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Chairman: Mr. ADENIJI (Nigeria)

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The meeting was called to order at 9:25 a.m.

STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN

The CHAIRMAN: I should like first to inform members of the Committee of a recommendation of the Bureau which met yesterday. The Bureau recommends that the deadline for the submission of proposals by Member States which, according to our previous decision was set at 25 June, should be extended to Monday, 28 June, in order to give Member States more time. That would mean that proposals would have to be submitted in writing to the Secretariat by that date. May I take it that the Committee decides to endorse the recommendation of the Bureau?

It was so decided.

STATEMENT BY THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL FOR DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

The CHAIRMAN: The first speaker for this morning is Mr. Jean Ripert, Director-General for Development and International Economic Co-operation. I now invite him to make his statement.

Mr. RIPERT (Director-General for Development and International Economic Co-operation)(interpretation from French): Mr. Chairman, I thank you and the other members of the Committee for giving me the opportunity to address the Committee on the subject of disarmament and development.

The consideration of statistical data is a very difficult exercise, particularly when one is dealing with global data. Such data may give rise to controversy because they originate from heterogeneous sources or their resources are not easily verifiable. They reflect only a limited aspect of a complex social and economic reality and, as we know, what is "quantifiable" is not always of the greatest significance. However, even a cursory perusal of the statistical data on public expenditure in the last decades reveals a sorrowful and dramatic story of efforts devoted, in the name of the maintenance of peace, to the construction of armaments, the only use of which seems to be the destruction of mankind. How could one fail to note the striking contrast between
the constant increase in these expenditures from public resources and the fluctuation in the financing of actions in favour of the poorest and of investments for the promotion of economic and social development.

A number of questions arise in the context of the magnitude of the resources applied to the military sector. The first and most obvious question is whether the world, faced with a universal economic slow-down, can afford to continue - much less to increase - the allocation to military purposes of real resources on this scale. Secondly, to what extent are certain of the most pressing economic and social problems a cumulative result of past patterns of military consumption? Finally, what are the direct and indirect benefits likely to follow from a reversal of the present trend in the arms race?

The economic and social implications of the arms race for the global economy have been comprehensively analysed in a number of United Nations studies. The most recent and most significant is the study by the Group of Governmental Experts under the dynamic leadership of Mrs. Inga Thorsson. The findings of that study fully justify the very need for it. Before I comment on a few points, I should like to draw the attention of members of the Committee to the first paragraph of the report's concluding chapter which candidly states that

"the world can either continue to pursue the arms race with characteristic vigour or move consciously and with deliberate speed toward a more stable and balanced social and economic development within a more sustainable international economic and political order. It cannot do both."

(A/36/356, annex, para. 391)

At its last session, the General Assembly decided to transmit the study of the group of experts to this special session for "substantive consideration and appropriate action" (resolution 36/92 G, para. 6). It is my firm belief that such consideration and action are important and urgent, given the magnitude of world military expenditures at a time when, as I have just said, the global economy is confronting a prolonged crisis of dimensions unprecedented in the post-war era.
This crisis envelopes both the developed and developing countries, but the burden on developing countries is particularly distressing and severe. The deterioration of the external environment of their economic activity and the limited flexibility and resilience in most of their economies have caused a sharp fall in the growth rates of those countries; these are now lower on the average than the population growth rate, which means that the per capita standard of living is falling. In many instances the very process of development seems to be threatened.

At the same time there appears to be a dangerous trend towards the erosion of the significant achievements of multilateral co-operation in the post-war period. The worsening of the world economic situation and the weakening of international economic co-operation appear to feed upon each other. If these trends continue, the consequences could be grave: stagnation could give way to a deep economic recession; internal social conflicts would increase; and international economic tensions could aggravate purely political conflicts. This, in turn, may escalate the arms race, with its adverse economic and social implications, setting into motion dangerous vicious circles.

In purely financial terms, we all know that world-wide military expenditures by 1981 exceeded the astounding level of $520 billion, representing 6 per cent of world output. This amount has been compared with many other statistics, but in connexion with development I shall merely point out that it is equivalent to all the resources available for investment in all developing countries combined.

In addition to this financial dimension, we must take into consideration the utilization for military purposes of real resources such as labour, industrial capacity, essential minerals and other raw materials. There are also other elements which deserve attention from the economic standpoint: the international arms trade, which has in recent years been growing in size, and military research and development, that is, the capacity of military sectors to influence the scale and direction of technological development in the world.
It is estimated that since 1960 expenditures on military research and development world-wide have increased from $13 billion to $35 billion. It is also estimated that out of the 50 million people directly or indirectly engaged in military activities throughout the world about 500,000 are eminent researchers and engineers working on the development of new weapons. During the 1970s, approximately 20 per cent of the world's qualified researchers and engineers were working in the military sector. While it is true that military research and development has sometimes contributed indirectly to progress in the civilian sector, we must also bear in mind that the resources allocated for it drastically reduce the finance available in many other priority areas which are today of concern to developed and developing countries alike. This may be more clear now, at a time when industry and Governments have to reduce their spending and investment programmes, while military spending nearly everywhere continues to enjoy an absolute priority.
Apprehension about loss of employment opportunity as a consequence of reductions in military spending has often been discussed in the context of disarmament. The present high level of unemployment in the most industrialized countries reinforces that apprehension. In this connexion, it is worth-while to consider, as the Group of Experts has done, whether non-military spending of the same magnitude as military spending would not have created employment opportunities on a similar or larger scale. I should like now to refer to the recent report of the Committee for Development Planning of the United Nations, which states that:

"...at any given level of public expenditure, the higher the amount spent on weapons, the lower the amount of employment created".

