Twelfth special session

AD HOC COMMITTEE OF THE TWELFTH SPECIAL SESSION

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 9TH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 28 June 1982, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico)
(Vice-Chairman)

CONTENTS

STATEMENT BY MR. ALFONSO GARCIA ROBLES, REPRESENTATIVE OF MEXICO

PRESENTATION OF REPORTS

STATEMENT BY MR. YASH PAL, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE SECOND UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE EXPLORATION AND PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION OF THE 1980s AS THE SECOND DISARMAMENT DECADE AND CONSIDERATION OF INITIATIVES AND PROPOSALS OF MEMBER STATES

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The meeting was called to order at 11.10 a.m.

STATEMENT BY MR. ALFONSO GARCIA ROBLES, REPRESENTATIVE OF MEXICO

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I should like first to make a statement in my capacity as representative of Mexico.

Having had the privilege of being a member of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, whose report was so brilliantly introduced at the 4th meeting of this Committee by its Chairman, Mr. Olof Palme, the former Prime Minister of Sweden. I should like to put it on record that I greatly admire and appreciate the masterly manner in which Mr. Palme guided the prolonged deliberations of the Commission, which has already come to be known as the Palme Commission, a name which I think is fully justified.

It would be impossible to summarize the contents of such a wide-ranging substantive report at this time. Accordingly, I shall confine myself to drawing attention to the fact that among the conclusions unanimously adopted by the Commission and to be found in the report are the following:

'The Commission strongly supports the goal of general and complete disarmament',

and

'Nuclear war would amount to an unprecedented catastrophe for humanity and suicide for those who resorted to it.'

As Chairmen of the Working Group on the preparation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament whose ultimate goal is precisely that supported by the Palme Commission, I cannot fail to stress that encouraging coincidence of purpose.

I feel it my duty also to draw attention to the correct title adopted by the Palme Commission for its report. It is the one on the original English edition published in London: Common Security: a Programme for Disarmament. For reasons which I fail to understand, that title— which was not chosen by chance but was the result of careful consideration and lengthy debate—has been changed in the American edition to Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival. From the commercial point of view that may be more striking, but from the substantive point of view
it does not correspond to the specific recommendation of the General Assembly in the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament: to seek security in disarmament: (resolution S 10/2, para. 1).

PRESENTATION OF REPORTS

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): Representatives will recall that at a previous meeting the Ad Hoc Committee decided to hear weekly progress reports from the Chairmen of the three Working Groups. The Committee will therefore hear those brief reports now.
Speaking now as Chairman of Working Group I, I should like to recall that at one of its first meetings the Group decided to establish four drafting groups. Drafting Group A was to take up the item entitled "Objectives", which, as members are aware, is the title of part II of the comprehensive programme of disarmament. The representative of France, Ambassador de La Gorce, was elected Chairman.

Drafting Group B was to study part III of the programme, entitled "Principles". Ambassador Sheldov of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic was elected Chairman.

Drafting Group C was to consider most of part V, on "Measures and stages of implementation". Ambassador Ahmad, representative of Pakistan, was elected Chairman.

Finally, Drafting Group D was to study the rest of part V, on measures, which deals with other measures, disarmament and development, and disarmament and international security, as well as part VI of the programme, which deals with machinery and procedures.

I have endeavoured to keep in touch with the work of the Groups. Just before this meeting I had lengthy talks with their Chairmen. On the basis of those direct contacts and the verbal reports of the Chairmen I shall now attempt to summarize the position of the work in the four Groups.

As regards objectives, only one paragraph, the last, still contains brackets and there is still a choice to be made between two possible terms in the first paragraph. This, then, is the Group that has made the most substantial progress in its work.

In Drafting Group B, dealing with principles, the situation is briefly as follows. Twenty-three paragraphs have already been approved and contain no brackets. There are 10 other paragraphs in respect of which there are no substantive problems, but it still remains to be decided in what part of the programme those paragraphs should be included. Eleven of the paragraphs still remain between brackets.

In Drafting Group C there have been two complete readings. The first reading took six meetings and the second started on 22 June and ended on 28 June. In this Drafting Group it has unfortunately not yet been possible to make as much progress. This is understandable and is not due to lack of industry or skill on the part of the members, who have been meeting every day. Nor can it be blamed on the group's worthy Chairman, Ambassador Ahmad. It is due to the fact that, as members are aware, this is perhaps the thorniest part of the entire programme.
Lastly, Drafting Group D has completed the first reading of all the material assigned to it, which I mentioned a few moments ago - that is, the last part of part V and all of part VI. A considerable number of paragraphs remain between brackets. There are also differences of view in respect of several of the issues dealt with. At the same time it is worth emphasizing that the discussions held by the Group have brought to light a similarity of views in respect of many of the outstanding issues.

I think that this over all picture will give members a general idea of the status of work in the Drafting Groups of Working Group I.

The Chairmen of Drafting Groups C and D have begun holding informal consultations with the members of their respective Drafting Groups.
I believe that it will be necessary for the informal consultations and scheduled meetings to produce concrete results in the course of this week with a view to the adoption of formulas acceptable to all, because, as you will recall, we have only this week and next week before the special session ends.

The Chairman of the Working Group II, the representative of Australia, Ambassador David Sadlier, will now present a summary progress report on the work of the drafting groups of his Working Group.

Mr. SADLIER (Australia), Chairman of Working Group II: Working Group II has held six meetings since it began work on 18 June. The Ad Hoc Committee gave the Working Group a mandate to deal with item 9 of the session's agenda, as described in document A/S-12/20.

The Working Group gave extensive consideration to the organization of its work and, in particular, to establishing subsidiary bodies and defining their mandates. In the event, it agreed to establish two open-ended drafting groups, respectively designated "A" and "B".

The Working Group further agreed that Drafting Group A should be given a mandate to deal with the Programme of Action as set out in paragraphs 25 to 137 of annex I to the report of the Preparatory Committee for the second special session on disarmament.

The Working Group also decided that Drafting Group B should deal with all other sections of annex I as well as with subitem 9(D) of the agenda of the special session. That subitem refers in particular, to the matter of studies.

In an encouraging spirit of compromise, the Working Group was able to achieve consensus on the appointment of co-ordinators to the Drafting Groups - Ambassador A. T. Jayakoddy, representative of Sri Lanka, as the co-ordinator of Drafting Group A, and Ambassador Nana S. Sutresna, representative of Indonesia, as the co-ordinator of Drafting Group B.

Drafting Group A began its work on 22 June and Drafting Group B began its work on 23 June. Both Drafting Groups have since met each day.
The Working Group decided that Drafting Groups should aim at 1 July as the target date for finishing their work and that the Working Group itself should seek to finish its work on 2 July, if possible.

