
GENERAL DEBATE (concluded)

1. Mr. MALILE (Albania) said that the repeated failure of the United Nations to deal effectively with the Korean question must be attributed to the aggressive policy of the United States and its supporters. The procedure of inviting only one of the parties to attend the debate was unjustifiable and made any constructive solution impossible, while the absence from the United Nations of the People's Republic of China compounded the difficulty. The United Nations must not persevere in such an erroneous course.

2. Since 1945 the United States had been attempting, as part of its general aggressive plans in Asia, to impose the South Korean régime on the Korean people. The main cause of the continued division of the country was the attempt by the United States to transform South Korea into a military base for use against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China, as was shown by the very large proportion of United States aid to South Korea which was devoted to military purposes, the transfer of nuclear weapons to South Korea in violation of the Armistice Agreement, and the constant provocations instigated by the United States. Such activities did not help to bring about a peaceful solution of the Korean problem.

3. To solve that problem, the United Nations must act in accordance with the provisions of the Charter. The existence of two Korean States with different economic and social systems was a fact which could not be denied. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea was supported by the population of North Korea and reflected the vital interests of the Korean people. Its Government had done everything in its power to bring about the reunification of Korea by peaceful means, proposing measures intended to establish direct contact between the two parts of the country and offering to assist South Korea economically, to reduce its armed forces and to commit itself not to resort to force. Unfortunately, however, the United States and the South Korean authorities had rejected all those proposals. Continuing its efforts to unify Korea, the Democratic People's Republic had on 5 February 1958 proposed the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the country and the holding of free elections under the observation of a neutral nations organ (A/3865, para. 9). That initiative had been considered by all peace-loving peoples as an important contribution to the relaxation of international tension. However, the United States had kept on its forces in Korea as part of the same policy of "positions of strength" it was pursuing elsewhere in the world—a policy which was doomed to failure.

4. His delegation considered that since the Chinese People's Volunteers had been withdrawn from North Korea there could be no further reason for leaving foreign troops in occupation of South Korea. Until they had been evacuated, the unification of the country would be impossible.

5. It was regrettable that the United Nations should compromise itself in the eyes of the world by its activities in Korea. The report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) (A/3865) reflected the United States position and had in it nothing that would assist in the reunification of the country. No positive results could, indeed, be expected from a Commission made up of States which had taken part in the Korean war or belonged to aggressive military blocs. The work of the Commission had in fact served only the continued division of the country, not its reunification, and for that reason it should cease to function.

6. The Commission's report did not reflect the true economic situation in Korea; in particular, it failed to mention the great economic, social and cultural progress made in North Korea. In contrast, the aggressive policy imposed on South Korea had caused a dangerous rise in unemployment, taxes and prices, while United States monopolies were assuming control of the country's economy.

7. His country welcomed the proposals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China for the peaceful unification of Korea, which it considered would be an invaluable contribution to the cause of peace, and it regretted that no solution had been reached at the current session because of the negative attitude of the Western Powers.

8. The thirteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.217) contained nothing which would contribute to the unification of Korea and for that reason his delegation would vote against it. To solve the Korean problem the United Nations must approach it in a spirit of objectivity and good will.

9. Mr. ALEMAYEHOU (Ethiopia) said that his country's foreign policy was based on the desire to cooperate with all peace-loving nations, particularly
those of Asia and Africa, and on the conviction that the safety and independence of small countries depended upon the maintenance of an effective system of collective security, Ethiopia's own experience had taught it that the failure of the United Nations to apply the machinery for collective security provided for in its Charter would not only render that machinery meaningless, but bring mankind to disaster. That conviction had led it to respond promptly to the Security Council's appeal for troops to repel aggression in Korea.

10. Thanks to the collective action of the United Nations, the situation in Korea had been restored. But the current truce could be transformed into lasting peace only through the peaceful reunification of the country. It was encouraging to note that all parties were agreed on that objective, differing only on the means by which it should be achieved. His delegation believed that those differences could be overcome if all concerned made an effort to do so and if all possible means for contact and the exchange of views were made available to the parties directly concerned. That could not be done, as some delegations had suggested, by inviting the North Korean authorities to take part in the Committee's discussion of the question, for by doing so, the United Nations, which had already taken the position that there was only one lawful Government in Korea, would be compromising its legal and moral authority. Nevertheless, the United Nations could, as provided in the Charter, assist in solving the problem by directing or encouraging the two parties most directly concerned to seek agreement, through mediation, conciliation or other means of their choice, outside the United Nations. If there were any other means of bringing the two parties together, they should be explored by the United Nations, for only in that way could the peaceful reunification of the country be achieved.

