NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

The report of the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament consists of the text of the report (volume I) and its annexes, which are contained in six volumes (volumes II to VII).

Volumes II to VI contain the documents of the Preparatory Committee except the summary records which are found in volume VII.

In volumes II to VI the documents are in order of symbol and in each volume a detailed chronological list has been provided. A list of the documents, by subject, follows:

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2. Working papers and other documents submitted by Member States

3. Background papers, working papers and tabulations prepared by the Secretariat at the request of the Committee

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1.

**Introduction**

1. By resolution 31/189 B of 21 December 1976, the General Assembly decided to convene a special session devoted to disarmament, to be held in New York in May/June 1978. It further decided to establish a Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, composed of 54 Member States appointed by the President of the Assembly on the basis of equitable geographical distribution, with the mandate of examining all relevant questions relating to the special session, including its agenda, and to submit to the Assembly at its thirty-second session appropriate recommendations thereon.

2. The General Assembly also requested the Secretary-General to render the Preparatory Committee all necessary assistance, including the provision of essential background information, relevant documents and summary records.

3. At its 2nd meeting on 31 March 1977, the Preparatory Committee requested the Secretariat to begin the preliminary work on certain factual background papers. Included among them was a paper on existing principles and proposals for the conduct of disarmament negotiations.

4. In response to this request of the Preparatory Committee, the Secretariat has prepared this paper, which consists of a compilation of documents - proposals and declarations - submitted or adopted within and outside the United Nations system. It covers the period from 1959 when, in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV), which was adopted unanimously, the question of general and complete disarmament became the subject of specific proposals and intensive discussions in the United Nations. The list is by no means exhaustive. It includes only the documents most frequently referred to by States in current discussions in the CCD and the General Assembly on the conduct of disarmament negotiations. Other documents which might be relevant in this connexion can be found in the publication "The United Nations and Disarmament 1945-1970" and its supplement "The United Nations and Disarmament 1970-1975".

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15. The participants in the Conference consider that disarmament is an imperative need and the most urgent task of mankind. A radical solution of this problem, which has become an urgent necessity in the present state of armaments, in the unanimous view of participating countries, can be achieved only by means of a general, complete and strictly and internationally controlled disarmament.

16. The Heads of State or Government point out that general and complete disarmament should include the elimination of armed forces, armaments, foreign bases, manufacture of arms as well as elimination of institutions and installations for military training, except for purposes of internal security; and the total prohibition of the production, possession and utilization of nuclear and thermo-nuclear arms, bacteriological and chemical weapons as well as the elimination of equipment and installations for the delivery and placement and operational use of weapons of mass destruction on national territories.

17. The participating countries call upon all States in general, and States exploring outer space at present in particular, to undertake to use outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes. They expressed the hope that the international community will, through collective action, establish an international agency with a view to promote and coordinate the human actions in the field of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space.

18. The participants in the Conference urge the Great Powers to sign without further delay a treaty for general and complete disarmament in order to save mankind from the scourge of war and to release energy and resources now being spent on armaments to be used for the peaceful economic and social development of all mankind. The participating countries also consider that:

(a) The non-aligned Nations should be represented at all future world conferences on disarmament;

(b) All discussions on disarmament should be held under the auspices of the United Nations;

(c) General and complete disarmament should be guaranteed by an effective system of inspection and control, the terms of which should include members of non-aligned Nations.

19. The participants in the Conference consider it essential that an agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests should be urgently concluded. With this aim in view, it is necessary that negotiations be immediately resumed, separately or as part of the negotiations on general disarmament. Meanwhile, the moratorium on the testing of all nuclear weapons should be resumed and observed by all countries.

20. The participants in the Conference recommend that the General Assembly of the United Nations should, at its forthcoming session, adopt a decision on the convening either of a special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to discussion of disarmament or on the convening of a world disarmament conference under the auspices of the United Nations with a view to setting in motion the process of general disarmament.

***
2. **Joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America**

We have the honour to transmit the attached report and document entitled "Joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations". We would be grateful if this letter and its enclosures could be circulated to all members of the United Nations as a document of the General Assembly.

(Signed) Valerian Aleksandrovich Zorin
Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations

(Signed) Adlai E. Stevenson
Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations

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**REPUBLICS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS**

In accordance with their statements of 30 March 1961 at the fifteenth session of the General Assembly, the Governments of the United States and the USSR wish to inform the members of the General Assembly of the results of their exchange of views on questions relating to disarmament and to the resumption of negotiations in an appropriate body, whose composition is to be agreed upon:

1. The exchange of views took place in Washington, D.C., from 19 June to 30 June; in Moscow from 17 July to 29 July; and in New York from 6 September to 19 September 1961.

2. As a result of the exchange of views, the two Governments submit a joint statement of agreed principles which they recommend as guidance for disarmament negotiations when such negotiations are resumed.

3. The two Governments were not able to reach agreement on the composition of a negotiating body prior to the sixteenth session of the General Assembly.

**Joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations**

Having conducted an extensive exchange of views on disarmament pursuant to their agreement announced to the General Assembly on 30 March 1961,

**NOTING WITH CONCERN THAT THE CONTINUING ARMS RACE IS A HEAVY BURDEN FOR HUMANITY AND IS Fraught WITH DANGERS FOR THE CAUSE OF WORLD PEACE,**

**REAFFIRMING THEIR ADHERENCE TO ALL THE PROVISIONS OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 1378 (XIV) OF 20 NOVEMBER 1959,**

**AFFIRMING THAT TO FACILITATE THE ATTAINMENT OF GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT IN A PEACEFUL WORLD IT IS IMPORTANT THAT ALL STATES AVOID BY EXISTING INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, REFRAIN FROM ANY ACTIONS WHICH MIGHT AGGRAVATE INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS, AND SEEK SETTLEMENT OF ALL DISPUTES BY PEACEFUL MEANS,**

The United States and the USSR have agreed to recommend the following principles as the basis for future multilateral negotiations on disarmament and to call upon other States to co-operate in reaching early agreement on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world in accordance with these principles:

1. **The goal of negotiations is to achieve agreement on a programme which will ensure:**

   (a) That disarmament is general and complete and war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems, and

   (b) That such disarmament is accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. The programme for general and complete disarmament shall ensure that States will have at their disposal only such non-nuclear armaments, forces, facilities and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens; and that States shall support and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations peace force.

3. To this end, the programme for general and complete disarmament shall contain the necessary provisions, with respect to the military establishment of every nation, for:

   (a) The disbanding of armed forces, the dismantling of military establishments, including bases; the cessation of the production of armaments as well as their liquidation or conversion to peaceful uses;

   (b) The elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological and other weapons of mass destruction, and the cessation of the production of such weapons;

   (c) The elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction.

   (d) The abolition of organizations and institutions designed to organize the military effort of States, the cessation of military training, and the closing of all military training institutions;

   (e) The discontinuance of military expenditures.

4. The disarmament programme should be implemented in an agreed sequence, by stages, until it is completed, with each measure and stage carried out within specified time-limits. Transition to a subsequent stage in the process of disarmament should take place upon a review of the implementation of measures included in the preceding stage and upon a decision that all such measures have been implemented and verified and that any additional verification arrangements required for measures in the next stage are, when appropriate, ready to operate.
5. All measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all.

6. All disarmament measures should be implemented from beginning to end under such strict and effective international control as would provide firm assurance that all parties are honouring their obligations. During and after the implementation of general and complete disarmament, the most thorough control should be exercised, the nature and extent of such control depending on the requirements for verification of the disarmament measures being carried out in each stage. To implement control over and inspection of disarmament, an international disarmament organization including all parties to the agreement should be created within the framework of the United Nations. This international disarmament organization and its inspectors should be assured unrestricted access without veto to all places, as necessary for the purpose of effective verification.

7. Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. During and after the implementation of the programme of general and complete disarmament, there should be taken, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security, including the obligation of States to place at the disposal of the United Nations agreed manpower necessary for an international peace force to be equipped with agreed types of armaments. Arrangements for the use of this force should ensure that the United Nations can effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

8. States participating in the negotiations should seek to achieve and implement the widest possible agreement at the earliest possible date. Efforts should continue without interruption until agreement upon the total programme has been achieved, and efforts to ensure early agreement on and implementation of measures of disarmament should be undertaken without prejudicing progress on agreement on the total programme and in such a way that these measures would facilitate and form part of that programme.

3. Draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control submitted by the USSR, 15 March 1962, as subsequently amended and revised

USSR Draft Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament Under Strict International Control*

PREAMBLE

The States of the world,

Acting in accordance with the aspirations and will of the peoples,

Convinced that war cannot and must not serve as a method for settling international disputes, especially in the present circumstances of the precipitate development of means of mass annihilation such as nuclear weapons and rocket devices for their delivery, but must forever be banished from the life of human society,

Fulfilling the historic mission of saving all the nations from the horrors of war,

Basing themselves on the fact that general and complete disarmament under strict international control is a sure and practical way to fulfill mankind's age-old dream of ensuring perpetual and inviolable peace on earth,

Desirous of putting an end to the senseless waste of human labour on the creation of the means of annihilating human beings and of destroying material values,

Seeking to direct all resources towards ensuring a further increase in prosperity and socio-economic progress in all countries in the world,

Conscious of the need to build relations among States on the basis of the principles of peace, good-neighbourliness, equality of States and peoples, non-interference and respect for the independence and sovereignty of all countries,

Reaffirming their dedication to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter,

Have resolved to conclude the present Treaty and to implement forthwith general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.


PART I. GENERAL

Article 1

Disarmament obligations

The States parties to the present Treaty solemnly undertake:

1. To carry out, over a period of five years, general and complete disarmament entailing:

   The disbanding of all armed forces and the prohibition of their re-establishment in any form whatsoever;

   The prohibition and destruction of all stockpiles and the cessation of the production of all kinds of weapons of mass destruction, including atomic, hydrogen, chemical, biological and radiological weapons;

   The destruction and cessation of the production of all means of delivering weapons of mass destruction to their targets;

   The dismantling of all kinds of foreign military bases and the withdrawal and disbanding of all foreign troops stationed in the territory of any State;

   The abolition of any kind of military conscription for citizens;

   The cessation of military training of the population and the closing of all military training institutions;

   The abolition of war ministries, general staffs and their local agencies, and all other military and paramilitary establishments and organizations;

   The elimination of all types of conventional armaments and military equipment and the cessation of their production, except for the production of strictly limited quantities of agreed types of light firearms for the equipment of the police (militia) contingents to be retained by States after the accomplishment of general and complete disarmament;

   The discontinuance of the appropriation of funds for military purposes, whether from State budgets or by organizations or private individuals.

2. To retain at their disposal, upon completion of general and complete disarmament, only strictly limited contingents of police (militia) equipped with light firearms and intended for the maintenance of internal order and for the discharge of their obligations with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security under the United Nations Charter and under the provisions of article 37 of the present Treaty.

3. To carry out general and complete disarmament simultaneously in three consecutive stages, as set forth in parts II, III and IV of the present Treaty. Transition to a subsequent stage of disarmament shall take place after adoption by the International Disarmament Organization of a decision confirming that all disarmament measures of the preceding stage have been carried out and verified and that any additional verification measures considered to be necessary for the next stage have been prepared and can be undertaken when appropriate.

4. To carry out all measures of general and complete disarmament such that at no stage of disarmament any State or group of States gains any military advantage and that the security of all States parties to the Treaty is equally safeguarded.
Article 2
Control obligations

1. The States parties to the Treaty solemnly undertake to carry out all disarmament measures, from beginning to end, under strict international control and to ensure the implementation in their territories of all control measures set forth in parts II, III and IV of the present Treaty.

2. Each disarmament measure shall be accompanied by such control measures as are necessary for verification of that measure.

3. To implement control over disarmament, an International Disarmament Organization composed of all States parties to the Treaty shall be established within the framework of the United Nations. It shall begin operating as soon as disarmament measures are initiated. The structure and functions of the International Disarmament Organization and its bodies are laid down in part V of the present Treaty.

4. In all States parties to the Treaty the International Disarmament Organization shall have its own staff, recruited internationally and in such a way as to ensure the adequate representation of all three groups of States existing in the world.

This staff shall exercise control on a temporary or permanent basis, depending on the nature of the measure being carried out, over the compliance by States with their obligations to reduce or eliminate armaments and the production of armaments and to reduce or disband their armed forces.

5. The States parties to the Treaty shall submit to the International Disarmament Organization in good time such information on their armed forces, armaments, military production and military appropriations as is necessary for the purpose of carrying out the measures of the stage concerned.

6. Upon completion of the programme of general and complete disarmament, the International Disarmament Organization shall have its own staff, recruited internationally and in such a way as to ensure the adequate representation of all three groups of States existing in the world.

This staff shall exercise control on a temporary or permanent basis, depending on the nature of the measure being carried out, over the compliance by States with their obligations to reduce or eliminate armaments and the production of armaments and to reduce or disband their armed forces.

5. The States parties to the Treaty shall submit to the International Disarmament Organization in good time such information on their armed forces, armaments, military production and military appropriations as is necessary for the purpose of carrying out the measures of the stage concerned.

6. Upon completion of the programme of general and complete disarmament, the International Disarmament Organization shall have its own staff, recruited internationally and in such a way as to ensure the adequate representation of all three groups of States existing in the world.

This staff shall exercise control on a temporary or permanent basis, depending on the nature of the measure being carried out, over the compliance by States with their obligations to reduce or eliminate armaments and the production of armaments and to reduce or disband their armed forces.

6. Upon completion of the programme of general and complete disarmament, the International Disarmament Organization shall have its own staff, recruited internationally and in such a way as to ensure the adequate representation of all three groups of States existing in the world.

This staff shall exercise control on a temporary or permanent basis, depending on the nature of the measure being carried out, over the compliance by States with their obligations to reduce or eliminate armaments and the production of armaments and to reduce or disband their armed forces.

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This staff shall exercise control on a temporary or permanent basis, depending on the nature of the measure being carried out, over the compliance by States with their obligations to reduce or eliminate armaments and the production of armaments and to reduce or disband their armed forces.

6. Upon completion of the programme of general and complete disarmament, the International Disarmament Organization shall have its own staff, recruited internationally and in such a way as to ensure the adequate representation of all three groups of States existing in the world.

This staff shall exercise control on a temporary or permanent basis, depending on the nature of the measure being carried out, over the compliance by States with their obligations to reduce or eliminate armaments and the production of armaments and to reduce or disband their armed forces.
4. The production and testing of appropriate rockets for the peaceful exploration of space shall be allowed, provided that the plants producing such rockets, as well as the rockets themselves, will be subject to supervision by the inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization.

Article 6
Elimination of military aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons

1. All military aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons shall be eliminated from the armed forces and destroyed. Military airfields serving as bases for such aircraft and repair and maintenance facilities and storage premises at such airfields shall be rendered inoperative or converted to peaceful uses. Training establishments for crews of such aircraft shall be closed.

2. The production of all military aircraft referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be completely discontinued. Undertakings or workshops thereof designed for the production of such military aircraft shall be either dismantled or converted to the production of civil aircraft or other civilian goods.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above.

Article 7
Elimination of all surface warships capable of being used as vehicles for nuclear weapons, and submarines

1. All surface warships capable of being used as vehicles for nuclear weapons and submarines of all classes or types shall be eliminated from the armed forces and destroyed. Naval bases and other installations for the maintenance of the above warships and submarines shall be demolished or dismantled and handed over to the merchant marine for peaceful uses.

2. The building of the warships and submarines referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be completely discontinued. Shipyards and plants wholly or partly designed for the building of such warships and submarines, shall be dismantled or converted to peaceful production.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above.

Article 8
Elimination of all artillery systems capable of serving as means of delivering nuclear weapons

1. All artillery systems capable of serving as means of delivering nuclear weapons shall be eliminated from the armed forces and destroyed. All auxiliary equipment and technical facilities designed for controlling the fire of such artillery systems shall be destroyed. Surface storage premises and transport facilities for such systems shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses. The entire stock of non-nuclear munitions for such artillery systems, whether at the gun site or in depots, shall be completely destroyed. Underground depots for such artillery systems and for the non-nuclear munitions thereof shall be destroyed.

2. The production of the artillery systems referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be completely discontinued. To this end, all plants or workshops engaged in the production of such systems shall be closed and dismantled. All specialized equipment and machine tools at these plants and workshops shall be destroyed, the remainder being converted to peaceful uses. The production of non-nuclear munitions for these artillery systems shall be discontinued. Plants and workshops engaged in the production of such munitions shall be completely dismantled and their specialized equipment destroyed.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above.

B. FOREIGN MILITARY BASES AND TROOPS
IN ALIEN TERRITORIES

Article 9
Dismantling of foreign military bases

1. Simultaneously with the destruction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons under articles 5-8 of the present Treaty, the States parties to the Treaty which have army, air force or naval bases in foreign territories shall dismantle all such bases, whether principal or reserve bases, as well as all depot bases of any type. All personnel of such bases shall be evacuated to their national territory. All installations and armaments existing at such bases and coming under articles 5-8 of the present Treaty shall be destroyed on the spot. Other armaments shall either be destroyed on the spot in accordance with article 11 of the present Treaty or evacuated to the territory of the State which owned the base. All installations of a military nature on such bases shall be destroyed. The living quarters and auxiliary installations of foreign bases shall be transferred for civilian use to the States in whose territory they are located.

2. The measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be fully applicable to military bases which are used by foreign troops but which may legally belong to the State in whose territory they are located. The said measures shall also be implemented with respect to army, air force and naval bases that have been set up under military treaties and agreements for use by other States or groups of States, regardless of whether any foreign troops are present at those bases at the time of the conclusion of the present Treaty. All previous treaty obligations, decisions of the organs of military blocs and any rights or privileges pertaining to the establishment or use of military bases in foreign territories shall lapse and may not be renewed. It shall henceforth be prohibited to grant military bases for use by foreign troops and to conclude any bilateral or multilateral treaties and agreements to this end.

3. The legislatures and Governments of the States parties to the present Treaty shall enact legislation and issue regulations to ensure that no military bases to be used by foreign troops are established in their territory. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article.
Article 10
Withdrawal of foreign troops from alien territories

1. Simultaneously with the elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons under articles 5-8 of the present Treaty, the States parties to the Treaty which have troops or military personnel of any nature in foreign territories shall withdraw such troops and personnel from such territories. All armaments and all installations of a military nature which are located at points where foreign troops are stationed and which come under articles 5-8 of the present Treaty shall be destroyed on the spot. Other armaments shall either be destroyed on the spot in accordance with article 11 of the present Treaty or evacuated to the territory of the State withdrawing its troops. The living quarters and auxiliary installations previously occupied by such troops or personnel shall be transferred for civilian use to the States in whose territory such troops were stationed.

2. The reduction of armed forces shall be carried out in the first place through the demobilization of personnel released as a result of the elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons, the dismantling of foreign bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from alien territories, as provided for in articles 5-10 of the present Treaty, but chiefly through the complete disbandment of units and ships' crews, their officers and enlisted men being demobilized.

3. Conventional armaments, military equipment, munitions, means of transportation and auxiliary equipment in units and depots shall be reduced by 30 per cent for each type of all categories of these armaments. The reduced armaments, military equipment and munitions shall be destroyed, and the means of transportation and auxiliary equipment shall be either destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

All living quarters, depots and special premises previously occupied by units being disbanded, as well as the territories of all proving grounds, firing ranges and drill grounds belonging to such units, shall be transferred for peaceful uses to the civilian authorities.

4. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control at places where troops are being disbanded and released conventional armaments and military equipment are being destroyed, and shall also verify the conversion to peaceful uses of means of transportation and other non-combat equipment, premises, proving grounds, etc.

Article 12
Reduction of conventional armaments production

1. The production of conventional armaments and munitions not coming under articles 5-8 of the present Treaty shall be reduced proportionately to the reduction of armed forces provided for in article 11 of the present Treaty. Such reduction shall be carried out primarily through the elimination of undertakings engaged exclusively in the production of such armaments and munitions. These undertakings shall be dismantled, their specialized machine tools and equipment shall be destroyed, and their premises and general purpose machine tools and equipment shall be converted to peaceful uses.

2. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control over the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this article.

Article 13
Reduction of military expenditure

1. The States parties to the present Treaty shall reduce their military budgets and appropriations for military purposes proportionately to the destruction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons and the discontinuance of their production, to the dismantling of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from alien territories as well as to the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments and to the reduction of the production of such armaments, as provided for in articles 5-12 of the present Treaty.

The funds released through the implementation of the first-stage measures shall be used for peaceful purposes, including the reduction of taxes on the population and the subsidizing of the national economy. A certain position for the purpose of the funds released shall be determined in the future.
the population and the subsidising of the national economy. A certain portion of the funds thus released shall also be used for the provision of economic and technical assistance to under-developed countries. The size of this portion shall be subject to agreement between the parties to the Treaty.

2. The International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this article through its financial inspectors, to whom the States parties to the Treaty undertake to grant unimpeded access to the records of central financial institutions concerning the reduction in their budgetary appropriations resulting from the elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons, the dismantling of foreign military bases and the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments, and to the relevant decisions of their legislative and executive bodies.

CHAPTER III
MEASURES TO SAFEGUARD THE SECURITY OF STATES

Article 14
Restrictions on the movement of means of delivering nuclear weapons

1. From the beginning of the first stage until the final destruction of all means of delivering nuclear weapons in accordance with articles 5-8 of the present Treaty, it shall be prohibited for any special devices capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction to be placed in orbit or stationed in outer space, for warships or military aircraft capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction to leave their territorial waters or to fly beyond the limits of their national territory.

2. The International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control over compliance by the States parties to the Treaty with the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article. The States parties to the Treaty shall provide the International Disarmament Organization with advance information on all launchings of rockets for peaceful purposes provided for in article 15 of the present Treaty, as well as on all movements of military aircraft within their national frontiers and of warships within their territorial waters.

Article 15
Control over launchings of rockets for peaceful purposes

1. The launching of rockets and space devices shall be carried out exclusively for peaceful purposes.

2. The International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control over the implementation of the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article through the establishment, at the sites for peaceful rocket launchings, of inspection teams which shall be present at the launchings and shall thoroughly examine every rocket or satellite before its launching.

Article 16
Prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons

The States parties to the Treaty which possess nuclear weapons undertake to refrain from transferring control over nuclear weapons and from transmitting information necessary for their production to States not possessing such weapons.

The States parties to the Treaty not possessing nuclear weapons undertake to refrain from producing or otherwise obtaining nuclear weapons and shall refuse to admit the nuclear weapons of any other State into their territories.

Article 17
Prohibition of nuclear tests

The conducting of nuclear tests of any kind shall be prohibited (if such a prohibition has not come into effect under other international agreements by the time this Treaty is signed).

Article 17a
Measures to reduce the danger of outbreak of war

1. From the commencement of the first stage, large-scale joint military movements or manoeuvres by armed forces of two or more States shall be prohibited.

The States parties to the Treaty agree to give advance notification of large-scale military movements or manoeuvres by their national armed forces within their national frontiers.

2. The States parties to the Treaty shall exchange military missions between States or groups of States for the purpose of improving relations and mutual understanding between them.

3. The States parties to the Treaty agree to establish swift and reliable communication between their Heads of Government and with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

4. The measures set forth in this article shall remain in effect after the first stage until the completion of general and complete disarmament.

Article 18
Measures to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security

1. With a view to ensuring that the United Nations is capable of effectively protecting States against threats to or breaches of the peace, all States parties to the Treaty shall, between the signing of the Treaty and its entry into force, conclude agreements with the Security Council by which they undertake to make available to the latter armed forces, assistance and facilities, including rights of passage, as provided in Article 43 of the United Nations Charter.

2. The armed forces specified in the said agreements shall form part of the national armed forces of the States concerned and shall be stationed within their territories. They shall be kept up to full strength and shall be fully equipped and prepared for combat. When used under Article 42 of the United Nations Charter, these forces, serving under the command of the military authorities of the States concerned, shall be placed at the disposal of the Security Council.
CHAPTER IV
TIME-LIMITS FOR FIRST-STAGE MEASURES; TRANSITION FROM THE FIRST TO THE SECOND STAGE

Article 19
Time-limits for first-stage measures

1. The first stage of general and complete disarmament shall be initiated six months after the Treaty comes into force (in accordance with article 16), within which period the International Disarmament Organization shall be set up.

2. The duration of the first stage of general and complete disarmament shall be eighteen months.

Article 20
Transition from the first to the second stage

In the course of the last three months of the first stage the International Disarmament Organization shall review the implementation of the first-stage measures of general and complete disarmament with a view to submitting a report on the matter to the States parties to the Treaty as well as to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations.

PART III. SECOND STAGE OF GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

Article 21
Second-stage tasks

The States parties to the Treaty shall undertake, in the course of the second stage of general and complete disarmament, to effect the complete elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, and to make a further reduction in their armed forces, conventional armaments and production of such armaments, and military expenditure.

CHAPTER V
ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL AND RADIOLICAL WEAPONS; CONTROL OVER SUCH MEASURES

Article 22
Elimination of nuclear weapons

1. (a) Nuclear weapons of all kinds, types and capacities with the exception of the warheads pertaining to missiles temporarily retained by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America under article 15, paragraph 1, of this Treaty, shall be eliminated from the armed forces and destroyed. Fissionable materials extracted from weapons, whether directly attached to units or stored in various depots, shall be appropriately processed to render them unfit for direct reconstitution into weapons and shall form a special stock for peaceful uses, belonging to the State which previously owned the nuclear weapons. Non-nuclear components of such weapons shall be completely destroyed.

All depots and special storage spaces for nuclear weapons shall be demolished.

(b) All stockpiles of nuclear materials intended for the production of nuclear weapons shall be appropriately processed to render them unfit for direct use in nuclear weapons and shall be transferred to the above-mentioned special stocks.

(c) Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures to eliminate nuclear weapons referred to in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph.

2. (a) The production of nuclear weapons and of fissionable materials for weapons purposes shall be completely discontinued. All plants, installations and laboratories specially designed for the production of nuclear weapons or their components shall be eliminated or converted to production for peaceful purposes. All workshops, installations and laboratories for the production of the components of nuclear weapons or plants that are partially engaged in the production of such weapons shall be destroyed or converted to production for peaceful purposes.

(b) The measures for the discontinuance of the production of nuclear weapons and of fissionable materials for weapons purposes referred to in sub-paragraph (a) above shall be implemented under the control of inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization.

The International Disarmament Organization shall have the right to inspect all undertakings which extract raw materials for atomic production or which produce or use fissionable materials or atomic energy.

The States parties to the Treaty shall make available to the International Disarmament Organization documents pertaining to the extraction and processing of nuclear raw materials and to their utilization for military or peaceful purposes.

3. Each State party to the Treaty shall, in accordance with its constitutional procedures, enact legislation completely prohibiting nuclear weapons and making any attempt by individuals or organizations to reconstitute such weapons a criminal offence.

Article 23
Elimination of chemical, biological and radiological weapons

1. All types of chemical, biological and radiological weapons, whether directly attached to units or stored in various depots and storage places, shall be eliminated from the arsenals of States and destroyed (neutralized). All instruments and facilities for the combat use of such weapons, all special facilities for their transportation, and all special devices and facilities for their storage and conservation shall simultaneously be destroyed.

2. The production of all types of chemical, biological and radiological weapons and of all means and devices for their combat use, transportation and storage shall be completely discontinued. All plants, installations and laboratories that are wholly or partly engaged in the production of such weapons shall be destroyed or converted to production for peaceful purposes.

3. The measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above shall be implemented under the control of inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization.
CHAPTER VI
FURTHER REDUCTION OF ARMEO FORCES, CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND MILITARY EXPENDITURES; CONTROL OVER SUCH MEASURES

Article 24
Further reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments

1. In the second stage of general and complete disarmament the armed forces of the States parties to the Treaty shall be further reduced to the following levels: United States of America—two million men and five million civilian employees; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—two million men, officers and employees.

2. Conventional armaments, military equipment, munitions, means of transportation and auxiliary equipment in units and depots shall be reduced by 33 per cent from the original levels for each type of all categories of these armaments. The reduced armaments, military equipment and munitions shall be destroyed, and the means of transportation and auxiliary equipment shall be either destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

3. As in the implementation of such measures in the first stage of general and complete disarmament, inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control at places where troops are being disbanded and released conventional armaments and military equipment are being destroyed, and also shall verify the conversion to peaceful uses of means of transportation and other non-combat equipment, premises, proving grounds, etc.

Article 25
Further reduction of conventional armaments production

The production of conventional armaments and munitions shall be reduced proportionately to the reduction of armed forces provided for in article 24 of the present Treaty. Such reduction shall, as in the first stage of general and complete disarmament, be carried out primarily through the elimination of undertakings engaged exclusively in the production of such armaments and munitions. These undertakings shall be dismantled, their specialized machine tools and equipment shall be destroyed, and their premises and general purpose machine tools and equipment shall be converted to peaceful uses.

2. The measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be carried out under the control of inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization.

Article 26
Further reduction of military expenditure

1. The States parties to the Treaty shall further reduce their military budgets and appropriations for military purposes proportionately to the reduction of nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological weapons and the discontinuance of the production of such weapons as well as to the further reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments and the reduction of the production of such armaments, as provided for in articles 24-25 of the present Treaty.

2. Control over the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be exercised in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of article 13 of the present Treaty. Financial inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall also be granted unimpeded access to records concerning the reduction in the budgetary appropriations of States resulting from the elimination of nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological weapons.

CHAPTER VII
MEASURES TO SAFEGUARD THE SECURITY OF STATES

Article 27
Continued strengthening of the capacity of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security

The States parties to the Treaty shall continue to implement the measures referred to in article 18 of the present Treaty regarding the placing of armed forces at the disposal of the Security Council for use under Article 42 of the United Nations Charter.

CHAPTER VIII
TIME-LIMITS FOR SECOND-STAGE MEASURES; TRANSITION FROM THE SECOND TO THE THIRD STAGE

Article 28
Time-limits for second-stage measures

The duration of the second stage of general and complete disarmament shall be twenty-four months.

Article 29
Transition from the second to the third stage

In the course of the last three months of the second stage the International Disarmament Organization shall review the implementation of this stage. Measures for the transition from the second to the third stage shall be similar to the corresponding measures for the first stage, as laid down in article 20 of the present Treaty.
PART IV. THIRD STAGE OF GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

Article 30
Third-stage tasks

The States parties to the Treaty undertake, in the course of the third stage of general and complete disarmament, fully to disband all their armed forces and thereby to complete the elimination of all the missiles and the nuclear warheads pertaining thereto, which remained at their disposal after the accomplishment of the first two stages of disarmament. The system of military reserves of each State party to the Treaty shall be completely abolished.

1. With a view to completing the process of the elimination of armed forces, the States parties to the Treaty shall disband the entire personnel of the armed forces which remained at their disposal after the accomplishment of the first two stages of the Treaty. All military equipment which cannot be converted to peaceful uses shall be destroyed.

2. The State parties to the Treaty shall destroy all types of armaments, military equipment and munitions, whether held by the troops or in depots, that remained at their disposal after the accomplishment of the first two stages of the Treaty. All military equipment which cannot be converted to peaceful uses shall be destroyed.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control over the disbanding of troops and over the destruction of armaments and military equipment, and shall control the conversion to peaceful uses of transport and other non-combat equipment, premises, proving grounds, etc.

The International Disarmament Organization shall have access to documents pertaining to the disbanding of all personnel of the armed forces of the States parties to the Treaty.

Article 31
Completion of the elimination of armed forces and conventional armaments

1. Military production at factories and plants shall be discontinued, with the exception of the production of agreed types and quantities of light firearms for the purposes referred to in article 36, paragraph 2, of the present Treaty. The factories and plants subject to elimination shall be dismantled, their specialized machine tools and equipment shall be destroyed, and the premises, general purpose machine tools and equipment shall be converted to peaceful uses. All scientific research in the military field at all scientific and research institutions and at designing offices shall be discontinued. All blueprints and other documents necessary for the production of the weapons and military equipment subject to elimination shall be destroyed.

All orders placed by military departments with national or foreign government undertakings and private firms for the production of armaments, military equipment, munitions and material shall be cancelled.

2. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control over the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this article.

Article 32
Complete cessation of military production

In accordance with their respective constitutional procedures, the States parties to the Treaty shall enact legislation prohibiting all military training, abolishing military conscription and all other forms of recruiting the armed forces, and discontinuing all military courses for reservists. All establishments and organizations dealing with military training shall simultaneously be disbanded in accordance with article 33 of the present Treaty. The disbanding of all military training institutions and organizations shall be carried out under the control of inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization.

Article 33
Abolition of military establishments

Abolition of military establishments

1. War ministries, general staffs and all other military and para-military organizations and institutions for the purpose of organizing the military effort of States parties to the Treaty shall be abolished. The States parties to the Treaty shall:

(a) demobilize all personnel of these institutions and organizations;
(b) abrogate all laws, rules and regulations governing the organization of the military effort and the status, structure and activities of such institutions and organizations;
(c) destroy all documents pertaining to the planning of the mobilization and operational deployment of the armed forces in time of war.

2. The entire process of the abolition of military and para-military institutions and organizations shall be carried out under the control of inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization.

Article 34
Abolition of military conscription and military training

In accordance with their respective constitutional procedures, the States parties to the Treaty shall enact legislation prohibiting all military training, abolishing military conscription and all other forms of recruiting the armed forces, and discontinuing all military courses for reservists. All establishments and organizations dealing with military training shall simultaneously be disbanded in accordance with article 33 of the present Treaty. The disbanding of all military training institutions and organizations shall be carried out under the control of inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization.

Article 35
Prohibition of the appropriation of funds for military purposes

1. The appropriation of funds for military purposes in any form, whether by government bodies or private individuals and social organizations, shall be discontinued.

The funds released through the implementation of general and complete disarmament shall be used for peaceful purposes, including the reduction or complete abolition of taxes on the population and the subsidizing of the national economy. A certain portion of the funds thus released shall also be used for the provision of economic and technical assistance to underdeveloped countries. The size of this portion shall be subject to agreement between the parties to the Treaty.
1. Military production at factories and plants shall be discontinued, with the exception of the production of agreed types and quantities of light firearms for the purposes referred to in article 36, paragraph 2, of the present Treaty. The factories and plants subject to elimination shall be dismantled, their specialized machine tools and equipment shall be destroyed, and the premises, general purpose machine tools and equipment shall be converted to peaceful uses. All scientific research in the military field at all scientific and research institutions and at designing offices shall be discontinued. All

2. For the purpose of organizing control over the implementation of the provisions of this article, the International Disarmament Organization shall have the right of access to the legislative and budgetary documents of the States parties to the present Treaty.

Article 35a
Elimination of missiles and of nuclear warheads pertaining thereto, retained until the end of the third stage

1. At the end of the third stage, there shall be carried out the elimination
of all intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles and anti-aircraft missiles
in the ground-to-air category retained by the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and the United States of America in accordance with the provisions
of article 5, paragraph 1, of this Treaty, together with the nuclear warheads,
launching devices and guiding systems.

2. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control over the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraph 1 above.

CHAPTER X
MEASURES TO SAFEGUARD THE SECURITY OF STATES
AND TO MAINTAIN INTERNATIONAL PEACE

Article 36
Contingents of police (militia)

1. After the complete abolition of armed forces, the States parties to the Treaty shall be entitled to have strictly limited contingents of police (militia), equipped with light firearms, to maintain internal order, including the safeguarding of frontiers and the personal security of citizens, and to provide for compliance with their obligations in regard to the maintenance of international peace and security under the United Nations Charter.

The strength of these contingents of police (militia) for each State party to the Treaty shall be as follows: ..................................................

2. The States parties to the Treaty shall be allowed to manufacture strictly limited quantities of light firearms intended for such contingents of police (militia). The list of plants producing such arms, the quotas and types for each party to the Treaty shall be specified in a special agreement.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control over compliance by the States parties to the Treaty with their obligations with regard to the restricted production of the said light firearms.

Article 37
Police (militia) units to be made available to the Security Council

1. The States parties to the Treaty undertake to place at the disposal of the Security Council, on its request, units from the contingents of police (militia) retained by them, as well as to provide assistance and facilities, including rights of passage. The placing of such units at the disposal of the Security Council shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions of Article 43 of the United Nations Charter. In order to ensure that urgent

military measures may be undertaken, the States parties to the Treaty shall maintain in a state of immediate readiness those units of their police (militia) contingents which are intended for joint international enforcement action.

The size of the units which the States parties to the Treaty undertake to place at the disposal of the Security Council as well as the areas where such units are to be stationed shall be specified in agreements to be concluded by those States with the Security Council.

2. The command of the units referred to in paragraph 1 shall be composed of representatives of the three principal groups of States existing in the world on the basis of equal representation. It shall decide all questions by agreement among its members representing all three groups of States.

Article 38
Control over the prevention of the re-establishment of armed forces

1. The police (militia) contingents retained by the States parties to the
Treaty after the completion of general and complete disarmament shall be
under the control of the International Disarmament Organization, which
shall verify the reports by States concerning the areas where such contingents
are stationed, concerning the strength and armaments of the contingents
in each such area, and concerning all movements of substantial contingents
of police (militia): ............................

2. For the purpose of ensuring that armed forces and armaments abolished
as a result of general and complete disarmament are not re-established, the
International Disarmament Organization shall have the right of access at
any time to any point within the territory of each State party to the Treaty.

3. The International Disarmament Organization shall have the right to
institute a system of aerial inspection and aerial photography over the territo-
ries of the States parties to the Treaty.

CHAPTER XI
TIME-LIMITS FOR THIRD-STAGE MEASURES

Article 39
The third stage of general and complete disarmament shall be completed
over a period of one year. During the last three months of this stage the
International Disarmament Organization shall review the implementation of
the third-stage measures of general and complete disarmament with a view to
submitting a report on the matter to the States parties to the Treaty as well

PART V. STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT ORGANIZATION

Article 40
Functions and main bodies

The International Disarmament Organization to be set up under article 2,
paragraph 3, of the present Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Organiza-

tion", shall consist of a Conference of all States parties to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Conference", and a Control Council, hereinafter referred to as the "Council".

The Organization shall deal with questions pertaining to the supervision of compliance by States with their obligations under the present Treaty. All questions connected with the safeguarding of international peace and security which may arise in the course of the implementation of the present Treaty, including preventive and enforcement measures, shall be decided by the Security Council in conformity with its powers under the United Nations Charter.

Article 41
The Conference

1. The Conference shall comprise all States parties to the Treaty. It shall hold regular sessions at least once a year and special sessions, which may be convened by decision of the Council or at the request of a majority of the States parties to the Treaty with a view to considering matters connected with the implementation of effective control over disarmament. The sessions shall be held at the headquarters of the Organization, unless otherwise decided by the Conference.

2. Each State party to the Treaty shall have one vote. Decisions on questions of procedure shall be taken by a simple majority and on all other matters by a two-thirds majority. In accordance with the provisions of the present Treaty, the Conference shall adopt its own rules of procedure.

3. The Conference may discuss any matters pertaining to measures of control over the implementation of general and complete disarmament and may make recommendations to the States parties to the Treaty and to the Council on any such matter or measure.

4. The Conference shall:
(a) Elect non-permanent members of the Council;
(b) Consider the annual, and any special, reports of the Council;
(c) Approve the budget recommended by the Council;
(d) Approve reports to be submitted to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations;
(e) Approve amendments to the present Treaty in accordance with article 47 of the present Treaty;
(f) Take decisions on any matter specifically referred to the Conference for this purpose by the Council;
(g) Propose matters for consideration by the Council and request from the Council reports on any matter relating to the functions of the Council.

Article 42
The Control Council

1. The Council shall consist of:
(a) The five States which are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council;
(b) ... [number] other States parties to the Treaty, elected by the Conference for a period of two years.

The composition of the Council must ensure proper representation of the three principal groups of States existing in the world.

2. The Council shall:
(a) Provide practical guidance for the measures of control over the implementation of general and complete disarmament; set up such bodies at the headquarters of the Organization as it deems necessary for the discharge of its functions; establish procedures for their operation, and devise the necessary rules and regulations in accordance with the present Treaty;
(b) Submit to the Conference annual reports and such special reports as it deems necessary to prepare;
(c) Maintain constant contact with the United Nations Security Council as the organ bearing the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security; periodically inform it of the progress achieved in the implementation of general and complete disarmament, and promptly notify it of any infringements by the States parties to the Treaty of their disarmament obligations under the present Treaty;
(d) Review the implementation of the measures included in each stage of general and complete disarmament with a view to submitting a report on the matter to the States parties to the Treaty and to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations;
(e) Recruit the staff of the Organization on an international basis so as to ensure that the three principal groups of States existing in the world are adequately represented. The personnel of the Organization shall be recruited from among persons who are recommended by Governments and who may or may not be citizens of the country of the recommending Government;
(f) Prepare and submit to the Conference the annual budget estimates for the expenses of the Organization;
(g) Draw up instructions by which the various control bodies are to be guided in their work;
(h) Make a prompt study of incoming reports;
(i) Request from States such information on their armed forces and armaments as may be necessary for control over the implementation of the disarmament measures provided for by the present Treaty;
(j) Perform such other functions as are envisaged in the present Treaty.

3. Each member of the Council shall have one vote. Decisions of the Council on procedural matters shall be taken by a simple majority, and on other matters by a two-thirds majority.

4. The Council shall be so organized as to be able to function continuously. The Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure and shall be authorized to establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.

Article 43
Privileges and immunities

The Organization, its personnel and representatives of the States parties to the Treaty shall enjoy in the territory of each State party to the Treaty such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the exercise of independent and unrestricted control over the implementation of the present Treaty.

Article 44
Finances

1. All the expenses of the Organization shall be financed from the funds...
Article 42

Privileges and immunities

The Organization, its personnel and representatives of the States parties to the Treaty shall enjoy in the territory of each State party to the Treaty such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the exercise of independent and unrestricted control over the implementation of the present Treaty.

Article 43

Finances

1. All the expenses of the Organization shall be financed from the funds allocated by the States parties to the Treaty. The budget of the Organization shall be drawn up by the Council and approved by the Conference in accordance with article 41, paragraph 4(c), and article 42, paragraph 2(f), of the present Treaty.

2. The States parties to the Treaty shall contribute funds to cover the expenditure of the Organization according to the following scale:

[The agreed scale of contributions shall be included in the present article.]

Article 45

Preparatory Commission

Immediately after the signing of the present Treaty, the States represented in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament shall set up a Preparatory Commission for the purpose of taking practical steps to establish the International Disarmament Organization.

PART VI. FINAL CLAUSES

Article 46

Ratification and entry into force

The present Treaty shall be subject to ratification by the signatory States in accordance with their constitutional procedures within a period of six months from the date of its signature, and shall come into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification with the United Nations Secretariat by all the States which are permanent members of the Security Council, as well as by those States that are their allies in bilateral and multilateral military alliances, and by ...............[number] non-aligned States.

Article 47

Amendments

Any proposal to amend the text of the present Treaty shall come into force after it has been adopted by a two-thirds majority at a conference of all States parties to the Treaty and has been ratified by the States referred to in article 46 of the present Treaty in accordance with their constitutional procedures.

Article 48

Authentic texts

The present Treaty, done in the Russian, English, French, Chinese and Spanish languages, all texts being equally authentic, shall be deposited with the United Nations Secretariat, which shall transmit certified copies thereof to all the signatory States.

In witness whereof, the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed the present Treaty.

Done at .................
4. Outline of basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world submitted by the United States, 18 April 1962, as subsequently amended

United States: Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World*

In order to assist in the preparation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world, the United States submits the following outline of basic provisions of such a treaty. The preamble of such a treaty has already been the subject of negotiations and is therefore not submitted as part of this treaty outline.

A. Objectives

1. To ensure that: (a) disarmament is general and complete and war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems; and (b) general and complete disarmament is accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the settlement of disputes and by effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. Taking into account paragraphs 3 and 4 below, to provide, with respect to the military establishment of every nation, for:

(a) Disbanding of armed forces, dismantling of military establishments, including bases, cessation of the production of armaments as well as their liquidation or conversion to peaceful uses;

(b) Elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, biological, and other weapons of mass destruction and cessation of the production of such weapons;

(c) Elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction;

(d) Abolition of the organizations and institutions designed to organize the military efforts of States, cessation of military training, and closing of all military training institutions;

(e) Discontinuance of military expenditures.

3. To ensure that, at the completion of the programme for general and complete disarmament, States would have at their disposal only those non-nuclear armaments, forces, facilities and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens.

3. To ensure that, at the completion of the programme for general and complete disarmament, States would have at their disposal only those non-nuclear armaments, forces, facilities and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens.

STAGE I

Stage I would begin upon the entry into force of the Treaty and would be completed within three years from that date.

During stage I the Parties to the Treaty would undertake:

1. To reduce their armaments and armed forces and to carry out other agreed measures in the manner outlined below;
2. To establish the International Disarmament Organization upon the entry into force of the Treaty in order to ensure the verification in the agreed manner of the obligations undertaken; and
3. To strengthen arrangements for keeping the peace through the measures outlined below.

A. ARMAMENTS

1. Reduction of Armaments

(a) Specified Parties to the Treaty, as a first stage towards general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world, would reduce by thirty per cent of armaments in each category listed in sub-paragraph (a) below. Each type of armament in the categories listed in sub-paragraph (b) below would be reduced by thirty per cent of the inventory existing at an agreed date.

(b) All types of armaments within agreed categories would be subject to reduction in stage I (the following list of categories, and of types within categories, is illustrative):

(i) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of 40,000 kilograms or greater; missiles having a range of 5,000 kilometers or greater, together with their related fixed launching pads; and submarine-launched missiles and air-to-surface missiles having a range of 300 kilometers or greater.

(Within this category, the United States, for example, would declare as types of armaments: the B-52 aircraft; Atlas missiles together with their related fixed launching pads; Polaris missiles; and each new type of armament, such as Minuteman missiles, which came within the category description, together with, where applicable, their related fixed launching pads. The declared inventory of types within the category by other Parties to the Treaty would be similarly detailed.)

(ii) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of between 15,000 and 40,000 kilograms and those missiles not included in category (i) having a range between 300 and 5,000 kilometers, together with any related fixed launching pads. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.)

(iii) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of between 2,500 and 15,000 kilograms. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.)

(iv) Surface-to-surface (including submarine-launched missiles) and air-to-surface aerodynamic and ballistic missiles and free rockets having a range between 10 and 300 kilometers, together with any related fixed launching pads. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.)
(v) Anti-missile-missile systems, together with related fixed launching pads. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.)

(vi) Surface-to-air missiles other than anti-missile-...ssile systems, together with any related fixed launching pads. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.)

(vii) Tanks. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.)

(viii) Armoured cars and armoured personnel carriers. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.)

(ix) All artillery, mortars and rocket launchers having a caliber of 100 mm. or greater. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.)

(x) Combatant ships with standard displacement of 400 tons or greater. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.)

2. Method of Reduction
   (a) Those Parties to the Treaty which were subject to the reduction of armaments would submit to the International Disarmament Organization an appropriate declaration respecting inventories of their armaments existing at the agreed date.

   (b) The reduction would be accomplished in three steps, each consisting of one year. One-third of the reduction to be made during stage I would be carried out during each step.

   (c) During the first part of each step, one-third of the armaments to be eliminated during stage I would be placed in depots under supervision of the International Disarmament Organization. During the second part of each step, the deposited armaments would be destroyed or, where appropriate, converted to peaceful uses. The number and location of such depots and arrangements respecting their establishment and operation would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

   (d) In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in a Treaty annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing reduction and would provide assurance that retained armaments did not exceed agreed levels.

3. Limitation on Production of Armaments and on Related Activities
   (a) Production of all armaments listed in sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 1 above would be limited to agreed allowances during stage I and, by the beginning of stage II, would be halted except for production within agreed limits of parts for maintenance of the agreed retained armaments.

   (b) The allowances would permit limited production of each type of armament listed in sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 1 above. In all instances during the process of eliminating production of armaments, any armament produced within a type would be compensated for by a normal armament destroyed within that type to the end that the 10 per cent reduction in numbers in each type in each step, and the resulting 30 per cent reduction in stage I, would be achieved.

(c) The testing and production of new types of armaments would be prohibited.

(d) The expansion of facilities for the production of existing types of armaments and the construction or equipping of facilities for the production of new types of armaments would be prohibited.

(e) The flight testing of missiles would be limited to agreed annual quotas.

(f) In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the following measures at declared locations and would provide assurance that activities subject to the foregoing measures were not conducted at undeclared locations.

4. Additional Measures
   The Parties to the Treaty would agree to examine unresolved questions relating to means of accomplishing in stages II and III the reduction and eventual elimination of production and stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction. In light of this examination, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to arrangements concerning chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction.

B. ARMED FORCES

1. Reduction of Armed Forces
   Force levels for the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would be reduced to 2.1 million each and for other specified Parties to the Treaty to agreed levels not exceeding 2.1 million each. All other Parties to the Treaty would, with agreed exceptions, reduce their force levels to 100,000 or one per cent of their population, whichever were higher, provided that in no case would the force levels of such other Parties to the Treaty exceed levels in existence upon the entry into force of the Treaty.

2. Armed Forces Subject to Reduction
   Agreed force levels would include all full-time, uniformed personnel maintained by national Governments in the following categories:

   (a) Career personnel of active armed forces and other personnel serving in the active armed forces on fixed engagements or contracts.

   (b) Conscripts performing their required period of full-time active duty as fixed by national law.

   (c) Personnel of militarily organized security forces and of other forces or organizations equipped and organized to perform a military mission.

3. Method of Reduction
   The reduction of force levels would be carried out in the following manner:

   (a) Those Parties to the Treaty which were subject to the foregoing reductions would submit to the International Disarmament Organization a declaration stating their force levels at the agreed date.

   (b) Force level reductions would be accomplished in three steps, each having a duration of one year. During each step force levels would be reduced by one-third of the difference between force levels existing at the agreed date and the levels to be reached at the end of stage I.
4.1. In accordance with arrangements that would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the reduction of force levels and provide assurance that retained forces did not exceed agreed levels.

4. Additional Measures
The Parties to the Treaty which were subject to the foregoing reductions would agree upon appropriate arrangements, including procedures for consultation, in order to ensure that civilian employment by military establishments would be in accordance with the objectives of the obligations respecting force levels.

C. Nuclear weapons

1. Production of Fissileable Materials for Nuclear Weapons
(a) The Parties to the Treaty would halt the production of fissileable materials for use in nuclear weapons.

(b) This measure would be carried out in the following manner:

(i) The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the International Disarmament Organization a declaration listing by name, location and production capacity every facility under their jurisdiction capable of producing and processing fissileable materials at the agreed date.

(ii) Production of fissileable materials for purposes other than use in nuclear weapons would be limited to agreed levels. The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the International Disarmament Organization periodic declarations stating the amounts and types of fissileable materials which were still being produced at each facility.

(iii) In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures at declared facilities and would provide assurance that activities subject to the foregoing limitations were not conducted at undeclared facilities.

2. Transfer of Fissileable Material to Purposes Other than Use in Nuclear Weapons
(a) Upon the cessation of production of fissileable materials for use in nuclear weapons, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would each transfer to purposes other than use in nuclear weapons agreed quantities of weapons-grade U-235 from past production. The United States of America would transfer . . . kilogrammes, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would transfer . . . kilogrammes of such weapons-grade U-235. For this purpose, "weapons-grade U-235" means the U-235 contained in metal of which at least 90 per cent of the weight is U-235.

(b) To ensure that the transferred materials were not used in nuclear weapons, such materials would be placed under safeguards and inspection by the International Disarmament Organization either in stockpiles or at the facilities in which they would be utilized for purposes other than use in nuclear weapons. Arrangements for such safeguards and inspection would be set forth in the annex on verification.

3. Transfer of Fissileable Materials Between States for Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy
(a) Any transfer of fissileable materials between States would be for purposes other than for use in nuclear weapons and would be subject to a system of safeguards to ensure that such materials were not used in nuclear weapons.

(b) The system of safeguards to be applied for this purpose would be developed in agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

4. Non-Transfer of Nuclear Weapons
The Parties to the Treaty would agree to seek to prevent the creation of further national nuclear forces. To this end the Parties would agree that:

(a) Any Party to the Treaty which had manufactured, or which at any time manufactures, a nuclear weapon would:

(i) Not transfer control over any nuclear weapons to a State which had not manufactured a nuclear weapon before an agreed date;

(ii) Not assist any such State in manufacturing any nuclear weapons.

(b) Any Party to the Treaty which had not manufactured a nuclear weapon before the agreed date would:

(i) Not acquire, or attempt to acquire, control over any nuclear weapons;

(ii) Not manufacture, or attempt to manufacture, any nuclear weapons.

5. Nuclear Weapon Test Explosions
If an agreement prohibiting nuclear weapon test explosions and providing for effective international control had come into force prior to the entry into force of the Treaty, such agreement would become an annex to the Treaty, and all the Parties to the Treaty would be bound by the obligations specified in the agreement.

(b) If, however, no such agreement had come into force prior to the entry into force of the Treaty, all nuclear weapon test explosions would be prohibited, and the procedures for effective international control would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

6. Additional Measures
The Parties to the Treaty would agree to examine remaining unresolved questions relating to the means of accomplishing in stages II and III the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapon stockpiles. In the light of this examination, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to arrangements concerning nuclear weapon stockpiles.

D. Outer space

1. Prohibition of Weapons of Mass Destruction in Orbit
The Parties to the Treaty would agree not to place in orbit weapons capable of producing mass destruction.

2. Peaceful Co-operation in Space
The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support increased international co-operation in peaceful uses of outer space in the United Nations or through other appropriate arrangements.
3. Notification and Pre-Launch Inspection

With respect to the launching of space vehicles and missiles:

(a) Those Parties to the Treaty which conducted launchings of space vehicles or missiles would provide advance notification of such launchings to other Parties to the Treaty and to the International Disarmament Organization together with the track of the space vehicle or missile. Such advance notification would be provided on a timely basis to permit pre-launch inspection of the space vehicle or missile to be launched.

(b) In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would conduct pre-launch inspection of space vehicles and missiles and would establish and operate any arrangements necessary for detecting unreported launchings.

3. Additional Observation Arrangements

The Parties to the Treaty would establish such additional observation arrangements as might be agreed. Such arrangements could be extended in an agreed manner during each stage of stage I.

4. Exchange of Military Missions

Specified Parties to the Treaty would undertake the exchange of military missions between States or groups of States in order to improve communications and understanding between them. Specific arrangements respecting such exchanges would be agreed.

5. Communications between Heads of Government

Specified Parties to the Treaty would agree to the establishment of rapid and reliable communications among their Heads of Government and with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Specific arrangements in this regard would be subject to agreement among the Parties concerned and between such Parties and the Secretary-General.

6. International Commission on Reduction of the Risk of War

The Parties to the Treaty would establish an International Commission on Reduction of the Risk of War as a subsidiary body of the International Disarmament Organization to examine and make recommendations regarding further measures that might be undertaken during stage I or subsequent stages of disarmament to reduce the risk of war by accident, miscalculation, failure of communications, or surprise attack. Specific arrangements for such measures as might be agreed to by all or some of the Parties to the Treaty would be subject to agreement among the Parties concerned.

G. THE INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT ORGANIZATION

1. Establishment of the International Disarmament Organization

The International Disarmament Organization would be established upon the entry into force of the Treaty and would function within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Treaty.

2. Co-operation of the Parties to the Treaty

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to co-operate promptly and fully with the International Disarmament Organization and to assist the International Disarmament Organization in the performance of its functions and in the execution of the decisions made by it in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty.

3. Verification Functions of the International Disarmament Organization

The International Disarmament Organization would verify disarmament measures in accordance with the following principles which would be implemented through specific arrangements set forth in the annex on verification:

(a) Measures providing for reduction of forces, equipment, and installations

(b) Verifiable reductions of military expenditures

(c) Notification and pre-launch inspection

(d) Additional observation arrangements

(e) Exchange of military missions

(f) Communications between Heads of Government

(g) International commission on reduction of the risk of war

(h) Establishment of the International Disarmament Organization

(i) Co-operation of the Parties to the Treaty

(j) Verification functions of the International Disarmament Organization
Specified Parties to the Treaty would permit observance posts to be established at agreed locations, including major ports, railway centres, motor highways, river crossings, and air bases, to report on concentrations and

(a) Measures providing for reduction of armaments would be verified by the International Disarmament Organization at agreed depots and would include verification of the destruction of armaments and, where appropriate, verification of the conversion of armaments to peaceful uses. Measures providing for reduction of armed forces would be verified by the International Disarmament Organization either at the agreed depots or other agreed locations.

(b) Measures halting or limiting production, testing, and other specified activities would be verified by the International Disarmament Organization. Parties to the Treaty would declare the nature and location of all production and testing facilities and other specified activities. The International Disarmament Organization would have access to relevant facilities and activities wherever located in the territory of such Parties.

(c) Assurance that agreed levels of armaments and armed forces were not exceeded and that activities limited or prohibited by the Treaty were not being conducted clandestinely would be provided by the International Disarmament Organization through agreed arrangements which would have the effect of providing that the extent of inspection during any step or stage would be related to the amount of disarmament being undertaken; and to the degree of risk to the Parties to the Treaty of possible violations. This might be accomplished, for example, by an arrangement embodying such features as the following:

(i) All parts of the territory of those Parties to the Treaty to which this form of verification was applicable would be subject to selection for inspection from the beginning of stage I as provided below.

(ii) Parties to the Treaty would divide their territory into an agreed number of appropriate zones at the beginning of each step of disarmament, submit to the International Disarmament Organization a declaration stating the total level of armaments, forces, and specified types of activities subject to verification within each zone. The exact location of armaments and forces within a zone would not be revealed prior to its selection for inspection.

(iii) An agreed number of these zones would be progressively inspected by the International Disarmament Organization during stage I according to an agreed time schedule. The zones to be inspected would be selected by procedures which would ensure their selection by Parties to the Treaty other than the Party whose territory was to be inspected or any Party associated with it. Upon selection of each zone, the Party to the Treaty whose territory was to be inspected would declare the exact location of armaments, forces and other agreed activities within the selected zone. During the verification process, arrangements would be made to provide assurance against undeclared movements of the objects of verification to or from the zone or zones being inspected. Both aerial and mobile ground inspection would be employed within the zone being inspected. In so far as agreed measures being verified were concerned, access within the zone would be free and unimpeded, and verification would be carried out with the full co-operation of the State being inspected.

(bv) Once a zone had been inspected it would remain open for further inspection while verification was being extended to additional zones.

(b) By the end of stage III, when all disarmament measures had been completed, inspection would have been extended to all parts of the territory of Parties to the Treaty.

4. Composition of the International Disarmament Organization

(a) The International Disarmament Organization would have:

(i) A General Conference of all the Parties to the Treaty;

(ii) A Control Council consisting of representatives of all the major signatory Powers as permanent members and certain other Parties to the Treaty on a rotating basis; and

(iii) An Administrator who would administer the International Disarmament Organization under the direction of the Control Council and who would have the authority, staff, and finances adequate to ensure effective and impartial implementation of the functions of the International Disarmament Organization.

(b) The General Conference and the Control Council would have power to establish such subsidiary bodies, including expert study groups, as either of them might deem necessary.

5. Functions of the General Conference

The General Conference would have the following functions, among others which might be agreed:

(a) Electing non-permanent members to the Control Council;

(b) Approving certain accessions to the Treaty;

(c) Appointing the Administrator upon recommendation of the Control Council;

(d) Approving agreements between the International Disarmament Organization and the United Nations and other international organizations;

(e) Approving the budget of the International Disarmament Organization;

(f) Receiving and reviewing reports from the Control Council and deciding upon matters referred to it by the Control Council;

(g) Approving reports to be submitted to bodies of the United Nations;

(h) Proposing matters for consideration by the Control Council;

(i) Requiring the International Court of Justice to give advisory opinions on legal questions concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty, subject to a general authorization of this power by the General Assembly of the United Nations;

(j) Approving amendments to the Treaty for possible ratification by the Parties to the Treaty;

(k) Considering matters of mutual interest pertaining to the Treaty or disarmament in general.

6. Functions of the Control Council

The Control Council would have the following functions, among others which might be agreed:

(a) Recommending appointment of the Administrator;

(b) Adopting rules for implementing the terms of the Treaty;

(c) Establishing procedures and standards for the installation and operation of the verification arrangements, and maintaining supervision over such arrangements and the Administrator;

(d) Establishing procedures for making available to the Parties to the Treaty data produced by verification arrangements;

(e) Considering reports of the Administrator on the progress of disarmament measures and of their verification, and on the installation and operation of the verification arrangements;
(f) Recommending to the Conference approval of the budget of the International Disarmament Organization;

(g) Requesting the International Court of Justice to give advisory opinions on legal questions concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty, subject to a general authorization of this power by the General Assembly of the United Nations;

(h) Recommending to the Conference approval of certain accessions to the Treaty;

(i) Considering matters of mutual interest pertaining to the Treaty or to disarmament in general.

7. Functions of the Administrator

The Administrator would have the following functions, among others which might be agreed:

(a) Administering the installation and operation of the verification arrangements, and serving as Chief Executive Officer of the International Disarmament Organization;

(b) Making available to the Parties to the Treaty data produced by the verification arrangements;

(c) Preparing the budget of the International Disarmament Organization;

(d) Making reports to the Control Council on the progress of disarmament measures and of their verification, and on the installation and operation of the verification arrangements.

8. Privileges and Immunities

The privileges and immunities which the Parties to the Treaty would grant to the International Disarmament Organization and its staff and to the representatives of the Parties to the International Disarmament Organization, and the legal capacity which the International Disarmament Organization should enjoy in the territory of each of the parties to the Treaty would be specified in an annex to the Treaty.

9. Relations with the United Nations and Other International Organizations

(a) The International Disarmament Organization, being established within the framework of the United Nations, would conduct its activities in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. It would maintain close working arrangements with the United Nations, and the Administrator of the International Disarmament Organization would consult with the Secretary-General of the United Nations on matters of mutual interest.

(b) The Control Council of the International Disarmament Organization would transmit to the United Nations annual and other reports on the activities of the International Disarmament Organization.

(c) Principal organs of the United Nations could make recommendations to the International Disarmament Organization, which would consider them and report to the United Nations on action taken.

Note: The above outline does not cover all the possible details or aspects of relationships between the International Disarmament Organization and the United Nations.

H. MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN ARRANGEMENTS FOR KEEPING THE PEACE

1. Obligations Concerning Threat or Use of Force

The Parties to the Treaty would undertake obligations to refrain, in their international relations, from the threat or use of force of any type—including nuclear, conventional, chemical or biological means of warfare—contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

2. Rules of International Conduct

(a) The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support a study by a subsidiary body of the International Disarmament Organization of the codification and progressive development of rules of international conduct related to disarmament.

(b) The Parties to the Treaty would refrain from indirect aggression and subversion. The subsidiary body provided for in sub-paragraph (a) would also study methods of assuring States against indirect aggression or subversion.

3. Peaceful Settlement of Disputes

(a) The Parties to the Treaty would utilize all appropriate processes for the peaceful settlement of all disputes which might arise between them and any other State, whether or not a Party to the Treaty, including negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, submission to the Security Council or the General Assembly of the United Nations, or other peaceful means of their choice.

(b) The Parties to the Treaty would agree that disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty which were not settled by negotiation or by the International Disarmament Organization would be subject to referral by any party to the dispute to the International Court of Justice, unless the parties concerned agreed on another mode of settlement.

(c) The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support a study under the General Assembly of the United Nations of measures which should be undertaken to make existing arrangements for the peaceful settlement of international disputes, whether legal or political in nature, more effective; and to institute new procedures and arrangements where needed.

4. Maintenance of International Peace and Security

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support measures strengthening the structure, authority, and operation of the United Nations so as to improve its capability to maintain international peace and security.

5. United Nations Peace Force

The Parties to the Treaty would undertake to develop arrangements during stage I for the establishment in stage II of a United Nations Peace Force. To this end, the Parties to the Treaty would agree on the following measures within the United Nations:

(a) Examination of the experience of the United Nations leading to a further strengthening of United Nations forces for keeping the peace;

(b) Examination of the feasibility of concluding promptly the agreements envisaged in Article 43 of the United Nations Charter;

(c) Conclusion of an agreement for the establishment of a United Nations
Peace Force in stage II, including definitions of its purpose, mission, composition and strength, disposition, command and control, training, logistical support, financing, equipment and armaments.

6. United Nations Peace Observation Corps

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support the establishment within the United Nations of a Peace Observation Corps, staffed with a standing cadre of observers who could be dispatched promptly to investigate any situation which might constitute a threat to or a breach of the peace. Elements of the Peace Observation Corps could also be stationed as appropriate in selected areas throughout the world.

I. Transition

1. During the last three months of stage I, the Control Council would review the situation respecting the following listed circumstances with a view to determining, in the light of specified criteria, whether these circumstances existed at the end of stage I:
   (a) All undertakings to be carried out in stage I had been carried out;
   (b) All preparations required for stage II had been made; and
   (c) All militarily significant States had become parties to the treaty.

2. Transition from stage I to stage II would take place at the end of stage I or at the end of any periods of extension of stage I, upon a determination, in the light of specified criteria, by affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members of the Control Council, including at least the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, that the foregoing circumstances existed.

3. If, at the end of stage I, one or more permanent members of the Control Council should declare that the foregoing circumstances did not exist, the agreed period of stage I would, upon the request of such permanent member or members, be extended by a period or periods totalling no more than three months for the purpose of bringing about the foregoing circumstances.

4. Upon the expiration of such period or periods, the Control Council would again consider whether the foregoing circumstances did in fact exist and would vote upon transition in the manner specified in paragraph 2 above.

STAGE II

Stage II would begin upon the transition from stage I and would be completed within three years from that date.

1. To continue all obligations undertaken during stage I;
2. To reduce further the armaments and armed forces reduced during stage I and to carry out additional measures of disarmament in the manner outlined below;
3. To ensure that the International Disarmament Organization would have the capacity to verify in the agreed manner the obligations undertaken during stage II;
4. To strengthen further the arrangements for keeping the peace through the establishment of a United Nations Peace Force and through the additional measures outlined below.

A. Armaments

1. Reduction of Armaments
   (a) Those Parties to the Treaty which had during stage I reduced their armaments in agreed categories by 30 per cent would during stage II further reduce each type of armaments in the categories listed in stage I, section A, sub-paragraph 1(b), by 50 per cent of the inventory existing at the end of stage I.
   (b) Those Parties to the Treaty which had not been subject to measures for the reduction of armaments during stage I would submit to the International Disarmament Organization an appropriate declaration respecting the inventories by types, within the categories listed in stage I, of their armaments existing at the beginning of stage II. Such Parties to the Treaty would during stage II reduce the inventory of each type of such armaments by 65 per cent in order that such Parties would accomplish the same total percentage of reduction by the end of stage II as would be accomplished by those Parties to the Treaty which had reduced their armaments by 50 per cent in stage I.

2. Additional Armaments Subject to Reduction
   (a) The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the International Disarmament Organization a declaration respecting their inventories existing at the beginning of stage II of the additional types of armaments in the categories listed in sub-paragraph (b) below, and would during stage II reduce the inventory of each type of such armaments by 50 per cent.
   (b) All types of armaments within further agreed categories would be subject to reduction in stage II (the following list of categories is illustrative):
      (i) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of up to 2,500 kilograms (declarations by types).
      (ii) Specified types of unarmed military aircraft (declarations by types).
      (iii) Missiles and free rockets having a range of less than 10 kilometres (declarations by types).
      (iv) Mortars and rocket launchers having a caliber of less than 100 mm. (declarations by types).
      (v) Specified types of unarmoured personnel carriers and transport vehicles (declarations by types).
      (vi) Combatant ships with standard displacement of 400 tons or greater which had not been included among the armaments listed in stage I, and combatant ships with standard displacement of less than 400 tons (declarations by types).
      (vii) Specified types of non-combatant naval vessels (declarations by types).
      (viii) Specified types of small arms (declarations by types).
   (c) Specified categories of ammunition for armaments listed in stage I, section A, sub-paragraph 1(b), and in sub-paragraph (b) above would be reduced to levels consistent with the levels of armaments agreed for the end of stage II.

3. Method of Reduction
   The foregoing measures would be carried out and would be verified by the International Disarmament Organization in a manner corresponding to that provided for in stage I, section A, paragraph 2.
4. Limitation on Production of Armaments and on Related Activities

(a) The Parties to the Treaty would halt the production of armaments in the specified categories except for production, within agreed limits, of parts required for maintenance of the agreed retained armaments.

(b) The production of ammunition in specified categories would be reduced to agreed levels consistent with the levels of armaments agreed for the end of stage II.

(c) The Parties to the Treaty would halt development and testing of new types of armaments. The flight testing of existing types of missiles would be limited to agreed annual quotas.

(d) In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures at declared locations and would provide assurance that activities subject to the foregoing measures were not conducted at undeclared locations.

5. Additional Measures

(a) In the light of their examination during stage I of the means of accomplishing the reduction and eventual elimination of production and stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, the Parties to the Treaty would undertake the following measures respecting such weapons:

(i) The cessation of all production and field testing of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction.

(ii) The reduction, by agreed categories, of stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction to levels 50 per cent below those existing at the beginning of stage II.

(iii) The dismantling or conversion to peaceful uses of all facilities engaged in the production or field testing of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction.

(b) The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed sequence and through arrangements which would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

(c) In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex to the Treaty, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures and would provide assurance that retained levels of chemical and biological weapons did not exceed agreed levels and that activities subject to the foregoing limitations were not conducted at undeclared locations.

B. Armed Forces

1. Reduction of Armed Forces

(a) Those Parties to the Treaty which had been subject to measures providing for reduction of force levels during stage I would further reduce their force levels on the following basis:

(i) Force levels of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would be reduced to levels 50 per cent below the levels agreed for the end of stage I.

(ii) Force levels of other Parties to the Treaty which had been subject to measures providing for the reduction of force levels during stage I would be further reduced, on the basis of an agreed percentage, below the levels agreed for the end of stage I to levels which would not in any case exceed the agreed level for the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the end of stage II.

(b) Those Parties to the Treaty which had not been subject to measures providing for the reduction of armed forces during stage I would reduce their force levels to agreed levels consistent with those to be reached by other Parties which had reduced their force levels during stage I as well as stage II. In no case would such agreed levels exceed the agreed level for the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the end of stage II.

