4. Cuba asserted that it was a victim of political and economic aggression within the meaning of articles 15 and 18 of the charter of the Organization of American States, signed at Bogotá in 1948. It thereby distorted the meaning of article 16, which had been written into the charter upon its own proposal. A basic distinction must be drawn between the criminal intervention covered by article 15 and the economic aggression dealt with in article 16. The latter must also be distinguished from retaliatory measures, and in that connexion the question arose whether the adoption of retaliatory measures was or was not a legitimate right. If the answer was yes, it could not be considered aggression. Retaliation nearly always began a self-defence. Hence, any economic measure, even if it harmed certain parties, could not be considered prima facie as aggression; it might well be that the party applying the measure was simply exercising its right. It was therefore impossible to contend that the adoption of any economic measure whatsoever necessarily violated the principle set forth in article 16 of the charter of Bogotá.

5. There were many forms of intervention, for an aggressor was a person who violated not geographical but juridical frontiers. The special committee which, at the Ninth International Conference of American States, held at Bogotá in 1948, had been instructed to clarify the principle later embodied in article 16, had stated that the clause condemned any action or attempted action calculated to oblige a State to adopt and thereby to renounce—an attitude which it deemed contrary to its interests. The committee had nevertheless pointed out that the proposed text in no way prevented the application of economic sanctions which certain international bodies were authorized to apply under existing agreements.

6. It was not quite accurate to regard article 16 of the charter of Bogotá as an extension or development of the principle set forth in article 15. The aggression dealt with in the latter was a breach of the rules of peaceful coexistence and hence was a matter of criminal law, whereas economic aggression could be regarded as an offence under civil law. Article 18 referred to political intervention which affected the sovereignty and the very structure of the State.

7. Article 16, on the other hand, related only to economic interference which was prejudicial to the public wealth and the interests of the State, and it had not been intended that the right of members of the OAS to trade or not to trade with anyone they desired might be withdrawn. It would be contrary to the very purpose of article 16 to claim that it obliged member States to maintain trade relations with anyone even if that harmed their interests. The United States and all the countries of Latin America were completely free in that respect, and their refusal to trade with any
given country could not be considered a crime or even an offence. Those countries could not be accused of intervening or committing aggression unless there was will or intention on their part of doing so.

8. Nothing in the Cuban accusation pointed conclusively to the aggression referred to in article 15, or to the threat of aggression provided for in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance signed at Rio de Janeiro on 2 September 1947. Though there was as yet no agreed definition of aggression, the elements constituting physical or moral attack had been clearly established. None of those elements was apparent in the case before the Committee. On the contrary, the Cuban charge abounded in elements of the cold war. In that connexion, he recalled the definition of aggression which the representatives of the Soviet Union had proposed to the Committee in 1950.

9. At the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American States, held at Punta del Este in January 1962, the Dominican Republic had been one of the fourteen States which had voted for resolution VI, entitled "Exclusion of the present Government of Cuba from participation in the inter-American system". It was as a sovereign State that Cuba had approved and ratified the charter of the Organization of American States: by virtue of the "principle of identity", Cuba's present Government could not simply ignore its international obligations on the pretext that they had been assumed by another Government whose actions it considered to be invalid.

10. The legal scruples of those who had abstained in the vote on resolution VI, adoption at Punta del Este, were admittedly very commendable, but a distinction must be drawn between the State, which was a permanent entity, and Governments, which changed and were transitory. Governments were simply the organs representing the people, and hence any Government which did not consult the people could not be regarded as a legitimate Government. According to the charter of Bogotá no American State could be excluded from the regional system, but the non-recognition of Governments was not prohibited. If each member State could break off diplomatic and other relations with one or more other Governments, under the terms of article 25, then the Inter-American organization, which was the sum of American Governments, could a fortiori do as much. That was the purport of resolution VI adopted at Punta del Este, and hence it did not conflict with the provisions of the Bogotá charter. The Cuban State had not been expelled from the OAS. The resolution referred to the "present Government of Cuba", which had been deprived of the rights granted to it under a charter whose provisions it had violated.

