Twelfth special session

AD HOC COMMITTEE OF THE TWELFTH SPECIAL SESSION

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 11TH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
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Chairman: Mr. ADENIJI (Nigeria)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.25 p.m.

ENHANCEMENT OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MACHINERY IN THE FIELD OF DISARMAMENT AND STRENGTHENING OF THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THIS FIELD, INCLUDING THE POSSIBLE CONVENING OF A WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE (continued)

The CHAIRMAN: It will be recalled that towards the end of yesterday's meeting the Ad Hoc Committee began its consideration of agenda item 12. Only one delegation was able to speak on it yesterday.

I of course recognize that this subject is of interest to many delegations. It was for that reason that we agreed to have an initial discussion of it in the plenary Ad Hoc Committee. But that decision was not intended to open up a general debate, as it were, on machinery in the Ad Hoc Committee.

In order to allow as many as possible of those delegations that wish to speak on this subject to be able to do so, it will be necessary for members to be rather brief and to the point in their statements on this subject. I would recall that, when it was initially decided to discuss this subject in this Committee, I indicated that one meeting or at the most two meetings would be devoted to it. This meeting is to be devoted to the subject, and I would hope that by its end all those who wish to speak on the item will have had the chance to do so. To make that possible delegations should please confine their remarks to no more than 10 minutes.
Mr. SOULIOTIS (Greece) (interpretation from French): Early in the morning of 1 July 1978, a few moments after the adoption of the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament, the Greek delegation stated:

"So that it can be reflected in the record my delegation would like to clarify its position concerning the negotiating body established in paragraph 120 of the Final Document. That paragraph contains the statement that: '...the membership of the Committee on Disarmament will be reviewed at regular intervals...'

Our interpretation of that wording is that generally accepted for the principal organs of the United Nations. Accordingly, the 'regular intervals' referred to in that paragraph cannot be more than three-year intervals, even while taking into account the important role that the nuclear countries are called upon to play.

It is quite natural that all interested countries, Greece among them, should have an opportunity to participate at a subsequent stage in that negotiating body, it being understood that disarmament and international security are a cause common to all Members of our Organization without any distinction." (A/S-10/PV.27, p.166-167)

Faithful to those lines laid down in 1978, my delegation has since sponsored or supported General Assembly resolutions dealing with the expansion of the Committee on Disarmament.

However, at the last session of the General Assembly my delegation considered it appropriate to make the following statement:

"My delegation is aware of the delicate problem of the review of the membership of the Committee on Disarmament, which we very much fear is likely to require a certain amount of time. That is why we express the sincere hope that the draft resolution we have just adopted will encourage the Committee on Disarmament to adopt without too much delay measures to facilitate to the utmost the participation of States not members of the Committee in the work of that Committee."

(A/C.1/36/PV.42, p.31)
We were not speaking about a change of position or going back on anything. This attitude was the result of intensive study of exchanges of view which took place on this subject during recent sessions of the General Assembly and of the Geneva Committee, the work of which we have followed closely from the outset. In part also this was dictated by my delegation’s belief in the continuing need for the international community to have a single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament capable of effectively fulfilling its mandate. Such machinery must without a doubt be limited in size, for the bigger it is the more cumbersome it becomes, and the more difficult it is for it to work.

Thus if "at regular intervals", as is provided for in the Final Document, we expand the Committee, we shall soon have a negotiating body similar numerically to the General Assembly.

That is why the Greek delegation, profoundly aware of the numerous problems posed by the expansion of the Geneva Committee, came out in favour of improving the status of States that are not members. In our view, this proposal could resolve the present problem of expansion in an effective and satisfactory way.

Of course, we are speaking of a compromise solution and a rather short-term one. Moreover, this solution is not designed to lay down definitive rules regarding the membership of the Committee and the status of its members.

We have said on several occasions and we shall continue to repeat with the same force that the Committee on Disarmament is not and must not be a closed club. There cannot be two categories of States, the privileged and the non-privileged, or the principal ones and the secondary ones. Moreover, it is inconceivable that criteria should be established for the admission of States to the Geneva Committee, because disarmament is a matter for all. The Final Document states:

"The Members of the United Nations are fully aware of the conviction of their peoples that the question of general and complete disarmament is of utmost importance and that peace, security and economic and social development are indivisible, and they have therefore recognized that the corresponding obligations and responsibilities are universal."

(resolution S-10/2, para. 5)
All States are equal and all are interested in disarmament and anxious to take an active part in negotiations and to make their contribution.

In that respect the Final Document states expressly that

"All the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations. Consequently, all States have the duty to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament. All States have the right to participate in disarmament negotiations. They have the right to participate on an equal footing in those multilateral disarmament negotiations which have a direct bearing on their national security." (ibid., para. 28)

The logical consequence of this is that each State has the right to participate in the work of the Committee on Disarmament. This is the unquestionable, inalienable right of each State in the disarmament field and can in no way be changed or modified by any criterion.

That is why my Government, wishing to take an active part in negotiations on disarmament, has decided that if there were to be even a limited expansion of the Geneva Committee it would submit Greece's candidacy to that Committee. This decision is dictated solely by my country's desire to participate in and make a positive contribution to efforts in the area of disarmament negotiations.
Mr. OKAWA (Japan): In considering the issue of machinery, it must be recognized that progress towards real disarmament can be achieved only through negotiations conducted in a favourable international climate. Disarmament will not come about merely through rearrangement of the machinery related to disarmament.

However, in the belief that the international community should leave no stone unturned in its efforts to advance the cause of disarmament and international peace, my delegation proposes that advantage be taken of the opportunity this special session provides to promote more effective use of the existing machinery.

My delegation is of the view that the central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament should be reaffirmed. In this connexion, due attention should be paid to the role of the Centre for Disarmament, which is the main Secretariat unit dealing with the activities of the United Nations relating to disarmament.
Since the first special session, in 1978, the Centre has performed many services for the deliberative and negotiating bodies of the United Nations system in the area of disarmament and my delegation is satisfied with the Centre's performance in this regard. At the same time, however, in order to utilize fully the limited human, financial and other resources of the United Nations, and in order to improve the effectiveness of United Nations efforts to bring about concrete measures of disarmament under effective international control, co-ordination of disarmament-related activities among the various bodies within the United Nations system should be greatly improved. This co-ordinating function should be entrusted to the Centre for Disarmament, and in this respect it might be worth while to consider the possibility of converting the present Centre for Disarmament into an independent department dealing solely with disarmament affairs. The official in charge of the new department should be able to report directly to the Secretary-General on developments in the field of disarmament. My delegation hopes that at this special session the General Assembly will consider the possible establishment of such a department.

It goes without saying that close co-operation and co-ordination among the relevant units or departments of the United Nations Secretariat itself is essential to fruitful results.

My delegation would like to take this opportunity to touch upon two additional functions that the Centre for Disarmament should perhaps perform in order to meet the growing need for the expanded Secretariat services in disarmament affairs expected by the international community.

The first of these additional functions concerns the involvement of the United Nations in the field of verification, in which regard my delegation wishes to recall the speech made by the Prime Minister of Japan, Mr. Zenko Suzuki, at the plenary meeting of the General Assembly on 9 June. He stated on that occasion:
In the light of the central role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament confirmed at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, Japan deems it desirable to form an international verification unit within the framework of the United Nations. I call on the United Nations, as a first step in this direction, to accumulate all available information and knowledge on verification techniques and applications." (A/S.12/PV.5, p. 31)

Taking into account the future role of the United Nations in the field of verification, the Government of Japan proposes the establishment of a small unit in the Centre for Disarmament that would initially be responsible for gathering all available information on verification techniques and their application. My delegation has already circulated a working paper (A/S.12/AC.1/4) on this subject for consideration by the General Assembly.

The second function to which my delegation attaches considerable importance is the Centre's reference and data processing service. My delegation recalls in this connexion the successful study on institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament (A/36/392), in which reference was made to a suggestion that a disarmament information bank be created to collect, classify and index relevant documents and data from the United Nations system and other sources. As is well known, an experimental project for reference and data processing services has been successfully implemented in the last few years under the auspices of the Centre for Disarmament.

My delegation supports strengthening the project and converting the project team into a permanent unit, for the following reasons. First, the reference and data processing service should be enabled to provide on a continuing basis and at short notice information that might often be valuable to delegations, experts and Secretariat staff engaged in disarmament deliberations or negotiations, as well as to the public at large. Secondly, the reference material and data to be collected should be as comprehensive as possible. Selection and processing should follow strict standards of objectivity and balance. Also, in collecting material from non-United Nations sources, priority should be given to factual information rather than political analysis and academic theories.
It goes without saying that increasing the availability and dissemination of information would further contribute to efforts to promote disarmament. For this reason, my delegation believes that the reference and data processing services deserve a permanent place in the Centre for Disarmament, and should therefore be allocated additional human and financial resources.

With regard to disarmament studies, it would seem appropriate to re-examine and strengthen the role of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies. Its mandate should be defined more clearly. The Board should be encouraged to take responsibility for the screening and co-ordinating of all disarmament-related studies undertaken within the United Nations system, in particular those initiated on the basis of General Assembly resolutions.

My delegation welcomes the establishment of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) as a significant step toward the strengthening of research capabilities. We hope that to the same end greater use will be made also of other research organizations within the United Nations system, such as the United Nations University, which is considering the inclusion of the theme “Peace, security, conflict resolutions and global transformation” in its programme of work.

In the light of the somewhat complicated situation whereby UNIDIR is placed under the guidance of both the Advisory Board and the Advisory Council, it would be desirable to streamline the involvement of these two supervisory bodies in order to enable the Institute to carry out its activities effectively.

My delegation notes the important work that has been done by the Committee on Disarmament as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum and believes that the consensus rule should be maintained in the decision of both substantive and procedural issues.

As regards the review of the membership of the Committee on Disarmament, my delegation would not stand in the way of a limited increase if consensus were to be reached. However, taking into account the character of the Committee on Disarmament as a negotiating forum as well as the results of deliberations held in the Committee on this subject, we are of the view that basically the status quo should be maintained.
Due attention should also be paid to the significant increase in the number of meetings of the Committee on Disarmament, which is due in particular to the expansion of its activities, symbolized by the establishment of working groups, especially since the 1980 session. In the light of the fact that further working groups may be set up, it would be only fair to consider allocating additional resources to the Secretariat unit in Geneva in order to enhance its capability to meet the increasing demands of the Committee's work programme.
Mr. DORR (Ireland): Like my colleague from Japan, I agree that
ing improvement in the so-called machinery dealing with disarmament questions is
not sufficient in itself. However it can be of some importance.

In the four years that have passed since the first special session, we
have had an opportunity to see how the institutional arrangements foreseen in
the Final Document of that session have worked in practice. I refer first to
the work of negotiation. My delegation believes that there has indeed been a
considerable improvement in the available disarmament negotiating machinery.
In particular, the expanded membership and adjusted procedures of the Committee
on Disarmament have enhanced the role of that body. The importance of the
Committee on Disarmament as the single multilateral negotiating forum is by
now well established.

