to the present situation in that country. In its first statement in the general debate, in 1960, when Cyprus had become a Member of the United Nations as a newly independent country, his delegation had stressed the need for international security, as stipulated in the Charter, through the establishment of a United Nations force to maintain world peace and security. It was a tragic irony of fate that subsequently Cyprus had become a living example of the lack of international security, even when Security Council decisions had been unanimous. In 1968, Cyprus had submitted a draft resolution proposing a study of the link between disarmament, development and international security. He was gratified to note that the concept of international security as a pre-condition progress disarmament had received support in some of the replies from Member States to the Secretary-General on the subject of the special session.\textsuperscript{11} (A/AC.187/SR.13, pp.7-8)

\textbf{CZECHOSLOVAKIA}  

\textit{He} said that his Government had been very much interested in becoming a member of an organ as important as the Preparatory Committee. He therefore regretted the fact that, as a result of the inadequate representation of the States of the socialist community, it had not been possible for the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to sit on the Committee. His Government felt that the inadequate representation of the socialist countries failed to reflect the important role which those countries played in disarmament talks. He would therefore like to take the opportunity to stress his Government's continuing interest in becoming a full-fledged member of the Preparatory Committee. He hoped that that interest would be taken into consideration during the debate on the special session which would take place at the thirty-second session of the General Assembly. (A/AC.187/SR.11, p.6)

\textbf{FINLAND}  

\textit{He} in the view of his delegation, the preparatory work for the special session should be seen in the context of the ongoing process of negotiations towards arms control and disarmament agreements. The atmosphere and the possibilities of a successful outcome of the session would be greatly enhanced if progress in the negotiations could be achieved before the special session. On the other hand, the agenda should be flexible enough that the work of the special session could be accommodated to results achieved in those negotiations.\textsuperscript{11} (A/AC.187/SR.7, p.5)

\textbf{FRANCE}  

See II.
Because the problems of arms control and disarmament were extremely complex and directly affected the security of States, the Preparatory Committee must adopt a very realistic approach even in its procedural decisions. In that connexion, his country deeply regretted the fact that the Eastern European group of countries was not adequately represented in the Committee despite the major initiatives which it had taken to promote arms control and disarmament. A temporary solution to that state of affairs had been provided by the decision to permit non-members to participate in the work of the Preparatory Committee, but in his view the membership of the Committee should be reviewed by the General Assembly at its thirty-second session.

In the matter of working procedure, the Preparatory Committee should be guided by the experience of other major United Nations bodies. Certain United Nations committees, as well as the sixth and seventh special sessions of the General Assembly, had applied the principle of consensus. It was particularly desirable to apply that principle when discussing the problems of arms limitation and disarmament, which affected the interests of all peoples. Since the constructive cooperation of all States would be required in order to ensure the success of the special session, the Preparatory Committee should set an example by continuing to work on the basis of consensus. (A/AC.187/SR.3, pp.2-3 and A/AC.187/SR.1-I4/Corr.)

During the forthcoming weeks questions directly related to the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament would be considered in many forums. Disarmament questions would also be considered at the thirty-second session of the General Assembly. The outcome of all those discussions should be borne in mind during preparations for the special session. Consequently, only after the thirty-second session would it be possible to make concrete preparations for drawing up a final document of the special session. (A/AC.187/SR.8, p.6)

At the first meeting of the Preparatory Committee (A/AC.187/SR.1), his delegation had pointed out that, when the Committee was being set up, the views of the socialist States of Eastern Europe had not been taken into account. Accordingly, it would be appropriate if the question of the composition of the Preparatory Committee was examined at the thirty-second session of the General Assembly with a view to increasing the number of its members. The Committee's report to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session should include a recommendation to that effect.

In the statement made by Poland on 10 May 1977 (A/AC.187/SR.5), the Secretariat had been requested to provide the Committee with a document listing disarmament proposals officially submitted to the United Nations. That document would present the substance of the proposal, the date and country of submission, and the status of its follow-up. His delegation supported that suggestion, since it felt that
the document would enrich the working documents available to delegations." (A/AC.187/SR.8, pp.6-7)

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF

With regard to the immediate purpose of the Preparatory Committee's meetings, efforts should be concentrated on reaching a consensus on the agenda for the special session devoted to disarmament. The proposal submitted at the preceding meeting (A/AC.187/43) provided an excellent basis for discussion. (A/AC.187/SR.6, p.3)

The United Nations Disarmament Centre should be used as rationally as possible to prepare the necessary background material for the next round of meetings of the Committee. That would also assist the preparation of the report which the Committee was to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session. No priority areas had yet been developed on which the Secretariat should concentrate, apart from a general assessment of the results so far achieved in disarmament and arms control, and efforts currently being made in that regard. It might also be useful to take into account the references to the relevant subjects made in the replies of States to the Secretary-General and in the statements of delegations in the Preparatory Committee. (A/AC.187/SR.6, p.3)

HUNGARY

Finally, his delegation considered the preparations for the special session a continuous process and was certain that the General Assembly would renew the mandate of the Preparatory Committee. It trusted that at that time it would be possible to enlarge the Committee in order to accommodate those socialist countries which played an important role in disarmament questions as members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. He requested that the observations of his delegation and the delegations of other socialist countries on that point should be reflected in the report of the Preparatory Committee to the thirty-second session of the General Assembly. (A/AC.187/SR.7, p.7)

IRAN

said that it was essential to the smooth functioning of the Preparatory Committee and, eventually, of the special session that the Committee should develop a collective theme and agree on a set of generally acceptable objectives for that collective venture. (A/AC.187/SR.5, p.3)

See also VI.
JAPAN

"His delegation commended the non-aligned members of the Committee for their efforts to achieve a balanced formulation of the agenda which had been adopted at the previous meeting (A/AC.187/54) and believed that in all deliberations due consideration should be given to the interests of nuclear-weapon States which were not members of the Preparatory Committee. It hoped that that policy would continue to be followed at all stages of the Committee's work so that all nuclear-weapon States would participate in the special session." (A/AC.187/SR.13, p.3)

See also VI.

MEXICO

"As to Governments' statements and suggestions, his delegation viewed as particularly encouraging the opinion expressed by the United States (A/AC.187/17), which had always shown itself to be a staunch defender of the status quo in the matter of international disarmament machinery, to the effect that the special session should be prepared to undertake the necessary improvements in existing machinery and practices and to launch any new organizational steps required for achievement of the goals established at the session.

In his opinion there was no need to establish any subsidiary intersessional bodies of the Committee, since the intervening time would have to be spent analysing the material available and studying the working papers prepared by the Secretariat on future stages of the work; that would not, of course, preclude the continuation of informal talks with a view to the preparation of preliminary drafts, which could be begun in connexion with the Committee's September session." (A/AC.187/SR.9, p.8)

"He thanked the Assistant Secretary-General, Mr. Björnerstedt, for the willingness of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament to prepare the working papers suggested by the Government of Mexico (A/AC.187/34). He agreed with him concerning paper No. 9 (Analytical list of the agreements concluded in the bilateral talks known by the acronym SALT). His delegation regarded the other working papers as purely descriptive and understood that they called for no value judgement by members of the Secretariat. His delegation had no preference in the matter of priorities and considered that the working papers could be issued in the order which the Centre deemed most appropriate for their preparation." (A/AC.187/SR.9, p.8)

See also II.
NEPAL

Success or failure would depend to a large extent on the work done by the Preparatory Committee and the progress achieved in its deliberations. The first task before the Committee was to agree on an agenda for the special session. Once there was agreement on the agenda, it would be much easier to plan the future work of the Committee. (A/AC.187/SR.8, p.4)

NEW ZEALAND

While understanding the reasoning behind the adoption of a conservative formulation concerning the participation of non-governmental organizations in the work of the Preparatory Committee, the New Zealand delegation reiterated its belief that such organizations had made and could make a distinctive contribution to the work of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. It was confident that they would be able to make a positive contribution to the work of the special session. (A/AC.187/SR.11, p.6)

PAKISTAN

As the special session was unlikely to complete its work in less than four to five weeks, and as very thorough preparations must be made in regard to the proposed declaration of principles and programme of action, it would be useful to arrange for the Preparatory Committee or a working group of the whole to meet between sessions. It would also be appropriate for the Centre for Disarmament, with the assistance of outside experts, to prepare background papers on important issues, a list of which could be drawn up after consultations. (A/AC.187/SR.10, p.8)

PERU

" said that, in view of the high hopes placed in disarmament by the vast majority of the human race, the Preparatory Committee was under an obligation to make every possible effort to ensure that proper preparations were made for the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. (A/AC.187/SR.9, p.3)

" It had been suggested that the Committee should proceed to prepare the principal documents for the special session. His delegation agreed with that proposal since it was clear that the more progress was made in that preliminary stage, the better would be the atmosphere at the special session and the chances for the adoption of final agreements. (A/AC.187/SR.9, p.4)
POLAND

If it was to prove effective, the disarmament process must not only be comprehensive in scope and universal in character but also reflect an agreed, common approach to disarmament on the part of participants. Decision-making by consensus and the equitable participation of all groups of States in the preparatory process were therefore pre-conditions for success. He observed that, because of the mechanical application of a formula which might have been valid in other bodies, the socialist States were seriously underrepresented in the composition of the Preparatory Committee. In disarmament efforts, a proper reflection of the existing world relationship of forces was a consideration that could not be ignored. His delegation therefore hoped that the current imbalance in the Committee would be duly rectified. (A/AC.187/SR.5, pp. 8-9)

His delegation felt that the preparations for the special session and the session itself represented an important step in the over-all disarmament effort. The United Nations had made an outstanding contribution to that effort, and the agendas of successive sessions of the General Assembly had seen dozens of disarmament initiatives submitted by Member States. With a view to profiting from what had been achieved to date, his delegation proposed that, for the next session of the Preparatory Committee, the Secretariat should compile a document listing disarmament proposals officially submitted to the United Nations. The list should present the substance of the proposal, the date and country of submission, and the status of its follow-up. He was convinced that such a document would be very useful both to the Committee and to the special session of the General Assembly. In accordance with its traditional position, his delegation stood ready to participate in the preparations for the special session with a view to ensuring the latter's success. (A/AC.187/SR.5, p.9)

See also I.

ROMANIA

The special session would need careful preparation, and in that connexion the Committee would have an important part to play, since the guidelines, strategies and documents to be adopted and the future structure of negotiations would largely emerge from its work. It might be said that the special session began with the deliberations of the Committee and, consequently, the Committee had the duty to give the General Assembly the opportunity to adopt clear-cut, specific and constructive documents and to set the disarmament negotiations on the right path. The Committee's activities should be conducted in such a way at to ensure that all interested States could participate in the proceedings and negotiations and that closed groups were avoided. (A/AC.187/SR.5, p.6)
The Committee would also have to prepare draft decisions and recommendations on the negotiating machinery providing for the establishment of viable structures with full authority that were also flexible and operated in accordance with democratic working rules and procedures, and allowed for the participation of all States interested in disarmament negotiations.

In order to discharge its functions the Committee must work at a faster pace. One of its first tasks would be the preparation of the provisional agenda for the special session. However, it would also have to begin to prepare drafts for the Declaration, the Programme of Action and documents on negotiating machinery, since any delay in those tasks could jeopardize both quality and content. The Committee would also have to make the maximum use of the time at its disposal.

(A/AC.187/SR.5, p.7)

SWEDEN

See IV.

TUNISIA

His delegation endorsed the decision to invite non-governmental organizations directly concerned to participate in the work on disarmament, since they would not only submit useful suggestions and proposals but would also help to create a new awareness in world public opinion, which would constitute the best stimulus in the disarmament process.

(A/AC.187/SR.11, p.3)

As to the organization of work, the establishment of an intersessional working group with the task of examining Governments' proposals and formulating recommendations for their consideration by the Preparatory Committee would represent a considerable contribution to the success of the work.

(TURKEY)

As his Government had welcomed the decisions taken by the Preparatory Committee relating to the participation of non-governmental organizations in its work.

The Preparatory Committee had an urgent responsibility for the preparations required for the special session, but he would like to stress the important role that the United Nations Centre for Disarmament could play in doing everything possible to produce the necessary background material in time.

(A/AC.187/SR.10, p.6)

Ukraine

II. The principal role of the Preparatory Committee would be to lay the necessary groundwork on the negotiating machinery and the structures, but to do this it would require a considerable number of meetings. The Preparatory Committee had an urgent responsibility for the preparation of the special session, but he would like to stress the important role that the United Nations Centre for Disarmament could play in doing everything possible to produce the necessary background material in time.

(A/AC.187/SR.10, p.6)
The next step in the preparatory work would undoubtedly be the elaboration of principles that would constitute the basis for a final political declaration. As the success of the preparatory work would depend on working out, in advance, a text reflecting a consensus on the basic content of such a final document, the Turkish delegation supported the suggestion that a committee of the whole should be established and entrusted with the drafting of that final document. He also supported the idea that the appropriate arrangements should be made for the intersessional work of the Preparatory Committee. (A/AC.187/SR.10, p.6)

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

His delegation wished to draw attention to the question of the composition of the Preparatory Committee which should reflect the specific tasks to be performed by the Committee and the role played by various States in disarmament negotiations. Unfortunately, the socialist countries, whose efforts and experience in disarmament talks were well known, had been discriminated against in setting up the Preparatory Committee. The system used in distributing seats was that known as the "Economic and Social Council formula", which was not appropriate when it was a question of discussing disarmament problems. The effective efforts made by the Group of Socialist States in dealing with those problems was reflected in the structure of other bodies concerned with disarmament questions. His delegation had therefore reserved the right to propose that at its thirty-second session the General Assembly should assign additional seats to the Socialist group. The Committee should include that recommendation in its report to the thirty-second session of the Assembly.

His delegation was prepared to play a constructive part in the work of the Committee. (A/AC.187/SR.6, p.5)

See also II.

UNITED KINGDOM

said that his delegation warmly welcomed the decision taken by the Committee at its fourth meeting (A/AC.187/SR.4) concerning the participation of non-governmental organizations in the work of the Committee, since the subjects under discussion affected the way of life of peoples all over the world. The non-governmental organizations, which reflected public opinion on questions of disarmament, should have the opportunity to make known to delegations their views on the matters under discussion, and it was to be hoped that they would take advantage of the possibilities which the Committee had provided for them. (A/AC.187/SR.8, p.7)

As to the future work of the Committee once the agenda for the special session had been agreed, his delegation agreed with the views expressed by the
representative of Sweden at the 5th meeting (A/AC.187/SR.5) to the effect that the primary object of the present session of the Preparatory Committee should be to start action-oriented preparations for the special session so as to lay a basis for other discussions on the substantive issues before the special session itself. The representative of Sweden had also said that by the end of the current session of the Committee a decision should be taken concerning the work to be accomplished during the intersessional period. His delegation further agreed with the statement made by the representative of Romania on 11 May (A/AC.187/SR.6) to the effect that the Committee had the responsibility to complete the preparation of the draft documents of the special session before the session opened. In this regard, his delegation agreed with the suggestions made by the representative of Canada and was also willing to give positive consideration to other proposals concerning ways in which work on the basic documents of the special session could be pursued between the present time and September. (A/AC.187/SR.8, p.8)

On the subject of the documentation which the Committee should request the United Nations Centre for Disarmament to provide, he was grateful to the representative of Mexico for his proposal that the Centre should prepare a document summarizing the views of Governments on different aspects of the special session under appropriate headings. For the rest, it would be necessary to proceed with some caution. In the first place, there was the question of finance. The General Assembly at its thirty-first session had allocated the sum of $90,000 for the preparation of background documents for the special session, and he felt that the Secretariat should not be requested to provide material costing more than the sum available. Moreover, the Centre for Disarmament had limited manpower. More important, in requesting the Centre to prepare studies, it was necessary to bear in mind the political implications of those studies. His delegation had a high regard for the impartiality of the Centre for Disarmament and for its ability to deal with potentially difficult subjects in a non-controversial manner. However, it felt that the Centre should not be asked to prepare studies which would require of it political judgements of the sort which international civil servants, who must always remain impartial, should not be asked to make. (A/AC.187/SR.8, p.7)

His delegation repeated its pledge to play an active and positive role in the search for a co-operative approach to the problems to be considered both by the Preparatory Committee and at the special session and drew attention to the fact that, in the reply sent to the Secretary-General in compliance with resolution 31/189 B, the United Kingdom Government had expressed the view that a special session could enhance the prospects for disarmament, provided that it was thoroughly prepared and widely attended, particularly by all significant military Powers. Thorough preparation meant that preparations should start as soon as possible, wide and active attendance would be facilitated by a sensible compromise on the question of the agenda. Such a compromise would be an important first step in the achievement of the co-operative approach which was sought. (A/AC.187/SR.8, p.8)
speaking on behalf of the nine members of the European Community, expressed support for the decision to permit delegations which were not members of the Preparatory Committee to take part in its deliberations without the right of vote. The nine members of the European Community also felt that the special session could succeed only if the decisions it adopted had the widest possible support. Decisions made in disregard of the vital interests of States or groups of States would not command the authority necessary to ensure their implementation and could jeopardize a unique opportunity to advance the cause of disarmament. It should therefore be the aim of the members of the Committee and of any sub-committees that might be established to conduct their work so as to be able to reach agreement by consensus. (A/AC.187/SR.2, p.2)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

said that his delegation hoped that the work of the Preparatory Committee would give a positive stimulus to United Nations disarmament activities and was determined to work in a spirit of co-operation with all members of the Committee in order to fulfil that hope. He drew the Committee's attention to the recent statement made by the President of the United States on the occasion of his visit to the United Nations, in which he had underlined the commitment of the United States to work towards real progress in arms control and disarmament.

His delegation endorsed the Chairman's remarks concerning the need for decisions to be adopted by consensus both within the Preparatory Committee and at the special session. Disarmament was a highly sensitive issue, and if the special session devoted to disarmament was to lend new impetus to the disarmament process, the decisions of both the Preparatory Committee and the special session must enjoy widespread support, particularly that of the major Powers. The approach adopted by the Chairman would help to promote a spirit of co-operation at the special session. (A/AC.187/SR.3, p.3)

said that the informal discussions and exchanges of view - which, in the opinion of his delegation, provided the best and most effective means of carrying out the work assigned to the Committee - had led to a consensus on the particular task of the current session, namely, the preparation of a draft agenda for the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It was encouraging to note the evidence of willingness on all sides to understand different points of view and make the necessary concessions. (A/AC.187/SR.14, p.3)

His delegation hoped that the momentum generated at the current session would not be lost and that bilateral, regional and multilateral talks would continue. In
that connexion, it supported the Chairman's proposal that work should be continued on an informal basis between sessions. While it would be necessary for Governments to bear responsibility for decisions in the field of disarmament, the delegation of the United States of America believed that support and ideas should be sought from all available sources. In particular, it believed that private and non-governmental organizations and national and international research institutes could make significant contributions. It hoped such bodies would use their talent and energies to develop ideas for the special session."

(A/AC.187/SR.14, p.3)

See also IV.

**VENEZUELA**

"His delegation was pleased that a consensus had been reached on inviting non-governmental organizations and institutions involved in the field of disarmament to participate in the Committee's deliberations, in view of both the importance of their contributions and the appreciation which that measure implied."

(A/AC.187/SR.10, p.3)

**YUGOSLAVIA**

"In its reply to the Secretary-General, his Government had enumerated the elements which, in its view, should be incorporated in the declaration on disarmament and in the programme of disarmament measures. His delegation would present those questions during the proceedings of the Preparatory Committee, together with proposals concerning the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and the negotiating machinery.

With regard to the date of the special session, the organization of further work of the Preparatory Committee and similar questions, his delegation would cooperate closely with the other members of the Preparatory Committee, especially within the Group of non-aligned countries."

(A/AC.187/SR.4, p.4)
IV. AGENDA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany, Federal Republic of</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
IV. AGENDA

ALGERIA

"expressed the satisfaction of his delegation at the success of the Preparatory Committee in drawing up a draft agenda for the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, with the approval of all members of the Committee. He was particularly gratified that the draft reflected the views of the Algerian Government, as transmitted to the Secretary-General in its reply (A/AC.187/28), on the lack of adequate progress in disarmament, on the continuation of the arms race and on the need to create conditions favourable to disarmament. In that connexion, his Government attached great importance to the need to establish a climate of confidence between States, through the final resolution of local conflicts, the elimination of the last remnants of colonialism and racism, and the ending of policies of spheres of influence, of interference in the internal affairs of States, and of denial of the right to self-determination of peoples under foreign domination.

His delegation noted with satisfaction that the Committee had decided to include in the agenda a review of the role of the United Nations in disarmament and of the international machinery for negotiations on disarmament. It considered that the United Nations should assume its natural role of providing leadership and guidance in the field of disarmament and should participate more actively in the disarmament process. It continued to support the convening of a World Disarmament Conference in which all nuclear-weapon States would participate." (A/AC.187/SR.13, p. 8)

AUSTRALIA

"One of the principal goals of the special session should be the elaboration of a framework within which arms control and disarmament issues could be examined and negotiations conducted. To that end, it was necessary to set out fundamental normative principles. However, those principles should be founded on political reality. For example, States would not be prepared to negotiate disarmament measures unless they felt militarily secure. Another major goal would be the identification of a consensus on the priority measures of arms control and disarmament and the issues of contention within those priority areas.

His Government did not believe that the special session would be an appropriate forum for the negotiation of any totally new arms control or arms limitation convention. However, completion, by the time the special session convened, of agreements currently under discussion would demonstrate international determination to generate a new momentum in disarmament. More particularly, the Australian
Government, whose position on the desirability of an immediate suspension of nuclear testing and the early negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty was well known, had warmly welcomed recent developments which demonstrated a new preparedness to reverse the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. In that respect it hoped that, by the time the special session commenced, a comprehensive test-ban treaty would either be negotiated, or at least, that agreement would have been reached on the basic elements for such a treaty.

Arms control and disarmament proposals touched directly the first responsibility of all Governments to provide for national security. All States sacrificed resources for military purposes which might otherwise be utilized to enhance the welfare of their citizens. Without ceasing to respect the sincerity of their position, it was essential to stop the endless international spending on more sophisticated weapons in a process which did not result in enhanced security.

Nevertheless, it was not enough for the super-Powers to take the step of achieving a more peaceful world. As they took steps to reverse the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons (and the other nuclear-weapons States had a similar responsibility, even if different quantitatively), other States should demonstrate their own preparedness to take complementary measures to guarantee that nuclear weapons did not become part of their own armouries. If the super-Powers were prepared to show the way by negotiating a comprehensive test-ban treaty, those States which had still not ratified the non-proliferation treaty should be encouraged to do so.** (A/AC.187/SR.10, pp.2-3)

AUSTRIA

** The difficulties impeding progress in disarmament, which stemmed from the intricate problems involved, would not disappear by themselves. Accordingly, a thorough and sincere examination of the causes underlying the current stagnation of disarmament negotiations was as necessary as was discussion of the possibility of a new and comprehensive approach to disarmament negotiations leading to the adoption of a balanced programme of action which would ensure the co-ordination of activities carried out on different levels and in different forums in order to obtain an accelerated solution of priority problems. Another topic of the discussions should be the institutional and organizational measures which would allow the United Nations to carry out more effectively its predominant role in the field of disarmament.

The Austrian Government attached special importance to a speedy solution of the various problems posed by the arms race in both the nuclear and the conventional fields. Nuclear disarmament continued to be the most urgent of those problems, and the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, besides being of vital importance to mankind, would facilitate disarmament in other
The credibility of measures to prevent the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons hinged in particular upon the willingness of the two leading nuclear-weapon States to agree on effective measures of nuclear disarmament. In that context, the fragile basis of the non-proliferation régime, as demonstrated by the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, could not be overlooked. National and international actions prior to the second Conference would be a determining factor for the future of non-proliferation treaties. A related problem was that posed by the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and especially by the peaceful use of nuclear explosive devices. The special session should elaborate recommendations on the subject and the resources of the International Atomic Energy Agency should also be strengthened.

The increasing build-up of arsenals of so-called conventional weapons in many parts of the world in recent years was also a cause of great concern to the international community, particularly because it accounted for the greatest proportion of world military expenditures. The solution to that problem called for an exhaustive examination of the political, social and economic reasons underlying it.