(c) Agreed levels of armed forces would include all personnel in the categories set forth in section B, paragraph 2, of stage I.

2. Method of Reduction

The further reduction of force levels would be carried out and would be verified by the International Disarmament Organization in a manner corresponding to that provided for in section B, paragraph 3, of stage I.

3. Additional Measures

Agreed limitations consistent with retained force levels would be placed on compulsory military training, and on refresher training for reserve forces of the Parties to the Treaty.

C. Nuclear Weapons

1. Reduction of Nuclear Weapons

In the light of their examination during stage I of the means of accomplishing the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapon stockpiles, the Parties to the Treaty would undertake to reduce in the following manner remaining nuclear weapons and fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons.

(a) The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the International Disarmament Organization a declaration stating the amounts, types, and nature of utilization of all their fissionable materials.

(b) The Parties to the Treaty would reduce the amounts and types of fissionable materials declared for use in nuclear weapons to minimum levels on the basis of agreed percentages. The foregoing reduction would be accomplished through the transfer of such materials to purposes other than use in nuclear weapons. The purposes for which such materials would be used would be determined by the State to which the materials belonged, provided that such materials were not used in nuclear weapons.

(c) The Parties to the Treaty would destroy the non-nuclear components and assemblies of nuclear weapons from which fissionable materials had been removed to effect the foregoing reduction of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons.

(d) Production or refabrication of nuclear weapons from any remaining fissionable materials would be subject to agreed limitations.

(e) The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed sequence and through arrangements which would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

(f) In accordance with arrangements that would be set forth in the verification annex to the Treaty, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures at declared locations and would provide assurance that activities subject to the foregoing limitations were not conducted at undeclared locations.
2. Registration of Nuclear Weapons for Verification Purposes

To facilitate verification during stage III that no nuclear weapons remained at the disposal of the Parties to the Treaty, those Parties to the Treaty which possessed nuclear weapons would, during the last six months of stage II, register and serialise their remaining nuclear weapons and would register remaining fissionable materials for use in such weapons. Such registration and serialisation would be carried out with the International Disarmament Organization in accordance with procedures which would be set forth in the annex on verification.

D. MILITARY BASES AND FACILITIES

1. Reduction of Military Bases and Facilities

The Parties to the Treaty would dismantle or convert to peaceful uses agreed military bases and facilities, wherever they might be located.

2. Method of Reduction

(a) The list of military bases and facilities subject to the foregoing measures and the sequence and arrangements for dismantling or converting them to peaceful uses would be set forth in the annex to the Treaty.

(b) In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures.

E. REDUCTION OF THE RISK OF WAR

In the light of the examination by the International Commission on Reduction of the Risk of War during stage I the Parties to the Treaty would undertake such additional arrangements as appeared desirable to promote confidence and reduce the risk of war. The Parties to the Treaty would also consider extending and improving the measures undertaken in stage I for this purpose. The Commission would remain in existence to examine extensions, improvements or additional measures which might be undertaken during and after stage II.

F. THE INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT ORGANIZATION

The International Disarmament Organization would be strengthened in the manner necessary to ensure its capacity to verify the measures undertaken in stage II through an extension of the arrangements based upon the principles set forth in section G, paragraph 3, of stage I.

G. MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN ARRANGEMENTS FOR KEEPING THE PEACE

1. Peaceful Settlement of Disputes

(a) In the light of the study of peaceful settlement of disputes conducted during stage I, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to such additional steps and arrangements as were necessary to assure the just and peaceful settlement of international disputes, whether legal or political in nature.

(b) The Parties to the Treaty would undertake to accept without reservation, pursuant to Article 36, paragraph (1), of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the compulsory jurisdiction of that Court to decide international legal disputes.

2. Rules of International Conduct

(a) The Parties to the Treaty would continue their support of the study by the subsidiary body of the International Disarmament Organization initiated in stage I to study the codification and progressive development of rules of international conduct related to disarmament. The Parties to the Treaty would agree to the establishment of procedures whereby rules recommended by the subsidiary body and approved by the Control Council would be circulated to all Parties to the Treaty and would become effective three months thereafter unless a majority of the Parties to the Treaty signified their disapproval, and whereby the Parties to the Treaty would be bound by rules which had become effective in this way unless, within a period of one year from the effective date, they formally notified the International Disarmament Organization that they did not consider themselves so bound. Using such procedures, the Parties to the Treaty would adopt such rules of international conduct as might be necessary to begin stage III.

(b) In the light of the study of indirect aggression and subversion conducted in stage I, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to arrangements necessary to assure States against indirect aggression and subversion.

3. United Nations Peace Force

The United Nations Peace Force to be established as the result of the agreement reached during stage I would come into being within the first year of stage II and would be progressively strengthened during stage II.

4. United Nations Peace Observation Corps

The Parties to the Treaty would conclude arrangements for the expansion of the activities of the United Nations Peace Observation Corps.

5. National Legislation

Those Parties to the Treaty which had not already done so would, in accordance with their constitutional processes, enact national legislation in support of the Treaty, imposing legal obligations on individuals and organizations under their jurisdiction and providing appropriate penalties for non-compliance.

H. TRANSITION

1. During the last three months of stage II, the Control Council would review the situation respecting the following listed circumstances with a view to determining, in the light of specified criteria, whether these circumstances existed at the end of stage II:

(a) All undertakings to be carried out in stage II had been carried out;

(b) All preparations required for stage III had been made; and

(c) All States possessing armed forces and armaments had become Parties to the Treaty.

2. Transition from stage II to stage III would take place at the end of stage II or at the end of any periods of extension of stage II, upon a determination, in the light of specified criteria, by affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members of the Control Council, including at least the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, that the foregoing circumstances existed.

3. If, at the end of stage II, one or more permanent members of the Control Council should declare that the foregoing circumstances did not exist, the agreed period of stage II would, upon the request of such permanent member
or members, be extended by a period or periods totalling no more than three
months for the purpose of bringing about the foregoing circumstances.

4. Upon the expiration of such period or periods, the Control Council would
again consider whether the foregoing circumstances did in fact exist and
would vote upon transition in the manner specified in paragraph 2 above.

STAGE III

Stage III would begin upon the transition from stage II and would be completed
within an agreed period of time as promptly as possible.

During stage III, the Parties to the Treaty would undertake:
1. To continue all obligations undertaken during stages I and II;
2. To complete the process of general and complete disarmament in the
manner outlined below;
3. To ensure that the International Disarmament Organization would have
the capacity to verify in the agreed manner the obligations undertaken during
stage III and of continuing verification subsequent to the completion of stage
III;
4. To strengthen further the arrangements for keeping the peace during
and following the achievement of general and complete disarmament through
the additional measures outlined below.

A. ARMAMENTS

1. Reduction of Armaments

Subject to agreed requirements for non-nuclear armaments of agreed types
for national forces required to maintain internal order and protect the
personal security of citizens, the Parties to the Treaty would eliminate all armam-
ments remaining at their disposal at the end of stage II.

2. Method of Reduction

(a) The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed sequence and
through arrangements that would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

(b) In accordance with arrangements that would be set forth in the
annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the
foregoing measures and would provide assurance that retained armaments
were of the agreed types and did not exceed agreed levels.

3. Limitations on Production of Armaments and on Related Activities

(a) Subject to agreed arrangements in support of national forces required to
maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens and
subject to agreed arrangements in support of the United Nations Peace Force,
the Parties to the Treaty would halt all applied research, development, produc-
tion, and testing of armaments and would cause to be dismantled or converted
to peaceful use all facilities for production of such weapons, and would transfer
all materials remaining at their disposal for use in such weapons to purposes
other than use in such weapons.

(b) In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the
annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify
the foregoing measures and would provide assurance that no nuclear
weapons or materials for use in such weapons remained at the disposal of the
Parties to the Treaty and that no such weapons or materials were produced at
undeclared facilities.

C. NUCLEAR WEAPONS

1. Reduction of Nuclear Weapons

In light of the steps taken in stages I and II to halt the production of fission-
able material for use in nuclear weapons and to reduce nuclear weapon
stocks, the Parties to the Treaty would eliminate all nuclear weapons
remaining at their disposal, would cause to be dismantled or converted
to peaceful use all facilities for production of such weapons, and would transfer
all materials remaining at their disposal for use in such weapons to purposes
other than use in such weapons.

2. Method of Reduction

(a) The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed sequence and
through arrangements which would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

(b) In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the
annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify
the foregoing measures and would provide assurance that no nuclear
weapons or materials for use in such weapons remained at the disposal of the
Parties to the Treaty and that no such weapons or materials were produced at
undeclared facilities.

D. MILITARY BASES AND FACILITIES

1. Reduction of Military Bases and Facilities

The Parties to the Treaty would dismantle or convert to peaceful uses the

parties to the Treaty and that no such weapons or materials were produced at undeclared facilities.

D. Military Bases and Facilities

1. Reduction of Military Bases and Facilities

The Parties to the Treaty would dismantle or convert to peaceful uses the military bases and facilities remaining at their disposal, wherever they might be located, in an agreed sequence except for such agreed bases or facilities within the territory of the Parties to the Treaty for agreed forces required to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens.

2. Method of Reduction

(a) The list of military bases and facilities subject to the foregoing measure and the sequence and arrangements for dismantling or converting them to peaceful uses during stage III would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

(b) In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measure at declared locations and provide assurance that activities subject to the foregoing measures were not conducted at undeclared locations.

E. Research and Development of Military Significance

1. Reporting Requirement

The Parties to the Treaty would undertake the following measures respecting research and development of military significance subsequent to stage III:

(a) The Parties to the Treaty would report to the International Disarmament Organization any basic scientific discovery and any technological invention having potential military significance.

(b) The Control Council would establish such expert study groups as might be required to examine the potential military significance of such discoveries and inventions and, if necessary, to recommend appropriate measures for their control. In the light of such expert study, the Parties to the Treaty would, where necessary, establish agreed arrangements for providing verification by the International Disarmament Organization that such discoveries and inventions were not utilized for military purposes. Such arrangements would become an annex to the Treaty.

(c) The Parties to the Treaty would agree to appropriate arrangements for protection of the ownership rights of all discoveries and inventions reported to the International Disarmament Organization in accordance with sub-paragraph (a) above.

2. International Co-operation

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support full international co-operation in all fields of scientific research and development, and to engage in free exchange of scientific and technical information and free interchange of views among scientific and technical personnel.

F. Reduction of the Risk of War

1. Improved Measures

In the light of the stage II examination by the International Commission on Reduction of the Risk of War, the Parties to the Treaty would undertake such extensions and improvements of existing arrangements and such additional arrangements as appeared desirable to promote confidence and reduce the risk of war. The Commission would remain in existence to examine extensions, improvements or additional measures which might be taken during and after stage III.

2. Application of Measures to Continuing Forces

The Parties to the Treaty would apply to national forces required to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens those applicable measures concerning the reduction of the risk of war that had been applied to national armed forces in stages I and II.

G. International Disarmament Organization

The International Disarmament Organization would be strengthened in the manner necessary to ensure its capacity: (1) to verify the measures undertaken in stage III through an extension of arrangements based upon the principles set forth in section G, paragraph 3, of stage I so that by the end of stage III, when all disarmament measures had been completed, inspection would have been extended to all parts of the territory of Parties to the Treaty; and (2) to provide continuing verification of disarmament after the completion of stage III.

II. Measures to Strengthen Arrangements for Keeping the Peace

1. Peaceful Change and Settlement of Disputes

The Parties to the Treaty would undertake such additional steps and arrangements as were necessary to provide a basis for peaceful change in a disarmed world and to continue the just and peaceful settlement of all international disputes, whether legal or political in nature.

2. Rules of International Conduct

The Parties to the Treaty would continue the codification and progressive development of rules of international conduct related to disarmament in the manner provided in stage II and by any other agreed procedure.

3. United Nations Peace Force

The Parties to the Treaty would progressively strengthen the United Nations Peace Force established in stage II until it had sufficient armed forces and arrangements so that no state could challenge it.

I. Completion of Stage III

1. At the end of the time period agreed for stage III, the Control Council would review the situation with a view to determining whether all undertakings to be carried out in stage III had been carried out.

2. This determination would be made by affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members of the Control Council, including at least the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. If an affirmative determination were made, stage III would be deemed completed.

3. In the event that one or more of the permanent members of the Control Council should declare that such undertakings had not been carried out, the agreed period of stage III would, upon the request of such permanent member or members, be extended for a period or periods totalling no more than three months for the purpose of completing any uncompleted undertakings. Upon the expiration of such period or periods, the Control Council would again consider whether such undertakings had been carried out and would vote upon the question in the manner specified in paragraph 2 above.

4. After the completion of stage III, the obligations undertaken in stages I, II and III would continue.
arrangements as appeared desirable to promote confidence and reduce the risk of war. The Commission would remain in existence to examine extensions, improvements or additional measures which might be taken during and after stage III.

3. Parties to the Treaty, Ratification, Accession and Entry into Force of the Treaty

(a) The Treaty would be open to signature and ratification, or accession, by all States Members of the United Nations or members of its specialized agencies.

(b) Any other State which desired to become a Party to the Treaty could accede to the Treaty with the approval of the Conference on recommendation of the Control Council.

(c) The Treaty would come into force when it had been ratified by ...... States, including the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and an agreed number of the following States: ..........

(d) In order to assure the achievement of the fundamental purpose of a permanent state of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world, the Treaty would specify that the accession of certain militarily significant States would be essential for the continued effectiveness of the Treaty or for the coming into force of particular measures or stages.

(e) The Parties to the Treaty would undertake to exert every effort to induce other States or authorities to accede to the Treaty.

(f) The Treaty would be subject to ratification or acceptance in accordance with constitutional processes.

(g) A Depositary Government would be agreed upon which would have all of the duties normally incumbent upon a Depositary. Alternatively, the United Nations would be the Depositary.

4. Finance

(a) In order to meet the financial obligations of the International Disarmament Organization, the Parties to the Treaty would bear the International Disarmament Organization’s expenses as provided in the budget approved by the General Conference and in accordance with a scale of apportionment approved by the General Conference.

(b) The General Conference would exercise borrowing powers on behalf of the International Disarmament Organization.

5. Authentic Texts

The text of the Treaty would consist of equally authentic versions in English, French, Russian, Chinese and Spanish.

United States: Draft Articles V and VI-XII of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World

Article V

1. Reduction of Armaments

(a) Each of the following Parties: agrees to reduce its armaments in stage I in accordance with the provisions of this article.

(b) Each Party named in sub-paragraph (a) above, with the exceptions provided in the annex on stage I armaments reductions, shall reduce the number of its armaments in each of the types listed in that annex by not less than 30 per cent of the number of such armaments existing at the beginning of stage I.

(c) Each Party named in sub-paragraph (a) above agrees not to retain at the end of stage I any armaments of the types listed in the annex on stage I armaments reductions in excess of the number of such armaments existing at the beginning of stage I by not the number of such armaments required to be reduced in stage I by such Party under this article.

2. Method of Reduction

(a) Each Party to this Treaty shall submit to the International Disarmament Organization, within ...... days after the beginning of stage I, a declaration setting forth inventories of the numbers of its armaments, existing at the beginning of stage I, in each type listed in the annex on stage I armaments reductions. The form of such declaration shall be in accordance with the requirements set forth in that annex.

(b) The reductions of armaments required by this article shall be accomplished in three consecutive steps, each consisting of one year. Each Party named in paragraph 1 of this article shall:

(i) reduce, by the end of the first step, the number of its armaments in each type by not less than one-third of the number of such armaments required to be reduced by such Party in stage I, and

(ii) reduce, by the end of the second step, the number of its armaments in each type by not less than one-third of the number of such armaments required to be reduced by such Party in stage I.

By the end of the third step, each Party named in paragraph 1 of this article shall complete the reductions of armaments it is required to make in stage I.

(c) Each step shall be divided into two consecutive parts, each consisting of six months. In the first part of each step, each Party named in paragraph 1 of this article shall deposit the armaments which it is required to reduce in that step in depots under the supervision of the International Disarmament
Organization. During the second part of each step, the deposited armaments shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses under the supervision of the International Disarmament Organization.

(d) The number, location, establishment and operation of depots, and the destruction or conversion to peaceful uses of armaments, shall be in accordance with the provisions of the annex on stage I armaments reductions and with rules adopted by the Control Council of the International Disarmament Organization in accordance with article 9.

3. Limitations on Production and Transfers of Armaments

(a) Each Party to this Treaty shall limit its production of armaments of the types listed in the annex on stage I armaments reductions in accordance with the table of production allowances contained in that annex. For each armament produced during stage I, an existing armament of the same type as that produced, in addition to the armaments required to be reduced in the absence of production, shall be deposited in a depot under the supervision of the International Disarmament Organization and disposed of in accordance with article 5 of the treaty.

(b) Each Party to this Treaty shall, from the beginning of stage I, limit its production of parts and assemblies usable in any type of armament listed in the annex on stage I armaments reductions in accordance with the provisions of that annex.

(c) No Party shall, after the beginning of stage I, expand its facilities for the production of any type of armament listed in the annex on stage I armaments reductions or construct or equip facilities for the production of any type of armament which has not been produced prior to the beginning of stage I.

(d) No Party shall, from the beginning of stage I, test or produce any type of armament which has not been tested and produced prior to the beginning of stage I.

(e) Each Party to this Treaty shall, after the beginning of stage I, limit flight testing of missiles in accordance with the table in the annex on stage I armaments reductions.

4. Verification

The obligations set forth in this article shall be verified by the International Disarmament Organization in accordance with the provisions of this treaty and the annex on verification.

Article VI

Transfer and Use of Fissionable Material for Nuclear Weapons

1. Each Party to this Treaty shall:

(a) prohibit and prevent the production, at facilities under its jurisdiction and control, of fissionable material for use in nuclear weapons;

(b) prohibit and prevent the production in nuclear weapons of all fissionable material produced after the beginning of stage I; and

(c) refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way assisting or participating in, the production anywhere of fissionable material for use in nuclear weapons.

2. Each Party shall limit the production, at facilities under its jurisdiction or control, of fissionable material for purposes other than use in nuclear weapons in accordance with the table of allowances set forth in the annex on stage I nuclear disarmament.

3. Each Party shall submit to the International Disarmament Organization declarations within 90 days after the beginning of stage I and thereafter every six months, which shall list (a) the name, location, and production capacity of each facility under its jurisdiction or control capable of producing or processing fissionable material and (b) the amounts and types of fissionable material being produced at each such facility. The form of such declarations shall be in accordance with the requirements set forth in the annex on stage I nuclear disarmament.

Article VII

Transfer of Fissionable Material to Purposes Other Than Use in Nuclear Weapons

1. The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agree that each of them shall, during stage I, transfer to deposits, as stated in paragraph 1 of this article, all nuclear weapons-grade U-235 from its stockpile of such U-235 in existence at the beginning of stage I, in order to transfer such amounts to other than nuclear weapons. The United States of America shall transfer not less than 90 kilogrammes of such nuclear-grade U-235. For the purpose of this article "nuclear-grade U-235" means the U-235 contained in metal which at least 90 per cent of the weight is U-235.

2. Transfers pursuant to this article shall take place at depots under the supervision of the International Disarmament Organization. The schedule of transfers, the location, establishment and operation of depots, and the safeguard procedures to be observed in making the transfers, in withdrawing transferred material from depots, and in transporting, handling and utilizing such material after withdrawal shall be as provided in the annex on stage I nuclear disarmament and in rules adopted by the Control Council of the International Disarmament Organization in accordance with article 5.

3. The Party owning any transferred material prior to transfer shall continue to own it after such transfer, subject to the limitations contained in this article, and may withdraw such material for any purpose other than use in nuclear weapons, providing it submits to the International Disarmament Organization prior to withdrawal a statement setting forth the purpose of withdrawal, the amount of material needed for such purpose, and the time and place at which such material will be used.

Article VIII

Transfer of Fissionable Material for Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

1. No Party to this Treaty shall transfer, or permit any individual or association under its jurisdiction or control to transfer, to any other State, or to
any individual or association under the jurisdiction or control of such other State, fissile material for use in nuclear weapons.

2. Any transfer of fissile material not prohibited by this article, and the transportation, handling, and utilization of such material after such transfer, shall be subject to the safeguard procedures provided in the annex on stage I nuclear disarmament and in rules adopted by the Control Council of the International Disarmament Organization in accordance with article 1.

Article IX
Non-Transfer of Nuclear Weapons

The Parties to the Treaty agree to seek to prevent the creation of further national nuclear forces. To this end the Parties agree that:

1. Any Party to the Treaty which has manufactured, or which at any time manufactured a nuclear weapon before an agreed date;
   (a) Not transfer control over any nuclear weapons to a State which has not manufactured a nuclear weapon before an agreed date;
   (b) Not assist any such State in manufacturing any nuclear weapons.

2. Any Party to the Treaty which has not manufactured a nuclear weapon before the agreed date shall:
   (a) Not acquire, or attempt to acquire, control over any nuclear weapons;
   (b) Not manufacture, or attempt to manufacture, any nuclear weapons.

Article X
Nuclear Weapon Test Explosions

The Parties to this Treaty agree to be bound by the provisions of the "Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in all environments", which is set forth in the annex on stage I nuclear disarmament.

Article XI
Preparation for Stages II and III

The Parties to this Treaty agree to examine unresolved questions related to the means of accomplishing in stages II and III the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles and, in the light of this examination, shall agree upon arrangements for the accomplishment of such reduction and elimination.

Article XII
Verification

The obligations set forth in this part of this Treaty shall be verified by the International Disarmament Organization in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, the annex on stage I nuclear disarmament, and the annex on verification.
5. The Programme for Peace and International Cooperation (Chapter VII), adopted at the Second Non-Aligned Summit Conference, Cairo, 5-10 October 1964*

GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT; PEACEFUL USE OF ATOMIC ENERGY, PROHIBITION OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS, ESTABLISHMENT OF NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES, PREVENTION OF DISPERSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ABOLITION OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The Conference emphasises the paramount importance of disarmament as one of the basic problems of the contemporary world, and stresses the necessity of reaching immediate and practical solutions which would free mankind from the danger of war and from a sense of insecurity.

The Conference notes with concern that the continuing arms race and the tremendous advances that have been made in the production of weapons of mass destruction and their stockpiling threaten the world with armed conflict and annihilation. The Conference urges the great Powers to take new and urgent steps toward achieving general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

The Conference regrets that despite the efforts of the members of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament, and in particular those of the non-aligned countries, the results have not been satisfactory. It urges the great Powers, in collaboration with the other members of that Committee, to renew their efforts with determination with a view to the rapid conclusion of an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

The Conference calls upon all States to accede to the Moscow treaty partially banning the testing of nuclear weapons, and to abide by its provisions in the interests of peace and the welfare of humanity.

The Conference urges the extension of the Moscow Treaty so as to include underground tests, and the discontinuance of such tests pending the extension of the agreement.

The Conference urges the speedy conclusion of agreements on various other partial and collateral measures of disarmament proposed by the members of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

The Conference appeals to the Great Powers to take the lead in giving effect to decisive and immediate measures which would make possible substantial reductions in their military budgets.

The Conference requests the Great Powers to abstain from all policies conducive to the dissemination of nuclear weapons and their by-products among those States which do not at present possess them. It underlines the great danger in the dissemination of nuclear weapons and urges all States, particularly those possessing nuclear weapons, to conclude non-disarmament agreements and to agree on measures providing for the gradual liquidation of the existing stockpile of nuclear weapons.

As part of these efforts, the Heads of State or Government declare their own readiness not to produce, acquire or test any nuclear weapons, and call on all countries including those who have not subscribed to the Moscow Treaty to enter into a similar undertaking and to take the necessary steps to prevent their territories, ports and airfields from being used by nuclear powers for the deployment or disposition of nuclear weapons. This undertaking should be the subject of a treaty to be concluded in an International Conference convened under the auspices of the United Nations and open to accession by all States. The Conference further calls upon all nuclear Powers to observe the spirit of this declaration.

The Conference welcomes the agreement of the Great Powers not to orbit in outer space nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction and expresses its conviction that it is necessary to conclude an international treaty prohibiting the utilisation of outer space for military purposes. The Conference urges full international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space.

The Conference requests those States which have succeeded in exploring outer space, to exchange and disseminate information related to the research they have carried out in this field, so that scientific progress for the peaceful utilization of outer space be of common benefit to all. The Conference is of the view that for this purpose an international conference should be convened at an appropriate time.

The Conference considers that the declaration by African States regarding the demilitarization of Africa, the aspirations of the Latin American countries to demilitarize their continent and the various proposals pertaining to the demilitarization of areas in Europe and Asia are steps in the right direction because they assist in consolidating international peace and security and lessening international tensions.

The Conference recommends the establishment of demilitarized zones covering these and other areas and the oceans of the world, particularly those which have been hitherto free from nuclear weapons, in accordance with the desires expressed by the States and peoples concerned.

The Conference also requests the nuclear Powers to respect these demilitarized zones.

The Conference is convinced that the convening of a world disarmament conference under the auspices of the United Nations to which all countries would be invited, would provide powerful support to the efforts which are being made to set in motion the process of disarmament and for securing the further and steady development of this process.

The Conference therefore urges the participating countries to take, at the forthcoming General Assembly of the United Nations, all the necessary steps for the holding of such a conference and of any other special conference for the conclusion of special agreements on certain measures of disarmament.

The Conference urges all nations to join in the cooperative development of the peaceful use of atomic energy for the benefit of all mankind, and in particular, to study the development of atomic power and other technical aspects in which international cooperation might be most effectively accomplished through the free flow of non-scientific information.

6. Working paper containing some introductory remarks on steps toward a comprehensive disarmament programme submitted by the Netherlands

1. In resolution 1722 (XVI) of 20 December 1961 by which the General Assembly endorsed the agreement reached on the composition of the UNDC, it was recommended that the new Disarmament Committee should undertake negotiations with a view to reaching, on the basis of the joint statement of agreed principles, agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The Committee should in its work take into account, *inter alia*, paragraph 8 of the aforementioned principles.

2. Paragraph 8 of the agreed principles stipulates that efforts should continue without interruption until agreement upon the total programme for general and complete disarmament has been achieved. Furthermore, efforts should be undertaken to ensure early agreement on and implementation of measures of disarmament without prejudicing progress on agreement on the total programme and in such a way that these measures would facilitate and form part of that programme.

3. Since then progress has been made first and foremost in the field of collateral measures. But for reasons which are well known the hope that the main task of the Committee could be dealt with without interruption, "as a matter of the utmost urgency" (Res. 1722 (XVI)), remained unfulfilled.

In the course of its existence the Committee "gradually concentrated more of its efforts on the partial and confidence-building, or collateral measures of disarmament, as they are usually called, than on general and complete disarmament". */ This trend is discernible in the Provisional Agenda of work of the Committee, adopted in August 1968. Likewise, in its report to the XXIVth session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Committee recognizes "the relationship of the various measures already achieved and those currently being considered toward the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control".

*/ CCD/276, 24 February 1970.

*/ The United Nations and Disarmament 1945-1965, chap. 6, p. 115.
4. Mainly as a result of the initiatives of the Romanian delegation (ENDO/PV.400) and of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the XXIVth session of the General Assembly declared the seventies as a Disarmament Decade. Disarmament and social and economic development are the main objectives of all mankind for the coming years.

5. In the relevant resolution the General Assembly endorses the view that general and complete disarmament is the ultimate goal. Toward that end, the Assembly requests this Committee:

1. to continue intensive negotiations with a view to reaching the widest possible agreement on collateral measures;
2. to work out a comprehensive programme, dealing with all aspects on the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament, under effective international control, which would provide the Committee with a guideline to chart the course of its further work and its negotiations.

6. In its last report to the General Assembly the Committee expressed its conviction of the continued need to give highest priority in its work to further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, with due consideration to maintaining a balance among various measures to prevent armament, to limit armament and of disarmament. As regards the first category some measure of success has been achieved.

7. As to the second the most hopeful event during the Committee's past session was the announcement in Moscow and Washington that discussions on the limitation of offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of defense against ballistic missiles would start shortly.

The Netherlands delegation fully shares the opinion that the strategic arms limitation talks, which had a promising beginning, are of the utmost importance. They may create a new and more rational relationship in the strategic balance of the two super-powers. Their successful outcome would certainly facilitate the conclusion of further measures in the field of armaments limitation and ultimately of disarmament.
8. This should not imply, however, that no efforts are to be made in the meantime to further new agreements on such other measures. Although it is understood that there is a close relationship and interdependence between SALT and a comprehensive test ban, the Netherlands Delegation is nevertheless of the opinion that early preparatory work for a close international co-operation in the seismological field should continue to receive high priority in this context. Without prejudice to the eventual shaping of a verification system in a comprehensive test ban treaty, methods of seismological detection and identification will in any case constitute a fundamental element of such a system. Therefore, the Netherlands Delegation attaches great importance to the implementation and follow-up of the General Assembly Resolution on a world-wide exchange of seismological data.

It remains of the opinion that the question of a cut-off of the production of fissile materials for military purposes should be examined more closely by the Committee (CCD/PV.432).

9. The Netherlands Delegation shares the view of the Italian Delegation as expressed in documents ENDC/245 and ENDC/263 that pending final results of the bilateral talks on vertical non-proliferation new and continued efforts should be made to prevent horizontal proliferation. During this session of the Committee the curtain on the Disarmament Decade could be raised by reaching agreement on the final text of a treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof.

10. Measures of non-disarmament and arms limitation certainly contribute to the creation of a climate of mutual confidence, which may pave the way to reach the final objective of general and complete disarmament. But apart from being an aid to "confidence-building", such measures have, of course, also an intrinsic merit of their own. They should not be limited to the nuclear field.

Much time of this Committee will certainly be devoted to the conclusion of new agreements regarding chemical and biological warfare.

Within the framework of the Disarmament Decade, efforts should also be made to reduce and eliminate conventional arms races. In this respect attention should be paid to the increasing build-up of arsenals and to the international trade in conventional armaments. The S.I.P.R.I. Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament gives an alarming picture of the dangers involved.
11. Finally, with regard to the third category mentioned in paragraph 6, it would appear that concrete negotiations on real disarmament measures only start fruitfully, when the preparatory phase of partial measures and confidence building has been sufficiently successful.

This, however, does not exclude that during the preparatory phase attention be devoted to the problems of general and complete disarmament. In this respect the joint statement of agreed principles still serves its purpose of being a guideline for the disarmament process as a whole. Nevertheless, as suggested by the Italian Delegation in ENDC/245, it might be considered whether this statement could be suitably supplemented. In the opinion of the Netherlands Delegation this should preferably be done in the form of an additional formulation rather than as a restatement of those principles, thus leaving the standing and validity of the joint declaration of 1961 itself intact.

12. The implementation of a comprehensive programme in the field of arms control and disarmament is closely linked with further developments and progress in the overall political world situation. The three cornerstones are: Disarmament, International Security and Peace.

During our last session several delegations referred to United Nations General Assembly resolution 2454 (XXIII) requesting this Committee to renew its effort to make progress toward general and complete disarmament. The Netherlands Delegation is of the opinion that during the preliminary phase studies could take place on the question of general and complete disarmament. The Indian Delegation (ENDC/PV.404) called on the United States and the USSR to submit revised versions of their draft treaties concerning general and complete disarmament. The Polish Delegation (ENDC/PV.406) proposed more specifically that the two Co-Chairmen prepare a new draft for the first stage of disarmament. An alternative approach might also be considered by the Committee, namely to start with an examination of the characteristics and requirements of the final stage of a process of general and complete disarmament. On the basis of such a study it could be tried subsequently to trace out a route along which this final stage can be reached. A similar method was proposed by the Swedish Delegation as far back as 1964 (ENDC/PV.202). Perhaps it could offer the advantage of getting a better insight in the political requirements and structural needs of a disarming world.
13. The consideration of a comprehensive programme inevitably raises the questions of priorities and deadlines. In this connexion reference should be made to the proposal of Sweden (ENDC/PV was) for "balanced package deals" and of India for a "selective approach" (ENDC/PV.404).

It is, of course, in the nature of things, when there is a whole range of topics, to establish some sort of order of priorities. However, in the opinion of the Netherlands delegation such a list can only be of a very tentative character. It should be flexible and may be subject to change - as has already been shown in the past - in as much as the political realities of the moment require. One should not overlook that the "partial measures" which have been adopted or are now under discussion, are, in fact, elements of different stages of the proposals for general and complete disarmament.

The very character of negotiations on arms control and disarmament is ill suited to set any meaningful timetables in the context of a "Decade". It remains to be seen what the net result will be at the end of the ten year period. No amount of pressure, nor the best efforts of the Committee to meet certain "target" dates can alter that fact. It is unlikely that a precise schedule and fixed time spans would be helpful in achieving the very goal we are trying to reach. It would therefore be undesirable to establish too rigid a programme of work or to assume that it will be possible strictly to adhere to any particular pattern.

Of course, it is a quite different matter to agree on a certain sequence of measures, to be carried out within specified periods of time, in a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament.
The Italian delegation considers that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should increase its efforts to give effect to resolution 2602 E concerning the question of general and complete disarmament adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its twenty-fourth session.

The part of that resolution which seems to us most faithfully to reflect the arguments presented in the United Nations by a large number of countries wishing to give a fresh impetus to the disarmament negotiations is to be found in paragraph 4 of the operative part.

The instructions given in that paragraph are closely related to the proposals for the preparation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament submitted by Italy at Geneva at the two preceding sessions of the Conference (see Working Papers ENDC/245 of 21 April 1969 and ENDC/263 of 23 August 1969).

With a view to facilitating the opening of a highly desirable discussion on this comprehensive programme of disarmament, the Italian delegation, as members of the Conference are aware, has at the present session taken the initiative of organizing contacts with a number of other interested delegations with the idea of engaging in exchanges of view such as may give rise to a basic plan for possible subsequent discussion by the Conference.

The Italian delegation has already described, in its statement of 2 July 1970, the nature and characteristics of the outline which was jointly prepared, and which is reproduced below.

"Preliminary considerations representing, in general terms, the views of a number of delegations with which the delegation of Italy has been in consultation.

A. Goal, principles and mandates

United Nations General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) of 20 November 1959 and the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles of 20 September 1961 (ENDC/5), endorsed by United Nations General Assembly resolution 1722 (XVI), represent the basis for disarmament negotiations and for new efforts towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Draft treaties on general and complete disarmament were presented in 1962 by the Soviet Union (ENDC/2/Rev.1) and the United States (ENDC/30 and Add.1-3). Several countries suggested that these draft treaties could be revised and brought up to date.

CCD/309, 19 August 1970
United Nations General Resolution 2602 E (XXIV) of 16 December 1969 requests the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: "... to work out ... a comprehensive programme, dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control, which would provide the Conference with a guideline to chart the course of its further work and its negotiations ..." (CD/275).

Both in the Agreed Principles and in resolution 2602 E (XXIV) it is recognized that negotiations should continue with a view to reaching agreements on partial or collateral measures, facilitating and forming part of a programme of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

B. Main elements of the programme

Progress in disarmament is not an isolated matter but is intimately connected with and influenced by problems of international peace and security and the peaceful settlement of disputes.

In order to establish the international climate of confidence and good will necessary for progress, specific measures to build up confidence should urgently be agreed upon, including special studies on certain subjects.

While progress is being made to build up confidence, the States members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should engage themselves to negotiate meaningful measures to prevent and limit armament as well as measures of disarmament, taking into account, inter alia, the special studies mentioned above.

In the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control through measures to prevent and limit armament as well as through measures of disarmament, there should be a balance among these categories of measures.

C. Phases of the programme

The need for flexibility has been generally recognized. The highest priority should be accorded to measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and for nuclear disarmament. Taking into account the Agreed Principles and the United Nations General Assembly resolutions mentioned above, and further taking into account agreements already achieved on collateral measures, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should envisage dealing in successive phases with the main elements mentioned under the second paragraph. An attempt should be made to decide upon these various phases and to outline the possible content of each phase.

A review of the programme of disarmament could take place each year in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly.

D. General considerations

Various problems closely related to disarmament negotiations would have to be examined. The following points were tentatively singled out for further discussion and elaboration: priorities, balance, verification, regional arrangements, universal participation, public opinion and methods of work.
The Italian delegation considers that this document should be exhaustively discussed by the Conference, and it wishes that all delegations would contribute to the consideration of the problem dealt with. For its part, and to facilitate the development of the ideas summarily expressed in the text, we should like to present our observations on some main points and, in particular, on Section B, entitled "Main elements of the programme".

In our opinion, the Conference should adopt a programme to guide its work and future negotiations, as recommended by the above-mentioned General Assembly resolution. The programme, in the preparation of which all governments members of the Conference should participate, might include the items indicated in the text prepared by the interested delegations. These items come under Section B and may be summarized as follows:

- measures for increasing international confidence;
- studies on particular points;
- measures to prevent and limit armament;
- disarmament measures;
- general and complete disarmament.

Each of the items in this list might provide the basis for the subsequent more thorough consideration which is necessary for establishing the programme.

(1) Measures for increasing international confidence

The development of the international situation and the improvement of confidence among States will obviously have a direct and favourable effect on the work of the Conference. The Conference should and can, however, contribute to the increase in international confidence by adopting a programme of work defining its undertakings and aims.

(2) Studies

The Italian delegation believes that, with a view to helping to create favourable conditions for negotiations, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament might now initiate programmes of studies relating to the question of the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments. Negotiations might also benefit from a preliminary work which would provide necessary clarification of certain important aspects of that question.
In connexion with the above programmes, the Conference might in particular examine the following points in depth:

(a) Relationship between nuclear disarmament and the beginning of reductions in conventional means of warfare;

(b) Determination of the geographical areas within which the first reductions in conventional means of warfare would take place. In other words, the Conference should address itself to the question whether the first "round" of reductions affecting armed forces and conventional armaments should be global in scope and apply to all States without distinction or whether it should initially apply only to some States. In the latter case, it would be necessary to study the criteria to be used for determining the States to which this first "round" of reductions would apply. Such States might be the principal world military Powers, or they might be States determined on the basis of a criterion that provides for the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in a particular regional context. Before negotiations began, it would be necessary to clarify this important question of principle, for it is on the answer to this question that the political dimensions of the problem will depend. The nature of the negotiations would vary in more than one respect depending on whether the reductions to be negotiated applied to more or less numerous States and whether those reductions would be partial or global. (It should be noted, by the way, that the United States draft treaty on general and complete disarmament provided that the first phase of the reductions would be applicable only to some of the States parties to the treaty);

(c) Elaboration of technical criteria necessary for the implementation of reductions (categories of armaments to be reduced, levels, initial declarations, unit of measurement to be used in reductions, extent of reductions, creation of a disarmament organization, verifications, etc.);

(d) Relationship between armament reductions and controls.

(3) Measures to prevent and limit armament

This concerns mainly the "collateral" measures to which the Conference has devoted most of its efforts since the start of the discussions concerning the two draft treaties on general and complete disarmament of 1962. Negotiations on these collateral measures were moreover envisaged in paragraph 8 of the USSR-United States Joint Statement of 1961. In spite of the fact that the procedure of negotiating collateral measures has caused certain imbalances which are not insignificant, it
has had positive results, as is shown by the conclusion of some important international agreements. These collateral measures have, in addition, made another positive contribution: that of reviving hope for the resumption of discussions on general and complete disarmament. Nevertheless, the Italian delegation feels that the Conference should make a maximum effort to pursue negotiations on measures designed to prevent and limit armament. Among such measures, and apart from those which are now the subject of active negotiations (denuclearization of the sea-bed and ocean floor, and prohibition of chemical and biological weapons), the most important and most urgent are the following: cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes, and agreement on the total prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. In the opinion of the Italian delegation, the Conference, in adopting its programme of work, should expressly confirm the fact that it is giving priority to negotiations relating to these two measures so necessary to the cessation of the nuclear arms race.

(4) Disarmament measures

The Italian delegation would like to reaffirm that the raison d'être of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is to negotiate disarmament measures, i.e. effective reductions of armed force and armaments. Such negotiations must begin as soon as possible. They could obviously be facilitated by the creation of an international climate of increased confidence and by the completion of the studies referred to above. Although it would be difficult to fix a precise time-limit for the start of these negotiations, we feel that it would be extremely useful if a specific commitment on the subject were assumed now. This would have the important result of reassuring public opinion, which is demanding more effective action by the CCD on disarmament. Such a commitment would be an incentive to Governments to take the necessary decisions, an incentive that would be strengthened if the commitment were assumed collectively by the States members of the Committee on Disarmament, which is the competent body for disarmament negotiations.

Accordingly, at the time it adopts its own programme, the CCD should - in the opinion of the Italian delegation - give expression to the commitment of its States members to open negotiations on a first "round" of reductions of armed forces and armaments. This would better ensure a balance among the various categories: preventive, limitative and effective measures of disarmament.

(5) General and complete disarmament

General and complete disarmament is the final goal of all CCD negotiations; and that has recently been confirmed by General Assembly resolution 2602 E. Consequently, a re-examination of general and complete disarmament plans by the CCD, as suggested by
some delegations, should reflect the will of the States members of the CCD to pursue that objective. So far as the Italian delegation is concerned, it believes that it will be necessary for the CCD to bear in mind past experience so as to be able to resume the discussion on new bases. With that in view, and taking as its point of departure the USSR-United States General Statement of Agreed Principles of 20 September 1961, the CCD might adopt a more articulated directive for the elaboration of a "programme" in line with that joint statement. A single treaty could hardly govern the implementation of the process of disarmament in all its phases. The programme should therefore serve as an overall agreement whose purpose would be to lay down in broad outline the approach to general and complete disarmament: it might envisage the conclusion of a series of treaties or agreements relating to the various phases of effective implementation of disarmament. This would avoid the rigidity inherent in a single treaty and the difficulty of discussing problems which are not ready for negotiation. At the same time, it would maintain the concept of a prior commitment with respect to the evolution of the whole process, in its successive phases.

As regards the nature of the programme which the CCD should adopt, the Italian delegation feels that it should be both a programme of work and a commitment: a programme of work with respect to negotiations on the categories of measures being examined and to the suggested studies on international disarmament, and a commitment to open negotiations on a first round of reductions of armed force and armaments.

Finally, as to the form of the programme, we might consider, among other solutions, a joint statement of the Governments members of the CCD or, more simply, the adoption by the CCD of its own programme of work.
8. Resolution on disarmament, adopted at the Third Non-Aligned Summit Conference, Lusaka, 8-10 September 1970

1. Conscious of the threat to mankind posed by the ever-spreading arms race, especially in view of the existing large stockpiles of and impending new qualitative advance in the ever more devastating nature of nuclear armaments, the Heads of State or Government reaffirm their conviction, expressed at the Belgrade and Cairo Summit Conferences of Non-Aligned countries, that general and complete disarmament under effective international control is the most imperative and urgent need of the international community today.

2. The Conference welcomes the designation of the 1970’s as the »Disarmament Decade«. The participating countries are determined to spare no efforts with a view to ensuring the success of the Disarmament Decade. They will cooperate closely among themselves and with other like-minded countries to help in the drawing-up of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. The Conference is of the opinion that the following general order of priorities should be followed in drawing-up this programme:

(i) Measures in the field of nuclear disarmament, such as a cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes and its transfer to peaceful uses, a stoppage of the production of nuclear weapons, a comprehensive test ban, reduction and destruction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons;

(ii) Other measures of priority in the disarmament field, such as an agreement prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of Chemical and Biological (Bacteriological) weapons and their elimination from the arsenals of all nations, etc.;

(iii) Non-arms or confidence-building measures, such as a convention on the non-use of nuclear weapons, demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor beyond an agreed limit, the establishment of nuclear free zones, etc.

3. The participating States feel that it may be useful to convene a World Disarmament Conference at an appropriate time open for participation to all States.

4. An essential confidence-building measure for ensuring progress in the field of disarmament is a firm commitment assumed through an international agreement, binding and universal in character, not to resort to force and not to interfere in any manner whatsoever and under any circumstances in the internal affairs of other States.

5. The Conference is aware of the tremendous contribution which the technology of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including peaceful nuclear explosions, can make to the economy of the developing world. It is of the opinion that the benefits of this technology should be available to all States without any discrimination.

6. The Conference notes the conclusion of the Treaty on Principle Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, and the Agreement on the Return of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects launched into Outer Space. The participating countries declare that the Outer Space should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. They deplore the fact that, despite repeated directives of the UN General Assembly, the Convention on the liability for damage caused by objects launched into outer space has not been finalised so far, and call upon all States, in particular the Space powers, to co-operate in facilitating early agreement in this connection.

# A/SPC/L.181.
9. Comprehensive programme of disarmament submitted by Ireland, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Sweden and Yugoslavia

INTRODUCTION

The present comprehensive programme of disarmament has been elaborated in compliance with the request made by the General Assembly in resolution 2602 E (XXIV) approved on 16 December 1969, by which it declared the decade of the 1970s as a Disarmament Decade.

In the light of the contents of that resolution it would seem fully justified to state that the request of the General Assembly implies that the comprehensive programme of disarmament should embrace not only the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament but all negotiations and other acts on this matter, in whatever forum and form they may take place, and that the programme should include effective procedures in order to facilitate the co-ordination of such activities and ensure that the United Nations General Assembly be kept informed on their progress so as to permit it the proper performance of its functions, including the constant evaluation of the situation.

It seems advisable to point out that the term "disarmament" is used here in the same manner as it has been in the various forums of the United Nations, that is, as a generic term which encompasses and may designate any type of measures relating to the matter, whether they are measures for the prevention, the limitation, the reduction or the elimination of armaments, or the reduction of military forces.

I. OBJECTIVE

The aim of the comprehensive programme is to achieve tangible progress in order that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control may become a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail, and economic and social progress are attained.

II. PRINCIPLES

1. The measures in the comprehensive programme should be carried out in accordance with the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament

Negotiations of September 1961, taking into account the obligations undertaken in various treaties on disarmament and the relevant resolutions of the United Nations, and all new elements and possibilities in this area.

2. The highest priority should be given to disarmament measures dealing with nuclear and chemical and biological weapons.

3. The problem of general and complete disarmament should be given intensive treatment, parallel to the negotiations of partial disarmament measures, including measures to prevent and limit armaments and measures to reduce armaments, in order to facilitate further clarification of positions and possibilities, including the revision and updating of the existing draft treaties submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America respectively, or the submission of new proposals.

4. The principle of balanced disarmament should be kept in mind. It concerns both a numerical decrease of men in arms and types of arms to prefixed levels, and packages of disarmament measures by which an over-all balance is achieved that is judged by all parties to be satisfactory in the light of their own security. Particular efforts will have to be undertaken by militarily important Powers in order to reduce the gap that exists between them and other countries. It is understood that the final solution of the limitation and reduction of conventional armaments can only be obtained within the framework of general and complete disarmament.

5. Verification methods form an indispensable part of disarmament measures. When elaborating such methods it must be recognized that a 100 per cent certainty can never be obtained by any such system. A single method of control is rarely sufficient. As a rule, a combination of several methods should be employed, mutually reinforcing one another in order to achieve the necessary assurances that a certain disarmament measure is being observed by all parties.

6. The comprehensive programme is correlated with other United Nations programmes for peace-keeping and international security. Progress in the former should not, however, be made dependent on progress in the latter and vice versa.

7. The necessity should be kept in mind of avoiding, when concluding disarmament agreements, any adverse effects on the scientific, technological or economic future of nations.
8. A substantial portion of the savings derived from measures in the field of disarmament should be devoted to promoting economic and social development, particularly in the developing countries.

9. In disarmament agreements every effort should be made not to prejudge or prejudice juridical or other unresolved issues in any outside field.

10. Concerted efforts should be made to associate militarily significant States, in particular all nuclear-weapon Powers, with the negotiations for disarmament.

11. The United Nations, which has specific responsibility for disarmament under the Charter, should be kept informed of all efforts thereon, whether unilateral, bilateral or multilateral.

12. Public opinion should be given adequate information about armament and disarmament, so that it might bring its influence to bear on the strengthening of disarmament efforts.

III. ELEMENTS AND PHASES OF THE PROGRAMME

A. Disarmament treaties in force or in preparation

1. The results achieved so far in the disarmament field and the agreements anticipated for the immediate future consist of partial or collateral measures, facilitating and forming part of the final aim of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Such results consist mainly of the following treaties:

   (a) The Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare of 1925;

   (b) The Antarctic Treaty of 1959;

   (c) The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water of 1963;

   (d) The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space of 1967;

   (e) The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and its two additional Protocols of 1967;

   (f) The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1968.
particular attention should be paid to the fulfilment of the obligations arising from these treaties, to the review conference provided for in some of them, and, when that is the case, to the adoption of measures intended to complete them.

2. Efforts and negotiations to reach agreement at an early stage of the Disarmament Decade on treaties and conventions whose contents have been for some time under consideration by the General Assembly, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and other competent international forums should be urgently intensified. This work has included consideration of:

(a) The prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons and the destruction of existing stocks of such weapons;

(b) Further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof; and

(c) The ban on underground nuclear-weapon tests.

B. Other measures of disarmament

1. Prevention and limitation of armaments

The possibilities of giving effect as soon as possible to the measures specified below should be the object of persistent scrutiny and negotiation.

(a) Nuclear weapons

(i) A moratorium or, cessation of testing and deploying new strategic nuclear-weapon systems;

(ii) The cessation of production of fissionable material for military purposes and the transfer of existing stocks to civilian uses;

(iii) A freeze or limitation on the deployment of all types of nuclear weapons;

(iv) The conclusion of regional agreements for the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon free-zones;

(v) A solution of the problem concerning the prohibition of the use of, or the threat to use, nuclear weapons.
(b) Conventional armaments and armed forces

(i) Further prohibitions of the use for military purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof;

(ii) The establishment of ceilings on the level and types of conventional armaments and the number of armed forces;

(iii) Restrictions on the creation of foreign military bases and the stationing of troops and military equipment in foreign territories;

(iv) Convening of regional conferences at the initiative of the States of the region for the prevention and limitation of armaments.

2. Reduction of all armaments, armed forces and military expenditures

At the appropriate stage in the disarmament negotiations, ways and means of carrying out the following measures should be thoroughly explored and actively negotiated:

(a) Gradual reductions in nuclear armaments;

(b) Gradual reductions in conventional armaments and armed forces;

(c) The conclusion of regional non-aggression, security and disarmament treaties at the initiative of the States concerned;

(d) Gradual withdrawal of troops and bases from foreign territories;

(e) Reduction in military expenditures.

3. Elimination of armaments

In accordance with the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations of 1961, the final stage of the comprehensive programme should be the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control, providing for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons and the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces to levels required for the maintenance of internal order and for international peace-keeping.

IV. PEACE-KEEPING AND SECURITY

1. It is recognized that there is a close interrelationship among disarmament, international security, the peaceful settlement of disputes and a climate of confidence.
2. During the period of the negotiations for the disarmament measures listed above, there should be parallel negotiations in the appropriate forums for the establishment or development of United Nations peace-making and peace-keeping machinery and procedures in order to increase and ensure the maintenance of international peace and security.

3. Agreement on such measures will facilitate the success of disarmament efforts, just as the adoption of disarmament measures will create favourable conditions for the strengthening of international security. Nevertheless, as has already been pointed out above, progress in one of these categories of measures should not be made dependent on progress in the other, and vice versa.

V. PROCEDURE

1. The General Assembly should consider annually the progress made in the implementation of the comprehensive programme. Every three years, the General Assembly should review the comprehensive programme and revise it as warranted. This will entail an evaluation of the overall situation in the field of disarmament and a comparison between the development in regard to armaments and disarmament. The United Nations Disarmament Commission might be reactivated and entrusted with a part of this task.

2. The practice of requesting the Secretary-General to prepare, with the assistance of expert consultants, authoritative studies on concrete questions relating to the arms race and disarmament should be continued.

3. The advisability of carrying out studies by qualified groups of experts on specific problems of disarmament, which warrant it, should be carefully explored in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

4. There should be more conferences and scientific exchanges among scientists and experts from various countries on the problem of the arms race and disarmament.

5. Universities and academic institutes should be encouraged to establish continuing courses and seminars to study problems of the arms race, military expenditures and disarmament.

6. The increased exchanges and publications of relevant information and data should lead to greater openness, to the establishment of greater confidence among States and increased knowledge and interest in these matters among the public.

7. The feasibility of convening, in due time and after appropriate preparatory work, a world disarmament conference of all States should be thoroughly studied.
10. Document on confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament, Questions relating to disarmament, Final Act adopted at the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1 August 1975, Helsinki

II

Questions relating to disarmament

The participating States recognize the interest of all of them in efforts aimed at lessening military confrontation and promoting disarmament which are designed to complement political détente in Europe and to strengthen their security. They are convinced of the necessity to take effective measures in these fields which by their scope and by their nature constitute steps towards the ultimate achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, and which should result in strengthening peace and security throughout the world.
11. Political declaration (Chapter XVII), adopted at the Fifth Non-Aligned Summit Conference, Colombo, 16-19 August 1976

XVII. DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY

135. The Conference expressed its conviction that universal peace and security can be assured only by general and complete disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament, under effective international control and that essential measures to that end should include the complete cessation of all nuclear weapon tests pending, the conclusion of a test ban treaty, an unequivocal renunciation of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons as well as chemical, bacteriological and other weapons of mass destruction and the elimination of arsenals of all such weapons.

136. The Conference declared that the arms race is inconsistent with efforts aimed at achieving the New International Economic Order in view of the urgent need to divert the resources utilised for the acceleration of the arms race towards socio-economic development, particularly of the developing countries.

137. The Conference urged all states to accelerate negotiations, with a view to securing, as rapidly as possible and within the context of the Diplomatic Conference which will hold a meeting in Geneva next year, the prohibition of certain conventional weapons of an indiscriminate or cruel nature, particularly the prohibition of the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons.

138. The Conference reiterated the urgent need to adopt effective measures leading to the convening of a World Disarmament Conference.

139. The Conference also recommended in the meantime, that Members of the Non-Aligned movement request the holding of a Special Session of the General Assembly as early as possible and not later than 1978. The Agenda of the Special Session should include:
   a. a review of the problem of disarmament,
   b. the promotion and elaboration of a programme of priorities and recommendations in the field of disarmament,
   c. the question of convening a World Disarmament Conference.

140. The Conference emphasized the necessity to strengthen international peace and security and ratified their firm decision to reinforce solidarity and mutual assistance among the Non-Aligned Countries in order to confront more effectively threats, pressures, aggressions and other political or economic actions directed against them by imperialism.

141. In this sense, the Conference recalled that Resolution No. 3 concerning economic security and collective action adopted at the 4th Summit Conference in Algiers remains fully in force, as do the measures indicated in the strategy of the Lima Programme, whose aim is to guarantee full exercise of their sovereignty and independent development processes particularly in the case of aggressions, pressures or coercion.

*/ A/31/197, 8 September 1976.
12. Memorandum on questions of ending the arms race and disarmament submitted by the Soviet Union

Under the new historic conditions in which international détente is making itself felt to an ever-greater degree and people everywhere entertain increasing hopes for the establishment of lasting peace, the Soviet Union, guided by the foreign policy programme of the 25th Congress of the CPSU, renews its appeal to all States Members of the United Nations, to all the States of the world, to redouble their efforts towards solving the problem which is greatest in scope and significance in contemporary relations among States - the problem of ending the arms race and disarmament.

No task confronting mankind today is more urgent. "Today, this objective is more vital than ever", declared L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. "Mankind is tired of sitting upon mountains of arms, yet the arms race, spurred on by aggressive imperialist circles, is becoming more intensive."

An arms race in the nuclear age is fraught with a far more serious threat to the life of the peoples than at any time in the past. Modern weapons are thousands of times more powerful than any of those used in wars of earlier periods. The destruction of Hiroshima - the first victim of the use of nuclear weapons - lives in the memory of the peoples as a horrible tragedy. But nowadays States possess such types of these weapons and possess them in such quantities that hundreds, and even thousands, of cities like Hiroshima could be destroyed. One modern nuclear warhead has a destructive power exceeding that of all explosives used by States in the Second World War. Yet weapons of mass destruction continue to develop, absorbing the latest achievements of the scientific and technological revolution, and they are ever growing in quantity.

It is an utterly false concept which justifies the arms race by alleging that the "balance of fear" is indeed a safeguard for peace. An official report by United Nations experts, world famous scholars, admits with full justice that each new step in the development of weapons of mass destruction entails a new and still more ominous degree of uncertainty and increased danger. The arms race provides security for no one.

Another thing is also obvious. If the arms race is not stopped, it will inevitably set up a barrier to the strengthening of political détente in relations between States. This is why an increasing number of States recognize the need for supplementing political détente with efforts towards reducing military confrontation and facilitating disarmament. The States that participated in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe unanimously came out in favour of such a policy.

The arms race is inconsistent with the interests and the will of the peoples. Only the militarists and the military-industrial complex stand to gain from it. The arms race consumes the vital resources of countries and deprives the peoples of a considerable and ever-growing proportion of the wealth created by their labour.

"/ A/31/232, 28 September 1976. Letter dated 28 September 1976 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the Secretary-General under the General Assembly item entitled "General and Complete Disarmament".
According to United Nations data, the world as a whole now spends about $300 billion a year on armaments, i.e., $1 million every two minutes. This considerably exceeds the entire national income of the developing countries of Asia and Africa. In the modern world, it costs on the average 60 times less to educate a child for creative endeavour than to teach a soldier the ABC's of destruction. And more and more States are being drawn into the arms race.

The continuance of the arms race hampers the solution of such urgent problems common to all mankind as the development of essentially new sources of energy, extensive exploration and use of the oceans and outer space, prevention of disastrous changes in the environment, and the eradication of disease, hunger and cultural backwardness. For all this to be done, enormous investments are needed, and it is impossible to mobilize sufficient resources without putting an end to the competition in armaments.

Thus, the problem confronting mankind today is as follows: either the arms race will be stopped and States will embark on disarmament, reducing step by step the threat of military conflict and releasing more and more material and intellectual resources for the purposes of economic and social development, or the gigantic war-preparations machine will consume an ever-greater amount of resources vitally needed by people, while the shadow of the catastrophe of war will loom larger and larger over all nations.

For any State desirous of safeguarding the security of its people and of creating the most favourable opportunities for their advancement along the road of progress, for any politician conscious of his responsibility for world developments, and for any sensible person, there can only be one alternative: to do everything that can be done to bring about disarmament and the cessation of the arms race. This is not a simple task, for in working out any measure in the field of disarmament, States have to take decisions on matters having a direct bearing on their national security and must carefully weigh the various political, strategic, technological and military factors. However, it is well known that the failure to put an end to the arms race is not due to these difficulties.

The main obstacle is the resistance of the forces of imperialism. This obstacle finds its principal support in monopolistic quarters for which the arms race brings in thousands of millions of dollars in profits. Another obstacle is the cold-war policy of political parties and groups which will not abandon their foolhardy designs to resolve the historical confrontation of the two social systems by force. Also desirous of impeding the resolution of disarmament problems are those who cynically assert that mankind's future can most easily be built on radioactive ruins, who, in pursuit of the narrow objectives of their great-Power policy, which are alien to the interests of the peoples, are ready to doom even their own people to mass annihilation in another world war.

These forces would not stop at any means of deception in the attempt to complicate the question of the cessation of the arms race and to hamper the struggle of the peoples for disarmament. These include shameless slander directed at the policies of States advocating disarmament, and specious reasoning about the lust for power inherent in man and about human rights and fundamental freedoms, with the aim of covering up the most inhuman and brutal activity of all—the manufacture of weapons for the annihilation of people.
However, there is not, nor can there be, any doubt about the real possibility of overcoming the opposition of the opponents of disarmament. In these, our times, the alignment of forces in international politics is not at all in their favour. The socialist States, whose social and political character rules out any kind of interest in war and armaments, are resolutely and persistently striving to bring about the cessation of the arms race. The non-aligned movement is also in favour of disarmament. Statesmen and politicians of widely differing countries throughout the world are becoming more keenly aware of the fact that in the nuclear age a military conflict is fraught with exceedingly grave consequences and that the interests of security demand the curbing of the arms race and not its further intensification. The voice of public opinion is becoming louder and more confident in demanding the early adoption of effective measures to this end.

The possibility of solving the disarmament problem has been convincingly demonstrated by the fact that in recent years certain steps of this kind have indeed been taken. Although these are but first steps and are limited in scope, they are of great importance.

These are the Soviet-United States agreements for preventing nuclear war and reducing the risk of its accidental outbreak and for the limitation of strategic arms, as well as the agreement between the Soviet Union and France on the prevention of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons.

These are the measures for limiting the nuclear arms race, including the treaties on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water; on the limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests; on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; and on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons in outer space, on celestial bodies, on the sea-bed and the ocean floor. Talks are now in progress on a long-term Soviet-United States agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms, and the successful completion of these talks would be a major new contribution to the consolidation of international peace and security.

These are also the international convention on the prohibition of the development and production and the destruction of stockpiles of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons, which is already in force, and the convention on the prohibition of military and any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques, the discussions on which are nearing completion.

And, finally, these are the efforts being made to ease military confrontation in different parts of the world. Of special importance in this connexion are, unquestionably, the negotiations now going on regarding the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe, the area where the most powerful groups of NATO and Warsaw Treaty armed forces are concentrated. Having recently advanced new proposals aimed at moving these negotiations forward, the participating socialist countries are now expecting reciprocal steps from their counterparts.
The Soviet Union's proposal for the conclusion of a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations is now getting broad support. The purpose of this initiative is, through the joint effort of States, to make the principle of the non-use of force embodied in the United Nations Charter an integral part of the practical policies of States and an effective rule of international life. The use of both nuclear and conventional weapons should be completely excluded from relations between States.

Thus, at the present time new prerequisites, both political and material, for more resolute progress towards ending the arms race and towards disarmament are now taking shape. In the past, including the years preceding the Second World War and the first post-war decades, such prerequisites did not exist. They do exist now. It is the duty of all States to make the utmost use of them in the interests of international peace and security and in the interest of the peoples.

The Soviet Union is prepared, as it has been in the past, to conduct negotiations on the most radical disarmament measures, going even so far as general and complete disarmament. It is prepared, in concert with its Warsaw Treaty allies, to take steps for the reciprocal dismantling of counterbalancing military-political groupings of States or, to begin with, of their military organizations.

If not all parties are prepared to set about realizing these objectives at once, they should do so gradually, step by step. What is most important is to move from discussions on ending the arms race to practical action.

An analysis of the present world political and strategic situation, of the trends and prospects for the future and of the material and technological factors determining the nature and form of the arms race leads to the conclusion that under present conditions the main areas for co-ordinated action by States in the field of disarmament are the following.

1. Cessation of the nuclear arms race, reduction and subsequent elimination of nuclear weapons

In a situation in which nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind, complete nuclear disarmament becomes the most important measure.

The Soviet Union has always favoured the banning of nuclear weapons and their exclusion from the arsenals of States. It worked for this when nuclear weapons had just appeared. At that time the stockpiles of such weapons were not large and it was relatively easier to agree on their prohibition and elimination. Now that nuclear weapons have grown into a huge complex of types and systems of means of destruction, diverse in purpose, capacity and ways of delivering nuclear charges to the target, the problem of eliminating them has become much more difficult. But it can be solved in the present situation as well.
The first thing necessary for this purpose is to stop the arms race, that is, to stop manufacturing nuclear weapons, equipping the armed forces of States with them, developing and constructing new models and types of such weapons. At the same time, or immediately after that, reductions in the stockpiles of nuclear weapons should commence, with the transfer of nuclear materials thus released to peaceful sectors of the economy. The ultimate goal of the reduction should be the complete elimination of all types of nuclear weapons - strategic and tactical, offensive and defensive. Along with the reduction of stockpiles of nuclear charges, warheads and bombs, there should be a reduction of their means of delivery.

Naturally, simultaneously with nuclear disarmament, measures should be taken for the limitation and reduction of the armed forces of States and armaments of conventional types, which also pose a considerable threat to the world's peoples.

It is evident that nuclear disarmament can be achieved only if all States possessing nuclear weapons take part in it. It is inconceivable that some nuclear Powers should be moving ahead towards eliminating their nuclear weapons while others are stockpiling and perfecting them. Therefore all nuclear Powers should participate in nuclear disarmament negotiations. As for the Soviet Union, it is prepared, as has been already stated by the Soviet side, to sit down at any time at the negotiating table together with all the other nuclear Powers for a comprehensive discussion of the nuclear disarmament problem in its full scope and for a joint elaboration of concrete ways of its practical solution. The Soviet Union has no objection to non-nuclear Powers also taking part in such negotiations, since all countries and all the peoples of the world are interested in nuclear disarmament.

2. Prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests

An important issue, on the solution of which the cessation of the arms race largely depends, is the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests. This problem should be tackled without waiting for the outcome of negotiations on complete nuclear disarmament.

The prohibition of all tests of nuclear weapons will put an end to their qualitative improvement and prevent the emergence of new types of such weapons. The Moscow Treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water and the treaty between the USSR and the United States on the limitation of underground tests have only partly solved this problem. Furthermore, two nuclear Powers out of five have not acceded to the Moscow Treaty, and one of them, China, still continues to carry out nuclear test explosions in the atmosphere.
The time has now come to bring the task of stopping nuclear-weapon tests to a conclusion. Conditions are quite ripe for that, in particular as a result of the signing between the USSR and the United States of a treaty on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, establishing such a procedure for carrying out peaceful explosions as will preclude their use for perfecting nuclear weapons.

As is known, in 1975 the Soviet Union proposed the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, that is, a treaty prohibiting the conduct of nuclear test explosions in all environments and by all States. The draft of such a treaty was submitted by the Soviet Union to the United Nations at that time, and a year has already passed since the General Assembly declared itself in favour of holding concrete negotiations to reach agreement on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. However, owing to the negative stand taken by some nuclear Powers, such negotiations have not started. It is necessary to begin them promptly.

It is a known fact that the question of stopping underground nuclear tests was complicated by certain States which artifically exaggerated the problem of supervision. It was persistently alleged, in particular, that it was impossible without on-site inspections to tell natural seismic phenomena (earthquakes) from similar phenomena caused by underground nuclear explosions, and that therefore, it was impossible to verify whether States were complying with their obligations with regard to the prohibition of underground nuclear-weapon tests. Most experts never accepted that view, believing that national technical means and the international exchange of seismic data were sufficient to verify compliance with a treaty banning underground nuclear-weapon tests. With the development of technology for detecting and identifying seismic phenomena, this view now enjoys practically unanimous support among scientists. However, even now some States suggest providing for the possibility of on-site inspection of actual circumstances if there is doubt as to compliance with obligations to stop underground nuclear tests.

The Soviet Union is convinced that no particular difficulties should arise in elaborating such a compromise basis for an agreement as would ensure a voluntary framework for taking decisions relating to on-site ascertaining of relevant circumstances and, at the same time, impart confidence to all parties to the treaty that the obligations are complied with. The Soviet Union stands ready to participate in a search for a universally acceptable understanding on this basis.
3. Consolidation of the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

It is quite clear that the threat of nuclear war would immeasurably increase if other States which at present do not possess nuclear weapons were to become involved in the process of developing and stockpiling such weapons. It is not difficult to imagine the consequences that would be brought about by the development of a situation in which the arsenals of parties in conflict in one region or another included nuclear weapons as well.

Hence the effective prevention of a further spread of nuclear weapons is essential. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to which about 100 States have become parties, has achieved a great deal in this regard. The obligation to renounce the proliferation of nuclear weapons is now a rule of international law.

It must, however, be taken into account that not all nuclear Powers have yet become parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Some non-nuclear States which are capable, in view of their industrial and technological level, of developing nuclear weapons of their own are also refusing to become parties to it. It is important, therefore, to make the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons genuinely universal. The Soviet Union supports all the decisions adopted in this respect by the United Nations.

In the interests of consolidating the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons it is also necessary to take actions of another kind. It is well known that in the process of their operation nuclear power plants produce and accumulate as a by-product a fissionable material - plutonium - which can be used for manufacturing nuclear weapons. With the development of international trade in nuclear materials, equipment and technology, possibilities of this kind will increase, including those of the States which have not assumed obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It is obvious that the States which supply nuclear materials, equipment and technology bear special responsibility in this connexion. Strict safeguards are needed to prevent international co-operation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy from becoming a channel for spreading nuclear weapons. This is not a question of commerce but a question of policy, a question of international security.

The Soviet Union is also firmly in favour of perfecting in every possible way the system of supervision over nuclear installations and materials that is exercised by the International Atomic Energy Agency. It is ready to co-operate with all interested States to this end.
4. Prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons

Following the conclusion of the convention banning bacteriological weapons, the task of completely prohibiting and eliminating another dangerous category of weapons of mass destruction — chemical weapons — has become especially pressing. The use of such weapons as far back as the years of the First World War caused grave suffering and mass deaths. Since that time, however, chemical warfare technology has made great strides. New types of chemical weapons threatening people with still more agonizing death have been developed. Radical improvements have also been made in the means of delivery of chemical weapons, which can now be used not only in combat areas, that is, against the armed forces of the other side, but also against the civilian population in vital centres of States.

The Soviet Union, together with many other countries, has long proposed that agreement should be reached on the prohibition and elimination of all chemical means of warfare. This problem should be solved radically and by a single action, as was the case with bacteriological weapons. However, the negotiations on this subject, which have already been going on for several years, still fail to offer prospects of such a comprehensive solution. A question that arises in this connexion concerns the possibility of starting with agreement on the prohibition and elimination of the most dangerous, lethal types of chemical weapons. The Soviet Union is ready to seek such a solution as well. A substantial contribution to this end could be the implementation of the Soviet-United States accord on a joint initiative to conclude a convention on the most dangerous, lethal chemical means of warfare.

Supervision of compliance with the prohibition of chemical weapons should be based on national means. In this respect there exists a positive precedent in the convention banning bacteriological weapons. At the same time, the Soviet Union is ready to examine the possibility of using additional supervision procedures and, in particular, to discuss methods of verifying the destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons which are to be excluded from the arsenals of States.

There is not, and there cannot be, any reason for delay on the question of banning chemical weapons. What is needed is a demonstration of the political will and desire to reach generally acceptable agreement.