11. According to Articles 5 and 6 of the United Nations Charter, a Member of the United Nations could be suspended from the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership, or, if it persisted in violating the principles contained in the Charter, it could be expelled from the Organization. Since the OAS was a body that was subsidiary to the United Nations, the question arose whether the norms of the United Nations were not valid for it too.

12. The representative of the present Government of Cuba had denied the constitutional validity of resolution VI. It was worth noting, in that regard, that the inter-American system had originated with the Treaty of Perpetual Union, League and Confederation concluded at Panama in 1826, article 19 of which provided for the expulsion of member states of the system if they violated the principles of the peaceful settlement of international disputes. Even if it were to be concluded that, because of the peculiar nature of the organization, no State member could be excluded from the OAS, Governments which did not comply with the principles of the organic charter could be suspended. That was precisely what had been done in the case of the present Government of Cuba.

13. The inter-American system was based on representative democracy, as was expressly stated in article 5 (d) of the charter of Bogotá. The Tenth Inter-American Conference, held at Caracas in 1954, had furthermore excluded international communism from the American juridical framework, thus strengthening a principle proclaimed as early as 1836 in a "Declaration of Principles of Inter-American Solidarity and Co-operation", adopted at Buenos Aires, and subsequently repeatedly reaffirmed: that the inter-American system rested on the concept of democracy as a joint and several responsibility. Jurisprudentially, the OAS was therefore entitled to consider that a Government which styled itself Marxist-Leninist was incompatible with the inter-American system. If the present Cuban Government did not agree with the provisions of the charter of Bogotá on that score, it could have denounced that instrument in accordance with article 112. The United Nations presupposed the peaceful coexistence of all political systems; the same was not true for the OAS, which did not however thereby violate the provisions of the United Nations Charter, since fundamental principles were not involved. An American Government could be Marxist-Leninist if it wished—the OAS did not presume to forbid that—but the Government must then leave the inter-American system. The Cuban Government had, in point of fact, voluntarily placed itself outside that system and had moved into the orbit of the Warsaw Treaty system.

14. If, in addition, the United Nations Charter allowed each Member State to adopt the political system which suited it, there seemed no reason why it should prohibit a regional organization from making the maintenance of representative democracy a condition for membership.

15. His delegation would not vote for the draft resolution sponsored by Czechoslovakia and Romania (A/C.1/L.309), nor for any other text which implied recognition of a non-existent aggression or threat of aggression. It did not wish to add to international tension by supporting texts which were in fact only cold-war strategems.

16. The people of the Dominican Republic were making free use of the benefits of self-determination, which they had won at such cost, and they had never stooped to asking for foreign help. It was therefore not the Dominican people to which certain offensive epithets might be applied.

17. The Dominican Republic wished to strengthen the inter-American system. When it had been condemned by the OAS for actions for which a tyrant had been exclusively responsible, its people had respected that decision and had then won back their freedom. The present Government was genuinely democratic and representative. It did not want war, but it was prepared to defend the other American States whose interests were bound up with its own.
18. Mr. TCHOBANOV (Bulgaria) unreservedly supported the draft resolution submitted by Romania and Czechoslovakia (A/C.1/L.309), which proposed the minimum action called for by the new preparations for intervention and aggression against the Cuban people.

19. Some representatives had claimed that the apprehensions of the Cuban Government and people regarding the imminence of a new attack by the United States were groundless. It had been said that there was no reason to doubt the sincerity of the moving statements made on the subject by the United States representatives.

20. Having learnt from experience, he did not share the optimism on that score displayed by the representative of Chile, among others. In that connexion, he pointed out that in January 1961, at the very time when the former representative of the United States, Mr. Wadsworth, was affirming in the Security Council that his Government harboured no aggressive designs against Cuba, the preparations for aggression had been in full swing: the mercenaries of the Central Intelligence Agency had been receiving a crash course of training by United States officers and the final touches were being given to the plan for an operation against Cuba involving the actual participation of United States Navy and Air Force units.

21. It might have been hoped, it was true, that the new Administration in the United States would at last suit its actions to its words. Unfortunately, the events of April 1961 had occurred. As some representatives had recalled, on 15 and 17 April 1961 the present representative of the United States, Mr. Stevenson, had categorically assured the members of the First Committee that his country was not preparing any armed aggression. Now it was common knowledge that at that very time mercenaries, recruited, trained and financed by the CIA, supplied with the most advanced United States military equipment and transported by United States army units under the escort of United States military aircraft, were landing on the coasts of Cuba.