Progress in achieving consensus texts in the Drafting Groups has so far been slow. However, I and the co-ordinators of the Drafting Groups, with whom I remain in close touch, are optimistic that there will be a significant increase in the pace of work during the week ahead.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I now call on the Chairman of Working Group III, the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Gerhard Herder.

Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic), Chairman of Working Group III: In accordance with the recommendation of the committee of the whole, Working Group III has been considering agenda items 11 and 13. Item 11 deals with the implementation of the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade and the initiatives and proposals of Member States. Item 13 covers measures to mobilize world public opinion in favour of disarmament, including disarmament education, seminars and training, the United Nations Programme of Fellowships on Disarmament, the World Disarmament Campaign and other public information activities.

After a preliminary exchange of views on agenda item 11, the Working Group considered it advisable to postpone further discussion until after this Committee had dealt with the initiatives and proposals of Member States.

In our detailed consideration of item 13, the Working Group had before it documents A/5-12/8 on the United Nations Programme of Fellowships on Disarmament; documents A/AC.208/18 and A/AC.201/21 on the public information activities; and documents A/5-12/27 and A/36/458 on the World Disarmament Campaign. At my request, the chief of the Information and Studies Branch of the Centre for Disarmament and the chief of the Planning, Programming and Evaluation Unit of the Department of Public Information made themselves available to give any clarification sought by representatives. I should like to take this opportunity to express our appreciation of their participation in our discussion and their willing co-operation.
The Working Group met each day. In the five formal and two informal meetings that it has held so far, we have concentrated mainly on the United Nations fellowship programme and the World Disarmament Campaign. Agreement in principle has been reached on the formulation of a recommendation to me made to this Committee on the United Nations fellowship programme. We have had an extensive exchange of views on the World Disarmament Campaign, and at our informal meeting last week some specific proposals were put forward by some delegations. Those proposals are now being considered with a view to reaching general agreement on the recommendations to be submitted to this Committee with regard to the objectives modalities and financial implications of the World Disarmament Campaign.

The Working Group is continuing its work and at this afternoon's meeting it will take up consideration of agenda item 11. It will continue consideration of item 13.
The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I now call on Ambassador Fonseka, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, to introduce the report of that Committee.

Mr. FONSEKA (Sri Lanka), Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean: It is my pleasure and privilege to introduce in the Ad Hoc Committee today the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, which appears in document A/S 12/5.

The report has been prepared in conformity with resolution 36/90, in which the Committee was requested to submit to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament a report on the work of the Committee and the implementation of that resolution.

Accordingly, the Committee devoted a considerable part of its session, held from 1 to 12 March and from 20 to 28 May this year, to the preparation of this report, which is now before the Ad Hoc Committee.

The report consists of three parts: "Introduction", "Work of the Ad Hoc Committee" and "Conclusions and recommendations". In the introductory part a concise summary is given of all the resolutions which guided the work of the Committee, beginning with resolution 2832 (XXVI), "Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace", of 1971, up to resolution 36/90 of 9 December 1981, which, inter alia, renewed the Committee's mandate as defined in all those relevant resolutions.

The second section of the report contains a brief description of the work of the Committee from 1973 to 1982. Without going into a detailed presentation of what has been done during the past 10 years, I should like merely to present the Committee's evaluation of the present status of work regarding a key issue before it, namely, preparation for the Conference on the Indian Ocean. Paragraph 50 of the report states:

"On the one hand, the discussions revealed a strong feeling that the Committee should proceed without delay to practical preparations for holding the Conference and make every effort to complete the necessary preparations for holding the Conference not later than the first half of 1983, as a necessary step for the implementation of the Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, adopted in 1971. On the other hand,
It was emphasized by some delegations that the lack of real progress on the harmonization of views and the prevailing political and security climate in the region were not conducive, at this stage, to the convening of the Conference."

In the part on "Conclusions and recommendations", the Ad Hoc Committee first of all recalls paragraph 64 of the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament, in which the Assembly noted the proposal for the establishment of zones of peace, inter alia, in the Indian Ocean, taking into account the deliberations of the Assembly and its relevant resolutions and the need to ensure the maintenance of peace and security in the region.

The Ad Hoc Committee also notes that at its thirty-sixth session the General Assembly reaffirmed its conviction that concrete action for the achievement of the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace would be a substantial contribution to the strengthening of international peace and security. While it expressed deep concern at the danger posed by the grave and ominous developments in the area and the resulting sharp deterioration of peace, security and stability, which particularly seriously affects the littoral and hinterland States as well as international peace and security, the General Assembly called for the renewal of genuinely constructive efforts through the exercise of the political will necessary for the achievement of the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.

Whereas the Ad Hoc Committee was not able in the time available to agree on more elaborate recommendations, it did, however, point out that the General Assembly might wish, at the present special session on disarmament, to make specific recommendations to facilitate the expeditious discharge by the Ad Hoc Committee of its mandate and to implement Assembly resolution 36/90.

I do not want to conclude my brief introduction of this report without expressing my deep gratitude to the Rapporteur of the Committee, Mr. Rasolondraibe of Madagascar, whose excellent work substantially facilitated the task of the Committee in unanimously agreeing on the report now before this Committee for consideration. I should like to take
this opportunity to express my sincere appreciation and thanks to the members of the Committee for the spirit of co-operation and accommodation which prevailed during the preparation of this report.

I should like also to thank the Secretary of the Committee and his staff for their valuable co-operation.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I call again on Ambassador Fonseka, this time as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference, to introduce the report of that Committee.

Mr. FONSEKA (Sri Lanka), Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference: It is my privilege, as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference, to introduce the report of the Ad Hoc Committee to this Ad Hoc Committee of the Twelfth Special Session. The report, contained in document A/S-12/4, has been prepared in fulfilment of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee contained in resolution 36/91 of 12 December 1981, which requested the Committee, inter alia, to submit a report to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament.

In implementing this particular mandate, the Ad Hoc Committee held its first session of this year during April. The Committee held a general debate during its meetings on 5 and 6 April. After concluding the general debate, the Committee decided to entrust its open-ended Working Group with the task of drafting the report of the Ad Hoc Committee. The Working Group held two meetings on 7 April 1982 under the able chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee's Rapporteur, Mr. Zelada of Spain.

The Working Group concluded its work successfully and presented the draft report to the Ad Hoc Committee on 8 April 1982. The draft report was adopted by the Committee by consensus at its 63rd meeting. I take this opportunity of thanking Mr. Krystosik of Poland, who presided over the work of the Committee during my absence, for the excellent guidance he provided to the Committee and of acknowledging the important contribution made
by Mr. Zelada of Spain and his colleagues in the Working Group. A spirit of co-operation and true dedication characterized all stages of the work.

