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Agenda item 90:
Complaint by the Revolutionary Government of Cuba regarding the various plans of aggression and acts of intervention being executed by the Government of the United States of America against the Republic of Cuba, constituting a manifest violation of its territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence, and a clear threat to international peace and security (continued) ........................................ 97

Chairman: Mr. Karel KURKA (Czechoslovakia).

AGENDA ITEM 90


1. Mr. PADILLA NERVO (Mexico), exercising his right of reply, expressed appreciation to the United States representative for his comments on his earlier statement (1154th meeting) and on the Mexican draft resolution (A/C.1/L.275), and thanked those other representatives who had commented on them. Although his delegation did not share the views of other Latin American delegations with regard to a draft resolution, it was inspired by the same spirit and agreed with much of what they had said in so far as it reaffirmed the competence of the General Assembly to consider the Cuban question.

2. Objections had been raised to the Mexican draft resolution on the grounds that it represented a departure from the procedures of the inter-American system. The objections were not well founded. In the first place, all Member States were bound, under Article 33 of the United Nations Charter, to seek the peaceful settlement of disputes by the means enumerated in that article, and, inter alia, by "resort to regional agencies or arrangements". Consequently, Mexico had been clearly within the terms of the article in suggesting, in its initial intervention (1154th meeting), that the Ad Hoc Good Offices Committee established at the Seventh Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American States, held at San José, Costa Rica, in August 1960, might endeavour to reconcile the differences between the United States and Cuba, provided that the parties voluntarily accepted its mediation. Should they refuse to do so, that procedure could not be applied. But the Assembly could not, on that account, remain inactive and allow the situation to deteriorate. Mexico did not wish to rule out the use of inter-American machinery, but rather to complement it in the event of its being unable to function with the effectiveness and urgency required by the circumstances. Moreover, the whole Mexican position rested on articles 15 and 16 of the charter of the Organization of American States (OAS) and was strengthened by the provisions of the Convention concerning the Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife and the Convention on Territorial Asylum. Those were all inter-American instruments, whose terms were fully compatible with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. Indeed, Mexico was implicitly requesting the Assembly to ratify and support the principles of those inter-American treaties; in the circumstances, it could not be said to have disregarded or overlooked the OAS. The United Kingdom representative had criticized the Mexican draft resolution on the ground that it failed to make it clear that the crisis in Cuba was an issue between Cubans. He would, however, point out that the reference in operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution to a "civil war" in Cuba clearly indicated that the struggle was one between Cubans. Moreover, the appeal made in operative paragraph 2 for an end to activity which might result in further bloodshed represented the supreme effort required of the Assembly or at least an unequivocal expression of its moral position. There were precedents for such appeals in the United Nations: in June 1954, in connexion with the possibility of bloodshed in Guatemala, the Security Council had unanimously adopted a resolution calling for "the immediate termination of any action likely to cause bloodshed" and requesting all Member States "to abstain ... from rendering assistance to any such action".

3. The Assembly could not evade responsibility for taking action on the Cuban question. Its competence had been established; it now had to be exercised. Moreover, the twenty-one members of the OAS were not the only States which bore that responsibility: surely, it was also the duty of the seventy-eight other Member States to demand an end to bloodshed and to a situation endangering international peace. The argument that the only decision open to the Assembly was to refer the Cuban question to the OAS overlooked the fact that the OAS was free to meet at any time to deal with any matter whatsoever. Indeed, Mexico would have no objection to the Cuban question being referred to the OAS, provided that such action did not exclude direct,
effective and urgent action by the General Assembly on a matter which was at present before it.

4. In view of the extreme gravity of the Cuban situation, it was the duty of all ninety-nine Member States to affirm the principles which they were obligated to uphold. In so doing, they would not be passing judgement on the responsibility of the parties. There was nothing in the Mexican draft resolution which could be construed as an expression of opinion on that issue; it merely contained a general appeal, directed against no State in particular, for a cessation of all activity which might lead to further bloodshed and further dangers; it made no implicit accusation against any country. The Mexican draft resolution was simply an affirmation of principles which had been universally accepted and which were held particularly dear by the people of Mexico and its Government.

5. He requested that the Mexican draft resolution (A/C.1/L.275) should be given priority in the voting over the draft resolution submitted by Romania (A/C.1/L.274) on the ground that it represented a statement of principles.

6. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the discussion had established a number of important facts beyond all possible doubt. Firstly, Cuba had been the victim of an attack by mercenary counter-revolutionary bands organized, trained and armed in the territory of other States, which had provided them with the most modern equipment and with sea and air transport to Cuba. Secondly, the countries principally concerned were the United States and Guatemala. The responsibility of the United States for the organization and execution of the attack had been admitted in articles in the United States Press, the truth of which had never been denied. United States citizens had participated directly in the operation, particularly as bomber pilots. It was significant that no reply had been given by the United States representative to the Cuban representative's statement at the 1155th meeting about a United States pilot brought down on Cuban territory. The United States Navy had protected the counter-revolutionaries' landings and its Air Force had given them cover. As far as Guatemala was concerned, no delegation had expressed the least doubt that it was being used as a base for the invasion, except for the Guatemalan delegation itself. Furthermore, the representative of Nicaragua had not answered the Ukrainian representative's statement at the 1156th meeting concerning a report in the New York Herald Tribune to the effect that Puerto Cañas in Nicaragua was the main point of departure for the invasion. His silence must be taken as an avowal of guilt. Thirdly, the purpose of the attack was to suppress the Cuban revolution, to overthrow the Government put in power by the people and to restore the domination of United States monopolies, especially the United Fruit Company. Fourthly, the attack created a threat to international peace and security and was leading the world towards a devastating war. It was a gross violation of international law and of the United Nations Charter and was an open attack by a great Power to subjugate a small country.

7. Those were the facts and the United States delegation had never tried to deny them. It had merely stated that its armed forces were not intervening directly. At his press conference on 17 April 1961 the United States Secretary of State had refused to answer such questions as whether his Government was in contact with the counter-revolutionary leaders, whether it had put its territory at their disposal for the organization of armed bands, whether it had equipped those bands with weapons, whether they had been trained by United States instructors and whether United States citizens had taken part directly in the operation. Those same questions had been put by the Saudi Arabian representative at the 1157th meeting, but no answer had been forthcoming from the United States delegation. Once again silence must be taken as an avowal. In an attempt to conceal its responsibility, the United States had advanced a theory about the penetration of Cuba by international communism, of which it said the intervention was a consequence. That was an old argument, which had been put forward to account for a wide variety of developments, such as the Egyptian revolution of 1952, the Iraqi revolution of 1958 and the national liberation movements in Africa and Asia. But revolutions were not caused by intrigue from outside; they were made by the people themselves. In any case, the achievements of communism were well known and could be seen in the communist countries. That doctrine provided the only correct approach for peoples struggling to free themselves from exploitation and to achieve peace. The United States theory had been supported by no one except the person illegally occupying the seat of the People's Republic of China, who himself represented a group of counter-revolutionaries.

8. The United States representative had said (1154th meeting) that he was entitled to speak of the internal affairs of Cuba, because internal problems led to international conflicts. Yet the United States itself had internal problems, as did the Soviet Union, but in neither case did they give rise to international conflicts. Such conflicts only arose when a State intervened forcibly in the affairs of another State. That was why the Charter prohibited such intervention. Hence, when the United States representative said that the aggression against Cuba was a result of its internal problems, he was admitting that the United States had intervened in Cuba's internal affairs.

9. Statements by other representatives had shown that no delegation supported the United States whereas many supported Cuba. The socialist countries had stated bluntly that they condemned United States aggression against Cuba; they had demanded its immediate cessation and had expressed support for Cuba in its struggle for independence. The representatives of India, Ceylon, the United Arab Republic, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Guinea, Mali and Ghana had recognized that Cuba had been the victim of an invasion prepared by a foreign Power and had demanded that such intervention in its internal affairs cease, although they had not said so directly in all cases. Mexico and Ecuador had shown themselves friends of the Cuban people, and other Latin American countries had indicated their objection to outside intervention, although, for obvious reasons, they had been careful not to offend the United States. Even the United States' allies, such as the United Kingdom, Canada and Italy, had been unable fully to support it. Its only champion had been Guatemala.

10. In those circumstances, the Soviet delegation was convinced that its draft resolution (A/C.1/L.277), which condemned the aggressive actions of the United States and other countries, demanded that assistance to the counter-revolutionaries cease and called on all Member States to help Cuba repel aggression, was the best solution to the problem, especially in view of the declaration made that very day by the United States
Secretary of State that operations against Cuba would probably continue and of the President’s statement, also made that day, which did not exclude the possibility of their continuation.