The problem of the demilitarization of outer space, which had not yet been completely solved, was a third dimension of disarmament. Although it did not completely eliminate the use of outer space for military purposes, the 1967 Treaty provided that States Parties to the Treaty would use the Moon and other celestial bodies only for peaceful purposes. It was to be hoped that in the future it would be possible to reach agreement on the total demilitarization of outer space. In that connexion, mention must be made of proposals such as that concerning an agreement prohibiting weapons which could destroy the other side's observation satellites and thereby prevent the verification of compliance with arms limits.

All States should adopt co-operative measures to put an end to the arms race and to redirect the resources currently being used for it towards social and economic development activities. That also applied to the large percentage of the world's intellectual resources which was diverted to military purposes. That aspect should be a topic for the United Nations Conference on Science and Technology for Development scheduled for 1979. (A/AC.187/SR.7. pp.2-3)

BANGLADESH

Like other countries, Bangladesh also subscribed to the view that one of the serious omissions in the agenda in the past had been the phenomenal growth in the conventional arms race. The real threat to international security continued to emanate from conflicts located in States of the third world. The ramifications of
those problems should also be the subject of discussion and recommendations during the special session devoted to disarmament." (A/AC.187/SR.9, p.3)

See also VI.

BELGIUM

For its part, the General Assembly should endeavour to broaden the scope of the measures which could contribute to disarmament. In that connexion, the question of the transfer of conventional weapons should receive closer attention from all States. Similarly, the United States suggestions concerning measures designed to improve the climate of international confidence and to reduce tension should be reflected in the agenda. The Assembly might also consider new working and negotiating methods which had scarcely been tried thus far. In that connexion, his delegation had already drawn attention at the thirty-first session of the General Assembly, to the possibilities afforded by a regional approach to disarmament. It was not a question of a regional approach as opposed to a global approach. All such approaches, like any potential bilateral measures, were complementary. It should be borne in mind that the prospects for agreement on certain aspects of disarmament could vary from one region to another. His delegation intended to propose at the thirty-second session of the General Assembly that a global study of the regional aspects of disarmament should be undertaken.

Meanwhile, the Committee should develop the topic of the regional aspects of disarmament in the documents which it was to prepare for the special session. (A/AC.187/SR.10, p.9)

See also VI.

BRAZIL

See VI.

BULGARIA

As far as the agenda of the special session was concerned, it was very important that it should include, as a separate item, the question of the convening of the world disarmament conference. His delegation believed that, in order to achieve further progress in the disarmament talks, the final documents drawn up by the special session should state clearly that the main objective of the efforts of all States in the field of disarmament should be a militarily non-participating principle of States during the special session devoted to disarmament. With regard to his delegation, the thirty-first document session on the main points of the agenda, the existing programs of the world disarmament conference would be need for practical purposes.

In discussion of nuclear weapons, with regard to the weapons made the existing programs, the weapons would be need for practical purposes.

In discussion of nuclear weapons, with regard to the weapons made the existing programs, the weapons would be need for practical purposes.
should be general and complete disarmament; should indicate the need for all militarily important States, in particular the nuclear-weapons States, to participate in the negotiations; and should emphasize the importance of the principle of not seeking unilateral advantages or endangering the security of States during the negotiations at the special session and in the taking of decisions. With regard to the priority measures which must be taken in the disarmament field, his delegation considered that the memorandum submitted by the Soviet Union at the thirty-first session of the General Assembly deserved special attention. That document set out a realistic and pragmatic programme for joint action by all States on the main disarmament issues. The special session should not take the place of the existing machinery for negotiations on the question of disarmament, but should provide it with new vigour and improve its efficiency.\textsuperscript{11} (A/AC.187/SR.10, p.11)

COLOMBIA

His delegation was concerned that too much emphasis might be placed on declarations or appraisals of the world disarmament situation and that the participants in the special session might become involved in philosophical discussions that would use up the short time available to them without offering the world any panaceas.\textsuperscript{11} (A/AC.187/SR.7, p.7)

With regard to the draft agenda submitted by the delegation of Sri Lanka on behalf of the non-aligned group in the Preparatory Committee, while it might be useful to carry out a review and appraisal of the present international disarmament situation and to adopt a declaration of principles on disarmament - something which the General Assembly had already done on countless occasions - his delegation felt that item 3 of the draft agenda, namely the adoption of a programme of action on disarmament, was most important and should be the core of the work of the special session. Nothing could be gained from a rhetorical declaration of principles if it was not accompanied by a programme of well-conceived measures for arms limitation. Such measures should be aimed at ending the proliferation of nuclear weapons, limiting conventional weapons, and eliminating incendiary and chemical weapons and weapons of mass destruction. Nevertheless, a mere announcement of such measures would not be sufficient; it would be necessary to prepare background documents on each one and to formulate practical suggestions on them. (A/AC.187/SR.7, p.7)

In discussions of practical measures, the need to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to eliminate nuclear stockpiles was constantly stressed. But there were other more urgent matters, since the horrible consequences of such weapons made it very unlikely that they would ever be used. On the other hand, the existing traffic and trade in conventional weapons kindled conflicts for profit. Nearly $20 billion were currently being invested in that trade. For example, on the Latin American continent, where large masses of the population were afflicted by the tragedy of underdevelopment, $570 million had been spent on arms in 1975.\textsuperscript{11} (A/AC.187/SR.7, p.8)
CUBA

His Government attached the greatest importance to the prompt convening of the world disarmament conference, which had been consistently advocated by the non-aligned countries since their first summit conference held in 1961 in Belgrade. The conference, with the participation of all States, could examine the agenda in proper perspective, giving due attention to all the factors involved. His delegation therefore felt that the world disarmament conference should be given high priority as a separate item on the agenda of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. However, the special session should not be regarded as a substitute for the world conference but should rather be a gateway leading to its early convocation.

The international community could thus advance towards general and complete disarmament in conditions which guaranteed the independence, territorial integrity and legitimate rights of all countries and which strengthened the process of international détente, making it irreversible and world-wide. (A/AC.187/SR.13, p.6)

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

His delegation was of the opinion that a number of positive and realistic proposals had already been submitted in connexion with the preparations for the special session. He wished, for example, to draw attention to the Soviet memorandum of 28 September 1976 on questions of ending the arms race and disarmament. The special session should give proper attention to that document, which was in harmony with the goals that the international community hoped to attain through the convening of the special session.

His Government felt that the agenda for the special session should include items on the preparations for the world disarmament conference, on the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and on the adoption of a declaration on disarmament. The declaration should set forth basic guidelines on disarmament, the principle of the universality of negotiations, and priorities and guidelines for disarmament negotiations.

It was essential that the special session devoted to disarmament should not weaken or undermine the existing machinery for disarmament talks but, on the contrary, make them more effective. His delegation was in full accord with the view expressed by the representative of the German Democratic Republic (A/AC.187/SR.8) that those organs should not be held responsible for the inadequate progress of the disarmament talks, since they had proved their viability. The blame lay, rather, with a lack of will on the part of States, and that could not be dealt with by organizational measures. The special session should stimulate that will. (A/AC.187/SR.11, p.7)
The question of convening a World Disarmament Conference had been raised in most considerations related to the special session on disarmament. His Government thought that there was ample reason for it; both would aim at focusing the attention of the world community on the problem of disarmament in its entirety. The Finnish Government, like the majority of the Members of the United Nations, was committed to the idea of a world conference on disarmament. Therefore, it was logical to expect that that would be reflected in the proceedings of the special session." (A/AC.187/SR.7, p.5)

"His delegation found it self-evident that the special session would discuss all crucial arms control and disarmament issues. Thus, it should deal with the serious and urgent problem posed by nuclear weapons, including the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests and the reduction of the existing nuclear-weapon arsenals. The risk of the proliferation of nuclear weapons was perhaps the most serious facet of the problem; the session should consider action for the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones was another viable approach to check the spread of those weapons. The limitation and elimination of other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons and new types of weapons, should also be included in the work of the session. It was also important that the session should tackle other major issues, such as the trade in and transfer of conventional arms. His delegation welcomed the Swedish Government's proposal for a study of the interrelationships between disarmament efforts and economic and social progress, and offered its full co-operation in that undertaking." (A/AC.187/SR.7, pp.5-6)

FRANCE

"His Government had made known its views on the work of the special session and the Preparatory Committee in the communication it had addressed to the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 31/189 B, in which it had emphasized in particular that participation in the special session should be universal, with no privileges for any State, regardless of its size and regardless of the responsibilities devolving on it because of the size of its arsenal. It had been stated in the communication that no aspect of disarmament should be excluded from the competence of the special session, which should freely discuss all problems relating to that complicated undertaking without, however, interfering in ongoing negotiations or departing from a subject which must be constantly borne in mind."
The text of the draft provisional agenda submitted by the non-aligned countries (A/AC.187/54), which had been adopted with minor changes at the previous meeting, reflected the concern of its sponsors to establish a broad framework, open to all opinions and in no sense pre-judging those views which, in the course of the special session, would form the consensuses hoped for by all.

At its September session, the Preparatory Committee would examine the question of a declaration of principles and a programme of action. His delegation would participate actively in that work, and it wished to emphasize now that one of the main objectives of the special session should be a thorough study of disarmament procedures and structures leading to the establishment of an effective negotiating body which would work in close co-operation with the United Nations. Secondly, although there was obviously a need for nuclear disarmament and it should be emphasized that that was a problem separate from the cessation of nuclear tests, the fact that nuclear disarmament could not be achieved without parallel progress in conventional disarmament should not be overlooked. Only if there was parallelism between the two spheres would it be possible to avoid the disruption of the strategic balance and the insecurity which might arise during the gradual development of the stages which should characterize such a delicate undertaking. (A/AC.187/SR.13, p.2)

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

The resolution on the World Disarmament Conference had been adopted in 1971 and had been confirmed at all subsequent sessions of the General Assembly. A World Disarmament Conference, with the participation of all States, would be a proper representative forum in which broad measures for disarmament could be discussed. The Government of the German Democratic Republic believed that such a conference would have the necessary authority to achieve real progress on the question of disarmament. A session of the General Assembly, or a special session, could not replace a world conference. In the view of the German Democratic Republic, the link between a special session devoted to disarmament and the World Disarmament Conference was that the special session could and should be made an important step in the process of convening a World Disarmament Conference. That position was in keeping with the Colombo Declaration, and he regretted the attempts which had been made to ignore the basic document of the Colombo Conference on so important a question.

With regard to the agenda for the special session, his delegation considered that it would be inappropriate at the current stage to adopt hard and fast formulations which in fact constituted an assessment of the situation prevailing in the disarmament field. The decisions of the General Assembly should not be anticipated, since there was always a danger of being mistaken.
"It was a fact that the first partial results in the area of arms limitation and disarmament already existed in the form of bilateral and multilateral agreements. On the other hand, the arms race continued to an increasing extent and the danger of a world war was not eliminated”. (A/AC.187/SR.8, p-5 and A/AC.187/SR.1-4/Corr.)

"The failure of certain bodies to achieve positive results could frequently be explained by the lack of will on the part of States. His delegation hoped that the debate which would take place at the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament would create an atmosphere conducive to achieving positive agreements in the disarmament field." (A/AC.187/SR.8, p.6)

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF

the special session should assess the results achieved so far with regard to disarmament and arms control and provide an effective impetus for further discussion, particularly where development tended to be stagnant. The Federal Republic of Germany would therefore be pleased if a consensus could be reached at the special session on the basic elements of the disarmament question and if some guidelines could be given concerning future priorities.

With regard to the issues to be discussed, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany believed that the problems of nuclear and conventional disarmament should receive equal treatment. In addition to the priority subjects of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, the discussion might also centre on the whole range of issues connected with a non-proliferation policy, the reduction of armament burdens, regional aspects of disarmament and problems arising from the interrelation between disarmament and economic and social development in the world." (A/AC.187/SR.6, p.2)

See also VI.

HUNGARY

"Hungary was convinced that the elimination of the arms race required the common effort of all States, and considered that the best framework for that was a World Disarmament Conference. Some maintained that the holding of that conference would not be a realistic solution because of the opposition of certain Powers. Recent history has provided many examples of the achievement of goals which had seemed unrealistic a few years earlier. When a number of countries proposed holding a European Conference on Security and Co-operation, for some the proposal had also seemed to be unrealistic; later, however, it was possible to hold the conference. It should be pointed out that the political climate in Europe had improved considerably in recent times and that any progress achieved in the field
of disarmament would surely accelerate the process of détente. The World Disarmament Conference would be a new approach in international disarmament negotiations, and Hungary considered it very important that the special session should devote due attention to it and include it as a separate item in the agenda.

With respect to the agenda of the special session, it was evident that a general debate on disarmament was needed, as well as a realistic appraisal of the present situation, so as to draw correct conclusions for the future. (A/AC.187/SR.7, p.6)

In that connexion, it should be stressed that the main task of the special session should be not to replace the existing machinery or forums but to exert a favourable influence on them, since the slow progress in the field of disarmament was not due to "imperfect" machinery but rather to the lack of adequate political will. His delegation hoped that the special session would contribute to the improvement of the political climate, which would in turn be reflected in greater progress in the existing disarmament forums.

The sequence of items on the agenda should be formulated in a logical way, which meant that the adoption of the final document or documents must be the outcome of the whole work of the session. (A/AC.187/SR.7, pp.6-7)

**INDIA**

His delegation hoped that the special session would address itself to the main issue of nuclear disarmament with a sense of realism and urgency. The survival of mankind should never be placed in jeopardy by any weapon. Nuclear weapons and other weapons of indiscriminate destruction should be prohibited as a matter of the highest priority. The doctrine of deterrence, which had led to the existing intolerable situation, should be re-examined with a view to preventing escalation from conventional to nuclear weapons. No solution would be possible unless there was agreement between the nuclear-weapon States.

Since a nuclear war posed a threat to the very survival of mankind, non-nuclear weapon States, particularly the non-aligned could play the role of a non-reacting catalytic agent in disarmament negotiations between the super Powers. However, as all States had a legitimate interest in the outcome of disarmament negotiations between nuclear weapon States, the negotiating machinery should be equipped with conciliatory procedures by which the non-involved States could play a useful role, when necessary.

The complexity of the disarmament question must not be overlooked; that was why the special session should confine itself to discussing concrete and feasible proposals. The nuclear-arms race was economically counterproductive and a threat
to the existence of life on the planet. Yet, because of the doctrine of deterrence, there was a cynical acceptance of the arms race as inevitable. One side should take the risk of unilaterally halting the arms race and the others should be morally obliged to do the same. A halt to the arms race was feasible without the slightest jeopardy to national or collective security.

The concept of a surprise nuclear attack should be outlawed. Among other confidence-building measures for improving the climate of international peace and security, the two draft treaties on disarmament proposed by the United States of America and the Soviet Union in 1962 should be revised and updated by the authors for the special session.

Besides the moral imperative of peace, the other crying need of humanity was development for all people so that justice and equality could prevail. But the fruits of development were worth noting as long as the danger of the total destruction of life on earth existed. It was to be hoped, therefore, that the special session would, as a matter of priority, take the first steps towards nuclear disarmament. (A/AC.187/SR.9, pp. 10-11)

**IRAN**

See VI.

**ITALY**

At the special session the Assembly should first of all undertake a comprehensive review of the numerous problems which the United Nations was prepared to face in the field of disarmament. It would be necessary in that regard to reach a decision on the nature of the role to be played by the United Nations and on the instruments required to strengthen that role. Secondly, the Assembly should concentrate on the priority issues selected by the Committee. In that connexion, the special session should not indulge in generalized rhetoric or detailed technical negotiations. Above all, it should avoid duplicating the activities of existing fora, such as the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, which his Government still viewed as a highly useful negotiating forum, although it was prepared to consider constructive proposals designed to improve its structure, procedures and organization.

Considering the diversity of the proposals on the objectives of the special session, it was essential to identify those proposals on which agreement was possible and concentrate on the search for a common basic position on those issues. At the same time, while identifying priority objectives for immediate action, the General Assembly should not ignore the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament or the general principles already established by the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament. Bearing that in mind, the Italian Government had repeatedly stressed...
the need for a coherent and comprehensive programme of complete disarmament, and considered that the special session should endeavour to elaborate a far-reaching plan for gradually achieving the total elimination of arms in order to create a world based on détente, understanding, co-operation and on an international security system.

To begin with, nuclear disarmament measures should be pursued with the greatest urgency, going ahead with the negotiations for a comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTB) and with the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). Arms reduction must follow a balanced pattern in both the nuclear and conventional weapons sectors. In the case of conventional weapons, the geographical factor should not be overlooked. In that connexion he recalled that Italy had proposed that the Security Council, under Article 29 of the Charter of the United Nations, should set up a committee, divided into regional sub-committees with the participation of major arms suppliers and purchasing Powers from each region, with the task of maintaining conventional weaponry at the lowest possible level. Furthermore, in order to lay the groundwork for the establishment of those subsidiary bodies, one could envisage the possibility of setting up parallel but separate regional committees or groups comprising the recipient countries. An agreement on the elimination of chemical weapons should also be actively pursued as a matter of the greatest urgency. A successful conclusion to the current negotiations in Geneva, in time for the special session, would be a major contribution to progress in the field of disarmament.\(^\text{11}\) (A/AC.187/SR.10, p.4)

JAPAN

Although a number of significant agreements on arms control and disarmament had been concluded in the past two decades, mainly as a result of the efforts of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, the measures adopted thus far did not seem to have produced sufficient progress. That was due to the fact that, in the past, disarmament negotiations had tended to give priority to preventive and peripheral measures. Accordingly, his Government earnestly hoped that the special session would devote itself to deliberations on crucial and central issues which would lead to the final goal of general and complete disarmament. Hence, in its reply to the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 31/189 B, his Government had stated that at the special session high priority should be given to such issues as cessation of the nuclear arms race and the reduction of nuclear armaments, a comprehensive nuclear test ban, the prohibition of chemical weapons, regulation of the international transfer of conventional weapons and the reduction of military budgets.

Nuclear disarmament was unquestionably the crux of the disarmament problem. As a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Japan was convinced that if the Treaty was to be effectively implemented universal accession
to it was essential; at the same time, however, no effort should be spared to rectify the inequality inherent in the fact that the Treaty granted a special status to nuclear-weapon States. The special session would be an appropriate time for the nuclear-weapon States to acknowledge their grave responsibility for nuclear disarmament and to adopt measures aimed at halting the nuclear arms race and reducing nuclear stockpiles; otherwise, the regime of the Non-Proliferation Treaty could not be maintained permanently. As a first step, it was urgently necessary to conclude a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty which would pave the way for prohibition of the development and improvement of nuclear weapons.

The special importance of nuclear disarmament should not divert attention from the struggle for conventional disarmament, for the recent acceleration in international transfers of conventional weapons would not only intensify existing conflicts but also increase the danger that new disputes would arise in many parts of the world. A great many countries had expressed the view that that matter should be carefully examined at the special session, and his delegation felt that a common stand in favour of giving more attention to the question of conventional disarmament had developed. The special session should therefore place the utmost emphasis on measures to move forward in stages towards the elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and towards the reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces. (A/AC.187/SR.13, pp.3-4)

MEXICO

The working paper submitted by the non-aligned countries had the advantage of clearly and concisely defining both the subject-matter and the fundamental purpose of the special session. In his view, that purpose was twofold. On the one hand, the aim was to conduct a debate on disarmament with the participation of all States Members of the United Nations and with the breadth, depth and high level of representation that the subject deserved. The purpose of the debates would be to review and appraise the present international situation in light of the urgent need to achieve substantial progress in the field of disarmament, the continuation of the arms race and the close interrelationship between disarmament, international peace and security, and economic development, and the role of the United Nations in disarmament and of the international machinery for negotiations on disarmament, including the question of convening a World Disarmament Conference, according to the draft agenda submitted by the non-aligned countries (A/AC.187/43) and slightly modified during informal talks. Furthermore, the debate must not be reduced to an academic exercise; that was why express reference was made to the adoption of two instruments that would include all the conclusions of the preparatory studies and the deliberations of the Assembly, avoiding unnecessary fragmentation. Those instruments would be a declaration on disarmament and a programme of action on disarmament. (A/AC.187/SR.9, p.6)
As to Governments' statements and suggestions, his delegation viewed as particularly encouraging the opinion expressed by the United States (A/AC.187/17), which had always shown itself to be a staunch defender of the status quo in the matter of international disarmament machinery, to the effect that the special session should be prepared to undertake the necessary improvements in existing machinery and practices and to launch any new organizational steps required for achievement of the goals established at the session. (A/AC.187/SR.9, p.8)

See also VI.

MONGOLIA

The problem of disarmament was connected with economic and social development, particularly in developing countries. The question of disarmament was a world problem affecting all States without distinction, and the appropriate solutions to that problem could only be adopted within the context of a world disarmament conference, which would constitute a suitable forum. The special session should discuss the convening of such a conference as a separate item.

In its reply to the Secretary-General his Government had expressed support for the recommendation adopted at the Fifth Conference of the Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in August 1976 at Colombo, to the effect that the agenda of the special session should include an item on the convening of a world disarmament conference. It was to be hoped that that recommendation would be duly reflected in the agenda of the special session. (A/AC.187/SR.9, p.9)

The special session should, above all, make a thorough analysis of activities being conducted in the field of disarmament. In the absence of an objective analysis of that kind it would be difficult to establish guidelines for future talks and negotiations on disarmament. The time had come for those nuclear Powers that had refrained from taking specific measures in the matter to join in the efforts of the international community to limit the arms race and bring about disarmament. If all States without distinction, whether nuclear or non-nuclear, large or small, assumed the obligation not to resort to the use or threat of force, the climate of international trust would improve and that would facilitate the solution of the problem of disarmament.

The Soviet Union's memorandum of 27 September 1976 contained a full programme of measures in the field of disarmament. The practical measures proposed in that document on the prohibition of nuclear tests, the prohibition of proliferation of nuclear weapons and their gradual elimination, the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons, the prohibition of the manufacture of new types of weapons of mass
Disarmament must be linked with economic development. However unpalatable it might be to a few, the truth remained that disarmament could contribute to real development in a great number of countries and benefit the vast majority of mankind while at the same time imparting a sense of international peace and security.

The special session should take up other important questions like the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and the non-proliferation treaty, the concept of the nuclear-weapon-free zone and the creation of zones of peace. One of the most alarming features of the current situation was the phenomenal growth in conventional arms. The production and development of conventional weapons at present accounted for four fifths of the entire expenditure on armaments. That problem therefore required study, as did the effect of international trade in arms on the growth of conventional arms. (A/AC.187/SR.8, p.4)

"It supported the convening of a World Disarmament Conference with the participation of all major Powers, including the nuclear Powers." (A/AC.187/SR.8, p.5)

His delegation hoped that an agenda for the special session would be drawn up and that it would reflect the political will of Governments to give new importance to United Nations efforts and other international efforts in the field of disarmament and arms control.

Referring to the excessive increase in conventional armaments, he said that there was no justification for the fact that both in the industrialized countries and in the developing countries scarce resources were being used to obtain arms in quantities beyond those required for national security. The special session
should attach particular importance to the problem of the considerable expansion in the conventional arms trade, which absorbed means that could have contributed to the economic and social well-being of mankind.

Problems related to arms control and disarmament were connected with problems in other fields, such as economics and sociology. There was a relationship between development and disarmament: although they constituted separate aims, substantial progress in disarmament would favourably affect the economic development of the developing countries and enhance prospects for a new international economic order. In that connexion, the Netherlands supported the Swedish proposal that the United Nations should undertake a study on the subject of the interrelationship between disarmament and economic and social progress. Such a study would not only be a follow-up to the excellent work previously done on that subject but would also take into account the results of the sixth and seventh special sessions. In particular, it could deal with the following issues: the effects of arms control and disarmament measures on the release of financial resources, including determination of the extent to which a system could be devised whereby resources released would be used not only for national development but also for purposes of international development; the release of human resources, including discussion of whether persons employed in the arms industry could be easily transferred to other industries and whether there should be national or international efforts to assist companies and workers in the conversion from arms manufacture to peaceful applications; the release of technological resources, including how technological know-how in the manufacture of arms could be switched to peaceful uses; the release of material resources, including examination of the fact that, whereas the release of such resources had immediate beneficial effect, it could produce negative effects for certain developing countries as a result of the drop in demand for certain materials for which there would be no immediate use in peaceful applications. It would also be necessary to study the effects of the arms race in terms of macroeconomic phenomena, including economic growth, inflation and employment.