The Final Document of the first special session provided for a review
of the Committee's membership. For our part we favour some further expansion
so as to permit a greater number of countries to contribute to the work in
Geneva. I want to take this opportunity to state that Ireland intends to
seek membership of the Committee on Disarmament.

I turn now to a second issue, that of the deliberative bodies dealing with
disarmament. The position here, we believe, requires further consideration.

The First Committee of the General Assembly is now entirely devoted to
the consideration of disarmament and related international security issues.
It remains, of course, the principal deliberative body. Its work has increased
considerably and in consequence the number of disarmament resolutions adopted
by the General Assembly has multiplied. However, the Disarmament Commission,
the other deliberative body, has not fared so well under the new arrangements
agreed on in 1978. It was intended to provide, as a subsidiary organ of the
General Assembly, a forum where all Members of the United Nations, in particular
those which were not members of the Committee on Disarmament, could make a
contribution. However, in two respects it has not functioned as well as
delegations such as my own had hoped. First, it does not seem fully to have
developed a role of its own as distinct from that of the First Committee and,
secondly, the question as to which items it should address has not been
satisfactorily settled.
Ireland considers that the activities of the First Committee and of the Disarmament Commission should now be examined jointly with a view to improving the effectiveness of both bodies. We favour the view that the Disarmament Commission's agenda should concentrate on a certain number of items which require more intensive study than is possible in the First Committee. This approach in turn would help to reduce the burden of work in the First Committee.

Finally, I turn to a third issue, that of the contribution of the United Nations Secretariat.

The Secretariat in its Disarmament Centre has served our deliberations and negotiations very well in the past in spite of the manpower constraints under which it operates. The preparation of studies by the Centre has made a very valuable contribution to our work. In addition, a successful programme of disarmament fellowships is being provided.

My delegation considers that there is now a case for increasing the status of the Centre within the Secretariat. This would allow it to maintain the enhanced role accorded to it in the period since the first special session in 1978, a role which we expect will increase further as a result of our deliberations at this present session.

For these reasons, Ireland would be ready to support proposals that have already been made that the Centre should now be established as a department directed by an Under Secretary-General.

Mr. de LAIGLESIA (Spain) (interpretation from Spanish): The question of the effectiveness of machinery in the field of disarmament is of the utmost importance and the Spanish delegation therefore believes that our special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament will have to consider thoroughly the way it has functioned so far and make specific recommendations on its future action. Clearly the Final Document adopted at the first special session introduced changes in the system prevailing before 1978 which have made it possible to increase the representativity of the various bodies and thus promote greater participation by all States in the discussions on disarmament matters.
I should like first of all to refer to the negotiating body, the Committee on Disarmament. Owing to its new structure, a number of non-member countries, among them my own, have been able to play an active part in the work of the Committee. The interest shown by these countries makes it advisable to proceed to expanding the membership of the Committee in order to accommodate those which, throughout these four years, have made contributions to this work. Clearly it will be necessary to respect the spirit and letter of the consensus mentioned in the Final Document to the effect that expansion of membership of the Committee will have to be moderate in order to maintain the restricted nature of the negotiating body thus rendering its activities more effective.

In this connexion, my delegation understands that the expansion that we deem necessary will have to go hand-in-hand with an in-depth examination that will make it possible to put into practice concrete solutions that will enhance its effectiveness.

While the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research has not yet had sufficient time fully to develop all its activities, it constitutes an important element and its possibilities should be taken advantage of to the greatest extent possible. Therefore it is necessary to adopt measures for this purpose.

As to the United Nations Centre for Disarmament, I should like first to recall the effectiveness of the extensive work done by it up until now. Therefore, in the view of the Spanish delegation, it would be advisable to provide more material and institutional facilities for its work. To be specific, its situation within the framework of the Secretariat of our Organization must be reviewed with a view to enhancing it so that its work may have the proper impact.

Finally, I should like to refer to the Disarmament Commission whose functions should be defined more stringently to ensure that it occupies its proper place among the deliberative bodies acting in the field of disarmament so that its work may be as useful as possible.
Mr. GLEISSNER (Austria): Progress towards disarmament depends ultimately on the political will of Governments. Institutional arrangements cannot compensate for the lack of political will. They can, however, if they are adjusted to changing requirements, contribute to the promotion of disarmament goals and facilitate negotiations on disarmament agreements. They have a role to play with regard to implementation and verification. Austria attaches great importance to the issues discussed under item 12 of the agenda. In view of the short time remaining to this special session, we strongly support an early beginning on the substantive work on this item. We trust that you, Mr. Chairman, will guide us in quickly developing appropriate procedures through which to undertake this task.

The Committee on Disarmament is today, four years after its reorganization at the first special session, a focus of the international community's efforts in the field of disarmament. It is true, of course, that it has not been in a position fully to accomplish the task assigned to it in the Final Document. Its efforts have not yet produced tangible results.

However, the Committee on Disarmament has through its concrete and valuable work on several issues, demonstrated its potential as a negotiating body. We sincerely hope that this special session will give the impetus that will enable the Committee on Disarmament to overcome some of the political difficulties which have so far frustrated its productivity. We also believe that this special session presents an opportunity to consider measures to enhance the effectiveness of the Committee on Disarmament. The establishment of working groups has clearly been a successful step in this regard. We believe that the Committee on Disarmament should now consider giving the Working Groups greater flexibility in organizing their work, in accordance with the specific requirements of the subject matter under review. An extension of the sessions of the Committee on Disarmament with a view to giving this senior negotiating body a full year's time to do a full year's work would prove useful.
With regard to the composition of the Committee on Disarmament, the Austrian delegation supports the view that the first review of the membership should be completed during the second special session. A limited expansion of the Committee of Disarmament would appear to be the most realistic and appropriate outcome of such a review. This would not diminish the effectiveness of that body but would facilitate the continuing contribution of some countries, thus broadening the Committee's spectrum. In this connexion, I should like to reiterate the position of the Austrian Government, which was stated already during the last session of the Committee on Disarmament: Should the Committee on Disarmament decide in favour of enlarging the Committee, Austria wishes to be considered a candidate for membership.

Let me now turn to the deliberative organs of the United Nations in the field of disarmament: namely, the First Committee of the General Assembly and the Disarmament Commission.

The First Committee offers all Members States the opportunity to present their views and make recommendations on all aspects of disarmament. Developments in this body since 1978 reflect the increasing interest and involvement of a growing number of countries in these issues. While this trend is highly welcome as such, it has led to a proliferation of sometimes repetitive and overlapping resolutions and to a debate that sometimes lacks focus and structure.

In our view, efforts are called for to remedy this aspect of the work of the First Committee so that the time allotted to the general debate may be used as effectively as possible. The submitting of several draft resolutions on the same issue might sometimes be avoided through greater opportunities for consultations and the harmonization of views among interested delegations. The introduction of draft texts that have already been decided upon in previous years should be avoided unless it serves a specific purpose.
The record of the Disarmament Commission for the last four years is rather uneven. While it successfully accomplished some of its tasks - I refer in particular to the elements of the comprehensive programme of disarmament and the draft declaration on the Second Disarmament Decade - its deliberations proved less productive on other issues. The special session will wish to review the mandate of the Disarmament Commission with a view to maximizing its usefulness for the purpose of disarmament. The division of work between the First Committee and the Disarmament Commission should be defined as precisely as possible. The United Nations Disarmament Commission, as an organ with universal membership deciding by consensus, might be reserved for the thorough consideration of the substance of a limited number of major disarmament issues.

United Nations studies in this field could be an excellent basis for this work. The United Nations Disarmament Commission could also be assigned a role in the review of the implementation of the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

The Centre for Disarmament in the United Nations Secretariat is currently performing its functions in a very satisfactory way. This fact is particularly significant as the workload of the Centre has multiplied in recent years and has severely strained the resources of the Centre. As these trends can be expected to continue throughout the 1960s, steps will have to be taken in time to meet these growing needs. Austria believes that the Secretary-General should consider the possibility of strengthening the Centre with an appropriate number of additional staff. In this context, all views concerning the organizational status of the Centre will have to be carefully considered.

Austria believes that the second special session on disarmament should review present arrangements for carrying out studies on disarmament matters. The review will have to cover the status of the Institute for Disarmament Research, defining the division of work between the Centre and the Institute and facilitating a full utilization of existing resources.
The mandate of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies should be re-examined with a view to enabling this body to assume co-ordinating functions for all disarmament research activities of the United Nations system.

In presenting these comments I wish to restate the interests of the Austrian Government in the various proposals for the creation of a world disarmament agency within the framework of the United Nations. While the implementation of this ideal seems premature in the present unsatisfactory state of the disarmament process, real progress in arms control and disarmament will eventually demand a corresponding expansion of institutional arrangements. In such a situation, this agency could provide the necessary institutional machinery and act as a complement to the substantive disarmament process. Apart from the functions currently performed by the Centre, this agency would also assume important responsibilities in the areas of verification of disarmament agreements and dissemination of information on military and disarmament matters. Austria favours continued consideration and study of the political and organizational implications related to such a course of action.

Political progress is first and last a matter of political ideas: first, because it is ideas that give inspiration and motivation, and last, because they provide the necessary utopian view that gives a sense of direction and of purpose. But, in between, political progress is largely concerned with procedure and institutions. Progress in disarmament is no exception.

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): Like previous speakers, I am going to heed the appeal that we be brief. My delegation's views on the subject of machinery are well known. Mrs. Thorsson presented them in her statement in this Committee on 28 June. She then introduced our specific proposals, which are contained in document A/S-12/AC.1/39.

Both as delegate of Sweden and as one who is responsible for one of the Drafting Groups, in which provisions concerning machinery are to be elaborated, I wish to express my belief in the urgent necessity for an adequate procedure to be established for dealing with the matter in depth and in a co-ordinated way.
In my drafting group, where we deal with the comprehensive programme of disarmament, we have not yet been able to deal with certain questions or machinery in a conclusive way because it has been considered necessary to wait for guide-lines from a body in which such questions were expected to be discussed in depth.

There is also an obvious interest in proper co-ordination between the provisions to go into the comprehensive programme and those which may be contained in the other documents which we expect to come out of this session.

Time is short; we can waste no further time. A group to deal specifically with machinery should start its work and come to a conclusion as soon as possible in order to facilitate the drafting work in the three working groups.

Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I formally propose that you set up a contact group which can start to deal with relevant matters concerning machinery as from tomorrow.

Mr. Rahman (Bangladesh): On 17 June the Head of the Government of Bangladesh, in his address to the plenary Assembly underlined, inter alia, three major challenges facing mankind's continued progress and eventual survival. These are, first, the arms race; secondly, under-development; and, thirdly, the unlawful use of force for solving international disputes. In the context of this backdrop, the Bangladesh delegation supports all efforts in the process of curbing the arms race. We believe that the efforts of the international community in the reduction of armaments and in the eventual elimination of the arms race, particularly in the nuclear field, will be greatly helped if the existing multilateral disarmament machinery is further strengthened.

