meeting of the General Assembly, which the delegation of Ghana entirely endorsed.

3. His delegation was happy to note that during the past year a substantial measure of understanding and co-operation had been achieved, at least in technical matters with regard to the settlement of the problem of disarmament and the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons. It firmly hoped that that new spirit would be encouraged by all the parties concerned, especially the United States and the Soviet Union, and that the forthcoming discussions of experts at Geneva would yield fruitful results.

4. From the statements made by various speakers in the Committee his delegation had gained the impression that all sections of opinion agreed that the armaments race and the stockpiling of nuclear weapons were contrary to the best interests of all countries and peoples. The large sums of money expended on the manufacture of armaments could be spent much more profitably on raising the standards of living of the masses of the people in the world and that would contribute to the advancement of civilization.

5. He had been profoundly impressed by the statement made by Mr. Lodge, the United States representative, before the First Committee at its 945th meeting, in which he had said that if the General Assembly encouraged the present tendency towards progress in disarmament, the world could hope to see the day when all nations could lay down their burden of armaments and their still heavier burden of fear.

6. Every State undoubtedly needed a minimum quantity of armaments to ensure its internal security and national self-defence, but that did not justify the arms race of the great Powers. The African countries were perhaps the least developed and the most backward in the world—"backward" by comparison with the standards reached in the highly developed countries. For centuries before the Europeans began to dominate and partition the African continent, the African tribes and ethnic groups had lived in a state of perpetual war and mutual fear. With the coming of European civilization to Africa, a great hope had been born—that wars and mass destructions would cease for all time and that peace and harmony would be established throughout the world. Unhappily, however, the two recent world wars had somewhat undermined the confidence of many Africans in the ability of the advanced countries to maintain peace and harmony in the world of today.

7. In Africa, more than 200 million Africans were becoming increasingly aware of their rights, of which they had been deprived for so many years under foreign rule. Their only desire was to see peace and tranquility reign, not only in Africa, but in the whole world, so that they could devote all their energies to the gradual development of their national economies and the raising of their levels of living.
8. Nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons were a danger to humanity, not only in the event of war, but also in time of peace, because of the radiation released through nuclear tests. It was for that reason that the Government of Ghana, alarmed to learn that France intended to carry out nuclear tests in the Sahara, appealed to the conscience of France not to allow such tests to be carried out. It also appealed to the four great Powers to agree among themselves to discontinue nuclear test explosions entirely in any other part of the world. Nuclear tests must be stopped once and for all and not merely suspended, for suspension meant that the tests could be resumed at any time.

9. The discontinuance of nuclear tests could, of course, only be effective if the "nuclear Powers" were agreed about it among themselves. The General Assembly could not compel them to discontinue tests if they did not want to listen to its recommendations. It was for the four great Powers, therefore, to decide whether to respond to the appeal of all the peoples of the world or to reject that appeal and so hold humanity at their mercy.

10. Mr. Krishna MEnON (India) recalled that his delegation had approved without reserve that there should be a simultaneous discussion of the three agenda items at present before the Committee. That procedure would undoubtedly save some time and the question of the discontinuance of nuclear test explosions could not be considered in isolation from the general question of disarmament. It was fallacious and dangerous to claim that to lay stress on the need to put an end to nuclear tests was to accord less importance to the problem of disarmament as a whole. It was as fallacious as to say that, since the disarmament question was discussed in the United Nations year after year without any satisfactory result, it would be better to abandon the discussion. The United Nations must never stop trying to reach its main purpose, to establish peace in the world and to outlaw war.

11. It had to be recognized that some progress had been made, not so much during the twelve months preceding the present session as since the opening of the session itself. Indeed, the Indian delegation had the impression that, at the beginning of the session, it was generally felt that the question of disarmament had been relegated to the Geneva talks and that all the General Assembly could do was to give those talks its blessing. Some had even thought that it would be better not to discuss the matter at all, but simply to await the results of the forthcoming negotiations.

12. No one underestimated the importance of those talks. On the contrary, everyone was glad they were to take place, but it was of the very highest importance to remember that the United Nations bore the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and that, if it wanted to survive, it could not afford to show any slackening of interest in disarmament. The progress made at Geneva was the result of the efforts and decisions of the General Assembly, whoever may have been the persons who had first suggested the ideas on which the resolutions adopted at the various sessions of the Assembly had been based.