11. His delegation could not agree, however, that the withdrawal of United Nations forces from Korea would make it easier for the two parties to settle their differences. On the contrary it would, in the present circumstances, not only make possible the resumption of hostilities, but perpetuate the division of the country. The United Nations forces in Korea had never been and could never be a threat to the North, while their presence had brought peace to the country and reduced tension considerably, thus giving the parties directly concerned an opportunity for calm reflection.

12. His delegation considered that the question of who should supervise the election of an all-Korean national assembly was also a proper subject for negotiation and agreement between the parties directly concerned. It had co-sponsored and would vote in favour of the thirteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.217) in that spirit.

13. Mr. HERRARTE (Guatemala) said his delegation believed that the unified, independent and democratic Korea, which was the goal of the United Nations could be achieved only through free elections under United Nations supervision. The demand that United Nations forces should be withdrawn before free elections were held and a government constituted which reflected the will of the entire population was based on the desire of the aggressors to renew their aggression and to avoid supervised elections. For those reasons his delegation firmly supported the thirteen-Power draft resolution.

14. Mr. DELGADO (Philippines) emphasized that the position of the Philippines was based exclusively on the facts as established by the best available evidence and as analysed logically. Korea was a symbol of the irreconcilable divisions of the time, and that fact should strengthen the United Nations determination to work towards a just and democratic solution of the problem. The Korean question was a test of whether the wishes of the majority of the General Assembly could be fulfilled indefinitely and whether that majority could allow a conflict which was being artificially fostered to develop into permanent civil war in Korea. It was because the United Nations recognized those issues that it chose to keep the Korean question alive.

15. While much had been made of the material progress of North Korea in recent years, the champions of that régime had had little to say about the way in which its officials were elected or appointed. In contrast, the report of UNCIK (A/3855) indicated not only material progress in the Republic of Korea, but the use of genuinely democratic processes in the election of its highest officials and of members of the house of Representatives of the National Assembly. They had clearly been elected in a free election which compared favourably with any free election held in the democratic countries.

16. While the withdrawal of Chinese Volunteers from North Korea and the recognition by the communists of the principle of free elections under neutral supervision had appeared to indicate some relaxation of communist intransigence, the subsequent exchange of notes between the United Nations Command and the communist authorities (A/3865, paras. 13-15) had shown that the communist proposals could not form a basis of agreement. The withdrawal of Chinese Volunteers could not be equated with the withdrawal of United Nations forces, which, unlike the Chinese forces, would have to retire to bases beyond the immediate geographical vicinity of South Korea, thus exposing the United Nations position to great risk. Moreover, in the absence of supervision, there could be no guarantee of a complete withdrawal of the Chinese Volunteers, and past experience indicated that even if the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission were to attempt to carry out such supervision, it would not be permitted to function satisfactorily.

17. With regard to elections, it should be noted that the communists had made the holding of free elections conditional upon the complete withdrawal of troops from all of Korea. Their subsequent refusal to clarify that proposal cast doubt on their willingness to hold such elections on United Nations terms and indicated that their offer was no more than an attempt to secure troop withdrawals and thereby obtain a military advantage.

18. The communist demand for withdrawal of United Nations forces as a condition for elections ignored the fact that those forces were not in Korea at the behest of the General Assembly in order to maintain stability and to promote conditions conducive to the achievement of United Nations objectives. Their withdrawal before those objectives had been fulfilled would ensure defeat of the principles on which the whole United Nations action in Korea had been predicated.

19. It was also significant that the communists had thus far failed to specify whether the neutral nations
organ which they had proposed for the supervision of the elections could be a United Nations organ. The elections could not be held under auspices other than those of the United Nations because the Korean war had not been a mere conflict between nations; it had been a just retaliation by the community of nations against a proven aggressor. The Communists had also failed to indicate whether the new Korean national assembly which was to emerge from the elections would be truly representative of the population of the whole of Korea. An assembly half of which consisted of representatives of North Korea and half of representatives of South Korea would merely perpetuate the tragic division of the country and frustrate hopes for real unification on a democratic basis. Proportional representation was essential.

20. Since the thirteen-Power draft resolution (A/C. 1/L.217) reaffirmed those principles, the Philippines had co-sponsored it.

21. Turning to the most recent note received from the communist authorities, the note dated 10 November 1958 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Peking to the United Kingdom Chargé d'affaires, he pointed out that it was a reaffirmation of charges against the nations of the United Nations Command and of the proposals of 5 February 1958, which were unacceptable as a basis for the solution of the Korean question. The communists again insisted on a withdrawal of all foreign troops prior to free elections and they again demanded supervision of the elections by a neutral nations organ. With regard to the last point, he would note that the members of the United Nations Commission were actually representative of both sides of the controversy and that it would be impossible to find neutral nations which were not committed with regard to the Korean question.

