4. The Iraqi delegation did not believe that any Power or group of Powers wanted to start a general war. Nevertheless, parliaments each year were voting bigger budgets for military expenditure without any great protest from their electorates. Although they knew that they would have to pay for that expenditure and that the production of armaments was good business for certain sectors of society, they tended to close their eyes to it because the manufacture of armaments created jobs and thus protected workers from the risk of unemployment. Furthermore, preparations for war kept millions of men under arms and needed three or four times as many people to feed and transport them and provide them with arms, clothing and other necessities, thus removing a large proportion of the manpower from the labour market. The fact remained that a high percentage of the economically active population was not contributing to social well-being or to raising the level of living. Since, however, armaments programmes were at present used as a remedy for economic recessions, it was understandable that certain countries should resist all efforts to bring about disarmament. Armaments also served to maintain the economic domination which some Powers exercised over colonial or semi-colonial territories and over the under-developed regions. It was not merely a case of the threat of force, for the supplying of weapons and troops to docile Governments helped to keep them in power.

5. Other Powers whose foreign and defence policies were based upon armaments secured the support of public opinion by persuading the people that the only way of improving their living conditions was to preserve and expand their control over foreign resources of raw materials and over markets. That approach had been used, for example, in connexion with the oil of the Sahara, as well as to justify the aggression against Egypt over the Suez Canal question. Moreover, many recent instances showed that some big Powers had been able to obtain political support amounting to real submission, with considerable economic advantage to themselves, merely through their possession of heavy armaments.

6. However, the armaments race also led to war. After the Second World War, there had been a tendency to interpret the armaments drive as one aspect of the ideological war, as a means of putting pressure upon opponents in the name of a certain social system. It was nevertheless a mistake to attribute wars to differences in social systems, for even when there had only been one social system in the advanced sector of the world, there had been arms races and wars.

7. In point of fact, armaments in the present day had become a matter of economic policy upon which depended the levels of employment and investment in certain countries and the level of living of their people. In those circumstances, it was clear that nothing could
be achieved if the problem of disarmament was examined in isolation. Together with measures of disarmament properly so-called, means must be sought to demobilize the millions of men under arms and reintegrate them into civilian life, and to divert the tremendous capital invested in armaments production to the production of consumer goods.

8. The transition from a war economy to a peace economy could not be effected piecemeal and at the purely national level. International agreement must be reached on certain economic questions, such as the promotion of international trade, the utilization and distribution of resources, and the employment of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

9. For all those reasons, the Iraqi delegation considered that the forthcoming technical conferences to be held at Geneva should be accompanied by political conferences between the great Powers and economic conferences organized on a wider basis.

10. Mr. HERRARTE (Guatemala) recalled that during the general debate in the Assembly the Guatemalan delegation had said (76th plenary meeting) that economic prosperity, freedom and justice were the instruments of peace and that with good faith and common sense all international disputes could be settled. Unfortunately, the world was divided today into systems and doctrines which sought to gain pre-eminence by force or by subversion.

11. From the technical point of view, the conquests of man were attaining hitherto unforeseeable heights. The conquest of outer space and inter-planetary travel were freely spoken of today. Thus, man had succeeded in dominating matter, but he would seem to have forgotten the great spiritual values which gave human existence its justification and which could only flourish in an atmosphere of freedom and respect for the human person.

12. After recalling the fruitless efforts of the United Nations in regard to disarmament since 1957, he pointed out that it had been necessary for meetings between experts of the great Powers to be held outside the United Nations before any progress could be achieved. The conclusions of those experts, which had been accepted by both groups of Powers, should provide a key to the effective control of nuclear test explosions and serve as a basis for a more general control of disarmament. However, the United Nations must not remain aloof from the study of such extremely important problems. It must express its views on them and should be kept informed of the progress achieved.

13. He then referred to the essential passages of the various draft resolutions before the Committee. The continuation of nuclear weapons tests was a matter of great concern to mankind, which rightly feared the adverse effects of an excessive dose of radiation as well as the possibility of atomic war. However, an inflexible attitude such as that of the Soviet Union reflected no desire to reach a solution, but appeared rather to be directed solely towards purposes of propaganda. That attitude seemed to ignore the complexity of the disarmament problem and the close links between its various elements, as well as the primary duty of States to provide for their own security.