5. Prohibition of the development of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction

Scientific and technological progress raises the pressing problem of preventing the emergence of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. New types of weapons may appear even in the foreseeable future and may become commensurate in destructive capability with nuclear, chemical or bacteriological weapons, or even surpass them.

At present there are no limitations whatsoever on the use of science for such purposes. This means that the most unexpected developments, whose consequences cannot be foreseen, may occur at any time. The danger is great, and it is necessary to find means to avert it.
It was precisely these considerations that guided the Soviet Union when it proposed in 1975 the conclusion of an international agreement which would prevent the development and manufacture of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. As is known, negotiations in this matter are already under way, which is a positive factor. In the course of the negotiations it has become desirable to specify the object of the prohibition, that is, define new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction.

The Soviet Union is ready to propose an approach which would include among new types of weapons of mass destruction any types of weapons based on qualitatively new principles of action — according to the method of use and the targets to be attacked or the nature of their impact. Some examples are ray weapons capable of affecting blood and intracellular plasma, infrasound weapons designed to damage internal organs and affect human behaviour, or genetic weapons whose use would affect the mechanism of heredity. If we take into account the fact that the forward march of science never stops, it is not difficult to realize that possibilities for the development of even more dangerous types of weapons may emerge in the future.

New systems of weapons of mass destruction should not be developed either for new types of such weapons or for those types of weapons which are based on scientific principles already in use but whose characteristics can be made even more dangerous by introducing new technical elements of combat or support means. In this context, aero-space systems of nuclear weapons using transport space ships as a basis may serve as an example.

The question of the prohibition of the development of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction is an important and timely one; it embraces an essential aspect of the whole problem of disarmament and prevention of war. Negotiations on this question should be given top priority.

6. Reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments

Nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction unquestionably pose the greatest threat to mankind. But can anyone forget how many millions of human lives have been lost as a result of the use of so-called conventional armaments? Even in the period since the Second World War the destructive power of these weapons has increased manyfold. A modern tank is a weapon many times more deadly than a tank of the 1940s. The same is true of artillery, small arms and, of course, aircraft.

The military conflicts which have taken place in various parts of the world in recent years have shown the tragic consequences for people of the use of new models of conventional weapons and the vast destruction of material values which they cause.
Thus, past experience confronts States with the task of taking practical measures to reduce the number of aircraft, artillery, tanks and other modern types of conventional armaments as well as armed forces equipped with those weapons. Since the Second World War, the Soviet Union has repeatedly made concrete proposals in this regard. It has cited specific figures for ceilings on the strength of the armed forces of major States and has expressed willingness to conduct negotiations on the matter both within the framework of a programme of general complete disarmament and as a separate measure covering major States. These proposals have not been accepted. Even now, however, the Soviet Union is prepared to conduct negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and armaments. Given a desire for this on the part of all States possessing powerful armed forces, such negotiations could lead to positive results and to constructive agreements.

Similarly, the Soviet Union considers it desirable that new efforts should be made at the international level to bring about the elimination of all military bases in foreign territory and the withdrawal of foreign troops from such territory. The United Nations has, in many of its forums, expressed itself in very definite terms in favour of a solution to this problem both on a global scale and in relation to individual continents. However, no progress has been made in this regard - a fact which cannot but cause concern. The Soviet Union is, as before, prepared to co-operate actively and constructively in solving this problem.

7. Zones of peace in the Indian Ocean and other regions

In recent years, States in various parts of the world have been ever more insistent in raising the question of carrying out regional measures of military détente and have particularly stressed that Powers which do not belong to a given region should not build up their armed forces or establish military bases there.

Thus, the coastal States of the Indian Ocean are expressing concern at the fact that some States which are geographically very remote from the region are expanding their military bases there and increasing their military presence. Regarding such actions as a threat to their independence and security, these countries are putting forward the idea of transforming the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace. The Soviet Union regards this proposal with understanding.

Obviously, the key question here is to ensure that there are no foreign military bases in the Indian Ocean, that bases which have been established there are dismantled and that no new bases are established. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it never has and does not now intend to build military bases in the Indian Ocean.

In resolving the question of foreign military bases along these lines, the Soviet Union would be prepared to join with other Powers in seeking ways to reduce on a reciprocal basis the military activities of non-coastal States in the Indian Ocean and in the regions directly adjacent to it. Naturally, measures of this kind must take fully into account the generally recognized rules of international
law regarding freedom of navigation on the high seas and the need for commercial stops at the ports of coastal States as well as for research. This question is of great importance to the Soviet Union, since virtually the only sea route navigable all the year round which links the European part of the USSR with the Soviet Far East passes through the Indian Ocean.

The coastal States of the Indian Ocean are in favour of holding an international conference to discuss practical measures for transforming the region into a zone of peace. The Soviet Union would be prepared to consider the question of its attitude towards the convening of such a conference in the light of the considerations set out above.

The Mediterranean is another region where military tensions, particularly in connexion with the Middle East conflict, have at times reached dangerous proportions. With a view to reducing these tensions, the Soviet Union proposed to the United States some time ago that an agreement should be reached on the withdrawal from the Mediterranean of Soviet and United States ships and submarines carrying nuclear weapons. This proposal still holds good, and it is in the interests of all States whose security in one way or another depends on the situation in the Mediterranean to work for its implementation.

The problem of military détente has great immediacy for the Middle East. The Soviet Union has repeatedly expressed itself in favour of halting the arms race in the Middle East within the framework of a comprehensive political settlement of the Middle East conflict.

In various parts of the world, interested States are putting forward proposals for the establishment of demilitarized zones. That reflects their desire for effective limitation of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and for a lessening of the threat of nuclear war. The Soviet Union supports such proposals. It is prepared to co-operate in their implementation, having regard, of course, to what is possible in any given region where it is proposed to establish a demilitarized zone. It is important that such zones should actually be free of nuclear weapons and that the relevant agreements should contain no loop-holes and should be fully consistent with the generally recognized rules of international law.

8. Reduction of military budgets

One promising approach to halting the arms race and to disarmament is the reduction of the military budgets of States. The resources thus released could be utilized for the economic and social progress of peoples and for accelerating the rate of economic growth, ensuring employment, developing new sources of energy, solving the food problem, combating disease and building new schools and universities.

The Soviet Union has repeatedly put forward proposals for reducing military budgets and has, by its actions set an example in that regard. Several years ago,
it proposed that agreement should be reached on the reduction of the military budgets of States permanent members of the United Nations Security Council by 10 per cent and utilization of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries. This proposal was approved by the United Nations General Assembly, but so far it has not been implemented because of opposition by those States which are stubbornly pursuing a policy of increasing military expenditure.

The Soviet Union is prepared to take a flexible position regarding the specific figure with which a reduction of military budgets would begin. A figure greater or smaller than 10 per cent could be agreed upon as a first step for 1977. What is important, however, is that this question should as soon as possible become the subject of businesslike negotiations between the States concerned. The present steady growth of military expenditure by many States can and must give way to the practice of systematically reducing that expenditure.

9. Negotiations on halting the arms race and on disarmament are being conducted in various forms: on a bilateral basis, particularly where States with the greatest military and war industry potential are concerned; within particular groups of States directly concerned, including negotiations at the regional level; in special bodies set up to discuss the disarmament problem as a whole or individual aspects of it and composed of States representing the major political groupings and geographical areas of the present-day world. Each year, questions relating to disarmament are given a prominent place in the work of the United Nations General Assembly.

On the whole, these various types of negotiations and discussions have proved their usefulness. They will unquestionably be used in the future as well. At the same time, the achievement of radical changes in dealing with the problem of disarmament, which affects the interests of all States without exception, requires consideration of it in the broadest and most authoritative possible international forum.

Such a forum must, first of all, be truly universal, and all States must be represented in it; secondly, it must provide an opportunity for examining the whole range of disarmament questions with the necessary expertise, with due regard for all circumstances and in the necessary detail; thirdly, it must be given the power to take effective decisions.

These prerequisites would be met by convening a World Disarmament Conference, and the Soviet Union continues to believe that such a conference should be held.

A special session of the United Nations General Assembly could also be an appropriate forum for discussing disarmament questions in all their scope, for deciding through joint efforts on the ways and means of resolving them and for working out a long-term programme of practical measures. In order to ensure that its results amount to something more than decisions containing general provisions in favour of disarmament of the kind with which the archives of the United Nations are already overflowing, such a special session of the General Assembly and the manner in which it is organized must not be routine in nature. It should be a very
particular kind of session. It should be prepared, organized and held in such a way as to ensure a break-through in solving the problems of disarmament. All its work should fully reflect the high responsibility of all States in the world and, in particular, of the major Powers which possess the most powerful armaments and armed forces.

The holding of a special session of the General Assembly should not, of course, push aside the question of a World Disarmament Conference.

The Soviet Union conceives of the convening of such a session as an interim stage which should, by its decisions, prepare the way for a broad and far-reaching review of the problem of disarmament at the World Conference. The session should not be burdened with strict time limitations or with the procedure normally followed at General Assembly sessions, including special sessions.

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Those are the views which the Soviet Union deems it necessary to bring to the attention of all States Members of the United Nations and of all States in the world. The Soviet Union hopes that these views, which are inspired by concern for peace and the security of peoples, by a desire to further mankind's advance along the path towards halting the arms race and towards disarmament, will be carefully considered by all States and will be helpful in achieving practical results in dealing with this historic task that faces mankind.
PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE
SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

EXISTING PRINCIPLES AND PROPOSALS FOR THE CONDUCT
OF DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS

Background paper prepared by the Secretariat

Corrigendum

1. Replace pages 1 and 2 by the table of contents attached hereto

2. Page 50, item 10
   Insert the attached new title and text as item 10
   Renumber existing item 10 as item 11

3. Page 51, item 11
   Insert the attached new title and text as item 12
   Renumber existing item 11 as item 13

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71. The Conference noted with concern that the flow of conventional arms to non-nuclear States, which is a threat to the security of the non-aligned countries and which gives rise to tension in some regions, is continuing. It demands that an end be put to the flow of such armaments.

72. The Conference declares itself in favour of general and complete disarmament, and especially a ban on the use of nuclear weapons and the manufacture of atomic weapons and warheads and the total destruction of existing stocks, as well as the total cessation of all nuclear tests in all environments and all regions of the world.

73. In this connexion, the Conference demands the suspension of the French nuclear tests being programmed and carried out at Mururoa in the South Pacific.

74. The Conference also declares itself in favour of the banning of all existing chemical and bacteriological weapons.

75. The Conference demands that a world conference on disarmament, with the participation of all States, shall be convened as soon as possible.

76. The Conference further emphasizes the enormous benefit to the well-being of all peoples and to the social and economic development of developing countries which could ensue from the peaceful use of nuclear technology and the releasing of resources resulting from disarmament.

...
In view of these considerations, Romania is in favour of concentrating efforts on getting the disarmament negotiations moving, and on the adoption of measures ultimately leading to general and complete disarmament, and particularly nuclear disarmament. At the same time it is necessary to intensify efforts for the adoption of partial military disengagement and disarmament measures that can contribute to the achievement of that aim.

To this end, Romania proposes various measures aimed at the freezing and reduction of military budgets; the banning, gradual reduction and, in the future, liquidation of nuclear weapons; the establishment of nuclear-free zones of peace and co-operation; disarmament and military disengagement measures, both partial and at the regional level; the Treaty on general and complete disarmament; the enhancement of the United Nations and the General Assembly role in the field of disarmament; the prohibition of war propaganda; and the mobilization of all forces in human society for the achievement of disarmament.

1. Romania considers that in the context of these efforts one of the first goals must be the immediate cessation of the arms race and the adoption of measures to put an end to competition in the acquisition, production and development of armaments and in the strengthening of military devices.

To this end it is necessary to proceed immediately to the freezing and reduction of military budgets, taking the 1975 level as a basis. Without the freezing and reduction of military expenditure the initiation of an effective process of disarmament is inconceivable. It has become an immediate necessity to proceed to the negotiation and conclusion of appropriate agreements and arrangements on the freezing of military budgets and the establishment of a specific scheme for the gradual, phased reduction of budgets, starting with those of the large and strongly armed countries.

This scheme should, essentially, specify the criteria for and proportions of the phased reduction of funds allocated for armaments and at the same time, specify the duration of each phase. It will also be necessary to reduce the budgetary funds spent on research and development for military purposes, which encourage technological competition in the field of armaments and directly result in the continual improvement of weapons and in the creation of new weapons systems with increased destructive capacity. The steps for freezing and reducing military budgets should be effective and irreversible and should ensure the use of the resources thus made available for peaceful purposes.

As suggested in the document entitled "Romania's position regarding the establishment of a new international economic order", submitted at the seventh special session of the United Nations General Assembly, Romania considers that, to begin with, the military budgets of all States should be reduced by at least 10 per cent, taking as a base the amount of expenditures for 1975, and that half of the funds thus saved should be placed unconditionally at the disposal of the United Nations development fund to be set up for the support of the economically backward countries, priority being given to those with a national per capita income below $200. At the same time, we consider that a programme should be worked out for the reduction of military budgets, in such a way that by the end of the decade, reductions should amount to 25-30 per cent of the initial level, with a corresponding reduction in forces and armaments.
In this way, efforts towards disarmament would be linked, from the beginning, to an effective contribution to the settlement of certain fundamental problems affecting the social and political progress of mankind - the elimination of under-development, and of the disparities existing in the economic levels of the States of the world, disparities that are in themselves sources of tension and constitute a source of danger for international peace and security.

2. Romania firmly maintains that, at the disarmament negotiations, highest priority should be assigned to nuclear disarmament.

The outlawing of nuclear weapons, the cessation of their production and the liquidation of existing weapons has become a basic goal.

To this end it is necessary to adopt measures to ensure:

A formal undertaking by all States to refrain from the use of nuclear weapons;

The banning of the introduction of new nuclear weapons into the territory of other States;

The withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the territory of other States;

The cessation of the development, testing and production of nuclear weapons and the means for their delivery;

The cessation of the production of fissionable material for military purposes, the use of existing material for peaceful purposes and the transfer of a quota to be used, by all States, within the context of broad international co-operation;

The reduction and complete liquidation of all existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and means of their delivery;

The total banning of nuclear weapons.

The implementation of all these measures should be carried out under appropriate control, with the participation of both States possessing nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and States that do not possess such weapons. The control should be strict and effective and should be exercised in such a way as to afford real guarantees that the measures provided for in agreements are actually being implemented.

At the same time it is an elementary requirement that States possessing nuclear weapons should formally undertake - possibly in an additional protocol to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons - never to use nuclear weapons on any pretext and not to threaten States not possessing nuclear weapons with the use of such weapons.

As long as nuclear arming goes on, other countries will also start producing nuclear weapons - and there is no stopping them. The danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons can be removed only by outlawing and halting the production of such weapons and by proceeding to destroy them.

Besides measures to outlaw and destroy nuclear weapons, Romania considers that the time has come for similar steps to be taken to ban the design and manufacture of new weapons of mass destruction, and new systems of such weapons, and to ban and destroy all weapons of mass destruction.
Resolute measures must be taken, through appropriate international instruments to which all States should be parties, to ban the use, halt the production, eliminate from military arsenals and outlaw all weapons of mass destruction, in existence or at the design stage. States must also undertake not to engage in any research activity connected with the design and development of such armaments. The banning of new mass destruction weapons and systems must be closely linked to firm measures for the cessation of nuclear weapons production, the liquidation of the existing stockpiles and the complete and definitive prohibition of nuclear weapons and, pending the attainment of that goal, to the undertaking of the nuclear States not to threaten other States with the use of nuclear weapons. Only thus can the dangers inherent in the existence of weapons of mass destruction and of chemical, bacteriological, biological, ecological or other weapons, be removed from the life of peoples.

Only thus will it be possible to achieve a general disarmament plan that will succeed in ridding mankind of the nightmare of war, in creating the necessary conditions for the enjoyment of full equality of rights, in eliminating once and for all the use of force and the threat of force, and in establishing peace and co-operation among peoples.

3. Within the framework of the measures for disarmament and military disengagement, Romania attaches particular importance to the creation of nuclear-free zones of peace and co-operation in various parts of the world. The creation of such zones has already been provided for in one treaty concerning Latin America, in the General Assembly resolution on Africa and in action taken with regard to other regions of the world. The encouragement and promotion of the establishment of nuclear-free zones of peace in various parts of Europe is gaining in importance.

Romania reiterates its proposal concerning the transformation of the Balkans into a nuclear-free zone of good-neighbourly relations, co-operation and peace, having no military bases or foreign troops. Such zones, protected against the use or the threat of the use of nuclear weapons by appropriate guarantees, should be gradually expanded, and would provide a foretaste of the world of tomorrow, a world rid of nuclear weapons.

In Romania's opinion, the agreements on the establishment of nuclear-free zones should meet several basic requirements, such as: the need to offer guarantees of equal security for all parties on the basis of the formal undertaking of the States possessing nuclear weapons not to use them against the countries in the zone, not to threaten them with their use and to respect the zone's nuclear-free status; not to limit in any way the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, but, on the contrary, to ensure unlimited rights and opportunities for all States, on an equal footing and without any discrimination, to carry on research in this field and to use the achievements of nuclear science for their development; to establish a system of strict and equitable control, based on the principle of full equality among States; to view the agreements as an integral part of a system of measures aimed at leading to the utter elimination of nuclear weapons.

4. Romania considers that a substantial contribution to the achievement of general and complete disarmament can be made by the adoption of partial measures of disarmament and military disengagement designed to diminish the sources of tension and conflict and to promote progress towards the final goal.
To this end the following measures are necessary:

The withdrawal of foreign troops, armaments and other military devices within national frontiers and the demobilization of the troops withdrawn;

The dismantling of military bases on foreign soil;

The gradual reduction of troops and armaments forming part of the equipment of national forces, through the conclusion of international agreements ensuring strict fulfilment of the obligations assumed. Romania realizes that, in order to be effective, the reductions should not be symbolic and that, in the initial stages, it will be necessary to effect a reduction in troops and armaments of at least 10-15 per cent, and more substantial reductions in the large countries having powerful armies;

The discontinuance of military manoeuvres, and particularly multinational manoeuvres near frontiers or in the territory of other States, and of troop concentrations and shows of force directed against other States. Romania considers that it would be necessary to study the possibility of concluding international agreements in this field, starting with the continent of Europe;

The conclusion of arrangements or agreements to prevent attacks due to accidents, errors in calculation or lack of communication.

5. In Romania's opinion, the consolidation of the trend towards détente and the building up of real and lasting security can also be achieved through the adoption of resolute military disengagement and disarmament measures in various parts of the world.

As a European country, Romania considers that energetic measures are required for the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the territory of the European States that do not possess such weapons, for the dismantling of military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of European States within national frontiers. At the same time sustained efforts will be necessary, on the part of all European States, to bring about a reduction in national armed forces, armaments and military expenditure.

The States which participated in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe must ensure the strict implementation of the decisions taken by the Conference with respect to the military aspects of security, as a first step in the efforts to build up security on the continent.

All over the world there is growing opposition on the part of the peoples and broad masses to the maintenance of military blocs - the creations of a bygone era in international affairs - and there is an increasing demand for the abolition of those blocs and of the bloc policy, which is incompatible with the new trend towards détente and co-operation. Romania expresses its satisfaction at the decision taken by the SEATO Council of Foreign Ministers to abrogate that military pact. In this day and age there is an increasing need to make every effort to bring about the simultaneous liquidation of both the NATO Treaty and the Warsaw Pact, as an essential prerequisite for the development of confidence and the building up of security on the European continent and throughout the world.
Romania considers that a comprehensive programme of military disengagement and disarmament measures should be worked out and implemented by stages, both on a continent-wide scale and in the various areas of the continent. The consideration and adoption of these measures cannot be undertaken without the participation of all European States and, in the case of the zones, of all States directly concerned. At the same time, it is essential that the measures adopted should not affect the security of any State, and that all States of the continent should be systematically informed of the progress of negotiations and be given the opportunity to present their views, which must be taken into consideration.

6. The attainment of the objective of the liberation of mankind from the danger of war requires the adoption of radical measures of general and complete disarmament. To this end it is necessary to negotiate and conclude a treaty on general and complete disarmament, under strict and effective international control, a treaty which Romania has consistently advocated.

Romania considers that necessary negotiations for the conclusion of this treaty must be resumed and continued as extensively as possible. To this end it is necessary that all States should have the opportunity to express their views on the substance and sic principles of such a treaty, and on its scope, practical ways and means of implementing it, and other aspects of the treaty; they should participate actively, in terms of full equality, in all phases of negotiations on and the drafting of the treaty, so that may embody the will of all peoples and give expression to their fundamental interests.

7. Romania considers that it is high time that negotiations on disarmament reflected the need for the democratization of international life and for the equal participation of all States in the settlement of international issues, and the great changes which have occurred in international relations.

In this connexion it must be admitted frankly that the United Nations is far from carrying out the task entrusted to it in the field of disarmament. The Organization will not fulfill the historic task it was created for until it has secured the cessation of the arms race and the adoption of real disarmament measures. That is why it is imperative to give the United Nations an enhanced role in the field of disarmament, in which it should exercise direct authority in the negotiation and conclusion of disarmament measures and in supervising their implementation. Romania considers that the United Nations General Assembly should fully exercise its powers with respect to this problem and make it as one of its fundamental preoccupations. It is necessary that the General Assembly should organize comprehensive debates on the armaments situation and the principles that should govern disarmament, making recommendations that might serve as a basis for disarmament negotiations and the conclusion of a treaty on general disarmament. In this respect it is imperative to convene a special session of the United Nations General Assembly.

At the same time, Romania endorses the proposals for convening periodically the United Nations Committee on Disarmament and having it consider in accordance with its mandate, all the problems of disarmament and the progress of the work in this
field. In spite of many recommendations by the United Nations, the Geneva Committee on Disarmament is kept away from the real problems of the arms race and disarmament, and it deals with aspects that have virtually no significance for overcoming these problems. The many proposals and ideas advanced by the participating States for redressing this situation have not been given due attention.

Urgent measures are required to improve and expand the work of the Committee, prominent among them being movement towards effective negotiations on essential problems of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, the democratization of methods of work, arrangements for open negotiations which can be watched by international public opinion, the participation of all States on an equal footing in the negotiations on disarmament, and the creation of sub-committees and working groups to consider various disarmament themes that have been referred to the Committee by resolutions of the United Nations.

8. The States of the world can make an important contribution to improving the international situation and creating a climate conducive to the preparation and conclusion of agreements in the field of disarmament by making a joint commitment concerning the banning of all forms of war propaganda, of animosity and hatred among nations. The mass media - press, radio, television, literature, cinema - and all information media which can influence public opinion should educate people in the spirit of firm opposition to war, aggression and violence, interference in internal affairs, racist policy, and colonialist and neo-colonialist oppression, and inculcate ideals of peace and brotherhood among peoples. A practical and efficient measure would be the adoption by States, to the extent permitted by their constitutional systems, of legislative measures to make the ban on war propaganda, on the dissemination of hatred among countries and on any other forms of propaganda against peace effective.

9. Romania's starting-point is the concept that disarmament problems are not the concern of a small group of States and Governments alone, but are of vital interest for all the States and peoples of the world, big or small, regardless of their military strength and of the types of weapons they possess. All States must participate in the negotiations on disarmament and in the consideration and adoption of disarmament measures, so that the right of every State to defend in such negotiations its legitimate security and development interests may be respected. Real and effective action to limit and halt armaments and achieve disarmament cannot be planned without active participation by and respect for the interests of all States.

The problems of disarmament, and particularly nuclear disarmament should not be a secret held by certain categories of persons, politicians and soldiers; they directly affect the security and the very life of peoples, and the peoples should know what action to take in this direction in order to be able to have their say and defend their vital interests. That is why public opinion and the peoples of all countries must be fully informed and periodic reports must be issued on the current status of armaments and its consequences, and on the steps to be taken to stop the arms race.
INTRODUCTION

In its resolution 2602 E (XXIV) of 16 December 1969, the United Nations General Assembly declared the decade of the 1970s as a Disarmament Decade and, inter alia, requested the "Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, while continuing intensive negotiations with a view to reaching the widest possible agreement on collateral measures, to work out at the same time a comprehensive programme, dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control, which would provide the Conference with a guideline to chart the course of its further work and its negotiations".

A number of suggestions and documents were submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament during 1970. In its resolution 2661 C (XXV) of 7 December 1970, the General Assembly, inter alia, expressed "its appreciation of

* This document is an addendum to document A/AC.187/30 and Corr.1 issued on 2 May 1977 entitled "Existing Principles and Proposals for the Conduct of Disarmament Negotiations". It consists of a working paper submitted by Mexico to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on 23 August 1977 containing a preliminary draft comprehensive programme of disarmament.
the important and constructive documents and views submitted at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, including the working papers on a comprehensive programme of disarmament submitted by the Netherlands on 24 February 1970 and by Italy on 19 August 1970, and the draft comprehensive programme of disarmament submitted by Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia on 27 August 1970, and of the comprehensive programme of disarmament submitted to the General Assembly by Ireland, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Sweden and Yugoslavia on 1 December 1970.

In the same resolution, the General Assembly recommended to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament "that it take into account in its further work and its negotiations" the comprehensive programme of disarmament submitted by Ireland, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Sweden and Yugoslavia (document A/8191) "as well as other disarmament suggestions presented or to be presented in the future".

In 1974 and 1975 the General Assembly adopted resolutions (3261 A (XXIX) and 3470 (XXX)) which, in reviewing the implementation of the purposes and objectives of the Disarmament Decade, urged that new efforts should be made to negotiate effective disarmament measures. At the 1975 session of the CCD Romania submitted a document entitled "Steps to be taken within a disarmament programme" (CCD/419). At the 1976 session Nigeria submitted a working paper on Conclusions of the Mid-Term Review of the Disarmament Decade (CCD/510) in which it referred, inter alia, to the adoption of a comprehensive programme as a primary obligation of the CCD during the Disarmament Decade.

On 10 December 1976 the General Assembly adopted resolution 31/68 in which, inter alia, it urged "the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to adopt, during its 1977 session, a comprehensive programme dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2602 E (XXIV) proclaiming the Disarmament Decade".

The present comprehensive programme of disarmament has been prepared in accordance with that request of the General Assembly.

In the light of the contents of resolutions 2602 E (XXIV) and 31/68 it would seem fully justified to state that the General Assembly's request means that the comprehensive programme of disarmament should embrace not only the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament but all negotiations conducted and other acts performed in this matter, in whatever place and form they are carried on, and that the programme should include effective procedures to facilitate the co-ordination of such activities and to ensure that the United Nations General Assembly is kept informed of their progress so as to be able to perform its functions, including the continuous appraisal of the situation, properly.

It seems advisable to point out that the term "disarmament" is used here in the same sense in which it has been used in the various forums of the United Nations: that is, as a generic term which encompasses and may designate any type of measures relating to the matter, whether they are measures for the prevention, limitation, reduction or elimination of armaments or for the reduction of military forces.
I. OBJECTIVE

The aim of the comprehensive programme is to achieve tangible progress in order that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control may become a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and the new international economic order is attained.

II. PRINCIPLES

1. The measures provided for in the comprehensive programme should be carried out in accordance with the joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations of September 1961, taking into account the obligations assumed in various treaties on disarmament, the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and any new factor or possibility arising in this area.

2. The highest priority should be given to disarmament measures dealing with nuclear and chemical weapons.

3. Parallel to the negotiations on partial disarmament measures, including measures to prevent and limit armaments and measures to reduce armaments, the problem of general and complete disarmament should be given intensive treatment in order to facilitate further clarification of positions and possibilities, including the revision and updating of the existing draft treaties submitted by the USSR and the United States of America respectively, or the submission of new proposals.

4. The principle of balanced disarmament should be kept in mind. This principle relates both to a numerical reduction of armed forces and certain types of weapons to predetermined levels, and to sets of disarmament measures whereby an over-all balance is achieved that all parties consider satisfactory from the standpoint of their own security. The militarily important Powers will have to make particular efforts to reduce the disparity between them and other countries. It is understood that the final solution with regard to the limitation and reduction of conventional armaments can only be achieved in the context of general and complete disarmament.

5. Methods of verification form an essential part of disarmament measures. In devising such methods it must be recognized that 100 per cent certainty can never be attained with any such system. A single method of control is rarely sufficient. A combination, in which several methods reinforce one another, should as a rule be employed in order to obtain the necessary assurances that a particular disarmament measure is being duly implemented by all parties.

The absence of such revision and updating has of necessity left this comprehensive programme of disarmament, and in particular sects. III.B.1 and 3, incomplete.
6. The comprehensive programme is correlated with other United Nations programmes for the maintenance of international peace and security. Progress in the former should not, however, be made dependent on progress in the latter, and vice versa.

7. It should be kept in mind that, in concluding disarmament agreements, any adverse effects on the scientific, technological or economic future of nations must be avoided.

8. Efforts in support of the link between disarmament and development, envisaged in General Assembly resolution 2602 (XXIV) on the Disarmament Decade, should be intensified in order to promote negotiations relating to disarmament and to ensure that the human and material resources freed by disarmament are used to promote economic and social development, particularly in the developing countries.

9. The steady acceleration of the arms race is incompatible with the efforts aimed at establishing the new international economic order, as defined in the Declaration and Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, contained in General Assembly resolutions 3201 (S-VI) and 3202 (S-VI) of 1 May 1974, and in the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, contained in General Assembly resolution 3281 (XXIX) of 12 December 1974. Those efforts entail, more than ever, resolute action by all States to achieve the cessation of the arms race and the implementation of effective measures of disarmament, particularly in the nuclear field.

10. Appropriate changes should be made in the organization and procedures of multilateral organs of negotiation on disarmament in order to secure the participation of all nuclear-weapon States.

11. The United Nations, which has specific responsibility for disarmament under the Charter, should be kept informed of all measures, whether unilateral, bilateral or multilateral, adopted in that connexion.

12. Public opinion should be supplied with adequate information about armaments and disarmament, so that it may bring its influence to bear to strengthen disarmament efforts.

III. COMPONENTS AND STAGES OF THE PROGRAMME

A. Disarmament treaties in force or in preparation

1. The results achieved so far in the disarmament field constitute partial or collateral measures which facilitate the pursuit of the final objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control and form part of it. Those results consist mainly of the following multilateral instruments at present in force:

(a) The Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, 1925 (Geneva Protocol);
Special attention should be paid to the fulfilment of the obligations arising from those treaties, to the review conferences provided for in some of them and, where applicable, to the adoption of measures designed to supplement them.

2. Efforts and negotiations to reach agreement before the end of the Disarmament Decade on the treaties, conventions and proposals which have been under consideration for some time by the General Assembly, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and other competent international organs should be urgently intensified. This work has included consideration of:

(a) A complete prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests;

(b) The prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and the destruction of stockpiles of such weapons;

(c) Further measures in the field of disarmament, in particular those aimed at achieving important qualitative limitations on and substantial reductions in strategic nuclear-weapon systems with a view to eliminating such systems from the arsenals of States;

(d) The establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones.
B. Other disarmament measures

1. Measures for whose implementation the political will of the two principal nuclear-weapon States is essential*

(a) Nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction

(i) A moratorium upon or the cessation of the testing and deployment of new strategic nuclear-weapon systems;

(ii) A ban on flight testing of delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons;

(iii) The cessation of production of fissionable materials for military purposes and the assignment of existing stocks to civilian uses;

(iv) A freeze or limitation on the deployment of all types of nuclear weapons;

(v) A solution to the problem concerning prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons or of the threat to use such weapons;

(vi) The complete prohibition of all techniques of environmental modification for military or any other hostile purposes;

(vii) The prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction.

(b) Conventional armaments and armed forces

(i) Further prohibitions of the use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and of the subsoil thereof for military purposes;

(ii) The setting of ceilings for the level and types of conventional armaments and for the numerical strength of armed forces;

(iii) The elimination of foreign military bases and the creation of zones of peace;

(iv) The limitation and regulation of the international transfer of conventional weapons;

(v) The reduction of the military budgets of the States permanent members of the Security Council and of any other State with comparable military expenditures.

* See foot-note to sect. II, para. 3, above.
2. Measures for which the political will of the States directly concerned may be sufficient

(a) Nuclear weapons

The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

(b) Conventional armaments and armed forces

(i) The convening, on the initiative of the States of the region, of regional conferences for the prevention and limitation of armaments;

(ii) The conclusion of regional non-aggression, security and disarmament treaties on the initiative of the States concerned;

(iii) The reduction of military expenditures.

3. Elimination of armaments

In accordance with the joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations of 1961, the final stage of the comprehensive programme should consist of the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control, providing for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons and the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces to the levels required for the maintenance of internal order and international peace.*

IV. THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE AND SECURITY

1. It is undeniable that there is a close relationship between disarmament, international security, the peaceful settlement of disputes and the creation of a climate of confidence.

2. During the period of negotiations on the disarmament measures listed above, parallel negotiations should be carried on in the appropriate organs for the establishment or development of machinery and procedures for peaceful settlement and peace-keeping within the United Nations in order to increase international peace and security and to ensure that they are maintained.

3. Agreement on such measures will facilitate the success of efforts for disarmament, just as the adoption of disarmament measures will create favourable conditions for strengthening international security. Nevertheless, as has already been pointed out above, progress in one of these spheres should not be made dependent on progress in the other, and vice versa.

* In this matter more than others, the revision and updating of the treaties submitted by the Soviet Union and the United States in 1950 are...
V. PROCEDURE

1. The General Assembly should examine annually the progress made in the implementation of the comprehensive programme. Every three years the General Assembly should examine the comprehensive programme and revise it as appropriate.

2. A thorough study should be made of the question of convening at an appropriate time an adequately prepared world disarmament conference, and of its institutionalization.

3. Until such time as a world disarmament conference is convened, the General Assembly should hold regularly — for instance, every three years — special sessions devoted to disarmament.

4. The practice of requesting the Secretary-General to prepare, with the assistance of expert consultants, authoritative studies on specific questions relating to the arms race and disarmament should be continued.

5. In view of the growing complexity of disarmament questions, States Members of the United Nations should endeavour to strengthen their Ministries of Foreign Affairs and their permanent missions in this field.

6. The United Nations Centre for Disarmament should be continuously strengthened and efforts should be made to ensure periodic publication of the United Nations Disarmament Yearbook.

7. More conferences and scientific interchanges should be held between scientists and experts from various countries on problems of the arms race and disarmament.

8. Universities and other academic institutions should be encouraged to hold continuing courses and seminars to study problems of the arms race, military expenditures and disarmament.

9. The intensification of exchanges and publication of relevant information and data should provide an atmosphere of greater sincerity and trust between States and a steady increase in knowledge of and interest in these matters among the public.

10. A world-wide "Disarmament Day" should be established under the auspices of the United Nations.
**PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT**

**EXISTING STRUCTURES AND MACHINERY FOR DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS**

*Background paper prepared by the Secretariat*

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INTRODUCTION

1. By resolution 31/189 B, of 21 December 1976, the General Assembly decided to convene a special session devoted to disarmament, to be held in New York in May/June 1978. It further decided to establish a Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament, composed of 54 Member States appointed by the President of the Assembly on the basis of equitable geographical distribution, with the mandate of examining all relevant questions relating to the special session, including its agenda, and to submit to the Assembly at its thirty-second session appropriate recommendations thereon.

2. The General Assembly also requested the Secretary-General, inter alia, to render the Preparatory Committee all necessary assistance, including the provision of essential background information, relevant documents and summary records.

3. At its second meeting on 31 March 1977, the Preparatory Committee requested the Secretariat to begin the preliminary work on certain factual background papers. Included among them was a description of existing structures and machinery for disarmament negotiations.

4. In response to this request of the Preparatory Committee, the Secretariat has prepared this paper intended to set forth factual background information on existing structures and machinery in the field of disarmament, within and outside the United Nations system. It essentially describes the composition and mandate of the relevant bodies and does not present the substantive issues that are discussed and negotiated in such bodies. 1/

5. This paper draws on material included in the background paper entitled "Role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament: 1945-1975" (A/AC.181/3, Annex A), which the Secretariat prepared for the Ad Hoc Committee on the Review of the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament. Revisions have been made in order to update the material and adapt it to the purposes of the Preparatory Committee. Thus, in the preparation of this paper account was taken of developments that have occurred since 1975, in particular the measures recommended by the Ad Hoc Committee on the Review of the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament (A/31/36), which were endorsed by General Assembly resolution 31/90, of 14 December 1976. This has required extensive revision in some cases and the inclusion of additional material under most headings. Unlike the paper prepared for the Ad Hoc Committee, this one only includes existing structures and machinery, as requested by the Preparatory Committee. However, in the presentation of such structures and machinery reference has been made to the past whenever it seemed that it would provide a better understanding of the body under discussion.

1/ For a more comprehensive presentation, reference should be made to the publication The United Nations and Disarmament 1945-1970 and the supplement The United Nations and Disarmament 1970-1975 (United Nations publications, Sales Nos. E.70.IX.1 and E.76.IX.1).
I. THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM FOR DISARMAMENT

1. The General Assembly

1. Article 11 of the Charter defines the powers of the General Assembly with regard to disarmament matters, as follows:

"The General Assembly may consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both ...").

(a) Plenary

2. The General Assembly regularly devotes attention to disarmament questions in its general debate and in connexion with the adoption of draft resolutions recommended to it by the First Committee and, occasionally, by other Main Committees.

3. Disarmament items have, in several instances, been discussed in plenary, without reference to the First Committee. This was, for example, the practice followed for the items "World Disarmament Conference" (twenty-sixth session), "Non-use of force in international relations and permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons" (twenty-seventh session), and "Reduction of the military budgets of States permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and utilization of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries" (twenty-eighth session).

(b) Special session of the General Assembly

4. At the thirty-first session, the General Assembly by resolution 31/189 B, of 21 December 1976, decided to convene a special session devoted to disarmament, to be held in New York in May/June 1978. The General Assembly further decided to establish a Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, composed of 54 Member States appointed by the President of the Assembly on the basis of equitable geographical distribution, with the mandate of examining all relevant questions relating to the special session, including its agenda, and to submit to the Assembly at its thirty-second session appropriate recommendations thereon. It also requested the Secretary-General to render the Preparatory Committee all necessary assistance, including the provision of essential background information, relevant documents and summary records.

5. The Preparatory Committee is composed of the following States: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Brazil, Burundi, Canada, Colombia, Cuba, Cyprus, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Guyana, Hungary, India, Iran, Iraq, Italy,
Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire and Zambia.

6. The Preparatory Committee held an organizational session from 28 to 30 March 1977. Substantive sessions are scheduled for 9-20 May 1977 and 31 August-9 September 1977.

(c) First Committee

7. Disarmament items on the agenda of the General Assembly are usually allocated to the First Committee. The number of disarmament items on the agenda of the First Committee has increased over the years and this is also true of the number of committee meetings devoted to disarmament, as illustrated by the following figures:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of items</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>1972</td>
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<td>1975</td>
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8. The number of resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the First Committee has also increased through the years. Twenty-five disarmament resolutions were adopted at the thirtieth session, a record number, and 22 were adopted at the thirty-first session.

9. In recent years the First Committee has followed the practice of holding a combined general debate on all the disarmament items before it and examining subsequently the draft resolutions one by one before bringing them to a vote. The agreed proposals submitted by the Ad Hoc Committee on the Review of the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament (A/31/36), which were unanimously endorsed by the General Assembly at its thirty-first session (resolution 31/90), contained, inter alia, the following suggestions aimed at making the work of the First Committee more constructive and efficient:

"(a) At the beginning of the First Committee's consideration of disarmament items, the Chairman should consider the carrying out of consultations with the members of the Committee in order to examine the advisability of submitting for consideration by the First Committee a schedule setting out a specific duration for the general debate and the debate on the draft resolutions presented under each agenda item, together with tentative dates for the voting on those draft resolutions. To the extent possible, this schedule should provide for the grouping together of matters that are closely related, provided that the State or States which brought the items in question to the attention of the General Assembly do not oppose such grouping;

"(b) It would be useful for the work of the First Committee if delegations made all efforts to arrange for informal circulation of draft
resolutions by the time the Committee starts its work during each session of the General Assembly. This could also help to promote the amalgamation, whenever possible, of draft resolutions with similar aims and content;

"(c) The members of the First Committee could hold informal consultations to determine whether any delegation intended to request the adoption of any measure with regard to a given item. If those consultations showed clearly that no delegation would request any action by the General Assembly, the Committee could decide to include the item concerned in the provisional agenda for a subsequent session of the General Assembly;

"(d) The First Committee should keep in mind the possibility of taking decisions instead of adopting formal resolutions on procedural questions with a view to reducing the number of draft resolutions presented to the General Assembly;

"(e) The Chairman of the First Committee should consult with the members of the Committee at the beginning of each session of the General Assembly on further measures that would make the Committee's deliberations more efficient and simplified;

"(f) The Chairman of the First Committee should consult with members of the Committee in order to explore the possibility of amalgamating draft resolutions on the same item, with the consent of their respective sponsors, whether they had been circulated informally or submitted formally to the Committee."

(d) Other Main Committees

10. Disarmament related issues are occasionally discussed by other Main Committees of the General Assembly in addition to the First Committee. For instance, the Special Political Committee examines reports submitted to it by the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, established by General Assembly resolution 913 (X). The Second Committee has considered several sessions the question of the economic and social consequences of disarmament and the link between disarmament and development. The Third Committee has repeatedly dealt with questions of human rights in armed conflicts. The Sixth Committee is currently considering some aspects of that same question.

(e) The Disarmament Commission

11. On 11 January 1952, the General Assembly adopted resolution 502 (VI) by which it created the Disarmament Commission and laid down its tasks for negotiations, as follows:

"The General Assembly, ..."

"1. Establishes under the Security Council a Disarmament Commission. This Commission shall have the same membership as the Atomic Energy Commission..."
and the Commission for Conventional Armaments, 2/ and shall function under the rules of procedure of the Atomic Energy Commission with such modifications as the Commission shall deem necessary;

2. Dissolves the Atomic Energy Commission and recommends to the Security Council that it dissolve the Commission for Conventional Armaments;

3. Directs the Disarmament Commission to prepare proposals to be embodied in a draft treaty (or treaties) for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments, for the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, and for effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only;

...

6. Declares that a conference of all States should be convened to consider the proposals for a draft treaty (or treaties) prepared by the Commission as soon as the work of the Commission shall have progressed to a point where in the judgement of the Commission any part of its programme is ready for submission to governments;

9. Requests the Secretary-General to convene such a conference when so advised by the Commission;

10. Requests the Secretary-General to furnish such experts, staff and facilities as the Commission may consider necessary for the effective accomplishment of the purposes of the present resolution.

12. On 19 April 1954, the Disarmament Commission created a sub-committee consisting of Canada, France, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States, 3/ with the task of searching for an agreement on a comprehensive and co-ordinated plan of disarmament. The Sub-Committee convened in London in May 1954 and held 157 meetings up to September 1957.

13. At its twelfth session, in 1957, the General Assembly, by resolution 1148 (XII), requested the Disarmament Commission to reconvene its Sub-Committee as soon as feasible and also requested the Commission to invite its Sub-Committee to establish as one of its first tasks, a group or groups of technical experts to study inspection systems for disarmament measures. It also recommended that any

2/ The 11 members of the Security Council and Canada, when that State was not a member of the Security Council.

3/ A USSR proposal to add the People’s Republic of China, Czechoslovakia and India was rejected.
such technical group or groups be composed of one expert from each of the States members of the Sub-Committee and one from each of three other States Members of the United Nations which should be designated by the Secretary-General in consultation with the Sub-Committee. The Sub-Committee was, however, never reconvened.

14. At the same session of the General Assembly, India submitted an item entitled "Expansion of the membership of the Disarmament Commission and of its Sub-Committee". The Soviet Union, stressing the necessity of inviting a larger number of States to participate in disarmament talks, proposed the establishment of a permanent disarmament commission consisting of all Members of the United Nations. The Soviet draft resolution was not adopted.

15. On the other hand, by resolution 1150 (XII), the General Assembly increased the membership of the Disarmament Commission by adding the following 14 States: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, India, Italy, Mexico, Norway, Poland, Tunisia and Yugoslavia. The Soviet Union, however, declared that its objections had not been removed and that it would therefore no longer participate in the work of the enlarged commission or its sub-committee. Efforts in 1958 to reconvene the new Disarmament Commission were unsuccessful.

16. In view of this interruption of disarmament negotiations, the Secretary-General proposed the inclusion of the item "Question of disarmament" in the agenda of the thirteenth session of the General Assembly, so as to maintain continuity of consideration of that question by the General Assembly. At that session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 1252 D (XIII) which reads as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"Having regard to the universal desire for the establishment of genuinely peaceful conditions in the world and therefore for taking steps to avoid the destruction that would result from a major armed conflict,

"Reaffirming the responsibility of the United Nations for seeking a solution of the disarmament problem,

"Expressing its determination that all Members of the United Nations should be in a position to contribute to a solution of this problem on a continuing basis,

"1. Decides that the Disarmament Commission shall, for 1959 and on an ad hoc basis, be composed of all the Members of the United Nations;

"2. Transmits to the Disarmament Commission all the documents, proposals and records of discussions relating to disarmament at the thirteenth session of the General Assembly;

"3. Requests the Disarmament Commission to convene as appropriate and to submit to the Security Council and to the General Assembly, at a special
session if necessary, constructive proposals and recommendations in the field of disarmament;

"4. Decides that the first meeting of the Disarmament Commission shall be convened by the Secretary-General after consultation with the Member States and that the Commission, having begun its activities under rule 162 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly and taking that rule into account, shall adopt its own rules of procedure."

17. In 1959, the Disarmament Commission held only one meeting, to consider the communiqué of the Foreign Ministers of France, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States which announced the creation of a new Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee with equal representation of NATO and Warsaw Treaty member States.

18. At its fourteenth session in 1959, the General Assembly decided in resolution 1403 (XIV) that the Disarmament Commission should continue to be composed of all Members of the United Nations. Following the breakdown of the Ten-Nation Committee talks, 4/ the Commission convened at the request of the United States to review the situation. It adopted unanimously, on 18 August 1960, a resolution calling for the earliest possible resumption of negotiations.

19. The Disarmament Commission met again from 21 April to 16 June 1965, at the request of the USSR. It undertook a review of the negotiations in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee and adopted one resolution on a world disarmament conference, and one on cessation of nuclear-weapon tests.

20. Since then, the Disarmament Commission has not been convened.

21. The agreed proposals of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Review of the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament (A/3I/35), which were endorsed by General Assembly resolution 31/90, contained a recommendation that:

"The General Assembly, at an appropriate time, consider the future role of the United Nations Disarmament Commission."

\footnote{(f) Conference of the Committee on Disarmament}

22. In 1959, on the 
\footnote{4/ See below under "Conference of the Committee on Disarmament".}
23. Following the failure of the Ten-Nation Committee, the USSR and the United States, in the course of 1961, exchanged views on the resumption of disarmament negotiation. On 20 September 1961, the two Powers issued a joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations, for circulation to all Members of the United Nations (A/4879).

24. The General Assembly, by resolution 1660 (XVI) of 28 November 1961, urged the Soviet Union and the United States to reach agreement on the composition of a negotiating body which both they and the rest of the world could regard as satisfactory; expressed the hope that their negotiations would lead to an agreed recommendation to the Assembly; and requested the two Governments to report to the Assembly on the results of such negotiations before the end of the sixteenth session.

25. In response to this request, the Soviet Union and the United States jointly submitted on 13 December 1961 a draft resolution in the First Committee, which was unanimously approved by the Assembly on 20 December as resolution 1722 (XVI). It read, in part, as follows:

"The General Assembly,

1. Endorses the agreement that has been reached on the composition of a Disarmament Committee, whose membership will be: Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, France, India, Italy, Mexico, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America;

2. Recommends that the Committee, as a matter of the utmost urgency, should undertake negotiations with a view to reaching, on the basis of the joint statement of agreed principles and taking into account paragraph 8 of those principles, agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control;

3. Requests that the Committee submit to the General Assembly a report on such agreement as soon as it has been reached, and in any case submit to the Disarmament Commission, not later than 1 June 1962, a report on the progress achieved ..."

26. The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) opened in Geneva on 15 March 1962 at the Foreign Ministers' level in the presence of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. One member of the Committee (France) decided not to participate, explaining that it hoped it might be possible later for the disarmament problem to be discussed among the Powers that could contribute effectively to its solution. At the outset, the Foreign Ministers decided to organize the Conference so as to permit simultaneous work on general and complete disarmament, confidence-building (collateral) measures, and the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests.
27. At the first meeting of the ENDC on 14 March 1962, procedural arrangements for the conduct of business were adopted, including the following. All meetings would be private except when otherwise agreed by the participating States. Publicity by or on behalf of the Committee would be limited to the agreed communiqué following its meeting. The draft communiqué would be prepared by the Chairman of the meeting and approved by the participating States; normally, it would refer to the chairmanship of the meeting, the title of any new documents tabled, agreements reached, the time of the next meeting and, when required, the release of the Committee's verbatim records and documents. The Chair would be rotated daily in English alphabetical order among all members of the Committee. The permanent Co-Chairmen of the Committee would be the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America. The Co-Chairmen would consult with each other and with other delegations, as desirable, with the aim of facilitating both the formal and informal work of the Conference.

28. By 1964, it became evident that the Committee was unable to reach agreement on general and complete disarmament. As a result, the Committee increasingly devoted its attention to collateral measures of disarmament.

29. On 15 August 1968, the Committee adopted a provisional agenda for its future work, reading as follows:

"Further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.

"Under this heading members may wish to discuss measures dealing with the cessation of testing, the non-use of nuclear weapons, the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons use, the cessation of manufacture of weapons, and reduction and subsequent elimination of nuclear stockpiles, nuclear-free zones, etc.

"Non-nuclear measures.

"Under this heading, members may wish to discuss chemical and bacteriological warfare, regional arms limitations, etc.

"Other collateral measures.

"Under this heading, members may wish to discuss prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, etc.

"General and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."

30. In its report to the General Assembly, for 1968, the Committee noted that the agenda had been recommended and adopted "in recognition of the views expressed by the members of the Committee and in response to recommendations of the General Assembly, taking into account the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and also the agreement announced on 1 July 1968 for bilateral discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union on the limitations of strategic nuclear arms". The Committee also noted the recognized right of any delegation to raise and discuss any disarmament subject at any time.
31. At the 1969 session of the UNDC, the two Co-chairmen, the Soviet Union and the United States, consulted with other members of the Committee regarding the possibility of a limited enlargement of the Committee's membership in view of the desire expressed by many countries to participate in the Committee's work. In carrying out the expansion, the declared objective of the Co-Chairmen was to ensure that geographic and political balance were maintained and, at the same time, to preserve the Committee as an effective negotiating body. As a result of the consultations, Japan and Mongolia joined the Committee on 3 July 1969, and they were followed on 7 August by Argentina, Hungary, Morocco, Netherlands, Pakistan and Yugoslavia. The membership was thus increased from 18 to 26. After the enlargement of the Committee, it was decided to change its name to "Conference of the Committee on Disarmament" (CCD).

32. On 16 December 1969, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2602 B (XXIV) endorsing the agreement which had been reached on the title and composition of the Conference, but expressing the Assembly's conviction that in effecting future changes in the composition of the Committee, the procedure followed at the sixteenth session of the General Assembly should be observed.

33. In 1974, the CCD agreed to invite the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, Iran, Peru and Zaire to become members beginning 1 January 1975. Bearing in mind General Assembly resolution 2602 B (XXIV) of 16 December 1969, the Committee reported this agreement to the Assembly for its endorsement. The General Assembly adopted resolution 3161 B (XXXIX) by which it endorsed the agreement that had been reached to the effect that the composition of the CCD would be increased as from 1 January 1975. It also expressed the conviction that, to effect any future change in the composition of the CCD, the procedure followed on that occasion should be observed.

34. The question of the review of the organization and procedures of the CCD has been raised on several occasions and, more extensively, at the CCD sessions in 1972, 1975, 1976 and 1977. In 1975 the CCD agreed that, unless otherwise decided, it should convene each year on the third Tuesday in February; that it should discuss the organization of its work at the beginning of the first session and thereafter, as the need arose; and that its report to the United Nations General Assembly should be transmitted on the last Thursday in August, unless otherwise decided (A/10027). In 1976, the CCD took further decisions concerning certain procedural aspects of its work during the session, inter alia, the preparation of the report and the communiqué of plenary meetings (A/31/27).

35. On 21 April 1977, the CCD adopted decisions concerning the organization of its work, the preparation of its annual report to the General Assembly, the distribution of provisional verbatim records of plenary meetings and working documents and the communiqué of plenary meetings (CCD/532).

36. With respect to the organization of work, provision was made for the establishment of ad hoc working groups to facilitate the negotiations of text of agreements (or any other document) and guidelines were laid down for that purpose, with the understanding that such guidelines were intended to reduce the necessity for lengthy procedural debate in the future but were not to be considered inflexible rules. It was agreed that:
1. When it appeared that there was a basis to negotiate a draft treaty or other draft texts, the CCD should establish an ad hoc working group for this purpose open to all members of the CCD.

2. The CCD should define the mandate for each working group including a target date for submitting its final report to the CCD and should provide the group with such working documents as may form an appropriate starting point for the group's work.

3. In accordance with the CCD's established procedure, the working groups shall work on the basis of consensus. The chairmanship of the working groups should rotate in the same manner as in the CCD. The meetings of the working groups should be on an informal basis and should be so scheduled as to avoid conflicting or otherwise interfering with the regular or informal meetings of the CCD. The level of representation in the working groups should be determined by each delegation. The working groups, on a periodic basis, should issue whatever reports to the CCD are deemed necessary. The Committee requests that the Secretariat provide assistance to the working groups as necessary, including the preparation of unofficial summaries of the working groups' proceedings.

4. The CCD will take any other decisions that may be necessary regarding the organization and the procedures of the working groups.

37. The decision concerning the preparation of the report made permanent the procedures introduced in 1976. It was decided that:

1. The draft report should be prepared by the Secretariat.

2. The draft should be made available to all members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at least two weeks before the scheduled date for the closure of the summer session. (It should be brought up to date at the end of the succeeding week.)

3. The draft should contain:
   (a) The provisional anna as adopted on 15 August 1968;
   (b) A summary of specific requests addressed to the Conference by the United Nations General Assembly at its preceding regular session;
   (c) Sectional headings in accordance with the items comprising subparagraphs (a) and (b) above and other matters raised in the Committee during the year;
   (d) Significant views expressed by delegations under each item including their analysis, if any, of the issues discussed (if more than one delegation has made the same point the fact should be clearly stated);
(e) Conclusions and decisions, if any, adopted by consensus;

(f) The same kind of index as appeared in the 1975 report (the subject headings may need to be changed from time to time);

(g) Working papers and proposals submitted during the year;

(h) Verbatim records of the meetings held during the year should be available in New York to delegations of States Members of the United Nations as a separate annex to the report.

4. The Committee will consider the draft report during the final week of its summer session. Delegations wishing to make statements on matters of substance during that week, and wishing reference to the statements to be included in the report, should provide very brief summaries for this purpose.

5. The report should be circulated in New York to all delegations of States Members of the United Nations by 1 October.

38. With respect to the provisional verbatim records of plenary meetings and working documents, the CCD decided that they should be distributed in New York to delegations of States Members of the United Nations as soon as received from Geneva, thus adopting in substance the recommendation of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Review of the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament, which was endorsed by General Assembly resolution 31/90.

39. With respect to the communiqué issued after each plenary meeting it was decided that it should be drawn up in such a way as to reflect the substance of the proceedings of the meeting. It should contain information with respect to the consecutive number of the plenary meeting held and the chairmanship of the day; it should enumerate the names of the representatives of the countries who made statements, with a brief indication of the topics covered by them, which normally should be limited to no more than a short paragraph, and should also cite the subject heading of proposals or working papers submitted to the Committee; and it should contain information with respect to the Committee’s decisions concerning its schedule of work, convening of formal, informal, or other meetings.

(g) Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean

40. The General Assembly, by resolution 2832 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, solemnly declared that the Indian Ocean, within limits to be determined, together with the airspace above and the ocean floor subject thereto, was designated for all time as a zone of peace. By the same resolution the Assembly called upon the great Powers to enter into immediate consultations with the littoral States of the Indian Ocean with a view to implementing the Declaration and further called upon the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, the permanent members of the Security Council and other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean to pursue the objective of establishing in the Indian Ocean area a system of collective security without military alliances and strengthening international security through regional and other co-operation.

(h) Verbatim records of the meetings held during the year should be available in New York to delegations of States Members of the United Nations as a separate annex to the report.
41. At the following session, the General Assembly, in resolution 2992 (XXVII), the Assembly decided to establish an ad hoc committee of not more than 15 members to study the implications of the Indian Ocean Peace Zone proposal, with special reference to the practical measures that might be taken in furtherance of the objectives of the 1971 Declaration, having due regard for the security interests of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean and the interests of any other State consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. The Assembly also decided that the Ad Hoc Committee be composed of the following countries: Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen and Zambia.

42. The Committee has held meetings every year since its creation and has reported annually to the General Assembly. In 1974, by resolution 3259 (XXIX), the General Assembly requested the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean to enter as soon as possible into consultations with a view to convening a conference on the Indian Ocean and invited all States, and in particular the great Powers, to cooperate in a practical manner with the Ad Hoc Committee in the discharge of its functions. In the same year, in pursuance of resolution 3259 B (XXIX), the Committee was enlarged by the addition of Bangladesh, Kenya and Somalia.

43. In 1976, the Ad Hoc Committee considered the general approach to the question of the convening of a conference on the Indian Ocean.

44. Pursuant to operative paragraphs 2 and 3 of General Assembly resolution 31/88, of 14 December 1976, the Acting Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee renewed the Committee's invitation to the great Powers and major maritime users of the Indian Ocean to participate in the consultations to be held regarding the convening of a conference on the Indian Ocean. Greece and Panama accepted the Ad Hoc Committee's invitation. During the first part of its 1977 session, held in April, the Ad Hoc Committee decided to invite those States that had accepted the Committee's invitation to participate in its deliberations without the right to make formal proposals or to vote. In addition, the Ad Hoc Committee endorsed the Acting Chairman's proposal that he send a letter to all the members of the Ad Hoc Committee, to those major maritime users of the Indian Ocean that have accepted the invitation of the Ad Hoc Committee to participate in its work and to all the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, requesting their Governments' views on the programme of action leading to the convening of a conference on the Indian Ocean. The second part of the session is scheduled for September 1977.

(h) Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference

45. The proposal to convene a world disarmament conference has been advanced by the non-aligned countries in the 1960s, notably in the Declaration of the Heads of State and Government issued at the 1961 Belgrade Summit and in the Programme for Peace and International Co-operation issued at the 1964 Cairo Summit. The proposal was supported by the General Assembly in 1965, by the adoption of resolution 2030 (XX), but it failed to materialize. The proposal was revived by
the USSR at the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly in 1971, and since then it has been given active consideration by the Assembly.

46. At its twenty-eighth session, the General Assembly unanimously adopted resolution 3182 (XXVIII) which, inter alia, reads as follows:

"The General Assembly,

1. Decides to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference to examine all the views and suggestions expressed by Governments on the convening of a world disarmament conference and related problems, including conditions for the realization of such a conference, and to submit, on the basis of consensus, a report to the General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session;

2. Decides further that the Ad Hoc Committee shall consist of the following forty non-nuclear-weapon Member States appointed by the President of the General Assembly after consultation with all regional groups: Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire and Zambia;

3. Invites the States possessing nuclear weapons to co-operate or maintain contact with the Ad Hoc Committee, it being understood that they will enjoy the same rights as the appointed members of the Committee;"

47. Since its establishment, the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference has met regularly. The Committee has also set up a working group to assist in the preparation of draft reports of the Ad Hoc Committee to the General Assembly. In addition to States appointed to serve on the Ad Hoc Committee as members, France, the United Kingdom and the USSR have participated in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee by virtue of paragraph 3 of resolution 3183 (XXVIII). Under the same paragraph, China and the United States have maintained contact with the Ad Hoc Committee through its Chairman.

48. The Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference has been mainly concerned with the examination of all views and suggestions expressed by Governments on the convening of a world disarmament conference and related problems, including conditions for the realization of such a conference.

49. In 1974, the Committee provided a comprehensive presentation (A/9628) of those views and suggestions, covering the following aspects:

(a) General views and suggestions on the convening of a world disarmament conference and related problems; conditions for the realization of the conference;

(b) Main objectives of the conference;
(c) Adequate preparations of the conference, including such questions as agenda structure and organization of the conference.

The Committee has also analysed those views and suggestions expressed by Governments and in its report to the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly it provided a general description of the approaches discernible, as well as a summary of those views and suggestions.

50. At its twenty-ninth session, the General Assembly requested all States to communicate their comments on the main objectives of a world disarmament conference and requested the Ad Hoc Committee to prepare an analytical report of the views thus received. The Committee's report (A/10028) included extensive comments received from States and the analysis requested by the General Assembly. The report included also sections containing conclusions and one recommendation in accordance with the said resolution.

51. At its thirty-first session, by resolution 31/190, of 21 December 1976, the General Assembly requested the Ad Hoc Committee to meet briefly, and submit a report to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session.

(i) **Ad Hoc Committee on the Review of the Role of the United Nations in Disarmament**

52. In the introduction to his annual report on the work of the Organization for 1974-1975, the Secretary-General proposed that the General Assembly consider a basic review of the role of the United Nations in disarmament.

53. By resolution 3484 B (XXX), the General Assembly, noting the Secretary-General's proposal, decided to establish "an Ad Hoc Committee of the General Assembly open to the participation of all Member States to carry out a basic review of the role of the United Nations in the disarmament field".

54. In 1976, the Ad Hoc Committee submitted a report (A/31/36), containing a set of agreed proposals with regard to the following subjects: (a) improved methods of work of the First Committee in disarmament matters, (b) relationship between the General Assembly and other United Nations bodies in the field of disarmament, (c) role of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, (d) role of the United Nations in providing assistance on request in multilateral and regional disarmament negotiations, (e) relationship between the General Assembly and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, (f) increased use of in-depth studies of the arms race, disarmament and related matters, (g) improvement of existing United Nations facilities for the collection, compilation and dissemination of information on disarmament issues, in order to keep all Governments, as well as world public opinion, properly informed on progress achieved in the field of disarmament, (h) assistance by the Secretariat, on request, to States parties to multilateral disarmament agreements in their duty to ensure the effective functioning of such agreements, including appropriate reviews, and (i) strengthening of the resources of the Secretariat. By resolution 31/90, of 14 December 1976, the General Assembly endorsed the agreed
proposals made by the Ad Hoc Committee on the Review of the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament as a step towards the strengthening of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament.

55. Having completed the task entrusted to it, the Ad Hoc Committee has ceased to function. In this connexion it may be noted that the General Assembly, pursuant to resolution 31/90, will keep the question of the strengthening of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament under continued review.

(j) Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation

56. At the tenth session of the General Assembly, India proposed the consideration of the question of "dissemination of information on the effects of atomic radiation and on the effects of experimental explosions of thermonuclear bombs", a question closely related to the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests. The General Assembly adopted resolution 913 (X) by which a scientific committee on the effects of atomic radiation was established, consisting of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, France, India, Japan, Mexico, Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Committee was entrusted with the task of assembling, studying and disseminating information on observed levels of ionizing radiation and radio-activity in the environment and on the effects of such radiation upon man and his environment.

57. At its twenty-eighth session, the General Assembly decided to increase the membership of the Scientific Committee with up to five additional members (resolution 3154 C (XXVIII)). The President of the General Assembly appointed the following additional members: Germany, Federal Republic of, Indonesia, Peru, Poland and Sudan. As a result, the Committee is now composed of 20 Member States.

58. Since 1955, the Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation has met regularly and has submitted periodic reports to the General Assembly. Technical reports reviewing, in detail, levels and effects of ionizing radiation were submitted to the General Assembly at its thirteenth, seventeenth, nineteenth, twenty-first, twenty-fourth and twenty-seventh sessions and progress reports at the intervening sessions.

59. As of 28 March 1977, the secretariat of the Committee, which was transferred to the United Nations Environment Programme from the Office of the Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs on 1 September 1976, will function as a unit in the Office of the Executive Director. The Committee secretariat will continue to be located in Vienna.
2. The Security Council and the Military Staff Committee

(a) Security Council

60. Article 26 of the Charter entrusted the Security Council with specific responsibilities in the field of disarmament. In its first decision on the question, on 9 January 1947, the Council formally accepted General Assembly resolution 41 (I) on the principles governing the general regulation and reduction of armaments, which contained the following recommendation concerning the implementation of Article 26: "The plans formulated by the Security Council shall be submitted by the Secretary-General to the Members of the United Nations for consideration at a special session of the General Assembly. The treaties or conventions approved by the General Assembly shall be submitted to the signatory States for ratification in accordance with Article 26 of the Charter."

61. On 13 February 1947, the Council adopted resolution 16 (1947) by which it recognized that the implementation of General Assembly resolution 41 (I) was "one of the most urgent and important tasks before the Security Council" and resolved to take appropriate measures in that connexion. In particular, the Council resolved to work out practical measures for giving effect to General Assembly resolutions 41 (I) and 42 (I) of 14 December 1946 concerning, on the one hand, the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces and the establishment of international control to bring about the reduction of armaments and armed forces and, on the other hand, information on armed forces to be supplied by Members of the United Nations; to set up the Commission for Conventional Armaments and to request the Military Staff Committee to submit to it recommendations with regard to the basic principles which should govern the organization of the United Nations armed forces.

62. Because of the close relationship between the security of States and disarmament, as well as the functions of the Security Council with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security, several disarmament agreements concluded in recent years envisage a role for the Security Council. Some examples are mentioned in the following.

63. During more than four years of negotiations in the ENDC on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, many non-nuclear-weapon States expressed a desire to receive certain additional assurances with regard to their security against nuclear attack, assurances which were not provided by the Treaty itself. The Governments of the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States took note of this desire of the non-nuclear-weapon countries and came to the conclusion that, in addition to the security benefits provided by the Treaty itself, further assurances of security could most appropriately be granted in the context of the United Nations Charter, under which every Member of the Organization had assumed a solemn obligation to co-operate in the maintenance of peace. Therefore, they agreed to sponsor a resolution on security assurances in the Security Council, which bears the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.
64. The resolution adopted by the Security Council on 19 June 1968, proceeded from the generally recognized fact that "any aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons would endanger the peace and security of all States". In this connexion, the resolution provided that "aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State would create a situation in which the Security Council, and above all its nuclear-weapon States permanent members, would have to act immediately in accordance with their obligations under the United Nations Charter".

65. Mention should also be made of the fact that article X of the Non-Proliferation Treaty provides that whenever a Party exercises its right of withdrawal from the Treaty, notice of such withdrawal should be given to the Security Council, in addition to all the Parties to the Treaty three months in advance.

66. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-bed and Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, which entered into force on 18 May 1972, stipulates in article III (4) that, in case doubts concerning the fulfilment of the obligations assumed under the Treaty are not removed, a State Party may, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, refer the matter to the Security Council which may take action in accordance with the Charter. Article VIII provides that a State Party withdrawing from the Treaty should give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties to the Treaty and to the Security Council three months in advance.

67. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and of their Destruction which entered into force on 26 March 1975 provides in article VI:

"(1) Any State Party to this Convention which finds that any other State Party is acting in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of the Convention may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such a complaint should include all possible evidence confirming its validity, as well as a request for its consideration by the Security Council.

"(2) Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to co-operate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the complaint received by the Council. The Security Council shall inform the States Parties to the Convention of the results of the investigation."

68. The withdrawal clause contained in this Convention is identical to the ones referred to above.

69. The Security Council has not been seized, so far, with any case related to the above-mentioned treaties.
(b) The Military Staff Committee

70. It was contemplated in Article 26 of the Charter that the Council would be assisted by the Military Staff Committee in formulating its plans for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments, but no assistance from the latter has been called for or rendered.

71. In its resolution 18 (1947) of 13 February 1947, creating the Commission for Conventional Armaments, the Security Council instructed the Commission to "make such proposals as it may deem advisable concerning the studies which the Military Staff Committee ... might be asked to undertake". No proposals, however, were made.

3. The Economic and Social Council

72. Some economic and social questions related to disarmament have been considered by the Economic and Social Council.

73. On 15 December 1960, by resolution 1516 (XV), the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to examine, with the assistance of consultants appointed by him, the economic and social consequences of disarmament in countries with different economic systems and at different stages of economic development. The report of the Secretary-General was submitted to the Economic and Social Council on 28 February 1962.

74. Having considered the report, the Economic and Social Council, on 26 July 1962 adopted resolution 891 (XXXIV) which requested the Secretary-General to make the report available to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee and also to give the report wide publicity and dissemination. The General Assembly, by resolution 1837 (XVII) entitled "Declaration on the Conversion to Peaceful Needs of the Resources Released by Disarmament" endorsed the conclusion of the report.

75. These questions have continued to hold the attention of the Economic and Social Council periodically.

4. The Secretary-General and the Secretariat

76. The activities carried out by the Secretary-General and his staff with respect to disarmament matters are derived from the general functions of the Secretary-General as defined in the Charter and developed over the years.

(a) Annual report on the work of the organization

77. Pursuant to Article 98 of the Charter, the Secretary-General submits to the General Assembly, at each regular session, a report on the work of the organization which is included in the provisional agenda of the General Assembly, together with the reports of the Security Council and of the Economic and Social
Council. Each of these annual reports contains, under the general heading "Political and security questions", a section on "Disarmament and related matters". The Introduction to the report has often been used by the Secretary-General as a means for submitting suggestions on matters relating to disarmament for consideration by the General Assembly.

(b) Initiatives and statements by the Secretary-General

78. On occasion, the Secretary-General in putting forth his views on disarmament matters has made recommendations or suggestions for consideration by the General Assembly and other bodies concerned with such matters. Various resolutions adopted by the General Assembly take note of these recommendations or suggestions. 5/

(c) Servicing United Nations disarmament organs

79. Article 97 of the Charter states that the Secretary-General "shall be the chief administrative officer of the Organization" and Article 98 states that "the Secretary-General shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the General Assembly, of the Security Council ... and shall perform such other functions as are entrusted to him by these organs". The functions of the Secretariat are defined by the rules of procedure of the General Assembly and the Councils in some detail.