22. Mr. SHAHA (Nepal) expressed gratification regarding the progress achieved in the Republic of Korea in all fields, largely with United Nations assistance. The United Nations must continue to work for an independent and unified Korea in which North and South could combine their resources for the use of the whole country. It must work for peace and security in the area, and it must strive to bring about free and fair elections under its auspices or the auspices of some other international agency, so as to enable the whole population of Korea to determine its own future.

23. His delegation had welcomed the news of the withdrawal of the Chinese Volunteers from North Korea, which might prove to be a step forward in the solution of the Korean question.

24. The unification of Korea had become a part of the general peace settlement in the Far East, and Nepal did not feel that it could contribute to a solution of the Korean question by taking a stand on the thirteen-Power draft resolution. It considered that the fate and future of Korea depended, for the present, on an improvement in general international relations.

25. Mr. BOUZA (Uruguay) reviewed United Nations objectives in Korea as stated in repeated resolutions of the General Assembly, as well as the principles of a lasting settlement of the Korean question set forth in the Declaration by the Sixteen (A/2786, annex), which had emerged from the Korean Political Conference held at Geneva in 1954, and had confirmed by the Assembly by its resolution 811 (IX). The thirteen-Power draft resolution was now before the Committee reaffirmed those principles, and Uruguay would vote for it.

26. He reviewed the recent developments reported by UNCURK (A/3865), in particular, the exchange of correspondence between the United Nations Command and the communist authorities which had followed the announcement of the communist prescription for peaceful unification of Korea and of the eventual withdrawal of Chinese Volunteers from North Korea. He emphasized that the communist authorities had not replied to the requests by the United Nations command for clarification regarding their understanding of the principle of free elections, regarding the nature of a "neutral nations organ" and the question whether such an organ might be a United Nations body, and regarding the elections to the new all-Korea national assembly on the basis of proportional representation of the indigenous population. The communist authorities continued to insist on the withdrawal of United Nations forces as a pre-condition for elections. They attempted, unfairly, to establish an equation between the withdrawal of the Chinese Volunteers beyond the Korean border and the withdrawal of the already reduced United Nations forces to distances considerably more remote. Moreover, the United Nations forces had been rendered responsible by the General Assembly for maintaining stability in the area and for creating conditions favourable to the peaceful unification of Korea.

27. The withdrawal of United States forces in 1948 had been followed by the North Korean aggression, which had temporarily frustrated United Nations attempts to create a unified, independent and democratic Korea. That attack had demonstrated the inadequacy of a purely regional system of security, had compelled the Security Council to act and had subsequently brought into operation Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. The action taken by the Council had been the first example of collective military action to repel aggression in the field of international relations, and had opened up new prospects in the field of collective security. Indeed, since the adoption of the United-for-peace resolution (377 (V)) empowering the General Assembly to act in matters of collective security, that action had proved to be the most constructive step taken by the United Nations for the maintenance of peace since its inception, for responsibility for that goal rested not only with the five great Powers and with the Security Council—it had been extended to the General Assembly as a whole, thus committing the small and middle Powers to an active role, for which they were eminently qualified because they were inherently peace-loving.

28. Uruguay could not accept the Soviet argument that there were two States in Korea. There was only one Korean people and the day that it could express itself freely, as proposed in the thirteen-Power draft resolution, it would reject all attempts to divide it. The existing situation in Korea was the result of circumstances arising out of the Second World War, and the main concern of the United Nations must continue to be to prevent the use of force in the solution of international problems and to seek to resolve them instead by applying the principles of the Charter and of international law. In voting for the thirteen-Power proposal, Uruguay was in fact reaffirming that the United Nations could not abandon responsibility for the future of the
Korean people. It hoped that the communist authorities would agree to the principles which that text prescribed for the reunification of Korea.

29. Mr. ZORN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that, while the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries had accused the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of aggressive behaviour, it was the United States which was occupying South Korea and the Chinese island of Taiwan, the United States Navy which was stationed off the coast of China, and United States political and military leaders who were threatening to use nuclear weapons against China. Groundless charges were being made against the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the absence of representatives of those States, but both of them would ultimately receive the right to reply to their accusers in the United Nations.

