discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests and because the efforts to work out a text acceptable to all had been unsuccessful. His delegation realized that the failure to arrive at an agreed text reflected a difference of opinion between the Powers taking part in the negotiations at Geneva, but felt that the negotiations could in no way be assisted by presenting the negotiators with a resolution which reflected a division of opinion. The purpose of the three-Power draft resolution was to avoid such a division. That purpose, however, could only be fulfilled if that draft resolution received priority over the other drafts dealing with nuclear tests. His delegation consequently requested priority for it.

3. Mr. WALDHEIM (Austria) said it was his delegation’s conviction that the Assembly must spare no effort in order to create the necessary conditions for a discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests. Such a discontinuance could, however, be achieved only through agreement between the "nuclear Powers" themselves; at the present stage, the General Assembly could hardly do more than express its hope that the Geneva talks would be successful. That was why his delegation had joined in sponsoring the three-Power draft resolution. It was aware that the draft provided no solution to the substance of the question, but felt that it would be wiser for the Committee to adopt a procedural resolution unanimously than to aggravate existing tensions by a divided vote. Only in that way could it contribute to the success of the Geneva negotiations.

4. He joined the other sponsors of the three-Power draft resolution in appealing to all delegations which had sponsored draft resolutions on the question not to press them to a vote, and supported the Swedish representative’s request that the three-Power draft resolution be given priority.

5. The CHAIRMAN noted that, although the three-Power draft resolution was entitled "Question of disarmament", it dealt only with the question of the discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests. He suggested that the title should be amended accordingly.

6. Mr. UNDEN (Sweden), Mr. WALDHEIM (Austria) and Mr. MATSUDAIRA (Japan) accepted the suggestion.

7. Mr. LODGE (United States of America) said that the sponsors of the seventeen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.205) were willing to support the three-Power draft resolution, and to give it priority, if the sponsors of other draft resolutions dealing with the question of nuclear weapons tests agreed to withdraw them or not to press them to a vote. His delegation hoped that the sponsors of other draft resolutions would agree to do so in the interests of the Geneva negotiations, since the adoption of the three-Power compromise draft resolution would be the most constructive action the General Assembly could take in the matter.
8. If, however, the sponsors of other draft resolutions insisted that their drafts be put to a vote, his motion for priority for the seventeen-Power draft resolution would, of course, still stand, and he would be obliged to press it.

9. Mr. NOBLE (United Kingdom) associated his delegation with the United States representative's statement. His delegation welcomed the effort made by the sponsors of the three-Power draft resolution to enable the Assembly to express its attitude towards the Geneva negotiations on the basis of unanimity or near-unanimity, and would be prepared to support the draft resolution in that spirit.

10. Mr. LALL (India) said that, although the Assembly had often found it best to express itself very mildly on an issue, the sponsors of the fourteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.202/Rev.1 and Add.1 and 2) felt that the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests was of such importance to the world that the Assembly was in duty bound to express its opinion on the substance of the matter. The fourteen Powers could not, therefore, agree that it would be a constructive action for the Assembly to adopt the three-Power draft resolution, and would consequently regrettably be obliged to maintain their draft resolution and to request that it be put to the vote first, as would be the normal procedure under the Committee's rules.

11. Replying to the comments made by the United States and USSR representatives at the 968th meeting, he wished to assure the Committee that he had, to the best of his ability, given it a frank and honest account of the negotiations in which his delegation had been engaged.

12. It was his delegation's belief that the Powers meeting at Geneva all desired the same goal—a definitive cessation of nuclear weapons tests. The Indian delegation still hoped that they would be able to reach agreement on the matter at Geneva.

13. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the three-Power draft resolution, far from advancing matters, would bring the debate on the question of nuclear weapons tests back to its starting-point. By merely expressing a generalized hope for the success of the Geneva negotiations, the draft ignored the opinions expressed in the Committee and made no effort to stimulate action in the direction desired by the whole world. Although he did not question the motives of its sponsors, it was plain that in the circumstances the objective effect of the draft resolution would be to hinder, rather than promote, the actual cessation of nuclear tests, and to create the spurious impression that agreement had been reached and some meaningful action taken by the United Nations. The Assembly would be remiss in its duty if it adopted a resolution which said nothing about the substance of a question on which the world expected it to speak out.

14. The United States and United Kingdom delegations' decision to support the suggestion that the three-Power draft resolution should be given priority clearly revealed their unwillingness to take any decision on the question of a cessation of nuclear tests and their desire to take shelter behind a meaningless resolution in the hope that world public opinion would thus be kept in ignorance of the position they had adopted in the final stages of the debate. His delegation considered it inadmissible that a draft resolution intro-

duced at the last minute should be given priority in the voting. For those reasons, it would vote against the draft resolution and against the request that it be given priority.

15. Mr. VIDIC (Yugoslov)ia) said that his delegation regretted the failure to reach an agreement which would have provided the most favourable conditions for the Geneva negotiations. It nevertheless continued to hope that the negotiations would be successful and that an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests would be achieved.

16. In the absence of a unanimous solution—to which all its efforts in the Committee had been directed—his delegation had considered it necessary to express its Government's policy in the matter by co-sponsoring the fourteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.202/Rev.1 and Add.1 and 2). It would therefore be unable to support the other draft resolutions on the subject. What he had said would also determine his delegation's position on the question of priority.

17. Mr. LODGE (United States of America) said that, as the sponsors of the other draft resolutions on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests were unwilling to withdraw them in favour of the three-Power text (A/C.1/L.213), his delegation was compelled to state its position on all the drafts and amendments before the Committee.

18. The United States would vote against the Soviet draft resolution on nuclear tests (A/C.1/L.203 and Corr.1) because of the absence from it of any reference to the need for any control or to the present Geneva negotiations, which offered the greatest hope for agreement. It was clear that the Soviet Union wanted a paper promise which would be a hoax on the peoples of the world.

19. His delegation would also vote against the fourteen-Power draft (A/C.1/L.202/Rev.1 and Add.1 and 2) because, although the text recognized the importance of agreement on controls, it called for an unconditional discontinuance of tests until such an agreement was reached. The substitution of the word "until" for the word "pending" used in paragraph 1 of the original draft (A/C.1/L.202) showed that the intent was that there should be a discontinuance of tests whether or not controls were established.

20. The United States would vote in favour of the text submitted by Austria, Japan and Sweden (A/C.1/L.213) because it expressed a sentiment shared by all States.

21. His delegation urged the adoption of the seventeen-Power draft (A/C.1/L.205) which it had co-sponsored and for which it had formally requested priority in the voting (968th meeting). It accepted the amendment submitted by seven Latin-American countries (A/C.1/L.209), but could not accept the Irish amendments (A/C.1/L.207). The objective of those amendments, while laudable in itself, could not be achieved in the context of the seventeen-Power proposal; the United States could not accept an obligation the observance of which could not be verified.

22. His delegation would also vote against the related Irish proposal for an ad hoc committee to study the dangers of the further dissemination of nuclear weapons (A/C.1/L.206) because such a committee would in effect be a committee to examine the whole disarma-
ment question, thus duplicating the work of the Disarmament Commission.

23. The United States would vote against the Soviet proposal on the reduction of the military budgets of the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom and France (A/C.1/L.204) because it considered that such a reduction would come in connexion with real agreement on disarmament; the Soviet draft was a transparent manoeuvre intended for propaganda purposes.

24. On the other hand, his delegation would vote for the Indian-Yugoslav draft resolution on measures to prevent surprise attack (A/C.1/L.211) because it restated a section of the seventy-Power draft.

25. With regard to the two proposals for United Nations disarmament machinery (A/C.1/L.208, A/C.1/L.210), he felt that a generally acceptable compromise could be worked out and suggested that the vote on those texts should be temporarily deferred.