In fact, it was during the first special session devoted to disarmament that the General Assembly underscored the necessity of revitalizing the process of disarmament and, to that effect, created the Disarmament Committee, which was to function as a forum for multilateral negotiations on disarmament. At the same time, it was agreed that the composition of the Committee would be examined at regular intervals.
By resolutions 33/91 G, 35/156 II and 36/97 J, the General Assembly decided to postpone the question of re-examining the matter of the composition of the Committee until the second special session on disarmament.

The national policy of the Government of Bangladesh commits it to total and complete disarmament. It is in this context that Bangladesh has supported all previous decisions and resolutions adopted in the General Assembly and other relevant forums on the question of disarmament. Bangladesh has also taken part in various inter-governmental expert groups on disarmament matters, which include, inter alia, the Expert Group on the Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race. We have actively followed the work of the Group of Experts on the relation between disarmament and development.

As a mark of our continued and positive interest in disarmament matters, Bangladesh has sought membership in the expanded Committee on Disarmament. It is our expectation that with our admission to the Committee on Disarmament we will be able to participate fully in and contribute to the various negotiations - ongoing as well as those to be undertaken - by the Committee on Disarmament in the days to come.

The United Nations Centre for Disarmament is functioning satisfactorily. We believe, however, that to cope with the increased volume of work in the 1980s the Centre will have to be expanded in order to carry out its functions effectively in various disarmament matters.

We are satisfied with the role and function of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies. We should also like to see a further strengthening of research activities in the field of disarmament. The main task of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research should be mainly research-oriented on disarmament and security issues.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to inform you and, through you, the Committee that my Government has decided to make a token contribution to the World Disarmament Campaign. This pledge is being made in view of the report of the Secretary-General, which emphasized that the campaign should be carried out in all regions of the world.
Mr. MUNZIES (Canada): The Canadian Government joined many other Governments in submitting its views, which have been reproduced in document A/S-12/12, of 10 May, on the very useful report of the Group of Governmental Experts to Study the Institutional Arrangements relating to the Process of Disarmament (A/36/392). My delegation has read and heard with great interest the views of other Governments and has noted the thoughtful comments and ideas put forward. At the outset of these remarks my delegation would wish to indicate its flexibility about the final positions which this special session will adopt regarding the enhancement of United Nations institutional arrangements for dealing with disarmament.

With regard to the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, my delegation supports the view that the Committee should remain the primary deliberative forum in the field of disarmament in the United Nations. However, ways should be explored of achieving a better division of labour between the First Committee and the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

As my Government indicated in its view on the United Nations Disarmament Commission, that body has at times been unable to focus on a sufficiently limited number of subjects in the short time available to it each year. There has been a tendency to discuss unrealistically wide issues. A serious attempt should be made to correct these shortcomings so that the Commission may hold substantive and in-depth deliberations on the most pressing issues. If there is to be a more in-depth discussion at this special session of the role of the United Nations Disarmament Commission my delegation will have further comments to make following on from those I submitted to the Commission.

With regard to the United Nations Centre for Disarmament, the Canadian Government agrees with the view expressed by many other Governments that the Centre should be given more authority within the Secretariat. We think that the Secretary-General should be enabled to take an increased and more direct interest in the work of the Disarmament Centre. Accordingly, serious thought should be given to elevating the status of the Centre to that of a department for disarmament affairs, headed by an Under-Secretary-General. It would also be desirable for this session to invest clearly in the Centre a leading and co-ordinating role in disarmament matters within the United Nations structure.
The Canadian authorities have recognized that the Secretary-General's
Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies has not been fully effective.
Although the Board was entrusted with the mandate to advise the
Secretary-General on the most useful and relevant studies which might be
undertaken, it has not been given sufficient authority to influence the
selection or terms of reference of studies proposed by delegations in the
General Assembly. It is clear that the Board's mandate must be clarified
and strengthened. My Government has recommended that, in addition to
clarifying and strengthening its role with regard to studies and research,
this special session should consider giving the Board the authority to guide
the research programme of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament
Research. We also support the view that the Board should review and assess
annually the programme of the World Disarmament Campaign in preparation for
discussion in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly.
It should also advise the Secretary-General, at his request, on any matter
within the area of disarmament and arms limitation. We think that these
purposes could be effectively achieved by a smaller board, which should
still maintain a geographical balance.

Concerning the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research,
Canada has suggested that the Institute should have its mandate extended
and that its budget should be furnished both from voluntary contributions
and from the regular United Nations budget. The most pressing problem,
however, is to clarify the Institute's role in research vis-à-vis the role
of the Centre for Disarmament.

Finally, the Canadian delegation looks forward to bringing to a
conclusion long-standing consultations on questions of membership and
effectiveness of the Committee on Disarmament. The Canadian Government
would be prepared to envisage a limited and balanced increase in
membership.
Mr. SHUSTOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): In this short statement, the Soviet Union would like to express its views on agenda item 12, which is now under discussion at the special session, entitled "Enhancement of the effectiveness of machinery in the field of disarmament and strengthening of the role of the United Nations in this field, including the possible convening of a World Disarmament Conference."

The Soviet Union is firmly convinced that there is now more than ever a need to work on concrete, realistic and specific matters in order to limit the arms race and turn to substantive measures for disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament. For its part the Soviet Union is ready to come to an agreement on the limitation, reduction or banning of any types of arms on a just and reciprocal basis. The Soviet Union takes this into account in assessing all questions dealing with the organization of negotiations on disarmament questions.

In our view, in order to ensure progress in the area of limiting the arms race and of disarmament, it is necessary to make more active use of all existing channels of negotiation, both multilateral and bilateral. In this connexion we should work towards enhancing the effectiveness of the work of the only multilateral body for negotiations on disarmament, namely, the Committee on Disarmament and, inter alia, due attention should be given to improving the organization of its work.

It seems to us that what would be particularly significant for the adoption of effective measure to limit the arms race would be the convening of a World Disarmament Conference - an international forum with the broadest possible participation of States. Therefore, we suggest that it would be most desirable, in accordance with decisions adopted to this effect by the General Assembly, for a World Disarmament Conference to be convened following this second special session devoted to disarmament and for the current special session to promote the initiation of practical work on convening such a conference.

The United Nations, which has the highest responsibility and plays one of the most important roles in the area of disarmament, should encourage all measures for promoting disarmament. In order to carry out such work, the
United Nations should for this purpose ensure that the Secretariat of the United Nations has an appropriate unit, namely, the Centre for Disarmament. If one compares the present state of affairs as regards providing for the organization of negotiations on disarmament with the situation that existed in 1977 when, pursuant to a decision of the General Assembly, the Centre for Disarmament was established, then one can only conclude that this unit of the Secretariat has been adequately adapted to working in a changed situation and that there is no need to raise the question of a radical restructuring of the Centre, inter alia, by the establishment within the Secretariat of a separate department on disarmament, as is sometimes proposed.

The fact that the Centre for Disarmament is now functioning as an integral part of the Security Council's Department of Political and Security Council Affairs is an extremely important advantage. This fact allows the Secretariat in practice to ensure a linkage between disarmament and international security, and the necessity for this has many times been pointed out by the General Assembly, including in resolutions adopted at its thirty-sixth session.

Disarmament is one of the most reliable means of strengthening international security. Therefore, an artificial separation of the functions of the Secretariat in servicing disarmament negotiations from its activities designed to promote the efforts of States to strengthen international security would only be detrimental to this cause.

No one has blamed the Centre for Disarmament for not being able to cope with the functions assigned to it. Hence, in our view, to disrupt the present machinery for servicing disarmament negotiations would be unjustified and would, to a significant extent, divert attention from substantive questions of disarmament and lead to useless organizational changes which would only result in misleading public opinion. It would be very sad indeed, if, at the present special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which has attracted the attention of millions upon millions of people throughout the world, we were to take decisions dealing solely with questions such as the transformation of machinery designed to provide for disarmament negotiations and did not solve major questions concerned with averting nuclear war and ensuring disarmament.
(Mr. Shustov, USSR)

On the whole, therefore, we should bear in mind the fact that, despite the great significance of organizational questions in the disarmament field, success in disarmament negotiations depends in the last analysis on the political will of States. It is, after all, no secret to anyone that the true reasons for the lack of progress which can be observed now in solving crucial disarmament problems are to be found not in the organization of the work of the relevant United Nations machinery, but in the lack of desire on the part of certain militarily major States to put a halt to the arms race and in their aspirations to continue on a course of piling up weapons. Only with the active assistance of all countries and peoples of the world can a breakthrough be achieved and can the course of events be turned back from the arms race towards disarmament.

In conclusion, I should like briefly to dwell on the question of the organization of the work of the present special session, which has already been raised by the Soviet delegation and by a number of other delegations. I would even say by a significant number of other delegations which agreed with our opinion. The Committee will recall that the question was raised regarding the necessity of establishing subsidiary organs for the discussion of the most important question of our session: how to avert nuclear war.

I am not now going to recapitulate the points of view which have already been expressed in this respect. I should like only to repeat that many representatives attach top priority to this question. Up to now, that question has not yet been resolved. We have, rather, become more involved here in questions dealing with the organization of the machinery of the United Nations Secretariat and of other areas of disarmament. Our delegation would therefore request you, Mr. Chairman, and the Bureau to expedite the efforts to find a solution to this problem in some way.
Dr. de SOUZA e SILVA (Brazil): My delegation would like to state its position in connexion with item 12 of our agenda. The specific proposals presented by several delegations and the interventions we have heard on this subject bear testimony to the laudable and widespread concern to improve the effectiveness of this Organization so that it can perform the task we all expect of it. This concern is fully shared by my delegation and, we believe, with well-founded reason: since the adoption of the Final Document four years ago, not a single agreement, let alone any concrete measure, has been achieved by the world community. The only international instrument negotiated in this period deals rather with humanitarian law and cannot be characterized as a disarmament agreement by any standard.

A number of proposals have been advanced on how to cope with this seeming inability of this Organization to fulfill a task that, nevertheless, we all described as being of "primary importance and urgency" in a consensus document adopted four years ago (resolution S-10/2, para. 1). Such proposals range from prescriptions on the functioning and methods of work of the negotiating and deliberative bodies in which Member States are represented to sweeping changes in the structure and tasks assigned to the organs of the Secretariat which are supposed to assist and provide administrative backing for the Governmental machinery. It would almost seem that, by a simple arithmetical device in the number of participants or in the amount and frequency of meetings, or through a magical organizational formula involving the renaming or the upgrading of the secretarial structure, we would suddenly imbue the existing machinery with effectiveness purpose and a sense of accomplishment.