30. The South Korean representative had said that the Korean problem would be solved "by force or by reason, in war or in peace" (975th meeting). In thus contemplating the possibility of a military solution, he had reflected the views of the South Korean ruling class. The dreams of reuniting Korea by force were encouraged by the United States and the other States which maintained troops in South Korea. The withdrawal of foreign troops from all of Korea was the only way to ensure the peaceful unification of that country. The Chinese People's Volunteers had recently been withdrawn from North Korea. It was therefore reasonable that the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea should now call for the withdrawal of foreign troops from South Korea.

31. The Australian representative had said that the withdrawal of United Nations troops from South Korea would remove the main guarantee that the unity, freedom and independence of the Korean people would ultimately be secured (977th meeting). That clearly meant that Korean unification was to be achieved by the use of foreign troops rather than by peaceful means. The United States representative had advanced a similar argument for keeping United Nations troops in Korea and had also asserted that the communist authorities feared the result of a free election in Korea (973rd meeting). It was apparent, however, that the United States feared the result of such an election once its troops were withdrawn.

32. He disputed the contention of the United Kingdom representative (975th meeting) that, while the proper way to settle differences was often to bring the opposing sides together around a table, the Korean problem could not be settled by a similar confrontation of North Korean and South Korean representatives.

33. He also wondered why the Canadian representative, after stating that the Committee should not "cling to attitudes and formulae which do not fit the facts", had said (976th meeting) that his delegation would vote for the thirteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.217), which meant in fact that he took his stand on the old positions. The Japanese representative, who had on the whole supported the position expressed in the thirteen-Power draft resolution, had advocated a flexible approach to the Korean problem and had pointed out that the General Assembly was competent to modify past resolutions dealing with that question and adopt new ones (977th meeting). Obviously, the new situation which had developed during the past year had compelled the representatives of those countries to give thought to the possibility of a new approach to the problem. The representatives of Asian countries like Ceylon and the Philippines had also argued the need to review the old positions in a spirit of conciliation.

34. The old policy on Korea, which had been expressed in numerous resolutions adopted over the years, had not brought unification of that country one step closer. Western-supported resolutions could not compel the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to do what military force had not made them do. Only the withdrawal of foreign troops would open the way to genuine negotiations between the two parts of Korea and to the peaceful unification of that country. If the United States and its supporters adopted the thirteen-Power draft resolution, they would thereby demonstrate that they were opposed to the peaceful unification of Korea and wanted to keep South Korea as a military base for aggressive action against North Korea and the People's Republic of China.

35. The Soviet delegation would vote against the thirteen-Power draft resolution because that draft could not bring a solution of the Korean problem and merely gave the stamp of approval to previous decisions which events had proved to be incorrect.

36. Mrs. ROSSEL (Sweden), replying to the observations of the representative of Ceylon (976th meeting) pointed out that the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, of which Sweden was a member, was limited by the Armistice Agreement (8/3079, appendix A) to certain clearly defined functions of control, inspection and investigation and could act only with the concurrence of both parties to the Armistice Agreement. For that reason, it had been unable to assume the task of supervising the withdrawal of the Chinese People's Volunteers.

37. Mr. HICKENLOOPER (United States of America), replying to the remarks of the Soviet representative, said that Korea had been divided after the Second World War solely in order to facilitate the surrender of the Japanese forces there and that the Soviet Union had prevented implementation of the agreement for early reunification of the country and the holding of free elections. Most of the world clearly understood the term "free elections" to mean the right to vote in secrecy for or against various candidates and policies; in the Soviet Union, however, it meant only the right to vote for the group in power. If the United Nations was wary of withdrawing its troops from Korea, that was because the free world had been deceived the last time that had been done in the region. The Soviet assertion that South Korea had been the aggressor in the Korean war required little discussion, since the General Assembly had overwhelmingly decided on that question at the time. The United States had no intention of holding elections in Korea or elsewhere at the point of bayonets, or of determining régimes in that way; indeed, its policies and those of the free world were certainly to be preferred to the Soviet Union's ruthless suppression of freedom in Hungary.

38. Mr. FORSYTH (Australia) said that the Soviet representative had misinterpreted his remarks so as to
suggest that the purpose of the United Nations troops in Korea was to bring about unification of that country by force. Their purpose was in fact to ensure that there would be no further aggression from the North and thereby contribute to a peaceful solution of the problem.

39. The CHAIRMAN said that the general debate on the Korean question had now been concluded and invited the Committee to proceed to consideration of the thirteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.217).

40. Mr. AMADEO (Argentina) moved that the meeting should be adjourned until the next morning.

The motion was adopted by 48 votes to none, with 19 abstentions.

The meeting rose at 5.50 p.m.