Twelfth special session

AD HOC COMMITTEE OF THE TWELFTH SPECIAL SESSION

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 10TH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Tuesday, 29 June 1982, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. SADLIER (Australia)
(Vice-Chairman)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.25 p.m.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION OF THE 1980s AS THE SECOND DISARMAMENT DECADE AND CONSIDERATION OF INITIATIVES AND PROPOSALS OF MEMBER STATES (continued)

Mr. JOHANES (Czechoslovakia) (interpretation from Russian): The delegation of Czechoslovakia, together with the delegations of the other socialist countries, pursues a policy based on principle and aimed at ensuring that the present special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament will be successful in achieving important and constructive results. On the basis of this position, we attribute special importance to the new initiatives and proposals submitted during the course of the session by a number of States Members of the United Nations and are in favour of the practical discussion of those proposals in order fully to explore their great potential and that of the United Nations Declaration on International Co-operation for Disarmament.

In this connexion, I should like to refer to the statement of the Foreign Minister of our country in the general debate on 18 June of this year in which he stated that we are ready to consider constructively any reasonable and realistic proposal for the limitation, reduction or prohibition of any weapons on an equitable basis.

As we see it, the few constructive proposals during the course of our debate have been made by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Among them are the proposals, which are of extreme importance in the present international situation, aimed at averting the growing nuclear threat and curbing the arms race and the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. In this connexion, we welcome the statement of Leonid Brezhnev of the USSR in which his Government undertook not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. We believe that it is necessary that this example be followed by other nuclear States. The value of all such proposals lies first and foremost in the fact that they are fully in accordance with the vital interests of the peoples and of mankind as a whole, as has frequently been emphasized during the course of this session. They are a firm expression of the sense of responsibility and the desire to seek lasting solutions to the problems of our times, to avert a nuclear catastrophe and to guarantee peace. It is quite natural that the international community — as
demonstrated by the events that have taken place during the course of the work of the present session - impatiently awaits from this session practical solutions and concrete action in this direction.

There are a number of other proposals which are very important and require urgent consideration and decision, including the proposed convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. Thus the session is now faced with a task of prime importance - that of discussing how to approach the proposals submitted and the initiatives put forward and, most important of all, finding ways and means to ensure their subsequent implementation.

Agenda item 11 proposes that this session should act in this way. From the practical point of view, we feel that this is feasible and practicable. All proposals aimed at averting nuclear war should be discussed within the framework of a special subgroup to be set up for this purpose within Working Group III, the mandate of which covers the new initiatives and proposals.

We feel sure that that kind of organization of work is the best way to tackle the main task that confronts us.

**Mr. Daytor (Turkey):** My delegation has submitted some proposals to this special session. The first has been distributed as document A/S-12/AC.1/33 and contains our views on the question of the review of the membership of the Committee on Disarmament. As members are aware, my delegation has initiated various General Assembly resolutions which call for the membership of the Committee on Disarmament to be reviewed during the course of the present special session. Therefore, we hope that the Chairman will find an appropriate way of allowing us to debate this important issue with a view to reaching a decision on the reasonable enlargement of the Committee on Disarmament. Such a decision would reflect the growing interest that States are showing in the work of that body. Since my delegation will use the opportunity that those discussions will provide to express its views, I shall refrain from elaborating on them at this point.
We have also submitted another proposal for other aspects of the machinery. Our first proposal relates to confidence-building measures. The importance that we attach to them as a means of creating a favourable atmosphere for disarmament efforts in general needs no further mention. Confidence-building measures are and will be instrumental in bringing about the reduction and eventual elimination of the causes of mistrust, lack of understanding, scepticism, tension and hostility. In line with such an approach, my delegation offers for this Committee's consideration under agenda item 11 the proposals on confidence-building measures that we have submitted in document A/S-12/AC.1/34.

I take this opportunity to request the Secretariat, through you, Mr. Chairman, to correct document A/S-12/AC.1/33: to show that the proposal therein is submitted under agenda item 11, not 12. Our proposal aims at providing a contribution to the implementation of measures enumerated in paragraph 93 of the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament as a first step.

The CHAIRMAN: I assure the representative of Turkey that the correction he requested has been noted and will be made.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): My delegation would like to propose to the Committee two new arms control measures which President Reagan presented during his address to the special session on 17 June 1982. Speaking for the United States delegation will be the Honourable Samuel Stratton, United States Representative from the state of New York and a member of the United States delegation to the second special session on disarmament.
Mr. STRATTON (United States of America): In his 17 June address to the special session on disarmament President Reagan called for an international conference under United Nations auspices to build on past United Nations efforts to develop a common reporting and accounting system on military expenditures. We believe that such a conference would contribute towards building mutual trust and confidence and would be an important and necessary step in the process of disarmament.

Over the past decade a series of groups of experts under the Secretary-General mandated by General Assembly resolutions sponsored by a broad group of neutral and non-aligned States have developed, refined and tested a standardized instrument for reporting national military expenditures and techniques for comparison and verification. We are pleased that the vast majority of States Members of the United Nations have supported those resolutions.

Last year a number of States submitted data on national military expenditures to the Secretary-General in the standard format approved by the General Assembly. From the beginning the United States has actively supported this effort. We provided our military expenditure data to the United Nations in 1980 and again in 1981 (A/36/353). Moreover, as is well known, our people and legislatures regularly carry on a spirited and open debate on how to allocate our defence resources. Unfortunately others do not value such a frank and public discussion. Only 16 nations, for example, have submitted data using the standardized reporting instrument.

How, then, can we hope to establish that mutual trust and confidence which are needed for fruitful and lasting agreements if nations refuse to co-operate in this most basic of requests for military data? How can we hope to begin to compare military expenditures with a view to mutual reduction in military budgets? How can we hope to begin on the long road of genuine disarmament if we cannot even have an open and honest consideration of present military expenditures, let alone present levels of armaments?

Even with the active co-operation of all Member States, agreement on the reduction of military expenditures will not be easy. None the less, real steps in building confidence can be registered on a world-wide, regional
and bilateral basis if States will pursue a course of greater openness and restraint. Fruitful and sustainable disarmament negotiations can proceed only from an accurate and mutually agreed upon basis of information.

It was with this in mind that the President proposed the convening of an international conference on military expenditures. Of course, we welcome other suggestions on the modalities of such a conference. We believe that at a minimum such a conference would review the progress of the United Nations groups of experts with emphasis on comparison and verification of military budgets. It should also consider refining further the United Nations standardized reporting instrument. Naturally, to be most effective the conference should be universal. Heretofore, in addition to the United States, only 15 nations have submitted military-expenditure data to the United Nations. We applaud these contributions. But we must now go beyond these fruitful yet incomplete efforts. We must discuss ways to make the implementation of past proposals on military budgets more effective and to seek means to ensure universal adherence to the United Nations reporting instrument.

The United States is proud of its record in living up to both the letter and the spirit of the United Nations resolutions regarding the military budgets I have just mentioned. Not only does the United States Government submit its most current military data to the United Nations, but it also reports on present as well as future expenditures and force levels to the United States Congress as part of the normal budgetary process. Of course, one need only pick up a copy of any local newspaper or Aviation Weekly in this country to appreciate the unabridged and thorough public debate that precedes any decisions on military spending. It is clear for the whole world to see; we believe in public debate on national policy. As President Reagan said in his address to the General Assembly on 17 June,

"The democracies of the West are open societies. Information on our defences is available to our citizens, our elected representatives and the world. We do not hesitate to inform potential adversaries of our military forces, and ask in return for the same information concerning theirs." (A/S-12/PV.12, p.10)
President Reagan went on to state that the practice of secrecy contributes to distrust and fear about their intentions.

Sadly, while my country has provided and will continue to provide to this body information on military expenditures, other nations have opposed all United Nations efforts in this field. Perhaps this should be surprising, given the closed nature of certain nations. But one has to wonder just what it is that they are hiding.

As much as many of us would like to, we cannot ignore the sad litany of statistics on military spending over the past decade. We may grow tired of hearing these statistics, and bringing them up may make some of us in this forum slightly uncomfortable. But the implications of these statistics should make us even more uncomfortable, and we can ignore them only at our peril.

I will not dwell on these statistics in this forum except to say that, when it comes to making the instruments of war, the Soviet Union has in fact been outspending, outproducing and outgunning the United States for over a decade and continues to do so. This frightening reality has been documented by a number of recognized centres for disarmament studies. Yet for the past 10 years the Soviet Government has insisted that it spends between 17 and 18 billion rubles on its military budget. No breakdown of this total military budget is provided, not even to show amounts by service. This single figure of 17 to 18 billion rubles is discredited by expert observers all over the world, including several United Nations groups of experts. Every serious independent assessment of Soviet military expenditure, from the Swedish International Research Institute to various academic studies, has concluded that Moscow understates its military spending by a factor of three or more. Some conclude that Soviet expenditures are seven times the acknowledged amount. This extreme reluctance of the Soviet Union to provide creditable data to the United Nations cannot help but affect other discussions with the Soviets, which also must rely upon a verifiable and agreed-upon information base.
That disproportionate use of scarce resources by the Soviet military-industrial complex has other, more immediate, side-effects. It is a sad fact of life that the people of that country, so rich in natural and human resources and so fertile in agricultural land, must yet rely on the production of foreign nations for the very bread on its own table.

But, while the leaders behind the Kremlin walls have consciously decided to put the emphasis on swords instead of ploughshares, the tragedy of misused resources is compounded in much of the developing world, where expanding military budgets deprive people of even scarcer resources. Today the developing world devotes a higher percentage of its gross national product to military expenditures than does the developed Western world, and that percentage is unfortunately rapidly increasing, as is reported in the United Nations study on disarmament and development.