11. The Soviet delegation would support the Romanian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.274), which provided for the minimum measures that must be taken initially to prevent a further deterioration of the situation. The Mexican draft resolution (A/C.1/L.275) had assuredly been submitted with good intentions and contained many useful provisions. It referred to the principles of non-intervention and the pacific settlement of disputes, urged Member States to put an immediate end to any activity that might result in further bloodshed and requested them to cooperate in the search for a peaceful solution. While it also contained certain passages which might be misinterpreted, his delegation felt that it could help to prevent further deterioration of the situation.

12. The seven-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.276) was completely unacceptable, although individual parts of it were on the right lines. The main objection was that it sought to refer the question to the OAS, thus removing it from the jurisdiction of the United Nations. The effect would be to postpone action on the matter indefinitely, since the United States exercised a preponderant influence in the OAS. In the United Nations, on the other hand, no one country could impose its will on the others, so that the rights of a victim of aggression were safeguarded. Finally, as the Mexican representative had stated, under the terms of its Charter, the OAS could not discuss the matter without the agreement of the parties concerned. For those reasons, his delegation would vote against the seven-Power draft resolution.

13. In conclusion, he hoped that the United Nations would do its duty towards the Cuban people in their struggle against imperialism, colonialism and reaction. If it did not, the Cuban people could rely on the protection of their true friends.

14. Mr. ROMAN (Nicaragua) denied that his Government had participated in any way in aggressive acts against Cuba. It had always fulfilled its international commitments and would continue to maintain complete neutrality with respect to the internal affairs of Cuba. In order to refute the accusations against his country, the President of Nicaragua invited the Committee to send a commission to inspect the country.

15. His delegation would vote for the seven-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.276).

16. Mr. SÓSA RODRÍGUEZ (Venezuela) explained, for the benefit of the representative of the Soviet Union, that it was not the intention of the seven-Power Latin American draft resolution that the Cuban problem as a whole should be referred to the OAS. The text itself was perfectly clear: it did not say "Exhorts the Organization of American States"; it said "Exhorts those Member States which belong to the Organization of American States...". In addition, operative paragraph 2 left no doubt that the action proposed was to be taken by the United Nations and not by the OAS; the members of the latter organization obviously had no jurisdiction over Members of the United Nations.

17. Mr. STEVENSON (United States of America), replying to the representative of the Soviet Union, said that it was important to distinguish between sympathy, which many people both inside and outside the United States felt for the Cuban exiles, and overt intervention in Cuba. His Government had no aggressive purposes against Cuba and did not intend to undertake any military intervention in that country. On the contrary, it was only too anxious that the friendly relations which once existed between Cuba and the United States should be restored, and it hoped that the Cuban people would settle their problems in a manner which would ensure social justice and political liberty for all Cubans. It was absurd to suggest that the United States, with all its military might, had in fact launched a deliberate armed invasion of Cuba and not yet succeeded in subduing that tiny country. Indeed, the best evidence that the United States was not concerned in the present action was the fact that it had so far failed of its purpose. Equally untrue were the communist charges of the United States’ economic “invasion” of Cuba. They entirely ignored the actual facts, such as President Kennedy’s recent proposals for a broad programme of economic assistance and social reform in Latin America.

18. Some might say that in the last forty-eight hours the Cuban people had spoken; that was clearly not the case; there was no doubt whatever what the outcome would have been had they done so. They yearned to be free of the new tyranny from which so many thousands had taken refuge—and many of those had returned to give their lives in an attempt to win back freedom for their country. But with assistance from outside the hemisphere, tyranny had already taken root in it, and that should serve as a warning to all the peoples of the Americas and spur them to a new determination to use all their resources and energies to implant political freedom and democracy and to foster economic growth and social progress throughout their continent.

19. The United Nations was bound to preserve the territorial integrity and the political independence of its Members. It had so far been relatively successful in maintaining territorial integrity. Political independence, however, was another matter. The outcome was not so certain. The challenge remained: in Cuba, in Laos, in the Congo and elsewhere. The small countries of the world and the new States, as yet insecure, should beware of the dangers of insidious subversion. All peoples who valued freedom should be on their guard lest the political independence they cherished be impaired and lost by subversion. The proof of freedom was the possession of the right to choose, not once but over and over again; when that right was lost, freedom was lost, as the present state of affairs in Cuba tragically demonstrated.

20. The United States delegation would vote against the Soviet and Romanian draft resolutions. It also found the Mexican draft resolution unacceptable, primarily because it made no reference to the OAS or to cooperation in the Western hemisphere. On the other hand it found the seven-Power Latin American draft resolution entirely suitable and would vote for it.