13. Such progress, however, was negligible in relation to the magnitude of the danger. He quoted some figures concerning the expenditures of the great Powers on armaments. The United States, whose military expenditures had been $64 million in 1913, had spent $5,113 million for that purpose in 1947, and its military budget today was $15,750 million. For the Soviet Union, the corresponding figures were $222 million in 1913 and $8,594 million in 1958. It should not be forgotten that the economy of the USSR was such that it was impossible to assess the real significance of those figures. As for the United Kingdom, its military budget before the First World War had been £77 million a year, and at that time it had had a vast colonial empire. In 1947 its military expenditures had been 30,655 million. For 1967 the figure was £1,525 million. Since the people of that country were very economical and frugal, the sum of £1,525 million must have made it possible to attain a destructive power far superior to that of the two other countries obtained with the same amount.

14. Nevertheless, in the statement he had made at the 94th meeting, the representative of the United Kingdom had expressed the view that the disarmament question had begun to offer a more hopeful picture.

15. He recalled the consequences of the first atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. Out of a population of 300,000, some 100,000 had been killed and another 100,000 had suffered injuries; 90,000 persons were still under observation and 6,000 were receiving care. During the last twelve months, that is to say more than ten years after the explosion, 185 persons had died from the effects of the bombing. Compared with present-day weapons, the Hiroshima bomb seemed a mere toy, and there were now weapons which did not even require the hand of man to direct them. The progress achieved was such that atomic bombs could be exploded underwater, on the surface or in the air. The state had even been reached where—with due respect to the French representative, who had at the twelfth session reproached him for liking science fiction—it was possible to manufacture portable atomic weapons. According to certain United States publications, science had reached the stage of portable atomic weapons which could be used for sabotage, to blow up bridges, etc. Although considerably less was known about what went on in the Soviet Union than in the United States, there were grounds for believing that the situation was the same in both countries.

16. But the worst thing of all was that atomic might was now spread throughout the world, and it was no longer possible to speak of a "nuclear club" of only three Powers. The distribution of atomic weapons had become so wide that the power to destroy the world had become decentralized, hence the situation was far more dangerous than if all nuclear weapons had been retained by two or three countries alone.

17. As a result of the work of the Conference of Experts to Study the Possibility of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests, held at Geneva in July and August 1956, it could now be said that it was possible to detect nuclear explosions and to impose degrees of control. He ventured to point out that everyone had known that even before the Conference convened. He had been repeatedly stated in the General Assembly, by his own delegation as well as several others, that there were no insurmountable obstacles in the way of the detection of explosions, so it should not be difficult to introduce a system of inspection and control. He
desired to make it clear that, in view of the situation in the world, the imperfections of humanity and the prevalent suspicion and mutual lack of faith, his Government did not think that any agreement could be effective without the machinery of control. It was therefore in favour of the establishment of a system of control and inspection which should be put into effect, but that did not mean that the question of control should be allowed to stand in the way of progress in disarmament.

18. In practice, all the speeches made up to that time in the First Committee had dealt with the cessation of nuclear test explosions. Consequently, whatever the political views of the different delegations might be, the need to consider the question of nuclear explosions as one requiring the earliest solution was uppermost in the minds of all. The Assembly, through the Disarmament Commission, had come to the conclusion that progress ought to be achieved by stages.

19. The idea of suspending atomic and hydrogen weapons tests showed a desire to proceed by stages. It was true, as the United Kingdom representative had said (948th meeting), that the cessation of nuclear tests was not the same thing as disarmament. But the fact that a race is not begun by arriving at the goal did not mean that no race should be run.

20. The French Government considered the ending of nuclear tests conceivable only within the framework of effective disarmament in the nuclear field. Fortunately, the discussions in the First Committee had shown that this opinion might be reviewed. It was claimed that tests were not necessary for the manufacture of bombs of the types already tested. Under those conditions there was no reason to believe that tests were so indispensable.