As regards the governmental bodies, that is to say, the ones that are charged with the substantive task of finding solutions to questions which concern not only our Governments, but mankind as a whole, the mildest judgement would have to be an acknowledgment of an increasing sense of frustration and of a nagging familiarity with failure. As for the organs of the Secretariat connected with disarmament, their dedication and competence is beyond question, but it would not be fair to expect them to do the job that the political machinery has proved unable to perform.
It is the considered opinion of my delegation that unless progress is achieved by this special session through the adoption of decisions that will advance the objectives set forth in the Final Document, there is little point in enlarging the existing machinery of the Secretariat or in creating new agencies or in assigning new additional tasks to administrative organs that can do only what Governments collectively ask them to do. There is no substitute for the political will of Governments to enter into significant commitments to adopt measures of disarmament and to abide by the decisions and directives adopted by consensus only four years ago.

Let us take, for instance, the proposals aiming at giving the United Nations an active and leading role in the conduct of campaigns designed to enlist public opinion in favour of disarmament measures. From what we personally witnessed in this very city a few days ago and in recent months in other parts of the world where opinion can be freely expressed, it would seem that it is rather public opinion that has taken the lead in pointing out to us the direction we should be following. My delegation believes that whatever assistance the United Nations can render in this field should be in accordance with the priorities that we ourselves set four years ago: not surprisingly, the thrust of the free expression of public opinion concentrates exactly on the issues of survival and urgent action in the face of impending nuclear doom. We have also heard suggestions that would enlarge the role of United Nations information and public awareness activities in countries that possess relatively modest means to defend their sovereignty and national security. In practical terms that would amount to stepping up the campaign to disarm the unarmed, and to perpetuating in the minds of peoples the notion that a handful of nuclear Powers are entitled to hold the rest of humanity forever hostage to their own narrow perceptions of security.

Another category of proposals are those which would, in one way or another, assign greater additional responsibilities to the organs devoted to the study and academic analysis of problems connected with disarmament, or which would expand the existing administrative machinery in anticipation of increased responsibilities such as, for instance, the participation in or the management of verification activities relating to compliance with disarmament agreements. In the view of my delegation, we would do better to ask ourselves whether or not, as a result of the second special session, the international community is any closer to the possibility of achieving any such agreements before instituting machinery to verify them.
Do the Powers that accepted and still acknowledge a special responsibility for disarmament show any willingness to live up to the commitments that they entered into only four years ago? Does a meaningful, politically binding comprehensive programme of disarmament comprising specific measures seem any closer than it did when the Programme of Action of the Final Document was adopted? Are the nuclear-weapon countries prepared to enter into multilateral commitments that would lead them to relinquish their formidable arsenals or their plans to increase them further? Answers to these questions, regretfully, can be given only in the negative. In such a situation, the real question seems to be not whether we should adopt decisions to increase or expand the additional functions of research organs or of administrative structures, but, rather, whether the nations gathered in this second special session on disarmament are prepared to move forward, and not backwards, in their commitment to seek security in disarmament and not in the stockpiling of ever more powerful weapons of mass destruction.

Finally, there is a group of proposals that take a critical look at the present structure and methods of work of the multilateral bodies charged with the deliberative and negotiating functions in the field of disarmament. We do not see why the institutional increase in the number and frequency of their meetings, or the addition to their membership of nations that in practice already contribute substantively to their work, would per se enable such organs to have a better chance of success. Whatever its shortcomings, the present structure cannot be blamed for the lack of results.

My delegation has time and again, both in the Committee on Disarmament and in the Disarmament Commission, called attention to the difficulties posed by the climate of confrontation between the two most powerful military alliances and to the dangers that may come in the wake of the virtual paralysis that afflicts the multilateral bodies on issues that are of real concern to nuclear and non-nuclear nations alike.

My delegation is of the opinion that it is this climate of confrontation and the political and strategic doctrines derived therefrom that lie at the root of the inability of such bodies to discharge their responsibilities.
The realities of the day-to-day negotiations on a comprehensive programme of disarmament which was supposed to constitute the centrepiece of this second special session on disarmament, bear ample testimony to such an evaluation.

Public opinion, which follows with expectation our efforts through the most valuable contribution and participation of non-governmental organizations in our work, demands substantive progress, rather than mere administrative and institutional arrangements. Such arrangements are no substitute for the lack of concrete progress. If the second special session on disarmament proved unable to yield results on the fundamental questions that require immediate action, my delegation would see no point in giving its support to additional measures that would, in the absence of those results, only take us further from, and not closer to, the goals that we should all be pursuing.

Mr. YANGO (Philippines): The Final Document of the first special session on disarmament, in 1978, apart from establishing and defining the deliberative and negotiating bodies on disarmament, considered the need for research and studies to support and complement disarmament negotiations. Thus the Secretary-General was requested to set up an advisory board on disarmament studies to advise him on various aspects of studies to be carried out under the auspices of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and arms limitation, including a programme of such studies.

In the period between that special session and the current special session the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies of the Secretary-General, in carrying out one of its tasks, recommended the establishment of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). That research Institute was established by the General Assembly to conduct scientific research aimed at encouraging efforts towards disarmament and to facilitate the access of a large number of States, in particular, the developing ones, to existing information, studies and research on disarmament.
The Institute was set up on 1 October 1980 within the administrative framework of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) for the period until this special session. During its short existence it has accomplished commendable work and has kept to a set programme for its activities. All delegations have already received copies of the book entitled "Risks of Unintentional Nuclear War", a study that forms part of UNIDIR's research programme and provides a qualitative sample of the work that it can do.

In my delegation's view the continued existence of UNIDIR as a part of the United Nations machinery for disarmament is indeed justified. My delegation therefore fully supports the proposals submitted and introduced to this Committee by Norway as contained in document A/S-12/AC.1/32 of 25 June 1982, concerning UNIDIR, the Committee on Disarmament and the Advisory Board on Disarmament Research and Information.

UNIDIR should function as an autonomous institution working in close collaboration with the Centre for Disarmament, and as such should report to the Secretary-General, and through him to the General Assembly. The Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies of the Secretary-General should function as the advisory council for the Institute. It may later be decided under the Norwegian proposal that the Board should be renamed "Advisory Board on Disarmament Research and Information", with the functions set out in Norway's proposals.

UNIDIR's activities should be funded by voluntary contributions from States, private and public organizations and individuals. The United Nations should also contribute, so that the stability and perspective of UNIDIR's activities are assured.

It is important for UNIDIR to be autonomous so that it may undertake independent research on disarmament and other related substantive issues. Thus its output would carry much weight and not be suspected of a biased or prejudiced orientation. Then world public opinion could really accept and recognize the study or research undertaken by the Institute as a valuable contribution to the cause of disarmament. This would result in the Institute's continued viability and would attract the necessary funding from States, organizations and individuals that support the United Nations Charter.
In the light of the work accomplished by the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies of the Secretary General and of its activities, it is now time to evaluate the usefulness and relevance of this body to the field of disarmament. The time between its establishment and the holding of this special session was too short to afford us a good opportunity to assess the Board's value. Nevertheless, in view of the expert study on institutional arrangements for disarmament, the report on which is before us, there appears to be justification for its continuation, but within certain parameters.
At this point I would advert once again to Norway's proposals concerning this body. I need not repeat those proposals, which embody the four main functions of the Advisory Board. Suffice it to say that in our view these are valid proposals which sufficiently define the tasks and mandate of the Advisory Board, which in the light of the experience of the Board, after several sessions in three years, need to be identified and defined in the interest of precision. Norway's proposals have made a significant contribution in this respect.

In conclusion, my delegation also supports the proposed expansion of the membership of the Committee on Disarmament as elaborated on by previous speakers in this debate.

Mr. MARTYNOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (interpretation from Russian): The Byelorussian SSR, together with other States of the socialist community, has on many occasions stressed the urgent necessity of averting nuclear catastrophe and curbing the arms race, and the need for a decisive reversal of the stockpiling of means of waging war and a move towards practical steps to limit and reduce them and begin real disarmament, first of all in the nuclear sphere.

Precisely that position of principle is at the basis of our delegation's attitude towards questions linked with organizational undertakings affecting the disarmament process.

In assessing the activities in the area of disarmament during the last four years of the United Nations Secretariat as structured at present, we should point out very clearly that despite its considerably increased duties the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs has through the United Nations Centre for Disarmament satisfactorily carried out its functions in all areas of organizational and other servicing of the disarmament negotiations undertaken by Members of the United Nations.

Incidentally, this was precisely the conclusion of the Group of Experts that conducted the well-known study on the institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament. The unanimity of that conclusion of the Group of
Experts and the absence of joint conclusions regarding the need for a change in the present machinery for servicing disarmament negotiations attest to the fact that the United Nations Centre for Disarmament, as the subsidiary unit of the United Nations Secretariat dealing with these questions, satisfies present requirements and that there are no objective reasons for raising - as are some delegations - the question of restructuring the Center and, inter alia, transforming it into a department on disarmament questions, much less for any more radical restructuring.

The activities of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament, as one of the major units of the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, must fully reflect the organic link between the problems of disarmament on the one hand and those of international security on the other. This has been laid down in many of the resolutions of the General Assembly concerning the existing work practices of its major political organs. Any artificial separation of the organically linked functions of the United Nations Secretariat in servicing disarmament efforts and the strengthening of international security would have a negative effect on both the results of those efforts and the effectiveness of the activities of the United Nations Secretariat.

In our view it is important to stress another point linked with the proposed restructuring. The raising and discussion of the question of a breakdown in the machinery for the servicing of negotiations not only has no connexion with reality and real needs but distracts the attention of Member States from the substance of disarmament problems and slows down effective negotiations and undertakings designed to limit arms and bring about disarmament. This should be borne in mind and has been proved again by the course of events at the present special session. Frequent and not really necessary reorganization of any unit of the United Nations Secretariat reduces the effectiveness of its activities. In addition, such reorganization, including, inter alia, the establishment within the United Nations Secretariat of a separate department on disarmament questions, not to mention proposals concerning a disarmament agency, would have unjustified financial implications and thus aggravate the already difficult problem of excessive expenditures to maintain the Secretariat.
In our view the existing structure of the United Nations Secretariat in the area of disarmament has great potential and possibilities, and the major task today consists not in erecting a complex labyrinth of restructured edifices but rather in making comprehensive use of existing possibilities and in further improving the activities of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament. In particular it would be appropriate to improve the use of personnel through the redistribution of staff in the various units of the Secretariat and also to improve the structure of the Centre itself.

Bearing in mind the enhanced role of the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs in ensuring the organization of all United Nations activities in the area of disarmament, the Byelorussian SSR believes that a logical conclusion of the reorganization carried out in 1977 and 1978 - and this would be in keeping with the real functions and tasks of that organ - would be to change its name officially to department of political affairs, disarmament and Security Council Affairs.