80. Secretariat services in the field of disarmament are currently provided for the First Committee of the General Assembly, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference, the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, an Expert Group on the Reduction of Military Budgets, and an Expert Group on the Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race.

(d) Implementation of General Assembly resolutions

81. The Secretary-General is frequently requested to perform functions relating to the implementation of disarmament resolutions. Such functions have included ascertaining the views of Governments, circulating replies received from Governments, presenting them in a systematized manner, communicating decisions of United Nations bodies to Governments or other parties concerned, convening meetings, reporting on disarmament related conferences outside the United Nations, etc. 6/

5/ Further details are provided in document A/AC.181/3, annex A, paras. 79-84.

6/ Examples may be found in document A/AC.181/3, annex A, para. 77.
82. Mention can be made here of the publication entitled *The United Nations and Disarmament*, prepared by the Secretariat and providing a comprehensive account of the deliberations and negotiations in the field of disarmament within the United Nations system. A first volume, covering the period 1945-1965, was issued in 1967, at the initiative of the Secretary-General. Before the end of 1970, a new volume entitled *The United Nations and Disarmament, 1945-1970* was prepared by the Secretariat, at the request of the General Assembly. A supplement covering the period 1970-1975 has also been prepared at the request of the Assembly.

83. The Ad Hoc Committee on the Review of the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament included in its agreed proposals, which were endorsed by General Assembly resolution 31/90, recommendations on ways and means of improving existing United Nations facilities for collection, compilation and dissemination of information on disarmament issues, in order to keep all Governments, as well as world public opinion, properly informed on progress achieved in the field of disarmament. The Ad Hoc Committee recommended that the United Nations publish annually before the regular session of the General Assembly in all the working languages of the Committee a United Nations Disarmament Yearbook. This Yearbook should contain a descriptive review of the main developments and ongoing negotiations in the field of disarmament, including a summary of the Assembly resolutions adopted and of the proposals made in this connexion. It should further contain:

(a) Texts of new treaties and agreements in the field of disarmament as well as drafts of such texts submitted to the United Nations or the Conference on Disarmament;

(b) A report on the status of the existing disarmament agreements;

(c) Decisions and conclusions on these matters reached by, *inter alia*, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, IAEA and possible review conferences;

(d) Factual information, as communicated by Governments or appearing in their official publications, on such topics as military expenditures, armed forces and armaments, military production, arms trade and foreign aid in the military field, with full citation of the sources. Such information should be contained in the Yearbook in a useful and standardized format once appropriate and generally applicable criteria for the measurement, reporting and evaluation of relevant internationally comparable data are developed and agreed upon by the United Nations.

The first volume of the Yearbook is under preparation.

84. The Ad Hoc Committee further recommended that the Secretary-General report to the General Assembly on the publication of the Yearbook and, on the basis of that report, the United Nations consider publishing a disarmament periodical in all the working languages of the General Assembly. The periodical would present in highly readable form current facts and developments in the field of disarmament,
such as summaries of new proposals and of important relevant statements and communiqués. It would also contain summaries of in-depth studies undertaken by the United Nations or the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. It should further provide annotated bibliographies and brief summaries of important books and articles on disarmament questions and related matters.

85. As requested by the General Assembly in resolution 31/90, the Secretary-General will report to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session on the implementation of the measures recommended by the Ad Hoc Committee falling within his area of responsibilities.

(f) Preparation of reports and studies

86. One aspect of the functions of the Secretary-General is the preparation, usually at the request of the General Assembly, of reports and studies with regard to disarmament questions dealt with by United Nations organs.

87. In entrusting the Secretary-General with the task of preparing studies dealing with highly complex disarmament questions, the General Assembly has often provided for the appointment of experts by the Secretary-General to assist him in this task. In the past, usually the experts have been appointed to act in their personal capacity, but there have been instances when, at the request of the General Assembly, reports have been prepared by governmental experts.

88. The studies provide an analytical treatment of the subject-matter and contain certain conclusions and recommendations. The following list of studies prepared with the assistance of experts appointed by the Secretary-General provides an indication of the nature and scope of the studies, as well as their frequency:

"The Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament", 1962 (resolution 1516 (XV));

"Effects of the Possible Use of Nuclear Weapons and the Security and Economic Implications for States of the Acquisition and Further Development of the Weapons", 1967 (2162 A (XXI));

"Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use", 1969 (2454 A (XXIII));

"Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures", 1971 (2667 (XXV));

"Disarmament and Development", 1972 (2685 (XXV));

"Factual statement on the great Powers' military presence in the Indian Ocean", 1974 (3080 (XXVIII));

"Reduction of the military budgets of States permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and utilization of part of the funds thus
At its thirtieth session, the General Assembly, by resolution 3462 (XXX), requested the Secretary-General to bring up to date, with the assistance of qualified consultant experts appointed by him, the report entitled Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures, covering the basic topics of that report and taking into account any new developments which he would consider necessary. This report will be issued in August 1977.

The following two reports were prepared with the assistance of governmental experts:

"Napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use", 1972 (2852 (XXVI));

"Comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects", 1975 (3261 F (XXIX)). (Prepared under the auspices of the CCD.)

Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 31/87, a report is being prepared, with the assistance of an intergovernmental group of budgetary experts appointed by the Secretary-General, containing an analysis of the comments provided by States with regard to matters covered in the report "Reduction of military budgets: Measurement and international reporting of military expenditures", in the light of the suggestions contained in that report, as well as any further conclusions and recommendations. As requested by the General Assembly, this report will be distributed not later than 31 August 1977.

The General Assembly, by resolution 2825 C (XXVI), expressed its support for the practice of requesting the Secretary-General to prepare, with the assistance of consultant experts, authoritative reports on concrete questions relating to the arms race and disarmament.

By resolution 31/90, the General Assembly endorsed the recommendation of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Review of the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament that the General Assembly consider making increased use of in-depth studies of the arms race, disarmament and related matters on an ad hoc basis conducted by the Secretary-General with the assistance of qualified experts nominated by Governments and with the assistance, whenever appropriate, from other sources.

(g) Representation at international disarmament conferences

The Secretary-General has represented the Organization at various international conferences related to disarmament. He was also present at ceremonies for the signing of international agreements in the disarmament field.
He has been represented by a personal or special representative at international conferences. A special representative of the Secretary-General is present at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. United Nations delegations have attended such international conferences as the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts.

(h) Functions with regard to disarmament agreements

95. The agreed proposals of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Review of the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament, which were endorsed by General Assembly resolution 31/90, included recommendations on the role of the Secretariat with respect to multilateral disarmament agreements.

96. The Ad Hoc Committee recommended that as a general rule States may request the Secretary-General to assume the depositary role for multilateral disarmament conventions and treaties.

97. It may be noted here that article IX of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques provides that the Convention shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. This is the first multilateral treaty in the field of disarmament that entrusts depositary functions to the Secretary-General. The General Assembly by resolution 31/72, of 10 December 1976, requested the Secretary-General, as Depositary of the Convention, to open it for signature and ratification at the earliest possible date. The Convention will be opened for signature and ratification on 18 May 1977, in Geneva, and 31 May, in New York.

98. The Ad Hoc Committee also recommended that States participating in multilateral and regional negotiations of disarmament agreements give serious consideration to the inclusion of a Review Conference provision and that, in making the necessary preparations for Review Conferences, the States parties consider requesting the United Nations to provide facilities, conference services and other assistance in connexion with such conferences. /7/

99. The Secretariat also performs functions regarding disarmament treaties in conformity with Article 102 of the Charter. Disarmament agreements concluded during the last 30 years have been registered with, and published by, the United Nations.

(i) Public information on disarmament

100. Public information activities relating to disarmament are carried out on a regular basis by the United Nations Centre for Disarmament, the Office of Public

7/ See also under "Review Conferences on multilateral treaties in the field of disarmament".

...
Information, the Centre for Economic and Social Information and, occasionally, by other branches of the Secretariat.

101. In addition, pursuant to specific requests by the General Assembly and other organs, the Secretary-General and the Secretariat have carried out activities regarding public information on disarmament. 8/

102. At the thirty-first session, the General Assembly, by resolution 31/90, endorsed the recommendation of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Review of the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament that the United Nations Secretariat, through the appropriate channels, continue to disseminate to the general public information on disarmament questions and related matters, including information contained in the periodical and the Yearbook.

(j) Relations with non-governmental organizations

103. There are a number of non-governmental organizations active in the field of disarmament. A group of non-governmental organizations at the Geneva Office of the United Nations has established a Special Non-Governmental Organization Committee on Disarmament. Similarly, in New York, a group of non-governmental organizations has established a Non-Governmental Organization Committee on Disarmament.

104. The non-governmental organizations have transmitted to the Secretary-General documents containing their viewpoint on various disarmament issues, declarations and appeals for disarmament, as well as technical studies on disarmament questions. These organizations have invited representatives of the United Nations to attend and address gatherings organized or sponsored by them. The Secretariat has, within the limits of its ability and resources, tried to respond to such requests.

105. The Secretary-General has noticed on several occasions that the United Nations has received much support and encouragement from non-governmental organizations. In the introduction to his annual report on the work of the organization for 1975-1976 (A/31/1/Add.1), he stated:

"It is essential that public opinion in the world should be actively aware of the dangers of present developments in the armaments field and should not adopt a defeatist or fatalistic attitude in the face of the appalling reality of the arms race. Mobilized public opinion has shown itself increasingly effective on a number of important issues in recent years. It seems to me that it is time that world public opinion became far more actively involved in the struggle for disarmament, which may well be a struggle for nothing less than human survival.

"I would therefore suggest that the General Assembly might discuss

8/ For details, see document A/AC.181/3, annex A, para. 90.
various ways in which public concern about disarmament could be stimulated
and channelled in constructive ways. In the light of its universal character
and its recent experience of focusing world public opinion on important
global subjects, the United Nations may well be able to play a major role in
generating a new approach to this most dangerous of all problems. One such
approach lies in the proposal endorsed by the non-aligned countries to
convene a special session of the General Assembly on disarmament."

106. Pursuant to resolution 1739 (LIV) of 4 May 1973, of the Economic and Social
Council, the Secretary-General prepared a report on ways of strengthening
co-operation between non-governmental organizations and the United Nations
(E/C.2/768), which has been under discussion in the Committee on Non-Governmental
Organizations since 1975. In the Introduction to his report, the Secretary-
General states that recent developments indicate that the consultative relationship
with non-governmental organizations can and should be improved, and that the
United Nations is dealing with many new and growing global problems and the
co-operation between non-governmental organizations and the United Nations is even
more vital for the Organization to meet its increased responsibilities and
challenges. The report contains a number of proposals designed "to ensure a more
clearly defined policy and more adequate machinery for liaison with
non-governmental organizations that will create a mutually productive relationship
which better reflects the evolving and expanding roles of both the United Nations
and non-governmental organizations". Among them is a proposal that the
Secretariat undertake, in consultation with the non-governmental community, a
study to determine what provisions might be proposed for non-governmental
organization participation in conferences and meetings called by the General
Assembly.

5. The International Atomic Energy Agency and other
organizations of the United Nations system

107. Article III of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
provides that "each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to
accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded
with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the
International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the
exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed
under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from
peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices ...".

108. Under the agreement governing the relationship between the United Nations and
the IAEA, the Agency shall keep the United Nations informed of its activities.
The Agency shall also consider any resolutions referred to the Agency by the
General Assembly or by a Council of the United Nations.

109. The IAEA submits annual reports to the General Assembly of the United
Nations. The General Assembly, for its part, has adopted every year a resolution
under the IAEA item. Moreover, in several disarmament resolutions, the General
Assembly has addressed itself to the IAEA in connexion with such questions as the...
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the question of peaceful nuclear explosions, the implementation of the results of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, new techniques for uranium enrichment, etc.

110. Other international organizations of the United Nations family have been occasionally involved in disarmament questions. The World Health Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization provided assistance in the preparation of the 1969 report of the Secretary-General on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the effects of their possible use. The World Meteorological Organization has occasionally dealt with disarmament related issues. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, in its publications, has given coverage to disarmament problems.

6. Review Conferences on Multilateral Treaties in the Field of Disarmament

(a) Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

111. Article VIII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons provided for the holding of a Review Conference five years after its entry into force. Accordingly, a Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty met in Geneva from 5 to 30 May 1975 and was attended by 58 States parties to the Treaty, in addition to seven signatory States participating in the Conference without taking part in its decisions, and seven observer States.

112. The Secretary-General, who has been asked by the General Assembly in resolution 3184 B (XXVIII) "to render the necessary assistance ... as may be required for the Review Conference and its preparation", submitted at the invitation of the Preparatory Committee working papers summarizing basic facts which had taken place within the framework of the United Nations in connexion with the realization of the purposes of the Preamble and of the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Preparatory Committee also invited the Secretary-General of the United Nations to nominate, in consultation with the members of the Preparatory Committee, an official to act on behalf of the Committee as provisional Secretary-General of the Review Conference, the nominee to be confirmed by the Review Conference itself. United Nations Secretariat staff was seconded to serve the Review Conference and the Preparatory Committee. The documents of the Conference are in the custody of the archives of the United Nations.

113. The Final Declaration of the Review Conference states the following with respect to article VIII of the Treaty:

"The States Party to the Treaty participating in the Conference propose to the Depositary Governments that a second Conference to review the operation of the Treaty be convened in 1980.

"The Conference accordingly invites States Party to the Treaty which are
Members of the United Nations to request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to include the following item in the provisional agenda of the thirty-third session of the General Assembly: 'Implementation of the conclusions of the first Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and establishment of a preparatory committee for the second Conference.'

(b) Review Conference of the Parties to the Sea-Bed Treaty

114. The Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil thereof provides, in article VII, for a Conference of the Parties to the Treaty to review its operation five years after its entry into force.

115. Pursuant to article VII of the Treaty, a Review Conference of States Parties to the Treaty will be held in Geneva from 20 June to 1 July 1977.

116. At its thirtieth session, in 1975, the General Assembly adopted resolution 3484 E (XXX) by which the General Assembly noted that after appropriate consultation a preparatory committee of the Parties to the Treaty was to be arranged and requested the Secretary-General to render the necessary assistance and services to the Preparatory Committee and the Review Conference.

117. The Preparatory Committee, which met in Geneva from 7 to 11 February 1977, decided to request the Secretary-General to prepare information papers for the Review Conference.

118. The Preparatory Committee also invited the Secretary-General of the United Nations to nominate, in consultation with the members of the Preparatory Committee, an official to act on behalf of the Committee as provisional Secretary-General of the Review Conference, the nominee to be confirmed by the Review Conference itself. United Nations Secretariat staff will be seconded to serve the Review Conference, as was done in the case of the Preparatory Committee.

(c) Review Conference of the Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention

119. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and of their Destruction provides in article VII: "Five years after entry into force of this Convention, or earlier if it is requested by a majority of Parties to the Convention by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, a conference of States parties to the Convention shall be held at Geneva, Switzerland, to review the operation of the Convention, with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention, including the provisions concerning negotiations on chemical weapons, are being realized. Such review shall take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention."
II. OTHER MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL STRUCTURES
IN THE FIELD OF DISARMAMENT

1. Conference of non-aligned countries

120. At every summit conference of non-aligned countries, disarmament questions were discussed and reference to them was made in conference resolutions and declarations.

121. In some instances, the non-aligned countries submitted to the General Assembly disarmament proposals that had been adopted at summit conferences. The Assembly then adopted resolutions on them. For example, at the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries, which met in Cairo in October 1964, a world disarmament conference with the participation of all States was proposed. That Conference also endorsed the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa issued by African Heads of State and Governments held in July 1964. At the initiative of the Non-Aligned Countries, the General Assembly adopted resolutions 2030 (XX) and 2033 (XX) dealing with the world disarmament conference and the denuclearization of Africa respectively.

122. The Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Colombo from 16 to 19 August 1976, called for a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and made specific suggestions in this regard in its declaration and resolution on disarmament. The General Assembly in its resolution on the convening of a special session of the General Assembly made reference to the recommendation of the Colombo Conference (resolution 31/189 B).

2. Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL)

123. The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), which was opened for signature on 14 February 1967, provided for the establishment of an international organization known as the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) and a control system, including IAEA safeguards, to ensure compliance with the Treaty's obligations.

124. The principal organs of OPANAL are the General Conference, the Council and the Secretariat.

125. The Treaty of Tlatelolco contains provisions concerning relations between OPANAL and other international organizations. Article 16, paragraph 8, of the Treaty of Tlatelolco provides that "The General Conference, convened in special session under this article, may make recommendations to the Contracting Parties and submit reports to the Secretary-General of the United Nations to be transmitted to the Security Council and the General Assembly". Article 20, paragraph 2, of the Treaty provides that the General Conference of OPANAL shall report violations of the Treaty which might endanger peace and security to the Security Council and the General Assembly through the Secretary-General of the...
United Nations. Article 30, paragraph 2, provides that notification of denunciation of the Treaty will be communicated by the General Secretary of the Agency, among others, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the information of the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations. Article 31 provides that "this Treaty, of which the Spanish, Chinese, English, French, Portuguese and Russian texts are equally authentic, shall be registered by the Depositary Government in accordance with Article 102 of the United Nations Charter. The Depositary Government shall notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the signatures, ratifications and amendments relating to this Treaty and shall communicate them to the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States for his information".

126. The General Assembly, which in resolution 2286 (XXII), of 5 December 1967, had welcomed with special satisfaction the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America as an event of historic significance in the efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, has adopted since then a number of resolutions on the question of the signature and ratification of Additional Protocols I and II of the Treaty which were opened for signature on 14 February 1967.

3. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)

127. In 1968, the USSR and the United States declared their intention to start bilateral discussions on the "limitation and reduction of both offensive and defensive strategic nuclear-weapon delivery systems and systems of defense against ballistic missiles".

128. The General Assembly has taken an active interest in the strategic arms limitation talks, and has adopted a number of resolutions on the subject.

129. By resolution 2456 D (XXIII), the General Assembly urged the two countries to enter at an early date into bilateral discussions on the limitation of offensive strategic nuclear-weapon delivery systems and systems of defence against ballistic missiles.

130. In 1969, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2602 (XXIV). After noting with satisfaction that, on 17 November 1969, the Governments of the USSR and the United States had initiated bilateral negotiations on the limitation of offensive and defensive strategic nuclear-weapon systems, the General Assembly appealed to the two Governments to agree, as an urgent preliminary measure, on a moratorium on further testing and deployment of new offensive and defensive strategic nuclear-weapon systems.

131. In 1970, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2661 A (XXV) by which, after noting with satisfaction the continuation of the SALT negotiations and expressing the belief that the chances for rapid success in these bilateral talks would increase if the nuclear-weapon Powers halted the development of new weapons, the Assembly urged the nuclear Powers to end the nuclear arms race and to cease all testing and development of nuclear weapon systems.
132. In 1972, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2932 B (XXVII) which, noting with satisfaction the results of SALT I, (a) appealed to the USSR and the United States to expedite further agreements including important qualitative limitations and substantial reductions of strategic weapon systems, and (b) invited the two Governments to keep the General Assembly informed on the progress of their negotiations.

133. In 1973, the General Assembly adopted resolution 3184 A (XXVIII) by which it appealed to the USSR and the United States to bear in mind the necessity and urgency of reaching agreement on important qualitative limitations and substantial reductions of nuclear arms and again invited the two Governments to keep the General Assembly informed in good time of the results of their bilateral talks.

134. In 1974, the General Assembly adopted resolution 3261 C (XXIX) by which the General Assembly shared the concern raised by the USSR and the United States over the gravity of the situation created by existing nuclear arsenals and the continued nuclear arms race; urged these two Powers to broaden the scope and accelerate the pace of their SALT negotiations; stressed once again the necessity and urgency of reaching agreement on important qualitative limitations and substantial reductions of their nuclear-weapon systems, and invited the two Governments to keep the General Assembly informed in good time of the results of their bilateral talks.

135. In 1975, the General Assembly adopted resolution 3484 C (XXX) by which it regretted the lack of positive results at the SALT negotiations during the last two years, expressed its concern over the high numerical ceilings and the absence of qualitative limitations in the Vladivostok Agreement, urged the two Powers concerned to accelerate the talks and reach agreement on important qualitative limitations and substantial reductions in their nuclear arms and again invited them to keep the General Assembly informed.

136. At its thirty-first session, in 1976, the General Assembly adopted resolution 31/189 A, by which it regretted the absence of positive results during the last three years of the SALT negotiations, expressed its concern over the very high numerical ceilings and the absence of qualitative limitations of nuclear arms, urged the Soviet Union and the United States to accelerate the talks and reach agreement on important qualitative limitations and substantial reductions of their nuclear weapons and again invited them to keep the General Assembly informed.

137. Agreements concluded within SALT have been circulated as documents of the United Nations.

4. Mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe

139. Negotiations on the mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe opened in Vienna on 30 October 1973. The following States participated in these negotiations: Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the United States, Bulgaria, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Norway, Romania and Turkey, the last eight States participating with special status.

5. Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe


141. Representatives of the following States participated in the Conference: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Morocco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Yugoslavia.

142. The Final Act of the Conference covered the following main topics: questions relating to security in Europe; co-operation in the field of economics, of science and technology and of the environment; questions relating to security and co-operation in the Mediterranean; and co-operation in humanitarian and other fields.

143. The chapter on questions relating to security in Europe includes a document on confidence building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament, which contains sections on prior notification of major military manoeuvres, prior notification of other military manoeuvres, exchange of observers, prior notification of major military movements, other confidence-building measures, questions relating to disarmament and general considerations.

144. The Final Act envisaged as a follow-up to the Conference the organization of meetings to provide for exchanges of views on the implementation of the Final Act, the improvement of security and development of co-operation in Europe and the development of the process of détente in the future.

145. The first of these meetings will be held in Belgrade in June 1977.

6. Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts

146. The Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts held its first session in Geneva from 20 February to 29 March 1974. The Diplomatic Conference decided to establish, in addition to three main committees to deal with the
revision of the Draft Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, an ad hoc committee to examine the question of the prohibition or restriction of the use of certain categories of conventional weapons that may cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects.

147. In 1973, 1974 and 1975, the General Assembly adopted resolutions on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use, by which it requested the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly on the work of the Diplomatic Conference relevant thereto (resolutions 3076 (XXVIII), 3255 (XXIX) and 3464 (XXX), respectively). Pursuant to these resolutions the Secretary-General submitted reports in 1974, 1975 and 1976.

148. The Conference is attended by a delegation of the United Nations representing the Secretary-General.

7. ICRC Conference of Government Experts

149. The first session of the ICRC Conference of Government Experts on Weapons That May Cause Unnecessary Suffering or Have Indiscriminate Effects, was convened at Lucerne from 24 September to 18 October 1974.

150. The Government experts reviewed, from the military, medical and legal points of view, incendiary weapons; small-calibre, high-velocity projectiles; blast and fragmentation weapons; time-delay weapons; treacherous weapons; and other currently used and new conventional weapons that might cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects. In November 1974, copies of the experts' report were submitted by the International Committee of the Red Cross to the Governments which had participated in the Diplomatic Conference and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. By resolutions 3255 A and B (XXIX), the General Assembly took note of the report of the Conference of Government Experts.

151. In its resolution 3464 (XXX), adopted at the thirtieth session, the General Assembly noted "with satisfaction" that the problem would again be discussed at the 1976 ICRC Conference of Government Experts, "with a view to focusing on such weapons as have been or might become the subject of proposed bans or restrictions and to studying the possibility, contents and form of such proposed bans or restrictions". In its resolution 31/64, of 10 December 1976, the General Assembly made reference to the discussions held by the ICRC Conference of Government Experts at Lugano from 26 January to 26 February 1976.
The Permanent Representative of Italy to the United Nations has the honour to transmit herewith the views of the Italian Government on the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament as contained in a letter dated 18 April 1977 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy, His Excellency Dr. Arnaldo Forlani.
Views of the Italian Government on the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament

1. Italy supports the decision to convene a special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It intends to make a strong and constructive contribution to the session, beginning with the work of the Preparatory Committee. It was in this spirit that Italy co-sponsored resolution 189/B adopted by the General Assembly.

It is in fact Italy's opinion that the continuation of the conventional and nuclear arms race can only contribute to a spiralling increase in international tension, and as such it is a source of deep concern for the future of world peace.

Only the progressive adoption and implementation of disarmament measures - envisaged as steps in a process aimed at general and complete disarmament - can truly strengthen international security, stability and peace.

The present world situation, however, is characterized by a general state of precariousness, the manifestations of which are innumerable, and which engenders in all countries a need for security, resulting in the strengthening of their military forces. Disarmament thus depends primarily on the capacity to gradually overcome this state of affairs, and it is in this respect that the desire for peace of all members of the international community is to be measured in the first place. This de facto situation, moreover, makes it imperative above all to outline, in a responsible and positive way, a serious programme for disarmament, complete in its definition of both steps and goals.

Italy hopes, therefore, that all States will positively commit themselves in a joint effort to this end. Such an effort need not necessarily involve the launching of a new disarmament strategy; it might perhaps prove sufficient to update, in the light of past experience, the content of those relevant documents which still retain their validity. Italy believes, for instance, that the ideas and guidelines contained in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations issued by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1961, and the draft treaties on general and complete disarmament prepared by both the Soviet Union and the United States in 1962, may serve as a useful and valuable point of departure. Italy, however, is ready to consider with interest any other constructive proposal which may be introduced on this subject.

2. The convening of a special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament does indeed fit into this framework, for two reasons: on the one hand, because the principal objective of the United Nations is to promote co-operation among States, and hence peace; and on the other, because disarmament is one of the main instruments for the achievement of these goals.

The work of the special session - which, in Italy's view, is due to take place at a particularly momentous time in world politics - should therefore be based on a factual agenda and organized so as to ensure a brisk pace for its debates. These are, in fact, the fundamental premises for the search and the subsequent adoption of agreed positive conclusions.
In this connexion, Italy feels obliged to insist upon the need for the special session to concentrate on the substance of the issues. The session, in fact, will not have enough time at its disposal to allow for a waste of efforts on sterile debates and arguments. It will be necessary, rather, to examine in depth and in a constructive spirit all proposals on which agreement may be possible.

The work of the Preparatory Committee - of which Italy is a member - will be especially important in this regard, and the outcome of the special session will indeed depend, in large part, on that work. The various issues of disarmament will have to be carefully reviewed in order to ascertain on which of them there is an opportunity to reconcile the various views; to select the most important from among these problems; and to concentrate on the search for generally acceptable solutions to them.

Italy would like to make known its willingness to actively participate in the elaboration of a common basic position on the issues which will have been thus selected.

3. Italy maintains that the halting of the nuclear arms race and the subsequent reduction of nuclear stockpiles, under effective international controls capable of guaranteeing the security of all States, is one of the major issues among those to be dealt with by the special session.

In this regard, it is not possible to ignore the special responsibility incumbent upon the nuclear-weapon States. These States are, in fact, in a position to make a decisive contribution to the cause of both disarmament and non-proliferation. In the field of disarmament, they must make the greatest possible efforts to reach agreements satisfying not only their own mutual security requirements, but also and above all, those for the security and peace of all the world's peoples. In regard to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, Italy believes that the Non-Proliferation Treaty remains the cornerstone of the system, and therefore the main point of reference for defining the rights of the nuclear-weapon States, as well as their duties, which must not be overlooked; for instance, the possibility of utilizing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes must be guaranteed to all States.

4. As for conventional weapons, whose progressive reduction should parallel that of nuclear armaments - and, in particular, their transfer and trade - it may be appropriate to recall a proposal introduced by Ambassador Vinci at the Conference on Human Survival in 1970.

That proposal, which was to be a part of a comprehensive programme for general and complete disarmament and which was meant as a plan of action to parallel that aimed at nuclear disarmament, provided for the establishment, under the guidance and control of the Security Council, of a Committee composed of representatives of the countries which are the major manufacturers and suppliers of conventional weapons. Sub-committees, each with a competence for a specific geographical area, were, according to the proposal, to have been entrusted with the task of maintaining the level of conventional weaponry at the lowest possible point. Moreover, negotiations were to have been initiated for the establishment
of a system of collective security, under which a permanent military force would be assigned to the United Nations - namely, to the Security Council - and would be used to prevent outbreaks of hostilities and, in general, to carry out all the decisions of the Council regarding the maintenance of peace and international security.

5. The persistent lack of a disarmament treaty on chemical and biological weapons is another source of concern. The intrinsic, proven capacity of these weapons for mass destruction and their easy storage; the continuous progress being made in the field of chemical research; and the subsequent potential applications of such research to the military sector all show that a ban on these weapons cannot be further postponed. Italy considers that the special session should play a major role in promoting an agreement on this issue. It would, of course, be preferable if the session itself could finalize such an agreement, the draft of which might be prepared, in the meantime, by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD).

6. Nor should subjects of a more general nature be ignored; such as, for example, the strengthening on the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, and the role of the CCD.

Italy took part in and made its own specific contribution to the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Strengthening of the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament, and subsequently co-sponsored the pertinent resolution. The Italian Government, however, does not feel that the General Assembly can act as a substitute for the existing specialized negotiating fora, because its present structure, even if reinforced, does not seem suited to such a purpose. An exception may perhaps be the case of ad hoc special sessions devoted to very broad issues, but such sessions are certainly not easy to convene and to organize. The United Nations, however, has the knowledge and expertise needed to play a primary role in the creation of a general framework for debates, in the elaboration of broad political options, and in promoting a favourable climate for negotiations. Such a role would constitute a major political factor in the negotiations which would follow in the appropriate fora. In this context, the possibility for the special session to issue a general policy statement might be taken into consideration.

The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is still a highly useful negotiating body: in several respects, it is indispensable. In the course of its sessions the CCD accomplishes an impressive amount of work which, for its technical complexity and political implications, can hardly be performed elsewhere. This does not mean, of course, that there is not some margin for improvement in the current structure, procedures, and organization of that body.

7. Among the goals of the special session, that of mobilizing world public opinion should not be overlooked. This is an end, as well as a means: it is an end, because public opinion must be made aware of the problems, and at the same time of the prospects, which disarmament can provide; it is a means, since the impact of public opinion may help to overcome certain obstacles which have so far been...
considered insurmountable. It might therefore prove advisable to allow non-governmental organizations and research institutes to make their contribution to the work of the special session, through the Secretariat and the Preparatory Committee.

8. In conclusion, Italy maintains that the special session should undertake, first of all, a comprehensive review of the numerous problems of a general nature which the United Nations, as such, is prepared to face in the field of disarmament: it will be necessary, in this regard, to reach a decision on the nature of the role to be played by the United Nations and on the instruments required for strengthening that role, also in connexion with concrete initiatives aimed at halting the arms race. Secondly, the special session should concentrate on those specific issues related to disarmament, previously singled out by the Preparatory Committee as requiring priority attention in view of their acknowledged political relevance and urgency.
The Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and, in respect of the terms of paragraph 2 of General Assembly resolution 31/189 B whereby an invitation is extended to Member States to convey to the Secretary-General views on the agenda and all other relevant questions relating to the special session on disarmament, has the honour to convey the attached comments to the Secretary-General.
The promotion of measures to achieve the reduction or control of nuclear and conventional armaments is directly related to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the prospects for maintaining a viable international order. The convening of a special session of the General Assembly on disarmament is a reflection of the sense of urgency felt by many countries that arms control measures should demand the increasing attention of the international community. Australia shares this concern, which is why it co-sponsored resolution 31/189 B and is playing an active role in the Preparatory Committee for the special session.

General comments

The goal of arms limitation has been an elusive one. While there have been a number of notable achievements - for example, the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons - over-all progress has been slow and limited. Universal acceptance of those agreements that have been successfully negotiated has been difficult to secure. The continued growth of military expenditures and levels of armaments is, however, to an important extent a reflection of the continuing uncertainties and instabilities in an international situation which has been subject to far-reaching changes and tensions over the last 30 years. Governments have therefore remained heavily preoccupied with real and perceived threats to their security. It is nevertheless true that some countries have developed their military forces and armaments beyond the levels required for defensive purposes.

Moreover, since the Second World War, the world has witnessed a tremendous growth in the sophistication of military technology and weaponry at both the nuclear and conventional levels. This ongoing revolution has added greatly to the complexities of arms control, has sometimes threatened the limited progress already accomplished and on occasion has stimulated wasteful and threatening arms races.

These considerations have direct relevance for the manner in which the international community approaches arms limitation. There is a need to establish what limitations should seek to achieve and what can be realistically accomplished. The principle of general and complete disarmament will remain the ultimate objective, but it is not a realistic goal in the time-span which should be encompassed by current efforts. Nations will for the foreseeable future, continue to maintain military forces and must have a reasonable capacity to ensure their self-defence. In these circumstances, the more immediate objective of arms control should be to assure greater stability in international relations and to minimize the risk of conflict.

Controlling the growth of armaments must be related to the underlying sources of insecurity and conflict which create the demand for weapons. Whether carried out...
in a bilateral or multilateral context, the regulation of weaponry needs to be
directed to the elimination, or at least the alleviation, of actual or potential
destabilizing situations as represented, for example, by the proliferation of
nuclear weapons. Arms control efforts should also recognize, inter alia, the
importance of strictly defensive postures and of military balances, the role of
deterrence in preventing conflict, the limitation of damage and lessening the
risks to civilians should conflict occur.

**Enunciation of principles**

Australia considers that one of the principal tasks confronting the special
session should be a discussion of the kind of principles suggested above with the
end in mind of seeking to secure a realistic conceptual framework within which
arms control issues are approached and negotiations conducted. This could be
combined with an objective review of past negotiations and statements of principle
and an appraisal of the current situation in regard to arms control measures. The
results of this consideration might be incorporated in a declaration of principles
to be adopted by the special session. Australia believes that effective
conclusions in this area would make a major contribution to the clarification of
arms control objectives.

**Establishment of priorities**

A second major goal of the special session should be the identification of
particular areas of arms limitation where action is required or desirable and the
establishment of priorities for future negotiations. Australia does not consider
that it would be practical for the session to attempt to negotiate any specific
arms control measures. The time available will be short. Moreover, important
negotiations are being conducted in other forums and in bilateral and regional
contexts, which should not be prejudiced. There may also be difficulties in
seeking to establish a firm time-table for negotiations on disarmament priorities.
While urgency is enjoined by the importance of achieving further arms limitation
measures, progress on many issues will be largely dependent on the resolution of
problems between the major Powers, which will not be advanced by the setting of
artificial time-limits or frames. Australia believes that the setting of
priorities by the session will be a satisfactory catalyst in promoting meaningful
negotiations in particular areas of concern to the international community.

Of all arms control issues, those concerning nuclear weapons have rightly been
at the centre of international efforts. It will be incumbent on the special
session to give major attention to nuclear issues. Australia has many times
reiterated that there are three fundamental areas of nuclear arms control where it
looks for early progress: first, the strengthening of measures to prevent the
proliferation of nuclear weapons; second, the termination of nuclear weapons
testing in all environments; and third, further progress in the strategic arms
limitation talks between the United States and the Soviet Union.

All three areas involve complex political and technical considerations, the
detail of which will be best left to the expert forums that are dealing with them.
The special session might rather address itself to basic principles and guidelines that are likely to promote the goal of nuclear arms control. For example, it might wish to endorse the essential elements of an effective comprehensive test ban treaty and how early agreement can best be facilitated. Or it might wish to give attention to the international obligations of the major nuclear-weapons Powers to curb their strategic arsenals and to particular areas and aspects of strategic arms control which, while enormously complex, would have to be confronted if substantial and balanced reductions are to be achieved.

It is to be hoped that before the special session convenes efforts to curb the nuclear arms race will have gained sufficient impetus for at least equal attention to be given to the need for parallel advances in the quest for a strengthened régime against the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries. Australia's commitment to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty is well known. The special session should seek to promote the view that "horizontal" non-proliferation is an objective to which all States should subscribe and that all have obligations and responsibilities in furthering that objective. The non-proliferation question raises many important issues, in particular in regard to controls and safeguards on the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, which are now being extensively discussed in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other contexts. The special session might seek to address the basis on which an effective non-proliferation régime can be built. For example, in addition to the clear need for strengthened safeguards and controls on nuclear materials, equipment and technology, such a régime should hold out incentives for co-operation and ensure that self-denial of a weapons option will not inhibit a country's wish to develop nuclear power for peaceful purposes. There must also be adequate security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.

With regard to the regulation of conventional armaments, the special session might wish to address itself to whether a conceptual framework can be identified. A number of approaches to arms control which have been suggested include: curbing the development of new weapons, prohibiting or restricting certain weapons which may be indiscriminate or cause unnecessary suffering; reductions of military budgets; and the possibilities of regional states taking the initiative in promoting regional arms control proposals. Stemming from consideration of such approaches, the session might seek to establish certain priorities for meaningful negotiations on particular areas of conventional arms control or particular categories of weaponry.

Another field to which the session might give attention is that of the strengthening of international security and the relaxation of tensions by "confidence-building" measures. Matters such as better communications between States in potentially hostile situations and prior notification of major military manoeuvres or movements and weapons testing could be considered here.
Review of disarmament machinery

The third principal area which should be dealt with by the special session is that of a review of the international disarmament negotiating machinery. The disarmament machinery of the United Nations has undergone an evolutionary process over the years; the present bodies have developed an expertise which could be lost in any restructuring process that does not adequately take into account the many intricate factors that have of necessity influenced the nature of the present machinery. Moreover, no single negotiating body can or should fulfil the objective of arriving at specific arms control agreements. Indeed, it is Australia's view that the basis for many such agreements can only be negotiated directly between the States concerned. Australia recognizes the need for a smaller negotiating body reporting to the General Assembly, such as the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, to assist in the negotiation of specific multilateral agreements. To function effectively, however, such a body must be so constituted and of such a size as to reflect a proper diversity of interests and must enjoy the total confidence of all members of the international community, including all the nuclear weapon States. Australia also recognizes that on occasion other bodies of either a standing or an ad hoc nature may be more appropriate to deal with specific issues. It is hoped that the special session will reach an appropriate consensus if it is agreed that there is a need to restructure the international disarmament negotiating machinery.

Organizational matters

With regard to the organization of the special session, Australia believes that it will be necessary to establish a committee structure to make the most effective use of time. This structure could correspond with the three main areas of possible action identified by Australia: (a) examination of fundamental principles of arms control and preparation of a declaration embodying these; (b) establishment of priorities, and (c) review of the international disarmament negotiating machinery. The plenary of the session could then be utilized for a general debate and for consideration of the reports of the committees.

Australia considers that, to the maximum extent possible, decisions of the session should be taken by consensus. Realism should be the keynote of the meeting which dictates against the use of voting majorities to impose decisions which may be unacceptable to significant minorities and thus unlikely to advance the cause of arms control.

In short, the special session can be a major milestone in an effort to promote more meaningful negotiations on a variety of arms limitation questions and thus to enhance international peace and security. To achieve this, however, all countries must be prepared to approach the meeting in a constructive manner, free from polemics and from attempts to apportion blame for past failures and to impose unreasonable panaceas.
Note verbale dated 26 April 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Mexico to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.

The Permanent Representative of Mexico to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and, in reference to note OR 421/6(3) dated 28 January 1977, has the honour to transmit herewith the views of the Government of Mexico on the agenda and other relevant questions relating to the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.
1. At its 106th plenary meeting, on 21 December 1976, the United Nations General Assembly adopted by consensus resolution 31/189 B, whereby it decided to convene a special session of the Assembly devoted to disarmament, to be held in New York in May/June 1978.

2. The resolution included an invitation to "all Member States" to communicate to the Secretary-General not later than 15 April 1977 "their views on the agenda and all other relevant questions" relating to the special session of the General Assembly.

3. The purpose of this memorandum is to respond to the invitation of the General Assembly by outlining the views of the Government of Mexico on the agenda, on the question as a whole and on the following specific subjects: (1) main objectives; (2) preparatory work; (3) agenda; (4) organization of work; (5) final document and (6) final considerations.

1. Main objectives

4. In the light of the situation created by the unwillingness of the nuclear-weapon States to adopt genuine disarmament measures of any kind, it has become clear in the past decade that the United Nations machinery for disarmament is grossly ineffective, especially in enabling all the world's peoples - which, as the General Assembly has stated in numerous resolutions, have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations - to make an effective contribution in this field which is of such importance to them, since, in the final analysis, it is their own survival that may be at stake.

5. The General Assembly, to be sure, meets each year. However, as has previously been pointed out, its agenda is always crowded with items relating to a wide variety of issues. Since the agenda items relating to disarmament are engulfed by more than 100 other items, their importance naturally cannot be correctly appreciated and it is impossible for them to receive the consideration which they merit within the First Committee. After four or five weeks of hurried debate, in which, in order to save time, the items are considered together and not separately, the Assembly is reduced to approving a series of somewhat routine resolutions, much like those adopted in previous years, almost every one of which, despite their tone of deep concern, justifiable alarm or serious urgency, are treated with inertia, resignation or neglect in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

6. For this reason, the non-aligned countries have, for the past five years, been seeking to bring about the convening of a World Disarmament Conference, whose main objective, as stated at the outset, would be to foster the chances of effective action by the United Nations in this most important area by supplementing the existing machinery of the United Nations with the concept of a World Disarmament Conference.
existing international machinery with a body having universal membership which should meet every three or four years and which, without lessening the supremacy of the Assembly, to which it would be subordinate, would play a role in disarmament analogous to the role the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) plays in economic and social affairs.

7. The Government of Mexico remains convinced that the institutionalization of a World Disarmament Conference, open to participation by all States without exception and meeting for two or three months every three or four years, as indicated above, would-as the Government of Mexico stated five years ago-serve to fill an obvious void and provide inestimable assistance to the Assembly in adequately fulfilling its responsibilities. The Conference would be given responsibility, inter alia, for carefully assessing the implementation of General Assembly resolutions, evaluating objectively the progress made in the field of disarmament, comparing the development of weapons with the progress of disarmament and taking the decisions it deems necessary in the light of its work.

8. In view of the impossibility of achieving any progress in the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference, Mexico has for several years endorsed the idea of holding a special session of the General Assembly, and on 30 October 1975 it expressed the view that if in 1976 it should not be possible to make genuine progress towards the convening of a World Disarmament Conference, it would be necessary for the Assembly at its thirty-first regular session to decide to convene a special session for the purpose of considering, among other urgent disarmament questions, the question of convening the proposed World Conference.

9. In the Political Declaration adopted by the Colombo Summit Conference held in August 1976, the non-aligned countries recommended the convening of a special session "as early as possible and not later than 1978". In the same section of the Declaration they also recommended that the agenda of the special session should include "a review of the problem of disarmament", "the promotion and elaboration of a programme of priorities and recommendations in the field of disarmament" and "the question of convening a World Disarmament Conference".

10. In approving resolution 31/189 B on 21 December 1976, the General Assembly endorsed the recommendation of the non-aligned countries.

2. Preparatory work

11. The Government of Mexico is convinced that the success of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament will depend largely on the work done by its Preparatory Committee. Among other things, the Committee should request the Secretary-General to prepare as working papers a number of authoritative studies on the background and most relevant aspects of disarmament and the nuclear arms race; the studies should be ready sufficiently in advance of the last meeting of the Committee, and after considering them, the Committee should transmit them to the General Assembly itself at its special session. Such studies might deal, inter alia, with the following subjects:
(1) A synopsis of the work done by the United Nations in the field of disarmament;

(2) A comparative study of the scope originally proposed or aimed at in draft multilateral disarmament treaties of a universal character concluded under United Nations auspices and the scope finally fixed in those treaties, including the contemplated measures for expanding that scope;

(3) A comprehensive study of official proposals or declarations made and decisions taken by the General Assembly on the procedure of unilateral or negotiated moratoria as a provisional measure for the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, as well as their application by any State;

(4) A synthesis of the arguments adduced for and against each of the four proposals for the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones that have been included in the General Assembly's agenda (Africa, South Asia, the Middle East and the South Pacific) and for and against the proposal for the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean, including a subject index and a country index;

(5) A comprehensive study of the origin, development and present status of proposals for the prohibition of the first use of nuclear weapons;

(6) A list of bilateral or multilateral meetings on disarmament held outside the United Nations since 1945, with an indication of the procedures followed in each case to keep the Organization informed;

(7) An analytical summary of studies describing the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, bacteriological (biological) weapons and napalm and other incendiary weapons;

(8) Parallel lists of military expenditures since 1945 and the possible significance of such expenditures in the economic and social field;

(9) An analytical list of the agreements concluded in the bilateral talks known by the acronym SALT; and

(10) A descriptive report on the human and material resources available to the United Nations Secretariat for its work on disarmament and on the organization of that work.

12. Other tasks which it would be desirable for the Preparatory Committee to carry out would be those of preparing recommendations for submission to the General Assembly on the three subjects dealt with in the three following sections of this memorandum, namely, the agenda, the organization of work and the final document.

13. Since the work of the special session of the General Assembly and of its Preparatory Committee will be governed by the rules of procedure of the Assembly itself, the Government of Mexico is convinced that the work of the Preparatory Committee will be relatively expeditious.
14. Lastly, it would be very important for the Preparatory Committee to endeavour to keep both non-governmental organizations and the press fully informed of the progress of its work, in order that they might help make world public opinion aware from now on of how important it is to mankind to ensure the success of the special session of the General Assembly.

3. Agenda

15. The agenda of the special session of the General Assembly might include, in addition to the usual items such as the election of the President and the Vice-Presidents and the appointment of the Credentials Committee, the following items:

- Report of the Preparatory Committee (which should include as annexes all the reports requested of the Secretary-General and specified in the preceding section);
- General debate;
- Approval of a Declaration and a Programme of Action, including the adoption of such provisions as may appear advisable in order to ensure that the documents are fully implemented.

4. Organization of work

16. During the special session of the General Assembly there should be established two main committees, which will be entrusted with preparing the Declaration and the Programme of Action respectively.

17. From the foregoing it will be clear that the General Committee at the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament will, as at regular sessions, consist of the President of the General Assembly, who will act as its Chairman, the 17 Vice-Presidents and the Chairmen of the two main committees.

5. Final document

18. The Declaration to be approved by the General Assembly at its special session should contain an assessment of the role played by the United Nations in disarmament and a balance-sheet of the results achieved. In that connexion, emphasis should be placed on the purposes and objectives fixed by the General Assembly in connexion with the Disarmament Decade.

19. The Declaration should enunciate the principles which are to govern disarmament negotiations, taking as a point of departure the September 1961 joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations, and taking account of the obligations undertaken in various treaties on disarmament and the relevant resolutions of the United Nations, as well as any new factors that may arise from...
the deliberations of the special session. It should be reaffirmed that the highest priority must be given to disarmament measures relating to nuclear weapons and that a high priority should be given to the question of eliminating chemical weapons.

20. In the Programme of Action to be adopted, it would be desirable to specify the measures aimed at halting the arms race, which could be included in a comprehensive disarmament programme.

21. The Programme of Action might include a series of practical recommendations aimed at strengthening the role of the United Nations in the disarmament field, through measures which will go beyond the very timid ones submitted to the General Assembly at its third, first session by the Ad Hoc Committee which dealt with the matter.

22. As a result of the examination of the structure and procedures of disarmament organizations as a whole, the General Assembly might make a statement concerning the future role of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. It might also make specific recommendations aimed at improving the organization and procedures of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

23. Because of the increased number of disarmament items on the General Assembly's agenda and the growing complexity of those items, it is advisable that:

(1) States Members of the Organization should consider the possibility of increasing their personnel, both at their permanent missions and in their respective ministries, for the careful examination required by those items;

(2) The States members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament that have not yet established at Geneva permanent delegations to the Committee adequately staffed with suitable personnel should consider the desirability of doing so as soon as possible;

(3) Attention should be given to the possibility of assigning to the First Committee solely and exclusively those agenda items which relate to international security and disarmament, in order that they might be given more attention and more complete treatment.

6. Final considerations

24. The special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament represents an excellent opportunity for the international community to concentrate its efforts on a subject of vital interest to all peoples. It will serve as a stimulus to States Members of the United Nations to redouble their efforts in that field. It will also serve to intensify the interest of world public opinion.
Letter dated 29 April 1977 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have been asked by my Government to convey to Your Excellency the following message:

Resolution 31/109 B of the thirty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly invited all Member States to communicate to Your Excellency their views on the agenda and all other relevant questions relating to the special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, which is due to be held in New York in May/June 1978. The following are the views of the United Kingdom Government.

1. Progress towards multilateral disarmament is essential to lessen the risk of military confrontation and to strengthen international peace and security. The United Kingdom Government believe that effective multilateral disarmament will give equal or greater security at a reduced level of armaments, pave the way towards the ultimate achievement of general and complete disarmament and release more resources for important social and economic needs.

2. The United Kingdom Government have for many years been committed to the achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. However, the level of international confidence has not permitted direct progress to that objective. By general consent the international community has worked for a series of intermediate steps designed to reduce the level of armaments and to increase international confidence. The United Kingdom Government have participated in all the major multilateral disarmament conferences since 1945, and have ratified all the arms control and disarmament treaties which these conferences have produced.

3. The United Kingdom Government wish to see a successful outcome to the special session on disarmament and are pledged to play a constructive part in the session's preparation. They believe that the special session could enhance the prospects for disarmament, provided that it is thoroughly prepared and widely attended, particularly by all significant military powers.

77-06656
4. The special session will provide the first occasion in recent years when disarmament in all its aspects will be a major focus of international public attention. The United Kingdom Government therefore believe that it is important for any proposals advanced at the session to be carefully considered, if the session is to avoid arousing false hopes and expectations leading to public disillusionment and frustration.

5. The special session will require a common recognition of the limitations of what can be achieved at one conference of limited duration. Because of the profound importance and complexity of the issues, effective disarmament measures require expert study and patient international negotiation. Accordingly, the United Kingdom Government do not expect the special session to negotiate arms control agreements or to resolve longstanding problems immediately but they believe its purpose should be to give an impulse to multilateral, regional and bilateral negotiations. However, they hope that it will be possible for the special session to reach agreement on the general principles for effective measures of disarmament, which will also indicate the priorities for negotiation.

6. The United Kingdom Government believe that the following could form the framework of the special session's agenda:

   (1) Review of achievements to date: and identification of the main sectors (nuclear and conventional, global and regional), where further action is necessary.

   (2) Discussion of general principles which should govern the approach to such action, taking into account the practical experience gained in previous disarmament negotiations.

   (3) Adoption of general priorities for action, with broad indications of what might best be dealt with multilaterally, regionally or bilaterally.

   (4) Examination of disarmament machinery, including the role of the United Nations.

7. The United Kingdom believe that the greatest assistance which the special session could give towards the achievement of disarmament would be to further a climate in which mutual international confidence will be increased. For it is by increasing mutual confidence, rather than by proposing any fundamental change in the machinery of disarmament, that the special session can chart a practicable and realistic course forward.

(Signed) Ivor RICHARD
I have the honour, pursuant to operative paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 31/189 B, to transmit to you herewith a letter by H.E. Mr. Petar Mladenov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria, whereby he states the views of my Government on the Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations Devoted to Disarmament.

I kindly request the circulation of this letter as an official document of the General Assembly.

(Signed) Dr. Alexander YANKOV
Ambassador, Deputy Foreign Minister,
Permanent Representative of
Bulgaria to the United Nations
Letter dated 6 April 1977 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria addressed to the Secretary-General

The Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria attaches exceptional significance to the struggle for the cessation of the arms race and for disarmament with the ultimate aim of achieving general and complete disarmament under strict international supervision. Together with the other countries of the socialist community, the People's Republic of Bulgaria is doing everything it can to achieve decisive progress in that field, to overcome the obstacles which some forces have placed in the way of disarmament, and to strengthen and deepen the détente which has been achieved in the political field by détente in the military field.

The results of the efforts made to date are well known - a number of international treaties and bilateral agreements have been concluded on various questions of disarmament and this undoubtedly represents considerable success. The fact remains, however, that the arms race in the world has still not been checked and the danger of war has not been completely eliminated. This arouses grave concern among all peoples. For this reason, the proposal of the Government of the USSR concerning the convening of a World Disarmament Conference has found support among the overwhelming majority of States Members of the United Nations. At such a conference, at which all countries, including the nuclear-weapon States, would participate, the problem of disarmament could be considered fully and the most effective ways of solving it could be studied. Unfortunately, despite many resolutions of the General Assembly, it has so far been impossible to convene that conference because of the attitude of some nuclear States towards it.

The decision by the General Assembly at its thirty-first session to convene a special session devoted to disarmament in 1978 was adopted on the full understanding that that session was not to take the place of the World Disarmament Conference. The majority of delegations, including the Bulgarian delegation, which supported the proposal for the convening of a special session, regarded it as a step towards the convening of the World Disarmament Conference.

In view of the foregoing, the People's Republic of Bulgaria considers that, in preparing the agenda for the session, the Preparatory Committee should take into account the need to ensure all the conditions necessary for the fruitful consideration of the question of the subsequent convening at an early date of the World Disarmament Conference. In addition to solving this fundamental problem, it would be advisable at that session to review the whole problem of disarmament in all its aspects, and, on the basis of that review, to prepare and adopt a final document reflecting the agreed views of States participating in the session. The decisions taken on these questions should give fresh impetus to the work of the specialized organs and forums on disarmament already established at the international level, in particular the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

To hold a special session of the General Assembly which achieves results would have enormous significance. That, however, is not an easy task. In view of the fact that it involves extremely important aspects of the security of States, the successful preparation and implementation of this complex undertaking will depend...
on the spirit of constructive co-operation shown by all countries, in particular by those States which are militarily most important. Unless the decisions concerning the preparation of the session and the recommendations of the session itself are adopted by general agreement, including the agreement of those States which bear the primary responsibility for peace and the security of peoples and which are expected to make the most significant contribution to the implementation of disarmament measures, it can hardly be expected that those decisions will lead to genuine results. The People's Republic of Bulgaria considers that the effectiveness of the work of the special session will depend to a great extent on whether this important aspect will be accurately reflected in the work of the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session.

As is generally known, during the consultations concerning the establishment of the Preparatory Committee, the Group of European socialist countries expressed disagreement with the method of allocation of seats in that body and stated that it would continue to insist on broader participation in view of the genuine role which the European socialist countries are playing in the struggle to limit armaments and bring about disarmament. As one of the countries nominated by that Group to participate in the Preparatory Committee, the People's Republic of Bulgaria expresses the hope that at the thirty-second session of the General Assembly the question of enlarging the participation of the socialist countries in the Committee will be settled correctly in the interests of the successful convening of the special session and the cause of peace and disarmament.

(Signed) Petar MLADENOV
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the People's Republic of Bulgaria
The Permanent Representative of Ireland to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to refer to the latter's Note No. 421/G(3) of 28 January 1977 regarding the forthcoming special session of the General Assembly to be devoted to disarmament. In reply, the Permanent Representative has the honour to furnish the following views of the Government of Ireland in accordance with paragraph 3 of resolution 31/189 B adopted by the General Assembly on 21 December 1976:

The Government of Ireland have sought over the years, within the United Nations, to encourage and promote efforts towards arms control and disarmament. They recognize that there are no easy solutions to the problems involved. Progress in disarmament is intimately linked to the climate of international relations. The degree of international mistrust, the nature and level of the perceived threat, the need felt to guarantee against any diminution of security, the military options and dilemmas made possible by technological advances and competition, all serve to constrain both the pace and scope of concrete disarmament negotiations. Moreover, the very complexity of the issues to be resolved makes it essential that negotiation be both painstaking and exhaustive.

Nevertheless, the limited progress in resolving issues which have been under study, debate or negotiation for almost a decade is rightly a cause of grave international concern. The arms race in both nuclear and conventional armaments has continued unabated throughout the present disarmament decade. New technologies have created new problems and new rivalries, and the growing and uncontrolled international trade in conventional arms risks exacerbating regional tensions.

Within the United Nations, the varying emphasis and approaches of the Member States and the range of issues currently arising have led to a lack of precision as to where the priority objectives in arms control and disarmament
lie. There is, therefore, a need for the international community to take stock of the over-all situation with a view to defining the priority objectives and identifying ways and means of progressing towards them. It was from this perspective that Ireland welcomed and supported the proposal made at the thirty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly to convene a special session devoted to questions of disarmament.

The special session should not entail either generalized rhetoric or detailed technical negotiations. Clearly, it cannot be called on to duplicate the activities of existing forums for the concrete negotiation of arms limitation and disarmament agreements. However, the session must have a practical outcome if it is to focus international attention on the main issues in disarmament and encourage progress towards their resolution. Careful and thorough preparation is therefore important.

The preparatory meetings should aim to elaborate a precise and realistic agenda: committees could be envisaged to facilitate detailed discussion of the agenda and the general debate could be kept reasonably short. The rule of consensus should prevail in the decisions of the session so as to ensure that its conclusions are shared by all the participating States and to obviate the risk that they might emerge as a source of controversy and division in the future. However, if the session is to succeed, it is important that all major powers participate actively and at all levels in its deliberations. The association of non-governmental organizations active in the field of disarmament with the work of the session could help to ensure that public opinion remains closely informed of the issues involved.

Although the special session will necessarily need to engage in a general review of the progress achieved to date in the field of arms control and disarmament and of the current state of negotiations in this field, it is to be hoped that its main emphasis will be prospective rather than retrospective. In this connexion, a fundamental objective should be the elaboration of a future programme of disarmament measures within which would be clearly identified the priority goals.

If such a programme is to remain at the centre of the disarmament negotiating process in the future, it must be based on realistic assessment of both the possibilities and limitations of that process. In particular, it will be necessary to take account of the fact that States are limited in the range of measures on which they can negotiate simultaneously and are unlikely to subject what they see as vital security interests to the pressure of rigid time constraints. Accordingly, in formulating, in particular, the short-term objectives, it seems important to aim for what is realistically attainable and reasonable to expect rather than what one would wish ideally to see achieved. It will also be necessary to distinguish between measures appropriate for realization at the broad multilateral level and those which lend themselves to implementation at the regional or bilateral level.

Within the programme, the Irish Government would hope that high priority will be assigned to the following issues:
(1) Nuclear armaments: the continuing problems of proliferation, the need for a comprehensive test ban treaty and, as an interim measure, an agreed moratorium by the two major nuclear Powers on all nuclear weapons tests: the need for early progress towards the reduction of nuclear weapons systems and progress on agreed systems of control and verification.

(2) Other weapons of mass destruction: in particular the question of a chemical weapons treaty already under discussion in the CCD.

(3) Conventional weapons: regulation of trade in conventional armaments: control of such armaments at the regional level.

In conjunction with the elaboration of a programme of disarmament measures, the session should also seek to formulate the broad principles which will guide future efforts towards disarmament. In this respect, it will be desirable and useful to draw on the experience gained from past negotiations and on the relevant international documents, understandings and agreements.

The decision to convene the special session serves in itself to emphasize the important role which the United Nations has in the disarmament process and in turn the decisions of the session should enhance that role. In this connexion, resolution 31/90 (XXXI) of the General Assembly and the conclusions of the Ad Hoc Committee which met in 1976, offer a useful basis for further follow-up discussion of the United Nations role at the session. The regular sessions of the General Assembly will, of course, allow for a continuing review of progress made in implementing the decisions of the special session. The special session should also examine ways and means of strengthening the role of the CCD as the principle existing forum for detailed multilateral negotiation of arms control and disarmament questions, including the desirability of all nuclear Powers associating themselves with its important work.

The Irish Government believe that disarmament can be a vital factor in the restructuring of the world order, politically, economically and socially. If, therefore, the special session can encourage progress towards arms control and disarmament, it will have helped to stem the massive and increasing diversion of scarce resources to programmes of military expenditure and thus make possible their redirection to the urgent tasks of economic construction and development. Not least for this reason, it is important that the special session should succeed.
Note verbale dated 2 May 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

The Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and, in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 31/189 B, has the honour to convey the views of the Government of Israel on the proposed special session of the General Assembly on disarmament.

Israel supported resolution 31/189 B and welcomes the convening of the special session as it has consistently, throughout the years, supported international initiatives aimed at achieving a reduction of armaments on a global scale. In so doing, Israel has been acting in accordance with the age-old yearning of the Jewish people for universal peace, first proclaimed by its prophets. Isaiah's vision of peace and disarmament is inscribed in stone facing the Headquarters of the United Nations. Peace and disarmament are for every Israeli not an abstract notion but an urgent need, a tangible necessity for Israelis of all political persuasions.

Israel's approach to the question of disarmament has been defined at the United Nations more than once. In the general debate at the thirty-first session of the General Assembly the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Yigal Allon, said:

"In my speech last year I drew attention to a problem of particular gravity for the prospects of peace as well as for the economic and social well-being of the countries of the Middle East. I refer to the seemingly limitless flow of weapons of war into the region, resulting in a frantic arms race. In the past three years the value of arms supplies delivered by both east and west to the Arab countries in the vicinity of Israel is estimated at 7.5 billion dollars. A further approximately 22 billion dollars-worth is contracted for delivery from the end of 1976 onwards, making a total of nearly 30 billion dollars invested in weaponry. This is an utterly staggering sum which is difficult for the human mind to take in. If, instead of being spent on means of destruction, most of this sum was..."
invested in the economic and social development of the area, the Middle East would be transformed and restored to its ancient glory".

The Minister went on to say:

"We repeat emphatically that we are prepared now, even before peace is made, to negotiate with our neighbours for a balanced limitation in the inflow of arms into the area in such a manner that the burden will be lightened for all, without adversely affecting the security and the defence capacity of any" (A/31/PV.22, p. 62).

It will be convenient to summarize here some of the principal points of Israel's position on the subject:

(a) The role of the United Nations is essentially one of creating an atmosphere in which disarmament negotiations can be advanced, it being understood and accepted that concrete measures cannot be taken except by agreements resulting from detailed negotiations between Governments;

(b) The importance of educating world public opinion, particularly among the rising generation, about the dangers inherent in the armament race and the efforts made by the international community to achieve general disarmament;

(c) Disarmament and arms control measures are not only of concern to major Powers on a global level, but are also of vital interest to small countries in the regional context. Constant endeavours should, therefore, be made to promote local and regional agreements between Governments so as to lighten the burden of armaments and to lessen the danger of local conflicts.

From these principles flow the proposals listed briefly in the following paragraphs which might usefully be incorporated in the agenda of the special session.

(1) The principle of regular rotation should be applied in the composition of all United Nations bodies dealing with questions of disarmament, so as to ensure that all Member States are given the opportunity of serving on them. The purpose of the system of rotation would be to emphasize that disarmament is the concern of all States and that every Member of the United Nations should be enabled to contribute to the collective effort on an equal footing.

(2) In line with the above approach, and in order further to strengthen the sense of common responsibility for advancing disarmament the Government of Israel proposes that it be generally accepted that resolutions of the General Assembly on questions of disarmament be adopted by consensus. Resolutions adopted by a majority are of little practical value and only undermine public confidence in the ability of the United Nations to further the cause of disarmament.

In this context, it is to be deplored that a Member State in its letter (A/AC.187/3) to the Secretary-General in response to resolution 31/189 B has found
it necessary to introduce suggestions for consideration by the special session which are extraneous to the subject of disarmament and at the outset introduce a discordant element of hostility against a Member State into a United Nations effort to reduce world tension. Attempts of this nature do not augur well for the successful treatment of the subject of disarmament by a special session of the General Assembly.

(3) In the same spirit, it is suggested that the United Nations undertake a world-wide programme of instruction, principally in educational institutions, reflecting the vision of the prophet Isaiah:

"... And they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning hooks: nation shall not lift up sword against nation. Neither shall they learn war any more."

The emphasis in this programme should be on the realization that disarmament represents a deeply rooted hope of mankind. And the educational thrust in this enterprise should be to expose the fact that so little has yet been achieved in realizing that hope.

(4) With a view to promoting progress wherever possible on local and regional levels, it is suggested that the United Nations establish regional disarmament commissions, composed of all Member States in the region, the task of which would be to review ideas and proposals for intergovernmental regional agreements on arms reduction and control.
PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

Note verbal dated 2 May 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Luxembourg to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

The Permanent Representative of Luxembourg to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and, with reference to his note OR 421/63 of 28 January 1977, has the honour to communicate to him below, in accordance in particular with operative paragraph 3 of resolution 31/169 B, the views of the Government of Luxembourg concerning the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

In the view of the Government of Luxembourg, the purpose of this session should be primarily to draw up a balance-sheet of the results achieved so far in disarmament and the regulation of armaments. A final declaration is acceptable provided that all Member States, including the nuclear-weapon States, adopt it. The search for a consensus must prevail both within the Preparatory Committee and during the special session.

As for the topics for discussion, the Government of Luxembourg wishes to make the following observations:

1. Equal importance should be attached to the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction and to the control of conventional armaments.

2. One of the principal long-term objectives should be the total cessation of nuclear tests. Luxembourg could support any proposal likely to bring about progress in the debate among the nuclear Powers.

3. The Government of Luxembourg remains attached to the objective of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Treaty on Non-Proliferation must remain the basic instrument for the attainment of that objective.

4. A World Disarmament Conference could be envisaged during the special session, provided that principal nuclear States agree to participate in it.

5. With regard to the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, Luxembourg is in favour of measures contributing to the strengthening of that role in so far as such measures are within the areas of competence of the organs of the United Nations as defined by the Charter.

77-09237
The Permanent Representative of New Zealand to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and, in accordance with the Secretary-General's note OR 421/6(3) of 28 January 1977, has the honour to transmit the views of the Government of New Zealand on the agenda and other relevant questions relating to the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.
New Zealand views on special session on disarmament

1. The New Zealand delegation welcomed and co-sponsored resolution 31/189B, which convenes a special session on disarmament in May/June 1978 and submits these comments on the special session's agenda and other related matters, in response to the request of the Secretary-General.

2. The vast expenditure on arms and armaments of recent years and the ever mounting stockpile of nuclear weapons threaten our civilization with nothing less than extinction. To set limits to the arms build-up and if possible to embark on disarmament to control the spread and growth of nuclear weaponry and diminish the fear of global and regional war is a supreme challenge to mankind. New Zealand fully shared the widespread frustration of members of the United Nations over the inadequate progress made since the Organization was founded and particularly in recent years towards international agreement on measures of arms control and disarmament. The special session offers an important, and perhaps unique, opportunity for Governments to correct the deficiencies that have caused this situation by consideration both of institutional means of dealing with disarmament issues and of the principles and attitudes with which Governments have traditionally approached them. The special session will not prove to be the panacea to all problems, and Governments must be careful to avoid creating unrealistic expectations to this effect. However, equal care must be given to ensure that full use is made of the occasion of the special session, for failure to do so may have a profoundly detrimental effect on arms control efforts thereafter. New Zealand hopes that the special session will be able to note that substantive progress in certain areas of disarmament has been made in the year before it meets and, further, that it will be able to establish a realistic framework that will facilitate negotiations in the years ahead.

3. While it is undesirable for the special session to become too preoccupied with past failures, Governments should be cognizant of the causes of short-comings in this respect in order that due attention can be given to their amelioration. Opinion has generally focused on a lack of political will of Governments to make the necessary sacrifices or take the necessary risks in order to conclude disarmament agreements. In New Zealand's view, the "lack of political will" is less a lack of intent than an absence of an adequate framework within which nations can proceed towards disarmament measures with equal security clearly guaranteed to all. There has also been a lack of general agreement within the United Nations over the priority areas of disarmament, with a consequent loss of focus in the debating and negotiating forums on central issues and a dispersion of effort. Finally, the lack of progress in the past has been to some extent due to the imperfections of the existing negotiating machinery, which has been compounded by the very real difficulty of following complex technical issues. Each of these areas should be addressed in turn at the special session and means sought of making improvements in each category with a view to facilitating progress in arms control.

4. New Zealand hopes that recent indications of a positive approach to disarmament by the United States and the USSR, reflected in the recent Conference
of the Committee on Disarmament session, will be translated into substantive achievements over specific disarmament measures in the months leading up to the special session and the forthcoming attitudes at the session itself. The success of the special session is also dependent upon constructive participation by all nuclear weapon States, an avoidance of extreme demands, and a seeking of consensus at the highest possible common factor of security interests.

Priority areas for attention of the special session

5. In New Zealand's view, the overwhelming priority of the special session must be nuclear disarmament. The most important areas of concern here are the levels of strategic nuclear arms possessed by nuclear weapon States, the danger of proliferation of nuclear arms for other States, the need to cease nuclear weapon testing and the establishment of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Attention should be given to each of these areas. The preparation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty is, however, of particular concern to New Zealand and it is to be hoped that a generally acceptable comprehensive test-ban treaty will have been drafted by the time the special session commences. Such a development would improve the prospect for a successful session. It would also generate maximum pressure for early ratification of the treaty.

6. The second area of priority should be chemical and biological weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, and the transfer of conventional armaments. In New Zealand's view, however, none of these areas should be given attention at the special session to the detriment of nuclear arms control.

Structure of the special session

7. New Zealand believes that the structure of the special session could reflect the need for a new declaration of principles, for a programme of action and for a review of all United Nations disarmament machinery and that there should be a committee responsible for each of these areas of work. A plenary debate could continue simultaneously with the work of at least two of the committees.

Declaration of principles

8. The New Zealand Government suggests that we use the principles already agreed upon (using the United Nations Charter as the basic document, and subsequent important documents such as the 1961 joint US/USSR Statement of Principles) as a starting point for a new declaration of principles. Experience since these documents were concluded, both in the area of security and disarmament, will no doubt affect the shape and content of a declaration at the session.

9. The principles could perhaps relate to different areas that are relevant to disarmament objectives and problems; for example, they could be grouped under the headings, inter alia: (a) principles of national and international security; (b) principles of arms control and disarmament; (c) principles of nuclear non-proliferation. New Zealand intends to examine these areas further and may wish to submit comments to the Preparatory Committee at a later stage.
Programme of action

10. The first task of the special session in formulating a programme of action should be to establish agreement on the areas of priority for disarmament negotiations in the future. New Zealand's views on this are recorded above. It believes, moreover, that a broad programme of action is desirable, since a recognition of the problems that could delay the achievement of parts of an action programme should be accompanied by an appreciation of the compelling responsibility of major military Powers and other States to make progress with these problems. A general action programme could include procedural arrangements for reporting progress, and explaining reasons for any delays, on a regular basis, to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

11. New Zealand believes that the special session must ensure a close relationship between the declaration of principles and the programme of action. If the principles prove too broad, they will lend insufficient direction and acceleration to the action programme. If the action programme is too detailed or too ambitious, it will drain the agreed principles of practical meaning.