26. Mr. BELAUNE (Peru) reviewed the various initiatives that had been taken with a view to formulating a satisfactory draft resolution on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests and expressed regret that the Indian compromise proposal (98th meeting, para.4) had not been accepted by the thirty Powers concerned. The Soviet Union representative had proposed that the delegations of the United States, the United Kingdom and the USSR should make identical declarations concerning their interpretation of the compromise proposal, but the text of those declarations would be merely a restatement of the Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.203 and Corr.1). Indeed, what had happened in the Committee was that the Soviet Union had ruled out all other initiatives on the question of tests as bad. Yet all States sought a solution of the problem and the public awaited a word of confidence from the General Assembly. In the circumstances, the three-Power draft (A/C.1/L.213) was not a meaningless banality: it represented the general sentiment of the Assembly and Peru would vote for it. The Soviet Union would have the Assembly, as an alternative, tell the Geneva negotiators that, regardless of what they accomplished by the normal process of exchange of views, they were precluded from agreeing to anything except a permanent and unconditional cessation of nuclear tests. There was not point in holding the Geneva talks if they were to be prejudged by setting as the exclusive goal the permanent and unconditional cessation of tests, as advocated by the Soviet Union.

27. The Soviet intention appeared to be to bypass the Geneva negotiations. The purpose of those talks was to reach agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests with practical controls which would ensure that the parties observed the agreement. Cessation could not be discussed independently of the question of controls because the two questions were substantially inseparable, just as the prohibition of atomic weapons could not be isolated from the question of inspection. Those who considered controls unnecessary were not really working towards a cessation; the Soviet Union appeared to want a verbal, not a real, cessation of tests, and it could not hope to delude world public opinion on the subject.

28. All parties agreed on the objective: the discontinuance of tests. The purpose of the Geneva talks was to agree on the means of achieving that objective, namely, inspection and controls. Unconditional cessation without inspection would be unacceptable logically and technically. Peru would be obliged to vote against the Soviet draft resolution and against the fourteen-Power draft (A/C.1/L.202/Rev.1 and Add.1 and 2). If the fourteen Powers had succeeded in presenting an agreed compromise proposal as a substitute for the three-Power draft (A/C.1/L.213), Peru would have been prepared to vote for it. Unfortunately, their laudable efforts had failed.

29. Peru would support the Indian-Yugoslav draft resolution on measures to prevent surprise attack (A/C.1/L.211).

30. Peru would also support the Indian-Yugoslav draft resolution regarding the reconstitution of the Disarmament Commission (A/C.1/L.210). While it was true that, under the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council had primary responsibility for security and consequently for disarmament, the Assembly was fully justified in taking over the problem because the Secretary-General had informed it that the Disarmament Commission had failed to carry out its function. The existence of the Disarmament Commission would be of great value, not only because it would provide the machinery through which the parties could continue to negotiate on disarmament, but because it could eventually deal with such other aspects of disarmament as the prevention of surprise attack and the control of the production and stockpiling of nuclear weapons.

31. Peru would also vote in favour of the seventy-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.205).

32. Mr. AMADEO (Argentina) reiterated his delegation's support for the seventy-Power draft resolution. It was true that the seven Powers had been prepared to accept the Indian-Yugoslav compromise proposal, but their approval was conditional on the approval of proposals for general, balanced disarmament and the prevention of surprise attack. They could not depart from their basic position on disarmament, namely that all aspects of the question were inseparable, and they had already made a great concession by agreeing to discuss separate proposals on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests and on surprise attack. They could not further strain their capacity for compromise. Argentina was prepared to vote for the seventy-Power text because it was a sound and non-controversial presentation of the position on the discontinuance of nuclear tests; that draft should be given priority in the voting. Argentina would also vote for the three-Power proposal (A/C.1/L.213).

