Twelfth special session

AD HOC COMMITTEE OF THE TWELFTH SPECIAL SESSION

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 8TH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Friday, 25 June 1982, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. VENKATESWARAN (India) (Vice-Chairman)

later: Mr. ALESSI (Italy) (Vice-Chairman)

later: Mr. OKAYA (Japan) (Vice-Chairman)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.30 p.m.

STATEMENTS BY PEACE AND DISARMAMENT RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS

The CHAIRMAN: I now call on Mr. Maurice Tugwell, the Director of the Centre for Conflict Studies.

Mr. TUGWELL (Centre for Conflict Studies): Although this special session of the General Assembly is being held at a moment of intense public concern about nuclear war, I dare to suggest that the probability of such a war is at present very slight indeed. The great Powers have too much to lose. So long as each nuclear-armed alliance fears the power of the other, the world is relatively safe. I appeal to the United Nations and to the peace movements of the world to respect this balance.

I do not ask anyone to endorse the present arrangement as a lasting basis for peace. Deterrence strategy, with its implied willingness to initiate nuclear war to halt aggression, is abhorrent. But so long as world peace is threatened by expansionist Powers, deterrence is our best peace-keeper. We have therefore to retain an unattractive system that works while we find ways, first, to reduce the level of armaments, secondly, to remove fear and hatred from men's hearts and, thirdly, to eradicate the major political cause of world conflict.

Nuclear deterrence can work with a fraction of existing stocks. Proposals for massive and regular cuts in stockpiles deserve the support of this Ad Hoc Committee and of the men and women who have thronged the streets of this city in recent weeks. But deterrence cannot work unless both sides understand, without a shadow of doubt, the lines that must not be crossed without risking nuclear war. A no-first-use treaty would blur those lines, and it would generate all manner of doubts and temptations. History has repeatedly shown that treaties without trust offer only false security. Can anyone here doubt that non-nuclear war between East and West is the likeliest road to nuclear war?
I have served on active duty with a United Nations peace-keeping force. I am a peace activist. As such, I urge the Western peace movement to serve the best interests of peace by applying balanced pressures on both Power blocs for massive but balanced arms cuts. The Western peace movement must communicate a sustained message of peace and brotherhood to the peoples of the Soviet bloc. They should invade the international air waves, using all available radio transmitters, to establish person-to-person links with their brothers and sisters beyond the minefields and the wire. Such messages will be warmly received. They will break down the fears and the suspicions created by hate propaganda. The next stage, which is difficult, dangerous, but not impossible, is for East-bloc citizens to generate pressures for peace and disarmament in their own countries. Thus all Governments will come under pressure and neither bloc can easily manipulate the peace movement to disarm its adversary, thereby upsetting balance and increasing the dangers of war.

The United Nations and peace activists should turn their backs on so-called peace proposals that undermine stability or promote partisan interests. Unilateral disarmament, for example, weakens deterrence and the Soviet motive to negotiate, exposes its advocates to nuclear blackmail or attack and might eventually allow its unfortunate victims to be drafted into Soviet military service. Nuclear-weapon-free zones can safely be applied in regions of great-Power confrontation only if their boundaries have equal effect on both sides. The proposal to make Canada a nuclear-free zone is counterproductive to the cause of peace because it would leave Soviet nuclear bases in the sub-Arctic intact, while severely handicapping the West at the same latitude. Similarly, a zone of peace has to be applied symmetrically or not at all. Neutralizing countries or regions beyond its borders has long been a Soviet tactic.
The campaign against NATO modernization is blatantly political in character, yet it has opened up the possibility for a complete ban on intermediate-range nuclear-weapon systems, which should be energetically pursued. Those in Western Europe who oppose NATO missiles while approving of the Soviet variety are, alas, what Lenin called "useful idiots". Since the "freeze now" campaign would effectively consolidate Soviet nuclear superiority over Europe, its supporters do have to ask themselves if they are drifting into the same distressing category.

I hope that this Committee will condemn the exploitation of mass hysteria and fear, the deliberate generation of nuclear panic. Terrorists use this psychological technique to force compliance from their victims, and it is worrying to see it used by parts of the peace movement. The intention no doubt is to deprive us of the capacity for rational thought, so that we can be coerced into concessions and mistaken policies. This is not the road to peace.

The true road to peace will lead us away from the root causes of war which make our present deterrent policy necessary. We can reject deterrence and make real strides towards disarmament when all nations, and especially the Soviet Union, abandon imperialism and expansionism. It is these forces, not the means of defence chosen by the West, which threaten world peace. I respectfully urge this Committee, with its valiant record of opposition to imperialism, not to abandon this struggle. The world's last great empire remains intact, holding millions of people in colonial status. Surely the United Nations will not turn its back on South Yemen, Afghanistan, Central Asia, Cambodia, Poland and elsewhere.

In recognizing the Soviet Union as the major source of imperialism today, we may also view that imperialism as the tragic legacy of Russian history and Marxist-Leninist ideology. This legacy weighs even more heavily on ordinary Russians than on their subject peoples. It gives rise to spiritual and social decay in the Soviet Union, unrest in Eastern Europe and fighting in Afghanistan and South-East Asia. This over-extended empire demands an excessive military establishment, which in turn drains the Soviet economy. It is, therefore, very much in the Soviet Union's own best interests to abandon imperialism,
withdraw the Drezhnev doctrine, and declare a moratorium on expansionism. A challenge before the United Nations is to find peaceful means of persuading the Soviets to act in their own countries, as well as the world's best interests.

In conclusion, please may I express the hope that this Committee, inspired by evidence of public concern, and guided as always by the commitment of the United Nations to the welfare of humanity, will nevertheless recognize that there is no easy short cut to peace and disarmament. Peace is the prize we may win if we respect the existing balance, negotiate extensive cuts, spread a message of brotherhood and eliminate imperialism. It is a challenging task, but one that can be accomplished provided we proceed with rationality and courage.

The CHAIRMAN: I know call upon Rear-Admiral Gene La Rocque, representing the Center for Defense Information, to make his statement.

Rear-Admiral LA ROCQUE: I am honoured to address this second special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament. We meet here today in a climate of both despair and hope. Much of the world is at war, but there is a rising world consciousness that the nuclear arms race must be slowed, stopped and reversed. This meeting of the world's Governments can make the difference in developing concrete action to move away from conflict towards a more stable and peaceful world order.

Armed conflicts exist today in some forty countries. Man's capacity for civilized savagery, applying the fruits of his intelligence to destruction, are constantly on display. Record levels of military spending and the international arms trade are accompanied by super-Power plans for the unprecedented expansion of nuclear weapons. Preparations to fight and win a nuclear war have increased. The United States and the Soviet Union are bitterly hostile to each other and are on a course towards nuclear war.
For many years there have been some in the United States who have perceived the Soviet Union as a threat to the peace and security of the world. At this moment, the current United States political leadership has determined that it would be in the interest of the United States and would promote peace and stability in the world if the Soviet Union were rendered impotent, economically, politically and militarily. It is equally apparent that the Soviet Union is determined to expand and strengthen its economic, political and military influence in the world. The strength, determination and intensity of feeling in both the United States and the Soviet Union on this fundamental difference puts both nations on converging courses which, if continued, will lead to war -- nuclear war.

Does anyone believe civilization will survive a nuclear war? Does anyone, any sane rational person, believe our different philosophies and economic and political competition warrant a nuclear war? We, the representatives of Non-Governmental Organizations, have come here in the hope that we would witness world leaders in serious, constructive discussion of measures to slow, stop and reverse the arms race. So far we have heard far too much fear, distrust and animosity expressed here. Has the United Nations become merely a forum to castigate our adversaries, build competing blocs and rattle sabres? Do those national leaders who pollute this platform with their diatribes against other peoples, other nations, other systems, serve their own nations or do they condemn them and all of us to the calamity of a nuclear war?

It is sometimes said that war is a natural condition of man. As a military man, I do not believe it. I do believe that breathing, eating, loving, caring are natural conditions of man. People do not make war: Governments do, and our Governments appear willing to accept war, even nuclear war, as a natural event. There is not one nation in the world where the people want war. People in the Soviet Union, in the United States, in China, all are increasingly fearful that Governments will sacrifice even their own children and generations yet unborn for economic gain and political advantage.
Put very simply, will the Soviet Union and the United States destroy civilization to ensure that their economic system and their political philosophy dominate the world? The answer is clear: both the United States and the Soviet Union are planning, training, arming and practising to destroy each other and all civilization. Neither side expects to win. Neither can avoid losing.

As we proceed at ever-increasing speed down the converging courses which lead toward a nuclear war, little time remains to alter course to avoid the catastrophe ahead of us. It is no longer a question of whether we will have a nuclear war, only one of 'how soon will it start}'.

We are arming for limited nuclear war, prolonged nuclear war and a general nuclear war. We have tactical nuclear weapons, theatre nuclear weapons, intercontinental nuclear weapons and offensive and defensive nuclear weapons. All nuclear Powers have nuclearized their conventional forces, their army divisions, their air wings and their warships. Nuclear weapons have become conventional weapons and war plans on both sides call for the explosion of nuclear weapons in the air, on the land, on the sea, under the sea and in outer space. No longer can anyone hope that a war between the United States and the Soviet Union will stop short of a nuclear war.
Once it begins it will proceed uncontrollably until all civilization, perhaps all life on earth has been extinguished. Is it possible that 4 billion people have a death wish, or is it only our national leaders who are prepared for the death and destruction of life on this planet?

We need not stay on this course that leads to nuclear war, but we cannot look to our national leaders to change course. We cannot look to the United Nations to change course unless there are you fearless and courageous men and women who will speak for us.

Government leaders meeting in international forums have in the past proved so lacking in vision, so lacking in compassion for human beings, that they have been unwilling or unable to turn away from the preparations for nuclear war. We do not expect a dramatic change, we do not expect a miracle, but we ask you to face the facts squarely and then act as representatives of the people, rather than as representatives of Governments which still see war as a rational course of action.

You know the facts. There are over 50,000 nuclear weapons in the world. Thousands more nuclear weapons are being built each year. All nuclear Powers are planning, training, arming and practicing for nuclear war.

We ask you, as representatives of people everywhere, to condemn in the strongest possible terms nations which propose to use nuclear weapons. We ask that you condemn the continued testing of nuclear weapons. We ask that you condemn the placement of nuclear weapons in foreign countries.

We are fully aware that you do not have authority here at the United Nations, but you do have a responsibility as making up the most important gathering of human beings on the surface of this planet. Your moral judgements can be a force for the survival of this planet. A courageous statement by you of your outrage at the approach of nuclear war might save us. Your silence will doom us. You are our only hope. If we are to survive on this planet the nuclear-arms race must be slowed, stopped and reversed, and the time to start is now.

The CHAIRMAN: I now call on Mr. Michael J. Davis, representing the Council for Arms Control.
Mr. DAVIS (Council for Arms Control): The Council for Arms Control is a new organization, formed in 1981, concerned with defence and disarmament and the apparent failure of Governments to halt the arms race. But rather than protesting against failures, we are developing a new form of action which we hope will be constructive.

First, we are not a campaign; we develop proposals which can be offered to Governments and international organizations for implementation. Secondly, we take into account the public interest in disarmament and the reasoning of Governments. Rather than selecting a path and campaigning for its acceptance, we believe in developing ideas to meet the concerns of the public and Governments alike. Thirdly, we include diplomats, politicians of different parties, academic specialists and religious leaders. In the framework of the Council they contribute to a new and positive approach to arms reduction and ensure that ideas are advanced in a practical form.