21. He could not conclude without paying a tribute to the real Cuban patriots who were continuing against Castro the revolution they had begun against Batista, because Castro had given them only a new tyranny and not the personal freedom, civil liberties, social justice and law for which they had fought. Rarely had a dictator been overthrown when the first blow for freedom was struck by the oppressed people. The endeavour to regain freedom was no less valid on that account. Valiant uprisings might be crushed by force of arms,
but the desire for freedom could never be quelled, and so long as one man yearned for freedom, tyrannies remained insecure. Those who had the courage and good fortune to escape from a tyrannical régime were always welcome in countries where freedom and democracy prevailed. That had been so in the past and it remained so today. Italy’s Garibaldi had found refuge in London. So, too, had General de Gaulle, waiting out the period of Nazi domination to restore to his country a splendid sense of its own identity and history. So too, for that matter, had Marx and Lenin, the idols of those who now denied the right of asylum. Many liberal leaders, both past and present, had sought asylum in the United States. Fidel Castro himself had had at one time found aid and shelter there. The door would remain open to those thousands of Cubans who would assuredly flee from his present despotic régime. All over the world people were fleeing from oppression, not only in Cuba but also in Korea, in Tibet, in Hungary and, most revealingly, in East Germany. People fled to freedom, not from it. No one should be misled, therefore, by the labels attached to Cuba’s freedom fighters by the communists. They were no imperialist lackeys, no mercenaries, but gallant patriots who had left their homes, lost all, and paid their lives rather than live in chains. They wanted a society in which a man might speak his mind without fear of reprisal, a society in which the law was a shield and not a trap, a system in which the State did not wield a paralysing power to sow death and terror. Those were not small things. Cubans had thought them worth dying for when Fidel Castro was trying to overthrow Batista. They thought them worth dying for now when they were fighting to overthrow the tyrant Castro in turn had set up. It was the faith of free societies that men would continue to fight and die for rights so simple yet so precious.

22. Mr. ROA (Cuba) said that in all the speeches he had heard in recent days, real though the anxiety of the speakers about the dramatic events in his country no doubt was, there had been no answer to the charges his delegation had made in opening the debate, and no reply to the questions it had asked.

23. He would not refer to the draft resolutions which had been submitted, except to say that the extraordinary insistence on the solution of the Cuban-United States question within the OAS was highly suspect, especially after the Seventh Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American States, held at San José, Costa Rica, at the end of which former Secretary of State Herter had informed the Press that the success of the meeting was to be gauged by the fact that it had condemned Cuba as a satellite of Sino-Soviet communism. Cuba belonged to the OAS but there, as in the United Nations, it maintained an absolutely independent position, however little that might be to the liking of the representatives of the United States. Moreover, the seven-Power Latin American draft resolution took on an entirely different complexion in the light of the statements made that day by President Kennedy in connection with the failure of the mercenaries’ invasion of Cuba. The ultimate goal, it was clear, was the reconquest of Cuba, however much the terms used to describe the situation might vary—three months before, it had been the conflict of Cuba with the Western hemisphere; today, it was a conflict between Cubans. Despite the fact that the President of the United States had declared that his Government had contracted international obligations which prevented it interfering in the internal affairs of any other country, including Cuba, it was known that he had, the day before, conversed with the leader of the Cuban rebels, and that his statements had been based largely on the conversation they had then had. It would not surprise him if the United States Government were at any moment to recognize the Cuban Revolutionary Council as the legitimate government of the Republic of Cuba. The rebel leaders had claimed to have the support of the entire Cuban people. So far, however, not one member of the civilian population of Cuba had joined the invaders. On the contrary, reports showed that the whole Cuban people had risen, firm and united, to repel the invaders. Once a people had recovered real and effective freedom, they were ready to die in the defence of what they had won. For the first time in their history, the Cuban people were really exercising their sovereignty and enjoying fundamental freedoms and the possibility of determining their own destiny. It was precisely because they were able to do so today that the United States Government had created the present situation of opposition from outside, an opposition which it financed, supplied and commanded.