(E/1982/15, para. 49)

For the less developed economies facing severe unemployment problems, the employment effects of higher military spending may be more far-reaching in the long run because the sustained emphasis on technological sophistication in the military sector usually raises the qualifications required of its personnel, with the result that its demand for labour increasingly diverts scarce talents and skills away from the civilian sector.

In the light of these general observations, let me now address some of the recommendations made by the Governmental Experts who met under the chairmanship of Mr. Thorsson.

Their study represents the beginning of a sustained and in-depth investigation into the complex relationship between disarmament and development. The Group has recommended that studies be undertaken to identify and to publicize some benefits that would be derived from the reallocation of military resources in a balanced and verifiable manner to address pressing economic and social problems and, in particular, to contribute towards reducing the gap in income as between the developed and the developing world.
Clearly, it is necessary for us in a concerted effort to harness and experience and expertise not only of military strategists and defence experts but also of the economists, sociologists and public administrators to undertake such studies. Some initiatives have already been taken within the United Nations, however modest, to devote attention to the economic and social consequences of the arms race in the context of the various global economic and social surveys that are being conducted. In my capacity as Director-General for Development and International Economic Co-operation, I am determined to ensure that increasing attention is given to this dimension in the further work of the United Nations in development research and analysis.

The Expert Group has drawn attention to the fact that disarmament, which is a complex process, involves a major conversion or redeployment of resources from the production of one set of goods and services to the production of another. Conversion and redeployment are not phenomena unique to disarmament. Any form of economic and social development implies a continuous process of conversion of resources, because in modern industrial societies the factors of production must respond continuously to the development of new products or new techniques and the phasing out of old ones. The process of conversion is particularly difficult at a time of global recession and stagnation. Despite these real difficulties, however, efforts will need to be made, as recommended by the Experts, to prepare and, where appropriate, plan to facilitate the conversion of resources freed by disarmament measures for civilian purposes. This is an area in which exchange of information and experiences between Member States could be very useful and productive and could, if so desired, be promoted by the United Nations.

The General Assembly had specifically required that the study on disarmament and development indicate specific action to reallocate financial resources released through disarmament measures to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries.
One proposal considered by the Expert Group was the establishment of a special development fund which would be financed from savings through the implementation of disarmament measures, a levy on armaments and/or voluntary contributions. The Expert Group was unanimous in its opinion that the disarmament dividend approach to financing a fund is most in accord with the United Nations concept of disarmament and development. The establishment of such a fund gives rise to complex problems which could be controversial. However, it is a proposal requiring serious examination by this Committee, given the implications that it has not only for development but for disarmament itself.

The United Nations, in close consultation with the specialized agencies and other organizations concerned, could, if this proposal were acceptable to the General Assembly in principle, consider the feasibility of such a proposal and the modalities for implementing it.

A concrete volume of activities, research and information related to disarmament and development, at both the national and global level requires increased co-ordination. The Expert Group has recommended that the United Nations Secretary-General should take appropriate action through the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination to foster and co-ordinate the incorporation of the disarmament and development perspective in the programmes and activities of the United Nations system. This perspective is interdisciplinary and requires the continuing attention of the various parts of the United Nations system within their respective areas of competence. The United Nations Centre for Disarmament has already established close co-operation with other relevant organizations and entities of our system and I wish personally to commend the Centre for its useful work, particularly in following up on the recommendations of the Expert Group. It is the mandated responsibility of my office to facilitate development and international economic co-operation in close consultation with all parts of the United Nations system. I intend, in close collaboration with the Centre for Disarmament, to help in increasing and enhancing the collective effort in this area of all the relevant agencies and organizations.
In conclusion, I wish to underline again the fact that while disarmament could undoubtedly facilitate economic and social development, it is even more true that the establishment of a more efficient and equitable international economic order would assist in ensuring peace and stability. Disarmament, development and security are inseparable elements; they have to be pursued in parallel. An international concerted effort for growth and recovery in the world economy and for the correction of current structural imbalances in international economic relations is vital to the issue with which this Committee is directly concerned. It is my sincere hope that current initiatives to launch in the United Nations a process of global negotiations will indeed be successful and provide an essential complementarity to the concerted efforts of the international community to promote disarmament.
STATEMENT BY MR. GIULIO ANDREOTTI, CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON POLITICAL QUESTIONS, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT OF THE INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION

The CHAIRMAN: I now call on Mr. Giulio Andreotti, Chairman of the Committee on Political Questions, International Security and Disarmament of the Inter-Parliamentary Union to make a statement.

