5. However, Turkey continued to regard the question of Cyprus, not as a colonial issue, but primarily as a Greco-Turkish problem. The Greek representative's last statements on the subject were in themselves sufficient proof of that contention, for 80 per cent of them had been devoted to Turkey and only 20 per cent to Cyprus. The question of Cyprus had indeed driven a wedge between Greece and Turkey. The Greek desire to annex Cyprus was an indication of its desire to subject the Turkish community of Cyprus to its domination. The Turkish Government asked no more for the Turks of Cyprus than Greece was asking for the Greek Cypriots: that they should be free of foreign domination.

6. The Greek representative had quoted the opinions (A/C.1/814) of Professors Alvarez and Bourquin, two distinguished jurists, on the question of whether the Turkish community in Cyprus was entitled to enjoy the right of self-determination. But Articles 1 and 73 of the United Nations Charter were quite explicit on the subject. Article 1 mentioned equal rights and self-determination of peoples in the context of friendly relations and peace and security. It was also significant that in the final text of Article 73 b the word "people" had been altered to "peoples", while the word "territory" had been left in the singular. Moreover, if the advice of Professor Bourquin and Professor Alvarez had been followed in all such cases and independence had been granted, not to peoples, but to individual geographic units, the map of the world would be quite different. There might have been a sovereign State of Hispaniola instead of the sovereign States of Haiti and the Dominican Republic, and one sovereign State of India instead of the two sovereign States of India and Pakistan. On the other hand, there might have been such States as Silesia and Mesopotamia. It was obvious that, when fundamental rights such as the satisfaction and safeguarding of the aspirations of the inhabitants of a given territory and the interests of peace, security, and good neighbourliness were involved, the right course was not the blind application of abstract rules, but an attempt to find solutions which were in accordance with the principles of the Charter and met the needs of each particular case.

7. The Greek representative had quoted Professor Alvarez as saying that, in applying the right of self-determination in any given area, the United Nations did not recognize "minorities" or "peoples": there were only "inhabitants". It was quite clear, however, that the Charter recognized the rights of peoples or populations, not of territories, and specifically referred to the possibility that several peoples might exist in a given territory. Dr. Luis A. Posadas Costa, an internationally respected jurist and a former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Argentina, had expressed the view that the principle of self-determination must in some cases yield to special circumstances of great political or economic importance. Many other distin-
guished jurists, for example, Professors Crozat, Rousseau, Eagleton and Kelsen, supported that view.

8. Even more directly relevant to the issue, however, were the precedents of the partition of Trieste, which had worked very well because it had taken into account of the existence of two communities living in the neighborhood of the two different nations with which they had ties, and the case of Danzig, which had touched off a world catastrophe because the city had been treated as an independent territory under the control and trusteeship of the League of Nations.

9. In order to lend further weight to the opinion of Professor Henri Rolin, which the Greek representative had cited (99th meeting) in support of his contention regarding article 16 of the Treaty of Lausanne, the Committee had been told that the Professor was a member of the International Court of Justice and that his view had been expressed in 1955. That fact could hardly be significant, however, when weighed against a decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice—to which Mr. Zorlu already referred—made barely two years after the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne.

10. With regard to article 27 of the Treaty of Lausanne, a glance at the text would be enough to dispel any doubt as to its meaning, in spite of the Greek representative's continued insistence on the erroneous interpretation he had presented to the Committee. It was clear that the two paragraphs of the article were linked, that they referred only to the temporal and spiritual jurisdiction of the Turkish Caliph over foreign nationals and that they consequently had nothing to do with the Cyprus question.

11. Regardless of legal argument, however, the important facts which stood out at present were the existence of a tense situation between the two communities in Cyprus and of a dispute between the three Governments concerned, which, in the case of Turkey and Greece, had its roots in the past. Turkey had always been a good friend of Greece and had shown good will and restraint in spite of the unjust treatment and the pressure of which the Turks of Western Thrace had been the victims. A study which would be shortly circulated would show to the members of the Committee the plight of the Turkish population in Western Thrace. Mr. Averoff-Tossizza, the Greek representative, tried always to interpret every matter according to his own country's interests. Mr. Zorlu wondered how the existence of Turkey and of the Turkish Cypriots could be ignored. Furthermore, the Greek representative endeavoured to present Greece as a small, peaceful country, while Turkey was allegedly war-like and nurtured territorial ambitions. Although the Greek representative had contended that Greece had no such ambitions, it was a fact that it was Greece which had first laid claim to Cyprus. Moreover, a map published some ten years previously by the Greek authorities showed that Greece also coveted territory belonging to the neighbouring States of Albania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Turkey.