24. It would be possible to trace the history of the Cuban revolution and to pinpoint the time when the attitude of the United States Government had changed to one of hostility. The Cuban revolution had at first been applauded by the United States, when it appeared to be no more than a revolution similar to any other Latin American revolution, and to mean nothing more than a change of personnel, a new team in power, with certain ideals of administrative honesty, pledged to restore the formal liberties destroyed by the earlier tyranny, and to hold free elections, but likely to leave in cold storage all the great promises that had moved the people to struggle and die for the revolution: land reform, industrialization, education, social prosperity, economic progress and so on. Those, however, had been the real objects of the Cuban revolution and Dr. Castro had been faithful to them throughout. It was for that reason that he had the militant support of the Cuban people, who were ready to shed their blood to safeguard the fruits of the revolution. When the United States Government had seen that the Cuban revolution was a real revolution, its initial support had rapidly faded, and when Dr. Castro had visited the United States in April 1959, he had received a warm welcome only from the people of the United States, and of course the Latin American colony, particularly that part of it which came from Cuba.

25. It was absurd now to suggest that the rebel group represented the very cream of the Cuban revolution. The Cubans themselves knew all its members and knew, too, that they had not participated in the forging of the revolution. The dozen who had survived the heroic landing from the Gramma had remained entirely loyal to the revolutionary cause. The only people who had betrayed the revolution had been those who had sought to gain some personal advantage from it. Most of those were now in exile, living in exile in the United States a life of privilege and opportunity that had vanished for them in Cuba. They were merely puppets—pleased and smiling, authentic puppets. They could scarcely claim to be bringing freedom to Cuba when they did not even go there, for in fact they remained in the United States while sending bands of mercenaries to the island.

26. The Cuban delegation’s charges remained and it was willing to reintroduce all the evidence that was necessary.
27. He would only add that Cuba was not alone. Cuba had friends both inside and outside the United States. Dr. Castro had received messages of support from many world leaders. It was surely surprising that a group of bandits and traitors, as the representative of the United States depicted them, should have won such universal support. Members of the Committee might ponder that fact. It remained simply to read out, for the benefit of the Committee, a dispatch from the Revolutionary Government of Cuba which revealed that the Cuban revolution had emerged victorious, the invading army organized over many months by the imperialist Government of the United States having been destroyed in less than seventy-two hours. A large quantity of arms of United States manufacture had been captured, including a number of heavy Sherman tanks. The men and women of Cuba were to be congratulated on the crushing defeat of the invaders.

28. The CHAIRMAN said that the Committee would now hear explanations of vote before the vote.

29. Mrs. ROSSEL (Sweden) said that, in the opinion of her delegation, the Committee should obtain more objective information, possibly through a United Nations investigation, before taking a decision which would set an important precedent. She would therefore be unable to support any of the four draft resolutions. She would vote against the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.277) because it accused a Member State, on clearly insufficient grounds, of having committed aggression. On the other three she would abstain. In connexion with the seven-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.276), she wished to emphasize her delegation's view that problems of the scope and nature of those now before the Committee were properly a matter for consideration by the United Nations. The Mexican draft resolution (A/C.1/L.275) might eventually serve as the basis for a decision by the Assembly should the facts when established warrant such action as it suggested.

30. Mr. CAMARA Maurice (Guinea) said that his delegation, recalling its own experience as a victim of colonialism, was ready to support any measure aimed at putting an end to the aggression launched from abroad and carried out by mercenaries against a Member State whose only crime had been to place the national wealth at the disposal of the people. He would therefore wholeheartedly support the Mexican draft resolution, which was the only one that met the requirements of the situation. In order that the Assembly's condemnation of the armed aggression against Cuba on the basis of that draft resolution might be as nearly unanimous as possible, he suggested that the Soviet and Romanian delegations should withdraw their drafts. He could not support the seven-Power draft resolution because, as he had said at the 1151st meeting, his delegation thought the question should be settled by the paramount international organization, namely, the United Nations.

31. Mr. WACHUKU (Nigeria) did not consider that any of the four draft resolutions offered a solution to the problem under discussion. Neither the Romanian, the Mexican nor the seven-Power draft resolution included any provision to ensure that the action called for would be carried out. Furthermore, under the seven-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/276), the complaint submitted by a Member State would be transferred from the United Nations to another body over which the latter had no control. If operative paragraph 1 was expanded to include the words "and to report to the United Nations General Assembly at its sixteenth session the measures they have taken to achieve a settlement by peaceful means", he might be able to support it. In the absence of such a provision, however, there could be no assurance that the regional organization in question, which might be dominated by the opinions of certain States, would not take action prejudicial to the interests of the complainant. In his opinion, the Cuban problem was now an international problem and, as such, should be dealt with directly by the United Nations. He agreed with the Swedish representative that the Committee had not sufficient evidence to brand any Member State an aggressor at the current stage, as provided in the Soviet draft resolution. If an impartial inquiry furnished categorical evidence that the condemnation expressed in that draft resolution was warranted, he would not hesitate to support it, but in the present circumstances to do so would simply aggravate existing tensions.

