Chairman: Mr. Miguel Rafael URQUIA (El Salvador).

AGENDA ITEM 24


GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. BARUSHKO (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) considered that the Powers which had refused to invite a representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to attend the debate had thereby shown that they did not wish the problem to be solved, since that country was not only one of the interested parties, but was the only one which had really tried to promote a rapprochement.

2. According to the Australian representative (197th meeting), the P'yongyang Government did not really express the will of the North Korean people; but the facts showed that the people of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea lent their full support to the Government, which had enabled them to make great progress in all sectors of their economy, to raise their standards of living and to develop their cultural life.

3. In South Korea, on the other hand, industry met only 20 to 30 per cent of needs in consumer goods. Metal products, machinery, chemical fertilizers and many other goods had to be imported. Agriculture was in a sorry plight: grain production was 30 per cent lower than it had been under the Japanese occupation. The United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) had been obliged to acknowledge that a large part of the rural population did not have enough to eat and that the purchasing power of the peasants had declined still further. The number of unemployed exceeded 1 million.

4. The prime responsibility for that abnormal situation lay with the United States, which was turning the country into a strategic base and was exercising its influence through the Syngman Rhee clique. The deplorable state of the South Korean economy was due to the extent of that country's military expenditure, as the UNCURK report indicated (A/3865, para. 56). However, the reason for that expenditure was clear: the "peaceful" government of Syngman Rhee, which had not yet signed the Armistice Agreement of 27 July 1953 (S/3079, appendix A) and which was the only Government in Asia to have welcomed the introduction of atomic weapons into its territory, was openly threatening to attack the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

5. The evacuation of North Korea by the Chinese Volunteers had created conditions conducive to the easing of tension in Korea. That step had also exposed the real intentions of the United States and its allies, who continued to occupy the part of Korea south of the 38th parallel.

6. In an attempt to justify the retention of foreign troops in South Korea it had been argued that the countries concerned were a long way from Korea, whereas China was close by. It was difficult to see, however, where the Chinese Volunteers could have withdrawn to, if not to their own country. Furthermore, the whole world knew that the armed forces of the United States had been the first to travel great distances in order to carry out their aggressive plans in Korea. It was the policy and the plans of the United States which were the crux of the matter, and not the distances involved.

7. According to the statement he had made at the 975th meeting, the United Kingdom representative considered that the elections should precede the departure of the troops stationed in Korea. In other words, he could contemplate elections only if the territory was occupied by foreign forces. In actual fact, the United States wished to remain in Korea indefinitely. It would do well, however, to bear in mind that the people of South Korea would not tolerate such an abnormal situation indefinitely.

8. The representatives of the Western Powers had often reiterated that a considerable number of the troops stationed in Korea had been withdrawn. However, what really mattered was how many troops remained, particularly in view of the smallness of the country and the modern weapons with which those troops were armed.

9. The first step towards the solution of the problem could only be the complete withdrawal of foreign forces. The elections were the Koreans' own affair. The proposals made by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea might also serve as a basis for a rapprochement conducive to a solution of the problem.

10. For all those reasons, the thirteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.217) was unacceptable to the Byelorussian delegation, because it provided for the continued occupation and division of the country, which was absolutely contrary to the interests of the Korean people.

11. Mr. PETER (Hungary) drew the Committee's
attention to the list of Governments which had diplomatic representation in Seoul (A/3865, annex III) and observed that Thailand should be added to it. The list was instructive, as it did not include the great majority of the Asian countries, a fact from which it could be concluded that their Governments did not wish to recognize the Government of South Korea alone and also that they did not wish to recognize both Governments, for fear of helping to perpetuate the division. In those circumstances, the attitude taken by the United Nations, whose resolutions always identified Korea with the Syngman Rhee regime, was obviously unsatisfactory.

12. It was also significant that not one South-East Asian delegation had objected to the Committee's inviting a representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to attend the debates and that the large majority of the representatives of those countries had shown by their vote that they wished the representatives of both Korean Governments to be present.

13. The whole United Nations approach to the Korean question had been mistaken from the outset. At the second session of the General Assembly, when the question of the independence of Korea had been discussed for the first time, the United States had managed to impose upon the Committee a resolution which had prevented any consultation of the Korean people. That attitude of refusing to take into account the opinion of the majority of those concerned had never been changed and had always been reflected in the work of UNCURK.

14. It was obvious from the Commission's report (A/3865) that all the initiatives for a rapprochement between the two parties had been taken by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and that none of them had met with any response. The report also showed that the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission had refused to inspect the evacuation of North Korea by the Chinese Volunteers.