Another very important aspect was that of security. It was obvious that any country's development reached an optimum level to the extent that it felt secure from external threats. Genuine progress in international disarmament and arms control would create a favourable climate for economic growth. Although quantification was difficult, various qualitative aspects of the relationship between security and development could be studied.† (A/AC.187/GR.11, pp. 3-4)

NEW ZEALAND

In New Zealand's view, the overwhelming priority of the special session must be nuclear disarmament. A further major step towards nuclear disarmament following the Partial Test-Ban Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty was overdue. The next logical step was a comprehensive test-ban treaty, for which the General Assembly had been calling with increasing urgency for a number of years. If a
draft comprehensive test-ban treaty were to be prepared and ready for signature at the special session, that would in itself guarantee the session's success. The acceptance of a small number of general principles would facilitate the negotiation of such a treaty. Those general considerations included the following: (i) while it was obviously desirable for all nuclear-weapon States to participate from the beginning in the drafting of a treaty, the fact that one or more nuclear-weapon States might not be ready to do so did not constitute a reason for delaying the drafting of a treaty; (ii) there should be provision for verification which permitted a reasonable degree of certainty regarding all nuclear explosions of significant size. The verification issue was important, but should not provide a pretext for putting off the political task of negotiating a treaty; (iii) a comprehensive test-ban treaty must provide a satisfactory solution to the problem of so-called peaceful nuclear explosions. It had yet to be proved that the benefits — if there were any — to be derived from such experiments were likely to outweigh the political and environmental problems they created.

There was no justification for delaying the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty beyond 1977. His delegation trusted that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament would give first priority to that task, in order to allow for the completion of a draft treaty by the time the special session was held. Opening the treaty for signature at that time would generate maximum pressure for early ratification. The conclusion of that treaty would be an important step towards limiting vertical proliferation, but it was to be hoped that in the interval before the special session bilateral agreements would be concluded between the Governments possessing the most advanced nuclear-weapon systems. Such agreements should encompass actual reductions in the numbers of weapons in existing arsenals as well as prohibition of the development of new types of weapons.

No less important than the limitation of vertical proliferation were steps to halt horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. Further ratifications of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, especially by potential nuclear-weapon States, and more effective controls on the supply of nuclear materials and nuclear technology which could be used to produce nuclear weapons, were urgently required. New Zealand would actively support proposals designed to secure those objectives while continuing to permit access to materials and technology required for the production of electric power through nuclear fission.

High priority should continue to be accorded to efforts to prohibit the use of inhumane weapons. New Zealand welcomed indications that agreement on a treaty to prohibit chemical weapons was within reach and that such a treaty would be opened for signature by the time the special session was held.

New Zealand shared the widespread concern at the political and economic ill effects of a spreading arms race in conventional weapons. In its view, the principal arms producers should exercise restraint in responding to excessive
demands and deny arms to States whose Governments engaged in the systematic violation of human rights. A United Nations study should be undertaken as soon as possible of all aspects of the problem of arms sales and his Government would continue to support initiatives to that end. Of fundamental importance in that regard was the need to release resources for social and economic development particularly in the third world countries.

It was apparent that one special session of the General Assembly would not be able to formulate a wide range of new disarmament measures; however, if one or more major disarmament agreements were opened for signature at the time of the special session, the possibility of ratification would be increased. In addition, the special session should adopt a general declaration on disarmament and a programme of action. Likewise, a review of the United Nations disarmament machinery was an essential part of the task of the session. New Zealand recognized the need for a relatively small negotiating body, such as the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, but at the same time it shared the dissatisfaction that had been expressed with that body's record. Nevertheless, during the current year CCD had shown signs that it was concentrating on issues of greater importance than in the past and was keeping United Nations Members better informed of the progress of its deliberations. New Zealand's approach to any proposed alteration of the existing machinery was a pragmatic one: it was disposed to judge by results. The special session would provide the opportunity to do so and if, before the convening of the special session, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament was unable to reach agreement on those important issues, New Zealand would not rule out the possibility of seeking new methods of negotiation including, if necessary, the establishment of a new negotiating forum. (A/AC.137/SR.11, pp.4-6)

NIGERIA

In the opinion of his delegation, at the special session devoted to disarmament the General Assembly should examine the following questions: the structure and functions of existing negotiation machinery on disarmament matters; the link between disarmament and economic and social progress, particularly in the third world; the link between sales and/or transfers of arms and local conflicts or wars in third world countries; the link between mining and prospecting rights and the control of scarce raw materials and disestablishment, or threats of disestablishment, in smaller and weaker countries; the observance of existing zones of peace and nuclear-weapon-free zones and the creation of others where necessary; the need to make available to smaller countries, particularly the non-nuclear-weapon States, the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, bearing in mind, inter alia, that, apart from Australia, Africa produced all the uranium necessary for nuclear development; the need to guarantee the safety of safeguards, for it was inconceivable that, in order to reap the benefits of technology it should
be more profitable for countries to remain outside the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons than to ratify it, and that whole cargoes of uranium could disappear for clandestine uses.

In conclusion, he said that the world should not wait for a catastrophe before deciding that the time had come to reach a viable global agreement on nuclear weapons. It was intolerable that, according to reports, some 500,000 scientists in the United States and some 900,000 in the Soviet Union were engaged in research geared to war, when some of their knowledge could more profitably be used in studying the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, particularly in the developing world. (A/AC.187/SR.14, pp.2-3)

NORWAY

There now seemed to exist general agreement on the basic elements of the agenda for the special session, and he appealed to delegations to finalize that agreement so that the Committee could move on to other areas of activity.

Norway felt that disarmament issues should be viewed in a broad political context, and it would be particularly important to consider them also from a resource and development perspective. In that connexion, Norway would regard the preparation of a United Nations study on the relationship between disarmament and economic and social development, in the context of a new international economic order, as a valuable contribution.

Regarding specific arms control and disarmament questions, his delegation, like many others, felt that the special session should prepare a realistic programme of action. There seemed to be general agreement that the question of nuclear proliferation, vertical as well as horizontal, should be given priority.

Norway supported the idea that the agenda of the special session should include the question of strengthening the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. It would seem natural, as a first step, to base its work on the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Review of the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament, adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-first session. He considered the following measures to be of particular importance: improving the methods of work of the First Committee of the General Assembly in disarmament matters; improving existing United Nations facilities for the collection, compilation and dissemination of information on disarmament issues; increased use of in-depth studies of the arms race, disarmament and related matters; and strengthening of the resources of the United Nations Secretariat.

With regard to negotiations on general and complete disarmament, Norway had always emphasized the particular importance of the participation of all nuclear-
weapon States, whether in CCD, in the special session or in an eventual World Disarmament Conference. Such a conference would not be meaningful unless all militarily important States took part, especially all nuclear Powers. However, that did not seem to be a realistic prospect at present. (A/AC.187/SR.8, p.3)

PAKISTAN

In the opinion of his delegation, pending the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, urgent action should be taken in three areas: first, agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States on a substantial reduction in the size of their nuclear arsenals and strategic delivery systems; second, agreement to refrain from further sophistication of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems; and, third, an undertaking by the nuclear-weapon Powers to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States.

Pakistan agreed that nuclear disarmament measures could not be considered in isolation from the problem of the high level of conventional armaments. There was thus an urgent need for the conclusion of specific agreements aimed at the reduction of conventional weapons, particularly those at the disposal of the two power alliances. In the opinion of his delegation, such reductions would not endanger, but would rather enhance, their security and would, furthermore, release vast resources which could be used for the betterment of the peoples of the countries concerned. In that context, he favoured the Swedish proposal that a new study should be made on the connexion between disarmament and economic development in all its aspects.

The special session must, of course, examine the problem of ensuring the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against nuclear attack or the threat of such attack. The ultimate aim must be the establishment of a system of positive guarantees, in other words, the system of collective security envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations. Pakistan considered that the special session could make progress on that issue on the basis of paragraph 1 of General Assembly resolution 31/189 C. Moreover, the non-nuclear-weapon States, which constituted the vast majority of the Members of the United Nations, should take the opportunity provided by the special session to show that they were prepared to take regional security measures against the nuclear danger. In that context, Pakistan supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace and reiterated its support for the clarification of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.

Referring to the question of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, he said that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the IAEA system of safeguards proved that States were willing to accept certain restrictions on their freedom of action in the interest of eliminating nuclear weapons from the world.
65.

A viable system could not be based on the assumption that there could be a monopoly in the field of knowledge and technology or by making arbitrary distinctions. The most effective measure to restrain both vertical and horizontal proliferation would be a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests. His delegation considered that a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests should not be made conditional on its acceptance by all nuclear-weapon States.

Pakistan accepted the broad list of items contained in the draft agenda submitted by the group of non-aligned countries, but suggested that consideration should be given to another item or subitem entitled "Adoption of agreements on disarmament" since, by the time of the special session, a comprehensive test ban treaty and a treaty banning chemical weapons might be ready." (A/AC.187/SR.10, pp.7-8)

PERU

"The Preparatory Committee had before it a draft agenda submitted by the delegation of Sri Lanka on behalf of the non-aligned countries. The adoption of an agenda in agreement with other groups of countries appeared to be very near and his delegation welcomed that first agreement, which would enable progress to be made on other important questions." (A/AC.187/SR.9, p.4)

See also VI.

POLAND

"The Government of Poland had supported the idea of holding a special General Assembly session devoted to disarmament, because it was an incentive for mobilizing the efforts of Governments towards more meaningful disarmament measures. In that connexion there was a direct relationship between the special session and the world disarmament conference, the idea of which had originated with the non-aligned countries and had subsequently been proposed in the General Assembly by the Soviet Union. In view of those considerations the agenda for the special session should include: (1) a general debate on disarmament; (2) preparations for the holding of a world disarmament conference; (3) the function of United Nations in the field of disarmament; and (4) the adoption of the final document or documents.

In fact, Poland's position coincided with that of the non-aligned countries regarding other aspects of the special session and of disarmament. For example, it was important that the special session should discuss the military, political, economic and social consequences of the arms race and define the relationship between disarmament, development and the restructuring of international economic relations, especially since the arms race was increasingly obstructing mankind's progress. In the Soviet memorandum of 28 September 1976, a comprehensive programme of action had been submitted which took account of the world situation and the ideas put forward in the Colombo Political Declaration which could be
It was to be hoped that at the special session consideration would be given to a wide range of issues in the field of nuclear disarmament, and to measures to put an end to the armaments race and limit armed forces and conventional armaments. The special session should take account at the same time of the basic security requirements of all States. In the view of the Polish Government, progress could only be made if the approach to disarmament was based on realistic premises, namely on the principles of undiminished security of every State, respect for inadmissibility of unilateral military advantages, universality of disarmament, effective limitation and reduction of military potentials, strict adherence to and full implementation of accepted obligations, refraining from actions detrimental to disarmament efforts and the adoption of global and regional measures to promote further strengthening of détente and growth of international confidence.

Given those conditions, one could envisage the possibility of viable agreements for prohibiting the use and production of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, reducing their number and finally eliminating them. Those objectives would be furthered by agreements on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, the banning and destruction of chemical weapons, the establishment of zones of peace and nuclear-free zones, and effective action to consolidate the non-proliferation régime.

One prerequisite for meaningful progress in that regard was the universality of disarmament processes. Without underestimating the role, capacities and obligations of the nuclear-weapon States, it must be borne in mind that disarmament was an historic necessity, incumbent upon all States without exception, and that States large and small, developed and developing alike should make their contribution to disarmament. It was therefore essential that all States should participate not only at the discussion stage but also in the implementation of disarmament measures. (A/AC.187/SR.5, pp.8-9)

ROMANIA

In a position paper circulated at the thirtieth session of the General Assembly, Romania had submitted its views and specific proposals on a disarmament programme. It had also stated that it was in favour of holding a world disarmament conference. (A/AC.187/SR.5, p.6)

The agenda for the special session should be clear and precise and be strictly linked to the subject-matter, so as to show the dangers of the armaments race and the shortcomings in the negotiations held so far on the subject, and an effort should be made to outline measures to be adopted in the future. The agenda should include the following items: consideration of the situation created in the field
of nuclear and conventional armaments and the status and results of the
negotiations on disarmament; measures to be adopted by the United Nations to ensure
that disarmament negotiations could start moving, so that viable agreements could
be concluded leading to general and complete disarmament, and especially nuclear
dismament; and the function of the United Nations in the disarmament field.

The Declaration should set forth the principles governing disarmament
negotiations, their objectives and priorities, the strategy and the tactics for all
action relating to disarmament.

The Programme of Action, covering various phases, should contain concrete
measures to promote confidence and co-operation among States.  

SPAIN

"said all countries were agreed
that the agenda should include a general debate, during which the progress made in
dismament would be assessed, the adoption of a declaration of principles on
dismament, the adoption of a programme of action on the subject, and a study of
the machinery that could be used in the context of the United Nations in order to
achieve progress in all aspects of disarmament." (A/AC.187/SR.5, pp.6-7)

Obviously, the first point the Committee must settle was the content of the
agenda of the special session. In that connexion, the document submitted by the
delegation of Sri Lanka on behalf of the group of non-aligned countries
constituted an excellent basis for negotiation, since it reflected the views of a
large number of Member States. The list of items should not, however, be
exhaustive, since Member States were probably interested in dealing with other
aspects of disarmament. As his delegation had indicated in document A/AC.187/9,
it might be important to have an agenda item providing an opportunity for careful
consideration and possible recommendation of drafts prepared by United Nations
negotiating bodies which were ready for adoption.

The agenda should also
give priority to the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear arms and to
effective measures to deal with the problem, without, however, affecting the
access of non-nuclear-weapon countries to the technology and raw materials needed
for peaceful nuclear activities under an effective system of international
safeguards. The establishment of zones of peace and denuclearized zones should
also be studied, as well as the possibility of extending such zones to other
geographical regions." (A/AC.187/SR.7, pp.4-5)

SRI LANKA

"The first item on the agenda proposed by the Group of Non-Aligned Countries
called for review and appraisal of the present international situation in the light of the lack of progress in the field of disarmament, since the non-aligned countries believed that that situation was seriously affecting international conditions in general. In that connexion, emphasis should be placed on the close link between economic development and disarmament, which the non-aligned countries regarded as extremely important. It was no secret that the inflation currently afflicting the world was the result of the huge sums spent on armaments. Although the non-aligned countries did not believe that the resources released by a reduction in arms expenditure should necessarily be used to promote economic development through assistance to the developing countries, they felt that doing so would benefit both the developed and the developing countries.

In proposing the convening of a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Colombo, had referred to three main subjects which should be dealt with at that session, namely, the problem of disarmament, the drawing up of a set of priorities and recommendations, and the convening of a world disarmament conference as part of the international machinery of negotiations on that subject. In conclusion, he stated that the Group of Non-Aligned Countries was always prepared to hold consultations with other States or groups of States belonging to the Committee and hoped that through such consultations it would be possible to reach a consensus on the agenda with a view to avoiding lengthy debates which would take up the limited time available to the Committee."

(A/AC.181/SR.5, p.10)

SWEDEN

"Early agreement on a draft agenda would facilitate the work of the Preparatory Committee. Her delegation felt that the agenda of the special session should be drafted in broad terms which indicated the type of action that the session was expected to take. The session should not devote too much time to an evaluation of past developments; if there was a real desire to achieve results, it should concentrate on future action. The views of delegations on the events which had led to the present situation could be recorded in a general debate but should not be the subject of lengthy negotiations. Towards the end of the present session of the Committee, a decision should be taken on the intersessional work that was to be done. It was essential to maintain the momentum created by the General Assembly's decision to convene a special session devoted to disarmament. The preparation of drafts of the final documents should start as soon as possible.

Sweden's reply to the note of the Secretary-General (A/AC.187/19) gave an account of her Government's thinking on issues of substance relating to disarmament. It was largely modelled on the structure of the informal paper prepared by a number of non-aligned countries. The reply contained comments on a possible declaration of principles which would provide a new basis for the efforts of the
international community in the field of disarmament, a programme of action which would give highest priority to nuclear disarmament, and, finally, organizational measures for the future, particularly with regard to the urgent problem of preventing further proliferation of nuclear weapons. The conventional arms build up in many parts of the world, involving ever more sophisticated weapons, was also cause for concern.

At the same time, she wished to stress the weight given in the Swedish reply to the need to clarify, in as concrete terms as possible, certain important aspects of the interrelationship between disarmament efforts and economic and social progress. Sweden proposed that the United Nations should undertake a new study of the subject which would deal in greater detail with certain very complex questions such as the effect of military spending on economic growth, inflation, the balance of trade, the supply of raw materials and other aspects of the economy. The study should also examine methods to be employed for a well-planned, controlled conversion of resources now being used for military production.

Her Government felt that the success of the special session could be ensured only through effective follow-up action on the decisions and recommendations adopted at the session. In that connexion, the United Nations Centre for Disarmament should be given an increased opportunity to carry out studies and information activities in the disarmament field. With regard to the possibility of convening a world disarmament conference, her Government had concluded that the prospects for convening such a conference with the participation of all the permanent members of the Security Council were unfortunately not very promising at the present time. The fact that her Government had proposed the convening of another special session devoted to disarmament after a period of three to five years should be viewed in the light of that assessment.\(^\text{a/AC.187/SR.5, pp.2-3}\) See also VII.

\textbf{TUNISIA}

It would also be useful to draw up a comprehensive list of the various aspects of the arms race including, for example, those directly affecting the countries of the third world. In that connexion, Tunisia endorsed the Swedish delegation's proposal that the United Nations Centre for Disarmament should make a comprehensive study of the effects of the arms race on economic and social development, particularly in the developing countries.

The danger that the special session would merely turn into a repetition of the debates of the First Committee of the General Assembly must be avoided. A new political consensus must be formulated which would make it possible to adopt concrete and realistic measures. In view of the difficulty of the task, the possibility of a second special session must not be ruled out; in any case, there remained the World Disarmament Conference, the convening of which had been supported by most Member States, including Tunisia.\(^\text{a/AC.187/SR.11, pp.2-3}\) See also VI.
As measures relating to disarmament must enjoy the support of the great majority of States, the agenda for the special session, as well as the final document, should reflect the broadest possible agreement. His delegation hoped that the ongoing consultations regarding the draft agenda submitted by the non-aligned members would shortly result in a compromise text. (A/AC.187/SR.10, p.6)

See also VI.

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Effective solutions to disarmament problems could be worked out only in a universal forum with the necessary machinery for adopting practical viable decisions that took the interests of all States into account. That could be accomplished within the framework of a world disarmament conference. At every session since 1971, the General Assembly had called for the convening of such a conference, and the idea had won active support at various meetings of the non-aligned countries. In August 1976, the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-aligned Countries in Colombo had proposed that the agenda of the special session devoted to disarmament should include an item on the convening of a world disarmament conference. His delegation was pleased to note that the convening of such a conference was receiving support in the replies submitted by States to the Secretary-General. Among the countries which had taken that position were Algeria, Poland, Venezuela, Spain; the German Democratic Republic, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Syria, Finland and Mexico. The question of convening a world disarmament conference had thus become universal in nature, and one of the main tasks of the special session was to decide on measures for preparing and holding the conference, which should be the next, decisive stage in the solution of disarmament problems. (A/AC.187/SR.6, pp.4-5)

See also VI.

UNITED KINGDOM

On the subject of the agenda of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, he felt that the wording of the agenda should not be prejudicial to the points of view of any particular State or group of States. Therefore, with regard to item 1, which would consist of a general debate, his delegation did not favour language which appeared to make a judgement in regard to the present disarmament situation or attempted to single out some aspects of the
special session's deliberations as being more significant than others. Similarly, with regard to item 4, his delegation felt it inappropriate to single out specific proposals concerning international disarmament machinery, since that could endanger the prospects of active participation by all members in the work of the special session. Such selection would amount to discrimination. His delegation hoped that the special session would result in broad agreement on disarmament machinery and the means by which the work of the special session should be followed up. The special session was still a year away and it was not appropriate in 1977 to prejudge decisions which the special session was to consider in 1978. (A/AC.187/SR.10, p.6)

Venezuela

Venezuela had participated actively in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference and supported the Conference so long as all the nuclear Powers took part in it. However, while believing that the subject of its convening could be discussed at the special session, his delegation felt that the session should not be a mere milestone on the road to the World Disarmament Conference. Instead, it hoped that at the special session the General Assembly would duly study the various aspects of the arms race and its economic and social consequences and achieve positive results, such as the adoption of a set of principles and a programme of action which would constitute progress towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under international control. It should also reaffirm the right of all States and, in particular, non-nuclear-weapon States, to access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes because, in view of the energy problems confronting the world, the possibility of using atomic energy could not be discounted. (A/AC.187/SR.10, p.3)
YUGOSLAVIA

"His Government felt that the agenda of the special session should be conceived in broad terms and include four fundamental items, namely, a general debate, preparation and adoption of a declaration on disarmament, preparation and adoption of a programme of disarmament measures, and the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. The question of convening a world disarmament conference could also be considered within that context." (A/AC.187/SR.4, p.4)

See also VI.
V. **ORGANIZATION OF WORK OF THE SPECIAL SESSION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany, Federal Republic of</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
V. ORGANIZATION OF THE WORK OF THE SPECIAL SESSION

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

"As to the question of the decisions to be adopted by the special session, his Government believed that the individual responsibility of all States Members of the United Nations - and, in particular, that of the nuclear Powers - would be expressed in the form of decisions. He therefore presumed that the principle of consensus would prevail at the special session, thus eliminating the possibility that only certain countries or groups of countries would accept its decisions."

(A/AC.187/SR.11, p.7)

DENMARK

"As regards the organization of the work of the special session, his Government had emphasized, in its reply to the Secretary-General under General Assembly resolution A/RES/31/189 B, that the general debate should leave sufficient time for thorough consideration of specific proposals. In any case such main committees as were established should be able to begin their work without waiting for the conclusion of the general debate."

(A/AC.187/SR.10, p.5)

FRANCE

See IV.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF

"With regard to the immediate purpose of the Preparatory Committee's meetings, efforts should be concentrated on reaching a consensus on the agenda for the special session devoted to disarmament. The proposal submitted at the preceding meeting (A/AC.187/43) provided an excellent basis for discussion. His delegation would prefer a committee of the whole to be established in order to draft a final political declaration reflecting the consensus of the international community on the future course of international disarmament efforts and negotiations. In its view, that committee of the whole would also be the most appropriate body of the special session to discuss possible improvements in the structure of disarmament institutions and their mechanisms, taking into consideration the need to maintain the negotiating capacity of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. If necessary, the committee of the whole could establish ad hoc groups to consider special problems."
"In connexion with the suggestions made concerning the organization of the special session, it should be borne in mind that the problems of disarmament were so closely interrelated, and even the consideration of structural problems was so closely linked with the task of defining priorities, that it was difficult to see how co-ordinated work could be done in several committees which lacked the cohesion of one single body." (A/AC.187/SR.6, pp.2-3)

ITALY

"At the special session the Assembly should first of all undertake a comprehensive review of the numerous problems which the United Nations was prepared to face in the field of disarmament. It would be necessary in that regard to reach a decision on the nature of the role to be played by the United Nations and on the instruments required to strengthen that role. Secondly, the Assembly should concentrate on the priority issues selected by the Committee. In that connexion, the special session should not indulge in generalized rhetoric or detailed technical negotiations. Above all, it should avoid duplicating the activities of existing fora, such as the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, which his Government still viewed as a highly useful negotiating forum, although it was prepared to consider constructive proposals designed to improve its structure, procedures and organization." (A/AC.187/SR.10, p.4)

MEXICO

"Referring to some matters that had already been discussed, he expressed the view that the special session should ideally last from six to eight weeks, since there would be no justification for summoning nearly 150 Members to a special session that would merely rubber-stamp the drafts prepared by a body such as the Preparatory Committee which represented slightly more than one third of the membership of the Organization. Naturally, if the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament completed a draft treaty on the cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests that had the support of the two super-Powers and of the other members of that body, the treaty could be opened for signature during the special session even though that was not the purpose of the special session. The completion of the draft treaty appeared to be a possibility in light of the statements made a year previously at United Nations Headquarters by the current President of the United States and of the memorandum submitted by the Soviet Union to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on 15 February 1977." (A/AC.187/SR.9, p.7)

See also II.
NEPAL

"In conclusion, he wished to point out that many non-governmental organizations had been actively associated for many years with questions relating to disarmament; their knowledge and experience should be utilized and they should be encouraged to continue their useful work." (A/AC.187/SR.8, p.5)

NEW ZEALAND

"While understanding the reasoning behind the adoption of a conservative formulation concerning the participation of non-governmental organizations in the work of the Preparatory Committee, the New Zealand delegation reiterated its belief that such organizations had made and could make a distinctive contribution to the work of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. It was confident that they would be able to make a positive contribution to the work of the special session." (A/AC.187/SR.11, p.6)

SWEDEN

See IV.

