of tests. It therefore failed to justify the hopes of the peoples of all countries, as expressed by the representative of Ghana at the 952nd meeting. Moreover, the Press had just published a message addressed to participants in the conference which had opened that day at Geneva; the signatories, who included prominent persons in many countries, including the United States, asked for the permanent ending of nuclear weapons tests. A "suspension" would only compel the Powers to hold themselves in constant readiness to resume the atomic armaments race.

4. The statements of the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States revealed the true intentions underlying the seventeen-Power draft resolution. The intention was to make the cessation of tests contingent on the solution of other disarmament problems and to replace the question of disarmament by that of the control of armaments, in contradiction to the resolutions adopted unanimously by the General Assembly in 1946 and 1954. Further, section III of the seventeen-Power draft resolution laid emphasis on "the technical approach." His delegation had already stressed the need for political negotiations aimed at the adoption of concrete measures. The representative of Ceylon had, at the 950th meeting, aptly commented that it would be unwise to concentrate on the technical aspect. For all those reasons, the draft resolution appeared wholly inappropriate to the situation; its adoption would in fact prejudice the negotiations on disarmament.

5. The compromise draft resolution proposed by the fourteen Powers (A/C.1/L/203/Rev.1 and Add.1 and 2) was satisfactory. That draft, which would doubtless be voted on first as it had been submitted first, would be supported by his delegation, which hoped that it would command unanimous support.

6. The USSR draft resolution on the reduction of the military budgets of the four great Powers (A/C.1/L.204) referred to a question of immense importance. The proposed measures would help to halt the armaments race and thereby to ease tension and to consolidate international peace and security. Paragraph 2 of the operative part proposed that part of the savings effected should be devoted to assistance to under-developed countries; that was a provision of unusual importance.

7. India and Yugoslavia had proposed (A/C.1/L.210/Rev.1) to increase the membership of the Disarmament Commission to include all States Members of the United Nations, and requested it to make every effort to reach agreement. The adoption of those recommendations could do nothing but good. His delegation would accordingly vote against the French amendments (A/C.1/L.212), which were too strongly reminiscent of the former Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, which had been too small and had for that reason failed to achieve results.
8. Mr. JORDAAN (Union of South Africa) recalled, in connexion with the compromise draft resolution proposed by the representative of India at the 96th meeting, that the three "nuclear Powers" were divided over the question of control, the United States and the United Kingdom not feeling able to agree to a cessation of tests unless effective controls had been established, while the USSR maintained that cessation should remain in effect regardless of the outcome of the conference which was opening that day at Geneva. But it would seem that the majority of the members of the Committee agreed that effective control was essential; the Union of South Africa, for its part, supported that view. The representative of Poland had also conveyed the impression that his country wanted effective control.

9. In any case, the position of the three great Powers concerned would appear not to be greatly different with regard to their common objectives. The three Governments had agreed to meet at a conference in Geneva, where they would aim at the establishment of machinery which would make possible agreement on the total cessation of nuclear weapons tests under an effective system of control. If those were not the intentions of the USSR, its statements must be taken as merely a propaganda manoeuvre.

10. His delegation would accordingly vote for the seventeen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.205), which would preclude it from voting in favour of any of the other draft resolutions dealing with the same subject. The adoption of that draft would also prevent it from voting in favour of paragraphs 2 and 3 of the operative part of the Indian-Yugoslav draft resolution (A/C.1/L.210/Rev.1), which duplicated the provisions of paragraphs 4 and paragraph 7 of the seventeen-Power draft. Furthermore, the Indian-Yugoslav draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.211, which noted that certain States had agreed to a meeting to study the technical aspects of measures against the possibility of surprise attack, duplicated paragraph 3 of the seventeen-Power draft. His delegation would accordingly not be able to vote in favour of that text if the seventeen-Power draft was adopted.

11. Mr. OSMAN (Sudan) said that he had not taken part in the general debate, as the opinions which he would have expressed had already been satisfactorily stated by other representatives.

12. His delegation would vote for the fourteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.202/Rev.1 and Add.1 and 2) but it was not unaware of the fact that the cessation of tests was only a first step towards real disarmament, which could not be achieved without the destruction of stockpiles and the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons as well as the reduction of conventional armaments.