32. Nigeria, as a country which had just won its independence, felt concerned about developments in Cuba because, while it recognized the right of any people to change their Government by legitimate means if they so desired, it was opposed to attempts to disrupt existing institutions from without.

33. The Romanian, Mexican and seven-Power draft resolutions each had certain good features which, if combined with an amendment along the lines he had suggested, might provide the basis for a text acceptable to his delegation. Otherwise he would abstain on all three, and would not take part in the vote on the Soviet draft resolution.

34. Mr. O'BRIEN (Ireland) said that he would support the Mexican draft resolution because, in his delegation's opinion, the Cuban situation constituted a very real threat to international peace and it was therefore fitting that the United Nations should take a position on it. The Mexican draft indicated a course which the United Nations could appropriately follow. At the same time, he would support the seven-Power draft resolution, which he regarded as complementary to the Mexican text. The one acknowledged the role of the United Nations in a matter involving a threat to the peace of the entire world while the other recognized the special role which, in view of the bonds linking the Latin American nations with each other and with the United States, the peoples of a certain region might be able to play in bringing about a just and peaceful solution. He drew attention to the logical connexion between operative paragraph 3 of the Mexican draft resolution (A/C.1/L.275), requesting all States to co-operate in the search for a peaceful solution, and operative paragraph 1 of the seven-Power draft (A/C.1/L.276), specifically directing that appeal to the members of the OAS. He hoped that the two texts could be brought together in a single draft which might command the overwhelming support of the Assembly. He would vote against the Romanian draft resolution not so much because of its actual wording as because of the thinking which appeared to lie behind it, for the sponsor's statement in defence of the freedom of small nations was hardly consonant with the position he had taken in the General Assembly at the fourteenth session on the subject of Tibet (826th plenary meeting). For similar reasons, but a fortiori, he would oppose the Soviet draft resolution. It was true that the Assembly, which seldom condemned the actions of a Member State, had condemned the Soviet action in Hungary. That, however, was a case in which a great Power had actually used its armed forces to overthrow the recog-
nized Government of a small country and to crush its people, whereas in the case under consideration the President of the United States had declared that United States forces would not intervene in Cuba. There was thus a very clear distinction between the two cases and his delegation would vote against any draft resolution which would have the effect of placing them on the same footing.

35. Mr. NOSEK (Czechoslovakia) said that the United Nations was facing one of the most serious tests in its existence. It had often been said that the Organization's main task was to defend the interests of the small countries. It would now be seen whether it was really its function. The Cuban representative had put forward irrefutable evidence that the United States had instigated aggression against Cuba and had recruited, financed, equipped and trained bands of counter-revolutionaries for that purpose in its territory. The paper entitled "Cuba" published by the United States Government (A/4725) proved that the United States was responsible. The Czechoslovak Government, in its declaration of 18 April 1961 (A/C.1/840), had denounced the United States for its part in the bombing and invasion of Cuba and had expressed the hope that the world would condemn the attack. Fortunately, the people of Cuba had succeeded in repelling the invasion, but the United States Secretary of State had stated that such operations would be continued. The actions of the United States and of other countries which had supported the counter-revolutionaries clearly constituted interference in Cuba's internal affairs and the United Nations must therefore immediately take measures to prevent their recurrence. All counter-revolutionary bands must be disarmed and no State must give them assistance. Provisions to that effect were contained in the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.277), for which his delegation would vote. It would also vote for the Romanian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.274). The seven-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.276), however, was entirely unsatisfactory, since it gave no guarantee that aggression against Cuba would cease, and his delegation would therefore vote against it.

36. Mr. BITSIOS (Greece) said that the seven-Power draft resolution could lead to a peaceful settlement of the dispute. It could not be said to deny the jurisdiction of the United Nations, since it exhorted all Member States to abstain from any action which might aggravate existing tensions. The Venezuelan representative had confirmed that interpretation. His delegation rejected the idea that the OAS was under the influence of the United States, since it believed that all its members were their own masters, and it would therefore vote for the seven-Power draft resolution.