22. At the meeting of 15 April 1961, the present representative of the United States had also stated that the bombing of Cuban towns had been carried out by aircraft and airborne personnel of the Cuban armed forces. He had even shown photographs in support of those assertions which, as it had emerged later, were forgeries.

23. As it had been proved that the two successive representatives of the United States, in January and April 1961, had spoken the exact opposite of the truth, it was obviously impossible to believe in the statements by the present representatives of that country.

24. The representatives of the Revolutionary Government of Cuba and a good many other speakers had cited a whole series of cogent facts showing that the Government of the United States was now making political, psychological, economic and legal preparations for the next aggression against Cuba. They had shown that the mercenaries of the CIA were continuing to receive military training in camps situated both on United States territory and in Central America. The United Nations should therefore declare that it would not allow a further violation of the Charter. Those who still harboured illusions would do well to ask themselves whether their countries did not run the risk of becoming another Cuba.

25. The representatives of the United States did not even wish to admit openly that the policy of their Government with regard to Cuba and the other Latin American countries had always been one of intervention, exploitation and aggression. On his return from Punta del Este, the Secretary of State, Mr. Rusk, had even gone so far as to maintain that it was the United States which had driven colonialism out of Cuba, thus ensuring its independence. But, according to a textbook entitled "Vitalized American History" and prescribed for students preparing for college entrance examinations in the United States, imperialism—that is, the acquisition of colonies or the establishment of economic or political authority over weaker countries—had been the main issue in the electoral campaign of 1900. Further on, the book pointed out that the Platt Amendment to the Cuban Constitution of 1901 had made that country a virtual protectorate of the United States. It then explained how the Monroe Doctrine had been extended in order to force the Caribbean countries to maintain stable Governments and thus safeguard the interest of the United States, to prevent European intervention and to protect the Panama Canal. The "good neighbour policy" had hardly changed that state of affairs, since in April 1961 and on other occasions the Government of the United States had not hesitated to undertake armed intervention with the help of mercenaries recruited by the CIA.

26. That agency had been criticized in the United States not for having committed a breach of international law and of the United Nations Charter but for having failed in its attempted aggression. It had been reorganized and a new head had been appointed, but, as in the past, it would be authorized to practise international banditry on behalf of the United States Government, and to trample on the Charter of the United Nations and that of the Organization of American States. The only difference would be that when the subversive and terrorist operations were of a certain magnitude, control would pass to the Pentagon. It was therefore obvious that the United States did not intend to abandon its policy of 1961.

27. The purpose of the two meetings held at Punta del Este, in August 1961 and January 1962, like that of President Kennedy's and Mr. Stevenson's visits to Latin America, had been to obtain the consent of the Latin American Governments to the application of sanctions against Cuba, in other words, to ensure their complicity in the next aggression. However, measures more or less akin to sanctions had been supported only by the representatives of States which made up no more than one-quarter of the population of Latin America. Of course, Marxism-Leninism had been declared incompatible with the inter-American system at Punta del Este, but the Marxist-Leninist concept of the world would lose none of its attraction on that account. For if the lot of the workers had shown some improvement in a few countries, situated chiefly in Western Europe and North America and with a little over 10 per cent of the world's total population, that was thanks to the socialist revolution. The fate of the rest of mankind remained the same and had even grown considerably worse in many cases as a result of colonial and semi-colonial exploitation.