Mr. ANDREOTTI (Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU)): (interpretation from French): The Inter-Parliamentary Union, which since 1889 has gathered together members of the representative Assemblies of States of different and often opposing political and social systems, has for some years now been giving priority to the problems of arms reduction, security and détente. The Lagos Conference last April unanimously adopted an important resolution, and it was decided that I should convey to the special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament the support and solidarity of the elected members of the 98 countries that make up the IPU.

We are deeply grateful that ours is the first non-governmental organization to make a statement.

It is indeed appropriate that the voices of those who have a direct mandate to represent the aspirations of the peoples and to receive every day their appeals for peace should be heard in support of the initiatives that must be developed and negotiated between Governments.

If we pause to consider what has happened during the four years that have elapsed since the first special session on disarmament in 1978, we may draw two different conclusions, both equally valid. On the one hand, world expenditure on armaments has continued to increase, and throughout the world there have been conflicts and increased manifestations of violence and terrorism. Even non-aligned countries have suffered from, and have sometimes taken, military action. But at the same time at least four positive developments may be noted.
First, we have become much more aware that a historical injustice that forces a large portion of mankind to lead a marginal existence can no longer be justified. We have therefore instituted aid programmes for developing countries and have tried to work out a coherent North-South policy, not giving in to strong psychological resistance and commercial interests, in striving effectively to lay the foundations for a new international economic order. Indeed, a future of universal peace is inconceivable if some countries can envisage the maintenance or increase of their prosperity while a substantial part of the earth's population languishes in hopeless poverty.

Secondly, the world-wide problems of hunger, disease, infant mortality, drought and damage to the environment through the destruction of vegetation and the impoverishment of the soil have won the attention of the public and especially of the younger generation and the well informed.

Thirdly, the reaction to the arms race has finally extended even beyond the terrifying scope of nuclear arsenals, and we have grasped the basic fact that at least 80 per cent of total military expenditures is on conventional weapons.

Fourthly, it is clearly realized that the crises of recent years have been so broad in scope that in other times they would have unleashed wars of international dimensions. That this has not happened is due not only to the nuclear deterrent but also to a better and more widespread awareness of the need for peace.

Without optimism, which would be unfounded, and without pessimism, for which history would hold us responsible, we must nevertheless continue, if with only small steps, to build up adequate safeguards for peace. We should begin by giving greater weight to the authority of the United Nations and subsequently consider policies of co-operation in specific areas, as we are now trying to do in Europe in our laborious efforts to recapture at Madrid the original spirit of the Final Act of Helsinki. In recent days I have heard of similar efforts in other regions of the world. It is very significant that the President of the United States
reminded us here last Thursday that there was an urgent need to implement the agreement on security and co-operation between all the European States signed at Helsinki in 1975.

The IPU has asked me to propose to the General Assembly at the United Nations the following measures, which seem to it to be urgently needed and possible of achievement: a courageous and comprehensive programme of disarmament, the continuation in a determined manner of the negotiations on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms, leading to their limitation and reduction as soon as possible; a clear endorsement of the anti-ballistic missile treaty; the conclusion of an agreement to stop flight testing of all new strategic delivery vehicles; a successful conclusion to the United States-Soviet talks in Geneva on the limitation and reduction of intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe; agreements in the Committee on Disarmament and other international forums on a comprehensive nuclear test ban and a ban on radiological weapons; the adherence of all States to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare; a treaty on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction; a further call on all States that have not yet done so to adhere to the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction; a new agreement to reinforce or complement the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, in the form of a treaty on the prohibition of the development, testing and stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space; further strengthening of the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, in accordance with the decisions of the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly; security guarantees for the non-nuclear-weapon States; the conclusion of other limited arms control agreements like the 1971 Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, the 1977
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques and the 1981 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which May be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, and agreements aimed at ensuring the successful conclusion of the Vienna negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe.
At the Lagos Conference in April 1982, which I have already mentioned, the IPU urged all its members to ensure that the respective parliaments and national Governments, first devote increasing attention to the problem of disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament; secondly, adopt concrete measures for halting the arms race, both nuclear and conventional, thus ensuring a military balance that does not endanger the security and peace of each country is achieved not by an increase but by a gradual reduction; thirdly, intensify inter-parliamentary contacts at the regional and subregional levels with a view to increasing mutual trust and strengthening security, supporting strongly the action taken by the Inter-Parliamentary Union to help stop the arms race and ensure the implementation of the resolutions to be adopted at the special session of the United Nations devoted to disarmament which is now going on - on which we should strive to focus the active interest of world public opinion.

Before concluding, I should like to make two specific comments. From 1975 on, a number of expert groups - in which Italy is also participating - has been working out a standardized method of calculating military expenditure. The aim is to lay the foundations for negotiations on the reduction of military budgets and, in particular, to increase the transparency of those budgets; to provide the maximum guarantees of the credibility of the data submitted; to ensure their comparability; and to ensure their verification.

