2. Referring to Mr. Zorin's argument that the offer of a one-year suspension of tests was meaningless because about one year was required to prepare a new series of tests and to process the results of the previous series, he pointed out that following its announcement of a unilateral suspension on 31 March 1958, the Soviet Union had resumed testing before the end of September, i.e., after less than six months, and was presently engaged in conducting an important series. He left it to the Committee, in the light of Mr. Zorin's own argument, to judge what the intentions of the Soviet Government had been when it had announced its suspension on 31 March.

3. What might ultimately be agreed upon at Geneva was something entirely apart from the voluntary offer of a one-year suspension. Only the negotiations could decide the nature and duration of the agreement, on which the United Kingdom had taken no position as yet. The United Kingdom delegation had made it clear that it envisaged the suspension of tests for longer than one year; that, if the Soviet Union was prepared to meet certain conditions, the Government of the United Kingdom would be prepared to suspend testing indefinitely. Those conditions were that the USSR would also suspend tests and that sufficient progress was made towards the installation of a control system and towards the adoption and execution of measures of real disarmament. It was the sincere hope of the United Kingdom that sufficient progress would be made at Geneva to justify the expectation of a permanent cessation.

4. The Soviet representative had accused the United Kingdom of adopting an intransigent approach to the Geneva negotiations because it had established as one condition for a permanent cessation of tests the achievement of satisfactory progress towards real disarmament. He (Mr. Noble) had said at the 94th meeting, in reply to a point made by Mr. Undén, the representative of Sweden, that, though he would not anticipate the United Kingdom position at the Geneva conference with regard to the interpretation of the words "satisfactory progress", that interpretation would certainly have due regard for what was practically possible. That could not be said to constitute an intransigent attitude.

5. The Soviet position was one of "all or nothing"—permanent cessation or no discontinuance of tests at all. As the representative of Peru had said (865th meeting), in urging the Soviet Union to agree to a one-year suspension, refusal to accept that offer would mean that the Soviet Union was prepared to give up the reality of the partial advantage for the shadow of the political position. That would be undertaking a serious responsibility. The United Kingdom envisaged a suspension of tests as a step towards real disarmament, which he believed must be the common objective.
6. He considered that it would be more appropriate to deal with the Soviet proposal for a reduction of the military budgets of the great Powers (A/C.1/L.204) when the draft resolutions were debated.

7. Mr. LODGE (United States of America) said that he was compelled to make a full reply to Mr. Zorin's statement at the 966th meeting because the United States position had been distorted and attacked. The Soviet allegations that the United States was opposed to the cessation of nuclear weapons tests, disarmament and the reduction of military budgets were grossly unfounded.

8. The Soviet representative's statements contradicted the previous Soviet position on nuclear weapons tests. Contrary to its policy at the twelfth session, the USSR would not be satisfied with a two to three-year suspension with adequate controls under the supervision of an international commission, but favoured unconditional cessation which was not to be made dependent on whether or not agreement was reached at the Geneva negotiations to begin on 31 October 1958. Although the USSR paid lip-service to acceptance of controls, it seemed really to want a permanent and uncontrolled cessation, notwithstanding the evident fact that the only way to be certain that testing ceased was to be sure that adequate controls were in operation and not to adopt a paper promise in the form of a General Assembly resolution. Thus, when the United States had moved towards the Soviet position, the USSR had adopted a stand in favour of what it knew would be impossible to carry out. Its unilateral offer of a suspension of tests made on 31 March 1958 had followed a United States public announcement that it would hold a series of tests in 1958. Yet the unilateral Soviet offer had been conditioned on the premise that the United States and the United Kingdom would call off their test series. Thus, the USSR was well aware that it could not be expected to fulfill its announced intention. Moreover, assuming, as the Soviet Union had, that about one year was required to prepare a test series, it must be deduced that, as early as the autumn of 1957, the USSR was planning the resumption of testing which was now in progress. Judging from the magnitude of those tests, it was clear that the original plans had not been altered.