28. Some might ask whether the masters of the world, who had already been prompted by the fear of revolution to introduce humanitarian measures in a small

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Footnote:

9 Official Records of the General Assembly, Fiftieth Session (Part II), First Committee, 1146th meeting.
number of countries, had not decided, driven by the same fear, to improve the lot of the peoples of Latin America, and whether that was not precisely the goal of the Alliance for Progress. Only a few figures were needed to show that that hope was vain, for in Cuba, a country with 7 million inhabitants, more than $1,000 million had been invested by the United States capitalists before the revolution. That $1,000 million had left the Cuban economy completely dependent on the United States monopolies and the population a prey to disease, unemployment and poverty. The sum of $20,000 million for 200 million Latin Americans amounted to considerably less than $1,000 million for 7 million Cubans and, at the end of ten years, the inhabitants of Latin America would be no better off than the Cubans before the revolution. Moreover, as the representative of the USSR had pointed out at the 1232nd meeting, without contradiction, the share of that amount to be contributed annually by the United States was less than the amount the United States capitalists were taking out of Latin America annually in the form of profits on their past investments. The Alliance for Progress might enable the United States to dispose of a part of its agricultural surpluses, but it would not give the Latin American countries what they needed, namely, sound, viable and independent national economies.

29. He pointed out that, by firmly expressing its will, the United Nations had already, in 1961, forced the United States to break off its plan of aggression against Cuba. It was important, in the interests of other countries as well as Cuba, not to encourage the aggressors by weakening in its attitude. His delegation urged the Committee to adopt the draft resolution submitted by Czechoslovakia and Romania.

30. Mr. URQUIA (El Salvador) recalled that until April 1961 the question of Cuba had seemed to present the features of a bilateral dispute between two States belonging to the American regional system; in its resolution 1615 (XV) the General Assembly had recognized that fact by recalling the peaceful means of settlement established at the Seventh Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers of the American Republics. No attempt had been made to resort to such peaceful means, namely, negotiation and the submission of the dispute to a special good offices committee. In the meantime, however, the Governments of the Latin American countries had realized the true situation; the subversive activities of international communism had compelled more than a dozen American countries to break off diplomatic relations with Cuba, in order to stem the infiltration, organized by the Cuban embassies, of certain elements and of communist propaganda material. The Seventh Meeting of Consultation had forcefully condemned intervention or threats of intervention by an extra-continental Power in the affairs of the American republics; it had reaffirmed the opposition of the Inter-American system to any form of totalitarian régime. The recent subversive activities, and the ever more explicit declarations made at Havana, had confirmed the existence of a serious threat to the peace and security of the American republics: that was why, on the initiative of the Colombian Government, a further Meeting of Consultation had been convened at Punta del Este.

31. The concept of the American regional system dated back to 1815; at that time, Simón Bolívar was already evolving the plan for a congress of representatives of all the countries of the continent. Seven years later Bolívar, in his capacity as President of the Republic of Greater Colombia, had invited the other Governments of the continent to organize an assembly of plenipotentiaries which would consider common dangers, interpret treaties and serve as a body for conciliation in the event of disputes. As a consequence, the Congress of Panama met in 1826. At that Congress the decision had been taken to establish a body whose main purpose would be to maintain peace among the republics of the hemisphere and between those republics and the rest of the world; it had also been decided that military contingents, to be furnished by the participating States, should constitute a permanent force responsible for the common defence of the American republics. That Congress represented the origin of modern international organizations and of the concept of collective security. One of the articles of the Treaty of Perpetual Union, League and Confederation concluded at the Congress of Panama had provided that if any party made a fundamental change in its form of government it would ipso facto be excluded from the confederation and might be readmitted only by unanimous decision of all the parties.

32. During the rest of the nineteenth and the first thirty years of the twentieth, the American republics had organized further conferences, primarily political in nature, with a view to giving practical expression to the concepts of Bolívar.

33. In 1936, at the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace convened at Buenos Aires, President Roosevelt had declared inter alia that others who, driven by war-madness or land-hunger might seek to commit acts of aggression against the American republics would find a hemisphere whose members were wholly prepared to consult together for their mutual safety and their mutual good.

34. On the initiative of the five Central American republics, the Conference had adopted, inter alia, a "Declaration of Principles of Inter-American Solidarity and Co-operation" relating to the existence of a common democratic form of government in America and to the establishment of a purely American system tending towards the preservation of peace, the proscription of war, and the harmonious development of the aspirations of the hemisphere's republics.