In particular, the Council is working with representatives of East and West to examine ways of reducing international tension and distrust, which provoke expenditure on arms. This is the background of our proposal now presented for the first time in the public domain.

One of the main obstacles to arms control and disarmament has always been the difficulty of verifying agreements. Now there is increasing scope for concealing weapons, nuclear and non-nuclear, and concealment is becoming easier while time passes, as weapons become more compact. This reduces confidence in agreements and makes it harder to achieve arms reductions. It is now widely accepted that much more effective methods of verification have to be developed.

Moves have been made to reduce this problem with co-operative measures, which provide, for example, new scope for on-site inspection. A proposal for a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons, put forward in February this year, provides for a range of functions to be undertaken by inspectors.

However, there would still be some serious gaps. Inspectors cannot find all violations of agreements. The proposed ban on chemical weapons acknowledges that inspectors would not be in a position to verify that all stockpiles had been declared and only might be able to spot movement of chemicals into military uses.
Such shortcomings continue to discourage Governments from giving up their weapons. Moreover, present verification measures are intrusive, requiring foreign inspectors to question the activities of Governments inside their own territories. It is encouraging that such measures have been accepted in some situations, but if there is to be real confidence as weapons become more compact and more complex, increasing depths of inspection will be needed.

To overcome the reluctance to accept this, we must start thinking of a new approach and it is proposed here to introduce the concept of internal verification, procedures which Governments can adopt voluntarily to reassure others that they are complying with arms agreements.

There is a useful precedent in the Geneva Conventions, which set out standards of conduct in warfare. These have been signed by Governments which are willing to comply with the terms. An independent body, the International Committee of the Red Cross, informs armed forces around the world of principles set out in the Conventions and encourages compliance. On a similar basis, an entirely new convention could be established and administered by a monitoring group to publicize the key features of arms agreements. Fully informing people that agreements are being accepted and upheld would build support for further advances. Also, thoroughly informing people of agreements which have been achieved could, to some limited but worthwhile extent, discourage Governments from actions which could be seen as violations. Also, the individual if required to contravene an agreement would by his or her Government's acceptance of the convention be authorized to talk in confidence with the monitoring group.

Some may still regard a prohibited weapon as an official secret. Others, recognizing a violation, would consider it right to use their Government's own authorization, inherent in the convention, to consult the group on ways to bring the matter back within the limits of the agreement. Again, the concept is similar to that of the Geneva Conventions: people can inform the Red Cross and seek its help if, for example, prisoners are maltreated. Notifying an independent group can help to rectify violations and, at the same time, reduce accusations between Governments, which damage international relations.
Still more important, the convention would help to reassure Governments when others were not involved in violations. Implementing the convention would be a new way for Governments to show that they mean to comply with agreements.

For the convention to work, the first task would be to spread information on existing arms agreements, with the monitoring group making contact at all levels of society to ensure that this was received and understood. In the process, questions raised by local people could be discussed. To avoid political misuse the group would ensure that any information received on possible violations of agreements was disclosed only if substantiated and only as required for the complaints procedures of relevant arms agreements to take effect. Allegations would not be released to the public, or to other countries or for political purposes.
In this regard, it is crucial for Governments in all parts of the world to have confidence in the group's work. The International Committee of the Red Cross has won such confidence by carefully guarding its independence, neutrality and integrity, which has enabled it to carry out its work with the co-operation of most Governments. Moreover, all members of the Committee coming from a single neutral country avoid the internal tensions which might otherwise arise, for example, if the home country of a member were to be involved in an investigation or dispute. Thus, in several important respects, an existing model shows that suitable forms of organization and conduct can be found.

Looking at another constructive aspect of the proposal, the group could also help towards further arms agreements by announcing successes in implementing the extra safeguard of "internal verification". Every step of co-operation reported would add to confidence and prospects for the future.

Some might say that contacting the group would be dangerous. However, discussions between citizens and the group would become widespread and commonplace in the course of confirming public awareness of arms agreements, so contacts would not attract attention. As a separate stage, perhaps after some time, other means of contact with the group could be facilitated. But still, a Government could try to hinder communication. So it would be appropriate for the Convention to encourage the allowance of travel and information for the future. Even if this stage of wider travel and information is never reached, the Convention will have achieved much of its purpose through the earlier steps. Therefore, doubts about the practicability of this most ambitious part of the proposal should not stand in the way of the principle, or the earlier stages.

Given the United Nations Charter and, in many cases, regional agreements such as the Helsinki Final Act, Governments need not take exception to this Convention, which is actually more limited and less demanding.

Admittedly, Governments differ in their interpretation of their right to restrict information and movement for security reasons, so among the group's most important tasks would be that of monitoring implementation. The group would
ensure that countries which endorse the principle of openness apply it sincerely with regard to this Convention. If not, it would be right to apply pressure through officials and by public reports on progress. Almost all Governments are sensitive to world opinion, which would be influenced by such reports. Even when leaders consider it necessary to suppress dissent in order to maintain stability, they do not want to be seen as obstructing reasonable steps to avoid war and to stop resources disappearing into military budgets. So co-operation, though it could be slow to develop, should be gradually forthcoming.

In conclusion, the new concept of "internal verification" does not reduce any existing safeguards in arms agreements. Its application would provide an additional facility, supporting present methods. It is co-operative and non-intrusive. It can start to build trust in a system otherwise based on suspicion. By reducing Governments' fears that others may agree to ban or reduce weapons but then keep them concealed, it can also make it easier for agreements to be achieved.

In addition to this proposal, which relates to all categories of arms, we are offering here our paper on the technical case for a Soviet-American strategic nuclear freeze. It argues that neither side can gain superiority, now or at any time in the future, sufficient to contemplate seriously a first strike. The paper is called "An unbreakable nuclear stalemate".

The CHAIRMAN: I now have the pleasure of calling on Mr. Pierre Marais, who represents the Foundation for the Study of National Defence/French Institute of Polemology.
Mr. MARAIS (Foundation for the Study of National Defence/French Institute of Polemology) (interpretation from French): I wish, on behalf of the Foundation for the Study of National Defence, to express my appreciation for the honour and privilege of addressing this Assembly and, thus, all Governments of the world.

The gravity of the subject, the exceptional status of those present, and the nature of our institution make it necessary for me to use the language of objective analysis and realism. It would be neither appropriate nor expedient for me to seem to be saying that the Governments that you represent, practically all of which are pursuing an armaments policy, are doing so out of malice or inconsistency. On the contrary, as studies have shown, each Government has very good reasons for taking its position, and there are good grounds to believe that, as long as those reasons exist, the concept of disarmament will not make any more progress in the future than it has thus far.

I do not mean to minimize the importance of the traditional approach of idealistic pacifism, even if at times it can seem utopian when we compare the principles of non-violence, general disarmament and unilateral disarmament with the present state of international relations. There is some nobility to utopian ideas, but their potential effect on the real world will remain negligible unless there is at the same time a realistic approach - one more modest, perhaps, but more effective because of its gradual nature.

At the risk of appearing sacrilegious, I should like at the outset to stress one principle: disarmament is not an end in itself. The deep yearning which must be responded to here is the need for security - a feeling which is growing in diverse forms among all peoples of the world. It is the duty of Governments to reply to this yearning for security. The United Nations Charter has made it a right, and no one yet can win it without leaving open the possibility of recourse to organized violence, a policy of armament. Hence it would be jeopardizing the security of the weakest to try to promote false disarmament measures, such as the banning of underground nuclear testing or the banning of international trade in weapons.

If we wish to make progress towards disarmament, what must be invented is a means of achieving at least the same level of security with fewer weapons and with less dangerous weapons than we have today. To that end, we must recognize, first and foremost, that there are not, on the one side, pacifists who are dedicated to
the elimination of weapons and, on the other side, strategists who only want to see the world destroyed. We must realize that disarmament and armament are the two terms of the same dialectic, the result of which is security. In practical terms, this means that disarmament has become one of the components of modern strategy, and, lest they be doomed to perpetual ineffectiveness, pacifists and strategists must join in the same search for security.

When Professor Thierry recently observed with legitimate bitterness that the degree of international regulation applied to each category of weapons seemed to be inversely proportionate to its strategic or tactical usefulness, he was showing how grossly simplified hypotheses can lead to an impasse when they disregard reality. And this is particularly true of the global approach to the nuclear phenomenon.

In 1945 the history of mankind was marked by the explosions of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Other cities, however, had been destroyed, but that took time. Indeed, in a single night, the people of Dresden had suffered more casualties than each of the two Japanese cities. But that was because great destructive air power had been marshalled. For the first time, the notion of mass destruction was separated from its corollary of numerical requirements. Two concepts were born of that change.

Nuclear deterrence and the equalizing power of the atom which alone can enable a medium-sized Power to hope that it can overcome the physical inequalities which separate it from more populous, more wealthy, more warlike nations. The concept of nuclear deterrence has replaced the traditional notion of deterrence. "To deter", in the more general sense, is, in effect, to persuade the other side to act. This has always been the true meaning of civis pacem para bellum, which has taken the form of the search for global or, at least, local superiority. That very complex deterrence can involve the almost mathematical balance of forces when viewed in the context of battle. It leads either to situations of unilateral deterrence which invite diktat by the stronger, or to unstable situations when neither competitor has been able to secure a decisive advantage in the arms race and can thus only hope to prevail on the ground by greater valour and greater skill in the conduct of operations.
Conversely, in the case of nuclear deterrence, as soon as the capacity for a significant second strike is ensured, the deterrent effect arising from the possibility of mass destruction leads, by its virtual certainty, to bilateral deterrence — meaning, a stable situation.

The result of this is that, when we pass on from the traditional concept of deterrence to the concept of nuclear deterrence, logic is changed: from the logic of battle to the logic of fear. The result is also that the notion of balance of power changes in nature. Being an almost mathematical comparison of continuous variables in the context of conventional deterrence, it implies, in the second case of the comparison, discontinuous variables subject to the threshold concept, the most important variable remaining that of mutual total or proportionate destruction.
However effective the balance of terror might have been over the past 30 years, at least in Europe, owing to the seriousness of the choices that must be made it is a policy which might not be credible in all crises. Nuclear deterrence has certain limits - the absence of mortal direct or immediate threats.

The two forms of logic - nuclear deterrence and battle - coexist and share the world: the logic of nuclear deterrence in certain zones and the logic of battle everywhere else. In 1945, both forms of logic - nuclear deterrence and battle - were associated with two large categories of armaments about which there was no ambiguity: nuclear weapons, on the one hand, and conventional weapons, on the other. Since then technology and concepts of use have evolved and that explains to a very considerable extent why there has been an absence of any kind of progress towards nuclear disarmament.

Nuclear weapons have been diversified. The mobility of launchers and trajectories has led to the non-stationing of nuclear weapons in certain areas. Now there is the logic of battle, and this can be considered only within the framework of a balance in which there is tactical dissymmetry and reciprocal action in terms of nuclear and conventional weapons. Radiation weapons are of particular significance in this respect. Tactical nuclear weapons are less dangerous for men and women who are not the military target, but cannot truly understand these weapons except when we consider mechanized targets. The anti-force nuclear strategies of the super Powers bring immensely powerful weapons into the logic of battle and thus into the arms race.