The General Assembly at its first special session on disarmament had before it the special report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the state of its work and deliberations submitted pursuant to the request contained in resolution 32/89. Accordingly, the present report covers the period between the first special session on disarmament held in 1978 and the present special session of the General Assembly.

With regard to the content of the Ad Hoc Committee's report, it is composed of three chapters encompassing sections on "Introduction", the "Work of the Committee" and "Conclusions and recommendations", including those related to its mandate. A significant part of the second chapter of the report reflects the fact that, in accordance with the mandate successively renewed each year by the General Assembly, inter alia in resolution 36/91 which was adopted on 9 December 1981, the Committee continued to maintain, through its Chairman, close contact with the representatives of States possessing nuclear weapons in order to remain currently informed of their respective attitudes. The positions of the nuclear-weapon States are set out in paragraph 24 of the report.

The Ad Hoc Committee incorporates in the present report the conclusions and recommendations from 1978 to 1981, as well as those of its first session of 1982, which reiterated the conclusions and recommendations contained in its report to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session. They reflect, inter alia, the view that, having regard to the important requirement for a world disarmament conference to be convened at the earliest appropriate time, with universal participation, the General Assembly may wish to decide that after its second special session devoted to disarmament a world disarmament conference will take place as soon as the necessary consensus on its convening had been reached.
As also reflected in the report, no consensus with respect to the convening of a world disarmament conference under present conditions has yet been reached among the nuclear-weapon States, whose participation in a world disarmament conference has been deemed essential by most States Members of the Organization.

However, the task of the Committee has always been carried out in a spirit of genuine co-operation, and that fact itself is, I believe, an important contribution to an undertaking of this magnitude which has been endorsed by the General Assembly. As in the case of many other measures of disarmament, steady and patient work to build up a base step by step for further progress would be the only practical answer with respect to the question of the world disarmament conference. I hope that the General Assembly at its present session devoted to disarmament will give adequate direction and an impetus to this task of the Committee in the context of the over-all framework of the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

In conclusion, I should like to thank all the members of the Ad Hoc Committee for the spirit of co-operation and accommodation that they have always shown during our meetings. I should also like to place on record my appreciation of the work of the Secretary of the Committee and his colleagues in the Secretariat and for the assistance that they have extended to the Committee at all times.

STATEMENT BY MR. YASH PAL, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE SECOND UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE EXPLORATION AND PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): At its 5th meeting, on 23 June, the Ad Hoc Committee decided to invite the Secretary-General of the Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNISPACE-82) to address it. Accordingly, I now call on Professor Yash Pal.
Mr. YASH PAL (Secretary-General, UNISPACE-82): I am greatly honoured and very happy to have this opportunity of speaking to this Committee. The whole world looks with great expectation and hope to this special session of the General Assembly on disarmament — a session in which the deliberations of this Committee of course play a crucial role.

While I - like most people on this earth - feel a deep and increasing concern about the vast arsenals of various nations, I speak to the Committee today as a scientist who has worked for a number of years on the peaceful uses of outer space and who recently had responsibility for helping to organize the Second United Nations Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, to be held in Vienna in August of this year.

As a scientist, I feel sad, and rather guilty, that during this century there have been such proud achievements in using science and technology for designing and building ever more sophisticated weapons of war and dominance to satisfy the rather ugly tribal urges of man, while the humanistic and cultural values of science have remained almost completely unappreciated. New capabilities in science and technology have not yet affected man's psyche as they should have. Years after the atomic bomb, Einstein is believed to have lamented that everything in the world had changed since Hiroshima except man's thinking.

Twenty-five years after the arrival of the space age there should have been among all the peoples on this earth a revolutionary upsurge of the sentiment that they are all members of a small family, neighbours in the real sense of the word, with a common ancestry and equally common destiny. Instead, we see more and more evidence that space might be used as a power amplifier for the already existing destructive capability and indeed might become a battleground of the future.

The dream of keeping space as a common heritage of mankind, of using space capabilities truly to knit all humanity into an interacting system of peoples, of eliminating ignorance and fear and of using the resources of the earth and its environment to bring prosperity with equity seems to be receding into the background.

We have today - on this very day - five brave men, from three nations, orbiting this planet. They may have various missions assigned to them, but if we only see our earth through their eyes, as they go around it every 90 minutes, we will not see national boundaries or the petty preoccupations which bring so much unnecessary misery and unhappiness.
The space age began with great hope, as expressed in General Assembly resolution 1721 (XVI) A of 20 December 1961:
"... the exploration and use of outer space should be only for the betterment of mankind and to the benefit of States irrespective of the stage of their economic or scientific development".

The 1967 outer space Treaty banned weapons of mass destruction and nuclear weapons from outer space. It also declared outer space to be the "province of all mankind". Unfortunately, we have begun contaminating this new frontier with our rivalries, our quarrels, and now with our weapons. From competitive rivalry towards peaceful goals, space is seeing a transition to military competition aimed at dominance.

For many years now outer space has been used for what are called national technical means of verification - which is a euphemism for reconnaissance or surveillance or, more crudely, spy-satellites - and other peaceful military uses. This contradiction in terms is explained by the fact that these reconnaissance satellites are used by the two super-Powers for monitoring adherence to the strategic arms limitation treaties. While any military use of space may be deplored, such uses doubtless contribute to stability to the same extent that mutual deterrence does.

These reconnaissance satellites therefore contribute to a certain amount of mutual confidence between the two super-Powers. But what of the remaining nine tenths of the world, in particular those countries in the developing world that are not in the space league? How should they face a situation in which sensitive data about their country might be collected by these reconnaissance satellites and might be made available to an adversary? If such satellites are to be used to contribute to genuine peace world-wide, just as they are said to contribute to peace and mutual confidence between the super-Powers - and I tend to agree with that - should not their data be available to all countries? Or, better still, why not operate the whole system under international auspices? Thoughts along those lines prompted a proposal by France some time ago for an international satellite monitoring agency, and the General Assembly has appointed a Group of Experts to study this issue. Their report is, I understand, to be considered at this special session.
It seems to me that, given the realities of the world today, there is both a great need for and yet considerable difficulty in implementing such a proposal. However, I think some mechanism or means of internationalizing such systems and of making the data available to all countries is a desirable step towards increasing mutual confidence among all nations. One hopes that early detection of aggressive preparations and the world-wide dissemination of such information may inhibit nations from the use of force to solve disputes.