9. The USSR had further misrepresented the United States position on the continuation of a suspension of tests beyond the first year. The United States had offered a one-year suspension beginning on 31 October 1958, provided that the Soviet Union also stopped conducting tests during that period. That suspension could actually amount to an immediate two-year halt: in the first year, an agreement might be expected to be reached on a suspension of tests with agreed controls; the following year, the control system would be installed. After that initial two-year period, the suspension could be continued indefinitely, subject to certain specifications which any nation negotiating in good faith should be willing to support.

10. It was difficult to understand why the Soviet Union now refused to adhere to principles which it had previously supported. It proclaimed its desire for a cessation of tests, yet it balked at the proposal for verification of the operation of controls each year; it exhorted all parties to disarm, yet it balked at the proposal that all parties should be satisfied each year that reasonable progress was being made in that direction. Finally, by playing on words, it accused the United States and the United Kingdom of intriguing against it and fostering the arms race, contrasting the United States proposal for armaments control as against the United Kingdom's reference to real disarmament. The United States was fully prepared to accept the United Kingdom wording if it would give satisfaction to the Soviet Union regarding its intentions.

11. It was true that the United States delegation had remained silent on the reduction of the military budgets of the great Powers proposed by the USSR. It had done so because the relevant draft resolution (A/C.1/L.204) was so spurious as not to deserve serious comment. The drastic reduction in United States armed forces and military expenditure following the Second World War and until the communist aggression in Korea should be compared with the build-up in Soviet armed forces and defence expenditure to a point where the Soviet people were being denied a decent standard of living in a land of great natural wealth. The United States was eager to reduce military expenditure and would agree to reductions to the fullest extent possible as a result of disarmament. That had been made clear by President Eisenhower's proposal as early as 1953 that savings from disarmament should be used to assist under-developed countries. Accordingly, the United States supported the amendment submitted by the seven Latin-American Powers (A/C.1/L.209) to the seventeen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.205).

12. Despite discouraging Soviet statements, the United States delegation was now on its way to the Geneva conference with instructions to conclude an agreement on testing on the basis of the report of the Conference of Experts to Study the Possibility of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests (A/3897). It hoped that the Soviet delegation would be similarly instructed.

13. The present situation should be viewed against the background of earlier Soviet actions on disarmament proposals. It would be recalled that the Baruch Plan/1 to place nuclear weapons under the control of an international agency had been wrecked by the Soviet Union; that the Soviet Union had refused to take part in the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe; that it had rejected the "open skies" plan proposed by President Eisenhower in 1955 to prevent surprise attack by means of ground and aerial inspection (DC/71, annex 17); and that it had vetoed the United States proposal in the Security Council for the establishment of an inspection zone in the Arctic (S/3996). It now appeared to be rejecting the clear proposal of the United States and the United Kingdom for a suspension of tests, a proposal made in complete good faith as an indispensable first step towards real disarmament.

14. Perhaps Soviet actions to obstruct progress towards peace could be accounted for by Soviet adherence to the doctrines of Karl Marx—which had always been inapplicable to the United States and were also obsolete so far as the rest of the world was concerned—and to the foolish notion that the United States was a

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capitalistic country standing in the way of Soviet progress. The United States was a country of economic humanism which desired nothing but health and happiness for the Soviet people. Soviet proposals in the United Nations were not defeated by an automatic majority led by the United States; they could win acceptance if there were a change in Soviet policy, and in that case the United States would like them to succeed. There was still time for the Soviet Union to effect such a change. He hoped that it would be represented at the Geneva conference and that it would abandon some of its antiquated ideas about the United States.

15. The CHAIRMAN declared the general debate closed and invited consideration of the various proposals before the Committee.

16. Mr. ABDOL (Iran) moved adjournment of the meeting until the following afternoon in order to allow time for the sponsors of the various draft resolutions and amendments to continue their efforts to work out a compromise formula acceptable to all, and especially to the Powers directly concerned.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 4.15 p.m.