Substitute the following text for the text now appearing on page 68 of the bound volume:

(See overleaf.)

* This erratum does not apply to separate fascicles, but only to the bound volume.
interests of their sovereign rights and in the wider interests of peace, would not manufacture nuclear weapons and would forgo the right to develop them. His delegation hoped that the suggestion made in the Irish amendments (A/C.1/L.207), urging the "nuclear Powers" to refrain from supplying nuclear weapons to other States, would receive serious consideration. Such an appeal must derive its strength from the hope that the concern it expressed was shared by all the "nuclear Powers".

37. The third benefit of an agreement to suspend tests was that it would establish for the first time a worldwide inspection system. In his delegation's view, that was really the key to disarmament, and it was encouraging to know that at least in one limited field it had been possible to remove the issue of control from the realm of controversy and propaganda. The fact that the Conference of Experts to Study the Possibility of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests had shown that a control system was feasible had therefore cleared away one major difficulty in the way of political agreement. Moreover, if such a control system could be made to work successfully, the experience gained would, as the Secretary-General had observed in his memorandum, be invaluable preparation for implementing, with the least delay, further world-wide inspection and control systems as agreements were reached on other disarmament measures (A/3936, para. 7).

38. The fourth and perhaps the most important benefit which would come from an agreement to end nuclear tests under effective international control was a lowering of tension and an increase in understanding and international confidence.

39. The New Zealand delegation would not wish to ignore the difficulties which must be overcome in order to complete an agreement even on the limited issue of ending tests. One of the main problems which would have to be resolved was the universal application of any measures agreed upon at Geneva by the three "nuclear Powers". In that connexion, the problem arose of extending the control system to the mainland of China.

40. A properly safeguarded agreement to end nuclear tests was therefore an urgent necessity. However, one of the substantial benefits his delegation looked for in suspension of test explosions would be lost if the suspension were not to be the prelude to a wider disarmament agreement resulting in balanced measures of genuine disarmament bringing about reductions in conventional as well as nuclear armaments.

41. His delegation agreed that all the possibilities presented by a technical approach to such disarmament problems as left room for study of a non-political nature should be explored promptly and fully. While unanimity among technical experts would not mean much without unanimity at the political level, it seemed clear that Governments would attach no value to mere protestations of faith. They would want to be satisfied that they could be protected against non-compliance before they committed themselves. Technical studies of inspection and control systems, therefore, had a contribution to make in the essential process of building confidence. His delegation hoped that the study of the technical aspects of measures against the possibility of a surprise attack would be followed by similar technical studies on other initial disarmament measures.

42. Mr. DE LA COLINA (Mexico), introducing his delegation's draft resolution (A/C.1/L.208), recalled that Mr. Padilla Nervo, head of the Mexican delegation, had explained in his statement of 13 October (946th meeting) the reasons of principle and the practical reasons for the draft, the sole purpose of which was to ensure a resumption of the disarmament negotiations which had been broken off more than a year previously.

43. The step taken by his delegation would in no way interfere with the general debate or with the consideration of and voting on the draft resolutions under items 64, 70 and 72 of the General Assembly's agenda, which had been referred to the First Committee. His delegation wished the Committee to examine the important procedural question it had raised after the substance of the problem now under discussion had been studied.

44. As the opening of the proposed informal conversations would depend on agreement between the representatives of the Powers mentioned in the Mexican draft resolution, it would be for the Chairman of the First Committee, after consulting them and the Secretary-General, to set the date of the first meeting. Again, it would be for the Chairman to decide, with the consent of the parties concerned, when his report should be submitted to the Committee.

45. The Mexican delegation, as its Chairman had stated on 13 October, fervently hoped that the negotiations which would begin at Geneva on 31 October 1958 and the work of the next meeting of experts who would examine measures to prevent surprise attacks, would be crowned with success. While the United Nations must continue its endeavours to arrive at a general balanced agreement on disarmament—one of its principal purposes—anything that represented genuine progress towards disarmament was to be welcomed. Moreover, his delegation was convinced that the active participation of the General Assembly, the plenary body of the United Nations, was not merely desirable and useful, but essential. That explained and justified the step it had taken in submitting the draft resolution.

46. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that it transpired from Mr. Moch's statement that France intended to make nuclear test explosions, that it would endeavour to make such tests harmless and that it would not regard any agreement reached at Geneva without its participation as binding. As Mr. Moch had himself recognized, there was less and less support for France's view on the question of nuclear tests. It would be readily understood that the USSR was unable to support it.

47. With regard to the reduction of military budgets, his delegation had never denied that the idea had been originated by France, but it noted with regret that France seemed it impossible to put the idea into effect at the present juncture. France's whole attitude might be summed up as wishing to hand over as many questions as possible to committees of experts, without previous political commitment.

48. Mr. Moch had emphasized the continuity of French policy in the matter of disarmament. Unhappily, that continuity was entirely negative, as the policy had been one of rejecting all practical disarmament measures.

49. Mr. MOCH (France) requested the USSR representative to read carefully the text of his statement.