There are other passive military activities in outer space which include the use of sophisticated navigation, weather and communication satellites. One is seeing an increased militarization of this category of space activity. This may not be a direct stationing of weapons in space and so one may not be able to object to it, but it does remain a tremendous amplifier of the force being put together on earth. Imbalance in this amplification factor could be, perhaps, as unsettling as the imbalance in the number of missiles in the silos. The increased importance of such systems in the sky might also be a temptation to an adversary in time of conflict to try to knock them out by exploding, let us say, a single atomic weapon in space, thereby also eliminating indiscriminately most of the satellites being used by various countries for their very basic needs of communication, education and earth observation. Increased militarization of space therefore seems to be a factor distinctly discouraging the exploitation of the tremendous potential of space for peaceful purposes.

In recent years, however, a greater danger has dwarfed these concerns. This is the "weaponization" of outer space, that is, the actual deployment of weapons in space. Systems already exist, though they are not yet operational, capable of incapacitating enemy satellites through rendezvous and mechanical destruction, perhaps using pellets or even nails, if not explosives, spread in their path.
Substantial efforts are being made to develop laser weapons, even though meaningful systems of this type are still far from realization. This is one area in which there is an urgent need to take action because after such systems are actually deployed it would be very difficult to come to an agreement. Bilateral negotiations on the non-deployment of anti-satellite weapons have been abandoned and it is probable that tests in this regard are already proceeding.

On the other hand, I do not have to mention to this Committee the very numerous and potentially great beneficial uses of outer space. Especially for developing countries, space holds out great promise: for education, for upgrading health services, for communication, weather prediction, resource-management and so on. It is these hopes and the need to see how best they can be realized that have prompted the convening of the Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNISPACE 82), which will be held in August this year.

It is clear that peaceful uses can proceed unhindered and rapidly only if the military use of space is checked. Such sentiments have been expressed in many of the national papers submitted to the Conference. Children from all countries, participating in an international essay competition held in connexion with preparations for the Conference, have agonized over this question even more. I do not have to spell out for the Committee the implications for co-operation, for technology transfer and for the availability of technology if space becomes an arena of greater and greater military activity.

What specific steps need to be taken in this regard? It seems to me that the first priority must be the banning of all weapons from space. This should be done before they are an important reality, because it would be difficult to address this question after one or the other side gains a distinct advantage in this regard. We should ensure the inviolability of all peaceful space activities by guaranteeing all peaceful space objects against any form of attack. As I mentioned earlier, some form of an international monitoring system through space surveillance may also be desirable.
Some of these issues are already before the Disarmament Commission. Given the heavy agenda of that body and recognizing the fact that the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space also has some relevant expertise and experience in this area, being very intimately involved in formulating the first space treaty, the latter Committee could also be asked to examine the question, perhaps jointly with the Disarmament Commission.

Of course, we need to go further than these holding steps. If wars begin in the minds of men, should we examine the possibility of some kind of United Nations system for information dissemination - through broadcasting satellites, for example? This could be a means of conveying impartial, factual information, of disseminating different points of view. For example, live telecasts of this General Assembly session could be broadcast as a counterpoint to propaganda and distorted information that tends to arouse xenophobia. Should we not also aid in the dissemination of space technology and its applications to all countries so that the economic disparities that may one day cause an upheaval are reduced before it is too late?

I believe we need to act quickly, for time is not on our side. Developments in this area proceed very fast. Space, I have often felt, should result in a new ethic for man. The images from space that show this unique planet as one small element in the whole universe should awaken us to our common destiny, just as science has made us aware of our common ancestry. Surely we cannot continue living in fear of devastation by war or, for millions, by want. Space technology provides one tool, a powerful tool, to improve the human condition. To me it seems also to offer a tool and a challenge to the human psyche. Can we accept this challenge and march towards a future of peace and plenty?
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION OF THE 1980s AS THE SECOND DISARMAMENT DECADE AND CONSIDERATION OF INITIATIVES AND PROPOSALS OF MEMBER STATES

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): Members will recall that at its fourth meeting the Ad Hoc Committee decided that the deadline for the submission of proposals by Member States should be extended to Monday, 28 June, which is today. This means that the proposals must be submitted to the Secretariat in writing in the course of today.

I should like to inform delegations that the proposals can be submitted until midnight tonight, instead of the usual deadline of 6 p.m.
(The Chairman)

The Bureau of the Committee has recommended that delegations which wish to introduce proposals orally be given an opportunity to do so at this meeting. Since it is my understanding that the Committee has no objection to that procedure I shall now call on representatives wishing to introduce such proposals.

Mr. RAPEMAEUSE (Belgium) (interpretation from French): When on 8 June last the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs addressed the General Assembly, he referred to two contributions which Belgium wished to make to our work. I should like to set them forth today.

The first relates to the regional approach to disarmament. The Secretary-General has circulated Belgium's memorandum on the subject in document A/S 12/AC.1/17. The proposals contained in it are the follow up which Belgium suggests for the study of regional disarmament in all its aspects. The text of the document is I hope explicit. I should however, like to draw the Committee's attention to a few of its basic elements.

At the thirty-fifth and thirty sixth sessions the General Assembly agreed by consensus on this regional approach, and my country welcomed that. That is why we feel that it would be useful to continue the work Belgium and a number of other countries have been doing for several years now. We attach great importance to the reaffirmation of the consensus. Therefore we wished to submit suggestions that took into account all the positions expressed on the regional approach. We deliberately decided not to submit more ambitious proposals which could be harmful to the attainment of the unanimity that we are seeking.

In defining the general framework for any future action we have in particular recalled two fundamental criteria. First of all regional disarmament must contribute to the achievement of general and complete disarmament. It can be justified only if it makes such a contribution and is not an obstacle. Secondly regional disarmament measures can be taken only by a consensus of the States of the region States that have sovereign identity as such. It is not up to us in this world Assembly, to define the regions; rather it is up to the States in their respective regions.
But the United Nations has an important role to play - namely, the development and organization of the process that this initiative is aimed at. The United Nations must first of all encourage efforts at the regional level. In this respect we suggest various indicative provisions that it should be possible to implement in the region. A link should be established between the region and the United Nations. Here too we suggest various measures, including a provision that Governments and the competent regional institutions should, if they so desire, inform the United Nations of regional disarmament measures taken.

The measures we are proposing should enable the United Nations to play its full role, and the States will benefit thereby.

The various suggestions are reflected also in the form of a draft resolution which depending on circumstances could be adapted to the requirements of the special session. Our delegation is quite flexible at this stage with respect to how the draft resolution should be used. We hope, however, that these suggestions, if endorsed, will be reflected adequately in the document that will emanate from the special session.

The second draft deals with a more specific question - the monitoring of the prohibition of the use in warfare of chemical and bacteriological weapons. Belgium has also submitted a memorandum on this subject, in document A/S.12/AC.1/18. The need to develop and broaden the work done by the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of chemical and bacteriological methods has been realized for a long time now.