Review of United Nations disarmament machinery

12. New Zealand considers that a review of the United Nations disarmament machinery should form an essential part of the special session's deliberations. Widespread dissatisfaction has been expressed with the record of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the General Assembly has demonstrated a need to handle more effectively the burdensome range of disarmament items raised for debate and to improve the existing machinery. There exists also a need for better liaison between the Assembly and the existing negotiating body that will allow non-members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to follow its deliberations more thoroughly, to be allowed a proper input of their views for its consideration and to be accorded a more appropriate opportunity to examine its proposals and recommendations than has recently been the case. New Zealand recognizes the need for a relatively small negotiating body in the field of disarmament, and notes the high level of expertise and mutual confidence which the present body has developed.

13. New Zealand welcomes recent signs by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament that it is returning to the central issues of disarmament and is showing a greater consciousness of the need to keep non-members informed of the progress of its deliberations. The special session will provide the opportunity to judge whether this concentration on issues of greater importance has been translated into substantive agreements. Failure to reach agreement will inevitably raise the prospect of consideration, in which New Zealand would join, of devising new methods of negotiation, including, if necessary, the establishment of a new, or altered, negotiating forum.
Communication dated 5 May 1977 received from the Permanent Mission of Austria on the views and suggestions of the Austrian Government concerning the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

1. General remarks

1.1. The Austrian Government has on many occasions voiced its deep concern over the lack of substantial progress in international disarmament negotiations. A permanently neutral country in the geopolitical position of Austria has a vital interest in effective steps towards arms reduction and disarmament. Indeed, the very existence of such a country could depend on progress in this field. When evaluating the disarmament efforts since the Second World War, both inside and outside the United Nations, it becomes obvious that most of the very limited achievements that have been obtained were in the field of arms limitation rather than effective disarmament. The international community has so far not been able to achieve a substantial break-through in this field of utmost and vital importance to mankind. The Austrian Government has therefore consistently lent its active support to all genuine efforts to overcome what begins to appear as a dangerous stalemate. In this connexion it may be recalled that Austria has always supported the convening of a World Disarmament Conference and will continue to do so.

1.2. During the thirty-first session of the General Assembly of the United Nations the Austrian delegation as one of the co-sponsors of resolution 31/189 B welcomed the proposal made by the Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-aligned Countries to convene a special session of the General Assembly in 1978.

In the opinion of the Austrian Government the special session, which should mark the starting point for the gradual solution of both general and specific problems of disarmament, will constitute a very important element in promoting the goal of general and complete disarmament.

1.3. To underline the political significance of the special session and of its final documents, the special session might - in the view of the Austrian Government - be held at a higher political level.
2. The main goals of the special session

2.1. There appears to evolve a common understanding as to the main features of the special session. Accordingly the special session should provide for:

2.1.1. A general exchange of views about the problems of disarmament on a high political level; this exchange of views in form of a general debate should form and direct the opinions of Governments and of the public towards universally acceptable solutions to the pending problems of disarmament. It will also give an opportunity for an examination of the causes underlying the stagnation of disarmament negotiations. General awareness of these causes should pave the way for action oriented and realistic recommendations in order to facilitate future progress. The result of this exchange of views should be embodied in a political declaration.

2.1.2. A discussion of the possibilities for a new and comprehensive approach to disarmament negotiations leading to the adoption of a well balanced programme of action.

2.1.3. Concrete measures aimed at enhancing the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament.

3. The preparation of the special session

3.1. Adequate and careful preparatory work is essential to ensure the success of the special session. Austria is prepared to take an active part in the deliberations of the preparatory committee.

3.2. The United Nations Secretariat and especially the newly established United Nations Centre on Disarmament will have to play an important role in the preparatory stage of the special session and should, **inter alia**, be requested to provide adequate background information. Furthermore, non-governmental organizations as well as recognized international research institutes could be called upon to contribute to the preparation for the special session.

3.3. It seems to be advisable for the preparatory committee to take an early decision as to the format and character of the final documents to be adopted by the special session and to direct its work in accordance with this decision.

4. Political declaration

4.1. The political declaration to be adopted by the special session should reflect an appraisal of the current situation regarding disarmament problems and set out in generally acceptable terms the guiding principles for the efforts to be carried out by all States in the field of disarmament.

4.2. In defining these principles which should enjoy the widest possible political support a thorough study of already existing pertinent documents, as for instance...
the 1961 Joint Statement by the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations as well as the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament submitted by the delegations of Ireland, Mexico, Pakistan, Sweden and Yugoslavia to the twenty-fifth General Assembly (document A/8191) can serve as a point of departure.

4.3. On the other hand, such a declaration will also have to take into account that disarmament can only be conceived of in a wider political framework and in particular in relation to international security.

Thus for instance, disarmament must be related to the existing balance of power, defined not only in military terms but comprising all aspects of relations between States.

The predominant position of two of the world's major military powers, and the privileges enjoyed by all five nuclear-weapon States, will have to find their counterpart in the underlining of the special responsibilities of these States for progress in the field of disarmament.

4.4. Apart from such general principles which could be reflected in the political declaration, more specific guidelines to future disarmament negotiations could be incorporated.

5. Programme of action

5.1. The programme of action should be based on a comprehensive and integrated approach which would reaffirm the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control and call for an early solution of priority items. At the same time, the usefulness of collateral measures has to be clarified.

The programme of action should provide the basis for co-ordinated further action on the different levels of disarmament negotiations by listing problem areas and demonstrating their interrelation.

5.2. The Austrian Government would suggest, inter alia, the inclusion of the following elements in the programme of action:

5.2.1. The question of nuclear disarmament.

This problem continues to be the most urgent of all disarmament issues. Progress in this field and especially the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty as a first step towards effective nuclear disarmament is not only of vital importance to all mankind but will also facilitate disarmament endeavours in other fields.

The future credibility of measures to prevent the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons hinges upon the willingness of the powers possessing nuclear weapons and especially of the two leading nuclear-weapon States to agree on effective measures of nuclear disarmament.
5.2.2. Measures to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

As already mentioned, this question can only be dealt with in connexion with the general problem of nuclear disarmament. Furthermore, the special session will have to address itself to the interrelated problem posed by the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and in particular by the peaceful uses of nuclear explosive devices. The programme of action should also contain recommendations regarding effective international supervision of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and should in this connexion provide for the strengthening of the resources of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

5.2.3. The prevention of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons.

5.2.4. Conventional weapons.

The increasing build-up of arsenals of so-called conventional weapons in many parts of the world during the last years has become to be a major concern to the international community. In order to find suitable solutions to this problem it seems to be essential to deal with all its aspects. Thus the special session should encourage a thorough examination of the political, economic and social reasons underlying the rapidly increasing production of conventional weapons, the accelerating international arms trade as well as of the security needs of the recipient States.

Urgent co-operative measures of all States are necessary to bring an end to this extremely costly arms race so that the human and financial resources which are currently being used for the build-up of these arsenals can be redirected towards efforts to achieve socio-economic development and progress.

5.2.5. Other measures.

Substantial disarmament efforts would be supplemented by measures designed to build confidence between States, as for instance by providing full information about the military budgets of these States. The special session should therefore promote the ongoing work in this field within the United Nations.

6. Institutional measures

The Austrian Government welcomes the adoption by the thirty-first General Assembly of the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Review of the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament.

However, these proposals, endorsed by General Assembly resolution 31/190, can only be regarded as the necessary first step towards more effective measures to enhance the central role of the United Nations in this field.
6.1. The special session should therefore adopt appropriate decisions to

- further improve the organization of work of the First Committee of the General Assembly and
- enable the Secretariat to carry out pertinent studies and provide factual information on disarmament matters.

6.2. Careful consideration should also be given to the special role played by the CCD and to its relation with the United Nations which might call for a corresponding reorganization of certain aspects of its present structure. Various possibilities should be studied which would allow non-members of the CCD to follow more closely the work of this organ and to take part in its deliberations.

Thus the possibility of opening the meetings of the CCD to interested States which are not members of this body and which could be invited as observers, might be discussed.

6.3. At the same time it might be worth while to discuss the chances for a reviving of the United Nations Disarmament Commission which has not met in recent years and which could for instance assume a very important co-ordinating function.

6.4. The special session will also have to decide on adequate follow-up mechanisms so that its impact in the future handling of disarmament matters can be constantly evaluated. The convening of a further special session at an appropriate time with the main purpose of examining the progress achieved in the meantime might be given serious consideration.

6.5. In this context, the role of a world disarmament conference as well as the conditions necessary for convening it, could be raised.

Finally, the programme and organization of work of the United Nations Centre on Disarmament should also be discussed.

7. The agenda of the special session

In accordance with the previous remarks the Austrian Government proposes the following items for inclusion in the agenda of the special session:

- General debate
- Adoption of a political declaration of principles on disarmament
- Adoption of a programme of action on disarmament
- Review and strengthening of the role of the United Nations in disarmament, including the question of convening a world disarmament conference.
The Permanent Mission of Peru to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour, with reference to General Assembly resolution 31/139 B on the convening of a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which requested the views and comments of Governments on the subject, to indicate the basic considerations which the Government of Peru believes should guide the work of the special session.

The Government of Peru is deeply concerned at the continuation of the arms race, which in the years since the Second World War has not only failed to increase in the slightest the security of any country, especially the militarily strong countries, but has absorbed human and financial resources which, had they been allocated to the priority tasks of development, would by now have made it possible to meet a large part of mankind's most pressing needs.

The Government of Peru is aware that ending the arms race and initiating an effective process of disarmament is the responsibility of all countries, although it cannot, of course, fail to note the obvious fact that some bear greater responsibility than others. Accordingly, as a non-aligned and peace-loving developing country, it has spared no effort to participate in this common task to the best of its ability. Evidence of this is its active and continuing involvement in the work of the specialized organs of the United Nations in which it has the honour to participate, including the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference and the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly, together with its constant support for the most important and significant resolutions on disarmament adopted by the United Nations ever since the establishment of the Organization.

Accordingly, the Government of Peru considers it important and appropriate to hold a special session of the General Assembly on disarmament questions. It is appropriate because the levels reached by the arms race are such that, defying...
all imagination, they deny mankind's basic aspiration for a minimum of security, peace and progress. It is important because, after many years and countless efforts, it has become clear that disarmament questions require a global approach covering all the varied aspects of a problem which is undeniably complex and difficult. Consideration of the topic of disarmament in the highest world forum is therefore a priority task to which the Government of Peru will contribute its best efforts.

The Government of Peru welcomes the fact that all the States Members of the United Nations will be participating on an equal footing in the special session devoted to disarmament. Moreover, the specific nature of the meeting gives reason to hope that the issue of disarmament will receive both general and in-depth treatment so that, by the end of the session, we shall have the kind of basic action guidelines for the essential dogged continuation of efforts without which the special session would become just another meeting.

By bringing together high-level political personalities, the special session could provide the opportunity for a frank and at the same time politically viable treatment of questions of general interest, while reaffirming as a priority the validity of the final objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

The special session should produce substantive documents that will constitute effective guidelines for disarmament. A Declaration of Principles, a Programme of Action and guidelines for the strengthening of disarmament mechanisms having the United Nations as their focal point are essential.

Obviously, Member States must agree on a set of basic principles to guide actions in the field of disarmament. The special session should specifically consider such matters as the need to pursue general and complete disarmament, and particularly nuclear disarmament, under effective international control as a means of ensuring world peace and security; the establishment of a new international order based on respect for the principles of international law and the active continuation of disarmament measures; priority for nuclear disarmament measures; reaffirmation of the responsibilities of the United Nations in this field; full participation of all States; access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes; balanced disarmament; the importance of verification methods; the active and increasing participation of public opinion throughout the entire process; and the final objective of eliminating conventional weapons within an international framework that would guarantee peace, security and complete disarmament.

The Programme of Action should establish priorities for the various questions involved, with emphasis on the urgency of dealing with nuclear disarmament. First priority should be given to the cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests, respect for nuclear-weapon-free zones and peace zones and other appropriate measures. The Programme of Action should, of course, cover other types of weapons and, finally, the possibility of reducing military forces. These matters must be given due consideration by the special session, which should in fact indicate the concrete steps or specific questions to be included in the Programme, so that the time-limit established by the Review of the Disarmament

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so that it would constitute a substantive document for dealing, within reasonable
time-limits, with the various aspects of the issue in appropriate forums or
negotiations.

The special session should conduct a thorough review of United Nations
disarmament machinery. It should be borne in mind that the General Assembly, at
its last session, endorsed the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee on the
Review of the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament. This in
itself was an important step although, of course, substantial aspects of the
role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament must still be clarified
and reaffirmed. Specifically, it is worth pointing out that the negotiating body
of the United Nations, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has produced
some important, although partial, results with regard to disarmament and that its
organization and procedures should be reviewed in light of the principle of the
legal equality of States and the need for all the nuclear Powers to join in the
Conference, since no positive results can be expected unless they actively
participate in the process.

The special session should be organized with an eye to the need to allow both
general and specific treatment of various questions. The possibility of
establishing one or more working committees for convenience and flexibility in
the handling of items should be considered.

The Government of Peru takes this opportunity to reiterate its determination
to participate actively in the special session, and accordingly to make every
possible contribution of effort and understanding to the work of the Preparatory
Committee. This attitude is in keeping with the sincere desire of the people and
Government of Peru to contribute to peace, security, progress and the best
possible relations with its neighbours and with all nations.
PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE SPECIAL
SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

Communication dated 10 May 1977 from the Permanent
Representative of Sri Lanka to the United Nations
and Chairman of the Co-ordinating Bureau of
Non-Aligned Countries addressed to the Secretary-
General

On behalf of the Non-Aligned Group in the Preparatory Committee, I have the
honour to transmit herewith a working paper entitled "Draft agenda for the special
session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament".

I would request you kindly to have the document published and circulated as a
working paper of the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General
Assembly Devoted to Disarmament.
Draft agenda proposed by the non-aligned members of the Committee (as revised after initial consultations with certain members of other regional groups)

1. Review and appraisal of the present international situation in the light of the lack of adequate progress in the field of disarmament, the continuation of the arms race and the close interrelationship between disarmament, international peace and security and economic development.

2. Adoption of a declaration of principles on disarmament.

3. Adoption of a programme of action on disarmament.

4. Review of the role of the United Nations in disarmament and of the international machinery for negotiations on disarmament, including the question of convening a world disarmament conference.
The Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and pursuant to General Assembly resolution 31/89 B has the honour to communicate the following views of the Federal Government on the special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament:

1. The Federal Republic of Germany shares the concern of the community of nations about the consequences of an unabated arms race. It not only sees in the continuing arms race a threat to international security but fears that the nations will be increasingly denied the limited economic resources of the earth for their economic and social development.

To the Federal Republic of Germany, the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control is indispensable. It cannot be ignored that, seen in terms of that goal, the success achieved up to now in negotiations on disarmament and arms control is but a beginning. The Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, Herr Hans-Dietrich Genscher, therefore, when addressing the United Nations in September 1976, welcomed the initiative adopted in Colombo in the same year by the non-aligned States for a special session of the United Nations General Assembly to be convened in 1978, stating that the Federal Republic of Germany would be ready to co-operate constructively in such a session. The Federal Government has supported the initiative from the beginning and was a co-sponsor of the relevant draft resolution tabled at the thirty-first session of the General Assembly.

2. The Federal Government attaches great importance to the proposed special session and hopes that it will proceed in an atmosphere of co-operation and mutual trust. It also hopes that, without trying to hide the problems, Governments will succeed in fulfilling the expectations of the public, that they will convincingly demonstrate the credibility of the world-wide effort in pursuit of disarmament and arms control, and strengthen confidence among the States.
3. It should not be the purpose of the special session to negotiate specific subjects or work out draft treaties. This should remain the task of the CCD which, though perhaps capable of structural improvements, has proved an expert negotiating body. It is to be hoped that prior to the special session further progress and results will be achieved in Geneva in important areas.

4. The Federal Government has on previous occasions, and also in the United Nations forum, underlined the great value it attaches to the arms control negotiations which are going on in the special bodies. It thinks it necessary that these specific efforts in support of peace and security should be continued.

5. The following might, in the Federal Government's view, be the aims of the special session:

- to take stock of results in the field of disarmament and arms control,
- to provide impulses for discussion which in some fields is stagnant,
- to reach a consensus on the basic elements of the disarmament discussion,
- to define priorities of future work,
- to review the present organization and structure of disarmament institutions as to their effectiveness.

6. Taking these aims into account, the Federal Government sees the following possible agenda:

- general debate
- discussion of basic elements of disarmament policy and adoption of a declaration based on stock-taking results
- discussion of future tasks and priorities
- discussion on the structure of disarmament institutions and their mechanisms.

7. As regards the subjects to be treated at the special session, the Federal Government considers that nuclear and conventional disarmament problems should receive equal treatment. The projects discussed should be genuinely conducive to strengthening confidence and international security. The Federal Government hopes that the special session will provide practical impulses for, among other things: the prohibition of chemical weapons, a comprehensive test ban, non-proliferation policy, the reduction of armament burdens, regional aspects of disarmament and discussion of the connexion between disarmament and economic and social development in the world.

8. The Federal Government is willing to participate in a discussion on possible modifications to the structure of both the CCD and the United Nations...
disarmament institutions, but any changes in the CCD structure should at least maintain if not improve the capacity of this body.

9. Only after the results of the special session will be available will it be possible to judge how the discussion should be continued. Whatever the decision, it should be made sure that the work of existing disarmament bodies will not be impaired.

10. The Federal Government believes that the special session can provide valuable and constructive impulses for future efforts to achieve greater international stability and security by balanced measures of disarmament and arms control. A consensus among the participants would be the appropriate basis for attaining the goals of the session.
Note verbale dated 6 May 1977 from the Permanent Mission of Greece to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

The Permanent Mission of Greece to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and, with reference to His Excellency's note Sub.No. OR 421/6(3) dated 28 January 1977 has the honour to communicate to him the views of the Greek Government on the agenda and all other relevant questions related to the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Views of the Greek Government on the agenda and all other relevant questions related to the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament

1. The Government of Greece shares the major concern at the effects of the growing arms race which puts at stake international peace and security and hinders the economic growth of countries and more particularly of the developing ones. It has, therefore, encouraged all initiatives in the field of a complete and general disarmament and arms control. It was in this spirit that Greece voted for General Assembly resolutions concerning the convening of a world conference on disarmament. In the same spirit Greece supported the holding of the special session of the General Assembly. The Greek Government believes that the special session should be guided by the aims of establishing a complete and general disarmament under effective international control and promoting the well-being of peoples throughout the world.

As a first priority, the special session should not lose sight of the fact that the problem of general and complete disarmament is so closely interlinked with that of international peace and security that none of them can be looked upon separately. In this regard, the special session should look into ways for the observance of the principles enunciated by the United Nations Charter, for the implementation of the resolutions adopted by the principal organs of the United Nations and for the respect of the norms of international law, which rules the relations among States.
2. The observance of the provisions of the United Nations Charter and the implementation of United Nations resolutions constitute one of the necessary pre-conditions for the establishment of a system of arms control and ultimately of disarmament in a framework of international security that will contribute to the enhancement of world détente and the application of the principles of a new economic order.

3. Moreover, as it is the first time that the international community is presented with a universal forum for the consideration of problems related to disarmament and arms control, it is necessary that the special session grasps this unique opportunity and spares no effort for the substantive discussion of all the matters concerned and for the adoption of measures leading to general and complete disarmament within the framework of a system of security.

4. It is, therefore, the firm conviction of the Government of Greece that the matters concerned should be looked upon in a pragmatic and constructive way, while a spirit of co-operation should prevail in the works of the special session. The attention of the delegations should be focused on the practical approach of the items of the agenda and on the avoidance of dwelling upon detailed doctrinal discussions which may frustrate the important tasks of the special session. In this regard, the Government of Greece expresses the wish that efforts should be made in order that resolutions and other decisions be adopted by consensus so as to avoid, as far as possible, resorting to voting.

5. The special session should proceed to a thorough assessment of efforts so far deployed and a careful appraisal of results attained in the field of disarmament and arms control. In addition, it should look into the causes of the existing situation of stagnation regarding disarmament negotiations and draw the necessary conclusions. This appraisal will help identify the proper measures to be adopted.

6. Greece believes that the contribution of all States, irrespectively of their size, political power and economic development, is indispensable for the achievement of complete and general disarmament in a system of peace and security. Nevertheless, the preponderant role that the nuclear powers play in this field should not be disregarded. It is, therefore, necessary to assure the participation of these States in the decision-making process of the special session and especially in the adoption of measures concerning the non-proliferation of nuclear arms, the gradual nuclear and conventional disarmament, the reductions of military expenditures and budgets etc.

Special attention should be directed to the non-proliferation of nuclear armaments and adequate guarantee should be given to the non-nuclear States. Further adequate arrangements should be made so as not to deny, or put into a disadvantageous position the non-nuclear States, as regards peaceful uses of nuclear power. The special session, therefore, should examine the establishment of mechanisms for the peaceful use of nuclear power.

7. While the existing machineries dealing with the disarmament matters, such as the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, should be preserved in order not to disarm the machinery of disarmament, it is suggested that the link between disarmament and development should be established and strengthened.

8. Moreover, the setting up of a system of security should result in:

(a) a commitment to non-aggression and peace;
(b) the implementation of a new economic order;
(c) a peaceful co-operation between States;
(d) a non-proliferation of nuclear weapons;
(e) a reduction of military expenditures and budgets.

9. In this connection, the special session should:

(a) consider the establishment of a Commission to examine the causes of the imbalance in the disarmament negotiations and the formulation of recommendations for their solution;
(b) consider the establishment of a Committee to examine the implementation of the principles of a new economic order;
(c) consider the establishment of a special zone for peaceful uses of nuclear energy; (d) consider the establishment of a special zone for the peaceful development of nuclear power; and other matters.
not to prejudice activities already undertaken or to be assumed in the field of disarmament, the special session should look into the institutional aspects of the relationship between the General Assembly and the CCD in the field of disarmament. The special session may examine the procedural system of the CCD and suggest specific improvements. Furthermore, it would be advisable that an organic link be established between the CCD and the United Nations in the sense that mutual co-operation and exchange of information between the CCD and the competent organs of the United Nations be inaugurated.

8. The special session should pursue to adopt a declaration of principles setting the foundation on which negotiations, bilateral or multilateral, leading to a general and complete disarmament, could be conducted. This declaration should include, inter alia, the following:

(a) Respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and implementation of the resolutions adopted by its principal organs;

(b) Disarmament and arms control in a system of security is an integral part of a new international order based on national independence and international co-operation;

(c) Urgent priority must be given to nuclear as well as conventional disarmament. The transfer of conventional armaments should be examined in the light both of its effects on international security as well as of its repercussions on the economy of various countries;

(d) Portion of the savings derived from the reduction of military expenditures should be devoted to promoting the economic and social development, particularly in the developing countries.

9. The special session of the General Assembly must draw up a programme of action indicating measures to be taken to the effect of a general and complete disarmament. Some of the measures to be included therein may be the following:

(a) Measures for the implementation of the United Nations Charter and the respect of the resolutions of the United Nations principal organs and obligations derived from international conventions;

(b) Measures to halt nuclear and conventional arms race. The problem of halting the nuclear tests should be examined by all concerned in a new spirit;

(c) Measures regarding general disarmament under effective international control;

(d) Measures regarding regional disarmament;

(e) Measures prohibiting the use of weapons of mass destruction, of napalm and other incendiary weapons, chemical and biochemical weapons, etc.
10. In connexion with the agenda to be followed at the works of the special session, the Greek Government is of the view that the following items, at minimum, must be enlisted:

(a) Review and appraisal of the present situation in the field of disarmament;

(b) Adoption of a declaration of principles on disarmament;

(c) Adoption of a programme of action on disarmament;

(d) Review of the role of the United Nations in disarmament and examination of the existing institutional and other mechanisms in this field.
Note verbale dated 2 May 1977 from the Permanent Mission of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

The Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General and, in reply to his letter No. OR 421/6(3) of 20 January 1977 and in compliance with paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 31/189 B, respectfully submits the views of his Government on the convening of a special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Colombia voted in favour of resolution 31/189 B. It did so for the simple reason that, in view of the resounding failure of the Organization in the field of disarmament, it feels that the international community must spare no effort in trying to reduce the horrible danger to life on this planet that is posed by the arms race. The Government of Colombia does not, however, have much hope that this new measure will produce any better results than those obtained in 30 years of exhausting and repeated debates in the General Assembly and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. For disarmament is in no way dependent on the will of the Organization as such, nor even that of the vast majority of its Members; it depends solely on the will of the countries that manufacture weapons, that have been stockpiling them, that trade in them and that derive both military and political power and enormous financial profit from this lethal industry. Therefore, so long as those countries are unwilling to disarm, to reduce the rate of weapons production or to place the interests of mankind in general above their own interests and hunger for power, nothing will be gained, no matter how many special sessions of the General Assembly or how many world conferences on disarmament are held.

Recognizing this undeniable truth, the Government of Colombia believes that if this new effort is to be pursued seriously at the special session of the General Assembly, the session must concentrate on specific questions. To undertake an analysis of what the Organization has done or left undone in the field of disarmament would be, as it has been in the past, just another scandalous waste of time, energy and money. The Government of Colombia therefore does not agree with the idea of drawing up a heavy agenda for the special session or of requesting the Secretary-General to prepare studies on disarmament matters, as these would...
only increase the huge mountain of papers that have accumulated over the past several decades with no visible benefit.

The Assembly should concentrate on those problems which are causing the greatest concern to mankind today, namely:

**Nuclear weapons**

1. Total prohibition of tests;
2. Measures for permanently halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons;
   (a) Total prohibition of the transfer of nuclear technology usable for weapons production to countries that do not have it;
   (b) Prohibition of the production of nuclear weapons;
   (c) Destruction of existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons.

**Conventional weapons**

(a) In-depth study of the trade in and transfer of conventional weapons and measures for prohibiting such trade;
(b) Total prohibition of the manufacture of chemical, bacteriological and incendiary weapons.

The delegation of Colombia will develop these views further during the course of the debate.
PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE SPECIAL
SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

Note verbale dated 10 May 1977 from the Permanent Representative
of India to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

1. The Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and with reference to his circular note No. OR 421/6(3) of 28 January 1977, regarding the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament to be held in New York in May/June 1978, has the honour to communicate the following views of the Government of India in response to operative paragraph 3 of resolution 31/189 R, adopted by the General Assembly on 21 December 1976.

2. The initiative for convening a special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament was taken by the first Summit Conference of Non-aligned Countries held in Belgrade from 1 to 6 September 1961, which adopted the following declaration on the subject:

"The participants in the Conference recommend that the General Assembly of the United Nations should, at its forthcoming session, adopt a decision on the convening either of a special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to discussion of disarmament or on the convening of a world disarmament conference under the auspices of the United Nations with a view to setting in motion the process of general disarmament."

3. The Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-aligned Countries held at Lima from 25 to 30 August 1975 made the following declaration regarding their joint policy on this subject:

"The Ministers for Foreign Affairs agree to co-ordinate the action of the Non-aligned countries within the framework of the United Nations in order to promote the holding of a World Conference on Disarmament, with as little delay as possible, with the participation of all States on an equal basis and during which universal disarmament guidelines, in particular with respect to nuclear disarmament, would be approved together with the utilization of resources thus freed for international economic co-operation.

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"If it becomes evident that it will not be possible to convene a world disarmament conference, the Foreign Ministers consider that a special session of the General Assembly should be convened as proposed in the Declaration of the First Summit Conference of non-aligned Countries."

4. The Fifth Summit Conference of Non-aligned Countries, held at Colombo from 16 to 19 August 1976, reiterated the call for a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and made the following specific suggestions in this regard in its declaration and resolution on disarmament:

"The Conference reiterated the urgent need to adopt effective measures leading to the convening of a World Disarmament Conference.

"The Conference also recommended, in the meantime, that members of the non-aligned movement request the holding of a special session of the General Assembly as early as possible and not later than 1978. The agenda of the special session should include:

a. a review of the problem of disarmament;
b. the promotion and elaboration of a programme of priorities and recommendations in the field of disarmament; and
c. the question of convening a World Disarmament Conference."

5. The Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-aligned Countries held in New Delhi from 7 to 11 April 1977, issued the following communiqué regarding the agenda and other related matters pertaining to the holding of a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament:

"The Bureau expressed the hope that the special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament scheduled to be held in May-June 1978, at the initiative of the Non-Aligned States, would enable a comprehensive review of the problem of disarmament and result in effective measures aimed in particular at halting the nuclear arms race and promoting nuclear disarmament in the first place and the process of general disarmament. In pursuance of the decisions adopted and the priorities established at the Colombo Conference, the Bureau recommends that the special session of the General Assembly should inter alia consider the adoption of a declaration of principles and a programme of concrete measures on disarmament as well as review the role of the United Nations in disarmament in terms of the United Nations Charter and the question of convening a world disarmament conference. The Bureau further considers that non-aligned countries including those who are members of the Preparatory Committee should act together in achieving the above-mentioned goals."

6. The Government of India are of the firm view that matters pertaining to the agenda and all other relevant questions concerning the forthcoming special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament should be considered by the Preparatory Committee in the light of the declarations issued by the non-aligned countries.
7. The Government of India are convinced that the work of the forthcoming special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament should be based on the following main considerations, which have been repeatedly put forward by India along with several other States and which have also been accepted by the international community, in regard to the fundamental approach to be adopted towards the question of disarmament.

8. One of the most important questions facing mankind in this nuclear age is that of disarmament. The goal of all efforts in the disarmament field should be the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Any partial or collateral measures, which might be adopted, should be conceived of and implemented within the framework of this ultimate goal. The highest priority in the field of disarmament should be accorded to the elimination of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.

9. All States have a vital interest in disarmament. Hence, deliberative forums are essential, where all States can express their views on disarmament. However, actual negotiations on specific measures of disarmament can be better conducted in small negotiating bodies. Measures of disarmament can be classified into three broad categories, namely, preventive or "non-arms" measures, arms limitation measures, and actual disarmament measures. Special efforts should be made to negotiate measures of actual disarmament, particularly in regard to nuclear weapons and all the other weapons of mass destruction. A substantial portion of the funds released by disarmament should be devoted to the economic and social development of developing countries.
I have the honour to transmit to you, in accordance with the provisions of resolution 31/189 B, the views of the Government of the Argentine Republic on the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament:

1. The Argentine Republic believes that the decision taken by the General Assembly in its resolution 31/189 B represents one of the most important and timely endeavours of the international community in the field of disarmament.

The knowledge that there can be no lasting peace and security without effective disarmament and that both concepts are closely linked to the needs of development obliges us to redouble our efforts to explore every opportunity for halting and then turning back the arms race.

At the same time, the Argentine Republic is convinced that matters so closely connected with the sovereignty, security and defence of nations will not be solved overnight through recommendations made by the General Assembly. Progress towards the settlement of questions of such substance will be possible within the framework of a continuing dialogue in which the interests of all States are represented.

Furthermore, it does not believe that the special session is the most appropriate forum in which to conduct negotiations on specific measures of disarmament.

It is, however, convinced that a clear and unequivocal expression of the majority view of the United Nations may lay the bases for determining, in a balanced manner, a system of principles and courses of action which will put a halt to the terrible waste of resources now being witnessed by mankind.

The achievement of these objectives and hence the promotion of the acceptance of new approaches which will broaden and deepen disarmament negotiations presuppose, in the opinion of the Argentine Government, that all Member States, and more
particularly all the nuclear-weapon States, will participate actively and
demonstrate the political will to harmonize their positions. The special session
of the General Assembly will then be able to open with a degree of agreement
which will make possible a radical reform of existing machinery. The Argentine
Government herewith undertakes to collaborate fully in the achievement of those
objectives.

2. The Argentine Republic believes that the agenda of the special session
of the General Assembly should be built around the following points:

(I) A general debate centred on the causes that have led to the existing
situation, the relationship between disarmament, security and
development, and means of overcoming the existing deadlock;

(II) Formulation and adoption of a set of general principles to guide the
efforts of the international community in the field of disarmament;

(III) Formulation and adoption of a programme of action which, based on the
general principles, will clearly indicate the specific steps to be
taken by the various negotiating bodies in order to achieve specific
measures of disarmament;

(IV) Consideration of the role of the United Nations in the sphere of
disarmament and of the operation of the various bodies connected with
the subject.

3. The instrument containing the general principles on disarmament should
be drawn up in such a way as to win the support of the greatest possible number
of States. In this connexion, it is essential to take account of international
political realities and, at the same time, of each country’s idea of what
constitutes its national security and its ideas with regard to the defence of its
territorial integrity.

It is also essential that the special session of the General Assembly should
endorse the following concepts:

(a) General and complete disarmament under strict and effective international
control continues to be the ultimate objective of efforts in this field;

(b) The nuclear arms race jeopardizes the strengthening of international
peace and security and is incompatible with the establishment of the new guidelines
in economic matters which have been adopted by the United Nations and with the
development objectives fixed by the peoples of the world;

(c) The full participation of all nuclear-weapon States in negotiations on
nuclear disarmament is indispensable if those negotiations are to be successful
and have lasting results;
(d) The existence and worsening of imbalances of military power between nations increases the possibility of all forms of interference in the internal affairs of States. In a world of great disparities between the weak and the powerful, defence of the principle of territorial integrity becomes particularly difficult;

(e) Research and development of new systems of weapons of mass destruction and their inclusion in existing arsenals complicates and inhibits efforts aimed at disarmament without increasing the security of the States involved;

(f) The interrelationship among the concepts of the economic and social consequences of the arms race between the most highly industrialized countries, its harmful effects on the world economy and ways of diverting resources to meet development needs must be studied in depth, and the results of such study widely disseminated;

(g) The principle of the sovereign equality of States must be fully implemented in matters involving the transfer of and trade in nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Attempts to discriminate in this field, although made on the pretext of defending most praiseworthy causes, result in the perpetuation of a scientific and technological oligopoly which is directly opposed to the interests of the developing countries;

(h) Universal respect for the validity and continuity of the rules and principles governing the structure of nuclear-weapon-free zones, of existing demilitarized zones and of those which may be established through decisions taken by the States directly involved must be clearly reaffirmed.

4. In the opinion of the Government of the Argentine Republic, the special session of the General Assembly should adopt a Programme of Action to implement all the general principles set forth above, indicating the specific measures which - in accordance with an order of priorities and on a step-by-step basis - should occupy the attention of the various negotiating bodies.

The Programme must necessarily include the following points:

(a) Gradual and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons, with a view to their complete elimination;

(b) Prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and elimination of existing stockpiles;

(c) Prohibition of research on and of the development and manufacture of new weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons;

(d) Prohibition of the use of incendiary weapons and other conventional weapons which cause unnecessary suffering or produce indiscriminate effects.

The implementation of the Programme of Action should be examined periodically by the General Assembly or such other body as may be decided upon, with a view to assessing its effectiveness and amending it whenever that is deemed necessary.
5. The implementation of the Programme of Action will undoubtedly be connected with the operation of the bodies in which disarmament questions are examined and negotiated. For that reason, it would be necessary for the special session of the General Assembly to consider:

(a) The possibility of improving the structure and working procedures of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. In this connexion, it would be necessary to revise the composition of the Conference, to grant de jure membership to all nuclear-weapon States and to change without delay the present system of co-chairmen;

(b) The establishment of an organic legal link between the United Nations General Assembly and CCD, so as to confirm the primary responsibility of the former in disarmament matters;

(c) Strengthening of the central role of the United Nations in negotiations on disarmament, including the possibility of considering the future activities of its Disarmament Commission and the United Nations Centre for Disarmament;

(d) The question of convening a world disarmament conference.

(Signed) Carlos ORTIZ DE ROZAS
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
Note verbale dated 11 May 1977 from the Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

The Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and, in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 31/189 B, has the honour to transmit the views of the Government of Brazil concerning the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.
Views of the Brazilian Government concerning the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament

Brazil considers that disarmament is one of the main tasks of our times, and that previous international efforts, judging by the meagre results attained, have not been commensurate with the needs of the international community. The first of these needs is the very survival of mankind. In the light of this need, all the others fall into their proper perspective, such as the establishment of true conditions for peace and international security that would benefit all peoples, without exception, and provide the tranquillity they must have in order to guarantee them the benefits of economic and technological progress.

2. In this context the States that are in conditions of greater potential to influence, either positively or negatively, the accomplishment of these objectives, have a correlated special responsibility to facilitate agreements, in progressive stages, between all States, leading towards disarmament and an international order that will be more stable, more peaceful and more equitable.

3. The appraisal of multilateral efforts in the field of disarmament reveals the scarcity of the results obtained so far, results limited to a partial and sectoral containment of the accelerated growth in armaments.

4. Brazil supported the convening of a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and co-sponsored resolution 31/189 B. The special session will be an opportunity to promote the opening up of new avenues for negotiation, leading towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

5. The Brazilian Government has never spared any effort to facilitate and promote the process of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, in the General Assembly and in the CCD, as well as in other fora. The present situation of the arms race requires the international community to redouble its efforts to correct the extremely critical conditions that now prevail because of the recurrent frustration of multilateral efforts in the field of disarmament.

6. In fact, the arms race is constantly going on, both in nuclear and in conventional weapons. Strategic arms continue to be perfected. The introduction of new generations of miniaturized tactical nuclear weapons seems to be accompanied by a more relaxed and more tolerant attitude towards their possible use than that of strategic arms. In the field of conventional weapons, particularly cruel and inhumane arms continue to be developed, some of them apparently designed specifically for use against civilian populations. In this sense, every effort must be made to prevent the best part of advanced technological capacity being oriented towards the creation of new destructive devices to the detriment of channelling resources to the promotion of development and higher living standards.
7. It therefore seems clear to Brazil that future negotiating efforts in the field of nuclear disarmament should be given maximum priority by the international community. In this context, the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is an important, but not an isolated element, in the general framework of disarmament problems. Brazil is, in fact, opposed to all forms of proliferation of nuclear weapons, and is ready to participate in international efforts to reduce and eventually eliminate these weapons, as well as to prevent their vertical and horizontal proliferation.

8. Brazil believes that certain fundamental principles and guidelines should necessarily be observed in the process leading towards new negotiations for disarmament. They are essentially the following:

(1) Negotiating efforts in the field of nuclear disarmament should be given maximum priority by the international community. Since the primordial responsibility for the development, production and stockpiling of nuclear weapons is that of the nuclear weapon Powers, it is their concurrent obligation to facilitate the achievement of adequate solutions for the problems of disarmament. The absence of positive steps on the part of these Powers will render inviable any significant progress in multilateral negotiations on disarmament.

(2) Disarmament measures should be correlated with the preservation and strengthening of international security in order to avoid the creation of military imbalances or similar situations which might, during the negotiation process, jeopardize international peace.

(3) The principle that responsibilities and obligations should be balanced must prevail in the field of disarmament; furthermore, obligations should not be discriminatory in nature.

(4) New international confidence-building measures or measures of non-armedament should be accompanied by truly significant steps in the field of real disarmament.

(5) The verification system should be an integral element of agreements on disarmament and should be implemented by the adoption of adequate methods, both on the national and on the international level.

(6) All States, including those possessing nuclear weapons, should participate on an equal footing in international negotiations on disarmament.

(7) International efforts on chemical weapons should proceed at an accelerated pace (completing the cycle initiated with the Convention on Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons), along with efforts to deal with weapons of mass destruction and arms that cause unnecessary suffering and those that are particularly inhumane.

(8) All countries must have free access to peaceful technologies both in the nuclear and other fields, given standardized non-discriminatory and universal safeguards. As an element to foster confidence among States in the
field of international co-operation, the system of safeguards should be applied equally to all States and should be extended, whenever necessary, to cover new advances in technological research and development. None of these measures, however, should permit unwarranted interference in the sovereignty of States, nor threaten scientific, technological or economic development for essentially peaceful purposes.

(9) Firm commitments should be made to apply significant portions of the savings derived from disarmament measures to the promotion of economic development in less developed areas. These commitments will facilitate the establishment of a new international economic order.

(10) The security of the non-nuclear weapon States should rest on concrete commitments on the part of the nuclear weapon States, such as the following:

- Commitment to respect denuclearized zones and zones of peace established by agreements concluded among States of a region in the exercise of their independence and sovereignty;

- Positive guarantees on the part of nuclear weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States belonging to denuclearized zones;

- An agreed programme of measures for general and complete disarmament, elaborated on non-discriminatory bases, and with special regard to the interests of developing countries.

9. The special session, in the view of the Brazilian Government, should devote a significant part of its work to the adoption of a political declaration, reflecting, inter alia, the principles and guidelines mentioned above, indispensable for the projected multilateral negotiations to have the necessary objectivity in examining disarmament problems.

10. The Brazilian Government also believes that the special session should elaborate a programme of action based on adequate criteria, a programme that will take as its fundamental objective general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The programme of action could, from the outset, provide a general orientation that would give renewed impetus for negotiations in the appropriate fora.

11. In terms of priorities, the Brazilian Government believes as stated that measures on nuclear disarmament are the most urgent. Of special importance is the need for an effort to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear weapons test ban parallel to the adoption of measures for the destruction of the stockpiles of such weapons, for ending the process of research and development of new types of nuclear weapons and for freezing the production of fissionable material for military purposes.

12. Secondary priority could then be given to the following measures:

(a) Prohibition of the development and production of chemical weapons, parallel to the destruction of existing stockpiles;
(b) Prohibition of the development and production of new weapons of mass destruction and weapons that cause unnecessary suffering, and the destruction of the stockpiles of such weapons;

(c) Gradual and proportional reduction of stockpiles of conventional weapons, as long as major Powers recognize their own supremacy in this field, and, consequently, their primordial responsibility for any effort to be made in this direction.

13. The adoption of these measures should contribute, on the other hand, to the strengthening of international peace and security and to the establishment of a new international economic order. In this context, the special session of the General Assembly should also consider the adoption of measures for the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, and the application in less developed areas of savings generated by the process of disarmament.

14. Finally, the Government of Brazil believes that the United Nations, according to the Charter, has a preponderant role in negotiations. In order to be viable, efforts to strengthen the role of the Organization in this field should take into account the fact that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, organically linked to the General Assembly, remains the principal body for negotiations on disarmament. The work of the CCD should, however, obey the priorities decided upon by the special session. Eventual measures for the procedural reform of that body should be basically geared to the objectives recommended by the General Assembly.

15. With regard to the specific role of the United Nations Secretariat, it would be important to make full use of its administrative organs in order to satisfactorily fulfill the actual needs emanating from the special session. An excessive proliferation of bodies and bureaucratic structures within the Secretariat, with the resulting dispersion of efforts and of human and financial resources, would, however, be undesirable.
The Permanent Representative of the Republic of Cuba to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and has the honour to refer to his note in which the Government of the Republic of Cuba is asked for information and suggestions relating to General Assembly resolution 31/189 B, adopted on 21 December 1976, by which the Assembly decided to convene a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The Government of the Republic of Cuba considers that the arms race is one of the principal impediments to the strengthening of international security and to just and equitable economic and social progress.

Action to bring about general and complete disarmament is more necessary than ever since it is substantially inseparable from the objectives of achieving lasting peace. Never before have arms possessed such destructive power, and never before has the risk that mankind might be wiped out been greater.

It is obvious that the use for military purposes of an ever-increasing volume of material and human resources is damaging not only to international security but also to the economic and social development of nations. Despite the increasing activity of peace-loving peoples in pursuit of general and complete disarmament, imperialist circles are still beating the drums of the cold war and assigning ever-growing budgets to building up their war arsenal.

In the face of these reactionary forces, world-wide awareness of the historic responsibility for saving mankind from a new holocaust of war is rapidly increasing. The Government of the Republic of Cuba therefore considers that, in the present international political situation, conditions are such as to enable progressive peace-loving forces to prevail over the forces of the armaments monopolies, for which the well-being and future of mankind have become just another item of merchandise.
It is essential to move forward from the existing disarmament proposals to the search for, and implementation of the necessary machinery to put the proposals into practice.

The Government of the Republic of Cuba considers that mere declarations of goodwill and of devotion to the irrefutable principles of disarmament are no longer enough; the need is to proceed to adopt practical measures that will genuinely make a gradual advance towards general and complete disarmament possible. To that end, it draws attention to the letter dated 28 September 1976 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the Secretary-General, which made specific proposals concerning the most pressing problems of disarmament.

Given the existence of conditions favourable to the achievement of practical results with regard to general and complete disarmament, the special session should prepare the way for the holding of a world disarmament conference, as called for in the resolution on disarmament adopted at the Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-aligned Countries held at Colombo.

The special session could make a valuable and vital contribution to the convening of a world conference on disarmament which could lead to joint efforts and common approaches to a question of concern to all mankind.

The Government of the Republic of Cuba has always advocated general and complete disarmament and has maintained a position consistent with this view in the United Nations, by supporting proposals for the attainment of this goal, which is of such pressing urgency. This position was recently reiterated by the First Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba in the following passage of its statement of principles and programme objectives:

"The promotion of détente and peaceful co-existence among States and the achievement of a peace which will benefit all peoples and extend to all areas of the earth. To this end, it will determine its participation in international organizations and events in the light of the general interests of peoples and of socialism.

"To work tirelessly for the consolidation of a worthy and lasting peace for all peoples, in accordance with Leninist principles of peaceful co-existence between countries with different social systems, for the cessation of the arms race, general and complete disarmament, the total prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction, for the dismantling of imperialist military bases in various countries and for the elimination of aggressive military pacts."

In keeping with this position, the Government of the Republic of Cuba has consistently supported, within the framework of the world forum of the United Nations, proposals designed to achieve general and complete disarmament, such as: total prohibition of nuclear tests; prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons and of the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction; prohibition of the use of the environment for military purposes; and the convening of a world conference on disarmament at its highest level.
of a world disarmament conference, the preparatory framework for which should be the special session of the General Assembly, as decided by the General Assembly at its thirty-first session.

The Government of the Republic of Cuba believes that, unless the arms race is halted, it will inevitably become an obstacle to the strengthening and expansion of political détente in relations among States and it will accordingly offer its full support and co-operation to ensure a most successful and productive outcome of the special session of the General Assembly on disarmament.

The Permanent Representative of the Republic of Cuba takes this opportunity to renew to the Secretary-General of the United Nations the assurances of his highest consideration.

New York, 10 April 1977
Views of Member States on the agenda and all other relevant questions relating to the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament

(background paper prepared by the Secretariat)
INTRODUCTION

At its sixth meeting on 11 May 1977, the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament requested the Secretariat to prepare a document classifying, under various headings, the replies received from Governments pursuant to operative paragraph 3 of resolution 31/189 B (XXXI) of the General Assembly.

At its seventh meeting on 12 May 1977, the Preparatory Committee approved a list of headings to be used by the Secretariat in fulfilling the task assigned to it.

The present document incorporates, under the various headings, the views of Member States on the agenda and all other relevant questions relating to the Special Session of the General Assembly, as received up to 12 May 1977.
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I. GENERAL REMARKS

ALGERIA

"The problem of disarmament has always been a central concern of the United Nations, which has ceaselessly endeavoured to bring about general and complete disarmament under international supervision which would ensure peace and security in the world. Unfortunately the results achieved thus far do not measure up to the efforts made and do not meet the needs of the international community.

Like other non-aligned countries, Algeria has repeatedly expressed its concern at the acceleration of the arms race and the production of new and advanced weapons, the constantly growing amount of human and financial resources being devoted to them instead of being used for the advancement of mankind and the economic and social development of peoples, especially at a time when efforts are being made to establish a new international economic order, and the lack of progress in disarmament negotiations, particularly in the nuclear field.

Algeria has also worked unceasingly for the dissolution of rival military blocs, the withdrawal of foreign troops from foreign territories, the eradication of colonialism and racism and the elimination of zones of influence and hegemony.

For that reason, Algeria joined in sponsoring resolution 31/189 B, believing that a session of the General Assembly devoted exclusively to the problems of disarmament would reflect the urgent concern of the international community at the arms race and would promote disarmament negotiations, since the special session would certainly constitute the broadest and most representative forum ever convened to deal with the question of disarmament." (A/AC.187/28, p.2)

ARGENTINA

"The Argentine Republic believes that the decision taken by the General Assembly in its resolution 31/189 B represents one of the most important and timely endeavours of the international community in the field of disarmament.

The knowledge that there can be no lasting peace and security without effective disarmament and that both concepts are closely linked to the needs of development obliges us to redouble our efforts to explore every opportunity for halting and then turning back the arms race." (A/AC.187/48, p.1)
The goal of arms limitation has been an elusive one. While there have been a number of notable achievements - for example, the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 and the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons - overall progress has been slow and limited. Universal acceptance of those agreements that have been successfully negotiated has been difficult to secure. The continued growth of military expenditures and levels of armaments is, however, to an important extent a reflection of the continuing uncertainties and instabilities in an international situation which has been subject to far-reaching changes and tensions over the last 30 years. Governments have therefore remained heavily preoccupied with real and perceived threats to their security. It is nevertheless true that some countries have developed their military forces and armaments beyond the levels required for defensive purposes.

Moreover, since the Second World War, the world has witnessed a tremendous growth in the sophistication of military technology and weaponry at both the nuclear and conventional levels. This ongoing revolution has added greatly to the complexities of arms control, has sometimes threatened the limited progress already accomplished and on occasion has stimulated wasteful and threatening arms races.

These considerations have direct relevance for the manner in which the international community approaches arms limitation. There is a need to establish what limitations should seek to achieve and what can be realistically accomplished. The principle of general and complete disarmament will remain the ultimate objective, but it is not a realistic goal in the time-span which should be encompassed by current efforts. Nations will for the foreseeable future, continue to maintain military forces and must have a reasonable capacity to ensure their self-defence. In these circumstances, the more immediate objective of arms control should be to assure greater stability in international relations and to minimize the risk of conflict.

Controlling the growth of armaments must be related to the underlying sources of insecurity and conflict which create the demand for weapons. Whether carried out in a bilateral or multilateral context, the regulation of weaponry needs to be directed to the elimination, or at least the alleviation, of actual or potential destabilizing situations as represented, for example, by the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Arms control efforts should also recognize, inter alia, the importance of strictly defensive postures and of military balances, the role of deterrence in preventing conflict, the limitation of damage and lessening the risks to civilians should conflict occur. *(A/AC.187/33, pp. 2-3)*
"The Austrian Government has on many occasions voiced its deep concern over the lack of substantial progress in international disarmament negotiations. A permanently neutral country in the geopolitical position of Austria has a vital interest in effective steps towards arms reduction and disarmament. Indeed, the very existence of such a country could depend on progress in this field. When evaluating the disarmament efforts since the Second World War, both inside and outside the United Nations, it becomes obvious that most of the very limited achievements that have been obtained were in the field of arms limitation rather than effective disarmament. The international community has so far not been able to achieve a substantial break-through in this field of utmost and vital importance to mankind. The Austrian Government has therefore consistently lent its active support to all genuine efforts to overcome what begins to appear as a dangerous stalemate. In this connexion it may be recalled that Austria has always supported the convening of a World Disarmament Conference and will continue to do so.

During the thirty-first session of the General Assembly of the United Nations the Austrian delegation as one of the co-sponsors of resolution 31/189 B welcomed the proposal made by the Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-aligned Countries to convene a special session of the General Assembly in 1978.

In the opinion of the Austrian Government the special session, which should mark the starting point for the gradual solution of both general and specific problems of disarmament, will constitute a very important element in promoting the goal of general and complete disarmament.

To underline the political significance of the special session and of its final documents, the special session might - in the view of the Austrian Government - be held at a higher political level." (A/AC.187/41, p.1)

BELGIUM

"At this special session the General Assembly should first endeavour to take stock of the efforts made and results attained so far in the sphere of disarmament and arms control.

Belgium is well aware of the merits of the negotiations which have been undertaken or are under way in this field. It has no wish to ignore favourable developments that have occurred in international life - the signing of a treaty, a conference producing encouraging results or the reduction of tension in a given region. Our country is, however, disturbed by the scant results achieved and by the slow pace of the work and negotiations on disarmament.

The international community is right to inquire into the reasons for the limited nature of these results (limited both in participation and in substance)."
Belgium is convinced that the special session comes just at the right time.

There is growing concern within the international community about the danger that the ever-growing arms race may constitute for both the security and the economy of States.

The Belgian authorities venture to hope that 1977 will witness the start of an active period of work and negotiations on arms control at the world, regional and bilateral levels. Should these efforts not bear fruit and should the distrust and fear that are still all too common in relations among States not be overcome in time, the international community may yet be drawn into the toils of war.

The dissatisfaction and concern of the Belgian authorities are the product of their analysis of a number of disturbing factors. These include the all too frequent doctrinaire positions maintained by many States on the topics discussed and on priorities among the measures needed. In a climate often marked by distrust, States tend to waver about the best way of designing their own security and sometimes begin to doubt that their security can emerge strengthened from agreements on arms control.

Doctrinaire confrontations do not serve the cause of disarmament. Belgium has always preferred a specific approach to well-defined subjects to doctrinaire theoretical proposals.

One of the chief reasons for the lack of movement in international disarmament efforts lies in the absence of dialogue between the major military States and, indeed, between all the nuclear Powers.

Belgium believes that the States have to shoulder a special responsibility at the international level.

Although not accepting that nuclear disarmament must precede conventional disarmament, Belgium does recognize the difficulty of planning disarmament measures at the world level unless nuclear States set an example, especially in this field, in which they have acquired a definite monopoly and a privilege sanctioned, in the case of some of them, by international treaty.

In the case of nuclear States which are parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Belgium wants them:

- to commit themselves more deeply to the goal of nuclear disarmament;
- to strive to eliminate the possible discriminatory repercussions of certain provisions of the Treaty concerning the control of civilian activities or free access to nuclear technology;
- to show greater flexibility concerning the institutional situation in multilateral disarmament work.

Belgium considers that the special session of the General Assembly cannot produce fruitful results unless all nuclear Powers take an active part in its deliberations." (A/AC.197/10, pp. 1-2)
BRASIL

"Brazil considers that disarmament is one of the main tasks of our times, and that previous international efforts, judging by the meagre results attained, have not been commensurate with the needs of the international community. The first of these needs is the very survival of mankind. In the light of this need, all the others fall into their proper perspective, such as the establishment of true conditions for peace and international security that would benefit all peoples, without exception, and provide the tranquility they must have in order to guarantee them the benefits of economic and technological progress.

In this context the States that are in conditions of greater potential to influence, either positively or negatively, the accomplishment of these objectives, have a correlated special responsibility to facilitate agreements, in progressive stages, between all States, leading towards disarmament and an international order that will be more stable and more peaceful and more equitable.

The appraisal of multilateral efforts in the field of disarmament reveals the scarcity of the results obtained so far, results limited to a partial and sectoral containment of the accelerated growth in armaments." (A/AC.187/49)

BULGARIA

"The results of the efforts made to date are well known - a number of international treaties and bilateral agreements have been concluded on various questions of disarmament and this undoubtedly represents considerable success. The fact remains, however, that the arms race in the world has still not been checked and the danger of war has not been completely eliminated. This arouses grave concern among all peoples. For this reason, the proposal of the Government of the USSR concerning the convening of a World Disarmament Conference has found support among the overwhelming majority of States Members of the United Nations. At such a conference, at which all countries, including the nuclear-weapon States, would participate, the problem of disarmament could be considered fully and the most effective ways of solving it could be studied. Unfortunately, despite many resolutions of the General Assembly, it has so far been impossible to convene that conference because of the attitude of some nuclear States towards it."(A/AC.187/36,p.2)

BYELORUSSIAN SSR

"The Byelorussian SSR considers that an important step towards putting an end to the arms race would be the implementation of the measures provided for in the memorandum of the Soviet Union on questions of ending the arms race and disarmament submitted by the Soviet delegation for consideration by the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-first session. Now, as is noted in the memorandum, "What is most important is to move on from discussions on ending the arms race to practical action". In that important document the Soviet Union, guided by the noble purposes set forth in the foreign policy programme of the 25th Congress of the CPSU, submits for co-ordinated action by States a realistic platform of joint measures to be taken with regard to the main areas of disarmament." (A/AC.187/4, p.2)
6.

**CANADA**

"Canada's objective is to make the special session as productive and as constructive as possible: its hope is that this international forum may reach a meeting of minds on a broadly based co-operative approach to the issues involved and thus infuse a new sense of shared purpose in arms control and disarmament endeavours." (A/AC.187/26, p.2)

**COLOMBIA**

"Colombia voted in favour of resolution 31/189 B. It did so for the simple reason that, in view of the resounding failure of the Organization in the field of disarmament, it feels that the international community must spare no effort in trying to reduce the horrible danger to life on this planet that is posed by the arms race. The Government of Colombia does not, however, have much hope that this new measure will produce any better results than those obtained in 30 years of exhausting and repeated debates in the General Assembly and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. For disarmament is in no way dependent on the will of the Organization as such, nor even that of the vast majority of its Members; it depends solely on the will of the countries that manufacture weapons, that have been stockpiling them, that trade in them and that derive both military and political power and enormous financial profit from this lethal industry. Therefore, so long as those countries are unwilling to disarm, to reduce the rate of weapons production or to place the interests of mankind in general above their own interests and hunger for power, nothing will be gained, no matter how many special sessions of the General Assembly or how many world conferences on disarmament are held." (A/AC.187/46, p.1)

**CYPRUS**

"It is a source of encouragement that after 32 years of United Nations, the Organization will for the first time be devoting more concerted efforts towards effective disarmament with the participation of the whole United Nations membership in a special session of the General Assembly." (A/AC.187/18, p.1)

**CZECHOSLOVAKIA**

"An effective and far-reaching solution of the problems of disarmament and the establishment of lasting peace in the world are unquestionably the most urgent requirement of the present day. Czechoslovakia consistently strives for general and complete disarmament and supports all steps which are realistically directed towards that goal. The tendency in recent years towards the relaxation of international tension has made it possible to activate disarmament negotiations on a broader basis and to adopt certain partial measures aimed at halting the arms race and lessening the danger of a military confrontation." (A/AC.187/13, p.2)
DENMARK

"It remains a primary goal of Danish foreign policy in promotion of international détente and security to assist in all genuine efforts to achieve practical and durable results in the field of arms control and disarmament. In keeping with this policy the Danish Government endorsed the convening of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament on the condition that it be prepared thoroughly and in such manner that it would be likely to make a constructive and realistic contribution to the attainment of satisfactory solutions."

(A/AC.187/20, p.1)

FINLAND

"The Finnish Government welcomes the resolution by the thirty-first session of the General Assembly to convene a special session devoted to disarmament to be held in New York in May-June 1978.

Progress in the limitation of the arms race and in disarmament has been slow although the continued growth of armaments in virtually all sectors of arms technology has rendered the urgency of arms limitation and disarmament increasingly obvious. The measures so far adopted in arms limitation are encouraging as such. Nevertheless, reliance on military means as a way to seek security has not decreased; on the contrary, its pace is, to some extent, even accelerating.

While marked progress has been achieved in the reduction of tensions in international relations and in developing peaceful patterns of co-operation, endeavours towards disarmament are proceeding excruciatingly slowly. Clearly, there is an interdependence between détente on one hand and the reduction of armaments and disarmament on the other.

Several crucial arms control and disarmament questions are presently subject to an intensive process of negotiations. The Finnish Government wants to emphasize that if progress in these negotiations could be achieved before the special session, the possibilities of a successful outcome of the session would be greatly enhanced."

(A/AC.187/21, pp. 1-2)

FRANCE

"France welcomes the decision taken at the thirty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly to hold a special session devoted to disarmament. For very many years, the representatives of France who have had occasion at successive sessions of the General Assembly to deal with the problems of disarmament have continually stressed the inadequacy of the progress made. The French Government simply wishes to recall the views which it put forward in the reply sent to the Secretary-General on the strengthening of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament (document A/AC.181/1/Add.3 of 7 June 1976). In France's view, the decision adopted shows that the United Nations realizes the need, in an effort of profound reflection, to make a detailed study of ways and means of advancing the disarmament endeavour." (A/AC.187/23, p.2)
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

"The German Democratic Republic regards it as the most important and urgent tasks of our time to remove the threat of a new world war and to achieve disarmament. While certain partial results have been achieved in arms limitation and disarmament, the fact remains that the arms race goes on. In the Bucharest Declaration of November 1976 of the Warsaw Treaty participating States (A/31/431-S/12255, annex I), the German Democratic Republic joined the other Treaty members in expressing their readiness actively and constructively to co-operate with all States in solving these problems, which concern the most elementary interests of mankind. In striving to bring about the cessation of the arms race as well as effective steps towards disarmament, the German Democratic Republic is in harmony with the majority of States Members of the United Nations and with peace-loving mankind.

In the wake of political détente, tangible opportunities have emerged for achieving far-reaching international agreements in the field of disarmament. These opportunities must now be used with still greater resolve in order to check the material preparations for war, to strengthen peace and security and to free the peoples from the huge burden placed on them by armaments." (CA/32/62, p.1)

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF

"The Federal Republic of Germany shares the concern of the community of nations about the consequences of an unabated arms race. It not only sees in the continuing arms race a threat to international security but fears that the nations will be increasingly denied the limited economic resources of the earth for their economic and social development.

To the Federal Republic of Germany, the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control is indispensable. It cannot be ignored that, seen in terms of that goal, the success achieved up to now in negotiations on disarmament and arms control is but a beginning. The Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, Herr Hans-Dietrich Genscher, therefore, when addressing the United Nations in September 1976, welcomed the initiative adopted in Colombo in the same year by the non-aligned States for a special session of the United Nations General Assembly to be convened in 1978, stating that the Federal Republic of Germany would be ready to co-operate constructively in such a session. The Federal Government has supported the initiative from the beginning and was a co-sponsor of the relevant draft resolution tabled at the thirty-first session of the General Assembly.

The Federal Government attaches great importance to the proposed special session and hopes that it will proceed in an atmosphere of co-operation and mutual trust. It also hopes that, without trying to hide the problems, Governments will succeed in fulfilling the expectations of the public, that they will convincingly demonstrate the credibility of the world-wide effort in pursuit of disarmament and arms control, and strengthen confidence among the States." (A/AC.187/44, p.1)
GREECE

"The Government of Greece shares the major concern at the effects of the growing arms race which puts at stake international peace and security and hinders the economic growth of countries and more particularly of the developing ones. It has, therefore, encouraged all initiatives in the field of a complete and general disarmament and arms control. It was in this spirit that Greece voted for General Assembly resolutions concerning the convening of a world conference on disarmament. In the same spirit Greece supported the holding of the special session of the General Assembly." (A/AC.187/45, p.1)

HUNGARY

"The Government of the Hungarian People's Republic, bent on serving the fundamental interests of the Hungarian people, consistently favours any initiative and proposal seeking to promote the strengthening of international peace and security, the curbing of the arms race and the realization of general and complete disarmament, and lends active support to the elaboration and implementation of effective measures in pursuit of these goals. It has been particularly active in this respect since it became a member of the Geneva Committee on disarmament. At this forum of high prestige, it is led by an endeavour, in keeping with the sincere aspirations for peace of the Hungarian people, to do constructive work and put forward useful initiatives and workable proposals in order to enhance the cause of disarmament, and to contribute its share to elaboration of measures for checking and halting the arms race and for achieving actual disarmament. The Hungarian People's Republic has at all times declared its readiness to support reasonable and realistic disarmament initiatives at other forums as well, and is a party to all the international agreements already achieved on disarmament.

The current period, in which the main tendency is for the relaxation of international tension, is held by the Hungarian Government particularly propitious for disarmament negotiations to move ahead at a higher speed and to make considerable progress, a decisive breakthrough in this field. While this is facilitated by détente, the goal of widening this process and making it irreversible calls for the urgent adoption of further effective disarmament measures. Extension of détente to the military field would undoubtedly have a favourable influence on the political, economic and other aspects as well."

(A/AC.187/6, p.1)

INDIA

"The initiative for convening a special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament was taken by the first Summit Conference of Non-aligned Countries held in Belgrade from 1 to 6 September 1961, which adopted the following declaration on the subject:
The participants in the Conference recommend that the General Assembly of the United Nations should, at its forthcoming session, adopt a decision on the convening either of a special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to discussion of disarmament or on the convening of a world disarmament conference under the auspices of the United Nations with a view to setting in motion the process of general disarmament.\(^1\)

The Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-aligned Countries held at Lima from 25 to 30 August 1975 made the following declaration regarding their joint policy on this subject:

"The Ministers for Foreign Affairs agree to co-ordinate the action of the Non-aligned countries within the framework of the United Nations in order to promote the holding of a World Conference on Disarmament, with as little delay as possible, with the participation of all States on an equal basis and during which universal disarmament guidelines, in particular with respect to nuclear disarmament, would be approved together with the utilization of resources thus freed for international economic co-operation.

'If it becomes evident that it will not be possible to convene a world disarmament conference, the Foreign Ministers consider that a special session of the General Assembly should be convened as proposed in the Declaration of the First Summit Conference of Non-aligned Countries.'\(^{1}\)

\((A/AC.187/47, \text{pp.1-2})\)

**INDONESIA**

"In accordance with the decision of the Fifth Summit Conference of the Non-Aligned Countries held in Colombo, Indonesia supports the convening of a special session of the General Assembly to consider disarmament issues, as negotiations in the past have not resulted in concrete progress and it has become necessary to exert fresh efforts."\((A/AC.187/27, \text{p.1})\)

**IRAN**

"We approach the decision to convene the special session devoted to disarmament with no illusion. We are cognizant of the extremely difficult nature of the subject-matter and of the inherent complexity of the issues involved. We believe the snail-pace progress towards disarmament is not merely due to the lack of trying, nor can the absence of appreciable advance in this direction be reasonably explained by sheer deficiencies related to the machinery of disarmament. Substantive international issues and antagonisms - fed by mistrust and by real or perceived insecurity - stimulate the drive for armament and weapon competition which is the heart of the problem.

Yet, in the nuclear era, the growing burden and increasing dangers of a continued arms race with unthinkable consequences are too foreboding to be ignored by any responsible country. Thus Iran gives active support for all genuine efforts that are intended to lead us along the road towards disarmament, and in particular, the decision to convene the special session in which we have pinned certain hopes."\((A/AC.187/2, \text{p.1})\)
"The Government of Ireland have sought over the years, within the United Nations, to encourage and promote efforts towards arms control and disarmament. They recognize that there are no easy solutions to the problems involved. Progress in disarmament is intimately linked to the climate of international relations. The degree of international mistrust, the nature and level of the perceived threat, the need felt to guarantee against any diminution of security, the military options and dilemmas made possible by technological advances and competition, all serve to constrain both the pace and scope of concrete disarmament negotiations. Moreover, the very complexity of the issues to be resolved makes it essential that negotiation be both painstaking and exhaustive.

Nevertheless, the limited progress in resolving issues which have been under study, debate or negotiation for almost a decade is rightly a cause of grave international concern. The arms race in both nuclear and conventional armaments has continued unabated throughout the present disarmament decade. New technologies have created new problems and new rivalries, and the growing and uncontrolled international trade in conventional arms risks exacerbating regional tensions.

Within the United Nations, the varying emphasis and approaches of the Member States and the range of issues currently arising have led to a lack of precision as to where the priority objectives in arms control and disarmament lie. There is, therefore, a need for the international community to take stock of the overall situation with a view to defining the priority objectives and identifying ways and means of progressing towards them. It was from this perspective that Ireland welcomed and supported the proposal made at the thirty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly to convene a special session devoted to questions of disarmament." (A/AC.187/37, pp. 1-2)

"The Irish Government believe that disarmament can be a vital factor in the restructuring of the world order, politically, economically and socially. If, therefore, the special session can encourage progress towards arms control and disarmament, it will have helped to stem the massive and increasing diversion of scarce resources to programmes of military expenditure and thus make possible their redirection to the urgent tasks of economic construction and development. Not least for this reason, it is important that the special session should succeed." (A/AC.187/37, p.3)
Israel supported resolution 31/18 B and welcomes the convening of the special session as it has consistently, throughout the years, supported international initiatives aimed at achieving a reduction of armaments on a global scale. In so doing, Israel has been acting in accordance with the age-old yearning of the Jewish people for universal peace, first proclaimed by its prophets. Isaiah's vision of peace and disarmament is inscribed in stone facing the Headquarters of the United Nations. Peace and disarmament are for every Israeli not an abstract notion but an urgent need, a tangible necessity for Israelis of all political persuasions.

Israel's approach to the question of disarmament has been defined at the United Nations more than once. In the general debate at the thirty-first session of the General Assembly the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Yifat Allon, said:

"In my speech last year I drew attention to a problem of particular gravity for the prospects of peace as well as for the economic and social well-being of the countries of the Middle East. I refer to the seemingly limitless flow of weapons of war into the region, resulting in a frantic arms race. In the past three years the value of arms supplies delivered by both east and west to the Arab countries in the vicinity of Israel is estimated at 7.5 billion dollars. A further approximately 22 billion dollars' worth is contracted for delivery from the end of 1976 onwards, making a total of nearly 30 billion dollars invested in weaponry. This is an utterly staggering sum which is difficult for the human mind to take in. If, instead of being spent on means of destruction, most of this sum was invested in the economic and social development of the area, the Middle East would be transformed and restored to its ancient glory".

The Minister went on to say:

"We repeat emphatically that we are prepared now, even before peace is made, to negotiate with our neighbours for a balanced limitation in the inflow of arms into the area in such a manner that the burden will be lightened for all, without adversely affecting the security and the defence capacity of any." (A/31/PV.22, p. 62).

It will be convenient to summarize here some of the principal points of Israel's position on the subject:

(a) The role of the United Nations is essentially one of creating an atmosphere in which disarmament negotiations can be advanced, it being understood and accepted that concrete measures cannot be taken except by agreements resulting from detailed negotiations between Governments;

(b) The importance of educating world public opinion, particularly among the rising generation, about the dangers inherent in the armament race and the efforts made by the international community to achieve general disarmament;

(c) Disarmament and arms control measures are not only of concern to major Powers on a global level, but are also of vital interest to small countries in the regional context. Constant endeavours should, therefore, be made to promote local and regional agreements between Governments so as to lighten the burden of armaments and to lessen the danger of local conflicts." (A/AC.187/38, p.1-2)
ITALY

"Italy supports the decision to convene a special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It intends to make a strong and constructive contribution to the session, beginning with the work of the Preparatory Committee. It was in this spirit that Italy co-sponsored resolution 189/B adopted by the General Assembly.