13. He would also vote for the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.203 and Corr.1), the Irish draft resolution (A/C.1/L.206), the Mexican draft resolution (A/C.1/L.208) and the Indian-Yugoslav draft resolution (A/C.1/L.210/Rev.1). It would probably be difficult to settle the disarmament question permanently in a body consisting of all the Members of the United Nations, but the principle of universality should outweigh any other consideration; he hoped that the expanded Disarmament Commission would set up the small groups necessary to facilitate its work.

14. His delegation would abstain from voting on the draft resolution submitted by Austria, Japan and Sweden (A/C.1/L.213). It would vote in favour of the Indian-Yugoslav draft circulated under the symbol A/C.1/L.211, and of the seventeen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.205), which contained elements absent from the others.

15. Mr. BRUCAN (Romania) said that he had the unfortunate impression that the Committee was being put under pressure to reach a decision, despite the extreme importance of the question under consideration.

16. The seventeen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.205) was chiefly distinguished by the fact that it did not commit anybody in any way. It certainly referred to the forthcoming negotiations, but there was no mention of the position of the General Assembly or the responsibility of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. If it was adopted, the "nuclear Powers" would continue to prepare further series of test explosions, distrust would continue to prevail among them, and, even worse, more States would obtain possession of those terrible destructive weapons.

17. The real issue lay between suspension and cessation of test explosions. That was the crux of the matter, and in that he would disagree with the representative of the Union of South Africa. Control was merely a secondary issue, as the proposal for suspension, which could be renewed every year, by the United States and the United Kingdom would still be valid even if there was a system of control. All the nations of the world demanded a universal cessation of test explosions; a recommendation for a one-year suspension would clearly run counter to world public opinion.

18. Mr. SOSA RODRIGUEZ (Venezuela) said that his delegation would vote in favour of the seventeen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.205), as amended by the seven-Power amendment (A/C.1/L.209). It would also vote for the first Indian-Yugoslav draft resolution (A/C.1/L.210/Rev.1), but would abstain on the second (A/C.1/L.211), which merely repeated the substance of the seventeen-Power proposal.

19. His delegation would vote against the fourteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.202/Rev.1 and Add.1 and 2) and against the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.203 and Corr.1), which did not provide for the necessary safeguards in the matter of control. It would also vote against the USSR draft resolution for the reduction of the military budgets of the great Powers (A/C.1/L.204), because its provisions would be too easy to circumvent.

20. His delegation would vote for the Irish draft resolution (A/C.1/L.206) because the problem of the dissemination of nuclear weapons was extremely important. It would also support the three-Power draft (A/C.1/L.213), which would give encouragement to the participants in the Geneva conference. He would vote for the Mexican draft resolution (A/C.1/L.203) because no permanent settlement was possible without agreement between the great Powers.

21. Mr. ZORN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the best reply he could give the representative of the Union of South Africa was to refer to a
United Press dispatch from Geneva. The dispatch stated that the USSR had that day submitted to the Western Powers a draft treaty providing for the immediate and final cessation of nuclear weapons tests with the establishment of a control system to ensure that the agreement was carried out. According to the dispatch, the United States had indicated that it was not prepared to conclude an agreement of that kind. Those facts needed no comment.

22. The representative of Venezuela appeared to believe that the USSR was against controls. The proposal made at Geneva should suffice to dispel any doubts on that score.

23. Mr. SCHURMANN (Netherlands), speaking on a point of order, said that the object of holding a night meeting was presumably to adopt one or more resolutions before the end of the opening day of the Geneva conference. There were a great number of draft resolutions, and voting might take a considerable time; besides, the debate had already lasted for three weeks. He would therefore move the closure of the debate. It was not his intention to deprive representatives of the right to explain their votes, but there appeared to be no reason why such explanations should not be given after the vote.

24. Mr. LALL (India) felt that, before the debate was closed, the sponsors of the proposals should be allowed to reply to the criticisms made and to the questions asked by various speakers. It would be too late to do so when explanations of vote were given. He therefore hoped that the Chairman would permit him to speak a few minutes on certain points raised with reference to the draft resolution submitted by fourteen Powers including India (A/C.1/L.232/Rev. 1 and Add.1 and 2).