37. Mr. LEWANDOWSKI (Poland) said that the attack on Cuba had been a complete failure and that the Cuban people had emerged victorious from their struggle. Recent statements made in the United States, however, showed that the danger had not passed. Various pretexts were being invented for continuing aggression against Cuba. The Guatemalan representative had painted a picture of Cuba being occupied by Chinese, Soviet and other socialist troops, which was totally false and was, moreover, provocative. Immediate measures must therefore be taken to prevent any further aggression: amongst other things, the counter-revolutionary bands in the United States and other countries must be disarmed and assistance to them must cease. Member States should also be ready to give such assistance as the Cuban Government might request to repel any future aggression. Poland had already indicated its willingness to do so.

38. For those reasons, his delegation would support the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.277) and the Romanian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.274), which was a first step towards ending military operations against Cuba. It would not vote for the seven-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.276), which did not reflect the gravity of the situation. It appreciated that the Mexican draft resolution (A/C.1/L.275) represented an effort to stop further bloodshed, but it had reservations about describing the situation in Cuba as "civil war", since the attack had clearly come from outside. Whatever draft the Committee adopted, however, it was to be hoped that the parties responsible for aggression would abide by it and take steps to prevent any further deterioration of the situation.

39. Mr. BRUCAN (Romania) said that his delegation's draft resolution (A/C.1/L.274) represented the minimum action that the General Assembly could take to deal with the problem. Recent developments in the Caribbean and statements to the effect that the attack was only the first of its kind made it all the more necessary that military operations against Cuba and assistance to the counter-revolutionaries should be stopped. There was increasing evidence that the present conflict would develop into something more serious. Recent editorials in the New York Journal-American, the New York Herald Tribune and The Wall Street Journal indicated that if the anti-Castro forces were not successful, the United States might intervene. The United States representative's statement showed that his country was already qualifying its decision not to intervene, despite the fact that it had found no support in the Committee other than from Guatemala.

40. No valid arguments had been put forward against his country's draft resolution. The representative of Ireland had compared Romania's position on Cuba with its position on Tibet, but he had not mentioned that Romania had opposed the debate on Tibet because the People's Republic of China, which was directly involved, had not been seated. The representative of Uruguay, though unable to find anything wrong with the Romanian draft resolution, had said he could not support it because of the statement made by the Romanian representative. Yet in his own statement the Uruguayan representative had praised United States policy and blamed the Cuban Government, and the seven-Power draft resolution, of which Uruguay was a sponsor, was correspondingly biased. The Romanian delegation had the highest regard for the charter of the Organization of American States and considered that if the United States had observed article 15 of that charter there would be no problem. But the OAS had proved quite unable to halt United States intervention. The seven-Power draft resolution would not do anything to stop aggression against Cuba or the assistance given to the aggressors. It would in effect condone the intervention and his delegation would vote against it.

41. As regard the Mexican representative's request that his delegation's draft resolution (A/C.1/L.275) should be given priority, Romania had no objection, but would like the matter to be put to the vote.

42. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia) said that while he sympathized with the Swedish representative's attitude, he believed that it would be unwise to wait for the establishment of a committee of investigation in the present dangerous situation, since the parties to the
dispute might not recognize its authority, as had happened before.

43. He pointed out that the Arab States also had a regional organization similar to the OAS—the League of Arab States—but its members were fully entitled to bring disputes before the United Nations, which they had done on occasion. Similarly, if Cuba wished the present dispute to be dealt with by the United Nations rather than by the OAS its wishes should be respected. His delegation would not, therefore, support the seven-Power draft resolution.

44. The Romanian draft resolution, which had been submitted first, was the mildest of all: it did not make accusations against any particular State. His delegation would therefore vote for it. The Mexican draft resolution also made no accusations, and his delegation would vote for it, partly for the reasons put forward by the Irish representative and partly because of its respect for the views and experience of the Mexican representative. It would not support the Soviet draft resolution because the charges it contained had not been substantiated. His delegation had great sympathy for the Cubans of both parties and it would therefore have liked those charges to be investigated, but, as he had said, there was no time to do so. In any case, the effect of the Soviet draft resolution was likely to be that the United States attitude would stiffen in response to the condemnation of its actions. For the sake of prestige, the Soviet Union would have to show similar inflexibility and the end result might be a catastrophe. His delegation would therefore abstain on the Soviet draft resolution and it hoped that priority would be given to the Mexican draft resolution.

45. The CHAIRMAN said that the Committee could now proceed to vote on the four draft resolutions before the Committee.

46. Mr. AMADEO (Argentina) requested that priority in the voting should be granted to the seven-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.276). It should be put to the vote before the Romanian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.274) because it was sponsored by seven Latin American countries more directly concerned in the Cuban situation. It should be put to the vote before the Mexican draft (A/C.1/L.275) because it had in fact been drawn up earlier.