Member States of the United Nations have been invited by the Secretary General to use this method of calculation and to submit the results annually to the Organization. While many Western countries, including Italy, and some non-aligned countries have accepted that invitation, other States have so far refused to participate in the exercise. They maintain that it is designed, in particular, to delay the start of real and sincere negotiations on reduction. In their opinion, military budgets must be reduced in absolute or percentage figures on the basis of the total aggregate communicated by individual Member States.
I realize that this is also a technical problem, but the political aspect is predominant.

This second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament would achieve one good result if, through an effort of goodwill, we could overcome the obstacles and feelings of mistrust and if we could ultimately give the citizens of the world a true picture of military expenditure, thus ending a controversial system of real misinformation.

In 1978, as President of the Council of Ministers of Italy, I proposed that the United Nations should discuss the control of transfers of conventional weapons in a series of committees with regional membership made up of the producers and purchasers of such weapons. Many countries, especially among the non-aligned, brought up numerous difficulties, maintaining that the control of such transfers could affect the defence capability of the third-world countries and hence their sovereignty. We have taken up this idea again at the second special session devoted to disarmament, proposing, as a first step, the establishment of a register of transfers of conventional weapons within the framework of the United Nations. We have also requested the Secretary-General of the United Nations to study the question in detail in the course of the discussions of the Expert Group on Conventional Disarmament that are to begin next July. I venture to direct the Committee's attention forcefully to these important subjects.

I have already spoken of a step-by-step approach, although I am well aware that it is more attractive to deal with global proposals for the total and immediate reform of what is disturbing the equilibrium and the conscience of mankind.

I would like here to express the hope that this New York meeting will transmit a realistic signal of the common will to proceed in the right direction, building, not destroying, narrowing, not widening, positions.

At the Inter-Parliamentary Union Conference to be held next September in Rome we shall study your results and we shall do our utmost to ensure that this
second special session on disarmament has a better follow-up than the 1978 session, which nevertheless awakened the enthusiasm and faith of the many people of goodwill who are to be found in every country in the world without exception.

STATEMENT BY MR. OLOF PALME, CHAIRMAN OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY ISSUES

The CHAIRMAN: I now invite Mr. Olof Palme, Chairman of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, to make a statement.

Mr. PALME (Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues): It is a great privilege for me to speak here today as Chairman of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues. It was this second special session on disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly that we wanted to provide some input through our work. I can assure the Committee that we considered it important to be able to present our findings and our conclusions to the United Nations and the delegations here present.

I should also like to express the Commission's gratitude to the Governments, organizations and individuals that have supported our work by financial contributions, by inviting us and receiving us and by meeting and discussing with us. I would like also to express special appreciation to the non-governmental organizations, the popular movements, the peace groups, the churches, doctors, trade unions, scientists and all those that have together formed public opinion and created such strong popular support for disarmament in the past two years or so.

I certainly do not agree with all the arguments or all the slogans or all the proposals of those groups, but I think that we should all recognize what a great service they have rendered. They have made us all much more aware of the dangers of the arms race. They have questioned the necessity of a continued build-up of nuclear weapons and the wisdom of the common strategic thinking. They have changed public opinion and thus influenced political leaders, for these are normally sensitive to criticism. Many of the groups have been small and
have worked under difficult circumstances. Many have had limited financial means, and large resources only of idealism. I am convinced that without all the arguments put forward in books and articles, at seminars and conferences, and without these marches and demonstrations, we would not have been able to see negotiations that had been idle now being revived, and we would not have had the many proposals to reduce, to freeze, to cut or not to use nuclear weapons that have been put forward of late.
It is sometimes said that the flamboyant rhetoric of popular movements must be tempered by the realism of statesmen. In these days, I rather feel that the rhetoric of statesmen should be tempered by the down-to-earth realism of ordinary people who have come to understand what nuclear war would mean and who demand practical action to prevent it.

The Commission started its work in September 1980. The international atmosphere at that time partly explains why we decided to set up the Commission. The international dialogue was more or less silent, apart from accusations. Negotiations had stopped. New weapons were deployed or planned. One thing that we had in mind when we started was to contribute to a revival of the international dialogue and to try to draw public attention to current arms limitation and disarmament problems. I remember that at our first meeting it was said that the most acute problem was to try to help save the SALT II agreements and keep the SALT process going. I can only express my satisfaction that the SALT process is being reborn, whatever the acronym.

The members of our Commission were not primarily experts in the disarmament field. What we may possess, though, is experience drawn from policy-making and from a broad political field. Five are former Heads of State or leaders of Governments; five others have served as cabinet ministers; some of us have had long diplomatic careers. We come from both NATO and Warsaw-Pact countries, from non-aligned and neutral countries, from industrial nations and from the developing world. That means that we had in our Commission different interests, different ideologies, different perspectives. But the members did not represent Governments: they were all invited in their personal capacities.