25. The CHAIRMAN understood that, in making that statement, the representative of India was one of the two speakers opposing the closure of the debate permitted under rule 118 of the General Assembly's rules of procedure. Only one more representative opposing the closure of the debate could be permitted to speak.

26. Mr. WINIEWICZ (Poland) said that he opposed the closure of the debate. None of the arguments put forward seemed to be valid. The matter under discussion was of such importance that its discussion should not be curtailed. He fully supported the remarks of the representative of India, since he was, for his part, anxious to hear the explanations of the sponsors of the proposals concerning points raised in the course of the debate.

27. The CHAIRMAN said that he was bound to apply the rules of procedure. As there had been two speakers against closure of the debate, the Netherlands representative's motion would have to be put to the vote.

28. Mr. SCHURMANN (Netherlands) explained, in connexion with the statement of the representative of Poland, that in moving the closure of the debate, he had referred only to the specific discussion of the question of nuclear weapons tests and not to the debate on the question of disarmament as a whole.

29. Mr. LALL (India) said that he was against the closure of the debate since it would deprive the members of the Committee of their right of reply. He asked the Committee to allow the sponsors of draft resolutions to use their well-recognized right to reply to questions put to them and provide the explanations expected of them.

30. The CHAIRMAN said that he would be compelled to abide by his decision to put the motion for closure to the vote unless it was withdrawn in response to the request made by the representative of India.

31. Mr. SCHURMANN (Netherlands) said that he was willing to amend his motion and to request that the debate should be closed after the representative of India had replied to comments on his draft resolution.

32. In reply to a question from Mr. SLIM (Tunisia), Mr. SCHURMANN (Netherlands) said that his motion did not apply to the reduction of military budgets or to the United Nations machinery for disarmament talks. It referred exclusively to the draft resolutions to be voted on at the present meeting.

33. The CHAIRMAN invited the representative of India to reply, if he wished, to remarks made concerning his draft resolution.

34. Mr. LALL (India) appealed to the representative of the Netherlands to withdraw his motion for closure and to reintroduce it, if he so wished, after two or three speakers had replied to the questions put to them as sponsors of the draft resolutions.

35. Mr. SCHURMANN (Netherlands) said that he had gone as far as he could to meet the wishes of the representative of India and was afraid that he could go no further.

36. The CHAIRMAN said that, as two representatives had spoken against the motion for closure, he would put the motion to the vote.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

The United Arab Republic, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Guatemala, Honduras, Italy, Laos, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Thailand.


Abstaining: Venezuela, Austria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Federation of Malaya, Finland, Greece, Haiti, Iran, Israel, Japan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Mexico, New Zealand, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sudan, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, Union of South Africa.

The result of the vote was 27 in favour, 27 against, and 27 abstentions.

The motion was not adopted.

37. Mr. LALL (India) explained that operative paragraph 1 of the fourteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.202/Rev.1 and Add.1 and 2) referred to the
technical arrangements and controls considered necessary to ensure the observance of the discontinuance of nuclear tests. Operative paragraph 2 stated that control was essential.

38. The sponsors had wished to ensure that the Geneva conference would be a success. If, in spite of their efforts, the conference did not succeed in establishing effective international controls, the negotiators would be able to refer the matter back to the General Assembly or to the Disarmament Commission, or call for a special session of the Assembly.

39. He hoped that that explanation would induce those who had felt that they could not vote for the draft resolution to reconsider their position.

40. Mr. SOSA RODRIGUEZ (Venezuela) said that his objection to the fourteen-Power draft resolution was that it allowed for indefinite suspension of nuclear tests as long as it suited one of the parties: that which wanted to prevent the conclusion of an agreement for the permanent cessation of tests.

41. In the event of a deadlock he wondered if, after tests had been suspended for a period, one party could ask the Assembly to decide that nuclear weapons tests might be resumed. He felt that, in a situation of that kind, the moral constraint would be too great, since the party that was at a disadvantage would have to ask the Assembly to adopt a resolution authorizing it to resume tests.