In considering the results and prospects of the activities of the United Nations Secretariat in the area of disarmament, and also in considering such bodies as the United Nations Commission on Disarmament and the Committee on Disarmament, which work on a carefully geographically balanced basis, despite the great significance of the question of organizational structure, we are firmly convinced that we should base ourselves on the fact that, regardless of the organizational structures and means involved, progress towards disarmament depends in the last analysis on the political will and readiness of States to make the greatest possible use of these means in order to ensure that not only in words but in deeds we firmly promote the cause of curbing and ending the arms race, not accelerating it.

In discussing questions of machinery we should also base ourselves on a proper view of their relative significance as compared with the questions which are of the utmost priority for mankind, as set forth in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.
In the documents it is to adopt at the present second special session devoted to disarmament the General Assembly cannot allow questions of machinery to take precedence over the priorities that have already been established.

Mr. ENKHSAIKHAN (Mongolia): The position of the Mongolian delegation on the item under consideration is well known. It is based on Mongolia's principled peace-loving policy aimed at strengthening international peace and security, removing the threat of war and bringing about genuine disarmament. We consider that progress in achieving those goals greatly depends on the effectiveness of the negotiations carried out by States. Although a proper negotiating structure plays an important role in facilitating and enhancing the effectiveness of negotiations, we are not inclined to exaggerate the organizational side of the question.
The crucial element for conducting successful negotiations is the political will of negotiating States and their readiness to reach concrete results. This fact is universally recognized and was fully reflected, inter alia, in the replies of States and Governments sent to the Secretary-General in accordance with General Assembly resolution 36/97 D.

Careful analysis of the report of the Secretary-General entitled "Study of the institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament", issued under the symbol A/36/392, reveals that the organizational and structural changes in the disarmament negotiations machinery, introduced by the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, have made a favourable impact on the machinery as a whole. Thus, for example, by paragraph 123 of the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament, the General Assembly decided that the United Nations Centre for Disarmament should be adequately strengthened and its research and information functions should accordingly be extended. The Centre was also assigned some additional tasks with regard to studies and information on disarmament and so on.

Our delegation fully agrees with the assessment made by the group of experts, as reflected in paragraphs 93 and 94 of document A/36/392, that the United Nations Centre for Disarmament, a subdivision of the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs of the Secretariat, "was performing its functions in a highly satisfactory way." (A/36/392, para.94) This unanimous appraisal of the Centre's work in servicing the efforts of Member States in negotiations on disarmament problems was, in the report, followed by differing views as to the need to introduce further structural changes. While some of the experts thought that there was no need for such changes, others expressed the view that the Centre should be converted into a department headed by an under-secretary-general or into a world disarmament agency within the United Nations system. In this respect my delegation would like to point out that, in its view, the Centre should continue to function as a unit of the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, since it is not only satisfactorily discharging its functions but is also reflecting and providing the organic link and close interrelationship between disarmament and international security. The importance of such a link and of the interrelationship between the two has time and again been stressed in General Assembly resolutions,
including in paragraph 13 of the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament. Therefore separation of the Centre from the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs would weaken the link and thus have a negative effect on the work both of the Department and of the Centre. Moreover, unjustified organizational experiments, such as the creation of a new body when the existing one is satisfactorily performing its functions, would, as the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mongolia, Mr. Dugersuren, pointed out in his statement in the general debate on 16 June, only divert the attention of Member States from the solution of the main problems of disarmament.

On the other hand, we support the view that there is still room for further improvement of the Centre's performance and that this could be done within the existing resources of the Secretariat and that owing to the important place that questions of disarmament occupy in the Department, the Department should be renamed "Department for Political, Disarmament and Security Council Affairs".

Following the decision taken at the first special session on disarmament, as reflected in paragraph 120 of the Final Document, some changes have been introduced in the Committee on Disarmament, including the expansion of its membership. In this connexion we should like to point out that the participation of all nuclear-weapon States in the Committee's work is a positive fact. Regrettably, however, owing to the growing obstructiveness of certain members of the Committee, its work of late reveals a tendency to get bogged down in unnecessary discussions of a procedural nature. As to the question of further expansion of the Committee's membership, my delegation, like many others, doubts that this would lead to the enhancement of the effectiveness of its work.

While commenting on the institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament, on the ways and means of enhancing the effectiveness of the machinery in the field of disarmament, all States and Governments without exception have stressed the importance of political will and good faith in disarmament negotiations. Thus, for example, the Government of Finland, in its reply of 31 March 1982, pointed out that the main reason for lack of progress was substantive, not procedural; political, not related to machinery.
Indonesia's reply of 30 March 1982 stressed that tangible progress in disarmament negotiations would depend primarily on the political readiness of all States to negotiate and achieve concrete results.

Indeed, numerous negotiations are being held on disarmament issues. Some of them are at the initial, others at an advanced and still others at their concluding stages. Some of them are stalled while others have been broken off. In most cases, as is widely recognized, the fault of lack of progress in negotiations is not to be found in the negotiating structure or machinery, but rather in the lack of political will of States.

The political will of States is generally manifested in their attitude towards given negotiations. As good faith at negotiations is a necessary prerequisite for fruitful and successful negotiations, it is also an indication of positive political will of States. Therefore my delegation deems it appropriate for this Assembly to identify in more concrete terms the factors that taken together would serve as a yardstick of the good faith of States at negotiations. These factors should include, inter alia, the will and determination of States to attain the aim and purpose of negotiations at their earliest possible date; strict respect for and observance of the main principles on which the given negotiations are based, such as the principle of equality and equal security of parties; the avoidance of and refraining from committing acts that might adversely affect or even defeat the purpose of negotiations or adversely affect the atmosphere at or around them; refraining from raising irrelevant preconditions for the commencement, pursuance or conclusion of negotiations; negotiating with the intention of honouring the result; and some others.

Finally, our delegation fully supports the view that the request of the Soviet delegation regarding the organization of the work of the present session, as it was reiterated earlier this afternoon in this room, should be given careful consideration.
Mr. VO ANH TUAN (Viet Nam) (interpretation from French): The delegation of Viet Nam would like to express its point of view on item 12 of the agenda. My delegation shares the views of several delegations that the political will of all States, especially those that have nuclear weapons, constitutes an imperative and urgent need for speeding up negotiations on the limitation of armaments and on disarmament, primarily on the prevention of a nuclear catastrophe. Nevertheless, the continued strengthening of the effectiveness of machinery in the disarmament field and the strengthening of the role of the United Nations in this field are of an importance that we should not underestimate. As regards the role of the United Nations, the delegation of Viet Nam believes that in past years the United Nations, as the primary deliberating body, has played an increasingly important role in the disarmament field.
Since the thirty-third session of the General Assembly, the First Committee has given priority consideration to disarmament questions as well as to other questions relating to international security. The work of the Disarmament Committee of the General Assembly is becoming more effective. The Centre for Disarmament has been functioning in a very satisfactory manner. In a word, in the view of my delegation the existing United Nations bodies have been effective in the exercise of their respective roles, and while we hope for steady improvement of their effectiveness my delegation is of the view that it is necessary to retain these bodies as they stand at present, not to create any new ones or to change the status of the existing bodies, in particular the Centre for Disarmament. It is also important to use to the utmost extent all existing multilateral and bilateral channels in the field of disarmament negotiations.

The Committee on Disarmament is a unique multilateral forum for negotiations on disarmament. The Socialist Republic of Viet Nam fully appreciates the role played by that body ever since its creation. As indicated in the Final Document of the first special session:

"All the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations .... All States have the right to participate in disarmament negotiations ... on an equal footing."

(resolution S-10/2, para. 28)

While sharing the views of other delegations which have stated that it would be preferable for the membership of that negotiating body to be relatively restricted in the interest of effectiveness, the delegation of Viet Nam nevertheless wishes to become a member of the Committee on Disarmament if this special session decides to extend the membership.

Under its foreign policy of peace, the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam has always supported joint efforts in the field of disarmament, both within and outside the United Nations. We have acceded to almost all the international instruments on the limitation of arms and on disarmament. As recently as 15 June last - during this present special session - my country announced its accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
While the role of the United Nations should continue to be enhanced, the contribution made by the Non-Governmental Organizations and world public opinion should be made more effective. As regards those contributions, my delegation is happy to note that at this special session the non-governmental organizations and research institutes have had a more important voice than in the past, even though still to a limited extent.

At the present time and in present circumstances the convening of a world disarmament conference with universal participation would create favourable conditions for providing world public opinion with an appropriate forum for expressing its views on a question which is of vital interest to all the peoples of the world. The Socialist Republic of Viet Nam is therefore of the opinion that efforts must be made to remove all existing obstacles and thus enable the Ad Hoc Committee to speed up the practical preparations for convening a world disarmament conference as soon as possible.

Mr. ALESSI (Italy) (interpretation from French): The interest which the Italian Government takes in the institutional aspects of disarmament and to the role of the United Nations in this field led my delegation to submit on 12 May last, in the course of the preparatory work for the special session, a working paper entitled "International machinery of disarmament and its institutional aspects" (A/AC.206/22). That document contains observations and suggestions, in particular regarding the role and functioning of the United Nations General Assembly, the Disarmament Commission, the United Nations Secretariat and the Advisory Board. My delegation would be grateful if, in the course of the drafting work on the various aspects of institutional problems, note could be taken of the ideas contained in that document. For its part, my delegation will certainly express its ideas in proposals relating to the drafting as the various topics are dealt with.

In this connexion I should like to emphasize the need for specific work on the institutional aspect of the question to be undertaken immediately. In that spirit I support the proposal made by the representative of Sweden for the immediate establishment of suitable procedures for dealing with item 12 of our agenda.
Mr. SYLLA (Senegal) (interpretation from French): It is generally recognized that one of the aspects of disarmament on which the first special session adopted rather important decisions is the question of the machinery and institutions of disarmament. Thus, not only was it decided that the First Committee should in future deal only with disarmament and security issues but it was also decided, inter alia, to establish a Disarmament Commission with universal membership as well as a Committee on Disarmament with limited membership. It is therefore normal, as this work was done four years ago, that we should today review the problems relating to the institutions set up at that time. At this stage my delegation does not wish to go into the details of the matter. It has done so, and will do so, in the relevant working groups, as it has done by its active participation in the work of the Group of experts entrusted with the study of the institutional aspects of disarmament.

We would simply confine our comments here to the membership of the Committee on Disarmament. In setting up that Committee in its present form, in 1976, the General Assembly, at its first special session on disarmament, highlighted the fact that the success of negotiations on disarmament was of vital interest for all peoples of the world and that therefore all States had the duty to contribute to efforts in this field. It was in order to link that idea with the need to have a forum of negotiation of limited size that, in our opinion, the General Assembly emphasized the need to reconsider the membership of that Committee at regular intervals, and that in earlier resolutions it decided that this should be done, at the very latest, at this current special session.