What is the practical consequence that can be drawn from this analysis?

We must condemn nuclear weapons immediately and unreservedly and unconditionally renounce the first use of such weapons. This leads to conceptual confusion and an impasse in negotiations. If we wish to make progress we must deal separately with three categories of nuclear weapons.
First, there are weapons of nuclear deterrence characterized by their relative invulnerability, imprecision and power. Tactical nuclear weapons should be included among them when it is clear that they are a part of nuclear deterrence.

Secondly, there are anti-force nuclear weapons which are very accurate and of intercontinental or intermediate range.

Thirdly, there are nuclear battle or tactical weapons, which are characterized by their range, relative lack of power, mobility and the large number of warheads involved. These cannot be dissociated from conventional weapons, for together they create a kind of global balance and contribute to keeping the battle below the nuclear level. They create stability at a certain threshold of minimum deterrence.

The first two categories are associated with the idea of balance also, and can be progressively reduced. In fact we wonder whether nuclear weapons are the absolute weapon or the greatest evil.

About two centuries before Jesus Christ, the battle of Cannes, it will be recalled, caused more than 70,000 deaths by hand-to-hand fighting in one day. The work of Gaston Bouthoul, the founder of the French Institute of Polemology reminds us that in a war we must draw a distinction between deaths caused by military operations and those due to the massacres that follow. Genocidal weapons are traditionally the least advanced. On the other hand, researchers admit the hypothesis that the growing sophistication of weapons might make military operations less deadly.

Finally, if weapons represent a potential danger, human beings make it possible for this danger to take concrete form. Essentially, tensions and crises provoke and maintain the arms race, not vice versa.

We must move towards disarmament, it is true, but in order to achieve our goal we must not forget that man is the absolute weapon, and we must take account of that.

We must stress procedures for the settlement of disputes and the solution of crises, so that a potential danger remains just that - potential. In a study started in 1975 by our Foundation we give special attention to the action of peace-keeping forces. In dealing with those problems, we must take into account
the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, because it attacks the root cause of
the arms race - distrust of the other side. That is why, we would add, there
must be confidence-building measures, the exchange of men and ideas and the
free circulation of those ideas. Also we must now set up technical control
measures, which will be indispensable in the future. Therefore we attach great
importance to the creation of a world satellite monitoring agency.

We must also concern ourselves with destabilizing weapons, in particular
those which endanger the small amount of stability that exists in the world in
certain nuclear-free zones, where destabilization could be a prelude to a
third world conflict more destructive than the first two. These are anti-missile
weapons, which make it possible to destabilize zones where subsequently
nuclear weapons might very well be used.

Finally, we must take the opportunities provided by unilateral disarmament
measures. I doubt that the major Powers will be much interested in this when it
comes to strategically significant weapons, but might not certain underprivileged
States be able to achieve a certain amount of stability in this way without
aggravating their poverty? If there were a credible system of international
guarantees, a certain amount of waste, especially the more regrettable kind,
could be eliminated. Here the hope would be to be able to combine two kinds of
action: development and disarmament.

I should like to stress the modesty of the actions that we have mentioned:
the fight against destabilization in the world, which is doubtless of limited
practical usefulness, unilateral international guarantees, and the creation
of an international satellite monitoring agency. While they may seem modest,
however, they are only the first steps that might lead to the creation of disarmament
momentum. They seem modest because they are part of a new methodology.
The primary feature of this new methodological framework is that we must
draw a clear distinction between the concept of nuclear war and the concept
of defensive nuclear deterrence which emerged in 1966 when Professor Leo Hamon
wrote "Strategy against war". It is the result of a new intellectual approach to which the Foundation for the Study of National Defense is devoted. We must bring about a meeting of minds between the strategist and the pacifist. We should like the United Nations Institute for Development and Research to take an interest in this at the international level, and we assure it of our complete and loyal co-operation.

**The CHAIRMAN:** Before I call on the next speaker, I should like to remind all representatives that the time-limit agreed upon for each statement is 10 minutes and urge them to conform to that stipulation.

I call on Mr. Dominique Moissy of the French Institute of International Relations.
Mr. Molissé (French Institute of International Relations) (interpretation from French): It is a great honour for our Institute, but also a heavy responsibility, to address this Committee for the first time.

I cannot fail at the beginning of this statement to remind you of the distinction drawn by Max Weber between the ethics of conviction and the ethics of responsibility. Many people who have spoken in your debate have spoken in favour of the ethics of conviction. When it is the product of a sincere vision and not of cynical calculation, this choice is morally legitimate. But the French Institute of International Relations, a body for independent research, would be betraying its mission were it to choose to express itself according to an ethic other than that of responsibility.

This would mean that we would be placing the debate on disarmament in the context of the evolution of the international situation. Since the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in 1978, the worsening of the international climate has been speeded up. Two weeks ago, when this second special session convened, three armed conflicts were all in varying degrees in the news. The most bloody one, the war between Iraq and Iran, was not the one that was most spoken about. In the South Atlantic the English and the Argentines were involved in a relentless battle, while in Lebanon the Israeli invasion compounded the tragedy of that region. In Afghanistan, because of the Soviet armed intervention, murderous combats were going on, and the same can be said for too many areas of Africa and Asia.

While these conventional type conflicts are taking place, crowds are gathering in Western Europe and the United States to demand, if not the elimination, at least the reduction of nuclear weapons. It is as if the horrors of a future nuclear war make us forget the horrors of the very real conventional wars. None of the armed conflicts now tearing our world asunder is the direct product of the arms race. Each is the consequence of the confrontation of nationalist, ideological, religious or tribal ambitions.
Thus, disarmament is not an end in itself. It is inseparable from security. Nuclear over-armament is not the cause of international tension, or at least not its main cause, even if it constitutes an additional destabilizing factor. Above all, it is the reflection of that tension. It can be said without it being paradoxical that if the European continent is the only one to have escaped the wars which have proliferated on our earth since 1945 it is because of the existence of nuclear weapons and the logic of deterrence, which have contributed to the maintenance of peace.

Peace through law, that Wilsonian ideal which was the basis of the creation of the League of Nations and, by way of metamorphosis, of the United Nations, has not been established. Peace through terror has replaced the reign of law. In a world dominated by the opposition of power interests and ideologies, could it be otherwise?

Nevertheless, we cannot merely make that egotistical statement. Nuclear over-armament, the pattern of measures and countermeasures, the product of the unfortunate convergence of the progress of science and a political, even bureaucratic, logic, have led to a qualitative and quantitative race between the big Powers and to the absurdity of an overarmed world. The balance of terror seems to us more unstable and more costly than ever today. The moral imperative requires us to seek the conditions for a balance which would assure every State, not just the Western countries, of an equal right to security. Therefore we should seek boldly, as far as the objectives that we assign to ourselves are concerned, and humbly as to the knowledge of the difficulties to be overcome and, especially, with sincerity the paths towards a safer world. In this effort we should define basic principles. I think there are three of them: no disarmament unless it takes account of the balance of force; no real reduction without effective control; no disarmament measures unless they are accompanied by measures to reduce tensions.
No disarmament unless it takes account of the balance of force: contrary to what is too often said, it is the conventional imbalances that most threaten the balance of forces, which has throughout history maintained stability and security. The maintenance of security in Europe requires not only a significant reduction in the over-all nuclear weapons of the two big Powers, but also a reduction in all imbalances.

No real reduction without effective control: the arms race is the reflection, not the cause, of political conflicts. As such, it is a product of fear and ambition, and trust among States cannot be legislated for. As long as the resources for dissimulation are higher than the resources for inspection, the goal of disarmament will remain largely a pious wish. It is to mitigate these difficulties that we should stress the search for and the development of new verification and control methods allowing us to expand the field of application of disarmament measures. Concomitantly, these measures of verification and control should not remain the prerogative of a limited number of countries. In this regard, the establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency, as proposed by France, would be a useful contribution.

No disarmament measures unless they are accompanied by measures to reduce tensions: since 1945 the relations between the two major Powers which emerged from the Second World War, the United States and the USSR, have been dominated by alternating phases of cold war and détente, which represent the two branches of a single alternative, reflecting the formula of Raymond Aron: "impossible peace, improbable war". The cold war meant more tension; détente meant more consultation, more co-operation. The reduction of tensions means a resumption of the strategic negotiations between the two big Powers. But it also means multilateral talks, in particular through a conference on disarmament in Europe. It also implies respect by States for the wishes of the peoples for whom they are responsible, in accordance with the principles enshrined in the Final Act of Helsinki.
In the third world the reduction of tensions involves taking into account the need for development, but regional insecurity cannot be attributed only to underdevelopment or to the extension of East-West rivalries. It has local causes and the confrontation of nations which are more jealous of their rights as they grow less sure of their identity cannot be neglected. The development objective is still fundamental. The gap between arms expenditures and development expenditures is far too great.

The risks of nuclear proliferation on the one hand and the right of all States to have access to the most modern forms of energy on the other tend to promote the establishment outside the zone covered by nuclear deterrence, and with the agreement of the States concerned, of nuclear-free zones which, under the control of regional and international bodies, would help to bring about the development, at the smallest political cost, of nuclear energy for civilian purposes.
To that objective I would add another - that of the prohibition, production, stockpiling and use of the most inhuman weapons - bacteriological and chemical weapons.

To set more ambitious goals would be not only unrealistic but even dangerous for peace. The quest for unilateral disarmament could have only destabilizing effects. Neither could the unilateral renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons be a satisfactory response to the dilemma of the balance of forces in Europe.

Our realism may shock the feelings of those who want to transcend, in the name of humanism and civilization, the nuclear world in which we live. It will certainly not satisfy those who, under cover of a quest for peace, monopolize and manipulate the generosity or naivete of people for their own political ends. There are champions of peace who stand for a moral value and whose voices must legitimately be heard and there are also pacifists against peace.

Between the pacifism of some and the cynicism of others, narrow is the path for a research institute such as ours. Beyond the objective of disarmament, or more simply the reduction of weapons, there is the quest for peace. Beyond peace itself there is the quest for a world reconciled by the values of tolerance, recognition of the right of all to security, without distinction as to nationality, race, religion or class.

In conclusion I should like to quote the famous phrase of Antonio Gramsci: that it is necessary to combine "the optimism of will and the pessimism of intelligence". The pessimism of intelligence requires that we seek a balance of forces, a precondition for peace and security. The optimism of will leads us, beyond that balance of forces, not to give up our quest for the victory of justice and moral values.

The CHAIRMAN: I now call on Mr. Radhakrishna, representing the Gandhi Peace Foundation.

Mr. RADHAKRISHNA (Gandhi Peace Foundation): I deem it a great honour and privilege to have been invited to speak at the second special session of this body devoted to disarmament on behalf of the Gandhi Peace Foundation.
I believe this honour has been done not to any individual, not even to the organization, but to my country, India, and to the father of the nation, Mahatma Gandhi. Because of its background and tradition of the culture of ahimsa and pacifist civilization, I trust that India, among other countries, is better suited to espouse the cause of disarmament, and Gandhi, because of his relentless non-violent struggle, is the only contemporary leader who has an uncompromising commitment to disarmament and a world without war. It is with this strength of background that I can venture to share some thoughts with you on what all of us are concerned about: to save mankind from the scourge of the accelerating arms race.