42. Mr. DE LA COLINA (Mexico) said that he wholeheartedly supported the draft resolution submitted by the delegations of India and Yugoslavia (A/C.1/L.210/Rev.1) concerning the membership of the new Disarmament Commission, which would, in a way, be an extension of the First Committee under another name. He also approved the establishment by the new Disarmament Commission of a limited working group, provided for in the French amendments (A/C.1/L.212).

43. The Mexican delegation reserved the right to amend its draft resolution by introducing some slight drafting alterations, in the light of the decision to be taken concerning the draft submitted by India and Yugoslavia and the French amendments. But, however wide the scope of the preliminary negotiations on the membership of a group that would be acceptable to all countries, it was essential that the "nuclear Powers", which had the technical and industrial capacity, the scientific knowledge and the resources necessary to manufacture nuclear weapons, should participate in those negotiations.

44. He hoped that the draft resolution submitted by India and Yugoslavia, as well as the Mexican draft, would be unanimously adopted.

45. Mr. AIKEN (Ireland) moved the adjournment of the meeting under rule 119 of the rules of procedure. He thus hoped that delegations would have time to study in detail the draft resolution concerning the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons (A/C.1/L.206).

46. The CHAIRMAN, in accordance with rule 119, put the motion of the representative of Ireland to the vote without discussion.

The motion was rejected by 36 votes to 26, with 16 abstentions.

47. Mr. AIKEN (Ireland) said that the failure of the debate on the discontinuance of tests of nuclear weapons to produce any result was most disappointing to his delegation and to many others. Moreover, the inability of the Committee to reach an agreement on the question only heightened the risk that the number of States possessing nuclear weapons would increase.

48. The fears of the "nuclear Powers" for their security, whether exaggerated or not, made them highly exacting as to the formula they would accept for the stopping of tests. The stopping of tests would involve risks which would not be entailed by an agreement to check further dissemination of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, very great risks were inherent in a failure to reach such an agreement.

During the debate, several representatives, including the representative of Canada (954th meeting), the representative of New Zealand (955th meeting), the representative of Burma (960th meeting), the Polish representative (953rd meeting) and the representative of Australia (960th meeting), had painted an impressive picture of the danger which would result from an extension of what had been called the "Nuclear Club".

49. There were two imperative reasons why the spread of nuclear weapons must be checked as soon as possible. The first was the slowness with which negotiations towards general disarmament were proceeding. The second was that failure to halt the spread of nuclear weapons during the long period of negotiations on general disarmament was likely to make those negotiations abortive. The representative of the Soviet Union had rightly said, in the statement he had made at the 954th meeting, that as the number of States able to manufacture nuclear weapons increased, it would be more and more difficult to stop tests.

50. He stressed that the measures proposed by his delegation were not intended to preserve the existing situation or to replace an effective and equitable disarmament agreement. As the Argentine representative had pointed out at the 957th meeting, the Irish proposal sought to localize the blaze while in the meantime efforts were being made to put it out. He asked whether the negotiations which accused the Irish proposal of maintaining an undemocratic distinction between the "nuclear Powers" and the other States thought it would be desirable to achieve an "atomic democracy" in which all the States of the world had atomic weapons. Many people thought that would be impossible to attain, because the intervening phase during which a large number of States had nuclear weapons would be even more dangerous than the present situation. A certain number of States—and even factions within States—would find themselves in the possession of a decisive temporary advantage over a rival or an enemy. There was no certainty that those who had such an advantage would display the restraint which the United States had done in a somewhat similar situation at the end of the Second World War.

51. As regards the agreement of the Powers possessing nuclear weapons not to put their weapons at the disposal of countries which did not at present possess them, its very nature would be the best guarantee of its effectiveness, since it would be in the interest of the "nuclear Powers" to respect it individually and collectively.
52. It was essential that the "nuclear Powers" should undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons to other States, if manufacture of those weapons by the "non-nuclear Powers" was to be avoided. Indeed, until the "nuclear Powers" formally undertook to refrain from doing so, the "non-nuclear Powers" might fear a possible transfer to an enemy or rival, and strive to offset that risk by trying to manufacture their own nuclear weapons. The "non-nuclear Powers" would not be ready to refrain from manufacturing those arms as long as the "nuclear Powers" did not undertake to refrain from transferring them.