14. The complete discontinuance of nuclear test explosions could only be secured by means of negotiations in which safeguards and means of control would be agreed upon. To discontinue nuclear weapons tests without prohibiting the manufacture of weapons and destroying those already existing would not go far towards allaying the anxiety of a world which feared atomic war.

15. In order to demonstrate their good faith, the two Western Powers which possessed nuclear weapons had declared themselves ready to suspend nuclear tests for a year if the USSR would do the same and if negotiations were started. They had also said that such a suspension could be prolonged from year to year until a final agreement was reached. That was a realistic attitude towards the problem as it actually existed and would make it possible to achieve the same result as was sought by the Soviet Union, namely complete discontinuance.

16. The delegation of Guatemala was therefore prepared to vote for the seventeen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.205), because, unlike the other drafts, it provided for practical and immediate measures with no complications. As the representative of Peru had said at the 94th meeting, a problem as complex as that of disarmament must be solved by negotiation and not by injunction, for that was in effect what a call for unconditional discontinuance would be. Again, as the representatives of France (95th meeting) and Greece (95th meeting) had pointed out, the unconditional discontinuance of nuclear tests would amount to awarding a kind of monopoly to the Powers now in possession of such weapons unless a solution was found to the problems of halting the production of nuclear weapons and of destroying the existing stocks of such weapons. That fact would be to discriminate seriously against other countries, with unforeseeable consequences to their security.

17. His delegation would favour any amendment to the seventeen-Power draft resolution put forward in a constructive spirit. It was sponsoring, together with six other Latin American countries, an amendment (A/C. 1/L.209) to that draft inviting the States concerned to devote, out of the funds made available as a result of disarmament, additional resources to the improvement of living conditions throughout the world and especially in the less developed countries.

18. Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) pointed out that the United Nations had been dealing with the problem of disarmament for twelve years without any agreement having been reached and that the only result had been the stockpiling of vast quantities of weapons that were being steadily improved. In the socialist countries there were no groups interested in profits from war or from the exploitation of other peoples. Therefore the People's Republic of Bulgaria could only pursue a policy of peace. That was demonstrated by its budget, in which less than 7.5 per cent of the expenditure was allocated for national defence, an insignificant percentage when compared to the corresponding figures for certain small countries which were members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO. The socialist countries, which were wholly engaged in the work of building up their economies, were doing all they could to reduce international tension.

19. The statements of most delegations showed that the peoples of the world ardently hoped that the great Powers would agree on practical measures of dis-
The question, then, was why so many years had gone by without any agreement having been reached, and the answer was simply that some of those Powers did not want to solve the problem. When, in a conciliatory spirit, the Soviet Union had accepted the proposals of the Western Powers, the latter had immediately disavowed them. The same thing had happened when the Soviet Union had proposed a partial agreement on the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments and had thus been willing to put itself in an unfavourable position in relation to the United States. The United States had then declared that it could only accept a comprehensive solution of the problem, embracing both conventional and atomic weapons. In 1957, the Government of the United States and its allies had put forward a new proposal providing for the reduction of armed forces in two stages (DC/113, annex 5). When the USSR had agreed, the United States, being afraid to find itself hopelessly compromised in the eyes of world opinion if it once again disavowed its own proposal, had made the implementation of the plan subject to numerous impossible preconditions.

20. The problem of control offered the Western Powers one of their chief pretexts. They treated it as a matter that had to be dealt with for its own sake. In that way, they justified the failure of the negotiations and placed the responsibility for that failure on the Soviet Union. Actually, it was the Soviet Union which had first proposed in the United Nations a system of international disarmament control. It was the Soviet Union which had first proposed effective measures to prevent surprise attack through the establishment of a network of control posts.

21. In short, the failure of the negotiations on disarmament was to be explained by the intransigent position adopted by the United States. That position was a manifestation of the policy of world domination, which was the root cause of the armaments race and which showed itself, in particular, in the establishment of a multitude of bases in foreign countries, the formation of aggressive blocs and the remilitarization of West Germany.

22. The question of disarmament was today more urgent than ever before. That was why the Soviet Union had presented to the General Assembly at its thirteenth session a memorandum on the measures that had to be taken if all disarmament problems were to be solved (A/3929). That was the most complete and most realistic programme which had thus far been submitted. On the other hand, the United States had proposed nothing new. From the very beginning of the Committee's work, it had done everything to prevent the discussion of clear and specific questions in order to avoid clear and specific solutions. As in the past, it tied in one problem of disarmament with another. Actually, it was forced to do so by the necessity of catering both to world opinion and to its desire to prevent any solution.