This special session is obviously being held against the ominous background of the two major crises now engulfing the whole world. One is the continuing tension between Great Britain and Argentina, and the other is the renewed phase of the West Asian crisis. This may create some despair and cynicism that the United Nations is not an effective instrument for containing international crises, much less for bringing about a world without war. But it must be admitted that within the framework of the nation-State system it appears that the United Nations offers some hope to the international community facing an imminent danger of a nuclear holocaust. Its process may be slow, but it is the only process available. The fact that the United Nations has been able to universalize the base of disarmament negotiations and that it has been able to hold a second special session on disarmament within a span of four years provides an opening that can be widened.

What has happened between 1978 and 1982, between the first special session and the second special session? How far have the decisions taken in 1978 been implemented? What are the bottlenecks to progress towards disarmament? How can they be removed? These are questions that have been debated and should be further pondered on during the rest of the session. What is important is that we take stock of the situation as to how far the disarmament movement has gained additional momentum during those four years. When we come to that, we find that the disarmament movement has suffered a setback in certain respects but also made an advance in certain others. Thus, while the intervening period between the two special sessions has witnessed an accentuation of the arms race, a phenomenal
rise in military expenditures all over the world and a disruption of the process
of nuclear non-proliferation even among the super-Powers, the same period has also
witnessed a tremendous upsurge of anti-nuclear campaigns and a general revulsion
against nuclear weapons. There is thus an element of hope against despair. The
element of hope to which I am referring is the fact that disarmament as a goal
is now shifting from the exclusive preserve of policy-makers to a level where it
is likely to be transformed into a people's movement. It is this shift that must
not only be seized by the peace-makers as such, but the United Nations itself
must utilize this base and convert it into a base for the achievement of a
disarmed world both by the United Nations and by non-governmental organizations.

Nearly 20 years ago the Gandhi Peace Foundation raised its voice on the
question of the resumption of nuclear tests by the USSR and the United States
late in 1961. The convention which we called decided to send deputations of
eminent persons to Washington, Moscow, London and Paris to appeal to the Heads
of Government to give up all kinds of nuclear testing and any further production
of nuclear weapons. It also launched a massive campaign for obtaining 1 million
signatures from people in India demanding a ban on the testing and use of nuclear
arms. Since the anti-nuclear-arms convention, the Gandhi Peace Foundation has
been trying to promote the cause of disarmament in a variety of ways, in particular
in the field of education for disarmament and peace intervention. The special input
in this presentation is the proposition that disarmament can never be achieved
if it is left to the ruling élites, that it has to be made a people's movement
and that it has to be pursued as a goal along with other goals like human rights
and the international distribution of justice. We believe that the time has come
when we should adopt a holistic approach to disarmament. We believe also that the
United Nations can make a significant contribution to disarmament with the help
of this holistic approach. Let us realize that peace-keeping and conflict
resolution are not enough by themselves, unless accompanied by a simultaneous
effort at building a world community. Thus, an entirely new approach to disarmament
has to be developed incorporating elements of development, conflict resolution
and community-building.
The development of this approach and its transplanting into our efforts for disarmament itself are something that requires the pooling of all resources and the mobilization of all efforts at all levels. The United Nations has to convince itself that disarmament can be achieved if it can develop a total approach in its own building and not a casual compartmental approach. The problems of development, peace-keeping, environment, human rights and justice are all so interrelated that, unless we shed the usual sectorial approach and evolve the methodology of an holistic approach to problems, the problem will continue to dodge us because, if we put it off at one end, it will reappear at the other end and we will be caught in the network of our own creation.

Disarmament then becomes a larger concern and commitment. It is here that the steps taken at the second special session in terms of greater input by the non-governmental organizations could be qualitatively and quantitatively increased if more serious efforts are undertaken to ensure collaboration between the United Nations and the non-governmental organizations. This could be promoted possibly at two levels—between the non-governmental organizations and the United Nations, and among the non-governmental organizations themselves. The collaboration could go a long way to arousing people's consciousness against this mad race.
Disarmament education, therefore, takes precedence, so that the United Nations commitment to disarmament may be transmitted through people's voices around the United Nations body back to the body itself. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization has been doing commendable work in the field of disarmament education. One of the proposals contained in the five-point programme for disarmament offered by the Government of India is that the United Nations and all its specialized agencies must undertake a comprehensive programme of educating people about the horrors of the unending arms race and about disarmament as an instrument of development. One hopes that the proposed world disarmament campaign will not be just a ritual but will be integrated in its approach and will offer a very important basis for collaboration between non-governmental organizations and the United Nations system so that each strengthens the other. If it is to succeed, this programme should be properly structured so that it becomes organizationally strong and not amorphous.

The question of disarmament cannot be isolated from the task of peace-making in the context of existing problems of tension and conflict in different parts of the world. Unfortunately the tendency has been to look at these two tasks as different and that is where a certain irreality has crept into the discussion about disarmament. Disarmament is not a theoretical concept. It has to have an immediate relevance and application to the existing problems of conflict. This is a task where again the United Nations and the non-governmental organizations will have to play a joint role in a collaborative strategy.

I do not wish that these should be dismissed as idealistic, long-term goals. There is also a sense of immediacy about the various aspects of the discussion going on here, that we are called upon to work for a short-term as well as a long-term strategy. In the short term, I believe certain priorities could be identified, and we urge the special session to agree to the following: (a) a comprehensive test-ban treaty; (b) to freeze the manufacture, testing and deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems; (c) a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons and making their use a crime against humanity; (d) to declare a time-frame within which specific measures should be implemented; and (e) to assert unequivocally and unambiguously the central and primary role of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament.
While disarmament strategy continues to be debated within the parameters of existing structures of society without fully realizing that these structures are on the verge of collapse, the smaller nations - and there is a large number - can adopt bold and ethical steps instead of being caught as victims in the game of the super-Powers. The small nations which do not possess and do not hope to possess nuclear weapons, nor wish to depend on the super-Powers for security and protection, can take a decision to support a policy of unilateral nuclear disarmament. It will demonstrate the victory of man over technology, the victory of ethical over physical forces. Years ago Gandhi wrote:

"The atomic bomb has deadened the finest feeling that has sustained mankind for ages. There used to be the so-called laws of war which made it tolerable. Now we know the naked truth ... The moral to be drawn from the supreme tragedy of the bomb is that it will not be destroyed by counter-bombs even as violence cannot be by counter-violence. Mankind has to get out of violence only through non-violence."

Again, he wrote:

"If the mad race for armaments continues, it is bound to result in a slaughter such as has never occurred in history. If there is a victor left, the victory will be a living death for the nation that emerges victorious."

There is no reason to put this thought aside. Perhaps an initiative like this may create a breakthrough from the deadlock of discussions on disarmament. Maybe the initiative will come from the non-super non-Powers.

I see the need therefore to look at disarmament in its totality so that it no longer is the art of bargaining in an atmosphere of mistrust between the super-Powers; to link it up with the totality of United Nations activity for human development and growth and not restrict it merely to survival and security; to take short-term measures adequately provided with structures and mechanisms for necessary follow-up; to enlist non-governmental organizations' support and to support them in order to strengthen the movement outside and let the United Nations hear the voices of the people; and to persuade the large number of small countries to opt out of this race and declare unilateral disarmament as their commitment.
As far as we are concerned in the Gandhi Peace Foundation, one of our great poets symbolises our role in these words: "Darkness fell all over. It was pitch-darkness - no light, no hope, all despair. From a small far-off corner of the deep darkness came a small beam from a small lamp. The lamp was saying, 'Master, let me do my duty.'" In that spirit of humility, we shall continue to do what we feel is our duty.

The CHAIRMAN: I now call on Mr. Burton Yale Pines, representing The Heritage Foundation.

Mr. PINES (The Heritage Foundation): I welcome this opportunity and am grateful and honoured at being allowed to address this United Nations gathering on disarmament on behalf of The Heritage Foundation. Disarmament is indeed a very serious matter. That the nations of the world should devote fewer resources to weapons and more to meeting mankind's social, cultural, economic and political needs is the very serious desire of all civilized peoples. How to reduce arsenals is a very serious challenge. Of this there can be no question.

What is questionable, however, is just how serious is this second special session on disarmament. All that can be done here for five weeks is talk. And, while words can be very powerful weapons, they can be so only if they are spoken and taken seriously. The question is: are we engaging in serious discussion or merely playing a ritualistic parlour game? I wonder.

A serious discussion of disarmament we must be willing to abandon slogans and confront the most urgent problems affecting peace today. How can we talk about preventing future wars without first raising our voices in outrage at current wars? How can we talk about future disarmament treaties without first condemning violations of existing treaties? How can we focus almost exclusively on nuclear and other exotic weaponry which have taken absolutely no lives since the Second World War without exhausting our efforts to limit and even reduce the arsenals of those conventional weapons which, since 1945, have been used in more than 100 wars and have killed tens of millions of our fellow men?
The international trade in such arms is booming, not so much because they are being pushed by sellers but because of the enormous demand from third-world buyers. In the 1970s, in fact, imports of arms by the third world soared 150 per cent. Those with the most voracious, insatiable appetites for arms have been Libya, Iraq, Syria, Iran, Viet Nam and India. A serious discussion of disarmament must ask why those nations buy so many arms.

Such a discussion must ask also why third-world countries such as Iraq, Libya, Syria, Tanzania and South Yemen, as well as the Soviet Union and its East European allies, have been spending more of their gross national product on arms than have NATO members on average. Why, indeed, has the Soviet Union for more than a decade been amassing arms at a historically unprecedented sustained rate and building its arsenal to unprecedented levels of destruction? During almost that entire period the United States froze its arsenal, or even reduced it.

Why also are Nicaragua, Cuba, Libya and India amassing arsenals far greater than those needed for defensive purposes? At a time when we hear so much touching rhetoric about the tragic hunger, poverty and illness that chronically plague much of the third world's populations, why do those third-world nations spend so much of their scarce resources on instruments of violence?

Certainly a serious conference on disarmament would be most concerned with the world's most rapidly expanding arsenals.

I have been listening to and reading the statements emanating from this rostrum and from the other platforms at this special session. I have been visiting the exhibits and closely examining the literature being distributed by organizations in and around these buildings. I am shocked that those questions and issues are almost universally being ignored.

I realize that these are tough issues to address and tough questions to ask. Perhaps they are too tough for a conference restricted by diplomatic conventions and by the chronic limitations of the United Nations system. But unless these issues are confronted and these questions are raised, I cannot take seriously any disarmament conference, and I very much doubt whether many of my fellow Americans will either."

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Mr. Alessi (Italy), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.
The CHAIRMAN: I now call on Mr. Gyula Gyovai, the representative of the Hungarian Institute of International Relations.

Mr. GYOVAI (Hungarian Institute of International Relations) (interpretation from Russian): It is a great privilege for me to make a statement on behalf of the Hungarian Institute of International Relations at this second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The issue being discussed is of the greatest concern to mankind, and I am fully aware of the human, political and scientific responsibility involved in contributing to this debate.