33. Mr. WINIEWICZ (Poland) emphasized that the first step towards disarmament should take the form of a permanent and unqualified agreement on the urgent question of a cessation of nuclear weapons tests. Such an agreement could be reached without delay and would have a particular value in reducing the dangers of atomic radiation. It would also facilitate future agreement on disarmament problems and lead to an improvement in the international climate and to the arresting of the armaments race. It was the duty of the United Nations to convey to the Geneva conference beginning on 31 October an explicit position on the tests. That duty could be adequately carried out by the adoption of the Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.203 and Corr.1). Nothing in that draft could be construed as giving orders to the Geneva negotiators: the proposal merely
recommended negotiation of an appropriate agreement to implement a permanent cessation of nuclear tests.

34. The main shortcoming of the seventeen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.205) was that it was evasive on the most important question of a cessation of nuclear tests and was limited to a suspension of tests. Moreover, by proposing a one-year suspension, it implied a probable resumption of testing, thus undermining hopes for a lasting improvement in the international atmosphere. The United States and the United Kingdom opposed a permanent cessation and called instead for a suspension with controls, renewable when controls had been installed and general progress had been made towards disarmament. The Polish delegation was in favour of speedy, general and controlled disarmament, but in the light of the difficulties inherent in reaching that goal, it had preferred a step-by-step approach which would not make a specific disarmament measure conditional upon any other measures. An agreement by all States to stop all tests forever should be reached, and it was the Assembly's duty to take a stand in favour of such cessation.

35. The fourteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.202/Rev.1 and Add.1 and 2) represented a serious and worth-while effort to reach a compromise on a cessation of tests until agreement could be reached on controls to ensure observance. It emphasized the importance and urgency of such an agreement and contained a proper evaluation of the situation. Poland further supported the position the draft took with respect to the reports of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (A/3838) and of the Conference of Experts to Study the Possibility of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests (A/3897).

36. As to the three-Power proposal (A/C.1/L.213), while the Polish delegation was convinced of the noble motives of its sponsors, it had to be said that the proposal avoided any expression of views regarding the cessation of tests, did not even attempt to summarize the opinions expressed in the Committee on the subject, and, in short, evaded the issues upon which the United Nations was expected to give a clear opinion.

37. The Polish delegation regretted that, despite the efforts of the Indian and Yugoslav delegations, it had not been possible to reach a compromise solution on the cessation of tests. However, compromise at any price would certainly have been an undesirable solution. The Soviet Union had therefore quite properly requested a clear declaration on the part of the Powers directly concerned of their interpretation of the meaning of the compromise proposal. In its view, the proposal should mean that tests would cease forever until agreement was reached on the means of control. Such a statement, had it been forthcoming from the United States and the United Kingdom, would have meant an honest understanding to cease tests—it would not have been a paper promise. Poland still hoped that the Committee would find a way of taking a clear position in favour of a permanent cessation of tests.

38. Mr. AIKEN (Ireland) said that he had originally hoped that the Committee would agree unanimously on a draft resolution covering the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests and the restriction of the discontinuance of nuclear weapons. However, in an effort to secure the widest possible agreement, he had considered it wiser to separate the question of the restriction of the discontinuance of nuclear weapons from that of the discontinuance of tests. Since it was now clear that no substantive resolution on disarmament could be adopted, he was withdrawing his amendments (A/C.1/L.207) to the seventeen-Power draft. His delegation was, however, maintaining its draft resolution on the same question (A/C.1/L.206) and hoped to be able to demonstrate that the restriction of the discontinuance of nuclear weapons was not only urgently necessary, but feasible.

39. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that he supported the compromise draft resolution formulated at the 968th meeting by the Indian representative, which urged the Geneva conference to discuss the discontinuance, rather than merely the suspension, of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests. The United States, however, had withdrawn its earlier approval of the Indian compromise proposal and was now prepared to vote only for the seventeen-Power draft resolution, which called for only a suspension of testing. He asked why the United States had taken that position, in view of the fact that the compromise proposal stressed the need for effective international control of any agreement that might be reached on the discontinuance of testing.