In 1972 a convention banning the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological weapons was concluded. A draft convention having the same objectives in the field of chemical weapons is at present under negotiation in Geneva. However there is a desirable complement to the present system prohibiting this type of weapon of mass destruction - the setting up of international machinery for verification of the non-use in combat of chemical and bacteriological weapons. The development of such machinery would meet a need that is greatly felt by international opinion.

We have given some thought to new institutional provisions mainly because of the need to cover all chemical and bacteriological weapons and also because verification of their non-use requires methods that could ensure a speedy procedure.
Moreover, the solution that we advocate should allow us to overcome certain difficulties connected with the implementation of the convention on the banning of chemical weapons now being negotiated in the Committee on Disarmament. The machinery for verification that we are suggesting be set up should be able to function within reasonable time-limits and be accessible not only to States parties to the new international instrument but, by right, to all those that have acceded to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and to the Convention on bacteriological weapons. The parties to this treaty would meet occasionally within an advisory committee whose task would be to define and assess the modalities of the action undertaken. But it would be to a restricted body - the standing committee, functioning under a very flexible procedure - that the operational tasks of control would be entrusted, especially those dealing with possible complaints. The members of that committee, established on a geographical basis, could be the heads of diplomatic missions accredited to the United Nations. This composition would guarantee the flexibility of the system, but also allow and above all for swift action. All the parties concerned in a complaint would moreover have the right to be represented within that body. A small technical secretariat would guarantee the indispensable logistic support and, with the assistance of national bodies and competent organizations such as the World Health Organization, would draw up adequate control procedures and improve them later, if need be.
An inquiry could be set up very rapidly. This is an essential element of any verification system, as is the possibility of sending an international mission of inquiry to the spot. The report drawn up by the standing committee following an examination of the complaint would be an important element of assessment for the bodies of the system set up under the Charter to settle differences.

The institutional section of the provisions set forth in our memorandum could perhaps be redrafted, at the appropriate time, to take into account a convention banning chemical weapons and to avoid duplication within the Organization. That is one of the reasons why we have suggested that the Committee on Disarmament, where this convention is being negotiated, should also be entrusted with the carrying out of our plan, again in conformity with its role as the single negotiating body.

The system that we are proposing stands halfway between initiatives relating to the general problem of the verification of the whole series of agreements on disarmament and those dealing with certain limited aspects of controlling the prohibition on the use in combat of chemical and bacteriological weapons. We must position ourselves within the framework of the former and avail ourselves of the latter.

Our proposal has been the subject of many consultations, carried out without taking into account the lines that divide States. It seems to us to be capable of filling a gap which is often evident. Recourse to a procedure of impartial examination of the facts should allow us to eliminate controversy and mistrust in an area whose importance need not be stressed.

In submitting this memorandum to the special session, so that the session may discuss it and, if need be, determine appropriate means for following it up, we are convinced that we are making a useful contribution to the work of disarmament.
Mr. VAERNØ (Norway): In document A/S-12/AC.1/32, my delegation has put forward certain proposals concerning agenda item 12, Enhancement of the effectiveness of machinery in the field of disarmament and strengthening of the role of the United Nations in this field, including the possible convening of a World Disarmament Conference. In the view of my delegation there is a need for strengthening the multilateral machinery in the field of disarmament. We are of course aware of the fact that institutional arrangements cannot by themselves provide a substitute for real progress in disarmament negotiations.

In the opinion of my delegation the role and function of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies should be more precisely defined. A new mandate for the Board might comprise the following tasks: first, to advise the Secretary-General on studies and research under the auspices of the United Nations or institutions of the United Nations family; secondly, to serve as a scientific board for the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), reviewing and approving the annual programme of that Institute; thirdly, to advise the Secretary-General, upon his request, on any matter within the area of disarmament and arms limitations; and fourthly, to assess activities undertaken in connexion with the World Disarmament Campaign.

The membership of the Board should be maintained on its present balanced and equitable geographical basis. The Board ought to meet once or twice a year.

The establishment of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research represented, we think, a significant strengthening of the research activities of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. Bearing in mind resolution 36/97 D, concerning institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament, this session should decide to make UNIDIR an autonomous institute within the United Nations framework, working in close contact with the United Nations Secretariat. Its headquarters should be maintained in Geneva. The main tasks of the Institute would be to conduct research on disarmament and other issues related to security in general.
According to General Assembly resolution 36/97 J, the first review of the membership of the Committee on Disarmament should be completed, following appropriate consultations among Member States, during this session. We understand from the special report of the Committee on Disarmament that the members of the Committee will complete their consultations on this question during this session.

Against that background, the Norwegian Government would like to make the following observations: In our opinion, the Committee on Disarmament should remain the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament, taking its decisions on the basis of consensus. We hope that the members of the Committee on Disarmament will agree among themselves to a limited expansion of the Committee's membership, compatible, of course, with the requirements entailed by the Committee's role as a negotiating body. In our view, a limited expansion which included countries having special interest and expertise in the field of disarmament would increase the representative nature of the Committee without hampering its negotiating character.

My Government hopes that the members of the Committee on Disarmament will take those views into consideration.

Hrs. THORSSON (Sweden): In my statement before this Committee on 14 June, I outlined in broad terms the expectations and ideas that the Swedish delegation had and has with regard to the outcome of this special session of the General Assembly. I am not going to repeat what I said on that occasion, but I would like to introduce some Swedish proposals, to be inserted in the relevant documents which are expected to emerge from this session. Unfortunately, there is still considerable uncertainty as to which particular working groups should deal with some of the proposed paragraphs.
In the view of the Swedish delegation, matters which pertain to the past, the present and the immediate future, that is, matters to be decided upon by the present General Assembly session, should in principle be dealt with in Working Group II. Entirely new initiatives, which are not to be regarded as a follow-up to past or present activities, should be taken up in Working Group III and, finally, what is to be regarded as being of a long-term character and part of the disarmament process as such belong to the comprehensive programme on disarmament and should, therefore, be referred to Working Group I.

There has been extensive discussion in Working Group II regarding the nature of the review and assessment to be undertaken in that Group. It seems to my delegation that it is natural to draw practical conclusions from the review, which would in several cases entail recommendations for action. Otherwise that exercise would be almost meaningless. In order to avoid having first lengthy discussions of all issues when reviewing them and later repeating the arguments in trying to formulate and agree upon recommendations, it would seem more practical to formulate the conclusions and - if need be recommendations - immediately in connexion with reviewing and assessing the various items in the Final Document.