12. In asserting that General Assembly resolution 1013 (XII), calling for the resumption of negotiations on the Cyprus question, could be implemented only by talks between the United Kingdom Government and Archbishop Makarios, Greece was denying both the Turkish Cypriot community and Turkey itself the right to speak on behalf of their interests. Thus the opinions expressed by delegations, including those of Turkey and the United Kingdom, during the debate preceding the adoption of that resolution were ignored. The Greek representative had also maintained that Greece should not participate in negotiations with Turkey and the United Kingdom because it was advancing no claims with regard to Cyprus. However, his statement to the effect that Cyprus was Greek and the convention by both government and opposition leaders in Greece that there was no Cypriot nation showed that Greece wanted to bring the Turkish Cypriots under the domination of the Greek Cypriot community. In taking that stand, Greece was clearly pursuing an imperialist and colonialist policy. It was essential that Greece should desist from such a policy, which had had tragic consequences in Turkey itself until 1922 and whose continued existence was demonstrated in the map shown to the Committee.

13. Notwithstanding the Greek representative's objections, the word "terrorist" aptly described the Greek underground organization on Cyprus, EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters), whose tactics included shooting women, children and old men in the back. Turkey had always honoured those who were truly courageous fighters for their countries' independence and Turkish history also had its own heroes. He asked Mr. Averoff-Tossizza whether he thought that the Turkish community on Cyprus lacked heroes and fighters who would willingly sacrifice their lives to prevent the imposition of new foreign domination or to obtain their freedom.

14. However, he wished to avoid inflammatory statements which would merely cause a further deterioration in the relations between the two Cypriot communities and between Turkey and Greece. The statesmen of the nations concerned should join in trying to settle the Cyprus dispute in the spirit of Articles 1 and 73 of the United Nations Charter. A solution that was imposed by one of the parties would not prove effective. It was the foremost duty of statesmen to avoid lines of conduct which were liable to lead to renewed conflict.

15. Mr. NOBLE (United Kingdom), replying to the remarks made at the 996th meeting by the Greek representative, said that the murder of innocent civilians by the EOKA warranted the use of the strongest possible language. No commission of inquiry was required to establish the facts, since the acts of terrorism were not in dispute.

16. The United Kingdom's objective on Cyprus was not to remain on the island at all costs, as the Greek representative had asserted, but to further the Cypriots' progress towards self-government and freedom in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The United Kingdom was pursuing a policy of partnership on Cyprus; at the end of the interim period envisaged in its new plan, it was prepared to share its sovereignty on the island with Greece and Turkey. Obviously, therefore, its primary concern was not the maintenance of its present sovereign status, but rather the welfare of the inhabitants of Cyprus, the preservation of stability in the Eastern Mediterranean and the


maintenance of harmonious relations between Greece and Turkey. Moreover, the interests of the United Kingdom in the Eastern Mediterranean were also the strategic and other interests of Greece, Turkey and its other allies.

17. He rejected the Greek representative’s contention that the United Kingdom had manufactured Turkey’s interest in the Cyprus question. The historical, geographical and racial basis for Turkey’s concern in the matter should be apparent to everyone, and the Turkish Cypriots’ determination to seek partition rather than submit to Greek Cypriot rule was the direct result of EOKA terrorism.

18. The Cyprus problem was one of great complexity for which a solution satisfactory to all the parties concerned could not at present be found. It was also, as the Greek representative had pointed out, an international rather than a purely colonial problem; that fact was the basis of the United Kingdom’s policy of partnership.

19. The Greek representative had said that only an interim settlement was possible under the present circumstances. He had further said that his Government would agree to such a settlement only if it provided for democratic self-government on Cyprus and did not prejudice the island’s future. The United Kingdom was in full agreement with those points; its plan for Cyprus left the future completely open and, by accepting the necessary minimum of communal separatism, offered the one real chance of progress towards its democratic goals. It should be recalled that during the recent inter-communal strife, the Turkish Cypriots had sought safety by migrating from the dangerous areas where they were surrounded by Greeks, with a view to congregating in a single area where they would be safe and free from the fear of ambush. Happily the fighting had been stopped. If it had continued, it would have resulted in the de facto separation of the two communities, thus possibly leading to partition.

20. With regard to the Greek representative’s assertion that the United Kingdom has disregarded General Assembly resolution 1013 (XI) by failing to conduct negotiations with the inhabitants of Cyprus, he said that the refusal to take part in conference was motivated by the Greek Cypriot leaders who had been the obstacle to such talks, although the Governor of the island and his advisers had made every effort to maintain contact with the local leaders. Furthermore, the resolution in question had envisaged negotiations among all the parties concerned, not merely between the United Kingdom and the Cypriots. The United Kingdom was prepared to take part in a conference along the lines recently suggested at the meeting of the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (A/C.1/811); it would welcome the presence at such a conference of representatives of the Turkish and Greek Cypriots and would not object to the presence of Archbishop Makarios among the latter. If the Greek Government wished to see negotiations between the United Kingdom and the Greek Cypriots, one obvious way would be for it to agree to a conference on the terms proposed.