We address these unfortunate realities not to cast aspersions but rather to emphasize that expanding military expenditures are a fact that affects most nations present in this forum. My country also faces difficult choices on how to allocate its resources. The manner in which a country chooses to allocate its resources is, of course, a sovereign decision. However, greater openness and adequate facilities for verifying military expenditures as well as all arms-control agreements are essential if we are to build a foundation of trust among nations.
It is with this goal in mind that President Reagan has called on all States, including the USSR, to join in convening an international conference on military expenditures, in a world which has often known only fear and distrust. The road of progress in addressing the growth of military budgets will not be short, nor will it be easy. After all, we all have legitimate security concerns. However, we need not cultivate the already fertile field of suspicion by shrouding our military expenditures in a cloud of secrecy. Rather, let us all today join together in taking a short but significant step in the direction of trust and understanding by agreeing to participate in an international conference on military expenditures.

I have been requested by my delegation to present a second statement to the Committee introducing an initiative on what everyone surely must consider to be among the most troubling developments of the last several years - the use of lethal chemical and toxin weapons in Afghanistan, Kampuchea and Laos. Even during the last month, as we have been meeting here, we have continued to receive reports that these attacks are continuing, thereby calling into question the sincerity of statements uttered here in favour of disarmament.

Some idea of the horror of chemical warfare may be gained from interviews conducted by the United Nations Group of Experts in Pakistan in February and reproduced in The Wall Street Journal of 7 June. For example, one Khwaja Muhammad reported that, in an attack in Afghanistan,

'Helicopters came and dropped a case of gas. Before it reached the ground, it exploded at about 1 metre above ground. Grey smoke came out, people were suffocated as if their throats were being caught. Water came from their eyes and their heads were turning around. They started to vomit ordinarily but then blood came from their mouths and they had diarrhoea with bleeding. After five or 10 hours, when I awoke, I had vomiting, headache and diarrhoea. After the bomb exploded when they were exposed to the smoke, my head felt as though it was turning around and my throat felt as though it was being pressed. I do not remember anything else as I became unconscious.'
Shortly after evening I came to and felt like taking a walk but I started vomiting at that time. There was no food in the vomit - blue liquid - and later bleeding."

It is vital that the special session on disarmament take some effective action which would contribute to bringing to a halt the use of these weapons - an activity that has severely harmed the political climate for arms control negotiations on chemical weapons, called into question the reliability of some participants in these negotiations and made more apparent than ever the need for adequate verification and compliance mechanisms in new agreements under consideration. But, most of all, we have taken this initiative in the hope that it could put a stop to the brutal attacks on the peoples of Afghanistan, Kampuchea and Laos by "yellow rain" and other poisonous chemicals. If the United Nations does not address this critical issue, which involves it directly, the special session will lose much of its credibility in the eyes of the world.

As members will recall, President Reagan raised this issue in the general debate when he said:

"The use of chemical and biological weapons has long been viewed with revulsion by civilized nations. No peace-making institution can ignore the use of those dread weapons and still live up to its mission. The need for a truly effective and verifiable chemical-weapons agreement has been highlighted by recent events. The Soviet Union and its allies are violating the Geneva Protocol of 1925, related rules of international law and the 1972 biological weapons Convention. There is conclusive evidence that the Soviet Government has provided toxins for use in Laos and Kampuchea, and are themselves using chemical weapons against freedom fighters in Afghanistan.

"We have repeatedly protested to the Soviet Government, as well as to the Governments of Laos and Viet Nam, against their use of chemical and toxin weapons. We call upon them now to grant full and free access to their countries or to territories they control so that United Nations experts can conduct an effective, independent investigation to verify cessation of these horrors."
"Evidence of non-compliance with existing arms control agreements underscores the need to approach negotiation of any new agreements with care." (A/S-12/PV.16, pp. 9, 10)

President Reagan's concern has been widely shared throughout the world and echoed by many other speakers during the general debate of this special session. For example, the representative of Thailand stated that his delegation had been

"following with serious concern the news reports on increasing evidence of the use of chemical and biological weapons in several areas of the world, including some countries on Thailand's eastern border". (A/S-12/PV.4, p. 21)

The representative of Malaysia also noted with concern "the alleged reports of the use of chemical toxins in Afghanistan, Viet Nam, Laos and Kampuchea". (A/S-12/PV.19, p. 32)

He went on to express the hope that "following the renewal of its mandate last year, the Expert Group will be able to continue its investigation and finally come up with a more definitive conclusion". (ibid.)

The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom pointed out that there was "reason to doubt whether every country that signed the 1972 Treaty is observing it". (A/S-12/PV.24, p. 7)

She noted the "disquieting and well-documented reports" (ibid.) of the use of chemical and toxin weapons in Asia and called for urgent investigation of them.

The Foreign Minister of France also supported the investigation of events in Afghanistan and South-East Asia.

The United States Government for its part has treated this question with all the seriousness it deserves, taking care to avoid using it for easy political advantage. This is not an East-West issue, not a revival of the cold war; we just want the practice stopped.

My Government has received information for several years, beginning in the mid-1970s, that lethal chemicals were being used in Laos and Kampuchea and that, since the Soviet invasion, they were being used in Afghanistan as well.
United States authorities conducted a very careful investigation, which included testimony of those who experienced chemical attacks, testimony of those who engaged in chemical warfare and scientific evidence based on analysis of physical samples, including blood samples. By mid-1980s, although the evidence was not conclusive, we began to make our findings public in the hope that publicity might put a stop to the attacks. But, regrettably, this did not prove to be the case.

Since then, evidence has continued to pour in. In September 1981 the United States Government was able to identify publicly that toxins probably were the mysterious lethal agents used for many years in Laos and Kampuchea. In March this year my Government released much of the information it had available in the form of a report to the Congress from the Secretary of State. The essential findings of that report were stated as follows:

"Taken together, this evidence has led the United States Government to conclude that Lao and Vietnamese forces, operating under Soviet supervision, have, since 1975, employed lethal chemical and toxin weapons in Laos; that Vietnamese forces have, since 1978, used chemical and toxin agents in Kampuchea; and that Soviet forces have used a variety of lethal chemical warfare agents, including nerve gas, in Afghanistan since the Soviet invasion of that country in 1979."

My Government realized that some reasonable people other than those accused of inhumane practices might question the impartiality of these findings. It has therefore strongly supported the investigation of the Group of Experts appointed by the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 35/144 C to investigate reports of the alleged use of chemical weapons. We have noted, however, that although - in the words of its report of November 1981 - "The Group... expressed the desire to carry out investigations on the territories where chemical attacks had allegedly occurred" (A/36/613, para. 94) and where victims were located, it had been able to visit only Thailand. Since then, the Experts have also visited Pakistan. The Group concluded that, in order to reach definitive conclusions, it would require "timely access to the areas of alleged use of chemical warfare agents". (Ibid., para. 98)
For that reason my Government is taking the initiative described in President Reagan's speech, and I call on the Assembly at this special session to endorse this proposal, which urges the Soviet Government, as well as the Governments of Laos and Viet Nam, to grant the Group of Experts full and free access to the areas where attacks have been reported, so that the experts can complete their work.

If those Governments are innocent, as they claim to be in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, then they should certainly welcome an impartial investigation by United Nations experts. Their unwillingness to allow the experts to enter territories under their control only reinforces our conclusion that they have something to hide.

Mr. GONZALEZ CESAR (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): The subject to which I am going to refer has more to do with the real causes of war than with its instruments. It is the subject of disarmament and development, more specifically of the link - the type of relationship - between the two concepts.

In doing this, I wish to make very clear my delegation's appreciation of the magnificent efforts of and the splendid results achieved by the Group of Experts which produced the now classic essay on disarmament and development under the leadership of the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Inga Thorsson. That study is without doubt one of the most important contributions to the examination of the conceptual framework and the focus of disarmament negotiations.

The Mexican delegation wishes to submit the following proposals for consideration by representatives:

First, that in paragraph 20 of annex I to the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Second Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, document A/S-12/1, the phrase "a close link exists between disarmament and development" be replaced by the words "an organic relationship exists between disarmament and development"; and, secondly, that in all official documents, including the relevant parts of the comprehensive programme of disarmament, where the first phrase or any other equivalent phrase appears, the proposed amendment be substituted.
Bearing in mind that the main conclusion of the report of the Group of Experts is that
"an effective relationship between disarmament and development can and must be established" (A/36/356, annex, para. 391),
and since the report also acknowledges that
"the arms race and development are in a competitive relationship,
particularly in terms of resources but also in the vital dimension of
attitudes and perceptions" (ibid.),
we consider that it is appropriate once and for all to find and decide on
the word that best reflects the main conclusion of the study to which I
have just referred.

This is no mere academic disquisition. What we are trying to do
is to express properly a fundamental concept which has already been broadly
discussed and on whose importance the most highly qualified group of experts
on the relationship between disarmament and development has agreed. Why
should this not be reflected in the final document emanating from this
special session?

Since the interpretation of the word "close" is inadequate and too
elastic - how close is close? I should like to list the following among the
various adjectives that are used to refer to the relationship between
disarmament and development: "organic", "direct", "decisive", "over-all",
determining", "causal", "antagonistic", "exclusive", "unavoidable", and "effective".
In our opinion, the adjective "organic", which comes from the Latin organicus,
is the one which most accurately describes the over-all character of the
relationship between the two concepts of disarmament and development, because
that word refers to the idea of an inherent, constituent, necessary relationship
between them, similar to the relationship among the component organs of a living
body.