After these introductory, general remarks, let me now turn briefly to document A/S-12/AC.1/39, which has been submitted by the Swedish delegation.

Paragraph 41 in the so-called "composite paper" deals with the verification of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. My delegation belongs to those that emphasize the importance of adequate verification. But one must observe that it is not reasonable to request more than what is called adequate verification, that is, somewhat less than 100 per cent verification but effective enough to make cheating too risky to be worthwhile. In this context it is important to make use of technical means like seismic methods and monitoring of airborne radioactivity. But politically important tools such as the concept of "verification by challenge" can also play a significant role in allaying suspicions and unfounded accusations. We therefore suggest that this concept should also be borne in mind in this context.
The highly topical issue of a "nuclear freeze" is reflected in several paragraphs in the composite paper. Paragraph 187 (b) reflects the Swedish position in this matter. Let me in passing mention that I am surprised that some countries consider this issue so controversial. "The nuclear freeze" is indeed nothing but "the cessation of the nuclear arms race", a goal to which all parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty since 1970, and we all, Member States of the United Nations, have been committed since the first special session on disarmament.

Another question of vital importance in the nuclear field is the fact that the tactical nuclear weapons - sometimes called battlefield nuclear weapons - are not subject to any negotiations. The Swedish Government is of the opinion that all tactical nuclear weapons should be gradually reduced and ultimately eliminated. For this reason paragraph 44 of the composite paper was introduced on the initiative of my delegation.

Sweden has for many years, as a matter of principle, urged that the complaints procedure in the Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons Convention be improved. The Review Conference in 1980 regarding that Convention recognized this need and concluded in its Final Document that "this question should be considered at an appropriate time". That is why my delegation has proposed the insertion of paragraph 78 in the composite paper.

It is of the utmost importance to prevent an arms race in outer space, not least after the inspiring and stimulating statement that we heard a few minutes ago by the Secretary-General of UNISPACE-82. Recent developments in both East and West seem to confirm this, as they obviously lead to an increased militarization of that part of our environment. Paragraph 107 in the composite paper therefore urges the space Powers to make a determined effort to limit the military use of outer space. In particular, the urgency of bans on anti-satellite and anti-ballistic warfare is underlined.

There are also other domains, inter alia, the sea-bed, which are threatened by growing militarization. Technological developments in this field should be kept under review in preparation of the second review conference of the parties to the Sea-Bed Treaty. As emphasized in paragraph 102 in the composite paper, the Committee on Disarmament should play an active role in such preparations.
In a world characterized by growing militarization it is important to keep in mind the environmental aspects of the arms race. The Swedish delegation therefore proposes that the Secretary-General, in co-operation with the United Nations Environment Programme, be requested to undertake continuing assessment, monitoring and evaluation of the impact of military activity on the environment.

My delegation further considers it essential to draw attention to the fact that the naval arms race goes on unabated and is not even under serious discussion in any disarmament forum. For this reason Sweden proposes the initiation of a United Nations study which can provide a factual basis for proposals regarding limitations and reductions in the naval field.

Among new Swedish initiatives at this session I should also like to refer particularly to the proposal for a United Nations study on military research and development and its impact, in qualitative terms, on the arms race as contained in paragraph 188 (c) of the composite paper.

Among the expert studies submitted to this session is a report on the reduction of military budgets. It provides a valuable technical background for the further refinement of the tools needed to compare military expenditures in different countries and in different years. This work must be continued. Sweden has therefore submitted a formal proposal to that effect. Excessive secrecy in these matters can only give rise to suspicions and contribute to fueling the arms race. Let me, therefore, in this context also emphasize the importance of the reporting instrument being used by as many countries as possible and particularly the importance of having new groups of countries involved in this exercise.

This special session of the General Assembly has been requested to take concrete action on two studies, one of which is the study on the relationship between disarmament and development. Many positive and constructive comments have been made on this study in the general debate, and the other day I noted with particular interest the forceful and valuable interventions made by Mr. Jean Ripert, Director-General for Development and International Economic Co-operation; by Mr. Bradford Morse, Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme; and by Mr. Mostafa Kamal Tolba, Executive Director.
of the United Nations Environment Programme. The five Nordic countries have
today jointly submitted their proposals for decisions by the second special
session based on the recommendations made in the study.

The other study submitted to this special session for substantive
consideration is the study on institutional arrangements relating to the process
of disarmament. My country has for many years argued in favour of the
establishment of an independent disarmament body within the United Nations system.
The matter has been thoroughly examined and developments in the last few years
have illustrated the merits of this idea. It is now time to decide, at least
in principle, that such an independent body within the United Nations framework
shall be established. Some practical modalities will, however, still have to
be worked out in some detail. As a first step towards the creation of such a
body, my delegation would be prepared to consider the establishment of a
department for disarmament affairs within the United Nations Secretariat. For
this purpose we suggest the replacement of paragraph 164 of the composite paper
by two new paragraphs on the same subject.

Let me in this context also briefly dwell on another topic within the
field of disarmament machinery. Sweden was the first country to speak out
in the Committee on Disarmament in favour of a limited increase in the
membership of the Committee, which would make it possible for those non-members
which are particularly interested and competent in the disarmament field to
become members. My delegation continues to maintain this position. A small
number of new members will not debar the Committee on Disarmament from acting
as an effective negotiating body, which is essential. On the contrary, competent
and interested new members are likely to strengthen the Committee.
Sweden has pledged 500,000 Swedish crowns to the financing of the World Disarmament Campaign. I hope that many other countries will also contribute to this Campaign. In so doing I want to stress that Sweden made its pledge against the background of the report of the Secretary-General. The report emphasized that the Campaign should be carried out in all regions of the world in a balanced, factual and objective manner. I am sure that not only Sweden but also many potential contributors attach great importance to this and will follow the carrying out of the Campaign with great attention.

Mr. van Dongen (Netherlands): I take pleasure in introducing working document A/S-12/AC.1/35, on the structure of the Committee on Disarmament.

We all know, of course, that the Committee on Disarmament is master of its own procedures. Nevertheless, this special session presents an opportunity to give an impetus towards improvement of its structure and organization, as was done at the first special session on disarmament, as reflected in paragraph 120 of the Final Document. Nowadays the Committee on Disarmament is a much more active organization than it was a number of years ago. The enormously increased number of meetings, both in working groups and in a variety of informal meetings, bears this out. In itself this is a good sign, but on the other hand it also brings out that, clearly, the internal organization of the Committee on Disarmament has not kept pace with the requirements of its being the multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament.