40. It was also surprising that the United States intended to vote against the fourteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.202/Rev.1 and Add.1 and 2), which was substantially identical in content with the compromise draft resolution and which presumably met the United States objections to the Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.203 and Corr.1) by referring both to the need for international controls and to the Geneva conference. It was obvious that, when it had originally supported the compromise draft resolution, the United States delegation had had something in mind wholly at variance with the actual terms of that draft and had in fact had no intention of seeking the complete cessation of testing.

41. Turning to the seventeen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.205), he criticized the fifth paragraph of the preamble which in effect praised the Geneva Conference of Experts for having taken "steps in the direction of progressive openness of information concerning technologies and armaments"; the implication of that paragraph was that the United Nations and other bodies dealing with disarmament should assume the function of collecting intelligence data on the armaments of various States. Furthermore, the stress placed on the "technical approach" to disarmament in operative paragraph 4 represented an attempt by the United States and the United Kingdom to divert the United Nations from consideration of concrete disarmament measures.

42. He could not support the seven-Power amendment (A/C.1/L.209) to the seventeen-Power draft resolution, which would incorporate in it the question of the reduction of military budgets. The policy of lumping the various disarmament problems together served merely to prevent any solution of the individual problems. The United States representative, in his criticism of the Soviet draft resolution on the reduction of the military budgets of the great Powers (A/C.1/
43. As the question of the prevention of surprise attack had occupied the attention of the Assembly, the Soviet delegation would vote for the draft resolution submitted on that matter by India and Yugoslavia (A/C.1/L.211), even though it contributed little to a solution of the problem.

44. The Soviet delegation would also support the fourteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.202/Rev.1 and Add.1 and 2), which, although not wholly satisfactory, met the chief requirement for a solution of the problem of nuclear weapons testing in that it called for the immediate discontinuance of tests without setting any conditions.

45. Mr. PETER (Hungary) said that the arguments in support of the seventeen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.205) could be reduced to four points. First, it was said that, as all problems of disarmament were interlinked, separate agreements on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests could not be envisaged. The fact was, however, that unless the great Powers embarked on partial agreements on individual problems, it would be impossible to take a first step towards disarmament. Secondly, it was contended that the cessation of testing would not reduce existing arms stockpiles. It would, however, halt the contamination of the atmosphere and prevent the development of new types of weapons, thereby promoting the mutual confidence required for progress towards disarmament. Thirdly, it was argued that the resolution ultimately adopted by the General Assembly should refer to the need for international controls. That argument also was groundless since the resolution would be only a broad statement of principle, not a formal agreement. The fourth argument in favour of the seventeen-Power draft was the Western Powers' contention that they had to rely on nuclear weapons until the other side's superiority in military manpower had been reduced. It was impossible to take that argument seriously for it meant, in effect, that discredited political groups, which lacked mass support, should be permitted to use nuclear weapons to threaten other peoples.

46. His delegation could not vote in favour of the seventeen-Power draft resolution because to do so would be to support the continuation of nuclear tests. Suspension was not a compromise between continuation and cessation. The record number of test explosions in recent weeks demonstrated that a suspension of testing in fact served only to increase world tension and thus led to intensified preparations for new tests.

47. The Hungarian delegation intended to vote for the fourteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.202/Rev.1 and Add.1 and 2), which was a satisfactory compromise in that its main objective was the permanent cessation of nuclear testing. It would also vote for the Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.203 and Corr.1), which called for the cessation of testing without setting conditions of any kind.

48. The voting priority should be based on the order in which the various draft resolutions had been submitted; the Committee should therefore vote first on the fourteen-Power draft resolution.

49. Mr. CORREA (Ecuador) moved that the meeting should be adjourned until 8.30 p.m.

The motion was adopted by 40 votes to 9, with 15 abstentions.

The meeting rose at 6.35 p.m.