This is not the time to repeat statistics on military expenditures or
projections about the benefits to development which would result from a
rereallocation of those expenditures to the civilian sector. Nevertheless,
we must retain a central idea summed up by Mrs. Thorsson when she introduced
the study on disarmament and development in the Second Committee during
the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly: that
"The arms race and development must be seen to be in a competitive relationship. Or to put it in another way, the arms race and under-development are not two problems; they are one. They must be solved together or neither will be solved."

To recognize the organic link - both within each system and globally - between the recently accentuated tendency to consolidate the war economies of the great Powers and the accelerated deterioration of the economies of the developing countries is to recognize a reality that cannot be ignored in a multilateral debate on disarmament.

Military expenditures greater than 6 per cent of the world's gross product not only lessen per capita consumption capacity, but also contribute to the growth of inflation and unemployment and ultimately lessen financial resources world-wide. In other words, military expenditures, in market, centrally-planned and mixed economies alike, stunt economic growth and accelerate the well-known spiral which generates military confrontations and threatens to bring about in this century a third world war, greater tensions, greater security problems, greater insecurity, greater military expenditures, a greater concentration of resources which are lost forever to productive investment, greater imbalance of power, greater polarization, further tensions, and so forth.

We must ask ourselves whether the obstacles in the way of launching the global economic negotiations, whose dramatic consequences we continue to witness in the wake of the Cancún and Versailles meetings, are not ultimately linked directly with the most recent decisions, which are now being implemented, to increase substantially the military budgets of some of the major industrialized Powers.
It is true that no significant decisions on development will be taken without corresponding decisions on disarmament, and there will be no progress in this respect unless the necessary political will is shown by the countries with the main responsibility. But we cannot expect any progress if we do not make progress in security matters.

The sources of insecurity are perceived in different ways by the various States or groups of States. It is true that the main danger is still nuclear war stemming from East-West tension, but perhaps the most immediate danger is the proliferation and worsening of conventional wars stemming from North-South inequalities. At any rate, it is well known that conventional weapons absorb four fifths of all military expenditures, and their use is channelled almost exclusively to the territories of developing countries.

That is why it is important to revise frames of reference and traditional schemes so that fundamental concepts such as the organic relationship which exists between disarmament and development and between disarmament and security may be clarified.

Mr. DORR (Ireland): In his address at the special session of the General Assembly on 11 June the Prime Minister of Ireland, Mr. Haughey, outlined Ireland's views on disarmament and the steps which we consider need be taken to halt the spiralling arms race.

One of the measures which my Prime Minister suggested on that occasion was that

"the nuclear Powers should take account of the many public calls for a freeze on nuclear weapons at least to the extent of agreeing on such a freeze or moratorium for, say, an initial two-year period. This would mean agreeing not to add to the existing number of warheads or of delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons on either side over a two-year trial period when serious negotiations ... are under way." (A/S-12/PV.8, p.12)
Ireland has now submitted a proposal calling on the two principal nuclear Powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, to agree to such a moratorium. The moratorium would be for an initial two years and would be renewable for further periods of two years.

The approach we are suggesting is intended to support the strategic arms negotiations which begin today. We consider that the success of these negotiations is vital if the nuclear arms race is not to enter a new and exceptionally dangerous phase.

The approach we suggest has two principal objectives. The first is to ensure that when, as we hope, the negotiations begin to make progress they will not be undermined by the introduction of new weapons. The second is to maintain the momentum of the negotiations by providing a concrete incentive to conduct the negotiations in earnest and with the necessary sense of urgency.

We have tried in this suggestion to take account of the various concerns which have been expressed. The proposal is deliberately limited in scope and duration. It addresses itself to a specific problem and it is linked in a sense with the negotiating process.

We believe that acceptance of this approach by both of the main nuclear Powers would make a major contribution to the eventual success of the negotiations between them and at the same time would help to meet the concern of the entire international community not to see any further increase in the already frightening number of weapons and delivery systems.

Mr. ENE (Romania): Romania has put forward a number of proposals relating to various items on the agenda of the present special session, which have been distributed under the symbol A/S-12/AC.1/24.
It is not my intention at this time to comment on them in detail, since that was done by the Foreign Minister of my country in the plenary meeting. What I want to do is formally place them on record in this Committee.

These proposals reflect the consistent stand of Romania on disarmament matters, which has been constantly pursued at the United Nations, in the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva and, in fact, in all the acts of foreign policy taken by the Romanian Government.

We believe that the fundamental objective of all efforts by Governments and responsible political forces in the field of disarmament should be the cessation of the arms race and the achievement of effective steps towards the reduction of existing weapons, and in the first place nuclear weapons.

To attain that objective it is necessary to freeze the production of nuclear weapons and to start the gradual reduction of existing stockpiles to their complete elimination, and to prohibit for ever all nuclear weapons, as well as other weapons of mass destruction. This process should start with a substantial reduction of nuclear weapons by the two Powers which possess most of them. At the same time, we believe that all countries have the duty to act directly, without waiting for the outcome of the bilateral negotiations, in order to determine urgent and efficient measures in the field of disarmament.

Secondly, we attach particular importance to the question of freezing military expenditures and their gradual reduction, with the resources thus saved being used in part to support the efforts of the developing countries. Various approaches towards that goal have been explored since 1978 on the basis of the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament, and we firmly believe that these efforts should be continued with greater determination.

In view of its serious situation, Europe occupies a special place in all endeavours towards disarmament. It is against this background that my Government envisages various measures aimed at eliminating the danger of war from the continent and at developing a climate of confidence, peace and co-operation among all European nations.
Among these measures, I should like to mention the cessation of the deployment and development of intermediate-range missiles in Europe, the withdrawal and destruction of the existing ones and the elimination from the continent of all nuclear weapons; the convening of a conference on confidence-building and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe; and the establishment on the continent, as well as in various parts of the world, of nuclear-free zones through agreements among the States of the respective regions and with the nuclear Powers committing themselves not to use nuclear weapons, as well as force in general, against the States participating in such zones. At the same time, proceeding from the special importance that the adoption of effective measures of substantial reduction of conventional armaments would have for world peace and security, we propose the conclusion of an agreement between the two military alliances on a maximum ceiling for the main armaments — aircraft, tanks, battleships, missiles, heavy guns and others.

Fourthly, other proposals submitted by Romania relate to the adoption, with the participation of all States, of effective measures for increasing confidence among States and to the need to create an international environment from which the use and threat of force would be eliminated and in which all disputes between States would be settled by peaceful means only.

Fifthly, since the implementation of the measures aimed at the cessation of the arms race and the achievement of disarmament should be carried out in conditions of mutual confidence and equal security for all countries, we believe that it is necessary to ensure strict and effective monitoring of the manner in which the obligations undertaken by States are carried out. To this effect, we favour the setting up, in the framework of the United Nations, of an international body entrusted with the monitoring and verification of the implementation of the disarmament measures adopted. We also believe that the achievement of real disarmament requires that all States contribute in good faith by providing the elements that are necessary to know and measure military budgets and forces, as well as armaments. This would constitute an important factor in encouraging and assisting negotiations.
Sixthly, in the same spirit, we consider that conditions should be created for world public opinion, for peoples, to play a greater role in the solution of all problems relating to peace and disarmament. The remarkable manifestations of the Non-Governmental Organizations during this special session demonstrate the vigour and the dynamism of world public opinion everywhere, which has developed as a new, powerful factor in international relations that is of particular importance for the cessation of the arms race and disarmament. This factor should necessarily be associated with our endeavours. It is against this background that we propose that the voice of scientists should be heard at the United Nations and in other international bodies and that they should participate in the debate on the problems relating to disarmament and peace.

In this context, we also propose the organization under United Nations auspices of a world conference on the role of mass media - press, radio and television - in promoting a climate of confidence, peace and co-operation among nations as part of a wider action to educate and mobilize the people for disarmament and peace.

Finally, the role and the responsibility of the United Nations in the field of disarmament should be further strengthened and developed. We therefore favour the consolidation and further democratization of the machinery for deliberations and negotiations in the field of disarmament established by the first special session, and we support the enlargement of the Geneva Committee on Disarmament and greater access of other States to its proceedings, the strengthening of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament and of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, as well as other measures designed to contribute to the effectiveness of the United Nations in the field of disarmament.

My delegation views all those proposals as relating to the process of disarmament as such. Important proposals have also been presented by other States, and I am happy to note that many of them refer to the same areas of interest. My delegation finds much similarity and even identity with our views in the approach contained in many of the proposals introduced yesterday and again today. We believe that all the proposals submitted at the special session should be considered with the greatest attention.
In this respect, and this is the last point I should like to make, I share the view expressed yesterday by the representative of Sweden to the effect that these proposals should be appropriately examined in the existing working groups when the respective issues to which they refer are being reviewed. At the same time, we believe that all of them should be considered as remaining on the agenda of the Ad Hoc Committee in the form in which they have been submitted, to be dealt with as necessary.

We are also flexible as regards any other practical modalities of work. Should, however, any new working body be established, my delegation would like to state its firm position in favour of open-ended structures with the direct participation of all interested delegations. This also applies to all consultations and negotiations that, it seems to us, tend to be frequent these days and that, in order to be efficient, should necessarily reflect and take into account the positions of all those concerned.

In is in this spirit that the Romanian delegation would like to pledge its contribution at this stage of our proceedings to a positive outcome of the special session of the General Assembly on disarmament.