TUNISIA

See IV.

UNITED KINGDOM

See III.
VI. **PRINCIPAL DOCUMENT OR DOCUMENTS OF THE SPECIAL SESSION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany, Federal Republic of</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
VI. PRINCIPAL DOCUMENTS OR DOCUMENTS OF THE SPECIAL SESSION

ALGERIA

See III.

AUSTRALIA

See IV.

BANGLADESH

"There appeared to be an emerging consensus regarding the need to have a general declaration on disarmament, the main focus of which would be an evaluation of past endeavours, a set of practical guidelines and principles reflecting the common denominator of international consciousness and the incorporation of the major objectives desired.

His Government believed that the irrevocable link between security and economic development was of cardinal importance, since peace and prosperity were indivisible. He also stressed that considerations of national security were incompatible with disarmament, so long as no international security system existed. The real issue of disarmament, therefore, hinged on the balance between national insecurity and the degree of international trust that could be collectively reinforced.

The crucial role of the United Nations in the process could never be over-estimated; nor could the need to channel resources freed by disarmament measures towards the effective promotion of the social and economic progress of humanity, particularly in the developing countries. Equally important was the recognition of the right of all States to free and equal access to technology for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Among the most important principles governing future disarmament negotiations was the recognition that progress towards disarmament was the responsibility of all States, individually and collectively. Nevertheless, it was the special responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States to participate in and implement disarmament measures, and also to guarantee that they would not resort to the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons against other States and in particular against non-nuclear-weapon countries.
Disarmament was intimately related to the search for a new international political and economic order based on mutual trust and justice, on the principle of equal security for all States, on the recognition of national independence and on international co-operation.

The acid test of the Preparatory Committee, and indeed of the special session itself, would be its ability to formulate a programme of action oriented recommendations, incorporating specific and achievable objectives and with machinery for co-ordinating, reviewing and following up action - a programme that was flexible and realistic enough to command the widest support.

Among the basic ingredients of such a programme, the highest priority must be given to measures pertaining to nuclear disarmament, the containment of vertical proliferation, including cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, and the reduction and complete elimination of nuclear arsenals. Equally important were efforts to contain horizontal proliferation, by increasing the credibility of measures towards that end. Closely related to those questions were problems posed by the peaceful uses of nuclear energy their accessibility to all nations under effective international safeguards and the avoidance of dangers connected with nuclear explosive devices. His Government was vitally interested in measures to strengthen regional and subregional co-operation, in order to encourage the relaxation of tension and the settlement of disputes on the basis of friendship and recognition of equal sovereignty. Such collateral disarmament measures as the creation of zones of peace and nuclear-free zones were particularly important. Another area of vital interest was the generation of resources for peace through a more rational use of the vast sums wasted on the arms race. He therefore fully supported the proposal submitted by Sweden for a United Nations study on the relationship between disarmament efforts and economic and social progress.\(^\text{I}\) (A/AC.187/SR.9, pp.2-3)

**BELGIUM**

said that the special session should provide the opportunity to implement a comprehensive disarmament programme under which all States, without distinction, would agree to participate in the implementation of recommended measures. The arms race, with its risks of destabilization and its impact on the economic development of States, was currently affecting all regions of the world. Disarmament was becoming an increasingly important matter of concern to all States, although some States, because of the weapons they possessed, had to assume special responsibilities.

The General Assembly, in the proposed declaration, should emphasize the universality and parallelism of the activities to be undertaken, without necessarily selecting one field of action for absolute priority in relation to the others. In disarmament matters, the method of selecting
priority fields and questions had often resulted in the long neglect of entire sectors in which useful efforts and activities could have been undertaken. The scope was broad enough to permit the preparation of a comprehensive programme in which activities would be carried out side by side, without prejudice to the special responsibilities of certain States, particularly the nuclear States.

Belgium had always believed that one of the main reasons why international efforts had come to a standstill was the lack of communication among nuclear States, whose responsibility to the international community should motivate them to seek ways of establishing a dialogue among themselves. It was to be hoped that the special session would help to bring about the conditions – particularly the institutional conditions – which would enable such a dialogue to begin. The Preparatory Committee should bear that objective in mind and prepare documentation which would enable all States to attend and participate in the special session.

(A/AC.187/SR.10, p.9)

BRAZIL

In that reply, addressed to the Secretary-General in accordance with resolution 31/189 B, the Government of Brazil had envisaged the adoption by the special session of two basic documents: the first would be a political declaration of principles and guidelines for future negotiations on disarmament, and the second would be a programme of action for general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

The declaration of principles and guidelines should, in the view of his delegation, include the following essential elements: first, the international community should give maximum priority to negotiating efforts in the field of nuclear disarmament; second, disarmament measures should be correlated with the preservation and strengthening of international security in order to avoid the creation of military imbalances which might, during the negotiation process, jeopardize international peace; third, the principle that responsibilities and obligations should be balanced must prevail in the field of disarmament; furthermore, obligations should not be discriminatory in nature; fourth, new international confidence-building measures or measures of non-armorment should be accompanied by truly significant steps in the field of real disarmament; fifth, the verification system should be an integral element of agreements on disarmament and should be implemented by the adoption of adequate methods, both at the national and international levels; sixth, all States, including those possessing nuclear weapons, should participate on an equal footing in international negotiations on disarmament; seventh, international efforts on chemical weapons should proceed at an accelerated pace, along with efforts to deal with weapons of mass destruction, arms which caused unnecessary suffering and those which were particularly inhumane; eighth, all countries must have free access to peaceful technologies both in the
nuclear and other fields, with standardized non-discriminatory and universal safeguards. The system of safeguards should be applied equally to all States and should be extended, whenever necessary, to cover new advances in technological research and development. None of those measures, however, should permit unwarranted interference in the sovereignty of States or threaten scientific, technological or economic development for essentially peaceful purposes; ninth, firm commitments should be made to apply significant portions of the savings derived from disarmament measures to the promotion of economic development in less developed areas. Those commitments would facilitate the establishment of a new international economic order; tenth, the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States should rest on concrete commitments on the part of the nuclear-weapon States, such as the commitment to respect demilitarized zones and zones of peace, positive guarantees on the part of nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States belonging to demilitarized zones, and an agreed programme of measures for general and complete disarmament, elaborated on non-discriminatory bases and with special regard to the interests of developing countries.

With regard to the second of the final documents of the special session, his delegation was of the opinion that the programme of action should accord the highest priority to negotiations on effective measures in the field of nuclear disarmament, with particular reference to a comprehensive nuclear-weapon-test ban, to the destruction of stockpiles of such weapons, to the ending of the process of research and development of new types of nuclear weapons and to the freezing of production of fissionable material for military purposes. The programme of action should also refer to negotiations on chemical weapons, on new weapons of mass destruction and on conventional weapons. (A/AC.187/SR.9, pp.4-6)

COLOMBIA

With regard to the draft agenda submitted by the delegation of Sri Lanka on behalf of the non-aligned group in the Preparatory Committee, while it might be useful to carry out a review and appraisal of the present international disarmament situation and to adopt a declaration of principles on disarmament - something which the General Assembly had already done on countless occasions - his delegation felt that item 3 of the draft agenda, namely the adoption of a programme of action on disarmament, was most important and should be the core of the work of the special session. Nothing could be gained from a rhetorical declaration of principles if it was not accompanied by a programme of well-conceived measures for arms limitation. Such measures should be aimed at ending the proliferation of nuclear weapons, limiting conventional weapons, and eliminating incendiary and chemical weapons and weapons of mass destruction. Nevertheless, a mere announcement of such measures would not be sufficient; it would be necessary to prepare background documents on each one and to formulate practical suggestions on them. (A/AC.187/SR.7, p.7)
"So that generally acceptable solutions could be reached, all States must participate in consultations which would take into account their views and suggestions. It was therefore essential that formal and informal consultations on the content and drafting of the documents to be adopted by the special session should be conducted on the basis of studies and papers concerning a new approach." (A/AC.187/SR.10, p.5)

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

See IV.

DENMARK

"Besides formulating a declaration on disarmament, it should be the main purpose of the session to identify the fields in which action should be taken and to establish priorities. He wished to draw particular attention to the problem of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and also to the conclusion of a treaty for a comprehensive nuclear test ban. It was clear that progress in the SALT negotiations would create a climate which would facilitate the finding of solutions for the nuclear issues he had mentioned. Those problems should not, however, be given exclusive attention to the detriment of efforts for curbing the conventional arms race. Recipient countries within a given region might help to further conventional arms control." (A/AC.187/SR.10, p.5)

FRANCE

See IV.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

"Even if the special session merely established principles, that would nevertheless constitute a new step in the desired direction. The final document or documents might contain something more than mere principles, since proposals already existed with regard to curtailment of the nuclear arms race, prohibition of nuclear tests, banning and destruction of chemical weapons, prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction and reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons. In that connexion, the memorandum on questions of ending the arms race
and disarmament, submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in September 1976 (A/31/232), deserved detailed study.

As to the final document or documents, there was a need for prior study of the replies sent by Governments to the Secretary-General in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 31/189 B. He regretted to note that fewer than half of all Member States had submitted replies.\(^{(A/AC.187/SR.8, p.6)}\)

See also III.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF

See IV.

HUNGARY

The need for achieving concrete results in the field of disarmament was unquestionable, but they could be achieved only if the basic document respected certain principles, such as the need for States to take into account each other's security interests, the exclusion of unilateral military advantages for any State or group of States, and the universality of disarmament both in the geographical sense and in the sense of types of weapons.

The sequence of items on the agenda should be formulated in a logical way, which meant that the adoption of the final document or documents must be the outcome of the whole work of the session.\(^{(A/AC.187/SR.7, p.7)}\)

IRAN

There seemed to be a measure of agreement among most Member States as to the format within which the objectives of the special session could be achieved. In that connexion, the adoption of a declaration of principles and a programme of action was widely regarded as of cardinal importance. The Preparatory Committee should seek to direct its attention as soon as possible to the elaboration of an outline of those two basic documents.

The declaration should embody a set of guiding principles and contain, in broadly acceptable, clear terms, the essentials of a new approach to the
complicated problem of disarmament. It should reflect current trends and realities and should re-emphasize old but still valid assumptions. It should cite the basic premises which underlay the decision to convene a special session, and it should provide a general framework for the substantive and institutional approaches necessary for action.

Although general and complete disarmament was the ultimate goal, short-term and immediate objectives should not be ignored. The necessary attention should be given to controlling the growth of armaments and also to the underlying sources of insecurity and the continuing conflicts and threats which created the demand for weapons. In preparing a declaration of principles, account should be taken of technological and political changes and of new economic realities, thoughts and trends. In a document intended to provide directions for follow-up measures, a broad outline of priorities was an essential element. Of no less importance was reasonable, realistic consideration of the varying degrees of responsibility of different countries on the basis of priorities in the field of disarmament.

A programme of action was a logical concomitant of a declaration of principles, and it was in the programme of action that the value of the special session would be determined. The desired aim was obviously not a hasty agreement on abstract priorities or a rigid programme and schedule of action. It was recognized that the implementation of any programme of action in that field was influenced by political and security considerations of the highest order and that an international atmosphere of distrust, in which goodwill and a willingness to co-operate were lacking, would hardly be conducive to meaningful efforts to achieve disarmament. The programme of action should reflect those realities and offer a reasonable, balanced approach embodying the fundamental interests of the international community.

In the identification of particular areas of arms limitation where action was required and in the establishment of priorities for future negotiations, the following considerations seemed to be of particular importance: there seemed to be a measure of general agreement that nuclear arms limitation and reduction should be given the highest priority and should be pursued with the greatest urgency; all areas of nuclear arms control and, in particular, a comprehensive nuclear test ban called for careful attention at the special session; consideration should be given to the possibility of strengthening the non-proliferation regime by re-emphasizing the fundamental elements of the non-proliferation treaty, which included horizontal and vertical proliferation and the vital area of the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Other matters of concern were the security of non-nuclear-weapon States and progress in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.
The programme of action should also deal with a number of other important issues, such as other weapons of mass destruction, confidence-building measures, the regulation of conventional armaments and review of disarmament machinery. His delegation would, when appropriate, express detailed and more specific views on those issues. (A/AC.187/5, p. 4-5)

**JAPAN**

His delegation felt that in future the Preparatory Committee should concentrate its attention on the formulation of the final documents, namely a declaration of principles and guidelines and a programme of action. The declaration should be adopted by consensus, with the support of all nuclear-weapon States. The programme of action should be comprehensive and integrated and should provide a broad and flexible framework for future work. It should be broad enough to ensure that account was taken of the concerns of all countries and flexible enough to permit the adoption of realistic and concrete measures in the immediate future and in the medium and long term, according to priorities. The programme should aim at giving world public opinion a broad, organic picture of concrete tasks in the field of disarmament, to be executed in successive stages but without a rigid time-table. (A/AC.187/5SR.13, p.3)

**MEXICO**

"The debate must not be reduced to an academic exercise; that was why express reference was made to the adoption of two instruments that would include all the conclusions of the preparatory studies and the deliberations of the Assembly, avoiding unnecessary fragmentation. Those instruments would be a declaration on disarmament and a programme of action on disarmament.

In that context, unnecessary fragmentation should be avoided and an effort should be made to ensure that all the conclusions and provisions were contained in the two aforementioned documents. Thus, the declaration on disarmament would spell out all the most relevant and significant principles on the subject, such as the following: all peoples of the world had a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations; general and complete disarmament under effective international control should be the ultimate goal of mankind; gradual progress towards that goal required the conclusion of partial agreement on genuine disarmament measures; the gradual reduction of nuclear weapons leading to their total elimination should be given the highest priority among such measures; the reduction and elimination of other weapons of mass destruction should also be given high priority; the international transfer of conventional weapons should be restricted, and regulated; international verification was essential to many disarmament
measures and the use of a combination of various verification methods provided the best guarantees; the declaration of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace was one of the most effective means of disarmament available to all non-nuclear-weapon States. nuclear-weapon States should faithfully comply with their obligations, as set forth in the definition approved by the General Assembly, towards nuclear-weapon-free zones and the States belonging to those zones; the reduction of the military budgets of the permanent members of the Security Council and of other militarily important States would be a commendable disarmament measure; although there was a close relationship between disarmament and international peace and security, on the one hand, and disarmament and development on the other, progress in one of those areas should not be conditional upon progress in the other; the growing arms race and the resulting waste of resources were incompatible with the decisions of the United Nations aimed at establishing a new international economic order based on justice and equity; a considerable portion of the resources released by the adoption of disarmament measures should be devoted primarily to promoting the economic and social development of the developing countries; in accordance with the Charter and with countless General Assembly resolutions, the United Nations had a vital role and responsibility in the field of disarmament and it should therefore keep abreast of all measures taken in the field of disarmament, whether they be unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral; the United Nations machinery for deliberations should be strengthened by the institutionalization of a World Disarmament Conference on terms acceptable to all Member States; the appropriate changes should be made in the organization and procedures of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in order to allow China and France to participate in its work; world public opinion should be adequately informed of the progress of work in the field of disarmament, in order that it might use its influence to intensify efforts to achieve positive results; non-governmental organizations recognized by the United Nations should have all the documentation they needed to carry out their complementary work effectively. A similar description, though much more extensive and detailed, could be made of the possible contents of the programme of action. II (A/AC.187/SR.9, pp.6-7)

MONGOLIA

"The disarmament programme was a complex and delicate issue since the national security of all States was at stake. Hence, the document or documents approved by the special session should include the principle that the security of States must not be endangered. The special session should strengthen and enhance the efficacy of existing machinery for dealing with disarmament questions." (A/AC.187/SR.9, p.9)
NEPAL

"Having reviewed and discussed the existing situation, the special session should draw up and adopt a declaration of principles on disarmament, along with a comprehensive programme of action in that field. There seemed to be a broad degree of agreement on that point." (A/AC.187/SR.8, pp.4-5)

NEW ZEALAND

See IV

PAKISTAN

See II and IV

PERU

The special session must establish the broad objectives and the most important guidelines for future action. Substantive principles for disarmament must be compiled and identified. Requirements for action must be stipulated. Finally, decisions must be adopted so that the United Nations could play its appropriate role in the field of disarmament.

In the outline of action and the establishment of priorities, vital importance must be attached to the cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests, to respect for nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace and other appropriate measures.

It had been suggested that the Committee should proceed to prepare the principal documents for the special session. His delegation agreed with that proposal since it was clear that the more progress was made in that preliminary stage, the better would be the atmosphere at the special session and the chances for the adoption of final agreements." (A/AC.187/SR.9, p.4)

ROMANIA

The agenda for the special session should be clear and precise and be strictly linked to the subject-matter, so as to show the dangers of the armaments race and the short-comings in the negotiations held so far on the subject, and an effort should be made to outline measures to be adopted in the future. The agenda should include the following items: consideration of the situation created in the field of nuclear and conventional armaments and the status and results of the negotiations on disarmament; measures to be adopted by the United Nations to ensure that disarmament negotiations could start moving, so that viable agreements could be concluded leading to general and complete disarmament, and especially nuclear disarmament; and the function of the United Nations in the disarmament field.

The Declaration should set forth the principles governing disarmament negotiations, their objectives and priorities, the strategy and the tactics for all action relating to disarmament.

The Programme of Action, covering various phases, should contain concrete measures to promote confidence and co-operation among States." (A/AC.187/SR.5, pp.6-7)
His delegation felt that the adoption of a general political declaration would be very useful and that, among the principles which should be reflected in such a document, stress should be placed on the relationship between disarmament and international security at the global and regional levels. The declaration should also take into account a just apportionment of obligations among countries in matters of nuclear and conventional disarmament. There was no doubt that greater obligations devolved upon those States which possessed nuclear arms and whose enormous arsenals constituted a major threat to world peace. Another basic principle which should be reflected was the effects of the immense costs of an unrestrained armaments race on the economic development of the entire international community.

The principle of equality of States and the right of all to participate in the measures which would be adopted for the eventual achievement of general and complete disarmament should also be taken into account." (A/AC.187/SR.7, p.4)

If the entire international community was to participate in discussion of the disarmament problem, it was essential to reach an agreement on the principles which were to govern the matter. The non-aligned countries therefore gave high priority to the adoption of a declaration of principles on disarmament and to its logical corollary, a programme of action which would make those principles effective. Experience showed that the United Nations as a whole did not play an important role in discussions of disarmament, and the non-aligned countries believed that that situation should be brought to an end." (A/AC.187/SR.5, p.10)

Early agreement on a draft agenda would facilitate the work of the Preparatory Committee. Her delegation felt that the agenda of the special session should be drafted in broad terms which indicated the type of action that the session was expected to take. The session should not devote too much time to an evaluation of past developments; if there was a real desire to achieve results, it should concentrate on future action. The views of delegations on the events which had led to the present situation could be recorded in a general debate but should not be the subject of lengthy negotiations. Towards the end of the present session of the Committee, a decision should be taken on the intersessional work that was to be done. It was essential to maintain the momentum created by the General Assembly's decision to convene a special session devoted to disarmament. The
preparation of drafts of the final documents should start as soon as possible.

Sweden's reply to the note of the Secretary-General (A/AC.187/19) gave an account of her Government's thinking on issues of substance relating to disarmament. It was largely modelled on the structure of the informal paper prepared by a number of non-aligned countries. The reply contained comments on a possible declaration of principles which would provide a new basis for the efforts of the international community in the field of disarmament, a programme of action which would give highest priority to nuclear disarmament, and, finally, organizational measures for the future, particularly with regard to the urgent problem of preventing further proliferation of nuclear weapons. The conventional arms build up in many parts of the world, involving ever more sophisticated weapons, was also cause for concern.\irl (A/AC.187/SR.5, pp.2-3)

TUNISIA

In the opinion of his delegation, the convening of a special session devoted to disarmament would make it possible to remedy the inadequacies of the methods adopted in recent years. One of the main tasks of the special session was to secure and define a common political will, which alone would make it possible to establish a new international strategy with universal participation. That was why Tunisia supported the idea of the adoption of a declaration on disarmament. That document should not only embody the political undertaking of all Member States to take effective action for disarmament but should also establish the objectives to be achieved and the guiding principles to be followed. The endeavour would succeed only if account was taken of the interests of all, particularly those who had not had an opportunity to express their opinion on that serious matter.\irl (A/AC.187/SR.11, p.2)

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

The special session of the General Assembly should provide a useful international forum for consideration of the existing situation with regard to disarmament. Views could be exchanged and the principal trends could be outlined, and the session could conclude with the adoption of a final political declaration setting out agreed views on the question of disarmament. The adoption of such a document would undoubtedly be an important contribution to the task of disarmament.

In their replies, many States proposed that the special session should formulate broad basic principles to guide disarmament negotiations. His delegation would not be opposed to seeing the special session discuss and perhaps draft a number of declarations of principles. In particular, it would be useful to reaffirm that the main purpose of all disarmament efforts should be the achievement of general and complete disarmament and to emphasize the need for participation in negotiations by all States, particularly the nuclear Powers, and for the enunciation of a firm determination to work towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament.
of basic principles such as the principle that no one should seek to obtain unilateral advantage or threaten the security of any State.\(^\text{[1]}\) (A/AC.187/SR.6, pp.3-4)

Agreements concluded in recent years on limitation of the arms race were of great importance for progress towards disarmament. Their importance was such that they should be reflected in the final documents of the special session. They included agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States on the reduction of nuclear weapons and limitation of strategic arms, negotiations on the banning of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, and the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and ocean floor. Negotiations on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons were also vitally important, as were the conventions on the prohibition of bacteriological (biological) weapons and other agreements on the reduction of armaments. On 18 May, at Geneva, a large number of States had signed the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques. That represented an important step towards strengthening the peace and security of peoples and safeguarding the environment.

It should be emphasized in the final documents prepared by the special session that inter-State discussions were taking place on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, the prohibition of chemical weapons, and the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. Negotiations on further reductions of strategic weapons were continuing between the USSR and the United States, as were talks on the reduction of military forces and armaments in Central Europe. Participants in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe had undertaken not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. In the United Nations, consideration was being given to the question of a universal treaty on the non-use of force in international relations.

In the opinion of the Soviet Union, the principal approaches to the solution of the problem of disarmament at the current stage of international relations should be stated in the resolutions of the special session. States should be encouraged to pursue the basic and final objective of all disarmament efforts, namely, general and complete disarmament under strict international control, since that was the only way in which mankind could be guaranteed universal peace and security on a lasting and firm basis.

From that standpoint, all States had an obligation to progress towards the achievement of concrete goals, taking every possible opportunity to prohibit and eliminate existing types of weapons, to prevent the manufacture of new systems of weapons of mass destruction, to keep entire regions of the world out of the arms race, and to reach agreement in other areas.

One of the main prerequisites for success in disarmament agreements should
the principle of allowing the greatest possible number of States, particularly nuclear States and those with the most powerful weapons and forces, to participate in the talks and in the adoption of measures. As for nuclear disarmament, the participation of all the nuclear Powers was absolutely essential.

Measures to solve the problems of the arms race and disarmament should not in any way jeopardize the security of States. If that principle was violated or if any attempt was made to obtain undue unilateral advantages, the effectiveness of negotiations for the adoption of viable agreements could not be guaranteed.

It was also important that the decisions to be taken by the special session should include provisions concerning the use of the resources released as a result of disarmament measures for the improvement and well-being of mankind, the accomplishment of the main tasks facing mankind, such as the war against hunger, disease and illiteracy, and the solution of social, energy and ecological problems, as well as for the economic progress of the developing countries.

The special session should establish guidelines for States in their disarmament efforts. In that connexion, the USSR had submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session a memorandum setting forth several measures that could be taken to solve the problems faced by mankind in the field of disarmament. Above all, it was essential to achieve the cessation of the nuclear-arms race. Nuclear disarmament measures should include the prohibition of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and the supply of such weapons to the armed forces of States, as well as the reduction of existing stockpiles and, as a final goal, their complete destruction.