It is in fact Italy's opinion that the continuation of the conventional and nuclear arms race can only contribute to a spiralling increase in international tension, and as such it is a source of deep concern for the future of world peace.

Only the progressive adoption and implementation of disarmament measures - envisaged as steps in a process aimed at general and complete disarmament - can truly strengthen international security, stability and peace." (A/AC.187/32, p.2)

JAPAN

"For the past three decades the disarmament problem has been treated as one of the world's most vital concerns in the discussions in such international bodies as the United Nations and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD). Despite these efforts, however, the prospects for attaining the ultimate goal of mankind, general and complete disarmament under effective international control, are still very remote.

Japan, the first and only victim of nuclear weapons, is strictly adhering to the policy of not producing, not possessing and not bringing in nuclear weapons, and ardently desires that all nuclear weapons be completely abolished from the earth which is the home of all mankind. In contradiction of this earnest desire of the people of Japan, however, the threat posed by nuclear weapons has not diminished in the slightest and the stockpiles in the arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States have registered enormous increases in both quality and quantity.

Moreover, in recent years the world's annual military expenditures have reached the level of 300 billion dollars, and this increasing cost, which is so detrimental to the economic and social development of all countries, and especially the developing countries, constitutes the heaviest burden now resting upon the world.

In these circumstances the Government of Japan attaches great significance to the special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, to be convened next year, and strongly hopes that it will become a milestone on the road to general and complete disarmament and will contribute to the relaxation of tension and the strengthening of international peace and security.

In order to achieve this goal, it is necessary in the first place to secure the participation of all nuclear-weapon States in the special session. Furthermore, all participating States should bear in mind that, although there may be discrepancies of views, political confrontations would be counter-productive; they should endeavour not to allow the special session to become just another forum for exchanging slogans, and instead to make it a truly constructive opportunity for deliberations which will lead to concrete disarmament measures.

At the same time we attach great importance to the role being played by the CCD as an effective negotiating body, and we consider it most desirable that the special session give fresh impetus to the future work of the CCD." (A/AC.187/14, p.2)
"The goal of general and complete disarmament cannot be attained in a day, but can only be achieved by the gradual accumulation of substantial and concrete disarmament measures under effective international control.

The Government of Japan is convinced that this is the most practical and realistic approach to disarmament, since it provides a short-cut to the attainment of this final goal. In this context, we must take it into account, that all these disarmament measures "should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation ... could any States or group of States gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all", as is stated in point 5 of the principles for general and complete disarmament agreed upon between the United States and the Soviet Union on 20 September 1961." (A/AC.187/14, p.3)

KUWAIT

"Kuwait believes that the elimination of colonialism, foreign occupation and similar forms of domination is an essential prerequisite for achieving general and complete disarmament.

Kuwait also believes that recognition of the sovereignty of States over their natural resources will liberate States from the need to defend one of the basic attributes of their nationhood and well-being.

The pace of disarmament can be accelerated through the dissolution of military blocs, great Power alliances, the dismantling of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of troops from foreign territories.

The cause of disarmament can be immensely promoted through the cessation of all forms of foreign interference in the internal affairs of States." (A/AC.187/7, p.1)

MONGOLIA

"The Mongolian People's Republic, guided by the principles of its peace-loving foreign policy, endeavours in every possible way to contribute to a solution of the problems of halting the arms race and bringing about disarmament and consistently supports all constructive steps which contribute to single-minded efforts by States to agree on measures in the field of disarmament. At the thirty-first session, the delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic accordingly supported the decision of the General Assembly to convene a special session of the Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The Government of the Mongolian People's Republic believes that the special session of the General Assembly should concentrate its attention on the search for practical, rational ways and effective means of solving disarmament problems, thus preparing the way for the holding of a world disarmament conference, the convening of which is supported by an overwhelming majority of States. It also believes that the special session should help to enhance further the role and effectiveness of proven forums for disarmament negotiations such as the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

At the present time, when the international community is primarily concerned with averting the threat of a new world war, the problem of halting the arms race and taking effective measures of disarmament takes on the utmost urgency. Disarmament questions affect the vital interests of all States and peoples, particularly their security interests. They are complex and specific, and they require careful study and comprehensive consideration. The approach taken to these problems must be based on full consideration of current political realities and reflect the special characteristics of specific situations existing in the world;
due consideration must also be given to the views of States or groups of States which are sincerely trying to make a significant contribution to the strengthening of peace and general security and to a solution of disarmament problems. In this connexion, we believe that one of the basic prerequisites for the success of disarmament negotiations is active, constructive participation by all States, particularly those having a significant military potential, including the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.

The special session can carry out its task only if all participating States, regardless of their size and level of development, demonstrate the necessary political will and determination to contribute to disarmament negotiations and to the achievement of positive results in this vitally important field." (A/AC.187/16, pp.1-2)

**NETHERLANDS**

"Since the Second World War a virtually uninterrupted arms race has resulted in large quantities of both conventional and nuclear weapons which are still increasing and with which mankind could destroy itself and all other life on earth several times over. Reflecting on this situation, one is led to the conclusion that the unabated accumulation of arms can only reduce world security rather than fulfil the original intention of enhancing it. The Netherlands Government considers that one of the most important ways of reducing the likelihood of war, and therefore of total destruction, is to slow down the arms race and to reduce armaments to the levels required for national defence.

From the point of view of world security there is every reason to strive for disarmament and arms control. Economic considerations simply reinforce this. Military expenditure, which currently runs at $300 thousand million per annum, consumes a considerable proportion of the human and material resources available to mankind. Reduction in military expenditure as a result of disarmament measures or, under certain conditions, as an independent step, would increase the chances of finding solutions to the social and economic problems facing the world, particularly the developing countries.

The Netherlands Government views disarmament and development as two quite separate aims and contributes as much as possible to the realization of both but nevertheless considers that substantial progress in the field of disarmament would considerably enhance in particular the prospects of creating a New International Economic Order. In the light of the above, the eighth special session could support the results of the sixth and seventh special sessions. Solutions to both problems will form the basis of efforts to bring about a safer and more just world.

In the view of the Netherlands Government, international security can ultimately only be guaranteed in a world legal order based on justice in which the issues of international politics will have been transformed into issues of global domestic politics. This will only be possible in a world order which differs considerably from the present one. As long as the world is divided into national sovereign States, attempts to bring about general and complete disarmament will require the active involvement and co-operation of all countries: each and every one of them will bear individual responsibility for bringing this about." (A/AC.187/25, pp.1-2)
NEW ZEALAND

The vast expenditure on arms and armaments of recent years and the ever mounting stockpile of nuclear weapons threaten our civilization with nothing less than extinction. To set limits to the arms build-up and if possible to embark on disarmament to control the spread and growth of nuclear weaponry and diminish the fear of global and regional war is a supreme challenge to mankind. New Zealand fully shared the widespread frustration of members of the United Nations over the inadequate progress made since the Organization was founded and particularly in recent years towards international agreement on measures of arms control and disarmament. The special session offers an important, and perhaps unique, opportunity for Governments to correct the deficiencies that have caused this situation by consideration both of institutional means of dealing with disarmament issues and of the principles and attitudes with which Governments have traditionally approached them. The special session will not prove to be the panacea to all problems, and Governments must be careful to avoid creating unrealistic expectations to this effect. However, equal care must be given to ensure that full use is made of the occasion of the special session, for failure to do so may have a profoundly detrimental effect on arms control efforts thereafter. New Zealand hopes that the special session will be able to note that substantive progress in certain areas of disarmament has been made in the year before it meets and, further, that it will be able to establish a realistic framework that will facilitate negotiations in the years ahead.

While it is undesirable for the special session to become too preoccupied with past failures, Governments should be cognizant of the causes of shortcomings in this respect in order that due attention can be given to their amelioration.\(^{(A/AC.187/40, p.1)}\)

NORWAY

"Norway considers the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament to offer a particularly valuable opportunity for focusing global attention on a complex of problems which urgently requires action and re-evaluation. The international arms race does not only represent a threat to the security of all nations, but also involves an unacceptable waste of resources in a world of poverty and distress. Norway is concerned that the arms control and disarmament issues to an increasing extent are becoming complicated technical questions only fully understood by experts. The special session will hopefully contribute to a greater understanding and general awareness of these vital questions."\(^{(A/AC.187/22, p.1)}\)

PERU

"The Government of Peru is deeply concerned at the continuation of the arms race, which in the years since the Second World War has not only failed to increase in the slightest the security of any country, especially the militarily strong countries, but has absorbed human and financial resources which, had they been allocated to the priority tasks of development, would by now have made it possible to meet a large part of mankind's most pressing needs. The Government of Peru is aware that ending the arms race and initiating an effective process of disarmament is the responsibility of all countries, although it cannot, of course, fail to note the obvious fact that some bear greater responsibility than others. Accordingly, as a non-aligned and peace-loving developing country, it has spared no effort to participate in this common task to
17.

the best of its ability. Evidence of this is its active and continuing involvement in the work of the specialized organs of the United Nations in which it has the honour to participate, including the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference and the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly, together with its constant support for the most important and significant resolutions on disarmament adopted by the United Nations ever since the establishment of the Organization.

Accordingly, the Government of Peru considers it important and appropriate to hold a special session of the General Assembly on disarmament questions. It is appropriate because the levels reached by the arms race are such that, defying all imagination, they deny mankind's basic aspiration for a minimum of security, peace and progress. It is important because, after many years and countless efforts, it has become clear that disarmament questions require a global approach covering all the varied aspects of a problem which is undeniably complex and difficult. Consideration of the topic of disarmament in the highest world forum is therefore a priority task to which the Government of Peru will contribute its best efforts. (A/AC.187/42, pp.1-2)

POLAND

"The most important and pressing task at present confronting the international community, is ending the arms race and reaching effective disarmament agreements. The imperative need of disarmament is necessitated by considerations of strengthening world security and eliminating the threat of a new world war; it represents the basic foundation of ensuring the irreversibility of the process of political détente. Particular concern of the Government of Poland is aroused by the fact of earmarking on armaments enormous and constantly growing material resources which could have been utilized for development and raising of the standards of living of all peoples, and especially the developing countries, as well as for complete eradication of poverty and hunger, still prevailing in different parts of the world. Progress in limiting the arms race and in disarmament would likewise serve the implementation of the new, just principles of the international economic order.

The Government of the Polish People's Republic has always considered the struggle to strengthen international security and world peace, to put an end to the arms race and embark upon disarmament, as one of the basic areas of Poland's activity on the international forum. This involvement stems both from the fundamental tenets of the country's system and the most horrifying of prices the people of Poland had to pay for the peace to be restored, following the tragic years of war and aggression brought about by Nazi Germany and fascism. It also reflects the steadfast desire to secure a peaceful future to the young generations of all nations. The Government of Poland strongly believes that owing to the transformations in the world relationship of forces to the advantage of progress and peace and considering the new political climate in the world, conditions have emerged under which aggression and war can ultimately be eliminated from international life.

Poland's determined and consistent efforts towards disarmament can be seen in its constructive role played on all the negotiating fora it is participating. We have lent and continue lending our unfailing support to all initiatives and realistic proposals which may assist to complement political détente with that in the military sphere. Along with other States of the socialist community, Poland has co-sponsored a number of such proposals, both of a global as well as regional character, as they have been in keeping with the interest of all States, regardless of their size, socio-political system, geographical location or level of economic development. Their implementation would indeed serve the materialization of the basic purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations."
Proceeding from these general considerations, the Government of the Polish People's Republic has firmly endorsed the proposal, submitted by the USSR, to convene a World Disarmament Conference attended by all States. (A/AC.187/12, pp.1-3)

ROMANIA

"In the opinion of the Romanian Government, this special session should adopt measures which will enable the United Nations to play a more active role in military disengagement and disarmament, as an integral part of the process of the establishment of a new international economic and political order guaranteeing the free and independent development of all States, without any external interference, and broad and unimpeded co-operation among all nations. The importance of the special session of the General Assembly is also due to the fact that the United Nations is still far from having accomplished the mission entrusted to it in the sphere of disarmament.

The disarmament negotiations have gradually been removed from the authority of the United Nations, and those negotiations which have continued in one form or another to be guided by the United Nations have in fact been deprived of any real content. Although more than three decades have elapsed since its establishment, the United Nations still cannot exercise direct competence in the negotiations concerning military disengagement and disarmament. The problems of disarmament, and particularly of nuclear disarmament, have not yet resulted in the adoption by Governments of resolute and decisive measures which would be really likely to lead to the reduction and elimination of armaments and to secure mankind from another war. Although the international treaties and conventions so far concluded have made a certain contribution to the creation of an atmosphere of better understanding, they have proved unable to halt the arms race or to guarantee the implementation of effective disarmament measures and have not affected the bases of armaments, particularly nuclear armaments.

The disquieting picture presented by armaments and disarmament at the present stage shows that the strategy, approaches, rules and procedures used to tackle these problems have not proved to be the most suitable and effective and, despite the efforts made, have not produced the results demanded by the peoples.

In convening the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the United Nations is in fact acknowledging that the time has come to take forceful action in order to guarantee equal and real security for all, by the adoption of efficient measures of general and complete disarmament, primarily nuclear disarmament, under strict and effective international control." (A/AC.187/24, p.3)

SPAIN

"The Spanish Government attaches great importance to the work on disarmament to be done at the special session of the United Nations General Assembly to be held in May/June 1978." (A/AC.187/9, p.2)

SWEDEN

"The Swedish Government welcomes the decision to convene a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It can be recalled that Sweden at an early time gave its support to the idea of a special session, endorsed by the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-aligned Countries in Colombo in August 1976, and it was a co-sponsor of General Assembly resolution 31/189B."
19.

The results achieved so far in international disarmament negotiations are wholly inadequate. The arms race continues in all regions of the world. Vast human, technological and economic resources, which are desperately needed for economic and social development, are wasted on armaments. Never in history has the capacity of man to destroy himself, his civilization and his physical environment been greater than today. It has not yet proven possible to build up the degree of confidence and trust between States, which is necessary to set in motion a process of real disarmament.

... The success of the special session can only be ensured through careful and constructive preparations and an ambitious follow-up of the decisions and recommendations of the session. The participation of all Member States in this process is essential. The Swedish Government is prepared, for its part, to make an active contribution to this endeavour. " (A/AC.187/19, pp.1-2)

SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC

"A general debate on the problem of disarmament, an elaboration of the idea of effectively securing world co-operation with a view to establishing peace and security in the world, and the prior elimination of all traces of aggression and foreign occupation and settlement as a prerequisite for effective and complete disarmament." (A/AC.187/3, p.1)

TURKEY

See II.

UKRAINIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

"In recent years, as a result of the conclusion of a number of international treaties and agreements, some progress has been noted in limiting the arms race in certain areas. The developing process of international détente makes it urgently necessary to achieve further success in halting the rampant arms race.

... Halting the arms race is becoming the most urgent task of the present day. The memorandum of the Soviet Union on questions of ending the arms race, which met with a favourable response from many delegations at the thirty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly, has become an important document which greatly facilitates the search for a solution to the unsolved problems of disarmament. The memorandum constitutes a comprehensive programme of disarmament measures.

... The Ukrainian SSR believes that it would be possible to achieve effective solutions to all aspects of the disarmament problem, including those mentioned above, in the widest and most authoritative international forum, which could be provided by a world disarmament conference. The Soviet Union's proposal for the convening of such a conference with the participation of all States has won broad support from the international community. A number of recent sessions of the General Assembly have adopted resolutions in favour of holding the conference. (A/AC.187/5, pp.1-2)
Since the first days of its existence, the Soviet State has consistently devoted its efforts to ensuring peace, ending the arms race and bringing about disarmament. In recent years, as a result of the conclusion of a number of international agreements, it has been possible to limit the arms race somewhat in certain areas. Questions involving disarmament and the limitation of armaments, including rocket and nuclear weapons, are being discussed in current multilateral and bilateral negotiations. The developing process of the relaxation of international tension is creating favourable opportunities for the realization of other, more radical steps in the solution of the problem of disarmament.

However, although some progress in checking the arms race has been made, the race still goes on. Advances in science and technology, which should bring benefit to the peoples of the world, continue to be used for the production of increasingly destructive and sophisticated weapons capable of annihilating people and the material and cultural values they have created. More and more States are becoming involved in the arms race; the lessening of international tension has not yet brought a reduction in the stockpiles of weapons and in the immense financial resources spent on accumulating and perfecting them.

The task of halting the arms race is therefore all the more essential. Striving to help bring about the attainment of that goal, the Soviet Union submitted for consideration by the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-first session a Memorandum on questions of ending the arms race and disarmament. That document contains a comprehensive programme of serious and urgent measures in the sphere in question. It states new and specific observations taking account of the views of many countries; those observations were dictated by the Soviet Union's aspirations for peace and its desire to facilitate the search for a solution of the problems still remaining unsolved. As L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, declared, "Our policy is not to strive for superiority in armaments but to strive for their reduction, for a lessening of military confrontation".

The Memorandum mentions the main areas for co-ordinated action by States: cessation of the nuclear-arms race, reduction and subsequent elimination of nuclear weapons, prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, consolidation of the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, prohibition and destruction of chemical means of warfare, prohibition of the development of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction, reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments, establishment of zones of peace in the Indian Ocean and other regions, and reduction of military budgets.

Realization of the measures discussed in the Memorandum would undoubtedly be a great step forward on the road to ending the arms race and to disarmament.

The curbing of the arms race requires the combined efforts of all States, nuclear and non-nuclear, large and small, developed and developing. On the basis of that principle, the Soviet Union put forward the proposal that the problem of disarmament should be considered in its entirety in the widest and most authoritative forum - a world disarmament conference. Such a forum would be truly universal; it could consider in a qualified manner and in the necessary depth the whole complex of questions concerning disarmament and could adopt effective decisions regarding them. The proposal to convene a world disarmament conference is supported by the overwhelming majority of States, which shows that there is a growing conviction in the world concerning the need to hold it. The General Assembly, at several of its sessions, adopted a number of decisions in favour of holding a world disarmament conference." (A/32/60, pp.1-2)
Progress towards multilateral disarmament is essential to lessen the risk of military confrontation and to strengthen international peace and security. The United Kingdom Government believe that effective multilateral disarmament will give equal or greater security at a reduced level of armaments, prove the way towards the ultimate achievement of general and complete disarmament and release more resources for important social and economic needs.

The United Kingdom Government have for many years been committed to the achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. However the level of international confidence has not permitted direct progress to that objective. By general consent the international community has worked for a series of intermediate steps designed to reduce the level of armaments and to increase international confidence. The United Kingdom Government have participated in all the major multinational disarmament conferences since 1945, and have ratified all the arms control and disarmament treaties which these conferences have produced. (A/AC.187/35, p.1)

The United States supported the adoption last fall of General Assembly resolution 31/189B, which called for the convening of a special Assembly session devoted to disarmament. At that time, the United States representative said that the United States would take an active part in preparations for the session and was willing to work co-operatively with other members of the United Nations to make it a success. In his address at the United Nations on 17 March, President Carter stated that "we will make a strong and positive contribution to the upcoming special session on disarmament ..."

Underlying this approach is our belief that the special session offers an important opportunity to come to grips, in a concentrated manner, with some of the fundamental problems in the disarmament field. The session can, of course, serve a great many valuable purposes, both for Governments and the public, including the deepening and sharpening of understanding of vital disarmament issues. But we believe the central objective of the session should be to give a genuine new impetus to productive multilateral negotiations on issues old and new - of pressing concern. In our view, the over-all significance of the session's achievement will be measured primarily in terms of the specific stimulus it gives to such negotiations. More broadly, the session's value will in part be determined by the extent to which it promotes measures and approaches that can contribute to an improved international atmosphere and to greater progress in arms control and disarmament." (A/AC.187/17, p.1)

The Government of Venezuela considers that peace and security in the world can be ensured only through general and complete disarmament under strict international control. Firmly convinced of the pressing need to achieve this objective, Venezuela has repeatedly expressed its concern at the growing arms race and at the increased production of new and sophisticated weapons; at the vertical and horizontal, qualitative and quantitative spread of the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race; at the human and financial resources it involves, which are increasingly devoted to the arms build-up instead of being used for the progress of mankind and for the economic and social development of the developing countries; at the deadlock in the disarmament negotiations, particularly those between countries possessing nuclear weapons." (A/AC.187/8, p.1)
The Government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia considers that the decisions of the thirty-first regular session of the General Assembly to convene a special session devoted to disarmament is an expression of the strong desire of the international community to halt the ever more accelerated arms race and to set in motion the process of disarmament.

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In its basic provisions, the Charter of the United Nations makes it incumbent on States to refrain, in their international relations, from the threat or use of force, to solve their international disputes by peaceful means and to remove the basic causes of the arms race.

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At their conferences, in the United Nations, within the framework of CCD and elsewhere, the non-aligned countries have been constantly striving to agree on measures of disarmament and have themselves submitted numerous proposals. Yugoslavia has always believed that the United Nations is the most appropriate and only universal forum where this problem can be considered and a solution found. Consequently, it emphasizes the need for the world Organization to assume responsibility for solving the problem of disarmament without, however, negating the importance of regional, bilateral and other forms of negotiations.

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At their Fifth Summit Conference in Colombo, the non-aligned countries launched the initiative for convening a special session of the General Assembly convinced that it is the most appropriate way to remove this problem - on a universal basis, in the United Nations - from the state of certain stagnation and to ensure rapid progress toward resolving some substantive questions of disarmament." (A/AC.187/11, pp.2-3)
II. OBJECTIVES OF THE SPECIAL SESSION

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II. OBJECTIVES OF THE SPECIAL SESSION

ALGERIA

"Algeria believes that the special session should first of all make it possible to evaluate the present disarmament situation, the results of the negotiations and the effect of the continued arms race on international peace and security and on the economic and social development of peoples. It should also make it possible to reach agreement on a programme of measures and priorities in matters of disarmament. Lastly, it should ensure a greater role and more active participation for the United Nations in the disarmament process.

Moreover, Algeria believes that the following principles should govern future negotiations on disarmament:

- The principle of universal dedication to the work of disarmament, a pre-condition for the implementation of the decisions adopted;
- The principle of incompatibility between the arms race and the maintenance of international security;
- The principle of the special responsibility of the nuclear Powers for the implementation of disarmament measures;
- The principle that the nuclear Powers will not resort to the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons against other States;
- The principle of equal security for all States;
- The principle of free and equal access of all States to the broadest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technical information for the utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes;
- The principle of complementarity between disarmament, the maintenance of international peace and security, and development.

Furthermore, while all efforts and negotiations should be aimed at general and complete disarmament under effective international control, it is desirable to fix an order of priorities for them, which may be the following:

1. Nuclear weapons;
2. Chemical and biological weapons;
3. Incendiary weapons;
4. Other weapons of mass destruction;
5. Conventional weapons.
With regard to the measures to be implemented with a view to an early ending of the arms race, the greatest attention should be given to the following measures:

- Cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests;
- Cessation of research and development relating to new types of nuclear weapons;
- Respect for the status of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace;
- Prohibition of the manufacture and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons;
- Prohibition of the use of incendiary weapons;
- Withdrawal of foreign troops and foreign military bases.

In addition to the well-known conditions which have led to the present stagnation in the field of disarmament, emphasis should be placed on the inadequacy of existing machinery for disarmament negotiations. The need for an effective multilateral organ for the negotiation of disarmament measures is becoming more and more evident. It is generally felt that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has failed to meet the hopes placed in it. It has confined its efforts to partial or collateral measures for the control and limitation of armaments. For that reason, the special session should provide an opportunity for improving the structure and methods of work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, establishing an organic link between that body and the United Nations General Assembly and ensuring that all nuclear Powers will participate in its work.

(A/AC.187/28, pp.2,3,4)

ARGENTINA

"...the Argentine Republic is convinced that matters so closely connected with the sovereignty, security and defence of nations will not be solved overnight through recommendations made by the General Assembly. Progress towards the settlement of questions of such substance will be possible within the framework of a continuing dialogue in which the interests of all States are represented.

Furthermore, it does not believe that the special session is the most appropriate forum in which to conduct negotiations on specific measures of disarmament.

It is, however, convinced that a clear and unequivocal expression of the majority view of the United Nations may lay the bases for determining, in a balanced manner, a system of principles and courses of action which will put a halt to the terrible waste of resources now being witnessed by mankind.

The achievement of these objectives and hence the promotion of the acceptance of new approaches which will broaden and deepen disarmament negotiations presuppose, in the opinion of the Argentine Government, that all Member States, and more
particularly all the nuclear-weapon States, will participate actively and demonstrate the political will to harmonize their positions. The special session of the General Assembly will then be able to open with a degree of agreement which will make possible a radical reform of existing machinery. The Argentine Government herewith undertakes to collaborate fully in the achievement of those objectives." (A/AC.187/48, pp.1-2)

AUSTRALIA

"Australia considers that one of the principal tasks confronting the special session should be a discussion of the kind of principles suggested above with the end in mind of seeking to secure a realistic conceptual framework within which arms control issues are approached and negotiations conducted. This could be combined with an objective review of past negotiations and statements of principle and an appraisal of the current situation in regard to arms control measures. The results of this consideration might be incorporated in a declaration of principles to be adopted by the special session. Australia believes that effective conclusions in this area would make a major contribution to the clarification of arms control objectives.

A second major goal of the special session should be the identification of particular areas of arms limitation where action is required or desirable and the establishment of priorities for future negotiations. Australia does not consider that it would be practical for the session to attempt to negotiate any specific arms control measures. The time available will be short. Moreover, important negotiations are being conducted in other forums and in bilateral and regional contexts, which should not be prejudiced. There may also be difficulties in seeking to establish a firm time-table for negotiations on disarmament priorities. While urgency is enjoined by the importance of achieving further arms limitation measures, progress on many issues will be largely dependent on the resolution of problems between the major Powers, which will not be advanced by the setting of artificial time-limits or frames. Australia believes that the setting of priorities by the session will be a satisfactory catalyst in promoting meaningful negotiations in particular areas of concern to the international community.

Of all arms control issues, those concerning nuclear weapons have rightly been at the centre of international efforts. It will be incumbent on the special session to give major attention to nuclear issues. Australia has many times reiterated that there are three fundamental areas of nuclear arms control where it looks for early progress: first, the strengthening of measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons; second, the termination of nuclear weapons testing in all environments; and third, further progress in the strategic arms limitation talks between the United States and the Soviet Union.

All three areas involve complex political and technical considerations, the detail of which will be best left to the expert forums that are dealing with them.
The special session might rather address itself to basic principles and guidelines that are likely to promote the goal of nuclear arms control. For example, it might wish to endorse the essential elements of an effective comprehensive test ban treaty and how early agreement can best be facilitated. Or it might wish to give attention to the international obligations of the major nuclear-weapons Powers to curb their strategic arsenals and to particular areas and aspects of strategic arms control which, while enormously complex, would have to be confronted if substantial and balanced reductions are to be achieved.

It is to be hoped that before the special session convenes efforts to curb the nuclear arms race will have gained sufficient impetus for at least equal attention to be given to the need for parallel advances in the quest for a strengthened régime against the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries. Australia's commitment to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty is well known. The special session should seek to promote the view that "horizontal" non-proliferation is an objective to which all States should subscribe and that all have obligations and responsibilities in furthering that objective. The non-proliferation question raises many important issues, in particular in regard to controls and safeguards on the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, which are now being extensively discussed in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other contexts. The special session might seek to address the basis on which an effective non-proliferation régime can be built. For example, in addition to the clear need for strengthened safeguards and controls on nuclear materials, equipment and technology, such a régime should hold out incentives for co-operation and ensure that self-denial of a weapons option will not inhibit a country's wish to develop nuclear power for peaceful purposes. There must also be adequate security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.

With regard to the regulation of conventional armaments, the special session might wish to address itself to whether a conceptual framework can be identified. A number of approaches to arms control which have been suggested include: curbing the development of new weapons, prohibiting or restricting certain weapons which may be indiscriminate or cause unnecessary suffering; reductions of military budgets; and the possibilities of regional states taking the initiative in promoting regional arms control proposals. Stemming from consideration of such approaches, the session might seek to establish certain priorities for meaningful negotiations on particular areas of conventional arms control or particular categories of weaponry.

Another field to which the session might give attention is that of the strengthening of international security and the relaxation of tensions by "confidence-building" measures. Matters such as better communications between States in potentially hostile situations and prior notification of major military manoeuvres or movements and weapons testing could be considered here.

The third principal area which should be dealt with by the special session is that of a review of the international disarmament negotiating machinery. The disarmament machinery of the United Nations has undergone an evolutionary process over the years; the present bodies have developed an expertise which could be lost in any restructuring process that does not adequately take into account the many intricate factors that have of necessity influenced the nature of the present machinery. Moreover, no single negotiating body can or should fulfil the
objective of arriving at specific arms control agreements. Indeed, it is Australia's view that the basis for many such agreements can only be negotiated directly between the States concerned. Australia recognizes the need for a smaller negotiating body reporting to the General Assembly, such as the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, to assist in the negotiation of specific multilateral agreements. To function effectively, however, such a body must be so constituted and of such a size as to reflect a proper diversity of interests and must enjoy the total confidence of all members of the international community, including all the nuclear weapon States. Australia also recognizes that on occasion other bodies of either a standing or an ad hoc nature may be more appropriate to deal with specific issues. It is hoped that the special session will reach an appropriate consensus if it is agreed that there is a need to restructure the international disarmament negotiating machinery." (A/AC.187/33, pp.35)

AUSTRIA

"There appears to evolve a common understanding as to the main features of the special session. Accordingly the special session should provide for:

A general exchange of views about the problems of disarmament on a high political level; this exchange of views in form of a general debate should form and direct the opinions of Governments and of the public towards universally acceptable solutions to the pending problems of disarmament. It will also give an opportunity for an examination of the causes underlying the stagnation of disarmament negotiations. General awareness of these causes should pave the way for action oriented and realistic recommendations in order to facilitate future progress. The result of this exchange of views should be embodied in a political declaration.

A discussion of the possibilities for a new and comprehensive approach to disarmament negotiations leading to the adoption of a well balanced programme of action.

Concrete measures aimed at enhancing the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament.

The political declaration to be adopted by the special session should reflect an appraisal of the current situation regarding disarmament problems and set out in generally acceptable terms the guiding principles for the efforts to be carried out by all States in the field of disarmament.

In defining these principles which should enjoy the widest possible political support a thorough study of already existing pertinent documents, as for instance
the 1961 Joint Statement by the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations as well as the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament submitted by the delegations of Ireland, Mexico, Pakistan, Sweden and Yugoslavia to the twenty-fifth General Assembly (document A/8191) can serve as a point of departure.

On the other hand, such a declaration will also have to take into account that disarmament can only be conceived of in a wider political framework and in particular in relation to international security.

Thus for instance, disarmament must be related to the existing balance of power, defined not only in military terms but comprising all aspects of relations between States.

The predominant position of two of the world's major military powers, and the privileges enjoyed by all five nuclear-weapon States, will have to find their counterpart in the underlining of the special responsibilities of these States for progress in the field of disarmament.

Apart from such general principles which could be reflected in the political declaration, more specific guidelines to future disarmament negotiations could be incorporated.

The programme of action should be based on a comprehensive and integrated approach which would reaffirm the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control and call for an early solution of priority items. At the same time, the usefulness of collateral measures has to be clarified.

The programme of action should provide the basis for co-ordinated further action on the different levels of disarmament negotiations by listing problem areas and demonstrating their interrelation.

The Austrian Government would suggest, inter alia, the inclusion of the following elements in the programme of action:

The question of nuclear disarmament.

This problem continues to be the most urgent of all disarmament issues. Progress in this field and especially the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty as a first step towards effective nuclear disarmament is not only of vital importance to all mankind but will also facilitate disarmament endeavours in other fields.

The future credibility of measures to prevent the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons hinges upon the willingness of the powers possessing nuclear weapons and especially of the two leading nuclear-weapon States to agree on effective measures of nuclear disarmament.
Measures to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

As already mentioned, this question can only be dealt with in connexion with the general problem of nuclear disarmament. Furthermore, the special session will have to address itself to the interrelated problem posed by the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and in particular by the peaceful uses of nuclear explosive devices. The programme of action should also contain recommendations regarding effective international supervision of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and should in this connexion provide for the strengthening of the resources of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The prevention of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons.

Conventional weapons.

The increasing build-up of arsenals of so-called conventional weapons in many parts of the world during the last years has become to be a major concern to the international community. In order to find suitable solutions to this problem it seems to be essential to deal with all its aspects. Thus the special session should encourage a thorough examination of the political, economic and social reasons underlying the rapidly increasing production of conventional weapons, the accelerating international arms trade as well as of the security needs of the recipient States.

Urgent co-operative measures of all States are necessary to bring an end to this extremely costly arms race so that the human and financial resources which are currently being used for the build-up of these arsenals can be redirected towards efforts to achieve socio-economic development and progress.

Other measures.

Substantial disarmament efforts would be supplemented by measures designed to build confidence between States, as for instance by providing full information about the military budgets of these States. The special session should therefore promote the ongoing work in this field within the United Nations." (A/AC.108/41, pp.2-4)

BELGIUM

"The Assembly should at the special session avoid any confrontation in debate and try to devote itself to general consideration of the future programme of work and of disarmament negotiations. That programme should serve to support the efforts already under way in various forums. The work of the Assembly should not be a mere reflection of the traditional debates at regular sessions of the General Assembly.

Belgium is prepared to consider the framing of a general declaration and the adoption of a short- and long-term disarmament programme. Those documents will possess real credibility only if they are acceptable to most member States, particularly the major nuclear States."
Belgium recommends that, both within the Preparatory Committee and at the special session of the Assembly, the pursuit of consensus should be the basic working hypothesis.

With regard to the subjects to be discussed, Belgium wishes to make the following preliminary observations:

(a) Equal importance should be given to banning weapons of mass destruction and controlling conventional weapons;

(b) In the case of nuclear questions, Belgium wishes the SALT negotiations to be pursued vigorously with a view to arriving at reduction measures as soon as possible. That, in its view, is the only way to get the negotiations extended to other nuclear States;

(c) The Belgian authorities are still wedded to the goal of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. They are prepared to make further efforts in this sphere on condition that:

- The NPT remains the basic instrument of any system. The obligations imposed by that Treaty on nuclear Powers must not be overlooked,

- The freedom to trade of States, as it affects the peaceful use of nuclear energy, should be preserved;

(d) Complete halt to nuclear tests. Belgium will support any proposal that might lead to progress in the discussions between the nuclear Powers. That not all nuclear States participate in agreements already concluded or to be concluded may not, however, be invoked as a reason for refusing to consider further partial bilateral progress between the most powerful States;

(e) Belgium has consistently supported, in principle, a world disarmament conference, on condition that the major military States, particularly the nuclear States, agree to participate in it. It would be premature to express views on whether the special session of the Assembly should set up such a conference. It is Belgium's hope that a favourable climate and the beginnings of a dialogue will develop during the special session;

(f) Control of international armaments transfers. In this field no progress is possible without the co-operation of both recipient and exporting countries. Belgium expresses the hope that consultation on this subject will develop during the preparation and proceedings of the special session;

(g) Regional aspects of disarmament. Belgium has expressed its views on this subject at the thirty-first session of the General Assembly (see Belgian memorandum, document A/C.1/31/10 of 26 November 1976). It has the growing conviction that, particularly in the sphere of conventional weapons, the United Nations should make an over-all review of the possibilities for negotiations and for measures of disarmament and arms control available to the regions. It hopes to explain these ideas once again and possibly to submit a proposal; (A/AC.187/10, pp. 3-4)
Brazil supported the convening of a Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and co-sponsored resolution 31/189B. The Special Session will be an opportunity to promote the opening up of new avenues for negotiation, leading towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

The Brazilian Government has never spared any effort to facilitate and promote the process of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, in the General Assembly and in the ONU, as well as in other fora. The present situation of the arms race requires the international community to redouble its efforts to correct the extremely critical conditions that now prevail because of the recurrent frustration of multilateral efforts in the field of disarmament.

In fact, the arms race is constantly going on, both in nuclear and in conventional weapons. Strategic arms continue to be perfected. The introduction of new generations of miniaturized tactical nuclear weapons seems to be accompanied by a more relaxed and more tolerant attitude towards their possible use than that of strategic arms. In the field of conventional weapons, particularly cruel and inhumane arms continue to be developed, some of them apparently designed specifically for use against civilian populations. In this sense, every effort must be made to prevent the best part of advanced technological capacity being oriented towards the creation of new destructive devices to the detriment of channeling resources to the promotion of development and higher living standards.

It therefore seems clear to Brazil that future negotiating efforts in the field of nuclear disarmament should be given maximum priority by the international community. In this context, the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is an important, but not an isolated element, in the general framework of disarmament problems. Brazil is, in fact, opposed to all forms of proliferation of nuclear weapons, and is ready to participate in international efforts to reduce and eventually eliminate these weapons, as well as to prevent their vertical and horizontal proliferation.” (A/AC.187/49)

BULGARIA

The decision by the General Assembly at its thirty-first session to convene a special session devoted to disarmament in 1978 was adopted on the full understanding that that session was not to take the place of the World Disarmament Conference. The majority of delegations, including the Bulgarian delegation, which supported the proposal for the convening of a special session, regarded it as a step towards the convening of the World Disarmament Conference. In addition to solving this fundamental problem, it would be advisable at that session to review the whole problem of disarmament
its aspects, and, on the basis of that review, to prepare and adopt a final document reflecting the agreed views of States participating in the session. The decisions taken on these questions should give fresh impetus to the work of the specialized organs and forums on disarmament already established at the international level, in particular the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. *(A/AC.187/36, p.2)*

**BYELORUSSIAN SSR**

In the opinion of the Byelorussian SSR, in order to make decisive progress in checking the arms race and moving toward general and complete disarmament it is essential to consider the whole problem of disarmament in the widest and most authoritative forum - a world disarmament conference, the convening and holding of which is supported by the overwhelming majority of States.

Such a conference, being a truly universal forum, would be able to consider in a qualified manner and in depth the whole complex of problems concerning disarmament and take effective decisions regarding them which would provide for the adoption of concrete and efficacious measures aimed at the solution of the problems of disarmament.

With regard to the special session of the General Assembly devoted to questions of disarmament, the decision to convene which was taken by the Assembly at its thirty-first session, it could, in the opinion of the Byelorussian SSR, constitute an intermediate stage on the path towards a world disarmament conference.

The Byelorussian SSR considers that a most important task facing the special session is that of determining the further steps to be taken toward the practical preparation and holding of a world disarmament conference at the earliest possible time. Its results should help to facilitate consideration of the problem of disarmament at the world disarmament conference, in which all States would participate.

The Byelorussian SSR considers that the special session should be thoroughly and comprehensively prepared and should provide in its agenda for a broad exchange of views with regard not only to the fundamental approaches to the question but also to the basic directions of the priority efforts of States with a view to attaining the ultimate goal of all efforts in the field of disarmament - general and complete disarmament. It could also devote attention to partial measures in the field of disarmament, and to measures taken on a regional basis.

A joint approach by States to these problems could be reflected, for example, in a final political declaration to be adopted by the special session. Decisions at the session should be taken in such a way as to exclude entirely the possibility of damaging the security interests of States. The Byelorussian SSR considers that the organization and holding of the session must fully reflect the lofty responsibility of all States of the world, especially the great Powers.

The special session of the United Nations General Assembly should not replace existing forms of negotiation on disarmament which have proved their usefulness. It should facilitate the work of the existing bodies dealing with disarmament." *(A/AC.187/4, pp.2-4)*
The Government of Cyprus suggests that during the special session, there should be first a review of the existing situation with reference to the long-standing stagnation in the field of disarmament and a search into the basic causes thereof.

In light of such review, the close interconnexion between disarmament and other world problems, namely international security, the peaceful settlement of disputes and economic development would have to be given particular consideration in its significant ramifications to the disarmament problem. (A/AC.187/18, p.1)

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

In the opinion of the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the proposal by the Soviet Union for the convening of a world disarmament conference, which has won the support of an absolute majority of States Members of the United Nations, fully responds to these tasks.

The special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament should constitute an important stage in the preparations for convening the conference. Czechoslovakia therefore re-affirms its full support of the proposal made by the non-aligned countries at their 1976 summit conference in Colombo that the question of a world disarmament conference should be placed on the agenda of the special session of the General Assembly. The special session should formulate specific measures for the practical preparation and conduct of the world disarmament conference at the earliest possible time.

The special session should at the same time assist existing bodies engaged in multilateral disarmament negotiations by undertaking the broadest possible exchange of views on the entire range of disarmament problems and charting the main directions for a co-ordinated effort by States in this field for the purpose of bringing general and complete disarmament nearer. Within this framework, the special session could also discuss the most urgent partial problems connected with halting the arms race and bringing about disarmament, thus facilitating the task of reaching a political agreement for their solution. In this connexion, due attention will surely be given to the memorandum of the Soviet Union of 28 September 1976 on questions of ending the arms race and disarmament, which provides a practical starting point for solving the most urgent problems of disarmament. (A/AC.187/13, pp.2-3)
DENMARK

"It should be a main purpose of the session to try to identify the fields in which actions should be taken, and also their priorities. Among specific issues which the special session should preferably help to bring closer to a solution, the Danish Government would point especially to the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear arms, including primarily the conclusion of a treaty for a complete test ban, questions relating to chemical weapons and weapons of mass destruction, and the various problems concerning conventional weapons and transfers of such weapons, including measures to limit the arms transfers on a regional basis. The various disarmament measures should be so designed that they do not present to any party military advantages that would upset the military balance, and provisions should be made for adequate international control to ensure observance of the agreements."

(A/AC.187/20, p.2)

FINLAND

"...the Government of Finland considers that the task of the special session is

- to make a comprehensive survey of current disarmament issues,
- to outline the principles for action that the new challenges and circumstances call for,
- to adopt guidelines of action for reaching tangible results in disarmament negotiations.

In this context it is to be noted that the General Assembly has for more than six years striven to pave the way for convening of a world disarmament conference. The Finnish Government has given its backing to convening such a conference and supported efforts to this effect. In the view of the Finnish Government, the special session devoted to disarmament could contribute to the attainment of this goal."

(A/AC.187/22, p.2)

FRANCE

"France is not a priori opposed to a study being made of the possibility of a 'political declaration of principle' on the subject of disarmament. However, a general text of this kind can have only a limited scope and an essentially academic importance; it is not desirable that it should become the sole focus of the Assembly's attention. More specific objectives should be sought.

In this connexion, one task which could usefully be performed by the Assembly would be a study of a number of major general problems in specialized committees: reduction of nuclear armaments, prohibition of the manufacture of certain types of weapon such as chemical weapons, conditions for the application of international verification and control procedures, improvement of the procedures of the United Nations and related bodies, etc. The aim of this study should be not to evolve solutions or to try to draft conventions but to determine the conditions which
would permit the attainment of these objectives by identifying the political or
technical obstacles preventing their achievement and by making as realistic an
evaluation as possible of the chances of success.

In the light of this evaluation, the Assembly would be in a position to set
priorities, to determine interim objectives, if necessary, and to establish the
necessary correlations between the various aspects of disarmament, so that progress
may be resumed towards the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament
under effective international control, which must remain and be reaffirmed as the
essential goal of our efforts." (A/AC.187/23, p.3)

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

"The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has proposed that the problems
of disarmament should be discussed in their entire scope at a world
dismament conference. This idea has met with world-wide approval. The
United Nations has supported it in several resolutions. The German Democratic
Republic is convinced that such a world forum, if vested with the necessary
powers, would have the authority and the potential to achieve a real
break-through in the negotiations on disarmament and to move closer to the
ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament.

The holding of a United Nations special session devoted to disarmament,
as decided by the General Assembly at its thirty-first session, would be an
important stage on the road to such a world conference. The special session
should, in our opinion, give priority to the task of working out measures for
the substantive and organizational preparation and the holding of the World
Disarmament Conference. (A/32/62, p.1)

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF

"It should not be the purpose of the special session to negotiate specific
subjects or work out draft treaties. This should remain the task of the CCD which,
though perhaps capable of structural improvements, has proved an expert
negotiating body. It is to be hoped that prior to the special session further
progress and results will be achieved in Geneva in important areas.

The Federal Government has on previous occasions, and also in the United
Nations forum, underlined the great value it attaches to the arms control
negotiations which are going on in the special bodies. It thinks it necessary that
these specific efforts in support of peace and security should be continued.

The following might, in the Federal Government's view, be the aims of the
special session:
- to take stock of results in the field of disarmament and arms control,
- to provide impulses for discussion which in some fields is stagnant,
- to reach a consensus on the basic elements of the disarmament discussion,
- to define priorities of future work,
- to review the present organization and structure of disarmament institutions as to their effectiveness." (A/AC.187/46, p.2)

GREECE

"The Greek Government believes that the special session should be guided by the aims of establishing a complete and general disarmament under effective international control and promoting the well-being of peoples throughout the world." (A/AC.187/45, p.1)

HUNGARY

"Starting from the consideration that each and every country is most directly affected by and interested in the waging of the arms race, the Hungarian Government deems it necessary for the problems of disarmament to be discussed in a comprehensive manner and on the widest scale. The most appropriate forum for such a discussion, which would make participation by all States and peoples of the world possible, could be a world disarmament conference where States would be enabled to put forth their views on the current situation and on the measures to be adopted in the interest of disarmament. Having thus learned better the views and positions of each other, they would be able to define the most essential characteristics of the road leading to general and complete disarmament, and to outline a realistic long-term programme of practical action. A world disarmament conference could in this way give great impetus to starting the elaboration of the most urgent measures, and helping to make the existing results more solid and truly universal.

Such a realistic approach characterizes the proposal put forward in 1971 by the Government of the Soviet Union, which has been and continues to be supported by the majority of the countries of the world. The Government of the Hungarian People's Republic has from the outset come out in favour of convening a world disarmament conference at the earliest possible date and invariably seeks to promote initial steps for the preparation of a world conference. It is a deplorable contradiction of our age that certain Powers may block the convening of a world conference in defiance of the peoples' aspirations for peace and of the vast majority of States. Given as such the situation, the Hungarian Government regards the convening of the special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament as a useful step towards, as a stage on the road of preparations for a world disarmament conference, and is lending its support to it accordingly.
The special session of the General Assembly and the world disarmament conference are forums that are not mutually exclusive but are organically interrelated. This realization is similarly reflected, in a manner acceptable also to the Hungarian Government, by the political declaration and the resolution on disarmament adopted by the Summit Conference of Non-aligned States held in Colombo last year. Member States of the United Nations were also led by this consideration when, in a resolution unanimously adopted at the thirty-first session of the General Assembly, they decided to convene the special session for May/June 1978.

The Government of the Hungarian People's Republic believes that the special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament will, if prepared and held in such a spirit, create favourable conditions and an appropriate atmosphere for the participating countries to devote all their attention and all their efforts to the elaboration of effective and realistic measures designed to end the arms race and enhance disarmament, and to promote the preparation and convening of a world disarmament conference. These are the goals to be served by the work of the special session and by the documents to be adopted. The special session should at the same time favourably influence the work of the present bilateral and multilateral forums which have proved to be good practical channels of disarmament negotiations, first of all the concrete negotiations going on in the Geneva Committee on disarmament. All these combined may ensure that the special session will be a truly decisive turning point in the solution of current disarmament issues so long awaited by the peoples of the world."

(A/AC.187/6, pp.2-3)

INDIA

"The Fifth Summit Conference of Non-aligned Countries, held at Colombo from 16 to 19 August 1976, reiterated the call for a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and made the following specific suggestions in this regard in its declaration and resolution on disarmament:

'The Conference reiterated the urgent need to adopt effective measures leading to the convening of a World Disarmament Conference.

'The Conference also recommended, in the meantime, that members of the non-aligned movement request the holding of a special session of the General Assembly as early as possible and not later than 1978. The agenda of the special session should include:

a. a review of the problem of disarmament;

b. the promotion and elaboration of a programme of priorities and recommendations in the field of disarmament; and

c. the question of convening a World Disarmament Conference.'
The Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-aligned Countries held in New Delhi from 7 to 11 April 1977, issued the following communique regarding the agenda and other related matters pertaining to the holding of a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament:

"The Bureau expressed the hope that the special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament scheduled to be held in May–June 1978, at the initiative of the Non-Aligned States, would enable a comprehensive review of the problem of disarmament and result in effective measures aimed in particular at halting the nuclear arms race and promoting nuclear disarmament in the first place and the process of general disarmament. In pursuance of the decisions adopted and the priorities established at the Colombo Conference, the Bureau recommends that the special session of the General Assembly should inter alia consider the adoption of a declaration of principles and a programme of concrete measures on disarmament as well as review the role of the United Nations in disarmament in terms of the United Nations Charter and the question of convening a world disarmament conference. The Bureau further considers that non-aligned countries including those who are members of the Preparatory Committee should act together in achieving the above-mentioned goals." (A/AC.187/47, p.2)

INDONESIA

"The purposes of the special session are mainly threefold:

First, it would provide a forum which would enable the medium and small powers to play an important role in disarmament efforts and in particular in helping to bridge the gap between the often divergent and frequently irreconcilable positions of the great powers.

Second, in view of the fact that the United Nations bears responsibility under the Charter with regard to the principles governing disarmament, to the achievement of general and complete disarmament, and in fact, with regard to all aspects of disarmament, its role must be enhanced to all aspects of disarmament, its role must be enhanced and more clearly defined.

Moreover, the special session can promote the process of disarmament and initiate measures designed to achieve genuine progress as well as improve the disarmament machinery. This will, in general, strengthen the role of the United Nations in disarmament issues.

Third, it would provide an opportunity for world public opinion to become more familiar with the difficulties that have impeded the attainment of substantive progress, the dangers of the arms race as well as the problems and challenges which face the United Nations in its consideration of disarmament issues in order to bring its influence to bear on the strengthening of efforts and adopt measures that are widely acceptable." (A/AC.187/27, pp.1-2)
Among the many diverse ideas suggested to justify the convocation of this special session devoted to disarmament, a number has emerged as broadly acceptable themes embodying the goals of this session. The special session should accordingly:

(a) Provide a vantage point to bring all States together, to undertake a genuine discussion of global disarmament;

(b) Provide a forceful and fresh impetus to all disarmament negotiations;

(c) Generate public interests and opinion; through the provisions of reliable information of the (i) present situation in the field of disarmament; (ii) consequences of an arms race; (iii) measures to be undertaken to slow and, if possible, eventually arrest armaments;

(d) Reassert the United Nations responsibilities and declining influence in this vital field, and reject the thesis that it is the prerogative of super-Powers which possess the more deadly paraphernalia of war.\textsuperscript{(A/AC.187/2, pp.1-2)}

\textbf{IRELAND}

"The special session should not entail either generalized rhetoric or detailed technical negotiations. Clearly, it cannot be called on to duplicate the activities of existing forums for the concrete negotiation of arms limitation and disarmament agreements. However, the session must have a practical outcome if it is to focus international attention on the main issues in disarmament and encourage progress towards their resolution. Careful and thorough preparation is therefore important.

Although the special session will necessarily need to engage in a general review of the progress achieved to date in the field of arms control and disarmament and of the current state of negotiations in this field, it is to be hoped that its main emphasis will be prospective rather than retrospective. In this connexion, a fundamental objective should be the elaboration of a future programme of disarmament measures within which would be clearly identified the priority goals.\textsuperscript{(A/AC.187/37, p.2)}"
ITALY

Italy hopes, therefore, that all States will positively commit themselves in a joint effort to this end. Such an effort need not necessarily involve the launching of a new disarmament strategy; it might perhaps prove sufficient to update, in the light of past experience, the content of those relevant documents which still retain their validity. Italy believes, for instance, that the ideas and guidelines contained in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations issued by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1961, and the draft treaties on general and complete disarmament prepared by both the Soviet Union and the United States in 1962, may serve as a useful and valuable point of departure. Italy, however, is ready to consider with interest any other constructive proposal which may be introduced on this subject.

*** Among the goals of the special session, that of mobilizing world public opinion should not be overlooked. This is an end, as well as a means: it is an end, because public opinion must be made aware of the problems, and at the same time of the prospects, which disarmament can provide; it is a means, since the impact of public opinion may help to overcome certain obstacles which have so far been considered insurmountable. It might therefore prove advisable to allow non-governmental organizations and research institutes to make their contribution to the work of the special session, through the Secretariat and the Preparatory Committee. (A/AC.187/32, pp. 4-5)

JAPAN

"The Government of Japan considers that the special session offers an excellent opportunity for all States (a) to undertake an over-all review and appraisal of the accomplishments achieved thus far in the field of disarmament; (b) to fix priorities for future disarmament negotiations; and (c) to agree upon the basic principles and fundamental approaches which are appropriate for the advance of disarmament." (A/AC.187/14, p. 2)

See also I.

LUXEMBOURG

"In the view of the Government of Luxembourg, the purpose of this session should be primarily to draw up a balance-sheet of the results achieved so far in disarmament and the regulation of armaments. A final declaration is acceptable provided that all Member States, including the nuclear-weapon States, adopt it." (A/AC.187/39)

MEXICO

"In the light of the situation created by the unwillingness of the nuclear-weapon States to adopt genuine disarmament measures of any kind, it has become clear in the past decade that the United Nations machinery for disarmament is grossly ineffective, especially in enabling all the world's peoples - which, as the General Assembly has stated in numerous resolutions, have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations - to make an effective contribution in this field which is of such importance to them, since, in the final analysis, it is their own survival that may be at stake.
The General Assembly, to be sure, meets each year. However, as has previously been pointed out, its agenda is always crowded with items relating to a wide variety of issues. Since the agenda items relating to disarmament are engulfed by more than 100 other items, their importance naturally cannot be correctly appreciated and it is impossible for them to receive the consideration which they merit within the First Committee. After four or five weeks of hurried debate, in which, in order to save time, the items are considered together and not separately, the Assembly is reduced to approving a series of somewhat routine resolutions, much like those adopted in previous years, almost every one of which, despite their tone of deep concern, justifiable alarm or serious urgency, are treated with inertia, resignation or neglect in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

For this reason, the non-aligned countries have, for the past five years, been seeking to bring about the convening of a World Disarmament Conference, whose main objective, as stated at the outset, would be to foster the chances of effective action by the United Nations in this most important area by supplementing the existing international machinery with a body having universal membership which should meet every three or four years and which, without lessening the supremacy of the Assembly, to which it would be subordinate, would play a role in disarmament analogous to the role the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) plays in economic and social affairs.

The Government of Mexico remains convinced that the institutionalization of a World Disarmament Conference, open to participation by all States without exception and meeting for two or three months every three or four years, as indicated above, would - as the Government of Mexico stated five years ago - serve to fill an obvious void and provide inestimable assistance to the Assembly in adequately fulfilling its responsibilities. The Conference would be given responsibility, inter alia, for carefully assessing the implementation of General Assembly resolutions, evaluating objectively the progress made in the field of disarmament, comparing the development of weapons with the progress of disarmament and taking the decisions it deems necessary in the light of its work.

In view of the impossibility of achieving any progress in the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference, Mexico has for several years endorsed the idea of holding a special session of the General Assembly, and on 30 October 1975 it expressed the view that if in 1976 it should not be possible to make genuine progress towards the convening of a World Disarmament Conference, it would be necessary for the Assembly at its thirty-first regular session to decide to convene a special session for the purpose of considering, among other urgent disarmament questions, the question of convening the proposed World Conference.

In the Political Declaration adopted by the Colombo Summit Conference held in August 1976, the non-aligned countries recommended the convening of a special session "as early as possible and not later than 1978". In the same section of the Declaration they also recommended that the agenda of the special session should include "a review of the problem of disarmament", "the promotion and elaboration of a programme of priorities and recommendations in the field of disarmament" and "the question of convening a World Disarmament Conference".

In approving resolution 31/189 B on 21 December 1976, the General Assembly endorsed the recommendation of the non-aligned countries. (A/AC.187/34, pp.2-3)
MONGOLIA

The Government of the Mongolian People's Republic believes that the agenda of the special session should be drawn up in such a way as to enable all participating States to set forth and compare their views on major disarmament questions and contribute to the task of devising ways and means both of achieving tangible results in the disarmament field through the adoption of partial and subsidiary measures and of attaining the ultimate goal, namely, general and complete disarmament. In this connexion, it supports the recommendation adopted at the Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in August 1976 at Colombo, to the effect that "the agenda of the special session should include a review of the problem of disarmament, the promotion and elaboration of a programme of priorities and recommendations in the field of disarmament, and the question of convening a world disarmament conference." This recommendation of the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries was, of course, taken into account by the General Assembly in its resolution 31/109 B. (A/AC.187/16, p.1)

NETHERLANDS

The Netherlands Government sees the special session as providing the world community with an opportunity to reflect on what has been achieved in the past in the field of disarmament and on the reasons why certain measures have not yet been achieved; to recognize the dangers of the present arms race; and to consider steps to be taken to reduce these dangers.

It cannot be denied that since the early sixties, important agreements with the aim of increasing world security and slowing down the arms race have been concluded. However, none of these are genuine disarmament measures, except for the biological weapons convention. In general, they are more concerned with preventing the arms race from developing in specific directions which could be anticipated. In recent years the actual arms race has received more attention. Current efforts to halt the arms race and subsequently to reduce existing arms stocks create a new situation in which factors such as the balanced reduction of armaments and the verification problem receive greater emphasis. These circumstances will undoubtedly complicate future negotiations which can be expected to take up more time than in the past.

In view of the above, the Netherlands Government considers that the special session must avoid drawing up a time-table of specific target dates for achieving certain measures.

Without wishing to go into too great detail in this reply, the Netherlands Government does feel that the measures to be adopted in the coming years should give high priority to de-emphasizing the role of nuclear weapons in today's armaments. An important contribution to this would be halting all tests of nuclear weapons by all nuclear-weapon States, followed by a reduction of nuclear weapons and delivery systems for such weapons. If all nuclear-weapon States are not prepared to accept this from the outset, the United States and the Soviet Union should in the view of the Netherlands Government agree to a temporary cessation of nuclear tests.

High priority should also be accorded to strengthening the non-proliferation régime. Rules must be drawn up in joint consultation to minimalize the dangers
of a proliferation of nuclear weapons without imposing undue restrictions on the development of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The Netherlands Government supports strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States by having the nuclear-weapon States grant to them—subject to certain conditions—so-called negative security guarantees.

The Netherlands Government considers that the special session should give particular attention to the problem of the considerable expansion in the conventional arms trade.

... Taking into account the legitimate desire of sovereign States to take security measures for their own defence, efforts must be made to devise regulations to counter an excessive increase in conventional armaments. There are various ways of approaching this problem, such as through negotiations between the exporting nations, between the importing nations, or between countries in particular regions of the world.

In addition a more general approach could be adopted in which, for instance, within the framework of the United Nations rules governing the trade in conventional weapons could be drawn up in which the United Nations could play a supervisory role." (A/AC.187/25, pp.4-5)

NEW ZEALAND

"In New Zealand's view, the overwhelming priority of the special session must be nuclear disarmament. The most important areas of concern here are the levels of strategic nuclear arms possessed by nuclear weapon States, the danger of proliferation of nuclear arms for other States, the need to cease nuclear weapon testing and the establishment of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Attention should be given to each of these areas. The preparation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty is, however, of particular concern to New Zealand and it is to be hoped that a generally acceptable comprehensive test-ban treaty will have been drafted by the time the special session commences. Such a development would improve the prospect for a successful session. It would also generate maximum pressure for early ratification of the treaty.

The second area of priority should be chemical and biological weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, and the transfer of conventional armaments. In New Zealand's view, however, none of these areas should be given attention at the special session to the detriment of nuclear arms control." (A/AC.187/40, p.3)

NORWAY

"Disarmament has always been one of the paramount objectives of the United Nations. In spite of the fact that in 1959 the General Assembly declared the question of general and complete disarmament to be the most important issue facing the world, and in spite of the 1970s having been decreed as a Disarmament Decade, this objective does not seem to have come closer to realization.

Norway therefore proposes that the special session undertake a full review and evaluation of the working methods adopted in this field and of the results achieved. It will be of particular importance to study the transition in the beginning of the 1960s, from the work on comprehensive disarmament proposals to more limited measures of arms control. Even if arms control efforts undoubtedly have had an important political and confidence-building effect and have achieved certain limited, concrete results, it is, however, obvious that this approach has not fulfilled the hopes and expectations of the early 1960s." (A/AC.187/22, p.1)
PERU

"The Government of Peru welcomes the fact that all the States Members of the United Nations will be participating on an equal footing in the special session devoted to disarmament. Moreover, the specific nature of the meeting gives reason to hope that the issue of disarmament will receive both general and in-depth treatment so that, by the end of the session, we shall have the kind of basic action guidelines for the essential dogged continuation of efforts without which the special session would become just another meeting.

By bringing together high-level political personalities, the special session could provide the opportunity for a frank and at the same time politically viable treatment of questions of general interest, while reaffirming as a priority the validity of the final objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control." (A/AC.187/42, p.2)

POLAND

"In the view of the Government of the Polish People's Republic, the agenda of the special session should be based on the proposal contained in the Political Declaration of the Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries in Colombo. At this stage, the Government of Poland wishes to make the following preliminary comments on the subject:

(a) With regard to item one of the proposed agenda: a review of the problem of disarmament, one of the main objectives of the special session should be joint search for global solutions and working out of a platform for effective action. With this in mind, the general debate should first and foremost be future-oriented.

It would be an important matter for the session to discuss military, political, economic and social consequences of the arms race and define the relationships between disarmament, development and restructuring of international economic relations. For there can be no doubt that the burden of the arms race is becoming an ever greater hindrance to mankind's progress and prosperity.

(b) As far as item two of the agenda is concerned: the promotion and elaboration of a programme of priorities and recommendations in the field of disarmament, Poland believes that the discussion and decisions should be focused on matters which are already part of negotiations or on the agenda of such fora as, for instance, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva, as well as on new issues. A point of departure for an elaboration of the main course of action could be the comprehensive programme of measures contained in the Soviet memorandum of 28 September 1976 on questions of ending the arms race and disarmament, some proposals of the Colombo Political Declaration and other suggestions which might be made at the special session.

It is understood that such a programme would include measures aimed at general and complete disarmament as well as regional and collateral measures, both with respect to nuclear disarmament, other weapons of mass destruction, and conventional disarmament. Particularly important should be the creation of an effective barrier to development or introduction of new types and new systems of weapons which might give new dimensions to the arms race.

(c) Regarding item 3 of the proposed agenda: the question of convening a World Disarmament Conference. Poland is of the view that the special session should decide on the date of the convening of the conference and adopt recommendations as to its substantive terms of reference.
In the view of the Spanish Government, the topics to be discussed by the General Assembly should include the following priority questions:

(a) The horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons;
(b) The problem of new types of especially deadly weapons;
(c) The elimination of chemical weapons;
(d) The establishment of demilitarized zones;
(e) The problems relating to the security of non-nuclear countries;
(f) The possibility of initiating multilateral negotiations with a view to preparing a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control, and the continuation of efforts aimed at making it possible to convene a World Disarmament Conference." (A/AC.187/19, p.2)

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(a) The horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons;
(b) The problem of new types of especially deadly weapons;
(c) The elimination of chemical weapons;
(d) The establishment of demilitarized zones;
(e) The problems relating to the security of non-nuclear countries;
(f) The possibility of initiating multilateral negotiations with a view to preparing a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control, and the continuation of efforts aimed at making it possible to convene a World Disarmament Conference." (A/AC.187/19, p.2)

The special session should become a forceful expression of political will, which promotes the efforts towards disarmament. The documents adopted at the session must thus be precise and action-oriented. The session could be seen as the starting point for the gradual solution of specific problems. Decisions on an effective follow-up mechanism of the session will be of great importance in this context.

Hopefully, the special session will also be able to register substantial progress towards the solution of certain matters, e.g. a Comprehensive Nuclear Weapon Test Ban Agreement, the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction, and agreement on reductions in the strategic arms of the United States and the Soviet Union." (A/AC.187/19, p.2)
(b) The implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security under the Charter of the United Nations and its principles and under effective international control.

(c) The immediate cessation of nuclear tests as a preliminary step until a treaty aimed at the banning of such tests on the ground, in the sea and under water throughout the world is concluded.

(d) Cessation of the use of incendiary, chemical, bacteriological and other deadly weapons.

(e) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions now exposed to international tensions and the extension of this process, as far as possible, to other regions of the world.

(f) Prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques and encouragement of States to sign the treaty dealing with that subject.

4. The convening of a world disarmament conference which would establish an international committee entrusted with the supervision and follow-up of the implementation of the resolutions and recommendations adopted at the next special session of the General Assembly, this committee being designed to replace the formerly established Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.


TURKEY

"I. The arms race has in the last years reached alarming proportions, endangering world peace and security, as well as hindering economic and social development. Therefore, the Turkish Government regards it a timely decision to convene a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which, in its view, as the international forum most suitable to review disarmament efforts in general, may give a fresh and strong impetus to future negotiations on disarmament and arms limitation. To this end, however, every effort should be made so that the special session would not simply duplicate what the General Assembly and its First Committee are doing in their annual debates on disarmament.

II. The Government of Turkey is of the opinion that the special session should be prepared in a thorough and comprehensive manner. Moreover, to be fruitful and to provide guidelines for the future, it has to take the current political and military situation as its starting point. Its deliberations ought to be carried out in a frank and objective manner which should concentrate on realistic approaches that could ensure progress towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control. In the view of the Turkish Government, all the States of the world, large and small, irrespective of the military power they hold, have a role to play to this end."
III. The present realities of the world political scene, the experiences of the cold war and the strenuous attempts that have been made during the later period to establish détente in Europe and in the world, lead Turkey to believe in the necessity to consider arms limitation and disarmament issues through a pragmatic approach. Such an approach takes into account the concepts being evolved in actual negotiations which have been carried out in the last years. Experience has shown that the successful application of specific arms control and disarmament measures is contingent upon the existence of an efficient verification mechanism. Other basic concepts which have emerged in the work that has been pursued in recent years are those of balance, the need for stabilization measures, and the necessity to preserve undiminished security for all countries throughout the gradual process of disarmament. The Turkish Government fears that concrete measures may not be achieved if such a pragmatic approach is not pursued.

IV. As for the small distance covered so far and the slow pace on the way to general and complete disarmament, Turkey believes that improved political conditions throughout the world and enlarged economic co-operation among countries will result in the strengthening of mutual confidence as a pre-condition greatly facilitating and accelerating efforts towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

V. Disarmament negotiations are being conducted today in a number of United Nations bodies and other fora. Generally speaking, because of the very complex nature of disarmament questions, Turkey believes that the chances of success in disarmament issues would be greater through negotiations in bodies set up for specific purposes. Nevertheless, a pre-condition for success in any issue would be the participation in that body of countries most directly involved, in particular so far as nuclear issues are concerned. This holds true also for the direct participation of all the nuclear powers in any organization dealing with any aspect of nuclear arms control and nuclear disarmament. On the other hand, Turkey considers that the United Nations has a responsibility to draw general guidelines and watch the work done in the appropriate fora.

VI. Today, the most characteristic aspect of the disarmament picture seems to be the difficulty in the transformation of declared intentions into political will and then into concrete measures. No Government can proceed to disarmament without a real sense of security and mutual confidence. That feeling will have a stronger foundation through a better public understanding of the disarmament question. Hence, Turkey believes in the vital need to present to the world public opinion a full account of the proceedings of the special session as well as a political declaration that might be adopted at the end covering its conclusions."

(UA/AC.187/15, pp.1-2)
Inasmuch as the ultimate goal of all disarmament negotiations is the achievement of general and complete disarmament, the agenda for the special session could provide for a general exchange of views with regard not only to over-all approaches to the problem of disarmament but also to specific directions for co-ordinated action by States in this field at the present stage. In particular, the special session could discuss the problems connected with partial measures as well as measures taken on a regional basis for the purpose of limiting the arms race and bringing about disarmament." (A/AC.187/5, p.2)

**UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS**

"The special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament could constitute an intermediate stage on the path towards a world disarmament conference. Without replacing the existing and proven forms of disarmament negotiations, the special session of the General Assembly could facilitate consideration of the problem of disarmament at a world disarmament conference, in which all States would participate.

A most important task facing the session is that of determining the further steps to be taken towards the practical preparation and holding of a world disarmament conference at the earliest possible time. Such a conference, if properly organized and provided with machinery for adopting effective decisions and with the working bodies needed for carefully elaborating and achieving practical agreement on them, taking into account the security interests of all States of the world, could formulate concrete, effective measures designed to solve the problem of disarmament. That approach would at last ensure that a turning point was actually reached in the solution of disarmament problems and in the curtailment of the arms race, the limitation and reduction of arms, and progress towards general and complete disarmament.

The Soviet Union proceeds from the premise that the convening of the special session of the General Assembly and its decisions should assist the work of existing channels of disarmament negotiations, which are faced with the task of working out practical steps and arrangements aimed at halting the arms race and bringing about disarmament." (A/32/60, pp.2-3)

**UNITED KINGDOM**

"The special session will provide the first occasion in recent years when disarmament in all its aspects will be a major focus of international public attention. The United Kingdom Government therefore believe that it is important for any proposals advanced at the session to be carefully considered, if the session is to avoid arousing false hopes and expectations leading to public disillusionment and frustration.

The special session will require a common recognition of the limitations of what can be achieved at one conference of limited duration. Because of the profound importance and complexity of the issues, effective disarmament measures require expert study and patient international negotiation. Accordingly, the United Kingdom Government do not expect the special session to negotiate arms control agreements or to resolve longstanding problems immediately but they believe its purpose should be to give an impulse to multilateral, regional and bilateral negotiations. However, they hope that it will be possible for the special session to reach agreement on the general principles for effective measures of disarmament, which will also indicate the priorities for negotiation.