53. The CHAIRMAN declared the discussion on the draft resolutions and amendments closed.

54. He recalled that the Committee had before it nine draft resolutions and invited it to decide on the order of priority for the vote. The United States representative had requested priority for the seventeen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.205). Priority had also been requested by the Swedish representative for the draft resolution submitted by his delegation together with those of Austria and Japan (A/C.1/L.213). According to the normal procedure, the first text to be put to the vote should be the seventeen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.202/Rev.1 and Add.1 and 2) but under article 132 of the rules of procedure, the Committee could decide otherwise.

55. Mr. WINIEWICZ (Poland) considered that, under article 132 of the rules of procedure, the fourteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.202/Rev.1 and Add.1 and 2) should be put to the vote first because it had been submitted first. Admittedly, article 132 allowed for exceptions, but the regular order could not be altered without good reason. The reasons put forward for giving priority to the seventeen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.205) did not justify an exception to the rule.

56. Mr. CORREA (Ecuador) said that he supported the United States motion to give priority to the seventeen-Power draft resolution. The fourteen-Power draft resolution, in its revised form, had been submitted after that of the seventeen Powers. If the Committee wanted to apply the rules of procedure to the letter, it should first vote on the draft resolutions of the USSR. Nevertheless, the seventeen-Power text dealt with the three questions which the Committee was considering, and his delegation would find it difficult to express its views on draft resolutions concerning certain aspects of disarmament before knowing the Committee's opinion on the text which covered the problem as a whole.

57. The CHAIRMAN said that the fourteen-Power draft resolution in its original form had been submitted by India on 9 October as a Committee document (A/C.1/L.202) and on 5 October as an Assembly document (A/L.246). The fact that the text had later been recast did not change the date of the original draft.

58. Mr. NOSEK (Czechoslovakia) recalled that, during the debate on the Committee's agenda, his delegation had expressed the view (942nd meeting) that the question of the cessation of nuclear tests should be given priority. It held to that opinion as regards the order in which the draft resolutions were to be put to the vote. The United States' tactics were intended to prevent consideration of questions which would embarrass certain delegations.

59. Prince WAN WAITHAYAKON (Thailand) pointed out that it had been decided at the 944th meeting that the order of priority of the draft resolutions should be determined on their merits. The Committee had thus already "decided otherwise" in the sense of article 132 of the rules of procedure. His delegation thought that the seventeen-Power draft resolution, which covered many aspects of disarmament, should be put to the vote first.

60. Mr. PAZHWAQ (Afghanistan) observed, in reply to the argument put forward by the representative of Thailand, that the Committee had not finished discussing those provisions of the seventeen-Power draft resolution which did not deal with the cessation of nuclear tests. It therefore did not seem possible to proceed to the vote.

61. Mr. LALL (India) said that the fourteen-Power draft resolution had priority under the rules of procedure and that the sponsors did not intend to yield on that point. Article 132 of the rules of procedure only applied to proposals relating to the same question. Only the fourteen-Power draft resolution and that of the USSR fulfilled that condition. The seventeen-Power draft resolution also dealt with other matters and was therefore outside the scope of article 132. If, as the representative of Thailand had very rightly pointed out, the proposals were to be considered on their merits, the fourteen-Power draft resolution was the most comprehensive of those which dealt with the cessation of nuclear tests. The seventeen-Power text scarcely touched on the problem. Moreover, it was open to doubt whether that text dealt with disarmament at all; it vaguely alluded to certain aspect of disarmament, with particular reference to work which was to take place outside the General Assembly. The seventeen-Power draft resolution should not, therefore, have priority over proposals which dealt exclusively with the cessation of nuclear tests.

62. The CHAIRMAN reminded the representative of Thailand that, after the general discussion on the three questions relating to disarmament, the Committee had to take a decision on the priority of all draft resolutions on their merits, which it had not yet done.

63. In reply to the representative of Afghanistan, he stated that, following a motion by the Netherlands concerning the closure of the discussion on those draft resolutions which dealt with the discontinuance of nuclear tests, a motion which had not been adopted, the Chairman had declared the closure of the discussion on all the draft resolutions.