The question of the reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons, which also represented a threat to peoples, should be considered simultaneously with the question of nuclear disarmament.

One of the priority measures to be taken in the prohibition of the nuclear-arms race was the general and complete ban on nuclear-weapons tests. Another important task was the strengthening of the system for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It was important to enhance the effectiveness of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by making it genuinely universal and by reinforcing the IAEA system of safeguards. It was essential to ensure that international co-operation in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes did not become a channel for the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The special session should also take decisions concerning the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons so as to prevent scientific and technological
advances from being used for destructive purposes. Similarly, practical measures should be taken for the reduction and limitation of aircraft, artillery, tanks and other types of conventional weapons.

The adoption of regional measures of military détente and disarmament, such as the establishment of zones of peace in various regions, in particular in the Indian Ocean, would make a substantial contribution to the limitation of the arms race and to disarmament by eliminating foreign military bases and by prohibiting the shipping of nuclear weapons in the Mediterranean.

The reduction of military budgets was one of the most powerful means for limiting the arms race. The resources thus released could be devoted to furthering the economic and social progress of peoples, particularly those of the developing countries.

The USSR was prepared to take into account the opinions of other States on those and other matters and to take an active part in the formulation of constructive decisions. The existing negotiation machinery should be maintained, as it had already proved effective. At the special session, special attention should be given to the adoption of further measures for the convening of the World Disarmament Conference, in accordance with the agreement to include an item on the convening of the World Disarmament Conference in the agenda of the special session.\(^{(A/AC.181/SR.14, pp.4-6)}\)

**UNITED KINGDOM**

As to the future work of the Committee once the agenda for the special session had been agreed, his delegation agreed with the views expressed by the representative of Sweden at the 5th meeting \(^{(A/AC.187/SR.5)}\) to the effect that the primary object of the present session of the Preparatory Committee should be to start action oriented preparations for the special session so as to lay a basis for other discussions on the substantive issues before the special session itself. The representative of Sweden had also said that by the end of the current session of the Committee a decision should be taken concerning the work to be accomplished during the intersessional period. His delegation further agreed with the statement made by the representative of Romania on 11 May \(^{(A/AC.187/SR.6)}\) to the effect that the Committee had the responsibility to complete the preparation of the draft documents of the special session before the session opened. In this regard, his delegation agreed with the suggestions made by the representative of Canada and was also willing to give positive consideration to other proposals concerning ways in which work on the basic documents of the special session could be pursued between the present time and September.\(^{(A/AC.187/SR.8, p.8)}\)
91.

VENEZUELA

See IV.

YUGOSLAVIA

The special session should appraise the current status of the problem of disarmament, the results of negotiations, the consequences for and dangers to the process of détente constituted by the continuation of the arms race, and its consequences for the economic and social development of the international community, and should reach agreement on a programme of measures which would effectively solve some basic problems of disarmament and ensure greater and over-all involvement of the United Nations in that field. For that purpose, it was essential to agree on the measures to be implemented jointly, on the measures to be implemented by each State individually, in keeping with their position and responsibility vis-à-vis the international community, and on the negotiating machinery. (A/AC.187/SR.4, p.4)

See also III.
VII. ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE FIELD OF DISARMAMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republic</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
VII. ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE FIELD OF DISARMAMENT

ALGERIA

"His delegation noted with satisfaction that the Committee had decided to include in the agenda a review of the role of the United Nations in disarmament and of the international machinery for negotiations on disarmament. It considered that the United Nations should assume its natural role of providing leadership and guidance in the field of disarmament and should participate more actively in the disarmament process. It continued to support the convening of a World Disarmament Conference in which all nuclear-weapon States would participate." (A/AC.187/SR.13, p.8)

AUSTRIA

"Another topic of the discussions should be the institutional and organizational measures which would allow the United Nations to carry out more effectively its predominant role in the field of disarmament." (A/AC.187/SR.7, p.2)

BANGLADESH

"So far as institutional and follow-up measures were concerned, he strongly supported the strengthening of the central role of the United Nations in the disarmament process. He agreed that attention should be devoted to streamlining and restructuring the working methods of existing bodies, such as CCD, in order to make them more representative and also to link them more intimately with the General Assembly." (A/AC.187/SR.9, p.3)

FINLAND

"The relatively slow progress in disarmament negotiations was mainly due to the inherent complexity of the problem rather than to the lack of adequate machinery and procedures either within the framework of the United Nations or outside it. At the same time, improvements should be made in the existing mechanisms and procedures so as to strengthen the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament." (A/AC.187/SR.7, p.6)

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

See I.
HUUNGARY

"With respect to the agenda of the special session, it was evident that a general debate on disarmament was needed, as well as a realistic appraisal of the present situation, so as to draw correct conclusions for the future. While reviewing the role of the United Nations and that of the existing machinery in the field of disarmament, one should keep in mind the proven usefulness and the so far unused capacities of that machinery." (A/AC.187/SR.7, p.6)

IRAQ

See I.

ITALY

See IV.

MEXICO

"In accordance with the Charter and with countless General Assembly resolutions, the United Nations had a vital role and responsibility in the field of disarmament and it should therefore keep abreast of all measures taken in the field of disarmament, whether they be unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral; the United Nations machinery for deliberations should be strengthened by the institutionalization of a World Disarmament Conference on terms acceptable to all Member States; the appropriate changes should be made in the organization and procedures of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in order to allow China and France to participate in its work; world public opinion should be adequately informed of the progress of work in the field of disarmament, in order that it might use its influence to intensify efforts to achieve positive results; non-governmental organizations recognized by the United Nations should have all the documentation they needed to carry out their complementary work effectively." (A/AC.187/SR.9, p.7)

NEPAL

"A major area for consideration should be the machinery for disarmament. His delegation considered that the United Nations should play an increasingly active role in the field of disarmament." (A/AC.187/SR.8, p.5)
NEW ZEALAND

See IV.

NORWAY

Norway supported the idea that the agenda of the special session should include the question of strengthening the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. It would seem natural, as a first step, to base its work on the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Review of the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament, adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-first session. He considered the following measures to be of particular importance: improving the methods of work of the First Committee of the General Assembly in disarmament matters; improving existing United Nations facilities for the collection, compilation and dissemination of information on disarmament issues; increased use of in-depth studies of the arms race, disarmament and related matters, and strengthening of the resources of the United Nations Secretariat. (A/AC.187/SR.8, p.3)

POLAND

Poland was determined to persist in its efforts to promote disarmament on all planes, including the United Nations, which had an important role to play in that field. Nothing should be done to weaken existing disarmament machinery whose establishment had taken three decades. (A/AC.187/SR.5, p.7)

ROMANIA

The time had come to make radical changes in disarmament negotiations and in proposed approaches and measures, as well as in the machinery for the conduct of negotiations. The United Nations certainly had special responsibilities and competence in the matter. The President of Romania, Mr. Ceausescu, had stated that the special United Nations session on disarmament should make it possible to move towards the adoption of concrete disarmament measures and, first and foremost, nuclear disarmament. (A/AC.187/SR.5, p.6)

The time had come for disarmament talks to be placed under the auspices of the United Nations, and held in forums open to all States and under the control of world public opinion. In order to discharge its fundamental duty of defending the peace and security of peoples, the United Nations should exert its authority in matters relating to negotiations on disarmament and the adoption of appropriate
95.

measures, as well as on the supervision of their implementation. The first General Assembly session on disarmament would have a very important function, since it would be the forum for the adoption of decisions vital to international peace and security. Principles, decisions and measures would be adopted to institute a new era of negotiations, the era of real and concrete disarmament, under strict and effective international control. (A/AC.187/SR.5, p.6)

**SPAIN**

The special session was an excellent opportunity to study the United Nations negotiating machinery on disarmament and to consider possibilities for restructuring it. The United Nations had a guiding role to play in that field. The links should therefore be strengthened between the United Nations and certain organs such as CCD, whose work was extremely useful but which was not in a position adequately to bring together the views of all the members of the international community. Finally, consideration should be given to the possibility of the General Assembly's holding further special sessions so as to continue to serve as an effective instrument in the cause of disarmament. (A/AC.187/SR.7, p.5)

**SRI LANKA**

See VI.

**SWEDEN**

Sweden proposed that the United Nations should undertake a new study of the subject which would deal in greater detail with certain very complex questions such as the effect of military spending on economic growth, inflation, the balance of trade, the supply of raw materials and other aspects of the economy. The study should also examine methods to be employed for a well-planned, controlled conversion of resources now being used for military production.

Her Government felt that the success of the special session could be ensured only through effective follow-up action on the decisions and recommendations adopted at the session. In that connection, the United Nations Centre for Disarmament should be given an increased opportunity to carry out studies and information activities in the disarmament field. With regard to the possibility of convening a world disarmament conference, her Government had concluded that the prospects for convening such a conference with the participation of all the permanent members of the Security Council were unfortunately not very promising at the present time. The fact that her Government had proposed the convening of another special session devoted to disarmament after a period of three to five years should be viewed in the light of that assessment. (A/AC.187/SR.5, p.3)
He reaffirmed the need for the United Nations, through the Centre for Disarmament, to launch a wide-ranging public information campaign concerning the grave dangers of the arms race and its economic and social consequences. Furthermore, his country felt that the proposal by certain delegations that the First Committee of the General Assembly should deal solely with questions relating to disarmament and international security was a positive one.\footnote{A/AC.187/6R.10, p.3}
I. The magnitude of the conventional and nuclear arms race and the development, diversification and accumulation of nuclear and conventional weapons, which represent in total an immense potential for mass destruction, are a matter of serious concern for all peoples. Immense human and material resources are being concentrated in the sphere of arms; new expenditures are being added to military budgets; military forces are reaching levels which cannot be justified in time of peace; the accumulation of conventional weapons and the development of the most deadly types of weapons and weapons systems are continuing; in the application of scientific and technological progress in the sphere of nuclear energy, electronics, laser technology and other fields, priority is given to the development and creation of new weapons; opposing military blocks are still maintained, as are numerous military bases and forces in the territories of other States.

The arms race and military expenditures are a heavy burden for all peoples throughout the world; they impede economic and social progress and the development of co-operation between States and constitute an obstacle to efforts to eradicate under-development, to solve other problems on which the future of mankind depends. The arms race brings about distortions in the economic development of all States, feeds inflation and balance-of-payments deficits, erects artificial barriers to the transfer of equipment and technology and to the expansion of trade between nations, gives rise to irrational management of human resources and raw materials and contributes to the pollution of our planet and to the disturbance of the ecological balance.

The continuation of the arms race is in total conflict with the new efforts to achieve détente, with the development of new international relations based on trust between States, and with measures aimed at the institution of broad international co-operation and understanding. The continuation of the arms race acts as a stimulus for imperialist policy of force and diktat and interference in the internal affairs of other peoples, and serves to perpetuate sources of tension and conflict in different regions of the world. It will be impossible to implement
a genuine peace policy or to consolidate and develop international détente if the arms race is not brought to an end, if troops and military bases are maintained in the territory of other States, and if a vigorous disarmament process, dealing first of all with nuclear weapons, is not launched. It is on this basis alone that the necessary climate of confidence can be created for continuing the process of détente, that relations between States can be based truly on the principles of national independence and sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, full equality of rights, non-use of force or the threat of force, and the right of each people to decide on its own destiny.

The fundamental interests and aspirations of mankind demand the adoption of resolute measures to put an end to this situation which has such potentially grave consequences for world peace and security. The most enlightened and far-sighted forces of human society, the movements fighting for peace and disarmament, the broad masses in all parts of the world, have declared themselves firmly opposed to war and the danger of war and to the arms race, and demand that the arms build-up should be ended, that nuclear weapons should be banned completely, and that the spectre of the incalculable destruction threatening contemporary civilization and the future of humanity should thereby be eliminated.

The most noble duty of Governments and States towards their peoples for the cause of civilization and the progress of mankind is to reveal openly the danger implicit in the continuation of the arms race and to show that, as the arms race increases, the security of States is diminished; it is their duty in no way to create the illusion that anyone can live in peace and safety while immense accumulations of the means of annihilation exist. That is why action is needed before it is too late with a view to adopting and putting into effect resolute disarmament measures, particularly nuclear disarmament measures, in order to respond to the aspirations of all nations for peace, freedom and well-being.

II. Disarmament is an integral part of the process of establishing an international economic and political order.

The new international economic and political order categorically demands the halting of the wastage represented by expenditures on arms and the utilization of these immense material and spiritual resources for the progress and well-being of all peoples and of mankind. The achievements of science and technology applied for military purposes should be reoriented towards the needs of development. Steps must be taken to ensure that advanced nuclear energy is utilized by all States on conditions of full equality without any discrimination whatsoever.

At least 25 per cent of the funds saved in the process of disarmament should be allocated to international assistance programmes for the developing countries, with the view to reducing and ultimately eliminating the abyss which exists, from the economic point of view, between developed countries and developing countries.

The process of disarmament should be accompanied by the elimination of sources of conflict, by the political settlement of contentious problems, by the strict application in relations among States of the rules and principles of international law and by the strengthening of institutions for the maintenance of peace and for
Disarmament problems are not the concern of a limited group of States and Governments alone: they are of vital interest to all the States and peoples of the world, large or small, irrespective of their military strength and of the types of weapons they possess. It is essential that all States should participate in disarmament negotiations and in the deliberations on and adoption of measures in that sphere, and that the right of each State to defend its legitimate security and development interests should be respected in any such negotiations. During these negotiations public opinion and the peoples of all countries must be kept fully

the peaceful settlement of international disputes, in conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

III. General and complete disarmament and, above all, nuclear disarmament has now become one of the major problems of international life. An urgent solution to this problem is vitally important if the threat of a destructive war is to be eliminated.

The achievement of disarmament measures, above all, nuclear disarmament measures, is a fundamental prerequisite for bringing about lasting world peace. It is the profound desire of all peoples, of all mankind, to see a climate of peace, security and trust established on our planet, through the elimination of all sources of tension and conflict and the establishment of conditions of co-operation, understanding and mutual respect, so that their pursuit of a life of freedom, prosperity and progress may be unimpeled.

In spite of over three decades of negotiations, Governments have never yet applied to disarmament problems resolute and decisive measures to reduce and eliminate armaments and to save mankind from the danger of another war. Although existing treaties and conventions have helped to establish a climate of understanding, they have not proved effective in slowing down the arms race or ensuring the enforcement of effective disarmament measures and they have no effect on the very foundations of armaments, namely, nuclear weaponry.

In view of the serious situation which has thus arisen, the prime duty of the present generation is, more than ever before, to spare no effort, to awaken all consciences, to channel all their energies towards a single end - that of instituting resolute measures in the sphere of disarmament, chiefly measures of nuclear disarmament, of concluding a treaty of general and complete disarmament, of completely eliminating force and the threat of force from international life and of thus liberating mankind from the nightmare of atomic war.

Disarmament negotiations should concentrate primarily on specific measures to bring about the immediate cessation of the arms race, measures which would put an end to the acquisition, production and development of armaments and to the building up of military strength.

The conclusion of suitable agreements and arrangements for the freezing of military expenditure and the establishment of a concrete programme of gradual step-by-step reduction of budgets, beginning with those of the major countries, would fully satisfy this objective.

Disarmament problems are not the concern of a limited group of States and Governments alone: they are of vital interest to all the States and peoples of the world, large or small, irrespective of their military strength and of the types of weapons they possess. It is essential that all States should participate in disarmament negotiations and in the deliberations on and adoption of measures in that sphere, and that the right of each State to defend its legitimate security and development interests should be respected in any such negotiations. During these negotiations public opinion and the peoples of all countries must be kept fully
informed and periodic reports must be submitted on the current situation in the
sphere of armaments, its consequences and measures that must be taken in order
to halt the arms race. Disarmament negotiations should reflect the requirement for
the democratization of international life and for equal participation of all States
in solving international problems, and should also reflect the great changes that
have occurred in international relations.

The United Nations should live up to the historic mission for which it was
created: to save present and succeeding generations from the scourge of a new
conflagration. It is for that reason that it is essential to increase the role
of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, in which it should exercise
direct jurisdiction over negotiation, the development of disarmament measures and
the monitoring of their implementation. It is necessary that the United Nations
should exercise its leadership, and its evaluation, guidance and decision-making
functions with regard to all disarmament problems.

IV. If practical results are to be attained, now and in the future,
disarmament negotiations must be governed by the following fundamental principles:

1. There must be an immediate halt to the arms race and to sharply rising
   military expenditure and the diversion of such expenditure into disarmament;

2. Absolute priority must be given to measures of nuclear disarmament;

3. The process of disarmament must start with the heavily armed major States;

4. Parallel negotiations must be carried on at several levels, with
discussions on the conclusion of a general disarmament treaty being complemented
by the adoption of partial measures, by increased mutual trust, by military
disengagement and disarmament, so as to encourage progress towards the final
objective;

5. There must be parallel negotiations aimed at universal objectives having
   a regional or bilateral nature but forming part of a single design to promote the
   objective of general disarmament and with a commitment to keep all States informed
   systematically, so that they may be in a position to evaluate the status of the
   negotiations and their implications for their own security;

6. Adequate monitoring must be provided for each measure so that the
   fulfilment by all parties of obligations assumed by them may be reliably guaranteed;

7. Equal security for all States in each phase of disarmament must be
   promoted; special attention must be given to the security of newly independent
   States having small armed forces;

8. Concurrently with disarmament measures, specific procedures must be
   adopted for the settlement of disputes by peaceful means, with a view to
   maintaining the peace and security of all States, in conformity with the principles
   of the Charter of the United Nations;
9. The acceleration of the process of disarmament must be pursued so that its progress outpaces any technological research designed to replace arms destroyed or about to be eliminated.

10. The advantages to be derived from each disarmament measure at the military, political and economic levels must be publicized systematically so as to keep world opinion informed of the progress of negotiations and to secure its support.

11. All restrictions on widespread access by States, chiefly the developing countries and those having more limited economic and technological potential, to the use of advances in science and technology must be removed.

12. Full information must be made available, through the United Nations, on the status of armaments so that all States may be able to obtain the basic data required to enable them to participate in or keep abreast of the progress of negotiations.

13. Arrangements must be made to ensure that multilateral forums for disarmament negotiations are open for participation by all States and, in the case of forums having limited participation, that non-member States are in a position to submit their point of view on the problems under discussion whenever they so request.

14. The disarmament process must be organically linked with measures adopted at the world level to establish a new economic and political order aimed at ensuring international peace and security, co-operation and the economic, social and cultural progress of all States and all peoples.
The fact that the arms race continues unchecked and is steadily gathering momentum, and that no satisfactory progress has been made in the disarmament negotiations, creates the risk of another world war of annihilation. The problem of disarmament has to be solved if international peace and security are to be safeguarded so that peoples can devote their efforts to development and progress and work unhindered towards the goal of a free and independent life.

The United Nations must increase its involvement in disarmament problems substantially by exercising direct powers with regard to the negotiation and formulation of disarmament measures and the supervision of their implementation. To this end, the General Assembly has laid down that disarmament negotiations carried on under the auspices of the United Nations are to be based on a programme of measures and action comprising the following elements in order of priority:

A. The negotiation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Such negotiations should be carried on without interruption in a forum especially designated for that purpose, preferably within the framework of the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

B. With regard to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the achievement of nuclear disarmament:

- A solemn undertaking by all States not to use nuclear weapons;
- Prohibition of the emplacement of new nuclear weapons in the territory of other States;
- The withdrawal of nuclear armaments from the territory of other States;
- Cessation of the development, testing and production of nuclear weapons and of the means of delivering them;
Cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes, peaceful use of existing materials and the transfer of a quota of such materials for use by all States within the framework of broad international co-operation;

- The creation of nuclear-weapons-free zones of peace and co-operation in different regions of the world;

- The reduction and total destruction of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and existing means of delivering them;

- Total prohibition of nuclear weapons;

- Guaranteed unlimited rights and opportunities for all States to make peaceful use of nuclear energy on an equal basis and without discrimination; guaranteed expansion of research in this area with a view to applying the achievements of nuclear science for the development of all countries.

C. With regard to the prohibition of other weapons of mass destruction:

- Prohibition of research, planning and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons;

- Prohibition of the use, cessation of the production, elimination of military arsenals and the outlawing of all existing or planned weapons of mass destruction (chemical, bacteriological, biological or of any other type)

- Total prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques.

D. With regard to the adoption of colateral measures:

- A freeze on and gradual reduction of military budgets in accordance with a definite programme. To start with, the military budgets of all States should be reduced by at least 10 per cent and half of the resources thus saved should be transferred, unconditionally, to a United Nations development fund to be set up to support development efforts, particularly in countries with a national income of less than $200 per capita. By the end of a decade, that reduction should be in the order of 25-30 per cent of the original level of military budgets, and armed forces and armaments should have been reduced by the same proportion;

- The withdrawal behind national frontiers of foreign troops, their armaments and other combat equipment, and the demobilization of the troops withdrawn;

- The dismantling of military bases situated in foreign territories;
- The gradual reduction of troops and armaments in the service of national armies by means of international agreements guaranteeing strict fulfilment of the undertakings entered into. To be effective, such reductions must not be of a token nature and, in a first stage, troops and armaments must be reduced by at least 10 to 15 per cent and by even more in large countries with powerful armies;

- An undertaking not to carry out military manoeuvres, particularly those of a multinational nature, near the frontiers or within the territories of other States, or to concentrate troops or make shows of strength against other States;

- The prevention of attacks which take place by accident, miscalculation or communications failure;

- Measures to reduce military activity effectively on the ground, in the air and on the seas and oceans;

- The dissolution of military blocs.

E. Although negotiated and adopted separately, all these partial measures relating to nuclear and non-nuclear weapons should be made an organic part of the programme for implementing the treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

All these measures must be implemented subject to suitable control, with the participation both of States which possess nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and of States without such weapons. Such control must be strict and effective and must be exercised in such a way as to offer genuine guarantees that the agreements reached and the measures adopted will be effectively applied.
Governments have not yet applied to the problems of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, the resolute and decisive measures which could bring about the reduction and elimination of arms and protect mankind from the danger of a new war.

While the treaties and conventions concluded in recent years have made some contribution to creating a climate of understanding, they have not proved capable of curbing the arms race or ensuring the implementation of effective disarmament measures and they do not deal with the basic aspects of the armaments problem, notably nuclear weapons.

The existing negotiating machinery, including the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, in spite of all the efforts made and the suggestions and proposals advanced, has failed to produce tangible results in the field of disarmament commensurate with the demands of peoples and the security requirements of the countries of the world.

Since the consideration of the problems of disarmament as a whole is related to the national security of all States and to international security in general, the starting-point must be the participation of all States in the negotiations on the basis of full equality in accordance with the principles and actions called for in the declaration and programme of measures to be adopted by the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

An essential prerequisite for the proper organization of negotiations on disarmament and for the adoption of effective measures relating to the basic problems of disarmament is the concentration of such negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations. The United Nations will be able to fulfil the historic mission for which it was created if it succeeds in bringing about the cessation of the arms race and in implementing concrete measures in the field of disarmament. The strengthening of the role of the United Nations in this field requires the...
direct exercise by the General Assembly of its competence with respect to
negotiation and the preparation and monitoring of the implementation of disarmament
measures. The General Assembly should organize in-depth discussions on the arms
situation, based on the principles which must govern disarmament.

The General Assembly, as the main body concerned with political decisions, the
basic forum which examines all of the problems of disarmament in its regular
sessions or in special sessions, should discuss the situation of disarmament
negotiations either in terms of specific topics or as a whole; adopt decisions,
resolutions and recommendations on this question; and decide on the establishment of
negotiating forums, co-ordinate their activity and receive reports from them on the
status and results of negotiations. The General Assembly will examine the draft
treaties prepared in different negotiating forums, put them into final form and
recommend them to States for signature.

Accordingly, the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly should
concern itself exclusively with the problems of disarmament and security.

The United Nations Disarmament Commission should resume its activity and
proceed to an examination of the entire range of disarmament problems and the
development of efforts undertaken in this field.

The United Nations Disarmament Commission, comprising all the Members of the
Organization, will be able to concentrate all disarmament negotiations under the
auspices of the United Nations. It will be able to negotiate the disarmament
problems entrusted to it by the General Assembly and exercise supervisory functions
with respect to the implementation of international agreements in the field of
disarmament.