We did not want to interfere with ongoing negotiations or with disarmament work already under way, and we did not want to try to cover the whole ground or to elaborate a complete programme of disarmament. Others do that, and in a much better way that we could hope to do. We had a more limited objective: to try to show what practical steps could be taken to create a downward spiral in the arms race. General and complete disarmament is, of course, the final goal, but there is a need now to initiate a process that with time can gather
momentum and lead us towards the goal. Results are badly needed if people are to continue having any confidence in us, so we tried to identify measures that in the years ahead could reasonably be negotiated and implemented and could contribute to disarmament.

We also tried to identify a starting-point, a basis that would be agreeable to the different interests and the different security needs. We did not try to find out who was guilty of what. We asked what we did have in common, despite our different backgrounds and different opinions. To find such a basis is, I think, essential for any practical work towards disarmament.

So, our report contains some principal conclusions that we all think are essential, and it outlines a practical programme of action. We propose a set of short-term and medium-term measures. The short-term measures could and should be implemented within the next two years, the medium-term measures within the next five years. If one studies the programme one will find that the concrete measures that we propose do not imply or presuppose a total change of policy by Governments. The proposals are not revolutionary in the sense of meaning that Governments would have to give up basic convictions. But if the whole programme is implemented the security situation will be changed in a revolutionary way, and for the better.

We spent much time studying the effects of nuclear war. We met with experts in the East and the West. We talked with doctors; we travelled to Hiroshima to hear about the effects of the only two nuclear attacks that have taken place in reality, and we heard testimony from survivors of those attacks. Our conclusion was unambiguous: a nuclear war cannot be won. Victory is not possible. It would be such a catastrophe that the notion of victory would be meaningless. It is sometimes argued that the loss of life and the damage, even if they are great, are in some sense acceptable. But who is to decide what is acceptable, to one's own country and to other countries, to the world as a whole, to the unborn generations? Can that question be answered by strategic institutions or by military planners? To my mind, this is a political and moral issue of the highest magnitude.
We on the Commission used our humble moral and political judgement, and this is our answer: any doctrine based on the belief that it is possible to wage a victorious nuclear war is dangerous and irresponsible.

Further, we do not believe that a nuclear war can be controlled and limited. Some claim that conflicts involving the use of nuclear weapons and extending over days or even months could remain limited. We conclude in our report that to envisage such a conflict seriously one must make incredible assumptions about the rationality of decision-makers under intense pressure, about the resilience of the people and machinery in command and control systems, about social coherence in the face of unprecedented devastation and suffering, about the continuance of effective governmental operations, and about the strength of military discipline.

Limited nuclear war is simply an illusion, and to contemplate it as a serious possibility is equally dangerous and irresponsible.

When the Commission visited Hiroshima, four survivors of the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki told us about their experience during those days in August 1945. One of them was Dr. Tatsuichiro Akizuki, from the St. Franciscan Hospital in Nagasaki, now an old man. He told us how hopeless he felt as a doctor on that day and he went on to say that science and technology had made great advances and transformed the world, but that unfortunately the moral standards of human beings have not caught up with the development of science and technology. I think that Dr. Akizuki, that healer of human wounds from Nagasaki, is right: we have fantastic skills and tools, but we lack in wisdom. We have not yet understood. But I am after all optimistic: wisdom will grow with every generation, even if there are temporary setbacks.

One thing that we must all understand and that we must teach those that have not yet understood is that nuclear weapons have transformed the very concept of war. In the nuclear age, no nation can achieve absolute security through military superiority. No nation can defend itself effectively against a nuclear attack; no matter how many nuclear weapons a nation acquires it will always remain vulnerable to a nuclear attack, and thus its people will ultimately remain insecure. That is a central fact that all nations must realize.
Security can thus not be achieved through unilateral measures. There is no such thing as a modern pax romana. Security must instead be achieved through co-operative efforts. Even political and ideological opponents must work together to avoid nuclear war. They can only survive together: they would be united in their destruction. A nuclear war would not end in a victory for one, but in mutual destruction. Security in the nuclear age means common security.

That principle of common security does not deny that nations have a legitimate right to a secure existence, but it does mean that security cannot be based on military competition. Stability based on armament cannot be sustained indefinitely. Deterrence cannot be made foolproof. An international system based on armament may suddenly crumble.

Common security means that nations should show restraint, and renounce policies which seek advantage through armament and military power. The search for military superiority must not be a goal of national policy, but instead parity ought to be the guiding principle. And once one has accepted military parity as a principle, one is committed to negotiations. For parity can be defined only by the parties concerned in negotiations. This also means that the notion of linkage must be abolished; linkage is an unsound principle. Negotiations for the limitation of arms require continuity and stability, and cannot be regarded as rewards for an adversary's good behaviour.
We therefore conclude that a doctrine of common security must replace the present expedient of deterrence through armaments. International peace must rest on a commitment to joint survival rather than on a threat of mutual destruction.

Of course, the changes in thinking will not occur overnight. But nations must start now to build an international structure of common security. I should like to outline for the Committee some of the components of that structure and the practical steps that we propose. These steps cover both nuclear and conventional armaments and concern both the United States and the USSR, strategic arms competition and regional conflict. We strongly urge limits on the qualitative arms race, including the early conclusion of a treaty banning all nuclear tests, a treaty banning chemical weapons altogether, universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and so on. We discuss verification problems in connexion with our proposals. In the short time available, however, I cannot give the Committee a complete account of the whole programme and I should like to concentrate on some aspects of it.