Mr. RAJAKOSKI (Finland): The Prime Minister of Finland, when addressing the special session on 10 June, referred to the initiative by Finland at the United Nations that a comprehensive study should be undertaken on the questions of nuclear-weapon-free zones. He said, inter alia:

"In this useful study consensus was reached on several principles, but this did not prove possible on a number of questions. Since the study, progress has been achieved in arrangements for nuclear-weapon-free zones. New concrete ideas envisaging the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions suggest the need to update the comprehensive study to reflect new realities. It could facilitate the creation of such zones and thus advance the limitation of nuclear arms. Finland intends to make a proposal for such an updated study." (A/S-12/PV.7, p. 42)

I now have the pleasure of introducing a working paper, document A/S-12/AC.1/50, on the subject of the comprehensive study on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects.
As other delegations have pointed out, there is considerable uncertainty concerning the particular working group in which new proposals should be introduced and considered. My delegation has therefore considered it advisable to introduce its working paper in this Ad Hoc Committee under two items - items 9 and 11 of our agenda. I believe that the working paper and the proposal which is included are both self-explanatory. The starting-point for this initiative lies in the growing interest in nuclear-weapon-free zones, which has been clearly reflected in the deliberations of the current special session of the General Assembly. The zonal approach and concrete proposals have been discussed in statements made in the general debate.

It is almost seven years since the study carried out by the Ad Hoc Group of Qualified Governmental Experts under the auspices of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament was completed and considered by the General Assembly at its thirtieth session. In these years important development has taken place in both the conceptualization of nuclear-weapon-free zones and the practical implementation of existing arrangements. There has also been further consideration of modalities and issues closely related to the establishment of such zones. Thus, the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones and related questions have become subjects of growing interest and attention. This is natural if we recall that the study was the first of its kind. The important developments that I am referring to are mentioned in paragraph 4 of the working paper in a concise and brief form.

The conclusion of the working paper is very clear and simple: a supplementary study on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones should be carried out in an appropriate form to be agreed upon.

In recent years the General Assembly has initiated many studies which either have been carried out or are still under way. My delegation considers this activity to be very important. In this special session there seem to be four different situations as far as the studies are concerned. For certain studies there is a clear mandate to take action during the
special session. In the case of others mere consideration is called for. The third category of studies consists of those where delegations have proposed a follow-up to past activities. A fourth category is the one into which completely new proposals would fall.

In accordance with the organization of work, certain studies should be considered by one working group, whereas others will fall within the competence of another. To our mind, this is not the most effective procedure. My delegation therefore suggests that all studies should be considered by one contact group in order to achieve a comprehensive view of all the studies. The suggested contact group could work directly under the Ad Hoc Committee in a fairly informal way.

My delegation has detected the same intention of centralizing the work on one group of questions in the proposal that the representative of the Netherlands made yesterday in his intervention. We welcome, indeed, the idea of creating a contact group for all the questions which concern the machinery of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. I am happy that the Ad Hoc Committee has already taken action accordingly. Equally, we appreciate his suggestions as to the structure and organization of the work of the Committee on Disarmament. As is well known, Finland has been observing the work of the Committee on Disarmament and its predecessor, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, on a regular basis, ever since the mid-1960s by maintaining a permanent presence at the Committee on Disarmament from 1975 and earlier by sending special emissaries. We have been following with some concern the trend towards a more deliberative and thus time-consuming way of proceeding. There is certainly room for improvement in its working structure. Furthermore, the possibility of being in session practically all the year round should be explored, since we all - members of the Committee on Disarmament and observers alike - are all keeping the necessary staff at Geneva anyway.
In conclusion, may I express the satisfaction of my delegation to note the more flexible position shown by various delegations members of the Committee on Disarmament as regards a limited increase in the membership of the Committee. I felt especially encouraged yesterday by the statement of Mrs. Inga Thorsson, Chairman of the Swedish delegation, that a small number of competent and interested members could only strengthen the Committee. The Finnish delegation has stated time and again that it is of paramount importance to keep the size of that single multilateral negotiating body as limited as possible. Acceptance of a few countries among those non-members that have most actively participated in the work of the Committee would not hamper the Committee's work. In this spirit Finland continues to seek full membership of the Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. TERNOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (interpretation from Russian): During the recently concluded general debate of the present special session of the General Assembly many delegations emphasized how important the present session could be if we concentrated on concrete aspects of disarmament. That is made possible by a number of businesslike and constructive proposals submitted by States to the present session. Among them, we should mention first the Soviet Union's memorandum entitled "Averting the growing nuclear threat and curbing the arms race" and the draft document entitled "Basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction". The proposals in those documents are made in the interests of mankind as a whole. Their aim is to achieve real progress in limiting the arms race and in disarmament. Given the political will, States can significantly promote a constructive solution to a whole range of disarmament problems.

Attention should be given to the proposed freeze of nuclear arsenals as a first step towards their reduction and eventual complete elimination. The prohibition of chemical weapons and destruction of their stockpiles, preventing the arms race being extended to outer space, limiting the naval activities of States, and renunciation of the use for military purposes of new inventions and scientific and technological advances are very topical matters.
The majority of statements in the general debate and the statements of representatives of non-governmental organizations within the framework of this Ad Hoc Committee show that the most important thing that nations expect from the special session of the General Assembly is progress on the key problem of today, namely, the prevention of a nuclear war. For those who have listened attentively to the statements made by delegations and the representatives of non-governmental organizations there should be no doubt that this task in substance has priority importance among all peace-loving forces. It is, figuratively speaking, the first item on the agenda of mankind.

The question of avoiding nuclear war did not arise today or yesterday; it belongs to the era of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. But now the threat of a nuclear disaster has become especially acute. At this session data have frequently been cited to show the over-saturation of the planet with nuclear weapons. Even more alarming is the adoption by one of the nuclear Powers of a doctrine permitting and even providing for the use of nuclear weapons as an instrument to be used in achieving political goals.

Today the commitment of the Soviet Union not to be the first to use nuclear weapons has become increasingly important, a commitment made in the message of the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Comrade Brezhnev, at the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament. That decision by the Soviet Union is based upon the undeniable fact that in the international climate of today if a nuclear war were started it would lead to the destruction of human civilization and perhaps even the destruction of all life on earth. That means that it is the primary duty of the leaders of States to shoulder their responsibility for the fate of the world and make every effort to ensure that nuclear weapons are never used. The nations of the world have the right to expect that, following the decision of the Soviet Union, similar commitments will be made by other nuclear Powers. If other nuclear Powers would assume an equally clear and concise obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, that in practice would be equivalent to the prevention of any use of nuclear weapons, which the majority of the countries of the world desire. Such action is called for in the United Nations
General Assembly Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe. If the nuclear Powers took those steps it would be a powerful stimulus to the strengthening of trust and the achievement of agreement on the banning of the production of nuclear weapons and the final liquidation of their stockpiles, the strengthening of the principle of the non-use of force in international relations and negotiations on the preparation of agreements on true disarmament measures in the nuclear and other fields.

The second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament cannot bypass the proposals made by States on the solution of the problem of preventing nuclear war, the central topic of concern to mankind. We should study those proposals carefully.

On the basis of these considerations, the delegation of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic supports the view that the Committee of the whole should at today's meeting adopt a decision to set up at the current session a subsidiary body to deal with the consideration of proposals by States on the absolutely key issue of the prevention of nuclear catastrophe. Constructive consideration of such proposals is the duty of those participating in the present special session, since nations require a positive solution to the question upon which their present and future depends.

In connexion with the statement made by the representative of the United States at today's meeting, I wish to stress that malicious insinuations, however often repeated, cannot alter the fact that the Soviet Union has never used chemical weapons and has never put them into any other hands. Those insinuations cannot alter the fact that the United States used chemical weapons on a large scale during its aggression against the peoples of Viet Nam and the other countries of Indo-China. They cannot erase the fact that the United States has refused to enter into negotiations with the Soviet Union on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons and the United States is sabotaging the work of the Committee on Disarmament, which has been entrusted with the task of drafting a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. No anti-Soviet calumny can disguise the fact that the United States is a country which, in spite of the resolutions of the United Nations, has been manufacturing lethal chemical weapons and is distributing them in the territory of other States. Slanderous statements, no matter how often repeated, will never become the truth.
Mr. WEBENER (Federal Republic of Germany): On behalf of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany I have the honour to introduce two working papers for consideration by the second special session and, more specifically, in the relevant Working Groups of the Committee of the whole. Those working papers are now available as documents A/S-12/AC.1/37 and A/S-12/AC.1/38.

The first of the two working papers relates to confidence-building measures and further work the United Nations system might undertake to promote their elaboration and application. As members are aware, my Government attaches particular value to confidence-building measures as one of the most promising means of encouraging and facilitating disarmament at every stage of the disarmament process. My delegation has therefore been actively involved in the work of the United Nations system in this field.

The working paper, in its first part, undertakes to retrace achievements in the field of confidence-building measures since the first special session, culminating in the comprehensive study by Governmental Experts on confidence-building measures. For the convenience of delegations, the working paper provides a brief summary of the contents of the comprehensive study, describing the objectives, characteristics and principles of confidence-building measures, as well as the procedure for the introduction of such measures, a list of possible measures and proposals made by the Group of Experts. The working paper recalls resolution 36/97 F of the thirty-sixth session of the Assembly and stresses with particular satisfaction that this resolution found a large number of co-sponsors and was adopted by consensus, reflecting broad agreement among the Member States of the United Nations on the usefulness and value of confidence-building and on some of the salient insights of the comprehensive study.
My Government regards the fact that a group consisting of representatives from all regions of the world reached agreement on the concept and objective of confidence-building measures as an important step towards the world-wide affirmation and acceptance of this means of helping to achieve stability and to safeguard peace. The study itself, and action by the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session, encourage my Government to make proposals at this session for the further promotion of confidence-building measures. The working paper suggests that the special session should endorse the results of the comprehensive study and refer it to the thirty-seventh session for further consideration. We suggest that the General Assembly should at that session initiate the elaboration of a code of conduct of general validity for confidence-building measures by a suitable United Nations body. While being flexible as to the forum to which this work would be entrusted — and we will have suggestions to make at the appropriate time — my Government is of the opinion that such a code could contain guidelines which, by giving substance to specific provisions of the United Nations Charter, could relate inter alia to the following: observation of manoeuvres, the carrying out of manoeuvres and other military movements, the notification of arms projects, making defence budgets public and comparable, border incidents, incidents on the high seas and in the air and the convening of regional conferences on confidence-building and disarmament along the lines of the envisaged Conference on Disarmament in Europe.