In this connexion, we welcome the initiative taken by the delegation of Turkey in the Committee yesterday in introducing this question and at the same time we support the ideas expressed yesterday by the representative of Turkey in his statement. Indeed, we believe that, since the obligations and responsibilities arising from the over-armament prevailing in the world today have been recognized as universal problems, it is essential that all States wishing to be represented in that negotiating body should be able to do so. It is in that spirit, and in the hope of making a contribution within the limits of its possibilities to the solution of the problems of disarmament, that our country has submitted its candidacy to the Committee on Disarmament and I should like to reaffirm that fact - if, of course, a decision is taken to enlarge the Committee on Disarmament.
Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): My Government has set out its views on the enhancement of the effectiveness of machinery and strengthening the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament in its reply to the Secretary-General, which has been distributed in document A/S-12/12/Add.2. I do not purport to reflect the views contained in that document in full but will just present a brief reminder of the positions of my Government on those points that have figured with particular prominence in this debate.

The possibility of enlarging membership of the Committee on Disarmament has played a large role in our discussions. My Government is of the opinion that any proposal for a new increase of membership should take into account the necessity of preserving the efficiency of that single multilateral negotiating body. However, a limited enlargement of the membership of the Committee would seem to us appropriate and we feel that the criteria for admitting new members should be the contribution candidate countries can make and the competence they have demonstrated in the past, but also the degree of representativeness of security perceptions existing in the world.

On these criteria some of the candidacies that are now evident seem to be particularly deserving of our support.

A considerable number of expert studies have been undertaken at the request of the General Assembly over the last couple of years. My Government feels that the instrument of studies is particularly valuable and we hope that studies will continue to represent an important input to our work.

The competence of the United Nations Disarmament Commission has also been the subject of our discussion. In this context my Government feels that the Commission could be called upon to undertake tasks that are at present not dealt with in depth by the First Committee and other disarmament institutions. We should like to see a concrete and constructive agenda and assignment for the United Nations Disarmament Commission in the future.

The Centre for Disarmament has worked effectively. We are grateful to the staff of the Centre for their dedication and competence. However, we note that the Centre in its present structure and composition is strained to the utmost limits of its possibilities. Considering the new and certainly heavier responsibilities the Centre will have to assume in the future, its status
within the Secretariat should be re-examined after careful consideration of all implications, in particular in the financial field. The possibility of upgrading the Centre to a department headed by an Under-Secretary-General, who would report to the Secretary-General, should be favourably considered. One of the advantages would be that the head of the new department would be available directly to the Secretary-General to bring his views and experience to bear without additional administrative constraints, and this would better enable the Secretary-General to respond personally to the aspirations which world public opinion associates with the United Nations in the disarmament field.

The Federal Republic of Germany welcomes once more the establishment of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), which represents a significant additional strengthening of the research capabilities of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. The latest contributions of the Institute have been particularly convincing. The Federal Republic of Germany is confident that the second special session will take a decision concerning a permanent status for UNIDIR, which would make possible better co-ordination of its work with the activities of the Secretariat, which might be asked to prepare factual background papers, while UNIDIR might be given responsibility for policy studies. Certainly the new status of UNIDIR should preserve its scientific independence.

**Mr. Venkateswaran (India):** We have listened with keen interest to statements by a number of delegations on the question of institutional arrangements for improving the existing disarmament machinery. While we are all for ensuring that adequate machinery is available for overseeing and servicing agreed disarmament measures, we are a little puzzled by the emphasis which has been given to expanding the existing machinery, with very little indeed to show so far in terms of progress in the implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the first special session on disarmament. As will be noted from the statements made in the plenary Assembly by almost every delegation, there has been no real movement forward in terms of general disarmament measures since the first special session on disarmament was held in 1978. What has really held up the disarmament process, in our view, is not any lack of machinery but a conspicuous absence of political will, particularly on the part of the major actors. Our emphasis, therefore, should be on ensuring during the present session...
that we agree on meaningful measures in the field of disarmament and only thereafter consider what changes or improvements are necessary in regard to the institutional measures on machinery.

The Committee on Disarmament, on which India has the honour to serve, is clearly accepted as the sole multilateral negotiating body in regard to disarmament matters. There is a strong need felt there for improvement of vital services, especially in the context of the increased tempo of the work of the Committee, both in terms of the number of meetings of the plenary Committee, as well as of its subsidiary bodies, and of the volume of its documentation and records, over the last two years in particular.

We are glad to note that the setting up of an ad hoc working group on the nuclear test ban, in addition to the existing working groups, was agreed to at the Committee's spring session and that this ad hoc working group will commence its work at the summer session, which will start this August. The question of setting up a further ad hoc working group on preventing an arms race in outer space is also now under consideration. In the foregoing circumstances, we trust that the necessary additional servicing will become available to the Committee.

A number of suggestions have been made for the expansion of the membership of the Committee on Disarmament. These proposals, in our view, require very careful consideration.

These are by way of preliminary comments and my delegation will revert to the subject again in due course.

Mr. KOSTENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (interpretation from Russian): The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR would like to express its views on item 12 of the agenda. In its work and in the work of the drafting groups of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in which to a greater or lesser extent questions of enhancing the effectiveness of machinery in the field of disarmament and strengthening of the role of the United Nations in this field are discussed, the Ukrainian SSR bases itself on the following considerations.

At the present time a wide range of bodies have already been established in which negotiations on disarmament questions are being conducted and which have adequate experience in organizing such types of negotiations.
As is well known, in addition to the United Nations there are bilateral and trilateral organizations. Negotiations also take place in the Committee on Disarmament, whose role has in recent times grown considerably. And there are also other meetings and conferences. The variety of negotiating bodies on disarmament is also determined by the complexity of the questions discussed by them, the various degrees of involvement of States in one or other aspect of disarmament and, finally, practical considerations.

We believe that this variety of channels for negotiations is fully justified. And, as has already been stressed today, particularly by the representatives of Brazil and India, a decisive factor in achieving true disarmament, moving from words to deeds, is the political will of the States which are participating in disarmament negotiations. Without such will no efforts designed to curb the arms race will be successful.

We can talk until doomsday about the problem of international machinery in the field of disarmament. We can talk until doomsday about problems of organization and increasing the number of bodies working on disarmament questions. But, if certain participants in the negotiations do not really wish to achieve success in this area, the goals facing the international community will not be achieved.

In the view of the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR, in that case no organizational restructuring can assist in achieving progress in the field of disarmament. Indeed, it will only distract attention and the efforts of States from the search for solutions to really pressing substantive questions. We believe that it is necessary to direct efforts not to restructuring machinery which already exists but to speeding up the negotiations now being conducted, to renewing those which have been broken off and to beginning new negotiations on those questions which have not yet been solved, thus ensuring a move to practical measures of a real disarmament.

If we look at the discussions on disarmament questions during the past few years we must recognize the obvious fact that in the area of restructuring the negotiating machinery quite a lot has been done. I do not wish now to list such changes. At the same time, when in the corridors of the United Nations and of other forums there is an assessment of the various units of the
Secretariat of the United Nations which work on questions of disarmament or which service such negotiations, we always hear only positive reactions, positive assessments of their activities. No one can say that the Secretariat of the United Nations is to blame for organizational difficulties, on the whole. There have been hold-ups because negotiations have not moved forward on various aspects of limiting the arms race and on disarmament.

Clearly the problem is not an organizational one. That is why the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR believes that at the present time there is no need to restructure the existing international machinery in the area of disarmament.

This disposes of the question of the reorganization of the Centre for Disarmament as well, including the proposal that a separate department on disarmament be established. The United Nations Centre for Disarmament is one of the units of the Department for Political and Security Council Affairs, which in our view is quite appropriate. That arrangement creates favourable conditions for ensuring a close link between such important political problems as disarmament and international security. Therefore, an artificial separation for organizational servicing of such problems would, in our view, be unjustified and would be contrary to the decisions of the United Nations General Assembly and the interests of the world community.

The United Nations Centre for Disarmament was established on the basis of the principle of equitable geographical representation among the staff working in it. Of course, many people are aware of the fact that representatives of a number of States work in the Centre. At the same time, the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR believes that we could study the possibility of staffing the Centre within the context of a more rational distribution of personnel among the units of the Secretariat of the United Nations which would not result in increased expenditure.

Mr. de LA GORCE (France) (interpretation from French): The French delegation attaches considerable importance to the problems covered by agenda item 12. Indeed, we believe that the institutions and the methods are an important factor of effectiveness and progress in the efforts of the United Nations in the field of disarmament.
(Mr. de La Gorce, France)

In that regard, we believe that the system of institutions established by the first special session on disarmament is satisfactory and cannot be blamed for any shortcomings there might be in the results. However, improvements undoubtedly can be made. It is in this spirit that we should like to refer to the various questions under discussion.

The French delegation has made two proposals in this connexion. One concerns the Centre for Disarmament. It is designed to adapt the means of the Centre to the increased activity which devolves upon it and to ensure it of a status within the Secretariat corresponding to the United Nations mission in the field of disarmament. It is also designed to establish and strengthen the responsibility of the Centre with regard to the co-ordination of activities concerning disarmament within the United Nations family.

The second proposal deals with the question of an international satellite monitoring agency. The Secretary-General has submitted to the General Assembly for consideration at this special session the study on this subject prepared by a Group of Governmental Experts on the technical, legal and financial implications of the establishment of such an agency.

In his speech to the General Assembly on 11 June the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic recalled my country's determination to continue to work in favour of a proposal which received such wide support from the international community.

Indeed all Members of the United Nations should be enabled to benefit from access to appropriate technology for the verification of disarmament agreements, whether it is a question of seismic detection, remote sensing of the earth by satellite or specific methods of control of the use and the prohibition of the production of stockpiling of certain types of weapons.
Consequently, the French delegation proposed to the General Assembly, first that it should take note of the report and study of the Group of Experts on the Question of the Establishment of an International Satellite Monitoring Agency; that it should take note of the conclusions of the study as to the possibilities of establishing such an agency; that it should request the Secretary-General to report on the practical ways and means of implementing those conclusions with regard to the institutional aspects of the project considered in chapter V of the study; and, finally, that it include the question in the agenda of its thirty-eighth session. Moreover, it would certainly be desirable, in the French delegation's view, for the Governments concerned to make their comments or possible proposals on that project.

There are other institutional aspects to which the French delegation attaches very great importance. In this connexion, we wish to associate ourselves fully with the recommendations put forward by the delegation of Norway. Those recommendations, contained in document A/S-12/AC.1/32, deal, respectively, with the Committee on Disarmament, with the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, and with the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, established by the Secretary-General. As to the Committee on Disarmament, we, like the delegation of Norway and other delegations that have spoken in this debate, believe that it would be possible to extend, to some degree, participation in the Committee on Disarmament to certain countries that have expressed a particular interest in having access to the Committee. Such expansion or extension of the membership should, of course, remain consistent with the specific conditions necessary for a negotiating body.