Let me start by taking up the question of regional security. In the last few weeks, stateswomen and statesmen have come to this session on disarmament to talk about peace. No one, I believe, has claimed that war as such is good or that it gives glory to men and countries. Not one, I believe, has objected to disarmament as a goal. On the contrary, all those who have spoken here have supported the high principles, have warned of the nuclear arms race and reminded us of the horrors of war.

But in the same weeks several wars have been fought around the globe: between Iran and Iraq; in Lebanon, where Israel has invaded; in the South Atlantic. There is fighting going on in Afghanistan and Kampuchea. There is war in El Salvador. The war in Chad has continued and recently the capital was taken by one of the sides.
Those are only the latest examples from a list of 130 to 140 so-called local wars that have been fought since 1945. Nearly all of them have taken place in the third world. All these wars mean a loss of life, human suffering, tragedy. Young men who in March of this year were alive and laughing and planning for their future are now, in June, dead, killed on the Falklands/Malvinas Islands or drowned in the South Atlantic Ocean. Children in Lebanon have been mutilated, families uprooted, homes destroyed. And we know from previous wars that once the fighting has come to a halt, the suffering continues for the civilians. There is often widespread famine. There are, perhaps, millions of refugees. There is often a society unable to cope with the problems that war has created.

All these wars will have served little purpose and after some time we will look back at the wars of these last few months and we will be able to see that the real causes of conflict have not been removed. And one thing is certain: these wars have not awakened the noblest feelings in the nations among the peoples concerned. The rhetoric accompanying these wars has not been one of great cultural and humanistic advancement.

Furthermore, the wars have created new problems, more difficult to solve. The Palestinian question, to mention one example, cannot be solved by the destruction of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Desolation is not peace, even if you call it that. It is quite obvious that the Middle East nations cannot achieve security at each others' expense. The nations in the region can only destroy each other if they do not accept the fact that the peoples and their nations have to live together side by side. They must seek security together. They must agree to co-operate even with their prospective and very real opponents. Security in this region must also be common security.
Local wars have the potentiality of developing into larger conflicts, perhaps involving the major Powers. The developing world is fragmented and torn by a variety of indigenous conflicts. There are territorial claims, often with roots in a colonial past. There are ethnic and religious animosities and there are struggles for political influence and privilege among disparate elements of society. Pressures resulting from economic underdevelopment and the maldistribution of resources and wealth produce strains that may result in violence and war.

All these local and regional tensions are further complicated by the East-West rivalry that is often superimposed on the conflicts in the third world. The developing world has a great interest in détente between East and West.

There is another important dimension to security. Many nations in the third world see no alternative to arming themselves. But economic resources are unevenly distributed among nations and so is military power. Many of the nations that have emerged since 1945 are small States. Some 62 States have fewer than one million inhabitants. They cannot possibly afford large standing armies or expensive modern military equipment. Their very smallness and weakness may be a temptation to other, more powerful nations. Indeed, whole new questions of security arise for the international community, problems that call for a joint common effort.

The most important and most valuable tool for common security that we together possess is the United Nations. We believe that this instrument can be used in a more determined way and that the United Nations in its security role must be strengthened. In particular, we think that the capacity of the Security Council and of the Secretary-General to pre-empt conflict ought to be enhanced. We propose, therefore, in our report a procedure to deal with third-world border conflicts. This procedure would constitute the first step towards collective security.
After the emergence of a border conflict the procedure involves the Security Council and the Secretary-General at an early stage. It includes the sending of fact-finding missions, military observer teams and United Nations military forces to the area in question. Its purpose would be to prevent conflicts from being settled by armed forces, but the purpose would not be to pronounce on the substantive issues in dispute. The introduction of substantial United Nations forces before the outbreak of hostilities would in most cases, we believe, prevent violation of territories from occurring at all.

This procedure must have the support of the veto Powers and of the third world. The Security Council and the Secretary-General must have the power to act and be able to act. The co-operation of the permanent members of the Security Council is particularly important. Their consent is a prerequisite for the effective functioning of the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security.

What are the chances, then, for such a concordat? I believe the chances should be rather good. The scope for the concordat is clearly limited, both in procedural and in operational terms. But the prize could be great in terms of conflicts that may be resolved peacefully instead of violently. And I believe that in many ways we would all benefit. The regions would be more secure. We could limit the resources spent on arms. Major Powers would not feel induced to get involved in remote areas, as their opponents could also be expected to keep out.