In referring the subject-matter in this manner to the thirty-seventh session, this session should reaffirm the need for and usefulness of confidence-building measures in achieving progress in disarmament and arms control and should call upon all States to agree on confidence-building measures in accordance with the recommendations of this study and to promote confidence-building in general. I am confident that the consensus so far achieved in this important field will provide the necessary momentum to see these proposals adopted.
The second working paper which I have the honour of introducing relates to the principles and rules for verifying compliance with a future chemical weapons convention. This also is a field in which my Government has been active and where it feels that determined action by the international community is imperative.

The working paper, while regretting that a chemical weapons convention has still not been fully negotiated, takes stock of the work done so far in ensuring compliance with multilateral disarmament agreements. The working paper reflects the view that a consultative committee with broad and well-defined investigatory powers should - as in other agreements - also be the institutional centre-piece of a new chemical weapons convention and the working paper then proceeds to lay down the principles which should govern the work of such a consultative committee.

Subsequently, the working paper sets out to summarize the concept of credible international verification in the chemical weapons field, a concept which the Federal German Government has introduced before the Committee on Disarmament, refining its approach in a succession of working papers. One of the salient features of the verification régime which my Government has consistently recommended for adoption is on-site inspection in its two aspects - regular on-site inspection of all declared relevant facilities on the basis of a lot-casting system and on-challenge inspection in case allegations of a breach of the future convention are made. The main features which would make up the system of regular checks based on the random selection of certain activities, the choice of percentage by lot and various other modalities of on-site inspections are set out in the paper. It is argued that the system of regular checks would also take account of binary chemical weapons and that the system as a whole would provide reliable and effective verification which would be as practicable and cost-effective as possible.
The working paper expresses gratification that one major delegation participating in the Geneva negotiations has made from the rostrum of this Assembly new proposals in which the need for systematic on-site inspection is recognized, although these proposals would seem to need not only thorough examination but also some substantial further amplification.

Unlike the working paper on confidence-building measures, this second working paper on problems of verification in the chemical weapons field does not contain a firm proposal for action by this Assembly. It rather purports to raise further the level of consciousness concerning this important problem in the international community and contains an appeal to all States to join in efforts to work out further details of a reliable monitoring system in connexion with the effective total banning of chemical weapons for which we all hope.

In the relevant working groups my delegation will informally introduce a text for the purpose of adequately reflecting, in the concluding documents of this session, the ideas and proposals contained in the two working papers which I have had the honour to introduce.

Mr. STAYKOV (Bulgaria) (interpretation from French): I should like to introduce document A/S-12/AC.1/31 entitled "World-wide action for collecting signatures in support of measures to prevent nuclear war, to curb the arms race and for disarmament."

The document sets forth some reasons which prompted the delegation of Bulgaria to propose that the question of such world-wide action to collect signatures in support of disarmament should be considered at the present session with all the attention it deserves and that the Assembly should decide that this action be carried out within the context of the World Disarmament Campaign. I avail myself of this opportunity to recall that this suggestion was made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Bulgaria in his address to the General Assembly in the course of the general debate. Specifically, we propose that the document be considered under agenda items 11 and 13 of the present special session.
First of all, we must emphasize that the General Assembly at its tenth special session, devoted to disarmament, recognized the important positive role which widely expressed world public opinion can play in support of measures to curb the arms race and of disarmament. The Final Document of that session particularly stressed the need for concrete measures to mobilize public opinion in favour of disarmament.
The General Assembly at its regular sessions has considered a number of proposals submitted by Member States on implementing this recommendation. Thus, at its thirty-sixth session the Assembly adopted resolution 36/92 J, entitled "World-wide action for collecting signatures in support of measures to prevent nuclear war, to curb the arms race and for disarmament". Furthermore, this present session has solemnly launched a World Disarmament Campaign.

This task of mobilizing world public opinion is all the more important in the present international situation, which is characterized by a horrifying increase in the threat of a nuclear war. It is quite understandable that ever more people and groups of people in various countries of the world are becoming aware of the complexity and gravity of the present international situation and are anxious about the manner in which the situation might evolve. We are witnesses to different ways of expressing this anxiety in the activity of the world public, including the collection of signatures on petitions calling for the prevention of a nuclear war and supporting disarmament.

It was most instructive to hear the representatives of the non-governmental organizations some days ago, when they gave their organizations' views on disarmament problems. And it is fitting to recall that the document adopted by the Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations held at Geneva on 1 and 2 April 1982 points out that the participants emphasized the importance of supporting the world-wide collection of signatures of those calling for the curbing of the arms race and the promotion of disarmament. Furthermore, the United Nations has already launched campaigns calling for broad participation by the world public in such efforts as Disarmament Week, the Day of Solidarity with the Struggling People of South Africa, the International Year of Women, of Children and of the Handicapped, and so on.

Given the general orientation and complementarity of the measures provided for in resolutions 36/92 J and 36/92 G, this action to collect signatures could become an important factor in the World Disarmament Campaign. Moreover, in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 36/92 J, a number of Member States have communicated to the Secretary-General their views and suggestions concerning the most appropriate ways and methods of carrying out
such world-wide action. The replies of those States annexed to the report of the Secretary-General on this question in documents A/S-12/15 and its addenda clearly indicate the advisability of carrying out this world-wide action in the context of the World Disarmament Campaign and present useful ideas as to how this should be done.

To conclude, I should like to express the conviction of the delegation of Bulgaria that world-wide action under United Nations auspices to collect signatures in support of measures to prevent nuclear war, to curb the arms race and to promote disarmament would make it possible to strengthen the role of the United Nations in mobilizing international public opinion in favour of the struggle for peace and for disarmament and would give a new impetus to efforts undertaken in that direction.

Mr. ALESSI (Italy): I have pleasure in introducing two initiatives submitted by Italy for the consideration of Member States under agenda item 11. Both of them were announced by the Prime Minister of my country, Senator Giovanni Spadolini, in his statement in the general debate.

The first proposal is entitled "Institution of an international body for the verification of disarmament agreements" and has been circulated as the annex to document A/S-12/AC.1/19/Rev.1. As we stress in the introductory part of our paper, the negotiations conducted in recent years on disarmament matters have emphasized the importance of the issue of verification, as well as its complexities. They have also demonstrated the existence of a general consensus on the indispensability of including in disarmament agreements provisions specifically designed to ensure monitoring of the implementation of and compliance with the provisions contained therein.

However, the solutions proposed so far have shown marked differences of approach and emphasis, which, in Italy's view, could be considerably narrowed by the institution of what may be called a unifying factor. That factor might be an international body to be created within the framework of the United Nations and entrusted solely and specifically with the task of verifying the observance of agreements on limitation and reduction of armaments and disarmament.
The participation of all States in that body would contribute to the achievement of a common approach, would give the best guarantees of compliance with their obligations, would strengthen the principle of undiminished security at all stages of the disarmament process, and would ultimately foster the goal of the universality of disarmament agreements referred to in paragraph 40 of the Final Document.

Italy is fully aware that an international verification body can be created only in successive stages: indeed, the pace of its functional and structural development would depend on both the disarmament process and the strengthening of the United Nations role in this field. For these reasons, the initial stage is first and foremost of a political nature and is intended in particular to confirm the principle of United Nations competence in this field. A specialized section would be created within the Secretariat unit competent in disarmament matters—currently the Centre for Disarmament. The substantive functions to be assigned to that section, which are indicated in detail in our working paper, fall within three main areas: first, the collection and dissemination of data, including an annual report to the United Nations Secretary-General on the implementation of existing disarmament agreements; secondly, assistance as a permanent secretariat to the various consultative committees of experts envisaged by existing and future arms control and disarmament agreements in order to provide the support necessary for the implementation of the complaints procedures; thirdly, assistance in the work of disarmament bodies, including the preparation of schematic and factual analyses of individual monitoring measures, as required by the negotiating body.
In the second and final phases that structure will evolve both structurally and substantively. From the second phase onwards, the nucleus of a corps of inspectors might be established and developed along the lines of the safeguard provisions of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Italy has also introduced document A/S-12/AC.1/20, entitled "Control and limitation of the volume of the international transfer of conventional weapons". If we take into account the very high percentage of military expenditures assigned to conventional weapons, the urgent need for an effort aimed specifically at finding appropriate and effective ways of substantially reducing these kinds of expenditures becomes apparent. In particular the international transfer of arms is a significant factor in the conventional arms build-up, and its control and limitation should, in our view, be dealt with concurrently with the efforts towards conventional disarmament.

The proposal contained in the document I just mentioned is linked with the proposal my country introduced in 1980 in the Committee on Disarmament as a follow-up to paragraph 45 and particularly paragraph 85 of the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament. It is aimed at taking a first practical step towards the promotion of measures conducive to the gradual solving of problems relating to the control of the international transfer of conventional weapons in strict conformity with the United Nations Charter and the stability and security needs of all countries.