35. Since the Conference of Buenos Aires, certain principles and concepts—which were absolutely incompatible with the attitude adopted by the present Cuban Government towards the other republics of the hemisphere—had been constantly strengthened; and in 1948 they had been incorporated in the charter of the Organization of American States. American solidarity must mean the consolidation, on the continent, within the framework of democratic Institutions, of a system of individual liberty and social justice based on respect for fundamental human rights. It required the political organization of the American States to be based on the effective exercise of representative democracy.

36. At the Ninth International Conference of American States in 1948, the charter of the regional organization had been signed; and a resolution on the maintenance and defence of democracy in America had been adopted, whereby the political activities of international communism or any other form of totalitarian system were stated to be incompatible with the American concept of liberty, which was founded on the dignity of man and the sovereignty of the nation.

37. Those propositions had been ratified at Caracas, in 1954, at the Tenth Inter-American Conference; in a declaration of solidarity, the American States had ex-
pressed their determination to take the necessary measures to protect their political independence against the intervention of international communism, acting in the interests of an alien despotism. They had also reiterated the faith of the peoples of America in the effective exercise of representative democracy as the best means of promoting their social and political progress. Lastly, they had declared that the domination or control of the political institutions of any American State by the international communist movement would constitute a threat to the sovereignty and political independence of the American States, endangering the peace of America, and would call for a meeting of consultation to consider the adoption of appropriate action in accordance with treaties in force.


39. Against the application of the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro and other inter-American instruments to the Cuban question, the principle of non-intervention and that of the self-determination of peoples were invoked. But for the American States another principle was fully as important: the principle that all the States of the hemisphere must be politically organized on the basis of the effective exercise of representative democracy, in order to preserve their solidarity and to attain their objectives. Moreover, the principle of non-intervention by one State in the affairs of another did not prohibit action by the appropriate international organizations where it was taken as a result of obligations freely assumed, as in the case of action by the Security Council or the General Assembly of the United Nations or the Organ of Consultation of the Organization of American States. The application of coercive measures arose from the normal political and juridical functioning of those bodies, and from the very essence of the system of collective security in America and in the rest of the world.

40. In that connexion, he quoted statement made by Mr. Lleras Camargo, President of Colombia, and by Mr. Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, as well as an article in the newspaper El Tiempo. According to those statements, collective action undertaken against a State which menaced peace and security did not constitute intervention in the domestic affairs of that State. It was a question of defending the democratic ideals of the American States and their firm desire for lasting co-operation and peace. Democracy could not endure in America if it was not defended collectively. If, under the cloak of non-intervention, certain countries considered themselves free to change the rules which in a binding multilateral instrument they had agreed to observe, the principle of non-intervention must be applied with the same flexibility, in order that countries should be able to respect the commitments which others sought to derive.

41. El Salvador had always fervently supported the principle of the self-determination of peoples. But the will of the people must be expressed freely, with all the necessary safeguards and within a system ensuring real and conscious participation by all, if the expression of that will was to be valid. Tumultuous meetings of the type conducted by Hitler and Mussolini were not an expression of the people's will.

42. While representative democracy had not reached the same level of development in all the countries of America, it was the form of government best suited to all the peoples of the hemisphere, given their origins and all the features which had distinguished them during more than a century of independence.

43. The United Nations included countries following the Christian and democratic tradition and countries which did not believe either in God or in the dignity of the human person. Such heterogeneity was not to be found among the countries of Latin America, whose peoples had always given evidence of their allegiance to democracy, their love of liberty and their religious faith.

44. At the Eighth Meeting of Consultation at Punta del Este, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American States had adopted several resolutions in which they had affirmed, among other things, that the continental unity and the democratic institutions of the hemisphere were in danger (resolution 1). They had stated that the present Government of Cuba, which had officially identified itself as a Marxist-Leninist one, was incompatible with the principles and objectives of the Inter-American system, and that such incompatibility excluded it from participation in the system (resolution VI). That declaration regarding exclusion was the only point on which the Ministers of Foreign Affairs had not been unanimous. Six of them had abstained on account of legal scruples regarding automatic exclusion, but only the representative of Cuba had voted against the declaration. As had been confirmed by the statements which the representatives of some of the six abstaining countries had made during the current debate, there had been unanimity at Punta del Este regarding the incompatibility of a régime proclaming itself to be Marxist-Leninist with the inter-American legal and political system.