While I am speaking of the United Nations and the efforts to strengthen the role of this Organization, I should like to refer to one additional, important aspect concerns the role of international law. If the United Nations is to be an effective instrument for peace, the countries of the world must give universal adherence to the rules of international law. There must be certain established rules for the international behaviour of nations and when I say universal adherence, I mean universal. We cannot have one set of rules for the rich countries of the world and their friends and another set of rules for the poor countries. As within nations, the law must apply equally otherwise it can never be respected.
Let us now turn to another area. The confrontation between East and West has found its military expression primarily in Europe. On that continent, with its dense population, a continent that twice in this century has been ravaged by war, we find today the greatest concentration of military power in history. Nowhere in the world is there so large an amount of conventional and nuclear weapons poised against each other. This confrontation takes place between the two military alliances. Their perceptions, their security needs, their decisions, are major factors behind the military build-up in the United States and the Soviet Union.

Some countries in Europe have decided to remain neutral, outside the alliances, and in that way to alleviate the East-West confrontation. But they cannot totally escape the military logic of the alliances, for they maintain military forces that have a relation to the general level of military confrontation around them. Even a conventional war in Europe would be a catastrophe, regardless of who prevailed, given the quantity and quality of the weapons, and it would almost inevitably escalate into nuclear war. A nuclear war in Europe would also affect the neutral States that have deliberately given up the option of nuclear weapons, and such a war would most likely result in a total nuclear conflagration.

There are many problems in Europe, and there will be difficult developments in the next decades, but one thing is certain: war is not a solution to Europe's problem; security in Europe must also be common security.

The Commission has devoted much time to discussing the situation in Europe. We believe that the armies in Europe today are much larger than the basic security needs of each of the two sides demand. A drastic reduction would enhance security. We do not believe that the military build-up has resulted in a net increase in the security of either side. The ratio of forces has not changed much over the past 20 years. The main difference is merely that though the confrontation continues it does so at a much higher level of potential destruction than before.
Security in Europe is a complex and difficult problem. There are
different opinions about the military doctrines, about the credibility of
deterrence and so on. I shall not go into them. Personally, however, I do
not believe that security in Europe can be sought solely on the basis of a
continued military build-up. It would be too risky and too costly politically
and economically. Something more than developing new weapons must be done.
Europe needs détente and co-operation, but the continued military confrontation
is an obstacle to détente.

The large deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe or targeted on Europe
raises special problems. There must be substantial reductions in the stockpiles
of those weapons. But there is a link between the nuclear weapons in Europe and
the balance of conventional forces between East and West. The North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) introduced more nuclear weapons in Europe to compensate
for what it perceived as an inferiority in conventional forces, so we believe
that a pre-condition for demilitarization in Europe is that the two sides
reach a negotiated agreement on rough parity in conventional forces. When
our proposals for Europe have been discussed it seems that those points have
sometimes been missed.

What the Commission has stressed is not merely the need for the withdrawal
of nuclear weapons but the need for an agreement on conventional forces to
facilitate reductions in nuclear weapons. We have therefore called for the
early conclusion of an agreement in the negotiations in Vienna on conventional
force reductions. In presenting our report to this special session, I should
like to repeat and stress that we urge that the Foreign Ministers of the
participating States get together to solve the remaining problems and conclude
an agreement before the end of this year.

An agreement on conventional forces in Europe would facilitate reductions
in nuclear weapons. Of those weapons, the so-called battlefield weapons
constitute a special risk, since they are likely to be used early in a conflict.
We have therefore proposed that those weapons be withdrawn from the forward
areas and that a zone free of battlefield nuclear weapons be created in Europe.
That scheme would also be implemented within the context of a negotiated
agreement on conventional forces.
It has been said that such a zone would be of limited military significance and value. In that case, the risk that one takes by agreeing to such a zone is equally small. That objection, rather, speaks in favour of the idea. It has also been said that nuclear weapons could quickly be reintroduced into the area. That is probably true, even if one does not move nuclear weapons around as if they were sacks of potatoes. The Commission recognizes that in the report, saying:

"However, we consider the establishment of the proposed zone an important confidence building measure which would raise the nuclear threshold and reduce some of the pressures for early use of nuclear weapons."

The scheme would contribute to increased mutual confidence, especially as the Commission also says that there would have to be provisions for verification, including:

"a limited number of on-site inspections in the zone on a challenge basis."

I am convinced, in short, that if our proposals for Europe were implemented there would be more stability, more security, more confidence and fewer armaments in Europe.

Finally, there is an economic dimension to security. The arms race makes us not only more insecure but poorer. We should remember what Adam Smith once taught, that great fleets and armies are unproductive labour. I do not need to elaborate at length on that theme. Many speakers have discussed it, and the question of disarmament and development has been carefully analysed by a United Nations study group under the leadership of Inga Thorsson. I say simply that in the long run real security for any nation lies in economic and social progress and in economic co-operation between nations, in regions and worldwide.

We share the conviction of the Brandt Commission that the South and the North, the East and the West have mutual interests in economic progress. No country can solve its problems alone. A reduction in the present high level of military spending would therefore be in the economic interests of all countries, even those that spend relatively little on their own military efforts.
Seen from another angle, a reduction in military spending gives more resources to fighting poverty. This is also a contribution to peace. That rich nations grow richer while poor nations become poorer is intolerable from the point of view of solidarity and justice, but it is also intolerable because of the dangers inherent in such a situation of conflict between the poor and the rich, between North and South. A widening gap between rich and poor nations will inevitably lead to increased tensions and ultimately become a threat to world peace.