We believe that the Committee on Disarmament has discharged its responsibilities properly and that it cannot be blamed for the inadequate results achieved. We believe that the admission to the Committee of members that have a special interest in these matters would improve the quality of its work, without really complicating the Committee's working methods.
As to the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, the French delegation has repeatedly expressed its interest in it, and we share and support the Norwegian proposal to confer, at this session, autonomous status on that body. Such status would enable the Institute to carry out its specific tasks in full autonomy and in close co-operation with the United Nations Secretariat. The Institute has received, in this discussion, considerable support, as we have noticed, and this reflects the interest of many Members of the international community in a body that must fulfil a specific role—a role played by no other United Nations body, one that will undoubtedly make a most interesting contribution to the work we are doing in the disarmament field, particularly with regard to general problems and long-term research.

Finally, we should like to refer to the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, established by the Secretary-General. Here again, we associate ourselves with the recommendations made by the delegation of Norway, namely, to specify the role of that body and make it more substantive. It should, of course, pursue, or resume, its task of providing the advice expected of it by the Secretary-General on the establishment of studies and research under United Nations auspices and of providing the Secretary-General with the required opinions on any subject in the field of disarmament or arms limitation on which the Secretary-General requests to be informed or to receive advice.

Finally, the Advisory Board should, in our opinion, be given two new tasks: the first would be the role to be assigned to it as the scientific board of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. In this connexion, the Advisory Board would be called upon to examine and approve the annual programme of the Institute. Finally, it seems to us that the Advisory Board could and should play a most useful role in following the activities conducted in the context of the World Disarmament Campaign.

In conclusion, the French delegation sincerely hopes that discussion of the questions covered by agenda item 12 will be undertaken forthwith in the contact groups, the establishment of which was agreed upon at the time of the organization of our work.
Mr. ZARIF (Afghanistan): As was stated by my Minister for Foreign Affairs during the general debate at this special session, it has been the view of my Government that only through sincere negotiations based on a true political will would it become possible to tackle highly complicated issues such as disarmament. The role played by proper machinery for co-ordinating and organizing such negotiations has naturally acquired significant importance. However, the manner in which that machinery functions becomes a determining factor in its effectiveness.

The Committee on Disarmament, although to a rather limited extent, has provided such machinery. It is a fact that the work of the Committee has been hindered from time to time. However, we believe that that should not undermine the importance of that organ. What is required, in our view, is to make the work and organization of the Committee more efficient.

The same remarks may be applicable to the functions of the Centre for Disarmament, whose activities have proved useful and satisfactory. There is, of course, enough room for further refinement of the present structure and for better use of the facilities and personnel available to it.

Regarding enlargement of the membership of the Committee on Disarmament, we strongly believe that our interests would be best served if a fair balance prevailed there. Any enlargement of the membership of the Committee should take this element into consideration.

With those extremely brief remarks, I should like to put on record the desire of my Government to serve on the Committee in case a decision is taken to enlarge it.

Mr. CARASALES (Argentina) (interpretation from Spanish): If there is one thing on which there is a consensus at this special session of the General Assembly, it is clearly the fact that the present international climate is not the most conducive to the achievement of effective disarmament negotiations, and that what is happening in this field hardly offers an encouraging picture.
Moreover, in taking part in the work of the various working groups and drafting groups of this session, we note with concern that the general climate to which I just referred is also reflected in the work of those subsidiary bodies, which, at least at this time, certainly does not give us cause for great optimism about the results of this special session of the Assembly.
In spite of that not very encouraging picture, we have nevertheless arrived at a situation in which numerous proposals have been put forward on machinery for dealing with disarmament questions which contemplate the establishment of new bodies, entities, agencies, and the strengthening and enhancement of the effectiveness of existing bodies. These are all worthy of consideration and have at least some merit. In any event, they are proposals which will have to be considered very carefully in due course, when my delegation will ask questions and express its misgivings on each of them. This is certainly not the proper time to do that.

However, I should like to point out the facts of life: that the prevailing international situation and the situation in the field of disarmament specifically do not encourage us to create or expand bodies in the field of disarmament. Now does not seem to be the right time to embark upon long-term efforts on this question. It would be quite paradoxical if the only achievements recorded as a result of this special session on disarmament were procedural and bureaucratic. That is not what world public opinion expects of us.

For this reason, I find a great deal of realism and common sense in the statement made by the representative of Brazil this afternoon, and I noted that subsequently the representative of India expressed similar views.

I wish to express my delegation's views on one specific point, namely, that there is a need to increase the budgetary and human resources of the Centre for Disarmament and the secretariat of the Committee on Disarmament, which have to deal with increasingly complex tasks.

As for the main negotiating body on disarmament, the Committee on Disarmament, much has been said in the past few days about the possibility of increasing its membership. In this context I should like to say that the delegation of Argentina will certainly not oppose a small increase - and I wish to emphasize the word "small" - in the number of members of the Committee, if there is a consensus on this. Again, I emphasize the word "consensus". However, my delegation has some doubts as to whether a small increase is possible. In other words, if there is an increase, could it really be small? We all know that many countries have expressed
their interest in playing a full part in the work of the Committee on Disarmament, and that is quite understandable and natural. My country is sympathetic to several of the candidates. Undoubtedly there are other countries interested in membership of this important body. Can we satisfy all those legitimate interests and maintain the right balance in the membership of the Committee, I wonder, while making only a small increase. My delegation believes that it will be very difficult to give reasonable satisfaction to all those interested by expanding the membership of the Committee by fewer than 12 or 14 at least. Hence, before we take any action we must consider very carefully whether such a membership is compatible with the functions of the Committee on Disarmament, which is a negotiating body. I must point out that my delegation has serious doubts about that.

Moreover, in considering any possible expansion there is a question which will have to be discussed very carefully, and that is the question of the criteria that should be taken into account in reaching a decision on increasing the number of members. Some criteria have been suggested and there undoubtedly exist others. We shall have to bear in mind very carefully, if and when we decide on an increase, how we are to deal with the matter of the aspirations of the countries interested in participation and in accordance with what criteria. I repeat that this requires very serious consideration.

I believe that the Committee can improve its working methods, its modus operandi. It is the function of the Committee itself to consider this question and I think that it will have to be done quite soon. Various ideas have been expressed during this session of the Assembly; others have been heard before: for instance, that the Committee should meet all year long, as proposed by the Netherlands, and that the Committee's Working Groups should function in a different manner in order to make it possible to achieve better results. Furthermore, I think that the participation of non-member States in the work of the Committee will have to be made much easier.

Those many questions and others which certainly exist will have to be considered very closely by the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. But I think that we could improve the productivity of the Committee and make possible
the fuller and more complete participation of all non-member States that have an interest in the work of the Committee. We could find some way - and it should not be difficult to do this - for those non-member States to participate in a very satisfactory way in the work of the Committee.

Mr. JOHANES (Czechoslovakia): On behalf of the delegation of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, I should like to express some of our views concerning agenda item 12.

Our delegation holds the view that the most important current task is to halt the arms race and prevent a nuclear catastrophe. This applies first of all to the field of nuclear arms of all types; it also applies to other weapons of mass destruction, such as bacteriological, biological, chemical and now also so-called binary weapons. There are no weapons which the socialist countries would not be prepared to limit, reduce or prohibit, provided, of course, that the principle of equality and equal security were maintained.

That is why Czechoslovakia has been consistently and systematically advocating effective negotiations aimed at adopting specific and realistic disarmament measures, particularly in the nuclear field, and that is why it has taken part in a number of such negotiations. Furthermore, by practising a peaceful policy, Czechoslovakia encourages the creation of favourable conditions for actual disarmament negotiations. On Czechoslovak initiative, the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly, in 1979, adopted the Declaration on International Co-operation for Disarmament, and the thirty-sixth session adopted a resolution on international co-operation for disarmament.
We believe that a disarmament conference in accordance with the well-known decisions of the General Assembly might and should be of especially great significance for the adoption of effective measures aimed at halting the arms race and achieving real progress in the field of disarmament generally. We therefore fully support the opinion that the current second special session devoted to disarmament should make a practical contribution to the start of the work for the convening of such a conference.

Czechoslovakia has been striving to promote the speeding up of the process of disarmament by assisting in the resolution of other issues relating to disarmament. It is the view of the Czechoslovak Government that the United Nations Centre for Disarmament is functioning well and is providing high-quality services. A recent report of the Group of Experts had not a single critical comment to make on the Centre's work.

The current situation, as far as institutional arrangements are concerned, is fully in keeping with present objectives and needs. This becomes particularly apparent when compared with the situation in 1977 when the United Nations Centre for Disarmament was established. We do not therefore see any reason for a restructuring of the Centre such as would involve the establishment in the United Nations Secretariat of a special department for disarmament questions. Moreover, the fact that the Centre is currently functioning within the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs enables the United Nations Secretariat to establish in practice the interrelationship between disarmament and international security. The necessity of this interrelationship was repeatedly pointed out in sessions of the General Assembly, including the last session, the thirty-sixth. Any artificial separation of the Secretariat's functions relating to disarmament negotiations from its activities aimed at co-ordinating efforts by States to strengthen international security could only be detrimental to the entire process.

Restructuring the machinery would to a considerable extent divert attention from topical disarmament issues and also entail unnecessary financial expenditures. This, of course, does not mean that the work of the Centre would not be improved by increasing its staff by a certain number. Together with some other States, Czechoslovakia is of the view that the name of the department should also be in keeping with current needs and should thus cover political affairs, disarmament and Security Council affairs.
On the whole, our delegation holds the view that it is not organizational matters but matters of substance relating to disarmament which should be the centre of the attention of States because the maintenance of peace will not be guaranteed even by the most ingenious restructuring of the machinery, but rather by political goodwill and the determination of States to act in the interests of peace.

Mr. LUNDBO (Norway): On 28 June my delegation had the honour of introducing my Government's proposal concerning the expansion of the membership of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, the status of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and the mandate of the Advisory Board on disarmament studies.

Today my delegation would like to present some views concerning the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the Centre for Disarmament.

As for the Centre, we are of the opinion that it has performed services of great value to disarmament deliberations with its present structure. However, new tasks have been allocated to the Centre since the first special session. No doubt the Centre will have additional responsibilities as a result of this special session. In the view of my Government, the Centre for Disarmament should therefore be strengthened and this should be decided during this special session. In this connexion, we feel that the establishment of a separate department might be considered.

As for the Disarmament Commission, we feel that the Commission might assume additional tasks that at present are not dealt with in depth by the First Committee due to that Committee's heavy workload. In particular, the preparatory function of the Disarmament Commission could be strengthened.

Finally, we should like to stress that we attach considerable importance to the discussion of institutional questions during this session and hope that the contact group to which many delegations have referred will be established tomorrow.