(A/AC.187/35, p.5)
"Without prejudice to the paramount importance of contributing to productive negotiations on specific disarmament and arms control issues, we believe the session should also consider one broad area that has not yet been intensively explored in the United Nations - namely, measures to increase international confidence and reduce international tensions. It is clear that progress toward substantial disarmament cannot be achieved independently of progress toward a more peaceful world - a world in which problems are solved without recourse to force or threat of force, in which actions are governed by respect for law, and in which mutual understanding and negotiation replace mistrust and conflict. An examination of the problem of achieving broad disarmament should, in our view, take account of this underlying reality.

... If these tasks are to be accomplished, the session will need to do more than seek agreement on abstract priorities determined without reference to their achievability, on general principles for disarmament that may or may not contribute to the solution of specific problems, or on a rigid programme and schedule of action seeking to determine a long-range process inevitably dependent on a multitude of factors subject to unforeseeable change. Such efforts, if not kept in perspective, could result in obscuring the session's paramount purposes and divert its attention from more urgent problems.

Whether or not the special session can successfully stimulate, broaden, and accelerate disarmament negotiations will, in our view, depend primarily on the ideas and attitudes that countries develop for and bring to the session. The tremendous difficulties that have hindered negotiations so far, such as definition, balance of verification, conflict of political purposes, of insecurity, are not artificial.

... Important as the special session will be as a major international event, it still must be regarded as one step in a very long and arduous process. That process is nothing less than improving the security of all nations and their peoples and building a world order in which human energies and talents are devoted more fully to meeting the basic needs of all humanity. We face too many pressing challenges to improve the quality of life for all peoples to be satisfied with the indefinite perpetuation of the present situation.

The special session on disarmament could offer us an important opportunity for accelerating a basic change in direction. The United States will do everything in its power to contribute. But the determined and creative efforts of all will be essential." (A/AC.187/17, pp.2-4)

VENEZUELA

"The special session should consider as a matter of high priority the following measures, among others:

(a) Prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons;

(b) Prohibition of the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons;

(c) Prohibition of the use of weapons of mass destruction and of the development of new types of such weapons;"
(d) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and of zones of peace;
(e) Obligation to respect the nuclear-weapon-free zones;
(f) Utilization of oceans exclusively for peaceful purposes;
(g) Consideration of the problem of intercountry agreements that may permit diversion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy;
(h) Cessation of all nuclear weapons tests;
(i) Appeal to countries that have not yet acceded to the non-proliferation Treaty and to other existing treaties in the field of disarmament, to do so;
(j) Reduction and control of the international traffic in conventional weapons;
(k) Reduction of military budgets." (A/AC.187/8, p.2)

YUGOSLAVIA

Yugoslavia believes that the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament should be held at the highest possible political level with a view not only to appraise the present state of the problem of disarmament, the results of negotiations, the consequences and dangers posed to the process of détente by the continuation of the arms race as well as consequences involving the economic and social development of the international community but also toreach agreement with regard to a programme of measures the consistent implementation of which would enable an effective solution of some basic problems of disarmament and ensure a greater role and over-all involvement of the world Organization in this field." (A/AC.187/11, p.3)
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III. PREPARATORY WORK FOR THE SPECIAL SESSION

AUSTRIA

"Adequate and careful preparatory work is essential to ensure the success of the special session. Austria is prepared to take an active part in the deliberations of the preparatory committee.

The United Nations Secretariat and especially the newly established United Nations Centre on Disarmament will have to play an important role in the preparatory stage of the special session and should, inter alia, be requested to provide adequate background information. Furthermore, non-governmental organizations as well as recognized international research institutes could be called upon to contribute to the preparation for the special session.

It seems to be advisable for the preparatory committee to take an early decision as to the format and character of the final documents to be adopted by the special session and to direct its work in accordance with this decision."

(A/AC.187/41, p.2)

CANADA

"The preparation of a final document that will meet with general agreement will be the most onerous task of the special session. In order to facilitate this achievement, it seems desirable that work begin just as soon as possible and be pursued as a matter of the highest priority through to the end of the special session. In particular, Canada considers that the preparatory committee for the special session should, at the beginning of its second series of meetings in May 1977, set up a drafting sub-committee to begin work on a collective approach to the elements of a final document and that the work of this sub-committee should continue during the series of meetings of the preparatory committee in May and September of 1977. It may also be found desirable for the results of the work of this drafting sub-committee to be included in the progress report which the preparatory committee is to make to the thirty-second session of the General Assembly pursuant to operative paragraph 6 of resolution 31/189B, so that Member States wishing to do so may offer their comments in the First Committee. Thereafter the drafting sub-committee of the preparatory committee should convene during any meetings of the preparatory committee in 1978 and, if necessary, between such meetings and the start of the special session to produce a working draft of a final document for consideration by the special session."

(A/AC.187/26, pp.25)

COLONIA

See IV.
The organizational and substantive preparation of the special session is of great importance for achieving real progress in its deliberations. That fact should be fully reflected in particular in the structure of the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session, in which the actual role of States in the disarmament field must be projected in an equitable manner. (A/AC.187/15, p.3)

FINLAND

A successful session requires careful preparations. The Finnish Government considers it important that the various expectations and views about the session will adequately manifest themselves at the preparatory stage. Thus, it is essential that the preparations of the session will be based on a broad participation. The Finnish Government, although not a member of the Preparatory Committee, reiterates its readiness to make its contribution to these preparations in all their forms. (A/AC.187/21, p.3)

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

The German Democratic Republic feels strongly about the need to ensure that the special session will make an effective contribution to solving the problems of disarmament. The preparation of the session will therefore be an exacting task - a fact that should be taken into account in the composition of the Preparatory Committee and in the organization of its work. (A/32/62, p.2)

HUNGARY

As the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic attaches particular importance to the satisfactory preparation of the special session, it deems it necessary to state that it does not regard the present composition of the preparatory committee to be final, for it does not include such members of the community of the socialist countries, which play a consistent and important role in disarmament questions also in their capacity as active members of the Geneva Committee on disarmament. (A/AC.187/6, p.3)

See also IV.

INDIA

The Government of India are of the firm view that matters pertaining to the agenda and all other relevant questions concerning the forthcoming special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament should be considered by the Preparatory Committee in the light of the declarations issued by the non-aligned countries. (A/AC.187/47, p.2)

See also I and II.
IRAN

"If reasonable success of the special session is to be ensured, meticulous preparation is necessary. This, among other things, requires care, patience and also perseverance, in order to lay the groundwork for widespread agreement on such basic issues as objectives and agenda." (A/AC.187/2, pp.1-2)

IRELAND

"Careful and thorough preparation is therefore important. The preparatory meetings should aim to elaborate a precise and realistic agenda." (A/AC.187/37, p.2)
ITALY

"The work of the Preparatory Committee - of which Italy is a member - will be especially important in this regard, and the outcome of the special session will indeed depend, in large part, on that work. The various issues of disarmament will have to be carefully reviewed in order to ascertain on which of them there is an opportunity to reconcile the various views; to select the most important from among these problems; and to concentrate on the search for generally acceptable solutions to them.

It might therefore prove advisable to allow non-governmental organizations and research institutes to make their contribution to the work of the special session, through the Secretariat and the Preparatory Committee. (A/AC.187/3, pp. 3-5)

LUXEMBOURG

See V.

KUWAIT

"The special session needs a lot of preparation. Governments should be invited in the preparatory stages to submit working papers and other documents expressing their views on disarmament matters. These views should be analysed and sifted beforehand to reflect areas of agreement and disagreement. Once the contentious issues are clearly defined, they should be isolated and treated as the subject of intensive negotiations. The special session should not be allowed to repeat the proceedings of the First Committee, though at a higher level of representation. The special session should not be used as a propaganda forum by one or other of the super-Powers. Kuwait views the special session as a forum in which non-aligned countries will bring their force to bear on the conduct of the major military Powers." (A/AC.187/7, p.2)

MEXICO

"The Government of Mexico is convinced that the success of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament will depend largely on the work done by its Preparatory Committee. Among other things, the Committee should request the Secretary-General to prepare as working papers a number of authoritative studies on the background and most relevant aspects of disarmament and the nuclear arms race; the studies should be ready sufficiently in advance of the last meeting of the Committee, and after considering them, the Committee should transmit them to the General Assembly itself at its special session. Such studies might deal, inter alia, with the following subjects:

1. A synopsis of the work done by the United Nations in the field of disarmament;

2. A comparative study of the scope originally proposed or aimed at in draft multilateral disarmament treaties of a universal character concluded under United Nations auspices and the scope finally fixed in those treaties, including the contemplated measures for expanding that scope;
A comprehensive study of official proposals or declarations made and decisions taken by the General Assembly on the procedure of unilateral or negotiated moratoria as a provisional measure for the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, as well as their application by any State;

A synthesis of the arguments adduced for and against each of the four proposals for the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones that have been included in the General Assembly's agenda (Africa, South Asia, the Middle East and the South Pacific) and for and against the proposal for the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean, including a subject index and a country index;

A comprehensive study of the origin, development and present status of proposals for the prohibition of the first use of nuclear weapons;

A list of bilateral or multilateral meetings on disarmament held outside the United Nations since 1945, with an indication of the procedures followed in each case to keep the Organization informed;

An analytical summary of studies describing the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, bacteriological (biological) weapons and napalm and other incendiary weapons;

Parallel lists of military expenditures since 1945 and the possible significance of such expenditures in the economic and social field;

An analytical list of the agreements concluded in the bilateral talks known by the acronym SALT; and

A descriptive report on the human and material resources available to the United Nations Secretariat for its work on disarmament and on the organization of that work."

Other tasks which it would be desirable for the Preparatory Committee to carry out would be those of preparing recommendations for submission to the General Assembly on the three subjects dealt with in the three following sections of this memorandum, namely, the agenda, the organization of work and the final document.

Since the work of the special session of the General Assembly and of its Preparatory Committee will be governed by the rules of procedure of the Assembly itself, the Government of Mexico is convinced that the work of the Preparatory Committee will be relatively expeditious.

Lastly, it would be very important for the Preparatory Committee to endeavour to keep both non-governmental organizations and the press fully informed of the progress of its work, in order that they might help make world public opinion aware from now on of how important it is to mankind to ensure the success of the special session of the General Assembly." (A/AC.187/34, pp.3-5)

MONGOLIA

"The success of the special session of the General Assembly will largely depend on careful, suitable preparation of the session, and we feel that it would be useful to provide an opportunity for all States Members of the United Nations which so desire to take part in all the preparations for convening the session. The Mongolian People's Republic therefore favours a substantial enlargement of the membership of the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session." (A/AC.187/16, p.2)
"Norway would regard the preparation of a United Nations expert study on the relationship between disarmament and economic and social development, including a new international economic order, as a valuable contribution in this connexion." (A/AC.187/22, p.2)

POLAND

"In order to meet its expectations, the special session devoted to disarmament should be adequately prepared. Its practical impact upon solution of urgent disarmament problems will greatly depend on those agreed provisions of the adopted Political Declaration which will represent the highest common denominator of the cravings of the entire international community. At the same time, it is extremely important that preparatory work to the special session be conducted so as to properly reflect the existing relationship of forces in the world, the military potential of individual States, their responsibility for world peace as well as the role they play in international disarmament efforts. The Government of Poland considers that the present composition of the Preparatory Committee includes too small a number of socialist States whose important contribution to and long involvement in disarmament efforts can be questioned by no one." (A/AC.187/12, p.5)

ROMANIA

"The Preparatory Committee will play an important role in ensuring the complete success of the special session. To this end, the work of the Preparatory Committee must be conducted in such a manner as to guarantee broad participation, on an equal footing, of all States in all forms of activity and throughout the negotiations and to avoid the practice of closed blocs and groupings.

In the opinion of the Romanian Government, the Preparatory Committee should be responsible for drafting the following basic documents:

1. The agenda, which should be clear, precise and strictly to the point, in order to highlight the danger of the arms race and the specific short-comings of the negotiations so far conducted on the subject of disarmament and to establish the measures to be taken in the future. In our view, the special session should deal with problems such as: the situation which has arisen with regard to nuclear and conventional weapons, the stage reached and the results achieved in the disarmament negotiations; the measures which should be taken by the United Nations in order to break the deadlock in disarmament negotiations and to achieve workable agreements leading to general and complete disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, détente, co-operation, peace and security; the role of the United Nations in disarmament.

2. The declaration to be adopted at the special session should cover the principles of disarmament negotiations, the aims and priorities of those negotiations, and the tactics and strategy to be followed in all disarmament talks.

3. The programme of action, spread over a period of time, embodying specific measures which should be taken in the area of nuclear and conventional disarmament in order to strengthen confidence and co-operation among States.

4. The negotiating machinery should provide for the establishment of viable structures, invested with full authority, which would both be flexible and would follow democratic rules and methods of work. These structures should give all interested States an opportunity to participate in disarmament negotiations on an equal footing." (A/AC.187/24, pp.3-4)
"As has been stated above, careful preparations are a key to the success of the session. The work of the Preparatory Committee would be greatly facilitated if one or several informal working groups of the whole were to be established at the opening of its planned session in May 1977. Provisions should also be made for intersessional work on a formal or informal basis.

The meetings of the Preparatory Committee should, if possible, be scheduled so as not to overlap with the sessions of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD).

The Preparatory Committee should at an early stage direct its attention to the format and character of the final documents of the session. Early agreement on the main direction of the documents is highly desirable in view of the short time available. Careful consideration should be given to finding appropriate ways of making use of non-governmental organizations and generally recognized international research institutions in the preparations for the session. Many of these organizations and institutions make a valuable contribution by disseminating information on disarmament problems and have a high reputation for their competence in this field."

"It is the view of the Swedish Government that a new United Nations study on this subject is most desirable and should be initiated as soon as possible. Certain preliminary ideas on the scope and direction of such a study are given in the annex to this note. (A/AC.187/19, pp.2-3,6) See also Annex to A/AC.187/19, page 7.

TURKEY

See II.

UKRAINIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

See II and V.

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

"The special session should be prepared in a thorough and comprehensive manner. The organization of work and the composition of the Preparatory Committee established for that purpose should also take into account the special nature of the disarmament questions with which they will deal; in particular, the Committee's structure should reflect the actual role which States play in this field."

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

"We believe it will be essential for all Governments wishing to contribute to the success of the special session to review intensively all the possible approaches to arms control and disarmament arrangements that could contribute to their own security and that of others, or that could help reduce tensions, or limit expenditures and diversion of resources to armaments without prejudicing security."
Governmental reviews of this nature should and obviously will cover an extremely broad spectrum of arrangements - including those dealing with restrictions on levels or types of armaments, restrictions on activities, deployment limitations, expenditure limitations, and tension-reducing measures. It will be equally important to identify a broad range of frameworks for such arrangements - including choices between global, regional, and bilateral actions, between formal treaty negotiations and less formal undertakings or mutual restraint, and between comprehensive and more limited undertakings.

Some approaches may not, of course, be applicable on a global scale. One of the potential benefits of the special session, in our view, could be to encourage Governments to consider how concepts developed for particular problems or regions might be adapted to situations relevant to their own concerns.

The national reviews that precede the session itself should be based on a recognition that arms control arrangements have the potential of enhancing, not merely preserving, the security of the participants. It will thus be important to consider ways in which arms control approaches can be used by States to deal helpfully with their own security concerns and those of others with whom they interact.

This review process, together with a pattern of broad and open consultations among countries of all political views, would contribute significantly to preparations for the special session. It should provide the necessary raw material to fashion general and specific objectives commanding a wide measure of consensus, to agree on meaningful priorities, to overcome some existing obstacles, to spur existing disarmament efforts where possible, to launch new efforts where desirable, and to begin consideration of any necessary new arrangements for carrying out future negotiations. " (A/AC.187/17, p.3)
### IV. AGENDA

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IV. AGENDA

ALGERIA

"Algeria believes that the agenda of the special session should include the following questions:

1. Evaluation of the present situation in the field of the arms race and disarmament;

2. Elaboration and adoption of fundamental principles and objectives in matters of disarmament;

3. Elaboration and adoption of a Programme of Action in the field of disarmament;

4. Examination of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and of the various types of machinery and organs for negotiation;

5. Question of the convening of a World Disarmament Conference."

(A/AC.187/28, pp.2-3)

ARGENTINA

"The Argentine Republic believes that the agenda of the special session of the General Assembly should be built around the following points:

(I) A general debate centred on the causes that have led to the existing situation, the relationship between disarmament, security and development, and means of overcoming the existing deadlock;

(II) Formulation and adoption of a set of general principles to guide the efforts of the international community in the field of disarmament;

(III) Formulation and adoption of a programme of action which, based on the general principles, will clearly indicate the specific steps to be taken by the various negotiating bodies in order to achieve specific measures of disarmament;

(IV) Consideration of the role of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament and of the operation of the various bodies connected with the subject.

The implementation of the Programme of Action will undoubtedly be connected with the operation of the bodies in which disarmament questions are examined and negotiated. For that reason, it would be necessary for the special session of the General Assembly to consider:
(a) The possibility of improving the structure and working procedures of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. In this connection, it would be necessary to revise the composition of the Conference, to grant de jure membership to all nuclear-weapon States and to change without delay the present system of co-chairmen;

(b) The establishment of an organic legal link between the United Nations General Assembly and CCD, so as to confirm the primary responsibility of the former in disarmament matters;

(c) Strengthening of the central role of the United Nations in negotiations on disarmament, including the possibility of considering the future activities of its Disarmament Commission and the United Nations Centre for Disarmament;

(d) The question of convening a world disarmament conference. *(Ref: A/AC.187/48, para. 4)*

**Austria**

"In accordance with the previous remarks the Austrian Government proposes the following items for inclusion in the agenda of the special session:

- General debate
- Adoption of a political declaration of principles on disarmament
- Adoption of a programme of action on disarmament
- Review and strengthening of the role of the United Nations in disarmament including the question of convening a world disarmament conference."

 *(Ref: A/AC.187/41, p. 5)*

**Brazil**

See VI.

**Bulgaria**

"In view of the foregoing, the People's Republic of Bulgaria considers that, in preparing the agenda for the session, the Preparatory Committee should take into account the need to ensure all the conditions necessary for the fruitful consideration of the question of the subsequent convening at an early date of the World Disarmament Conference. *(Ref: A/AC.187/36, p. 2)*

**Canada**

See VI.
COLOMBIA

"...the Government of Colombia believes that if this new effort is to be pursued seriously at the special session of the General Assembly, the session must concentrate on specific questions. To undertake an analysis of what the Organization has done or left undone in the field of disarmament would be, as it has been in the past, just another scandalous waste of time, energy and money. The Government of Colombia therefore does not agree with the idea of drawing up a heavy agenda for the special session or of requesting the Secretary-General to prepare studies on disarmament matters, as these would only increase the huge mountain of papers that have accumulated over the past several decades with no visible benefit.

The Assembly should concentrate on those problems which are causing the greatest concern to mankind today, namely:

**Nuclear weapons**
1. Total prohibition of tests;
2. Measures for permanently halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons;
   (a) Total prohibition of the transfer of nuclear technology usable for weapons production to countries that do not have it;
   (b) Prohibition of the production of nuclear weapons;
   (c) Destruction of existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons.

**Conventional weapons**
(a) In-depth study of the trade in and transfer of conventional weapons and measures for prohibiting such trade;
(b) Total prohibition of the manufacture of chemical, bacteriological and incendiary weapons.

The delegation of Colombia will develop these views further during the course of the debate." (A/AC.187/46, pp.1-2)

CYPRUS

"It is therefore suggested that in the special session there should be a new and more realistic approach of the problem of disarmament by the initiation of parallel efforts on the subjects interconnected with disarmament, already mentioned, namely: international security, peaceful settlement of disputes and economic development. Committees on these subjects may be set up as appropriate."
(a) Review and appraisal of the present international situation in the light of the stagnation in the field of disarmament, the continuing arms race and close interrelationship between disarmament, international peace and security and economic development

(b) Adoption of a Declaration of Principles on Disarmament in the light of the above

(c) Adoption of a Programme of Action on Disarmament

(d) Review of the role of the United Nations in disarmament and its interrelation with international security and peaceful settlement of disputes and of disarmament mechanisms, including the question of convening a World Disarmament Conference. *(A/AC.187/18, p.2)*

**FINLAND**

"In the opinion of the Finnish Government, the special session should, while adopting a comprehensive approach, give priority to the most pressing disarmament issues. Thus, the special session should discuss, in particular, the serious and urgent problems posed by nuclear weapons, including the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, etc.

In order to be able to give an impetus to negotiations aiming at curbing the arms race the special session should consider the limitation and elimination of other mass destruction weapons, including chemical weapons, the development of new weapons of mass destruction, etc.

Furthermore, the session should pay attention to all opportunities and avenues for stimulating disarmament measures, including the reduction of military budgets, the control of conventional armaments and the limitation of trade in conventional arms as well as the strengthening of the role of the United Nations system in disarmament." *(A/AC.187/21, p.2)*

**GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC**

"The special session could provide an opportunity for conducting a comprehensive exchange of views on the long-term and topical questions of disarmament and arms limitation and for discussing specific partial measures. In this respect, maximum attention should be devoted to the "Memorandum of the Soviet Union on questions of ending the arms race and disarmament" of September 1976 (A/31/232) which constitutes an important reference document for the planned special session of the General Assembly, because it covers all essential problems of disarmament in their interrelationship and, moreover, points out ways of solving them."
The special session should contribute by appropriate means to further progress in the work of existing multilateral fora dealing with disarmament. This is desirable in particular for the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva, which has stood its test as an effective working organ, with a record of concrete results achieved in disarmament negotiations.

(CA/32/62, pp.1-2)

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF

"Taking these aims into account, the Federal Government sees the following possible agenda:

- general debate
- discussion of basic elements of disarmament policy and adoption of a declaration based on stock-taking results
- discussion of future tasks and priorities
- discussion on the structure of disarmament institutions and their mechanisms.

As regards the subjects to be treated at the special session, the Federal Government considers that nuclear and conventional disarmament problems should receive equal treatment. The projects discussed should be genuinely conducive to strengthening confidence and international security. The Federal Government hopes that the special session will provide practical impulses for, among other things: the prohibition of chemical weapons, a comprehensive test ban, non-proliferation policy, the reduction of armament burdens, regional aspects of disarmament and discussion of the connexion between disarmament and economic and social development in the world.

The Federal Government is willing to participate in a discussion on possible modifications to the structure of both the CCD and the United Nations disarmament institutions, but any changes in the CCD structure should at least maintain if not improve the capacity of this body.

Only after the results of the special session will be available will it be possible to judge how the discussion should be continued. Whatever the decision, it should be made sure that the work of existing disarmament bodies will not be impaired." (A/AC.187/44, pp.2-3)

Greece

"As a first priority, the special session should not lose sight of the fact that the problem of general and complete disarmament is so closely interlinked with that of international peace and security that none of them can be looked upon separately. In this regard, the special session should look into ways for the observance of the principles enunciated by the United Nations Charter, for the implementation of the resolutions adopted by the principal organs of the United Nations and for the respect of the norms of international law, which rules the relations among States."
The observance of the provisions of the United Nations Charter and the implementation of United Nations resolutions constitute one of the necessary pre-conditions for the establishment of a system of arms control and ultimately of disarmament in a framework of international security that will contribute to the enhancement of world détente and the application of the principles of a new economic order.

Moreover, as it is the first time that the international community is presented with a universal forum for the consideration of problems related to disarmament and arms control, it is necessary that the special session grasps this unique opportunity and spares no effort for the substantive discussion of all the matters concerned and for the adoption of measures leading to general and complete disarmament within the framework of a system of security.

The special session should proceed to a thorough assessment of efforts so far deployed and a careful appraisal of results attained in the field of disarmament and arms control. In addition, it should look into the causes of the existing situation of stagnation regarding disarmament negotiations and draw the necessary conclusions. This appraisal will help identify the proper measures to be adopted.

Special attention should be directed to the non-proliferation of nuclear armaments and adequate guarantee should be given to the non-nuclear States. Further adequate arrangements should be made so as not to deny, or put into a disadvantageous position the non-nuclear States, as regards peaceful uses of nuclear power. The special session, therefore, should examine the establishment of mechanisms for the peaceful use of nuclear power.

While the existing machineries dealing with the disarmament matters, such as the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, should be preserved in order not to prejudice activities already undertaken or to be assumed in the field of disarmament, the special session should look into the institutional aspects of the relationship between the General Assembly and the CCD in the field of disarmament. The special session may examine the procedural system of the CCD and suggest specific improvements. Furthermore, it would be advisable that an organic link be established between the CCD and the United Nations in the sense that mutual co-operation and exchange of information between the CCD and the competent organs of the United Nations be inaugurated.

In connexion with the agenda to be followed at the works of the special session, the Greek Government is of the view that the following items, at minimum, must be enlisted:

(a) Review and appraisal of the present situation in the field of disarmament;

(b) Adoption of a declaration of principles on disarmament;

(c) Adoption of a programme of action on disarmament;

(d) Review of the role of the United Nations in disarmament and examination of the existing institutional and other mechanisms in this field."

(A/A/0.187/45, pp.1-5)
The Hungarian Government deems it indispensable both for the preparatory stage of the special session and for the special session itself as well as the documents to be adopted to spell out clearly the enormous responsibility borne for the cause of disarmament by each and every State, particularly the nuclear Powers, which, having the greatest military potential, are able to do the most for disarmament. Similarly, effect should be given to the principle that disarmament measures must not prejudice the security of any single State. These principles should be asserted to the full not only in general disarmament measures but also in the different partial or regional agreements.

(A/AC.187/6, p.3)

The Government of India are convinced that the work of the forthcoming special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament should be based on the following main considerations, which have been repeatedly put forward by India along with several other States and which have also been accepted by the international community, in regard to the fundamental approach to be adopted towards the question of disarmament.

One of the most important questions facing mankind in this nuclear age is that of disarmament. The goal of all efforts in the disarmament field should be the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Any partial or collateral measures, which might be adopted, should be conceived of and implemented within the framework of this ultimate goal. The highest priority in the field of disarmament should be accorded to the elimination of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.

All States have a vital interest in disarmament. Hence, deliberative forums are essential, where all States can express their views on disarmament. However, actual negotiations on specific measures of disarmament can be better conducted in small negotiating bodies. Measures of disarmament can be classified into three broad categories, namely, preventive or "non-armament" measures, arms limitation measures, and actual disarmament measures. Special efforts should be made to negotiate measures of actual disarmament, particularly in regard to nuclear weapons and all the other weapons of mass destruction. A substantial portion of the funds released by disarmament should be devoted to the economic and social development of developing countries.

(A/AC.187/47, p.3)

The agenda of the special session should reflect the present state of affairs as well as those fundamental issues which are more frequently identified in deliberations on arms control and disarmament, the solutions of which would represent significant progress towards the goal of general and complete disarmament. These would include the entire range of questions concerning nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons, incendiary weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, other types of weapons, reduction of armed forces as well as the establishment of zones of peace and co-operation.

(A/AC.187/27, p.2)

See also VI.
66.

IRAN

"The agenda of the special session should be responsive to and consistent with these above-mentioned objectives. It must, at the same time, be attuned to the particularities envisaged for this special gathering.

A broad enough agenda allowing for discussion and consideration of basic aspects of arms control seems necessary. It is, however, desirable that it be comprised of an agreed list of priority items that embody critical issues of disarmament.

To emphasize the deliberative feature of the special session, the agenda should focus on mapping a general, theoretical strategy; to bring about a futuristic outlook of this important undertaking, the agenda should also be clearly geared, in part, to produce action-oriented decisions.

To summarize, the agenda of the special session of the General Assembly should be drawn up along the following lines:

(a) Review and assessment of basic aspects and principal assumptions;

(b) Concise and systematic evaluation of the present state of affairs;

(c) Consideration of future outlook with a view to charting a programme of action based on priority issues;

(d) A review of disarmament mechanisms, in order to make them more consistent with present realities and responsive to follow-up responsibilities."

(A/AC.187/2, pp.2-3)

IRELAND

"The special session should also examine ways and means of strengthening the role of the CCD as the principle existing forum for detailed multilateral negotiation of arms control and disarmament questions, including the desirability of all nuclear Powers associating themselves with its important work." (A/AC.187/37, p.3)

See also VI.
The following paragraphs might usefully be incorporated in the agenda of the Special Session:

(1) The principle of regular rotation should be applied in the composition of all United Nations bodies dealing with questions of disarmament, so as to ensure that all Member States are given the opportunity of serving on them.

(2) In line with the above approach, and in order further to strengthen the sense of common responsibility for advancing disarmament the Government of Israel proposes that it be generally accepted that resolutions of the General Assembly on questions of disarmament be adopted by consensus. Resolutions adopted by a majority are of little practical value and only undermine public confidence in the ability of the United Nations to further the cause of disarmament.

(3) In the same spirit, it is suggested that the United Nations undertake a world-wide programme of instruction, principally in educational institutions, The emphasis in this programme should be on the realization that disarmament represents a deeply rooted hope of mankind. And the educational thrust in this enterprise should be to expose the fact that so little has yet been achieved in realizing that hope.

(4) With a view to promoting progress wherever possible on local and regional levels, it is suggested that the United Nations establish regional disarmament commissions, composed of all Member States in the region, the task of which would be to review ideas and proposals for intergovernmental regional agreements on arms reduction and control.

(A/AC.187/38, pp.2-3)

"... An effort to outline a serious disarmament programme need not involve the launching of a new disarmament strategy; it might perhaps prove sufficient to update, in the light of past experience, the content of those relevant documents which still retain their validity. Italy believes, for instance, that the ideas and guidelines contained in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations issued by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1961, and the draft treaties on general and complete disarmament prepared by both the Soviet Union and the United States in 1962, may serve as a useful and valuable point of departure.

The work of the special session - which, in Italy's view, is due to take place at a particularly momentous time in world politics - should therefore be based on a factual agenda and organized so as to ensure a brisk pace for its debates. These are, in fact, the fundamental premises for the search and the subsequent adoption of agreed positive conclusions.

Italy maintains that the halting of the nuclear arms race and the subsequent reduction of nuclear stockpiles, under effective international controls capable of guaranteeing the security of all States, is one of the major issues among those to be dealt with by the special session."
In this regard, it is not possible to ignore the special responsibility incumbent upon the nuclear-weapon States. These States are, in fact, in a position to make a decisive contribution to the cause of both disarmament and non-proliferation. In the field of disarmament, they must make the greatest possible efforts to reach agreements satisfying not only their own mutual security requirements, but also and above all, those for the security and peace of all the world’s peoples. In regard to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, Italy believes that the Non-Proliferation Treaty remains the cornerstone of the system, and therefore the main point of reference for defining the rights of the nuclear-weapon States, as well as their duties, which must not be overlooked; for instance, the possibility of utilizing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes must be guaranteed to all States.

As for conventional weapons, whose progressive reduction should parallel that of nuclear armaments - and, in particular, their transfer and trade - it may be appropriate to recall a proposal introduced by Ambassador Vinci at the Conference on Human Survival in 1970.

That proposal, which was to be a part of a comprehensive programme for general and complete disarmament and which was meant as a plan of action to parallel that aimed at nuclear disarmament, provided for the establishment, under the guidance and control of the Security Council, of a Committee composed of representatives of the countries which are the major manufacturers and suppliers of conventional weapons. Sub-committees, each with a competence for a specific geographical area, were, according to the proposal, to have been entrusted with the task of maintaining the level of conventional weaponry at the lowest possible point. Moreover, negotiations were to have been initiated for the establishment of a system of collective security, under which a permanent military force would be assigned to the United Nations - namely, to the Security Council - and would be used to prevent outbreaks of hostilities and, in general, to carry out all the decisions of the Council regarding the maintenance of peace and international security.

The persistent lack of a disarmament treaty on chemical and biological weapons is another source of concern.

Italy considers that the special session should play a major role in promoting an agreement on this issue. It would, of course, be preferable if the session itself could finalize such an agreement, the draft of which might be prepared, in the meantime, by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD).

The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is still a highly useful negotiating body; in several respects, it is indispensable. In the course of its sessions the CCD accomplishes an impressive amount of work which, for its technical complexity and political implications, can hardly be performed elsewhere. This does not mean, of course, that there is not some margin for improvement in the current structure, procedures, and organization of that body."

(A/AC.187/32, pp.2-4)
69.

JAPAN

"...We attach great importance to the role being played by the CCD as an effective negotiating body, and we consider it most desirable that the special session give fresh impetus to the future work of the CCD.

the Government of Japan is of the view that the following issues should be given high priority at the special session.

(1) The cessation of the nuclear arms race and the reduction of nuclear armaments.

There can be no dispute that nuclear disarmament is the crux of the disarmament problem and is indeed the most urgent task of the present era. Japan, as a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, is convinced that for its effective implementation, it is essential to achieve universal adherence of all States to the Treaty. At the same time it should never be forgotten that the inequality inherent in this Treaty, which accords special status to the nuclear-weapon States, must not be perpetuated, but it should be rectified through the abolition by the nuclear-weapon States of all nuclear weapons in their arsenals. We strongly urge that all nuclear-weapon States, mindful of their grave responsibilities for nuclear disarmament, contribute to the curtailment of the nuclear arms race and the reduction of nuclear armaments.

(2) Prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests.

It is of urgent necessity to conclude, as a prerequisite to the curtailment of the nuclear-arms race, a comprehensive test-ban treaty in order to obtain the prohibition of the development and improvement of nuclear weapons.

(3) Banning chemical weapons.

The question of banning chemical weapons is a subject which the General Assembly for years has requested the CCD to consider as a matter of high priority. As a result some prospect has now emerged for the conclusion of a treaty banning these dangerous weapons. In view of this prospect, due consideration should be paid at the special session to promoting a settlement of this question.

(4) International transfer of conventional arms.

It is striking to realize that four fifths of the total military expenditures of the world are being devoted to the accumulation of conventional weapons. The arms race, in terms of resources, is primarily a race in producing, buying and selling conventional weapons. The recent acceleration in the international transfer of conventional weapons will not only intensify existing conflicts but will increase the risk of provoking new disputes in many parts of the world."
It is the firm conviction of the Government of Japan that the time has come to seek feasible ways to formulate an international agreement to restrict the international transfer of conventional weapons, and it hopes that the special session will take up this issue in a most serious way.

(5) Reduction of military budgets.

World military expenditures, which have now reached astronomical figures, demonstrate how much the diversion of limited resources to military ends has accelerated. There is an urgent need to explore possible ways by which part of the resources released through the reduction of military expenditures can be made available to improve economic and social conditions in all States.

It is to be hoped that the special session will take up this question in its deliberations as a long-term goal, the achievement of which would help preserve the scanty resources remaining to the world and would contribute also to the relaxation of international tension."

(KUWAIT)

"Major military Powers should actively collaborate in the creation of zones of peace and all nuclear Powers should respect the status of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

All States should renounce the use of incendiary weapons and all other weapons that pose a threat to civilian life or vegetation.

All States should have the right to share, on an equal basis, in the access to modern technology for peaceful purposes.

Nuclear-weapon tests should be stopped in all atmospheres and the partial test-ban Treaty should be expanded to include underground tests. All nuclear Powers should become parties to the new treaty.

An organic link should be established between the CCD and the United Nations which should serve as the proper framework for disarmament negotiations. The membership of the CCD should be revised to ensure equal status for all its members. Disarmament negotiations should cease to be a dialogue between the two super-Powers. All members of the CCD should be entitled to introduce amendments to draft texts reached by the super-Powers. Draft treaties submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations should be subjected to the normal procedures applicable generally in the law of treaties.

Reports of the CCD should be intelligible enough to give an accurate picture to Member States of the United Nations of progress made within the CCD. The reports should give a summary of the debate and give an up-to-date assessment and evaluation of new trends that may emerge or encouraging signs for future negotiations.

All Members of the United Nations should be allowed to submit concrete disarmament proposals to the Secretary-General which he, in turn, would communicate to the CCD. The CCD should submit annual reports on its reaction to these proposals and the reasons for not implementing them. The Secretary-General should draw his conclusions from the disarmament negotiations and submit detailed analyses to the General Assembly so as to bring moral pressure to bear on the super-Powers.

All significant military Powers should undertake a commitment to channel a specific portion of the resources released by disarmament for socio-economic purposes in the developing countries."
71.

**LUXEMBOURG**

"As for the topics for discussion, the Government of Luxembourg wishes to make the following observations:

1. Equal importance should be attached to the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction and to the control of conventional armaments.

2. One of the principal long-term objectives should be the total cessation of nuclear tests. Luxembourg could support any proposal likely to bring about progress in the debate among the nuclear Powers.

3. The Government of Luxembourg remains attached to the objective of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Treaty on Non-Proliferation must remain the basic instrument for the attainment of that objective.

4. A World Disarmament Conference could be envisaged during the special session, provided that principal nuclear States agree to participate in it." (A/AC.187/39)

**MEXICO**

"The agenda of the special session of the General Assembly might include, in addition to the usual items such as the election of the President and the Vice-Presidents and the appointment of the Credentials Committee, the following items:

- Report of the Preparatory Committee (which should include as annexes all the reports requested of the Secretary-General and specified in the preceding section);

- General debate;

- Approval of a Declaration and a Programme of Action, including the adoption of such provisions as may appear advisable in order to ensure that the documents are fully implemented." (A/AC.187/35, p.5)

**MONGOLIA**

"The Government of the Mongolian People's Republic believes that the agenda of the special session should be drawn up in such a way as to enable all participating States to set forth and compare their views on major disarmament questions and contribute to the task of devising ways and means both of achieving tangible results in the disarmament field through the adoption of partial and subsidiary measures and of attaining the ultimate goal, namely, general and complete disarmament.

The Mongolian People's Republic takes the view that the question of preparing for a world conference should be a separate item in the agenda of the special session. We consider it completely logical that the special session should discuss the question of convening a world disarmament conference and adopt a specific decision on the holding of the conference." (A/AC.187/16, p.2)
NEVERLANDS

In the view of the Netherlands Government the special session is not a suitable forum for conducting concrete disarmament negotiations or for concluding agreements. It could however, endorse agreements which have previously been reached. The work of the special session should result in a declaration which could include an evaluation of disarmament results so far and an analysis of the current world security situation, but which should concentrate on the following points:

(a) The principles which should form the points of departure for conducting and concluding disarmament negotiations;

(b) An outline of the measures which should be taken in the future bearing in mind the proviso in paragraph 7;

(c) Recommendations for the organization of future disarmament negotiations.

(A/AC.187/25, pp.3-4)

NEW ZEALAND

The New Zealand Government suggests that we use the principles already agreed upon (using the United Nations Charter as the basic document, and subsequent important documents such as the 1961 joint US/USSR Statement of Principles) as a starting point for a new declaration of principles. Experience since these documents were concluded, both in the area of security and disarmament, will no doubt affect the shape and content of a declaration at the session.

The principles could perhaps relate to different areas that are relevant to disarmament objectives and problems; for example, they could be grouped under the headings, inter alia: (a) principles of national and international security; (b) principles of arms control and disarmament; (c) principles of nuclear non-proliferation. New Zealand intends to examine these areas further and may wish to submit comments to the Preparatory Committee at a later stage.

New Zealand considers that a review of the United Nations disarmament machinery should form an essential part of the special session's deliberations. Widespread dissatisfaction has been expressed with the record of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the General Assembly has demonstrated a need to handle more effectively the burdensome range of disarmament items raised for debate and to improve the existing machinery. There exists also a need for better liaison between the Assembly and the existing negotiating body that will allow non-members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to follow its deliberations more thoroughly, to be allowed a proper input of their views for its consideration and to be accorded a more appropriate opportunity to examine its proposals and recommendations than has recently been the case. New Zealand recognizes the need for a relatively small negotiating body in the field of disarmament, and notes the high level of expertise and mutual confidence which the present body has developed. (A/AC.187/40, pp.3-4)
The agenda of the special session should also include an assessment of the existing international negotiating machinery in relation to arms control and disarmament questions. Measures for strengthening and increasing its efficiency should be seriously considered.

Since the General Assembly has previously adopted resolutions regretting the lack of progress in the work of the CCD in recent years, it would seem appropriate to devote particular attention to this question. In this connexion Norway would like to reiterate the particular importance of the participation of all nuclear Powers in the work on international disarmament.

Norway has given positive consideration to the question of convening a world disarmament conference. In such a conference, however, all States of military importance, and especially all the nuclear Powers, must participate. This does not seem to be a realistic possibility at present. Our common efforts should therefore be devoted to making the special session of the General Assembly a success.

(A/AC.187/22, p.2)

PERU

See VI.

POLAND

See II.

ROMANIA

See III.

SPAIN

In the view of the Spanish Government, the agenda should place special emphasis on the consideration of practical measures that would effectively help to curb the arms race and establish a climate propitious to the development of a programme aimed at achieving general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

It is therefore important that one of the agenda items should provide an opportunity for careful consideration and eventual adoption of the drafts prepared by United Nations organs which are sufficiently mature.

Clearly, a general debate should be held. In addition, it would be advisable to adopt a declaration reflecting the feelings of Member States and containing recommendations that would help to bring about progress with regard to disarmament. It might be useful for the Assembly to consider the methods which have been used thus far to obtain positive results in connexion with disarmament and the appropriate forums for that purpose." (A/AC.187/9, p.2)

SWEDEN

See VI.

SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC

See II.
TURKEY

"In the light of the foregoing, the Turkish Government considers that the agenda of the special session might include the following items:

1. General debate (Review of the consequences of the arms race and assessment of the current situation in the field of arms control and disarmament).

2. Adoption of a political declaration consisting of basic principles of arms control and disarmament and guidelines for future efforts.

3. General discussion of some specific disarmament issues of general and immediate interest; establishment of priorities and formulation of recommendations.

4. The role of the United Nations and that of public opinion in disarmament." (A/AC.1/15, p.2)

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

"The agenda for the special session should, in the view of the USSR Government, provide for a broad exchange of views on the problem of disarmament with regard not only to the fundamental approaches to the question at the present stage but also to the basic directions of the priority efforts of States in the disarmament field, with a view to attaining the main, ultimate goal of all efforts in that field, namely general and complete disarmament. In that connexion, the session could also devote attention to partial measures directed towards limiting and halting the arms race and bringing about disarmament, and to measures taken on a regional basis.

The special session could culminate in the adoption, for example, of a final political declaration reflecting the joint approach of States to those questions." (A/32/40, p.2)

UNITED KINGDOM

"The United Kingdom Government believe, that the following could form the framework of the special session's agenda:

(1) Review of achievements to date: and identification of the main sectors (nuclear and conventional, global and regional), where further action is necessary.

(2) Discussion of general principles which should govern the approach to such action, taking into account the practical experience gained in previous disarmament negotiations.

(3) Adoption of general priorities for action, with broad indications of what might best be dealt with multilaterally, regionally or bilaterally.

(4) Examination of disarmament machinery, including the role of the United Nations." (A/AC.187/35, p.2)
"Clearly the primary focus of the session's work should be its examination of major substantive issues in the disarmament field and its search for practicable approaches toward their resolution.

... Negotiations and disarmament mechanisms, institutions, and procedures should not, of course, be a substitute for the development of substantive goals and concrete proposals. Nonetheless, the session should be prepared to undertake any needed improvements in existing machinery and practices. It should also be in a position to launch any new organizational steps, perhaps including the creation of additional machinery, that may be required to facilitate the achievement of the goals agreed upon at the session." (A/AC.187/17, pp.3-4)

VENEZUELA

Venezuela co-sponsored General Assembly resolution 31/189 B because it feels that a session of the General Assembly devoted exclusively to disarmament would not only reflect the international community's deep concern at the arms race but might also help to spur on the disarmament negotiations. One of the main items of the special session should be the convening of a World Disarmament Conference, the importance of and need for which have been recognized by the overwhelming majority of States Members of the United Nations.

(A/AC.187/8, pp.1-2)

YUGOSLAVIA

Proceeding from the aforementioned ideas, the Yugoslav Government feels that the agenda of the special session should be conceived in broad terms and proposes that it should include the following: general debate; adoption of a political declaration (or declaration on disarmament); adoption of a programme of measures of disarmament; and question of negotiating machinery in the United Nations. Within this framework should also be considered the question of convening a world disarmament conference. The rules of procedure of the General Assembly should apply in the work of the Preparatory Committee and the special session of the General Assembly with regard to the adoption of decisions. However, one should strive to the maximum for the adoption of decisions by consensus.

(A/AC.187/11, pp.3-4)
V. ORGANIZATION OF WORK OF THE SPECIAL SESSION

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V. ORGANIZATION OF WORK OF THE SPECIAL SESSION

AUSTRALIA

"With regard to the organization of the special session, Australia believes that it will be necessary to establish a committee structure to make the most effective use of time. This structure could correspond with the three main areas of possible action identified by Australia: (a) examination of fundamental principles of arms control and preparation of a declaration embodying these; (b) establishment of priorities; and (c) review of the international disarmament negotiating machinery. The plenary of the session could then be utilized for a general debate and for consideration of the reports of the committees.

Australia considers that, to the maximum extent possible, decisions of the session should be taken by consensus. Realism should be the keynote of the meeting which dictates against the use of voting majorities to impose decisions which may be unacceptable to significant minorities and thus unlikely to advance the cause of arms control." (A/AC.187/33, p.5)

BELGIUM

"Belgium recommends that, both within the Preparatory Committee and at the special session of the Assembly, the pursuit of consensus should be the basic working hypothesis." (A/AC.187/10, p.3)

BULGARIA

"To hold a special session of the General Assembly which achieves results would have enormous significance. That, however, is not an easy task. In view of the fact that it involves extremely important aspects of the security of States, the successful preparation and implementation of this complex undertaking will depend on the spirit of constructive co-operation shown by all countries, in particular by those States which are militarily most important. Unless the decisions concerning the preparation of the session and the recommendations of the session itself are adopted by general agreement, including the agreement of those States which bear the primary responsibility for peace and the security of peoples and which are expected to make the most significant contribution to the implementation of disarmament measures, it can hardly be expected that those decisions will lead to genuine results. The People's Republic of Bulgaria considers that the effectiveness of the work of the special session will depend to a great extent on whether this important aspect will be accurately reflected in the work of the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session."
As is generally known, during the consultations concerning the establishment of the Preparatory Committee, the Group of European socialist countries expressed disagreement with the method of allocation of seats in that body and stated that it would continue to insist on broader participation in view of the genuine role which the European socialist countries are playing in the struggle to limit armaments and bring about disarmament. As one of the countries nominated by that Group to participate in the Preparatory Committee, the People's Republic of Bulgaria expresses the hope that at the thirty-second session of the General Assembly the question of enlarging the participation of the socialist countries in the Committee will be settled correctly in the interests of the successful convening of the special session and the cause of peace and disarmament. (A/AC.187/36, pp. 2-3)

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

"The work and the decisions of the special session must proceed from the common interest and joint responsibility of all States, and particularly all the major Powers, in dealing with disarmament questions. The special session should fully endorse and develop the principles of universality in disarmament negotiations and, above all, of unimpaired security for all the parties concerned. The results of the special session should be summed up in a final document, which could, for example, take the form of a political declaration reflecting agreed positions on the matters discussed." (A/AC.187/13, p. 3)

DENMARK

"The Danish Government considers it of paramount importance to secure the broadest possible participation in the special session and, in particular, that all the permanent members of the Security Council and the leading military Powers take part in it. Only in that event would the session be able to accomplish its task in recognition of the fact that these Powers hold the key to progress and are also bearing a special responsibility for a reversal of the spiralling arms race.

The Danish Government is of the opinion that with a view to attaining positive results the items of the agenda should be clearly specified and that the rules of procedure should be as precise as possible in order to allow an expedient course of the session. Considering the short period of the session, it should be endeavoured to make the most effective use of the time available. The general debate should therefore not take up so much time that there would not be sufficient time for thorough consideration of any specific proposal before the session. In the final declaration, which is anticipated to ensue from the session, the States participating should not only express their common stand on the issues concerned, but the declaration should also contain a programme for further action." (A/AC.187/20, pp. 1-2)

FINLAND

"Considering the aims of the special session and the need for the support of an enlightened public opinion for their attainment, due attention should also be paid to the vital role held by non-governmental organizations.

Although the procedural arrangements of the special session are largely dependent on the agenda to be adopted for the session, the establishment of committees for discussing the major groups of issues will probably be needed to facilitate a flexible and efficient functioning of the session."
the Finnish Government holds it important that the documents and recommendations to emerge from the special session will be based on the widest possible support and be adopted preferably by consensus. In the view of the Finnish Government this is an essential prerequisite for their effectiveness."

(A/AC.187/2L, p.3)

**FRANCE**

"All States in the world will attend the special session in order to discuss problems which concern them all immediately and directly; concepts as important as their defence, their security and hence their national independence will be involved. France therefore considers it essential that, starting with the preparatory phase, each State - whether or not it is a member of the Preparatory Committee - should be permitted to state its views and make any suggestions which it may consider relevant, without any constraints or restrictions of any kind. During the discussion at the thirty-first session, the French Government had supported the idea of a Preparatory Committee open to all States; its view did not prevail. The Preparatory Committee should at least evolve without delay methods and procedures which will enable States not members of the Committee to make known their views, opinions and suggestions.

The Powers with the greatest military strength - and in particular the nuclear Powers - which bear a large share of the responsibility for the continuing acceleration of the arms race, must necessarily play a leading role in disarmament; without their active co-operation, any effort may be in vain. However, since the special session is an international forum for discussion and not for the negotiation of disarmament conventions, this responsibility should not be reflected in special privileges.

Just as all States should be able to participate in the special session on an equal footing, so it appears essential to the French Government that no subject should be barred from the discussion a priori. All questions of substance, procedure or organization concerning disarmament should be legitimately admissible. No subject should be taboo.

On the other hand, the United Nations should refrain from any discussion of subjects which are outside the topic of disarmament or have only tenuous links with that topic. Similarly, it should not interfere in the bilateral or multilateral negotiations in progress.

Lastly, it seems inappropriate to try to determine in advance the lines to be followed by the session itself. For example, the Assembly will have to decide on its relationship to a future World Disarmament Conference. All options should remain open, and the decisions to be taken or not taken by the special session in this regard should not be prejudged.

The forthcoming special session should attempt to open up new avenues leading to disarmament, and it should therefore not be a simple repetition of the discussions held each year in the First Committee of the General Assembly. This would be the case if the agenda of the session were to include the same items as are dealt with each year during the annual debates. New approaches appear essential, and the French Government reserves the right to make suggestions to this end, should the circumstances appear propitious.
The French Government considers it desirable that the Assembly should at its special session attempt to reach generally acceptable consensuses on the questions to be considered. A decision on the subject of disarmament which does not enjoy the approval of a very large majority and does not command the support of the principal countries which may have to implement it will remain without effect and may even have adverse effects." (A/AC.187/23, pp.2-3)

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

"In determining the procedures and working method of the special session, the basic consideration should be that the problems of arms limitation and disarmament affect the interests of all peoples and that, consequently, the constructive co-operation of all States and, in particular, of the major Powers is needed to solve them." (CA/32/62, p.2)

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF

"The Federal Government believes that the special session can provide valuable and constructive impulses for future efforts to achieve greater international stability and security by balanced measures of disarmament and arms control. A consensus among the participants would be the appropriate basis for attaining the goals of the session." (A/AC.187/44, p.3)

GREECE

"It is, therefore, the firm conviction of the Government of Greece that the matters concerned should be looked upon in a pragmatic and constructive way, while a spirit of co-operation should prevail in the works of the special session. The attention of the delegations should be focused on the practical approach of the items of the agenda and on the avoidance of dwelling upon detailed doctrinal discussions which may frustrate the important tasks of the special session. In this regard, the Government of Greece expresses the wish that efforts should be made in order that resolutions and other decisions be adopted by consensus so as to avoid, as far as possible, resorting to voting.

Greece believes that the contribution of all States, irrespectively of their size, political power and economic development, is indispensable for the achievement of complete and general disarmament in a system of peace and security. Nevertheless, the preponderant role that the nuclear powers play in this field should not be disregarded. It is, therefore, necessary to assure the participation of these States in the decision-making process of the special session and especially in the adoption of measures concerning the non-proliferation of nuclear arms, the gradual nuclear and conventional disarmament, the reductions of military expenditures and budgets etc." (A/AC.187/45, p.2)
The special session..."should not duplicate the annual disarmament discussion of the General Assembly and the First Committee and should possess distinct characteristics of its own emanating from its purposes." (A/AC.187/27, p.1)

"Given the multiplicity and the complexity of the issues involved and general goals to be achieved in a relatively short span of time, the special session should best act as a deliberative body – albeit possessing special character...and avoid simply duplicating what the General Assembly and the First Committee produce in their annual debates." (A/AC.187/2, p.2)

See also III.

"The special session should not entail either generalized rhetoric or detailed technical negotiations. Clearly, it cannot be called on to duplicate the activities of existing forums for the concrete negotiation of arms limitation and disarmament agreements.

...committees could be envisaged to facilitate detailed discussion of the agenda and the general debate could be kept reasonably short. The rule of consensus should prevail in the decisions of the session so as to ensure that its conclusions are shared by all the participating States and to obviate the risk that they might emerge as a source of controversy and division in the future. Moreover, if the session is to succeed, it is important that all major powers participate actively and at all levels in its deliberations. The association of non-governmental organizations active in the field of disarmament with the work of the session could help to ensure that public opinion remains closely informed of the issues involved." (A/AC.187/37, p.2)
LUXEMBOURG

"The search for a consensus must prevail both within the Preparatory Committee and during the Special Session." (A/AC.187/39)

KUWAIT

"The Special Session should not be allowed to repeat the proceedings of the First Committee, though at a higher level of representation." (A/AC.187/7, p.2)

MEXICO

"During the special session of the General Assembly there should be established two main committees, which will be entrusted with preparing the Declaration and the Programme of Action respectively.

From the foregoing it will be clear that the General Committee at the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament will, as at regular sessions consist of the President of the General Assembly, who will act as its Chairman, the 17 Vice-Presidents and the Chairmen of the two main committees." (A/AC.187/34, p.5)

NETHERLANDS

"In view of the responsibility which all States share for disarmament, the Netherlands Government assumes that the debates in the special session will take place in a constructive atmosphere, that the failure of disarmament negotiations in the past will be examined in a businesslike and impassionate manner and that united efforts will be made to create options for future actions on disarmament. This does not alter the fact that certain countries are in a position to contribute more to disarmament than others; obviously, only the nuclear-weapon States can halt the nuclear arms race (vertical proliferation) and can take nuclear disarmament measures and they alone can bear responsibility for this.

Positive results will depend on thorough preparation as well as on a non-controversial approach to the work of the special session. The Netherlands Government hopes that the preparations will be such that it will prove possible to take decisions by consensus at the special session. It attaches all the more significance to this as the decisions of the special session will have a considerable impact on the progress of disarmament negotiations in subsequent years.

It would probably be best if the work of the special session were arranged to reflect this suggested classification and committees be set up for each of the separate topics. These committees should deal with the subjects under each heading and engage in drafting the relevant passages of the final declaration.

With regard to the principles of disarmament negotiations the joint statement of 19 September 1961 by the United States and the Soviet Union could be used as a starting point for the discussions of the special session. The principles of this statement (the Zorin-McCloy agreement) could be adapted and/or supplemented in the light of the experience gained since 1961 in negotiations on disarmament.
82.

As regards consideration of the organization of multilateral disarmament consultations by the special session, the Netherlands Government considers that the complicated and often very technical negotiations will have to continue to be held in fora of limited size and composition in which a quiet atmosphere of consultation and the absence of publicity will create the most favourable conditions for reaching agreement. Countries not directly involved in such consultations will have to be given the opportunity to make their views known and to express their opinions on the result of such consultations. (A/AC.187/25, pp.3-4)

NEW ZEALAND

New Zealand believes that the structure of the special session could reflect the need for a new declaration of principles, for a programme of action and for a review of all United Nations disarmament machinery and that there should be a committee responsible for each of these areas of work. A plenary debate could continue simultaneously with the work of at least two of the committees.

New Zealand believes that the special session must ensure a close relationship between the declaration of principles and the programme of action. The success of the special session is also dependent upon constructive participation by all nuclear weapon States, an avoidance of extreme demands, and a seeking of consensus at the highest possible common factor of security interests. (A/AC.187/40, pp.3-4)

NORWAY

The question on the level of representation should, to a certain degree, be regarded in the light of developments and anticipated results. It must, however, be assumed that representation at Foreign Minister level would be appropriate and in accordance with standard procedure at the General Assembly sessions of the United Nations;

In order to obtain results of any significance which may be complied by all parties, one should, to the greatest extent possible, aim at consensus decisions. It would, however, seem practical to adopt the rules of procedure of the General Assembly;

The right to take the floor and to submit proposals, should be limited to Governments.

A great number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have for many years made a substantial contribution to the disarmament efforts. These organizations should therefore be permitted to attend meetings, submit documents and to receive documentation. Such a presence by the NGOs may also be of value in furthering public understanding and interest regarding the special session. (A/AC.187/22, p.4)

PERU

The special session should be organized with an eye to the need to allow both general and specific treatment of various questions. The possibility of establishing one or more working committees for convenience and flexibility in the handling of items should be considered. (A/AC.187/42, p.3)
The special session should approach the subject of disarmament in a constructive, businesslike and realistic manner. It should do nothing to complicate or make more difficult the ongoing negotiations on different planes and fora; in particular, it should refrain from anything that might hurt the existing and well-tested mechanisms of disarmament negotiations.

The present mechanisms of disarmament negotiations reflect the special responsibility which States participating in them bear for laying foundations of specific agreements. Consequently, results arrived at at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva provide for a good basis to discuss disarmament issues in the United Nations.

The Government of Poland has stressed on more than one occasion that the root-cause of insufficient progress in the field of disarmament derives not from the alleged weaknesses of the mechanisms of disarmament negotiations but from the lack of political will on the part of certain States. Particularly the effects of work of the Geneva Committee on Disarmament, inter alia last year's agreement on the Convention on the Prohibition of Environmental Modification Techniques for Military and Other Hostile Purposes, offer persuasive evidence that the Committee remains a valuable and effective negotiating forum. The special session should contribute to the strengthening and further intensifying the Committee's work as well as of other planes of disarmament negotiations.

In conformity with the principle of undiminished security of all States without exception, the special session should refrain from taking decisions of unilateral advantage to some States or groups of States, at the expense of others. Therefore, it is the considered view of the Government of Poland that all decisions of the session should reflect an agreed and common approach of its participants to disarmament. To this end, it is necessary that decisions at the session be taken by consensus.”

(A/AC.187/12, p.3)

ROMANIA

See I.

SPAIN

"With regard to the methods of work of the special session of the Assembly, it might be advisable to appoint ad hoc groups composed of a limited number of countries, although the various geographical groups should be represented therein, as well as the nuclear-weapon States. These ad hoc groups could be instructed to consider very specific points, with a view to preparing proposals for subsequent discussion in the plenary meeting." (A/AC.187/9, p.2)
**Sweden**

"In the view of the Swedish Government, the special session should be held at least at the level of Foreign Ministers. States participating in the session should be given the opportunity to present general views in a general debate. The main emphasis at the session should, however, be deliberations aimed at finalizing the texts of decisions and recommendations. For this purpose Committees of the Whole should be established.

The duration of the special session should be decided upon at a later stage of the preparations. As a working hypothesis a duration of a minimum of three weeks seems reasonable.

The agenda of the special session should be drafted in broad terms indicating the type of action which the session is expected to take." (A/AC.187/19, p.3)

**Syrian Arab Republic**

See II.

**Turkey**

See II.

**Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic**

"Provision should be made to ensure that the special session is prepared and conducted with due regard for the specific nature and significance of disarmament problems for the causes of peace and of maintaining the security of States. Decisions at the session should be taken in such a way as to obviate completely any possibility of damaging the security interests of States. The preparation and holding of the session should fully reflect the lofty responsibility of all States in the world, particularly those which are militarily most important.

The special session should be carefully prepared with due regard for the views of all the parties concerned. Both the organization of the session itself and the organization of work and composition of the preparatory committee should take into account the specific nature of disarmament problems. The structure of the preparatory committee should bear a proportional relationship to the role which States play in the field of disarmament." (A/AC.187/5, p.3)

**Union of Soviet Socialist Republics**

"In deciding questions relating to the preparation and holding of the special session, consideration must be given to the vital importance of disarmament questions for the fate of the world and to their specific nature and significance for maintaining the security of States. Both the preparatory work and the organization and holding of the session itself must fully reflect the lofty responsibility of all States of the world, especially the great Powers, which possess the most powerful weapons and armed forces. Decisions at the session should be taken in such a way as to exclude entirely the possibility of damaging the security interests of States." (A/32/60, p.3)
The United Kingdom believe that the greatest assistance which the special session could give towards the achievement of disarmament would be to further a climate in which mutual international confidence will be increased. For it is by increasing mutual confidence, rather than by proposing any fundamental change in the machinery of disarmament, that the special session can chart a practicable and realistic course forward.

(A/AC.187/35, p.2)

**UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

In this connexion, we believe the special session could make an important contribution by giving significant attention to means of strengthening international confidence, both through practical measures that could be implemented in the near term and through steps that could be taken over a longer term. Such measures might, for example, include recommendations for greater openness with respect to military expenditures and activities, for reciprocal acts of restraint in various fields, for minimizing the risks of conflict through accidents or misunderstanding, and for the development of guidelines for consultation and mediation in times of tension.

The United States will take a flexible approach to the structuring of the agenda of the special session. In general, we believe it should simply establish an organizational framework for the work of the session, without seeking to predetermine the scope of discussion - particularly at this early stage. The agenda should, of course, provide time for a general debate, giving an opportunity for all members to set forth their views and to air new ideas. At the same time, it would be desirable for the arrangements to provide ample opportunity for informal discussions and negotiations.

The session's attention should be focused primarily on the preparation of its final substantive document. As suggested earlier, we believe it should identify practical approaches for solving pressing problems through negotiations and through other national, regional, and international actions. It might also, more generally, attempt to restate the fundamental interests of the international community in seeking progress in disarmament, identify long-term goals, and set out any generally applicable guidelines that might be helpful in working to achieve these goals.

(A/AC.187/17, p.3)

**YUGOSLAVIA**

In the light of such a concept of the objectives and results to be achieved at the special session, Yugoslavia considers that it is indispensable to examine the current situation and, in particular, to indicate the most appropriate way leading the international community toward general and complete disarmament under international control. Yugoslavia believes that it is necessary to adopt generally acceptable principles on which disarmament negotiations and the whole activity of the United Nations and of all of its Member States should be based. The broadest possible consensus should be achieved with regard to the adoption of such measures as will render possible the effective organization of the United Nations and organs and bodies under its auspices and co-ordinate the negotiating machinery.

(A/AC.187/11, p.3)
# Principal Document or Documents of the Special Session

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VI. PRINCIPAL DOCUMENT OR DOCUMENTS OF THE SPECIAL SESSION

ARGENTINA

"The instrument containing the general principles on disarmament should be drawn up in such a way as to win the support of the greatest possible number of States. In this connexion, it is essential to take account of international political realities and, at the same time, of each country's idea of what constitutes its national security and its ideas with regard to the defence of its territorial integrity.

It is also essential that the special session of the General Assembly should endorse the following concepts:

(a) General and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control continues to be the ultimate objective of efforts in this field;

(b) The nuclear arms race jeopardizes the strengthening of international peace and security and is incompatible with the establishment of the new guidelines in economic matters which have been adopted by the United Nations and with the development objectives fixed by the peoples of the world;

(c) The full participation of all nuclear-weapon States in negotiations on nuclear disarmament is indispensable if those negotiations are to be successful and have lasting results;

(d) The existence and worsening of imbalances of military power between nations increases the possibility of all forms of interference in the internal affairs of States. In a world of great disparities between the weak and the powerful, defence of the principle of territorial integrity becomes particularly difficult;

(e) Research and development of new systems of weapons of mass destruction and their inclusion in existing arsenals complicates and inhibits efforts aimed at disarmament without increasing the security of the States involved;

(f) The interrelationship among the concepts of the economic and social consequences of the arms race between the most highly industrialized countries, its harmful effects on the world economy and ways of diverting resources to meet development needs must be studied in depth, and the results of such study widely disseminated;

(g) The principle of the sovereign equality of States must be fully implemented in matters involving the transfer of and trade in nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Attempts to discriminate in this field, although made on the pretext of defending most praiseworthy causes, result in the perpetuation of a scientific and technological oligopoly which is directly opposed to the interests of the developing countries;
(h) Universal respect for the validity and continuity of the rules and principles governing the structure of nuclear-weapon-free zones, of existing demilitarized zones and of those which may be established through decisions taken by the States directly involved must be clearly reaffirmed.

In the opinion of the Government of the Argentine Republic, the special session of the General Assembly should adopt a Programme of Action to implement all the general principles set forth above, indicating the specific measures which - in accordance with an order of priorities and on a step-by-step basis - should occupy the attention of the various negotiating bodies.

The Programme must necessarily include the following points:

(a) Gradual and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons, with a view to their complete elimination;

(b) Prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and elimination of existing stockpiles;

(c) Prohibition of research on and of the development and manufacture of new weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons;

(d) Prohibition of the use of incendiary weapons and other conventional weapons which cause unnecessary suffering or produce indiscriminate effects.

The implementation of the Programme of Action should be examined periodically by the General Assembly or such other body as may be decided upon, with a view to assessing its effectiveness and amending it whenever that is deemed necessary."

(A/AC.187/48, pp.2-3)
BRAZIL

Brazil believes that certain fundamental principles and guidelines should necessarily be observed in the process leading towards new negotiations for disarmament. They are essentially the following:

(1) Negotiating efforts in the field of nuclear disarmament should be given maximum priority by the international community. Since the primordial responsibility for the development, production and stockpiling of nuclear weapons is that of the nuclear weapon powers, it is their concommitant obligation to facilitate the achievement of adequate solutions for the problems of disarmament. The absence of positive steps on the part of these powers will render infeasible any significant progress in multilateral negotiations on disarmament.

(2) Disarmament measures should be correlated with the preservation and strengthening of international security in order to avoid the creation of military imbalances or similar situations which might, during the negotiation process, jeopardize international peace.

(3) The principle that responsibilities and obligations should be balanced must prevail in the field of disarmament; furthermore, obligations should not be discriminatory in nature.

(4) New international confidence-building measures or measures of non-disarmament should be accompanied by truly significant steps in the field of real disarmament.

(5) The verification system should be an integral element of agreements on disarmament and should be implemented by the adoption of adequate methods, both on the national and on the international level.

(6) All States, including those possessing nuclear weapons, should participate on an equal footing in international negotiations on disarmament.

(7) International efforts on chemical weapons should proceed at an accelerated pace (completing the cycle initiated with the Conventional on Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons), along with efforts to deal with weapons of mass destruction and arms that cause unnecessary suffering and those that are particularly inhumane.

(8) All countries must have free access to peaceful technologies both in the nuclear and other fields, given standardized non-discriminatory and universal safeguards. As an element to foster confidence among States in the field of international cooperation, the system of safeguards should be applied equally to all States and should be extended, whenever necessary, to cover new advances in technological research and development. None of these measures, however, should permit unwarranted interference in the sovereignty of States, nor threaten scientific, technological or economic development for essentially peaceful purposes.

(9) Firm commitments should be made to apply significant portions of the savings derived from disarmament measures to the promotion of economic development in less developed areas. These commitments will facilitate the establishment of a New International Economic Order.
(10) The security of the non-nuclear-weapon States should rest on concrete commitments on the part of the nuclear weapon States, such as the following:

- Commitment to respect demilitarized zones and zones of peace established by agreements concluded among States of a region in the exercise of their independence and sovereignty;

- Positive guarantees on the part of nuclear weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States belonging to demilitarized zones;

- An agreed program of measures for general and complete disarmament, elaborated on non-discriminatory bases, and with special regard to the interests of developing countries.

The Special Session, in the view of the Brazilian governments, should devote a significant part of its work to the adoption of a political declaration, reflecting, inter alia, the principles and guidelines mentioned above, indispensable for the projected multilateral negotiations to have the necessary objectivity in examining disarmament problems.

The Brazilian Government also believes that the Special Session should elaborate a programme of action based on adequate criteria, a programme that will take as its fundamental objective general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The programme of action could, from the outset, provide a general orientation that would give renewed impetus for negotiations in the appropriate fora.

In terms of priorities, the Brazilian government believes as stated that measures on nuclear disarmament are the most urgent. Of special importance is the need for an effort to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear weapons test ban parallel to the adoption of measures for the destruction of the stockpiles of such weapons, for ending the process of research and development of new types of nuclear weapons and for freezing the production of fissionable material for military purposes.

Secondary priority could then be given to the following measures:

(a) Prohibition of the development and production of chemical weapons, parallel to the destruction of existing stockpiles;

(b) prohibition of the development and production of new weapons of mass destruction and weapons that cause unnecessary suffering, and the destruction of the stockpiles of such weapons;

(c) gradual and proportional reduction of stockpiles of conventional weapons, as long as major powers recognize their own supremacy in this field, and, consequently, their primordial responsibility for any effort to be made in this direction.

The adoption of these measures should contribute, on the other hand, to the strengthening of international peace and security and to the establishment of a New International Economic Order. In this context, the Special Session of the General Assembly should also consider the adoption of measures for the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, and the application in less developed areas of savings generated by the process of disarmament.
Canada is of the view that the deliberations of the special session should lead to the adoption of a basic final act or political declaration. Indeed, the success of the special session will depend on whether and the extent to which Member States can reach agreement on the contents of such a final document as its principal instrument. A basic document falling short of common consent or lacking the support of those Member States which are most significant in terms of arms control and disarmament would detract from the significance and the value of the special session and undermine the international co-operative approach to arms control and disarmament questions that the session should be concerned to foster. Accordingly, Canada believes that, from the outset, all Member States should commit themselves to the goal that the political declaration or final act of the special session should reflect the broadest possible agreement.

Aside from the crucial necessity of approaching the final document of the special session on a co-operative basis from the outset and through to its achievement, Canada has an open mind regarding other forms of agreement that the special session may decide upon with regard to other aspects of its work. If the special session can also reach full agreement on, for example, general principles relevant to arms control and disarmament, a programme of specific measures, mechanisms for negotiations or priorities, these should be included formally in an appropriate way in the final document of the special session. Any such supplementary proposals that cannot be endorsed on the same basis as the final document, however, should, in the Canadian view, have a different status from that document.