We are confident that the two proposals I have introduced will be favourably considered by all delegations as a contribution to the positive results of this session and our common endeavours to achieve disarmament.

Mr. Ott (German Democratic Republic): With the conclusion of the general debate the work of the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament has entered a decisive stage. On the
agenda now is the task of drafting and agreeing upon relevant documents which
must reflect the vital issues of safeguarding peace and promoting disarmament.
In that connexion allow me to make some observations in connexion with the
concrete proposals and initiatives which have been put forward by the German
Democratic Republic.

First, in the general debate the overwhelming majority of States viewed
the elimination of the threat of a nuclear war as the cardinal question of
our time and the key issue of this special session. This basic approach is
in accordance with the Final Document of the first special session of the
United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament and reflects the main
concern of the world-wide peace movement and the non-governmental organizations
which are committed to the cause of peace and whose contributions we highly
esteem. A summary of the general debate shows the wide variety of valuable
proposals made and initiatives taken in that direction.

The delegation of the German Democratic Republic believes that, if the
second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to
disarmament is to yield positive results, greatest attention should be given
to immediate action to prevent a nuclear war. Therefore it seems urgently
necessary to establish a body for that purpose. Such a body would enable us
to deal thoroughly with those proposals that have already been submitted and
those that are still to come.

The German Democratic Republic attaches the highest importance to
the pledge made by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at this special
session not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. In view of the worsening
state of international affairs and the growing danger of a nuclear world war,
this unilateral decision of the Soviet Union is a courageous step of world
importance. Both in this forum and beyond this decision has met with a vivid
and positive response.

Only a few days ago Erich Honecker, General Secretary of the Central Committee
of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, and Chairman of the Council of State of
the German Democratic Republic, declared that, mindful of its responsibility to its
own people and aware of its obligation to other peoples, the German Democratic
Republic wholeheartedly supports the unilateral pledge of the Soviet Union under
international law not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. That position of the German Democratic Republic is rooted in its direct experience of two world wars and its awareness of its situation at the very heart of Europe. For the German Democratic Republic, the aim of German peace policy is to ensure that a war is never again unleashed from German soil.

When the USSR took that historic decision it could build on the peoples' expectations that the other nuclear-weapon States would follow suit. For that reason my delegation advocates that a pertinent appeal should be addressed to the other nuclear-weapon States at this second special session on disarmament. A declaration by all nuclear-weapon States renouncing the first use of nuclear weapons would virtually be tantamount to a general ban on the use of nuclear weapons. It would without any doubt greatly strengthen confidence among States. It would pave the way to ending the nuclear arms race and achieving nuclear disarmament. It would facilitate the solution of a number of urgent questions also facing our session, such as a commitment to the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

It is regrettable to note that the representatives of the United States and other States members of NATO have so far rejected such a step. In the interest of peace we can only hope that this opposition will not be their last word. They try to justify their attitude by claiming that NATO has had to maintain its doctrine of a nuclear first strike and so-called nuclear deterrence because of an alleged superiority in conventional armaments of the States members of the Warsaw Treaty organization. The German Democratic Republic wishes to state with all due sobriety and clarity that there is no imbalance between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty organization, neither in the nuclear field nor in the conventional field. Moreover, one should in that connexion recall that the socialist States have repeatedly declared their readiness to agree on disarmament measures in the conventional field also. Furthermore, we would remind Members of the socialist States' offer to conclude a general agreement on the non-first use of conventional weapons as well. Finally, let me refer to the draft world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations, which would indeed prohibit the use of any types of weapons. The other side's position has been and unfortunately still is negative on all these proposals.
Secondly, the appropriate working bodies of our session should more actively approach the elaboration of the programme of nuclear disarmament as an essential part of the recommendations and decisions to be adopted by the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament. In the general debate the overwhelming majority of States reaffirmed the absolute priority of this issue and submitted a variety of relevant and valuable proposals and initiatives. In the opinion of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic, the main elements of such a programme are there, including the demand for a freeze of nuclear armaments.
This programme starts with a halt in the development of new nuclear weapons systems, continues with a stop in the production of both fissionable material for weapons purposes and the weapons themselves and leads to the reduction and complete destruction of stockpiles. That is a realistic path on which to proceed. It involves disadvantages for neither side and allows for strict adherence to the principle of equality and equal security. My delegation hopes that this session will confirm this approach.

Thirdly, the delegation of the German Democratic Republic reaffirms its stance that the neutron nuclear weapon must be banned. Following up on its initiative at the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly, the German Democratic Republic has submitted a working paper substantiating that position. I should like to point out just one thing. The neutron weapon has been developed for so-called limited nuclear war. It is to be deployed in Europe and other continents. Its production and the simultaneous rejection of any negotiations on a convention on its prohibition is in clear contradiction to the letter and spirit of the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament and, in particular, to paragraph 50 of the Programme of Action.

We hope that this session will call upon the Committee on Disarmament to draft a convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, stationing and use of neutron weapons. Furthermore, the German Democratic Republic advocates appealing to all non-nuclear-weapon States to oppose the stationing of such weapons in their territories.

Fourthly, the delegation of the German Democratic Republic holds the view that, in the interest of halting the arms race in the field of weapons of mass destruction, a ban on chemical weapons should be agreed upon as a matter of priority. The basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction proposed by the Soviet Union will, we hope, lend new impetus to negotiations. We think that the Soviet proposal contains all the major elements of such an instrument up to detailed verification provisions. My
delegation has proposed in a working paper that all States should refrain from any action that would prejudice the conclusion of negotiations in this field. That also includes the cessation of provocative statements on the alleged use of chemical weapons.

I should like now to make some concluding remarks. In the interest of the successful course of our work, all attempts to set aside the main issues of the present time, the vital issues of mankind, should be resisted. The session will not meet its objectives with a list of general slogans and affirmations and neither will it fulfill the hopes and expectations of the peoples. What is needed are concrete forward-looking provisions on the most urgent substantial questions. I should like here to re-emphasize the following. The process of arms limitation and disarmament requires the various negotiating and debating forums to complement each other in their proceedings. It is a contradiction obvious to everybody when, on the one hand, lip-service is paid to the growing role of the United Nations and the negotiating bodies while, on the other hand, efforts are made practically to deprive these very bodies of the possibility to discuss the most important disarmament measures.

The yardstick used by the peoples to measure the activities of our world Organization is not how many and which bodies are still to be created and established. The decisive criterion has been and remains its concrete contribution to the irreversible elimination of the danger of a nuclear war. What is called for now are political decisions. My delegation hopes that striving for concrete disarmament steps will prevail in the further activities of the special session's working bodies. With that in mind, the German Democratic Republic has submitted a working paper underlining the obligation of States to conduct negotiations in a constructive manner.

I wish to take this opportunity to inform the special session that the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic has ratified the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

I should like also to announce that the German Democratic Republic is prepared to make a financial contribution to the World Disarmament Campaign.
Mr. XIE Qimei (China) (interpretation from Chinese): The Chinese delegation participating in the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament submitted a proposal, on 21 June, on the essential measures for an immediate halt to the arms race and for disarmament. This proposal has already been distributed in document A/5-12/AC.1/23.

I wish now to introduce this proposal in the Ad Hoc Committee. I do not intend to dwell at length on the content and the purpose of this proposal, since the Chairman of our delegation, Mr. Huang Hua, already did so in his statement in the general debate.

First of all, I wish to state that any discussion or proposal on the question of disarmament must be based on the premise of the current international situation and the state of armament in the world and take into consideration the earnest hope of the small and medium-sized countries and the people of the world. Only thus can such proposals have a realistic basis.

It is an undeniable fact that hegemonic aggression, expansion and the arms race between the two States possessing the largest arsenals constitute a serious threat to current international peace and security. It therefore stands to reason that those two States should assume the major responsibility in the field of disarmament.

The Chinese proposal consists of five parts, namely, objective, principles, measures, verification and negotiation. It points out how the urgent issues of disarmament should be solved in the present circumstances and, in particular, advocates certain essential measures concerning nuclear disarmament.

This proposal first calls upon all the nuclear States to reach an agreement on the non-use of nuclear weapons. Pending this, the nuclear States should each undertake unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States or against nuclear-weapon-free zones and not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other at any time or under any circumstances.
At the same time, we ask the two States possessing the largest nuclear arsenals to cease all nuclear tests and to stop the qualitative improvement and manufacture of nuclear weapons, and to take the lead by reducing by 50 per cent their nuclear arsenals. Thereafter, all nuclear States, including China, should likewise assume their obligation to carry out, together, nuclear disarmament.

Apart from stressing the non-use and the reduction of nuclear weapons, our proposal also deals with conventional disarmament and the prohibition of chemical weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, as well as questions concerning the cessation of intervention and aggression against any other States and a guarantee of international security. Those issues are brought up out of a concern for the close relationship between the above-mentioned issues and the question of nuclear disarmament, which must not be overlooked.

The Chinese proposal represents the sincere wish of the Chinese Government and people for disarmament. It also embodies the obligation that China is ready to assume. Today the people of the world earnestly desire that the second special session on disarmament will conclude having achieved something with regard to halting the arms race and to the prevention of nuclear war. Together with all other delegations, we are prepared seriously to study all disarmament proposals in a common effort to make progress in this important field.

Mr. ISSRAMELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)(interpretation from Russian): At the last meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee, the Soviet delegation submitted for consideration by this body a number of documents, including the Soviet Union's proposal on the question of prohibiting chemical weapons. I should like to say a few words about that extremely important question.