45. A summary of the principles of the inter-American system was to be found in the Declaration of Santiago de Chile, adopted in August 1959 at the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and approved by Mr. Roa, the Cuban Foreign Minister. That Declaration stated that the Governments of the hemisphere must maintain a régime of individual liberty and social justice, based on respect for fundamental human rights and for freedom of information and expression in all its forms.

46. Economic and social reform was certainly essential in the countries of Latin America. That necessity had inspired the vast programme of co-operation proposed by the President of the United States, and the economic charter adopted at the special meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council held at Punta del Este in August 1961. The communist Governments were doubtless opposed to the Alliance for Progress, as they had been to the Marshall Plan, for accelerated economic development in a region upon which they had designs was not to their advantage.

47. In the light of the most recent events and of the Marxist-Leninist declarations emanating from Havana, the Caribbean question had ceased to have the appearance of a conflict between the United States Government and the Cuban régime; it had assumed the aspect of a grave danger for every country in the area. El Salvador was one of those countries which, because of their geographical position and their characteristics,
tics, felt themselves to be the most menaced. That was why it had favoured the convening of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation at Punta del Este, on the initiative of Colombia, and had voted unreservedly, at that Conference, for all the resolutions adopted. El Salvador was therefore not prepared to vote for the draft resolution submitted by Romania and Czechoslovakia (A/C.1/L.309), which, using unacceptable terms and ignoring the OAS, continued to claim that the question was one of a bilateral dispute which could be resolved by negotiations.

48. Mr. FLORES AVENADO (Guatemala) regretted that certain representatives had not seen fit to maintain the debate at a very high level. He protested, in particular, against the language used by the representative of the Ukrainian SSR in reference to the President of Guatemala. All the leaders of Guatemala had struggled for the reincorporation of Belize into the territory of Guatemala. To seek passionately to attain that end by all honourable means in keeping with national dignity, including resort to the good offices of friendly countries, as the President of Guatemala had done, was not to sell oneself for American gold.

49. He repeated that his country, which had known iron dictatorships, had rejoiced at the news of the freedom won by the Cuban people in their revolution, for which Guatemala had felt the greatest sympathy. However, commandos organized in accordance with the plans of Castro and Arbenz Guzmán had tried to invade Central America, including Guatemala. Between July and November 1959, more than one hundred bombs of Czechoslovak manufacture had exploded on Guatemalan territory, killing women and children.

50. Some hoped to see a change of policy on the part of the Cuban Government. Ten years of experience under a pro-communist Government had taught the Guatemalan people that communism never changed and never forgave. In Cuba, it had made the law of the firing squad its supreme law and had already executed more than one thousand dissident citizens.

51. The representative of a Government which violated Inter-American agreements, and thwarted the desires of the people by refusing to hold elections which it had promised, could only speak the language of calumny. It was not true that the American Governments had gone to Punta del Este under pressure from the United States. They had gone there because of the solidarity which united them, a glorious heritage from the great liberators. That solidarity, based on history, geography, culture and firm legal foundations, had made possible the creation of a moral climate in which the American man could advance.

52. The representatives of the Soviet bloc knew very well that a democracy in the Batista style was not representative democracy, which was the ideal of the Latin American peoples and of the Guatemalan people in particular. Mr. Castro, on the other hand, had abolished representative democracy, together with elections, self-determination, and freedom of information and of the Press.

53. The statements of the communist representatives concerning monopolies in Latin America were likewise falsehoods. The three monopolies formerly existing in Guatemala had been liquidated or were in process of liquidation. He himself had abolished the railway monopoly when he had been President of his country. Under article 222 of the Guatemalan Constitution of 1956, undertakings were subjected to very strict regulations.

54. He wished to protest against the insulting remarks of the Soviet Union representative who had accused him of acting as an echo of the United States Department of State. The cause defended by the Guatemalan Government was defended in equal measure by every country of Latin America.

55. Finally, he wished to mention a sad event which had aroused indignation among all the peoples of Latin America: the attack on the Ecuadorian Embassy by Castro's militiamen, who had murdered eight young Cubans. The driver of the lorry where these young men lay, when asked what had happened, had replied: "They died because they wanted to be free!"