My colleagues and I, working in a small research centre of as little as 10 years' standing, are concerned with studying the set of laws governing international relations and, not least, the possibilities of achieving disarmament. Yet we cannot address this question solely from a professional standpoint. We believe that the problems of disarmament make it necessary, much more than any other issue does, to consider the close interrelationships between the scientific and political spheres, for scientific findings on this question can be acted upon only in the realm of politics. Therefore, in our view, the function of research is to explore not only the positions of the parties but the possibilities of accommodating their interests and to contribute, aware of its share of responsibility, to providing public opinion with authentic information and enlisting its support for the cause of disarmament.

Since the first special session devoted to disarmament the arms race has unfortunately entered a new stage, many aspects of which are more dangerous than the rivalry in armaments was in past decades. New types and systems of weapons have emerged, with their delivery ranges, target accuracy and consequential destructive power increased in unprecedented measure. The growing sophistication of weapons makes it more and more difficult to draft and conclude disarmament accords and to reach agreement on questions of verification and control. The new stage in the arms build-up entails very harmful political and psychological consequences, and may create mistrust in relations between States which may paralyse disarmament efforts and initiatives.
In parallel with the arms race, a number of new concerns, tensions and conflicts confront the world. Economic difficulties, shortages of energy and of food have grown into global problems faced by mankind. To meet them requires political foresight, courage and - particularly important - concentration of tremendous resources, primarily economic. What we see instead is the squandering on an appalling scale of mankind's material and intellectual resources on conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction, which are being accumulated in preparation for a new world war.

The coincidence in time of these two trends - the new wave of armaments and the aggravation of global problems - tends to create an explosive situation, with one reinforcing the other. In these circumstances, what we must work for in the face of such dangers is, first and foremost, the halting of the arms race. We consider the proposal to freeze production of nuclear weapons as particularly important. Stopping the arms race, both nuclear and conventional, is of enormous political importance as it would enable us to gain time for the drafting and discussion of mutually acceptable disarmament concepts. Technology must not be allowed to dictate to politics and to good sense. Time must be gained to enable decision-makers at the highest political level to discuss relevant proposals and to adopt the necessary political decisions. The entry into force of a moratorium would be of enormous help to the negotiating forums dealing with the diverse aspects of disarmament at different levels and would in the first place allow for an improvement in Soviet-American relations.

The danger of nuclear war is a source of concern to the whole world, but it is claiming public attention particularly in Europe, a continent which has been ravaged by two world wars in our time and which is also the foremost target of the strategic concepts of a local nuclear conflict.
This danger is now creating a distinct common attitude of mind in that part of the world. Although Europe is divided into two sets of sharply and substantively different societies, where the problems of peace, disarmament and détente are concerned, mutual understanding among the various social and political factors is growing. Since the danger posed by a nuclear war is global, the avoidance of such a war is also a global task in the fulfilment of which the progressive forces of all continents should work together.

Everyone knows that increased international tension in recent years has curtailed international contacts in certain fields. Fortunately, this has not occurred in the relationships among international research institutes. On the contrary, co-operation in this field has been strengthened, and we are witnessing significant achievement. We would like to hope that this second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament will galvanize once more the whole of the scientific community in the field of international relations. We would also hope that the resolutions and recommendations adopted at this session will help to give further impetus to new scientific co-operation, both in and outside Europe. It is my hope that the studies and the results of the studies for peace will be given practical implementation in the near future.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French): I now call on Ms. Siegrid Poellinger, representing the Institute for Peace Research.

Ms. POELLINGER (Institute for Peace Research): You have conferred on me the honour of addressing this most important international forum on disarmament. I appreciate this opportunity all the more for three reasons, first, as an Austrian, secondly, as a representative of a peace-research institution, and thirdly, because I am a woman.
Since Austria is a neutral country in the heart of Europe, it has a particular interest in the building of peace and its corollary, disarmament. Austria is not a weapons super-Power, and in any major confrontation it would not escape unscathed by virtue of its neutrality alone. Moreover, Vienna, our capital, has become the third United Nations city and thus a permanent meeting-ground between East and West.

As a representative of peace research activities within the Austrian Academy of Sciences in Vienna, I can say that our conviction is not that war is an inevitable disaster that we have to accept, but that its prevention depends on our foreseeing the dangers and avoiding them. War, like injustice in the world, is a man-made institution. It is an obsolete custom that we must outgrow through our search for a just order to preserve peace.

Women have always played a special role in the building of peace. We want peace on all levels, in the family, the State and the world. I have a famous compatriot, Bertha von Suttner, who inspired Alfred Nobel to establish the Nobel Peace Prize, which she herself was awarded for organizing effective disarmament campaigns at the turn of the century. The title of her book, Put Down Your Arms, is as potent today as it was then.

What, therefore, is the main point of my argument? The linkage between peace and disarmament is vital. But what is the most important aspect of that linkage? It is the building of confidence.

Ever since the period of the two world wars, efforts towards disarmament have concentrated on reducing the level of troops and armaments. The results have been meagre. I view what has happened as something similar to an attempt to do away with the symptoms of the arms race without examining the underlying causes. Without such a study, disarmament efforts are likely to lead nowhere and to end in failure. This seems to me like an attempt to put the cart before the horse, or like fighting against the symptoms and not the illness. The only way out of this dilemma is to create an atmosphere of confidence on different levels, for without mutual confidence there can be no progress.
The historical record confirms my contention. The Geneva disarmament talks failed between the two world wars because the parties lacked confidence in each other. That situation still prevails. An obvious example are the negotiations on the reduction of forces in Europe that have been taking place in Vienna for the past eight years. From the outset, those talks have been stalled by the so-called data question. In other words, one side has no confidence that the data supplied by the other are in fact correct.

What kind of confidence-building measures are essential? I think we should distinguish between two types of such measures, first, political and psychological measures and, secondly, practical or contractually agreed measures.

As for the first, we are faced with a state of mind that could be described as disarmament of words. By that, I mean that words are used in the disarmament dialogue that are hostile to the purposes of disarmament. Speeches are deliberately directed at the faults and weaknesses of the other party. There must be more voluntary restraint.

Nations should try to talk to each other and not against each other. This means that the other party's point of view should never be rejected out of hand. An effort should always be made to understand the other party's case, or there can be no progress.

Where should disarmament of words begin? I suggest it should start here in this forum, for there is no better place for such an initiative than the General Assembly of the United Nations, and particularly its disarmament sessions.

Another possible way of building confidence would be to encourage the world-wide extension of peace research. As a concrete step, I would suggest that one tenth of 1 per cent of the money spent on the arms race should be diverted to peace research.

As for practical confidence-building measures, their importance was stressed in the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament. Thus, the United Nations followed the example set by the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe in Helsinki, which approved
a whole series of so-called first-generation confidence-building measures. Those measures dealt mainly with military topics. Generally speaking, they have been implemented by both sides and have thus contributed to the building of a minimum of confidence that could serve as a basis for further steps.

A number of promising proposals have since been made in many fields. Unfortunately, many of them have remained a dead letter because of lack of confidence.
How can this process be accelerated? It must not be left to Governments alone, nor to the public at large. Here the non-governmental organizations have a special role to play. They form the most effective link between Governments and the general public. This role of non-governmental organizations was actually envisaged by the German philosopher Immanuel Kant in his treatise "Towards Eternal Peace", when he said:

"It cannot be expected nor even is it desirable that kings should philosophize or that philosophers should become kings, since the possession of power inevitably spoils the free judgment of reason. However, it is essential that kings should not silence the wisdom of philosophers but should let their voices be heard in public for the benefit of both."

Therefore, let our non-governmental organizations implement the function as envisaged by Immanuel Kant.

Disarmament and peace are our common aims. They cannot be achieved without justice and good order, as was underlined by the ancient Greek philosopher, Hesiod, who emphasized that good order, justice and peace belong together. Similarly, his contemporary, the Chinese philosopher Lü Buwei, wrote: "When there is justice the world is at peace, because peace derives from justice." That is the very essence of confidence.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French): The next speaker is Mr. Ohtori Kurino, of the Institute for Peace Science, Hiroshima University, on whom I now call.

MR. KURINO (Institute for Peace Science, Hiroshima University): I must first admit that we Japanese people, as a nation, have not made much contribution to world peace. On the contrary, during the 1930s and 1940s Japan caused the loss of 20 million lives and other irreparable damage in Asia and the Pacific area.
However, the end of the Second World War and the defeat of Japan marked a turning point in a very important sense. At that time Japan got rid of its militarism and the military; but more important was the fact that we Japanese came to possess new spiritual assets.

First, from the tragic experiences of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and from the testimonies and appeals of the hibakushas - the survivors of the atomic bomb - we have learned among other things that we should create a world where we can live in peace and let others live in peace, and that similar horrors and sufferings, especially nuclear disasters, should never be repeated anywhere in the world.

Secondly, we have become aware of the universal principle of fundamental human rights. In the Constitution of Japan which came into force in 1947 there is recognition of this principle as a supreme law. Here I should like to emphasize that this principle constitutes the very basis of the provisions and the spirit of article 9 of the Constitution, which is well known for renouncing war and war potential.

These two things we have learned are essentially the same thing at bottom. One is the love of humanity and the other is its legal confirmation. Needless to say, both of them are of the utmost importance for the full human being in living in this nuclear age, or even beyond it.

Today these principles have become deeply ingrained in the minds of the Japanese people and they have also had a strong influence upon the thought and behaviour of Japanese scientists concerned about the problems of war and peace, especially peace researchers. In addition, these principles have been among the important factors bringing about the rejuvenation of Japan as a peace-loving nation and contributing to its present economic prosperity. In a sense, Japan has been trying to prove that war does not pay but peace does.

However, it may be objected here that there are discrepancies between these ideals or principles and the realities of Japan. It is true that Japan virtually possesses a military force, called the self defence force; it is a partner in a military alliance; there are foreign military bases within its
territory, which is said to be covered by a so-called nuclear
umbrella; and its military budget is the eighth largest in the world.
I want to add a few words on Okinawa. Okinawa did return to Japan 10 years
ago, but today in Okinawa are to be found more than half of the old foreign
military bases in Japan, and people there hardly feel the benefit of the
provisions of the Constitution of Japan which I mentioned earlier. Moreover,
along with the increasing global tendency towards militarization, not only
among industrialized countries but also in some of the developing countries,
Japan has also been under pressure from both within and without to follow
the same direction.

We are not unaware of the discrepancies, nor are we unconcerned about the
trend towards militarization, both domestic and global. Japanese scientists,
keenly aware of the present state of affairs, above all the nuclear arms race,
have exerted their efforts in grasping and analysing the situation and finding
the way out of it. The Science Council of Japan, an organ representative of
most of the Japanese scientists, held a symposium in November last year
jointly with five institutes engaged in peace research, including the Institute
for Peace Science, Hiroshima University, which I represent here. The main
theme of the symposium was the threat of nuclear war and conditions for
human survival. The same Council also expressed its concern in a special
statement adopted at its general meeting in May this year.

As for peace research in Japan, I may say that already in 1973 the
Peace Studies Association of Japan was established. My Institute was founded
in Hiroshima University in 1975. In addition, around the same time the United
Nations University opened its headquarters in Tokyo.