Disarmament negotiations, under the firm direction and control of the United
Nations and carried out in bodies with clearly defined agendas and priorities,
should be compartmentalized in various categories of activity, such as the
consideration of all problems relating to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race
and the conclusion of agreements on the prohibition, reduction and elimination of
nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction; the negotiation of measures to
reduce armed forces and conventional weapons at the world and regional levels;
discussion of the problem of the freezing and gradual reduction by stages of the
military budgets of States; the adoption of collateral measures of military
disengagement and disarmament.

Within this framework a decision can also be adopted concerning the convening
of a World Disarmament Conference with the participation of all States and all
nuclear-weapon Powers.
Disarmament and development: proposal for a United Nations study

Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden: working paper

1. Introduction

The relations from an economic point of view between armament/disarmament and development have already been the subject of studies within the United Nations. In this paper it is proposed that a further in-depth study should be undertaken. Focusing on the basic conditions for a successful redeployment of resources released as a result of disarmament measures, the proposed study would be relevant i.a. to the efforts to attain the goals of a New International Economic Order. These matters should be clarified in a manner sufficiently elaborate to stimulate the public debate and to serve as a basis for decisions on concrete action. It is an important element of the study that present-day utilization of resources and effects of armament/disarmament are investigated closely.

An indication is given below of the direction which could conceivably be given to an international study of this kind. The terms of reference for the study should be further developed during the preparations for the special session of the General Assembly.

The point must be made that there is also an obvious need for national studies, in order for maximum use to be made of an international study project under the aegis of the United Nations. This question should be considered more closely at a somewhat later juncture.

2. Present-day utilization of resources for military purposes

The economic consequences of armaments cannot be sufficiently evaluated solely in terms of the financial resources allocated for military purposes. Correct evaluation of the economic effects of armament/disarmament (using the term "economic" in its broad sense) presupposes an awareness of the inter-State relationships of economic dependence which are connected with armaments.
An evaluation of this kind moreover presupposes a careful study not only of the financial resources earmarked for armaments, but, indeed, of the total real resources utilized. The following is one possible breakdown of the total resource utilization involved by military activities:

- utilization of labour (military, paramilitary and civilian personnel, conscripts) within the military sector as well as within industry for the production of weapons systems and other military equipment;
- utilization of R and D capacity (scientists, technicians, research facilities) for military research and development;
- utilization of production facilities in industry, of service industries, of raw materials for the production of military supplies;
- utilization of land and facilities of different kinds for military purposes.

The civilian substitution value of these real resources plays a vital part in the economic analysis of the consequences of armament/disarmament. The economic effects of a change in the volume of armaments will to a great extent depend on how much the real resources thus utilized are in demand for other purposes, nationally or internationally. The crucial consideration is the degree of scarcity of these resources.

Therefore an economic analysis of the consequences of armament/disarmament also demands an exploration of the competition for real resources which exists between military activities and urgent civilian purposes. Resource categories where this competition for limited resources appears to be most conspicuous include, for example, certain raw materials (e.g. sources of energy such as oil, minerals such as copper, bauxite, zinc and nickel), R and D capacity (scientists, technicians, research facilities) and industrial production facilities.

In analysing the above-mentioned competition for real resources, particular consideration must be given to resource requirements arising out of aims related to the social and economic development of the developing countries. The continuous work in progress within the United Nations system on the establishment of aims for development efforts is relevant in this connexion. For example, attention can here be drawn to the strategies of the United Nations Development Decades, the results of the sixth and seventh special sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, and the work of the ILO to develop strategies for meeting the basic needs of the population.

3. Effects of armament/disarmament

In analysing the economic consequences of armament/disarmament, the following factors are among those which should be elucidated in as concrete terms as possible:

/...
The successful redeployment of military production resources will demand a close knowledge of their special properties. Deviations may occur from the civilian sector as regards the conditions applying to research and development, conditions of production, marketing, administration, finance, relationships with Governments, etc. Often the criteria of what is technically/economically desirable and possible differ from the corresponding criteria applied within the civilian sector. In these respects it is also possible that ownership relations may have certain effects.

In a more long-term perspective the main question will be the relationship between civilian demands and the resources now allocated to military purposes. Civilian demands may be concerned with international development efforts, or they may be nationally oriented and concerned with consumption and investment purposes for the easier attainment of urgent national development objectives. Institutional
arrangements in the form of long-range planning may in many cases be a prerequisite for the efficient utilization of released resources in meeting these demands.

In a more short-term perspective, problems of various kinds, such as employment, arise when resources are to be transferred from one sector to another. Various measures of support may be necessary in order for the transfer to take place in a manner that is socially acceptable. There are a number of instruments of economic policy available for this purpose. These issues must be further investigated.

(b) A number of questions will have to be looked into more closely in order to describe the long-term and short-term problems that must be solved in the controlled transfer of military resources to civilian use.

For a clear picture of the situation today, and as a starting point for further studies, the following basic factors will have to be gone into:

- characteristics of the market for military matériel compared with its civilian counterparts;
- the regional distribution and importance of the military establishment and the arms industry;
- transnational characteristics of military production;
- the importance of military equipment orders in different sectors of industry;
- the technological resources of the military sector, their composition and their applicability to civilian purposes.

With regard to the actual redeployment of resources, the following factors must be taken into account:

- civilian demands which are to replace military demands and the required measures of planning;
- time factors in the process of readjusting the production, including possibilities of co-ordinating disarmament measures and measures of economic policy.

With respect to the transfer of resources from military objectives to international economic and social development, the study should focus on the following questions:

- mechanisms for transferring released material and human resources to development efforts in the developing countries in accordance with principles complying with the needs of those countries;
- utilization of strategic raw materials no longer needed for military purposes but of great importance to the exports of developing countries.
Basic provisions of the declaration on disarmament

Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: working paper

I

Ending the arms race, achieving disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, and removing the threat of a world war is the most acute and urgent task of the present day. Mankind is confronted with a choice: it must halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament or else the machinery of preparation for war will continue to consume an ever-increasing proportion of resources vital to human beings, making the danger of a disastrous war ever more real.

Modern weapons are thousands of times as destructive as anything used in military conflicts of the past and they pose a far more serious threat to the survival of nations than has ever been the case before. Yet, the actions of the enemies of détente and disarmament and the interests of the military-industrial complex are pushing mankind into a new and ever more dangerous and destructive spiral of the arms race. Weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems are continuing to develop with the aid of the latest achievements of science and technology while the stockpiles of weapons are steadily increasing in size. This creates an increased threat of nuclear war, particularly since under present circumstances any military conflict can develop into a nuclear cataclysm.

The arms race involves an enormous waste of resources which could be used to advance the well-being of peoples. At the present time, the world is spending approximately $350 billion a year on armaments. The war machine requires ever greater human resources, diverting people from peaceful creative work. This hampers the solution of such important and pressing problems facing mankind as the eradication of disease, hunger and cultural backwardness, the development of new sources of energy, extensive exploration of the ocean and outer space, and the prevention of disastrous environmental changes. It also calls for urgent measures to curb the arms race and bring about disarmament.
Recent history shows that it is possible to curb the arms race. In the past few years, it has been possible to achieve a positive change in the development of international relations towards détente and the affirmation in international relations of the principle of peaceful coexistence between States with different social systems. Thus, favourable conditions have been established for successful negotiations on disarmament. The recently concluded agreements in this field provide tangible proof that it is possible to solve the problem of disarmament. These are but the first steps; their importance, however, is great.

They include the Soviet-United States agreements aimed at preventing nuclear war and reducing the risk of its accidental outbreak and at limiting strategic arms, as well as the Soviet-French agreement on the prevention of an accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons.

They also include such measures for limiting the nuclear arms race as the treaties on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and underwater and on the non-emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and also the Soviet-United States treaties on the limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests and on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

An important role in curbing the arms race belongs to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and other measures agreed upon in recent years for preventing the spread of such weapons.

These steps also include the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and the Convention on the Prohibition of Action to Influence the Environment and Climate for Military and Other Hostile Purposes.

Important proposals for the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, for the prohibition of chemical weapons and for the prohibition of the development and production of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction are on the negotiating table. Negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe and on further limitation of the strategic weapons of the USSR and the United States are currently in progress. A proposal has been submitted calling upon all the participants in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe to undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other. The question of concluding a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations is under consideration.

Thus, the political and material prerequisites exist for making decisive progress towards ending the arms race and achieving disarmament. The crucial question now is to translate into practical terms the initiatives which have been taken and to proceed along the road towards binding and effective international agreements in the field of disarmament. This calls for joint efforts by all States, nuclear and non-nuclear, big and small, developed and developing.
The following fundamental provisions and principles should form the basis of negotiations and decisions on the questions of curbing the arms race and achieving disarmament.

1. The relaxation of international tensions and the resulting positive political processes can be truly stable if accompanied and buttressed by measures of military détente, i.e. new concrete results in the field of limiting the arms race and of disarmament.

2. The principal, ultimate objective of the efforts of States in this field is general and complete disarmament under strict international control; only general and complete disarmament can bring mankind, on a stable, long-term basis, the universal peace and security which are essential in order to solve the urgent problems of economic and social development on a world-wide scale.

3. Specific partial measures for limiting the arms race, reducing armaments and achieving disarmament can play an important role as stages on the road to general and complete disarmament and the establishment of stable peace. Such partial measures should involve prohibiting and destroying certain types of existing armaments, preventing the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, excluding certain spheres or regions from the arms race, systematically reducing the military expenditures of States, limiting armaments and achieving disarmament on a regional basis as well as other steps to prepare the way for general and complete disarmament.

All States should refrain from actions which might adversely affect efforts in the field of disarmament. An important prerequisite for the success of negotiations on limiting armaments and achieving disarmament is the willingness of States to display a constructive approach to negotiations and a political will to reach agreements.

4. Measures to curb the arms race and bring about disarmament should be based on the principle of not impairing the interests of any of the parties to an agreement; strict adherence to this principle and the abandonment of attempts to obtain unilateral advantage are the essential prerequisite for the effectiveness of negotiations and the viability of agreements once they have been worked out.

5. The universal acceptance and development of the principle of the non-use of force in international relations are extremely important in terms of ensuring favourable conditions for curbing the arms race and saving mankind from the danger of war. Renunciation of the use or threat of force must become a law of international life.

6. In order to prevent a continuing arms race it is essential to put an end to qualitative improvements of arms, especially weapons of mass destruction, to the development of new means of warfare. Scientific and technological achievements must be used solely for peaceful purposes.
7. If disarmament measures are to be effective, it is of the utmost importance that negotiations and agreements should involve the largest possible number of States, particularly nuclear Powers and States which possess the most powerful arms and armed forces. The participation of all the nuclear Powers in efforts to curb the nuclear arms race and to limit and eliminate all armaments is essential if complete success is to be achieved in this regard. The accession of all States to existing international agreements aimed at limiting the arms race and achieving disarmament is a major prerequisite of further progress in this field. A world disarmament conference must be used as an important forum for working out specific, effective measures to solve the problem of disarmament.

8. Agreements in the field of disarmament must provide for effective verification of disarmament measures, with the scope and nature of such verification depending on the scope, nature and specific characteristics of the concrete measures provided for in the agreements.

9. The resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures should be used in a manner which will promote the well-being of peoples, the solution of world-wide problems facing mankind, and the economic and social progress of the developing States.
Guided by the purposes and principles set forth in the Declaration on Disarmament, it is essential to seek appropriate international agreements in the following principal areas:

Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. It is essential to halt the nuclear arms race, i.e. to stop manufacturing nuclear weapons, equipping the armed forces of States with them, and developing and constructing new models and types of such weapons; to begin reducing the stockpiles of nuclear weapons and subsequently to proceed with their complete elimination.

The limitation and reduction of the armed forces of States and of conventional weapons, which also pose a major threat to peoples, should be carried out parallel with nuclear disarmament.

Measures to avert the danger of nuclear war. Measures to avert the danger of nuclear war should be taken in the interests of achieving disarmament and providing reliable safeguards for the future of all mankind. Such measures can be bilateral and multilateral.

Complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. This urgent measure, for the implementation of which all the necessary prerequisites exist, including the solution of the problem of effective verification of compliance, will make it possible to put an end to the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and to prevent the development of new types of such weapons.

Consolidation in every possible way of the régime of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should be
made more effective and truly universal; the IAEA system of safeguards should be strengthened in every possible way; broad international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which plays an important role in the development of the national economies of States, should not be permitted to become a channel for the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

Prohibition and destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles. The elimination of this type of weapon of mass destruction is long overdue. Measures to ban the most dangerous types of chemical weapons can be taken as the initial step towards a radical resolution of the entire problem.

Prohibition of the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. The solution of this problem is very urgently needed as a means of curbing the most dangerous aspects of a continued arms race and preventing the use of scientific and technological achievements for the purpose of destroying human beings.

Establishment of nuclear-free zones and zones of peace. The establishment of nuclear-free zones and zones of peace in various parts of the world is an important measure of regional military détente; it should contribute to strengthening the security of States within such zones and international security as a whole. Specifically, it would be of great importance to establish a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean, to withdraw ships and submarines carrying nuclear weapons from the Mediterranean area and to establish nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world.

Limitation and reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons. Military conflicts involving the use of conventional weapons lead to the tragic and often mass destruction of human lives and of the material values created by man. Accordingly, practical steps should be taken to limit and reduce aircraft, artillery, tank forces and other modern types of conventional weapons as well as armed forces equipped with them. Foreign military bases in foreign territories should be dismantled; foreign troops should be withdrawn from such territories.

Reduction of military budgets. This measure is one of the most effective means of curbing the arms race. The resources thus released would be used to promote the economic and social progress of peoples and for assistance to developing countries. The question of reducing military appropriations should be made the subject of concrete, businesslike negotiations among States, and a start should be made on their systematic reduction.

Complete demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor. The exclusively peaceful use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor should be the ultimate goal of States in this field. It would be a major contribution to the achievement of this goal if all the parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof strictly complied with their obligations, if the number of parties to this Treaty was enlarged and if a new agreement on complete demilitarization of the sea-bed was worked out at an early date.
Regional measures for military détente and disarmament. Measures such as mutual reductions of armed forces together with the establishment of zones of peace and nuclear-free zones can make a substantial contribution to the limitation of the arms race and to disarmament - above all, in those areas where military confrontation is particularly grave.

II

Machinery for disarmament negotiations. All channels for the conduct of negotiations should be effectively used by States for the purpose of solving vital problems connected with ending the arms race and achieving disarmament.

On the whole, the existing system of negotiations - multilateral, bilateral and regional - is suited to the scope and nature of the varied problems of disarmament. The existing types of negotiation should be utilized further in order to reach the necessary international agreements.

A breakthrough in solving the problem of disarmament, which affects the interests of all countries without exception, requires that the problem should be considered in the broadest and most authoritative international forum - a World Disarmament Conference. Such a truly universal forum could consider with expertise and in sufficient depth the totality of disarmament questions. If properly organized and with working bodies available to ensure a thorough preparation and practical agreement in taking appropriate decisions with due regard for the interests of all States, a World Disarmament Conference could work out specific, effective measures aimed at curbing the arms race and achieving disarmament.

A World Disarmament Conference should be convened in ... A preparatory committee is being set up for its practical preparation.
Public information activities in connexion with the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament

Working paper prepared by the Secretariat

At the request of the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, the Secretariat is presenting below a tentative outline of public information activities envisaged in connexion with the forthcoming special session on disarmament.

Centre for Disarmament

1. A systematized retrieval and dissemination of information on disarmament and related questions has been organized in the Centre and the first visible result will be the United Nations Yearbook on Disarmament for 1976 (see General Assembly resolution 31/90), which will be issued in October 1977. The Yearbook is intended to provide those who work on disarmament questions with a relevant source of officially available information. A special effort is planned to present the 1977 Yearbook on Disarmament in time for the special session, although possibly not in printed form and in all languages.

2. A second information project, the Disarmament Bulletin, may be established by the General Assembly at its thirty-second session in 1977 (see General Assembly resolution 31/90). The Bulletin is intended to present, three times a year, information on disarmament issues "in highly readable form" and should, therefore, give a wider public and accurate picture of the problems and progress in the field. If the General Assembly decides to establish the Bulletin, the Centre will make a special effort to have the first issue ready for the special session.

3. The Secretary-General's report, prepared under General Assembly resolution 3462 (XXX) with the assistance of qualified consultant experts, "economic and social consequences of the arms race and military expenditure" is ... and will be issued as a General Assembly document during the first days of September 1977. It is expected that, as in the past, the General Assembly at its

77-18192
thirty-second session may request the Secretary-General to arrange for the production of the report as a United Nations publication and to give it the widest possible publicity in as many languages as is considered desirable and practicable. If the General Assembly makes such a request, it will be implemented in time for the special session.

4. Another report by the Secretary-General, under General Assembly resolution 31/87, prepared with the assistance of qualified experts and dealing with the question of the reduction of military budgets, will also be before the General Assembly at the thirty-second session which may decide to give the report wide publicity.

5. The working papers prepared by the Secretariat at the request of the Preparatory Committee for the special session, providing information concerning disarmament, have been sent to the depository libraries and to the United Nations information centres and they are available to the public at large, together with all the other documents relating to the preparation of the special session.

6. The Centre for Disarmament will continue to provide staff for briefings and lectures in connexion with activities of the Visitors' Section of the United Nations and at the request of universities, non-governmental organizations and other bodies.

7. The activities described above will not require specific appropriations in connexion with the special session, since they are or will be financed from the regular budget of the United Nations.

Office of Public Information

A. Press and publications

1. Publications

(a) A leaflet containing the statement by the Secretary-General at the opening of the Preparatory Committee for the special session.

(b) A brochure providing background information on United Nations activities on disarmament and the purpose of the special session in United Nations official languages as well as in various other languages.*

(c) A brochure on the economic and social consequences of the arms race, containing highlights of the Secretary-General's report on the same subject.

*Activities for which there are no funds available and which should be provided for are indicated with an asterisk.
(d) A "question and answer" leaflet on the same subject as above.

(e) A special chapter on the special session in the leaflet, "Suggestions for Speakers".

(f) A list of documents relating to the subject-matter of the special session for the information of correspondents accredited to the United Nations and for distribution through United Nations information centres.

(g) Fact sheets on various aspects of United Nations activities on disarmament.

(h) Background press releases, explaining the purpose of convening the special session.

2. Press conferences

To assist in holding press conferences by the President of the special session, the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee, delegations and officials of the Secretariat.

3. UN Monthly Chronicle

A signed article will be published in the UN Monthly Chronicle before the special session.

Audio-visual services

1. Radio and television coverage will be provided for activities relating to the session, including press conferences and briefings.

2. In its weekly feature programmes Perspective and Scope as well as in news and broadcast programmes, in a variety of languages, the Radio Service will include material relating to the forthcoming session.

3. A special exhibition to be held at United Nations Headquarters in New York during the session.*

4. To release a documentary film on the subject of nuclear disarmament.

5. To release an animated film on the arms race.

6. To produce (together with the Publishing Division, Department of Conference Services) a special poster for wide distribution (in several languages).*

United Nations information centres

1. A special circular memorandum will be sent to all directors of information centres, drawing their attention to the preparations for the session.

2. All relevant documentation and information materials will be sent to information centres for their use and further distribution.
D. Co-operation with non-governmental organizations

Special briefings on the session will be conducted for non-governmental organizations at Headquarters and at the United Nations Geneva Office.

E. Other

The editors' round-table discussions will focus on disarmament and the special session. The Centre for Economic and Social Information (CESI) intends to devote several projects to the subject of "Disarmament and Development". Issues relating to disarmament and the special session might also be taken up by the CESI Development Information meeting and the World Development Information Day Encounter.

In-session activities

1. OPI media and functional Divisions will provide intensive coverage for the session by all available means at its disposal. This will include issuing press releases, holding briefings for the press and for non-governmental organizations, organizing interviews with delegates, providing adequate visual and radio coverage, including live radio-broadcasts, etc.

2. The network of United Nations information centres will not only be involved in the dissemination of materials but also in encouraging local initiatives to arouse public opinion in support of disarmament. With this aim, they will use the information media and other available channels of communication to reach wide segments of the population, including educational institutions, non-governmental organizations and others.

Post-session information activities

A multi-media information programme, based on the results of the special session will be worked out by OPI in co-operation with the Centre for Disarmament. It will include inter alia:

(a) A special pamphlet reflecting the work, decisions and recommendations of the session.

(b) The results of the session's deliberations will be published in the UN Monthly Chronicle.

(c) Radio programmes reflecting the discussions and results of the session.

(d) A special round-up press release for the use of information media.

(e) To ensure effective publicity displays of various United Nations visual material, including publications, photos, etc., in collaboration with non-governmental organizations concerned, will be mounted in all information centres.
Financial implications of items included in the description of public information activities in connexion with the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The Office of Public Information will absorb within its work programme most of the work and costs of the activities listed in Conference Room Paper No. 3. However, because they fall outside the normal scope of OPI resources, certain specific items will have additional financial implications as follows:

Pre-session information activities

Item A. 1 (b)

While OPI will produce the brochure in the working languages, additional funds are needed to allow for the translation and publication in a variety of languages of this text for dissemination by the information centres. Among the languages are: Amharic, Dari, Dutch, Greek, Hebrew, Hungarian, Indonesian, Italian, Malagache, Persian, Pidgin, Filipino, Polish, Pashtu, Pashto, Serbo-Croat, Singalese, Thai, Turkish, Urdu and several other languages.

$15,000

Item B. 3

A small sum is required to cover external services in connexion with the display panels and the preparation of captions which cannot be done in the house.

2,000

Item B. 6

Production costs of a poster in two to three colours, printed in several languages. The design of the emblem and the artistic work would be done in co-operation with the Department of Conference Services.

12,000

Post-session information activities

Item (a)

In the same manner as for the pre-session brochure, OPI would produce the post-session pamphlet in the working languages but would require funds for its translation, printing and dissemination into all the other languages. The pamphlet is expected to be larger in volume than the brochure.

26,000

Item (e)

An amount is needed for the reproduction into the required number of copies of the photos and other display materials, for the provision of captions in various languages and for the shipment by surface, or where necessary, by air freight of the display materials.

10,000

Total

$65,000
INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS

1. The Government of Costa Rica firmly supported the idea of holding a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and welcomes the decision to hold the session in 1978.

2. As a country with a deep-rooted civilian tradition and no military institutions, Costa Rica opted for disarmament of its own accord and cannot but be sympathetic to any effort to achieve that goal at the international level.

3. Although items on disarmament have been discussed at all past sessions of the General Assembly, it must in all honesty be admitted that little has been achieved so far and that in most cases the results have been disappointing.

4. An enlightened approach to the international arms race, which could halt that race and bring about substantial reductions in military arsenals, has been lacking.

5. The special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament will offer an unprecedented opportunity to raise and discuss in depth, and from a new standpoint, a whole series of issues of universal concern, in particular the alarming trend towards huge increases in nuclear weapon arsenals and their proliferation, as well as the various issues raised by the arms race in all its implications.

NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

6. The greatest concern of the world today is to reduce nuclear weapon arsenals, to halt the dangerous trend towards the proliferation of those weapons and to prevent the most advanced technologies from producing new types of nuclear weapons.
7. The international community's efforts to block the nuclear arms race have been very limited, because the nuclear Powers have always been wary of any discussion, within an international organization like the United Nations, of matters which affect their security. Those Powers have generally preferred to conduct nuclear disarmament negotiations among themselves through bilateral contacts.

8. There would be nothing wrong with this were it not that the nuclear threat hangs over not only the Powers which manufacture nuclear weapons but also the rest of the world, for nuclear war threatens the entire human race and the physical environment of the world.

9. Although its achievements have been limited, the international community has strongly condemned within the United Nations any trend which encourages vertical or horizontal nuclear proliferation and has repeatedly testified to its concern that nuclear arsenals should be reduced in order to achieve the ultimate goal of a total ban on the use of nuclear weapons.

10. Although the world organization has failed in its attempts to limit the production of nuclear weapons, it has scored major successes by backing all regional efforts to prohibit the use, transfer and stockpiling of nuclear weapons in certain parts of the world.

11. Together with most of the countries of Latin America, Costa Rica is participating in the pioneering effort of the Tlatelolco Treaty, which declared Latin America a nuclear-weapon-free region.