In a world where hundreds of millions of people are literally starving to death, where millions and millions are without water, where children die because of diseases that could be cured with just a fraction of the resources spent on arms, tensions will persist and the threat of war will not go away. In my view, that is another decisive argument in favour of disarmament and of using the resources thus released for the economic and social well-being of people. No country can hope to win military advantage by out-running its competitor in an economically costly arms race. All countries are hurt by the economic difficulties of the major economies. Common security is not only a matter of freedom from military fear. Its objective is not only to avoid being killed in a nuclear apocalypse, or in a border dispute, or by machine guns in one's own village: its objective is in the end to live a better life in common security and common prosperity.

STATEMENT BY MR. EDGAR FAURE, FORMER PRIME MINISTER OF FRANCE AND VICE-CHAIRMAN OF THE FRENCH DELEGATION

The CHAIRMAN: I call on the representative of France.

Mr. FAURE (France) (interpretation from French): The main factors that will be taken into account in evaluating the results of this session are its recommendations or decisions on institutions, for the strengthening of institutions offers our Organization the means to secure a central role and responsibility in the field of disarmament, tasks set for it in the Charter. In that spirit, and in keeping with decisions adopted at our last session, the French delegation has submitted a document concerning the Centre for Disarmament, and it intends to submit in the near future, together with other delegations, a document concerning international verification.
I should like now to discuss briefly a proposal mentioned by Mr. Cheysson at the conclusion of his statement to the General Assembly, in which he generously made reference to my work. He mentioned the creation of a group, under the aegis of the United Nations and chosen by the Secretary-General, that might, we suggest, be called the 'universal council of conscience'. That body could make a major contribution to mobilizing public opinion and keeping it informed, within the framework of the World Disarmament Campaign.

The world has for too long viewed with indifference and scepticism the problems of disarmament as a whole. That passivity may be imputed either to ignorance or to a sense of impotence. However, we now see indications of encouraging changes. Many people are today devoting particular attention to this problem, and there is a new awareness and the awakening of a new feeling of responsibility.

Those developments are, on the one hand, linked to the qualitative changes in military technology. We contemplate with horror the devastating effects of nuclear weapons, effects that, in the extreme case, can bring about a phenomenon no one could have imagined until recent decades, namely, the total extermination of the human species. Enemy leaders need only push the command buttons within a few seconds of each other. It is that scenario we refer to when we speak of the war of weapons against mankind.

On the other hand, the frantic expenditures on armaments are creating a burden on all the world's economies. Thus the industrialized nations, in spite of their relative wealth, are suffering from an economic crisis and unemployment. For the most part, they lack the means to fulfil their duty of solidarity as well as might have been hoped.

People are beginning to realize that certain situations are not necessarily inevitable: crisis for the 'haves'; poverty for the 'have-nots'; war for all.

This movement of greater understanding must be encouraged as well as educated and oriented towards greater effectiveness. Disarmament should not
evoke only emotional reactions. It is a good thing to cease to be apathetic, but it must not be in order to find Utopia. Disarmament is a heartfelt longing that must be carried out with logic.

Since we are witnessing a new awareness, we must create a body to respond to it, and the body we propose would therefore be called the universal council of conscience. It would consist of eminent figures whose names and qualifications would be known to a large public and who would represent the main branches of mankind's intellectual life, namely, the scientific, including of course the humanities, artistic, religious and philosophical. It might include two categories of members. The first would be life members, selected for example from among Nobel Prize winners and former Heads of State or Government who are widely respected and who no longer exercise any national political functions. President Leopold Senghor comes to mind. The second category would consist of persons with analogous qualifications who would be appointed for fixed terms, two or three years for example, in order to ensure the constant renewal of the group's membership. Such a body is not to be confused with the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, but that Board would, if necessary, lend its assistance to the new Council.

The mission of the council of conscience would be to disseminate general information, enlightening public opinion: a kind of moral judicature. It could create and support general trends of opinion and a new awareness in the world both in the political, parliamentary and university circles and among the ordinary people of the various countries. It could emphasize the terrible aspects of a possible war as well as the enormous waste and diversion of resources that result from the arms race alone in peacetime.

It could put forward useful proposals for the transfer of resources and suggest experimental conversion studies to enable the contributing countries to protect themselves against the economic risks that might result from their increased effort towards solidarity. It is in this spirit that we have studied the plan for an international conversion agency.
In conclusion, the proposal that we are making could be implemented very quickly. It does not require vast machinery, it will not have any ill effects. Some will consider it quite modest and even purely symbolic. In that case, why not give it a try? But we believe that in fact it will very quickly yield positive results, the scope and speed of which will be astonishing.

Men who are looked upon as guides and sages by their peers can exercise a decisive influence on the thinking of Governments and peoples. Let us not hesitate to entrust this task to them, under the guidance of our Organization, whose very existence symbolises, in the words of the poet, "the inexorable persistence of hope".

The meeting rose at 10:50 a.m.