Delegations are rushing from one meeting to another and during the sessions they barely have time for reflection on the often very complicated issues before them. One of the causes of this unsatisfactory state of affairs is the fact that the periods during which the Committee on Disarmament is actively at work are very limited. Sessions of the Committee are squeezed in between meetings of deliberative bodies like the General Assembly, the United Nations Disarmament Commission and so forth. This is rather odd. While we all underline the necessity of concrete negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament, we barely
give it the chance to do its work properly. No one would advocate the idea that, for instance, the START negotiations or the mutual and balanced force reduction talks in Vienna should be suspended during the General Assembly or Disarmament Commission sessions. Yet at the same time it is regarded as normal that the multilateral negotiations should come to a temporary halt.

We believe that this situation ought to be redressed immediately. It should be possible for the Committee on Disarmament and/or its working groups to be in session the year round, with a few relatively short recesses to get fresh instructions and to reconsider positions. Thus much more time would be available for organizing the complicated work and for making more progress in the various working groups. This would also make it possible to handle more subjects.

Giving the working groups a more independent status may also be worthy of consideration. In other words, they might be given more leeway to organize their own work schedules rather than being dependent on other working groups. Some issues are more complicated than others; many require the attendance of experts; and diversity in organization is therefore required.

At Geneva several ideas on how to improve the organization of the Committee on Disarmament have been put forward, and we should like to leave it mainly to that Committee itself to have another look at its own organization. But this special session can give a good political impulse to do just that.

This is why we have introduced our proposal. We would of course welcome other suggestions on this matter, but we believe that there is a need to improve the Committee on Disarmament as an effective negotiating body.

I would also draw the Ad Hoc Committee's attention to the Netherlands working paper on an international disarmament organization. My Prime Minister has already taken up this matter and related suggestions have been made by other delegations, notably those of Italy, Japan and Sweden. Although those proposals differ slightly from ours, all of them make the same point: that is, that some kind of an organization will be necessary to cope with the verification and implementation of multilateral disarmament treaties. We all know, for example, that a treaty banning chemical weapons will demand a good deal of machinery to handle notifications, to organize consultations between parties, to verify the treaty and so forth. The same holds for a nuclear test ban, with an international seismic verification system.
We would welcome a first exchange of views on these proposals. The special session could then decide to ask Governments for detailed comments on the structure and the tasks of a disarmament organization, and subsequently, a report could be made by a group of experts. We do not want to rush this matter, but I think that the time has come to start discussing seriously the concept of the creation of such an organization.

This brings me to the last part of my statement. Besides the ideas I have mentioned, other proposals have been made in the field of disarmament machinery, inter alia, by France and by Norway, on the United Nations Centre for Disarmament, on the Advisory Board, on the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, and so on. All of these are important matters on which this special session must decide, or at least give guidance. Surprisingly, there is no special working group or drafting group at this special session which handles these questions. This situation — in which in all working groups some questions relating to machinery are being discussed, but in which some such questions are not being discussed at all — is highly unsatisfactory to us.

We are convinced that it is not desirable to wait much longer, and we ask for the Chairman's guidance now on how and where agenda item 12 on institutional aspects and machinery is to be discussed as a whole. I formally repeat my earlier suggestion that as from today a contact group of the Ad Hoc Committee be set up to discuss machinery. By bringing questions of machinery together we can and should take a look at the multilateral disarmament organization as an integrated whole.

Mr. VENKATESWARAN (India): In his statement on 11 June in the plenary meeting of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament the Foreign Minister of India declared that the first and most urgent step in the efforts to root out the menace of nuclear weapons should be an immediate agreement on the total prohibition of their use. India subsequently submitted the text of a draft convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons pending the complete elimination of such weapons.

At our meeting this morning I have the honour of introducing the proposal contained in document A/S-12/AC.1/13 dated 17 June 1982, and to commend it for favourable consideration by this special session.
Ever since nuclear weapons were first used, in 1945, the conscience of all humanity has been filled with deep revulsion and horror at the very prospect of their ever being used again. Yet the accumulation and refinement of these means of mass annihilation have continued at an accelerated pace, with the result that today the world faces an imminent threat to the very survival of mankind.

This Assembly has gathered at a time when renewed international tensions and great-power confrontation threaten to tear apart the fragile fabric of peace. At times such as this it is the duty of all nations, big and small, whatever their political persuasion or ideology, to return to their first and most important responsibility to their peoples: the responsibility to ensure their survival. For only if the survival of the human species is ensured can the security of States have any relevance. It is with this urgent sense of responsibility that India has proposed the present draft convention for the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

In its preamble the draft convention reaffirms an important declaration that has been made in many resolutions of the General Assembly since 1961: namely, that any use of nuclear weapons constitutes a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity. Some delegations have questioned the accuracy of this declaration. It has been argued that Article 51 of the United Nations Charter guarantees States the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence. It has also been stated that the Charter prohibits any use of force and that a prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons only would constitute a licence for the use of force through other means, such as conventional armaments and armed forces.

To those who put forward such arguments our response is simple. Is the right to self-defence an unlimited right? Can this right be interpreted to mean that in pursuit of its national security a State can put into jeopardy the security of other States as well as the very survival of mankind? Does the right of self-defence imply a jettisoning of the obligations of States to humanity and civilization in general? Does this right imply a licence for the use of weapons of mass destruction, which would surely annihilaate combatants and non-combatants alike and lead to the extermination of all living beings on this planet of ours?
Can there be any doubt as to what the response of any sane person should be to these questions?

Recently the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy issued a statement after a meeting in New York in May of this year in which it categorically declared that the use of nuclear weapons of any type would "inevitably result in massive violations of both the Hague Conventions of 1907 and the Geneva Conventions of 1949".

To those who argue that no specific treaty or body of rules prohibits nuclear weapons or their use, the Lawyers' Committee has pointed to a general principle contained in the 1907 Hague Regulations known as the Martens clause, which states:

"The inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and rule of the principles of the laws of nations as a result of the usages established among civilized peoples from the laws of humanity and the dictates of public conscience".

It is on the basis of this long-standing and fundamental principle that the General Assembly of the United Nations has correctly and consistently declared that any use of nuclear weapons would be a violation of the United Nations Charter and a crime against humanity.

Let me now turn to the other argument - namely, that the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons only would detract from the general prohibition of the use of force contained in the Charter. This is simply not true. As we have pointed out, there already exists a substantial body of international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, which imposes certain obligations upon States in the conduct of their affairs. The obligation not to use force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another State is a universal principle. The application of this principle will not in legal terms be abridged in any way by the adoption, through mutually agreed instruments, of specific prohibitions on the use of certain categories of weapons. If such were the case, then the Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibiting the use of chemical and biological weapons could also be interpreted as contrary to the principle of the non-use of force. But this is obviously not the case.
The adoption of a convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would in our view confirm what we already regard as prohibited by the laws of humanity and the dictates of public conscience. Today millions upon millions of ordinary citizens all over the globe are demanding, in the name of these laws of humanity, in the name of the dictates of public conscience, in the name of the survival of mankind, an immediate end to the menace posed by nuclear weapons.

