not possess nuclear weapons, tried to help in settling the disarmament problem they were not interfering in the domestic affairs of the great Powers. They were defending the interests of their own peoples in an inevitably interdependent world.

4. However, it was not enough for those States merely to act as the spokesmen of their peoples’ desire for peace and to analyse the situation in order to try to find ways of breaking down the barriers to disarmament. Their essential contribution was to give expression to the impact on the bystander at the discussions of the great Powers of the attitude and proposals of a particular great Power on the question of disarmament. Admittedly, the sponsor of a proposal knew best the purpose of his own recommendation, but the bystander was better placed to interpret objectively the effects which a proposal might have because of international interdependence and to determine whether it was favourable or unfavourable to the cause of disarmament. For that, the representatives of the small Powers must disengage themselves as far as possible from their political alignments in order to assess the attitude of the great Powers objectively.

5. Such an objective examination was bound to bring to light surprising contradictions in the attitude of the United States Government to the disarmament problem. For example, at the 945th meeting of the First Committee, Mr. Lodge had stated that the General Assembly debates on disarmament at the twelfth session had begun under a cloud. According to him, all the hopes of agreement built up during months of careful diplomacy in the talks of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission had suddenly been disappointed. On 13 January 1958, however, the President of the United States had declared in his message to Congress that he was particularly pleased to note the progress made, under the aegis of the United Nations, in the fields of disarmament and the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Similarly, although Mr. Lodge had declared at the same meeting of the First Committee that the United States had always recognized the fundamental responsibility of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and had co-operated whole-heartedly in every effort of the Organization to solve the disarmament dilemma, the United States Secretary of State had not made a single mention of prospective disarmament in his reports on United States foreign policy to the various bodies of Congress. Any reference to disarmament had been simply in order to mention a plan favoured by the United States for reducing the armed strength of the Soviet Union but not its own. On the contrary, in every speech Mr. Dulles had stressed the need to redouble the military strength of the United States and its more than forty allies.

6. Again, Mr. Lodge’s statement of the 944th meeting of the First Committee that the United States attached great importance to the first step which the dis-
continuance of nuclear weapons tests would constitute was contradicted not only by the article by Mr. Kissinger, Associate Director of the Harvard Center for International Affairs and political advisor to the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, which appeared in the current issue of Foreign Affairs, but also by the United States’ own draft resolution; in it the three agenda items now under consideration were approached in such a way that it was quite clear that the United States did not attribute any special importance to the stopping of nuclear weapons tests as a first step.

7. Two regrettable conclusions emerged from those contradictions. The first was that the United States Government did not wish to conclude an agreement with the Soviet Union on the final cessation of nuclear weapons tests. In order to justify that attitude, the United States was seeking, despite the statements of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, to minimize in the eyes of public opinion the danger of radiation from nuclear tests. Moreover, although the Conference of Experts to Study the Possibility of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests had stated unanimously that test explosions could not be kept secret and that control was possible, Mr. Kissinger, in the article already referred to, had begun to sow doubt regarding the possibility of control. Moreover, with a view to replacing the recommendations on the discontinuance of nuclear tests, he proposed that the "atomic Powers" should share out among themselves the annual quantity of radiation which could be produced without danger of serious effects on the living organism. Members of the United Nations and the world as a whole should not be surprised, therefore, if, at the three-Power conference which was to be held at Geneva, efforts were made to reach an agreement, not on the cessation of nuclear tests, but rather on the annual dosage of contamination.

8. The second conclusion was that, in the present international situation, the United States Government did not wish to progress towards a disarmament agreement; in other words, it was opposed to progressive and controlled disarmament. That was why the United States Secretary of State had spoken about other quite different matters during the general debate which had taken place in the Assembly.

9. The Hungarian delegation had carefully and objectively examined the steps taken by the Soviet Union in connexion with disarmament. It was quite certain that no such contradictions were to be found in the attitude of the Soviet Union as in that of the United States. The position of the Soviet Union, as defined within the United Nations, in statements by Soviet Government officials, in the decisions of the Supreme Soviet and in Press communiqués, was to insist on a disarmament agreement. When a USSR proposal to ban nuclear weapons was rejected by the Western Powers on the pretext that the Soviet Union favoured such a ban because it has superiority in conventional weapons, the Soviet Union proposed to reduce conventional armed forces. When the Western Powers rejected the Soviet proposal to reduce conventional armed forces, on the ground that the Soviet Union was willing to reduce them because it was stronger in ballistic and guided missiles, the Soviet Union proposed negotiations and agreement on both points. When the Western Powers objected to the absence of controls, the Soviet Union proposed introducing various forms of real control. When the Western Powers said that the general disarmament projects were not feasible, the Soviet Union then proposed an agreement on specific details, and, as a first step, on the banning of nuclear weapons tests.