21. Mr. AVEROFF-TOSSIZZA (Greece), reserving the right to reply at a later stage to the two preceding statements, said that the figures of 400,000 Greeks and 120,000 Turks quoted by the Turkish representative (997th meeting) were at variance with the official United Kingdom statistics, according to which there were 417,000 Greeks and 93,000 Turks on Cyprus.

22. With regard to self-determination, there was no inconsistency in the statements made by Greek officials between 1951 and 1957. Nor was there any contradiction with the quotation from Dr. Podestà Costa, The people of Cyprus claimed the full exercise of the right of self-determination. In view, however, of the important political implications, they limited that right to the right of self-government, which must precede independence. With regard to the safeguards connected with the acceptance of those limitations, his delegation proposed that they should be studied and determined by the United Nations. It was necessary to have confidence in the study to be carried out by the United Nations and in the provisions that would be laid down as a result.

23. The example of Trieste, which had been mentioned by the Turkish representative (997th meeting), was not relevant, because Trieste and its region did not constitute a geographic, historical or ethnic entity. The short-lived political unity of Trieste had been ended by dividing the region along an obvious line of demarcation, so as to separate the Italian, who were a majority in the city area, from the predominantly Yugoslav population of the outer zone. The example could not, therefore, have any bearing on Cyprus, which did not constitute an artificial entity, but one made by geography and 3,000 years of history.

24. The Greek Government disapproved of the murder of women, children and old people no less than the United Kingdom representative. That was precisely why his delegation had asked that a neutral commission of investigation should examine all the accusations which had been made. But he could not accept the United Kingdom representative’s assertion that those who were fighting on Cyprus were no different from London gangsters. All those who had struggled for liberty in the past, at the time of their struggle, been called terrorists and murderers, only to be acknowledged later as heroes and champions of freedom. In fact, such recognition was already taking place: a British newspaper, for example, had published a poem called the “Ballad of Gregory Afentious” describing the death of a Cypriot fighting against British soldiers.

25. He repeated that there was no political contact between his country and those who struggled in Cyprus. It was, however, inconceivable that his delegation should accept a statement that those people were no different from gangsters who killed for base motives.

26. Mr. ZORLU (Turkey) said that his delegation disagreed with the official statistics quoted by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece, because they had been drawn up by employees of the Cyprus administration who were of Greek origin. He would show photostats of such statistics in which the religion of the parents of Turkish children was given as “Greek Orthodox”. Unfortunately, in Cyprus statistics, persons were classified in accordance with their religion, and many Turks were listed as members of the Greek Orthodox Church.

27. The Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs had quoted the distinguished jurist Professor Alvarez as holding the view that the authors of the Charter of the United Nations had been concerned not with “peoples” but only
with "inhabitants". In fact, an examination of the French and English texts of Article 73 of the Charter showed that the terms populations and habitants had been used in the same way in the French text, whatever differences there might be in the use of the corresponding words in the English text.

28. With regard to the quotation from Dr. Podestá Costa, that distinguished jurist had stated that the principle of self-determination of peoples could not have absolute application and that it was necessary to have regard to certain other principles of international law, such as the legitimate right of States to self-defence and as well as to economic and other questions.

29. Journalists might pay tribute to a courageous act by a terrorist, but the task of statesmen was different. Statesmen were called upon to find a solution to the Cyprus question by means other than the use of force; that result would not be brought about by praising terrorists as heroes and thereby providing an incitement to violence.

30. With regard to the question of safeguards, the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs had once more endeavoured to limit the rights of the Turkish community in Cyprus to those of a minority. In fact, the Turkish community was entitled to the same justice as the Greek community; it could not be denied the right not to live under the domination or government of a foreign Power. A member of the United Kingdom Parliament belonging to the Labour Party, had recently reported that the Greek community of Cyprus did not want self-government for itself, but simply government by the Cypriot church; the Greeks were interested in self-government only in so far as it would provide them with an opportunity to govern the Turks, as the Turks were well aware. That was exactly what the Turks did not want, and therein lay the crux of the Cyprus dispute.

31. Notwithstanding the view of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece, there was similarity between the questions of Trieste and Cyprus. The Trieste settlement had left some Yugoslavs in the Italian zone and some Italians in the Yugoslav zone. The dispute, however, had died down and quiet now prevailed, because those persons knew that they could if necessary, emigrate from one area to the other where they would feel at home. It was necessary to give that feeling—of freedom and security—to peoples who did not wish to become enslaved by others.

32. Approximately 40,000 Greeks had emigrated from Cyprus to the United Kingdom, to the very country which was the source of British domination and control. It was difficult to see why they had emigrated to the United Kingdom in such numbers if they were so hostile. He did not think that 4,000 Greeks of Cypriot origin were likely to be found in Greece.

The meeting rose at 4.50 p.m.