21. Another argument was that nuclear weapons were instruments of peace. That was the theory of the "deterrent". It was indefensible, for it was based on fear and trust at the same time; it regarded atomic weapons as a scarecrow and yet implied faith that the other side would not use them.

22. Certain people claimed that nuclear tests were necessary in order to perfect a "clean" bomb which would eliminate the danger of radiation. Surely they realized that whether "clean" or not, the bombs could only deal death. Furthermore, the United States Secretary of Defense had recently told Congress that some nuclear weapons in the nation's stockpile had been altered in a way that increased radio-active fall-out over a local area, and that it was known that the Soviet Union was also conducting tests of "dirty" bombs.

23. The United Kingdom representative claimed that the situation was more encouraging now than before. Nevertheless, simple calculation of the nuclear test explosions carried out in 1958 showed that they had increased by 100 per cent.

24. The argument respecting the possible clandestine manufacture of weapons was invalid if the decision to discontinue tests applied equally to all types of weapons of mass destruction, irrespective of the technical principle upon which they were based.

25. The decision to put an end to experimental explosions would at least result in less danger to present and future generations. The conclusions of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (A/3833) were particularly alarming. Even if nuclear tests were stopped in 1958, there would be 2,500 to 100,000 cases of leukaemia resulting from tests carried out so far.

26. His Government had received with the greatest satisfaction the Soviet Union's unilateral decision to end the testing of nuclear weapons, and its disappointment had been very great when the Soviet Union had resumed its tests. The argument intended to justify this reversal was irrelevant, for by definition a unilateral decision was not dependent upon the attitude of the other side. Furthermore, the change of position casts doubt on the good faith upon which any further decision to suspend tests would be based.

27. His delegation had been glad to see at the present session that an appeal for the discontinuance of tests had been made by Governments which had taken the opposite view before. For example, the New Zealand delegation had done so at the 770th plenary meeting. The Swedish delegation, at the Committee's 946th meeting, had also supported the proposal for a universal discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests.

28. The work of the General Assembly did not take place behind closed doors. Public opinion in all countries of the world, irrespective of their form of government or their economic and social systems, hoped ardently for the cessation of nuclear weapons tests and the non-utilization of nuclear power for destructive purposes, and, after all, delegations to the Assembly were there to represent public opinion. Recently about 10,000 scientists, seventy or eighty of whom were Nobel Prize winners, had made an urgent appeal for the cessation of test explosions.

29. The Indian Government thought that a decision by the great Powers not to continue nuclear tests, endorsed by an Assembly resolution, would reverse the trend towards war. Although it would not solve the disarmament problem as a whole, such a decision would have political and psychological effects which would help to reduce the risk of war. In addition, it would make it easier to work out a general disarmament programme.

30. Turning to the question of surprise attack, he said he was glad to see that the various parties concerned were agreed on the need to tackle the problem. Fears of a new Pearl Harbor were certainly justified. It was to be hoped that the technicians would be able to work out a control system which would not interfere in the internal affairs of States and would not injure the sense of dignity of peoples. That would undoubtedly be one way of re-establishing confidence. Moreover, discussions would, perhaps, help to solve the problem of detecting stockpiles of nuclear weapons.

31. He went on to deal with the general problem of disarmament. Over a period of several years, his delegation had submitted many proposals to the Disarmament Commission, but unfortunately, to no effect. It was regrettable that the Disarmament Commission had not sat during the preceding twelve months. The time had come to consider the question from a new aspect. Sessions of the General Assembly were the only time when the problem of disarmament received real consideration. As the United States representative had pointed out (945th meeting), the attitudes of delegations were, as a result, less rigid; but the
Indian delegation was convinced that there would be an advantage to be gained by making use of the technical help which the Secretary-General could provide. It was, moreover, important that the United Nations should have a part to play in the field, since only through the United Nations could world opinion influence the great Powers in their decisions.

32. For that reason, he would propose at the appropriate time that the Disarmament Commission should be composed of all eighty-one Members of the United Nations. Even the smallest countries could contribute to the study of the question. As the representative of the United Kingdom had said (54th meeting), the over-all responsibility for disarmament lay with the United Nations and if the General Assembly were to transform itself into a disarmament commission, it would be able to transmit to the whole world the results of the forthcoming negotiations at Geneva, particularly with regard to inspection and control; that would lead to a development of public opinion in favour of inspection and control, which might thus become an instrument of effective action.