Purely as an illustration and in order to facilitate earliest consideration of the possible elements of a final document, Canada is including with this reply a very tentative thematic outline of some of the major topics that a final document of the special session might seek to address, together with some provisional notes on possible treatment. This outline is not intended to be complete. Rather, it represents an attempt to begin the process of thinking about the possible content of a final document that could meet with general acceptance. Canada will welcome consideration of all other suggestions for inclusion in a final act of the special session submitted in the spirit of a determined search for general agreement.

Possible final document - thematic outline

I. Introduction

The document might contain several preambular paragraphs that would:

- recognize that all nations must be concerned with international security and with the essential part to be played in its enhancement by arms control and disarmament measures in the fields of both nuclear and conventional weapons;
recognize that enormous expenditures on a world-wide scale for arms and military forces absorb material and human resources from the peaceful economic and social development of all countries;

emphasize that the United Nations is and should remain the principal forum enabling all States to review and discuss proposals in the area of arms control and disarmament, to express their concerns regarding threats to international security arising from the development and deployment of armaments, and to inform and develop world public opinion on these issues.

II. Nuclear arms control and disarmament

Under this heading the document might:

- recognize that the danger of nuclear warfare remains a grave threat to the survival of mankind requiring thorough-going, balanced and effective measures to curb and reverse the nuclear arms race;

- note the importance of the linkage between efforts to deal with nuclear weapons proliferation in the vertical dimension and in the horizontal dimension and affirm the need for balanced progress in both areas in order to enhance international security on an equitable basis.

A. Nuclear weapons

- emphasize the fundamental importance of the strategic arms negotiations between the two major nuclear weapon Powers;

- express the conviction that the successful conclusion of agreements on nuclear arms control between the two major nuclear Powers should be followed up by efforts for the control and eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons;

- assess the progress in these negotiations to date;

- urge the two major nuclear weapon Powers to intensify their efforts to reach further agreements to curtail the strategic nuclear arms confrontation in both its quantitative and its qualitative dimensions.

B. Nuclear testing

- reaffirm the conviction that the cessation of nuclear testing would be a useful step toward controlling the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities;

- recall the stated aim of the Original Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time;
- assess the progress to date in achieving a cessation of nuclear testing;
- urge the achievement of an effective underground test ban between the two major nuclear Powers immediately;
- emphasize the need for such a bilateral ban to be given a broader base through the achievement of a Comprehensive Test Ban and call for intensified efforts in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to achieve such an agreement.

C. The peaceful uses of nuclear energy

- recognize that effective international safeguards and controls are essential in order to ensure that the peaceful application of nuclear energy will not lead to further proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
- stress the importance of strengthening international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy through the collaboration of States receiving and supplying nuclear technology, facilities, equipment and fuel;
- assess the achievements to date in the International Atomic Energy Agency and among supplier States in strengthening the regime to ensure that international co-operation in the uses of nuclear energy is employed only for peaceful purposes;
- call for creation of new mechanisms for consultation and co-operation among both supplier and receiver States to seek agreement on collective measures to avoid the dangers for international security inherent in the development of an international plutonium economy.

D. Nuclear-weapon-free zones

- express the conviction that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones can contribute to the security of members of such zones and to the prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons;
- assess the progress to date in achieving such zones;
- urge non-nuclear weapon States to initiate regional discussions with a view to the establishment of such zones where appropriate;
- urge all nuclear weapon States to extend their co-operation in the creation of such zones and to enter into binding undertakings never to employ nuclear weapons or the threat of use of such weapons against States that have entered into a binding agreement establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone encompassing their territory.
III. Other weapons of mass destruction

Under this heading the document might:

- recognize that weapons of mass destruction other than nuclear weapons - such as chemical and biological weapons and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect - are of special concern, secondary to nuclear weapons because of their indiscriminate, widespread and inhumane effects;

- call on all nations to adhere to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and on their Destruction and to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare;

- reaffirm the objective of reaching early agreement on the effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their elimination from arsenals of all States and assess the progress to date;

- call for intensified efforts in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to achieve agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and for their destruction.

IV. Conventional arms control and disarmament

Under this heading the document might:

- assess the efforts of member nations collectively to limit the conventional arms race and the transfer of conventional arms.

A. Confidence-building measures

- call for the establishment, under the auspices of the United Nations Secretary-General, of an international register of conventional arms transfers and urge all Member States to submit information concerning such transfers;

- call for more openness among Member States on expenditures for military purposes, recommend compilation and publication, under the auspices of the Secretary-General, of military expenditures by Member States and urge all Member States to supply information on their national military expenditures to the Secretary-General on an annual basis.
B. Regional approaches

- call for conferences between both recipients and suppliers to restrain arms transfers on a regional basis;
- call for regional arms control conferences to address local conventional arms races and to secure agreed measures of restraint.

V. Resources for peace

Under this heading the document might:

- recall General Assembly resolution No. 2626E(XXIV) of 16 December 1969 in which it declared the decade of the 1970s the Disarmament Decade and envisaged a link between the Disarmament Decade and the Second United Nations Development Decade;
- urge Member States to intensify their efforts to ensure the world resources freed by disarmament are devoted increasingly to the satisfaction of the economic and social needs of humanity, particularly in the developing countries.

VI. Further special session on disarmament

The document might:

- recommend that a further special session on disarmament be held in ... to assess the progress in negotiating effective arms control and disarmament measures." (A/AC.187/26, pp. 3-7)

FINLAND

"As has been the case at previous special sessions, the special session on disarmament would probably wish to adopt a number of final documents incorporating the results of the session. In the view of the Finnish Government, these final documents should contain, on one hand, a politically authoritative declaration on the goals of disarmament and, on the other hand, practical guidelines setting out the tasks of disarmament negotiations for the coming years." (A/AC.187/21, p.3)

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

"To achieve good results naturally presupposes strict respect for the principle of undiminished security for all parties involved. The results of the special session might be laid down in a joint declaration of intent, which would be helpful in co-ordinating activities in the field of disarmament." (CA/32/62, p.2)
The special session should pursue to adopt a declaration of principles setting the foundation on which negotiations, bilateral or multilateral, leading to a general and complete disarmament, could be conducted. This declaration should include, inter alia, the following:

(a) Respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and implementation of the resolutions adopted by its principal organs;

(b) Disarmament and arms control in a system of security is an integral part of a new international order based on national independence and international co-operation;

(c) Urgent priority must be given to nuclear as well as conventional disarmament. The transfer of conventional armaments should be examined in the light both of its effects on international security as well as of its repercussions on the economy of various countries;

(d) Portion of the savings derived from the reduction of military expenditures should be devoted to promoting the economic and social development, particularly in the developing countries.

The special session of the General Assembly must draw up a programme of action indicating measures to be taken to the effect of a general and complete disarmament. Some of the measures to be included therein may be the following:

(a) Measures for the implementation of the United Nations Charter and the respect of the resolutions of the United Nations principal organs and obligations derived from international conventions;

(b) Measures to halt nuclear and conventional arms race. The problem of halting the nuclear tests should be examined by all concerned in a new spirit;

(c) Measures regarding general disarmament under effective international control;

(d) Measures regarding regional disarmament;

(e) Measures prohibiting the use of weapons of mass destruction, of napalm and other incendiary weapons, chemical and biochemical weapons, etc."

(A/AC.187/45, p.3)

HUNGARY

See IV.

INDONESIA

"Towards this end, the special session should engage in an authoritative appraisal of the current status of disarmament negotiations in order to adopt a flexible and appropriate approach in determining priorities and in selecting the main issues for consideration. In addition, Indonesia firmly believes that the special session should concentrate its efforts in formulating action-oriented measures relevant to substantive issues." (A/AC.187/27, p.2)
If a programme of disarmament "is to remain at the centre of the disarmament negotiating process in the future, it must be based on realistic assessment of both the possibilities and limitations of that process.

It will also be necessary to distinguish between measures appropriate for realization at the broad multilateral level and those which lend themselves to implementation at the regional or bilateral level.

Within the programme, the Irish Government would hope that high priority will be assigned to the following issues:

(1) Nuclear armaments: the continuing problems of proliferation, the need for a comprehensive test ban treaty and, as an interim measure, an agreed moratorium by the two major nuclear Powers on all nuclear weapons tests: the need for early progress towards the reduction of nuclear weapons systems and progress on agreed systems of control and verification.

(2) Other weapons of mass destruction: in particular the question of a chemical weapons treaty already under discussion in the CCD.

(3) Conventional weapons: regulation of trade in conventional armaments: control of such armaments at the regional level.

In conjunction with the elaboration of a programme of disarmament measures, the session should also seek to formulate the broad principles which will guide future efforts towards disarmament. In this respect, it will be desirable and useful to draw on the experience gained from past negotiations and on the relevant international documents, understandings and agreements." (A/AC.187/37, pp. 2-3)
ITALY

"... The possibility for the Special Session to issue a general policy statement might be taken into consideration." (A/AC.187/32, p.4)

JAPAN

It is desirable that the special session adopt a political declaration summarizing the fundamental considerations set forth above, thereby giving new impetus to future efforts leading to the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament. Such a political declaration should have the support of all nuclear-weapon States in order to obtain its full implementation.

A/AC.187/14, p.3)

See also I, II and IV.

LUXEMBOURG

"A final declaration is acceptable provided that all Member States, including the nuclear-weapon States, adopt it." (A/AC.187/39)

MEXICO

"The Declaration to be approved by the General Assembly at its special session should contain an assessment of the role played by the United Nations in disarmament and a balance-sheet of the results achieved. In that connexion, emphasis should be placed on the purposes and objectives fixed by the General Assembly in connexion with the Disarmament Decade.

The Declaration should enunciate the principles which are to govern disarmament negotiations, taking as a point of departure the September 1961 Joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations, and taking account of the obligations undertaken in various treaties on disarmament and the relevant resolutions of the United Nations, as well as any new factors that may arise from the deliberations of the special session. It should be reaffirmed that the highest priority must be given to disarmament measures relating to nuclear weapons and that a high priority should be given to the question of eliminating chemical weapons.

In the Programme of Action to be adopted, it would be desirable to specify the measures aimed at halting the arms race, which could be included in a comprehensive disarmament programme.

The Programme of Action might include a series of practical recommendations aimed at strengthening the role of the United Nations in the disarmament field, through measures which will go beyond the very timid ones submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session by the Ad Hoc Committee which dealt with the matter.

As a result of the examination of the structure and procedures of disarmament organizations as a whole, the General Assembly might make a statement concerning the future role of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. It might also make specific recommendations aimed at improving the organization and procedures of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament."
Because of the increased number of disarmament items on the General Assembly's agenda and the growing complexity of those items, it is advisable that:

(1) States Members of the Organisation should consider the possibility of increasing their personnel, both at their permanent missions and in their respective ministries, for the careful examination required by those items;

(2) The States members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament that have not yet established at Geneva permanent delegations to the Committee adequately staffed with suitable personnel should consider the desirability of doing so as soon as possible;

(3) Attention should be given to the possibility of assigning to the First Committee solely and exclusively those agenda items which relate to international security and disarmament, in order that they might be given more attention and more complete treatment.  

MONGOLIA

"The Mongolian People's Republic takes the view that the special session could adopt as its final document a political declaration which could set out the basic principles and priority tasks connected with halting the arms race and bringing about disarmament as well as recommendations concerning ways and means of accomplishing them."  

(A/AC.187/16, p.2)

NORWAY

Having thus drawn up status in regard to the international work for arms control and disarmament, the special session should aim at preparing a General Declaration of Principles. Considering the limited time available at the session, the work on this declaration should be initiated as soon as possible.

Norway is of the opinion that such a Declaration of Principles should view the issues of arms control and disarmament in a broad political context. It would be particularly important to regard these questions from a resource and development perspective. In this connexion it should be recalled that the General Assembly on previous occasions has stressed that a continuing arms race is incompatible with the efforts to establish a new international economic order.

At this point we think it is appropriate once again to refer to the opening statement of the Secretary-General in the Preparatory Committee on 28 March this year, where these problems were dealt with in a particularly illustrating manner...

In this connexion, international measures for the reduction of the use of resources for military purposes with a view to the releasing of such resources, for development purposes, should be considered.
5. Regarding specific arms control and disarmament questions, the special session should prepare a realistic programme of action. Efforts should be made toward achieving measures that individually or in concert would establish effective arms limitation measures and prevent the weapons development from being channelled along other lines. Generally, one should aim at the drawing up of a comprehensive and, as far as possible, integrated Programme of Action on the basis of guiding principles of disarmament, and with consideration to agreements achieved as well as to current negotiations.

Norway finds the following items to be of particular importance:
- preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons;
- conclusion of a comprehensive Test Ban Treaty;
- limitation of nuclear and conventional weapons;
- restrictions on conventional arms transfers;
- ban on chemical weapons and on the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction;
- restrictions on the development of weapons technology. (A/AC.187/22, pp.2-3)

PERU

"The special session should produce substantive documents that will constitute effective guidelines for disarmament. A Declaration of Principles, a Programme of Action and guidelines for the strengthening of disarmament mechanisms having the United Nations as their focal point are essential.

Obviously, Member States must agree on a set of basic principles to guide actions in the field of disarmament. The special session should specifically consider such matters as the need to pursue general and complete disarmament, and particularly nuclear disarmament, under effective international control as a means of ensuring world peace and security; the establishment of a new international order based on respect for the principles of international law and the active continuation of disarmament measures; priority for nuclear disarmament measures; reaffirmation of the responsibilities of the United Nations in this field; full participation of all States; access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes; balanced disarmament; the importance of verification methods; the active and increasing participation of public opinion throughout the entire process; and the final objective of eliminating conventional weapons within an international framework that would guarantee peace, security and complete disarmament.

The Programme of Action should establish priorities for the various questions involved, with emphasis on the urgency of dealing with nuclear disarmament. First priority should be given to the cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests, respect for nuclear-weapon-free zones and peace zones and other appropriate measures. The Programme of Action should, of course, cover other types of weapons and, finally, the possibility of reducing military forces. These matters must be given due consideration by the special session, which should in fact indicate the concrete steps or specific questions to be included in the Programme, so that it could constitute a substantive document for dealing, within reasonable time-limit, with the various aspects of the issue in appropriate forums or negotiations." (A/AC.187/42, pp.2-3)
The Government of Poland believes that the special session should result in adopting a Political Declaration, comprising in the first place basic guidelines for disarmament agreements and disarmament.

(a) The guidelines for agreements in the field of disarmament should comply with the basic security requirements of all States and reflect the scope of responsibilities in the field of disarmament. They should inter alia cover: undiminished security of every State; inadmissibility of unilateral military advantages; universality of disarmament; effective limitation and reduction of military potentials; strict adherence to and full implementation of accepted obligations; refraining from actions detrimental to disarmament efforts; taking global and regional measures to promote further strengthening of détente and growth of international confidence, and facilitating attainment of general and complete disarmament.

(b) In Poland's view, the programme of measures of action should cover as comprehensively as possible the most essential and urgent problems which at the same time are ripe enough for solution or constructive discussion under the prevailing political circumstances. In the field of nuclear disarmament, the ultimate objective ought to be prohibition of production, reduction and subsequent elimination of nuclear weapons. Such an objective should be attained by means of renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons; their limitation and reduction; universal and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapons tests; establishment of zones of peace and nuclear-free zones; effective measures for consolidation of the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and promotion of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parallelly, intensified efforts should follow towards a complete prohibition of chemical means of warfare and new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction.
An important step towards the limitation and reduction of armed forces and armaments would be reaching an agreement as to an obligation not to increase armaments nor military budgets.

The agreed measures should also apply to limitation and reduction of conventional armed forces and armaments, a problem which could be reviewed for both its world-wide and regional applicability. (A/AC.187/12, p.4)

ROMANIA

See III.

SPAIN

See IV.

SWEDEN

"In the opinion of the Swedish Government, the special session should adopt a Declaration of Principles, a Programme of Action and take necessary organizational measures in order to ensure, i.a., an effective follow-up of the session.

Declaration of Principles

Work should be initiated as soon as possible on the text of a Declaration of Principles, which would provide a new basis for the endeavours of the international community in the field of disarmament. A set of guiding principles should be agreed upon, aimed at strengthening the political momentum of efforts towards disarmament. As a starting point, a careful examination should be made of certain existing documents, e.g. the Joint Statement by the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations dated 20 September 1961 (document A/4879) and the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, referred to in General Assembly resolution 2661 C (XXV). An attempt should be made to give disarmament its proper place in a wide global perspective. In this connexion, the Preparatory Committee should draw on experiences from the United Nations Conference convened in the first six years of this decade as well as the sixth and seventh special sessions of the General Assembly.

Programme of Action

In the following, elements are suggested which could be included in the Programme of Action. It is important for the success of the special session to ensure a reasonable balance between the different components of the Programme.

1. In the opinion of the Swedish Government, nuclear disarmament should remain the most important objective of United Nations efforts in the field of disarmament.

A Comprehensive Nuclear Weapon Test Ban (CTB) would constitute an important first step towards nuclear disarmament by restricting the further technological development of nuclear weapons and weapons systems. This matter has been on the agenda of the CCD as an item of the highest priority for many years. Prospects for a CTB seem to have improved recently as a result of encouraging statements made by leading representatives of both the United States and the Soviet Union. Sweden has put forward in the CCD a draft CTB treaty with the aim of facilitating the start of negotiations. The goal of such negotiations should be to arrive at a draft treaty in time for the special session.
There is a strong need for intensified measures to halt the nuclear arms race and bring about a substantial reduction of nuclear weapons and weapons systems. It is high time that the solemn obligations undertaken by the major nuclear-weapon States, e.g. in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) of 1968, to strive for nuclear disarmament be fulfilled.

The special session should formulate forceful recommendations to this end.

2. The problem of ensuring the security of non-nuclear weapon States is closely connected with the matters discussed above. Attempts to solve this problem, e.g. through Security Council resolution 255 of 1968, have so far been inadequate. The nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT should undertake to refrain from the use of or the threat of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT. The same commitment on the part of the nuclear-weapon States should be undertaken with respect to nuclear-weapon-free zones.

The special session should promote the non-proliferation efforts by adopting recommendations concerning:

- nuclear disarmament
- the need for strict international supervision and control of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, covering the entire fuel cycle
- the need to strengthen the resources of the IAEA in the fields of physical protection of nuclear materials in use, storage and transit
- support for other activities of the IAEA relevant to the problem of nuclear weapons proliferation.

4. The CCD has devoted many years' work to reach an agreement on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. These efforts should be speeded up with the aim of registering substantial progress towards an agreement at the time of the special session.

5. The conventional arms build-up in many parts of the world is a cause of considerable concern to the international community. The rapid advancement of military technology and extensive international arms transfers, involving ever more sophisticated weapons, has greatly increased the pace of this development.

Among factors to be taken into account in this connexion international and regional security as well as progress towards nuclear disarmament should be mentioned. Also, efforts to reduce the level of conventional armaments would facilitate the realization of the New International Economic Order.

In the past, the United Nations has undertaken several valuable studies in an attempt to formulate constructive approaches for linking disarmament efforts with economic and social progress. These studies have demonstrated the complex nature of this problem. There is a need for more extensive clarification, in as concrete terms as possible, of important aspects, such as the economic consequences of the arms race. These matters are increasingly coming into the focus of interest.

7. An increased confidence between States is a prerequisite for disarmament. One step to build up such a confidence would be for States to give more information on their military expenditures. The Swedish Government hopes that the special session will advance the "ongoing work of the United Nations in the field of military budgets." (A/AC.187/19, pp.4-6)
103.

TURKEY

See II.

UKRAINIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

"The Ukrainian SSR believes that the Special Session could culminate in the adoption of a final political declaration." (A/AC.187/5, p.2)

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

See IV.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

"The precise format and label of the session's final product is, in our view, less important than the quality, practicality, and significance of the ideas developed and reflected in it." (A/AC.187/17, p.4)

YUGOSLAVIA

"Yugoslavia considers that the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly should elaborate appropriate proposals in the light of such an agenda. Yugoslavia considers that - in the political declaration (or declaration on disarmament) - particular stress should be laid on the principles on which future negotiations should be based, and emphasizes the following:

(a) Highest priority to be given to the urgent need for considering and proposing measures for the prohibition of the manufacture, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction as well as new weapons and techniques of warfare.

(b) Principle of parallel negotiations on general and complete disarmament and on individual aspects of this problem.

(c) Principle of balanced reduction of forces on a lower level.

(d) Principle of control implying international, regional and national control, applied individually or in combination.

(e) Principle ensuring equal security for all countries.

(f) Universality as a prerequisite for the successful solution of this problem and implementation of adopted decisions.

(g) Principle that the United Nations should be kept informed of the course of negotiations, their substance and results.

A broader formulation and more precise defining of these principles, as well as adoption of others, should be the object of activity of the Preparatory Committee and agreement of all participants in the special session.

With regard to the programme of measures, Yugoslavia believes that it should be based on the present activity of the United Nations, the CCD and results of regional and bilateral negotiations, so as to ensure the solving of individual aspects of disarmament. Among the measures that could be adopted at the special session, we propose the following:
a) Measures conducive to the cessation of the arms race, primarily nuclear.

(b) Measures for reducing other arms which, by their effects, approach the weapons of mass destruction.

(c) Measures for prohibiting other weapons of mass destruction (chemical and in combination with others).

(d) Measures prohibiting the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons as well as weapons which are excessively injurious and have indiscriminate effects.

(e) Measures for the reduction of troops and, in connexion with this, reduction of expenditures for armament as well as establishment, from savings effected in this way, of funds for assistance to developing countries and for struggle against hunger and the effects of major natural catastrophes.

(f) Measures accelerating the adoption of decisions and agreements on withdrawal of foreign troops and bases from foreign territories.

(g) Measures restricting as well as prohibiting transfers of weapons, particularly in areas of crisis and armed conflicts.

Furthermore, Yugoslavia believes that agreement should be also reached with regard to other collective measures, especially those promoting the consolidation of international security, relaxation of tensions and building of confidence among peoples, such as:

(a) Measures contributing to the strict application of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations in international relations, to respect for the decisions of the United Nations and fulfilment of international treaty obligations.

(b) Measures adopted in Helsinki within the context of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, which could be extended so as to enlobe other regions of the world as well (notification of manoeuvres, of major troop movements, refraining from demonstrations of military force).

(c) Measures for overcoming bloc contradictions and for lessening bloc confrontations.

(d) Measures for avoiding military and other incidents, particularly those liable to lead to conflicts of wider proportions.  (A/AC.187/11, pp.4-5)
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VII. ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE FIELD OF DISARMAMENT

ARGENTINA

See IV and VI.

AUSTRIA

"The Austrian Government welcomes the adoption by the thirty-first General Assembly of the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Review of the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament.

However, these proposals, endorsed by General Assembly resolution 31/190, can only be regarded as the necessary first step towards more effective measures to enhance the central role of the United Nations in this field.

The special session should therefore adopt appropriate decisions to

- further improve the organization of work of the First Committee of the General Assembly and
- enable the Secretariat to carry out pertinent studies and provide factual information on disarmament matters.

Careful consideration should also be given to the special role played by the CCD and to its relation with the United Nations which might call for a corresponding reorganization of certain aspects of its present structure. Various possibilities should be studied which would allow non-members of the CCD to follow more closely the work of this organ and to take part in its deliberations.

Thus the possibility of opening the meetings of the CCD to interested States which are not members of this body and which could be invited as observers, might be discussed.

At the same time it might be worth while to discuss the chances for a reviving of the United Nations Disarmament Commission which has not met in recent years and which could for instance assume a very important coordinating function.

The special session will also have to decide on adequate follow-up mechanisms so that its impact in the future handling of disarmament matters can be constantly evaluated. The convening of a further special session at an appropriate time with the main purpose of examining the progress achieved in the meantime might be given serious consideration.

In this context, the role of a world disarmament conference as well as the conditions necessary for convening it, could be raised.

Finally, the programme and organization of work of the United Nations Centre on Disarmament should also be discussed." (A/AC.187/41, pp.4-5)
BELGIUM

"On the subject of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, it is Belgium's view that the existing international machinery for negotiating treaties must be preserved.

The CCD has repeatedly proved that it can successfully carry out the negotiation process.

The Belgian authorities believe, however, that its structures are no longer suited to present circumstances. The co-chairmanship system should be changed. Again, parity of representation among States allied to the two Co-Chairmen should have no place in an organ which operates on the basis of consensus.

Every effort should be made to induce France and China to reconsider their attitude to participation in international negotiation machinery.

Role of the United Nations in disarmament. Belgium, which during 1976 actively participated in 'the Ad Hoc Committee on the Review of the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament, still favours practical measures to strengthen that role, provided that such measures:

fall within the competence of organs of the United Nations, as laid down in the Charter,

do not have the effect of entrusting to the United Nations in the negotiations powers exceeding those desired (or asked for) by the States participating in the talks." (A/AC.187/10, p.4)

BRAZIL

"Finally, the Government of Brazil believes that the United Nations, according to the Charter, has a preponderant role in negotiations. In order to be viable, efforts to strengthen the role of the Organization in this field should take into account the fact that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, organically linked to the General Assembly, remains the principal body for negotiations on disarmament. The work of the CCD should, however, obey the priorities decided upon by the Special Session. Eventual measures for the procedural reform of that body should be basically geared to the objectives recommended by the General Assembly.

With regard to the specific role of the United Nations Secretariat, it would be important to make full use of its administrative organs in order to satisfactorily fulfill the actual needs emanating from the Special Session. An excessive proliferation of bodies and bureaucratic structures within the Secretariat, with the resulting dispersion of efforts and of human and financial resources, would, however, be undesirable." (A/AC.187/49)
"Canada continues to regard the United Nations as the principal forum in which to focus world attention on the need to limit and reduce the levels of military forces, armaments and expenditures and for an exchange of views among Member States on arms control and disarmament issues. Canada also recognizes the important catalytic role that the United Nations can play in encouraging, and preparing the ground for, the pursuit of arms control and disarmament in fora appropriate for negotiating specific agreements."

"In order to make the fullest possible use of its potential, the special session should not be a mere stepping-stone to some other plenary forum but a plenary consultation on arms control and disarmament in its own right. On the other hand, Canada considers that if efforts to agree on a final document of the special session in 1978 meet with success, it would probably be desirable for a further special session on disarmament to be convened, after an appropriate interval, to assess progress in implementing this new co-operative approach to arms control and disarmament questions that Canada hopes will be enshrined in the final document of the special session next year." (A/AC.187/26, pp. 2-3)

"In our view, effective progress in disarmament will continue to be hampered so long as there is no means for the security of nations other than dependence on armaments. The functions of the United Nations and more particularly of the Security Council under the Charter, for the maintenance of international security and peace, will have to be basically examined in its effects upon the disarmament problem." (A/AC.187/18, p.1)

"The Danish Government hopes that the special session may help to strengthen the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. The holding of the session could undoubtedly itself be seen as an expression of the firm wish of the world community to bring this about. If the session could help to generate among the peoples and Governments of the world a growing interest in the cause of disarmament, and if it resulted in a stronger political will to intensify the efforts of the United Nations in the fields of disarmament and arms control, it would have attained one of its principal goals." (A/AC.187/20, p.2)

"In the view of the Finnish Government, it is natural and desirable that the United Nations, keeping general and complete disarmament as the ultimate aim, will meet these challenges. Progress in disarmament requires purposeful, consistent and continuous efforts." (A/AC.187/21, p.2)
The realization of such a role can be facilitated by the participation of the United Nations in all negotiations held outside the auspices of the Organization and by the establishment of an organic relationship between the United Nations and the CCD with appropriate structural and organizational changes which will strengthen that forum for multilateral disarmament negotiations.

"In order to restore the central role of the United Nations in disarmament issues, the establishment of a machinery to implement the agreed measures of the special session would be of great importance, as Indonesia considers the United Nations to be the principal international forum for a meaningful discussion of disarmament questions." (A/AC.187/27, p.3)

See also II.

IRAN

See II.

IRELAND

"The decision to convene the special session serves in itself to emphasize the important role which the United Nations has in the disarmament process and in turn the decisions of the session should enhance that role. In this connexion, resolution 31/90 (XXI) of the General Assembly and the conclusions of the Ad Hoc Committee which met in 1976, offer a useful basis for further follow-up discussion of the United Nations role at the session. The regular sessions of the General Assembly will, of course, allow for a continuing review of progress made in implementing the decisions of the special session." (A/AC.187/37, p.3)
ISRAEL

"The role of the United Nations is essentially one of creating an atmosphere in which disarmament negotiations can be advanced, it being understood and accepted that concrete measures cannot be taken except by agreements resulting from detailed negotiations between Governments;" ... (A/AC.187/38, p.2)

See also IV.

ITALY

"The Italian Government, however, does not feel that the General Assembly can act as a substitute for the existing specialized negotiating fora, because its present structure, even if reinforced, does not seem suited to such a purpose. An exception may perhaps be the case of ad hoc special sessions devoted to very broad issues, but such sessions are certainly not easy to convene and to organize. The United Nations, however, has the knowledge and expertise needed to play a primary role in the creation of a general framework for debates, in the elaboration of broad political options, and in promoting a favourable climate for negotiations. Such a role would constitute a major political factor in the negotiations which would follow in the appropriate fora." (A/AC.187/32, p.4)

LUXEMBOURG

"With regard to the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, Luxembourg is in favour of measures contributing to the strengthening of that role in so far as such measures are within the areas of competence of the organs of the United Nations as defined by the Charter."

(A/AC.187/39)

NETHERLANDS

"The special session should furthermore try to bring about a gradual strengthening of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. In this connexion, the Netherlands supports setting up an international disarmament organization to promote the practical implementation of disarmament treaties." (A/AC.187/25, p.5)
NORWAY

It would seem appropriate that the agenda of the special session include the question of strengthening the work of the United Nations in the field of disarmament.

Once again, Norway considers it necessary to emphasize that the work for general and complete disarmament under effective international control constitutes one of the paramount objectives of the United Nations, and that the world organization, both in view of its universality as well as the open debates taking place in this forum, may play a decisive role with regard to influencing public opinion.

In pursuance of this item of the agenda, it would seem natural, as a first step, to base the further procedure on the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Review of the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament, adopted by the thirty-first General Assembly. Norway considers the following measures to be of particular importance:

- improving the methods of work of the First Committee of the General Assembly in disarmament matters;
- improving existing United Nations facilities for collection, compilation and dissemination of information on disarmament issues;
- increased use of in-depth studies of the arms race, disarmament and related matters;
- strengthening of the resources of the United Nations Secretariat."

(A/AC.187/22, p.3)

PERU

"The special session should conduct a thorough review of United Nations disarmament machinery. It should be borne in mind that the General Assembly, at its last session, endorsed the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Review of the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament. This in itself was an important step although, of course, substantial aspects of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament must still be clarified and reaffirmed. Specifically, it is worth pointing out that the negotiating body of the United Nations, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has produced some important, although partial, results with regard to disarmament and that its organization and procedures should be reviewed in light of the principle of the legal equality of States and the need for all the nuclear Powers to join in the Conference, since no positive results can be expected unless they actively participate in the process." (A/AC.187/42, p.3)

See also VI.
The special session should, finally, consider which further measures could be undertaken to strengthen the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. In this connexion, emphasis should be put on the following matters:

- further organizational improvements in the work of the First Committee of the General Assembly
- possibilities of increased activities of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament with regard to studies and information in the field of disarmament
- the possibilities of Member States to follow and influence the work of the CCD
- decision to convene a second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament after a period of three to five years.

\(\text{(A/AC.187/19, p.6)}\)

SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC

See II.

TURKEY

See IV.

VENEZUELA

"As the matters to be considered at the special session concern the very survival of mankind and as there is widespread ignorance of the dangers of the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, one of the objectives of the Assembly should be to adopt measures that will enable world public opinion to play a more effective role in disarmament efforts. This can be achieved by means of a vast public information campaign designed to create international awareness of the grave risks and economic and social consequences of the arms build-up. In that connexion the following might be envisaged; the United Nations public information services might give priority to the distribution of material on the destructive potential of nuclear weapons and on the disarmament negotiations; in this connexion, the United Nations Information Centres might intensify the dissemination of such material; more systematic co-ordination between the newly-created United Nations Centre for Disarmament and the non-governmental organizations concerned with the subject so as to increase the volume and distribution of such material.

The special session should be widely publicized and the non-governmental organizations devoted to disarmament should participate in the session in an appropriate manner."

\(\text{(A/AC.187/8, p.2)}\)
YUGOSLAVIA

"The negotiating machinery should be based on the role of the United Nations, as determined by the Charter. Yugoslavia considers that the United Nations is an irreplaceable forum which should take over the whole organization of negotiations and activities in line with the adopted programme. In this connexion, Yugoslavia proposes that the First Committee of the General Assembly should deal exclusively with questions of disarmament and international security. It is necessary to review the activity of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, its closer link with the United Nations as well as re-examine the question of expanding its membership and possibly improving its organization and methods of work.

Yugoslavia also feels that it is necessary to determine and propose a more direct and closer link between bilateral and regional negotiations and the United Nations ensuring, in particular, that the international community should be kept informed of the substance and course of negotiations. Yugoslavia also believes that the existing United Nations Centre for Disarmament can and should play an important role, primarily with regard to research concerning some problems, especially those impeding negotiations and the adoption of definite measures."

(A/AC.187/11, p.6)
PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

Views of Member States on the agenda and all other relevant questions relating to the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

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After Argentina, insert

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Under "General remarks", page 14

After Kuwait, insert

MEXICO

"The special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament represents an excellent opportunity for the international community to concentrate its efforts on a subject of vital interest to all peoples. It will serve as a stimulus to States Members of the United Nations to redouble their efforts in that field. It will also serve to intensify the interest of world public opinion." (A/AC.187/34, p. 6)

Under "Role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament", page 109

After Luxembourg, insert

MEXICO

"The Programme of Action might include a series of practical recommendations aimed at strengthening the role of the United Nations in the disarmament field through measures which will go beyond the very timid ones submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session by the Ad Hoc Committee which dealt with the matter.

As a result of the examination of the structure and procedures of disarmament organizations as a whole, the General Assembly might make a statement concerning the future role of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. It might also make..."
specific recommendations aimed at improving the organization and procedures of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

Because of the increased number of disarmament items on the General Assembly's agenda and the growing complexity of those items, it is advisable that:

(1) States Members of the Organization should consider the possibility of increasing their personnel, both at their permanent missions and in their respective ministries, for the careful examination required by those items;

(2) The States members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament that have not yet established at Geneva permanent delegations to the Committee adequately staffed with suitable personnel should consider the desirability of doing so as soon as possible;

(3) Attention should be given to the possibility of assigning to the First Committee solely and exclusively those agenda items which relate to international security and disarmament, in order that they might be given more attention and more complete treatment." (A/AC.187/34, p. 6)
PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE SPECIAL
SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

Views of Member States on the agenda and
all other relevant questions relating to
the Special Session of the General Assembly
devoted to disarmament

(Background paper prepared by the Secretariat)
INTRODUCTION

This document is an addendum to document A/AC.187/51, issued on 14 May 1977 containing the views of Member States on the agenda and all other relevant questions relating to the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Like the previous document, it incorporates, under the various headings, the views of Member States received between 12 May and 5 July 1977.
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## I. GENERAL REMARKS

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I. GENERAL REMARKS

BARBADUS

"For too long the issue of disarmament has been considered the special preserve of experts from two countries - the United States of America and the Soviet Union. The truth is that all countries are affected. Third world countries such as Barbados are continually exposed to dangerous radio-active fall-out and the effects of spoliation of the environment by those actively engaged in the arms race. Atmospheric and marine pollution on the one hand and disruption of the ecological balance on the other today represent a few of the major hazards. Such are the consequences of the arms race.

Third world countries suffer directly or indirectly from these consequences of the arms race and must be allowed to bring their perspective to bear upon these serious problems. The economy of Barbados like that of small States depending on a tourist industry could be seriously disrupted by the kind of environmental pollution which experimenters in arms development have caused over the years.

The investment of large sums of money, vast quantities of technology and skill in the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction represent gross misuse of the world's resources in an era of scarcity. Not only does it pose serious danger to life, limb and health but it diverts resources more needed in the eradication of poverty to the useless exercise of increasing weapons of mass destruction."

(A/AC. 187/65, p.1)

CUBA

"The Government of the Republic of Cuba considers that the arms race is one of the principal impediments to the strengthening of international security and to just and equitable economic and social progress.

Action to bring about general and complete disarmament is more necessary than ever since it is substantially inseparable from the objectives of achieving lasting peace. Never before have arms possessed such destructive power, and never before has the risk that mankind might be wiped out been greater.

It is obvious that the use for military purposes of an ever-increasing volume of material and human resources is damaging not only to international security but also to the economic and social development of nations. Despite the increasing activity of peace-loving peoples in pursuit of general and complete disarmament, imperialist circles are still beating the drums of the cold war and assigning ever-growing budgets to building up their war arsenal."

(A/AC. 187/50, p.1)
EGYPT

"The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt has always supported all efforts and constructive proposals made for arriving at general and complete disarmament under effective international control and has submitted a number of suggestions which make a positive contribution towards the realization of this major goal, both with regard to regional action to save specific regions from the serious consequences of the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, and with regard to international action to halt this momentous race which threatens humanity and its achievements with total destruction at a time when the peoples of the world are being deprived of important resources which could contribute to its progress or help in coping with development problems, particularly with regard to developing countries.

General and complete disarmament under effective international control is therefore rightly regarded as one of the major objectives at the current stage of international development, if not the major objective to which many other objectives, not least among them the turning of the wheel of development, the reform of the international economic order and the direction of scientific progress along a sound course which will serve the cause of peace, justice and progress - the objectives for which the United Nations was founded and which it has made its final objectives - are linked and on which they are based.

On the basis of the above views and convictions, the Egyptian Government cannot but support the convening of a special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to discussion of this major and vital topic; this support is reflected in its support for the General Assembly resolution on the convening of this session."

(A/AC.187/61, p. 2)

LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA

"The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has long deplored the waste of human and economic resources implicit in the arms race and the large-scale expenditures on armaments. Not only could these resources have been better used in the cause of economic and social development but also it is now well recognized that the arms race has only exacerbated international insecurity. It is furthermore well recognized by the international community that despite various initiatives and discussions in various forums little progress has been made in the field of disarmament since the establishment of the United Nations, whose objectives under the Charter include disarmament.

The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya was, therefore, one of those States that strongly supported the convening of a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Our support for this initiative is based on our belief that the said special session would provide an excellent forum for multilateral discussions by sovereign States on an equal footing of such world-wide problems as the arms race and international security. The special session will be an appropriate forum for discussions on issues that are extremely complex and inextricably interrelated, for it is widely recognized that such problems as the arms race, international insecurity and the consequences of acts of aggression and other hostile practices, as they are perpetrated by Zionist and other racist regimes, are just such interrelated issues. The special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament will be in a position to arrive at balanced conclusions and assessments on these matters as well as fully taking into account those aspects and implications of disarmament affecting the achievement of the new international economic order."

(A/AC.187/66, p. 2)
As a first step towards attaining global disarmament, the Government of Malaysia has always believed in the need for the creation of conditions that would be conducive to the relaxation of tension both at the regional and the international levels, the advancement of peaceful relations among all States and the promotion of regional as well as intraregional co-operation in all fields. This favourable climate would inevitably create an atmosphere of confidence in the world community that could help to generate progress in disarmament efforts towards halting and eventually eliminating the arms race. It would also give added impetus towards accelerating the creation of zones of peace and the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones which constitute positive steps towards the attainment of the goal of disarmament. The savings gained through the reduction of military expenditures devoted to the arms race could be constructively channelled to the much needed areas of national development in the developing countries. At the international level, the surplus resources in the developed countries arising from the reduction of their military expenditures could be utilized towards achieving an equitable international economic order.

Since the special session would be the first occasion that the question of disarmament would be considered in its entirety, full participation by all Member States of the United Nations is highly desirable to ensure success in concerted a co-operative approach towards achieving a comprehensive programme for general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

(A/AC.167/53, p.2)

During the three decades that have elapsed since the Second World War, vast transformations have taken place in the world and this development is continuing. The process of decolonization is nearly completed and has transformed the geopolitical map of the world. All States, regardless of their size and their economic and military potential, are increasingly active in the discussion and solution of major issues.

While fully recognizing the important role and responsibilities of great Powers with respect to peace and security, the small and medium-sized States, the developing countries and the non-aligned States, are all parties which must be involved in this time and age when the process of scientific and technological advance and democratization is producing a new form of world society. The world is in the search for a more and just acceptable world order. The positive results of this search are, however, constantly threatened by the continuing arms race. In an international environment dominated by the arms race, military and strategic considerations stand to shape the over-all relations between States affecting also all other relations and transactions. Only if we make a major progress in the field of disarmament will it be possible to create a system of world order based on collective responsibility and a climate of international confidence.

...
The disarmament efforts, since the Second World War, have produced some very modest results in the nature of arms limitation, rather than disarmament. The thrust has been on regulating competition in armaments proscribing certain developments deemed to be particularly destabilizing, costly or otherwise unacceptable rather than an attempt to substantially reduce important weapons systems. In the context of a rapidly innovating arms race such an approach is bound to fail. Technological innovations tend to outstrip the pace of negotiations. The momentum of the arms race makes it circumvent the too weak barriers that have been built to stop it. Partial and collateral measures can play a role in the cessation reversal of the arms race only if they are conceived as part of a broader programme aimed at substantial disarmament in areas of weaponry of central military significance ultimately leading to general and complete disarmament and particularly nuclear disarmament under effective international control.

Disarmament should be approached in a comprehensive manner, efforts should aim at real disarmament. Work should be resumed on the elaboration of a treaty on general and complete disarmament." (A/AC.187/60, p. 1 and 2)

PAKISTAN

"The Government of Pakistan attaches great importance to the success of the special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament. However, the special session should not merely be another forum to discuss the broad aspects of disarmament. Mere declarations or resolutions would not mark a meaningful advance towards the disarmament goals established by the General Assembly but merely give an illusion of progress. The convening of the special session would be justified only if there is a real prospect of reaching concrete agreements on specific disarmament questions." (A/AC.187/52, p. 2)

PHILIPPINES

"The Philippines believes that after 30 years of consideration of the issue of disarmament by the United Nations, time has come indeed to take concerted measures in order to achieve the over-all objective of disarmament. The special session is an approach that could open avenues to achieving a programme of gradual and balanced disarmament measures which ultimately would lead to general and complete disarmament. In other words, now is the time for the super-Powers and the major military Powers to give proof of sincere political will in co-ordinated and co-operative efforts towards resolving disarmament issues." (A/AC.187/57, p. 1)

PORTUGAL

"The Portuguese Government supports the convocation of a special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, as proposed in paragraph 1 of resolution 31/189 B of the thirty-first session of the General Assembly. Such initiative meets the concerns repeatedly expressed by the Portuguese Government regarding the increasing armaments race that has been taking place since the Second World War and that has led to the waste of non-renewable resources and technical knowledge extremely necessary for the progress of mankind." (A/AC.187/59, p. 2)
QATAR

"The State of Qatar has consistently and repeatedly supported the convening of an international conference devoted exclusively to the problems of disarmament and where all nuclear and non-nuclear countries can participate on equal footing in accordance with the principles of the Disarmament Decade.

Qatar believes that the mass production of chemical, biological and incendiary weapons and napalm and the use of such weapons must come to a halt and the special session must adopt a programme of action prohibiting the manufacture of these dangerous weapons.

Qatar also believes that zones of peace and nuclear-weapon-free zones should be created in order to lay the foundations for international peace and security. Qatar attaches great importance particularly on the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and in the Indian Ocean.

... Qatar has repeatedly supported the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, free of all foreign military bases, whether air or naval, in the territory of the littoral countries or islands of the Indian Ocean, to contribute to the security of the whole world. For the same reasons, Qatar also supports the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in South Asia, the South Pacific and Latin America." (A/AC.187/58, p. 1)

SRI LANKA

"The special session will perhaps be a culmination of efforts set in motion by non-aligned countries as far back as 1961 at their first summit conference in Belgrade. At the fifth summit conference of non-aligned countries held in Sri Lanka, heads of State or Government reiterated their call for a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It is gratifying that resolution 31/189 B was unanimously adopted without recourse to vote which is indicative of the wide support for a special session among Member States of the United Nations!" (A/AC.187/64, p. 1)

SURINAM

"Disarmament is of vital interest to all States. The Surinam Government, therefore, welcomes the special session as a forum where all States can consider and express their views on this important issue and consequently attaches great importance to the work to be done at the special session.

It is the view of the Surinam Government that the unbridled production, stockpiling of, and trade in conventional weapons, poses a serious threat to international peace and security and to the very existence of mankind. The unabated arms race not only menaces international peace and security but should be regarded as a regrettable waste of time, energy and resources in a world where poverty and hunger are still prevailing." (A/AC.187/63, p. 1)
II. OBJECTIVES OF THE SPECIAL SESSION

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II. OBJECTIVES OF THE SPECIAL SESSION

BARBADOS

"The Government of Barbados' opinion is that nuclear disarmament must be given the highest priority on the agenda. The Government of Barbados enthusiastically welcomes the United Nations special session on disarmament. We recognize that the absence of political will has so far not enabled the establishment of an international authority to guarantee the security of every country. We look forward however to a solution of the disarmament problem. We consider the diversion of resources from the creation of armaments to the satisfaction of the basic needs of the developing nations would be a positive step in this direction. We further consider the mobilization of world opinion in favour of disarmament as necessary to this end." (A/AC.187/65, p. 1)

CUBA

"Given the existence of conditions favourable to the achievement of practical results with regard to general and complete disarmament, the special session should prepare the way for the holding of a world disarmament conference, as called for in the resolution on disarmament adopted at the Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-aligned Countries held at Colombo.

The special session could make a valuable and vital contribution to the convening of a world conference on disarmament which could lead to joint efforts and common approaches to a question of concern to all mankind." (A/AC.187/50, p. 2)

EGYPT

"Despite all the efforts made, the initiatives and decisions taken and the agreements arrived at, the importance of which must not be underestimated, the practical results are not commensurate with the efforts made and the hopes placed on them. There is a clear contradiction between the pressing need to halt the arms race - at least - and the paucity of actual achievements in the field and the vicious circle in which international efforts have become engaged.

The efforts currently being made, particularly at the bilateral level and in the light of the responsibilities binding upon the two major Powers under the provisions of the Charter and in accordance with the specific commitments arising out of a number of international agreements, in particular article VI of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation, merit careful attention and support inasmuch as they may provide an effective point of departure for progress towards the halting of the arms race and, eventually, general and complete disarmament itself. This by no means negates the importance of joint international action, nor is it a substitute for it. The issue is world-wide in its dimensions and consequences, hence the importance of the forthcoming special session."
The Egyptian Government would like to emphasize its faith in the role of the United Nations in tackling all the problems facing mankind in our present age. It would, however, at the same time, like to point out that a major step such as a special session of the General Assembly should not conclude merely with a declaration or declarations concerning the international community's zeal for disarmament, but must tackle the problem with in-depth studies which take into account the technical, political, economic, social and informational aspects of the subject and which serve to link and coordinate the measures taken to this end in the past with those taken currently and those which may be taken in the near future. In addition, there is the important question of planning for a programme divided into time phases over which progress towards the agreed objectives is to be achieved, taking into account the elements mentioned above and other elements. All this indicates clearly the important role which the Preparatory Committee must play in steering action towards the realization of this study on a world-wide level and towards the achievement of significant results at this session.

Furthermore, efforts must be made to check the trend towards auctioneering and opportunism and prevent it from dominating, or at least infiltrating, the discussions of the special session, as this possibility emerges from some of the replies, which indicate a desire to utilize the occasion of the session for the realization of specific objectives. In this connexion, in order to make the matter clear, the Arab Republic of Egypt would point out once again that the framework of the United Nations and acceptance of its decisions and the agreements concluded under its auspices constitute the only appropriate basis for serious and sincere work on general and complete disarmament. (A/AC.187/66, p. 3 and 4)

**LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA**

"The objectives of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament should therefore be to focus the attention of the international community on the question of disarmament and to make recommendations on certain priority issues. Among the priority issues and principles that are particularly important and urgent in the view of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya are the following:

Full participation of all nuclear-weapon States must be secured, for the utmost priority must be given to the elimination of all arsenals of nuclear, chemical and other weapons of mass destruction;

Complete cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests;

Unequivocal renunciation by nuclear-weapon States of the use, or threat of use of such weapons against any State, especially non-nuclear-weapon States;

Nuclear-weapon States must undertake to respect nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace and co-operation;

The dissolution of military blocs, and the dismantling of foreign military bases and withdrawal of military forces from foreign territories;

Funds released as a result of measures achieved in the field of disarmament should be allocated to the economic and social development of the developing countries;

Free and equal access of all States to the technologies and technical information for the exploitation of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes."

(A/AC.187/66, p. 2 and 3)
8.

MALAYSIA

See 1 above.

MAURITIUS

"International agreement in the field of disarmament concluded so far should become universal and all parties should fulfil all the obligations arising from these treaties.

The programme for general and complete disarmament shall ensure that States will have at their disposal only such non-nuclear armaments, forces, facilities and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens; and that States shall support and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations peace force.

To this end, the programme for general and complete disarmament shall contain the necessary provisions, with respect to the military establishment of every nation for:

(a) The disbanding of armed forces, the dismantling of military establishments, including bases, the cessation of the production of armaments as well as their liquidation or conversion to peaceful uses;

(b) The elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological and other weapons of mass destruction, and the cessation of the production of such weapons;

(c) The elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction;

(d) The abolition of organizations and institutions designed to organize the military effort of States, the cessation of military training, and the closing of all military training institutions;

(e) The discontinuance of military expenditures. (A/AC.187/60, p. 3 and 4)

PAKISTAN

"One of the main objectives of the special session should be ... to promote an agreement on the question of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. The formula for "negative" guarantees approved by the General Assembly at its last session (resolution 31/189) provides a most realistic basis for negotiations on this question. The resolution
"invites the nuclear-weapon States, as a first step towards a complete ban on the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to consider undertaking, without prejudice to their obligations arising from treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States not parties to the nuclear security arrangements of some nuclear weapon powers".

This is a sufficiently flexible yet precise framework within which an agreement can be evolved for a binding undertaking by the nuclear Powers against the nuclear threat while at the same time accommodating what they consider to be their legitimate security interests and obligations. It is, therefore, Pakistan's conviction that urgent attention be given at the special session and in other relevant forums to elaborating an agreement for security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States on the basis of the recommendation adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-first session, as well as to the question of "positive" guarantees.

At the same time, Pakistan believes that the non-nuclear-weapon States must not depend solely on the great Powers to ensure their security in the nuclear era. Acting in a spirit of self-reliance, they should themselves take initiatives towards regional security measures against the nuclear threat emanating from within or outside their respective regions.

In view of what must be considered to be the failure of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to elicit a sufficiently wide measure of support, especially from the so-called "threshold nuclear powers", the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones provides the best available approach to prevent nuclear proliferation.

The specific issues which Pakistan believes should be at the centre of the Preparatory Committee's deliberations are: conclusion of SALT agreements providing for deep cuts in nuclear weapons systems, a complete ban on chemical weapons, and a test ban treaty. Agreements must also be concluded on effective and binding security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace, promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technology, and the creation of a more effective machinery for disarmament negotiations." (A/AC. 187/52, p. 4 and 5)

QATAR

"Qatar believes that the Special Session on Disarmament should seek to safeguard sovereignty - independence and territorial integrity of all States, as well as sovereignty over their natural resources." (A/AC.187/58, p.1)
The special session should undertake a frank and comprehensive evaluation of the present state of negotiations on disarmament and examine in depth the impact which the continuation of the arms race is having on international peace and security. An important objective of the special session should also be a study of the massive expenditure on arms production, research and development and an examination of ways and means of diverting such resources for the economic and social well-being of all mankind. The reallocation, of course on the basis of criteria relevant to development assistance, of even a portion of the estimated $300 billion being expended on armaments cannot fail to have a significant effect on the world economy as a whole.

(SR. LANKA)

(A/AC. 187/64, p. 1)

SURINAM

"It is the opinion of the Government of Surinam that the special session should be aimed at practical, genuine and durable solutions in order to contain the further production and proliferation of arms and simultaneously at setting the process of general disarmament into motion. Given the limited period of the session, participants should endeavour to make the most effective use of the time available. A lengthy general debate should therefore be avoided, as such a debate may result in hostile exchanges and statements of a predominantly propagandistic nature."

(SURINAM)

(A/AC. 187/63, p. 1 and 2)
### III. PREPARATORY WORK FOR THE SPECIAL SESSION

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III. PREPARATORY WORK FOR THE SPECIAL SESSION

BARBADOS

See I and II above.

CUBA

See II above

EGYPT

"In addition to determining the agenda on which the programme of action and any other measures will be based, the Preparatory Committee should consider the preliminary organization of work and submit its recommendations in that respect to the General Assembly at its forthcoming regular session so that the Assembly may refer the recommendations to the competent organs for study, and for the preparation of the relevant working papers. The Preparatory Committee should then meet again before the special session in order to finalize the documents for the special session including any declarations and the programme of action.

The work of the Preparatory Committee should receive support from other organs specializing in the field of disarmament. Those organs should submit to the Preparatory Committee reports on matters which it has been agreed should be included in the agenda, so that the work of the special session will be new and comprehensive.

Thirdly, the Preparatory Committee should examine the political action which is to be combined with action in the field of disarmament, such as that relating to foreign military occupation and methods of curbing the arms race, so that it will be possible to give consideration to the discontinuation and reduction of armaments and to disarmament.

Fourthly, the Preparatory Committee should submit a report on the efficiency of existing disarmament machinery. The Egyptian Government is of the view that it is important to maintain the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference since this Committee has covered significant ground in considering relevant topics, solving a number of issues, and reaching some conclusions.

It would also be worth while for the Preparatory Committee to study the possibility of a proposal to amend the Charter by the inclusion of a provision prohibiting nuclear weapons, or a proposal for a commitment to seek such a prohibition regarding the proliferation of military nuclear armaments as a threat to international peace and security. The Committee may also consider the inclusion in the programme of action of a provision requiring States to submit reports periodically (e.g. annually) on the extent of their nuclear armaments, on measures they have taken in connexion with the reduction of such armaments or the commitment to nuclear disarmament, and on the enhancement of the authority of international control of nuclear armaments.

Consideration of an international information programme to be carried out at all levels to publicize the importance of disarmament." (A/AC.187/61, p. 6 and 7)
LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA

"The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya realizes that the field of disarmament is very complex and extensive and therefore considers that the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament must be carefully prepared, if it is to achieve the desired results. Otherwise there is a risk that the special session may be merely a repetition of the work of the First Committee of the General Assembly, though at a higher level of representation. In this context, the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament may wish to consider the convening of a world disarmament conference to further pursue and follow up on its objectives of achieving world disarmament under international control and thereby ensuring international security."  

(A/AC.187/66, p. 3)

MALAYSIA

"In view of the need to ensure the total success of the special session, it would be useful to co-ordinate the task by assigning specific aspects of disarmament problems to a number of sub-committees or working groups so that agreement could be greatly facilitated."  

(A/AC.187/53, p. 3)

PAKISTAN

"The work of the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session should be framed with the purpose of facilitating the adoption of concrete measures on the most important and pressing tasks in the field of disarmament. In this context, we would like to refer to document No. A/6191 dated 2 December 1970, sponsored by six countries, including Pakistan, on a comprehensive programme of disarmament. This document enumerates the most important tasks for achieving the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament. Pakistan believes that the Preparatory Committee should first of all identify the priority tasks in the fields on which it is essential that progress should be made and then take the necessary steps for the conclusion of agreements in regard to them.

In organizing its work, the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session should focus its attention on substantive issues and not be led away into debating procedural questions alone or the adoption of anodyne resolutions. The first and perhaps most important task of the Committee is to establish the agenda for the special session. It is hoped that the suggestions made in the preceding paragraphs will be taken into account by the Committee when drawing up the questions to be considered at the special session. Having identified the issues which are to be addressed, the Preparatory Committee should simultaneously indicate the modalities and machinery through which concrete agreements and proposals on these issues are to be elaborated. For instance, it may wish to suggest that some questions, e.g., the CTB Convention should be elaborated within the CCD while the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones could be considered by a separate ad hoc group set up for the purpose. The Committee should decide on the organizational aspects of the special session after it has accomplished the first two tasks and only when the possibilities for concrete progress on various issues are clearer."  

(A/AC.187/52, p. 2 and 7)
PHILIPPINES

"The special session, to be a success, should be well prepared and should be approached by all interested parties with no reservations or pre-conditions. All Members of the United Nations should whole-heartedly and actively participate in the special session. It is obvious to us that the success of the special session will spell a greater and more meaningful role for the United Nations in the field of disarmament." (A/AC.187/57, p.2)

SRI LANKA

"Adequate preparations should be made in advance of the special session to ensure the optimum use of the limited time available next year during the session itself. Every effort should be made before the session to seek the co-operation of all Member States of the United Nations. Members of the Preparatory Committee have a special role and should be in continuous consultation with all Members of the United Nations so that the broadest possible range of views would be taken into consideration to ensure that the session would have a truly universal character.

Preparations for the special session should include discussions at a formal and informal level (not confined to members of the Preparatory Committee alone) so as to reach agreement at least on the broad substance and framework of the final document to be adopted at the session."

(A/AC.187/64, p.2)
### iv. Agenda

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IV. AGENDA

BARBADOS

"The Government of Barbados' opinion is that nuclear disarmament must be given the highest priority on the agenda. The Government of Barbados enthusiastically welcomes the United Nations special session on disarmament. We recognize that the absence of political will has so far not enabled the establishment of an international authority to guarantee the security of every country. We look forward however to a solution of the disarmament problem. We consider the diversion of resources from the creation of armaments to the satisfaction of the basic needs of the developing nations would be a positive step in this direction. We further consider the mobilization of world opinion in favour of disarmament as necessary to this end." (A/AC.187/65, p. 1)

EGYPT

See II above.

EGYPT

"Programme of action and agenda:

(a) It is essential that the special session should produce, as well as such declarations and decisions as it may issue, a specific and clear programme of action indicating the role of all committees and subsidiary organs active in this field with regard to all points agreed upon or approved for study.

(b) Programme of action and the role of United Nations bodies and machinery in international action on disarmament: A study should be made of the role of the Security Council in the field of disarmament, as the Council is the main body concerned with the maintenance of international peace and security. It is perfectly clear that there is a link between the maintenance of international peace and security, on the one hand, and general and complete disarmament, on the other. The programme of action should take into consideration the co-ordination of the political and security aspects which are within the competence of the Security Council, the economic and social aspects which are a matter for the Economic and Social Council, and the technical aspects which concern the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, as well as other aspects referred to specialized committees and bodies. The General Assembly will undertake the over-all supervision and co-ordination of all these efforts within a specific time period.

(c) With regard to the agenda, the Egyptian Government maintains that the topics to be discussed at the special session, and in the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session, should include the following:
(i) General principles, the link between disarmament and the establishment of international peace and justice, and the role of the principal organs of the United Nations, such as the Security Council, in this respect;

(ii) Examination of what has been achieved so far in the field of disarmament, the reduction of armaments, the banning of certain nuclear tests, etc.;

(iii) The cessation of nuclear tests and, in particular, the question of the conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive nuclear test ban; the extent of implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and measures for the implementation and strengthening of that Treaty; the conclusions of the Review Conference held in 1975; the enhancement of the safeguards system; the establishment of general principles concerning non-proliferation, binding on all parties, as a result of the entry into force of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation as part of the applicable rules of international law;

(iv) The question of nuclear-free zones and its relation to accession to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation;

(v) Consideration of measures to be taken in accordance with a specific timetable with regard to the banning of the production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and the prohibition of the development of weapons of mass destruction;

(vi) The importance of international control of peaceful uses; the question of safeguards; and the measures to be taken in respect of non-compliance by a State;

(vii) Follow-up of progress achieved in bilateral talks, especially the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between the United States and the Soviet Union, in the light of reports submitted by the two super-Powers to the special session. In this connexion, the Egyptian Government proposes that the General Assembly should, at its thirty-second session, adopt a resolution calling on both super-Powers to submit such reports to the special session;

(viii) Disarmament and the environment;

(ix) The economic and social implications of disarmament;

(x) The security of non-nuclear States pending the establishment of a comprehensive nuclear disarmament régime;

(xi) Trade in armaments;

(xii) Machinery to supervise the implementation of any commitments that may arise from the resolutions and instruments adopted at the special session;

(xiii) United Nations organs active in the field of disarmament;

(xiv) An international information programme on disarmament.\textsuperscript{1} (A/AC.187/61, p 56)
LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA

The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya realizes that the field of disarmament is very complex and extensive and therefore considers that the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament must be carefully prepared, if it is to achieve the desired results. Otherwise there is a risk that the special session may merely be a repetition of the work of the First Committee of the General Assembly, though at a higher level of representation. In this context, the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament may wish to consider the convening of a world disarmament conference to further pursue and follow up on its objectives of achieving world disarmament under international control and thereby ensuring international security.

(A/AC. 187/66, p. 3)

MALAYSIA

Malaysia considers that the agenda of the special session should include the following elements:

1. Consideration of practical measures towards curbing and eventually eliminating the nuclear arms race.

2. Co-operative approach to seek agreement for:
   (a) The cessation of all nuclear weapons tests with a view to concluding a comprehensive test ban treaty, a prompt cessation of research and development of new types of nuclear weapons and other non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction, the reduction and elimination of existing arsenals of all nuclear weapons as well as chemical, biological weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction.
   (b) General prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and non-use of force in the settlement of disputes.

3. Creation of favourable conditions towards bringing about the relaxation of tension and to advancement of peaceful relations that would be conducive to promoting common agreement in establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace.

4. Review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament to enable the existing United Nations disarmament machinery to proceed in a more co-ordinated and efficient manner directed towards the realization of the goal of complete and general disarmament under effective international control.

5. Improved United Nations machinery to give widest dissemination to the potential dangers of nuclear weapons at all stages of disarmament.

(A/AC.187/53, p. 2 and 3)
"The work of the Assembly should be oriented as follows:

I. States should be represented on a high level.

II. The general debate should avoid confrontations of a political character and, without being a mere repetition of the usual discussions, should lead to the approval of a declaration of principles, accepted by all States, which would express the new approach in the disarmament negotiations.

III. In specialized committees there should be debated and approved:

(a) Concrete measures for disarmament or arms limitation, prepared by specialized bodies.

(b) A programme of medium and long-term action in which would be indicated the problems needing priority treatment. Among those, the Portuguese Government suggests:

(1) Nuclear disarmament.

(2) Prohibition of the manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction, and reduction, under international control, of existing nuclear arsenals, with a view towards their complete extinction.

(3) Prohibition of chemical, bacteriological (biological) and incendiary weapons.

(4) Control and reduction of the manufacture and transfer of conventional weapons.

The Portuguese Government is fully conscious of the difficulties involved in solving the above-mentioned problems; responsibility for this should be given to organs of a necessarily specialized nature within which opinions of all interested States should be heard. The Portuguese Government, however, does not believe that strict timing can be fixed for the fulfilment of these measures.

IV. One of the matters that must be carefully studied by the special session of the General Assembly is that of revision of the role of the United Nations, particularly its Centre for Disarmament, in the negotiations and studies to be undertaken. Also, should be reviewed the activities, composition and work methods of other bodies charged with this type of negotiations.

As was stated earlier, special attention must be taken to inform public opinion of the problems and measures related to disarmament." (A/AC.187/59, p. 2,3)
The Surinam Government suggests that the agenda of the special session include the following items:

I. The drawing up of a balance-sheet of weapons for mass-destruction and their locations;

II. Prohibition of research, production, stockpiling and proliferation of nuclear and other weapons for mass-destruction;

III. Cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests;

IV. Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace;

V. The role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament.

Since the issues to be dealt with during the special session concern the very survival of mankind as a whole, the question of disarmament cannot be considered as regarding only a few powerful States, but as a matter of vital interest to all peoples of the world. (*A/AC.187/63, p.2*)
V. ORGANIZATION OF WORK OF THE SPECIAL SESSION

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V. ORGANIZATION OF WORK OF THE SPECIAL SESSION

CUBA

See II above.

EGYPT

See III above.

LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA

See II above.

PAKISTAN

See II above.

PORTUGAL

"The Portuguese Government must yet emphasize that, in a spirit of conciliation, the resolutions of the Assembly must be adopted, whenever possible, by consensus, the only way of ensuring their universal applicability."

Also see IV above.

(A/AC.187/59, p.3)
VI. PRINCIPAL DOCUMENTS OF THE SPECIAL SESSION

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VI. PRINCIPAL DOCUMENT OR DOCUMENTS OF THE SPECIAL SESSION

LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA

"The special session should, in accordance with its worthy and ambitious objectives, consider the formulation of a declaration calling upon all States to pledge to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. This declaration must be agreed upon and signed by all States and must be promulgated under the auspices of the United Nations and considered an international covenant."

(A/AC.187/66, p.3)

MALAYSIA

"The Government of Malaysia considers it important that the special session should adopt a declaration of principles that reflect a renewed commitment by Member States of the United Nations towards general and complete disarmament as well as a programme of measures aimed at accelerating all disarmament efforts."

(A/AC.187/53, p.3)

PHILIPPINES

"The special session should be able to adopt a declaration of principles on disarmament coupled with a programme of action in the implementation of said principles. In this connexion, and in so far as the Philippines is concerned, like many others, nuclear disarmament is number one in importance and should be given the highest priority. We cannot conceive or envisage a peaceful world in which nuclear weapons exist. The imponderables of power politics are such that the risk and danger of a nuclear exchange is ever present as long as there are nuclear weapons. The escalation to an all-out nuclear war is not far-fetched due to the use and sophistication of nuclear warheads in both tactical and strategic weapons."

(A/AC.187/57, p.1)
VII. ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE FIELD OF DISARMAMENT

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VII. ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE FIELD OF DISARMAMENT

CUBA

"In keeping with this position, the Government of the Republic of Cuba has consistently supported, within the framework of the world forum of the United Nations, proposals designed to achieve general and complete disarmament, such as: total prohibition of nuclear tests; prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons and of the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction; prohibition of the use of the environment for military purposes; and the convening of a world disarmament conference, the preparatory framework for which should be the special session of the General Assembly, as decided by the General Assembly at its thirty-first session."

(A/AC.187/50, p.2)

EGYPT

"The Egyptian Government would like to emphasize its faith in the role of the United Nations in tackling all the problems facing mankind in our present age. It would, however, at the same time, like to point out that a major step such as a special session of the General Assembly should not conclude merely with a declaration or declarations concerning the international community's zeal for disarmament, but must tackle the problem with in-depth studies which take into account the technical, political, economic, social and informational aspects of the subject and which serve to link and co-ordinate the measures taken to this end in the past with those being taken currently and those which may be taken in the near future. In addition, there is the important question of planning for a programme divided into time phases over which progress towards the agreed objectives is to be achieved, taking into account the elements mentioned above and other elements. All this indicates clearly the important role which the Preparatory Committee must play in steering action towards the realization of this study on a world-wide level and towards the achievement of significant results at this session.

..."

Consideration should be given to the convening of another special session, perhaps on the occasion of the thirty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations, in other words, shortly before the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly, which will coincide with the end of the Disarmament Decade. Consideration might also be given to the convening of a world disarmament conference in which all nuclear Powers would participate, since without their participation the Conference would serve little purpose."(A/AC.187/61, p. 4 and 7)
"Disarmament being a matter of great concern to all States and to all peoples, there is a pressing need for all Governments and peoples to be informed about and understand the prevailing situation in the field of the arms race and disarmament and that the United Nations has a central role in this connexion in keeping with its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations. The problems of disarmament and particularly nuclear disarmament should not be a secret held by certain categories of persons, politicians and soldiers; they directly affect the security and the very lives of peoples and the peoples should know what action to take in this direction in order to be able to have their say and defend their vital interests. That is why public opinion and peoples of all countries must be fully informed and periodic reports must be issued on the current status of armaments and its consequences and on the steps to be taken to stop the arms race.

The United Nations which bears responsibility for disarmament under the Charter should be kept informed of all unilateral, bilateral or multilateral efforts thereon.

All disarmament measures should be implemented from beginning to end under such strict and effective international control as would provide firm assurance that all parties are honouring their obligations. During and after the implementation of general and complete disarmament, the most thorough control should be exercised, the nature and extent of such control depending on the requirements for verification of the disarmament measures being carried out in each stage. To implement control over and inspection of disarmament, an international disarmament organization including all parties to the agreement should be created within the framework of the United Nations. This international disarmament organization and its inspectors should be assured unrestricted access without veto to all places, as necessary for the purpose of effective verification.

Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. During and after the implementation of the programme of general and complete disarmament, there should be taken, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security, including the obligation of States to place at the disposal of the United Nations agreed manpower necessary for an international peace force to be equipped with agreed types of armaments. Arrangements for the use of this force should ensure that the United Nations can effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations."

(A/AC.187/60, p. 3)
PAKISTAN

"A number of decisions of the United Nations, including the NPT, have called for international co-operation for the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. While co-operation in this field has been expanded, this has been mainly among the industrialized States. At the same time, with the revalorization of oil prices, the potential of nuclear energy has assumed ever-increasing importance for the developing countries. The vast majority of these countries have yet to benefit from nuclear technology for their economic development.

Further steps should also be envisaged to strengthen the IAEA as an organization which is called upon to play a vital role in the promotion and development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, as also in administering universal and effective safeguards to ensure non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, some of the in-built proclivities within the Agency, which tend to discriminate against recipient countries, should be eliminated." (A/AC.187/52, p. 5 and 6)

PORTUGAL

"One of the matters that must be carefully studied by the special session of the General Assembly is that of revision of the role of the United Nations, particularly its Centre for Disarmament, in the negotiations and studies to be undertaken. Also, should be reviewed the activities, composition and work methods of other bodies charged with this type of negotiations." (A/AC.187/59, p. 3)

QATAR "The United Nations in its Special Session on Disarmament and all States are duty bound to exert all possible means on Israel which has been rejecting the signature and adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is indispensable that all parties concerned in the area proclaim solemnly and immediately their intention to refrain from producing, testing, obtaining, acquiring or in any other way, possessing nuclear weapons, and call upon parties concerned in the area to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty." (A/AC.187/58, p. 1)
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