THE PROBLEM OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

12. Mutual distrust among nations is perhaps the most powerful influence on and stimulus to the world arms race. This lack of trust, which seems to be linked inevitably with considerations of prestige and power, engenders tensions and constant fears which most countries think can be dispelled by the arms race.

13. Some of the factors which apparently prompt countries to increase their arsenals are the desire to defend their sovereignty, to keep national pride unblemished and to avoid the risk of appearing weak.

14. No one denies the legitimate right of every nation to look to its own security. It is an apparently undisputed fact that each country carries on the arms race in the name of that security, the validity of which no one dares to question.

15. If the truth be known, behind the arms race there lies a security problem which, unfortunately, the international community has so far been unable to deal with through machinery which would take over, or at least lighten, each State's inescapable obligation to guarantee its own security.

16. Thus, the question of world disarmament cannot be separated from the problem of collective security. Despite major international efforts to promote collective security — and it can be stated as a fact that the United Nations was brought into
being to meet precisely that need - the machinery devised for ensuring collective security has so far been unable to achieve the cherished goal of general and complete disarmament.

17. Costa Rica may be said to be an exception in that it has sought to demonstrate its faith in the agreements on collective, regional and international security to which it is a party and which it recognizes as useful in safeguarding its security interests.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND DISARMAMENT

18. Confronted with a generally adverse international situation, the struggle to ensure the effective enjoyment of human rights throughout the world is a crusade which is gathering momentum daily, for it is being waged in the name of the highest moral values.

19. Some régimes violate human rights on the pretext of maintaining internal order and security. It is these despotic and unpopular Governments which ceaselessly stockpile weapons, for they can only impose their will by force.

20. There is no way of preventing the arms escalation of a Government which justifies that escalation on security grounds when it has been the victim of or is threatened with external aggression. It is quite a different matter, however, when a dictator has recourse to an arms build-up in order to counteract his internal weakness and oppress his people.

21. This distinction is an important one, for the international community cannot remain indifferent in the face of a despotic, oppressive régime. The cause of human rights fully justifies all attempts to prevent weapons from falling into the hands of tyrants who torture, persecute and cut short human lives, just as they must not fall into the hands of colonial régimes which prevent entire peoples from exercising their national rights.

DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT

22. The General Assembly has repeatedly emphasized the link between disarmament and development and has denounced as one of the most repugnant paradoxes of our times the squandering of human, financial and technological resources caused by the runaway arms race in the midst of a world oppressed by poverty and need.

23. As the Secretary-General rightly observed in his statement opening the session of the Preparatory Committee on 28 March 1977: "... progress in disarmament is also needed in order to end the present trend of a massive diversion to military ends of financial resources, manpower, raw materials, technical skills and research and development capability. There is at the present time a greater awareness that the world is facing a series of urgent and important problems which will require the mobilization of all the world's energies and resources for their solution. Chief among these questions is the problem of development and the associated task of establishing a new international economic order".

/...
24. Costa Rica is confident that the special session of the General Assembly will generate a new impetus which will ultimately achieve the cherished goal of halting the dangerous escalation of nuclear weapons until their use is prohibited and until the international trade in conventional weapons is curbed, so that sufficient trust can be restored in the world to guarantee peace among all nations and free the resources which mankind so urgently needs for the purposes of economic and social development.

New York, 26 August 1977
Note verbale dated 19 October 1977 from the Permanent Mission of the Bahamas to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

The Permanent Mission of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and with reference to his note OR 421/6(3) of 28 January 1977, requesting the views of Member States on the agenda of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which the Assembly, in its resolution 31/189 B of 21 December 1976 (operative para. 3), decided to convene in May/June 1978, has the honour to propose the following:

1. The convening of a special session on disarmament should act as a catalyst in securing consensus from all Member States that general and complete disarmament would be possible within the near future.

2. All Member States should participate in the special session with a view to implementing those measures that would curb, and eventually stop the arms race and the spread of nuclear weapons.

3. Bearing in mind that a very large majority of the peoples of the world are suffering from malnutrition, starvation and disease; and that their economic, social, cultural and political situation is worsening, Member States should, if for no other reason, support disarmament measures on the ground of morality.

4. In addition to the adoption of resolutions by consensus at the special session, Member States should emphasize the need for regional co-operation as another means of strengthening the appeal to halt the arms race and the spread of nuclear weapons.

5. The slowdown in the arms race should coincide with a build-up of economic advancement especially in developing and non-industrialized States.

6. Careful evaluation should be made of expenditure on arms growth and serious appraisal given to the establishment of an international order that would promote justice and equity for all nations.

77-20875
7. The ultimate aim of these conferences is to bring about complete disarmament, but Member States should not ignore the fact that a gradual process of denuclearization and arms reduction would help to lessen the threat of aggression and stabilize the maintenance of universal peace and security.
Letter dated 9 December 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

The Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General and has the honour to draw attention to the views of the Government of Japan on the agenda and all other relevant questions relating to the special session as presented in the document A/AC.187/14, which states that the following issues should be given high priority at the coming special session.

1. The cessation of the nuclear-arms race and the reduction of nuclear armaments
2. Prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests
3. Banning chemical weapons
4. International transfer of conventional arms
5. Reduction of military budgets

In this connexion, the Government of Japan would like to expatiate its views and make some proposals concerning the fourth item set above, which are stated in the document attached herewith.

The Permanent Representative of Japan would like to request these documents to be kindly published and circulated as a working paper of the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly.

(Signed) Isao Abe
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative to the United Nations
PROPOSAL CONCERNING THE CONVENTIONAL ARMS RACE INCLUDING, IN PARTICULAR, THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND MUTUAL LIMITATION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND ARMED FORCES ON THE REGIONAL LEVEL

1. Since the end of the Second World War millions of lives have been lost as a result of military conflicts employing conventional weapons. The international community is witnessing an increase in the arms build-up in many parts of the world, to which the growing international transfer of conventional arms has been one of the major contributors. This trend, if continued, could further intensify the potential for conflicts.

2. Four fifths of the world's military expenditure is now being devoted to conventional armaments. If the conventional arms race continues at the present rate, the prospect of using the resources now being diverted to military purposes towards improving the economic and social conditions in the world, in particular, those of the developing countries, will be further narrowed.

3. It is encouraging that, after a long period of negligence, a great number of countries now feel concern over the conventional arms race and, in particular, the increasing international transfer of conventional arms. As a result, a wide consensus is now emerging in favour of having these issues considered at the special session. These sentiments have been made clear by the statements of many States before the Preparatory Committee and at the thirty-second session of the General Assembly, and in their views on the special session submitted to the Secretary-General. A number of private organizations concerned with disarmament have also supported these views.

4. It is clear beyond question that nuclear disarmament should have the highest priority in disarmament negotiations. It is, however, also evident that the goal of general and complete disarmament cannot be achieved without curbing the conventional arms race.

The special session should, therefore, take up this question with a view to initiating a comprehensive study as a preliminary step to its final solution within the framework of general and complete disarmament.

5. The question of the conventional arms race and, in particular, the question of the international transfer of conventional arms, is unquestionably a delicate and difficult matter, since it is closely related to the domestic production of weapons, global as well as regional security and the security of recipient countries, the freezing of mutual arms levels and armed forces or their reduction, and the peaceful settlement of international disputes. These and all other relevant aspects should be fully taken into consideration in the comprehensive study in order to secure, above all, the just and impartial treatment of all States.
6. It is recommended that the following principles be recognized in a declaration on disarmament in order to emphasize the relevance and importance of conventional arms control and disarmament:

(1) Most of the world's military expenditures are being devoted to the acquisition and maintenance of conventional military power. This absorbs essential material and human resources. All States should make all possible efforts, parallel to those in the field of nuclear disarmament, to halt this diversion of resources and to bring about concrete measures for their reallocation from military to civilian purposes.

(2) The increasing build-up of conventional arms in many parts of the world produces a potential risk of heightening military tension and endangering international peace and security. The unabated international transfer of conventional arms should be brought under control.

(3) Conventional arms control and disarmament, with the reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces, together with control of the development and production of new systems of sophisticated weapons with increased destructive power and strategic capability - which have blurred the classical distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons - will contribute to the achievement of general and complete disarmament.

7. In order to implement the above-mentioned principles, the following measures are suggested for incorporation within the framework of the programme of action on disarmament. These measures would constitute a starting-point for negotiations, the goal of which is general and complete disarmament, as is declared in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles between the United States and the USSR issued in 1961.

(1) As initial and preliminary steps:

A. Comprehensive studies of conventional arms control and disarmament from all aspects, to be undertaken by a qualified group of experts on, inter alia:

(a) The international transfer of conventional weapons;

(b) The possibility of mutual limitation of the level and types of conventional armaments and the number of armed forces, according to regions.

B. Preliminary measures parallel to the comprehensive studies:

(a) A request by the United Nations General Assembly to the major arms-supplying countries, in particular, the United States and the USSR, to start consultations on voluntary restraint measures with due regard to the security of recipient countries;

(b) On the initiative of the States of the region, the convening of regional conferences for the prevention and limitation of armaments, provided that there exist appropriate conditions.
(c) A request to the Secretary-General or a watch-dog committee, to follow (i) the current state of affairs of the international transfer of conventional weapons and (ii) the development of the consultations of the major arms-supplying countries envisaged in (a) above or in the regional conferences, envisaged in (b) above, and to keep the United Nations General Assembly informed on these matters.

(2) As to future steps:

After a certain period of time a review of the implementation of the initial and preliminary steps should be conducted. After this review further measures should be worked out and agreed upon according to paragraph 4 of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles during a transition period leading to the final stage of general and complete disarmament.

8. A decision on appropriate measures to implement the initial steps should be taken at the special session devoted to disarmament.
Working document containing a draft declaration on disarmament: Australia, Canada, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
The States Members of the United Nations who met in New York from 23 May to 28 June 1978 to attend the United Nations special session on disarmament,

1. Recalling their solemn obligation enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State;

2. Considering the devastation visited on mankind by wars and the urgent need to make every effort to remove the scourge of war and to take measures to safeguard the security of all peoples;

3. Considering the importance of the adherence by all States to existing multilateral treaties on arms control and disarmament;

4. Bearing in mind the complexity and importance of the problems of disarmament which affect the vital security interests and the territorial integrity of all States;

5. Recognizing that all States must be concerned with the maintenance and strengthening of international security and with the essential part to be played in its enhancement by arms control and disarmament measures in the field of both nuclear and conventional weapons;

6. Noting that enormous expenditures on a world-wide scale for arms and military forces absorb material and human resources from the peaceful economic and social development of all countries;

7. Convinced therefore that arms limitation and disarmament can make a major contribution to furthering international peace and security and to the economic and social advances of mankind;

Declare as follows:

II

GENERAL OBJECTIVES

1. The ultimate goal of disarmament negotiations is to ensure the survival of mankind and the elimination of the possibility of war through the strengthening of international peace, security and stability.
2. To this end agreement should be reached on a comprehensive and integrated programme of action designed to ensure that:

(a) Disarmament is general and complete under strict and effective international control;

(b) Such disarmament is accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and that effective arrangements are undertaken for the maintenance of peace and security in accordance with the principle of the United Nations Charter.

General and complete disarmament shall permit States to have at their disposal only those non-nuclear forces, armaments, facilities and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens and in order that States shall support and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations peace force.

3. A further goal is to release resources in order to facilitate efforts to attain a more just world order which will eliminate present inequalities in the world community and to ensure that a significant portion of the resources freed by disarmament are devoted to the satisfaction of the economic and social needs of humanity, particularly in developing countries.

III

MAJOR PRINCIPLES GOVERNING RELATIONS AMONG STATES

1. States Members of the United Nations reaffirm their commitment to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. Of particular relevance in this context are those principles relating to their obligations concerning international collective security, peaceful means of settlement of disputes and non-intervention in the internal affairs of other States.

2. States Members of the United Nations affirm their commitment to undertake confidence building measures for the purposes of relaxing international tensions.

IV

PRINCIPLES GOVERNING DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS

1. In order to promote disarmament efforts, it is important to secure the active participation and support of all States and particularly the nuclear-weapon States, and of other militarily significant States, for disarmament negotiations.

2. Arms control and disarmament measures will be most effective when it is apparent to all States concerned that the measures are in their interests and represent concrete progress towards the goal of enhanced security and peace. To ensure that all parties are convinced that their vital interests have been sufficiently protected it is important that negotiations should be conducted on the
basis of a consensus about the objectives of the measures and, wherever possible, possible, the terms of any agreements eventually adopted.

3. All measures of disarmament should be balanced to ensure that the security of all States is safeguarded and that no State or group of States can gain military advantage at any stage. The goal is undiminished security at a lower level of armaments and military forces.

4. This implies the graduated reduction of manpower and armaments to agreed levels, coupled with other necessary measures to ensure that an over-all balance is achieved which is judged by all parties to be satisfactory for their own security.

5. Progress in the arms control and disarmament field is dependent upon agreement on effective methods of verification. A combination of several methods of verification should be employed, including, as appropriate, international inspection and control in order to achieve the necessary assurances that a certain arms control or disarmament measure is being observed by all parties.

6. Negotiations on limited measures of disarmament should not preclude negotiations on a treaty of general and complete disarmament.

V

GENERAL MEASURES OF DISARMAMENT AND PRIORITIES

1. Multilateral disarmament measures dealing with specific issues including those on a regional basis, should be undertaken as soon as possible as a contribution to progress, step by step, towards the ultimate objective of achieving general and complete disarmament:

   (a) Nuclear weapons and non-proliferation

   No State can regard itself as immune from the tragic consequences of a global war fought with nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. The common vulnerability of States makes it essential that they should plan an effective role in the achievement of international peace and security and share in the responsibility for the achievement of effective arms control and disarmament measures. Nuclear-weapon Powers and other militarily significant States have particular responsibilities in this regard.

   Eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons in the context of general and complete disarmament is the most important challenge of our time since the dangers of nuclear warfare remain a grave threat to the survival of mankind. Partial agreements on nuclear arms control and, in particular, universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty can make a vital contribution to progress towards this goal. Efforts to curb and reverse the nuclear arms race must include measures to prevent both horizontal and vertical proliferation. There must be progress in both areas in order to enhance international security.
The establishment under appropriate conditions of nuclear-weapon-free zones could contribute to strengthening the security of all members of such zones and to the prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons.

While recognizing the inalienable right of all States to develop research, production and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and to enjoy the benefits thereof, as well as the importance of strengthening international co-operation in that field, it is also essential to ensure through the application of appropriate international safeguards, in particular, those of the International Atomic Energy Agency, that the peaceful application of nuclear energy will not lead to further proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

States must ensure that the régime of non-proliferation is strengthened, as a minimum, by the application of internationally agreed controls to international transfers of nuclear material, equipment and technology.

(b) Chemical weapons

The effective prohibition and elimination of weapons of mass destruction other than nuclear weapons, and in particular chemical weapons, and of any future weapons based on new scientific principles which have characteristics comparable in destructive effects, are of great importance.

(c) Conventional weapons

Most of the world's military expenditure is being devoted to the acquisition and maintenance of conventional military power. This absorbs essential material and human resources. All States should make all possible efforts parallel to those in the field of nuclear disarmament to halt this diversion of resources and to achieve concrete measures for their reallocation from military to civilian purposes. To this end it will be necessary to intensify research on how best to achieve this goal.

The increasing build-up of conventional arms in many parts of the world involves a potential risk of heightening military tension and endangering international peace and security. The unabated international transfer of conventional arms should be brought under control.

Reduction of military budgets in all countries on an assured basis could provide undiminished security at a lower level of armaments, help to reduce international tensions and also lead eventually to the release of resources both nationally and internationally for economic and social development.

* * *

These objectives and principles are hereby declared to constitute the guidelines for the Programme of Action on Disarmament.
PROVISIONAL AGENDA

for the meeting to be held in Conference Room 4, at Headquarters, on Tuesday, 24 January 1978, at 3 p.m.

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. Election of Rapporteur
3. Organization of work
4. Principal documents of the special session
5. Organization of work of Preparatory Committee at its fifth session
6. Other business
The main purpose of this working paper is to facilitate the practical implementation of the recommendation formulated by the Preparatory Committee in paragraph 33 of the report which it submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session. It will be recalled that, in that paragraph, the Committee, after having noted that there had been a trend in favour of the adoption of one final document at the special session, stated that consensus had been reached, in principle, regarding the contents of the final document, namely, that it should be divided into four sections: an Introduction, a Declaration on Disarmament, a Programme of Action, and a final section devoted to what was called in the report "Machinery for Disarmament Negotiations".

The foregoing conclusion of the Preparatory Committee appears appropriate from every point of view. The concentration in four sections of a single final document of all the conclusions and decisions of the special session will make it easier to organize and co-ordinate future work on disarmament and avoid the risk of dispersion which is so apparent in the case of the many resolutions on the subject which the General Assembly has adopted year after year, and will provide world public opinion with convincing proof that a new approach has been adopted which there is reason to hope will yield more fruitful results.

It should also be borne in mind that the Committee at its fourth session, at which it will have to prepare all – or at least almost all – the substantive drafts which it will have to transmit to the General Assembly for its special session, will have only a little over four weeks of work. Thus, it would appear highly advisable that from the outset the Committee should have the clearest possible idea of what should be the structure, the framework, of the final document referred to in paragraph 33 of its aforementioned report (A/32/41) so that it will faithfully reflect the view set forth in that paragraph.
The achievement of rapid agreement on the matter would appear to be relatively easy, compared with the considerable difficulties which will certainly have to be overcome in attempting to reconcile the various views on the questions of substance which will be dealt with, in particular, in the last three sections of the final document. Perhaps for that very reason it would be all the more appropriate to begin by obtaining a consensus concerning the distribution to be given to the many proposals, of which some have already been submitted and the number will undoubtedly increase daily, within each of the four sections of the final document. It would appear all the more appropriate when one considers that several of the working papers submitted to the Committee suffer to a greater or lesser degree from a lack of clarity in that respect.

Since all the instruments adopted by the General Assembly are always adopted by means of a resolution, this working paper begins with a draft which could serve as a basis for the resolution to which the final document will be annexed. It has been considered preferable to keep this resolution very short in order to avoid any unnecessary redundancy since all the ideas, principles, purposes and rules which are relevant must be included in the final document, which should be a complete and self-sufficient instrument.

All the texts included in the working paper for possible use in the drafting of the four sections of the final document correspond to the schematic character of the draft, the very limited and precise objective of which has been explained above. Suffice it to add that it has been deemed appropriate to begin the drafts of the sections intended for the Declaration and the Programme of Action with a paragraph which should help to evaluate the significance and the scope of the instrument concerned.

The substantive material included in the working paper for the Introduction is limited to four paragraphs, which it is suggested could be the first paragraphs of the section. They emphasize concepts the importance of which is obvious and about which there appears to be unanimity: the dangers involved in the arms race for international peace and security and the incompatibility of the arms race with the new international economic order. Following those paragraphs, various others would undoubtedly have to be added since in the working papers already before the Committee and in those which may be submitted at its fourth session a wealth of material will be found.

The purpose of the final paragraph - which is marked with an X since there is no way of knowing what number it will be once the additional paragraphs have been incorporated - is to define the relationship between the Introduction and the other three sections, a relationship which is one of cause - the deplorable and alarming situation created by the arms race - and effect: the various decisions which it is hoped the Assembly will adopt at its special session to try to remedy the situation.

/...
The Declaration on Disarmament, apart from the opening paragraph - whose purpose, as has already been mentioned, is similar to that of the paragraph with which the Programme of Action also opens - consists simply, by way of example, of the first two principles in the working paper submitted to the Preparatory Committee by the delegation of Mexico in May 1977 (A/AC.187/56), to which no objection seems likely to be raised. Certainly, from among the wealth of documentation already available to the Committee - suffice it to recall, for example, that the Mexican working paper mentioned above included 25 principles and norms - it will be possible to find sufficient material for the formulation of all principles and purposes that it may be deemed necessary to embody in the Declaration.

It will, we believe, be obvious to anyone with some experience of disarmament negotiations that, in the five months which remain before not only the opening but the closure of the special session, it would be Utopian to think of completing the formulation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament that would obtain general approval. It is for that reason that we have put forward the idea of making provision, in the Plan of Action included in the working paper, for a Three-Year Disarmament Plan as a purely transitional measure. Such a plan - as was stated as long ago as 1 September 1977, when the representative of Mexico in the Preparatory Committee explained this point at the 10th meeting of the Committee - would not try to present a more or less exhaustive catalogue of disarmament measures that would be fated, as has happened so often in the past, to remain a scrap of paper. It would include only a selection of such measures, chosen from among the most urgent and meaningful ones, which it is thought may realistically and objectively be considered capable of being transformed into reality during the three-year period from June 1978 to May 1981. In this sense, therefore, the draft Programme of Action is not too ambitious. At the same time, however, in order to stress the transitional nature of this procedure and the fact that it in no way means the abandonment of the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, the draft provides for another procedure which appears best suited for ensuring that, within a period of roughly 2 1/2 years, it will be possible to draft a comprehensive, thoroughly negotiated programme, the implementation of which should lead to the attainment of that goal. The Three-Year Plan also includes provisions that will enable the General Assembly to keep the manner in which the Plan is being implemented under periodic review and to consider and adopt, at a second special session devoted to disarmament that would be held in May-June - or perhaps in May-July 1981 - the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament which will have been drafted.

With regard to the final section of the working paper, concerning what the Preparatory Committee has been calling "Machinery for Disarmament Negotiations" and what here is given the title of "Guidelines for Disarmament Negotiations", it is suggested that, to begin with, the provisions contained in the three paragraphs should, as in the case of the outline of a Declaration on Disarmament, be taken as simply examples of some measures which, for various reasons, seem to merit priority action. To such measures, of course, will have to be added all others that may be deemed desirable, perhaps including with the one which in this paper is given the letter X - the establishment in Geneva of permanent missions to CCD...
of all States members of the Conference - and the implementation of which would enormously increase the effectiveness and pace of disarmament negotiations.

The delegation of Mexico feels sure that this working paper, despite - or perhaps precisely because of - its modest aims, can have a very constructive effect in helping to ensure that the work of the Preparatory Committee takes, from an early stage of this fourth session, a direction that is in keeping with the conclusion expressed by the Committee itself in paragraph 33 of its first report to the General Assembly. It is in this belief that the delegation has the honour to submit to the Committee, for its consideration, the outline of a draft final document reproduced below.

OUTLINE OF A DRAFT FINAL DOCUMENT OF THE SPECIAL SESSION OF
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

The General Assembly,

Convinced that it is imperative to put an end to the arms race, both because it entails a threat to the very survival of mankind and because it is incompatible with the new international economic order,

Having resolved to lay the foundations of a new international disarmament strategy which, through co-ordinated and persevering efforts within the framework of the United Nations, can culminate in general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Adopts the following

Final document of the first special session of the General Assembly
devoted to disarmament

I

Introduction

1. Never since the period of prehistory has mankind faced a threat of annihilation as real as that posed by the arms race. For years the nuclear arsenals of a few States which possess those terrible instruments of mass destruction have been sufficient to wipe out, not once but many times over, every vestige of life in the world and to make the earth itself uninhabitable.

2. The increase in weapons, especially nuclear ones, far from helping to strengthen international security, weakens and decreases it. The enormous quantities of weapons which have been stockpiled and the constant process of qualitative and technological refinement to which unbridled competition is subjecting them pose incalculable threats to peace.

3. Military expenditures are reaching ever higher levels which until recently would have seemed inconceivable. The magnitude of the waste represented
by the hundreds of billions of dollars spent annually on the manufacture or improvement of weapons is in sombre and dramatic contrast to the want and poverty in which two thirds of the world's population live.

4. This gigantic squandering of financial resources is even more serious in that it diverts to military activities enormous material and, in particular, technical and human resources which are essential for development. Thus, the economic and social consequences of the arms race are so detrimental that their continuation is obviously incompatible with the consolidation of the new international economic order, which should be based on co-operation, justice and equity.

X. The alarming situation whose principal aspects have been described above makes it imperative to take without delay the necessary steps to ensure that disarmament is recognized in practice, and not only in theory, for what it really is: the most important and urgent question confronting the international community today. The General Assembly has accordingly resolved solemnly to proclaim, in this final document of its first special session devoted to disarmament, the following three instruments: a Declaration on Disarmament, a Programme of Action, and Guidelines for Disarmament Negotiations.