The Soviet Union considers that that question must be resolved without delay. These weapons constitute a threat, especially if we consider the latest achievements of science in the field of chemistry. The work of the current special session has shown that the overwhelming majority of States feel the need to make every effort to ensure that chemical weapons are removed from the face of the earth.
It is clear from the message sent by Mr. Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev to the Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament that the Soviet Union fully shares that view. Guided by these considerations, the Soviet Union has drafted and submitted at the present session a proposal on basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, which has been circulated in document A/S-12/AC.1/12.

The proposal provides for a comprehensive and effective prohibition of chemical weapons, which is the goal consistently pursued by the USSR in various negotiations on this question. The document draws on the experience gained from the useful work already carried out in the field of chemical weapons in the Committee on Disarmament and was drafted under the guidance of Ambassador Czyrek of Poland, Ambassador Okawa of Japan, and Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden.

In particular, our document includes general provisions on the scope of the prohibition as well as more specific suggested limitations on the permissible production of super-toxic lethal chemicals. A broad range of measures is suggested on the submission of information, both on various forms of permissible production and on fulfilment by States of their obligations with regard to the destruction of chemical weapons and their means of production.

An important place is given in the document to provisions on verification. It must be emphasized immediately that we, no less than other States, are concerned with having confidence in the fulfilment by all parties of the provisions of a future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The Soviet document provides for a broad spectrum of means of verification, ranging from the use of national technical means to the carrying out of on-site inspections. I wish to draw special attention to the fact that, under the terms of the Soviet proposal, States parties possessing national technical means of verification may, where necessary, place at the disposal of other parties information which they have obtained through those means and which is important for the purposes of the convention.
With regard to on-site inspections, we suggest that they be carried out both on request in the case of suspicion of a violation of the convention - so-called "on-challenge inspections" - and on a systematic basis, for example, on the basis of an agreed quota, whenever justified by the nature of the verification activities.

It goes without saying that in drawing up this document we did not feel it necessary to try to address ourselves to all the questions which could arise in connexion with the problem of prohibiting chemical weapons; the experience of negotiations has shown that there are a great many of them. All of them - including procedures for carrying out international on-site inspections and the technical aspects of verification - should be the subject of all-embracing and thorough consideration. In other words, those questions should be resolved through concrete negotiations held on the basis of the principle of not harming the security of any party to a future convention without exception.

At the same time, we believe that the main provisions of the Soviet document could form a good basis for a generally acceptable agreement.
We also wish to express the hope that the new and constructive elements in our document, especially on the question of control, will make it possible for a decisive step to be taken towards agreement on a mutually acceptable basis on the basic provisions of a convention, if, of course, the other participants in the negotiations display the necessary political will.

The Soviet delegation hopes that the new initiative on the part of the USSR concerning the prohibition of chemical weapons will be studied intensively by all delegations and will receive support at this session and be submitted to the Committee on Disarmament for detailed consideration.

I should like to take this opportunity to express our gratitude to all delegations that, both during the course of the plenary meetings of the special session of the General Assembly and today at the meeting of the Committee, have given a positive assessment of the Soviet document, which from our point of view proves the concern of those delegations and the States they represent to see speedy agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

However, not all States are interested in the success of the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. This was proved once again today by the statement of the American delegation. What can delegations say about that statement? It touched upon two so-called proposals by the United States: one for the convening of a conference on the question of military budgets and a second on questions linked to chemical weapons.

But I must say that, although the subjects of these proposals are different, they are as like as two drops of water. Both of them are deeply permeated with the poison of anti-Sovietism. Frankly, it is difficult to say what is predominant in those statements: demagogy, slander or lies. Those present at the meeting can judge.
We should just say one thing, and we are sure that our view is broadly shared by the delegations present. The statement by the American Congressmen sounded a sharply dissonant note, in marked contrast to the generally constructive, calm and practical nature of the statements made by other delegations in the Committee of the whole. Apparently the American Congressmen did not have the time or the opportunity to acquaint themselves thoroughly with the documents on the question which they assumed the responsibility of addressing. We should like to assist them in this. We understand, of course, that for the Congressmen The Wall Street Journal is rather like the Bible, but we wish to draw their attention to other documents. In particular, we would advise them to acquaint themselves with document A/37/233 – which, by the way, exists in English and the other working languages.

We should also like to draw attention to certain incontrovertible facts and truths. The use of chemical weapons can always be proved conclusively. I repeat – it can always be proved. There is physical and biological proof of the fact that the United States conducted a chemical war in South-East Asia from 1961-1972, and that proof is still in existence. What does this consist in? There is living proof among the Vietnamese people who suffered from the use of harmful herbicides and toxins. And to this day – I repeat, to this day – dioxides are discovered in the soil of wide areas of land. There are also the remains of smoke grenades and CS grenades, and herbicides in large quantities and, finally, examples of herbicidal and other chemical weapons. In other words, there is substantial material evidence. And although insinuations about the involvement of the Soviet Union in chemical warfare in Afghanistan and South-East Asia have been spread around, the United States, over the course of several years and to this day, has not presented one direct – I repeat, direct – piece of material evidence, irrespective of the evidence of so-called material witnesses.
We know and are ready to submit material evidence as to how those witnesses were hired. Not one piece of ammunition has been found - not one rocket, missile or cannister to confirm such insinuations.

I will not take up the time of my colleagues with the conclusion which can be drawn from the numerous materials presented by the State Department and by the statement of the Congressmen, who wish to disseminate propaganda through the American press. The conclusion is none the less obvious. It is an indubitable fact that these materials not only do not withstand scientific criticism but do not withstand elementary logical analysis.

The evilly planned slander against the Soviet Union, the accusation of the use of chemical weapons and this entire campaign are designed to draw attention away from the true chemical war which the United States carried out in South-East Asia and from its large-scale preparations for a new chemical war.
Finally, and this should be particularly emphasized in this hall, such statements are designed solely for the purpose of undermining the negotiations on the banning of chemical weapons.

Those are the comments I wished to make in connexion with the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons. As we have done on earlier occasions, we express the hope that the document submitted by the Soviet Union, notwithstanding the attempts made to distract attention from the calm, constructive work of drawing up a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, will assist the Committee on Disarmament in turning to and carrying out the task that has been entrusted to it.

Mr. KABIA (Sierra Leone): Yesterday, 28 June, the delegation of Sierra Leone submitted a proposal to the Secretary-General. That proposal deals with the strengthening of United Nations information centres around the world in order to educate, inform and disseminate information on disarmament and the arms race in all regions of the world, particularly in the developing countries. We hope that this could be done in collaboration with the Centre for Disarmament, which has the expertise in this area.

That proposal by our delegation has not yet been circulated in document form, but we take this opportunity to introduce it now pending its circulation and use in the Working Group on this agenda item.

In his statement in the plenary meeting of the twelfth special session of the General Assembly on 8 June 1982, the Chairman of the Sierra Leone delegation, His Excellency Ambassador Abdul Koroma stated:

"...we urge world-wide support for the World Disarmament Campaign and propose that, because of the unequal level of disarmament knowledge in various regions, information centres should be established in each
region of the world or existing United Nations information centres around the world should be strengthened and mandated to educate and inform the peoples of all countries and increase their awareness of the dangers of the arms race, in particular the need for and urgency of disarmament. The United Nations Centre for Disarmament and the United Nations Department of Public Information should work closely together in this regard.\(^{11}\) (A\/-S-12/PV.3., p. 53)

The Government of Sierra Leone attaches great significance to the mobilization of world public opinion in favour of disarmament and believes that such mobilization can be possible only if the peoples of all regions are well informed and educated on the issues relevant and related to the disarmament problem. It is in this light that we support the United Nations disarmament fellowships programme approved by the first special session on disarmament, in 1978, and the World Disarmament Campaign launched on 7 June 1982.

Within the framework of the World Disarmament Campaign in particular and of United Nations information activities in general, the Sierra Leone Government is of the view that this special session should request the Secretary-General to take immediate concrete steps within the existing budgetary and personnel resources of the Secretariat to promote disarmament information, education and training in all countries, in particular the developing countries, where such knowledge is at the moment relatively under-developed. Specifically we propose that some of the United Nations information centres in various regions around the world, especially in the developing areas, should be mandated and strengthened to enable them to play a more active role in their respective regions in generating understanding of the nature and dangers of the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, and in stimulating support for the objectives of disarmament through such measures as the dissemination of balanced, factual, objective and non-tendentious information, education and seminars for the countries of the various regions. We see the Centre for Disarmament, which is the principal Secretariat unit responsible for disarmament matters, and the
Department of Public Information, under whose direct authority the various United Nations information centres fall and which is the focal point for the co-ordination and implementation of the public information task of the United Nations, as playing a pivotal role in ensuring the concrete implementation of this proposal.

The Government of Sierra Leone therefore proposes that the General Assembly at the current special session on disarmament should, first, request the Secretary-General to take immediate, concrete measures within the existing resources of the Secretariat to mandate and strengthen a number of the United Nations information centres around the world, with at least two of those centres to be strengthened to be in each of the developing regions, within the context of the World Disarmament Campaign; and, secondly, further request the Secretary-General to report to the Assembly at its thirty-seventh session on steps taken to implement that proposal.

Finally, the delegation of Sierra Leone hopes that this proposal will be taken up under agenda items 11 and 13 and be considered favourably by all delegations.