23. During the general debate in the Assembly, the representative of the United States had said that his country was ready to dedicate its power "to world order" (749th plenary meeting, para. 84). However, in order to achieve that goal, the United States relied on the myth of military supremacy. Under such circumstances, one must not be surprised at the appearance of many articles in the United States Press urging more armaments, larger armed forces and the delivery of nuclear weapons to the European members of NATO.

24. Nevertheless, there were certain questions which could be solved if they were separated from the problem as a whole. Agreement on some of them would make for an immediate relaxation of tension and would open the door to future successes. The discontinuance of nuclear test explosions was one such problem. No procedural manoeuvre could reduce its importance, and all the speakers in the debate had given it special attention. It would have been surprising if they had not done so in view, for example, of the conclusions reached by the Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation. Professor Linus Pauling, the famous American scientist and winner of the Nobel Prize, had recently stated that it might be assumed that any test explosion would cause degeneration in 15,000 newly-born children in the course of the year following the explosion.

25. The test explosions created a special situation from the point of view of law. They were covered by the Geneva and The Hague Conventions, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Geneva Convention of 1949. International law and custom and humanitarian laws had condemned nuclear weapons even before they had been invented, and the existing international instruments offered sufficient grounds for prohibiting them. In that connexion the proposal of Ethiopia (955th meeting) merits the attention of the Committee. The prohibition of such weapons in time of war made it difficult to justify, in time of peace, tests which caused material damage and injury to health.

26. At a time when some United Nations bodies were taking action to protect public health and seeking to frame legal rules for the punishment of crimes against mankind, it was inconceivable that other United Nations bodies should remain indifferent to nuclear test explosions, which were a hazard to health and a much more heinous crime. The only obstacles to a settlement of the problem were those created by the United States, the United Kingdom, France and a few other countries. Three years had elapsed since the Soviet Government had proposed the total, unconditional prohibition of nuclear weapons tests.

27. The United States Government, realizing that its attitude was unpoplar, had alleged that its policy had evolved. Was it referring to its proposal that tests should be suspended for one year? That was hardly an evolution since the United States needed that much time to study the results of recent tests and to prepare new ones. The United States was unreservedly supported by its allies on that question and the French representative had gone so far as to describe, at the 955th meeting, as exaggerated fear the legitimate anxiety of the peoples concerning the danger created by nuclear tests. If that was the case, what was the explanation of the moving appeal for the cessation of nuclear weapons tests made in January 1956 by 9,256 scientists throughout the world?

28. The United States did not see in the results of the Conference of Experts to Study the Possibility of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests, held at Geneva in July and August 1958, an opportunity of rapidly achieving agreement on the cessation of nuclear test explosions; instead it had found in the Conference a new way of
dealing with the problem—the substitution of technical discussion for genuine negotiations. While technical discussions were obviously necessary, the precedent set by the League of Nations in that matter was hardly encouraging. The United States representative had based his defence of that "new" method upon the Secretary-General's memorandum (A/3936). But, important though they were, the technical aspects were subordinate to the political goal pursued: total disarmament to safeguard world peace.

29. Influential circles in the United States had, moreover, adopted a negative attitude on the question of control. Underground nuclear explosions had taken place in the United States at the beginning of the year and the western Press had disclosed that the results of the tests had been distorted in an attempt to prove that some explosions could not be detected.

30. To engage in interminable technical discussions after twelve years of fruitless debates was out of the question. The United States, supported by a few countries some of which suffered the consequences of nuclear weapons tests, had tried to show that a clear-cut decision by the General Assembly would serve no purpose in view of the conference of the "nuclear Powers" on the question of the cessation of nuclear tests scheduled to open at Geneva on 31 October 1958. The Bulgarian delegation was gratified to note that most delegations did not share that view.

31. The proposal made by Poland at the twelfth session for the establishment of a zone in Central Europe free of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons (697th plenary meeting, para. 130) had aroused considerable interest in Bulgaria. It was regarded by the Bulgarian people as a means of easing tension in that particularly sensitive area. He agreed with the view expressed by the Czechoslovak representative at the 946th meeting that urgent consideration should be given to the establishment of similar zones in other parts of the world. The peoples of those areas, and world peace itself, had everything to gain from such a decision. The Bulgarian delegation supported the suggestion that the problem should be considered as part of the disarmament measures.