10. Turning to the draft resolutions before the Committee, he pointed out that the wording of the seventeen-Power draft (A/C.1/L.205) made it difficult to reach an early decision concerning the discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests, because, before forming an opinion on sections I, II and III of the draft resolution, the Committee would have to discuss in detail all the relevant agenda items. Moreover, section II dealt with an item which had not yet come up for discussion, namely, sub-items (a) and (b) of item 2 of the First Committee’s agenda (Question of the peaceful use of outer space). Therefore the draft resolution, by its very structure, made it impossible for the Committee to take a decision.

11. On the other hand, the Soviet draft resolution concerning the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests (A/C.1/L.203) gave hope that an agreement might be arrived at early enough to be of help to the Geneva conference and ensure its success.

12. In conclusion, he recalled the General Assembly’s obligations arising out of the interdependence of nations. The General Assembly could not disappoint the peoples who ardently desired peace.

13. Mr. NOBLE (United Kingdom), replying to the objections raised by the Soviet representative at the 948th meeting, said that his Government had already accepted the conclusions and recommendations in the report of the Conference of Experts (A/3897), which was neither more nor less than the Soviet Government had accepted. He quoted a statement made by Mr. Khushchev, Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, to a correspondent of Pravda (A/3904) and the statement of the Government of the United Kingdom dated 22 August 1958 (A/3896/Rev.1); it was clear from those texts that the position of the United Kingdom and of the Soviet Union were identical as regards the approval of the system of control.

14. He emphasized the purely technical nature of the report of the experts. The nature of the international control organ it mentioned remained to be defined. Many other points which were of capital importance in determining whether an organ could or could not perform its functions effectively, such as its membership, its method of work, its manner of taking decisions, and other matters, had to be specified. In short, the plan drawn up by the experts had to be translated into practical reality; only through negotiations defining the political and administrative framework wherein controls would function, could that objective be attained.

15. Mr. LODGE (United States of America) stated categorically that his Government had also accepted the report of the Conference of Experts and the control system it contained. It had always been understood that once the experts had completed their task, the next step was for government representatives to study the practical application of their recommendations. It was
hard to see why the Soviet Union sought to obscurefacts that were perfectly clear.

16. It should be pointed out that the Soviet Union hadaccepted no more than its two partners and that it stillhad an opportunity to destroy all the progress madethus far by opposing the actual establishment of effec-tive controls. If it vetoed the establishment of inspectionteams, the world could not but have the gravestdoubts as to its real intentions.

17. The allegation that the United States had notaltered its position concerning the suspension ofnuclear tests since 1957 was devoid of all foundation.It was sufficient to recall that the United States, like theUnited Kingdom, was ready to suspend its tests forone year if the Soviet Union did the same. It would be-noted that the USSR had not yet declared its intentionsin that respect.

18. According to the representative of the SovietUnion, it was not a matter of suspending nuclearweapons tests, but of stopping them altogether. Butsuch a discontinuance would still have to be accompa-nied by effective controls. It was also essential toknow if an agreement on the cessation of tests wouldlead to further progress on the disarmament pro-
gramme. The Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.203)made no mention of controls. The United States wantedthe conference which was to meet at Geneva on 31October, as well as the technical talks on the preven-tion of surprise attack, to be a success.

19. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)said he had no intention of engaging in polemics. In thecourse of the debate he would have an opportunity torevert in detail to the points raised by the representa-tives of the United Kingdom and the United States.He was glad to note that those two countries hadfinally announced that they accepted the control systemproposed in the report of the Conference of Experts.The conference which was to open at Geneva on 31October would thus make it possible to take the politi-cal decisions necessary to put an end to nuclear wea-pons tests.

20. However, in considering the seventeen-Powerdraft resolution (A/C.1/L.205), the representatives ofthe United Kingdom and the United States would have toclear up the various doubts arising out of the draftwhich referred only to suspension, and not to thecessation, of nuclear tests.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.