47. Mr. PAZHWAJK (Afghanistan) said that the Argentine request for priority would compel him to reconsider his previously stated intention to vote in favour of the Mexican draft resolution and to abstain on that of the seven Powers.

48. Mr. ROA (Cuba) opposed the granting of priority to the seven-Power draft resolution on the ground that the Mexican draft had been introduced earlier.

49. Mr. UMANA BERNAL (Colombia) supported the Argentine request for priority in view of the fact that the seven-Power draft resolution enjoyed the support of the majority of Latin American States and that the Cuban situation was of direct concern to those States.

50. The CHAIRMAN said that two formal requests for priority were now before the Committee: Mexico had requested priority for its draft resolution (A/C.1/L.275) and Argentina had requested priority for the seven-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.276). The Committee should take a decision on those two requests in the order in which they had been made.

51. He put to the vote the Mexican motion that priority in the voting should be given to draft resolution A/C.1/L.275.

The motion was approved by 35 votes to 33, with 22 abstentions.

52. Mr. AMADEO (Argentina) said he interpreted the vote to mean that the Mexican draft resolution would have priority only over that submitted by Romania. He requested the Chairman to put to the vote his motion that priority should be given to the seven-Power draft resolution.

53. Mr. AGUIRRE (Uruguay), Mr. URQUIA (El Salvador), Mr. HASAN (Pakistan) and Mr. BITOS (Greece) supported that request.

54. Mr. JHA (India) said that while he had no objection to the Argentine request for priority being put to the vote, he would warn the Committee of the procedural confusion which would result if the USSR, the sponsor of the remaining draft resolution before it (A/C.1/L.277), should then request priority for its text over all others. In the circumstances, the vote just taken should be interpreted to mean that the Committee would vote on the Mexican draft resolution first. If it wished to reverse that decision and decide to vote on some other draft resolution as a matter of priority, a two-thirds majority would be required.

55. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) shared that view.

56. After a procedural discussion, in which Mr. FEKINI (Libya), Mr. SCHWEITZER (Chile), Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru), Mr. BRUCAN (Romania), Mr. RAFAEL (Israel) and Mr. NESBITT (Canada) took part, Mr. PAZHWAJK (Afghanistan) proposed that the Committee should decide first whether a two-thirds majority was required to give the seven-Power draft resolution priority, and secondly, whether that draft resolution should in fact have absolute priority.

57. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the question whether a two-thirds majority under rule 124 of the rules of procedure was required to give priority to the seven-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.276).

A vote was taken by roll-call.

The Netherlands, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.


Against: Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Federation of Malaya, Finland, France, Gabon, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Luxembourg.

The Committee decided by 53 votes to 33, with 11 abstentions, that a two-thirds majority was not required.

58. The CHAIRMAN announced that, as a result of the vote, the Argentine request for priority would require a simple majority for adoption. He put to the vote the Argentine motion that the seven-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.276) should have absolute priority in the voting.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Venezuela, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dahomey, Denmark, El Salvador, Federation of Malaya, France, Gabon, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Laos, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay.


The motion was adopted by 49 votes to 35, with 13 abstentions.

59. Mr. ADEEL (Sudan), noting that the voting on the draft resolution had not started, put forward a number of amendments\(^5\) to the seven-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.276).

60. Mr. WACHUKU (Nigeria) formally submitted the amendment\(^6\) he had suggested earlier (paragraph 31 above) to the seven-Power draft resolution.

61. Mr. DE FREITAS-VALLE (Brazil) requested a separate vote on the third preambular paragraph of the seven-Power draft resolution.

62. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia) suggested the insertion, between operative paragraphs 1 and 2 of the seven-Power draft resolution, of a new operative paragraph reading as follows: "Requests the Organization of American States, due to the urgency of the situation in Cuba, to publish as soon as possible the result of their friendly intervention for resolving this question".

63. Mr. PAZHWAHAK (Afghanistan) pointed out that the amendments just proposed by the representatives of the Sudan, Nigeria and Saudi Arabia made important changes in the seven-Power draft resolution, and that delegations would require time to reflect on those changes. He therefore moved the adjournment of the meeting.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose on Friday, 21 April, at 2.25 a.m.

\(^5\) Subsequently circulated as document A/C.1/L.278.
\(^6\) The first of two Nigerian amendments subsequently circulated as document A/C.1/L.279.