The most effective guarantee against the danger of nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament. Pending nuclear disarmament, however, we must meet the challenge of the growing danger of the outbreak of nuclear war by adopting at this session a convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. To do less would be a cruel mockery of the hopes and aspirations of the peoples of the world, whose survival and well-being all Governments claim to serve. For let us not forget that the United Nations is the representative of the peoples of the world, as it is of their Governments, and that the Charter of the United Nations is in fact a declaration of the hopes and aspirations of the peoples of the world.

It is the peoples of the United Nations that in the United Nations Charter have declared their determination "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war". Today they demand an end to the threat of total annihilation posed by the existence of nuclear weapons. The adoption of the convention I have the honour to introduce today would therefore be one small but crucial step in implementing the noble principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter.

Before concluding I should like to inform the Committee that my delegation intends at the appropriate time to propose a draft resolution to enable the General Assembly at this special session to adopt the draft convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, with a view to its ratification and entry into force. It is our earnest hope that the General Assembly will be able to adopt by consensus the draft resolution with the draft convention annexed to it.
Mr. BLOKHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): Our Committee is now entering a new phase, and the focal point of work has been moved to the subsidiary bodies that are considering the results of the Final Document and the priority tasks in the field of disarmament. It is the view of the Soviet delegation that the general debate has once again confirmed that the central question of contemporary international policy is the prevention of a nuclear war, the curbing of the arms race and the reduction of military tension.
That is illustrated not only by the statements made by the majority of delegations of States Members of the United Nations and representatives of non-governmental organizations but by the numerous statements made by those who support peace and the curbing of the arms race. We hear their voices and we witness the active participation in the struggle for peace of the Soviet people, who, at many meetings, have demanded an end to the arms race and the removal of the possibility of a nuclear catastrophe.

With the aim of avoiding that catastrophe, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, said in a message to the second special session on disarmament that the Soviet Union had assumed an obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. That unilateral and important act by the Soviet Union is intended to promote a turning away from the danger of today to a more reliable and permanent peace and to strengthen the hope of peoples that the nuclear fire will never be started anywhere.

That statement has already received wide support, both within the United Nations and beyond. I should like to take this opportunity to express our delegation's gratitude to all those representatives who at this session have reacted positively to the new Soviet initiative.

A number of delegations have put forward various ideas for the removal or restriction of the threat of nuclear war. Those proposals merit wide-scale consideration and concrete decisions. That is why the Soviet delegation, like many others, is determined to insist upon the immediate establishment of a subsidiary body to concentrate on drawing up measures on this most important question.

We are convinced that this session will not live up to the world wide hopes for it if it does not give prime attention to the prevention of nuclear war. Questions related to that matter are the focal point of the Soviet Union's memorandum entitled "Averting the growing nuclear threat and curbing the arms race" introduced by the Foreign Minister of the USSR, Andrei Gromyko on 15 June, for consideration by this session. That sets out the general position and our country's most important proposals.
The Soviet Union believes that it is better immediately to work out and adopt a programme of nuclear disarmament, to be implemented in stages. The document also puts forward the USSR's position on such important questions as a comprehensive ban on all nuclear-weapon tests, the prevention of the further proliferation of nuclear weapons, the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space, the limitation of naval activities, the limitation and reduction of conventional armaments and so on.

Undoubtedly, one of the most urgent tasks in the curbing of the arms race is the banning of chemical weapons. The Soviet Union appeals for an urgent decision on that matter. In his statement in the plenary session on 15 June the Foreign Minister of the USSR put forward for consideration, together with the memorandum, a draft document entitled 'Basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction'. We are convinced that on the basis of the Soviet draft there is a possibility of achieving progress towards the banning of this dangerous means of mass annihilation.

The Soviet delegation reserves the right to speak in more detail on our proposals in those documents. In this statement we are formally presenting for the consideration of the Committee of the whole and its subsidiary bodies the message sent by Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev to the second special session devoted to disarmament, the Soviet memorandum on averting the nuclear threat and curbing the arms race and the document entitled 'Basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction'. We hope that those documents will be studied with great attention and supported by Member States. If necessary, the Soviet delegation is ready to submit the corresponding draft resolutions.

As a doctor and as President of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR I wish to state that scholars and medical experts in the USSR are now studying the medical consequences of a possible nuclear war. We are following with great alarm what is happening in the Middle East because of the Israeli aggression in Lebanon and the sufferings of the Lebanese and the Palestinian people but these are far removed from the results of a nuclear war. Even the experience of Hiroshima and Nagasaki cannot tell us what nuclear war today
would mean. The dropping of the atom bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was restricted nuclear war, about which much has been said. That could no longer happen, because the State that dropped the bomb had a monopoly on it and knew that there could be no reprisals.

Doctors have considered the matter at two international congresses. In Cambridge in April this year representatives of 30 countries unanimously agreed that the idea of restricted nuclear war could not be taken seriously, for it could not happen. We were trying to decide what would happen if, for example, a 1-megaton bomb were dropped on a city with 1 million inhabitants. The general view of the doctors who discussed these questions was that one third of the inhabitants would die in the first minute after the explosion. Such a bomb would cause a mushroom cloud containing 1 million tons of various kinds of material, including parts of buildings, all of which would fall to earth again, burying and killing the people of the city.

The suffering and destruction in a nuclear war are of a number of kinds combined. They involve not only mechanical trauma but fire and radiation. Those aspects, which are considerable, will if they do not lead to immediate death result in death within a short time. Those who survive such a catastrophe will suffer various diseases, such as cancer and possibly brain disease, as will their offspring. The society that might remain after such a war would consist of cripples, idiots and people severely handicapped and not fully developed.

Any nuclear explosion will inevitably lead to global catastrophe. Therefore, such a study is very important. Not only should it be carried out, but its results should be widely propagated so that the broad masses of people know the real threat of a nuclear war.
In our Academy of Sciences, there is a special scientific Committee that was set up to study the possible medical consequences of a nuclear war. I had to speak here, to make our proposals and refer to this information, which is causing us a great deal of anxiety. We also deplore the fact that our international Organization is powerless in the face of what is happening now in the Middle East, regardless of the fact that the opinion of the overwhelming majority and the general opinion of the United Nations have been expressed through a vote taken the day before yesterday. Even though we are all unanimous, it is a bitter fact that, regardless of the unanimous view of our Organization, everything is continuing as before.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.