64. The interpretation given by the representative of India to rule 132 of the rules of procedure did not seem to be a tenable one. The seventeen-Power draft resolution certainly dealt with the discontinuance of nuclear tests as well as with disarmament; but it also dealt with the reduction of the military budgets of the great Powers, as a result of the seven-Power amendment (A/C.1/L.209), which had been incorporated in that draft. For priority purposes, that text was comparable to the fourteen-Power draft resolution and that of the Soviet Union.

65. For those reasons, he considered that the Committee could decide to give priority to a draft resolution concerning all the items.
66. Sir Claude COREA (Ceylon) said that the fourteen-Power draft resolution constituted a single proposal, while the seventeen-Power draft resolution, which was divided into four sections, contained several proposals. It could not be argued, therefore, that the present proposals related to the same question within the meaning of rule 132 of the rules of procedure: the question at issue was dealt with only in section I of the seventeen-Power draft resolution, while it was the sole subject of the fourteen-Power draft. Moreover, as far as the substance was concerned, the fourteen-Power draft resolution dealt more fully with the question of the discontinuance of nuclear tests than section I of the seventeen-Power draft resolution. It would therefore be preferable for the Committee to vote first on the more detailed proposal: if that was rejected, representatives would then be able, if they so desired, to vote for the other; that would be impossible if the order was reversed.

67. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) thought that the Committee itself ought to settle the question of priority. Rule 132 gave the Committee discretionary powers to take any steps that were necessary for the orderly progress of its work. The order of priority should be decided at once by a vote. Moreover, when it was decided not to classify the proposals under various headings—disarmament, discontinuance of nuclear tests, reduction of military budgets—the Committee had quite properly retained the right to determine the order of priority, in due course, according to the way the discussion went. The question ought therefore to be settled by a vote, first on the order proposed by the United States at the 968th meeting.

68. Mr. LODGE (United States of America) proposed that the Committee should vote on his motion.

69. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that, despite the lateness of the hour, it was important to give some thought to the order of priority to be accorded to the draft resolutions on the cessation of nuclear tests. The United States procedural manoeuvre to prevent the Committee from dealing first with the question of the cessation of tests by grouping three different problems under the same heading, had not succeeded because the Committee had virtually confined itself to the cessation of tests, and by doing so had in fact decided the order of priority.

70. He therefore shared the view of the Indian representative and others that the Committee should keep to the procedure laid down in rule 132 of the rules of procedure. The Indian draft resolution on the cessation of tests had been submitted a few hours before that of the Soviet Union; hence the Soviet delegation would not dispute the right of the Indian delegation to request that the fourteen-Power draft resolution should be voted upon first. The argument made by the United Kingdom representative at the 968th meeting that the Committee must make haste because of the conference at Geneva was actually an argument in favour of adopting a decision on the cessation of tests, because the Geneva conference, which had actually started, was devoted to that question exclusively. Moreover, the seventeen-Power draft resolution merely touched upon the question of the cessation of tests in one of its four sections. It could therefore not be given priority.

71. In connexion with the Chairman's observation that the seventeen-Power draft resolution covered the three disarmament questions, he noted that when it was submitted the draft resolution had in fact carried the titles of the three items, but had not contained any provision relating to the reduction of military budgets. It was therefore not accurate to say that it covered the whole problem. For those reasons, the Soviet delegation would request that, in accordance with the rules of procedure, the Committee should vote first on the fourteen-Power draft resolution, then on the Soviet draft resolution, and subsequently on the other draft resolutions proposed.

72. Mr. SCHURMANN (Netherlands) said that, at the beginning of the discussion, it had been decided (944th meeting) that the order of priority would be determined by taking into account the respective merits of the draft resolutions and would not necessarily correspond to the chronological order. Consequently, a proposal to follow the chronological order would have the effect of reversing a decision already taken, and that would require a two-thirds majority.

73. He proposed that, in accordance with the decision it had already taken, the Committee should vote upon the order of priority and thus determine the respective merits of the various draft resolutions.

74. Mr. JORDAAN (Union of South Africa) moved that the procedural discussion be closed.

75. The CHAIRMAN said that, in the absence of any objection, the motion of the representative of the Union of South Africa was adopted.

76. He called for a vote upon the United States motion to give priority to the seventeen-Power draft resolution.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Iceland, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Iceland, Iran, Israel, Italy, Japan, Laos, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Federation of Malaya, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras.