Mr. BAGBINI ADEITO NZENGeya (Zaire) (interpretation from French): The tenth special session of the United Nations General Assembly which met in New York from 23 May to 30 June 1978 adopted the Final Document which contains a declaration, a programme of action and certain machinery. With regard to
machinery, paragraph 120 of the Final Document provides for "a single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of limited size taking decisions on the basis of consensus". (resolution S-10/2)

The Committee on Disarmament, or Committee of 18 for Disarmament, an international negotiating organ, has been working since 14 March 1962. Despite the work done by that Committee of 18, the General Assembly decided in 1978 to expand that Committee, while retaining all nuclear-weapon States, by appointing 35 other Member States on the basis of geographical distribution, of the contribution which those countries could make to the disarmament negotiations and also of the fact of the representativeness of those countries from an international standpoint.

The Committee on Disarmament has, since it was created in 1978, allowed non-member States interested in the work of the Committee to participate in it and has granted them all possible facilities for the purpose, and it is in this context that some States non-members such as Austria, Chile, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, the United Arab Emirates, Spain, Finland, Greece, Iraq, Madagascar, Norway and many others have been able to take part in the work of the Committee on Disarmament without any difficulty.

The five nuclear Powers - the United States, the USSR, France, Great Britain and China - are, of course, members of that Committee, as they were members of the Committee of 18, and 35 non-nuclear-weapon States were also admitted according to the following geographical distribution: seven from Africa, seven from Latin America, five from Western Europe, one from Oceania, eight from Asia and seven from Eastern Europe.
My delegation has confidence in whatever decision is taken by the present special session of the General Assembly on the composition of the Committee on Disarmament. However, we must point out that it is the absence of political will on the part of the nuclear Powers, and that alone, that has reduced the possibilities of progress in disarmament negotiations. The Committee set up Working Groups to deal with the comprehensive programme of disarmament and their work has resulted in a document submitted to this session; a Working Group on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear arms, whose report has also been submitted to the present session; a Working Group on chemical weapons, whose work is also well advanced, resulting in the submission of a specific proposal supported by most delegations; and, finally, a Working Group on radiological weapons. Our Working Group on nuclear weapons will start work at the session in August this year, but its terms of reference have yet to be determined. However, it seems to us that it is premature to consider the enlargement of the Committee on Disarmament, when deep-seated problems of ethics, organization and commitment are obstructing the satisfactory development of the Committee's work.

Nevertheless, my delegation supports the proposal made by the representative of Sweden to entrust to a working group the responsibility for making a thorough study of the matter and submitting the results of its efforts to the Ad Hoc Committee.

My delegation will return to the question of convening a world disarmament conference and state our position on it at a suitable time. We firmly support the idea of strengthening the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, and we also support the qualitative improvement of that role by giving the existing study bodies - whether the United Nations Centre for Disarmament or an agency of the United Nations - specific functions, consisting in the dissemination of information, in all the official languages of the United Nations and to all Member States, on the question of the armaments of Member States, particularly those with advanced deterrent arsenals.
Mr. RAHALLI (Morocco) (interpretation from Arabic): I apologize for asking to speak at this late hour.

It seems to be the intention that this meeting should be the last at which official statements are made on item 12 of our agenda. In view of the time that has been wasted, my delegation will limit itself to two questions on this item.

I do not need to remind the Committee of the importance that Morocco attaches to the institutional aspects of disarmament. Despite our belief that the political will is the essential basis for the success of all disarmament efforts, the institutional aspect is also very important. Therefore, we believe it to be very important to review that aspect from time to time and try to strengthen it.

As I have said before, my delegation would have liked to discuss all the matters under item 12, but because of the limited time available we shall confine our intervention to two questions. The first concerns the Committee on Disarmament and in particular its composition. My delegation believes that it is possible at the present session to respond to the wish expressed by many countries to contribute to the work of the Committee on Disarmament as members of that Committee. My delegation would approve a limited expansion of that Committee's membership. We must, of course, discuss the criteria for choosing States from those that have submitted their candidature. Some views on those criteria have been expressed, and we agree with some of them. But the criteria should not be only technical, because the Committee on Disarmament also has a very political aspect that should be taken into account.

In that respect also I should like to discuss the role of the Disarmament Commission. We believe that the Commission has played a very successful role, particularly in 1978 and 1980, and in spite of the delay in the Commission's work in the past two years we believe that it is possible at the present session to give an impetus to that work.
The other question with which I should like to deal briefly is that of strengthening the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. The present session will produce some documents that will give the United Nations Centre for Disarmament a specific role and increase its area of competence. To enable it to play that role we have a duty to try to strengthen the Centre.

As I have said, our delegation would have liked to discuss all the problems and details of the two subjects with which we have dealt, but because of the shortage of time we will do that within the contact group that is to be established and that will start its work tomorrow.

The CHAIRMAN: We have concluded our initial consideration in plenary meeting of this item. We may now think of moving to the next stage, in accordance with the decision that we took at our third meeting, that an informal contact group would look into some of the matters mentioned in the discussion and at the same time determine which aspects of the question of machinery can go to the established Working Groups and which can be retained by the contact group. The contact group will then make recommendations to the Committee as a whole.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION OF THE 1980s AS THE SECOND DISARMAMENT DECADE AND CONSIDERATION OF INITIATIVES AND PROPOSALS OF MEMBER STATES (continued)

Mr. ZAKI (Egypt): At yesterday's meeting my delegation did not have the opportunity to introduce the proposals submitted by Egypt in connexion with agenda item 13. These proposals were submitted for consideration on 28 June 1982 under the title "Measures to enhance the effectiveness of the activities of United Nations centres related to the programme for the World Disarmament Campaign". As document A/S-12/AC.1/63, comprising these proposals, has not yet been circulated, I wish for the record to give a brief summary of the document pending its circulation.

First, the report of the Secretary-General (A/S-12/27) has identified the objectives for the World Disarmament Campaign as determined by the Group of Experts and also the requirement to carry out this campaign in all the regions of the world in a balanced, factual and objective manner owing to the importance of conducting United Nations information activities on a global scale so as to reach the largest number of people. In addition to the important role of the five major constituencies identified by the Group of Experts, we believe that the United Nations should further seek to establish the fundamental role of Governments in assisting the carrying out of such a campaign on a world-wide basis. In particular we believe that the goals of the campaign would not be effectively achieved without considerable co-operation, assistance and co-ordination on the part of Governments, particularly those of developing countries.

Secondly, as for the objectives of United Nations information and educational activities, the Secretary-General's report identifies short-range and medium-range stages during which the mobilization of world public opinion for furthering understanding of the growing menace of the arms race to international peace and security could be achieved through the programme of United Nations activities set forth in the Secretary-General's report. In addition to this there is a long-range stage during which two main objectives should be outlined. The first objective is the elimination of all factors conducive to passive world public thinking and to making it more receptive to the concept of armaments. To this end a world ban should be enforced on the production of all materials that may lead directly or indirectly to such results. The second objective is the employment of psychological methods designed to instil the concepts of disarmament and peace in children's thinking through educational programmes.
Thirdly, a periodical assessment of the activities of the Department of Public Information in this respect should be of considerable value. In addition, the difficulties, if any, that the Department may have encountered in the course of discharging its responsibilities should be pinpointed along with recommendations for surmounting them.

We believe that the Disarmament Commission should be given a role in this assessment. The implementation of such a process should assist the Department in drawing up a more effective plan for carrying out its activities and also assist in evaluating the situation.

The CHAIRMAN: The United States representative wishes to exercise his right of reply. I call upon him.

Mr. STRATTON (United States of America): I know that the hour is late, and I shall be very brief.

The representative of the USSR took exception yesterday to my presentation of one of two initiatives being offered by the United States delegation – the one calling for a United Nations investigation of the use of chemical and toxin weapons in Afghanistan, Laos and Kampuchea.

As the Soviet representative noted, I happen to be a member of the United States Congress, a body in which rhetorical give-and-take has been elevated to a high art and in which sharp differences of opinion are not unknown. I strongly believe that frank and honest debate and a candid expression of disagreements provide the most effective way for a group of men and women with differing viewpoints to arrive at the truth of a question.

I therefore regret that, when he addressed this Committee yesterday on the subject of chemical warfare, the representative of the USSR did not address himself to the special details of the proposal made by the United States delegation but chose instead to make an assessment of my personal qualifications for presenting the issue.

In my judgement the proposal put forward yesterday by my delegation is a very simple one and deserves to be discussed on the basis of its own merits rather than on the quality of the individual representative who presented it.

Over the past few years there have been many disturbing reports of the use of chemical and toxin weapons against indigenous populations in Afghanistan, Laos and
Kampuchea. At this special session, in the general debate, the General Assembly has itself heard statements on this subject by the representatives of several concerned nations.

In fact, in the spring of 1980 I myself, as a member of a Congressional delegation to Pakistan, visited the Afghan refugee camps in Peshawar and heard at first hand accounts of the use of chemical agents against unarmed Afghan civilians and saw with my own eyes the effects of these terrible weapons.

Most of us would prefer to believe that no nation would ever use such weapons. But, despite our earnest hopes, there is a growing and persuasive body of evidence that these weapons are indeed being used, that they have been widely used not only in Afghanistan but in South East Asia - "yellow rain", for example, and other poisonous chemicals - and that their effects have been devastating. We would be naive and remiss in our duty to peace were we to rely exclusively on our hopes and not to insist on a full United Nations investigation of these allegations.

The initiative which our delegation offered yesterday called on the Governments in control of those areas where voluminous reports of chemical attacks have occurred "to grant full and free access to their countries or to territories they control so that United Nations experts" - not American experts, but United Nations experts, let me repeat - "can conduct an effective independent investigation to verify cessation of these horrors." (A/S-12/IV.16, p. 9)

Surely it is in the interest of everyone, not least the nations charged with using these weapons, that the facts be established to the satisfaction of the whole world.

My Government has recently issued a report that gives full details of the evidence which we believe proves that chemical weapons and toxins have been used in Afghanistan, Laos and Kampuchea. Copies of that report are available to any interested representative. They may be found on the table in the rear of the Committee chamber.

At a time when the need for verification of disarmament agreements is more evident than ever, I find it difficult indeed to believe that the representative of a great nation that has many times reiterated its commitment to world peace would in fact oppose the modest and humanitarian inquiry which I have had the honour to present on behalf of my Government.

I urge the members of the Committee to pick up copies of the document I have mentioned when they leave and to look at it carefully.
Mr. ZARIF (Afghanistan): My delegation was among those delegations which yesterday listened to the accusation made by the Congressman from the United States. We consider that statement to be a repetition of previous accusations against Afghanistan and we thought that it would not even require any response. But since we think that there is a great deal of insistence on the part of the United States Congressman to take up this issue and to continue the debate on it, we shall of course appreciate such an opportunity to bring to the attention of the Committee the facts regarding the use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan.

Let me state that there has been use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan: only those made in the United States and provided to the armed groups fighting against the Government of Afghanistan.

I reserve my right to return to this issue and to respond to some other matters referred to in the statement of the United States Congressman.

The meeting rose at 6.35 p.m.