15. It was instructive to note which points in the proposals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were most strongly opposed by South Korea, its allies and UNCURK. One such point was the proposal concerning a neutral nations organ to observe the elections, which showed that South Korea and its allies did not regard the United Nations as neutral. Other points were the proposal that that organ should not intervene in the elections and the proposal that all foreign forces should be withdrawn.

16. In its report, UNCURK did not even mention the proposals for facilitating freedom of travel and communication and the development of economic and cultural relations between the two parts of the country. Furthermore, it did not indicate that it had done anything to bring the two Koreas closer together, probably because it had done absolutely nothing. It seemed to consider that unification could take place only if the Democratic People's Republic of Korea handed over its powers to the Commission, at least for the duration of the elections.

17. If the deadlock was to be broken, those absurd methods must be abandoned and both parties consulted. The thirteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/ L.217) addressed an appeal to "the communist authorities concerned". But how was that appeal to be transmitted to those authorities? And if it eventually did reach them, could it be considered otherwise than as an insult? It was plain that the adoption of that text could only create new obstacles to the unification of Korea. If the problem was to be solved, past errors must be corrected by bringing the representatives of North and South Korea together, either within or outside the United Nations. That procedure would be in accordance with the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations.

18. Mr. CHANG (China) said he was afraid that the defiant, intransigent attitude of the North Korean régime and its allies might keep the Korean question on the agenda of the General Assembly for a long time to come.

19. Although little progress had been made, the United Nations should not regard its debates on the problem as a waste of time. Above all, it must not allow itself to be misled with regard to the so-called realities of the Korean situation and the so-called necessity of withdrawing United Nations forces from the Republic of Korea immediately, in order that the two parts of the country might freely negotiate reunification.

20. In actual fact, an attempt was being made to place the legally constituted Government of the Republic of Korea on an equal footing with the artificial and illegal régime that the Soviet Union had imposed on North Korea, a technique employed in other countries where communists had not yet been able to exercise complete control. The same technique might be extended to other countries, particularly to Asian countries which had recently achieved their independence.

21. He had been surprised to hear the Indian representative speak approvingly at the 978th meeting of the Soviet argument and wondered what the attitude of the Indian delegation would be if the State of Kerala, which now had a communist government, were one day to call itself the People's Democratic Republic of India and claim equality with the Indian Union.

22. The United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, set up by the General Assembly in 1947 (resolution 112 (II)) to supervise free elections throughout Korea, had never been able to cross the 38th parallel, which had been guarded by Soviet troops. In May 1948, elections had been organized in South Korea, where two-thirds of the Korean people resided, and the results had been recognized by the Temporary Commission to be a "valid expression of the free will of the electorate" (A/575, chap. VI, para. 58). After considering the Temporary Commission's report, the General Assembly had recognized on 12 December 1948, by its resolution 195 (III), that the Republic of Korea was the only lawful Government in Korea.

23. It was clear from the report of UNCURK (A/3865) that considerable material and cultural progress had been achieved in the Republic of Korea in the ten years of its existence.

24. The political maturity of its inhabitants had been evidenced in the elections to the House of Representatives of the fourth National Assembly held in May 1958. The voters had fully understood the intricate problems which the various political parties had freely expounded to them in the Press. In its democratic procedures, the National Assembly was moving definitely towards a firmly established two-party system.
25. In the economic sphere, despite the obstacles of the division of the country, the maintenance of an army adequate to cope with any foreign aggression and the shortage of private capital, prices had been stabilized, the standard of living had improved, savings had increased and new industries had come into being. The Chinese delegation also wished to congratulate the Republic of Korea on its remarkable social and cultural achievements.

26. With respect to North Korea, no amount of communist propaganda could obscure the true feelings of its inhabitants, millions of whom had fled to seek freedom and security in the South.

27. The North Korean régime was un-Korean in origin and in purpose. Its leaders had been trained in Moscow, and even in the Soviet army. The difference between the Republic of Korea and North Korea was therefore not a simple difference of social and economic systems that could perhaps be bridged by direct negotiations. Communism was a revolutionary ideology which aimed at overthrowing the present world order by various means: military, political, economic or psychological, as appropriate. There was no evidence to show that the communists had abandoned force as an instrument of policy in the Far East.

28. The Chinese delegation would vote for the thirteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.217), since the General Assembly should reaffirm its basic principles and its objectives.

29. Sir Claude COREA (Ceylon) believed that the United Nations should continue its efforts to solve the problem of Korea and, like the representative of Canada, he felt that the Korean question could only be settled by the organization of free elections by a process of conciliation and negotiation.

30. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea appeared to be in agreement on that point and the only thing that prevented the parties concerned from organizing such elections was the question of the withdrawal of troops. The North Korean authorities had announced the withdrawal of the Chinese Volunteers—in which connexion it was regrettable that the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission had refused to supervise that operation—and had requested that the troops stationed in South Korea should be removed. In view of the small number of United Nations troops, it did not seem that their presence should constitute an insurmountable obstacle if the elections were held under the supervision of a neutral supervisory body. The delegation of Ceylon therefore appealed urgently to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to agree to the holding of elections, even under the existing conditions. Similarly, it called on the Members of the United Nations to reconsider whether the withdrawal of troops from South Korea presented as many difficulties as certain representatives had asserted. The Republic of Korea had a well-trained and well-equipped army with which it could provide for its own security until the elections were held, in addition to which it was unlikely that the North Koreans would commit the error of repeating their aggression. It also had to be borne in mind that the United States was in a strong position in the Pacific region and in the nearby areas, and it would certainly not fail to respond, in case of necessity, to a new call of the United Nations.

31. In any event, it was essential to continue the attempts at conciliation and negotiation and there should be no hesitation in organizing, if necessary, a meeting of representatives of the two régimes or of the two regions, or of representatives of the parties concerned. Unless the question could be settled by negotiation, elections could not take place the following year and the present situation was likely to be prolonged indefinitely, with all the danger to world peace that that involved. For that reason the Committee must not be satisfied with merely adopting the draft resolution with which it was dealing; it must also urge the parties concerned to negotiate in regard to the holding of elections.

32. Mr. LEWANDOWSKI (Poland) said he would not engage in a sterile polemic over the peculiar version of Korean history since 1945 which had been presented by the representative of the United States and subsequent speakers, or over the misleading statements which the representative of South Korea had made at the 975th meeting. It was much more useful to consider the existing situation and to see how to remedy it.

33. It had to be borne in mind that the South Korean authorities had neither recognized nor signed the Armistice Agreement; they seemed to believe that they were free to renew hostilities when the time was suitable. They had hindered the work of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, undoubtedly for the purpose of concealing their efforts to reorganize and modernize their army. It was obvious that those efforts, as well as the violent speeches of Syngman Rhee, were encouraged by the foreign countries which maintained forces in South Korea. It was particularly disquieting, just a few days after the debate on the danger of atomic weapons and of their dissemination, to learn that the troops in South Korea were equipped with the most modern weapons. The presence of weapons of that kind in an area of particular tension was extremely dangerous.

34. Since the armed forces in South Korea flew the flag of the United Nations, he asked whether the United Nations had expressly approved the shipment of atomic weapons to Korea, or whether those shipments had taken place without its knowledge. The point was an extremely important one for the Organization.

35. If the South Korean Government and its allies abandoned their military objectives, a peaceful solution would be possible. The measures proposed on 5 February 1958 by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and supported by the Government of the People's Republic of China (A/3855, paras. 9 and 10) constituted a concrete, constructive programme.

36. The Polish delegation regretted that the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission had not supervised the withdrawal of the Chinese Volunteers, which had been carried out in accordance with the request of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It was high time that all other foreign forces were also withdrawn and that the United Nations showed political wisdom by recommending a conciliatory attitude to the two parties concerned.
37. Unfortunately, the First Committee had not seen fit to allow the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to take part in the present debate and reply to the questions asked by many delegations concerning the implementation of the proposed measures. The reason for that refusal was that a number of countries did not wish to recognize the existence of the Democratic People's Republic and refused to negotiate with its Government unless it submitted to their conditions.

38. The time had come for certain States Members of the United Nations to change their attitude on the Korean problem, for their rigidity, their partiality and their influence on the majority of the Members of the United Nations served only to hinder a solution of that problem. While not in agreement on all points with the representatives of Canada, Japan and other countries, the Polish delegation approved their action in advising greater flexibility and a more realistic approach.

39. In the interest of the Korean people and of the peoples of the entire Far East, it was essential that the United Nations should at last take constructive measures to which all the parties concerned could agree.

40. Mr. ORTIZ MARTIN (Costa Rica) said that the report of UNCURK (A/3865) was very encouraging.

41. The Korean people was capable of holding elections for the purpose of unifying the country. A plan should therefore be drawn up which would permit it to express its opinion without fear, in complete freedom and in a truly democratic manner. The plan should also include the legal measures necessary to ensure that the honesty and free character of the elections were not challenged.

42. Referring to paragraph 39 of the report of UNCURK, he said it was important to know that it would be the courts which would ensure the proper application of the election law. Consideration should be given, with a view to the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Korea, to setting up an electoral tribunal of a judicial character on which all points of view would be represented and which would render a decision expeditiously on the result of the elections.

43. The Costa Rican delegation would vote for the thirteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.217), since that draft was in accordance with its views and should, if strictly implemented, make it possible for the Korean people to wipe out the last vestiges of a murderous and ruinous war.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.