As I have said, we have our own domestic problems, but these problems
are closely intertwined with such global issues as militarization and
under-development and they cannot be solved independently of those issues.
Thus we should make every effort to find a way of solving these problems in
a global perspective. It is on the basis of this recognition that my
Institute has been striving to promote research on peace, development and
dismament, in close co-operation with peace researchers and peace research
institutions, in particular the United Nations University.
It is now high time that we Japanese contributed to creating a peaceful world. We should strive to find steps leading to stable regional or global peace and security, as recommended by the Palme Commission. We should endeavour to find alternative ways and means leading to enduring regional peace and security, for example, in East Asia, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations but not on the basis of the so-called balance of power or of military alliances.
In this connexion, one possibility to be explored is the establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone in this region of East Asia, including the Korean peninsula, as a matter of fact, coupled with the necessary steps for creating a new international environment. Another possibility is for Japan to take the initiative in carrying out unilateral disarmament, in line with the recommendation of the International Peace Research Association.

In view of the present state of the world community where, in addition to 10 million refugees and displaced persons, half a billion or more people are suffering from chronic famine, malnutrition and absolute poverty, and in view of the state of the economic and other affairs of our country we must also seek ways to activate our economic and intellectual capabilities in order to solve these pressing problems, thereby promoting both development and disarmament.

We believe that these are among the roles which derive from the aforementioned spiritual assets of us Japanese and which Japan is expected to play in the world at present and in future.

Of course, these problems cannot be solved by the efforts of Japan alone, nor by any one country. The solution requires combined efforts by all the Governments, peoples and researchers of the world. Here, I should like to emphasize the role to be played by scientists and researchers, as well as by Non-Governmental Organizations. Thus, in addition to the activities of such organizations as the United Nations, especially its Centre for Disarmament, the United Nations Institute for Training and Research, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the United Nations University, we should also strive to strengthen the global network of intellectual co-operation for the cause of peace and genuine development.

I should like to conclude this statement by expressing the hope for further co-operation and solidarity among the scientists of the world and for the good sense of the Governments of the world.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French): I now call on Mr. Hamboodiri, the representative of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses,
IR. NAUDEODINTI (Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses):

IR. Chairman, I bring to you and to this distinguished gathering concerned with issues of human survival the greetings and best wishes of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. I want to take this opportunity to place before you a perspective of the global armament phenomenon from the point of view of the non-aligned and developing world.

To say that the research institutions in the developed world have different priorities, concerns and perspectives and also different frameworks of analysis from ours is to state the obvious. Academicians do not think in a vacuum. Our part of the world consists overwhelmingly of nations which have acquired a sovereign status only during the last four decades; the challenge of nation-building and the problems of development are our major concerns. The problems of peace and security for us therefore are not only issues of promoting some perceived interests or ideologies. Peace and security for us are categorical imperatives to achieve and sustain our developmental objectives. Strategy for us is not a matter of doctrine or dogma. Our strategy is to optimize the competing claims of national security and development with the limited natural, human and material resources available to us. Threats to our security arise not only from aggressions across frontiers but also from the unfulfilled socio-economic expectations of our people; under-development for us represents a non-military threat to security and it is a formidable challenge by itself. That is being further exacerbated by an adverse strategic global environment dominated by doctrines of deterrence, notions of balance of power and struggles for spheres of influence.

Out of over 130 instances of international violence recorded since 1945, all but a few have occurred in the developing world and in most of the cases there were interventions by the developed world. Spatial nuclear proliferation has brought nuclear weapons to our doorsteps. Developing nations are increasingly exposed to the threat of the use of nuclear weapons. The induction effects of the central arms race, the persistent tendency of interventionism and arms transfer relationships are being used as instruments of influence and domination. These are our central preoccupations.

A distinction has to be made between the arms race in the industrialized world and the defence efforts in the developing countries. Both do not belong to the same category of threats to international security. What needs to be underlined is that, notwithstanding the developing countries' share of unresolved
Disputes, it is the developed world which is mainly responsible for global militarization. It is a handful of industrialized nations which account for 65 per cent of global military spending, 95 per cent of military industrial production, 93 per cent of world-wide exports of military hardware and over 99 per cent of military research and development.

Secondly, and more important still, is our concern that the international arms trade is increasingly becoming a means by which pressures of the central arms race among the major military Powers are transferred to tension-prone regions in the developing world. It is true that weapons are not supplied to unwilling recipients. Yet we have to grasp the full implications. During the last few years, the most sophisticated and the most exotic among modern weapons have been supplied to those regions which command geostrategic importance for the supplier countries. Along with weapon transfers, another transfer inevitably takes place - that of new threat perceptions. Such borrowed ideas vitiate old conflicts and further aggravate the security environment by demanding more arms imports. The fact is that out of the 80 developing countries which have either actually experienced or have been close to the scene of a military conflict, not more than 12 can produce domestically weapons of any significance.

Thirdly, and this in fact is our crucial concern, the strategies for preserving peace in the industrialized world are not only irrelevant for the developing countries, but in our view they constitute a major source of insecurity for the world. The first 35 years of the nuclear-weapons era have produced a dogmatic cult which postulated, among other things, that King Atom preserved peace in Europe, prevented a world war from breaking out and introduced a semblance of stability in the international system. Since nuclear weapons are in the possession of only a few nations, data relating to their deployment, to the tactics and strategy of their actual use, to command, control and communication aspects and to the effects of the use of nuclear weapons were available to selected scholars and institutions in those countries.
Analysts and policy-makers committed to perpetuation of the nuclear weapons cult also promoted the implicit notion of making nuclear weapons a currency of international power. Steps enhancing legitimization of nuclear weapons, nuclear strategic doctrines and nuclear weapon hegemony were often projected as measures of arms control. Academics and world media also played up the nuclear cult, deliberately or inadvertently. Meanwhile, really important questions remained unattended for instance: Can a nuclear war be controlled? Does the doctrine of deterrence lead to an ever-spiralling arms race? What is the impact on individuals and groups of a deterrence doctrine which envisages holding millions of people as hostages in legitimizing their practice of terrorism? Are acts of intervention in the developing world a necessary concomitant of testing the credibility of deterrence postures? In this context, it is relevant to note that, when détente was achieved in Europe and it was pointed out by leaders of the non-aligned world that unless détente was global in scope it would prove to be transient and fragile, this view was ignored by the practitioners of the nuclear weapons cult. It is because of this deliberate neglect that we find ourselves in our present predicament.

It is to be hoped that that era is now over. Many institutions, academics and popular movements in the industrialized world have now begun questioning the basic dogmas of the nuclear cult. The questions which were avoided over the last 35 years are now being raised. The high priests of the nuclear weapons cult are today clearly on the defensive and are finding it increasingly difficult to sustain their dogmas. The world today is facing the morbid reality of a nuclear holocaust bringing about the extinction of humankind. This sensitization of popular opinion in the industrialized world is an opportunity not to be missed.

The struggle between the nuclear cult and rationality is going to be hard and long. No wonder the cultists resent public debate on nuclear issues. Attempts are being made to divert attention from the real dangers posed by the nuclear arms race to less important concerns like horizontal proliferation, conventional arms, military expenditures in developing countries, regional security, and so on. These issues are held out as greater dangers than vertical and
spatial proliferation. Our plea is that priority must be given in research and disarmament education to the dangers of nuclear war, and towards that end studies should be encouraged on the fragility of the command, control and communication aspects, on the near-impossibility of controlling and limiting nuclear exchange, on the degree of control possible with the use of tactical nuclear weapons, along with analyses of nuclear war doctrines to expose their fallacies, and assessments of the relative risks and dangers of vertical, spatial and horizontal proliferation. It is here that the United Nations has a major role to play, to ensure that resources are not pre-empted and frittered away on peripheral issues and that attention is kept focused on the dangers of the nuclear arms race.

The other important issue is to follow up the perceptive United Nations study on disarmament and development by studies by various specialized agencies of the United Nations on the negative consequences of the arms race, which reflects a conflictive approach to international relations, as opposed to the co-operative management of global interdependencies envisaged in the New International Economic Order. Studies which would highlight with quantitative data the adverse impact of the arms race on international trade, on job creation in both developed and developing countries, on inflation, on investment and on pre-empting the research and development resources from vital areas of alternative sources of energy, on global pollution and conservation, on augmenting global food production and on optimal development of the developing world would go a long way towards dispelling the long-propagated myth that the industrialized world could optimize a high defence expenditure with sustained economic growth and a stable international order, at least in that part of the world.

The time has come for research institutions all around the world to evolve a consensus commitment to direct their research towards the prevention of a nuclear holocaust and the reversal of the arms race. In recent years the United Nations Centre for Disarmament has come up with many excellent and pioneering studies to name two outstanding ones: the comprehensive study on nuclear weapons and the study on the relationship between disarmament and development. These studies deserve
greater attention than has been given to them so far. Ways and means have to be explored to ensure that the United Nations studies on disarmament issues get wider coverage through better liaison with world media, various national media, research institutions and popular movements. In this regard, we pay a tribute to the popular movements and professional organizations in the industrialized world such as the National Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign, the Union of Concerned Scientists, Physicians for Social Responsibility and the Churches, which have done commendable work in educating the public. The United Nations should also serve as a clearing house for information on the activities of all peace movements and research institutions. We therefore welcome the move by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research to set up a data bank to cover these areas.

Hence our plea is to get our priorities right and concentrate all our meagre resources on the foremost concern of our times - avoiding a nuclear holocaust and reversing the central arms race.

In history there have been instances of many institutions long accepted as legitimate becoming illegitimate when popular opinion was mobilized. Similarly nuclear weapons and nuclear war doctrines should also be consigned to the dustbin of history, along with slavery, colonialism and apartheid, which after an era of legitimacy came to be rightly recognized as crimes against humanity.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French): I call now on Professor Bykov, who represents the Institute of World Economics and International Relations, USSR Academy of Sciences.

Mr. BYKOV (Institute of World Economics and International Relations, USSR Academy of Sciences) (interpretation from Russian): The second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament is considering priority issues of great importance. Indeed, no task is or could be more topical today than that of ending the arms race and achieving real disarmament.
Weapons of tremendous destructive power resulting from the scientific and technical revolution, have not proved, in terms of their capabilities, to be commensurate with the goals for which they could be used. Given the correlation of forces in the world today, they are unsuitable, both as a means of solving acute international problems and as a back-up for ideological crusades by one State or group of States against countries with a different social system. Whatever the aims an initiator of nuclear war might pursue, they are unattainable because there can be no winners in such a war. Any use of weapons of mass destruction would detonate truly global upheavals.

The 1970s have convincingly demonstrated that joint efforts by States can effectively contain the development of a pernicious tendency which threatens humanity with an unprecedented disaster. Political détente and arms limitation agreements lessened the threat of a world nuclear war. It will be recalled, however, that in recent years the international situation has become more complex. Tensions have increased, the arms race has been stepped up and intensified and the danger of war is looming once again.

What are the root causes of this process? Have the objective conditions which determined the need for, and the possibility of, averting a world nuclear conflagration changed?

An impartial analysis shows that this could not have happened and has not happened. The central link in the world balance of forces – the global military strategic balance – remains unchanged. The approximate equality of military forces of the two world systems has both a quantitative and a qualitative aspect. Its real meaning lies in the fact that a first nuclear strike would inevitably trigger off crushing retaliation against the attacker. Given the commensurate economic, scientific and technological potentials of the opposing sides, the existing situation is, in principle, irreversible.