Abstaining: Ireland, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, Venezuela, Austria, Finland.

The motion was adopted by 45 votes to 25, with 11 abstentions.

77. The CHAIRMAN recalled that the seven-Power amendment (A/C.1/L.209) had been incorporated in the text of the seventeen-Power draft resolution.

78. He called for a vote on the draft resolution submitted by Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil,
Canada, Denmark, Ecuador, Iran, Italy, Laos, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Thailand, United Kingdom and United States (A/C.1/L.205), as amended.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Costa Rica, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Federation of Malaya, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Sudan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti.

Abstaining: Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Philippines, Sudan, Sweden, Tunisia, Austria, Bolivia, Federation of Malaya.

The paragraph was rejected by 36 votes to 26, with 19 abstentions.

82. Mr. LALL (India) withdrew the remainder of the fourteen-Power draft resolution.

83. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that he had voted for the fourteen-Power draft resolution's main provision calling for a discontinuance of tests pending the conclusion of an agreement. The Soviet Union delegation had thus shown that it was anxious to reach an agreement, which would not appear to be the case with those who had cast negative votes.

84. Since members of the Committee had indicated their positions by their votes on that paragraph of the fourteen-Power draft resolution, his delegation considered that there was now no point in putting its draft resolution (A/C.1/L.203 and Corr.1) to the vote.

85. Mr. WINIEWICZ (Poland) said that his delegation had voted for operative paragraph 1 of the fourteen-Power draft resolution and that it would have voted for the entire text as well as for the Soviet Union draft resolution.

86. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the Soviet Union draft resolution on the reduction of the military budgets of the great Powers (A/C.1/L.204).

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Belgium, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.


Against: Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Federation of Malaya, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti.

Abstaining: Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Ghana, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Panama, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Sweden, Tunisia, United Arab Republic, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Austria.

The draft resolution was rejected by 39 votes to 10, with 32 abstentions.

87. The CHAIRMAN said that the Irish delegation had asked for a roll-call vote on the second paragraph of its draft resolution (A/C.1/L.206). He therefore put that paragraph to the vote.
A vote was taken by roll-call.

Poland, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Poland, Romania, Sudan, Sweden, Tunisia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, Venezuela, Yemen, Albania, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Ceylon, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Finland, Ghana, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Liberia, Libya, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Panama.

Abstaining: Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Cambodia, Canada, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, France, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines.

The paragraph was adopted by 37 votes to none, with 44 abstentions.

88. Mr. Aiken (Ireland) was gratified to note that no delegation had voted against the second paragraph of the Irish draft resolution. Nevertheless, he did not wish to recommend any particular method for the study of that question, and he therefore withdrew the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.208), hoping that the Disarmament Commission would give the matter priority.

89. Mr. Walker (Australia) said that his delegation had abstained in the vote on the second paragraph because its intention had been not to support the proposal in the third paragraph. However, the Australian delegation believed the problem to be very important and the new Disarmament Commission ought certainly to give it the very closest attention.

90. The CHAIRMAN recalled that the Mexican delegation had asked for its draft resolution (A/C.1/L.208) to be voted on last. He therefore suggested that the Committee should take up the Indian-Yugoslav draft resolution (A/C.1/L.210/Rev.1), to which France had proposed some amendments (A/C.1/L.212).

91. Mr. Lall (India) said that many delegations had expressed a desire to consider the Indian-Yugoslav draft resolution with its sponsors at greater length. It would therefore be preferable to defer the vote until Monday, 3 November.

92. Mr. Lodge (United States of America) proposed that the vote on that draft should be deferred until Monday afternoon.

It was so decided.

93. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to vote on the Indian-Yugoslav draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.211.

94. Mr. Jordaan (Union of South Africa) asked whether the sponsors of that draft insisted on its being put to the vote, since the same subject was dealt with in operative paragraph 3 of the seventeen-Power draft resolution already adopted.

95. Mr. Lall (India) preferred the wording of the Indian-Yugoslav draft resolution and asked for it to be put to the vote.

The draft resolution was adopted by 73 votes to none, with 7 abstentions.

The meeting rose on Saturday, 1 November at 1.5 a.m.