II

Declaration on Disarmament

In order both to formulate and to apply a programme of action which will provide for and co-ordinate the adoption of genuine disarmament measures aimed at achieving general and complete disarmament under effective international control and to define the basic rules which should serve to make disarmament negotiations more effective, it is imperative to have a clear idea of the fundamental principles and purposes meritng general acceptance in this connexion. The systematic compilation of those principles and purposes is the subject of this Declaration on Disarmament, through which it is reaffirmed or established that:

1. All the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations.

2. General and complete disarmament under effective international control should be the final objective of mankind.
III

Programme of Action

This Programme of Action has a twofold purpose. First of all, it enumerates a series of specific disarmament measures which have been selected because there is a consensus on the need and advisability of making every possible effort to implement them within a period of not more than three years, it being felt that, realistically and objectively, there is a reasonable likelihood that such efforts will succeed. Secondly, the Programme of Action seeks to establish suitable procedures for monitoring compliance with the commitment thus made and for conducting serious negotiations on the preparation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. In the light of the foregoing, the States participating in the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament undertake to do everything in their power, in good faith, to ensure the implementation, during the period from June 1978 to May 1981, of the measures set forth in the following Three-year Disarmament Plan:

X. The agendas for the thirty-third, thirty-fourth and thirty-fifth regular sessions of the General Assembly should include an item permitting the Assembly to review the manner in which the Three-year Disarmament Plan is being carried out and to make any appropriate recommendations resulting from that review.

XX. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, as soon as it has undergone the reforms envisaged in the Guidelines comprising section IV of this Final Document, will undertake the preparation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament encompassing all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated. The comprehensive programme should contain appropriate procedures for facilitating the co-ordination of all disarmament negotiations, regardless of where and in what form they are conducted, and for ensuring that the General Assembly is kept fully informed of the progress of the negotiations so that it can properly perform its functions, including an appraisal of the situation when appropriate and, in particular, a continuing review of the implementation of the programme. The said programme should be completed by 1 March 1981 at the latest and should immediately thereupon be submitted, as a draft, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations so that he may transmit it to Member States and to the General Assembly at the latter's second special session devoted to disarmament.

XXX. A second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament will open at the end of May 1981, its main objective being to consider and adopt the comprehensive programme of disarmament prepared in accordance with the provisions of the preceding paragraph.
IV

Guidelines for Disarmament Negotiations

1. The experience gained since the establishment of the United Nations shows that, for maximum effectiveness, two kinds of bodies are required for disarmament negotiations - deliberative and negotiating. The largest possible number of States should be represented on the former, whereas the latter, for the sake of convenience, should have a relatively small membership.

2. Where the deliberative function is concerned, it is undeniable that the General Assembly, at its regular sessions, cannot deal adequately with the numerous disarmament items which are always included in its agenda. Accordingly, until such time as a consensus is reached on convening and institutionalizing a world disarmament conference - which could play the same role in its own sphere as the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development plays with regard to economic and social matters - it seems desirable to hold regular special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

3. With regard to the negotiating body which functions within the framework of the United Nations, namely, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, it is obvious that it too has not been in a position to fulfil the extremely important task required of it in its own field of competence. Among the reforms necessary to increase its effectiveness, priority ought to be given to the following: the co-chairmanship system should be replaced by a chairmanship to be held on a monthly rotating basis by non-nuclear-weapon States represented in CCD, thereby helping to make it easier for China and France to participate in its work; a standing subcommittee of the whole should be established; and appropriate steps should be taken to ensure that, without prejudice to its limited membership, CCD can receive such co-operation as all States, or at least all Members of the United Nations, may wish to extend to it.

X. States members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament which have not yet established in Geneva adequately staffed permanent delegations to the Committee should endeavour to do so as soon as possible.
Outline of a draft final document of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament

Mexico: Addendum to the working paper in document A/AC.187/89

Introductory note

A number of delegations have requested that the delegation of Mexico should supply some examples of the measures which are being considered for inclusion in the Three-year Disarmament Plan proposed in the working paper entitled "Outline of a draft final document of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament".

In response to that request, the following list, which is neither exhaustive nor rigid, but simply illustrative, contains 15 measures which appear worthy of inclusion among those to be considered by States participating in the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament with a view to determining the desirability of undertaking "to do everything in their power, in good faith, to ensure the implementation of the measures/ during the period from June 1978 to May 1981", in accordance with the above-mentioned working paper. These measures are:

1. Ensuring the broadest possible application of the treaty on the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests (which presumably will have been opened for signature by the end of the special session).

2. Ensuring the broadest possible application of the convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction (in this case, too, it is assumed that the convention will have been opened for signature by the end of the special session).

3. The formulation of a joint declaration (or similar unilateral declarations) in which nuclear-weapon States would undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against States which do not possess nuclear weapons and refuse to admit them to their territory.

78-01651

/...
4. The establishment of at least one new nuclear-weapon-free zone of the type created by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco).

5. The signature and ratification of Additional Protocols I and II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco by States entitled to become parties to those instruments although they have not yet done so.

6. The formulation of a joint declaration (or similar unilateral declarations) by nuclear-weapon States in which they would undertake not to embark on new installations of nuclear weapons in the territory of other States.

7. The convening of an international conference under the auspices of the United Nations to ensure that the status of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace is respected by all States, especially by nuclear-weapon States and the principal maritime users of the Indian Ocean.

8. The formulation of a joint declaration (or similar unilateral declarations) by the two major nuclear-weapon States which would establish a moratorium on the testing of new nuclear-weapon-launching systems.

9. The conclusion of an agreement or treaty between the two major nuclear-weapon States which would stipulate, as a first step towards the elimination of nuclear weapons, a balanced 10 per cent reduction in their strategic nuclear-weapon systems and a five-year moratorium on any qualitative improvement of such systems.

10. The formulation of a joint declaration (or similar unilateral declarations) by all nuclear-weapon States, or at any rate by the two major nuclear-weapon States, in which they would undertake to halt production of fissile materials for military purposes.

11. The establishment by the General Assembly, at its thirty-third session, of a committee in which the two major nuclear-weapon States and other States engaged in substantial military expenditure would participate, with a view to the committee's submitting to the General Assembly, no later than the thirty-fifth session, a report containing a data-presentation system which would allow a minimum of uniformity in the measurement of military budgets.

12. The formulation of a joint declaration (or similar separate declarations) by the two major nuclear-weapon States in which they would undertake, as soon as the Assembly had approved the report proposed in the preceding paragraph, to reduce by 10 per cent their military expenditure and to devote 25 per cent of the savings to the promotion of the economic and social development of the developing countries.

13. The conclusion of a treaty or convention on the prohibition of the use of specific conventional weapons, including those which may be considered to be excessively harmful or to have indiscriminate effects, in the light of humanitarian and military considerations.
14. The reform of the Convention on environmental warfare in order to prohibit the use of all scientific or technological techniques to modify the environment for military or other hostile purposes.

15. The preparation of the study provided for in resolution A/32/88 A concerning the relationship between disarmament and development.
It must be noted that the efforts made in recent years to solve the problem of disarmament have been as numerous as they have proved vain. The world has never been as armed, or over-armed, as it is today. What has been lacking in so many well-intentioned attempts has been not so much sincerity as clear thinking. For that reason, France has been obliged to express reservations about some of those attempts, reservations which, it feels, have been justified by events.

It must not, however, confine itself to such a negative statement, but conclude that the time has come to seek a new and positive approach.

Such an approach is not to be found in unilateral measures: it is not by renouncing its own security that France will improve world security. Nor is it to be found in following the example of others and embarking on courses which experience has shown would lead to an impasse.

On the contrary, what is needed is a clear definition of the goal to be achieved, the obstacles to be overcome and the specific conditions of the action to be taken.

The goal cannot be the Utopia of a world totally disarmed. Nations, both large and small, like individuals, have a 'legitimate right to safeguard their security'. This right must be recognized and defined, but its limits must be established in order to avoid abuse.

The obstacles to disarmament are, in fact, the excesses resulting from the exercise of that right, whether from an excessive accumulation of armaments or from excessive disparities between the military arsenals of neighbouring States. These
factors of instability engender distrust, the arms race and, finally, conflict. It is on these factors that efforts must focus. In order to understand them correctly, they must, however, be viewed in the proper geographic and strategic context.

The conditions of action differ profoundly from what they were 10 or 20 years ago. The world no longer follows the lead of the super-Powers or even of the military blocs surrounding them. It is both more vast and more diverse, and has both a universal and a pluralistic dimension. Neither should be ignored. The problem of nuclear weapons concerns the whole of mankind; it is not posed in the same terms in areas where nuclear weapons are an element of the over-all balance and in areas where their introduction would create a serious imbalance.

The principles of disarmament are the same everywhere. Their practical application must be adjusted to a variety of specific situations.

With an equal concern for universality and pragmatism, France will propose action at three distinct, but complementary, levels.

1. At the world-wide level

It is at this level, above all, that it is important to affirm that disarmament is a matter for all, that is to say that it must be carried out with the co-operation, under the control and for the benefit of all.

With the co-operation of all. The United Nations is the natural forum for the debates of the international community on general problems relating to disarmament. The forthcoming special session in the spring will provide an excellent opportunity for such debates. In order to produce more effective results, however, a smaller and more permanent but equally representative forum, also linked to the United Nations, is required.

The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, which is currently meeting in Geneva, should be replaced by a new forum with a different membership and different procedures.

France will have proposals to make in this regard.

Under the control of all. No disarmament is possible without control, and no valid control without international supervision. In that connexion, space techniques offer hitherto unknown possibilities. They should therefore be made available to the international community.

To this end, France will propose the creation of a world observation satellite agency.

For the benefit of all. It is by providing benefits for mankind as a whole from the economies resulting from disarmament that disarmament will become meaningful and will be effectively stimulated.

...
France will therefore propose the establishment of a special fund financed by a tax levied on excessive armaments.

2. At the level of non-nuclear regions

The problem here is twofold. It is important to ensure that non-nuclear areas remain so, and also that a costly and dangerous conventional arms race does not develop in those areas.

(a) Prevention of nuclear proliferation. The primary responsibility lies with the States in these regions, but those States have a right to be assured that, in exercising that responsibility, they will not be discriminated against from the standpoint of their own progress or from that of their own security.

- From the standpoint of their own progress. This implies the implementation of a policy of non-proliferation which is both strict and open: strict with regard to the risk of the dissemination of nuclear armaments, but open with regard to access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

France will continue to work actively towards this end and to set an example.

- From the standpoint of their own security. This implies that the military nuclear Powers will not use their situation to seek to gain political or military advantage over non-nuclear States.

Accordingly, France will take a positive position of principle with regard to the creation of demilitarized zones on continents or substantial portions of continents. It expresses its readiness to consider in what conditions it could enter into specific obligations in that regard.

(b) Curbing the conventional arms race. France hopes that States in each of the major regions of the world will take the initiative in seeking ways of curbing the conventional arms race in their region.

For its part, France is prepared to make its contribution to that end provided that the States in the region concerned are unanimous in wishing it and that there is no discrimination among suppliers.

3. At the level of nuclear regions

One nuclear region, that extending from the Atlantic to the Urals, is crucial to world peace and to the security of France. Nowhere else is there such an accumulation of nuclear and conventional weapons. Nowhere is it more necessary to draw the consequences of the principles of a new approach to disarmament. In the conditions prevailing in that region, the factors of instability are to be found not in nuclear weapons in isolation, which have become an element in the over-all balance, but in the factors that might upset that balance, in other words, on the one hand, the quantitative over-stockpiling and qualitative race in the field of nuclear weapons, and, on the other, the obvious disparity in the field of conventional weapons.
The quantitative over-stockpiling and qualitative race in the field of nuclear weapons.

France maintains its deterrent force at the level of credibility necessary for its security. Because of the accumulation of their nuclear resources, the responsibility for furthering progress in disarmament through a significant reduction lies with the United States and the Soviet Union. France views their current efforts favourably. It notes, however, that the level at which they propose to stabilize their nuclear arsenals would still enable them to annihilate each other several times over.

The disparity in the field of conventional weapons.

To be effective, action should not be confined to Central Europe, but should extend to all States which might be concerned. Priority should be given to promoting trust and to reducing the more unsettling elements in the current situation. All those States which, in signing the Final Act of Helsinki, indicated their willingness to contribute to security and co-operation in Europe should, naturally, be associated with such action.

It is in this spirit and with these aims in view that France, after having made the necessary contacts, will propose the convening of a European conference on disarmament which would consider problems relating to disarmament from the Atlantic to the Urals."
The General Assembly,

Considering that:

The concept of universal and collective security visualized in the Charter of the United Nations can become a reality if substantial progress is made towards the goal of General and Complete Disarmament. Despite the intense consideration of disarmament within and outside the United Nations, progress has been marginal and negligible. There are several facets and dimensions of the disarmament problem which require urgent solutions.

The greatest stimulus to the global arms race is the effort of the great Powers, especially the two major nuclear Powers, to maintain a strategic balance, primarily in Europe but increasingly in other parts of the world. The existence of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, continue to pose a threat to the very survival of mankind.

Efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons have not been accompanied by complementary steps to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race, to reassure the non-nuclear weapon States against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons and the ensure that all States accept and adhere to the goal of non-proliferation. The objective of nuclear non-proliferation cannot be furthered by restrictions on the transfer and development of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes; on the contrary, such measures place needless strains on international co-operation and introduce a new element of division between the developed and developing countries.

The disproportion in the military strength and power between the industrialized and developing countries is an element in the existing inequitable world political and economic order.
The creation of a global strategic balance should not be an end in itself; nor should it be allowed to recreate the concept of spheres of influence. Such policies heighten the danger of local and regional conflicts.

The "opportunity cost" of the diversion of more than $1 billion a day to the arms race is incalculable. This irrational use of the world's finite resources distorts the economic development of all States, large and small, advanced and underdeveloped, contributes to the current problems of inflation, balance of payments deficits, energy shortages and has created economic and political obstacles in the way of establishing the New International Economic Order.

The development of technology is a destabilizing factor in the so-called strategic balance. Some newly developed weapons and those that are planned, such as PGMs and RCVs as well as developments in laser technology, will make possible the selective use of force and place in the hands of those who possess such weapons the capacity to dominate and control other States:

Therefore, declares:

(1) The achievement of General and Complete Disarmament under strict international control is essential to ensure universal peace and security, promote global progress and prosperity, and establish a new and stable international political and economic order.

(2) Disarmament is an integral part of the endeavour to evolve a new international order based on the principles of the United Nations Charter, especially those concerning respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of States, non-interference in their internal affairs, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and the right of peoples to self-determination and national independence.

(3) Disarmament will be facilitated by an international climate of trust and confidence; in turn, the creation of such an international climate depends to a large extent on progress towards disarmament.

(4) The enormous expenditure on armaments by States do not contribute materially to their security but on the contrary intensify the international climate of insecurity and serve further to fuel the arms race.

(5) Nuclear weapons pose the most immediate and all-pervasive threat to international peace and security and to the very survival of mankind. It is, therefore, imperative to prohibit the use of such weapons, prevent their qualitative development, reduce and ultimately eliminate the nuclear weapons and delivery systems of the nuclear weapon States and take measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

(6) The promotion of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace are effective instruments by which non-nuclear-weapon States can promote non-proliferation, insulate themselves from the nuclear and conventional arms race and thus enhance their security.
(7) The objective of harnessing nuclear technology for economic development and preventing its diversion to military purposes can and should be fully reconciled without jeopardizing the respective fuel cycle policies of various countries or international co-operation, agreements and contracts for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy which should be fulfilled in good faith in accordance with their terms and provisions.

(8) The progressive and balanced reduction of conventional weapons would be facilitated by measures to resolve outstanding disputes and remove sources of tension.

(9) The arms race and current global expenditures on armaments interpose significant obstacles in the way of establishing the New International Economic Order based on a rational and equitable distribution and utilization of the world's human and material resources and productive capacities.

(10) All States, both the developed and developing countries, should commit themselves to reducing their expenditures on armaments and divert the human and material resources saved thereby to economic and social development and improving the conditions of life especially in the developing countries.

(11) The United Nations, in accordance with the Charter, has the primary responsibility to promote General and Complete Disarmament and to oversee, monitor, facilitate and encourage all measures - unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral - in this field.

(12) Member States commit themselves to the following goals and principles which shall guide all disarmament efforts:

(i) The goal of disarmament negotiations is to achieve agreement on a programme which will ensure:

(a) That disarmament is general and complete and war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems, and

(b) That such disarmament is accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations;

(ii) Agreements on partial measures of disarmament or non-armament will be productive only if these form an integral and sequential part of measures aimed at General and Complete Disarmament. Each measure and stage of disarmament should be carried out within specified time-limits;

(iii) Verification should be an essential component of disarmament agreements and measures;

(iv) Disarmament must be achieved, at each stage, in a balanced manner and ensure equal security for all States;
(v) The primary responsibility for progress towards general and complete disarmament rests on those Powers with the largest nuclear and conventional military arsenals and on other militarily significant States;

(vi) The use of nuclear weapons, under any circumstances, is indefensible and should be considered a crime against humanity;

(vii) The use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction must, as a matter of first priority, be curbed and prohibited and stockpiles and deployments of such weapons be reduced and ultimately eliminated altogether;

(viii) The non-nuclear-weapon States in particular have the need to be assured that their security will not be jeopardized by the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against them by the nuclear-weapon States;

(ix) The creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace constitute one of the most effective disarmament measures that can and should be initiated and accepted by the non-nuclear-weapon States;

(x) The nuclear-weapon States must undertake binding obligations not to introduce or station nuclear weapons in nuclear-weapon-free zones and Zones of Peace and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against States which comprise these zones;

(xi) All States have the right to develop, acquire, transfer and use, without hindrance, nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and to determine their peaceful nuclear programmes in accordance with their priorities, needs and interests. Access to nuclear technology should be available to all States under agreed international safeguards applied through the IAEA on a non-discriminatory basis;

(xii) The expenditure on conventional arms and the level of armed forces should be restrained and progressively reduced, in the first instance by the major Powers and other militarily significant States;

(xiii) Reduction in the arms expenditures and armaments of States should be achieved in a balanced and equitable manner;

(xiv) The financial savings and human and material resources made available through disarmament should be primarily diverted to promote economic and social development, especially in the developing countries.
The General Assembly,

Considering that progress towards the goal of general and complete disarmament can be achieved through the implementation of a programme of measures for disarmament, in accordance with the principles and guidelines established in the Declaration on Disarmament,

Adopts the following Programme of Action:

I. Prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

(1) An international agreement or another form of binding international instrument should be adopted, as early as possible, under which the nuclear-weapon States would commit themselves not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the nuclear security arrangements of some nuclear Powers.

(2) Nuclear-weapon States should undertake, in a binding legal form, not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States which comprise nuclear-weapon-free zones or zones of peace and not to introduce nuclear weapons in such zones.

(3) Following the adoption of the above measures, negotiations should be initiated among the nuclear-weapon States for an agreement on the total prohibition of the use or threat of use of all nuclear weapons, strategic or tactical, under any circumstances.
II. Reductions and elimination of nuclear weapons and delivery systems and prohibition of their qualitative development

(1) The negotiations between the United States, USSR and UK on a treaty for the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests should be finalized as early as possible so as to enable the CCY to consider and adopt the treaty in the shortest possible time.

(2) The two major nuclear Powers should conclude in the course of 1978 the second agreement on strategic arms limitations providing for meaningful reductions in their deployment of nuclear weapons and to halt the development and refinement of new kinds of nuclear weapons and delivery systems.

(3) The two major nuclear Powers should conclude, in the shortest possible time, a third agreement on strategic arms limitation which would translate into specific commitments their declared willingness to implement substantial reductions, of up to 50 per cent, in their deployments of strategic nuclear weapons and delivery systems. This agreement should also prohibit all research into the development and refinement of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.

(4) An international agreement should be reached on measures to prevent the diversion of the results of scientific research and development (R and D) to war-like purposes.

(5) The two major nuclear Powers, and their allies, should initiate, as soon as possible, within the negotiations for mutual force reductions in Europe, consideration of an agreement to limit, reduce and ultimately eliminate tactical nuclear weapons in co-ordinated phases.

(6) Negotiations should be initiated among all the nuclear-weapon States for a general agreement to limit, reduce and ultimately eliminate all nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.

III. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

(1) Immediate steps should be taken to ensure that nuclear facilities which are not presently subject to IAEA safeguards are brought under international inspection and control.

(2) International safeguards should be applied by the IAEA to supplies of nuclear equipment, materials, technology and facilities on a universal and non-discriminatory basis.

IV. Promotion of nuclear technology for economic development, especially of developing countries

(1) An international programme should be adopted, under United Nations auspices, for the promotion of the transfer and utilization of nuclear technology for economic development, especially of developing countries.
for economic and social development, especially of the developing countries, in accordance with the principles approved in the United Nations General Assembly resolution 32/1.

V. Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones

(1) The nuclear-weapon States which have not ratified Protocols I and II of the Treaty Prohibiting Nuclear Weapons in Latin America should do so without delay.

(2) All States and parties in the regions of Africa, the Middle East and South Asia and the South Pacific should take steps to implement the objective of denuclearizing their respective regions.

(3) In the meantime, no action should be taken which would retard the establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zones in these regions.

(4) All States and parties in these regions should accept the application of IAEA safeguards over their nuclear facilities on a non-discriminatory basis.

(5) The United Nations should continue to encourage measures to establish the nuclear-weapon-free zones in these regions.

VI. Creation of zones of peace in the Indian Ocean and other regions

(1) The littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean should reach agreement at their forthcoming meeting on measures, such as a commitment to settle outstanding disputes by peaceful means, the renunciation of nuclear weapons and the maintenance of a reasonable military balance among themselves, in order to promote conditions of security within the Indian Ocean region.

(2) The great Powers should, for their part, agree at an early date to eliminate altogether their presence and rivalry from the region.

(3) Consultations regarding all aspects of the proposal to create a peace zone in the Indian Ocean should take place in the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean with the participation of all the States concerned and lead to the early convening of the Conference on the Indian Ocean.

(4) Efforts should be made to encourage the creation of zones of peace in other regions, such as the Mediterranean.

VII. Other weapons of mass destruction

(1) The 1925 Geneva Protocol on Asphyxiating Substances should be adhered to universally.

(2) The Biological Weapons Convention, adopted by the General Assembly, should be ratified by all States.
(3) The Convention on Environmental Modification Techniques should be ratified by States as widely as possible.

(4) Early agreement should be reached by the US and the USSR in their negotiations for a chemical weapons treaty so that the CCD can finalize the treaty at an early date. The absence of completely foolproof verification measures should not be allowed to prevent the conclusion of the treaty.

(5) The negotiations for a treaty prohibiting the development of all new kinds of weapons of mass destruction should be intensified in the CCD with a view to reaching agreement in the next two years.

(6) Separate agreements should be simultaneously reached on identified weapons of mass destruction, e.g. radiological weapons.

VIII. Reduction and limitation of conventional weapons

(1) The major Powers should reach an agreement to progressively reduce their military budgets and level of conventional armed forces.

(2) Other militarily significant States should also join in co-ordinated reductions in their military budgets and armed forces.

(3) An international convention should be adopted by 1979 to prohibit the use of incendiary and certain other conventional weapons deemed to have extremely injurious or indiscriminate effects.
HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS
United Nations publications may be obtained from bookstores and distributors throughout the world. Consult your bookstore or write to: United Nations, Sales Section, New York or Geneva.

COMMENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS DES NATIONS UNIES

КАК ПОЛУЧИТЬ ИЗДАНИЯ ОРГАНИЗАЦИИ ОБЪЕДИНЕНИХ НАЦИИ
Издания Организации Объединенных Наций можно купить в книжных магазинах и агентствах во всех странах мира. Написать в адрес организации, как указано ниже.

COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS
Las publicaciones de las Naciones Unidas están en venta en librerías y casas distribuidoras en todas partes del mundo. Consúlteme a su librero o diríjase a: Naciones Unidas, Sección de Ventas, Nueva York o Ginebra.

Litho in United Nations, New York

Price: $ U.S. 16.00 (or equivalent in other currencies)

10402—May 1978—4,000