The intentions and the actions of those capable of affecting the strategic situation in the future are quite another matter. While attempts to tilt the existing equilibrium in one's favour are by definition hopeless, they are fraught with the danger of seriously destabilizing the international situation and of bringing about a greater danger of a nuclear conflict.
As for the Soviet Union, its position is extremely clear: it has not sought, nor does it seek, military superiority; it has not intended, nor does it intend, to threaten any State or group of States. As Leonid Brezhnev declared in his message to the second special session devoted to disarmament, the Soviet Union has undertaken not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

The ruling circles of the United States of America, as is clear from their official statements and concrete actions, have taken a different position. A massive build-up of American military might is coupled with a strategy geared to a first use of nuclear weapons, either in a generalized confrontation or initially in a "limited" conflict, which would inevitably become a prelude to world war. This trend in the arms build-up and the development of strategic concepts can testify only to the desire to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union. That policy is as unrealistic as it is dangerous. In our times, to seek confrontation and military superiority is to place one's own narrow interests above the interests of universal security.

At present disarmament has become especially urgent. Development of nuclear technology has outstripped the pace of negotiations. New kinds of weaponry which are being developed can render verification of them extremely difficult, if not impossible. What is needed is an immediate breakthrough in arms limitation and reduction. The groundwork has been done, and extensive research conducted in the United Nations and elsewhere provides a solid scientific and technical basis for elaborating agreements. A large amount of practical experience has been accumulated in working out mutually acceptable measures to reduce the level of military confrontation while observing the principle of the undiminished security of either side. Realistic approaches to achieving agreements which take comprehensive account of all qualitative and quantitative components of mutually balanced military potentials of the sides concerned and the differences objectively existing between them have proved their effectiveness. An optimal combination of measures to limit and reduce armaments and to verify their implementation has been found, where the nature and scope of verification required are determined by the nature and the scope of concrete measures that are undertaken.
What is needed to give a powerful thrust to the process of limiting and reducing armaments is the political will and the readiness of all States to act in the interests of preserving and consolidating international security.

The Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist community are invariably and unswervingly advocating curbing the arms race and preventing nuclear catastrophe. For them these are not transient diplomatic or propaganda actions prompted by time-serving considerations or by the desire to show their peaceful nature in words. That is the essence of the socialist policy of peace and disarmament. It is the core of the Programme of Peace for the 1980s adopted by the Twenty-sixth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and of a number of constructive initiatives launched recently by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries - some of them at this very session. They make up a broad set of concrete proposals encompassing all fields of arms limitation and reduction and of disarmament.

The avalanche of armaments should be checked. But there is one area where most energetic, urgent efforts are required — the halting and reversal of the unbridled build-up of the most destructive weapons, the nuclear weapons. That this is the priority task is self-evident. Nuclear weapons have become the backbone of the modern military arsenals. They are the main strike force as regards both strategic and tactical uses. Any use of nuclear weapons in any armed conflict, even in a most limited and localized one, would inevitably escalate the conflict into an all-out war of annihilation.

What is needed is the consistent elimination of the very material base for waging war with the use of weapons of mass destruction. The approach to the solution of that crucial problem will be all the more effective the more purpose-oriented and the wider it is. Logic dictates above all the urgency of freezing the strategic arms of the USSR and the United States of America for the duration of the current talks. That important measure would facilitate progress towards radical nuclear arms limitation and reduction. In accordance with the principle of equality and equal security, the present levels of strategic arms and medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe, including medium-range missiles, can and must be reduced. The complete dismantling of nuclear arsenals must be the ultimate goal.
There is another major and urgent task - banning and eliminating chemical weapons. There are no grounds, nor can there be any, for retaining that weapon of mass destruction in the arsenals of States. In the name of the survival of millions and millions of people, the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons should be banned and existing stockpiles destroyed.

The elimination of the most deadly weapons should of course be coupled with the limitation and reduction of conventional armaments. The process of disarmament must encompass all spheres of military activities - on the ground, in the air, on the seas and in the oceans. It is also important to prevent the extension of the arms race to such environments as the depths of the world oceans and outer space.

Soviet scholars working on problems of peace and disarmament join in the expressions of good wishes to the participants in the second special session on disarmament by the peace-loving public of the world and wish them success in the discharge of the exceptionally responsible and important mission entrusted to them in the interests of strengthening universal peace.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French): I call now on Mr. Gerhard Kade, the representative of the International Institute for Peace.

Mr. KADE (International Institute for Peace): When I concluded my statement to the first special session devoted to disarmament, I committed the Institute which I represent to considering the results of that important session with great care in our symposia and publications. Today I assure this Assembly that the International Institute for Peace, in collaboration with its member institutes, has taken the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament as a guiding light for its work and has organized the dialogue between peace researchers from East and West along the lines indicated in that important document.
But when we look back on the four years which have elapsed since the first special session on disarmament and try to make an assessment, it is really difficult to arrive at positive conclusions.

The first special session stressed the urgent need for international disarmament. Its Final Document states:

"Unless its avenues are closed, the continued arms race means a growing threat to international peace and security and even to the very survival of mankind." (resolution S-10/2, para. 2)

None the less, in the years following that special session, the arms race has not only been maintained but also intensified and made more dangerous. Today, approximately $600 billion are spent per year for this purpose throughout the world. There is a striking contradiction between the intentions expressed in the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament and arms policies of many United Nations Member States.
And that is why at this moment, we, the community of peace researchers and specialists on international relations, have to speak out and make it quite clear that an unabated quantitative and qualitative arms race is bound to lead to large-scale general use of the immense and rapidly growing nuclear arsenals and will eventually produce an unimaginable world-wide catastrophe. There would be a substantial risk involved of self-extermination of the human race.

But, moreover, any use whatever of nuclear weapons, on no matter how small a scale, would generate a prohibitively high probability of expansion to large-scale general use. The possibility of limitation, restriction or control of any nuclear conflict is remote.

Any major hostilities between nuclear-weapon States or alliances using conventional weapons have an unacceptably high probability of developing into nuclear warfare.

Consequently, the prevention of general nuclear war and of other hostilities which would almost inevitably lead to general nuclear war has, in our judgement, priority over all other problems facing mankind today.

Today we are sitting on top of a volcano. According to cautious estimates by experts, the potential of nuclear arms stocks alone equals a detonating power of 50,000 megatons of conventional TNT. That means several tons per head of the present world population. That is the 10,000-fold detonating power of all bombs and grenades that exploded during the Second World War at the cost of about 55 million human lives. After a period of 30 years, this huge destructive potential could cause in only one day devastation equalling those of the entire Second World War.
If those weapons were ever to be used, it could mean the end of all civilization and human life. Today there is a real danger of a world poisoned by lethal radiation, scarred by detonations and bare of life. Therefore we share the opinion expressed in the Final Document of the tenth United Nations special session, on disarmament, that

"Mankind today is confronted with an unprecedented threat of self-extinction arising from the massive and competitive accumulation of the most destructive weapons ever produced."  (S-10/2, para. 11)

Computer break-downs and serious accidents have demonstrated the danger arising from the very existence of various kinds and systems of nuclear weapons. Their build-up makes it likely that accidental destructions, abuse of such means and even war might occur.

The most dangerous armament measures jeopardizing peace and the existence of mankind are those strategic concepts aiming at "limited" nuclear wars based on a "strategic superiority" or an alleged security lead, or whatever terms are used for these illusions. Much remains to be done until a world without arms is created - the final aim of all efforts towards complete and general disarmament. The way forward to this aim is through a comprehensive programme of disarmament related to both nuclear and conventional weapons, as stated in paragraph 109 of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament.

While emphasizing the principle that nuclear and conventional disarmament must be interrelated, it must be our first and foremost objective to ban the danger of a nuclear war and to take measures to halt and reverse the arms race, especially in the nuclear field.

Nuclear weapons are not suitable for pursuing political aims. Their employment involves the risk of self-extinction; it is highly unlikely in the extreme that their use could be limited to specific regions of the world or to specific target systems. There will therefore be no winner in a nuclear war. The loser will be mankind as a whole.
I should like to point out some essential political conditions for arms limitation and reduction. Any arms limitation and disarmament have to be based on the political will to refrain from military superiority and to accept the principle of equality and equal security in all negotiations on disarmament and arms limitation.

Arms limitation and disarmament should neither be conceived as concessions nor proclaimed as such. All countries are principally interested in and have the right to the maintenance of security by decreasing military confrontation.

Confidence-building measures can be politically effective only if complemented and strengthened by a defensive development of military structures, conceptions and armaments beyond the mere stage of mutual information and contacts.

Military blocs, especially the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact, can meet the claim for collective representation of security interests only when they decrease military threats and threat conceptions through clear-cut defensive armament and policies and refrain from all attempts to use military force to solve political problems.

Armament and confrontation policy must be taken as phenomena that not only threaten the physical existence of mankind, but increasingly undermine all prerequisites for the settlement of problems concerning the very existence of the world. The problems not being solved satisfactorily, or being solved only partially, because huge amounts of money are being wasted range from growing unemployment in Western industrialized countries through global environmental problems to the difficulties in developing countries. Momentary dangers and risks for the future of mankind are created by the irrationally continued increase in armaments.
We believe that the United Nations should bring its influence to bear especially in the following areas. The United States and the Soviet Union, as the chief nuclear-weapon States, should agree to cease the development, testing, construction and deployment of all types of nuclear weapons and, further, to make deep and progressive reductions in all types of their existing weapons. All other nuclear-weapon States should be pressed to join in both the freeze and the reductions with regard to their own nuclear forces.

All nations possessing nuclear arms should renounce first use of such arms, thus restricting the legitimate use of nuclear weapons, if there is such a thing, to responding to nuclear attack.

Nations having nuclear weapons situated in other countries should agree to withdraw them and all nuclear-weapon nations should renounce the deployment abroad of such weapons. This would restrict legitimate deployment of nuclear weapons to the national territory of the possessor and to the high seas.

Treaties should be agreed establishing new nuclear-free zones on the model of the Treaty of Tlatelolco in areas of Africa, Asia and, with especial urgency, in Europe, covering nations on both sides of the NATO-Warsaw Pact boundary.

Treaties and agreements covering NATO and the Warsaw Pact should be given the strongest emphasis. It is there that the greatest bulk of nuclear forces are concentrated and where the two blocs adjoin. In addition to the foregoing agreements, these two alliances should be urged to take priority action on the following:

Ceasing the development and deployment of tactical weapons, which tend to erode the vital boundary between nuclear and non-nuclear operations and of counter-force weapons, leading to the theoretical possibility of a disarming attack and to a critically dangerous erosion of deterrence.
Using restraint in all nuclear programmes to avoid systems which either increase tensions by being of particular concern to the other side, or reduce the possibilities of arms control by being difficult or impossible to monitor.

Making every effort to reduce inter-bloc tensions by refraining from aggressive or threatening actions beyond their own borders and from policies of confrontation. They should concentrate on improving their mutual relations.
Today it is possible to fight successfully disease, to overcome hunger and to preserve and exploit the riches of nature with the help of modern science. But at the same time this science has given us the means for self-destruction. For the first time in history, mankind is at a crossroads: should it employ its improved capabilities to solve the problems of its own existence, or should those problems be made immaterial by self-destruction? The answer to this question serves to determine the level of human wisdom and common sense or, if you like, the relationship between scientific-technical expertise and social responsibilities today.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French): I now call on Major-General Indar Jit Rikhye, representative of the International Peace Academy.