Mr. MENZIES (Canada): At the tenth and twelfth special sessions of the General Assembly the Prime Minister of Canada proposed a strategy of suffocation designed to halt the technological momentum of the nuclear arms race. The four elements of that strategy are: a comprehensive test ban to impede the further development of nuclear explosive devices; an agreement to stop the flight testing of all new strategic delivery vehicles; an agreement to prohibit the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes; and an agreement to limit and then progressively to reduce military spending on new strategic nuclear-weapon systems.
Each element involves the negotiation of verifiable agreements between the nuclear Powers. In combination, these elements would provide a more coherent, more efficient and more promising instrument for curbing the development, production and deployment of new destabilizing nuclear-weapon systems.

The strategy is complementary to current negotiations aimed at limiting and reducing nuclear forces. Those negotiations seek to achieve a stable nuclear balance at lower levels. The strategy of suffocation seeks to inhibit the development of new nuclear-weapon systems.

Canada expresses the hope that the four elements of the strategy of suffocation will be taken into account by the nuclear-weapon States in their current discussions on reducing existing nuclear-weapon systems as a means of inhibiting the development of new systems. We believe that stabilization at a lower level will be better assured if it is backed up by agreements to prevent the development of new destabilizing systems.

Mr. VO ANH TUAN (Viet Nam) (interpretation from French): The delegation of Viet Nam wishes to make some comments on the proposals regarding the drafting of a convention on the elimination of chemical weapons. During the 1960s we suffered from chemical weapons, and, as a non-member of the Committee on Disarmament, we should like to be a member in order to help in drafting such a convention and thus spare present and future generations the horrors of these weapons of mass destruction. Unhappily, my country was not able to take part in the work of the Committee on Disarmament because of the opposition of two Members of the United Nations, one of which was the United States of America.

Today, under the pretext of introducing an initiative on chemical weapons, the United States representative again launched an anti-Soviet and anti-Viet Nam campaign, in particular in respect of chemical and bacteriological weapons. Those remarks are not new and they contribute nothing to the proper working of our Committee. This is simply a case of a pyromaniac's crying "Fire". The report of the United Nations Group of Experts to the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly clearly demonstrated, with much supporting evidence, that American accusations against Viet Nam were without foundation. We wonder, therefore, why the United States deems it useful to embark on this deplorable exercise.
The United States objectives are perfectly clear. First, it seeks to put the Vietnamese, the victims of American chemical warfare, in the dock, while the Americans, who committed those atrocious crimes, are the accusers. Thus they are seeking to whitewash themselves after the monstrous crimes committed against Viet Nam. Using more than 600,000 tons of chemical products, they caused the deaths of tens of thousands of people, while millions suffered from the effects of those products. The grave long-term consequences of the American chemical warfare against the Vietnamese population are the responsibility of the American military leaders who took part in the campaign. The harm to the environment will last for scores of years.

The United States representative quoted the address by President Reagan to the General Assembly. The President said: (spoke in English)
"The use of chemical and biological weapons has long been viewed with revulsion by civilized nations." (A/S-12/PV.16, p. 9)

(continued in French)
My delegation cannot fail to agree with that statement. In fact, all the nations of the world have condemned the American chemical warfare in Viet Nam, because they are civilized nations and they view with revulsion the use by the United States Government of chemical weapons against the people of Viet Nam and other peoples of Indo-China. Those who were the only ones to use chemical weapons in Viet Nam and Indo-China cannot and should not be described as "civilized".

Secondly, American leaders seek to distract world public opinion from the United States Government's decision to manufacture extremely deadly new generations of chemical weapons - the binary and multiple-component weapons - and install them in other States for possible future use. If the United States Government really wishes to spare populations the horrors of these weapons, then, instead of carrying out slanderous propaganda campaigns against my country and other socialist countries, it should end its policy of delay and obstruction in the negotiations on drafting a convention to ban chemical weapons. It would be helpful if it adopted a positive attitude to the proposals of the Soviet Union and other States on this question.
ENHANCEMENT OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MACHINERY IN THE FIELD OF DISARMAMENT 
AND STRENGTHENING OF THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THIS FIELD, INCLUDING 
THE POSSIBLE CONVENING OF A WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE

The CHAIRMAN: At its third meeting, the Ad Hoc Committee took a 
decision that this item, referred to in shorthand terms as "Machinery", would 
initially be discussed in the Ad Hoc Committee of the whole itself. After such 
initial discussion of the item, the Ad Hoc Committee would endeavour to 
co-ordinate matters in such a way that the review aspects of "Machinery" would 
be taken up by Working Group II, and what might be termed the forward looking 
aspects would be considered in an informal contact group in which all 
regional groups would be represented. Thereafter, the item would form an 
appropriate subject for a drafting group, as necessary.

Mr. BAYTOK (Turkey): Appropriate institutional arrangements play a 
leading role in the success of any multilateral enterprise. Disarmament is 
no exception to this rule. It is true that progress in disarmament matters 
depends above all on the political will of sovereign States. But it is no 
less true that in order to translate the slightest manifestation of political 
will into concrete measures of disarmament we need the appropriate 
machinery, which in its turn will also contribute to amplifying this will. 
That is why my delegation attaches particular importance to the institutional 
aspects of disarmament efforts. In my delegation's opinion, these aspects 
require consideration in depth by this session, leading to the adoption of 
certain essential decisions.
The present institutional framework, which was established by the first special session devoted to disarmament, no doubt constitutes a step forward when compared with the situation prevailing before 1978. However, this fact should not preclude the re-examination of this framework, four years after its establishment, with a view to highlighting any possible improvements.

When we speak of the machinery established in 1978 we ought to remember that the first session accorded the United Nations a central role and a primary responsibility in the field of disarmament. The United Nations, that is, we the Member States meeting here, can assume this role and responsibility only to the extent that we are willing to do so. In spite of the intensification of the debates on disarmament which take place in the different organs of our Organization, and in spite of the multiplicity of the resolutions adopted, an objective evaluation of the period which has passed since the first session, cannot allow us to say - at least not my delegation - that the United Nations has been the backbone of efforts in the field of disarmament. In these circumstances, four years after having entrusted the United Nations with a central role and a primary responsibility, we should perhaps start thinking of endowing it with the real means which will permit it to carry out its task. In this context, it also has to be noted that the nature of the links between the Committee on Disarmament, the single multilateral negotiating body, and the United Nations still remains to be defined.

The machinery established in 1978 rests on three components: the negotiating body, the deliberating organs and the Secretariat. Certain views of my delegation concerning the functioning of these three components have been reflected in the composite paper annexed to the report of the Preparatory Committee. We hope that the section devoted to questions of machinery in that document will be debated in depth in an appropriate forum during the course of our work. My delegation will at that time take part in the discussion of these issues and for this reason I shall not repeat our views at this stage. However, I wish to make certain observations on two points, one of a general and the other of a more specific nature.
The distinction envisaged between the deliberating and the negotiating bodies of the present machinery is understandable. The aim is to establish a certain balance between the need to ensure universality and the need to maintain efficiency. In such a distribution of roles, the deliberating bodies as well as the Secretariat have the task of providing intellectual and logistic support to the negotiating body.

This functional design presupposes a complementarity between the different components, a linkage which then necessitates co-ordination and efficient channels of communication. Here we face a situation in which it is not sufficient merely to reaffirm the principle but is also essential to put this principle into effect, with appropriate structural arrangements, if necessary.

On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that in a field such as that of disarmament final success is dependent on the largest possible base of participation and negotiation is the only means of achieving concrete measures. It is indeed normal to be cognizant of the need for efficiency in the carrying out of such negotiations. Nevertheless, efficiency and universality must not be considered to be conflicting concepts in all instances. At the level of implementation of the measures of disarmament, universality constitutes the principal, if not the only, source of efficiency.

In the negotiation and elaboration of the measures of disarmament, the international community needs and will continue to need an organ like the Committee on Disarmament with a relatively limited composition. Here we face a practical necessity, which we would be wrong to interpret as a limitation of the right of all countries to participate in the disarmament negotiations on an equal footing. It is in the interest of none to allow the possibility of participating in those negotiations to be the prerogative of certain countries. Moreover, such an attitude would be consistent with neither the spirit nor the letter of the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament.

Since 1979 the Committee on Disarmament has been functioning on the basis of provisions contained in paragraph 120 of the first special session. The different elements included in that paragraph constitute a whole which should be considered in conjunction with paragraph 28 of the same document.
This latter paragraph enumerates the general criteria to be observed for the success of negotiations. The provision of paragraph 120 that foresees the periodical review of the composition of the Committee is of particular importance from this point of view in that it provides for the flexibility needed for reflecting these criteria on a continuous basis in the composition of the Committee.

With such an approach, my delegation considers the review of the composition of the Committee, which this session is invited by resolution 36/97 J of the General Assembly to complete, as one of the most important tasks concerning the machinery issues. It is in precisely this spirit that we have put forward for examination by members a proposal for a reasonable enlargement of the Committee. We hope and maintain that this proposal will generate a close study and consultations in an appropriate format and context within the scope of our work.

We are in fact conscious of the necessity of safeguarding the relatively limited character of the negotiating body. However, we also maintain the opinion that the sort of relativity we are talking about here cannot be measured against a scale of mathematical dimensions. Every single stage in the process of disarmament necessitates, before anything else, participation. The expression of the desire and the political will to participate in the negotiations actively and on an equal footing signifies a commitment, as well, to work with others towards the final goal. At this very moment there are States, Turkey among them, that have declared their readiness to make such a commitment, which in itself constitutes a considerable contribution.

Not to know how to respond favourably to this readiness cannot in any way carry the cause of disarmament onwards.

In conclusion, I wish to point out that my delegation will revert to this issue in a much more detailed manner at a later stage of our work and subsequently will request support for Turkey's own candidature. We believe that as a militarily significant and interested country it can make an important contribution to the disarmament negotiations.

The meeting rose at 6.20 p.m.