32. Mr. ISMAIL (Federation of Malaya) felt that it was incumbent upon all countries, large or small, to support efforts to find some means of beginning to solve the disarmament problem. Since the question had now become a sprawling complex of interrelated parts, its various parts should be attacked without losing sight of the over-all problem.

33. His delegation was convinced that nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons tests must cease in view of their harmful effects on the human race. The initiation in that matter rested with the "nuclear Powers." Two of them had already indicated their willingness to suspend tests for one year; world public opinion looked to the third to make a similar gesture. The findings of the Conference of Experts justified the hope of the Powers which did not possess nuclear weapons that the countries concerned would soon be able to discontinue the tests under a proper control system.

34. Some members of the Committee were asking for an unconditional cessation of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons tests, while others felt that the cessation of tests must be linked to the other related problems of disarmament. As his delegation saw it, the two positions were not irreconcilable since the difference was one of degree and procedure. It was the task of the General Assembly, on the eve of the talks which were to begin at Geneva on 31 October 1958, to reinforce the climate of mutual confidence created by the Conference of Experts. It could do so by appealing to the "nuclear Powers" to suspend tests immediately, pending a political agreement at the forthcoming conference. It would not be necessary to stipulate a period of one year for the suspension of tests if the stipulation constituted an obstacle to agreement on the immediate suspension of tests.

35. In view of the general agreement that tests of nuclear weapons should cease, the Assembly should appeal to the great Powers to compromise and agree to an immediate suspension. That decision could lead to an agreement at Geneva, for a more permanent arrangement which might, in turn, open the way to a general agreement on disarmament. In that connexion it remained the view of his Government that the question of the control of atomic and hydrogen weapons could not be separated from the over-all question of disarmament. It was as unrealistic to talk of limiting or prohibiting the production and use of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction without at the same time limiting conventional weapons as it was to suggest that general disarmament could be satisfactorily achieved by a reduction in the military budgets of the great Powers by a uniform percentage.

36. Mr. MOCH (France) wished to refer to certain inaccuracies in the Bulgarian representative's statement. In the first place, it was wrong to claim that the Soviet Union had been the first to accept international control. It was one thing to say that "proper control was essential" and another to define that control in unambiguous terms and to specify the rights and duties of the international control organization. On that point the Western Powers had never received a clear response from the Soviet Union delegation. Secondly, it was unfortunate that the Bulgarian representative, who had spoken at length about the danger of nuclear test explosions, had not noticed that since 20 September 1958 the Soviet Union had carried out twelve nuclear explosions, a rate never reached hitherto. Lastly, the Bulgarian representative had referred to underground explosions as a means of circumventing control regulations. It should however be remembered that such explosions were a method of scientific research which might prove extremely valuable; within a few years, it might be possible to use the great heat and pressure generated under the earth's surface to convert coal deposits into gas and thus extract the energy required by mankind without difficulty. Moreover, explosions carried out underground where there was no infiltration eliminated the danger of radio-active fall-out and might possibly provide a solution to that problem.

37. He was gratified that the representative of the Federation of Malaya had borne in mind the over-all problem of disarmament. In that connexion, he wished to state once again that, even if nuclear test explosions were discontinued, there was nothing to prove that stockpiles and thus the danger of war would not continue to grow. If it contented itself with a discontinuance of tests, the United Nations would betray its responsibility towards the people of the world. The question to be considered was that of disarmament, in other words the reduction of military stockpiles, armaments, armed forces and expenditure.
38. Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) pointed out, with reference to the nuclear test explosions carried out by the Soviet Union, that as early as March 1958 that country had stopped its explosions in the hope that the Western Powers would take similar action. Unfortunately those Powers had announced that they would continue their tests until 31 October in order, as they had put it, to complete their programmes of perfecting nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union had stated on several occasions that it had halted its nuclear tests and would not resume them unless it was compelled to do so in the interests of national defence because of the nuclear weapons tests carried out by the Western Powers.

39. It was wrong to claim that the Soviet Union did not want any control or was reluctant to accept it. It was the Soviet Union which had in fact proposed measures to prevent surprise attack and to achieve a feasible control system, whereas the Western Powers proposed measures which were both difficult to carry out and likely to increase international tension, such as, for example, the aerial surveillance of the territories of all countries. The real purpose of that measure was to carry out military reconnaissance rather than to control a non-existent disarmament.

The meeting rose at 5.20 p.m.