33. Turning to the question of the reduction of military budgets, he said that his delegation favoured such a reduction and that his Government was ready to contribute to it within the limits of its modest resources. In that connexion, account would have to be taken, not only of the funds spent on manufacturing arms in a given country, but also of expenses incurred by providing arms to other countries through the establishment of military bases or under pacts. India was firmly opposed to the system of military pacts, which, even during recent years, had proved to be without value.

34. His delegation thought that many of the most important proposals submitted in previous years were similar, and that if the General Assembly were to transform itself into a disarmament commission, there should be some possibility of making a synthesis and establishing what might be called an abridgment of a disarmament convention, which would provide a concrete basis for the discussions.

35. So far as nuclear weapons were concerned, the Indian Government had continually affirmed that there could be no disarmament unless such weapons were totally prohibited. That was not to say that that objective could be achieved at a single stroke. The stopping of tests would be the first stage, and the confidence which would result from the establishment of a system of control and inspection would make it possible to arrive at total prohibition. His delegation thought that tests should cease until an agreement was reached on the matter. In that event, if one of the three "nuclear Powers" began to carry out tests again, the Assembly would have to take the necessary measures. The technicians had said that an agreement was possible and the United States and the Soviet Union had declared themselves in favour of a control system. Thus, all that remained to be done was to set up the system. Remembering that control machinery had already been applied in some very delicate situations, in particular, on the borders of Israel and the Arab States.

36. His delegation agreed with the greater part of the seventeen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.205), but felt that not all the questions which it touched upon should be included in the same draft resolution. The impression must not be given that the suspension of tests depended on other aspects of disarmament. On that point, he could not agree with the United Kingdom delegation. The draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union delegation (A/C.1/L.203), on the other hand, had the drawback that it made no reference either to the forthcoming Geneva conference or to the question of control. The chief fault of both draft resolutions was that they did not indicate that the question should be referred back to the General Assembly whatever results were obtained at the conference which was to convene at Geneva.

37. In his delegation's view, there could be no alternative. There were already enough atomic weapons in the world to destroy the whole of civilization. It was thus useless for countries to increase their power of destruction. Furthermore, the world was weary of fear and of the burden of armaments. Accordingly, an end must be put to tests once and for all; they must not merely be suspended for a year. That was a measure which must be taken if the United Nations was to continue to serve mankind.

38. Mr. MOCH (France) said that he wished briefly to clarify two points. First, he had spoken of science fiction only in connexion with the Indian representative's reference to atomic pistols and thermo-nuclear machine-guns. Secondly, the representative of India had reproached the French Minister of Foreign Affairs for insisting that the discontinuance of nuclear test explosions should take place within the framework of an effective disarmament programme. But the representative of India had at the same time expressed support for such a disarmament programme, and had justified his request for a discontinuance of test-by the fact that such tests would no longer be necessary since nuclear weapons of all types would be prohibited. That was a reversal of the true order of things. The Indian representative and many others were seeking to recommend, or even to impose, the cessation of test explosions, whereas everyone at bottom recognized that such a cessation was not in itself an act of disarmament and would not reduce the risk of war. He wondered, therefore, why those representatives did not reformulate, with the same enthusiasm, the cessation of the production of fissionable material for military purposes and a beginning towards the progressive conversion of existing stockpiles to peaceful uses. Those measures would be a real beginning of disarmament. The General Assembly must not confuse appearances with reality; its task was to achieve disarmament.

39. Mr. Krishna MENON (India) said that his Government had always been in favour of the peaceful uses of fissionable materials. On the other hand, France had voted against draft resolutions calling for the prohibition of atomic weapons, the prohibition of the use of fissionable materials for the manufacture of such weapons and the conversion of stockpiles to peaceful uses. India, for its part, had always voted for such draft resolutions.

40. In his country nuclear research was directed solely towards civilian purposes. It would be very dangerous for more countries to manufacture nuclear weapons, particularly if their manufacture was not under the direct control of the Government and if the economy of the countries concerned depended, in part, on supplying arms to others.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.