Major-General RIKHYE (International Peace Academy): I find myself, as the fifteenth speaker, as the man in the middle. I have also sat in the chairs on the right for many years as adviser to Hammarskjold and U Thant, and for the past 12 years I represented the International Peace Academy in many of the discussions here, but I have always been a silent man by virtue of my background as a soldier and the work in which I am at present involved. I speak today because my Academy strongly believes in the objectives which the special session has adopted. I also speak somewhat differently from what you heard so far this afternoon. I fought in the Second World War and in other wars. I have tried to keep peace, not always successfully, and I have dealt or tried to deal in a practical way with issues of war and peace.

We meet today in the shadow of a war that has just ended in the South Atlantic and a terrible war that is being waged in Lebanon. So when we speak about disarmament, I am convinced that we must first find a way to deal with the conflicts that we have. It is my belief, and the belief of my Academy, that it is impossible to speak of the goal of disarmament without at the same time addressing the issue of international security. Disarmament and international security are not only linked— they are interlocked. No nation here will agree to lay down or reduce its arms, be they conventional or nuclear in nature, without assurances of viable alternative measures to provide for its security. Unless
the world community is itself prepared to offer assurances that threats, both real and perceived, to national security will not be carried out, disarmament will remain a goal: disarmament will never be a reality.

The United Nations Security Council was intended to be just such an instrument, a guarantor of international peace and security. It has regretfully failed in its primary responsibility. Order and an uneasy peace have been maintained between the two super-Powers and within their spheres of primary interest and influence, not by the Security Council, but by the balance of power reinforced by the balance of terror.

However there are grey areas outside these clearly defined orbits where the balance of power does not apply. This grey area includes much of the third world where most of the conflicts seem to occur, and it is here that most of the armed conflicts of the post-war era have occurred and it is here that the need for a workable system of international security is most pressing.

The United Nations and regional organizations are all we have to promote peace and security beyond the reach of the super-Powers. International peace-keeping has been one of the most important means available for this purpose. This arrangement is today badly flawed. Peace-keeping is beset by lack of political will on the part of the world community, by financial and administrative difficulties and by manpower and logistical problems which place limitations on its effective implementation and operation. And yet, on balance, peace-keeping has served the cause of international security well. It can be strengthened, it can be improved, and this can be done at an immeasurably lower cost to nations than the costs of war and preparations for war.

Since its inception in 1956, the concept of peace-keeping has slowly gained acceptance. The withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force leading to the June 1967 war between the Arabs and Israelis caused a serious setback, but following the 1973 war in the Middle East a new consensus in support of United Nations peace-keeping emerged. This consensus was reflected in the establishment of a second United Nations emergency force, another force in the Golan Heights and a United Nations interim force in Lebanon in 1978.
The United Nations Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was confronted with two overwhelming difficulties from the very start. First, the Palestine Liberation Organization's strongholds in southern Lebanon remained intact. Secondly, the Christian forces in "Haddad land" buffering Israel and the United Nations forces were turned over to the Lebanese Christian militia. Those two conditions made it virtually impossible from the beginning for UNIFIL to maintain order and prevent armed conflict in Lebanon or to succeed in any way.

To avoid similar situations and their tragic consequences from recurring, the mandates of United Nations peace-keeping operations must be strengthened. They must be given greater authority to contribute successfully to the maintenance of peace, the restoration of order and a return to normalcy in Lebanon, or wherever else they may be stationed.

There are other means available to us for the enhancement of international security. These so-called confidence-building measures include the use of acceptable international observers and the application of technology.

As has been proposed by other speakers at this special session, the use of technology should be given serious consideration. Modern technology has already been applied to international peace-keeping operations, for example, in the use of ground-based sensors and night-vision devices. These enable the number of people involved to be restricted and confidence to be built by enhancing the capability of the force. Where populations are small and the areas to be protected are great, technology has obvious applications. The International Peace Academy is continuing its study on the use of technology for peace with an Austrian-based enterprise LASS - Large Area Surveillance System - to explore its application.

Two concepts which would alter and modify the international relations of States in such a way as to enhance security deserve to be strongly promoted. One is the proposal for a United Nations treaty on military non-intervention which would clarify and limit the uses of Article 51 of the Charter. Another is the concept of nuclear-free zones. The Persian Gulf, where the scenarios for East-West confrontation seem most likely to be put into practice, is an area where this could be fruitfully applied. Such a step would enhance the security of the peoples of the region and subsequently of the world as well.
I have briefly outlined a few of the available alternatives to the stockpiling, development and use of weapons. There are others. As a final recommendation, I firmly endorse the undertaking of an in-depth study of the practical steps that can and should be taken to strengthen international peace and security and pave the way for international disarmament.
The CHAIRMAN: I now call on the representative of the International Peace Research Association, Mr. Yoshikazu Sakamoto.

Mr. SAKAMOTO (International Peace Research Association (IPRA)): All of us deplore the fact that, while the danger of war has increased significantly, no real progress has been made in disarmament in the four years since the first special session on disarmament in 1978. This lack of achievement would suggest that there is something fundamentally wrong with the approach taken by the parties to the disarmament negotiations. It would thus be a gross mistake if this special session were to put forward another set of recommendations without critically examining the premises on which disarmament negotiations have been conducted.

Three premises in particular should be questioned. First, that the most realistic approach to disarmament is to conclude an agreement based on the principle of "balanced" disarmament. Secondly, that unless the initiative for disarmament is taken by the super-Powers, little can be done by other, smaller nations. Thirdly, that disarmament is a matter to be handled by Governments and the people and public opinion will play only an ancillary role. These premises, while containing half-truths, should be scrutinized in light of the unmistakable failure of disarmament in the last three decades.

First, let me ask, "Is it not true that the habitual emphasis by the two super-Powers, and even by the United Nations, on the need for negotiations towards an agreement based on balanced disarmament has proved sterile and even counter-productive?" Given the lack of mutual confidence between the two super-Powers, the inherent ambiguity of the notion of "balance" has contributed only to prolonging futile talks; and while the talks have dragged on, new developments in military research and development have spawned one generation of new weapons after another. Perhaps we should wait until an agreement has been reached on what constitutes the "balance". Perhaps we should even wait until a treaty has been concluded as a precondition for actual disarmament. But to do so would ignore the one reality staring us in the face: the longer the talks take, the more destabilizing the effects of the arms race become, exacerbating the danger of a nuclear holocaust. Time is short, the matter is urgent and decisions have to be made now—before it is too late.
Under these circumstances, the second special session on disarmament should call upon the nuclear weapon Powers, particularly the two super-Powers, to take even unilateral initiatives for disarmament that do not jeopardize their fundamental security. More concretely, the nuclear over-kill stockpiles of the two super-Powers should be reduced rapidly to the level of so-called minimum deterrence. That would mean the abolition of more than a half of the existing nuclear stockpiles. As an initial step, one of the super-Powers should unilaterally reduce its stockpile by, say, 100 strategic missiles and dismantle them under international supervision to ensure verification, urging the other party to implement a similar measure. This is not unilateral disarmament. It is a unilateral initiative for disarmament. This initiative would serve two purposes. First, it would demonstrate the sincerity of the super-Power's commitment to the goal of disarmament, serving as a good confidence-building measure. Secondly, it would strengthen the initiating super-Power's diplomatic position in taking the lead in disarmament negotiations, without weakening its strategic posture.

Similarly, all nuclear-weapon tests and the deployment of theatre nuclear missiles should be unilaterally halted and frozen, pending the completion of negotiations for a treaty arrangement.

A series of such unilateral initiatives and acts of reciprocity on both sides would greatly help create a favourable political climate of mutual confidence. Once this happens, the disarmament process will gain additional momentum, greatly facilitating the conclusion of a formal disarmament treaty.

As for the second premise, let me ask, "Is it true that not much room remains for smaller nations to initiate and promote disarmament unless the super-Powers take the first step?" To demonstrate the increasing political influence of smaller nations, I need only point to the extremely significant experience of decolonization which the majority of nations in the United Nations has undergone in the last three decades.
In view of the fact that from time immemorial military conquest and colonial domination have been the order of the day, it is truly remarkable that for the first time in history direct colonial domination has been virtually eliminated with the exception of southern Africa and several other parts of the world. What has made this historic achievement possible? It is not because the colonized peoples were more powerful than the colonial Powers in military and economic terms. National liberation succeeded when it became recognized as a just cause that politically delegitimized colonialism. Today, none of the big Powers can safely dominate the smaller nations in defiance of the political influence of the latter.

Having greater political influence than ever before, the smaller nations also have increasing political capacity and responsibility for taking initiatives for disarmament. More specifically, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones should and can be achieved on the initiative of smaller nations in their respective regions of the world. More serious attention should also be drawn to the fact that, since the two super-Powers are not contiguous, but are confronting each other primarily through other, smaller nations, a drastic reduction of conventional weapons initiated by the smaller nations in each region could serve not only to enhance peace and security in the region, but also to provide an effective leverage for the reduction of conventional weapons on the part of the super-Powers.

Finally, as for the third premise, let me ask, “Is it true that citizens can play only a secondary role in promoting peace and disarmament?”

Recognizing the growing importance of the role of the people and public opinion, the special session in 1978 rightly assigned to non-governmental citizens’ organizations a role to help the United Nations mobilize public opinion and disseminate information on armaments and disarmament. That is probably the only part of the Final Document of 1978 that has been put into practice, even to a greater extent than was anticipated. In the last few years, for the first time in post-war history, a popular movement has emerged that is by now an independent, international political actor calling for nuclear disarmament.
The time therefore has come for the United Nations to develop much closer links with citizens' movements. More concretely, this special session should officially endorse the establishment of an non-governmental organization consultative committee on disarmament that would act as a counterpart to the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, and should request that Government representatives to the Committee on Disarmament co operate in the exchange of views with such a non-governmental organization committee. Furthermore, a non-governmental, independent expert committee on disarmament, designated by research institutes and Non-Governmental Organizations, should be established and attached to the United Nations Centre for Disarmament. That committee should conduct research of high scientific quality in order to prepare recommendations independent of the positions of their Governments. In brief, the United Nations should utilize the human and intellectual resources of the Non-Governmental Organizations and movements by taking innovative steps in its disarmament campaign to strengthen ties with the people of the world.
The Governments of the super-Powers are in danger of losing control over the development of military technology. The Governments of many smaller nations are in danger of losing control over regional arms races and the proliferation of modern weapons. The citizens' movement has emerged, and is here to stay, to help Governments restore genuine political leadership committed to and capable of creating, a new demilitarized international order.

All the States of the world and all the peoples of the world, have the right to live in a demilitarized world without war. In this sense, disarmament is the right of the States and the peoples of the world. Moreover, in a world where 450 million people are starving, military expenditures of over $550 billion a year should be considered a criminal act against humanity. In this sense, all Governments and the people, particularly those in the industrial societies, have the duty to bring about disarmament.

Future generations will assess this special session by the extent to which it fulfils that specific right and duty. The members of the International Peace Research Association appeal to the delegates gathered here to take bold strides forward to create a demilitarized, peaceful and equitable international order.

The CHAIRMAN: Before calling on the next speaker, I call on Mr. Martenson the Assistant Secretary-General.

Mr. MARTENSON (Assistant Secretary-General, Centre for Disarmament) I have been informed that owing to the unexpected reconvening of the seventh emergency special session of the General Assembly, as well as to meetings of the Security Council, it will not be possible to provide interpreters for any statements made after this point.

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